​Quotes of the Day:

​“Elected officials are hard-wired to ask for options first and hen reverse-engineer objectives. And the military is hard-wired to do exactly the opposite.”

- General Martin E. Dempsey, Former CJCS

“There are two ways to be fooled. One is to believe what isn’t true; the other is to refuse to believe what is true.”

-Soren Kierkegaard

“People almost invariably arrive at their beliefs not on the basis of proof but on the basis of what they find.”

- Blaise Pascal

1. Inside the Beltway: OSS Society reunion brings America’s most notable toast

2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 25 (Putin's War)

3. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (25.10.22) CDS comments on key events

4. FM 3-0 Operations | SOF News

5. Preventive War: Explaining Russia's Ukraine War and China's Taiwan Future?

6. Former Defense Secretary Ash Carter dies of heart attack at age 68

7. US launches airstrike to assist Somali forces under attack

8.  $115,000,000,000: How Much Aid America Could Give Ukraine

9. Why are NATO and Russia Both Now Training for Nuclear War?

10. China's Xi deals knockout blow to once-powerful Youth League faction

11. Abandoned Russian base holds secrets of retreat in Ukraine

12. House progressives retract Russia-diplomacy letter amid Dem firestorm

13.  Russia’s chaotic draft leaves some out in cold, without gear

14. Iran Using Minors to Suppress Protests in Iran

15. Same Type Of Rotax Engines Used In Iranian Drones Targeted In Bizarre Theft Wave

16. General Winter Knocks at the Door

17. Outrage over NFL brain injuries; silence over military brain injuries

18. Russia’s Recruiting Afghan Commandos

19. Commander Bans Army-Issued Warm, Comfy Fleece Jacket as Winter Approaches

20. The ‘Anti-Navy’ the U.S. Needs Against the Chinese Military

1. Inside the Beltway: OSS Society reunion brings America’s most notable toast

I concur. David Cohen's toast was most excellent. It is inspiring and I would dare say provides the entire outline of a US OVERT information and influence campaign.

The Donovan Award Dinner last weekend was another excellent event especially after a 3 year hiatus due to COVID.

Former DCI George Tenet received the Donovan Award and LTG (RET) Charles Cleveland received the inaugural Hugo award, named for the late MG Victor Hugo who was a Special Forces icon who began his service as a 2LT right out of West Point serving with Edward Lansdale.

But we should study David Cohen's toast and think not only how to best employ it but also how we must all live up to it.

Inside the Beltway: OSS Society reunion brings America’s most notable toast

https://newsnetdaily.com/inside-the-beltway-oss-society-reunion-brings-americas-most-notable-toast/

NEWS AND NOTICES:

Let’s take a moment to consider that toast given at a recent gathering hosted by the OSS Society – which pays homage to the powerful and innovative Office of Strategic Services, the CIA’s World War II-era predecessor.

The much appreciated toast was carried to the audience of 600 people by David Cohena 35-year veteran of the CIA and former Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence for the New York City Police Department who is now a senior adviser to Starr Holdings.

“This is for you, America,” Mr. Cohen shouted.

“You were born in the heat of the revolution, from the battle of Bunker Hill to the harsh winter quarters of Valley Forge – and finally victorious in Yorktown. You became a nation on the battlefields of Shiloh in Vicksburg to Gettysburg, and you showed incredible grace at Appomattox Court House,” Mr. Cohen said.

“You matured in World War I, leaving on the battlefields of Belleau Wood, Flanders Fields and others nearly 120,000 Americans – who would otherwise be farmers, haberdashers or factory workers. Your blood flowed in Normandy and Bastogne, in the air and at sea, in Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima and Okinawa. You opened the doors of the Nazi extermination camps, then you raised your old enemies with your treasures and your valuables,” continued Mr. Cohen.

“You have achieved victory against the insatiable evil Soviet Empire in a nearly 50-year war, with titanic battles ranging from the freezing Chosin Reservoir in Korea to the scorching jungles of Vietnam – to the airlift of Berlin and the Cuban Missile Crisis. And you closed the Fulda Gap with your troops and your tanks,” he said.

“You liberated Kuwait, saw bravery in Fallujah, and shed blood again in Khost and Afghanistan – and brought justice to Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Ladeniran Qassim Soleimani, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and now Ayman Al-Zawahiri. And while achieving all of this, America – along the way, let’s not forget – you found the cure for polio, sent a man to the moon, invented baseball – and of course, rock ‘n’ ‘ roll. America: never tire, for your greatest accomplishments are yet to be seen,” Mr. Cohen concluded.

“Now please raise your glass to toast America,” he told his audience.

And they did.

2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 25 (Putin's War)

Maps/graphics:  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25

Key Takeaways

• Russian siloviki factions continue to voice dissatisfaction with the Russian war effort in Ukraine, likely indicating that President Vladimir Putin will struggle to appease the pro-war faction.
• Direct confrontations between Putin and siloviki members regarding the war in Ukraine illustrate the significance of siloviki factions in Russian power structures.
• Russian officials are likely rhetorically realigning the war in Ukraine with religious ideals ostensibly accessible to both Christians and Muslims to cater to religious and ethnic minorities.
• Russian occupation officials continue to claim that the evacuations in Kherson Oblast are a part of a larger resettlement program.
• Levada polling surveys suggest that the Russian public’s sentiments toward the Russian government have not fundamentally changed despite societal pressures associated with the war in Ukraine.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks west of Svatove and on Kreminna on October 25.
• Russian forces continued to establish fallback and defensive positions on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River.
• Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast.
• The Russian military continues to mobilize personnel in violation of recruitment policies. Russian mobilization efforts also are placing strains on the Russian labor market.
• Ukrainian partisans conducted an attack targeting the occupation head in Russian-occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 25

Oct 25, 2022 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 25, 7:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Members of the Russian siloviki faction continue to voice their dissatisfaction with Russian war efforts in Ukraine, indicating that Russian President Vladimir Putin will continue to struggle to appease the pro-war constituency in the long term. The Russian siloviki faction refers to people with meaningful power bases within Putin’s inner circle who are fielding combat forces in Ukraine. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov complained that the Russian response to claimed Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory have been “weak,” noting that Russia must “erase Ukrainian cities from the earth.”[1] Kadyrov also claimed that Russia is now engaged in a war with Ukraine instead of a “special military operation,” given that Ukrainian forces are fighting on “Russian territory.” Kadyrov noted that he is unhappy with the lack of Russian retaliation despite the establishment of martial law. Kadyrov had remained relatively quiet throughout October.

Kadyrov’s statement indirectly criticizes the scale of the Russian missile campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and is in line with milblogger critiques that followed days after the first massive campaign on October 10.[2] ISW has previously assessed that that Putin’s missile campaign is unlikely to satisfy the pro-war nationalist camp in the long term, given that Putin cannot fix the many flaws within the Russian military campaign in Ukraine nor can he deliver his maximalist promises.[3] Kadyrov’s rant also highlights Putin’s error in annexing four Ukrainian oblasts before Russian forces reached the oblasts’ borders, which has created confusion about where “Russian territory” begins. ISW has previously reported that Putin’s annexation of Ukrainian territories has likely triggered criticism within the Kremlin elite, which will likely intensify as Putin loses more occupied territories.[4]

Russian siloviki have also directly confronted Putin regarding the progress of the Russian war in Ukraine, which further highlights their significance within Russian power structures. The Washington Post, citing US intelligence, revealed that Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin sharply criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in a private conversation.[5] Prigozhin reportedly accused the Russian MoD of heavily relying on Wagner forces while failing to finance the group or provide necessary resources, which is consistent with his numerous public statements.[6] Prigozhin has denied ever criticizing the Russian Armed Forces in response to The Washington Post report—a denial that is patently false given his repeated public attacks on the MoD.[7]

The criticism revealed by The Post further supports ISW’s assessment that Prigozhin holds a unique position that allows him to reap the benefits of Putin’s dependency on Wagner forces without having formal responsibility for any axis or area in Ukraine and while wielding considerable influence in the information space. Prigozhin is accumulating a following on Telegram (with some Wagner-affiliated channels having over 300,000 followers), is directly interacting with online publications, and is reportedly financing the RiaFan (Federal News Agency) media conglomerate.[8] Prigozhin is likely using a growing number of platforms to accrue power and has even previously engaged RiaFan in promoting his September prisoner recruitment drive to Russian audiences.[9] Putin’s regime is largely dependent on Putin’s monopolization of the state information space, but Prigozhin is increasingly challenging that monopoly.

Prigozhin’s influence in the information space is evident through the positive portrayal of Wagner forces, despite their failure to make significant advances in the Bakhmut area. Wagner forces have yet to reach Bakhmut despite fighting there since early summer and are reportedly suffering significant losses.[10] Prigozhin himself admitted that Wagner forces advance only 100-200 meters a day, which he absurdly and falsely claimed is the norm for modern warfare.[11] Wagner forces are plagued with the same supply and troop quality issues that Prigozhin‘s criticizes the Russian MoD for allowing to occur within the Russian Armed Forces. Prigozhin, for instance, denied seeing a video in which Wagner troops complained about the lack of food and supplies.[12] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) also noted that Wagner prisoner recruits suffer from serious infectious diseases like HIV and Hepatitis C, and that Russian doctors are refusing to assist a growing number of infected troops when they are wounded in combat.[13]

Prigozhin is able to shape the narrative within Russian milblogger community by consistently deflecting attention from his forces by demeaning the Russian higher military command. He will likely retain his upper hand despite his forces’ lack of advances given the Russian information restrictions on the Russian MoD. Prigozhin’s close interactions with the media and online community allows him to address any criticism or unfavorable narratives in real time, unlike the Russian MoD or the Kremlin. Prigozhin, for example, denied his involvement with Russian war criminal Igor Girkin less than a day after Russian milbloggers suggested that Girkin is forming a Wagner-based volunteer battalion.[14]

Russian officials are increasingly attempting to rhetorically align Russia’s war in Ukraine with religious concepts ostensibly accessible to both Christians and Muslims, likely in order to cater to religious minority groups within the Russian armed forces. Assistant Secretary to the Russian Security Council Alexei Pavlov amplified statements made by Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov on October 25 that the goal of the war in Ukraine should be “complete de-Satanization.”[15] Pavlov claimed that Ukrainian society is defined by “fanatics” who seek to abandon values held by the Russian Orthodox church, Islam, and Judaism.[16] Kadyrov also declared that the war on Ukraine is now a jihad against Ukrainian “Satanism.”[17] These statements may represent a desire to deflect dissent among religious minority groups in the Russian Armed Forces. As ISW previously reported, recent schisms between Muslim and non-Muslim servicemen have caused violent outbursts in Russia ranks.[18] The invocation of war on religious but not overtly Christian grounds is likely an attempt to transcend religious divides and set information conditions for continued recruitment of ethnic and religious minorities to fight in Ukraine.

Russian occupation officials continued to indicate that efforts to “evacuate” civilians in Kherson Oblast to the east bank of Dnipro River are part of a wider resettlement scheme. Kherson occupation deputy Kirill Stremousov claimed on October 25 that occupation officials have moved over 22,000 people from the west bank of the Dnipro to the east bank and that the administration’s “resettlement program” (программа переселения) is designed to accommodate 60,000 people.[19] Stremousov’s statement seemingly admits that Russian occupation officials view the evacuations as precursors to the permanent resettlement of a large population of Ukrainians. It is unclear where Russian officials intend to “resettle” those who move from the west bank. The implication of a permanent program designed to resettle Ukrainians in other Russian-occupied territories, and even within Russia itself, may amount to a violation of international law.[20] According to international law, an occupying power has the right to evacuate civilians for their safety with the necessary stipulation that such evacuations are temporary.[21] The implication of a “resettlement program” seems to suggest that Russian officials intend to permanently resettle large parts of Kherson Oblast’s population.

Russian President Vladimir Putin held a coordination council meeting on October 25 in which Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin expressed a need to enact additional security measures in border oblasts, likely indicating that the Kremlin intends to utilize recent martial law decrees.[22] Putin also said that the Russian government needs to work at a high pace and according to an extremely realistic assessment of the national security situation. Sobyanin indicated that Russian officials are proceeding with planned security measures throughout the Russian Federation. These comments indicate that the Kremlin intends to utilize recent martial law declarations to ease mobilization and military efforts occurring within the Russian Federation.

Russian independent polling organization Levada posted survey results on October 25 showing that the number of Russians desiring change has declined despite recent societal stresses introduced by sanctions, mobilization, and the war in Ukraine.[23] The Levada surveys conducted in late September show that the percentage of Russians who believe that Russia needs decisive, full-scale changes decreased from 59 percent in July 2019 to 47 percent in October 2022. The surveys show that the percentage of the Russian public that believes Russia needs only minor changes increased from 31 percent in July 2019 to 36 percent in October 2022 as did the number of Russians who said that Russia needs no change whatsoever, from 8 percent to 13 percent. The Levada surveys show that of those Russians desiring full-scale change, only 11 percent desire a change of government in some fashion. The Levada surveys also show that of those Russians desiring full-scale change, 10 percent desire that the war in Ukraine ends and that Russia begins negotiations with Ukraine. Many changes that Russians wish for are primarily focused on domestic economic issues.

Key Takeaways

• Russian siloviki factions continue to voice dissatisfaction with the Russian war effort in Ukraine, likely indicating that President Vladimir Putin will struggle to appease the pro-war faction.
• Direct confrontations between Putin and siloviki members regarding the war in Ukraine illustrate the significance of siloviki factions in Russian power structures.
• Russian officials are likely rhetorically realigning the war in Ukraine with religious ideals ostensibly accessible to both Christians and Muslims to cater to religious and ethnic minorities.
• Russian occupation officials continue to claim that the evacuations in Kherson Oblast are a part of a larger resettlement program.
• Levada polling surveys suggest that the Russian public’s sentiments toward the Russian government have not fundamentally changed despite societal pressures associated with the war in Ukraine.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks west of Svatove and on Kreminna on October 25.
• Russian forces continued to establish fallback and defensive positions on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River.
• Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast.
• The Russian military continues to mobilize personnel in violation of recruitment policies. Russian mobilization efforts also are placing strains on the Russian labor market.
• Ukrainian partisans conducted an attack targeting the occupation head in Russian-occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Oskil River-Kreminna Line)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops conducted limited ground attacks west of Svatove on October 25. Russian sources claimed that Russian artillery fire repelled Ukrainian forces during an attempted attack on Kuzemivka, 15km northwest of Svatove.[24] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations along the Raihorodka-Kovalivka line, about 10km southwest of Svatove.[25] Various Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops are grouping forces west of Svatove for future counteroffensive operations and that Russian forces are strengthening their defensive positions around Svatove.[26] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai noted that Russian troops mined the entire bank of the Krasna River near Svatove, apparently in anticipation of potential Ukrainian advances.[27]

Russian sources additionally claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted an unsuccessful frontal assault on Kreminna on October 25.[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian troops repelled the attack.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian troops repelled a Russian attack on Bilohorivka, about 10km south of Kreminna, suggesting that Russian troops are continuing efforts to retake lost positions along the Donetsk-Luhansk Oblast border.[30]

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)

Russian forces continued to establish fallback positions near the Dnipro River on October 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are preparing defensive positions on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River and are mining the coastline near Hornostaivka, about 40km northeast of Nova Kakhovka.[31] The Ukrainian General Staff added that Russian forces are leaving small passages for a potential retreat and are attempting to repair destroyed pontoon crossings.[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian military command has not decided on the fate of Kherson City, given the ongoing situation in Kherson Oblast.[33] Other milbloggers argued that Russian forces will be unable to hold Kherson City and that the Russian government can prevent a “Battle of Stalingrad” by fully withdrawing to the eastern bank of the Dnipro River.[34]

Ukrainian and Russian sources provided limited insight into the situation on the frontlines in Kherson Oblast. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that Ukrainian forces repelled two small-scale assaults by a platoon and a detachment in two unspecified areas on October 24.[35] Ukrainian military officials also reported that Russian forces continued to shell Ukrainian positions along the line of contact and struck Nova Kamianka in northern Kherson Oblast.[36] Ukrainian forces also reportedly shot down two Iranian-made Shahed-131 drones in Kherson Raion.[37] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks in the direction of Ishchenka and Bruskinske in northern Kherson Oblast.[38] Geolocated footage also showed Ukrainian artillery striking a Russian tank in Kalynivske, approximately 47km northwest of Nova Kakhovka.[39]

Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian positions and logistics in Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that a recent precision strike on Kairy (about 27km northeast of Nova Kakhovka) killed up to 30 Russian servicemen and left over 100 troops under the rubble.[40] Recent combat footage seems to confirm this report and indicates that the strike likely hit Chechen forces.[41] The Ukrainian General Staff added that Ukrainian forces also destroyed an ammunition depot in Hornostaivka.[42] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command noted that Ukrainian forces struck three ammunition depots in Beryslav and Kakhovka raions, and shot down three Russian attack helicopters.[43] Ukrainian sources published footage of explosion sounds in Khakovka Raion on October 25.[44]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued to conduct unsuccessful ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast on October 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults on Bakhmut itself; northeast of Bakhmut near Bakhmutske (11km northeast of Bakhmut), Soledar (13km northeast of Bakhmut), Bilohorivka (23km northeast of Bakhmut), Verkhnokamianske (33km northeast of Bakhmut), and Spirne (30km north of Bakhmut); and south of Bakhmut near Ivanhrad (4km southeast of Bakhmut) and Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[45] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks southwest of Avdiivka near Mariinka (28km southwest of Avdiivka) and Nevelske (15km south of Avdiivka).[46] The Donetsk Peoples Republic (DNR) People’s Militia announced on October 25 that the “battle for Avdiivka is in full swing” and Russian forces intend to encircle Avdiivka.[47] Russian forces are unlikely to encircle Avdiivka given the poor performance of Russian offensives near Avdiivka since the beginning of the war. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian operational encirclements of Avdiivka and Vuhledar in Donetsk Oblast are impossible as recent Russian offensives in the areas illustrate that Russian forces are unable to make rapid advances.[48] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued to conduct indirect fire along the line of contact in Donetsk Oblast on October 25.[49]

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Chechen units continue to play an outsized role in Russian operations in Donetsk Oblast. Kadyrov claimed on October 25 that Chechen State Duma Deputy Adam Delimkhanov has directly coordinated the actions of Chechen forces fighting in Donetsk Oblast since the start of the Russian offensive campaign in Ukraine.[50] Kadyrov also claimed that “Akhmat” special forces are directly responsible for more than 100km of territory in Donetsk Oblast.[51] Kadyrov repeated claims that the Russian military leadership routinely praises Chechen elements for their fighting in eastern Ukraine.[52] Kadyrov and associates will continue to try to frame Chechen elements as significant formations among the Russian forces fighting in Donetsk Oblast.

