Quotes of the Day:

"If we let Korea down, the Soviet[s] will keep right on going and swallow up one [place] after another.”

– President Harry Truman, remarks at his first meeting with his advisors after learning that North Korea had invaded South Korea, June 25, 1950

"General Bradley said that we must draw the line [against communist expansion] somewhere. The President stated he agreed on that. General Bradley said that Russia is not yet ready for war. The Korean situation offered as good an occasion for action in drawing the line as anywhere else."

- From the official minutes of President Harry S. Truman's meeting with his top military and foreign-policy advisers at the Blair House on the evening of June 25th, 1950

"In my generation, this was not the first occasion when the strong had attacked the weak. [...] Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall, communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores."

- President Harry Truman

1. Korean War June 25, 1950

2. Redeploying tactical nuclear weapons to S. Korea could strengthen nuclear umbrella against Russia-NK threats: Bolton

3. South Korean activists say their balloons will continue to fly, despite North warnings

4. Conflict fears grow ahead of Korean War anniversary

5. South Korean military says 350 waste balloons detected from North Korea overnight as tensions flare

6. Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Explained

7. S. Korea conducts live-fire drills with Chunmoo multiple rocket launchers

8. Meet the North Koreans who haven't been able to return home in over 70 years

9. Putin says ties with N. Korea raised to 'unprecedentedly high level' in thank-you message to Kim

10. Russia and North Korea signed a defense pact with each other. What does this mean?

11. South Korea latest to level charges against Israeli officials for alleged war crimes in Gaza

12. North Korean Munitions Factories: The Other Side of Arms Transfers to Russia

13. Campbell stresses Washington Declaration as deterrence tool amid security concerns over Putin-Kim summit

14. UN aviation authority condemns North Korea GPS jamming near Incheon airport

15. N. Korea supports Russia's war with Ukraine as 'legitimate act of self-defense'

1. Korean War June 25, 1950

This may be the "forgotten war," but it was pivotal in many respects. Its effects are still felt to this day.

Korean War

https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/research/online-documents/korean-war

1. 
   
2. Online Documents  Korean War

After five years of simmering tensions on the Korean peninsula, the Korean War began on June 25, 1950, when the Northern Korean People's Army invaded South Korea in a coordinated general attack at several strategic points along the 38th parallel, the line dividing communist North Korea from the non-communist Republic of Korea in the south. North Korea aimed to militarily conquer South Korea and therefore unify Korea under the communist North Korean regime. Concerned that the Soviet Union and Communist China might have encouraged this invasion, President Harry S. Truman committed United States air, ground, and naval forces to the combined United Nations forces assisting the Republic of Korea in its defense. President Truman designated General Douglas MacArthur as Commanding General of the United Nations Command (UNC).

The first several months of the war were characterized by armies advancing and retreating up and down the Korean peninsula. The initial North Korean attack drove United Nations Command forces to a narrow perimeter around the port of Pusan in the southern tip of the peninsula. After the front stabilized at the Pusan perimeter, General MacArthur surprised the North Koreans in September 1950 with an amphibious landing at Inchon behind North Korean lines, forcing the North Koreans to retreat behind the 38th parallel.

In October, the United Nations, urged by the United States Government, approved the movement of UN forces across the 38th parallel into North Korea in an effort to unify the country under a non-communist government. In spite of warnings issued by the Chinese Government, the United Nations forces moved toward the Yalu River, marking the North Korean border with Manchuria. Discounting the significance of initial Chinese attacks in late October, MacArthur ordered the UNC to launch an offensive, taking the forces to the Yalu. In late November the Chinese attacked in full strength, pushing the UNC in disarray south of the 38th parallel with the communist forces seizing the South Korean capital, Seoul.

In early 1951 the Chinese offensive lost its momentum and the UNC, bolstered by the revitalized 8th U.S. Army led by General Matthew B. Ridgway, retook Seoul and advanced back to the 38th parallel. From July 1951, until the end of hostilities the battle lines remained relatively stable and the conflict became a stalemate. The Truman Administration abandoned plans to reunite North and South Korea and instead decided to pursue limited goals in order to avoid the possible escalation of the conflict into a third world war involving China and the Soviet Union. When General MacArthur publicly challenged the Truman Administration's conduct of the war, the President, "...concluded that...MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government..." and relieved him from command in April 1951, replacing him with General Ridgway.

Acting on a campaign pledge, President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower went to Korea on December 2, 1952. After visiting the troops, their commanders and South Korean leaders, and receiving briefings on the military situation in Korea, Eisenhower concluded, "we could not stand forever on a static front and continue to accept casualties without any visible results. Small attacks on small hills would not end this war." President Eisenhower sought an end to hostilities in Korea through a combination of diplomacy and military muscle-flexing. On July 27, 1953, seven months after President Eisenhower's inauguration as the 34th President of the United States, an armistice was signed, ending organized combat operations and leaving the Korean Peninsula divided much as it had been since the close of World War II at the 38th parallel.

The Korean U.N. "police action" prevented North Korea from imposing its communist rule on South Korea. Also, the United States' actions in Korea demonstrated America's willingness to combat aggression, strengthened President Eisenhower's hand in Europe as he sought to organize European military defense under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and insured that the United States would pursue its military buildup called for in the famous cold war document, National Security Council Policy Paper No. 68.

2. Redeploying tactical nuclear weapons to S. Korea could strengthen nuclear umbrella against Russia-NK threats: Bolton

Before we decide to do this we should first describe in detail what deters Kim Jong Un and how tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea will significantly improve our deterrence capabilities. Will such a deployment have any significant effect on Kim and his decision making? If we think so then we need to describe that. Is the perception of improved deterrence in Kim's mind or only in ours?

Second, we need to determine what is the actual concept for employment of these weapons? How will they be used? What capabilities gap will they overcome?

Redeploying tactical nuclear weapons to S. Korea could strengthen nuclear umbrella against Russia-NK threats: Bolton

The Korea Times · June 25, 2024

Former U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton speaks during an event hosted by the Korea Finance for Construction (FINCO) at InterContinental Seoul COEX, Gangnam District, Seoul, June 25. Yonhap

Former U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton said Tuesday that the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea could enhance its deterrence against North Korean threats amid Pyongyang's deepening ties with Russia.

Bolton also said South Korea should do more for security in the Indo-Pacific region, suggesting it should join the QUAD security partnership as a fifth member.

"In Korea, I don't think it would necessarily increase deterrence to begin a nuclear weapons program here ... More countries that get nuclear weapons, even reliable friends, make it riskier that we would have a nuclear exchange started by somebody, somewhere," Bolton said during an event hosted by the Korea Finance for Construction (FINCO) in Seoul.

"What could help would be to strengthen the nuclear umbrella in the near term by bringing U.S. tactical nuclear weapons back to the peninsula, to say to (North Korean leader) Kim Jong-un, 'We're right here and ready if you try anything,'" Bolton said.

Bolton's remarks came as calls for stronger deterrence, or even South Korea to go nuclear, have gained traction amid concerns over the growing military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang.

Concerns have intensified after Russian President Vladimir Putin's trip to Pyongyang last week, as Putin and Kim declared their new partnership under a treaty that commits them to providing military support in case either is put under an armed attack.

Tactical nuclear arms refer to battlefield weapons with relatively lower yields, compared with relatively higher yield "strategic" weapons usually carried by longer-range delivery vehicles, such as ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles or long-range bombers.

U.S. tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the Korean Peninsula in 1991. South Korea has since adhered to its non-nuclear status while relying on America's security commitment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un greet each other during their meeting at the Pyongyang Sunan International Airport outside Pyongyang, North Korea, in this picture provided by the North's official Korean Central News Agency, June 19. Yonhap

On Putin's recent trip to North Korea, Bolton said that Kim used it to show to China that he was "capable of playing between Russia and China, like his grandfather," the North's founder, Kim Il-sung.

"To the extent North Korea's leverage between Russia and China has increased, that is a problem for South Korea because it means that the North is stronger and has potentially greater support than it did when the North relied almost entirely on China," he said.

The U.S. believes that the North has been providing Russia with weapons and other munitions for use in the war with Ukraine, in exchange for Moscow's assistance in North Korea's space programs, which ultimately require similar technologies to make ballistic missiles.

The changing dynamics, or "a new alignment" being formed around China and Russia with "satellite countries" like North Korea, calls for boosting trilateral or greater security cooperation among the U.S. and like-minded countries, Bolton said.

"My view is that South Korea shouldn't be a part of the Quad, we should make it a 'Quint,'" he said, referring to the Quad security partnership, comprising the U.S., India, Japan and Australia.

Bolton also suggested South Korea take part in the AUKUS forum involving the U.S., Britain and Australia.

"For South Korea, the whole thinking about the bigger picture behind the obvious threat from Kim Jong-un in the North is important here," he added. (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · June 25, 2024

3. South Korean activists say their balloons will continue to fly, despite North warnings

As they should and must. But we (the ROK and US governments) must do so much more.

A comprehensive, holistic, and sophisticated information campaign will likely achieve greater effects than simply deploying tactical nuclear weapons. And if we do decide to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to make them effective we will need a comprehensive, holistic, and sophisticated information campaign to achieve the desired effects. Tactical nuclear efforts without an information campaign is a wasted effort.

South Korean activists say their balloons will continue to fly, despite North warnings

Stars and Stripes · by David Choi and Yoo Kyong Chang · June 25, 2024

South Korean activists pose before sending balloons to North Korea from an undisclosed location, June 6, 2024. (Fighters for a Free North Korea)

SEOUL, South Korea — Activists who drew official North Korean ire for sending balloons carrying humanitarian supplies across its border say they will continue their decades-long campaign, despite the North’s in-kind retaliation against the South.

