I will be traveling Thursday and given my arrival time late Thursday night I will probably not be able to disseminate my daily distro until Friday (late!)

Quotes of the Day:

 "Do as much good as you can for as many people as you can for as long as you can."

– John Wesley

"Preparation for war is an expensive, burdensome business, yet there is one important part of it that costs little--study. However changed and strange the new conditions of war maybe, not only generals, but politicians and ordinary citizens may find there is much to be learned from the past that can be applied to the future."

– Field Marshal Slim, Defeat into Victory

"Generals should receive advice, in the first place from the experts who are both specially skilled in military matters and have learned from experience; secondly, from those who are on the scene of action…..Thus, if there is anyone who is confident that he can advise me as to the best advantage of the state in this campaign which I am about to conduct, let him not refuse his services to the state, but come with me into Macedonia."

– Consul Lucius Aemilius Paulus, Rome, 168.b.c. 

1. The Kyiv Children’s Hospital Attack

2. Flying aboard the Ghostrider, a deadly aircraft carrying America’s biggest gun in the sky

3. The Pentagon Can’t Wait to Innovate By Leon E. Panetta and Mike Gallagher

4. U.S., Allies Issue Rare Warning on Chinese Hacking Group

5. U.S. Officials Say Russia Is Unlikely to Take Much More Ukrainian Territory

6. CNA Explains: Myanmar’s ex-president visited China, followed by its junta No 2. What’s the play?

7. Analysis | At NATO summit, Gaza is the elephant in the room

8. Combing the desert: 'Spaceballs' and the Hamas tunnel quagmire - analysis

9. WATCH: 'Where were you on Oct 7?': New footage of Hamas hostage Daniela Gilboa published

10. Can China's PLA fight a modern war?

11. NATO needs to plug the “Hawaii gap” in the US Indo-Pacific deterrence strategy

12. Why the Himalayan Region Is Integral to a Rules-Based Order in the Indo-Pacific

13. Putin’s New War Economy

14. Iran’s New Naval Ambitions

15. Wrestling with the Future of US-China Competition

16. High-Tech American Weapons Work Against Russia—Until They Don’t

17. Army Advocates Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence by Soldiers as Other Services Are Hesitant

18. Understanding the next era of warfare

19. Exclusive | Was fallen Chinese defence minister Wei Fenghe compromised by hostile force?

20. What we know — and don’t know — about Hezbollah’s weapons arsenal

1. The Kyiv Children’s Hospital Attack

I ask Americans and citizens of the free world to reflect on this:

Excerpts:

The war in Ukraine provides the West with the clearest example in the modern era of a war of good versus evil. The brutal atrocities of the Russian military throughout their Ukraine campaign must act as a clarion call for countries that believe in the rights of individuals and in preserving democratic systems.

There is a strategic imperative and a moral obligation to assist Ukraine to win this war as rapidly as possible. The deliberate Russian attack, using precision missiles against the children at the Okhmatdyt hospital, provides us with more evidence for why this is so. Let’s hope that those attending the NATO summit decide that a shift in strategy for the war is necessary.

The Kyiv Children’s Hospital Attack

More Evidence for Why NATO Must Change its Strategy for Ukraine

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/the-kyiv-childrens-hospital-attack?utm

MICK RYAN

JUL 10, 2024

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Image: @IAPonomarenko at Twitter / X

This was one of the most barbaric and demonstratively deliberate gestures of Russia's war on Ukraine. Russia & Vladimir Putin are not interested in any "peace," "the end of the conflict," or a "compromise." They are interested in Ukraine's unconditional surrender enforced via unlimited civilian terror.

Illia Ponomarenko, 9 July 2024

In the past 24 hours we have seen again the brutality of the Putin regime, and the murderous band of barbarians called the Russian military. The deliberate attack by a Russian precision missile on the Okhmatdyt hospital, despite its horror, is part of a wider Russian campaign to terrorise the people of Ukraine.

This was not the actions of a few bad apples. It is the outcome of a systemic, command-led campaign to terrorise and brutalise Ukrainians, just as the Russians did with Syrians and Chechens. Russian political and military leaders have nurtured a culture of indiscriminate killing in Ukraine and set the conditions for it to flourish. They bear full responsibility for the killings at Okhmatdyt hospital, Bucha and other atrocities across Ukraine in the past two and half years.

Throughout this war, prompted by the awful conduct of Russian forces, I have continued to ponder the notion of good and evil, and the idea of ‘just wars’. Just War Theory seeks to provide a guide for how nations might act in the right way both in deciding to go to war and in the conduct of war. As Cian O’Driscoll writes in his superb book, Victory, “the idea of just war rests on the dual aim that war may sometimes be justified and that it is possible to discern between just and unjust uses of force.”

Given the behaviour of Russian leaders in the last couple of years, they clearly do not believe in the underlying philosophies of Just War Theory.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation and Europe has released several reports that examine Russian atrocities in Ukraine. These makes for grim reading and this particular report from the OSCE delivered in April last year details a massive number of horrific acts that are attributed to the Russian Army and its proxies in Ukraine. The report notes that “some of the most serious violations encompass targeted killing of civilians, including journalists, human rights defenders, or local mayors; unlawful detentions, abductions and enforced disappearances of the same categories of persons; large-scale deportations of Ukrainian civilians to Russia; various forms of mistreatment, including torture, inflicted on detained civilians and prisoners of war.”

The Ukrainian prosecutor general’s office is also currently investigating over 120,000 alleged war crimes by Russians since the beginning of the large scale invasion in February 2022. Each of these allegations by themselves and in their totality is indicative of institutional failures in the Russian government and military forces. They also indicate a systemic approach to the brutalisation of the Ukrainian people, and a callous disregard for international law and the laws of war. There are good reasons why Putin, Shoigu and Gerasimov all now have standing arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court.

As someone who spent decades honing my professionalism in the Australian Army, Russian behaviour throughout the war demonstrates that it is a professionally corrupt and morally hollow military institution. It is also indicative of a Russian regime that is not scared of the speeches by western politicians. Indeed, Western inaction in the face of Russian atrocities ensures they will continue.

This latest act by the Russians at the Kyiv children’s hospital provides yet another layer of evidence about the mindset of Putin and his determination to erase the culture, and indeed the very existence, of Ukraine. And it should provide further impetus for rethinking Western strategy about the war and a rapid elevation in the level of western support to help Ukraine defeat Russia.

So, what does this mean?

The most important priority at the moment is that the West needs to change its ideas about the kind of war it is supporting in Ukraine. Too many nations, with the exception of the Baltics and Poland, act like they are undertaking a large-scale goodwill gesture for a distant, eastern European nation. While there has been a degree of generosity from many countries, the level of diplomatic, military and financial support is barely meeting the rhetoric of ‘defending Ukraine for as long as it takes.’ That strategy is failing.

Trickle feeding support to Ukraine, as has been the case for the last 28 months, is not stopping the war. Importantly, it is not scaring Putin into stopping his aggression against Ukraine nor deterring his threats against other nations. Indeed, it is having the opposite impact. Putin sees that he can arbitrarily attack hospitals and shopping centres, torture POWs, rape and loot in occupied territories and conduct sabotage operations throughout Europe, with the West almost doing nothing in response.

Image: @ZelenskyyUa at Twitter / X

If we do not change course, embrace a strategy of defeating Russia in Ukraine and resourcing this effort accordingly, Russia will continue its almost endless stream of atrocities against Ukrainians. And eventually it will turn its eye upon other nations in Europe as well.

To resource this strategy, Ukraine needs enhanced air and missile defences to protect their people (Biden’s announcement today on this is very welcome). They need more armoured vehicles, trucks, medical supplies, munitions, UAVs, training, support combating Russian misinformation and EW. In essence, Ukraine needs more of just about every kind of military equipment and munitions, as well as reconstruction, financial, humanitarian and de-mining assistance. And, they don’t need restrictions on where to use their weapons.

It will be expensive for all of us (Australia also needs to step up and act like the G20 member it is). But the cost of helping Ukraine throw the Russians out of their territory will be cheaper than persisting with our current strategy. It will be much, much cheaper than the inevitable follow-on wars that Putin and Xi will launch if Putin believes he has succeeded in Ukraine.

Finally, the West must stand by any commitment to support Ukraine in beating Russia. The U.S. Congressional debate about Ukraine assistance profoundly hurt the Ukrainians, impacted on trust between the U.S. and its allies, and gave heart for Putin, Xi and other authoritarians. It was indicative of a polity that not only had doubts about Ukraine but had doubts about itself. This demonstrated lack of commitment, and lack of confidence in our own systems, is being exploited by China and Russia through their misinformation, coercion and cyber operations.

The war in Ukraine provides the West with the clearest example in the modern era of a war of good versus evil. The brutal atrocities of the Russian military throughout their Ukraine campaign must act as a clarion call for countries that believe in the rights of individuals and in preserving democratic systems.

There is a strategic imperative and a moral obligation to assist Ukraine to win this war as rapidly as possible. The deliberate Russian attack, using precision missiles against the children at the Okhmatdyt hospital, provides us with more evidence for why this is so. Let’s hope that those attending the NATO summit decide that a shift in strategy for the war is necessary.

2. Flying aboard the Ghostrider, a deadly aircraft carrying America’s biggest gun in the sky

Video report at the link below.

It is one helluva weapons system.

Flying aboard the Ghostrider, a deadly aircraft carrying America’s biggest gun in the sky

By Brad Lendon and Mike Valerio, CNN

 6 minute read 

Updated 9:07 PM EDT, Tue July 9, 2024

https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/09/asia/korea-ac130j-ghostrider-gunship-biggest-gun-intl-hnk-ml/index.html

CNN gets access into America’s ‘biggest gun in the sky’

02:25 - Source: CNN

Above the Korean Peninsula CNN —

As the US Air Force AC-130J flies over South Korea’s towering apartment blocks, its powerful cameras can almost see inside windows on the highest floors.

Aiming farther afield, the weapons officers on the four-engine aircraft, nicknamed Ghostrider, can pick out objects at 50,000 feet, almost 10 miles away – all potential targets for the biggest gun ever mounted on a fixed-wing plane.

CNN got an exclusive look inside the aircraft, assigned to Air Force Special Operations Command, in early June after it flew from its home base in Hurlburt Field, Florida, for joint drills in South Korea.

In a live-fire exercise, the 105-millimeter howitzer pumped out 43-pound shells, into a firing range east of Seoul, the force of each blast so powerful that it pushed the tail of the 80-

ton plane six feet to the right.

About eight seconds after firing, the shells hit the range 10,000 feet below, sending smoke billowing skyward as the controllers of the big gun watched the results of their handiwork on large video screens in the middle of the aircraft.

“Assess two tanks destroyed,” a scratchy voice confirms in the radio headsets of the AC-130 crew.

AC-130 gunners Joe Gipson (back) and Isaac Dowell tend the 105mm cannon aboard a US Air Force AC-130J during a live-fire exercise over South Korea.Brad Lendon/CNN

Pilot Capt. John Ikenberry said the AC-130’s presence for drills in South Korea was designed to send a simple message to its belligerent neighbors and their leader

Kim Jong Un to the north – deterrence.

“It shows we are ready,” Ikenberry said.

Tensions have been simmering on the peninsula in recent months.

The North has been sending balloons filled with trash to areas in and near Seoul and testing missiles, and South Korean troops have fired warning shots as North Korean soldiers from the North have crossed the military demarcation line in the middle of the demilitarized zone.

Just this week, North Korea criticized live-fire exercises in the South in late June and early July as an “‘inexcusable and explicit provocation.”

Meanwhile, Washington has kept a steady stream of hardware heading to the South for land, air and sea exercises leading up to one of their biggest yearly exercises, Ulchi Freedom Shield, set to begin later this summer.

Experience they can’t get stateside

The AC-130J, the newest version of the US Air Force Hercules gunships, is testing its mettle in Korea for the second year in a row.

Maj. Heath Curtis, combat systems officer on the Hercules, says it’s important for the gunship to make the flight across the Pacific because it offers experience training where a conflict could be fought with conditions that can’t be duplicated on firing ranges in Florida or New Mexico that the gunship would use in the United States.

CNN senior global military affairs writer Brad Lendon holds a 105mm howitzer shell aboard a US Air Force AC-130J gunship flying out of Osan Air Base, South Korea, in June 2024

Mike Valerio/CNN

The mountain ranges and ridges of the Korean Peninsula present wind conditions not found elsewhere, he says, and that can make a difference even to a projectile traveling more than 800 mph.

It also gives the chance for Curtis and a second officer seated at AC-130’s weapons control center the chance to practice alongside South Korean allies they may need to protect in the event of a ground war on the peninsula.

The huge television monitors bring the battlefield below up close in both regular and infrared definition. The cameras mounted outside the plane can zoom in on details to ensure weapons fire is accurate.

A 105mm howitzer is seen at the rear of a US Air Force AC-130J at Osan Air Base, South Korea, in early June 2024.

Brad Lendon/CNN

“The unique thing about the AC-130 is the amount of fire that we bring, the amount of munitions – the diverse amount of them – and the amount of loiter time we can provide,” says the mission commander for this gunship, Maj. Justin Burris.

Besides the 105-millimeter howitzer, the AC-130J carries a 30-millimeter cannon and can launch precision-guided missiles and bombs from pylons on its wings.

With the weapons’ near-pinpoint accuracy, it can fire on enemy positions within shouting distance of friendly troops, earning the aircraft the title of “the infantryman’s best friend” in some circles.

And with air-to-air refueling, it can, in theory, stay on station supporting ground forces as long as the crew and ammunition can last.

‘Spooky’ history

US Air Force gunships trace their lineage back to the Vietnam War, when the service set up 7.62 mm guns to fire out one side of a C-47 transport aircraft.

With that configuration, the aircraft could circle a single point and deliver massive, continuous firepower on it, from its guns that could fire 6,000 rounds in a minute, according to Air Force fact sheets.

The firepower and the flares they used to light up targets during night missions earned them the nicknames “Spooky” and “Puff the Magic Dragon.”

As the war went on, the Air Force looked for a heavier airframe for the gunship role and turned to C-130 Hercules transports.

The first conversion of a C-130 to an AC-130 saw action over Southeast Asia in 1967, according to the National Museum of the US Air Force.

With their ability to support troops in close combat, AC-130 gunships in different variations have seen action in conflicts including Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan and have saved an untold number of lives, according to the Air Force.

With the AC-130J model, introduced in 2017, the Air Force removed the machine guns in favor of the more precision-guided munitions.

But there have been problems, too, including a 2015 attack on a Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, that killed left 42 patients, staff and caretakers

dead.

Despite the formidable firepower it carries, the AC-130 flies low and slow, making it vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire.

And seven AC-130 gunships have been lost over the years, the last being on January 31, 1991, when an Iraqi surface-to-air missile brought down a AC-130H during Operation Desert Storm, according to Air Force news releases.

The AC-130 gunship's primary missions are close air support, air interdiction and force protection.

Shutterstock

The plane crashed into the Persian Gulf while supporting US Marines during a battle in Khafji, Saudi Arabia, killing all 14 crew aboard.

The AC-130’s crew acknowledges the dangers of ground fire to their aircraft, and some analysts question its usefulness in any potential conflict with North Korea.

“They couldn’t be operated within say 100 nautical miles of the border as they’re too vulnerable to North Korean border air defenses,” says Peter Layton, a visiting fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute in Australia and former Royal Australian Air Force officer.