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued to conduct routine air, missile, and artillery strikes west of Hulyaipole, and in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv oblasts on October 25.[53] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck Nikopol in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and Ochakiv and Bereznehuvate in Mykolaiv Oblast.[54] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces also conducted drone attacks on Nikopol and Bashtanka Raion in Mykolaiv Oblast on October 25.[55] Ukraine’s General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct any ground attacks in the Zaporizhia direction on October 25.[56]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian military continues to mobilize Russian men—including those from ethnic minority republics—in violation of published Russian recruitment policies. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty reported that Russian authorities mobilized 200 fathers with multiple children who are legally eligible for mobilization deferral in the Republic of Bashkortostan.[57] The report found that local Russian military commissariats flatly ignore or find legal arguments to circumvent deferment eligibility criteria. Mobilized men from Bashkortostan fighting near Enerhodar reportedly did not receive proper training, are running low on food, and are sleeping in a dirty granary with grain, mice, and pools of standing water.[58] A Moscow man legally entitled to mobilization deferment due to being the parent of three children was reportedly mobilized anyway on October 23 despite Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin’s announcement that mobilization in Moscow ended on October 17.[59]

Russia’s military mobilization is causing workers to flee Russia, placing stress on the Russian labor market. Russian independent outlet Verstka reported on October 25 that Russian officials from local Moscow government offices are fleeing Russia en masse to avoid mobilization.[60] Verstka reported that between 20 to 30 percent of male IT employees from some departments within the Moscow City Hall fled Moscow, depriving Moscow local government departments of IT support for days. Verstka reported that employees from the Russian Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Digital Development, and the Central Bank are similarly fleeing Russia. Russian business newspaper RBK reported that demand for temporary employees working under fixed-term contracts increased by 52 percent in the first half of October 2022.[61] RBK reported that temporary employees replaced mobilized workers so that mobilized workers (such as couriers, sales managers, and drivers) do not lose their positions while serving.[62] A Russian source reported that the mobilization of dozens of bus drivers in Voronezh is placing stress on public transit, with wait times between bus services increasing.[63] A large Russian agrobusiness in Tyumen Oblast reported losing a significant portion of its workers to mobilization and announced incentives to recruit more laborers.[64]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian partisans conducted a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack against a building owned by the head of the Zaporizhia occupation administration in Melitopol on October 25. Russian media and Ukrainian sources reported that a car exploded near the headquarters of the Russian propaganda channel ZaTV where a Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) branch was reportedly deployed.[65] Various sources reported that the building belongs to Zaporizhia occupation head Yevheny Balitsky, who was not present at the time of the attack.[66] Russian milbloggers called the event a “terrorist attack” and called for more stringent law enforcement protections in occupied areas.[67]

Russian occupation officials continued to move personnel, equipment, and occupation assets to the east bank of the Dnipro River on October 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian officials are continuing to move bank equipment and personnel and occupation administrators, as well as civilians, across the Dnipro River to Henichesk and Skadovsk, 175km and 60km southeast of Kherson City, respectively.[68] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally noted that medical personnel are subject to evacuation and that Russian officials have pulled funding and are no longer providing meals for school children who remain on the west bank.[69] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that mobilized servicemen are arriving in Lvove (40km east of Kherson City) to replace evacuated collaborators.[70] Kherson Occupation Deputy Kirill Stremousov claimed that Russian occupation officials have evacuated over 22,000 people from the west bank of the Dnipro River as of October 25.[71] Russian milbloggers noted that the decision to leave Kherson City is a chiefly political one and claimed that the evacuations are voluntary.[72]

Russian occupation officials are struggling to enforce the use of rubles in occupied territories, despite long-standing efforts to conduct rubleization measures. Stremousov reprimanded those who “refuse to accept rubles” in a video address on October 25 and claimed that after the situation in Kherson Oblast stabilizes, those who refuse to use rubles will be forcibly expelled from Kherson Oblast, which he claimed will adhere exclusively to the laws of the Russian Federation.[73] Stremousov’s statement reflects frustration on the part of Russian occupation officials in the face of recent reports that Ukrainian residents of Russian-occupied areas in Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblast are refusing to use rubles and that Russian soldiers are exchanging their rubles for hryvnias in order to make purchases.[74] ISW previously reported that Russian authorities in occupied areas had escalated efforts at rubleization in early August, and Stremousov’s statements suggest that Russian occupation officials have struggled in their efforts to economically integrate occupied areas into systems of the Russian Federation.[75]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://meduza dot io/news/2022/10/25/kadyrov-nazval-slabym-otvet-na-obstrely-territorii-rossii-prizval-stirat-s-zemli-goroda-i-nazyvat-spetsoperatsiyu-voynoy

[13] https://gur.gov(dot)ua/content/vahnerivtsi-masovo-rekrutuiut-viazniv-khvorykh-na-vil-ta-hepatyt.html

[15] https://aif dot ru/society/religion/chto_varyat_v_vedminom_kotle_na_ukraine_nabrali_silu_neoyazycheskie_kulty; https://t.me/s/RKadyrov_95

[22] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/69676;

[23] https://www dot levada.ru/2022/10/25/zhelanie-peremen/

https://t.me/vilkul/2149 ; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/1156 ; https...

[60] https://meduza dot io/feature/2022/10/25/uezzhayut-ostaviv-na-rabochem-meste-veschi-ne-pomyv-kruzhku

[61] https://www.rbc dot ru/economics/24/10/2022/63527ce09a7947deae987f58

[62] https://www.rbc dot ru/economics/24/10/2022/63527ce09a7947deae987f58

[65] https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1584807054258364416 ; https...(dot)ua/2022/10/25/v-czentri-melitopolya-prolunav-vybuh-poblyzu-biznes-czentru-golovnogo-gaulyajtera/; https://t.me/readovkanews/45288; https://twitter.com/Cosmonaut19/status... https://t.me/ZaTV_Media/3536; https://t.me/stranaua/71544; https://t.m...

[66] https://sprotyv.mod.gov(dot)ua/2022/10/25/v-czentri-melitopolya-prolunav-vybuh-poblyzu-biznes-czentru-golovnogo-gaulyajtera/; https://t.me/itsdonetsk/36527; https://t.me/The3rdForceUA/11883; https...

[74] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/10/24/meshkanczi-tymchasovo-okupovanyh-terytorij-ignoruyut-rosijski-rubli/; https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/1584160299560894464 ; https://t...

understandingwar.org

3. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (25.10.22) CDS comments on key events

CDS Daily brief (25.10.22) CDS comments on key events

Humanitarian aspect:

The Minister of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories, Iryna Vereshchuk, called on Ukrainians who have gone abroad after the beginning of the full-scale war not to return to Ukraine for the winter if possible. "We have to survive the winter. Unfortunately, the electrical grids will not withstand... we understand that the situation will only get worse, and we have to survive this winter," she emphasized.

As of the morning of October 25, 2022, more than 1,250 Ukrainian children are victims of full- scale armed aggression by the Russian Federation. According to the official information of juvenile prosecutors, 430 children died, and more than 821 sustained injuries of various degrees of severity. However, the data is not conclusive since data collection continues in the areas of active hostilities, temporarily occupied areas, and liberated territories.

Another operation to exchange the bodies of fallen soldiers was held on October 25. As a result, Ukraine has returned another 25 of its heroes, the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine reported.

The Russian forces were attacking the Nikopol district of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast throughout the night, the head of the Dnipropetrovsk OMA, Valentyn Reznichenko, said. They used Grad MLRS, heavy artillery, and kamikaze drones. Three communities, namely Nikopol, Marhanets, and Myrove, came under enemy fire. According to preliminary information, people were not injured. Houses, cars, a food company, and a water supply pipeline were damaged.

In Dnipro, as a result of today's evening missile attack on a gas station, at least two civilians were killed, and three were injured, the head of the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast military administration, Valentin Reznichenko, said.

In Kherson Oblast, the Russian forces shell the front-line and de-occupied villages in the Beryslav district with mortars and artillery. There are victims among the civilian population, the Kherson City Council said. Over the past day, the police launched 12 criminal investigations into the facts of war crimes committed by the Russian army in Kherson Oblast.

During the 8 months of the full-scale Russian invasion, Mykolaiv was not shelled for only 41 days. On average, the Russian military fires eight missiles daily at the city. However, there is a case when 38 missiles were fired in one day, the Mykolayiv City Council reported, with reference to the city mayor Oleksandr Sienkevych. 148 civilians have died in the city so far, including two children. About 800 people were seriously injured and had to be treated in medical institutions.

On October 24, 7 civilians were killed by the Russian forces in Bakhmut of Donetsk Oblast. In addition, law enforcement officers discovered the bodies of 3 civilians who died during the

occupation: 2 in Drobysheve and 1 in Stavky, the head of the Oblast Military Administration, Pavlo Kyrylenko, reported.

Russia uses phosphorous shells prohibited by international documents in the village of Velyka Novosilka, Donetsk Oblast, the press service of the National Guard of Ukraine informed.

According to Zhytomyr Oblast police, as of October 24, law enforcement officers have initiated 1,193 criminal investigations into the facts of war crimes by the Russian aggressor on the territory of Zhytomyr Oblast.

Occupied territories:

Occupying Russian forces fired at a car with residents of Oleshky, Kherson Oblast, because it did not stop on time. As a result, two people were killed, and a 5-year-old child was injured, the mayor of Oleshky, Yevhen Ryschuk, said.

In the captured territories of Luhansk Oblast, recruitment announcements for mercenaries for the private military company "Wagner" became more frequent, the head of the Luhansk Military Oblast Administration, Serhii Gaidai, said. Construction of the "Wagner line" continues rather a long way away from the frontline, and they are looking for bulldozer drivers, manipulator drivers, excavator drivers, etc. Requirements: age 24-50 years and experience working on similar equipment.

The first parliamentary summit of the international Crimean Platform took place in Zagreb, Croatia. The Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Ruslan Stefanchuk, said that the participants of the Crimean Platform parliamentary summit would discuss, in addition to Crimea itself, issues of world security, the future reconstruction of Ukraine and further pressure on Russia.

The Governor of the Russian Krasnodar Krai, Veniamin Kondratyev, has decided to restrict the movement of trucks through the region to Crimea via the Kerch ferry crossing starting October

27. An exception for vehicles transporting military or special-purpose cargo, pharmaceutical products, and equipment needed to restore infrastructure will be made. In addition, trucks with perishable goods and certain types of "socially significant food and non-food essential goods" will be able to move through the Krasnodar Krai. Everyone else is invited to use an alternative overland route from Taganrog to Dzhankoy.

The Nizhneangarsktransstroy company was appointed the sole contractor hired by the Crimean Railway for the restoration of the railway tracks on the Kerch Strait Bridge. The work must be completed before December 1, 2023, the Russian government said in a decree.

Operational situation

It is the 244th day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to defend Donbas"). The enemy tries to maintain control over the temporarily captured territories and

improve its tactical position. It concentrates its efforts on disrupting the counteroffensive actions of the Ukrainian troops and, at the same time, does not give up attempts to conduct the offensive in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka directions.

The Russian military shells the positions of the Ukrainian troops along the entire contact line and conducts aerial reconnaissance. In violation of the norms of international humanitarian law, the laws and customs of war, during the past day, the Russian forces launched missile and air strikes on the infrastructure. In total, over the past day, the Russian forces have launched 3 missile and 12 air strikes and fired over 60 MLRS rounds. Civilian infrastructure objects of Vuhledar and Neskuchne of Donetsk Oblast, Nova Kamianka of Kherson Oblast, and the city of Mykolaiv were hit by Russian attacks. In addition, the border villages Senkivka of Chernihiv Oblast, Rozhkovichi, Sosnivka, Velyka Pisarivka of Sumy Oblast, Veterynarne, Vilkhuvatka, Vovchansk, Dvorichna, Kamianka, Krasne, Starytsya, Strilecha, Khatnye and Chuhunivka of Kharkiv Oblast were shelled from mortars and barrel artillery.

The threat of missile and air strikes against critical infrastructure of Ukraine from the territory of the Republic of Belarus persists, including the use of attack UAVs.

The aviation of the Ukrainian Defense Forces made more than 30 strikes over the past day. Impact on 22 enemy weapons and military equipment concentration areas, 5 ammunition depots, and 9 anti-aircraft missile systems positions is confirmed. In addition, Ukrainian air defense units shot down 3 Ka-52 "Alligator" helicopters, one Su-24m bomber, 2 "Orlan-10" UAVs, and "Shahed-136" UAVs.

Over the past day, Ukraine's missile forces and artillery hit 6 areas of manpower, weapons and equipment concentration, 2 ammunition depots, an air defense complex, "Zoopark" radar, and 2 other important Russian objects.

Being unable to provide the new wave of mobilized personnel with the necessary ammunition produced domestically, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation began to use Iranian-made equipment. Soon, the transfer of 3,000 units of ballistic protection, namely 1,500 body armor and 1,500 helmets manufactured by "Milad" (Iran), is planned. Currently, Iranian ammunition is stored in the warehouse of the 1061 logistics center of the 3rd motorized rifle division (Soloty/Valuyka, Belgorod Oblast).

The Iranian authorities plan to send a new group of advisers to assist the Russian Armed Forces in the combat operation of a new type of UAV - "Arash-2" and Iranian surface-to-surface missiles. Their deliveries are planned to start in the near future.

A group of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps advisers has departed Iran for Dzankoy in the occupied Crimea to assist in the combat use and improvement of Shahed-136 and Mohajer-6 UAVs.

The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remain low.

Kharkiv direction

• Zolochiv-Balakleya section: approximate length of combat line - 147 km, number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 10-12, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 13.3 km;

• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd, and 197th tank regiments, 245th motorized rifle regiment of the 47th tank division, 6th and 239th tank regiments, 228th motorized rifle regiment of the 90th tank division, 1st motorized rifle regiment, 1st tank regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 6th Combined Arms Army, 27th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Tank Army, 275th and 280th motorized rifle regiments, 11th tank regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division of the 11 Army Corps, 7th motorized rifle regiment of the 11th Army Corps, 80th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps, 2nd and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 1st Army Corps of so-called DPR, PMCs.

The Russian military fired at the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces with tanks and artillery in the area around Kyselivka.

The Russian command formed the "West" troop grouping, which mainly included detachments and units of the Western Military District, reinforced by a small number of units from the Central Military District. The advanced control point of the grouping is located at the northeastern outskirts of the village of Pokrovske, Luhansk Oblast. In particular, it includes the forces and equipment of the 1st tank army, 20th Army, 2nd Army (three BTGs from the 15th, 21st, and 30th separate motorized rifle brigades), 41st Army (one BTG from the 35th separate motorized rifle brigade) and 11th Army Corps. In total, this is up to 10-11 BTGs, of which at least 4-5 are in the reserve of the first and second line and are in the process of restoring combat capability. The positions between the regular units of the Russian Armed Forces are covered by formations of the BARS type, units of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps and their "mobilization reserve," and various "assault units" of the "Wagner" PMC (approximately up to six units).

The main task of the grouping is to hold the northern part of the Luhansk region of Ukraine and prevent the Defense Forces from reaching the state border of Ukraine in Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblasts in the Pisky - Novokyivka section.

During the past day, the Russian forces of the 423rd motorized rifle company of the 4th tank division of the 1st tank army, with the support of four tanks, and the fire of two batteries, tried to attack the advanced positions of the Ukrainian Joint Forces in the direction of Novoselivske - Berestove. However, during the 40-minute battle, they suffered losses and retreated to the starting position in the area of Novoselivske. Units of the enemy's 4th tank division were forced to go on the defensive in the area of Krokhmalne and Novoselivske villages.

In the area of Nevske village, the Russian military continued to hold advanced positions for the last two days, with the forces of the motorized rifle unit, disregarding the threat of encirclement. It suffered significant losses due to the fire of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and, this morning, was forced to leave its positions in and near the village. South-west of Svatove (Kovalivka village area),

the Russian forces are intensively preparing to conduct defensive operations. For this purpose, they are creating a battalion defense area of the BTGs from the 30th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 2nd Army. A reinforced motorized rifle company (up to 22 units of armored vehicles and more than 100 servicemen) was transferred to the left flank of this defense area from Miluvatka village.

During the last two days, the Russian military conducted unsuccessful defensive battles on the eastern outskirts of the village of Makiivka (Luhansk Oblast), employing the forces of the BTGs formed from the remnants of the 15th and 21st separate motorized rifle brigade units of the 2nd Army. They were unable to complete the task and were forced to withdraw in two separate groups to the village of Kovalivka and in the direction of Novomykilske - Miluvatka.

After the Ukrainian Armed Forces advanced units advanced towards Svatove in the Stelmakhivka area, the enemy was forced to leave the Myasozharivka village area. Two motorized rifle companies (probably from the 15th or 21st separate motorized rifle brigade) suffered significant losses and retreated to the area further south of Kolomiychykha.

Kramatorsk direction

● Balakleya - Siversk section: approximate length of the combat line - 184 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17-20, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;

●  252nd and 752nd motorized rifle regiments of the 3rd motorized rifle division, 1st, 13th, and 12th tank regiments, 423rd motorized rifle regiment of the 4th tank division, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, 35th, 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 3rd and 14th separate SOF brigades, 2nd and 4th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Army Corps, 7th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Army Corps, PMCs.

The Russian military fired tanks, mortars, barrel and jet artillery at Nevske and Stelmakhivka, Berestove, Zarichne, Terny, Torske, and Yampolivka.

The Ukrainian defense forces repelled Russian attacks in the areas of Bilohorivka, Verkhnokamyanske, Klishchiivka, and Spirne.

Donetsk direction

● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 235 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 17 km;

●  Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th tank regiment of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th, and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet," 336th separate marines brigade, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The Russian military shelled the populated areas with tanks, mortars, barrel and jet artillery in the areas of Andriivka, Bakhmutske, Bakhmut, Bilohorivka, Vesele, Ivanhrad, Kurdyumivka, Mayorsk, Opytne, Soledar and Yakovlivka, Vodyane, Krasnohorivka, Maryinka and Pervomaiske.

The Ukrainian defense forces repelled Russian attacks in the areas of Bakhmut, Ivanhrad, Klishchiivka, Soledar, Maryinka, and Nevelske.

Zaporizhzhia direction

●  Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;

●  Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 29th Combined Arms Army, 38th and 64th separate motorized rifle brigades, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37 separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 136th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps, 39th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 68th Army Corps, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, and 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The Russian forces shelled the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces with tanks, mortars, barrel and jet artillery in the areas of Vremivka, Vuhledar, Neskuchne, Novosilka, Pavlivka, Zeleny Hai, Novoandriivka, Olhivske, Stepove, Chervone, and Shcherbaky.

In recent days, the destruction of five units of weapons and military equipment and up to 110 servicemen of the occupation forces was confirmed.

Tavriysk direction

-    Vasylivka – Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line – 296 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 42, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 7 km;

-   Deployed BTGs: 114th, 143rd, and 394th motorized rifle regiments, 218th tank regiment of the 127th motorized rifle division, 57th and 60th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 37th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 429th motorized rifle regiment of the 19th motorized rifle division, 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments of the 20th motorized rifle division, 34th and 205th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division, 10th, 16th, 346th separate SOF brigades, 239th air assault regiment of the 76th Air assault division, 217th and 331st parachute airborne regiments of the 98th airborne division, 108 air assault regiment, 171st separate airborne assault battalion of the 7th Air assault division, 11th and 83rd separate airborne assault brigade, 4th military base of the 58 Combined

Arms Army, 7 military base 49 Combined Arms Army, 224th, 237th and 126th separate coastal defence brigades, 127th separate ranger brigade, 1st and 3rd Army Corps, PMCs.

The Russian fire affected more than 20 towns and villages, including Bilohirka, Davydiv Brid, Myrne, Sukhy Stavok, and Ternovi Pody.

The Russian military is setting up defensive positions on the left bank of the Dnipro River. So, in the area around Hornostaivka, Russian engineering and sapper units plant mines along the river bank, leaving small passages for a potential retreat of their troops from the right bank.

Evacuation of the local residents from the temporarily occupied Kherson is underway. All banking employees, equipment, and the occupation administration were taken from the right-bank part of the city to the towns of Henichesk and Skadovsk. The equipment of Internet providers was stolen. Emergency services and medical personnel are subject to evacuation. Funding of schools and provision of food for children in schools has been stopped. The number of robberies of local residents and cases of looting has increased. To replace the evacuated collaborators, servicemen from among the mobilized persons are transferred to the village of Lvove.

Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:

The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black Sea and to maintain control over the captured territories.

The Russian naval group at sea is comprised of 11 ships and boats. They are located along the southwestern coast of Crimea. The number of Kalibr missile carriers is 3, 20 Kalibr missiles are ready for use at sea.

In the Sea of Azov waters, 6 patrol ships and boats are located on the approaches to the Mariupol and Berdyansk seaports to block the Azov coast.

Russian aviation continues to fly from the Crimean airfields of Belbek and Hvardiyske over the northwestern part of the Black Sea. Over the past day, 10 combat aircraft from Belbek and Saki airfields were involved.

"The Grain initiative." On October 25, 4 ships with 107.2 thousand tons of agricultural products left the ports of Greater Odessa. Ships are sent to European countries. In particular, the bulk carrier REGIUS left the Odesa port, and the CAPTAIN J. NEOFOTISTOS, SANIN 1, ZUMRUT ANA left the "Pivdenny" port. Since the departure of the first ship with Ukrainian food, 8.9 million tons of agricultural products have been exported. A total of 390 ships with food for the countries of Asia, Europe, and Africa left Ukrainian ports.

Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 25.10

Personnel - almost 68,420 people (+480);

Tanks - 2,611 (+21)

Armored combat vehicles – 5,321 (+26);

Artillery systems – 1,674 (+1);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 377 (+2); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 190 (+1); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 4,054 (+10); Aircraft - 271 (+1);

Helicopters – 248 (+3);

UAV operational and tactical level – 1,372 (+2); Intercepted cruise missiles - 350 (0);

Boats / ships - 16 (0).

Ukraine, general news

60% of the Ukrainian budget goes to defense; another 16% goes to social needs. Medicine and education also require significant allocations. However, the Ukrainian government also recently managed to allocate 125 million euros for quick recovery. This is not enough, as it covers only 5% of the objects that have been destroyed, Prime Minister of Ukraine Denys Shmyhal said during a panel discussion at the International Conference on Reconstruction of Ukraine in Berlin.

761 Ukrainian enterprises have moved to safer areas from the regions where active hostilities are underway. 588 of them have already resumed their operation, and another 274 are looking for a location or means of transportation, Deputy Minister of Economy Tetyana Berezhna said.

International diplomatic aspect

"Because of the timing, our message is being conflated by some as being equivalent to the recent statement by Republican Leader McCarthy threatening an end to aid to Ukraine if Republicans take over," Rep. Pramila Jayapal (D-Wash.) explained the withdrawal of the letter to the POTUS from the House Congressional Progressive Caucus she chairs. The document, overall, backed the Biden Administration policy of supporting "Ukraine's legitimate struggle against Russia's war of aggression." But referring to "the destruction created by this war for Ukraine and the world, as well as the risk of catastrophic [nuclear] escalation," and believing that "it is in the interests of Ukraine, the United States, and the world to avoid a prolonged conflict," the caucus called on Joe Biden for "a proactive diplomatic push, redoubling efforts to seek a realistic framework for a ceasefire."

Without sharing insights into how it could be achieved, the progressive Representatives drew the red lines, which are "preserving a free and independent Ukraine" and "establishing security guarantees for a free and independent Ukraine." The caucus adhered to the principle that there should be "nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine." In return, Moscow might have been granted "some form of sanctions relief." Yet, the wording of the letter allowed to read it as a proposal for a territorial "concession" though the "outrageous and illegal invasion of Ukraine and its [Russia's] decision to make additional illegal annexations of Ukrainian territory" was condemned.