North Korea launched over 1,200 balloons tethered to bags of trash toward its southern border between May and June, with some of them reaching as far as South Gyeongsang province, roughly 170 miles below the border, according to South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some of the balloons and their contents, such as batteries, cigarette butts, scrap paper, manure and other household trash, landed on vehicles and roofs, prompting Seoul and other provinces to issue mass-alert warnings by cellphone.

The trash-laden balloons were a response to balloons launched by South Korean activists toward the north, according to reports from North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency.

“Mounds of wastepaper and filth will soon be scattered over the border,” North Korean Vice Defense Minister Kim Kang-il said in a May 26 KCNA report, two days before the North’s balloons appeared.

South Korean troops inspect the trash carried by a balloon from North Korea to Seoul, South Korea, on June 1, 2024. (South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff)

Battle of the balloons

One of these South Korean groups, Fighters for a Free North Korea, has sent humanitarian aid and anti-Pyongyang propaganda leaflets to the North since the group’s founding in 2003.

The 10-member organization based in Seoul solicits online and direct-deposit donations to fund their campaign “for the freedom of North Koreans,” chairman Park Sang Hak said by phone May 31.

The group on Thursday sent 20 large balloons carrying roughly 300,000 propaganda leaflets, 3,000 U.S. one-dollar bills and 5,000 USB thumb-drives containing South Korean music and TV shows, according to a statement from the group that day.

Free North Korea Radio, a separate group of five North Korean defectors based in Seoul, has sent about 900,000 propaganda leaflets and shortwave radios by balloon since last year, group chairman Kim Seongmin said by phone June 3. He said the group sent over 6,000 plastic bottles containing rice and medicine through the Yellow Sea during the same one-year period.

Former South Korean President Moon Jae-in described groups like Fighters for a Free North Korea and Free North Korea Radio as a menace during his administration, which ended in 2022.

Moon’s administration, which attempted to broker peace through summit meetings with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, outlawed the groups’ practices and imposed fines starting in 2020.

The ban was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of Korea three years later.

“What we have been doing is extremely tough, difficult and dangerous,” Park said. “We have been doing this at our own risk. Who can do this job as a volunteer?”

Both activists said their headquarters were raided by police prior to the court ruling. Nowadays, the police visit them because of noise complaints, according to Kim Seongmin.

The balloons carry leaflets into “the depths of the North,” Kim Seongmin said. “Such places are usually quiet since they’re quiet country towns or villages. But some South Korean villagers are scared of our actions, so they report it to the police sometimes.”

North Koreans who come across the ballons have the choice of reporting it to local authorities or keeping its contents, according to Kim Seongmin. However, North Koreans can be punished severely for having these items in their possession.

“We need each other,” he said. “We have been sending [aid] to North Korea to help North Koreans who would like to know and yearn for the outside world.”

American dollar bills and USB thumb drives are prepared for balloon flights into North Korea by South Korean activists on June 6, 2024. (Fighters for a Free North Korea)

‘No moral or legal equivalence’

Sung-Yoon Lee, a Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars fellow in Washington, D.C., described the activists’ campaign as “arguably the right thing to do.”

Lee referred to Article 19 of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”

What the activists are doing is not illegal, Lee said by phone June 14. “It’s the exercise of freedom of speech.”

Kim Yo Jong, the sister of Kim Jong Un, mocked the notion of the activists’ campaign as a form of free speech and called North Korea’s trash-carrying balloons as “sincere presents,” according to a May 29 statement in KCNA.

But there is “no moral or legal equivalence” between the South and North’s balloons, according to Lee.

“It’s the intent and the nature of their efforts,” Lee said. “The material objects the South Korean side is sending … and the nature and the contents of the objects that North Korea has been sending over the past two weeks are very different.”

Despite North Korea’s retaliation, Kim Seongmin and Park said their groups will continue sending balloons across the border.

“North Koreans have not been living like human beings for nearly eight decades,” he said. “They have no right to sing songs and do other things. Our goal is to make them live like human beings.”

Stars and Stripes · by David Choi and Yoo Kyong Chang · June 25, 2024

4. Conflict fears grow ahead of Korean War anniversary

No one has sufficiently answered the question of why Kim Jong Un is more dangerous than ever and why would he consider going to war right now?

Conflict fears grow ahead of Korean War anniversary – DW – 06/24/2024

Julian Ryall

20 hours ago20 hours ago

Tensions between the two Koreas are running high after Pyongyang signs a major defense deal with Russia and sends trash-filled balloons over the border into the South.

DW

When North Korean troops poured across the frontier with the South on June 25, 1950, Rah Jong-yil was a boy of nine-years-old. He and his family would endure more than two months of indoctrination from the communist invaders before they were liberated.

Now, as South Korea marks the 74th anniversary of the start of the three-year Korean War, Rah fears the regime of Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang has been emboldened by its new military pact with Russia and that Kim believes the nations that stood with the South in 1950 will not commit to its defense again.

Rah said the situation could convince the North Korean leader to once again roll the dice on a military adventure with the aim of achieving a key pillar of Pyongyang's national policy: the reunification of the entire peninsula under North Korean control.

"The North Korean advance was so rapid in 1950 that my family became stuck behind the front line outside Busan in the southeast of the peninsula," Rah told DW.

"I remember they tried to brainwash us about how great the communist regime in the North was and they made us sing songs in praise of Kim Il Sung," said Rah, who went on to become a diplomat and senior South Korean intelligence officer. "It was pure political indoctrination."

Putin's North Korea visit deepens alliance against US-led global order

Trash balloons and border incidents

A massive influx of United Nations troops, under US command, reversed the course of the war and Rah's family was liberated after two months. And while the conflict ended in stalemate along the 38th parallel in 1953, Rah says the world is a very different place today and North Korea is far more powerful than it was in the past. And that makes him deeply concerned.

"Back then, the world was divided into the two blocs of the Cold War and there was a status quo," he said, adding: "Today, we see a similar situation of hostile blocs, but the US does not enjoy the same military superiority that it had in 1950."

"North Korea has nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles," he pointed out. "China was primitive in 1950, but it is a superpower with nuclear weapons today. And Russia has very recently become the North's military ally and the pact they have signed says they have to go to each other's assistance if one of them is attacked."

On June 20, a detachment of North Korean soldiers crossed the military demarcation line that sits exactly half-way within the Demilitarized Zone that divides the peninsula. South Korean troops responded with warning shots and the North Korean troops withdrew — but this was the third unusual incident in the space of 11 days.

Kim Yo-jong, the younger sister of Kim Jong Un, was quoted in North Korean media on June 21 as warning that the regime could send more balloons carrying trash and human waste over the border into the South.

And on Monday, June 24, South Korea's military said that Pyongyang was again launching balloons likely filled with trash.

The South and its US ally have not sat idly by as tensions have increased, with the US Navy aircraft carrier the USS Theodore Roosevelt — appropriately nicknamed the "big stick" — docking in Busan on June 22. Joint US-South Korean military air exercises in recent days are also being seen as a another thinly veiled warning to the North.

Dangerous tit-for-tat on the Korean Peninsula

Change in military balance

Yet many in the South cannot shake the sense that the peninsula is once again on the brink of a 1950-style crisis.

"The situation is extremely concerning," said Kim Sang-woo, a former politician with the left-leaning South Korean Congress for New Politics and now a member of the board of the Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation.

"The big question is around the commitment of the US to the security of the South and while I believe we can still count on Washington, there are too many variables about what that support might look like, especially after the elections in November," he told DW.

Kim also pointed to the dramatic change in the military balance on the peninsula in the last 74 years.

"The big problem, of course, is that the North now has nuclear weapons and long-range missiles and the South does not," he said. "In terms of conventional weapons, the South has the advantage of modern weapons systems that would stand up well against the North's obsolete equipment, but we just do not know if the North would use nuclear weapons in the event of a conflict."

Pyongyang has in recent decades been in a perilous position, Kim Sang-woo said, with gross economic mismanagement leaving the nation broke and its people hungry. Its allies — including Russia — turned their backs on the North after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the arrival of democracy in much of Eastern Europe.

The North's investment in its nuclear arsenal and ballistic missiles brought more hardship for ordinary people in the form of United Nations sanctions that limited much-needed imports. The crisis deepened when the regime increased its isolation during the COVID pandemic.

Why North Korea is more dangerous than ever

Russia-NK cooperation and the Ukraine conflict

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has been an unexpected boon for Pyongyang, Kim Sang-woo said, as President Vladimir Putin sought support — and munitions — from regimes that he could previously afford to ignore.

The Ukraine war has drawn Moscow and Pyongyang closer, as Western powers have stepped up sanctions against Russia.

Kim Jong Un has arguably played his limited hand masterfully, allegedly providing millions of artillery shells and short-range missiles to Putin's hard-pressed troops in Ukraine and obtaining, in return, Russian fuel in amounts beyond limits specified in UN sanctions, food supplies and technology for his nuclear, missile and space programs.

During Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent trip to North Korea, both sides signed a major defense pact, fueling concerns of increased weapons cooperation between the two sides.

Pyongyang has denied allegations of supplying weapons to Russia.

Putin also said recently that the UN sanctions against the North over the country's banned nuclear programs should be reviewed.

And in March, Russia used its veto in the UN Security Council to effectively end monitoring of sanctions violations, just as UN experts were beginning to probe alleged arms transfers.

Escaping North Korea: A perilous journey to freedom

Commitment to mutual defense

Most importantly, the defense deal also included a pledge to come to each other's assistance if attacked.

"Kim has been emboldened by Putin's support and we in the South must be prepared for a worst-case scenario, although we must also remember that this is a relationship of desperation on both sides," Kim Sang-woo said. "We just do not know if Kim believes he is strong enough to attack, if Russia will support him and whether he will resort to nuclear weapons."