But Layton says the gunships could be helpful supporting allied troops who might be trying to round up North Korean special forces units that had managed to infiltrate deeper into southern territory.

Still, he cautioned, “if a war starts there, try not to be on an AC-130 unless it’s heading out of theater.”

Maj. Christopher Mesnard, Special Operations Command Korea public affairs director, said the AC-130J is a suitable weapon system for the Korean Peninsula.

“We have the utmost confidence in our ability to operate weapons systems like the AC-130J in times and places of our choosing and in a way that adequately considers risks, regardless of the region,” he said.

CNN’s Yoonjung Seo and Gawon Bae contributed to this report.

CNN · by Brad Lendon, Mike Valerio · July 10, 2024

3. The Pentagon Can’t Wait to Innovate By Leon E. Panetta and Mike Gallagher

Conclusion:

America faces an axis of authoritarianism whose combined economic and military power dwarfs any national-security challenge since World War II. To prevent cold-war competition from devolving into a hot war, it’s time to innovate as if the free world depended on it. The path forward must be paved with investments in technology and undergirded by infrastructure built for innovative national-security research and education. Failure risks not only our current strategic position; it threatens our future stability and influence on the world stage.

The Pentagon Can’t Wait to Innovate

The American military must make rapid adoption of new commercial technologies a priority.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-pentagon-needs-to-innovate-yesterday-defense-enemies-war-4ad88e3f?page=1

By Leon E. Panetta and Mike Gallagher

July 9, 2024 4:48 pm ET

ILLUSTRATION: DAVID GOTHARD

The U.S. faces grave national-security threats around the globe. Conflicts in the Middle East and Europe, combined with a shifting balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, embolden America’s adversaries and threaten the free world. If the U.S. doesn’t act swiftly to ensure our technological edge, we’ll risk further deterrence failures and the erosion of international freedom.

China and Russia are expanding their global influence through conventional military power and advances in manufacturing and critical technology. The U.S. is unlikely to adopt industrial policy or match our enemies in sheer production volume. That’s OK; our path forward instead lies in America’s capacity to innovate.

Our enemies prioritize personal power and ambition over their citizens’ interests. Such authoritarians are also willing to steal to overcome a dearth of homegrown innovation. The well-documented theft of intellectual property and cyberattacks conducted by state-sponsored actors in China, Russia, Iran and North Korea reveals that our enemies have contempt for the rules-based international order. Yet we needn’t stoop to their level to compete. By embracing American innovation and ingenuity as cornerstones of our national-defense strategy, we can uphold and strengthen our fundamental values.

The Defense Department must make the rapid adoption of new technologies a priority, particularly in the commercial sector. This will require Pentagon bureaucrats to overcome the aversion to risk that permeates their agency and to leverage the expertise of academia and the private sector. The goal will be to build a defense innovation ecosystem in which the brightest minds in technology, strategy and defense can collaborate without constraint.

That will be a tall order. As the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption and the Defense Innovation Board have reported, the status quo is woefully insufficient. Washington has yet to shift significant resources—or to adapt business processes—to harness commercial solutions at scale or speed. The Atlantic Council’s January 2024 report highlighted a host of persistent problems, such as the Pentagon’s “outdated” research and development “model that struggles to adopt and apply leading commercial innovations to weapon systems,” a shrinking industrial base, long acquisition timelines, “an insufficient understanding of emerging technology” and “a bureaucracy seemingly designed to stifle speed and innovation.” This means that while American companies “demonstrate technological prowess,” such innovation “serves little use in deterring conflict” unless the Pentagon can put “new technology into the hands of warfighters at a faster pace.”

The Defense Innovation Board added separately that despite numerous initiatives to turbocharge innovation in the Defense Department, the complexity of the defense structure “hinders rapid adoption and ultimately, implementation of new systems.” This will persist, the authors intone, unless the defense secretary drives a shift toward “a culture of innovation and risk-taking.”

Senior defense leaders and policymakers can hasten that shift by investing in collaborative projects, such as the Naval Innovation Center planned to open at the Naval Postgraduate School. The program would offer a unique national resource: a center for the military’s brightest minds, tasked with removing barriers to innovation and accelerating the Pentagon’s adoption of commercial technology.

Many policymakers seem to believe that we don’t need to mobilize the Defense Department until the shooting starts. That’s a dangerous delusion. Our enemies are intent on aggression and will succeed in their aims if we’re stuck catching up. We must innovate in peacetime with the same speed and creativity with which we have traditionally innovated in war. The Naval Innovation Center can be a hub for such thinking, with a focus on the rapid adoption of commercial technology and the integration of cutting-edge practices from the private sector into Defense Department operations.

America faces an axis of authoritarianism whose combined economic and military power dwarfs any national-security challenge since World War II. To prevent cold-war competition from devolving into a hot war, it’s time to innovate as if the free world depended on it. The path forward must be paved with investments in technology and undergirded by infrastructure built for innovative national-security research and education. Failure risks not only our current strategic position; it threatens our future stability and influence on the world stage.

Mr. Panetta served as defense secretary, 2011-13. Mr. Gallagher served as chairman of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, 2023-24.

4. U.S., Allies Issue Rare Warning on Chinese Hacking Group

Excerpts:

The warning marked the first time South Korea and Japan joined with Australia in attributing malicious cyber activity to China. It was also the first time that Australia—which has been reluctant to point the finger at China, its largest trading partner—led such an effort, according to a person familiar with the matter.

“In our current strategic circumstances, these attributions are increasingly important tools in deterring malicious cyber activity,” said Richard Marles, Australia’s deputy prime minister and defense minister.

On Tuesday, China accused the U.S. and its allies of hyping China’s cyber activities to smear Beijing and distract from Washington’s efforts to engage in surveillance and espionage worldwide. “Who is the biggest threat to global cybersecurity? I believe the international community sees this clearly,” said Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian.

U.S., Allies Issue Rare Warning on Chinese Hacking Group

An advisory by Australia, along with the U.S. and six other countries, details a group known as APT40

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/u-s-allies-issue-rare-warning-on-chinese-hacking-group-9eebb0ce?page=1

By Mike Cherney

Follow

July 9, 2024 7:38 am ET

Beijing accused the U.S. and its allies of hyping China’s cyber activities. PHOTO: VINCENT THIAN/ASSOCIATED PRESS

SYDNEY—Australia, the U.S. and six other allies warned that a Chinese state-sponsored hacking group poses a threat to their networks, in an unusual coordinated move by Western governments to call out a global hacking operation they say is directed by Beijing’s intelligence services.

Tuesday’s advisory was a rare instance of Washington’s major allies in the Pacific and elsewhere joining to sound the alarm on China’s cyber activity. Australia led and published the advisory. It was joined by the U.S., U.K., Canada and New Zealand, which along with Australia are part of an intelligence-sharing group of countries known as the Five Eyes. Germany, Japan and South Korea also signed on.

The warning marked the first time South Korea and Japan joined with Australia in attributing malicious cyber activity to China. It was also the first time that Australia—which has been reluctant to point the finger at China, its largest trading partner—led such an effort, according to a person familiar with the matter.

“In our current strategic circumstances, these attributions are increasingly important tools in deterring malicious cyber activity,” said Richard Marles, Australia’s deputy prime minister and defense minister.

On Tuesday, China accused the U.S. and its allies of hyping China’s cyber activities to smear Beijing and distract from Washington’s efforts to engage in surveillance and espionage worldwide. “Who is the biggest threat to global cybersecurity? I believe the international community sees this clearly,” said Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian.

Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Richard Marles. PHOTO: VINCENT THIAN/ASSOCIATED PRESS

The technical advisory detailed a group known in cybersecurity circles as Advanced Persistent Threat 40, or APT40, which conducts cybersecurity operations for China’s Ministry of State Security and has been based in the southern island province of Hainan. The advisory detailed how the group targeted two networks in 2022—though it didn’t identify the organizations—and said the threat is continuing.

“Having all eight nations collectively call this out is significant,” said Rachael Falk, chief executive of the Cyber Security Cooperative Research Centre in Australia. “You don’t see collective attribution from so many agencies about one malicious cyber threat actor very often.”

Falk said APT40 carefully carries out reconnaissance, can look like a legitimate user and is very effective at stealing valuable data. She said APT40 rapidly exploits new, and sometimes old, public vulnerabilities in widely used software and uses compromised small home office devices. That enables the group to launch attacks and blend in with traffic.

“They are highly skilled at hiding within the network,” she said, noting the group’s tradecraft continues to evolve. “They look like legitimate traffic or normal users and strike with precision when the time is right, stealing valuable data.”

In one of the incidents, the hackers accessed large amounts of sensitive data and got privileged authentication credentials that enabled the group to log in, the advisory said. In the other incident, the group got several hundred unique username and password pairs, as well as multifactor authentication codes and technical artifacts related to remote access sessions.

Officials didn’t publicly say why the advisory was released now, though cybersecurity experts said it takes time to determine who is responsible for an attack.

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FBI Director Christopher Wray testified about the threat posed by Chinese cyber intrusions into U.S. critical infrastructure networks before the House China committee. Photo: Julia Nikhinson/AFP via Getty Images

The advisory suggests the group is still active despite previous efforts to disrupt it. In 2021, U.S. prosecutors charged four Chinese nationals tied to APT40 with a campaign to hack into the computer systems of dozens of companies, universities and government entities as part of an effort to steal information that would benefit Chinese companies, the Justice Department said at the time.

Three of the defendants in that case were officers in the Hainan State Security Department, a provincial arm of the Ministry of State Security, who coordinated computer hackers at front companies for the ministry. The stolen information included technologies for submersibles and autonomous vehicles, specialty chemical formulas, commercial aircraft servicing, and proprietary genetic sequencing technology, the Justice Department said. Infectious-disease research was also targeted.

Concerns about China’s hacking campaign have grown since the 2021 case. U.S. officials are now worried that China’s aims involve not just stealing sensitive data and weapons information, but also targeting infrastructure that underpins civilian life. U.S. officials have said that China is seeking to “preposition” in critical infrastructure networks for future attacks, unleashing chaos when the time is right.

Microsoft revealed last year that the state-sponsored Chinese campaign went after a range of networks on Guam and elsewhere in the U.S., including communication, transportation, maritime and other sectors. The company said the hackers were likely developing capabilities that could disrupt critical communications infrastructure between the U.S. and Asia during future crises.

The U.S. and its allies have stepped up their public criticism of Beijing in recent months. In March, the U.S. hit more alleged Chinese hackers with sanctions and criminal charges, and the U.K. government accused Beijing of hacking into its electoral register to steal personal details of voters. In New Zealand, officials also said in March that APT40 was behind an August 2021 cyberattack on networks in the nation’s parliament.

Grace Zhu in Beijing contributed to this article.

Write to Mike Cherney at mike.cherney@wsj.com

5. U.S. Officials Say Russia Is Unlikely to Take Much More Ukrainian Territory

U.S. Officials Say Russia Is Unlikely to Take Much More Ukrainian Territory

Russian forces continue to inflict pain, but NATO leaders gathering in Washington can say that their efforts to strengthen Ukraine are working.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/09/us/politics/russia-ukraine-nato.html

Installing a trench line in eastern Ukraine last month. Russia’s incremental advances have been slowed by the Ukrainians’ hardened lines in recent months.Credit...Daniel Berehulak/The New York Times

By Julian E. Barnes and Eric Schmitt

Reporting from Washington

July 9, 2024

Russia is unlikely to make significant territorial gains in Ukraine in the coming months as its poorly trained forces struggle to break through Ukrainian defenses that are now reinforced with Western munitions, U.S. officials say.

Through the spring and early summer, Russian troops tried to take territory outside the city of Kharkiv and renew a push in eastern Ukraine, to capitalize on their seizure of Avdiivka. Russia has suffered thousands of casualties in the drive while gaining little new territory.

Russia’s problems represent a significant change in the dynamic of the war, which had favored Moscow in recent months. Russian forces continue to inflict pain, but their incremental advances have been slowed by the Ukrainians’ hardened lines.

The months ahead will not be easy for Ukraine. But allied leaders gathering in Washington this week for the 75th anniversary of the founding of North Atlantic Treaty Organization can legitimately argue that their efforts to strengthen Ukraine are working.

“Ukrainian forces are stretched thin and face difficult months of fighting ahead, but a major Russian breakthrough is now unlikely,” said Michael Kofman, a senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who recently visited Ukraine.

Leaders at the summit are expected to promise new funding for Ukraine, announce plans for the alliance to coordinate weapons delivery and strengthen a promise to Kyiv that it will, eventually, become a full ally.

It is that last point that has become the focus of the war, more important even than reclaiming territory. While Ukrainian officials insist they are fighting to get their land back, growing numbers of U.S. officials believe that the war is instead primarily about Ukraine’s future in NATO and the European Union.

Image

A Ukrainian gun crew near the front lines in the Donetsk region last month.Credit...Daniel Berehulak/The New York Times

Looming over the summit are concerns about Russia’s acquisition of arms — particularly missiles, drones and the parts to build them — from Iran, North Korea and China.

And deep into the third year of a devastating war, there are real concerns about Ukraine’s ability to keep its infrastructure, including its electrical grid, functioning amid long-range Russian attacks.

But the biggest wild card of all may be U.S. policy toward Ukraine after the presidential election this fall.

While Russia is not in a position to seize large parts of Ukraine, the prospects of Kyiv retaking more land from the invading army are also waning. Prodded by American advisers, Ukraine is focused on building up its defenses and striking deep behind Russian lines.

Eric Ciaramella, a former intelligence official who is now an expert on Ukraine working with Mr. Kofman at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said it had become clear over the past 18 months that neither Russia nor Ukraine “possesses the capabilities to significantly change the battle lines.”

The United States, Mr. Ciaramella said, has always defined its strategic objective “as a Ukraine that is democratic, prosperous, European and secure.” The United States and its allies will need to make long-term investments to enable Ukraine to hold its lines, wear out Russia and do damage, according to Mr. Ciaramella and current U.S. officials.

“That’s still a highly unstable scenario,” Mr. Ciaramella said. “That’s why Western leaders also really need to focus on integrating Ukraine into European and trans-Atlantic security structures.”

The European Union agreed last month to begin membership negotiations with Ukraine, a critical step in the long accession process. While NATO is not yet ready to invite Ukraine to join, allied leaders are set to approve language this week that all but promises Kyiv that it will become part of the alliance.

Image

Deep into the third year of the war, there are real concerns about Ukraine’s ability to keep its infrastructure, including its electrical grid, functioning amid long-range Russian attacks.Credit...Daniel Berehulak/The New York Times

The statement aims to avoid a repeat of what happened at last year’s summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, where leaders declared that “Ukraine’s future is NATO” but did not follow that up with any concrete invitation. Diplomats called the convoluted language a “word salad,” and President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine angrily complained about the lack of a time frame for membership.

The possibility of Ukraine joining NATO seemed distant before Russia’s 2022 invasion. Allies were reluctant to provoke Russia or take on what seemed like a vast security commitment. Since then, Ukraine’s partnership with the United States, Britain and other European countries has grown stronger, and the West has poured billions of dollars into training and equipping the Ukrainian army.

Keeping Ukraine out of NATO has been an aim of President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia since he began the war, one that ironically his invasion has made more of a possibility. Peace talks in April 2022 broke down when Moscow insisted on neutrality for Ukraine and a veto over any outside military assistance.

Since then, Ukraine has become even more committed to integrating into Europe.

