Quotes of the Day:
“The happy man is one who is freed from both fear and desire because of the gift of reason.”
- Seneca
"In war the will is directed at an animate object that reacts."
- Carl von Clausewitz
“The world of conspiracy theories is one where stupid people dismiss the expertise of highly qualified people, and attribute to these experts a wicked desire to lie to and gull the masses. In other words, they portray experts as sinister enemies of the people. Conspiracy theories reflect the increasingly prevalent notion that the average, uneducated person is always right – can always see the real truth of a situation – while the educated experts are always wrong because they are deliberately lying to the people to further a conspiracy by the elite against the people. It is increasingly being perceived as a “sin”, a crime, to be smart, to be an expert. Average people do not like smart people, do not trust them, and are happy to regard them as nefarious conspirators. They are constructing a fantasy world where the idiot is always right and honest, and anyone who opposes the idiot always wrong and dishonest. A global Confederacy of Dunces is being established, whose cretinous values are transmitted by bizarre memes that crisscross the internet at a dizzying speed, and which are always accepted uncritically as the finest nuggets of truth. Woe betide anyone who challenges the Confederacy. They will be immediately trolled.”
- Joe Dixon
1. Biden Foreign Policy Tracker - Late July: Korea
2. Pope must not allow himself to be propaganda tool for North Korea
3. From Korean Special Forces to Army Chaplain
4. 'Hotline restoration between two Koreas shouldn't be overplayed'
5. Remaking the South Korea-US Alliance
6. The Koreas are talking again — Moon is for real, but what about Kim?
7. S. Korea to discuss with N.K. ways to hold virtual inter-Korean talks via restored hotlines
8. Senior diplomats of S. Korea, U.S. hold phone talks after reactivation of inter-Korean hotline
9. The predictable collapse of the Afghan Air Force is happening in real time
10. No decision yet on details of summertime S. Korea-U.S. combined exercise: defense ministry
11. N.K. leader says 'kindred ties' with China will last for generations
12. N. Korea's trade down 73.4 pct in 2020: KOTRA
13. Kim Jong-un Likens N.Korea's Plight to War
14. North yet to send signal on denuclearization after restoring hotlines
15. One-quarter of Yongsan Garrison being returned to Korea
16. US speeds up return of Yongsan Garrison site
17. Blockbuster 'Escape from Mogadishu' scores highest Korean film opening record of this year
18. The number of inmates in North Korean political prisons have increased by at least 20,000 since March 2020
1. Biden Foreign Policy Tracker - Late July: Korea
Korea
By David Maxwell
Previous Trend: Positive
The administration continues efforts to prioritize alliance relationships in Asia through high-level engagement. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman traveled to the region for a trilateral meeting with Japan and South Korea and then bilateral meetings with several South Korean officials, including President Moon Jae-in. She also plans to travel to China, where she is expected to discuss the North Korean issue, among others. Although the Biden and Moon administrations continue to call for nuclear negotiations, there has been no response from Pyongyang. North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un is likely distracted by continued internal problems, including COVID-19, severe food shortages, and cracking down on outside information. Lord David Alton, chairman of the British-DPRK All-Party Parliamentary Group, issued a new report updating the 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry’s assessment of human rights in North Korea. There has been no change in North Korea’s disastrous human rights situation. China remains complicit in this human rights crisis, as Beijing forcibly repatriated 50 escapees who now face severe punishment, torture, and possible execution in North Korea. The ROK-U.S. combined military exercise in August will go ahead, but ROK political leaders continue to call for its cancelation in the hope that Kim will come to the negotiating table.
2. Pope must not allow himself to be propaganda tool for North Korea
Excerpts:
The pope’s dealings with the regime in China should not provide the roadmap for how to prepare for a visit to Pyongyang. That would involve a sell-out, moral compromise and a further undermining of the Holy Father’s moral authority. That’s not the way.
But that doesn’t mean he should not go. If he does go, he must use it as an occasion to shatter the silence, to speak truth to power, to break through the wall of isolation that surrounds Kim Jong-un’s brutal regime. He must absolutely not allow himself to be misused as a propaganda tool for one of the world’s darkest powers. If he is serious about going, he must personally study the UN inquiry’s report and the APPG report, consult the authors of both reports and prepare with care and conviction.
The world is full of problems today. My own in-box alone has Myanmar, Hong Kong, the Uyghurs, Tibet and a multitude of other issues in Asia on a daily basis, and we all have Covid-19 still to contend with. And yet there can be few issues graver than the plight of North Korea’s 25 million people living in a giant prison.
The APPG’s report has blown the dust off the UN inquiry’s report. We must not allow the dust to gather again on either. Let us take both reports as manuals for action and finally act to end impunity for the gravest crimes against humanity in North Korea.
Pope must not allow himself to be propaganda tool for North Korea - UCA News
Pope must not allow himself to be propaganda tool for North Korea
If Pope Francis visits Pyongyang, he should try to break through the wall of isolation that surrounds Kim Jong-un’s brutal regime
Published: July 26, 2021 04:05 AM GMT ▾
Updated: July 26, 2021 05:38 AM GMT
For years the world has known about the truly appalling atrocities in North Korea. And yet for years, much of the world has chosen to close its eyes and cover its ears and do little.
Fourteen years ago, the human rights organization I work for, CSW, published one of the first and most comprehensive, in-depth accounts of the horrors in North Korea — a report titled “North Korea: A Case to Answer, a Call to Act” — which called for the establishment of a United Nations commission of inquiry to investigate crimes against humanity.
Initially, the response was discouraging. I recall diplomats, policymakers, journalists and other major human rights groups telling me to my face: “You are wasting your time. You are banging your head against a brick wall. The UN will never hold an inquiry into North Korea’s crimes.”
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When faced with such disheartening reactions, there are only two possible responses. To give up or to shrug it off and keep going. My colleagues and I took the latter course. We felt that if enough of us banged our heads against the brick wall for long enough, we might just dislodge some bricks, even if we got a headache in the process. And in my mind was what is said to be a Chinese proverb: “The person who says it cannot be done should not interrupt the person doing it.”
So we persisted. A tiny band initially. Then we recruited others. Finally, we formed the International Coalition to Stop Crimes Against Humanity (ICNK), launched in Tokyo in 2011, bringing together over 40 organizations from around the world, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), to campaign for a UN inquiry into North Korea. And a movement was born.
Less than two years later, with support from the UN high commissioner for human rights and the UN special rapporteur for human rights in North Korea, the UN Human Rights Council established a commission of inquiry. And seven years ago, that inquiry, brilliantly chaired by Australian judge Michael Kirby, concluded that Kim Jong-un’s regime is committing crimes against humanity, the “gravity, scale and nature” of which “reveal a state that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world.”
China has already recently returned 50 North Koreans, despite international protests and appeals, and it has a habit of sending North Koreans back to torture and death
The UN’s report documented a catalogue of atrocities including "extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions" as well as severe religious persecution, enforced disappearances and starvation. All of this should lead, the inquiry recommended, to a referral to the International Criminal Court.
Yet that was seven years ago. Today we are faced with an unchanged situation. Indeed, there is an imminent emergency as Human Rights Watch reports that over 1,000 North Koreans are detained in China, poised to be forcibly repatriated to North Korea by the Chinese regime in total breach of international humanitarian norms and to a certain incarceration, mistreatment, torture and probable death.
China has already recently returned 50 North Koreans, despite international protests and appeals, and it has a habit of sending North Koreans back to torture and death.
With the world news full of woes, North Korea only receives occasional attention. Sporadic gossip about Kim Kong-un’s health, physique and succession, as well as occasional reports of a new famine, get a look-in from time to time. But last week a new report by a British parliamentary group shattered the silence for the first time in years on North Korea’s crimes against humanity.
The new report, published by the All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on North Korea in the British parliament, complements and shakes the dust off the UN’s report and investigates what has happened since 2014.
Its findings are damning. It concludes that there has been no improvement in the human rights situation in the past seven years, that the UN and the international community have failed to implement most of the commission of inquiry’s recommendations, and that there is clear evidence of continued killings, torture, sexual violence, modern-day slavery and religious persecution.
Moreover, according to the APPG report, these atrocities continue to amount to crimes against humanity, and “there are reasons to believe that some of the atrocities reach the threshold of genocide.” A genocide claim is a big one to make and one which the UN inquiry stopped short of making, although it is raised as a question.
The APPG believes the targeting of three groups in particular — Christians, half-Chinese children and the so-called “hostile” class in North Korea — might reach the definition of genocide, the crime of crimes which requires proof of intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.
For anyone who has worked on North Korea for any length of time, the testimonies in the report are all too familiar. But that does not make the findings any less raw. According to the International Bar Association’s 2017 report, cited by the APPG, a prisoner described how another inmate “was raped by a security officer, after which the officer stuck a wooden stick inside her vagina and beat her lower body, resulting in her death within a week of the rape.” Another example was cited where a female prisoner was raped and impregnated by a prison officer. “When the woman gave birth, she was taken to the punishment block, and her newborn baby was fed to prison guard dogs.”