But the South's allies must not falter, he added.

"The US, the West and our other allies must continue to do what they have been doing, supporting us and warning the North what will happen in the event of a war on the peninsula," he said. "And if Putin does send more weapons to the North, then we have to send weapons to Ukraine. There is no choice."

Edited by: Srinivas Mazumdaru

DW

5. South Korean military says 350 waste balloons detected from North Korea overnight as tensions flare

The "filth balloon barrage" or "s**t show" continues.

South Korean military says 350 waste balloons detected from North Korea overnight as tensions flare | CNN

By Gawon Bae and Michael Mitsanas, CNN

 3 minute read 

Updated 1:54 AM EDT, Tue June 25, 2024

CNN · by Gawon Bae, Michael Mitsanas · June 24, 2024

A balloon believed to have been sent by North Korea, carrying various objects including what appeared to be trash and excrement, is seen over a rice field at Cheorwon, South Korea, May 29, 2024.

Yonhap News Agency/Reuters/File

Seoul CNN —

South Korea spotted another 350 North Korean balloons “presumed” to be carrying waste on Monday, reigniting a tit-for-tat exchange as tensions on the Korean Peninsula continue to heighten.

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said a suspected balloon was seen flying in northern Gyeonggi Province, which borders Seoul, around 9 p.m. local time (8 p.m. ET).

About 100 of the balloons fell inside South Korean regions, most of which were found in north of Gyeonggi Province and capital Seoul with “no hazardous substances” found so far, it said.

Seoul’s Metropolitan government later sent out a push notification alerting the city that a North Korean balloon had entered the sky over Seoul, adding that citizens should refrain from touching downed balloons and report any sightings to authorities.

The South Korean military has warned it could restart loudspeaker propaganda broadcasts at the border — which it had paused for the last few years — adding whether Seoul resumes the loudspeakers is “up to North Korea’s actions.”

“Our military is ready to immediately start anti-North Korea propaganda broadcasts, and will operate with flexibility according to the strategical and operational situation,” said the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Tuesday.

North Korea has sent over 1,000 balloons toward the South since May, which it calls reprisals for South Korean activists flying leaflets that contain materials critical of the regime of its leader Kim Jong Un.

On Thursday, a South Korean advocacy group flew 20 large balloons carrying thousands of anti-North Korean propaganda leaflets and USB sticks with South Korean entertainment toward North Korea. A day later, on Friday, Kim Yo Jong, the powerful sister of North Korea’s leader, warned of “trouble” ahead.

“When you do something you were clearly warned not to do, it’s only natural that you will find yourself dealing with something you didn’t have to,” she said.

A South Korean analysis of North Korean balloons sent between late May and early June detected parasites in the balloons’ soil, which “may have originated from human feces,” the ministry said, pointing to “human genes” found in the soil.

An F-18 fighter aircraft sits in the hanger of the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, anchored in Busan Naval Base in Busan on June 22, 2024. (Photo by SONG Kyung-Seok / POOL / AFP)

Song Kyung-Seok/Pool/AFP/Getty Images

Related article US aircraft carrier arrives in South Korea as Russia-North Korea defense pact deepens regional fears

The analysis found roundworms, whipworms and larva currens along with other waste, such as cloth and wastepaper, the ministry said, adding there was no risk of contamination or infectious disease from the analyzed soil.

The balloons also carried damaged clothes from a South Korean brand, signaling “hostility towards South Korean goods,” as well as clothes with imitations of Disney characters, according to the ministry.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un shake hands after a signing ceremony of the new partnership in Pyongyang, North Korea, on Wednesday, June 19, 2024.

Kristina Kormilitsyna/Sputnik/AP

The latest balloon salvo comes as tensions on the Korean Peninsula heighten, and inter-Korean diplomacy remains at an impasse. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a defense agreement with North Korea last week as talks on its denuclearization efforts have stalled, and Kim has vowed to expand his country’s nuclear arsenal and threatened to use it against the South.

In the meantime, a US Navy aircraft carrier arrived in South Korea over the weekend ahead of trilateral exercises with South Korea and Japan in the waters near the peninsula. It is the latest in a series of US military moves aiming to affirm Washington’s “ironclad” commitment to its treaty ally in South Korea.

US and South Korean officials signed a new memorandum of understanding on diplomatic intelligence sharing and analysis on Monday, according to South Korea’s foreign ministry.

Japanese, South Korean and U.S. officials also held a trilateral call where they issued a joint statement that called the deepening security cooperation between Russia and North Korea a matter of “grave concern” to those seeking to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula.

“The United States, ROK, and Japan condemn in the strongest possible terms deepening military cooperation between the DPRK and Russia, including continued arms transfers from the DPRK to Russia that prolong the suffering of the Ukrainian people, violate multiple United Nations Security Council Resolutions, and threaten stability in both Northeast Asia and Europe,” the statement said.

CNN’s Mike Valerio contributed reporting.

CNN · by Gawon Bae, Michael Mitsanas · June 24, 2024

6. Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Explained

A useful tutorial (for me anyway) with an important conclusion:

War, it’s been said, is politics by other means. With nuclear or any other kind of weapons, whether those means are tactical or strategic depends on the objectives a nation is trying to achieve, not the damage it’s trying to do. Any nuclear detonation in a wartime environment would likely be for the furtherance of strategic objectives and almost certainly would result in strategic consequences. The term “tactical nuke” will almost certainly continue in use but should be thought of only as a reference to size and range, not desired outcomes.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Explained

Are they really tactical?

thedispatch.com · by Carl Graham · June 24, 2024

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent announcement of military rehearsals for the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in response to NATO’s support of Ukraine is only the latest in a series of hints, statements, and threats from the Russian government intimating a willingness to “go nuclear.”

But the characterization of these weapons as “tactical” as opposed to “strategic” is a holdover from Cold War terminology that has little applicability to today’s interconnected world, where the use of any nuclear weapon would have immediate and profound strategic consequences.

What is a tactical nuclear weapon?

Nuclear weapons are often categorized based on range, yield, and delivery method. Tactical nuclear weapons are generally described as relatively low-yield, short-range weapons delivered by battlefield systems such as artillery or tactical aircraft. Although exact definitions vary, yields can be less than 1 kiloton (kt) to upward of 100kt (for comparison, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs were 15kt to 23kt), with ranges in the dozens to low hundreds of miles. This compares to theater or strategic systems, which are delivered by missiles or long-range bombers and have megaton (mt) yields with ranges measuring thousands of miles.

During the Cold War, these limited-yield weapons served to address military challenges for which NATO and the Soviet Union had no conventional response. Leaving weapons in storage, deploying them to battlefields and air bases, or mating them to delivery systems (loaded on aircraft or placed on artillery shells, for example) sent a strong message about how seriously a crisis or conflict was being taken by either side. This is the psychology of escalation that Putin is employing now, but is more applicable to a Cold War world with two distinct blocs and controlled information than today’s multipolar and interconnected world.

While the thought of using a nuclear weapon to destroy a tank formation seems nearly inconceivable today, the doctrine behind these weapons was developed by tacticians with living memories of two world wars and millions of casualties inflicted by both conventional and non-conventional arms. For someone who learned to duck and cover near the missile fields of Montana, Wyoming, or North Dakota, nuclear war was anything but unthinkable. Enormous intellectual capital went into formulating plans and doctrine for not just surviving but ultimately prevailing in a Cold War nuclear conflict.

Who possesses tactical nuclear weapons, and why?

First, a caveat: All of these numbers are open to debate and even questionable at the unclassified level because nations closely guard such information. But they do provide orders of magnitude for useful comparisons. The Center for Strategic and International Studies has compiled data consistent with numbers and capabilities presented below along with important caveats here.

The question of “who has what” perfectly illustrates why the term “tactical nuclear weapon” has outlived its usefulness. There are estimated to be more than 12,000 nuclear weapons in the nine declared and undeclared nuclear states. The United States is currently reducing its stockpile. French and Israeli stockpiles are relatively stable. And China, India, North Korea, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom, as well as possibly Russia, are thought to be increasing their stockpiles.

Of the more than 12,000 weapons, a little less than 20 percent can be categorized as non-strategic or tactical based on their sizes, ranges, and/or delivery mechanisms. Russia has by far the most tactical nuclear weapons with more than 1,500. The U.S. has 100 stored in Europe, and likely more stored on the U.S. mainland. India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel are estimated to have a little fewer than 500 among them. But Israel, India, North Korea, and Pakistan certainly don’t consider their “tactical” weapons as means to achieving tactical ends. The weapons exist to advance the strategic goals of regime survival or the threat of inflicting unacceptable punishment on potential adversaries.

So depending on where one sits, weapons with similar characteristics can be either tactical or strategic. The defining characteristic is in the objective, not the weapon. A nuclear state’s doctrine will define how it intends to translate means into ends, but it’s the ends that determine whether any military action is tactical, operational, or strategic.

Unfortunately, nuclear doctrine is not always clear. All nuclear states intentionally maintain some level of ambiguity in their statements about when and how they would use their nuclear arsenals to inject doubt into a potential adversary’s cost/benefit calculations and provide maneuvering room during a crisis. China and India, for example, have articulated so-called no first-use doctrines. In truth, it’s anybody’s guess whether they would adhere to their “no first use” rhetoric in an existential crisis. Russia explicitly states that it will use nuclear weapons to achieve its war objectives or to protect its sovereignty if it’s threatened. Israel doesn’t acknowledge its weapons, much less any doctrine.

U.S. nuclear doctrine is outlined by the Defense Department in periodic Nuclear Posture Reviews, the latest of which was published in 2022. It describes the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. policy as deterring strategic attacks, assuring allies and partners, and achieving U.S. objectives if deterrence fails. The underlying theme is a strategy of deterrence: having a strong and survivable enough arsenal to deter any potential adversary from using nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against the United States or its allies. As simple as that sounds, it’s a policy that evolved over decades, just as technologies and adversaries have evolved.