Russia seized the most pro-Russian parts of Ukraine in the first year of the war. American officials say privately that it will be all but impossible for Ukraine to win back all its territory, but that it can insist on more European integration if its performance on the battlefield is stronger.

Some officials say that even without formally winning back its land, Ukraine could still emerge a victor in the war by moving closer to NATO and Europe.

Officials interviewed for this article spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss secret military and intelligence assessments, battlefield positions and sensitive diplomacy.

American officials acknowledge that Russia could make significant headway, if there is a big strategic shift, such as by expanding its military draft and training program.

Their predictions would also be undermined if the U.S. policy toward Ukraine and Russia changed.

Under the Biden administration, the United States has provided military advice, real-time intelligence and billions of dollars in weapons.

Former President Donald J. Trump has promised that if elected, he would begin peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. While he has not outlined the peace terms he would seek, a quick negotiation would probably force Ukraine to cede vast swaths of territory and give up its ambitions to join NATO.

But officials say demanding that negotiations begin now would be a mistake. About $61 billion in aid approved by Congress in May after months of wrangling is strengthening Ukrainian defenses and halting Russia’s territorial advance.

Throughout the war, U.S. intelligence agencies have been far more pessimistic about its outlook than the Pentagon, whose senior officers have been working closely with Ukraine’s military to help develop its strategy. But assessments across the U.S. government now appear to be more aligned when it comes to Russia’s prospects on the battlefield.

With a supply of electronic components from China, drones from Iran and missiles and artillery from North Korea, Russia has secured enough weapons to keep its army supplied.

But it lacks sufficient personnel to mount a significant breakthrough.

Lara Jakes and Anton Troianovski contributed reporting.

What to Watch for at the NATO Summit This Week

July 9, 2024

Julian E. Barnes covers the U.S. intelligence agencies and international security matters for The Times. He has written about security issues for more than two decades. More about Julian E. Barnes

Eric Schmitt is a national security correspondent for The Times, focusing on U.S. military affairs and counterterrorism issues overseas, topics he has reported on for more than three decades. More about Eric Schmitt

A version of this article appears in print on July 10, 2024, Section A, Page 6 of the New York edition with the headline: Ukraine’s Strength Is Growing, Foiling Russia’s Advances. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

6. CNA Explains: Myanmar’s ex-president visited China, followed by its junta No 2. What’s the play?

CNA Explains: Myanmar’s ex-president visited China, followed by its junta No 2. What’s the play?

Myanmar correspondent Leong Wai Kit unpacks recent trips to China by Thein Sein and Soe Win, and what both countries want from each other.

Leong Wai Kit

@LeongWaiKitCNA

10 Jul 2024 06:00AM

(Updated: 10 Jul 2024 07:42AM)

channelnewsasia.com

Beijing has been regularly inviting Myanmar’s junta-appointed ministers to China on various official visits.

But it was a late June visit by ex-president Thein Sein that sparked international headlines.

And just over a week later, the Myanmar military leadership’s No 2 man Soe Win made an official trip to attend a forum in Qingdao in Shandong province.

This made him the highest-ranking military leader to visit China in an official capacity since the 2021 coup.

What’s behind the timing of the visits?

The timeline of events would suggest that China seems to favour Myanmar’s former president over any of the current leaders in the military. Or that Thein Sein’s visit paved the way for Soe Win, who’s deputy army chief - and deputy prime minister under the State Administration Council formed after the coup.

But neither is the case, according to sources close to the Myanmar military.

For starters, CNA understands that since the military coup which ousted Aung San Suu Kyi and her democratically elected government, Beijing has adopted an unspoken policy of inviting junta-appointed ministers via multilateral rather than exclusive, bilateral platforms.

This would explain why junta ministers have only gone to China for forums, conferences and events involving other countries’ participation.

Late last year, specifically two months after the Operation 1027 military offensive kicked off, Beijing began stepping up engagements with Myanmar.

The moniker refers to Oct 27, the date when a trio of powerful ethnic resistance armies launched large-scale, coordinated attacks that caught the Myanmar army off-guard. Since then, the ethnic armies have seized control of various territories from the junta.

In January, China brokered a ceasefire between the fighting groups, though the ethnic armies have since accused the junta of violating the truce and causing civilian casualties.

“Beijing intended to engage deputy army chief Soe Win and would have invited him to China in the first quarter of the year,” a source told CNA.

“But back then, (military chief) Min Aung Hlaing had trust issues with Soe Win – that disrupted the engagement effort and China’s invitation.

“Meanwhile, via the diplomatic track (of) engagement, Thein Sein was able to make the trip to Beijing on Jun 28,” the source added.

As to why China is open to engaging the junta leadership but has yet to officially host Min Aung Hlaing, another source said Beijing would not do so unless Myanmar’s No 1 can produce firm dates for an election – which he initially promised to hold in August 2023 – or lay out concrete plans for the country’s transition towards democracy.

What's on the table?

Thein Sein’s Jun 28 trip was to mark the 70th anniversary of China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence or guidelines for foreign relations.

Thein Sein, a former general himself who was Myanmar’s president from 2011 to 2016, attended a conference where Chinese leader Xi Jinping said in a speech that Beijing would not become a “strong” state that would try to dominate others.

Thein Sein also attended the 60th anniversary back in 2014.

This year, on the sidelines of the event, he met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, with Myanmar state media reporting that the two exchanged views on friendly relations and cooperation between the countries.

A source told CNA that Wang had asked Thein Sein to persuade Min Aung Hlaing to hand over power and form an interim government to pave the way for elections.

Meanwhile on Sat (Jul 6), second-in-command Soe Win arrived in China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation's Green Development Forum.

Myanmar state media said he held bilateral talks with China officials and discussed issues including border stability, weeding out online gambling and drug-smuggling, as well as boosting trade between both countries.

Observers have noted China’s unhappiness with the junta for its inability to crack down on online scam syndicates – which allegedly involve Chinese nationals – operating near the Myanmar border.

The Myanmar military has also been unable to stop clashes up north and near the China border, which have resulted in deaths and injuries on the Chinese side.

Soe Win’s trip takes place just as the junta is struggling to fend off renewed fighting with ethnic armies. The general is likely to seek China’s help and support in suppressing his opponents.

What's the significance of the trips?

If there’s one thing the visits by Thein Sein and Soe Win have made clear, it’s that China has not abandoned the junta, said Peace Research Institute Oslo researcher Amara Thiha.

“The visits indicate that China is willing to support the central administration and its efforts towards transition,” he said.

He added Beijing was likely also using the visits to quell anti-China sentiments within Myanmar, strengthen ties and fix any issues of distrust.

While Soe Win’s in China, he’ll also likely need to clarify some of Myanmar’s positions.

“Honestly, (he) has a lot of explaining to do to China – its election plan, the escalation of fighting and the meeting with US in Hanoi,” said Stimson Centre senior fellow and co-director of the East Asia Programme and director of the China programme Yun Sun.

In June, United States assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink reportedly met senior Myanmar naval officer Kyaw Lin Zaw in Vietnam.

No details emerged from the reported meeting but it has prompted talk of a possible US-led mediation process. The meeting was also reportedly given the go-ahead by countries in the region – as well as China.

What else could happen in the coming months?

Sources told CNA to also look out for China demonstrating its commitment to helping the Myanmar military.

One source close to both diplomatic and military circles in Myanmar said Beijing had already agreed to “support Myanmar’s State Administration Council with armaments and has committed to preventing the (Myanmar leadership) from failing”, amid strong resistance.

Other sources said more details of this deal would be unveiled in the coming months.

By end-July, Myanmar’s state of emergency - already extended five times - will expire. Many expect Min Aung Hlaing to continue holding on to power and delaying elections.

This would also be a time for China to closely watch Myanmar’s next move – whether it will heed Beijing’s call to hasten the peace process and transition to democracy, with concrete timelines for an election, remains the key question.

Want an issue or topic explained? Email us at digitalnews [at] mediacorp.com.sg. Your question might become a story on our site.

channelnewsasia.com

7. Analysis | At NATO summit, Gaza is the elephant in the room

Analysis | At NATO summit, Gaza is the elephant in the room

War rages in Ukraine and across the Middle East. But at this week’s NATO summit, it’s unlikely Gaza will draw much attention.

Columnist

July 10, 2024 at 12:01 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Ishaan Tharoor · July 10, 2024

You’re reading an excerpt from the WorldView newsletter. Sign up to get the rest free, including news from around the globe and interesting ideas and opinions to know, sent to your inbox on Monday, Wednesday and Friday.

In Washington’s giant downtown convention center, one issue will loom above them all: Ukraine. The country’s plight as it resists Russian invasion is the central focus of NATO leaders gathering in the U.S. capital this week. While Kyiv is not expected to come away with the direct invitation into the alliance it much desires, U.S. officials and their partners are mustering a package of other political and security commitments to help Ukraine turn the tide of the war.

The urgency of the moment was underscored after yet more Russian missile strikes hit civilian areas in Ukraine on Monday, killing dozens and, in one instance, destroying a children’s hospital in Kyiv. Ukrainian officials have been pleading for months for their Western allies to transfer more air defense platforms and munitions to thwart the Russian barrages, and stepped up their entreaties in Washington.

“We’re looking for some serious and strong decisions from the Washington summit about concrete systems of air defense because it’s one of the most critical moments,” Andriy Yermak, chief of staff of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, told reporters in Washington ahead of the summit.

On Tuesday, President Biden unveiled plans to provide Ukraine with additional air defenses. However, while the summit’s final communiqué, intended to be signed by all the delegations, may discuss Ukraine’s path toward NATO accession as “irreversible,” no time frame has been set for that process. Biden is reportedly hesitant about Kyiv’s inclusion into the alliance, and has tasked aides to include language in the final document that stresses the progress on political and anti-corruption reforms that Ukraine still has to make.

“What they will get are some things that are more than just window dressing, that are improvements in how we will assist Ukraine in coming years,” Jim Townsend, a former Pentagon official for Europe, told my colleagues. “So it’s glass half empty, or glass half full.”

But behind NATO’s urgent deliberations over Ukraine looms another conflict. Since Oct. 7, Israel’s devastating campaign in Gaza has taken global attention away from the Russian invasion and inflamed passions about perceived Western hypocrisy. Many critics pointed to the gap between U.S. and European ire over Russia attacking Ukrainian hospitals and their relative quiescence as Israel repeatedly levels medical facilities and schools in its war against militant group Hamas.

At this week’s summit, it’s unlikely Gaza will draw much significant comment — though at least one member state intends to make it a talking point. Ahead of arriving in Washington, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has been sharply critical of Israel since the war began, said he wanted to bring the catastrophe in Gaza into “the spotlight at the summit.” In a statement, he lamented that the “the international community failed to stop Israel in this dire situation” and added that “it is impossible for global conscience to be relieved without the establishment of a fair, permanent peace in Palestine.”

Such a peace does not seem close in either the Middle East nor Ukraine, whose embattled leadership is grimly hoping to turn the tide of battle against Russia’s war machine. But the absence of meaningful Western pressure on Netanyahu or condemnation of some of Israel’s attacks on civilians, argued a leading Turkish delegate, makes NATO’s impassioned embrace of Ukraine all the more glaring.

“It is very clearly hypocrisy, a double standard,” Numan Kurtulmus, speaker of the Turkish parliament and a long-standing Erdogan ally, told me in an interview Monday in Washington. “It’s a kind of racism because if you don’t accept Palestinian victims as equal to the Ukrainian victims, it means you want to create a kind of hierarchy within humanity. It’s unacceptable.”

In just a span of months, the Israeli bombardments have produced more rubble in Gaza than in multiple years of war in Ukraine. The densely packed territory has been pulverized. Reconstruction, whenever it starts, will take decades. Most Gazans have been forced from their homes and a sprawling set of humanitarian crises prevails, including, per U.N. experts, a full-blown famine.

The war has killed close to 40,000 people, according to local authorities and U.N. estimates. The Lancet, a respected British medical journal, calculated that the real death toll, including those missing in Gaza’s ruins and “indirect” deaths from malnutrition, disease and other conditions brought on by the conflict, could be around 186,000 people — that is, roughly 8 percent of Gaza’s population.

In the face of such an onslaught, leaders from countries in the so-called Global South have already expressed their disquiet. “When Russia invaded Ukraine, the West led the global campaign of condemnation. It called for the world to denounce Russia in the name of human rights and international law,” wrote Indonesian President-elect Prabowo Subianto earlier this year. “Today, however, the same countries are allowing yet another bloody conflict, this time in Gaza.”

Last November, outgoing NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg rejected the “double standard” charge. “Ukraine never posed a threat to Russia, Ukraine never attacked Russia,” he told reporters. “The Russian invasion of Ukraine was an unprovoked invasion, a full-scale invasion, of another country. So, of course, Ukraine has the right to self-defense against an unprovoked attack and to uphold territorial integrity.”

Stoltenberg’s successor, Mark Rutte, until recently the longtime prime minister of the Netherlands, has walked an awkward line on the war in the Middle East. He has expressed criticism of the Israeli approach to the Gaza campaign, but critics accuse him and his allies of stifling internal Dutch government condemnation of Israel, perhaps to safeguard his own ascension to the top NATO post. Rutte has denied these charges.

Still, only weeks into the start of the war, a leaked memo from the Dutch embassy’s military attaché in Tel Aviv effectively accused Israel of planning to commit war crimes, suggesting the Israeli military “intends to deliberately cause massive destruction to infrastructure and civilian centers.” The Dutch defense minister at the time said the leaked memo did not represent official policy, and characterized some reports on the memo’s contents as selective and “unfair.” But the leak itself was a demonstration of burgeoning Western discontent with Israel’s prosecution of the war — a discontent that threatens to become more pronounced with time. Just don’t expect to hear about it in Washington this week.

The Washington Post · by Ishaan Tharoor · July 10, 2024

8. Combing the desert: 'Spaceballs' and the Hamas tunnel quagmire - analysis

Video at the link: https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-809576

I think this is a useful analogy. It is hard to describe the complexity and difficulty of destroying the entire tunnel network.

Think about the scale of north Korean tunnels.

Combing the desert: 'Spaceballs' and the Hamas tunnel quagmire - analysis

Jerusalem Post

As the IDF comes close to concluding its second invasion of Shejaiya in northern Gaza and starts its reinvasion of Gaza City - the fifth reinvasion of a part of Gaza - many are asking why they didn't the IDF destroy all of the Hamas tunnels during its first run through?

Weren't tens of thousands of soldiers and thousands upon thousands of airstrikes from October to January enough to do the job?

Clearly, the answer is no—the explanation of why: Spaceballs.

This is not a random explanation by the Jerusalem Post but an analogy used to define the challenge by a high-level defense source with some of the most intimate and up-close knowledge of the challenges of Hamas's tunnels in multiple areas of northern and southern Gaza.

What does Spaceballs, an off-color 1987 cinematic comedy spoofing Star Wars, have to do with understanding tunnel warfare and the immense challenge and quagmire the IDF is confronting in eliminating the Gazan terror group's greatest tool for hiding its leadership, hiding hostages, ambushing IDF forces, and avoiding aerial detection?

IDF entering tunnel in which rocket production site is located, July 1, 2024. (credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON'S UNIT)The answer- the scene with the giant comb in the desert.

During the scene, Spaceball's version of the evil empire is searching an immense desert planet in a spoof of the original Star Wars search for two robots who hold a secret message that can save the good rebel alliance from the empire.