Rep. Pramila Jayapal made an excuse, explaining that the draft was prepared in the summer and was published by staffers without vetting. She refuted any different readings of democrats in Congress of the Biden Administration policy.

"Everything started with it [Crimea]. Its return will mean the revival of true peace. The Russian potential for aggression will be destroyed to the core when the Ukrainian flag is back in its rightful place in the cities and villages of Crimea. Crimea must be freed from Russia's use as a springboard," the Ukrainian President addressed the participants of the Parliamentary dimension meeting of the Crimean Platform, an international forum composed of governmental, parliamentarian, and civil society representatives, launched by Ukraine in 2021.

Any proposals to cede territories as a "compromise" for a "peaceful" settlement are wrong for several reasons. Russia's illegal annexation of the peninsula, the first since the Nazis and the Bolsheviks did it in 1939, should not set a precedent and ensure impunity. It would demolish the UN Charter and the CSCE Helsinki Final Act of 1975, two pillars of global and European order, and unleash forces that might bring the world into more chaos and destruction. Even more than a humanitarian issue, as Crimea was turned into lawless land with repressions against Ukrainian citizens, including Crimean Tatars, it's a security issue. Heavily militarized Crimea is an existential threat to Ukraine, a grave danger for other Black Sea nations, and is a bridgehead of Russia's aggressive policies in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Northern Africa. Russia's grip on Crimea means missile and nuclear threat to the whole of Europe. Therefore, it's in the interest of Ukraine, Europe, and beyond, as well as the United States, to have Crimea liberated from illegal occupation and returned to its rightful owner – the Ukrainian nation.

Though the turbulent British politics resulted in the consequent change of three heads of the

H.M. Government within seven weeks, Ukraine remains among the priorities. However, Rishi Sunak's first speech as Prime Minister was entirely focused on domestic affairs, though for a good reason, while his predecessors also kept a global perspective. Boris Johnson mentioned "ensuring that Britain is once again standing tall in the world." At the same time, Liz Truss touched upon the struggle between democracies and autocratic regimes, pointing out that "now more than ever, we must support Ukraine in their brave fight against Putin's aggression. Ukraine must prevail". Anyway, the good news is that the new Prime Minister's view on Ukraine doesn't diverge from both predecessors, and he keeps Rt Hon Ben Wallace and Rt Hon James Cleverly as secretaries of State for Defence and for Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Affairs.

"It was important to me in this phase of air attacks with drones, cruise missiles, and rockets to send a signal of solidarity to Ukrainians," the German President said upon his arrival to Kyiv. It might be even more important that he spent several hours in a bomb shelter on the outskirts of Chernihiv, hiding from the routine Russian missile attack, and saw the level of destruction Russia brought to Ukraine. He could have experienced these feelings in April, but at that time, Ukrainians didn't think his presence was appropriate. It sparked a diplomatic row that the Chancellor used as a justification not to visit Kyiv, though the UK, Poland, Baltic, the EU leaders, and German's foreign minister paid several visits to the capital of fighting Ukraine. Leaving that in the past,

Frank-Walter Steinmeier is welcomed in Ukraine. And he is welcomed even more for he brought the good news of delivering two more MARS MLRS and four Panzerhaubitze 2000 howitzers.

In the meantime, German and European Union leaders kicked off what Germany's Chancellor described as "a new Marshall Plan for the 21st century." The World Bank puts the cost of damage to Ukraine so far at €350 billion, so Europeans expressed their readiness to "ensure and sustain the financing of the recovery, reconstruction, and modernization of Ukraine for years and decades to come."

Along with longer-term help and short-term assistance with its regular budget, "Ukraine needs fast rehabilitation right now as we speak," as Russia commits "pure acts of terror," as described by the European Commission President, referring to Moscow's deliberate destruction of civilian and critical infrastructure. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy estimates $17 billion the need for a "fast recovery" plan to repair damage to hospitals, schools, transportation, and energy infrastructure.

Russia, relevant news

Estonia will stop importing Russian oil products before the end of the transition period established by the EU. Also, starting December 5, it will introduce a ban on the transit of Russian oil, Foreign Minister Urmas Reinsalu told the Postimees newspaper.

Aiyl-Bank is the first Kyrgyz state-owned bank to suspend the service of Russian Mir [payment] cards, Russian publication Kommersant reported.

IKEA confirmed that the decision to sell all four factories in Russia remains in force. IKEA Industry will not resume furniture production in any of the production units in the Russian Federation.

The Spanish fashion group Inditex, which owns Zara, Massimo Dutti, Pull & Bear, Oysho, Bershka, and Stradivarius clothing brands, has agreed to sell its Russian business to the Daher Emirati group (the owner of the Dubai Mall), the company announced on its website.

Russian nationals with a valid Schengen visa issued by any EU member state traveling for the purpose of tourism, sports, or culture cannot enter the Czech Republic from Tuesday, October 25.

Journalists Bellingcat, The Insider, and Der Spiegel, as part of a joint investigation, identified members of the Main Computing Center (GTC) unit of the Russian Armed Forces, who are working on guiding Kalibr, Iskander, and Kh-101 missiles to targets in Ukraine.

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4. FM 3-0 Operations | SOF News

​Two key elements of FM 3-0 for those of us who focus on the Irregular aspect of warfare are the descriptions of conventional and irregular warfare.

One of the interesting points is that in conventional warfare it mentions irregular warfare and in the definition of irregular warfare it includes conventional warfare.

I would argue that this excerpt actually describes (and provides the rationale for) the political warfare that is being being conducted by our adversaries. (See Kennan and Smith's definitions of political warfare below)

 "Conventional deterrence creates the paradox that although combat-ready forces reduce the probability of large-scale combat, they increase the frequency of adversaries pursuing irregular warfare and malign activity short of armed conflict to achieve objectives."

​I would make these three arguments:

​I​rregular Warfare​ is the dominant form of war for the military in the​ ​human domain.  

“Political Warfare is the dominant form of warfare in the gray zone between peace and war and Irregular Warfare is the military contribution to Political Warfare.”  

I would also argue that the description of Joint Force Commands (JFC) in the irregular warfare discussion implies the need for an "irregular warfare proficient campaign headquarters."

FM 3-0:

Conventional Warfare

1-37. Conventional warfare is a violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions of nation-states. Conventional warfare is generally carried out by two or more military forces through armed conflict. It is commonly known as conventional warfare because it means to fight enemy forces directly, with comparable military systems and organizations. A nation-state’s strategic purpose for conducting conventional warfare is to impose its will on an enemy government and avoid imposition of the enemy government’s will on it and its citizens. Joint doctrine refers to conventional warfare as “traditional” because it has been understood that way in the West since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which reserved, for the nation-state alone, a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. However, irregular warfare has a longer history, and it has been just as common as the “traditional” method of warfare in some societies.

1-38. Conventional warfare normally focuses on defeating enemy armed forces, enemy warfighting capabilities, and controlling key terrain and populations to decisively influence an enemy government’s behavior in favorable ways. During conventional warfare, enemies engage in combat openly against each other and generally employ similar capabilities. Conventional war may escalate to include nation-state use of weapons of mass destruction. Like the other branches of the armed forces, the Army is organized, trained, and equipped primarily to conduct or deter conventional warfare, especially its most lethal manifestation— large-scale combat operations.

1-39. Conventional deterrence creates the paradox that although combat-ready forces reduce the probability of large-scale combat, they increase the frequency of adversaries pursuing irregular warfare and malign activity short of armed conflict to achieve objectives. The tradeoff is acceptable because conducting irregular warfare with forces prepared for large-scale ground combat incurs less risk than conducting large-scale ground combat with forces unprepared to do so.

Irregular Warfare

1-40. Irregular warfare is the overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and non-military capabilities across multiple domains by state and non-state actors through methods other than military domination of an adversary, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare. Irregular warfare may include the use of indirect military activities to enable partners, proxies, or surrogates to achieve shared or complementary objectives. The main objective of irregular warfare varies with the political context, and it can be successful without being combined with conventional warfare (for example, the Cuban Revolution). While it often focuses on establishing influence over a population, irregular warfare has also historically been an economy of force effort to fix enemy forces in secondary theaters of conflict or to cause enemy leaders to commit significant forces to less critical lines of effort. Two characteristics distinguish irregular warfare from conventional warfare:

• The intent is to erode a political authority’s legitimacy and influence or to exhaust its resources and will—not to defeat its armed forces—while supporting the legitimacy, influence, and will of friendly entities engaged in the struggle.

• The nonmilitary instruments of power are more prominent because the military instrument of power alone is insufficient to achieve desired objectives.

1-41. JFCs can employ most Army forces and capabilities during irregular warfare. Certain forces and capabilities are irregular warfare focused (for example Army special operations forces), in that they are specifically designed and organized for irregular warfare, but they can also be employed effectively in conventional warfare (for example as combat advisors to host-nation forces). Other forces are irregular warfare capable, in that they are primarily designed and organized for conventional warfare, but they can also be employed effectively in irregular warfare. Historically, the overwhelming majority of Army forces employed to conduct irregular warfare have been conventional forces.

• The intent is to erode a political authority’s legitimacy and influence or to exhaust its resources and will—not to defeat its armed forces—while supporting the legitimacy, influence, and will of friendly entities engaged in the struggle.

• The nonmilitary instruments of power are more prominent because the military instrument of power alone is insufficient to achieve desired objectives.

1-41. JFCs can employ most Army forces and capabilities during irregular warfare. Certain forces and capabilities are irregular warfare focused (for example Army special operations forces), in that they are specifically designed and organized for irregular warfare, but they can also be employed effectively in conventional warfare (for example as combat advisors to host-nation forces). Other forces are irregular warfare capable, in that they are primarily designed and organized for conventional warfare, but they can also be employed effectively in irregular warfare. Historically, the overwhelming majority of Army forces employed to conduct irregular warfare have been conventional forces.

​

FM 3-0 Operations | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · October 25, 2022

The Department of the Army has released its latest version of FM 3-0, Operations. The lessons learned from past conflicts in recent years have been shaping how the military fights and conducts operations. Multidomain operations started as an operating concept, and the U.S. Army is now solidifying it into doctrine.

Field Manual 3-0 remains rooted in the principles of war, reinforces the offensive mindset, and establishes multidomain operations (MDO) as the Army’s operational concept. MDO concept draws from previous operational concepts such as AirLand Battle, Full Spectrum Operations, and Unified Land Operations.

Contents by Chapter:

• Chapter 1 – Foundations of Operations
• Chapter 2 – Generating and Applying Combat Power
• Chapter 3 – Fundamentals of Operations
• Chapter 4 – Operations During Competition Below Armed Conflict
• Chapter 5 – Operations During Crisis
• Chapter 6 – Operations During Armed Conflict
• Chapter 7 – Operations in Maritime Environments
• Chapter 8 – Leadership During Operations

Contents by Appendices and other Sections:

• Appendix A – The Principles of War
• Appendix B – Command and Support Relationships
• Appendix C – Contested Deployments
• Glossary
• References
• Index

*********

FM 3.0, Operations, October 2022, PDF, 280 pages.

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN36290-FM_3-0-000-WEB-2.pdf

Image: Department of the Army.

sof.news · by SOF News · October 25, 2022

George F. Kennan defined political warfare as “the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace.” While stopping short of the direct kinetic confrontation between two countries’ armed forces, “political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command… to achieve its national objectives.”  A country embracing Political Warfare conducts “both overt and covert” operations in the absence of declared war or overt force-on-force hostilities. Efforts “range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures…, and ‘white’ propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of ‘friendly’ foreign elements, ‘black’ psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.”  See George Kennan, "Policy Planning Memorandum." May 4, 1948.

http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm

Political warfare is the use of political means to compel an opponent to do one's will, based on hostile intent. The term political describes the calculated interaction between a government and a target audience to include another state's government, military, and/or general population. Governments use a variety of techniques to coerce certain actions, thereby gaining relative advantage over an opponent. The techniques include propaganda and psychological operations (PSYOP), which service national and military objectives respectively. Propaganda has many aspects and a hostile and coercive political purpose. Psychological operations are for strategic and tactical military objectives and may be intended for hostile military and civilian populations. Smith, Paul A., On Political War (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1989)

 https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a233501.pdf

5. Preventive War: Explaining Russia's Ukraine War and China's Taiwan Future?

Excerpts:

While China’s economic power now rivals America’s, it has built its prosperity on the back of a one-child policy and the issuance of debt that makes future prospects look relatively bleak. Who will pay for this debt as workers age and more working-aged people are required to take care of their parents and grandparents, instead of working to propel China’s economy and military forward? Xi probably feels cornered, with time running out on China’s ambitions.

This feeling expresses itself through action, including China’s “wolf-warrior diplomacy,” its violent domestic crackdowns in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet, and aggressive threats to its neighbors in the South and East China Seas. These actions are supported by the logic of preventive war. Specifically they suggest that China will make a play to envelop Taiwan while it still has the chance. Doing so would satiate Chinese nationalists even as their economic prospects decline. It would also provide China a military bastion within the Pacific’s first island chain, and it would give Beijing control over the area’s resources and the trillions of dollars of trade that annually transit through the South China Sea.

However, taking Taiwan is probably no more realistic for China than Ukraine has proven to be for Russia. Invasions over water are difficult to successfully undertake, and Taiwan is much more militarized than Ukraine was before Russia invaded. Hopefully, Xi realizes this and reasons that the tactics, techniques, procedures, and military hardware that China has largely adopted from Russia will not be a match for Taiwan’s Western-backed military capabilities. However, Levy also suggests that logic can be warped when a powerful state sees an impending decline in its material strength. The state’s actions will sometimes violently hasten that decline.

Ultimately, Levy is right that preventive wars are often suicidal. But the logic behind them also supports Neil Young’s idiom: Statesmen would rather burn out than fade away.

Preventive War: Explaining Russia's Ukraine War and China's Taiwan Future?

19fortyfive.com · by Josh Caldon · October 24, 2022

Over the last three decades, America’s share of the international economy has stabilized at around 25%. This figure has remained steady even as the European Union has become a solid economic rival and partner, and as China and Russia have risen to compete with the U.S. for international predominance. These powers look set to fade in the coming decade, leaving the U.S. to continue as the world’s sole superpower.

Image Credit: Creative Commons.

What will this future look like though? One near-term prognostication is quite pessimistic and reflects the theorizing of realist international relations theorist Jack Levy, who in his 1983 article Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War identified preventive war as an action that declining great powers generally take.

Levy used Prussian diplomat and realpolitik practitioner Otto von Bismarck to make his case. Bismarck once argued that “no government, if it regards war as inevitable even if it does not want it, would be so foolish as to leave the enemy the choice of time and occasion and to wait for the moment that is most convenient for the enemy.”

Levy tried to apply his ideas to the U.S. during its relative economic and military decline in the early 1980s. However, his thoughts more presciently explain the actions of present-day Russia and China, who fearfully grab whatever territory and resources they can. Beijing and Moscow seek to increase their prestige and physical security, and to soothe their revisionist hunger, before they lose the material power to do so.

The Origins of a Disastrous War

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the type of preventive war that Levy theorized is a possibility for a peaking power. Russia rapidly rebuilt its material strength and geopolitical power after Putin came to power. Moscow fueled its rise largely by using the leverage it earns through the export of hydrocarbons. Putin has used this windfall to reinvigorate Russia’s military-industrial complex and to solidify his power over Russia’s domestic political scene by doling out hydrocarbon largesse to willing clients (i.e. oligarchs). However, the world is slowly moving away from hydrocarbons. As Russia’s demographic time bomb erupts, leaving a country marked by a low fertility rate and poor public health, Putin finds himself in a precarious position. He has a small window of opportunity to give Russia the security and prestige that he believes great power status conferred upon it during the Cold War.

In essence, Putin sees himself as cornered. He is trying to swing his way out of trouble before a knockout blow lands on Russia’s weakening body. Like Putin’s previous invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014, he is engaged in a calculated, if extremely risky, preventive war.

These types of wars demonstrate Russia’s resolve. They are designed to deter former Soviet states from moving toward closer union with the West, while growing Moscow’s control of the flat, open plains that Napoleon and Hitler used to invade Russia. Control of Ukraine would give Russia a dominant position in international wheat markets and even greater control over Eurasia’s energy grid. Moreover, Russia’s recent invasions are also designed to unite its citizenry around Putin’s regime and distract them from the internal rot and centrifugal ethnic forces that plague Russia again.

Unfortunately for Putin, his invasion of Ukraine is likely to be as disastrous as Pearl Harbor was to the peaking power of Japan in World War II. Again, Levy uses Bismarck to highlight the logic behind preventive wars, and the damage they can wreak. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine suggests that, “preventive war is like suicide from fear of death,” as Levy described it on p. 103. Putin, like Gorbachev before him, certainly had the opportunity to withdraw from the ring before being knocked out. But the logic of preventive wars made it appear to Putin that offense was a better option than capitulation – something that Russia’s disastrous and rapid decline after the Cold War likely taught him.

China’s Pacific Prospects

What can Russia’s aggression in Ukraine tell us about China? In many ways, the two countries are similar. Like Putin, China’s leader, Xi Jinping, has used China’s economic prosperity to entrench his control over his nation by establishing patron-client relationships. He also has expanded China’s territorial buffer from potential adversaries, especially through aggressive actions to claim and control territory in the South and East China Seas. These actions have soothed a national psyche deeply wounded by its “Century of Humiliation.” However, like Russia, China’s power is peaking, and its more aggressive international stance reflects Levy’s theorized actions of a declining power.

While China’s economic power now rivals America’s, it has built its prosperity on the back of a one-child policy and the issuance of debt that makes future prospects look relatively bleak. Who will pay for this debt as workers age and more working-aged people are required to take care of their parents and grandparents, instead of working to propel China’s economy and military forward? Xi probably feels cornered, with time running out on China’s ambitions.

This feeling expresses itself through action, including China’s “wolf-warrior diplomacy,” its violent domestic crackdowns in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet, and aggressive threats to its neighbors in the South and East China Seas. These actions are supported by the logic of preventive war. Specifically they suggest that China will make a play to envelop Taiwan while it still has the chance. Doing so would satiate Chinese nationalists even as their economic prospects decline. It would also provide China a military bastion within the Pacific’s first island chain, and it would give Beijing control over the area’s resources and the trillions of dollars of trade that annually transit through the South China Sea.

However, taking Taiwan is probably no more realistic for China than Ukraine has proven to be for Russia. Invasions over water are difficult to successfully undertake, and Taiwan is much more militarized than Ukraine was before Russia invaded. Hopefully, Xi realizes this and reasons that the tactics, techniques, procedures, and military hardware that China has largely adopted from Russia will not be a match for Taiwan’s Western-backed military capabilities. However, Levy also suggests that logic can be warped when a powerful state sees an impending decline in its material strength. The state’s actions will sometimes violently hasten that decline.

Ultimately, Levy is right that preventive wars are often suicidal. But the logic behind them also supports Neil Young’s idiom: Statesmen would rather burn out than fade away.

Josh Caldon is a 20 year veteran of the U.S. Air Force. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from SUNY Albany in 2020 and focuses on geopolitics and national security. He is a father, husband, adjunct professor for the Air University, small business owner, and corporate pilot. Josh can be reached through LinkedIn.

19fortyfive.com · by Josh Caldon · October 24, 2022

6. Former Defense Secretary Ash Carter dies of heart attack at age 68

Two articles and there will of course be many obituaries.

Rest in peace Mr. Secretary.

Former Defense Secretary Ash Carter dies of heart attack at age 68

militarytimes.com · by Leo Shane III · October 25, 2022

Former Defense Secretary Ash Carter died Monday evening after a heart attack, according to a family statement. He was 68.

Carter, a native of Philadelphia, served in the top Defense Department role under President Barack Obama from 2015 to 2017. He also served in a variety of other Pentagon leadership roles over five presidential administrations.

In Tuesday’s statement, his family described Carter’s death as a “sudden loss.”

“While he was known for his keen understanding of military technology, nuclear weapons, and international affairs, Secretary Carter loved nothing more than spending time with the troops, making frequent trips to Iraq and Afghanistan to visit U.S forces with his wife Stephanie,” they said.

Carter’s tenure as defense secretary is perhaps most remembered for his order to open to women all military jobs, including combat assignments. The decision came after years of study by military leaders and strong opposition from conservative groups.

Months later, Carter also announced the military would end its ban on transgender troops serving in the ranks. That order was later overturned by President Donald Trump when he took office, and subsequently reversed again after President Joe Biden was elected.

Carter, who rose from the Pentagon’s acquisition chief to deputy defense secretary, spearheaded innovation efforts and outreach to the commercial tech sector, including establishing the Defense Innovation Unit.

To protect troops from roadside bombs at the height of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, he oversaw the rapid development and fielding of mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles, known as MRAPs.

At Carter’s swearing-in ceremony in 2015, he said the Pentagon had to “think outside this five-sided box,” a dig at the Pentagon’s plodding weapons development process. He later launched the department’s “Better Buying Power” initiative, meant to guide the acquisition workforce to smarter and more efficient purchasing.

The high-level organization the Pentagon is using today to rush military aid to Ukraine is based on a bureaucracy-busting model Carter originated to speed supplies to troops in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.

