Update, July 22, 2021: Based on information in a superseding federal indictment that was unsealed on July 22, we have updated this story to include the name and title of an individual previously identified only as PRC Official-2 and the title of an official identified as PRC Official-1. PRC Official-2 is Tu Lan, 50, a prosecutor for the Hanyang District of Wuhan. PRC Official-1 is the director of the Wuhan prosecution office’s anti-corruption bureau.

The July 22 indictment charged two additional defendants with acting and conspiring to act in the United States as illegal agents of the People’s Republic of China and with engaging and conspiring to engage in interstate and international stalking. It also charged two of the nine defendants in the case with obstruction of justice and conspiracy to obstruct justice.

While the view out of Beijing suggests the PLA is capable of a swift and unannounced attack, military analysts in the U.S. and Taiwan predict such an outcome is far from conclusive.

China watchers say any invasion of Taiwan will require extensive amphibious preparations, including intentional troop movements that will serve as timely indicators for military intelligence in Taipei—and perhaps the U.S., too.

While the possibility of U.S. intervention remains, there is also the likelihood of action by Japan, which could find itself involved in the conflict in its capacity as an American treaty ally. Earlier in July, Japanese Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso intimated that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could pose an "existential threat" to Japan's own survival, necessitating a collective defense of the island with U.S. forces.

In addition, the U.S. has about 50,000 forward-deployed troops in Japan, mostly on Okinawa.

But despite the tense atmosphere and bellicose threats of war, analysts say there is no indication that China is preparing an imminent attack. They say Beijing is unlikely to take such a large risk before 2022, when China hosts the Winter Olympics and Chinese President Xi Jinping seeks a third term in the fall.

The announcement could also help establish the kind of global norms that have long been lacking in cyberspace. The longer-term goal should be to work toward agreements akin to disarmament treaties, through which governments recognize their collective interest in curbing pointless, mutually harmful activity. Some of the intrusions detailed in the new charges, such as ransomware attacks against U.S. civilian targets, amount to pure criminality; they have no plausible national-security rationale or strategic objective. In the meantime, naming and shaming countries that permit such attacks — combined with a systematic effort by the Justice Department to target the criminals behind them — would be real progress.

Finally, greater openness on the government’s part is welcome in its own right. U.S. intelligence agencies were admirably transparent in detailing more than 50 specific tactics used by the attackers and providing technical advice for businesses responding to them. This should make clear that cybersecurity is something all Americans should take more seriously, and that better defenses are everyone’s responsibility.

Such measures won’t stop cyberattacks on their own, of course. And skeptics will find this judicious approach less satisfying than more aggressive forms of retaliation. But these steps are prudent, principled, and — most important — far more likely to succeed.

The breakthrough comes as the U.S. military and the Army in particular struggles with connecting an ever-wider array of weapons, vehicles, and objects on the battlefield, part of an overall vision for transforming and accelerating operations called Joint All-Domain Command and Control, or JADC2.

The military is also grappling with how to extend its range over the vast distances of the Pacific Ocean, and do so with limited runway space as it prepares to counter China.

The Army is partnering with data visualization company Palantir to see how the data that the drone collects on the battlefield could help fuel new machine learning tools to allow operators to better make sense of intelligence data.

Terrorists have already shown that they understand the link between gender and security and the advantages they can reap from Western biases regarding the assumed role of women in security by, for example, posing as women to avoid being searched by men and by using women as suicide bombers. U.S. military women were eventually brought in as part of Lioness and female engagement teams in Iraq and Afghanistan to counter cultural biases, both American and local. Islamic State also exploited gender equality to recruit and retain members, something they couldn’t have done were gender subordination not already accepted in their culture. Now, with U.S. government attention now shifted to great-power competition, integrating women into security sectors across the board can give the United States an important edge over China and Russia. Internal and external implementation of the WPS framework is a security imperative.

• Leidos Inc.’s Bronco II
• MAG Aerospace’s MC-208 Guardian
• Textron Aviation Defense’s AT-6E Wolverine
• L-3 Communications Integrated Systems’ AT-802U Sky Warden
• Sierra Nevada Corp.’s MC-145B Wily Coyote.