The slapstick scene shows empire leaders ordering their troops to "comb" the entire desert for the escaped robots - with them actually using giant combs to hopelessly make their way through the sand.

IDF remains hopeful, but more work to be done

According to the high defense source, the IDF's progress is not at all hopeless, and huge progress has been made in destroying Hamas tunnels both in the first invasion stage of October-January and in the reinvasion stages which have been taking place in recent months, including now in Shejaiya and Gaza City.

But seeing the vastness of a planet full of sand and the limited search capabilities of the giant combs hits home how long it would take the IDF to actually destroy every Hamas tunnel.

In December 2023, a top defense source told the Post and others that it would take around two years (translate December 2025) to destroy all of the Hamas tunnels in just the Khan Yunis area, and that would have been if the IDF kept working on the tunnels without a break.

Instead, the IDF was only in Khan Yunis in full force until February and by April 7 had pulled out.

That means that if and when the IDF would return to Khan Yunis, it could easily have another 19 months of work to do - if it kept working on the issue constantly.

Another senior IDF source told the Post recently during an embedded visit to Rafah that it would take a minimum of six months nonstop to eliminate just the cross-border tunnels into Egypt - without even giving an estimate for destroying all Rafah tunnels, given that that project seemed too far away to even estimate at this point.

Translate these numbers into the entire Gaza Strip, and it becomes apparent that absent years of constant attention, there will always be more tunnels for Hamas to hide in.

Given the possibility of a ceasefire deal in the coming weeks, the public should not be surprised if the IDF's achievement regarding tunnel destruction, while very substantial and includes eliminating all major strategic Hamas tunnels that existed on October 7, will still not be close to destroying all of the tunnels.

For those of the public who have not understood until now how the IDF could both: have destroyed so many tunnels and also not arrived at so many tunnels - Spaceballs has finally paved the way to an answer.

Jerusalem Post

9. WATCH: 'Where were you on Oct 7?': New footage of Hamas hostage Daniela Gilboa published

Video at the link: https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-809541

WATCH: 'Where were you on Oct 7?': New footage of Hamas hostage Daniela Gilboa published

"I have been in Hamas captivity for 107 days now, and I don't know when or if I will ever return home," Gilboa said.

By SAM HALPERNJULY 9, 2024 10:07Updated: JULY 9, 2024 22:38

Daniela Gilboa in footage published July 9, 2024New footage of Hamas hostage and female IDF observer Daniela Gilboa was published on Tuesday morning with the permission of Gilboa’s family.

In the footage distributed by Hamas about four months ago, Daniella appeals to the government, asking for her release.

“My name is Daniela Gilboa. I’m a 19-year-old soldier from Petah Tikva, and I was kidnapped on October 7th from the Nahal Oz base,” Gilboa said. “I’ve been in Hamas captivity for 107 days now, and I don’t know when or if I’ll ever return home. I’m under constant bombardment and gunfire 24 hours a day. I’m terrified for my life. At one point, your bombs nearly killed me.

Where were you on October 7 when I was taken from my bed? Where are you now? Why do I, as a soldier who gave 100% of myself to the country and served in such difficult conditions in the Gaza envelope, have to feel abandoned and discarded by you?” she asked.

Daniella Gilboa (credit: Courtesy)

'Bring us home alive'

“Get your act together, my dear government, and start doing your job properly to bring us all home while we’re still alive,” Gilboa continued. “I don’t need any food, money, clothes, or anything else–just bring us home alive. To my dear family, I miss you so much and love you – Mom, Dad, Nuni, and Roiko. Please stay strong and do everything you can to bring me home while I’m still alive.”

Later, the Hostages and Missing Families Forum released a statement that included a reaction to the video from Daniela Gilboa’s mother, Orly Gilboa.

“170 days have passed since the release of the video where I last saw my daughter,” Orly Gilboa said. “In the footage, she appears strong and determined, but psychological assessments we’ve received indicate her poor mental state. Who knows what my daughter has endured in the 170 days since then? I implore the decision-makers to show leadership and approve the deal so that I can embrace Daniela again soon so that all the hostages can return home.”

In May, the Hostages and Missing Families Forum published footage of female IDF observers, including Gilboa, being kidnapped from the IDF’s Nahal Oz base.

The video shows the female hostages, bloodied and bound, as armed Hamas terrorists yell and hurl abuse at them.

On Tuesday afternoon, the forum stated that a silent demonstration entitled, “Mother is Waiting" would take place at Hostages Square in Tel Aviv that evening.

Orly Gilboa will be one of the mothers participating in the demonstration. 

10.

They are not 10 feet tall. But do not underestimate them either. Will to fight is hard to measure before the fight.

Can China's PLA fight a modern war? - Asia Times

Personnel problems with deep and complicated cultural roots mean the PLA may not be as fierce and war-ready as claimed

asiatimes.com · by Francesco Sisci · July 8, 2024

China’s failures to reform the army may lie deep in the ancient military mindset that doesn’t fit modern requirements.

Can the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) fight? And in case, how would they fight? They had the human waves in Korea and they advised the Vietnamese on guerrilla warfare but how would they perform in a modern war?

Reportedly[i], General He Weidong, the second-ranked vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, denounced “fake combat capabilities” in the military, which experts say is likely related to weapons procurement – the focus of present corruption investigations.

However, foreign experts like Kenneth Allen believe personnel is the actual weak link of the PLA. His key findings are the following:

• “The PLA has continued to make major adjustments to its enlisted force since 1999. These include creating a 30-year enlisted force, recruiting college students and graduates as two-year conscripts, shifting from a one-cycle to a two-cycle per year conscription system in 2021, and directly recruiting personnel with special technical skills as NCOs.
• The turnover of conscripts each year affects the annual training cycle, such that units are missing a significant number of personnel for months at a time.
• The officer corps has also changed considerably by abolishing the National Defense Student program that began in 1999, reducing the number of officer academic institutions from 63 to 34 in 2017, and directly recruiting college graduates as officers.
• When addressing personnel issues, one must examine each service, force, and branch, which are not equal in terms of conscript and NCO percentages as well as in the turnover of officers each year.
• Males cannot get married until they are 25 and females until they are 23, so the conscript force consists almost entirely of unmarried personnel.”
• Given problems identified in each of these programs, the PLA will most likely continue to make more major changes over the next decade. [ii]

These are current issues, however they may have complicated and deep cultural roots.

As Moss Roberts pointed out, Analects 2.3 argues against administrative law. Legge translated zheng 政 (make it right with a cudgel) as law. Confucius sees zheng, along with punishment, as external coercion, arguing instead for de-virtuous leaders who, as role models, keep conscience/sense of shame chi 恥 (something like having an ear to the heart) alive in the people — a more dependable basis of social order.

Mozi disagrees and says external leverage on behavior is essential, and therefore, internal factors like virtue and conscience are unlikely to suffice. Mencius’ theory of xing 性 (the personal character, what is engendered from the heart) as inherently good tries to recover the internal factors forcefully. Then, Xunzi admits the existence of xing but argues that it is evil which brings us back to the need for external force pushing people to comply.

“The phrase from 12.5, ‘All men are brothers,’ makes the same point. In 2.3, we find an important correlation between li and de. “Lead the people with law/governmental administration and keep order with punishments, then they will act so as to evade punishment, losing their sense of shame. Lead them with virtue (de德) and keep order with Ritual then the people will retain their sense of shame and observe discipline as well.”[iii]

Rituals like brotherhood have a hierarchy. Not everybody is equal, although classes are not clearly fixed. But there are junzi君子, lords who give orders, and xiao ren小人, little people. Ren仁 “benevolence,” respect among equals holds the ranks.

“Mozi replaced ren with jianai 兼愛(comprehensive love), which redefined filial service: one should serve the parents of others so that others will serve yours.”[iv]. That is, jian ai (jian= two hands holding tight a grain stalk, and ai sentiments between a claw and a cudgel, indicate feelings strongly controlled and held together) has no hierarchy.

There are no differences in how people are treated. People have to become a unified body that listens to their masters, conform above (shang tong尚同), and do not conspire below (xia dang下黨). This gradual social transformation was the premise of how Levy saw the army as a perfect projection of society as a whole[v].

Albert Gavalny has a critical account of this situation. There is a precise economic dimension to war. Conflict is not profitable; it’s wasteful, and it puts its survival at stake

“Squandering and losses arising from any military outlay are the equivalent of ten annual harvests. Faced with the prospect of similar expenditure, few states are in a position to put together and participate in a military coalition.” (Zhanguo ce 12:672).[vi] Plus, incorporating new land and people within the existing state was not a carefree exercise.

Greek armies moved differently. They pillaged the land, divided the spoils among the victors, and imposed a ‘command’ empire on the “victi” who paid taxes, tributes to Rome but famously kept their laws and religions.

In ancient China, we are in totally different circumstances, as war is deemed dangerous, expensive, and rewarding less than it can potentially beget. It is waged as a matter of survival of one’s political domain, but not for the economic returns moving Greek-Roman armies.

The generals and the strategists become very important.

“What matter now are abilities shown in accurate evaluation of the situation and circumstances of combat, correctly fathoming the state of enemy forces, hatching plans, devising intelligent strategies adapted to the conditions of the adversary, and so on…

The soldier, an anonymous member of a mass army, must submit to the commander’s edicts, making sure that his body scrupulously performs the automatic movements that are required of him. What is demanded of him is not so much bravery as docility.

This new conception of war generates mechanical, passive subservience as the ineluctable condition, not only for victory but even for being in a position to enter into contest for it. The prime objective of the art of warfare is that of extracting from every soldier obedient, docile, and useful submission thanks to the sustained, constant, analytical, and thoroughgoing application of a tenacious disciplinary technique that is aimed at wholly neutralizing any resistance that these individuals might originally have harbored.

Strictly speaking, the meaning of war no longer pertains to the person who wages it, to the person whose blood is spilled in the heat of combat. The crucial factor of discipline resides in human nature itself.” [vii]

Here, the primary tool of control of the soldier is fear. In Greece, fighting a war is about greed and self-preservation of the “polis,” the “res publica” to which each soldier feels he belongs. It is then about his friends, agape, brotherly love, built by being next to each other, holding a spear or a shield.

Conversely, in ancient China, we have this:

“Inclinations, the masses tend to be mere manipulatable, objects, unable to resist or oppose. If these strategic and authoritarian thinkers are right and human beings really do have a natural inclination to desire with all his might something that benefits him, and to avoid by every means possible anything that might adversely affect him the theory, nevertheless, apparently comes up against a major stumbling block or even contradiction in the case of warfare since, to the extent that humans are living organisms governed by natural laws, they automatically recoil from any situation in which they might lose their lives and would, therefore, put up the utmost resistance against going to fight on the battlefield…

The survival instinct, these authoritarian and military thinkers managed to invert and capitalize on the situation by making fear of death their best ally. Dread at the idea of losing one’s life would provide or, at least, would serve as the basis for two kinds of solutions. The first was simple, direct coercion, which is to say threats from commanders that anyone who tried to escape going into battle, who was not sufficiently bellicose, and who attempted to desert would simply face death… the theoreticians of war took their intimidation to the extreme of extending the punishment to include, with equal mercilessness, the families of soldiers accused of noncompliance (Shangjunshu 10:70).” [viii]

The Chinese did that by capitalizing on the familial sentiment. If a soldier, a child in a large family with many children, dies, the family will be rewarded. If one shrinks duties, the family will be punished.

Losing men to save the king

“The new peasant-soldier, stripped of the heroic, virile qualities of the old-style warrior, and with no chance of acting as a free agent, is turned into a mere disciplined object… act, is an inherent logic of the interchangeability of soldiers in mass-based warfare, the setting into operation of a logic of ‘replacements’ or, in other words, the introduction of an idea of the dispensability of human beings as an axiom of the new way of conceiving the military arts…conforming to a type of behavior in which initiative is abandoned in favor of passivity, calm, and composure.”[ix]

On the other hand. It is not about losing one or a few men but putting at risk the country’s survival then everything proceeds differently:

“Because war is extremely expensive and wastes much more than it gains, “Ideally, at least, the perfect military action is that which, so to speak, has zero energy cost (Billeter 1984:49)… Ideally, at least, the perfect military action is that which, so to speak, has zero energy cost (Billeter 1984:49)… The confrontation is not, for Chinese strategic thinking, anything but the consequence of symmetry or, at least, an insignificant difference between the warring factions because, otherwise, there would be a manifest, irreversible imbalance between the two camps, which would give rise to two possibilities. First, when the clash finally occurs, it would be an unequal fight between a strong side and a weak side which would swiftly end in favor of the former in such a way as to obviate the undesirable consequences of a drawn-out battle.

The second possibility would be that, as a consequence of the dissuasive nature of the disparity between the strong and weak sides, the latter would forsake its bellicose plans and concede defeat. In both cases, confrontation, understood as a process of reciprocal wear and tear, is ruled out…it is necessary to extend the logic of war to other human activities, including the ostensibly peaceful ones. Politics, economics, and diplomacy become the perfect extension of war, which is no longer envisaged as confrontation or conflict but, instead, as a process of domination.

It would seem logical, then, that the military text known as Taigong liutao should include a chapter titled “Civil Offensives” (wenfa 文伐),” which details up to twelve techniques of non-violent subversion by means of which it is possible, inter alia, to lead the enemy into error in his administrative decisions, sabotage social cohesion by inciting insurrection, bring him into disrepute in the international sphere, bribe his officials, among many other actions, so that it becomes possible to ensure his complete submission without any need for undesirable bloodshed (Taigong Liutao 14:88–93).”[x]

If it is about projecting fear, intimidation it is essential to “keep moving and continue advancing through the “empty” points, that is, the gaps in the enemy’s ground (xu 虛) while avoiding his stronger, more consistent or “full” areas (shi 實).”[xi]

Controlling the light

Still, there are two ways of blinding the enemy — keeping it too dark or too bright. Too bright is more effective because one loses the sense of sight. The West then has a strategic advantage here.

It keeps everything in flux; everything changes constantly. Look, for instance, at the 2024 drama about President Joe Biden. In early July 2024, nobody knows for sure if he will keep running for president or if he will win or lose.

Conversely, China casts everything into darkness. Light, although blinding, gives a sense of freedom, which darkness does not provide.

Moreover, present US military actions are limited (not an all-out war) and frequent. They are not life-threatening and aim to balance advantages with expenditures. Similarly to Greek-Roman traditions, their soldiers are not passive instruments but increasingly active, entrepreneurial players seeking their benefit.

The recognition of private property fits this. The benefits acquired through war can’t be challenged or appropriated by anybody. Here, the cultural cornerstone is Achilles turning against Agamemnon and refusing to fight after Agamemnon, the commander of the Greeks against Troy, seizes Achilles’ spoils of war.

This memory may have been set aside for a while, as we had Napoleonic armies with large masses of disposable people. However, in modern wars, significant battles are no longer fought by closed-rank armies but by units coordinated from above, which have a substantial degree of independent assessment of shifting situations.

The initiative left to single units, or operatives is held together by a collective sense of purpose—belonging not to loyalty to one man but to a cultural-ideal project, a polis as a physical space, and a political project. If the general or the president doesn’t fit the project, the soldier can turn against him either through proper internal channels or by voting against the president at the next elections. In China, nothing like that exists. Unyielding loyalty is to the party and its top leader, who cannot be challenged or doubted without threatening the entire socio-political edifice.