Christians are especially targeted. Possession of a Bible results in certain incarceration in a prison camp and the most severe forms of torture, while those who are caught sharing their faith face execution.
Half-Chinese children also seem to be singled out. North Korean woman who are trafficked to China and become pregnant by Chinese men would be forced to have an abortion upon return to North Korea. Allegations of infanticide of half-Chinese children have been made, according to the APPG inquiry. “There are strong suggestions that no half-Chinese children are permitted to live,” the report claims. When the Chinese regime talks furiously about Sinophobia, it ought to look to North Korea first.
Projects developing transitional justice, truth and reconciliation should be supported, with targeted sanctions continued and strengthened
The regime has long divided North Korean society into multiple political classes, from “loyal”, “wavering” to “hostile”. Anyone with a religious background, South Korean ancestry or a historic connection with wealth is categorized from birth as disloyal to the regime and therefore in the “hostile” class, consigning them upon birth to a lifetime of discrimination in employment, education, housing, health care, access to food and other opportunities.
Thae Yong-ho, North Korea’s former deputy ambassador in London who defected in 2016 and is now an elected member of the South Korean National Assembly, told the inquiry that under Kim Jong-un, the human rights situation is getting worse. Frequent purges of the elite have created “an unpredictable atmosphere” in the regime.
The APPG’s report provides a range of recommendations, aimed primarily at the United Kingdom but relevant for the international community as whole. It argues that governments must re-engage on human rights in North Korea using all available avenues, work with the new US administration and other allies to push for renewed attention on North Korea’s human rights crisis at the UN Security Council, and revisit the UN inquiry’s recommendation to establish a human rights contact group for North Korea to ensure coordination and dialogue between concerned states.
Mechanisms for accountability for crimes against humanity must be reviewed, including referral to the International Criminal Court or an ad-hoc tribunal. Countries should exercise universal jurisdiction where possible, while action at the International Court of Justice for North Korea’s breaches of the Geneva Convention should be considered.
Projects developing transitional justice, truth and reconciliation should be supported, with targeted sanctions continued and strengthened. Humanitarian assistance should be coordinated to ensure it reaches those who need it in North Korea, and survivors of sex trafficking and sexual violence should receive support in the country where they are found and given protection and assistance, including asylum, where needed.
This new report is a wake-up call: nothing has changed, little has been done and there is much, much more to do.
The pope’s dealings with the regime in China should not provide the roadmap for how to prepare for a visit to Pyongyang
It is especially important as media speculation grows that Pope Francis may be lining up a historic visit to North Korea. I do not oppose such a visit per se, but I would urge extreme caution, deep thought and intense preparation. And prayer and reflection about what the goals are.
The pope’s dealings with the regime in China should not provide the roadmap for how to prepare for a visit to Pyongyang. That would involve a sell-out, moral compromise and a further undermining of the Holy Father’s moral authority. That’s not the way.
But that doesn’t mean he should not go. If he does go, he must use it as an occasion to shatter the silence, to speak truth to power, to break through the wall of isolation that surrounds Kim Jong-un’s brutal regime. He must absolutely not allow himself to be misused as a propaganda tool for one of the world’s darkest powers. If he is serious about going, he must personally study the UN inquiry’s report and the APPG report, consult the authors of both reports and prepare with care and conviction.
The world is full of problems today. My own in-box alone has Myanmar, Hong Kong, the Uyghurs, Tibet and a multitude of other issues in Asia on a daily basis, and we all have Covid-19 still to contend with. And yet there can be few issues graver than the plight of North Korea’s 25 million people living in a giant prison.
The APPG’s report has blown the dust off the UN inquiry’s report. We must not allow the dust to gather again on either. Let us take both reports as manuals for action and finally act to end impunity for the gravest crimes against humanity in North Korea.
3. From Korean Special Forces to Army Chaplain
Another fascinating human interest story.
From Korean Special Forces to Army Chaplain
Photo By Sgt. 1st Class Adam Ross | Ch. (Lt. Col.) Hyokchan Kim, command chaplain, 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command, previously served in the Korean Special Forces. At the time of his service, it was mandatory for Korean Army Soldiers to be a black belt in tae kwan do. Photo courtesy of Ch. Kim | View Image Page
DAEGU, SOUTH KOREA
07.29.2021
CAMP HENRY, Republic of Korea – “Impossible Makes Possible.”
It’s a motto that Ch. (Lt. Col.) Hyokchan Kim learned early in his first military career, and carried with him as he felt the call to become a U.S. Army Chaplain at the near-disqualifying age of 40.
“I have had some tough experiences, and whenever I have a challenge I can think of that,” said Kim, 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command command chaplain.
He learned the phrase as a young officer in the Korean Army shortly after he volunteered for Special Forces training. The official motto of Korean Special Forces, “Impossible Makes Possible” means there is always an alternative to quitting.
After finishing his military service in Korea, which included over 100 airborne jumps as an instructor, Kim headed to Las Vegas, Nevada, to earn his master’s degree and hopefully begin a career in hotel management. But as his studies drew to a close, he felt conflicted about beginning the next phase of life.
“Even though I accomplished that goal, my life was not satisfying,” said Kim.
“That’s why I kept asking, ‘what can I do for my entire life?’ I felt God’s calling as a minister.”
Kim answered that calling, and spent more than a decade as a minister in Las Vegas. And though he had put down roots in the city, and started raising a family with his wife, he again felt like the next chapter in his life was a question mark.
“I was soon to be 40, and would ask God ‘what’s your plan for my life?’” said Kim. “God called to me and wanted me to be a U.S. Army Chaplain.”
The path on his new journey included memories of counseling Korean Soldiers during his time as an airborne instructor. In between training sessions at the four week-long course, then-1st Lt. Kim would strike up conversations with his airborne trainees and often find them breaking down in tears once they let their guard down.
“When I would touch the Soldiers and talk to them, they would cry,” said Kim. “They never had that connection.”
This ability to form connections with Soldiers gave Kim the confidence he needed to be an Army Chaplain, even though he was nearing the candidate age limit of 40.
One fortuitous circumstance gave Kim’s journey toward chaplain a boost: the regional chaplain recruiting headquarters was located down the street from Kim’s chapel. Soon he was meeting face-to-face with the recruiter who would help make him a chaplain.
“I was very nervous,” said Kim. “To start a new journey, there’s a lot of risk and fear, but he believed in me.”
Kim’s confidence in his calling led to him succeeding at the Chaplain Basic Officer Leadership Course, and selected to become an active duty chaplain.
Now as a senior chaplain with several assignments behind him, Kim is watching his children succeed in their early military careers. Kim’s daughter and two sons are all graduates of the U.S. Air Force Academy and are active duty Air Force officers.
A common face around Camp Henry, Kim makes the effort to personally meet each and every member of 19th ESC HHC to give them a thought-provoking quote and verse of the day in order to ensure he is there when most needed.
“He aspires to provide guidance and leadership to every member of his immediate and subordinate Unit Ministry Teams, while providing excellent religious support to the 19th ESC community,” said Ch. (Maj.) Curtis Sutherland, 19th ESC family life chaplain. “He enjoys all aspects of his position, and takes great pride in the role and function of the chaplain.”
Thanks to Kim’s unique life experiences, he is able to counsel Soldiers who feel out of place in a Korea. Having spent several years in Korea as an Army chaplain, Kim has many times found himself talking to a young Soldier who is having difficulty adjusting to service far away from home or struggling to find meaning in a new environment. In these interactions, Kim believes the best remedy is reminding a Soldier of their historic purpose in Korea.
“Even though you are a private or a first term Soldier, what you are doing is very important in keeping peace in Korea,” said Kim. “That gives them pride when they see how important their job is here.”
NEWS INFO
Date Taken: 07.29.2021 Date Posted: 07.28.2021 20:30 Story ID: 401955 Location: DAEGU, KR Web Views: 24 Downloads: 0
PUBLIC DOMAIN
4. 'Hotline restoration between two Koreas shouldn't be overplayed'
Or overhyped by the media.
Wise advice.
'Hotline restoration between two Koreas shouldn't be overplayed'
An official from South Korea's Ministry of Unification makes a call to his North Korean counterpart at the Seoul branch of the joint inter-Korean liaison office, Tuesday, after the two Koreas restored their lines of communication. Courtesy of Ministry of Unification
Cheong Wa Dae denies reports on inter-Korean summit plan
By Nam Hyun-woo
The restoration of communication hotlines between South and North Korea, Tuesday, has led Seoul and Washington to express optimism about a potential reconciliatory mood on the Korean Peninsula.
However, experts said, the government here should not get too excited over the resumption of inter-Korean calls, noting that the North may only be reaching out to address its economic difficulties, food supplies and COVID-19 vaccinations, rather than for candid talks on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
"I think we have to view this as a positive sign for inter-Korean relations ― but not to get too excited about any sort of breakthrough just yet," Harry Kazianis, senior director at the Center for the National Interest, told The Korea Times via email.