Lower-yield nuclear weapons used for limited objectives are not necessarily considered as part of an escalation ladder leading to all-out nuclear war between major powers. If the use—or even threatened use—of such weapons either enables a decisive win or deters a decisive defeat, they could even be considered de-escalatory. This is certainly part of Russia’s strategy of provocation. It has an explicit “escalate to de-escalate” strategy that seeks to end fighting on its terms by threatening to take measures—including nuclear—the consequences of which are unpredictable.

But nobody really knows how or how quickly things might escalate once the taboo of using a nuclear weapon is broken. Command and control breakdowns could result in unauthorized use. Misinterpreted intentions could lead to further escalation. Other regional nuclear powers could see a superpower’s use of nuclear weapons as a green light to solve their own local conflicts using the same means. In today’s connected world, it is difficult to envision a scenario where nuclear weapons of any size could be used for any limited purpose and not have consequential strategic effects on all involved, and even many who are not.

Is any nuke really tactical?

Would a tactical nuclear weapon even be effective if used to achieve tactical, i.e. battlefield ends? That depends on the battlefield. Will friendly troops be required to travel through a contaminated zone? How would civilians and civilian infrastructure be affected? There are certainly cases where a small nuclear blast could destroy a target more quickly and efficiently than masses of conventional weapons and personnel. But despite any temporary tactical gains, its use would send a strategic message to the adversary and to the world. But such a message will almost certainly result in a strategic response, whether by military or other elements of national power. Not necessarily a like response, but one designed to have strategic impacts. So yes, nuclear weapons can have tactical effects. But these effects will be overshadowed by a much larger strategic fallout.

War, it’s been said, is politics by other means. With nuclear or any other kind of weapons, whether those means are tactical or strategic depends on the objectives a nation is trying to achieve, not the damage it’s trying to do. Any nuclear detonation in a wartime environment would likely be for the furtherance of strategic objectives and almost certainly would result in strategic consequences. The term “tactical nuke” will almost certainly continue in use but should be thought of only as a reference to size and range, not desired outcomes.

thedispatch.com · by Carl Graham · June 24, 2024

7. S. Korea conducts live-fire drills with Chunmoo multiple rocket launchers

These weapons will have devastating effects on the nKPA should Kim miscaluate and order an attack.

S. Korea conducts live-fire drills with Chunmoo multiple rocket launchers

The Korea Times · June 25, 2024

A Chunmoo multiple rocket launch system is deployed for drills at an army unit in the border county of Cheorwon, Gangwon Province, Feb. 28. Yonhap

The military conducted live-fire drills of homegrown Chunmoo multiple rocket launch systems (MRLS) Tuesday, the Army said, to sharpen precision strike capabilities and bolster readiness against North Korean threats.

Some 190 troops participated in the drills that mobilized seven units of Chunmoo MRLS, as well as some 80 pieces of equipment operated by the Navy and the Air Force, including corvettes and fighter jets, according to the Army.

During the drills that took place at a firing range in Boryeong, 140 kilometers southwest of Seoul, 48 long-range guided rockets were launched from the Chunmoo units to reach targets located 55 km away, the Army said.

The Chunmoo MRLS is a key military weapon designed to counter North Korean artillery threats in the event of a contingency. (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · June 25, 2024

8. Meet the North Koreans who haven't been able to return home in over 70 years

The division and family separations remain painful. We must not forget what has happened.

Meet the North Koreans who haven't been able to return home in over 70 years

JUNE 25, 20243:00 AM ET

By Hannah Yoon

NPR · by By · June 25, 2024

Lee Choo-sum (left) and Lee Geum-soon look for free fish or seafood from boats in Abai Village on Sept. 8, 2023. Both women left North Korea when the war broke out and have lived in the village for the past 70 years. Hannah Yoon

Editor's Note: This piece is published as the world marks the 74th anniversary of the start of the Korean War.

Situated on the eastern shore of South Korea rests an unassuming village home to resettled North Korean refugees who fled southward during the Korean War, often referred to as the Forgotten War in the U.S. Abai Village, inhabited by approximately a dozen displaced individuals from the north, occupies a small expanse of land within the coastal city of Sokcho. It initially served as an unofficial refuge for thousands of North Koreans who held the belief that they would eventually return to their homeland upon the end of the war.

Amid mounting tensions between the north and south before the war, some individuals made the decision to relocate to Seoul in order to avoid potential conflict. However, it was primarily the outbreak of the war that witnessed a mass exodus of thousands from the north.

School children walk around Abai Village on Sept. 10, 2023. The village is now a tourist destination due to its history of being a village of displaced people from North Korea. Only a few dozen displaced people remain. Hannah Yoon

Friends Lee Hwa-ja, Jun Sook-ja (center) and Choi Gi-hwal rest after picking up garbage around Abai Village in Sokcho, South Korea, on Sept. 12, 2023. Hannah Yoon

A meal of kimchi, fish, tofu and rice sits on a small dining table in Kim Yong-jae’s living room at her home in Sokcho, South Korea, on Sept. 11, 2023. Hannah Yoon

Kim Yong-jae, 82, gets off the Gaetbae ferry in Sokcho, South Korea, on Sept. 12, 2023. Hannah Yoon

King Yong-jae, 82, is silhouetted by her window at her home in Sokcho, South Korea, on Sept. 14, 2023. Hannah Yoon

During the Third Battle of Seoul in 1951, the North Korean military and the Chinese People's Volunteer Army formed an alliance, aiming to exert pressure on United Nations forces so they would withdraw from the Korean peninsula. Many Koreans and U.N. forces fled south toward Busan.

It was at this time that approximately 6,000 North Koreans from Hamgyong Province decided to resettle in Sokcho, South Korea, with the hope of returning home, given its proximity to the north. While awaiting their return, they established their own community, known as Abai Village. The word abai (아바이) comes from the Hamgyong Province dialect and means "uncle" or "aged person."

The land was too muddy for homes to be built, so the refugees’ houses were, initially, more like temporary shelters because most people planned on going back north.

The signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953, marked the official closure of the border but not the end of the war. Consequently, those who had fled to the south were not allowed to return to their homeland. Due to the continuing tensions between North and South Korea, thousands of aging North Koreans have been permanently separated from their homeland.

Left: A local’s residence is seen in Abai Village on the evening of Sept. 13, 2023. Right: Kim Yong-jae, 81, holds her dress in the morning in Sokcho, South Korea, on Sept. 14, 2023. Hannah Yoon

Kim Yong-jae, 82, left, and her friend, Kwon Gye-soon, 70, watch the news of a meeting between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Kim’s home in Abai Village on Sept. 12, 2023. Hannah Yoon

Old photos of Kim Yong-jae’s mother (left) and grandmother sit in a frame at Kim’s home in Sokcho, South Korea, on Sept. 12, 2023. Hannah Yoon

Kim Yong-jae, 82, peels garlic in her home in Sokcho, South Korea, on Sept. 9, 2023. Hannah Yoon

Kim Yong-jae, 82, sits as she rides the Gaetbae ferry while visitors take photos around her in Sokcho, South Korea, on Sept. 17, 2023. Hannah Yoon

One such individual is Kim Yong Jae, who has resided in Abai Village since 1951, when she was 10 years old. Having fled the north during the war with her mother and grandmother, Kim mainly views Abai Village as her home and, despite the passing of many of her friends and seeing her children relocate to larger cities, she says she finds solace and comfort within the confines of the village.

Kim spends most of her days shopping, prepping seafood side dishes (banchan) for her friends, seeing neighbors and playing with her Nanta drum group.

As she thinks about her life before the war, she remembers the abundance and comfort she experienced. Her father's employment in the railway industry provided financial stability and a comfortable life. She reminisces about her beautiful home and the numerous relatives who frequently visited her family.

Others, such as Jun Sook-ja, Kim Kim Chul-hwan and Lee Geum-soon, have found ways to pass time on the village, whether it's volunteering to clean the island, prepping dishes for their families and friends or playing Hwatu, a traditional Korean gambling game. As the only ones still alive from the north, they are familiar with each other and consider one another like family.

Kim Il-dong walks in his alleyway in Abai Village in Sokcho, South Korea, on Sept. 16, 2023. Hannah Yoon

Kim Il-dong (left) and his friend, Kim Chul-hwan, sit together at Il-dong’s home in Abai Village in Sokcho, South Korea, on Sept. 11, 2023. Hannah Yoon

Kim Chul-hwan, 85, shaves while sitting in his room at his home in Abai Village on Sept. 10, 2023. Kim left North Korea when he was 13 and has been displaced for the past 70 years, living in the village since 1953. Hannah Yoon

An aerial view of Abai Village in Sokcho, South Korea, on Sept. 12, 2023. Hannah Yoon

A group of friends, all seniors displaced from North Korea when they were young, play Go-Stop, a Korean card game, in Abai Village Sept. 10, 2023. Lee Hwa-ja (from left), Lim Joeng-ok, Lee Geum-soon and Choi Gi-hwal all lived in Korea's northern provinces before the country was divided. All fled with their families to escape the war, thinking they would eventually return home when the war ended. Hannah Yoon

Until the late 1980s, Abai Village boasted the highest concentration of resettled North Koreans in South Korea. Presently, the largest group of displaced North Koreans reside in Seoul, while Abai Village has evolved into a cultural tourist destination.

Now, the generation that once knew and experienced a unified Korea is gradually transitioning into a historical chapter of the country. Abai Village's transformation has left behind minimal remnants of its original character. Among the small tin-roofed homes, you can find coffee shops, bakeries, a quiet beach and a relatively small restaurant scene all serving similar dishes — North Korean cold noodles with spicy pollock and various squid dishes.