The Western dynamic starts a complex dialectical relationship with one’s superiors and generals. Generals are not expected to move soldiers as replaceable instruments but to motivate them. Starting this dialectic begets levels of freedom of opinion and what we might call ‘democracy,’ challenging a monolithic hold on power. Soldiers must be kept happy or they will revolt and topple the power.

Conversely, if power is held in unity, soldiers must have no freedom. Then they are passive, not proactive, and ill-suited to modern war conditions.

Plus, a fully disposable army fits a social model where families agree to sacrifice a young man for their collective benefit and have more young men who enjoy the sacrifice of their sibling. This requires many disposable young men in a family, i.e., a large pool of children. However, with the one-child policy, that pool no longer exists, and families have no benefit and only damages if their single child is dead, maimed or shell-shocked.

One might have imagined fighting a modern war was like playing a video game, guiding from afar toy-like drones. But the battlefields in Ukraine or Gaza with World War I-like casualties disprove that dream. China would need millions of people volunteering to risk their lives and well-being. Maybe China doesn’t have them.

In a nutshell, modern wars require levels of freedom so that one man is willing to take a risk for his personal return and the interests vested in his res publica. This challenges the traditional Chinese state and army structure.

Moreover, while posturing and threatening might work with countries similarly cautious about war, it can backfire with countries more ready to engage in conflict. When the US Army invites the PLA to tone down its rhetoric, the purpose is to create a situation where the US won’t feel obliged to respond with actions.

That is, if China vents its anger with words and symbolic gestures, the US might react to those words not by backing off (as China might expect) but with silent and effective actions. Still, China can’t back down from this trend because its domestic structure would see it as a loss of face. Losing face, in Chinese political culture, means losing power and everything.

This is the deep-seated challenge of the 3rd Party Plenum, which will focus on the economy but perhaps also on the army, as two defense ministers have been sacked and the whole PLA seems shaken.

In summary, China needs a different kind of state organization and a different economy to have a modern fighting army. Perhaps this is the issue. President Xi Jinping is moving in this direction, but the domestic headwinds are enormous and it’s unclear what will happen next.

In the meantime, one could argue that the king is naked, the PLA is possibly far less fierce than it claims to be and it could be easily challenged. However, even making this claim could be ominous—it could cause China to lose face and, consequently, lose everything. If China risks losing everything, it might bet everything and start a devastating war. Then: damn if the PLA is strong, worse if the PLA is weak.

[ii] https://www.andrewerickson.com/2024/07/personnel-of-the-peoples-liberation-army-ken-allens-accompanying-testimony-published-here/

[iii] The Oxford Handbook of Early China (Oxford Handbooks) (p.675). Oxford University Press.

[iv] Ibidem p.675)

[v] Levi, Jean 1989. Les Fonctionnaires divins: Politique, despotisme et mystique en Chine ancienne. Paris: Éditions du Seuil pp 99–101).

[vi] The Oxford Handbook of Early China (Oxford Handbooks) (p.639)

[vii] Ibidem (p.643)

[viii] Ibidem (p.646)

[ix] Ibidem (p.647-648)

[x] Ibidem (p.650-653)

[xi] Ibidem (p. 650)

This article first appeared on the Appia Institute and is republished with permission. Read the original here.

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asiatimes.com · by Francesco Sisci · July 8, 2024

11. NATO needs to plug the “Hawaii gap” in the US Indo-Pacific deterrence strategy

Looking for international law and treaty experts, as well as policy experts and strategists to weigh in.

PACNET

PacNet #47 – NATO needs to plug the “Hawaii gap” in the US Indo-Pacific deterrence strategy

Written By

• John Hemmings
• Senior Advisor at the Pacific Forum
• David Santoro
• President and CEO of the Pacific Forum

pacforum.org · July 9, 2024

Imagine this: US-China tensions over Taiwan escalate to boiling point. Hours after a Chinese missile attack on Hawaii, the US president calls upon regional and global allies and partners to discuss next steps. US officials in Brussels request clarity as to whether NATO will trigger Article V. The silence is deafening. Worse still, apart from quick affirmations from a few traditionally close allies—such as the United Kingdom and Netherlands—it is unclear whether many NATO member states will even cease trade with China, much less commit to a war. Some note that Hawaii is excluded from an automatic trigger of Article V by Article VI. Almost immediately, the alliance is thrown into one of the deepest crises of its history.

While this scenario is, in many ways, at the extreme end of the possible, it nevertheless illustrates a potential crisis-in-waiting for the alliance. As allies begin arriving in Washington DC for the NATO Summit this week, they should consider scenarios of this kind. They should reflect on the implications of a US-China conflict over Taiwan and what the alliance can and should do now to better deter and, if deterrence fails, better respond to such a conflict.

In a recent speech, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted that “NATO’s core business” is that of deterrence. His second theme was Ukraine, and his third strengthening global partnerships, “especially in the Indo-Pacific” due to the interplay between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific. Explicitly noting the invitations to the “IP4” (Indo-Pacific Four: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea), the secretary general raised strategic linkages between the alliance’s adversaries, such as Chinese and North Korean support for Russia’s war machine.

Given these themes—deterrence and the importance of the Indo-Pacific—it is astonishing that Hawaii’s (or Guam’s) exclusion from the NATO Treaty is not, at a minimum, an agenda item at the summit. Their exclusion—a historical relic of the Cold War—is remarkable given that both are critical to the United States’ deterrence strategy in the Indo-Pacific.

So, how did we get here? At the time of signing, the allies saw little threat of Chinese naval or air power. Fast forward to 2024—during which time China undertook one of the largest military build-ups since the World War II—and we have a situation in which the United States might be attacked in the Indo-Pacific and NATO could just sit by and do little. If that happened, not only would it likely lead to a serious crisis within the alliance, but it would represent a missed opportunity to deter a Chinese attack of Taiwan in the first place.

The time is thus ripe to address this gaping hole in the alliance, and there is no shortage of reasons to justify that change.

First, the inclusion of Hawaii and Guam—essential nodes in the US capacity to defend Taiwan—into NATO defense commitments would de facto add to overall US deterrence efforts over Taiwan.

Second, NATO is not merely a military actor. It is also a major power across the DIME (diplomacy, information, military, economy). Case in point: its total economic weight is a combined GDP of $39.6 trillion, with half of the top 10 economies as member states. This represents huge pre-conflict deterrence value for a China intent on maintaining economic growth for the sake of internal security.

Third, NATO has much political and diplomatic deterrence value since many NATO allies have strong ties to parts of the Global South and reach inside the Indo-Pacific. At a tactical level, this plays out in the information space where NATO messaging and signaling could help the United States and Taiwan in international forums.

Fourth, even if NATO commitments did not prevent a conflict, they could play a helpful role in the Euro-Atlantic by interdicting Chinese trade and energy supply. This would represent a serious challenge to the Chinese economy, which depends heavily on exports to Europe.

While we believe that these are strong arguments to discuss the status of Hawaii (or Guam), some have argued that the United States agreed to a treaty that excluded Hawaii and changing that fact is impossible. This is a specious argument, which ignores how the security environment in the Indo-Pacific has drastically deteriorated since the 1950s, making it nearly impossible for the United States to address its threats and challenges on its own. Adapting to the new environment is a must and deterring a US-China war the number one priority.

Another argument is that NATO should not act out-of-area. This argument, however, conveniently forgets that NATO has been expanding remits and members from its earliest days—when it was based around the English Channel—to incorporate West Germany, Greece, and Turkey, and to carry out operations in Afghanistan. Adjusting NATO to defend the collective interest of its members is what NATO has been all about—and deterring a war with China is in the collective interests of all NATO members.

Furthermore, if the United States were to be at war with a near-peer adversary like China, any out-of-area considerations would be meaningless. The draw on US military resources from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific would substantially drain NATO capability and capacity, as the United States may be compelled to engage Chinese naval units and maritime shipping globally.

Some Europeans are also open about not wanting to get dragged into a war with China over Taiwan. To them, this is an “America Problem,” and NATO already has its hands full with Russia. This is problematic, at least for three reasons.

For starters, and as mentioned, the United States is NATO’s largest member and the drain on its resources and capabilities will impact NATO allies, whether they like it or not.

Second, this view does not take into account US domestic politics and the US population, who would note the amount of blood and treasure poured into European security since 1941; the geography is emotive and pertinent. It was, after all, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 that directly led to US involvement in World War II which saw the US adopt a “Europe First” approach to prosecuting the war.

Third, and finally, some will argue that it is the United States itself which wants Europe to focus on Russia, and that it is up to the United States to focus on China. This is true to an extent but misses the point argued here: NATO’s deterrent value across the DIME counts and could substantially undermine China’s resolve before a war starts. We should be considering all measures to prevent such a war and NATO deterrence must be operationalized in support of its largest member.

As leaders from across NATO meet in Washington to consider the world around them and make sure that the alliance’s deterrence and defense architecture is fit for purpose across the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific, they should take this opportunity to include Hawaii and Guam into Article V considerations. Doing so would not solve all problems—far from it—but it would be a step in the right direction and could prevent a catastrophe.

John Hemmings is Senior Advisor at the Pacific Forum. He specializes in US alliances and strategic competition, with a particular focus on Indo-Pacific Strategies, the US-Japan Alliance, AUKUS, the FVEY, the Quad, and other minilaterals.

David Santoro is the President and CEO of the Pacific Forum. He specializes in strategic and security issues with a regional focus on both Asia and Europe.

Photo: Attack on Pearl Harbor || Credit: National Archives

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pacforum.org · July 9, 2024

12. Why the Himalayan Region Is Integral to a Rules-Based Order in the Indo-Pacific

Excerpts:

Concurrently, China has been pursuing its “salami tactics” strategy with the neighboring states, including the small land-locked nation of Bhutan. Then there is the question of China’s increasingly unsustainable, “debt-trap”-inducing Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has already cast a dark shadow over economically weaker Himalayan states like Nepal and Pakistan. Most importantly, China’s massive hydro-infrastructure constructions and upper-riparian-derived unilateral control of South Asian rivers that begin in Tibet have raised serious questions about the impact on Himalayan ecology and control of resources.

Against such an overall bleak scenario, will the latest Pelosi visit engender greater geopolitical awareness and considered responses, beyond the human rights questions, in the West about China’s tactics? Importantly, can the Himalayas as a whole be featured as a primary focus of the Indo-Pacific strategies, not just as a byline to specific conflicts be it vis-à-vis India or Tibet?

Time to Talk About a Himalayan Liberal Rules-Based Order

Pelosi’s remarks and meeting with the Tibetan Government in Exile evoke memories of her controversial 2022 visit to Taiwan, which intensified China’s military maneuvers against the democratic island and precipitated the so-called Fourth Taiwan Crisis. Not just Taiwan, but most countries in the Indo-Pacific, including South Korea – where President Yoon Suk-yeol opted not to meet the then-U.S. House speaker – worried about the repercussions on the region’s already fractious relations.

Yet that trip brought unprecedented global attention to Taiwan, whose democratic credentials weighed heavy against China’s autocratic, disruptive rule, and the surrounding region, too. Such a tactic, in turn, has proved consequential for globally publicizing the Indo-Pacific’s maritime concerns, including the South China Sea disputes. Greater awareness in the international media about the repercussions of Chinese interference in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea has further popularized the Indo-Pacific construct.

Yet much of the narrative has automatically assumed that a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific is primarily (and perhaps only) maritime in nature. This assertion is aided by the reality that the maritime trade routes would be directly affected by China’s actions, in turn impacting European/Western security and prosperity.

Yet, were China to become the “Himalayan hegemon,” the consequences would be dire. The interdependent nature of the security dilemmas means that a rules-based order in the Himalayan region is imperative for the stability, security, and prosperity of the Indian Ocean, South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait.

Why the Himalayan Region Is Integral to a Rules-Based Order in the Indo-Pacific

thediplomat.com · by Jagannath Panda

Chinese militarization and expansionism in the Himalayas remains a perennial concern not just for India, but for the United States – and its Indo-Pacific allies and partners.

By , Ryohei Kasai, and Eerishika Pankaj

July 06, 2024

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In June 2024, former U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi minced no words in criticizing the Chinese government and President Xi Jinping for the persecution of Tibetans, including attempts to erase their culture. Pelosi was part of a U.S. delegation that met with the 14th Dalai Lama in Dharamshala, India, where he has been living in exile since he was forced to flee Tibet in 1959 after an uprising against China’s repressive rule was brutally suppressed. China considers the Dalai Lama a dangerous separatist, and seeks to prevent all diplomatic contact with him.

Pelosi’s acrimony went beyond empty rhetoric. Building on the U.S. Congress’ “Resolve Tibet Act,” passed only days before her visit to Dharamshala, she heralded stronger U.S. support for the Himalayan region, which China is trying to rebrand as “Xizang,” the Mandarin term for Tibet. Her remarks have yet again brought to the forefront the fact that Chinese militarization in Tibet remains a perennial concern not just for India, but for the United States – and its Indo-Pacific allies and partners.

For China, Tibet is perhaps the most critical, but not the only, aspect of its growing Himalayan troubles. Most notably, China has a long-standing border dispute with India, which has kept getting more hostile since Xi Jinping came into power – recall the 2017 Doklam stand-off, the defining 2020 Galwan Clash, and the 2022 Tawang skirmish, to name but a few prominent contentions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Concurrently, China has been pursuing its “salami tactics” strategy with the neighboring states, including the small land-locked nation of Bhutan. Then there is the question of China’s increasingly unsustainable, “debt-trap”-inducing Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has already cast a dark shadow over economically weaker Himalayan states like Nepal and Pakistan. Most importantly, China’s massive hydro-infrastructure constructions and upper-riparian-derived unilateral control of South Asian rivers that begin in Tibet have raised serious questions about the impact on Himalayan ecology and control of resources.

Against such an overall bleak scenario, will the latest Pelosi visit engender greater geopolitical awareness and considered responses, beyond the human rights questions, in the West about China’s tactics? Importantly, can the Himalayas as a whole be featured as a primary focus of the Indo-Pacific strategies, not just as a byline to specific conflicts be it vis-à-vis India or Tibet?

Time to Talk About a Himalayan Liberal Rules-Based Order

Pelosi’s remarks and meeting with the Tibetan Government in Exile evoke memories of her controversial 2022 visit to Taiwan, which intensified China’s military maneuvers against the democratic island and precipitated the so-called Fourth Taiwan Crisis. Not just Taiwan, but most countries in the Indo-Pacific, including South Korea – where President Yoon Suk-yeol opted not to meet the then-U.S. House speaker – worried about the repercussions on the region’s already fractious relations.

Yet that trip brought unprecedented global attention to Taiwan, whose democratic credentials weighed heavy against China’s autocratic, disruptive rule, and the surrounding region, too. Such a tactic, in turn, has proved consequential for globally publicizing the Indo-Pacific’s maritime concerns, including the South China Sea disputes. Greater awareness in the international media about the repercussions of Chinese interference in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea has further popularized the Indo-Pacific construct.

Yet much of the narrative has automatically assumed that a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific is primarily (and perhaps only) maritime in nature. This assertion is aided by the reality that the maritime trade routes would be directly affected by China’s actions, in turn impacting European/Western security and prosperity.

Yet, were China to become the “Himalayan hegemon,” the consequences would be dire. The interdependent nature of the security dilemmas means that a rules-based order in the Himalayan region is imperative for the stability, security, and prosperity of the Indian Ocean, South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait.

A key reason why this connection has not yet been made as clearly is that the focus by the West on Tibet has remained limited to the human rights aspect, highlighting it as the central cause of concern in the Himalayas. Without taking away from the criticality of the human rights question, it is important to also connect the human rights violations to China’s broader geopolitical agendas in the Tibetan plateau, which need to be closely examined.