"It is possible this could be a play by North Korea to see what aid it can get from Seoul such as food aid, vaccines or personal protective equipment. However, as always, North Korea will want these things with little supervision of where they go and what they do with them."
Kazianis's comment came a day after Cheong Wa Dae and the North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announced that the two sides had restored communication lines, Tuesday, also revealing that South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un had exchanged personal letters numerous times since April.
The restoration came 13 months after Pyongyang cut them off, June 9 last year, in retaliation over Seoul-based activist groups' campaign of flying anti-Kim regime leaflets across the border. The regime also blew up a building housing the joint liaison office in Gaeseong in the North.
Upon announcing the news, presidential officials said the restoration would play "a positive role in improving inter-Korean relations, as well as progressing the U.S.-North Korea talks and negotiations on the Korean Peninsula's denuclearization."
Though Cheong Wa Dae did not go further than expressing hopes for improved inter-Korean relations, Reuters reported Wednesday that officials were in talks to reopen the demolished joint liaison office and hold a summit between Moon and Kim, citing unnamed South Korean government sources. South Korea's presidential spokesperson Park Kyung-mee denied the report.
The ruling bloc also hailed the restoration of communications. Democratic Party of Korea Chairman Song Young-gil wrote on Facebook that "it was a rain shower on a dessert," while presidential contenders of the party also expressed their high hopes on proper talks between two Koreas.
The U.S. also welcomed the restoration.
"We certainly believe that this is a positive step," said Jalina Porter, principal deputy spokeswoman of the U.S. Department of State. "I'll also say that diplomacy and dialogue are essential to achieving complete denuclearization and establishing permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula."
President Moon Jae-in speaks as North Korea leader Kim Jong-un watches on during their meeting at the border village of Panmunjeom in the Demilitarized Zone, South Korea, April 27, 2018. Joint Press Corps
Despite the rosy outlook, doubts remain that this may become another empty gesture.
"At the moment, both North and South Korea are nearly completely focused on the COVID-19 pandemic, and for both sides, the impact that has on their domestic situations is paramount," Kazianis said. "For example, I see little chance for a South-North summit anytime soon or any breakthrough on denuclearization this year as COVID-19 has to be the focus for both countries."
Prof. Kim Dong-yup at the University of North Korean Studies also said South Korea should not overreact given the North Korean media's reports regarding the communication lines restoration.
"While South Korea was promoting the restoration, with Cheong Wa Dae announcing the news by itself, the North ended it with a KCNA report. There were no reports even in the Rodong Sinmun," Kim said.
Unlike Seoul, Pyongyang announced the restoration only through the KCNA and a radio broadcast that targets the outside world. The Rodong Sinmun newspaper broadcaster Korean Central Television, which target North Koreans, did not cover the news.
"It was just the restoration of communication lines, and that's it. The restoration is just providing an environment for the North to focus on internal affairs such as its five-year economic plan."
South Korean opposition politicians also expressed worries over excessive optimism.
"It is worrisome that (the government) is overplaying the restoration of communication lines," said Yoo Seung-min, a former lawmaker and presidential contender from the conservative main opposition People Power Party (PPP).
"If the Moon administration stages a promotional show as its term is nearing the end, no member of the public will fall for that trick. Since the administration will be replaced soon, it should focus on facilitating talks that the next government can succeed to."
PPP Rep. Tae Yong-ho said, "We should not neglect the chances of the North attempting to exert influence on next year's presidential election with various events after the restoration of cross-border communication lines." Tae was North Korea's deputy ambassador to the U.K. before defecting to South Korea in 2016.
5. Remaking the South Korea-US Alliance
Some very interesting and substantive recommendations. Captain (Ret) Yoon has provided some excellent food for thought. He writes very provocative think pieces.
Remaking the South Korea-US Alliance
The threat from North Korea (and beyond) has changed. The ROK-U.S. alliance must change as well to keep pace.
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After 70 years of partnership, it’s time for an overhaul of the South Korea-U.S. alliance. The two need a complete rethink about North Korean military threats, which have become much more diverse. Besides the legacy threat of conventional military attack from the North, South Korea and the United States now confront a nuclear threat and also the prospect of asymmetric attacks through cyberspace and by other non-conventional means.
Symmetric and Asymmetric Threats
South Korea and United States Forces Korea (USFK) are currently based around tit-for-tat legacy operational concepts designed to push back North Korean mass and distributed threats. But today, the allies need to deal with North Korean unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), artillery, main battle tanks (MBTs), missiles, and special forces; they also need to distinguish a full-scale attack from provocations intended to send a political message.
North Korea has prioritized its nuclear weapons development over its conventional military capabilities, so most of their conventional weapons and systems appear to be obsolete, and the ROK-U.S. alliance therefore has a high degree of confidence in its ability to counter North Korean conventional military capabilities. In general, North Korean weapons can only target fixed ground facilities and still have limited precision and lethality. But North Korea has recently developed some new conventional weapons and systems, notably the 600 mm “super-large multiple rocket launcher,” the KN-23 improved short-range ballistic missile, and the Pukguksong-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). These emergent threats are serious, and need a response from South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense (MND).
ROK’s Defense Reform 2.0 is focusing on how to adapt technologies of the “fourth industrial revolution,” such as artificial intelligence, virtual reality, and augmented reality, to retrofit existing weapons and systems, but this is inadequate. Rather than adapting civilian technologies for military purposes, South Korea needs to develop dual-purpose technologies developed for and driven by military requirements.
North Korea is close to achieving its long-term goal of becoming a fully capable nuclear power, and is also enhancing its cyber warfare capability. The North conducts frequent cyberattacks, recently including those on the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Corporation, and Korea Aerospace Industries. Existing South Korean cyber defenses are incapable of effectively countering such attacks.
North Korea also conducts psychological warfare, for example by denying responsibility for sinking the ROKS Cheonan in 2010 and accusing the South Korean military instead. This campaign has aggravated the suffering of victims’ families and exacerbated political polarization in South Korea.
North Korea’s asymmetric threats will require some new thinking, going beyond the traditional conceptual scenarios. South Korea’s response needs to be practical, effective, and proportionate to the severity of the provocation. Unfortunately, however, it seems that the ROK military and USFK are currently experiencing considerable difficulty in moving toward this kind of a more realistic approach, which requires changing their tactical doctrines and evolving new operational concepts. A range of novel scenarios needs to be modeled, involving both symmetric confrontations and asymmetric attacks in the electronic, space, and cyber domains. The military strategy of the ROK-U.S. alliance is now heavily dependent upon the electronic interconnection of weapons and systems, such as UAVs/UUVs and Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) networks. These are vulnerable to new types of attack, for example, electromagnetic pulse weapons, which North Korea will likely seek to acquire.
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The Need for New Approach
There is also another reason to propose an urgent review of existing military scenarios. On May 21, at the Biden-Moon summit in Washington, D.C., the South Korean president agreed to participate in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Strategy. Many military experts have interpreted this to mean that the ROK-U.S. alliance will no longer be focused entirely on the military situation of the Korean Peninsula. In the future, the South Korean military and Combined Forces Command (CFC) of the two countries could become involved in military roles and missions throughout the wider Indo-Pacific region, perhaps in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait. In that case, the ROK-U.S. alliance surely needs to be adapted to encompass new concepts of joint operation and new doctrines.
The ROK-U.S. military alliance has a long and successful history. It is a great alliance, but in the contested and complex military environment of today’s Korean Peninsula, the CFC needs a new approach to sustain the alliance into the future. We must address the weaknesses and constraints which undermine the effectiveness of the current ROK-U.S. alliance.
First, we need to invest not just in preparing for symmetric and legacy threats, but also for asymmetric threats across an all-domain battlespace. North Korean conventional threats are well understood after seven decades, but asymmetric threats from North Korea are increasing, and poorly characterized. So far, the allies have no substantial countermeasures in place.
Second, rather than prioritizing or revitalizing the ROK defense budget, it needs to be recapitalized, to allow the development of new doctrines and operational concepts, and to build the appropriate platforms. The recapitalization should include integrating the Command and Control (C2) chains of South Korea and the United States to counter new and emerging threats, and Moon’s rigidly scheduled OPCON transfer plan must be abandoned.
Third, now that South Korea has bought into the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Strategy, the integrated ROK-U.S. C2 will be conducting more diversified missions and roles, whether for the military situation of the Korean Peninsula or for crises and contingencies at regional flashpoints, such as the South China Sea and Taiwan. A bilateral Combined Forces Combat Development Command between South Korea and the United States should be established to prepare for overseas expeditionary joint military operations beyond the Korean Peninsula.
Expanding the ROK-U.S. Alliance Into the Wider Indo-Pacific Region
At his May 21 summit with Biden, Moon agreed that ROK armed forces will join with USFK as part of a wider Indo-Pacific Strategy. What does the ROK-U.S. alliance need to get ready for in new military situations beyond the Korean Peninsula, and how can the current CFC evolve the necessary new operational concepts?