For North Koreans who have relocated to the south, the legacy of the war persists as a deeply personal matter. This legacy encompasses a myriad of emotions, including different opportunities, loss, growth and a profound sense of yearning for the life they knew up north.

Jun Sook-ja, 91 (left), sits at a restaurant in Abai Village as tourists walk by on Sept. 9, 2023. The village has become a tourist destination known for being a village of displaced people who settled here after the Korean War. Hannah Yoon

This project was supported by the National Geographic Society Grant.

Hannah Yoon is a documentary photographer based in Philadelphia, Pa. You can see more of her work on her website, hannahyoon.com, or on Instagram at @hanloveyoon.

NPR · by By · June 25, 2024

9. Putin says ties with N. Korea raised to 'unprecedentedly high level' in thank-you message to Kim

Weakness, fear, and envy.

I would offer a counter message and say both countries are at their weakest states due to internal contradictions and potential conflict.

They will never be able to compete with the ROK/US alliance or have what the ROK and US has.

Putin says ties with N. Korea raised to 'unprecedentedly high level' in thank-you message to Kim | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · June 25, 2024

SEOUL, June 25 (Yonhap) -- Russian President Vladimir Putin has thanked North Korean leader Kim Jong-un for showing heartfelt hospitality during his visit to Pyongyang last week, saying bilateral ties have been boosted to an "unprecedentedly high level," the North's state media reported Tuesday.

In a message to Kim, Putin said his trip to the North has opened ways for the two countries to achieve beneficial cooperation in various fields, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

"He said that his recent state visit to the DPRK was of special significance as it raised the relations between Moscow and Pyongyang to an unprecedentedly high level of comprehensive strategic partnership," the KCNA said, using the acronym of North Korea's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Putin said the North's leader is an "honoured guest" that Russia always waits for, wishing for Kim's good health and success.

After summit talks Wednesday, Putin and Kim signed a treaty of comprehensive strategic partnership that calls for providing military assistance without delay if either side comes under attack. It marked Putin's first trip to North Korea in 24 years.

Putin also voiced hope to hold the next summit with Kim in Moscow, according to Russian media outlets.

Meanwhile, North Korea condemned Ukraine troops for staging attacks on the Russian-annexed Crimean Peninsula this week with Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) missiles supplied by the United States.

"Puppet groups in Ukraine has been clinging to reckless terrorist acts as the country has faced repeated defeats with military confrontations with Russia," the KCNA said in a separate dispatch, calling the attack the outcome of Washington's madness against Russia.

In a similar message designed to show solidarity with Moscow, Pak Jong-chon, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of North Korea's ruling Workers' Party of Korea, slammed Washington's military support for Ukraine on Monday.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on June 20, 2024, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un (R) and Russian President Vladimir Putin holding a rare press conference in Pyongyang the previous day after signing a treaty on a comprehensive strategic partnership that expands military and other cooperation. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · June 25, 2024

10. Russia and North Korea signed a defense pact with each other. What does this mean?

My view: Desperation. weakness, fear, and envy.

Russia and North Korea signed a defense pact with each other. What does this mean?

By —

Sue Mi Terry, Council on Foreign Relations

By —

Stephen Sestanovich, Council on Foreign Relations

PBS · by Sue Mi Terry, Council on Foreign Relations · June 23, 2024

This Expert Brief combines interviews with Sue Mi Terry, senior fellow for Korea studies, and Stephen Sestanovich, George F. Kennan senior fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies. Terry was a deputy national intelligence officer for East Asia at the National Intelligence Council from 2009 to 2010. Sestanovich was the U.S. State Department’s ambassador-at-large for the former Soviet Union from 1997 to 2001.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un just signed a new defense pact. Why now?

SUE MI TERRY: Putin capped off his two-day trip to North Korea today with the surprise signing of a new comprehensive strategic partnership pact. The actual text of the document has yet to be released, so the details are uncertain, but the treaty is said to include a mutual defense provision, calling for each country to provide military assistance should the other be attacked.

STEPHEN SESTANOVICH: “Why now?” This is the easy question. North Korea has been supplying Russia with arms for its war in Ukraine, and Putin is paying them off with a great big thank you.

WATCH: Putin signs pact with North Korea that could increase weapons for Russia’s war in Ukraine

TERRY: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 forced Moscow to look to North Korea for munitions — and Pyongyang has delivered, providing artillery ammunition and short-range rockets that Russia has used against Ukraine. In return, Russia is likely to provide not only economic aid, as North Korea desperately needs cheap oil from Russia, but also military aid to help improve North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program.

The new treaty is a sign of the growing closeness between these two pariah states. As Putin said, “This is a truly breakthrough document, reflecting the desire of the two countries not to rest on their laurels, but to raise our relations to a new qualitative level.”

SESTANOVICH: But let’s also remember to ask, “Why ever?”

For years, North Korea has not been part of international polite society. All major powers — and the entire UN Security Council — stood against its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Putin hadn’t visited North Korea since 2000, for a reason. But he’s now cast his lot more irrevocably with the world’s rogues, and even if he claims it’s part of building an anti-U.S. “world majority,” the result in Japan and South Korea — in virtually all countries that Russia used to treat as more important than North Korea — has to be shock. There’s probably even some cringing within the Russian elite, asking themselves if they really want to be Kim Jong Un’s “dearest friend.”

What does this pact commit the two countries to do?

SESTANOVICH: Even after the text is made public, important questions will likely remain unanswered. Russian diplomats will likely be telling other governments not to worry and that they won’t do anything stupid — that Putin is just paying Kim off with a show, with meaningless gestures. What we don’t know is what’s been promised in secret — or will be promised over time. Kim has learned he’s got Putin where he wants him. So don’t be surprised if, before the next delivery of artillery shells, North Korean officials say, “you know, we were wondering whether you could help us out with X or Y.”

What does the treaty say about North Korean and Russian intentions?

TERRY: This treaty makes clear that Putin has abandoned all hopes of joining the West and is instead intent on bringing down the U.S.-led international order by making common cause with China, Iran, and North Korea. In the process, he is throwing a vital lifeline to a North Korean regime that remains weak and impoverished despite the success of its WMD program. Having failed to reach a deal with the United States under former President Donald Trump, North Korea has now broken out of its diplomatic isolation by making a deal with Russia.

What is the significance of the treaty?

TERRY: Because neither country is likely to be attacked by an aggressor, the mutual defense provision is unlikely to be invoked — unless North Korea chooses to pretend that the Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine is not an unprovoked invasion, but rather (as Putin pretends) a defensive measure against aggression by Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

If that were to happen, it’s possible that North Korea could send soldiers to fight in the Russian army — a military version of the “guest workers” that Pyongyang has sent around the world for years as a way of earning hard currency. Russia could certainly use more manpower given the heavy losses it is suffering in Ukraine and its own demographic woes in recent decades.

The more likely consequence of the treaty is simply closer cooperation in weapons production, with North Korea manufacturing more munitions for Russia and Russia providing more high-end help for North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, likely including aid in developing submarines capable of launching ballistic nuclear missiles. Both countries will become more dangerous as a result of this new partnership.

North Korea and Russia are both nuclear powers. Does this mean Russia will provide help to improve North Korean WMD capabilities?

TERRY: The likelihood is that, yes, this will lead Russia to improve North Korean WMD capabilities. There is some evidence of this already happening, with Russia possibly providing help to North Korea with its successful satellite launch last November, just two months after the last Putin-Kim meeting. This is deeply concerning because of the substantial overlap between the technologies used for space launches and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

READ MORE: North Korea claims progress in developing a hypersonic missile designed to strike distant U.S. targets

Russia can also provide North Korea with critical help in areas where its capabilities are still nascent, such as submarine-launched ballistic missiles. There is no way to tell how much assistance Russia will provide — and Moscow will always be wary of parting with its most cutting-edge technology — but there is no doubt that Russia has the capability, if it so desires, to substantially increase the threat that North Korea poses to its neighbors.

Is this new pact a revival of the now defunct 1961 treaty between North Korea and Russia?

TERRY: The mutual defense provision in the new Russia-North Korea treaty recalls the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance [PDF] between North Korea and the Soviet Union that was voided by the collapse of the latter in 1991. The mutual defense clause was notably missing when the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation in 2000 at the beginning of Putin’s reign.

In subsequent years, Russia cooperated with the United States to try and limit North Korea’s WMD program by imposing sanctions at the United Nations. Those days have clearly passed — and are unlikely to return. This year, on March 28, Russia actually vetoed the UN Security Council resolution reauthorizing an independent panel of experts to monitor North Korean sanctions compliance. The new treaty symbolizes the growing closeness between Moscow and Pyongyang.

SESTANOVICH: This new pact may or may not fall short of the one signed in 1961, but the wording isn’t the only interesting comparison.

In 1961, Soviet policy was on a tear. Premier Nikita Khrushchev revived nuclear testing, exploding the biggest bombs ever; built the wall between East and West Berlin; had a famously confrontational meeting with U.S. President John F. Kennedy; was waging a fierce rhetorical war with Chinese leader Mao Zedong; and was probably starting to think about missiles in Cuba, which he deployed a year later. The question for Western policymakers now is whether Putin is becoming comparably reckless. His language in North Korea — where he denounced the United States as a “worldwide neocolonialist dictatorship” — might make you think so.

What does the pact mean for Ukraine?

SESTANOVICH: Ukraine, has, of course, been feeling the impact of North Korean supplies for some time. It’s not clear to me whether there’s anything that Kim has been holding back from the Russian war effort, so there may not be much change in that respect. But we probably ought to look at the impact of this alliance in broader terms.