Such a lens is critical for trans-Himalayan and Tibetan studies, wherein geopolitics has often come second to human rights and environmental debates, often missing the connection between these issues as grander security narratives. For instance, with respect to the succession of the 14th Dalai Lama, few studies have looked at the geopolitics associated with succession politics, which will directly impact the bilateral relationship of countries across the world with China. This has meant that nations remain unprepared to deal with the strategic realities of such a question – a fact China relies on to work in its favor. More widely, issues of militarization and securitization in Tibet and adjoining areas, as well as weaponization of natural resources, need to be discussed in tandem with climate/ecological degradation and human security aspects in the Himalayas to preserve the Indo-Pacific’s rules-based order.

Due to the interconnected nature of regional stability and security, the Himalayas are a critical strategic region influencing major geopolitical dynamics. Tensions here can spill over, impacting maritime and territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific. A liberal rules-based order in the Himalayas ensures consistent principles of international law, mutual respect for sovereignty, and conflict resolution mechanisms. Without this, the broader rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific remains fragile and susceptible to power imbalances and regional conflicts. Therefore, integrating Himalayan security within the Indo-Pacific framework fosters comprehensive regional stability, enhancing the credibility and effectiveness of a rules-based international order.

Securitization of the Restive Himalayas

In the 2000s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched its Western Development Strategy to offset the lack of economic growth in the western provinces, including the Buddhist-dominated Tibet and the Muslim-dominated Xinjiang, compared to the stupendous high-quality development in the eastern zones and the southern coast. Under this “Go West” policy, the Chinese government aimed its own funds, as well as foreign investment and development assistance in implementing the development of both coastal and inland areas, to replace perceived backwardness with modernization, including new infrastructure. Under Xi Jinping, large-scale development went on to incorporate eco-environmental protection ideals to further these aims “to achieve common prosperity for all the ethnic groups of the western region” – but more specifically the goal was to consolidate the frontier regions, often at the expense of the ecological needs of the region despite environment protection promises. For instance, China’s extensive modern-day mega-dam building that began with the construction of the Three Gorges Dam has already disrupted biodiversity, as well as caused droughts, floods, earthquakes, and massive displacement of people.

In the more than two decades since the launch of the “Go West” campaign, the Chinese government has doubled down its pursuit of these aims, which remain laced with empty rhetoric. The main intent is to exploit the region’s abundant natural resources while building hard infrastructure to make civil-military logistics easier.

To securitize and militarize the areas, China has implemented unsavory measures such as resettlements, intrusive laws, internment camps, forceful induction into the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), increased surveillance, and accelerated assimilation. Such tactics will not only help China’s government repress separatist tendencies among minority groups and neutralize their own respective languages and cultures but also help fortify the regions around the Himalayas with infrastructure that can be utilized to expand territory.

Similarly, the unabated infrastructure development, including airports/helipads, highways, oil pipelines, rail networks, and reservoirs, aimed at improving land-sea linkages is mainly a tool to expand “dual-use” of infrastructure – that is, national security interests – in the garb of socioeconomic growth. For example, China’s increase in railway construction in Tibet and “leapfrog development in general aviation” look to facilitate better access not just to neighboring provinces but also to land ports along the border areas for military purposes.

Already, the increase in stationed PLA troops and even nuclear weapons have raised concerns about the impact of hyper-militarization on the fragile Himalayan region. China has in the past been accused of “conducting nuclear-weapons research on the Tibetan plateau and dumping radioactive waste” and also of building an “immense military bastion with tactical missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles.”

Another vital geopolitical aim is to enable this region’s active participation in the BRI, via initiatives such as the “Western Region Land-Sea Corridor” development announced in 2019. This would improve connectivity and integration between China’s poorer, restive regions with both the well-to-do eastern and southern provinces and countries in Eurasia, Central Asia, and South Asia, as connected by the expansive BRI. Through avenues like the “Himalayan Quad” China has sought to establish with South Asian countries Nepal, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, where Beijing has immense economic clout, it has sought to further the geopolitically motivated aspects of BRI into greater intent.

Similarly, China’s use of its position as the “upstream water hegemon” – with six major Asian rivers originating in the Tibetan Plateau flowing into nearly 18 downstream countries – has aimed at controlling access and prioritizing its own “water sovereignty.” China has a history of weaponizing water to achieve its national interests as seen, during Doklam clash of 2017 with India.

Furthermore, China has been indulging in rewriting Himalayan territorial borders, e.g., by issuing “standard maps” (e.g., showing India’s Arunachal Pradesh and the disputed Aksai Chin plateau as Chinese territory) and by expanding into Bhutanese territories. These moves call into question Xi’s stated aim of building a “community of shared future among neighboring countries.”

Aiming Beyond Rhetoric

Optimistically, one can hope that the latest round of support for Tibet in the U.S. Congress and the U.S. delegation’s visit to the Tibetan Government in Exile would usher in a new wave of international action and attention, including more foreign delegations, as happened with Taiwan in 2022. But more importantly, it should initiate a multiplicity of debates questioning not just China’s long-standing repressive actions – from unfettered territorial expansion and instability to overexploitation and access to natural resources – but also the international community’s tacit silence regarding Himalayan issues. For instance, the EU, which despite its focus on human rights in Tibet is only starting to recognize Chinese coercion globally, may also facilitate discussions in the European Parliament around the aforementioned Himalayan concerns with broader implications.

It is important to note that none of the major concerns regarding China in the Himalayas are new. For example, China has used Tibet and Xinjiang for nuclear bases since before 1964; the Tibetans have hence long worried about the militarization of the region. Old reports dating back to the 1980s highlighted how it is not just the Indian cities and industrial centers that are possibly within the range of China’s nuclear strikes, but also “all the major cities of Central Asia,” highlighting the interconnectedness of security debates.

Undoubtedly, in era of Chinese military modernization under Xi, the threat has only accelerated. For instance, satellite imagery in Bhutanese territory has confirmed China’s aggressive push to change the status quo in the Himalayas.

If the United States and democracies in Asia and Europe such as the EU states, India, and Japan, are serious about the intent to preserve a rules-based order, then they must acknowledge that the threat from China is not limited to its so-called autonomous regions in the Himalayas or the neighboring states, but covers China’s multidirectional expansionism, which has been going on for years. Given the current sliding geopolitical landscape and Xi’s focus on achieving his “China Dream” goals, including national rejuvenation and integration, the Indo-Pacific democracies have no choice but to put impetus into examining and upending China’s attempts at sinicizing the Himalayan (dis)order.

This piece is an outcome of the “China’s Himalayan Hustle” research project by the Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs at the Institute for Security and Development Policy (ISDP), Sweden.

Authors

Guest Author

Jagannath Panda

Dr. Jagannath Panda is the head of the Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs (SCSA-IPA); and a professor at the Department of Regional and Global Studies at the University of Warsaw.

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Guest Author

Ryohei Kasai

Ryohei Kasai is a visiting associate professor at the Gifu Women’s University, in Japan.

Guest Author

Eerishika Pankaj

Eerishika Pankaj is the director of the Organisation for Research on China and Asia (ORCA), India.

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thediplomat.com · by Jagannath Panda

13. Putin’s New War Economy

Excerpts;

Government spending on guns in Putin’s Russia has nearly reached the scale of that of the late Soviet era: formally, as a share of GDP, it is slightly less, but when the bosses announce the figures they keep silent about the fact that almost a quarter of the federal budget is secret. There is no mystery to this secrecy—the money is spent on what is shamefully called “defense and security” and on financial support for those lobbyists who successfully extract huge financial subsidies from the state. Belousov, who has a rigidly dirigiste and statist view of how the economy should develop, has been entrusted with the duty of bringing this type of model to full realization.

For those who support this approach, the belief in state intervention does indeed border on a special religion—or at least an ideology. The conviction that correctly calculated government spending on the products of the military-industrial complex can succeed in sustaining, and even growing the increasingly isolated Russian economy is anomalous in modern economic thought. It cannot be upheld without an appropriate political framework and strong ideological justifications. But the only framework that presupposes such an absurd scale of military spending is inevitably an autocracy; ideological support has been furnished by Putin’s concept of Russia’s special mission, its special path, its special cultural code, and the special role of its orthodoxy. And for all this, one must literally fight: war has become a permanent factor in Russian “development.”

In the 1940s, the economic planner Nikolai Voznesensky, who managed the Soviet economy during World War II, became a favorite of Joseph Stalin. At the end of the conflict, he wrote an extremely popular monograph, The Military Economy of the USSR During the Patriotic War, before being purged by Stalin in 1949. Whether Belousov, Putin’s current favorite, is destined to write a similarly triumphant monograph on the military economy of the Russian Federation during the “special operation” is an open question. Success is not guaranteed. And sooner or later, Russian economists will have to return the Russian economy from the military interventionism model to some form of normality—or, as the reformers joked in the early 1990s, to “make an egg out of an omelet.”

In the late twentieth century, Moscow’s militarization of the economy and belief in the magical power of massive state investment helped precipitate the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus far, Putin has avoided the same kind of fate for today’s Russia by maintaining the remnants of an open market and keeping his financial agencies in technocratic hands. But now that old-school economists are leading the military parades, it is unclear how long this economic rationalism can continue to survive.

Putin’s New War Economy

Why Soviet-Style Military Spending—and State Intervention—Won’t Save Russia

By Andrei Kolesnikov

July 10, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Andrei Kolesnikov · July 10, 2024

In Russia, the tradition of making fun of Soviet economic planning is almost as old as attempts to improve the economic system. “What would happen if socialism was built in the Sahara?,” an old joke asks. The answer: “At first, except for plans, there will be nothing. Then there will be sand shortages.” According to another—one that former U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan liked very much—in the Brezhnev era, a group of people are walking in a military parade in Moscow’s Red Square, except that they are wearing baggy formal suits instead of military uniforms. An aide runs up to the Soviet leader: “Leonid Ilyich, we don’t know who these people are!” Brezhnev replies: “Calm down, comrade, these are our most destructive weapons—Soviet economists.”

After more than two years and six months of Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be undeterred by the reputation of his country’s economic planners. The most striking outcome of his government reshuffle this spring was undoubtedly his replacement of longtime defense minister Sergei Shoigu with Andrei Belousov—a state economist with no military experience. A man not in a baggy suit but in an expensive and well-fitting one, Belousov previously served previously as minister of economic development, assistant to the president for economics, and vice prime minister. But there is a reason for his appointment: Russia’s military spending has now reached such gargantuan proportions—according to some estimates, nearly one-third of the 2024 budget is devoted to defense, reaching a higher portion of GDP than any other year in post-Soviet Russian history—that only an economist can make it efficient.

This, at least, is one of Putin’s explanations, and it appears to be the rare case in which he is not lying. Another explanation is that effective management of Russia’s military technology will make it possible for the country to achieve “technological sovereignty”—complete self-sufficiency—in civilian industries, as well. And also that vast military spending, even if it must come at the expense of human capital, sometimes including social and health services, is in principle capable of driving economic development. In this sense, Belousov is the right choice: as a product of the mathematical school of Soviet economics, he has total faith in the ability of the supreme authorities to calculate everything, and that state money and state interventions can solve any crisis.

Observers have already described Belousov as a “military Keynesian”—a somewhat offensive reference to John Maynard Keynes, the early-twentieth-century British theorist and advocate of government stimulus. More accurately, Belousov’s ideas are reminiscent of exactly the approach that helped undermine the Soviet Union: the unsustainable growth of defense spending and the relentless militarization of the economy. Of course, as a professional economist, Belousov does not advocate abandoning the market. But he supports the view that not only intensive government expenditures but specifically military spending can serve as a driver of development. It is fair to describe this approach as Putin’s new economic model—one shaped not only by the imperatives of his war in Ukraine but also by decades of Soviet nostrums and delusional thinking.

To an extent, this marks a shift from Putin’s first years in the office. After all, he came to power on the heels of the liberal reforms of the 1990s, and in his early years in power seemed to support large-scale restructuring and liberalization of the Russian economy. He is also fully aware of the importance of maintaining strong macroeconomic indicators and balancing the state budget. That is why he still keeps rational technocrats in his administration such as Elvira Nabiullina as central bank governor and Anton Siluanov as finance minister.

Belousov has total faith in the ability of the authorities to calculate everything.

But Belousov is cut from a very different cloth than the former liberal reformers. By appointing him, Putin is now returning to what is essentially a Soviet economy, but with important market elements. The new model combines state interventionism, a dominant emphasis on the military-industrial complex, and import substitution, with a market economy in different areas, including for parallel imports of various Western products to satisfy consumer demands. It is an interesting experiment, but also one with a long and perilous history. All the more so given that an increasing number of large businesses are being nationalized, undermining confidence in the protection of private property and suggesting that the market as such is at risk. Moreover, the Kremlin has signaled in other ways—it has just raised taxes on the middle class, for example—that it does not have enough money to balance the budget.

Like some of his Soviet predecessors, Putin seems to be wagering that huge military expenditures, managed by economic number crunchers, can save, rather than bankrupt, the country. But as the late Communist regime learned too late, an economy built on war cannot survive forever, no matter how good the planners’ math. By embracing such an approach, Putin and Belousov risk eroding what remains of Russia’s hard-won liberal economic foundations. Established by economic reformers more than thirty years ago, these principles have until now kept the Russian system relatively stable, despite the country’s growing isolation. When and if they disappear, it may be very difficult to avoid a larger collapse.

BREZHNEV’S BAGGY SUITS

Going back to the Soviet era, the leadership in Moscow has almost always had a crucial part in the success and failure of attempts to transform the country’s economy. Although economic reforms were discussed under Nikita Khrushchev (1953–64), it was in the Brezhnev era that Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, with Brezhnev’s consent, first attempted to reboot the socialist economy. The effort began with a provocative 1962 article in Pravda by an economist named Evsei Liberman, who argued for the need to increase the autonomy of enterprises, primarily in how they use their profits. The airing of this argument was no accident. In the Soviet era, an article in Pravda was not just an article; it was, almost always, an instruction. In this case, it meant that the authorities had deemed that the Soviet economy was already overripe for reform and that it was a favorable moment for change.

Thus began a debate in the Soviet press and among the authorities about how to overhaul the so-called economic mechanism. By early 1965, Liberman was appearing on the cover of Time magazine under the banner headline “The Communist Flirtation With Profits.” And finally, that fall, Kosygin issued his famous government report, in which, following a sustained debate among economists, he formally proposed giving enterprises limited independence, greater freedom to dispose of their revenues, and even the freedom to expand their range of products in response to demand. This marked a revolution in Soviet consciousness: goods not only had to be produced according to Soviet planning but also, preferably, sold. Still, it was just an experiment; among skeptics, the Kosygin reforms came to be known, with some irony, as “libermanization.”

Soviet-era tanks practicing for a military parade, Moscow, May 2024

Maxim Shemetov / Reuters

In fact, the reforms coincided with a transformation of the economics profession itself. At the time, economists were embracing mathematical methods to turn Soviet economics from a mere pillar of orthodox Marxism-Leninism into a modern science. Paramount was the theory of optimal functioning—the idea that a workable model of socialism could be based on a comprehensive set of calculations for a perfectly balanced economy, in which all industries and needs of citizens are taken into account. One of the centers of the new thinking was the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute (CEMI), where a new generation of mathematical economists searched for a magic formula of universal optimization, which they hoped to design with the help of computer technology.