First, the ROK-U.S. alliance needs to build a bilateral and integrated JADC2 network incorporating South Korea’s C2 and ISR to improve joint combat capabilities and enhance survival prospects in the event of a North Korean massed military attack against major fixed targets across the Korean Peninsula. Although USFK is being equipped with JADC2 capability under the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2022, it is imperative that the ROK armed forces are not left behind. For ISR, South Korea should accelerate its development of XLUUVs capable of monitoring newly-built North Korean ballistic missile submarines from the near seas of North Korea before oceangoing operations begin.
Second, the Ministry of National Defense should recapitalize its budget to develop a new concept of combined/joint coalition operations between South Korea and the United States to encompass next-generation platforms such as Manned and Unmanned Team (MUM-T), sophisticated ISR sensors similar to the U.S. Army AN/TPQ-53 radar to create a Korean version of the Israeli Iron Dome, and integrated C2 networks capable of being adapted for theaters beyond the Korean Peninsula.
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Third, now that ROK forces are going to be operating together with USFK as part of a wider Indo-Pacific Strategy, the ROK-U.S. alliance needs to establish a new conceptual basis for a bilateral combined defense posture that can respond either to threats from North Korea or to regional crises. In particular, the LPX-Ⅱ light aircraft carrier project currently underway for the ROK Navy should be developed with such all-domain operations in mind, and integrated into a new combined defense posture with a novel conceptual frame of operations.
Implementing this kind of strategic flexibility will be challenging for both militaries. For South Korea, the prospect of USFK being occupied with regional crises beyond the Korean Peninsula could create a disturbing military power vacuum, and the ROK armed forces must be ready to step up to the plate. For the United States, expanding and diversifying the responsibilities of USFK could send the wrong signal to North Korea that the U.S. is losing interest in Korea, perhaps leading to a catastrophic miscalculation. As well, China and Russia may draw a similar conclusion about the U.S. commitment to its alliance with South Korea, and this could also destabilize regional security.
Strategic flexibility of USFK, with some involvement of ROK armed forces, may offer some marginal advantages in managing regional security contingencies, but it also has serious ramifications for the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula. For the United States, strategic flexibility for USFK may be a misstep, but for South Korea it could become an existential issue. The ROK-U.S. alliance has weathered the turmoil of the Trump years and his America First policy, but it was weakened by the experience. South Koreans are hoping that better days are coming now, and are seriously concerned about where strategic flexibility is leading. The Biden administration is also reconsidering its overseas force deployments in the Global Posture Review – should South Korea worry about the outcome?
For seven decades the ROK-U.S. alliance has focused on dealing with conventional military threats from North Korea, but the nature of the threat is now changing, and the alliance needs to change as well. In order to meet its objectives of survival and deterrence it needs to become more closely integrated, and recapitalization is required to cope with new kinds of threats and provocations. The ROK-U.S. alliance has suffered a period of relative neglect, but now needs to move on. Moreover, since the Biden-Moon summit the very raison d’etre of USFK has become unclear, and the United States should do what it can to reassure South Korea that the security of the Korean Peninsula will not be imperiled by the wider Indo-Pacific strategy.
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Sukjoon Yoon
Navy Captain Sukjoon Yoon, retired, is a senior fellow at the Korea Institute for Military Affairs.
6. The Koreas are talking again — Moon is for real, but what about Kim?
Excerpts:
But, certainly, when it comes to North Korea, we have been here before. Every U.S. president since Bill Clinton has engaged in some sort of negotiation with North Korea. Pessimists will point out that there is no reason to think that any potential negotiation under Biden will produce a different outcome.
Optimists, however, will point out the rare combination of liberal administrations in Washington and Seoul, plus a pandemic that has changed North Korea’s calculus. Moon’s bet is that this combination can convince North Korea that diplomacy is the path it should take.
If this happens and the two Koreas kick-start a sustainable diplomatic process while Washington and Pyongyang also engage in talks, the scene would then be set for the new South Korean president taking office next year to also prioritize diplomacy. In other words, Moon hopes to create the conditions for his successor to have to follow his path — regardless of personal preferences.
The ball, thus, is in Pyongyang’s court. If Kim is really ready for diplomacy, as per North Korea’s announcement on Tuesday, Moon will respond. If he doesn’t, South Korea may turn away from negotiations for years to come.
The Koreas are talking again — Moon is for real, but what about Kim?
The Hill · by Ramon Pacheco Pardo, opinion contributor · July 28, 2021
The Koreas have announced measures to restore cross-border talks and links. For the first time since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, diplomacy could be about to take hold in the Korean Peninsula. Even better: The announcement by the two countries means that real, working-level negotiations toward an agreement, rather than made-for-TV, Trumpian summits, could lead to proper diplomacy in the Korean Peninsula.
We know that South Korean President Moon Jae-in is committed to inter-Korean negotiations. Ever since taking office, he has made clear that he sees diplomacy as the only path to promote reconciliation and peace between the Koreas. In his first summit with President Biden, Moon made North Korea his top priority.
Thankfully for Moon, the Biden administration has indicated repeatedly that it is open to engagement with Pyongyang. Even more relevant, Washington appears ready to take a realistic approach and settle for an arms control deal as a first step to rein in North Korea’s nuclear program. In exchange, the Biden administration would open the door to inter-Korean economic cooperation.
The problem, then, lies with Pyongyang.
North Korea truly has become a hermit kingdom since the pandemic hit, closing its borders and driving foreign diplomats and aid workers to leave the country. Pyongyang also has hurled all sorts of insults at Moon and Seoul more generally. And North Korea has been lukewarm at best in response to Biden’s diplomatic overtures.
So the question is whether North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is really interested in engagement between the two Koreas. The answer seems to be yes.
Surely a key reason that Pyongyang has decided to change its approach towards Seoul is its dire economic situation. Kim himself has confirmed reports of food shortages. North Korea apparently is yet to receive a COVID-19 vaccine, at least officially. And trade with China has ground to halt. Better relations with South Korea could mean aid and vaccines in the near future — as well as better economic prospects in the long run, if inter-Korean economic cooperation takes hold.
In addition, Kim is probably at least intrigued by Biden’s talk of diplomacy. This is no “strategic patience” redux, a policy whereby the Obama administration essentially neglected North Korea while in office. Inter-Korean economic relations won’t move forward unless Washington agrees to sanctions waivers that will allow for South Korean investment in the North. But the Biden administration is consulting on North Korea policy with Seoul, which former President Trump never did. Pyongyang, therefore, cannot play Washington against Seoul. It needs engagement with both countries if it is going to test Biden’s commitment to diplomacy.
With Biden and Moon seeking a diplomatic solution to the North Korean issue and Kim having good reasons of his own to seek negotiations, there is a window of opportunity for diplomacy. Certainly, North Korea has proved to be an unreliable negotiation partner. But Kim surely understands that only diplomacy can help North Korea leave behind the economic struggles exacerbated by the pandemic. So, whether out of a genuine belief in diplomacy or out of self-interest, Pyongyang is opening the door to diplomacy.
But, certainly, when it comes to North Korea, we have been here before. Every U.S. president since Bill Clinton has engaged in some sort of negotiation with North Korea. Pessimists will point out that there is no reason to think that any potential negotiation under Biden will produce a different outcome.
Optimists, however, will point out the rare combination of liberal administrations in Washington and Seoul, plus a pandemic that has changed North Korea’s calculus. Moon’s bet is that this combination can convince North Korea that diplomacy is the path it should take.
If this happens and the two Koreas kick-start a sustainable diplomatic process while Washington and Pyongyang also engage in talks, the scene would then be set for the new South Korean president taking office next year to also prioritize diplomacy. In other words, Moon hopes to create the conditions for his successor to have to follow his path — regardless of personal preferences.
The ball, thus, is in Pyongyang’s court. If Kim is really ready for diplomacy, as per North Korea’s announcement on Tuesday, Moon will respond. If he doesn’t, South Korea may turn away from negotiations for years to come.
Ramon Pacheco Pardo is KF-VUB Korea Chair at Vrije Universiteit Brussel and professor in International Relations at King’s College, London. Follow him on Twitter @rpachecopardo.
The Hill · by Ramon Pacheco Pardo, opinion contributor · July 28, 2021
7. S. Korea to discuss with N.K. ways to hold virtual inter-Korean talks via restored hotlines
Will KJU zoom?
S. Korea to discuss with N.K. ways to hold virtual inter-Korean talks via restored hotlines | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, July 29 (Yonhap) -- South Korea is planning to use the restored communication lines with North Korea to discuss ways to hold virtual inter-Korean talks amid the global pandemic, a unification ministry official said Thursday.
Four hotlines were restored Tuesday nearly 14 months after the North cut them off in June last year in protest of anti-Pyongyang propaganda leaflets coming in from the South.
"Considering the special circumstance of the coronavirus pandemic, we plan to discuss with the North holding a virtual conference, or safe ways to hold in-person talks, so that the restored inter-Korean communication lines can lead to the resumption of talks," the ministry official said.
The official said that the South has no plans as of now to assist the North in setting up the facilities and equipment required for the virtual conference.