On the one hand, Ukraine can say to its Western friends that Putin has made absolutely clear that he poses a threat to Western allies everywhere. In conversation with their counterparts in Japan and South Korea, Ukrainian leaders will have even less trouble saying we’re all in this together. On the other hand, Putin has also telegraphed a readiness for escalation that will surely unsettle some Western governments. We don’t know yet how this will play out.

What is China’s view of this pact?

TERRY: The Chinese are conflicted. They are North Korea’s biggest supporters, but they also have an uneasy relationship characterized by suspicion on both sides. Chinese President Xi Jinping didn’t even meet with Kim Jong Un until Trump decided to meet with him.

From the Chinese perspective, close ties between Russia and North Korea are a welcome distraction for Washington. But China is also wary of having Russia dilute its sway over North Korea by offering itself as an alternative source of support. North Korea’s increasing military collaboration with Russia undermines Beijing’s almost exclusive geopolitical influence over Pyongyang. Beijing may also be concerned that the Russia-North Korea axis could bring the United States, Japan, and South Korea closer together and increase the U.S. military footprint near China.

Given that there are some overlapping concerns in Beijing and Washington, it would make sense for the Joe Biden administration to reach out to the Chinese government and try to foster greater unease about closer Russia-North Korea alignment.

What should the United States do in response?

TERRY: The Biden administration has extremely limited options for responding. The best that it can do would be to double down on sanctions on both North Korea and Russia while strengthening the trilateral relationship between the United States, Japan, and South Korea.

At the same time, the Biden administration should also continue to pursue efforts to bring together U.S. allies in Asia with those in Europe — an effort that has already borne fruit with the leaders of Australia, Japan, and South Korea attending NATO summits. South Korea has also reportedly provided artillery ammunition to the United States to enable U.S. ammunition transfers to Ukraine. Washington’s Asian allies need to double down on their support for Ukraine because of the growing links between Russia and the countries that threaten them in Asia — namely China and North Korea. If the world’s dictators are uniting against the U.S.-led international order, the world’s democracies need to unite in its defense.

READ MORE: Russia and China are supporting each other’s territorial reach, says Taiwan’s foreign minister

SESTANOVICH: The Putin-Kim alliance further adds to the importance of “helping Ukraine win the war” — that exact phrase is directly from the new U.S.-Ukraine bilateral security agreement announced last week. There’s no better way to show the limits of North Korean arms supplies than to associate them with a losing cause. And there’s no better way to give Putin (or his successor) second thoughts about his foolish opening to Pyongyang than to show its futility. Fortunately, the shock of Putin’s visit is great enough that policymakers — in Washington and elsewhere—may understand what they need to do.

This Expert Brief was compiled and edited by Diana Roy and Asher Ross.

This article is republished from the Council on Foreign Relations. Read the original article here.

PBS · by Sue Mi Terry, Council on Foreign Relations · June 23, 2024

11. South Korea latest to level charges against Israeli officials for alleged war crimes in Gaza

Let's be clear here. This is NOT the South Korean government taking this action. Despite the implication, South Korea is not acting in the same way as South Africa. It is not on that level.

This is initiated by South Korea's People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) among others.

There is no reporting of this in the mainstream media or the Korean press (in English) yet. But this is in Al Jazeera and other outlets that are pro-Palestinian and who want to make it seem like a major democratic government is seeking charges against Israeli officials. This is an excellent example of a propaganda effort.

Excerpts:

The charges were brought on by the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, Asian Dignity Initiatives and more than 5,000 individuals, including two members of the country's National Assembly who contend Israel has committed multiple crimes since the October 7 war with Hamas began.

South Korea latest to level charges against Israeli officials for alleged war crimes in Gaza - UPI.com

upi.com

A Palestinian man walks through the rubble of destroyed buildings following an operation by Israeli Special Forces in the Nuseirat camp, in the central Gaza Strip, earlier this month. South Korean government officials and other organizations on Monday filed a series of charges leveled against top Israeli government officials, including Israel's president and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for genocide and other alleged crimes against humanity in the war in Gaza. Photo by Hatem Al-Rawag/UPI | License Photo

June 24 (UPI) -- South Korean government officials and other organizations on Monday filed a series of charges leveled against top Israeli government officials, including Israel's president and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for genocide and other alleged crimes against humanity.

The South Korean lawsuit cites seven high-ranking Israeli officials, such as the country's President Isaac Herzog along with Netanyahu, Israeli Defense Forces Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, Foreign Minister Israel Katz, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir.

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The charges were brought on by the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, Asian Dignity Initiatives and more than 5,000 individuals, including two members of the country's National Assembly who contend Israel has committed multiple crimes since the October 7 war with Hamas began.

The "key allegations" against Israeli government officials point to, specifically: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes against humanitarian activities, and war crimes using forbidden weapons and means.

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"The indictment signifies that some 5,000 co-accusers have acknowledged that a genocide occurred in Gaza. They are not only mourning but also insisting that the perpetrators be harshly punished according to South Korean law," Lee Dong-hwa, an ADI team manager, said in a written statement.

The group filed the charges under the 2007 Act on Punishment of Crimes under Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.

"Common sense dictates that even when war crimes are committed outside of South Korea, they should be investigated according to the law and principles, and the perpetrators should be punished according to the severity of the crime," Dong wrote.

This is the most recent effort since the United Nations Security Council recently passed a U.S.-drafted resolution calling for a Gaza cease-fire, and the immediate release of all hostages held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, to try and hold Israeli officials accountable for the allegedly over 34,000 dead in Gaza.

Brazil's president in February compared what he called the genocide of Palestinian people to the Holocaust

"What's happening in the Gaza Strip isn't a war, it's a genocide," Brazilian President Lula da Silva said in remarks at the time while in Ethiopia for the African Union summit. "It's not a war of soldiers against soldiers. It's a war between a highly prepared army and women and children."

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This latest effort by South Korea is now another in series of other formal complaints lodged against Israel.

The United Nations Human Rights Council in April adopted a resolution calling for Israel to be held accountable for what it called war crimes in Gaza, urging an immediate cease-fire. The 28 to 6 yes vote had 13 abstentions with the United States voting no.

South Africa last December filed a case in the U.N.'s International Justice Court accusing Israel of acts of "genocidal in nature" in its occupation of Gaza, followed by Egypt last month in May and the Arab League.

That was followed in January by the International Court of Justice in the Hague, the Netherlands, that ordered Israel to take immediate steps to end atrocities in Gaza in its war with Hamas, which Israel and the United States blasted at the time as baseless.

upi.com

12. North Korean Munitions Factories: The Other Side of Arms Transfers to Russia

Target list follows (note sarcasm). Map a the link.

Important conclusion here. Read the work of Dr. Bruce Bechtol to understand the full extent of north Korean proliferation to malign actors around the world.

Finally, it is worth noting that Russia is not the only customer of North Korean munitions. News reports indicate that North Korean missile technology has enabled Iran’s attacks on Israel. The role of North Korean munitions factories as a key source of current global conflicts should never be underestimated. If the international community fails to fully commit to preventing North Korea from becoming the “arsenal of autocracy,” it risks losing even more control over wars waged by adversaries and opportunities to curb North Korea’s expansion of its nuclear and missile capabilities.

North Korean Munitions Factories: The Other Side of Arms Transfers to Russia

• BY: KYUNG-JOO JEON AND SUNG-JUN BAE
• JUNE 24, 2024

https://www.38north.org/2024/06/north-korean-munitions-factories-the-other-side-of-arms-transfers-to-russia/

The United States and its allies have made concerted efforts to put an end to the ongoing war in Ukraine. One such endeavor is to stop North Korea’s illegal transfers of weapons to Russia, which the US government believes has occurred as early as 2022, in the months after Russia invaded Ukraine. There have been reports that North Korean missiles were found on the battlefields of Ukraine in recent months.

Given that the arms trade between North Korea and Russia has persisted for over two years, it is now time to be more decisive and effective. Although the US has sanctioned three Russia-based entities and two Russian individuals involved in transferring and testing North Korean ballistic missiles, this is insufficient. These sanctions address only one side of the equation: Russia. To curb these transactions more effectively, the US and the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) should target both parties involved. This starts with a proper understanding of North Korea’s munitions factories that help to fund and advance the country’s weapons programs, including Pyongyang’s production of potentially nuclear-tipped missiles targeting South Korea, Japan or even the US. In order to restrain North Korea’s weapons production and sales, efforts must be sustained, consistent and united, irrespective of whether they are making the headlines of the day.

Overview of Missile-Related Munitions Factories

North Korean munitions factories have been in the world’s spotlight more than ever before, with Pyongyang’s increased coverage of Kim Jong Un’s visits to munitions factories since August 2023, amid much controversy over the deepening of North Korea-Russia ties. South Korea estimates that these factories are “operating at full capacity” to supply ammunition to Russia. Despite the importance of these factories, they remain elusive not only to the public but even to experts due to the closed nature of North Korea and the sensitivities of these installations. Many of these factories also operate under different names (as shown in the table below), adding to the confusion.

The number of munitions factories varies. According to South Korea’s Defense White Paper 2022, North Korea has more than 300 munitions factories, but fewer than 100 factories were operating at that time due to difficulties in supplying power and raw materials. A different, more recent source notes that North Korea currently operates between 60 to 80 munitions factories, primarily situated in Chagang (Jagang) and North Pyongan (Phyongan) Provinces. Additionally, the physical size, the number of employees, the production capacity and the main products of each factory remain largely unknown.

According to Chinese data, approximately 20 factories are specifically involved in missile production and are directly linked to missile bases. They also indicate that these 20 munitions factories have been actively involved in manufacturing and assembling various types of missiles. The core facilities appear to be the Thaesong Machine Factory, Factory No. 125, Factory No. 26 and the Saneum-dong Research Center, which possess the capability to produce and assemble the Hwasong missiles.