The Senior Integration Group-Ukraine copied the Warfighter Senior Integration Group, which Carter launched in the middle of the war on terror to quickly deploy surveillance aerostats, working dogs and bomb-resistant underwear to troops.

“It goes back to Ash Carter,” Ellen Lord, a former undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment and defense executive, told Defense News in a May interview.

Since 2017, Carter had worked as director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School. Family members said Carter believed “his most profound legacy would be the thousands of students he taught with the hope that they would make the world a better and safer place.”

The Associated Press contributed to this story.

About Leo Shane III and Joe Gould

Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.

Joe Gould is the senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national security policy, politics and the defense industry. He served previously as Congress reporter.

Ash Carter, former defense secretary who pushed Pentagon innovation, dies at 68 - Breaking Defense

Carter, who served under President Barack Obama, tried to push the Defense Department into the technological future.

By  LEE FERRAN and VALERIE INSINNA

on October 25, 2022 at 12:04 PM

breakingdefense.com · by Lee Ferran · October 25, 2022

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter speaks at a press conference at the Pentagon, April 16, 2015. (DoD photo by Sgt. 1st Class Clydell Kinchen)

WASHINGTON — Former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter passed away Monday in Boston, according to his family. He was 68.

In a statement, the family reportedly said Carter died of a “sudden cardiac event.” Carter, originally from Philadelphia, served as the 25th secretary of defense, under President Barack Obama.

During his time as head of the Pentagon, Carter, a physicist by education, pushed the famously slow-moving institution to more quickly adopt cutting edge technology through initiatives like the Defense Digital Service, the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx) and the Defense Innovation Advisory Board. Before the establishment of those organizations, the department had fewer avenues to reach into the world of commercial technology, particularly the world of Silicon Valley startups.

In his speeches, he frequently charged the defense establishment to “think outside the five-sided box” — meaning, beyond the Pentagon’s typical roster of defense contractors and ways of doing business.

“Now, technical innovation and investment is necessary, but not sufficient — we have to pursue innovative practices and organizational structures, also,” Carter told a Defense One summit in 2016. “The world we live in demands it. While the Cold War arms race was characterized by strength, with the leader simply having more, bigger, or better weapons, today’s era of technological competition is characterized by the additional variables of speed and agility, such that leading the race now depends on who can out-innovate faster than anyone else. It’s no longer just a matter of what we buy. What also matters, it matters a lot, is how we buy things, how quickly we buy them, whom we buy them from, and how quickly and creatively we’re able to use them in different and innovative ways, all this to stay ahead of future threats.”

Outside of the technical arena, Carter’s time as secretary was also notable in that he opened all military combat positions to women and ended the ban on transgender troops serving openly.

Carter served in the Pentagon in a number of positions for years before his appointment to secretary, including a stint as undersecretary for acquisition, technology and logistics “with responsibility for DoD’s procurement reform and innovation agenda.”

7. US launches airstrike to assist Somali forces under attack

Combat operations in Africa.

US launches airstrike to assist Somali forces under attack

militarytimes.com · by Zamone Perez · October 25, 2022

The U.S. conducted an airstrike in Somalia on Sunday against al-Shabab, killing two, U.S. Africa Command said Tuesday.

According to a statement by AFRICOM, al-Shabab insurgents were attacking Somali National Army forces near Buulobarde, more than 124 miles north of the country’s capital of Mogadishu. This appears to be the 10th strike by U.S. forces in Somalia in 2022, according to a Long War Journal tracker. That’s compared to 11 such strikes in 2021 and 44 in 2020.

“Al-Shabaab is the largest and most kinetically active al-Qaeda network in the world and has proved both its will and capability to attack U.S. forces and threaten U.S. security interests,” AFRICOM officials said in a statement. “U.S. Africa Command, alongside its partners, continues to take action to prevent this malicious terrorist group from planning and conducting attacks on civilians.”

The strike on Sunday killed two al-Shabaab fighters, while no civilians were injured or killed, according to AFRICOM. The command has in the past been accused by groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch of killing civilians in strikes, despite the command claiming otherwise.

The airstrike came a week after the the Somali Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism released a statement saying that government forces had reclaimed territories in the Hiiraan and Middle Shabelle regions in the Hirshabelle State.

While the government would not give an exact number, the Ministry claimed that numerous al-Shabaab militants were killed as government forces made those territorial gains.

The U.S. airstrike is one in a series of such attacks in recent months. In September, a U.S. airstrike killed more 27 al-Shabaab militants in the same region, AFRICOM claimed. The strike took place in the same region, near Buulobarde.

“The defensive strikes allowed the Somali National Army and African Union Transition Mission in Somalia forces to regain the initiative and continue the operation to disrupt al-Shabaab in the Hiraan region of central Somalia,” the September statement said. “This operation is the largest combined Somali and ATMIS offensive operation in five years.”

In August, the U.S. also launched a series of strikes on al-Shabaab in Somalia, killing an estimated 13 militants, according to AFRICOM.

This came as hundreds U.S. troops restarted regular rotations in Somalia, after the Biden administration overturned a Trump-era decision to pull all troops out of country by the beginning of 2021.

The U.S. military has been operating in Somalia since 2007, as a part of the Global War on Terror.

About Zamone Perez

Zamone “Z” Perez is an editorial fellow at Defense News and Military Times. He previously worked at Foreign Policy and Ufahamu Africa, where he helped produce podcasts. He is a graduate of Northwestern University, where he researched humanitarian intervention and atrocity prevention in his thesis. He can be found on Twitter @zamoneperez.

8. $115,000,000,000: How Much Aid America Could Give Ukraine

A useful summary of some of the key issues with aid to Ukraine.

$115,000,000,000: How Much Aid America Could Give Ukraine

19fortyfive.com · by Brent M. Eastwood · October 25, 2022

Congress is considering even more aid to Ukraine on top of the $65 billion the United States has already pledged. Lawmakers on Capitol Hill may approve another tranche of Ukrainian assistance worth $50 billion before U.S. midterm elections in two weeks. A previous package of $12.3 billion was approved by legislators in September. The $50 billion is the largest single grant thus far since the war in Ukraine began.

Doing the math, that means if it all was passed, Ukraine would get an amazing $115 billion in total aid. To give some perspective, the entire Russian defense budget for one year is $77 billion in one year.

How much is enough? More is needed to help the Ukrainians get to 2023. The winter months of combat will be difficult for Ukraine as the defenders and the invaders dig in and conduct artillery and rocket barrages. Meanwhile, Kyiv will take any aid it can get.

Push Aid Package Through Before Midterm Elections

Congress looks to be headed into a lame-duck session post-election, so leaders are aiming to pass the $50 billion installment before public voting begins. They have been considering the additional aid package since around October 18. The Biden administration supports more aid, but some Republicans are skeptical and are concerned about allowing a “blank check” in funding. House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy has said aid to Ukraine should be curtailed. McCarthy is in line to become Speaker of the House should Republicans take control in November, and the party is not totally united along a common front for more aid to Ukraine.

Are the Republicans Divided on Additional Ukrainian Aid

In the Senate, Minority Leader Mitch McConnell supports more aid to Ukraine including “additional air defenses, long-range fires, and humanitarian and economic support.” McConnell is likely willing to whip enough votes for the Republicans to join Democrats who are in favor of White House plans for new assistance to Ukraine.

But a Large Majority of Americans Support Helping Ukraine

The American people generally support Ukraine aid, according to surveys. A Reuters/Ipsos opinion poll released on October 5 showed nearly 75 percent in favor of arming Ukraine in the war. Democrats were in support at 81 percent followed by fewer Republicans at 66 percent.

Diplomacy First

But when the questions are changed in polling, the results tell a different story. A majority in the United States wants the Biden administration to conduct diplomacy and negotiations with Vladimir Putin to end the war. A September poll by Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and Data for Progress found that 57 percent support a diplomatic solution in Ukraine. As many as 47 percent said future aid should be dependent on whether there are American efforts to negotiate peace. Thirty Democrat House Members wrote a letter to President Biden calling for direct negotiations with Putin to end the war.

How Much Aid From Europe?

The United States is by far the biggest provider of military, humanitarian, and financial aid to Ukraine under wartime conditions. The European Union is second at $16.2 billion, according to Statista, followed by the United Kingdom at $6.58 billion and Germany, Canada, and Poland with pledges of around $3 billion. Italy, Japan, Austria, and the Netherlands have granted around half a billion dollars.

Look At Aid as Proportionate to the Size of Economies

Another way to compare the size of aid packages is by percent of gross domestic product, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. Latvia and Estonia have given around 1 percent of their GDP to Ukraine aid, according to the institute. The U.S. and U.K. have given around 0.25 percent of their GDP. Poland and Lithuania are also ahead of the U.S. and U.K. in percent of GDP for assistance.

The Need for More Oversight of Dollars Spent

How long can this generosity go on? Domestic political pressures in the United States could reduce some of this funding in 2023. One concern is that all the money and military hardware may not be getting to the front. There seems to be no mechanism to ensure fraud does not happen. Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky has called for a special investigator general and auditor to ensure corruption does not occur. The United States had such an office during the War in Afghanistan called the Special Investigator General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. This body had subpoena and investigatory powers to root out waste, fraud, and abuse.

Need for a Ukrainian Marshall Fund

Even more monetary aid from the United States and Europe will have to be ponied up after the war for rebuilding and demining Ukraine. This could require a new Ukrainian “Marshall Fund” for reconstruction and more money will be floating around Kyiv that could go to the wrong places.

Ukrainian service members fire with a self-propelled howitzer 2S1 Gvozdika, as Russia’s attack on Ukraine continues, in unknown location in Kharkiv region, Ukraine May 7, 2022. REUTERS/Serhii Nuzhnenko

A likely outcome in the United States would be Congressional hearings that will call up Department of Defense and Department of State officials to examine the future pledges and grant packages for Ukraine. There will be more Republicans and perhaps Democrats calling for additional oversight. We are likely to hear no more “blank checks for Ukraine” while problems at home need funding too such as crime-fighting, aid for opioid abuse, and the environment.

This is the view that “foreign policy starts at home” and that domestic policy is more of a concern than the war in Ukraine.

Expert Biography: Serving as 1945’s Defense and National Security Editor, Dr. Brent M. Eastwood is the author of Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare. He is an Emerging Threats expert and former U.S. Army Infantry officer. You can follow him on Twitter @BMEastwood. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and Foreign Policy/ International Relations.

19fortyfive.com · by Brent M. Eastwood · October 25, 2022

9. Why are NATO and Russia Both Now Training for Nuclear War?

Because the best way to prevent war is to be prepared for war.

Of course George Washingotn said it much more eloquently:

"To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace."

Why are NATO and Russia Both Now Training for Nuclear War?

19fortyfive.com · by William Leban · October 25, 2022

We should be deeply concerned that, in the midst of what US President Joe Biden has described as the greatest risk of Armageddon since the Cuban missile crisis, Russia and NATO are this week conducting virtually simultaneous exercises of their nuclear forces, including live (conventional) missile launches. Both Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin no doubt believe the risks involved in signalling their resolve this way are manageable, but experience during the Cold War suggests otherwise.

Clearly, Putin would not use a tactical nuclear weapon against Ukraine if he believed it would ultimately lead to a nuclear exchange with the United States. That would be suicidal for the Russian regime, to say nothing of the broader global implications. But even threatening their use or conducting military exercises in a crisis can trigger events that rapidly increase the risk of a wider war. Richard Ned Lebow, an expert on nuclear risk, has identified three primary paths by which this can occur: pre-emption, miscalculated escalation and loss of control.

Pre-emption refers to the dynamics in a crisis in which neither side may want a war but each fears an imminent attack by the other and feels compelled to strike first to prevent a disadvantageous outcome. Of course, there’s no significant advantage to either side in striking first in an all-out nuclear war, but leaders may be convinced that advantages exist at lower levels of warfare.

Strategist Thomas Schelling’s work on this issue is particularly notable, and cycles of mutually reinforcing belief in imminent attack are possible whenever the element of surprise confers significant advantage.

The risks around NATO’s 1983 Able Archer exercise may have come close to triggering such a pre-emptive escalatory cycle. For a range of reasons, Soviet intelligence analysts and political leaders believed the exercise was preparation for a NATO first strike against the USSR, and they started preparing for it.

Miscalculation refers to crossing a threshold in the mistaken belief that the action will be tolerated by the adversary. Two good examples are the American decision to march north of the 38th parallel in Korea in 1950, and Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982. Both led to responses that had not been considered likely—Chinese entry into the Korean War, and a determined British campaign to retake the islands.

Loss of control might occur for any number of reasons. Military preparations or procedures might be poorly understood by political leaders, and certain steps taken by one side to defensively heighten readiness might be interpreted by the other as an offensive move. Their early warning and intelligence systems might misread force-posture changes in the adversary, leading one side to increase its own alert levels, which then triggers the other to do the same. The two sides can become locked in an action–reaction feedback loop.

Perhaps the classic example of loss of control is the July crisis of 1914, although it unfolded at a much slower pace than would be the case today with nuclear-armed adversaries. Statesmen and generals made deliberate decisions, including choices to accept or seek ‘limited’ war. But mutual and interacting mobilisations contributed to the outbreak of a world war in a ‘quasi-mechanical manner’.

Failures of technology can also lead to loss of control. In 1960, US early warning systems incorrectly interpreted with high certainty that the rising moon was a Soviet nuclear missile attack. Fortunately, decision-makers correctly identified it as an error. Vastly improved early warning systems would make that sort of error highly unlikely today, although other technological vulnerabilities continue to exist.

A profoundly worrying risk of loss of control relates to the interplay between restrictions placed on nuclear weapons to prevent their accidental or unauthorised use in peacetime (known as ‘negative controls’) and the systems to ensure their authorised use in crises (‘positive controls’). As a nuclear state seeks to prepare forces for potential use—or simply prepares them to signal resolve to an adversary, without the intention to employ them—the balance of controls shifts from negative to positive measures.

Under typical peacetime conditions, many nuclear states physically separate warheads and delivery systems. That’s not true of all systems; nuclear ballistic missile submarines are a critical case here. But states don’t tend to have bombers sitting on the tarmac with nuclear missiles or free-fall weapons already loaded. Examples of positive controls include the protocols and codes through which release authority is communicated and targets confirmed.

At a heightened state of readiness, with warheads married to delivery systems and various potential delivery systems physically dispersed and held at shorter and shorter notice, these positive controls assume much greater relative importance. In effect, the ‘safety catches’ are gradually released, increasing the capacity to launch and the risk of accidents.

The range of escalation options open to Russia is broad and has been repeatedly parsed over the past eight months. Putin could conventionally target Western supply lines at a border location or conduct a nuclear test in the Artic, or even the Black Sea, as a signal. He could also ‘jump rungs’ on the so-called escalation ladder and use a relatively small ‘tactical’ nuclear weapon, either demonstratively on Ukrainian territory or on military targets.

Pre-emption, miscalculation and loss of control—and their linkages—could well play out in the lead-up to or aftermath of any of these actions.

Putin may simply not believe that an American-led response would follow a given escalatory action by Russia. Or he could believe that the response would be limited enough to be tolerable. That is, he could miscalculate.

Or, if Putin used a tactical nuclear weapon and the US responded with large-scale, conventional strikes as signalled by retired American general David Petraeus recently, the risks of loss of control and pre-emption might both increase. Russian military leaders might misread preparations for conventional strikes against battlefield targets in Ukraine as instead positioning for strikes on Russia’s leadership or command-and-control systems.

Other factors could interact with this kind of escalatory dynamic. We are currently experiencing a heightened period of solar flare or ‘sunspot’ activity, which has historically interfered with satellites, as well as with terrestrial high-frequency radio. One hopes Russian and American systems have been hardened to withstand this well-known problem, but it is emblematic of any number of prima facie unlikely factors that could contribute to catastrophic escalation.

In 1963, the year after the Cuban missile crisis, US President John F. Kennedy gave a speech professing his commitment to peace. Among many remarks that resonate nearly 60 years later, Kennedy observed: ‘[N]uclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy or a collective death wish for the world.’

Putin’s humiliation is Putin’s doing, and Ukraine is understandably committed to reconquering its own territory. Paths must be found despite these realities that avert the spectre of the worst possible outcome for Ukraine, Russia and the rest of the world. A good starting point would be for leaders to understand that the risks of nuclear escalation are likely to be even greater than they have assumed.

William Leben is an analyst on secondment to ASPI (where this first appeared) from the Australian Army. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Department of Defence, the Australian Army or the Australian government.

19fortyfive.com · by William Leban · October 25, 2022

10. China's Xi deals knockout blow to once-powerful Youth League faction

Is this the equivalent of the Boy Scouts losing influence in US politics (asked with some attempt at sarcasm).

China's Xi deals knockout blow to once-powerful Youth League faction

Reuters · by Martin Quin Pollard

BEIJING, Oct 26 (Reuters) - The three most glaring omissions from China's new Communist Party leadership share one common trait: all rose through its Youth League and were considered members of a once-powerful faction whose influence Xi Jinping has now effectively crushed.

Premier Li Keqiang and Vice Premier Wang Yang, both 67 and young enough to be re-appointed to the elite seven-member Politburo Standing Committee, were left off even the wider Central Committee, as Xi installed loyalists in top party posts during the recent twice-a-decade leadership reshuffle.

Fellow vice premier and one-time high-flyer Hu Chunhua, who, at 59, had been seen by some party watchers as a candidate for premier and once even a possible future president, did not make it to the 24-man Politburo.

The omissions show Xi has succeeded in a years-long effort to eradicate the faction, analysts said.

"On Hu Chunhua, I think this has been Xi Jinping's main tactic of shutting down the youth league faction," said Victor Shih, an expert on elite politics in China and a professor at the University of California, San Diego.

"He has stifled the careers of quite a few cadres in that faction."

In a dramatic incident widely viewed as symbolic of the faction's demise, Xi's predecessor, Hu Jintao, who is 79 and a Youth League veteran, was unexpectedly escorted from the stage at Saturday's closing ceremony of the party congress.

Exactly what happened remains unclear, but state news agency Xinhua said in two English posts on Twitter that it was related to Hu's health. The social network is blocked in China.

"They are completely defeated," said Cheng Li, a specialist on the transformation of political leaders in China, referring to the sidelining of the Youth League faction.

"It means Xi can do many things he wants to, and opposing forces have got weaker," added Li, who is with the Brookings Institution in Washington.

"It can be read as, he didn't want the Western-style balance of power and wanted to show more of the centralisation of his power."

As Xi kicks off his third leadership term with more power than any leader since Mao Zedong, he faces a mountain of problems, from a dismal economy to his own COVID-19 policy that has backed China into a corner, and souring ties with the West.

TRAINING GROUND

The "faction" refers to officials in leadership roles in the Youth League, which recruits and trains some of China's brightest, mainly high school and university students, traditionally acting as a feeder organisation for the party.

The Youth League's budget has been cut from nearly 700 million yuan ($96 million) in 2012, the year Xi assumed power, to about 260 million yuan in 2021, official data shows.

Membership has dropped to about 74 million over the same period from around 90 million.

China's Communist Party has about 97 million members.

"As a party-led organization, the CYL has lost its clout as the place for grooming leaders," said Dali Yang, a political scientist at the University of Chicago.

"But it has already been working hard to adapt to the changing political circumstances," he said, adding that the Youth League had built a social media presence, appealing to nationalistic pride, and engaged in civic functions.

The Youth League has been active in attacking foreign brands accused of misbehaviour in China, such as false advertising.

Last year, Western journalists said they received death threats after its branch in the central province of Henan asked social media followers to report the whereabouts of a BBC reporter covering major floods there.

The Youth League did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Wednesday.

Its political image lost some sheen in 2012, when Ling Jihua, a top aide to Hu Jintao, tried to cover up the circumstances around the death of his son, killed while driving a Ferrari that crashed in Beijing.

Ling was later charged with corruption and jailed for life.

XI'S 'ZHIJIANG NEW ARMY'

Factions, cliques and power bases have existed, with varying levels of influence, since the party's founding a century ago.

They famously included the so-called "Shanghai Gang" of former leader Jiang Zemin, who is now 96.

Xi's faction, the so-called "Zhijiang New Army", was forged during his years as party chief of the eastern province of Zhejiang between 2002 and 2007.

John Delury, a professor of Chinese studies at Seoul's Yonsei University, said the new leadership reflects Xi's predominance.

"But history would remind us that no political system on earth has eradicated the existence of internal disagreement, rivalry, and power struggles," he said.

"It can take time, but after one particular faction is eliminated, another faction eventually emerges."

($1=7.2560 Chinese yuan renminbi)

Reporting by Martin Quin Pollard; Editing by Tony Munroe and Clarence Fernandez

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Martin Quin Pollard

11.  Abandoned Russian base holds secrets of retreat in Ukraine

A lot of photos, graphics, and documents at the link: https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ukraine-crisis-russia-base/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=newsletter&utm_campaign=daily-briefing&utm_term=10-26-2022

Abandoned Russian base holds secrets of retreat in Ukraine

Reuters · by MARI SAITO, MARIA TSVETKOVA and ANTON ZVEREV · October 26, 2022

When Russian troops fled the Ukrainian town of Balakliia last month, they left behind thousands of documents that detail the inner workings of the Russian war machine.