The two Koreas have held their routine phone calls at 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. through the restored inter-Korean liaison line but have not yet discussed a specific agenda, the official said.
On Wednesday, the office of President Moon Jae-in dismissed a news report Wednesday that the two Koreas are in talks to arrange another summit and said that there have been no discussions on either face-to-face contact or virtual talks.
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
8. Senior diplomats of S. Korea, U.S. hold phone talks after reactivation of inter-Korean hotline
A north Koreaan duty officer simply picked up the phone and answered it. And he has continued to do so. It is amazing how the north can turn a routine action into a perceived major diplomatic breakthrough. Of course it had to go about 13 months without answering the phone to make this action seem like it is a major advancement. This is typical blackmail diplomacy -they raised the tenions last June (2020), cut off communication and now make restarting communications as some kind of major concession it is making. Only north Korea could make what has been a routine action seem like some major development. The regime knows how to toy with South Korea and the US. This is all part of the regime's political warfare strategy. But Lucy is still holding the football and she will probably pull it just before Charlie Brown tries a kick off before the exercises next month.
Excerpts:
Following the reopening of the communication lines, South Korea has been cranking up diplomacy with the U.S. and other concerned countries to advance its drive to build peace with the North.
The reactivation came amid growing skepticism over Seoul's peace drive, which had been hamstrung by the North's explosion of a joint liaison office in June last year, its hardening rhetoric and unceasing drive for its nuclear program.
Senior diplomats of S. Korea, U.S. hold phone talks after reactivation of inter-Korean hotline | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, July 29 (Yonhap) -- Senior diplomats of South Korea and the United States held phone talks Thursday, the foreign ministry said, after this week's restoration of inter-Korean communication lines raised hopes for the resumption of nuclear diplomacy with North Korea.
First Vice Foreign Minister Choi Jong-kun and Seoul's top nuclear envoy, Noh Kyu-duk, had separate talks with their U.S. counterparts, Wendy Sherman and Sung Kim, respectively, to discuss cooperation for "substantive" progress in joint efforts to foster a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, the ministry said.
The two Koreas reactivated communication lines on Tuesday, 13 months after the reclusive regime unilaterally severed them in anger over South Korean activists sending anti-Pyongyang leaflets across the border.
In the phone calls, Choi and Noh said that continued efforts for dialogue and engagement with North Korea are important after the restoration of the communication lines, the ministry said.
The U.S. officials reaffirmed Washington's support for inter-Korean dialogue, noting they view the reactivation of communication lines as a good development, according to the ministry.
"The two sides agreed to continue close communication regarding the Korean Peninsula issue based on the diplomatic efforts coordinated between the South and the U.S.," the ministry said in a press release.
Following the reopening of the communication lines, South Korea has been cranking up diplomacy with the U.S. and other concerned countries to advance its drive to build peace with the North.
The reactivation came amid growing skepticism over Seoul's peace drive, which had been hamstrung by the North's explosion of a joint liaison office in June last year, its hardening rhetoric and unceasing drive for its nuclear program.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
9. The predictable collapse of the Afghan Air Force is happening in real time
Excerpts:
Jack McCain, a former advisor to the Afghan Air Force and son of the late Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), has described the Afghan pilots whom he worked with as “brave beyond measure.”
“We often had occasions where those pilots would remain in a landing zone, under fire, so wounded could be loaded,” McCain previously told Task & Purpose. “They are asked to fly to the toughest places in Afghanistan, on a regular basis, and do so day in and day out. I’ve never seen the like.”
But with the Afghan Air Force running low on ordnance and desperate for maintenance, someone has to pick up the slack. For right now, that someone is the U.S. military.
The U.S. military is also prepared to have Afghan aircraft taken to a third country where they can be refurbished and repaired and then returned to the Afghan Air Force, McKenzie told reporters at a news conference in Kabul.
So far, U.S. government officials have not said publicly where that “over the horizon” maintenance of Afghan aircraft might take place. In the meantime, the remaining American contractors are using Zoom to teach Afghan maintainers how to repair their aircraft in anticipation of the final withdrawal of contractor support, J.P. Lawrence of Stars and Stripes recently reported.
“I’m not going to kid you and say it’s going to be easy,” McKenzie said. “It will be far more difficult than it was in the past. And we think we have a path to do that.”
The predictable collapse of the Afghan Air Force is happening in real time
None of this is surprising.
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About one-third of the Afghan Air Force’s 160 aircraft can no longer fly because they lack spare parts since the United States withdrew its contractors from the country, Afghan lawmaker Haji Ajmal Rahmani reportedly said during a recent webinar sponsored by the State Department Correspondents Association.
The Afghan Air Force has also run out of laser-guided precision munitions, Rahmani said.
None of this is surprising.
An Afghan Air Force UH-60A Black Hawk assigned to the 2nd Wing Afghan Air Force, conducts dust off landing practice on Dec. 10, 2018, as a part of Train, Advise and Assist Command-Air’s (TAAC-Air) mission at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan. The mission of TAAC-Air is to train, advise and assist Afghan partners to develop a professional, capable and sustainable Afghan Air Force. (U.S. Air Force photo/Senior Airman Maygan Straight)
Since then, the Afghan Air Force has become an effective fighting force. It currently has 162 aircraft, of which as many as 143 were mission-capable as of March 31, according to a Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction report from April.
The Afghans have a fleet of aircraft that includes 23 A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft to provide close air support, the report said. Those A-29s replaced the Afghan Air Force’s Russian-made Mi-35 attack helicopters.
An Afghan A-29 pilot prepared for flight in the cockpit of his aircraft Sept. 10, 2017, at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Alexander W. Riedel)
Moreover, the Afghan Air Force has relied exclusively on contractors to sustain many of its American-made aircraft, including their Black Hawks and Super Tucanos. When the United States withdrew contractors from Afghanistan, it did not take long for mission-capable rates to plunge.
In fact, the U.S. military’s Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Air estimated that without contractor support the Afghan Air Force would be unable to keep their aircraft combat effective beyond a few months, Sopko said.
An Afghan Air Force member inspects a UH-60 Black Hawk as air crews prepare for their first Afghan-led operational mission on this aircraft May 8, 2018, Kandahar (U.S. Air Force photo/1st Lt. Erin Recanzone.)
Jack McCain, a former advisor to the Afghan Air Force and son of the late Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), has described the Afghan pilots whom he worked with as “brave beyond measure.”
“We often had occasions where those pilots would remain in a landing zone, under fire, so wounded could be loaded,” McCain previously told Task & Purpose. “They are asked to fly to the toughest places in Afghanistan, on a regular basis, and do so day in and day out. I’ve never seen the like.”
But with the Afghan Air Force running low on ordnance and desperate for maintenance, someone has to pick up the slack. For right now, that someone is the U.S. military.
The U.S. military is also prepared to have Afghan aircraft taken to a third country where they can be refurbished and repaired and then returned to the Afghan Air Force, McKenzie told reporters at a news conference in Kabul.
So far, U.S. government officials have not said publicly where that “over the horizon” maintenance of Afghan aircraft might take place. In the meantime, the remaining American contractors are using Zoom to teach Afghan maintainers how to repair their aircraft in anticipation of the final withdrawal of contractor support, J.P. Lawrence of Stars and Stripes recently reported.
“I’m not going to kid you and say it’s going to be easy,” McKenzie said. “It will be far more difficult than it was in the past. And we think we have a path to do that.”
More great stories on Task & Purpose
is the senior Pentagon reporter for Task & Purpose. He has covered the military for 15 years. You can email him at schogol@taskandpurpose.com, direct message @JeffSchogol on Twitter, or reach him on WhatsApp and Signal at 703-909-6488. Contact the author here.
10. No decision yet on details of summertime S. Korea-U.S. combined exercise: defense ministry
Do not give into north Korean (or north Korean apologists' and sympathizers') demands. Both the ROK and US governments need to inoculate their populations from the possible provocation north Korea will conduct before, during, or after the exercise next month. The reason it will conduct a provocation is not to signal its displeasure with the exercise but to try to play on the divisions in the ROK and us over the exercise with the intent to drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance. We should remember that the regime wants exercises to end for two reasons: to weaken combined military readiness and if US forces cannot train on the Korean peninsula they will have to withdraw which is a major strategic objective of the regime. And to drive a wedge in the regime with the intent to damage the alliance to again force US troops off the peninsula. But we should also know that the regime does not consider cancelling exercises as a "security guarantee." It will only serve as a security guarantee (or a demonstration of the end of the US "hostile policy") if it leads to the removal of US troops.
We must not waiver and we must conduct full up exercises to ensure ROK/US military combined readiness. That is the number one deterrent which is the best way to prevent war.
(LEAD) No decision yet on details of summertime S. Korea-U.S. combined exercise: defense ministry | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: ADDS more comments in last 2 paras)
SEOUL, July 29 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States are discussing when and how to stage their annual summertime military exercise, the defense ministry said Thursday, amid concerns the maneuvers could affect peace efforts involving North Korea.