The sheer scale of the work was daunting. How could Soviet economists link and balance the thousands of planning tasks and more than 10,000 material balances that had to be written for every Soviet good, from rolled ferrous metal to dairy products? After all, there was not even a single bureaucracy to handle all of this, with the former under the State Planning Committee, or Gosplan, and the latter under the State Supply Committee. In the late Soviet era, Gosplan itself had 70 subdivisions and about 3,200 employees. The annual plan itself took up dozens of volumes and was calculated in Gosplan’s Main Computing Center, where an enormous computer bought from the United Kingdom occupied two floors; underneath the machine rooms there was artesian water, because the machines needed cooling.

Yet little of this prodigious effort did much to save the Soviet economy. It is true that the Soviet economy picked up during the second half of the 1960s and official growth figures were very high. This was due to reforms, although it seems likely that the growth was provoked by inflationary pressures: a minimum of freedom pushed enterprises to increase their assortment and, accordingly, slightly increase prices. The deeper reality was that the Kosygin reforms were doomed to failure in the absence of a market and private property. Without an open economy, no amount of planners’ computations could keep supply and demand in line.

THE POLITBURO PETROCRACY

By the end of the 1960s, the Soviet economy faced another problem: labor shortages. Among other factors, rural villages, which had long supplied the workforce, had been exhausted. Surprisingly, Putin faces a similar problem today in his own war-fueled statist economics, but in his case it is more the result of long-term demographic decline and partly exodus of qualified personnel abroad, as well as the massive replenishment needs of the armed forces.

In December 1969, Brezhnev spoke bluntly about the labor crisis and other economic problems to the Plenum of the Central Committee. The speech was so red hot that it was classified. Perhaps he was trying to show that his rival Kosygin’s reforms had achieved nothing. But Brezhnev’s criticisms—from inefficient spending to the failure to implement new technologies—were accurate. And he seemed to apologize for Moscow’s engagement in costly geopolitical adventures, with reasoning that uncannily anticipates Putin’s logic today.

“If we had not helped repel the machinations of imperialism in Southeast Asia and the Middle East,” Brezhnev said, “it would have inspired the Americans and their allies to launch new aggressive actions somewhere closer to our borders.... If we had not thwarted the counterrevolutionary plans in Czechoslovakia, NATO troops would soon have been right on our western borders.”

As with other failed Russian and Soviet reforms, the decline of the Kosygin efforts coincided with a political freeze. This one began in August 1968, with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The economic changes were put on hold, and not only because of flagging interest from the top. Around this time, petrodollars were pouring into the Soviet economy, as the oil fields discovered in the 1960s came on line; and oil prices rose after the oil crisis of 1973. At this point, there was apparently no longer any need for reforms at all. As with the case of Putin’s Russia, the superpower was hooked on oil and gas, which it used to fund food and industrial imports. The will to change was devalued. But as the Soviets soon discovered, such an approach can only be sustained for so long.

Today’s Kremlin would do well to note that the Soviet petrocracy was exhausted within a decade. By 1979, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Moscow’s nuclear arms race with Washington, the Soviet economy was accumulating deficits in almost every possible sector. It was these factors that would later lead to hyperinflation, when, after the fall of the Soviet Union, a new generation of reformers ended price controls. At this point, Russia’s economic reformers could repeat the famous line from a popular Soviet movie from the 1960s: “Everything has already been stolen before us.”

WHO’S AFRAID OF UNEMPLOYMENT?

Today, the 1990s are generally remembered as the years of large-scale economic liberalization in Russia—and are often seen as the era against which Putin is now reacting. In fact, there had already been attempts at economic reforms in the 1980s under Mikhail Gorbachev, who not only began to give the Soviet people some political freedoms but also some economic ones, as well. But Gorbachev’s economic reforms were slow, and then they stopped altogether.

On the one hand, Gorbachev sought to gradually widen the space for economic initiative: for the first time, the government authorized joint ventures with foreigners, as well as allowing some forms of small private enterprise and the creation of semi-private companies in service sectors. Yet the machine-building industry continued to be pumped with state money in the usual way. And when the economist Nikolai Shmelev had the temerity to publicly suggest that the government should allow for unemployment under socialism, Gorbachev was furious.

Gorbachev did not dare redesign the Soviet economy.

Still, it had become clear that a more dramatic approach to economic reform was needed. Since the early years of the decade, groups of young economists had been holding underground, and then official, seminars in Leningrad and Moscow. In Leningrad, their leader was Anatoly Chubais, a young economist who organized informal and formal scientific workshops in the city, gathering a group of like-minded people; in Moscow, it was Gaidar, who, as the most gifted of the young cohort, was already involved in preparing analytical and program documents for the party and the government. These two groups formed a more or less cohesive team, and they quickly understood that radical and very far-reaching economic reforms would be required; they also considered different ways of privatizing property, without which they knew that no real transformation of the socialist economy was possible.

The remaining years of perestroika were filled with heated economic discussions and competition among different reform factions. In June 1987 the Central Committee even convened a Plenum on the economy that included many progressive Soviet economists from the old school. In particular, the academic economist Alexander Anchishkin was chosen to head the new Institute of Economics and Forecasting of Scientific and Technological Progress, which drew a cohort of other promising young economists, including Gaidar. Among its very young staff was also Andrei Belousov, Putin’s future defense minister.

Yet Gorbachev failed to embrace bolder steps. Although his role in the large-scale transformation of the Soviet Union was enormous, he did not dare redesign the Soviet economy, and it began to experience an ever more serious crisis: stagnation combined with a gigantic foreign debt, hidden inflation that was gradually breaking through, a colossal budget deficit, and, at the same time, an acute shortage of goods and products. The political collapse of the Soviet Union, which gained unstoppable momentum after the attempted coup against Gorbachev in August 1991, was the natural corollary of this breakdown.

LESS MATH, MORE MILK

As Gorbachev’s adversary, Boris Yeltsin understood that the Soviet Union was collapsing and that he could only establish a hold on power in an independent Russia—and not just politically. He also realized that Russia would need to carry out radical economic reforms that could not be coordinated with the former Soviet republics, many of which were unprepared for a market economy. It was then, in the fall of 1991, that he called in Gaidar’s young reformers to author the reform program.

He also offered the young economists—nicknamed the Chicago Boys because of their liberal convictions—key positions in the financial and economic bloc of his government: Gaidar became Yeltsin’s key economic adviser and then served as acting prime minister; Chubais became minister of privatization and then first deputy prime minister responsible for financial stabilization. Moreover, while the reforms were being implemented, the position of Russian president and prime minister were effectively combined, giving the reformers the political backing they needed. (The reforms met with fierce opposition from the parliament, and Yeltsin’s support was crucial in giving them political cover.)

Economist and presidential adviser Yegor Gaidar and First Vice Premier Anatoly Chubais in Moscow, November 1994

Gennady Galperin / Reuters

Thus began the controversial economic restructuring of the 1990s. Gaidar liberalized prices as well as domestic and foreign trade, and the government began to privatize state property. Although these forced reforms were considered shock therapy in the West, Gaidar himself referred to them as “defibrillation measures,” because he believed that without them there would simply be famine and stores would have nothing to sell. Thanks to the liberalization program, the shelves were full and market forces began to work.

Very quickly, however, the reformers were blamed for galloping inflation, production stoppages of goods that lacked sufficient demand, the rapid decline of military and agricultural spending, the closure of numerous military-industrial factories, and the lack of money for social support. A fierce political struggle erupted, and Gaidar’s government—as it was called at the time, although formally Gaidar was vice prime minister and minister of economy and finance, and then acting chair of the Cabinet of Ministers—lasted only until the end of 1992.

But no matter how fiercely they were criticized, Russia’s radical economists had accomplished one enormous thing: establishing a market economy. And in this they had significant success. Consider the simple challenge of stocking store shelves. In the early 1970s, the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute estimated that a computer performing a million operations per second would require 30,000 years to manage the gigantic demands of the planned economy for every single kind of product. Yet after Gaidar liberalized price controls in January 1992, the same result could be achieved with almost no planning at all: consumer demand was enough to keep the stores full. The founder of Soviet cybernetics, Viktor Glushkov, had once proposed attaching sensors to each cow’s udder to calculate the optimal volume of milk production; now the optimal volume was being determined without any sensors, simply thanks to the invisible hand of the market.

LIBERAL GHOSTS

In contrast to the first generation of Soviet economic reformers, who were mostly born in the 1930s, the new generation that came of age in the Yeltsin years had been born in the 1950s. They had been educated during the worst years of Soviet stagnation, gaining an appetite for underground self-education and for studying the reforms of socialist economies in Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Poland. The Hungarian economist Janos Kornai, who wrote openly about the nature of the deficit economy, was a particularly important figure to many of this generation. Overcoming socialist illusions allowed this cohort to carry out initial economic reforms and then to gain a significant foothold in the government administration. This meant that they could continue to oversee structural reforms or, for those, like Gaidar himself, who withdrew to the academy, contribute to the realization of reforms by consulting and drafting proposals.

To have a lasting impact on the political system, however, it was crucial for the economic liberals to have their ideas institutionalized. Notably, Yevgeny Yasin, who was one of the few members of the older generation who accepted Gaidar’s reforms, was a mentor to many young economists at Moscow State University, including future Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina. Also important was the creation of a new economic institute in Moscow in 1992, which later became the Higher School of Economics, a fully fledged university. This nest of liberalism soon attracted the best professors and researchers and became one of the most preeminent research institutions in Russia. Tellingly, that has also made it a target for regime crackdowns in recent years. After the replacement of the university leadership just before the war in 2021, the government oversaw a major purge of liberal professors on its faculty.

Almost a quarter of Russia’s federal budget is secret.

Yet even die-hard Putinists cannot completely eradicate liberalism from economic education and economic policy. Maxim Oreshkin, the president’s economic aide, may not be a liberal, but he is a technocrat and a fairly typical graduate of the Higher School of Economics. Present-day Russian conservatives and communists, who support Putinism in all its manifestations, grumble about the presence of “liberals” in the government’s financial and economic administration. But Putin is not suicidal: at the beginning of his rule, several liberal economists taught him the basics of macroeconomics and budget and monetary policy, led by Chubais and Alexei Kudrin, who was finance minister during Putin’s first decade in power. Putin, of course, moved away from liberalism, and almost all the reformers found themselves on the periphery. At best, it is possible to describe those that remain as rational technocrats. An autocrat who carries out illiberal counterreforms and demodernization does not need liberal modernizers.

As an economist, Belousov’s approach is diametrically opposite to that of the liberals. His father was a prominent figure of the Soviet mathematical school of economics, and he is, to oversimplify a bit, an adherent of it. When you spend public money in the right way, you get results. That’s what his economic philosophy is all about. Technological changes are also important. It is no coincidence that Belousov has been working a lot on new technologies in recent years; but technological innovation does not only happen in the public sector, and certainly not in an economy that has become increasingly isolated from the world. The deeper reality is that Putin’s new military-economic model seems likely to make it significantly more difficult to avoid making the country more brittle.

OMELETS INTO EGGS

Employees of the Soviet Gosplan were firmly aware that the socialist system depended on the principle of overestimating the required amount of capital investment and rejecting technical innovations. They understood that the more money there is, the more it is wasted in the state economy in the absence of private interest and initiative. This paradoxical Gosplan wisdom seems to have been completely forgotten by today’s generation of Russian economists, who are building a new model of mature Putinomics, based on an almost religious belief in the effectiveness of government spending and the special role of the military economy. Putin now has set an ambitious task: according to his words, economists must find a balance between guns and butter. There is no money left at all for butter in the state budget, but that can be handled by the market sector, which is still in place in Putin’s Russia thanks to the impetus given more than three decades ago by Gaidar’s reforms.

Government spending on guns in Putin’s Russia has nearly reached the scale of that of the late Soviet era: formally, as a share of GDP, it is slightly less, but when the bosses announce the figures they keep silent about the fact that almost a quarter of the federal budget is secret. There is no mystery to this secrecy—the money is spent on what is shamefully called “defense and security” and on financial support for those lobbyists who successfully extract huge financial subsidies from the state. Belousov, who has a rigidly dirigiste and statist view of how the economy should develop, has been entrusted with the duty of bringing this type of model to full realization.

Russian conscripts at a military recruitment center in Bataysk, Russia, May 2024

Sergey Pivovarov / Reuters

For those who support this approach, the belief in state intervention does indeed border on a special religion—or at least an ideology. The conviction that correctly calculated government spending on the products of the military-industrial complex can succeed in sustaining, and even growing the increasingly isolated Russian economy is anomalous in modern economic thought. It cannot be upheld without an appropriate political framework and strong ideological justifications. But the only framework that presupposes such an absurd scale of military spending is inevitably an autocracy; ideological support has been furnished by Putin’s concept of Russia’s special mission, its special path, its special cultural code, and the special role of its orthodoxy. And for all this, one must literally fight: war has become a permanent factor in Russian “development.”

In the 1940s, the economic planner Nikolai Voznesensky, who managed the Soviet economy during World War II, became a favorite of Joseph Stalin. At the end of the conflict, he wrote an extremely popular monograph, The Military Economy of the USSR During the Patriotic War, before being purged by Stalin in 1949. Whether Belousov, Putin’s current favorite, is destined to write a similarly triumphant monograph on the military economy of the Russian Federation during the “special operation” is an open question. Success is not guaranteed. And sooner or later, Russian economists will have to return the Russian economy from the military interventionism model to some form of normality—or, as the reformers joked in the early 1990s, to “make an egg out of an omelet.”

In the late twentieth century, Moscow’s militarization of the economy and belief in the magical power of massive state investment helped precipitate the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus far, Putin has avoided the same kind of fate for today’s Russia by maintaining the remnants of an open market and keeping his financial agencies in technocratic hands. But now that old-school economists are leading the military parades, it is unclear how long this economic rationalism can continue to survive.

• ANDREI KOLESNIKOV is a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.

Foreign Affairs · by Andrei Kolesnikov · July 10, 2024

​14. Iran’s New Naval Ambitions

Conclusion:

As Iran’s maritime forward defense takes shape, the United States and its allies need to be prepared. Iran’s strategy is designed to be nimble, allowing it to raise the stakes of regional conflict and to threaten U.S. interests in many places at once. Washington will need to draw on the full range of its diplomatic and military tools in order to deny Tehran the advantage it seeks at sea.

Iran’s New Naval Ambitions

As Tehran’s Maritime Power Rises, Washington Must Step Up to Secure the Seas

By Hamidreza Azizi

July 10, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Hamidreza Azizi · July 10, 2024

Since the start of the war in the Gaza Strip in October, the Red Sea has become a second battleground. The Houthis, an armed group based in Yemen and backed by Iran, have launched missiles and sent armed drones to strike commercial ships passing through the maritime route. They have sunk two vessels and damaged dozens more. By disrupting the route through which at least 12 percent of all international trade passes in a typical year, the Houthis’ attacks have caused shipping costs to skyrocket and upended the trade system. The group has pledged to continue targeting merchant vessels until Israel ends its military operations in Gaza, calculating that the disarray it causes will increase the international pressure on the Israeli government to bring the war to a close.

The Houthis may be leading this attack, but they are not acting alone. The group is a part of Iran’s “axis of resistance,” a network of mostly nonstate partners that Tehran mobilizes in service of its regional goals. Iran has provided weapons and intelligence to support the Houthis’ Red Sea campaign, and the country’s leaders have endorsed the strikes on commercial ships.