By MARI SAITO, MARIA TSVETKOVA and ANTON ZVEREV

Photographs by ZOHRA BENSEMRA

Filed: Oct. 26, 2022, 11 a.m. GMT

BALAKLIIA, Ukraine – The Russian soldiers had fled weeks before. But they left their traces everywhere.

Concrete steps led into the basement of their hastily abandoned headquarters in this small riverside town in eastern Ukraine. A bunker smelling of damp lay behind a steel door marked “Command Group.” Papers, some charred, were stuffed into a furnace. Others were scattered across the floor.

In a floral notebook, an unnamed staff officer left a sketch of a cartoon soldier and mused about going home. The book’s 91 handwritten pages contained other information, too: coordinates of Russian intelligence units, records of calls from commanders, details of battles, men killed and equipment destroyed. And accounts of a breakdown in morale and discipline.

In all, the bunker yielded thousands of pages of documents. Reuters reviewed more than a thousand of them. They detail the inner workings of the Russian military and shed new light on events leading up to one of President Vladimir Putin's most stinging battlefield defeats: Russia’s chaotic retreat from Ukraine’s northeast in September.

Russian posters on the walls of the abandoned base in Balakliia. One says: “We bring peace.” REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra

Russian soldiers slept on metal bunkbeds in the Balakliia base. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra

In the weeks before that defeat, Russian forces were struggling with surveillance and electronic warfare. They were using off-the-shelf drones flown by barely trained soldiers. Their equipment for jamming Ukrainian communications was often out of action. By the end of August, the documents show, the force was depleted, hit by death, desertions and combat stress. Two units – accounting for about a sixth of the total force – were operating at 20% of their full strength.

The documents also reveal the increasing effectiveness of Ukraine’s forces and offer clues to how the eight-month-old war might unfold, with Russia now under intense pressure on the southern front around the Black Sea coast. In the weeks before their retreat, Russian forces around Balakliia, a town 90 kilometres south of Kharkiv, came under heavy bombardment from HIMARS rocket launchers, recently supplied by the United States. The precision missiles repeatedly hit command posts.

A Russian officer who served in the Balakliia force for three months, described to Reuters a sense of menace hanging over the occupiers. One of his friends bled to death in early September after a Ukrainian strike on a command post in a nearby village.

“It’s a game of roulette,” said the officer, who asked to be identified by his military call sign Plakat Junior 888. “You either get lucky, or you are unlucky. The strikes can land anywhere.”

The Kremlin press service referred questions for this article to the Defence Ministry, which didn’t comment. Russia has said previously its military has everything it needs to fight the war.

This screenshot shows Colonel Ivan Popov, commander of the Balakliia force, during an interview on Russian TV in 2018.

The documents in the bunker name Colonel Ivan Popov as the commander of the Russian military force operating from Balakliia. Popov and many of his senior officers belong to the 11th Army Corps, part of the Russian navy’s Baltic Fleet. In 2017, the official newspaper of Russia’s armed forces published a profile of Popov. It said he served in Russia’s war against separatists in Chechnya and the 2008 invasion of ex-Soviet Georgia. He jogged with his men and remembered his officers’ birthdays, it said, adding that Popov “is motivated to achieve success.” Popov did not respond to a message seeking comment. His wife told Reuters he commanded a force in east Ukraine.

The Balakliia force included a commandant responsible for keeping the local civilian population in check. He is identified in the papers by an apparent pseudonym, Commandant V. “Granit” (Granite). He oversaw at least one interrogation centre where civilians were beaten and questioned using electric shocks, according to six former detainees and Ukrainian officials.

Reuters verified the authenticity of the documents by visiting five abandoned military outposts in northeast Ukraine whose coordinates were recorded in the cache. In each instance, local residents confirmed that Russian forces were stationed there. Reuters reporters also interviewed five soldiers who served in the Balakliia force, and cross-checked details in the documents with a contemporaneous account kept by one of the Russian servicemen.

“Current as of 18:00 on July 21. Comrade commander, here is my report!”

Extract from a status report to the base commander

Life under occupation

Russian troops occupied Balakliia, a quiet town of squat apartment buildings surrounded by bucolic villages, in early March. To the south was the Russian controlled Donbas region; to the north the city of Kharkiv, a Ukrainian stronghold.

The soldiers occupied a rundown vehicle repair complex on the outskirts of town. It became the command centre for Balakliia and dozens of surrounding villages and farms. It was here, in the basement, that Reuters found the document cache.

A destroyed vehicle repair hangar in Russian troops’ former base in Balakliia, Ukraine. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra

Inside the burned out hangar in Balakliia. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra

The door of a Russian army truck at the base is sprayed with the letter Z, symbol of Russia’s war. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra

Russian helicopters and drones constantly circled over the base, said Volodymyr Lyovochkin, a local man who managed the premises before the Russians arrived. Dozens of GRAD rocket launchers and other military vehicles were parked in the grounds, he said.

Inside the command room, a Reuters reporter saw desks arranged in a rectangle. Each bore a red nameplate of a military section: combat coordination, electronic warfare, intelligence, unmanned aerial equipment. The section commanders, including the commandant responsible for the civilian population, met here daily, according to rosters that were left amongst the papers. Reuters has identified at least 11 officers who attended these meetings. Five of the officers, including Colonel Popov, didn’t respond to requests for comment. The others couldn’t be reached.

Lists of personnel showed that conscripts from the Russian-controlled Ukrainian region of Luhansk fought alongside men from Russia’s 11th Army Corps. The soldiers scribbled on the walls of the base and put up fliers warning of Ukraine’s descent into Nazi rule if they withdrew. The invaders had brought with them old Soviet maps of Ukraine. A poster admonished the soldiers: Do not smoke, do not drop litter.

The notebook, kept by the unknown staff officer, contained coordinates for Russian military intelligence and other units scattered around the area. One unit had taken over a Balakliia kindergarten.

Lyovochkin, the site’s former manager, said Ukrainian investigators had visited the base repeatedly since the Russians retreated. De-miners were still removing the ordinance. “Everything is mined,” he said. “They were really protecting themselves.”

The base also served as a detention centre for captured Ukrainian veterans. One military veteran told Reuters he was hooded, beaten and thrown into a cellar, where he was held for six days with several others.

A sign at the entrance of the Russian base tells soldiers: “Do not smoke, do not drop litter.” REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra

Inside the Balakliia command bunker, desks are arranged for the daily briefings that were attended by senior officers. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra

Others were detained in Balakliia’s police station. Two men - one a firefighter, the other an inspector in the emergency services - said their jailers beat them with wooden batons and administered electric shocks. Russian soldiers questioned the inspector repeatedly about his calls with his supervisor in Kharkiv. They accused him of compiling a list of Ukrainians who had collaborated with the Russians, which he denies. The firefighter said he was accused of hiding weapons and organising a local partisan group, which he too denies. Albina Strilets, a 33-year-old logistics coordinator for the emergency services, recounted that she and other women were held simply for being “pro-Ukrainian.”

“I heard men being beaten so badly that at one point I heard a Russian soldier say, ‘bring a body bag,’” Strilets said. “Another time I heard a woman being raped upstairs and crying for hours.” Strilets said she broke the cell’s toilet so “it sounded like a waterfall” and would block out the woman’s screaming.

Albina Strilets, who works for Ukraine’s emergency services, said she was detained by Russian soldiers in August. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra

The Kremlin and Russia’s Defence Ministry didn’t respond to questions about events in Balakliia. Russia has said previously its forces do not target civilians.

Kharkiv regional police said Ukrainian investigators had discovered 22 torture chambers across newly liberated towns and villages in the region. “We cannot count the number of people who were detained. We are talking about hundreds of people. But every crime has a name and we will surely find those responsible,” regional police chief General Volodymyr Tymoshko said.

In an office opposite the police station, relatives of prisoners sometimes petitioned the Russian known as Commandant V. “Granit” to free their loved ones. Tetiana Tovstokora, 57, a school principal, said her husband was turned away when he sought information about her detention, which lasted several days. None of the detainees and families interviewed by Reuters had any success in swaying “Granit.”

Tetiana Tovstokora, a school principal, said Russian troops held her for several days in a cell at this police station in Balakliia. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra

Tetiana Tovstokora shows reporters how the Russian soldiers covered her head each time she was led in or out of her cell. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra

Under occupation, much of the policing of the population fell to the force from separatist Luhansk. It was a rag-tag group with even fewer resources than their Russian counterparts, the documents show. One Luhansk corporal was 64 years old. Another fighter was treated for finger wounds after the chamber of his Mosin rifle exploded, a medic wrote. The rifle was developed in the late 19th century and went out of production decades ago, as Reuters reported in April.

A spreadsheet at the Balakliia bunker showed a typical Russian sergeant was paid 202,084 roubles ($3,200) a month in salary plus bonuses, while a sergeant in the separatist force received just 91,200 roubles ($1,400). The head of a Luhansk flame-thrower company recorded in one document that eight of his subordinates had previous convictions - including one man for rape and sexual assault.

Locals sell vegetables in front of a damaged market in the Ukrainian town of Balakliia. REUTERS/Umit Bektas

The village of Hrakove, above, was the scene of heavy fighting between Russian and Ukrainian forces. REUTERS/Vyacheslav Madiyevskyy

A burned out car in Balakliia which for six months was under Russian occupation. Ukrainian Presidential Press Service/Handout via REUTERS

“!!! The commander of the ZVO (Western Military District) ordered that Hrakove is not to be surrendered.”

Extract from notebook of the anonymous staff officer

A narrow victory

On July 19, four months after seizing the area, the Russian occupiers encountered their first serious challenge from Ukraine’s armed forces, the documents reviewed by Reuters show.

At the regular morning meeting in the bunker, reports submitted to the commander, Colonel Popov, were normal: The previous night had been relatively quiet and enemy positions were unchanged. On the agenda for the day: some scheduled artillery fire on Ukrainian positions.

But by early afternoon, a column of Ukrainian soldiers, supported by tanks and under cover of an artillery barrage, attacked the Russian front line at Hrakove – a village on the north-western edge of the territory held by the Balakliia force.

Troops belonging to Russia’s 9th motorised rifle regiment were holed up in a concrete grain elevator in Hrakove. They’d positioned guns along the top of the structure. A Reuters reporter who visited the facility in October saw signs the men slept on the grain conveyor belts.

By 15:00, an unnamed Russian on the front line at Hrakove radioed his commanders in Balakliia: His position was being overrun, he said, and he had to retreat. He requested artillery strikes to destroy the post he was abandoning. Then communication was lost.

In the Balakliia bunker, the anonymous staff officer wrote in his notebook: “The munitions are running out.”

The commander of the Western Military District, one of Russia’s most senior officers, demanded a briefing on the situation and “ordered that Hrakove must not be surrendered,” further notebook entries said. According to official records, the commander at the time was Colonel-General Alexander Zhuravlyov, since fired by Putin. Independent Russian military analysts CIT have said, however, that Zhuravlyov was replaced by July by Lieutenant-General Andrei Sychevoi. Reuters was unable to reach Zhuravylov. Sychevoi didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Alexander Zhuravlyov, then Commander of the Western Military District, are pictured with President Vladimir Putin in 2020. Sputnik/Alexei Druzhinin/Kremlin via REUTERS

In the hours that followed, Russian commanders sent in reinforcements and mobilised attack helicopters. By 18:00, the Ukrainians were retreating and Russian forces were retaking lost ground. But the cost was high. The Russians lost a tank, two armoured personnel carriers and other equipment. Thirty-nine men were wounded, seven were dead, and 17 were reported missing, according to a report that was presented to Popov on July 21.

Among the Russian dead was Corporal Aleksandr Yevsevleev, a tank commander. A list of casualties inside the command bunker said his abdomen had been torn open, exposing his intestines, and he had shrapnel injuries to his right upper thigh. His parents, contacted by Reuters, said their son was fatally wounded when his position came under fire near Hrakove from a Ukrainian helicopter.

After the battle, five soldiers needed treatment for “acute reaction to stress.” Next to each of their names in the medical record was written: “Does not require evacuation.”

A soldier in his twenties was listed as having suffered blast injuries. Contacted by Reuters, the man said he remembered little, only that “the fighting was fierce.” He spoke on the condition of anonymity.

Following the battle, Colonel Popov applied to his superiors for 34 of his subordinates to be given medals for their bravery. The documents did not detail how his superiors responded. Two of the soldiers told Reuters they have yet to receive their awards.

Pyotr Kalinin, a 25-year-old commander of a reconnaissance platoon, was also on Popov’s list. Kalinin is from Crimea and briefly served as a cadet in Ukraine’s armed forces before Russia annexed the peninsula in 2014, according to his social media. A photograph shows him in a Ukrainian uniform. Kalinin didn’t respond to messages from Reuters seeking comment.

Pyotr Kalinin, commander of a Russian platoon, previously served as a cadet in Ukraine’s army. This picture is from his social media account.

Quadcopters - !!! Urgent - !”

Handwritten note on a July 19 briefing document

Near breaking point

Documents in the bunker show that Russian commanders understood the shortcomings of their force.

On July 19, hours before the battle of Hrakove, an unnamed officer scribbled on the daily briefing note a plea for drones to track the enemy: “Quadcopters!!! Urgent!” Quadcopter drones are generally not military grade and can be bought in store and on the internet. As Reuters reported in June, Russian troops have relied on crowdfunding to buy drones.

The Balakliia force finally took receipt of three off-the-shelf Mavic-3 quadcopter drones on July 20, the daily report recorded. They weren’t ready to fly, however, because their software wasn’t yet installed. The same daily report stated 15 soldiers were being trained how to operate them.

Ukrainian forces, meanwhile, were busy flying drones over Russian positions, their task made all the easier because two of the Russian force’s three jamming devices were out of action in need of repair, according to a note on a report by the electronic warfare unit.

The daily report on July 21 contained even more alarming news for Colonel Popov, the commander of the Balakliia force: Russian intelligence agency, the FSB had learned that Ukrainian forces were bringing to the area three highly accurate HIMARS missile launchers, supplied by the United States. And Ukraine had pinpointed the locations of one Russian command post and four warehouses that were being used by the Balakliia force.

Ukraine’s Defence Ministry and military did not respond to questions about weaponry and tactics.

Three days later, on July 24, the author of the handwritten notebook recorded that a HIMARS strike had killed 12 Russian soldiers belonging to the 336th marines brigade of the Baltic Fleet.

The fight further eroded morale and discipline among the soldiers.

Artyom Shtanko commanded a platoon that was in the thick of the Hrakove battle and suffered losses, according to his father Alexei and Plakat Junior 888, the officer who served in the Balakliia force.

Alexei said Shtanko refused an order from his company commander to “send his men into artillery fire.” Plakat Junior 888 identified the commander as Viktor Alyokhin, who was operating from a command post near Hrakove. Contacted by Reuters, Alyokhin confirmed he was in charge of a company during the battle but declined to comment further.

At the base in Balakliia, the notebook’s anonymous author wrote on July 24 – five days after the Hrakove battle – that Shtanko was a “bastard” facing disciplinary action because he “pulled back his platoon and took it into the rear.”

Shtanko’s commanders moved him to a different unit, his father told Reuters. He said Shtanko is still fighting in Ukraine.

The notebook also recorded the desertion of Roman Elistratov, a corporal in the 9th motorised rifle regiment, which felt the full force of the Ukrainian onslaught. Elistratov didn’t respond to messages from Reuters. Later, the author wrote of a soldier who deliberately shot himself in the hand to avoid further action. Command should be notified of the incident, he added.

None of these details made it into the official reports seen by Reuters.

“However many machine gunners you change, the machine gun still won’t work if it has no bullets inside.”

Extract from notebook of the anonymous staff officer

“No supplies”

By the end of July, Russian officers were convinced Ukrainian forces were preparing a counter-offensive to “take control of Balakliia,” the documents in the bunker show. Intercepted communications indicated an attack was imminent. Some of the communications were from cell phones registered to countries including Estonia, Britain, the Netherlands and the United States. Russian officers in the command bunker concluded the phones were in the possession of mercenaries or foreign instructors helping the Ukrainian military. Approached for this article, Estonia said its defence forces were not operating inside Ukraine. Britain, the United States and the Netherlands didn’t respond.

Around the same time, Russian military-electronics experts arrived in Balakliia. They wanted to see if Russia’s “Pole-21” system for jamming satellite navigation systems could be adapted to counter HIMARS missiles, according to the daily report of Aug 4.

Whatever the outcome of that experiment, Ukrainian strikes continued. Interviews with Russian servicemen, relatives of dead soldiers, and local residents indicate that at least three Russian command posts in northeast Ukraine were hit by HIMARS missiles in the weeks that followed.

Faced with increased Ukrainian attacks, the Balakliia command set about drafting in more troops, according to daily reports and records in the staff officer’s handwritten notebook. Yet a spreadsheet dated Aug. 30 showed that the force was at only 71% of full strength. Some units were far worse off, according to the same spreadsheet. The 2nd assault battalion had 49 personnel. It should have had 240. The 9th BARS brigade, an irregular unit, was at 23% of its intended manpower.

This furnace in the Balakliia command bunker contained partially burned documents. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra

A black and white photo, possibly from World War Two, shows Nazi soldiers and is overlaid with the words: “If we leave, they will come.” REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra

Names of cities in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine are scribbled on a wall inside the Balakliia base. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra

Graffiti on a door inside the Balakliia base. The letter “Z” has become a symbol of Russia’s war. Above it someone has written “Death to Muscovites.” REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra

Another spreadsheet tracked equipment. Where there had been five drones on July 25, by the end of August there were only two. Eight armoured personnel carriers were reduced to three. The force had four “Fagot” anti-tank weapons systems left, down from 24 at the end of July. The one “Zoopark” system they had for suppressing enemy electronics systems was gone by the end of August.

Plakat Junior 888, the Russian officer interviewed by Reuters, described trying to fight off successive Ukrainian attacks during August without adequate supplies. The small calendar he kept in the trenches during his three months rotation paints a dire picture. Days were marked with scribbled notes saying “Attack” and “Escaped from encirclement” or bearing the names of comrades killed in action. Aug. 27 was marked simply as “the worst day.” That, he said, was when their position came under heavy artillery attack, and one of his friends died in his arms.

“There were no supplies of munitions or drones,” he said of the situation in late August. Ukrainian forces mounted attacks, but “our artillery was not working in response.”

“I went home on Aug 10, 2023, I’m already home with my family…I’m having a nice time in Khabarovsk with my family, with my wife and my daughters.”

Extract from notebook of the anonymous staff officer

Chaos and retreat

Ukraine’s counter-offensive began in earnest on Sept 6.

A Russian soldier who was in Hrakove that day told Reuters that Ukraine first attacked Russian positions with artillery. By the evening Ukrainian forces had outflanked them. At that point, the order was given to retreat from the village, he said.

The battle continued. Between Sept 6 and 8, precision strikes hit the command centre in Balakliia. Lyovochkin, the local who formerly managed the site, said the entire facility erupted in flames. Dozens of bodies of Russian soldiers were pulled from the rubble, he said.

“My house was dancing” from the blast, he said.

A video posted on social media on Sept 10 showed Ukrainian soldiers viewing the destroyed hangar where Russian forces had kept their vehicles. “This is what the result of HIMARS’ work looks like,” said a voice in Ukrainian in the video.

Nataliia and Viktor, an elderly couple who live less than 300 metres from the bunker, said they heard constant Ukrainian strikes in the final days of the occupation. When the attacks ceased on the 8th, the couple saw 30 soldiers, many of them wounded, limping along the road in retreat. Two other residents said they saw Russian soldiers throw away their guns and abandon their vehicles as they ran away.

“It was just chaos,” said one of the two locals, Serhii, who lived across the street from the command headquarters. “There was a traffic jam” of fleeing Russians, he said.

Other Ukrainians described how fighters from Luhansk fled, often trailing behind the retreating Russian military.

Weeks after the Russian retreat, all that remained of the headquarters was a crater and a pile of documents. A plume of smoke rose from a heap of burnt out Russian equipment.

Popov, the force commander, was injured at some point and spent a month in hospital, his wife told Reuters. She said he has since been promoted to the rank of general and is about to head off on a new assignment. She didn’t disclose where.

The last, undated notebook entries by the anonymous staff officer are reflective.

“If you sit and look at the river for long enough, you will eventually see your enemies floating by,” he wrote.

One page later, he appears to be imagining his life in the future, in a city on the Russian border with China, 7,000 km from Balakliia.

“I went home on Aug 10, 2023, I’m already home with my family,” he wrote. “I’m having a nice time in Khabarovsk with my family, with my wife and my girls.”

A monument to Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko in the town of Balakliia. REUTERS/Gleb Garanich

Russian Roulette

By Mari Saito in Balakliia, Maria Tsvetkova in New York and Anton Zverev in Tbilisi

Photo editing: Simon Newman

Video: Zohra Bensemra, Yesim Dikmen, Francesca Lynagh and Lucy Ha.

Design: Catherine Tai

Edited by Christian Lowe and Janet McBride

• Follow Reuters Investigates

Reuters · by MARI SAITO, MARIA TSVETKOVA and ANTON ZVEREV · October 26, 2022

12. House progressives retract Russia-diplomacy letter amid Dem firestorm

Political ineptitude?