The two sides usually hold their summertime exercise in August. Sources have said that this year's one is expected to kick off around mid-August for a three-week run and take the form of a computer-simulated command post exercise (CPX) without outdoor drills.
Whether and how to stage the drill has been an issue, particularly as President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un have agreed to improve chilled relations and reopened cross-border communication lines this week, which had been severed for about 13 months.
Pyongyang has long bristled at such combined drills, branding them as a rehearsal for invasion, though Seoul and Washington have said they are defensive in nature.
"As I've repeated, the timing and scale of the summertime exercise have not yet been finalized," ministry spokesperson Boo Seung-chan told a regular briefing.
"South Korea and the U.S. have made close consultations, fully factoring in related conditions, including the fast spreading pandemic, maintenance of the combined readiness posture, the creation of circumstances for retaking the wartime operational control and supporting diplomatic efforts for the denuclearization of and a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula," Boo added.
On Tuesday, the U.S. Department of Defense refused to comment on future exercise plans, citing policy, but noted that the allied forces continue to maintain a "robust combined defense posture to protect the Republic of Korea against any threat or adversary," while hinting that future programs may be affected by COVID-19.
The two sides usually stage major combined exercises twice a year -- around March and in August -- along with smaller-scale drills throughout the year. This year's springtime program took place in March in a scaled-back manner amid the pandemic.
Asked if Seoul has proposed inter-Korean military talks to discuss Korea-U.S. military exercises, the defense ministry said it "has not made such a proposal up to now."
Earlier this year, President Moon said that the two Koreas can talk about the issue, if necessary, through a joint military committee as agreed upon in 2018.
graceoh@yna.co.kr
(END)
11. N.K. leader says 'kindred ties' with China will last for generations
And this implies that the Kim family regime is going to last for generations in order to maintain those "kindred ties."
(LEAD) N.K. leader says 'kindred ties' with China will last for generations | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: ADDS more info on Ri Pyong-chol's status in paras 6-7, photo)
By Yi Wonju
SEOUL, July 29 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un stressed that "kindred ties" with China will carry on generation after generation as he visited a monument symbolizing friendly relations between the two countries, state media said Thursday.
On Wednesday, Kim visited the Friendship Tower in Pyongyang, which was erected to commemorate China's participation in the 1950-53 Korean War, and sent a wreath to mark the 68th anniversary of the armistice that ended the war, the Korean Central News Agency said.
"The noble soul and exploits of the Chinese people who aided the sacred historic struggle of the Korean people at the cost of their blood when the DPRK was undergoing the harshest and most difficult trials will remain immortal," Kim was quoted as saying.
"The DPRK-China friendship forged as kindred ties will be firmly carried forward generation after generation on the road for the common cause," he said, referring to the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Top officials accompanied Kim, including Jo Yong-won, secretary for Organizational Affairs of the party's Central Committee, and Ri Pyong-chol, vice chairman of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party who is believed to have been dismissed as a member of the Workers' Party of Korea's Presidium in a recent reshuffle.
Photos released by state media show Ri accompanying leader Kim on his left side in an indication that he has returned as the top military official.
Ri, however, appears to have failed to retrieve his position at the politburo's presidium, as the KCNA listed him after the secretaries of the ruling Workers' Party. No official is known to have filled up the position yet.
North Korea and China have emphasized their close and friendly relations amid stalemated nuclear talks between Pyongyang and Washington, and an escalating Sino-U.S. rivalry.
Earlier this month, Kim and Chinese President Xi Jinping exchanged messages to mark the 60th anniversary of signing their friendship treaty and stressed their commitment to further strengthen relations between the two countries.
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
12. N. Korea's trade down 73.4 pct in 2020: KOTRA
When the economy has already collapsed it is hard to see how it could fall any more.
N. Korea's trade down 73.4 pct in 2020: KOTRA | Yonhap News Agency
By Kang Yoon-seung
SEOUL, July 29 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's annual trade plunged a whopping 73.4 percent in 2020 from a year earlier, as the country shut down its border amid the COVID-19 pandemic, data showed Thursday.
The combined amount of North Korea's trade came to US$863 million in 2020, compared with US$3.24 billion tallied a year earlier, according to the data compiled by the state-run Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA).
"The decrease came as both exports and imports lost ground after North Korea closed down its border amid COVID-19, coupled with the prolonged economic sanctions from the United Nations," the KOTRA said in a report.
Outbound shipments came to $89 million, plunging 68 percent from $278 million posted in 2019. Imports also slid 74 percent over the period to reach $774 million, leading to a trade deficit of $684 million.
The trade deficit, meanwhile, improved from the previous year as imports decreased at a faster pace.
North Korea's main export products included steel, mineral oil and watch products. Among major import goods were crude and tobacco products.
The combined amount of trade between North Korea and China came to $762 million, accounting for 88.2 percent of the North's annual trade.
Other major trade partners of North Korea included Russia, Vietnam, India and Nigeria.
KOTRA added Mozambique, Tanzania, Ghana and Thailand were newly listed in the top 10 trade partners of North Korea in 2020.
colin@yna.co.kr
(END)
13. Kim Jong-un Likens N.Korea's Plight to War
The north has psychologically been on a war footing since 1953 so this should not be a surprise in terms of regime rhetoric.
Kim Jong-un Likens N.Korea's Plight to War
July 29, 2021 12:48
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has told war veterans that the impoverished state is experiencing a "crisis similar to a war" due to the coronavirus pandemic, the official Rodong Sinmun daily said Wednesday.
"We are faced with difficulties and hardship caused by the unprecedented global health crisis and prolonged lockdown no less challenging than how it was during the war," he said.
The remarks came on the day of a surprise announcement that Kim agreed with President Moon Jae-in to restore overland communication lines between the two Koreas.
The North Korean economy is at its worst since the deadly famine of the 1990s because it sealed its borders with China, which supplies most of its necessities, amid the pandemic.
Domestic food production has plunged after heavy flooding last year and food prices have reportedly doubled in some parts of North Korea. International sanctions and a devaluation of the U.S. dollar and Chinese yuan are making matters worse.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un addresses war veterans on the occasion of the 68th anniversary of the Korean War armistice on Tuesday, in this grab from [North] Korean Central Television the following day.
Kim Byung-yeon at Seoul National University said, "If foreign currencies fall, prices of goods should also drop, but the exact opposite is happening in North Korea. The purchasing power of people has weakened."
North Korean authorities have put stores under curfew and cracked on open-air markets that used to provide a lifeline for ordinary people. "Gangs of people wearing armbands are marauding around markets, streets and even the countryside," a source said.
It was probably the urgent need for foreign aid that prompted the North finally to respond to Moon's relentless overtures. Nam Sung-wook at Korea University said, "We don't know what the two leaders said in their letters, but there was probably some sort of commitment to accept North Korea's demands for food aid on humanitarian grounds."
- Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com
14. North yet to send signal on denuclearization after restoring hotlines
I doubt the duty officer who picked up the phone on the north side of the Joint Security Area is empowered to make any comments about denuclearization.
Thursday
July 29, 2021
North yet to send signal on denuclearization after restoring hotlines
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un places a wreath at the Friendship Tower, commemorating Chinese soldiers who were killed in the Korean War, in Pyongyang on Wednesday, in a photo carried by the North’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). [KCNA]
Despite the restoring of inter-Korean communication lines Tuesday and speculation of a possible summit, Pyongyang has not sent any signs of its intention to denuclearize so far.
The Blue House has indicated that the restoration of the inter-Korean hotlines is the "starting line" toward the ultimate goal of complete denuclearization, and Washington also immediately welcomed the move as a step in that direction.
The U.S. State Department on Tuesday called the restoration of the inter-Korean communication lines a "positive step," adding that "diplomacy and dialogue are essential to achieving complete denuclearization and establishing permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula."
On Tuesday, the two Koreas revived four hotlines that were unilaterally severed by Pyongyang 13 months ago on June 9, 2020, in protest of what it claimed were Seoul's failures to prevent activists from sending propaganda leaflets across the border. The announcement was made simultaneously by Seoul and Pyongyang after a series of letter exchanges by President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un since April, which led to the decision to revive these communication lines.
However, after the initial announcement on its official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), meant for external audiences, North Korea has not been reporting on the news of the restored inter-Korean hotlines domestically through its Rodong Sinmun or state-run television.
While Pyongyang has refrained from extreme provocations recently, it has also yet to indicate willingness to denuclearize, the next step to return to meaningful dialogue.
South Korean Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong said Wednesday that "North Korea is maintaining a moratorium on nuclear tests and long-range missile launches" since the North-U.S. summit in Hanoi in February 2019, but such a commitment to denuclearization has yet to be confirmed by Pyongyang.
Since the beginning of last year, North Korea has closed off its borders due to the Covid-19 pandemic, which has further burdened the country which has already been facing stiff international sanctions.
Thus, some analysts point out that North Korea may have been pushed to restore the inter-Korean communication lines because of its food crisis and Covid-19 vaccine situation.