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Recent reports indicate that North Korea is constructing new munitions factories or remodeling existing ones to boost production in response to the growing demand for weapon sales, including artillery shells for exports to Russia. Additionally, the utilization rate of North Korea’s munitions factories has reportedly risen significantly, particularly since Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s visit to North Korea in July 2023. These new developments mean the information in the table will need to be updated as new details become available.

Funding the Second Economy

Seoul has said Moscow has provided Pyongyang with food, raw materials and parts required for weapons manufacturing in return. Russia is also paying back with cash: recently, it has approved the release of $9 million out of $30 million in frozen North Korean assets deposited in a Russian financial institution. All of this is in addition to the revenues from weapons produced in the above-cited munitions factories and sold to Russia. Such income likely is funneled into North Korea’s so-called “second economy.”

North Korea’s “second economy,” or the military economy, is an unofficial economy that has been kept separate from its official national economy and is rarely mentioned to its ordinary citizens, let alone the outside world. Former socialist states also had second economies, but what makes North Korea’s unique is that it is central to the upkeep of the national economy and serves the Supreme Leader’s priorities. These include funding his weapons programs and supporting the discretionary needs of the Kim family. Unlike its official economy, which is overseen by the cabinet, North Korea’s second economy is headed by the Second Economic Commission (SEC), which reports to the Munitions Industry Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK). The SEC was established in Kim Il Sung’s time and is responsible for North Korea’s planning, production, distribution and foreign sales of military products. The SEC was strengthened further under Kim Jong Il, when North Korea’s nuclear development began in earnest.

Munitions factories form the basis of the second economy in North Korea. From the early 1960s, then-leader Kim Il Sung pushed for the development of the munitions industry, based on his policy of simultaneously pursuing economic defense and development. Unlike its stated goal, however, Pyongyang’s focus was almost exclusively on building and strengthening the country’s national defense capability, which led to the establishment of the second economy. According to defectors who worked for the regime, including in second-economy institutions, North Korea generally prioritizes the allocation of resources to the second economy over the people’s economy.

North Korea’s official annual defense budget readout omits several key components related to the second economy. Each year, the Supreme People’s Assembly, North Korea’s parliament, presents a budget by sector, including defense. However, South Korean experts have assessed that North Korea’s defense budget—typically 15.8 percent—covers only a fraction of expenses for operations and maintenance and does not at all account for defense improvement, such as the procurement of weapons and systems, or research and development (R&D) of weapons and equipment. Pyongyang has never disclosed the sources and amounts of funds used to develop its weapons, which is why some experts have put forth estimates of how much North Korea has spent on its nuclear or missile development.

Although the financial resources for the second economy also stem from illicit activities such as hacking to acquire large amounts of cryptocurrency assets, as the latest and the last UN Panel of Experts on North Korea report suggests, the North’s munitions industry appears to be an increasingly significant source of revenue for the second economy owing to the ongoing war in Ukraine. In other words, whether in the form of cash or crude oil, rewards from Russia in exchange for production from munitions factories are more likely to fund North Korea’s ongoing nuclear ambitions than to benefit the general populace. This may be one reason why North Korea has denied arms sales to Russia, despite heavily publicizing its cooperation with Russia and attempting to foster a positive image of Russia among its citizens.

Bolstering Production Capability

Pyongyang’s weapons exports to Putin’s war in Ukraine align with Kim Jong Un’s policy of upgrading North Korea’s weapons production capacity, pursuant to their five-year plan for our national defense development. This also poses a threat to the United States, South Korea and Japan, all of which are within the reach of North Korean missiles.

In the past, Kim Jong Un focused more on R&D of advanced weapons, but he has gradually placed equal emphasis on “production.” For example, at the Eighth Party Congress in 2021, Kim Jong Un stated his expectation that “making military equipment intelligent, precise, unmanned, high-performance, and lightweight should be set as the priority target of the munitions industry.” At a party plenary meeting in December 2022, however, Kim called for a “super-intense drive for production” of weapons and development. Accordingly, munitions factories have had to step up and become capable of manufacturing quickly and in large quantities weapons with advanced technologies.

Given limited human and financial resources, Pyongyang might have focused on developing a handful of select munitions factories to enable them to produce critical weapons systems. Throughout the second half of 2023 and into May 2024, Kim visited munitions factories to encourage increased production and improved quality. During these visits, he emphasized concepts such as “modernization,” “expanding production capacity,” and “ensuring precision and quality.” Those factories that Kim Jong Un visited are likely to be manufacturing munitions requested by Russia, given the unprecedented frequency of Kim’s visits to, and level of detail about, munitions factories since last August, immediately after Shoigu’s visit to Pyongyang.

Kim Jong Un’s emphasis on munitions factories is not merely for weapons exports to Russia; it is also consistent with his repeated calls on the domestic populace for war preparedness. At a party plenary meeting in December 2023, Kim called on “the People's Army and the munitions industry, nuclear weapons and civil defense sectors to further accelerate the war preparations,” listing the munitions industry only second after the People’s Army.

North Korea’s arms deal with Russia continues to provide Kim with an opportune chance to enhance munitions factories’ production capacity while at the same time further developing North Korea’s own weapons systems, including missiles of various ranges that can reach South Korea, Japan and even the continental US. As North Korea's missiles advance rapidly in both quantity and quality, it will be challenging for US, South Korean and Japanese missile defense capabilities to stay ahead of these threats.

Policy Recommendations

The international community has become even less empowered following the demise on April 30 of the UN Panel of Experts, which was mandated to monitor and assess the implementation of UN sanctions on North Korea. Rigorous implementation of sanctions against North Korea is unlikely to be a viable policy option soon; an increased capacity for monitoring the North’s illegal transactions seems even further out of reach.

However, there are still ways to make sanctions more effective. The authors have four recommendations to monitor and restrain North Korea’s munitions factories.

First, rather than simply blaming Russia’s behaviors, which the international community has less control over, it would be more effective for countries to focus on addressing and closing their own loopholes. According to an analysis by the UK-based Conflict Armament Research (CAR), 90 percent of the electronic components recovered from the debris of North Korean missiles used by Russia originated from 26 companies in eight countries. The United States accounted for the largest share at 75.5 percent, followed by Germany at 11.9 percent, Singapore at 3.4 percent, and Japan at 3.1 percent. Most of these parts were produced between 2021 and 2023.

The immediate priority for these countries, therefore, is to closely scrutinize their own export routes to prevent their products from reaching North Korea. With international sanctions restricting traditional access to missile components, Pyongyang has turned to covert methods such as transshipment in international waters, establishing subsidiaries in China, Russia, and some African countries, and forging covert agreements with various companies. Tracking these requires a calibrated system grounded in close international cooperation to effectively tackle cross-border crimes. The advancement of Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) training would be one good example.

Second, it is important to understand likely supply routes to help identify ways to disrupt them. Work has already been done to roughly estimate the potential transportation routes of North Korean exports to Russia, given that the country’s munitions factories are clustered in the west and close to the North Korea-China border—Kanggye in Chagang Province, Nampho in South Pyongan Province, and Pyongyang—as the map below shows. Factories may use local transportation to Rajin Port (in Rason), which is near the Russia-North Korea border, while those near the North Korea-China border might utilize road and rail networks connected to China and then head into Russia. For factories in the west, ports like Nampho would play a significant role. There is evidence that North Korean products are shipped across the Yellow Sea to ports in China and then travel northbound to Russia.

Figure 2. Map by Kyung-joo Jeon; source: https://ontheworldmap.com/north-korea/. Numbers were manually added by the author to mark the approximate locations of the munitions factories listed in the table above, with the numbers matching those on the far left of the table.

The third way to improve sanctions enforcement is to update the list of designated entities and individuals in a timelier manner. To date, both international and independent sanctions have been slow to impact the North’s munitions factories, let alone the country’s entire second economy. The SEC has been sanctioned by the United Nations, the United States and South Korea. Most of their former senior leaders have also been sanctioned by all three. However, only four factories have been sanctioned solely by South Korea, with some of the key figures in North Korea’s munitions industry, including Pak Thae Song, chairman of the National Space Science and Technology Committee, and O Su Yong, former chairman of the SEC, remaining off the sanctions lists.

Last, despite the failure to extend the UN Experts Panel mandate, alternative efforts to investigate, monitor, and restrain the North’s munitions industry must continue. For one, it is crucial that the current US sanctions targeting Russian entities and individuals be complemented by sanctions against North Korea’s leadership in the munitions industry and its principal factories. South Korea and Japan have separately imposed similar sanctions, and South Korean sanctions included seven North Korean individuals, though not those directly involved in munitions factories. The United States, South Korea and Japan could collaborate to establish a new mechanism for monitoring North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, an option currently under consideration by the US government.

Finally, it is worth noting that Russia is not the only customer of North Korean munitions. News reports indicate that North Korean missile technology has enabled Iran’s attacks on Israel. The role of North Korean munitions factories as a key source of current global conflicts should never be underestimated. If the international community fails to fully commit to preventing North Korea from becoming the “arsenal of autocracy,” it risks losing even more control over wars waged by adversaries and opportunities to curb North Korea’s expansion of its nuclear and missile capabilities.