House progressives retract Russia-diplomacy letter amid Dem firestorm

By ALEXANDER WARD, ANDREW DESIDERIO, NICHOLAS WU and JORDAIN CARNEY

10/25/2022 12:07 PM EDT

Updated: 10/25/2022 03:51 PM EDT

Politico

Party lawmakers were blindsided by Monday's release of a letter calling for direct negotiations in Ukraine, according to several people familiar with the situation.

Amid the pushback, Progressive Caucus Chair Pramila Jayapal (D-Wash.) released a statement to clarify her support for Ukraine. | Joshua Roberts/Getty Images

10/25/2022 12:07 PM EDT

Updated: 10/25/2022 03:51 PM EDT

House progressives on Tuesday retracted a letter calling on President Joe Biden to engage in direct diplomacy with Russia, less than 24 hours after it sparked intense backlash from other Democrats.

The about-face comes as some Democratic lawmakers vent their fury that the letter backing talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin — originally drafted and signed in June — wasn’t recirculated before its public release on Monday. That release made it appear that the 30 House Democrats who signed on, all lawmakers in the roughly 100-member Congressional Progressive Caucus, were urging the Biden administration to push for diplomacy immediately despite Russia’s engagement in war crimes and indications of a military escalation against Ukraine.

Making the timing of the letter even more politically perilous: Ukraine is not ready for negotiations at this point, especially because its months-long counteroffensive has been successful to date, and there’s no indication Putin is ready to deal either.

“The Congressional Progressive Caucus hereby withdraws its recent letter to the White House regarding Ukraine,” the caucus’ chair, Rep. Pramila Jayapal (D-Wash.), said in a statement after POLITICO first reported that the retraction was imminent. “The letter was drafted several months ago, but unfortunately was released by staff without vetting.”

Jayapal said she accepts “responsibility” for the embarrassing flub, adding that the timing of the letter caused a “distraction” and was “conflated” with House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy’s recent suggestion that Republicans might pull back on Ukraine funding if they win control of the House.

“The proximity of these statements created the unfortunate appearance that Democrats, who have strongly and unanimously supported and voted for every package of military, strategic, and economic assistance to the Ukrainian people, are somehow aligned with Republicans who seek to pull the plug on American support for President [Volodymyr] Zelenskyy and the Ukrainian forces,” Jayapal added.

A source familiar with the situation told POLITICO that Jayapal personally approved the letter’s release on Monday. Spokespeople for the Progressive Caucus and Jayapal’s personal office, asked for comment, referred back to the group’s statement without denying Jayapal’s direct involvement.

The letter to Biden was released without the knowledge of many Democratic lawmakers who put their name on it, several people told POLITICO, speaking candidly on condition of anonymity. While it was partially updated with new information about Russia’s war on Ukraine and sent to other lawmakers to reach a threshold of 30 signees, POLITICO has learned, the letter got released mostly in its original form.

The original release date for the letter was August 1, a congressional aide said, adding that it was never made clear why there was a delay. Its text was circulating on the Hill during August’s weeks-long legislative recess.

“Once you sign on to a letter, it’s up to the original drafters and unfortunately not all of them will keep folks updated,” Rep. Ilhan Omar (D-Minn.), the Progressive Caucus whip and a signatory of the pro-Russia-diplomacy letter, tweeted Tuesday. “That’s why some of us don’t sign on to letters without direct insight into when or how it will be released.”

Other signatories and congressional aides blamed the Progressive Caucus’ office for releasing it as questions swirl over whether Republicans would continue funding Ukraine’s defense if they win the House majority in two weeks, as is expected.

“Amateur hour on part of the CPC not to have anticipated that,” said one lawmaker who signed on and, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity.

A Hill staffer put it even more bluntly: “It’s just a disaster. The CPC just needs to clean house.”

The letter called on Biden to consider a diplomatic path to end Russia’s war on Ukraine if the opportunity arises. Acknowledging the difficulty of direct talks with Putin, the lawmakers encouraged consideration of a negotiated settlement as the risk of nuclear war rises. Ukraine opposes such a diplomatic path because that would likely require surrendering some of its territory to Moscow. And the Biden administration has pledged that the U.S. wouldn’t do anything without Kyiv’s backing.

Outside progressive and anti-war groups supported the letter’s content, agreeing it was time to pursue a diplomatic path when the time was right. But the organizations split on the rollout, exposing a rift in the progressive foreign policy community. Just Foreign Policy’s Erik Sperling, one of the lead advocates of the letter, told POLITICO “the issue here is simply that, as happened during the Iraq War and other wars, those who oppose diplomacy want to use bad faith attacks to intimidate people out of having substantive debates about U.S. policy.”

A leader for another group that endorsed the initiative said, on condition of anonymity: “We signed the text of the letter, not the editorialized roll out that isn’t consistent with the progressive position on Ukraine.”

Amid the pushback on Monday, Jayapal — who’s mulling a bid for House Democratic leadership next year — released a statement to clarify her support for Ukraine and insist that the letter wasn’t suggesting a break from Biden’s policy.

Her explanation didn’t stop the ire within the Democratic caucus, where several lawmakers bashed the letter in public in a remarkable display of intraparty rejection. One of the signatories even said she wouldn’t have signed it today.

“Timing in diplomacy is everything. I signed this letter on June 30, but a lot has changed since then. I wouldn’t sign it today,” Rep. Sara Jacobs (D-Calif.) said.

Many Democrats took particular issue with the letter’s suggestions that sanctions relief could be on the table in order to incentivize Russia to end its assault on Ukraine.

Rep. Jake Auchincloss (D-Mass.) called it “an olive branch to a war criminal who’s losing his war.” Rep. Susan Wild (D-Pa.) told POLITICO she was “dismayed that some of my [Democratic] colleagues think that we can negotiate with Putin.” Neither lawmaker signed the letter or belong to the Progressive Caucus.

Other signatories of the letter quickly clarified their own positions, and more are expected to speak out as soon as Tuesday. Rep. Mark Takano (D-Calif.), who also chairs the House Veterans’ Affairs Committee, released a statement Monday declaring continued support for Ukrainian self-determination: “Only Ukrainians have a right to determine the terms by which this war ends.” Another signatory, Rep. Chuy García (D-Ill.), said in a statement the “letter should not have been sent” because of its outdated information, though he still believed in the letter’s “underlying message” of the need for diplomacy while supporting Ukraine’s defense.

Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.), however, said he didn’t support withdrawing the letter, calling it “common sense” in a CNN interview.

“All the letter said is that we, at the same time that we stand with Ukraine, need to make sure that we’re reducing the risk for nuclear war, that we’re engaging in talks with the Russians to make sure that the conflict doesn’t escalate,” he said.

The saga could have implications beyond the Ukraine funding efforts, given Jayapal’s leadership ambitions. And Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-Md.), who also signed the letter, is vying for the party’s top post on the powerful House Oversight committee.

Raskin said in a statement Tuesday that he was “glad” the letter was withdrawn due to its “unfortunate timing and other flaws.” He also pointed out he has “passionately supported every package of military, strategic and economic assistance to the Ukrainian people.”

Rep. Gerry Connolly (D-Va.), who is running against Raskin for that job and serves as president of NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly, released a statement Tuesday blasting “magical thinking regarding the nature of the Russian threat” — though without mentioning the letter or Raskin.

Sarah Ferris and Burgess Everett contributed to this report.

POLITICO

Politico

13. Russia’s chaotic draft leaves some out in cold, without gear

Russia’s chaotic draft leaves some out in cold, without gear

By The Associated Press

today

https://apnews.com/article/putin-europe-moscow-government-and-politics-d73e6f1e3ac1632953278e8ff179de65?user_email=06226fcc158b1f514791c81422207cd68e256e53c176b3708427fb43baccfcf3&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Oct26_MorningWire&utm_term=Morning%20Wire%20Subscribers

The mobilized reservists that Russian President Vladimir Putin visited last week at a firing range southeast of Moscow looked picture-perfect.

Kremlin video of the young men headed for the war in Ukraine showed them in mint-condition uniforms, equipped with all the gear needed for combat: helmets, bulletproof vests and sleeping bags. When Putin asked if they had any problems, they shook their heads.

That stands in stark contrast with the complaints circulating widely on Russian news outlets and social media of equipment shortages, poor living conditions and scant training for the new recruits.

Since Putin announced the mobilization Sept. 21, independent media, human rights activists and those called up have painted a bleak picture of a haphazard, chaotic and ethnically biased effort to round up as many men as possible and push them quickly to the front lines, regardless of skill, training and equipment.

Videos on Russian social networks showed conscripted men complaining of cramped, filthy accommodations, toilets overflowing with trash and a lack of food and medicine. Some showed men displaying rusty weapons.

In one video, a group of draftees milled in a field, claiming they had been left there with no food or shelter. Other clips depicted men forced to sleep on bare benches or tightly packed on the floor.

“We didn’t seek you out; you called us. Here, look at this! How long can this go on?” an exasperated voice says in a video.

Putin’s decree on the partial mobilization didn’t outline the criteria for draftees or say how many would be called up. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu has said it will affect only about 300,000 reservists with relevant combat or service experience.

Conscription protests have been harshly put down, and tens of thousands of men fled Russia to neighboring countries to avoid being pressed into service.

In the week after the decree, a young man opened fire on a recruitment officer in the Siberian city of Ust-Ilimsk, seriously wounding him. On Oct. 15, a shootout at a training camp in the southern Belgorod region killed 11 people and wounded 15 others. Enlistment offices and other administrative buildings also have been set on fire.

It’s now clear that in a country where almost all men under 65 are registered as part of the reserve, the mobilization process wasn’t carried out carefully. There has been a flood of reports of call-up summonses being served to those with no military experience. Police rounded up men in the streets of Moscow and other cities, or raided hostels to apprehend guests of fighting age. Enlistment offices often skipped required health checks.

The hasty call-up will hardly achieve anything other than “slowing down the advances” of Ukrainian troops in the 8-month-old war, military analyst Pavel Luzin said in an interview.

Moscow is simply “prolonging the agony” in Ukraine, said Luzin, a visiting scholar at The Fletcher School at Tufts University.

Activists also say ethnic minorities in some regions were drafted in disproportionate numbers. Videos circulated of protests in the Muslim majority region of Dagestan, with relatives complaining that the area was providing more recruits than elsewhere.

Vladimir Budaev of the Free Buryatia Foundation told AP that Indigenous people in Russia’s Far North and along the Mongolian border were “rounded up in their villages” in the drive.

In remote regions of Sakha and Buryatia, enlistment officers scoured the taiga for potential draftees, and “handed out summonses to anyone they met,” he said.

According to Yekaterina Morland, an ethnic Buryat volunteer at the Asians of Russia Foundation, Buryatia has seen mobilization rates up to six times higher than Russia’s European regions.

In the first two weeks of the call-up, authorities in some regions reported sending home hundreds of men who were drafted despite not meeting the criteria.

“The task of a military enlistment office is to recruit — recruit whoever they can grab,” says Elena Popova, the coordinator of the Movement of Conscientious Objectors.

Putin himself publicly acknowledged “mistakes” in the process and demanded its improvement.

But even when the summonses went to those who had served in the army, it didn’t necessarily mean that they had battlefield skills. Some former conscripts often don’t get proper military training when they serve and instead are engaged in menial labor.

A woman who spoke to The Associated Press on condition of anonymity because she feared reprisals said her 31-year-old husband did his mandatory service six years ago and had “no training at a firing range, or any combat drills in the field,” but authorities tried to draft him anyway.

In fact, he had only held a weapon once, when they were taught how to strip down and reassemble an automatic rifle, she said. Mostly, she added, “they were sweeping (the compound), cleaning the snow.”

Relatives of conscripts reported having to spend their own money on gear and basic necessities. Online groups were formed to raise funds for equipment.

One campaign was run by Kremlin-backed lawmaker and state TV host Yevgeny Popov, who said reservists in the Taman artillery division got shoes and clothes, but had “an acute shortage of drones, walkie-talkies, smartphones with maps (for gunners), binoculars, headlamps (and) power banks,” he said.

Russian media reported multiple deaths of reservists in Ukraine, with their relatives telling news outlets that they had received very little training.

When asked by a reporter why several reservists had died in Ukraine only three weeks after being called up, Putin confirmed that training could last as few as 10 days and as many as 25.

Luzin, the military analyst, said Russia isn’t able to train hundreds of thousands of men. “The army was not ready for mobilization. It never prepared for it,” he said.

Putin has promised to finish the mobilization drive by November, when the regular fall draft is scheduled. Military experts and rights groups say enlistment offices and training camps can’t process both at the same time, warning that the call-up may resume months later.

As of mid-October, 222,000 reservists have been recruited, Putin said. Whether it will be possible to enlist another 80,000 in the remaining two weeks is unclear.

Even though masses of Russian men are no longer fleeing the country and street protests have all but halted, there are still those resisting the effort.

Independent and opposition-leaning media have published instructions on how to avoid the call-up legally. Rights groups advise men not to sign the summons – which is required for it to be considered legally served – and not to go near enlistment offices.

Some men are seeking alternative civil service, a right that lawyers say is guaranteed by the constitution.

Kirill Berezin, 27, responded to a call-up notice shoved under the door of his St. Petersburg apartment by going to a enlistment office to apply for the alternative civil service, but he was taken to a military unit anyway, according to his friend, Marina Tsyganova.

Berezin, who has since been sent to a training facility in southern Russia, submitted a document to his commanders that said he “can’t serve with weapons, can’t kill people and help people who do it” because it was “contrary to my conscience.”

Tsyganova told AP that she represented him in a St. Petersburg court, which last week rejected Berezin’s lawsuit, saying only regular conscripts under 27 are eligible for alternative civil service. His defense team plans to appeal, she said, and at the very least, she hoped he won’t be sent to Ukraine while the legal battle proceeds.

-—

This story was reported from outside Russia by The Associated Press.

—-

Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine at https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

14. Iran Using Minors to Suppress Protests in Iran

Iran Using Minors to Suppress Protests in Iran

fdd.org · October 24, 2022

Latest Developments

Iran is reportedly using minors to crush protests in Iran. In recent weeks, photos have emerged showing children wearing unforms of the Basij militia, a branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). “Alongside the uniformed police stood many more plainclothes Basiji units. Some of them were clearly minors,” one Iranian protester reported. International law prohibits the recruitment or use of children in hostilities. Two U.S. laws penalize foreign countries and persons who recruit or use children in hostilities.

Expert Analysis

“Iran’s reported use of children to help crush anti-regime protests underscores the regime’s horrific disregard for human rights. The Biden administration should fully implement U.S. laws that require the U.S. government to spotlight and penalize any such violations.” – Orde Kittrie, FDD Senior Fellow

Use of Child Soldiers a Longstanding Battlefield Practice

The Iranian government, Iranian proxies, and IRGC clients have long used child soldiers against their adversaries. The Houthis in Yemen, for example, have recruited thousands of children, some as young as 10, in their fight against the U.S.-backed Saudi coalition. In Gaza, some 50,000 children registered last year for an Iranian-backed, Hamas-run child-soldier training camp, where they received religious indoctrination and “security” training. In Lebanon, Hezbollah has recruited child soldiers for its fight in Syria on behalf of the Assad regime.

Iran May Be Violating International Law

If the reports are correct that Iran is using children to crack down on protests, Tehran is in violation of its obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which Iran joined in 1994, and the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, which Iran joined in 2002. The Rights of the Child treaty prohibits any recruitment for, and any use in, hostilities of persons under 15. The Worst Forms of Child Labour treaty prohibits forced or compulsory recruitment for use in armed conflict of persons under 18.

The United Nations, including its special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, should investigate Iran’s alleged violations of these treaties.

U.S. Should Name and Penalize Iranian Officials Recruiting or Using Child Soldiers

The Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008 imposes penalties, including denial of entry into the United States, on any foreign person who has engaged in the recruitment or use of child soldiers. The U.S. should name and penalize the relevant Iranian officials. Such a step would send an important message to Iran’s anti-regime protesters that the U.S. supports them and is penalizing their Iranian abusers.

The Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 requires the U.S. to list annually in its Trafficking in Persons report those foreign governments that recruit or use child soldiers. The State Department included Iran in the 2022 list. The act also requires the State Department’s annual Human Rights Report to describe such recruitment or use of child soldiers. However, the 2021 Human Rights Report on Iran, published in April 2022, included very little information on this abhorrent practice.

Related Analysis

“Hamas defends its military summer camps for children and teenagers,” by Joe Truzman

fdd.org · October 24, 2022

15. Same Type Of Rotax Engines Used In Iranian Drones Targeted In Bizarre Theft Wave

Another form of "globalization?" (but in the criminal rogue nation space)

Consider the ways to interdict this.

Same Type Of Rotax Engines Used In Iranian Drones Targeted In Bizarre Theft Wave

After Ukraine displayed an Iranian drone with a Rotax 912 motor, the global targeting of those engines by criminals is even more intriguing.

thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · October 25, 2022

The Austrian-made Rotax light aircraft engine recently found in a Russian-operated, Iranian-made Mohajar-6 drone recovered by Ukrainian forces is a model that has been at the center of a puzzling and prolonged theft campaign around the globe, but especially in Europe. Sophisticated criminals who know how to circumvent airport security measures and find engines that often have low operating hours and surgically remove them have been the hallmark of the widespread thefts.

So many have been stolen just in the U.K. alone that Operation Opal - a national intelligence team focused on organized crime - was called in to investigate the matter, according to the British Microlight Aircraft Association (BMAA), which along with the Light Aircraft Association (LAA) is collating information about the thefts in the U.K. These facts certainly point to the possibility that Tehran has been getting at least some of its drone engines by having operatives systemically literally rip them out of aircraft in foreign countries.

The Rotax 912 aircraft engine. Credit: Rotax

“Over the years, many Rotax engines have been stolen from light aircraft in the UK,” Jerry Parr, LAA’s head of airworthiness told The War Zone Tuesday in an email. “To the best of my knowledge, there has never been any proof as to where the engines end up or for what purpose.”

Investigators in Norway are also looking into what is being considered sophisticated thefts of Rotax 912 engines.

Ukrainian authorities recently discovered a Rotax 912 four-stroke piston engine in an Iranian Mohajer-6 medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) unmanned aerial vehicle downed over the Black Sea earlier this month. You can read much more about that here.

The aircraft-specific engines made by Rotax, a subsidiary owned by Canadian company Bombardier Recreational Products (BRP), are usually found in light and ultralight aircraft. Their delivery to Iran, however, violates European Union sanctions banning the export of items with both civilian and military purposes, such as vehicle parts. Identical sanctions are imposed by the European Union against Russia, as well.

The discovery of the Rotax engine in the Mohajer-6 brought down over the Black Sea was initially made after Ukrainian intelligence specialists displayed the partially disassembled drone during a CNN network broadcast aired last Tuesday. In it, the outlet’s chief international correspondent Clarissa Ward was given exclusive access to view the recovered and now somewhat dissected drone.

After the discovery of the Rotax engine in the Mohajer-6 drone, Rotax and BRP issued a media release denying any wrongdoing.

“We have been made aware of the alleged use of Rotax engines, or counterfeit engines, in certain specific situations involving Iranian Mohajer-6 drones in the conflict areas,” read the press release. “We are taking this situation very seriously. BRP has not authorized and has not given any authorization to its distributors to supply military UAV manufacturers in Iran or Russia.”

A view of the Rotax 912iS engine found in the Iranian drone. Credit: CNN Screencap

In years past, other Russian drones have featured Rotax engines, which have been used to power General Atomics' MQ-1 Predator and Israel's Heron drones as well.

Reports of Rotax engines powering Iranian UAVs have existed for some time, specifically the Rotax 912 and 914 light aircraft engine variants. For example, the Iranian-made Shahed-129 is widely reported to use a Rotax 914 four-cylinder engine and first entered serial production in 2013.

We reached out to Rotax Monday and Tuesday and will update this story should it provide a response.

According to the company website, more than 130 Rotax 912 engines and six Rotax 914 engines have been stolen worldwide between 2000 and 2021. The first was stolen in Germany and the most recent in Florida.

Rotax has a list of more than 130 912 and 914 engines that were stolen between 2000 and 2021, here is just a snippet from it. (Rotax screen cap)

The U.K., which had 36 such thefts, topped the list, followed by Germany with 31. There were seven stolen from the U.S. and four from Russia.

The thefts peaked in 2016, with 18, and by 2021, tailed off, with only five reported on the Rotax website.

“The theft of Rotax engines from aircraft and airfields around the UK shows no sign of abating,” Flyer, an aviation enthusiast publication, reported in October 2016 in an article pointing to the sophistication of the thefts. “The thieves clearly targeted the aircraft and avoided CCTV cameras at the airfield by breaking into the rear of the hangar.”

The thefts “follow a similar scenario to those reported in Northamptonshire and Cambridgeshire earlier this year, LAA reported on its Facebook page in August 2016. “In this case, three aircraft were targeted, two gyroplanes and a Skyranger.”

Each of those aircraft “had relatively low-hours Rotax 912 engines, which were removed, but the pusher propellers from the gyros were left behind. It is noteworthy too, that two similar aircraft on the strip with high hours 912 engines were left untouched. As with the previous thefts, it was clearly a planned raid, with the thieves accessing the airfield across country and removing the engines with care.”