North Korean leader Kim in a speech at the National Conference of War Veterans Tuesday carried by its official Rodong Sinmun Wednesday, said, "Today the difficulties and obstacles caused by the world health crisis unprecedented in history and the protracted blockade are no less harsh for us than those in the wartime situation."
His speech in the English-language report compared the current Covid-19 situation and international sanctions to the difficulties of the 1950-53 Korean War. Tuesday marked the 68th anniversary of the armistice agreement that ended the three years of fighting.
North Korean media earlier this week reported on damage to crops in North Korea because of drought, and Kim publicly admitted to a food shortage in the country at a key ruling Workers' Party meeting last month.
The Rodong Sinmun reported Tuesday that "thousands of hectares" of rice and corn fields have withered in the extreme heat and lack of precipitation in South Hwanghae Province, and that many corn and bean fields in North Hamgyong Province also suffered from drought.
North Korea is expected to face a food shortage of about 860,000 tons this year, the UN's Food and Agricultural Organization estimated in a report released last month.
Despite the Joe Biden administration indicating it has no plans to offer sanctions relief for the sake of dialogue at the moment, Seoul has been considering incentives for Pyongyang to return to talks such as coronavirus vaccine cooperation.
North Korea officially claims it has no Covid-19 cases. It has yet to receive vaccine shipments through the Covax Facility, and reportedly has not been cooperative with the global vaccine-sharing mechanism led by the World Health Organization (WHO) and Gavi.
The South China Morning Post reported Thursday that the reopening of inter-Korean hotlines was partly because Pyongyang needs food aid from Seoul and Beijing.
Zhou Chenming, a researcher with the Yuan Wang military science and technology institute in Beijing, told the paper that North Korea needs "food, fuel and other goods so that it can deal with the impact of extreme weather and the pandemic."
On Wednesday, Kim placed a wreath at the Friendship Tower in Pyongyang, which commemorates Chinese troops killed in the Korean War, and stressed that the two countries' "kindred ties will be firmly carried forward generation after generation."
He referred to the "true militant friendship" of the Chinese soldiers who "fought shoulder to shoulder" with the North Korean troops "during the harsh days of the war under the uplifted banner of resisting America," according to the state-run KCNA Thursday.
Kim Ki-jung, president of the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS), affiliated with the South's National Intelligence Service, in a visit to Washington Wednesday said that the next two weeks are very important in continuing to thaw the atmosphere with Pyongyang.
Washington needs to take more action, Kim told reporters after a seminar hosted by the U.S. Institute of Peace think tank, noting the North's economic difficulties. He said that if this critical period is bypassed, then Pyongyang could tilt toward Beijing.
He said, "If the United States through indifference loses its grip on North Korea and the Korean Peninsula issue, there is a possibility that U.S. commitment to East Asia as a whole will weaken more than expected."
Seoul and Washington are scheduled to hold their annual summertime military exercises next month, usually a time of provocation from Pyongyang. The two sides have yet to reveal the exact format it will be run in, but have been conducting scaled-down combined drills since 2018 in consideration of diplomacy with Pyongyang and also amid the pandemic.
Kim added, "If two weeks pass without any additional measures, the restoration of communication lines and letter exchanges could be to no avail."
He also said that should China push for railway cooperation with North Korea and the South misses the opportunity to pursue its joint railway project, it could bring about difficulty in creating momentum to move along inter-Korean relations.
The revived communication lines have prompted speculation of a possible fourth summit between Moon and North Korean leader Kim, though the Blue House has so far denied reports.
The two sides also have other hurdles to overcome. North Korea has yet to offer an apology over the destruction of the joint liaison office on June 16 last year, a week after it severed its hotlines with the South and as warned by Kim Yo-jong, the younger sister of the country's leader.
Seoul's Unification Ministry also said it will raise the issue of the killed South Korean fisheries official to the North since communication lines have been restored.
On Sept. 22, 2020, North Korea shot a 47-year-old official who had drifted into its waters near the inter-Korean sea border in the Yellow Sea, and burned his body. At the time, leader Kim Jong-un offered a rare apology to the South. Family members of the deceased official have been looking to find out the truth behind the killing.
BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]
15. One-quarter of Yongsan Garrison being returned to Korea
A mistake in my opinion. The ROK/US CFC should remain in Seoul. It does not have to be on Yongsan but it should remain in Seoul.
Thursday
July 29, 2021
One-quarter of Yongsan Garrison being returned to Korea
A section of the Yongsan Garrison in central Seoul on Jan. 20. [YONHAP]
A fourth of the Yongsan Garrison will be returned to Korea by early next year, the governments of the United States and Korea announced Thursday.
Although the American forces have been relocating from Yongsan for years, this was the first time a specific deadline for partial return of the land was announced.
“The Joint Committee Representatives [of the Status of Forces Agreement] reaffirmed the need for expediting the return of camps no longer in use by the United States,” read a statement issued by the U.S.-Korea joint committee of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Thursday.
“Both sides have committed to closely work together for returning nearly 500,000 [square meters, or 5.4 million square feet] of Yongsan Garrison by early 2022,” read the statement.
The Yongsan Garrison, which is 20 million square feet, is one of the 80 bases of U.S. forces in Korea being relocated to Pyeongtaek and Daegu as part of a Korea-U.S. agreement from 2003.
As of today, relocation of 12 bases, including the Yongsan Garrison, have not been completed.
The process on Yongsan began in 2017, when the Eighth U.S. Army moved from Yongsan to Pyeongtaek. The next year, the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and United Nations Command (UNC) moved their headquarters from Yongsan to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek.
Last year, small sections of the garrison including a sports field were returned to Korea, consisting of some 2.6 percent of the total area of the garrison, according to Korea’s Foreign Ministry.
“With the return of the 500,000 square meters of space within the garrison by early 2022, we would have a total of some 27 percent of the garrison returned to Korea,” a ministry official told the Korea JoongAng Daily.
Part of the reason for the delay was a delay in the building of facilities in Pyeongtaek, where the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) will be headquartered.
Washington and Seoul reached an agreement in 2019 to move the CFC from Yongsan to Pyeongtaek by 2021. This deadline has been pushed back to next year, according to the Foreign Ministry.
“The CFC will be able to move out of Yongsan once the structures and facilities being built in Camp Humphreys to house the CFC are completed, which we expect will be around the middle of next year,” the ministry official said. “Until that point, the CFC, in order to operate, needs continued access to various facilities in the Yongsan Garrison.”
A more controversial aspect affecting the relocation of Yongsan is an ongoing bilateral consultation on environmental effects the U.S. forces may have had on the area.
By agreements set out in SOFA signed in 1966, the United States has no obligation to restore the land its uses to the condition it found when it started using the land.
This remains unchanged, but in 2001, the two governments signed a memorandum of understanding on environmental protection in which they agreed that environmental protection is important and that there was a need to work on standards to measure environmental effects imposed on the area by U.S. forces.
There have been reports of alarming levels of environmental contamination in areas used by the U.S. forces.
In 2018, benzene at 1,170 times the level deemed safe by the Korean government was detected in groundwater near Yongsan Garrison.
“We are still consulting with our American counterparts on reaching an agreement on what standards to use when examining environmental contamination in the area used by the U.S. forces,” said the ministry official. “We are also in discussion about who should pay for restoration of environments, if there is a need. But in order to do that, we need to agree on what counts as environmental contamination and how we should measure the contamination. These consultations are ongoing, and are part of the reason [for the delay].”
Korea intends to incorporate areas used by the Yongsan Garrison, once they are completely returned, into a public park. No deadline has been set for the complete relocation of the garrison yet, though Korea’s Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport once announced an intention to complete the park by 2027. In 2016, the ministry announced the deadline was “flexible.”
As to why the government is receiving sections of the garrison instead of having the entire garrison handed over at once, the Foreign Ministry said this procedure could “speed up the process overall.”
“If we wait for the CFC to move, and then all the other sections of the garrison to shut down, before starting the hand-over process, it will take an even longer time,” said the ministry official. “We can take sections of the garrison that become available and start working on turning them into a space that our citizens can enjoy.”
Of the 12 American bases still being relocated, six are located in Seoul, one in Daegu, three in Gyeonggi, one in North Gyeongsang and another in Gangwon. Of the 12, Yongsan Garrison is larger than the rest combined.
BY ESTHER CHUNG [chung.juhee@joongang.co.kr]
16. US speeds up return of Yongsan Garrison site
A useful graphic of Yongsan. At different times my wife and I lived there around 7 years (the rest of our decade living in Korea was spent at Camp Greaves in 2ID just south of the DMZ and north of the Imjin River)
US speeds up return of Yongsan Garrison site
Map of Yongsan Garrison in central Seoul
1/4 of Yongsan base to be returned by early 2022
By Nam Hyun-woo
The U.S. has agreed to return a 500,000-square-meter tract of land in the U.S. Army Garrison Yongsan, or about a quater of the site's total area, to Korea by early 2022.
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thursday, the two countries' representatives held a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Joint Committee Representative conference call and adopted a joint statement including more advanced plans for returning the military base in central Seoul.