1. [1]
2. In addition to the sources linked to the factory names, the table has been compiled by referencing the following webpages, portals, articles and books: https://wenku.baidu.com/view/860db314a6e9856a561252d380eb6294dd882237.html?_wkts_=1717185155390&bdQuery=%E6%9C%9D%E9%B2%9C%E7%9A%84%E5%AF%BC%E5%BC%B9%E5%B7%A5%E5%8E%82%2C1.25%2C1.18&needWelcomeRecommand=1; 尹瑞涛, “朝鲜“北极星”系列导弹(2),” FX361.com, March 20, 2020, https://www.fx361.com/page/2020/0320/6458560.shtml; the South Korean Unification Ministry’s North Korean information portal (https://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/); Joseph S. Bermudez, “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,” Occasional Paper No. 2, Monterey Institute of International Studies, November 1999, www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/op2.pdf; Gyeong-Seob Oh, Jin-Ha Kim, Byung-Jin Han, Yong-Han Park, “Cause and Current Status of Bloated Military Economy in North Korea,” Research Papers 18-23, Korea Institute for National Unification, 2018, https://repo.kinu.or.kr/bitstream/2015.oak/9963/1/%5B연구총서%2018-23%5D%20북한%20군사경제%20비대화의%20원인과%20실태.pdf; and Daniel A. Pinkston, The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College), February 2008, https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/04/2003215794/-1/-1/0/1937.PDF.

13. Campbell stresses Washington Declaration as deterrence tool amid security concerns over Putin-Kim summit

Yes, but....

But it is also an inflection point where we can adopt a new alliance strategy that is based on human rights upfront, an information campaign, and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea. The NCG and extended deterrence are the critical foundation that should allow us to adopt a new strategy.

Campbell stresses Washington Declaration as deterrence tool amid security concerns over Putin-Kim summit

The Korea Times · June 25, 2024

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, center, speaks during a joint press conference at the Presidential office in Yongsan District, Seoul, June 18. Korea Times file

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell on Monday highlighted deterrence steps of last year's summit declaration between South Korea and the United States as tools to harness amid resurgent calls for the allies to craft stronger defense measures following last week's summit between Russia and North Korea.

After Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un signed a "comprehensive strategic partnership" treaty in a show of their deeper military ties in Pyongyang on Wednesday, calls have resurfaced for Seoul to consider a nuclear option.

But Campbell appeared to be putting the brakes on the calls, pointing to the Washington Declaration that South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden issued during their summit in April to enhance the credibility of America's deterrence commitment.

"I think that the mechanisms that we've put in place between the United States and South Korea ... you talked about the Washington Declaration and the strategic initiatives that have been launched to underscore the added signification of American extended deterrence, particularly in situations like Korea, I think it's given us what we need to work with now," he said during a forum hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations.

"We just have to be purposeful on following through with the specific steps in the declaration," he added.

Key deterrence measures in the Washington Declaration were the establishment of the bilateral Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), a body to discuss strategic and nuclear planning issues, and a U.S. pledge to enhance the "regular visibility" of strategic military assets to the Korean Peninsula.

Particularly, the NCG was a culmination of the allies' efforts to enhance the credibility of the U.S.' "extended deterrence" commitment to using the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, to defend its ally.

But the summit between Kim and Putin raised renewed questions over South Korea's security as their new treaty calls for one side to provide military assistance to the other "without delay" in the event of an armed invasion — in a pledge that amounted to a revival of their Cold War-era military alliance.

Two women walk past portraits of Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang, June 20. AFP-Yonhap

During a webinar on Friday, Allison Hooker, former senior director for Asia at the National Security Council, warned that a deepening military relationship between Russia and the North could push South Korea to consider seeking its own nuclear program.

Campbell concurred with her view, noting that there are "limits" in the North Korea-Russia partnership, but they cannot be ignored.

"I do agree with Allison though (that) the steps that Russia and North Korea are taking are causing countries in the region to rethink all of their military and other steps. So what we've seen is substantial increases in military spending, different focus in South Korea, in Japan and elsewhere across the Indo-Pacific more generally," Campbell said.

"The United States is quite focused on underscoring the strength of our extended deterrence to the countries of Northeast Asia ... Japan and South Korea in particular."

Asked to comment on what North Korea could potentially get from the new treaty with Russia, Campbell raised the possibility of Moscow providing assistance linked to the North's nuclear and missile programs.

"We believe that there are discussions about what North Korea gets in exchange and they could be associated with its nuclear or long-range missile development plans, perhaps other things in energy and the like," he said. "I think we are steading in the aftermath of the agreement and watching carefully but we are concerned."

Touching on how China would feel about the growing ties between Russia and the North, Campbell said that China may be "anxious."

"I think it is fair to say that China is somewhat anxious about what's going on between Russia and North Korea," he said. "They've indicated so in some of our interactions and we can see some tension associated with those things."

He also pointed out China's concern that Pyongyang could undertake provocative acts that would have regional security implications.

"I think it would be fair to say that China is probably worried that North Korea will be somehow encouraged to take provocative steps that could lead to a crisis in Northeast Asia. So we are watching carefully," he said.

"You've seen some movements across the DMZ that have led to kind of a brief exchanges of fire we've seen," he added, referring to North Korean troops' recent incursions into the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas. (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · June 25, 2024

14.  UN aviation authority condemns North Korea GPS jamming near Incheon airport

This is a dangerous and hostile act. I am a little worried as I transit through Incheon on my way to Mongolia in 2 weeks.

NEWS

UN aviation authority condemns North Korea GPS jamming near Incheon airport

ICAO warns DPRK to prevent recurrence, as Seoul accuses Pyongyang of endangering aircraft through signal disruptions

https://www.nknews.org/2024/06/un-aviation-authority-condemns-north-korea-gps-jamming-near-incheon-airport/

Ifang Bremer June 25, 2024

South Korea's presidential airplane lifting off from an airport in Seoul | Image: Presidential Security Service (2018), edited by NK News

The U.N. aviation authority has sent a warning to North Korea over its jamming of GPS signals near the inter-Korean border this year, after Seoul accused the DPRK of endangering hundreds of civilian aircraft.

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) adopted a resolution last week condemning the GPS jamming by North Korea between May 29 and June 2, according to a press release by South Korea’s foreign ministry.

“This marks the first instance where the ICAO explicitly identified North Korea as the perpetrator of GPS signal disruptions,” the ministry stated, noting that the ICAO previously addressed such jamming in 2012 and 2016 but did not “explicitly” name the DPRK at the time.

Under the resolution, the ICAO agreed to notify Pyongyang of its decision urging measures to prevent recurrence, according to the press release.

North Korea jammed GPS signals near the inter-Korean maritime border in the Yellow Sea for several days from late May. 

South Korea’s biggest airport, Incheon International Airport, is located not far from the border on an island in the Yellow Sea, and the foreign ministry’s press release alleged that the DPRK’s signal jamming affected “500 civilian aircraft from 20 countries.”

Retired commercial pilot and aviation consultant Ed Condit told NK News that GPS jamming not only affects ship navigation but can also cause problems for pilots flying aircraft around the Korean Peninsula. 

If aircraft don’t have alternative navigation systems on board, interruptions caused by GPS jamming “would be critical,” forcing crews to “abandon their approach or divert,” he said.

However, most modern airliners have alternative navigation systems available, the expert said, though these are “less precise.”

Condit noted that GPS jamming is becoming more prolific, especially around conflict zones, leading flight crews to train more extensively on using alternative or “old school” navigational methods. 

When aircraft experience difficulties due to DPRK jamming, Condit said Incheon International Airport’s air traffic control tower radar coverage would likely “immediately identify any aircraft going off course while utilizing GPS navigation.” 

In such cases, the aircraft crew should “alert air traffic control of the issue and report they are on backup navigation.”

The U.S. and South Korean forces held joint space operation drills in April in which they trained to conduct strikes in response to North Korean GPS jamming attacks.

While the ICAO resolution marks the first time it has condemned North Korea for disrupting GPS signals, the aviation authority has repeatedly denounced DPRK missile launches as “a serious risk” to international air traffic.

Pyongyang has dismissed these concerns, stating in 2022 that its test launches are “conducted with full consideration in advance into the safety of civil aircraft in international flights” and that they don’t “pose any threat or harm to the safety of civil aviation.”

While North Korea typically provides advance notice of planned space launches, it does not do this for its tests of various weapons systems, including ballistic missile launches that overfly Japan.

Edited by Bryan Betts

15. N. Korea supports Russia's war with Ukraine as 'legitimate act of self-defense'

Self defense? Putin conducted an unprovoked attack on Ukraine and is committing crimes against humanity there. Self defense? I think not.

N. Korea supports Russia's war with Ukraine as 'legitimate act of self-defense' | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · June 24, 2024

SEOUL, June 24 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Monday criticized the United States for its military support of Ukraine and supported Russia's actions as a "legitimate act of self-defense," underscoring the growing military ties between Moscow and Pyongyang.

"If the rulers of the U.S. persist in recklessly pushing their war machine into Ukraine for a proxy war against Russia, it will inevitably provoke a stronger response from Russia," Pak Jong Chon, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea, said in a statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency.

Pak further said, "It is Russia's right to self-defense to make a strategic counterattack to defend its security from the ever-aggravating threat posed by hostile forces. Any responsive action taken by Russia will be a legitimate act of self-defense."

Last week, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un expressed "full support" for Russia's war in Ukraine and pledged to strengthen strategic cooperation with Moscow as he held summit talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Pyongyang.

"We will always stand together with the Russian army and people in a just struggle to defend sovereign rights, strategic stability, and the territorial integrity of their country," Pak said.

In particular, Pak criticized the U.S. for recently expanding its agreement with Ukraine to strike over the border inside Russian territory wherever Russian forces are engaging in cross-border attacks into Ukraine, not just in the Kharkiv region as was previously signed.

"This time the U.S. has gone so far as to allow the Ukrainian neo-Nazis to strike any part of Russian territory at their will," Pak said.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (R) and Russian President Vladimir Putin pose for a photo after signing the "Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Russian Federation" at the Kumsusan State Guest House in Pyongyang on June 19, 2024, in this photo provided by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the following day. DPRK refers to North Korea. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

khj@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · June 24, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com