An aircraft that had its Rotor 912 engine stolen. (Twitter photo)

LAA urged its members to “be on the lookout for ‘too good to be true’ bargain offerings, and please also exercise due vigilance if you fly from a private strip, perhaps reinforcing any security,” according to the Facebook post. “We’re liaising with the local Police to share our knowledge of the earlier incidents. If you have any information which might help apprehend these villains, please contact LAA HQ.”

World microlight champion David Broom, who runs Airplay Aviation, became a Rotax engine theft victim in 2017 and suspected "a fairly professional operation" was behind it, according to Flyer.

“They obviously knew exactly what they wanted, where to cut and what bits were important, so it was a fairly professional operation," Broom told Flyer. "The office cabin, workshop and two hangars were all broken into and damaged."

We contacted local police in the U.K. as well as Operation Opal and will update this story with any information they provide.

U.K. authorities aren’t the only ones looking into sophisticated Rotax 912 engine thefts.

Norwegian authorities are also looking into thefts there by criminals who apparently knew exactly what they were doing and were organized enough to be able to carry away an engine weighing more than 220 pounds undetected.

“Nothing was damaged and the aircraft engine was picked neatly from the aircraft,” according to an Oct. 31, 2021 story by Norway’s TV2 news. “A blanket had been laid over it and a bucket of oil and screws lay underneath.”

“There are obviously professional thieves who have been here,” Pål Vindfallet, deputy head of the Innlandet flight club and flight school, told the station. “They have taken the trouble to disassemble every little part and have not used off-cuts for anything.”

Several other aircraft engines were stolen in Norway, according to TV2 and officials are investigating to see if there is a connection.

Thomas Hauklien, the only Rotax supplier in Norway, told TV2 he is “certain that there is a connection between the thefts.”

Considering how professionally the thefts were carried out, Hauklien told TV2 he suspects that the thefts were "made to order."

And given the reports in Norway, the thefts listed in the Rotax database are likely only a fraction of the real number.

That database, for instance, only lists two thefts from Norway, both in 2018 and neither from the clubs cited by TV2 that took place in 2021.

Rotax engine thefts have raised such a concern in the aviation community that one pilot said he installed a tracking device in the engine on his aircraft, something you can watch him talk about in this video below.

Overall, Rotax engines are quite common, especially in light and experimental general aviation aircraft, and they clearly end up on the secondary market and there is potentially a black market for even newer examples. Iran is also well known to have entire networks dedicated to circumventing sanctions and acquiring various military and dual-use tech, as does Russia and especially North Korea. Everything from fake cutout companies to just straight-up theft could account for some engines, and that is on top of the secondary marketplace.

While there are likely many vectors for Iran to get its hands on Rotax engines, executives from a U.S. drone company that does business with the government told The War Zone on Tuesday that it would not be surprising to hear Iran obtained drones from a criminal enterprise.

There is precedence for criminal activity being tied to Iranian drone engine acquisition.

In 2014, for example, two Iranian men were charged with smuggling dozens of German-made engines capable of powering drones into Iran. They went on trial in Frankfort, according to Reuters.

One was accused of obtaining 61 engines between 2008 and 2009 and delivering them to Iran through his own import-export company. To get through customs, he allegedly declared them as jet ski engines.

And last year, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned a number of Iranian companies associated with drone production.

“Iran’s proliferation of UAVs across the region threatens international peace and stability. Iran and its proxy militants have used UAVs to attack U.S. forces, our partners, and international shipping,” said Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo in a media release at the time. “Treasury will continue to hold Iran accountable for its irresponsible and violent acts.”

Questions about Iranian drones are not the first that Rotax has faced about its products.

In 2020, Rotax-BRP came under fire after it was learned that their engines were powering the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones used to target Armenians during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As a response to the situation, BRP announced it would be temporarily suspending the export of Rotax 912 engines to “countries with unclear usage.”

And earlier this month, a Rotax 912 was found to be powering another Mohajer-6 drone that had been shot down by KDPI Peshmerga forces in Iraq.

As noted in our previous report, there are likely a variety of ways Iran gets its hands on Rotax and other export-controlled engines for its unmanned aircraft, including possibly using front companies, smuggling, the second-hand market, and theft. The fact that there has been a sustained wave of bizarre and well-orchestrated thefts of the exact type of engines that power their key unmanned aircraft systems certainly points to at least a thriving black market for these engines if not a straight-up Iranian operation to obtain them via outright theft. It also isn't clear how far Iranian's own industry has come with being able to clone the engines and to what degree of quality, but clearly, that would be a top priority.

At the moment, it is unknown how the Rotax engine in question wound up in the Iranian Mohajer-6 drone that Kyiv is displaying. But we will keep an eye on this situation and report any additional information we uncover.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · October 25, 2022

16. General Winter Knocks at the Door

A warning.

Excerpts:

For Ukraine the front-line troops may be able to cope while many civilians at home struggle without electricity and water. Residents of Kyiv are being told to prepare for blackouts of four hours a day. Elsewhere hospitals, transport and critical social infrastructure is being given priority. Concrete slabs and sand are being brought in to protect important energy sites. In the west of the country preparations are being made to accept more internal refugees from the east as mass evacuations may be unavoidable. No one pretends that this winter will be anything other than miserable, but there is no evidence that it is making the people of Ukraine any less determined to win the war.

From the start Putin has relied on coercive pressures to deliver the political victories that he has failed to achieve by military means. For all the suffering he has caused in Ukraine he has yet to succeed. The resilience of the Ukrainian people will certainly be tested by the freezing weather, as will that of Russian soldiers, away from home, poorly led, often cut off from supplies and in exposed positions. The key question at for this winter season is how many of the troops ordered to hold their positions at its start will be there at the end.

General Winter Knocks at the Door

samf.substack.com · by Lawrence Freedman

Adolph Northern, ‘Napoleon’s Retreat from Moscow’, 1851.

Winters loom large in the military history of Russia and Ukraine, famously when they were fighting together as part of Imperial Russia against Napoleon and then as part of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany. Winter is about to return and with it questions about how it will affect this war – whether in the impact of energy shortages and high prices in Europe, the vulnerability of ordinary Ukrainians after Russia has done its utmost to deprive them of the ability to keep the lights on and stay warm, and then the troops at the front, shivering in their tents, unable to function properly.

The onset of winter is already starting to shape thoughts about military strategy. It encourages the generals to look for ways to win their battles before manoeuvre becomes too difficult, and their logisticians to worry about how to get the necessary kit forward so that operations can continue. It creates pressure to speed up before everything slows down. It is not the only reason for the current sense of urgency, for both sides are finding it difficult to sustain this war, but it is one of them. Another factor is the growing worry that if things carry on as they are, and especially if Russia faces defeat, then something truly terrible will happen. Before we can assess the impact of winter, we therefore need to consider the fears of escalation.

Nuclear Deterrence and Dirty Bombs

Possible Russian nuclear use has dominated discussion about how the Russo-Ukraine War might escalate. We dare not ignore this possibility but the intense focus upon it glides over the role that nuclear weapons have been playing in Russian strategy from the start of the war. They have enabled Russia to pursue an aggressive war against Ukraine, including measures designed to hurt the Ukrainian people, without risk of other major powers intervening directly.

Terrible things have already happened. Tens of thousands have died. The amount of damage that Russia has inflicted, and continues to inflict, on Ukrainian civil society is horrendous. While they may have been spared the fireballs and insidious radiation associated with nuclear weapons, the human costs, destruction of property and infrastructure, along with the disruption to everyday life, is severe. One estimate suggests that the costs of putting the country together again could be up to $1 trillion.

Russia has been able to go about its destructive business with impunity without fearing comparable costs. The United States and its allies, who could impose costs, or simply make it impossible for Russia to continue to fight in Ukraine, have been unwilling to do so because they are – understandably – fearful of nuclear escalation. The Biden Administration’s policy has been to enable Ukraine to prevent a Russia victory, and if possible defeat Russia, while also avoiding a nuclear war.

Ukraine is not a member of NATO and so cannot expect to be backed on that basis. The UN Security Council should declare Russia a threat to international peace and security, but it cannot because Russia can veto any resolution to that effect. Ukraine can reasonably ask for support as a victim of aggression by invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter, which recognizes the inherent right of self-defence. This was basis for allied military action in support of Kuwait after Iraq’s invasion in August 1990.

This is where the nuclear risk kicks in. It was apparent from early on, when Russia first began to bomb apartment blocks in Mariupol in March, that when it came to the fighting Ukraine was on its own. President Zelensky asked the US and NATO to establish a No-Fly Zone over the country. He was refused because this would have required engaging Russian forces in combat. In addition, although Western countries accepted the need, with varying degrees of urgency, to provide Ukraine with the capabilities to sustain its fight, one area that has been problematic, for both practical and political reasons, has been the provision of extra aircraft. In addition, despite its considerable generosity with so many types of military systems, the US remains reluctant to supply Ukraine with anything, including long-range artillery, that would allow it to strike deep into Russia.

Putin has been explicit that Russia’s nuclear arsenal has this deterrent role. He underlined the was when launching the war on 24 February.

‘I would now like to say something very important for those who may be tempted to interfere in these developments from the outside. No matter who tries to stand in our way or all the more so create threats for our country and our people, they must know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.’

A clear restatement of this position came most recently on 14 October at a press conference. Putin was asked what appeared to be a planted question from a state media journalist, Sergei Dianov:

‘NATO officials are saying explicitly that Ukraine’s defeat would mean the alliance’s defeat. Do you think NATO will send troops into Ukraine if the situation on the battlefield becomes disastrous for Kyiv?’

He replied:

‘ ….. in any event, sending troops into direct engagement, a direct clash with the Russian Army is a very dangerous step that could lead to a global catastrophe. I hope those who talk about this will be smart enough not to undertake such dangerous steps.’

So when nuclear use is spoken of in the future tense it is important to keep in mind that Putin has already got value from his nuclear arsenal without it being used. It provides cover for his efforts to create a humanitarian disaster in Ukraine. (This does of course work both ways: the US arsenal provides cover for neighbouring NATO countries as weapons and war materiel for Ukraine pass through their territory.)

Putin will not want to lose this cover, which might happen if it tried to use nuclear weapons to influence the course of the land battle. This may be a reason, along with the practical difficulties of effective use, why this threat is kept in reserve. Meanwhile it does no harm from his perspective to generate as much anxiety as possible about these weapons being used, however irrational it might appear. One method for generating anxiety is to spread stories about what Ukraine is supposedly about to do, because then it is natural to assume that is exactly what Russia is planning to do. With most of these mooted outrages it is only Russia that has both the motive and the opportunity. When the Kremlin is asked to explain why Kyiv would do things to harm its own people, the normal explanation offered is that the aim would be to make Russia look bad, as if otherwise nobody could possibly conclude that Russia’s behaviour was anything other than considerate and fully in line with the Geneva Conventions. (I dealt with this false flag thinking in an earlier post).

The main Russia false flag claims currently in circulation involve a meltdown at the nuclear power plant at Zaporizhzhia, bursting a dam at Kherson, and now a ‘dirty bomb’. This latter scare was the subject of phone calls between Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and his American, British, and French counterparts, all of whom told him he was talking nonsense. A dirty bomb involves mixing radioactive materials with conventional explosives, so it irradiates an area, not necessarily large, within which people would likely suffer radiation sickness. The prospect might generate some panic, but the actual effects would be nowhere close to those associated with a nuclear device. The Russian media’s evidence to justify this claim has been put together with its singular incompetence. (See here and here). Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have visited the sites where Russia claims that Ukraine is preparing such a bomb (both of which are under Ukrainian control and where there is access to radioactive materials held legitimately). The inspectors have promised to check again.

Hopefully, all of this will soon be forgotten as just one more scare, of which there have been a number promoted by Moscow during the course of the war. Nonetheless, simply by imposing these scares on public consciousness they leave everybody nervous, not least by raising the question of whether they are pretexts for some awful Russian action to come. Ukraine’s nuclear energy operator, Energoatom, has issued its own warning that the Russian military operators at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant might be ‘preparing a terrorist act using nuclear materials and radioactive waste stored at the ZNPP site.’ Biden, asked about all of this talk about a ‘dirty bomb’ and the possibility that it is creating a pretext for a proper nuclear bomb, observed: ‘Let me just say: Russia would be making an incredibly serious mistake for it to use tactical nuclear weapons …. I’m not guaranteeing you that it’s a false flag operation yet — don’t know — but it would be a serious, serious mistake.’

One thought here is that if the Russians really wanted to get alarm bells ringing in Washington, London, and Paris they would not rely on these transparent games but instead ensure that Western intelligence picked up signs of relevant systems on the move or chatter involving command centres. At some point it can be truly difficult, as we discovered last February, to be sure whether what is being picked up represents bluffs, development of an option, or the real thing.

Surovokin’s Strategy

Such scares fit in with regular Russian efforts to manipulate perceptions about the conduct of this war and to increase international unease. They might be intended to encourage caution when it comes to supporting Ukraine for fear of where it all might lead, which clearly works on some sections of Western opinion. They are part of the exceptional measures that Putin took to move his ‘special military operation’ into a higher gear in mid-September. This came as he realized that Russia was losing and that this awkward fact could no longer be hidden from the Russian people or from moderately friendly countries, such as India and China. After a number of setbacks, starting with the successful Ukrainian offensive in Kharkiv, he was coming under intense pressure from hardliners to turn the situation around.

To address this pressure he went into overdrive. We do not need to see what Putin does when he starts to feel desperate and so escalates. We already know.

The escalation so far has taken the following form:

· Annexation of the four occupied (or more accurately semi-occupied) provinces of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. This has raised the stakes, demonstrating that the prize is the expansion of Russian territory, though this will never gain international recognition. The immediate effect was to make it much harder to back down, for that would now involve abandoning Russian territory.

· Introduction of martial law in these territories and also in some parts of Russia. This has made it easier to control discontent, continue with Russification, and, when possible, mobilise men for the front.

· Appoint a new ‘Commander of the Joint Group of Forces in the Special Operations Zone’, General Sergei Surovokin. His reputation is that of a tough and harsh commander, as demonstrated in Syria.

· Authorise mass mobilization. This initially seemed to be looking for up to a million draftees. After a chaotic process, which caused some backlash in Russia, the number now seems to have been capped at 300,000 (although the actual number may be higher).

· Send these additional troops, whether properly trained or equipped (and in most cases they are neither), to thicken defences at the front. The aim is to establish lines that if held can see the campaign through the winter, after which time there may be fresh units, better trained and ready to revive offensive operations.

This is how General Surovikin describes his approach:

‘Ukrainians and I are one people and we want one thing, that Ukraine was independent from the West and NATO, a friendly state to Russia. Our enemy is a criminal regime that is forcing the citizens of Ukraine to death.’

‘All measures are taken to build up the combat strength and formations of military units, create additional reserves, equip defense lines and positions along the entire line of contact, continue attacks with high-precision weapons on military facilities and infrastructure facilities affecting the combat capability of the Ukrainian troops, to reduce the combat capability.’

If he wants a state friendly to Russia he is going an odd way about it. Far from choosing targets for long-range strikes to affect Ukrainian combat capabilities, targets have been chosen to affect the will of the Ukrainian people and government to continue with the war. There have been similar attacks all through the war but the more recent, using combinations of missiles and ‘kamikaze drones’ supplied by Iran, these have been more systematic and focused. They have led to some 40 percent of Ukraine’s electricity generating capacity being damaged. In many areas water supplies have also been disrupted and contaminated.

We might note in passing that although Putin justified the first barrage of missile/drone attacks on Ukrainian cities on 10 October as retribution for the ‘terrorist’ damage inflicted on the Kerch Bridge connecting Crimea to the mainland by an act of sabotage a few days earlier, it is now clear that these attacks were planned well in advance.

It has become a priority for Ukraine to find ways to protect its cities from further attacks. In fact, according to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, they have been doing quite well intercepting missiles and drones, often using improvised means. Aircraft are becoming quite adept at intercepting the drones. (Some 70 percent of the Iranian-supplied Shahed-136 drones have been downed). Ukrainian air defences relied on relatively old systems – the S300 surface-to-air-missile, which can hit incoming targets out to 46 miles. As supplies are running low, and so must be conserved to take out the most accurate Russian missiles, the Ukrainians are eagerly awaiting the first NASAMS (National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System) from the Americans. These can see up to 80 miles away. The first of these, on which Ukrainians are being trained, should be arriving during November.

There are varying estimates of how many missiles the Russians have got left. Ukrainian intelligence suggests that stocks of the more precise cruise and ballistic missiles are well down, so they may have to rely on systems which may miss key targets. The problem remains for Ukraine that even while the defensive coverage could improve significantly it will never be possible to protect all possible targets. A lot of damage has already been done which will take time to repair. Many Ukrainians will have to cope with a cold winter without basic facilities.

None of this, however, will make much difference to their determination to continue to prosecute the war.

The Battle for Territory

In his interview Surovikin also explained that: ‘The situation regarding the special operation is tense. The enemy does not abandon attempts to attack the positions of Russian troops.’

How tense? Russia’s extra troops have caused some problems for Ukrainian forces. They prefer to avoid the need for frontal assaults on core areas of enemy strength, and therefore rely on attacks directed against Russian logistics, command, and morale, with artillery and air strikes, while seeking to get round enemy positions. The thicker and wider those positions the longer they take to encircle. Russian orders are clearly to hold their positions and not to abandon them as happened with earlier offensives. Recent fighting has therefore been gruelling for both sides.

Most attention has been given to the Kherson front. Here Russian forces are almost cut off as resupply depends on a ferry and a barge bridge. It will not be easy to escape in a rush. Russia reportedly told the civilian population to leave but this largely seems to have been those connected with the local Russian administration. There has been speculation that Russia is pulling its forces back to the eastern side of the Dnieper river, where the positions might be defensible, though this would mean conceding a lot of territory to the Ukrainians. They do appear to have moved some of their best troops there while leaving some of the newly-mobilised forces on the western bank to defend the city. Despite doubts about how well these units might cope, Ukrainian intelligence has reported that they are preparing for urban combat. They might still need to leave quickly if they otherwise risked getting trapped.

Ukraine has also warned that the large hydroelectric dam at Nova Kakhovka, upstream from Kherson, has been mined, with two trucks full of explosives placed on top of its walls. The Russians have also taken some steps have also been taken to reduce the volume of water behind the dam. If the dam was breached by explosions the flooding would still lead to environmental damage and loss of life. The Ukrainian view is that if this was done to impede their advance it would cause some delay – perhaps a couple of weeks – but would also affect water supplies to Crimea, a big issue for Russia.

If the liberation of Kherson is important to opening up the South, thereby rendering Crimea more vulnerable, penetration of the defensive line protecting Luhansk would open even more territory to be ‘de-occupied’. Although both sets of battles have been covered by news blackouts in Kyiv, Ukrainian sources are sounding optimistic about this front A key highway between the towns of Kreminna and Svatov has now been reached, adding to Russia’s problems of supply and encirclement.

Lastly there is Bakhmut in Donetsk. In some ways this has been a curiosity because here the Wagner paramilitary force, controlled by Yevgeniy Prigozhin, has been pummelling away for four months, achieving only small gains. Until recently Ukrainians were describing the situation as difficult, with occupation of the battered town at risk, but Russian forces seem to have exhausted themselves after a series of catastrophic pushes, many involving new draftees, that left many dead. They have been used as disposable soldiers, good only for one attack before dead, wounded or surrendered. It may be that here as elsewhere, for this reason, officers are not bothering to kit them out properly, saving scarce equipment for experienced soldiers more likely to survive.

If the Bakhmut attack has stalled – or has even gone into reverse – this could have important political implications. This was Wagner’s personal project – unrelated to what was going on elsewhere in the war. Even if Bakhmut had been taken it was not obvious how victory would be exploited. Prigozhin was aiming to demonstrate how much he could achieve compared with regular forces, thereby fortifying his standing as a power broker in the Kremlin. But if he has failed in his project and his forces now get pushed back then the effect could be opposite to the one intended.

Intriguingly it has been reported in the Washington Post that Prigozhin, a long-time critic of Shoigu and the Ministry of Defence, has complained directly to Putin that his forces have been given insufficient resources to prosecute the war effectively. This may just be getting his excuses in before his failure gets noted. He is quoted as saying that: ‘Our units are constantly meeting with the most fierce enemy resistance, and I note that the enemy is well prepared, motivated, and works confidently and harmoniously,’ adding that ‘This does not prevent our fighters from moving forward, but I cannot comment on how long it will take.’ At the same time he has also been getting to work on a line of fortifications in eastern Luhansk, bolstered by the presence of Wagner units – each one ‘already an impregnable wall.’ As this appears to concede some of the territory of the Donbas statelets and goes into Russia’s Belgorod Oblast this could be controversial.

The Weather

The war may yet take some unexpected and even terrifying turns. One of the few things that is predictable is that winter is coming.

Even if the Russians can hold their positions and avoid more hurried and humiliating retreats there is still a question about their ability to cope with winter weather. First there is heavy rainfall, making movement much more difficult, especially for heavy vehicles, and then there is the freezing snow, when movement is more possible but equipment, and people, are less reliable. Brigadier General Vahur Karus, Head of Ukraine’s Defence Forces Academy observes:

‘Fighting in winter is very different from summer as snow cover could keep you from staging major offensives out in the open and contain you to roads alone. The hostile environment means that the survival of your machinery and troops could prove more decisive than your tactical genius. It might turn into a preservation operation where you need to have a very clear overview of what you're using, where and how.’