The representatives were the ministry's North American Affairs Bureau Director-General Ko Yun-ju and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Scott Pleus.
In the statement, the representatives agreed to proceed with the return of "a considerable portion of Yongsan Garrison" and "identify the sections of Yongsan no longer in use that can be returned when all required transfer and force protection actions are complete."
As part of this agreement, both sides have "committed to closely work together for returning nearly 500,000 square meters of Yongsan Garrison by early 2022." This tract of land accounts for nearly a quarter of the base's 2.03-square-kilometer site that is subject to be returned.
Since 2002, Korea and the U.S. have been working on the return of 80 USFK facilities here to the Korean government, as part of a plan to consolidate the bases into one existing garrison at Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province, and another in Daegu.
Of the 80 bases, the U.S. has returned 68, while the two sides are still narrowing their differences over the terms for returning the remaining 12, such as cleaning up any environmental contamination at the sites. The Yongsan base is one of these still under negotiation, even though the 8th Army and the USFK headquarters located there both moved to Pyeongtaek in July 2017 and June 2018.
In December of last year, the USFK for the first time returned 53,000 square meters of land inside Yongsan Garrison ― a sports field at the South Post and a softball field adjacent to the National Museum of Korea.
But at the same time, questions have risen over the slow progress of the return, given that the previously returned area accounted for only 2.6 percent of the total land.
Yongsan Garrison in central Seoul / YonhapThough the two sides made progress by agreeing on returning a quarter of the Yongsan base's land this time, there are still several obstacles to overcome before the full return of the base, which the latest agreement failed to address.
One of them is the transfer of the ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) headquarters, which is still located in Yongsan Garrison. The USFK has yet to determine a timeframe for the transfer of the CFC headquarters, though the defense ministers of Korea and the U.S. in June 2019 agreed on moving the headquarters to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek.
Without the headquarters' transfer, delays seem to be inevitable on the Korean government's plan to set up a national park on the Yongsan Garrison site by 2027.
The cost for decontamination of the area are another obstacle.
The Korean government plans to pay to decontaminate the site out of its own pocket first and bill the U.S. for the environmental cleanup costs later. But concerns have been lingering whether the U.S. will indeed bear the final responsibility for the cleanup cost, which is estimated to reach 1 trillion won ($872 million), because Washington has not paid decontamination costs in other countries in which its troops have been stationed.
"The two representatives agreed to encourage the Facilities and Areas Subcommittee and Environmental Subcommittee to continue cooperation and discussions, and conduct joint reviews as needed to ensure the successful return and grant of facilities and areas during calendar years 2021 and 2022," the statement read without mentioning how the costs would be shared.
An official from Korea's foreign affairs ministry said, "The two sides will consult regarding cost-sharing in the environmental committee in accordance with SOFA processes."
17. Blockbuster 'Escape from Mogadishu' scores highest Korean film opening record of this year
Looking forward to seeing this. I hope escapees are getting this on DVDs and thumb drives for transmission into north Korea. This could be a very useful propaganda film like the Netflix series "Crash Landing on You."
Blockbuster 'Escape from Mogadishu' scores highest Korean film opening record of this year
A scene from "Escape from Mogadishu" / Courtesy of Lotte EntertainmentBy Lee Gyu-lee
Action blockbuster "Escape from Mogadishu" opened strong, Wednesday, scoring the highest opening record of this year among Korean films.
Star director Ryoo Seung-wan's latest flick saw about 127,000 ticket sales on its premiere day, taking up almost 50 percent of the entire ticket sales that day. It topped the local box office and grossed 893 million won ($780,000).
This, by far, surpasses the previous opening record among Korean films of the year by thriller action film "Hard Hit," which opened June 23 with about 55,700 ticket sales. The film ranked the fourth-highest opening score among all films, following the latest Fast & Furious film "F9," Marvel Studios' "Black Widow" and Thai horror film "The Medium."
Helmed by Ryoo, who has directed tent-pole films like "The Berlin File" (2013), "Veteran" (2015) and "The Battleship Island" (2017), the film unfolds the true story of South and North Korean diplomats during the Somali Civil War in 1991.
Amid the chaos of the uprising in the Somali capital city of Mogadishu, diplomats from the South ― played by Kim Yoon-seok and Zo In-sung ― join hands with their antagonistic counterparts from the North ― played by Huh Joon-ho and Koo Kyo-hwan ― on a mission for survival.
With "Escape from Mogadishu" landing at the top of the box office, both "The Boss Baby: Family Business" and "Black Widow" slipped down the chart to second and third, respectively.
"The Boss Baby: Family Business," which opened last week, saw about 34,000 ticket sales, Wednesday, with 261 million won ($227,800) grossing.
The sequel to the 2017 DreamWorks animated film "The Boss Baby," directed by Tom McGrath, follows two brothers, Tim Templeton (voiced by James Marsden) and Ted Templeton Jr. (voiced by Alec Baldwin), going undercover as babies to fight an evil genius.
Marvel Studios' latest flick "Black Widow" is still going strong in the local box office since it hit the theaters on July 7. It accumulated about 29,000 ticket sales, Wednesday, adding its total to 2.7 million tickets and 27 billion won ($23.7 million) grossing.
The superhero flick revolves around one of the Avengers, Natasha Romanoff (Scarlett Johansson), confronting her dark past as a spy.
18. The number of inmates in North Korean political prisons have increased by at least 20,000 since March 2020
This number needs to be vetted and verified but it seems plausible given the situation in the north - Kim's policies and paranoia.
The number of inmates in North Korean political prisons have increased by at least 20,000 since March 2020 - Daily NK
The number of inmates at North Korean political prisons has climbed by at least 20,000 or more since March of last year. This suggests North Korean authorities are responding to public discontent and ideological laxity in the wake of COVID-19-sparked economic troubles by maximizing control and fear.
A source in North Korea told Daily NK on Tuesday that the number of people at political prison camps has climbed “since the enactment of new laws.” Speaking on condition of anonymity, he said most of the new inmates were individuals guilty of “violating infectious virus [COVID-19] quarantine regulations and the Law on the Elimination of Reactionary Thought and Culture.”
North Korean authorities have continuously bolstered the country’s legal framework to preserve the Kim regime. During Kim Jong Un’s ascent to power, the authorities strengthened laws pertaining to citizen control, including the people’s administrative code, criminal code, and the administrative penalties law.
In particular, the government enacted an emergency quarantine law and a law on eradicating “reactionary thought” last year and is making active use of them in controlling citizens. This suggests North Korea has been trying to head off potential disaffection from the regime stemming from COVID-19 or the spread of information from the outside world.
The source told Daily NK that North Korean authorities have dragged off many people to political prison camps for violating these laws.
“The number of inmates [at political prison camps] have skyrocketed since December of last year,” he said. “The number has climbed most at the camp located in Sungho-ri [North Hwanghae Province], where there are currently over 21,000 inmates.”
Daily NK previously reported that North Korea built a new political prison in Sungho-ri last year. Based on that report, the camp mostly holds violators of COVID-19 quarantine regulations.
The general location of the recently-established political prisoner camp in Sungho-ri. / Image: Google Earth
“The number of prisoners at Yodok [Camp No. 15] climbed by about 1,800 between December and now,” the source said. “The number of inmates at the Susong camp [Camp No. 25 in Chongjin] has increased by more than 1,000, if you add together the transfers and the 500 to 600 new prisoners.”
The authorities reportedly transferred to Susong about 200 prisoners each from Camp No. 17 in Kaechon and Camp No. 18 in Bukchang, South Pyongan Province, which are both operated by the Ministry of Social Security. That is to say, “insincere” inmates were transferred to a camp run by the Ministry of State Security, suggesting the authorities intend to gradually intensify their control over malcontents.
Accordingly, the inmate populations of the Kaechon and Bukchang camps have each fallen by 200 to 19,000 and 24,000, respectively.
In total, the recent number of inmates at political prison camps might stand at around 232,400 – at least 23,400 more compared to March of last year, when the number was approximately 209,000.
That number could be larger if one takes into account the political prison camp at Pyongsan, North Hwanghae Province, where prisoner population numbers have yet to be determined.
Moreover, the source claimed that a “significantly growing number” of people have been dragged off to political prison camps for reasons other than violations of quarantine regulations or the anti-reactionary thought law.
According to him, the authorities are now consigning to political prison camps “people who try to defect to South Korea, people who illegally cross the North Korea-China border, people who have contacted South Koreans, people involved in party, state or military corruption, people who say reactionary things, and critics of government policy.”
The authorities appear to have subjected such people to heavy punishment to prevent ideological laxity and bolster internal unity.
Outwardly, North Korea’s leadership talks of “the spirit of loving the people” with tears in their eyes, but the rise in the number of prisoners in political prison camps shows that the regime continues to use an iron fist to maintain its hold on power.
People sent to political prison camps are stripped of their civic rights and subject to subhuman treatment, living lives of forced labor. Many die in the camps, never returning to society.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