Because of this troops stuck in the field for any length of time need to be able to cope with harsh conditions. It is not just a matter of staying warm. Equipment becomes harder to maintain and operate. Fuel demands go up to keep generators going. Mines may be hidden under the snow. Quantities of white paint are needed to camouflage vehicles.

NATO has made this a major priority in its resupply effort. Canada is providing nearly half a million sets of winter gear. Other countries including Finland and Estonia with experience of these conditions are also contributing. On the Russian side there are doubts about what will get through to the front. Given the miserable conditions about which draftees are already complaining, which see them left without proper kit and supplies, and left to their own devices by absent commanders, it is hard to imagine how they can survive unless there is a comparable effort. The war began during the last winter, and then Russian troops suffered frostbite. And that was before mobilization. Pentagon officials do not believe that it is ‘possible for Russia to adequately scale up its logistical operations before winter hits.’

For Ukraine the front-line troops may be able to cope while many civilians at home struggle without electricity and water. Residents of Kyiv are being told to prepare for blackouts of four hours a day. Elsewhere hospitals, transport and critical social infrastructure is being given priority. Concrete slabs and sand are being brought in to protect important energy sites. In the west of the country preparations are being made to accept more internal refugees from the east as mass evacuations may be unavoidable. No one pretends that this winter will be anything other than miserable, but there is no evidence that it is making the people of Ukraine any less determined to win the war.

From the start Putin has relied on coercive pressures to deliver the political victories that he has failed to achieve by military means. For all the suffering he has caused in Ukraine he has yet to succeed. The resilience of the Ukrainian people will certainly be tested by the freezing weather, as will that of Russian soldiers, away from home, poorly led, often cut off from supplies and in exposed positions. The key question at for this winter season is how many of the troops ordered to hold their posiitons at its start will be there at the end.

Comment is Freed is a reader-supported publication. We are making Lawrence’s posts on the Russian invasion of Ukraine free to read but if you find the pieces valuable and can afford to subscribe we would welcome the support. A monthly subscription is £3.50 and an annual one is £35. It includes four subscriber only posts a month.

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samf.substack.com · by Lawrence Freedman

17. Outrage over NFL brain injuries; silence over military brain injuries

Outrage over NFL brain injuries; silence over military brain injuries

militarytimes.com · by Frank Larkin · October 25, 2022

The NFL drew a hailstorm of criticism for its ineffective concussion guidelines that allowed Miami Dolphins quarterback Tua Tagovailoa to return to play after withstanding a hard tackle and exhibiting concussive symptoms during a game against the Buffalo Bills on Sept. 25. Days later, Tagovailoa was slammed to the ground and suffered a concussion during a matchup with the Cincinnati Bengals.

”It’s a potentially life-threatening brain injury,” Chris Nowinski, a neuroscientist and co-founder of the Concussion Legacy Foundation said of the back-to-back injuries.

The NFL has since tightened its concussion protocols to make it harder for players to return to a game after a serious hit to the head, which mounting evidence suggests can cause long-term physical or psychological effects.

The outpouring of concern over what is an occupational hazard for NFL players is in stark contrast to a similar occupational hazard faced by U.S. service members. Indeed, there is only muted discussion in the public discourse about the brain injury dangers service members face going about their daily business either in combat or in training.

And yet, brain injuries are pervasive for the men and women in uniform. Service members can sustain what are known as mild traumatic brain injuries, or mTBIs, in many ways, “including athletics, recreational activities, physical training, falls, motor-vehicle accidents and exposure to explosive blasts,” researchers reported in the Journal of the Alzheimer’s Association.

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“Military mTBI is also random and unpredictable, ranging from a single injury to many thousands of traumatic injuries over similar time periods depending on an individual’s chance exposure to blasts and impacts,” researchers said. While mTBI is the most common traumatic brain injury affecting military personnel, “it is the most difficult to diagnose and the least well understood.”

A 2017 study published in the American Journal of Epidemiology concluded that “mild traumatic brain injury is considered one of the signature injuries of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, with as many as 23 percent of U.S. veterans who served in these conflicts reporting at least one mTBI during their military service.”

Mild traumatic brain injuries predominantly occur at the microscopic level, challenging medicine’s ability to diagnose them with current imaging technology. Undiagnosed traumatic brain injuries often complicate other conditions of war such as post-traumatic stress disorders, moral injuries and substance abuse. Experts characterize this complex rubric of conditions as “invisible wounds.”

Another major concern about brain injury — especially for service members and veterans — is the link to suicide. As the Department of Veterans Affairs noted in its 2020 annual report on suicide among veterans, “Veterans Health Administration patients who died by suicide are more likely to have sleep disorders, traumatic brain injury or a pain diagnosis than other VHA patients.” Similarly, a study in the journal Psychological Services found that post-9/11 veterans with a history of traumatic brain injuries were at much greater risk for considering suicide.

With the Warrior Call initiative I lead, we are raising awareness about the problem through an effort known as National Warrior Call Day on Nov. 13. We’re asking all Americans to connect with veterans and service members and in turn get them connected to support and services. Connection is essential, because up to two-thirds of veterans who take their own lives have had no contact with the Department of Veterans Affairs.

The NFL is doing the right thing on concussions because they are dangerous to players and can lead to debilitating ailments down the road. But it’s nothing short of a national scandal that the Department of Defense lacks the urgency and a similar aggressive approach. The agency is only now getting around to studying the impact of TBIs on service members — this after 20-plus years in the global war on terror and as suicide rates among vets and service members have soared.

The government must focus resources on understanding the prevalence of brain injuries, including mTBI, in the armed forces and develop better screening to treat personnel and veterans well before they spiral into a suicidal abyss.

Frank Larkin, the chairman of Warrior Call, is a former Navy SEAL and the father of a Navy SEAL who died by suicide. He also served as the 40th Senate sergeant at arms.

Veterans in need of emergency counseling can reach the Veterans Crisis line by dialing 988 or 1-800-273-8255 and selecting option 1 after connecting to reach a VA staffer. In addition, veterans, troops or their family members can also text 838255 or visit VeteransCrisisLine.net for assistance.

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18. Russia’s Recruiting Afghan Commandos

Russia’s Recruiting Afghan Commandos

Foreign Policy · by Lynne O’Donnell · October 25, 2022

Analysis

Abandoned special forces veterans are getting job offers for a very different kind of battlefield.

ODonnell-Lynne-foreign-policy-columnist

Lynne O’Donnell

By Lynne O’Donnell, a columnist at Foreign Policy and an Australian journalist and author.

Afghan National Army soldiers train.

Afghan National Army soldiers train at the Kabul Military Training Center on the outskirts of Kabul on May 1, 2017. SHAH MARAI/AFP via Getty Images

Members of Afghanistan’s elite National Army Commando Corps, who were abandoned by the United States and Western allies when the country fell to the Taliban last year, say they are being contacted with offers to join the Russian military to fight in Ukraine. Multiple Afghan military and security sources say the U.S.-trained light infantry force, which fought alongside U.S. and other allied special forces for almost 20 years, could make the difference Russia needs on the Ukrainian battlefield.

Afghanistan’s 20,000 to 30,000 volunteer commandos were left behind when the United States ceded Afghanistan to the Taliban in August 2021 . Only a few hundred senior officers were evacuated when the republic collapsed. Thousands of soldiers escaped to regional neighbors as the Taliban hunted down and killed loyalists to the collapsed government. Many of the commandos who remain in Afghanistan are in hiding to avoid capture and execution.

The United States spent almost $90 billion building the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. Although the force as a whole was incompetent and handed the country over to the Taliban in a matter of weeks, the commandos were always held in high regard, having been schooled by U.S. Navy SEALs and the British Special Air Service.

Emblematic of the commandos’ pyrrhic success was the battle of Dawlat Abad, where an Afghan commando unit fought the Taliban while waiting for reinforcements and resupplies that never came in June 2021. The U.S.-trained major who led the unit, Sohrab Azimi, became a national hero when it was revealed he’d had only three days’ rest after fighting for 50 days straight before heading to his final battle.

Now, they are jobless and hopeless, many commandos still waiting for resettlement in the United States or Britain, making them easy targets for recruiters who understand the “band of brothers” mentality of highly skilled fighting men. This potentially makes them easy pickings for Russian recruiters, said Afghan security sources. A former senior Afghan security official, who requested anonymity, said their integration into the Russian military “would be a game-changer” on the Ukrainian battlefield, as Russian President Vladimir Putin struggles to recruit for his faltering war and is reportedly using the notorious mercenary Wagner Group to sign up prisoners.

Wagner is a shady organization that officially doesn’t exist but is believed to be run by Yevgeny Prigozhin, an associate of Putin who possibly funds it through the GRU military intelligence agency. It reportedly first emerged in Crimea after Moscow’s 2014 annexation of the region from Ukraine, and it has since appeared in Syria, Libya, and elsewhere in Africa. Prigozhin was recently filmed signing up prisoners in return for canceled sentences to reinforce Russian lines in Ukraine.

A former official, who was also an Afghan commando officer, said he believed Wagner was behind Russia’s recruitment of Afghanistan’s special forces. “I am telling you [the recruiters] are Wagner Group. They are gathering people from all over. The only entity that recruits foreign troops [for Russia] are Wagner Group, not their army. It’s not an assumption; it’s a known fact,” he said. “They’d be better used by Western allies to fight alongside Ukrainians. They don’t want to fight for the Russians; the Russians are the enemy. But what else are they going to do?”

Some former commandos report being contacted on WhatsApp and Signal with offers to join what some experts referred to as a Russian “foreign legion” to fight in Ukraine. News of the recruitment efforts has caused alarm in Afghanistan’s former military and security circles, with members saying up to 10,000 former commandos could be amenable to the Russian offers. As another military source put it: “They have no country, no jobs, no future. They have nothing to lose.”

“It’s not difficult,” he added. “They are waiting for work for $3 to $4 a day in Pakistan or Iran or $10 a day in Turkey, and if Wagner or any other intelligence services come to a guy and offer $1,000 to be a fighting man again, they won’t reject it. And if you find one guy to recruit, he can get half his old unit to join up because they are like brothers—and pretty soon, you’ve got a whole platoon.”

Since global attention switched to Ukraine following Russia’s February invasion, the Afghan commandos have been left high and dry. Instead of helping them escape Taliban death squads, the United States and its allies have largely gone AWOL. Their vulnerability to recruitment by countries hostile to the United States was flagged in a report by Rep. Michael McCaul on last year’s evacuation debacle. Referring to United States’ intelligence assets—which include the Afghan commandos—he said they “could potentially present a risk to U.S. security should they be coerced or coopted into working with an adversary, including international terrorist groups such as [the Islamic State-Khorasan] or state actors like China, Russia, and Iran.”

A 35-year-old former commando captain in hiding in Afghanistan said he had helped a number of former colleagues connect with a recruitment office in Tehran. Recruits were flown from Afghanistan to Iran and then to Russia, he said. What happened next was unclear: “When they accept Russia’s offer, the commando personnels’ phones are turned off. They proceed very secretly,” the former captain said.

He and other former commandos who spoke from Afghanistan and Iran described living in desperate conditions. “We are very disappointed. For 18 years, shoulder to shoulder, we performed dangerous tasks with American, British, and Norwegian consultants. Now, I am in hiding. I am suffering every second,” said the 35-year-old. He didn’t take up the offer, as he regards Russia as Afghanistan’s enemy. The former Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and fought a 10-year war against U.S.-supported mujahideen. More recently, Russia supported the Taliban’s insurgency, and it has close ties with them now that they’re in power, stopping short of diplomatic recognition.

Another commando who fought alongside British special forces said he fled to Iran to escape Taliban death squads and now worries he will be arrested by Iranian police. Both commandos said they wanted to resettle in Britain but have no idea how to contact the authorities to ask for protection.

Recruitment messages seen by Foreign Policy use the same wording, suggesting a centralized operation. “Anyone who would like to go to Russia with better treatment and good resources: please send me your name, father’s name, and your military rank,” the messages say. Recipients are asked to help recruit other members of their units. Afghan television reported that the recruitment offers include Russian citizenship.

The 35-year-old captain, father to four young children, said he was still hopeful that he would be resettled in Britain. “We fought the sworn enemies of Afghanistan for 20 years, all over the country, with high morale, on the side of Britain and the United States,” the captain said. “We are hiding like prisoners now.”

Lynne O’Donnell is a columnist at Foreign Policy and an Australian journalist and author. She was the Afghanistan bureau chief for Agence France-Presse and the Associated Press between 2009 and 2017.

19. Commander Bans Army-Issued Warm, Comfy Fleece Jacket as Winter Approaches

Sigh.....

Ban for what purpose?

Sigh...

Commander Bans Army-Issued Warm, Comfy Fleece Jacket as Winter Approaches

military.com · by Steve Beynon · October 25, 2022

A battalion commander is forbidding soldiers under his command from wearing their Army-issued fleece jackets while on a rotation in South Korea, where local average temperatures during the winter frequently dip below freezing.

"The fleece cold weather jacket is not authorized for wear as an outer garment," Lt. Col. Geoffrey Lynch, commander of 1st Battalion, 36th Infantry Regiment, 1st Armored Division, said in an August memo reviewed by Military.com.

A spokesperson for Fort Bliss, where the unit is based, did not return a request for comment ahead of this story's publication. Maj. David Matoi, Lynch's executive officer who is listed as the memo's point of contact, did not respond to a request for comment.

It is unclear why Lynch outlawed the fleece as an outergarment, given that Army clothing regulations specifically say that the jacket is meant to be worn on "mild cold days," with the memo referencing those same rules.

The other regulation referenced in the memo was a paragraph out of the Army's regulatory guidelines on uniforms which gives commanders broad authority on dictating what troops can wear, "Soldiers may wear the [cold weather] jackets and trousers as outer garments, to include the fleece jacket, when authorized by the commander."

It's not the first time a debate over the fleece has popped up, as questions sporadically surface about whether the jacket is primarily intended to be an undergarment worn under other cold weather gear. Though Army rules make it clear the jacket can be worn as an outer garment and are otherwise generally loose on when and where troops can wear it.

A top Army official overseeing uniform rules squashed any of that confusion back in January.

"It's an outer garment," Sgt. Maj. Ashleigh Sykes, the top enlisted leader for uniform policy said on Twitter in January. "There is hook and loop for name tapes, rank, and US Army to make that obvious."

Sgt. Maj. of the Army Michael Grinston, the service's top enlisted leader, endorsed the message. "That settles that," he tweeted.

-- Steve Beynon can be reached at Steve.Beynon@military.com. Follow him on Twitter @StevenBeynon.

military.com · by Steve Beynon · October 25, 2022

20.  The ‘Anti-Navy’ the U.S. Needs Against the Chinese Military

Excerpts:

These steps can deter war within the window of maximum danger. If Republicans gain control of Congress, preventing the same deterrence failure we saw in Ukraine from playing out in Taiwan must be our top priority.

Congress needs to bend the Pentagon bureaucracy, in service of a defense strategy that prioritizes hard power. Doing so demands we understand the paradox of deterrence: that to avoid war, you must convince your adversary that you are both capable and willing to wage war.

If we ignore the hard lessons about hard power that we have learned in Ukraine, if we succumb to the utopian path of disarmament, and if we allow the fear of escalation to dominate our decisions, we will feed Mr. Xi’s appetite for conquest and invite war. By choosing to put an anti-navy in Mr. Xi’s path, we can deter war in the short term and buy time to build a Navy that defeats communism over the long term.

The ‘Anti-Navy’ the U.S. Needs Against the Chinese Military

The U.S. is set to be weakest when the People’s Liberation Army aims to be strongest.

By Mike Gallagher

Oct. 25, 2022 6:14 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/anti-navy-us-needs-against-china-taiwan-invasion-xi-jinping-military-war-readiness-air-force-army-investments-pla-ccp-defense-spending-11666712660?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d

As Xi Jinping secured a third term as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, U.S. foreign policy entered a window of maximum danger. In a speech to the 20th Party Congress, Mr. Xi made clear that unification with Taiwan “must” and “can, without doubt, be realized.”

Secretary of State Antony Blinken admitted that Mr. Xi is moving on a “much faster timeline” to take Taiwan, and Chief of Naval Operations Michael Gilday said he couldn’t rule out an invasion in 2022 or 2023. Domestically, Mr. Xi’s problems—a structural economic slowdown, skyrocketing household debt, and the demographic buzzsaw of the largest group of retirees in human history—will all get worse in the 2030s.

At the same time, Mr. Xi faces an American military that is growing weaker within the decade. As the Heritage Foundation’s recently released 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength makes clear, because of inadequate budgets, truncated modernization and degraded readiness, the U.S. military is set to be weakest when the People’s Liberation Army aims to be strongest. The report, which for the first time rated the overall state of the U.S. military as “weak,” rated the Navy and Air Force—the two priority forces in the Indo-Pacific—as “weak” and “very weak,” respectively.

Rather than gambling the fate of the free world on Mr. Xi’s restraint, we must learn the lessons from Ukraine and put American hard power in Mr. Xi’s path before it is too late. Long-term investments to rebuild American military superiority in general, and maritime superiority in particular, are critical. But the reality is we won’t be able to build the Navy the nation needs within the next five years.

What we can do now is build an anti-navy—asymmetric forces and weapons designed to target the Chinese Navy, deny control of the seas surrounding Taiwan, and prevent the PLA’s amphibious forces from gaining a lodgment on the island.

The first step in assembling this anti-navy is to build up long-range ground-launched conventional missiles in three rings across the Pacific: (1) the First Island Chain, (2) the Second Island Chain plus the Central Pacific islands, and (3) the outer edges of the theater, including Alaska, Hawaii, and Australia.

As a new report from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments argues, in the first ring we need shorter-range antiship and air-defense missiles such as the Naval Strike Missile, Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile and SM-6. These weapons would be operated by the Army and Marine Corps, especially in the Southern Japanese and Northern Philippine Islands. Wherever possible, the weapons should be containerized to confuse Chinese targeting.

In the second ring, we need extended-range Maritime Strike Tomahawks and other intermediate-range missiles. In the third ring we need longer-range intermediate missiles with advanced energetic materials in places like Alaska and Australia’s Northern Territory.

The point is that the PLA Rocket Force (China’s anti-navy) has fielded low-cost weapons to keep American ships out of the fight and target American forces concentrated in a few, fixed locations. We must use this logic against China, building an anti-navy that can sink PLA ships and amphibious landing craft at port, in the Taiwan Strait and on Taiwan’s beaches. Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles cost only about $4 million a unit but could destroy Chinese ships that cost the PLA hundreds of millions of dollars to build. For once, U.S. forces would be on the right side of the cost equation.

The second step in building an anti-navy is to stockpile munitions before the shooting starts. At current rates, it could take two years to boost Javelin production from 2,100 to 4,000 missiles annually. In many cases Chinese companies are the sole source or a primary supplier of key materials used in our missiles. To fix this, the Pentagon should stop buying minimum sustaining rates of critical munitions and start maxing out the capacity of active production lines through multiyear procurement contracts. Drawing on the lessons of Operation Warp Speed, we can modernize the Defense Production Act and use it to provide direct project financing, automatic fast-tracking of permits, and investments in defense workforce training.

The third step is to turn the talk about arming Taiwan to the teeth into reality. This starts with moving Taiwan to the front of the Foreign Military Sales line and clearing the backlog of $14 billion in FMS items that have been approved but not delivered. Congress can go further by providing direct financial assistance to Taiwan and giving the Pentagon the same drawdown authority to provide defense supplies directly to Taiwan that it already has with Ukraine. Rather than demilitarizing hundreds of Harpoon missiles or putting them into deep storage, for instance, the Pentagon could use a Taiwan drawdown authority, make any necessary modernizations and certifications, and send these missiles, along with launchers, to Taiwan.

These steps can deter war within the window of maximum danger. If Republicans gain control of Congress, preventing the same deterrence failure we saw in Ukraine from playing out in Taiwan must be our top priority.

Congress needs to bend the Pentagon bureaucracy, in service of a defense strategy that prioritizes hard power. Doing so demands we understand the paradox of deterrence: that to avoid war, you must convince your adversary that you are both capable and willing to wage war.

If we ignore the hard lessons about hard power that we have learned in Ukraine, if we succumb to the utopian path of disarmament, and if we allow the fear of escalation to dominate our decisions, we will feed Mr. Xi’s appetite for conquest and invite war. By choosing to put an anti-navy in Mr. Xi’s path, we can deter war in the short term and buy time to build a Navy that defeats communism over the long term.

Mr. Gallagher, a Republican, represents Wisconsin’s Eighth Congressional District.

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WSJ Opinion: The U.S. Military’s Growing Weakness

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WSJ Opinion: The U.S. Military’s Growing Weakness

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Review and Outlook: The Heritage Foundation's latest 'Index of U.S. Military Strength' warns of declining power in the U.S. Navy and Air Force. Images: Department of Defence/Heritage Foundation Composite: Mark Kelly

Appeared in the October 26, 2022, print edition as 'The ‘Anti-Navy’ the U.S. Needs Against China'.

21.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com