For Iran, assisting the Houthis’ attacks is just one part of a broader strategic shift—one that increasingly relies on maritime capabilities to keep Iran’s enemies on the back foot. Until around four years ago, Iran’s activities at sea were largely confined to several hundred Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) speedboats patrolling in the Persian Gulf and periodic threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, a crucial chokepoint for global oil shipments. Lately, however, Iran’s naval forces have acquired more advanced vessels, including new submarines and missile-armed warships, and have begun to venture as far as the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. These changes are in line with Iran’s “forward defense” doctrine, adopted after the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 and consolidated in the early 2000s, which aims to engage adversaries far from Iran’s borders before they can pose a threat to the homeland.

Iran’s revamped navy is now at the heart of its military strategy. The tools that have long been central to Iran’s forward defense on land—missiles, drones, and proxy militias—are today being deployed at sea. To further bolster its power, Tehran has forged naval partnerships with China and Russia. By enhancing its maritime presence, Iran aims not just to deter attacks by foreign actors that may wish it harm but to do so by directly threatening those adversaries—primarily the United States.

Iran’s maritime threat demands a response. Washington must reduce the vulnerability of the international shipping system by developing alternative trade routes, and it can reduce Tehran’s desire to disrupt maritime transit in the first place by allowing Iran to integrate into the global trade system in limited ways. In addition, as the United States’ partners in the Gulf improve their relations with Iran, Washington should encourage them to wield their influence to rein in the country’s provocations. And on the military front, the United States must work closely with its allies to counter and contain Iranian naval power.

FORWARD DEFENSE

Iran has introduced several notable changes as it develops its naval strategy. First, the IRGC Navy has assumed a dominant role. The IRGC Navy historically comprised a fleet of agile speedboats that harassed American ships in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, Iran’s conventional naval forces with larger vessels patrolled, undertook antipiracy operations, and gathered intelligence in more distant waters—essentially defensive missions. The disparity in the two navies’ capabilities effectively disappeared in January, however, when the IRGC Navy received two new advanced warships. It is expected to acquire more in the coming years. The vessels will allow the IRGC Navy to conduct operations beyond the Persian Gulf and beyond the scope of the conventional naval forces’ mission. In 2020, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei specifically tasked the IRGC with expanding Iran’s ability to reach adversaries in distant waters, in keeping with a strategy known as the “long hand.”

The new forces’ technological capacity is another prominent change. Iran has been developing its missile program for decades, but now it is increasingly arming its naval fleet with the latest technology. The IRGC Navy’s warships are equipped with advanced missile systems that have a range of up to 430 miles. Previously, Iran’s land-based missiles could reach targets within only 1,200 miles of Iranian territory. But the mobility of a maritime fleet vastly expands the scope of potential targets.

Over the past few months, Iran has conducted naval missions to assist members of the axis of resistance with increasing frequency. According to a report in The Telegraph, a unit in the IRGC’s Quds Force—an elite force of the organization tasked with extraterritorial operations—has sent weapons to Hezbollah by stowing them on cargo ships that depart from the Iranian port city of Bandar Abbas. The ships make a stop at Syria’s Latakia port, where the weapons are unloaded, before continuing their commercial routes. Iran has also employed “ghost tankers”—vessels that turn off their tracking systems and change their names and registration to evade detection—to deliver oil to Syria, where Syrian President Bashar al-Assad maintains a close alliance with Tehran and is considered a crucial member of the axis of resistance. And in the Red Sea, the Iranian ship Behshad has been providing intelligence and surveillance support for the Houthis’ attacks on international shipping.

Iran increasingly relies on maritime capabilities to keep its enemies on the back foot.

Another key component of Iran’s maritime activities is tightening the country’s control of strategic waterways. Iran’s own geography gives its naval forces access to the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, through which upward of 20 percent of the oil consumed globally is shipped. Its partnership with the Houthis extends its reach to the Bab el Mandeb Strait, the passage between Yemen and the Horn of Africa at the southern opening of the Red Sea. In 2018, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani implied that Iran held sway in Bab el Mandeb when he said, “We have many straits, the Strait of Hormuz is just one of those.” Fast-forward five years to the Houthis’ attacks on ships passing through this waterway and Rouhani’s words read like a warning. State-affiliated media in Iran have reported that Tehran has sent Iranian-made antiship ballistic missiles to the Houthis and that Iranian technology has helped the Houthis strike ships in the Red Sea. It is possible that Iran has transferred similar missile technology to Hezbollah, which is already believed to possess Russian-made antiship missiles. Combining the coastal positions and maritime capabilities of axis of resistance members with its own, Iran can project power beyond the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea and the eastern Mediterranean.

Partnerships with China and Russia constitute the final pillar of Iran’s maritime strategy. Since 2019, the three countries have conducted four joint naval exercises, most recently in the Gulf of Oman in March. This display sent a signal of their capability and intent to challenge Western naval dominance in the region. As part of Iran and Russia’s growing military collaboration since the start of the war in Ukraine, Iran has also sought Russian assistance in developing more advanced long- and medium-range naval precision missiles.

THE LURE OF THE SEA

Iran’s revamped maritime strategy is primarily a response to changes in the country’s security environment. For one, Tehran sees a need to diversify its options for pushing back against the United States. Previously, U.S. military bases in Gulf countries offered easy targets; when diplomatic tensions escalated and Washington intensified its pressure on Tehran, Iran could threaten to strike a U.S. base. But over the past two years, Iran has taken steps to reconcile with its Arab neighbors, and it is now more reluctant to jeopardize those ties. Tehran’s threats against U.S. bases in the region have significantly decreased as a result. In a telling example of Iran’s caution, prior to its large-scale missile and drone attack on Israel in April, Iran informed several Gulf countries of its plans to reassure them that the operation would be confined to Israel and would not expand into their territories.

To avoid potentially angering its neighbors, Iran has begun to focus its threats on American interests farther afield. In May, for example, IRGC Navy Commander Ali Reza Tangsiri announced that one of the force’s new missile-equipped warships had sailed past Diego Garcia, a remote island in the Indian Ocean where U.S. military personnel are stationed. The maneuver was a clear message to the United States that Iran’s naval fleet is expanding its reach.

Iran’s new strategy also aims to box in Israel. Iranian proxies and allied militias in Lebanon and Syria already pose a military threat along Israel’s borders, and by providing Hezbollah and the Houthis with drones and antiship missiles, Iran is giving its partners the means to impose significant costs on Israel by targeting its shipping and ports. In a potential conflict, Iranian-backed groups could strike Israeli targets both on land and at sea. The United States could also have more difficulty providing aid and logistical support to Israel, as its own ships would be vulnerable to Iranian and allied attacks. Just establishing these capabilities enhances Iran’s leverage over Israel, which now has to factor in the risk of fending off attacks on multiple fronts into its own strategic planning.

A missile launch during an IRGC Navy exercise, January 2023

IRGC / West News Agency / Reuters

Some of Tehran’s motivations are defensive. Iran seeks to use its maritime presence to raise the costs of a conflict for its adversaries, whether Israel, the United States, or another hostile power. It can do this by honing its ability to impede international transit routes, as the Houthis have done during the war in Gaza. To build this capability further, Iran has attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to establish a naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast in exchange for providing advanced weaponry to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Together with its influence over the Houthis, a base in Sudan would give Iran access to a maritime chokepoint from two directions. In Tehran’s calculation, if its enemies were assured that a regional skirmish would upend global trade, they would be less likely to risk economic chaos by clashing with Iranian forces or launching an attack on Iranian soil.

Finally, operating by sea has become more attractive, as Israeli surveillance has made it increasingly difficult for Iran to smuggle weapons to its allies by land and air. Traditional routes—such as the “land bridge” that connects Iran to Syria and Lebanon through Iraq and the “air corridor” that links Iran to Syria via Iraq—have grown perilous as Israeli intelligence operations identify these transports and Israeli airstrikes disrupt them. Maritime transport, by contrast, is less heavily monitored and offers more flexibility in terms of altering routes and using different kinds of vessels, allowing Iran to maintain a steady flow of arms to its allies.

REDUCING THE THREAT

Even as Iran reorients its maritime strategy, the country’s conventional naval power still lags far behind that of the United States and most of its allies. But that does not mean Iranian activities at sea do not pose a threat. The real danger is Tehran’s growing capability to wage asymmetric warfare in maritime domains, using a combination of missile and drone attacks, operations through proxy militias, and control over strategic waterways to target U.S. interests.

Iran’s deepening ties with China and Russia heighten the threat. Not only could Tehran gain advanced naval technologies and experience conducting effective naval warfare through these partnerships, but each country’s maritime activities, whether organized in concert or not, could also serve their shared goal of challenging U.S. dominance at sea. As shown by the failure of the U.S.- and British-led military campaign to stop the Houthis’ strikes on ships in the Red Sea, asymmetric naval operations are difficult to combat, especially when they take place in distant waters. If Iran, China, and Russia were to direct maritime attacks on U.S. naval assets and commercial shipping all at the same time and across multiple geographic areas, they could overwhelm U.S. naval forces.

The United States must take action to mitigate the Iranian maritime threat. By advancing diplomatic initiatives to develop alternative international transit routes, Washington and its partners can reduce their dependency on vulnerable passages. One such initiative is the India–Middle East–Europe corridor. The United States should marshal the actors involved—including India, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the European Union—to secure funding, set concrete milestones, and expedite the construction of railways, ports, and other critical infrastructure. Washington can also move the economic project forward by encouraging American companies to invest through public-private partnerships. In a similar vein, the United States can lend its support to the Development Road project, which will connect the Persian Gulf to Turkey and Europe via Iraq. Washington can help this venture along by assisting the Iraqi government in its efforts to enhance security along the route and by fostering closer cooperation between Baghdad and Ankara. The United States can also help Iraq secure loans or grants for the project through the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Tehran sees a need to diversify its options for pushing back against the United States.

Furthermore, Washington can encourage its partners in the Gulf to use their warming relations with Tehran to reduce the risk of maritime conflicts. Both Iran and the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council have articulated their interest in regional security, and the next step is for them to develop a framework that contains assurances that all parties will respect international trade and shipping in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. A nonaggression pact between Iran and its neighbors could be the first step toward a regional security framework, as it would foster trust and lower the chances of clashes at sea. The United States needs to make clear to its partners that it supports such negotiations.

The Biden administration should also try to integrate Iran into the global economy, albeit in limited ways. U.S.-led sanctions have restricted the country’s international trade, which leaves Tehran with less to lose by obstructing transit routes. Raising the cost of disrupting global trade for Iran could help change its calculations. One step Washington can take in this direction is to renew a sanctions waiver that would allow India to proceed with its plans for the development and management of the Iranian port of Chabahar.

Along with its diplomatic efforts, the United States should urge its regional partners to take military measures to contain Iran’s maritime challenge. Arab-Israeli normalization talks offer an opportunity to secure such commitments. A formal military coalition that included Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states would no doubt provoke Iran, but these talks are more likely to yield narrower forms of cooperation, such as provisions for regular maritime intelligence sharing and technical and logistical support. These efforts would be particularly significant if a regional maritime security agreement that included Tehran failed to materialize. In that scenario, the Gulf states would seek other ways of restraining Iran’s power at sea, including military cooperation with the United States.

Collaboration with Washington’s European allies is equally important. European forces have joined the campaign against the Houthis in the Red Sea, but their ability to deploy rapidly and to sustain operations far from their home bases is limited. To equip their militaries to respond quickly to asymmetric naval threats in the future, European governments must increase the number of forward-deployed vessels in their fleets and improve logistical support.

As Iran’s maritime forward defense takes shape, the United States and its allies need to be prepared. Iran’s strategy is designed to be nimble, allowing it to raise the stakes of regional conflict and to threaten U.S. interests in many places at once. Washington will need to draw on the full range of its diplomatic and military tools in order to deny Tehran the advantage it seeks at sea.

• HAMIDREZA AZIZI is a Visiting Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs and a Nonresident Fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs.

Foreign Affairs · by Hamidreza Azizi · July 10, 2024

1​5. Wrestling with the Future of US-China Competition

Enjoy this unique story.

Excerpt:

As security analysts who believe that the American public should understand the growing threat from China, we believe it’s a useful thought experiment to consider what it might look like if this strategic rivalry were represented in wrestling’s particular corner of American pop culture. It might just aid American diplomats should they need to give the Chinese Communist Party a steel chair to the back.

Wrestling with the Future of US-China Competition - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Daniel Byman, Benjamin Jensen · July 9, 2024

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Although US government officials and pundits alike loudly proclaim an era of US-China rivalry, their calls to arms struggle to mobilize the American public. Indeed, a recent Gallup poll indicates that Americans see China as a negligible problem among those they rank as the most important facing the country today.

The reason for this gap is simple. China has not entered the popular imagination the way that Nazis, Russian communists, and Middle Eastern terrorists did. This gap is embodied, and perhaps even worsened, by one simple observation: professional wrestling does not feature an evil Chinese Communist Party wrestler.

Hear us out.

Of course, we are aware our influence over the powers that be of professional wrestling is limited, and even if we could shape the course of professional wrestling’s character development, the long history of often problematic portrayals inside the ring would make doing so a risky proposition. Still, however, it is a truism that war is a continuation of politics, and society and culture frame threats and thus shape politics. There is no better place to witness this display than the wonderful, colorful world of professional wrestling. And that world shows a different threat landscape than that of the strategy class in Washington. Unlike the Cold War era, which thrived on turning America’s rivals into ringside villains and heels, modern professional wrestling has yet to embrace China as a threat.

As security analysts who believe that the American public should understand the growing threat from China, we believe it’s a useful thought experiment to consider what it might look like if this strategic rivalry were represented in wrestling’s particular corner of American pop culture. It might just aid American diplomats should they need to give the Chinese Communist Party a steel chair to the back.

Geopolitics, Wrestling Style

Wrestling and politics are longtime companions. Indeed, wrestling shows the divisions in America that undermine the ability of leaders in Washington to forge a strategic consensus. Modern wrestling has bandits from south of the border with mottos like “I lie, I cheat, I steal” while continuing a class warfare theme started long ago about evil rich people—from Vince McMahon to Ted DiBiase—who are out to pull one over on a working-class hero. Today, race and class appear to loom larger than strategic rivalry in modern wrestling. And while taunting feminists through acts like the Pretty Mean Sisters and the LGBTQIA+ community through acts like Gorgeous George, Adorable Adrian Adonis, and Goldust is on the decline, it is still ever present.

Yet wrestling has a long history of villains also drawn from foreign policy adversaries. After World War II, Hans Schmidt (in reality, the Canadian wrestler Gary Larose) was a supposedly Teutonic bully whose wrestling style involved dirty tricks. Nikolai Volkoff represented the evil of the Soviet Union, and he even teamed up with the Iron Sheik, who embodied post–hostage crisis Iran. Known for his “Camel Clutch,” the Iron Sheik had legendary matches with Hulk Hogan and lost to Sgt. Slaughter in the Boot Camp Match. Sgt. Slaughter himself, however, turned heel, supposedly sympathizing with Saddam Hussein, and even had a (photoshopped) picture of himself with the Iraqi leader, leading to real-world threats that led him to don a bulletproof vest. The list went on, with updates including Rusev and his manager (and eventual wife) Lana—who, though from Florida, regularly used a Boris Badenov Russian accent, and received real criticism after going too far and appearing to dismiss the MH17 plane crash during a promotion with fans.

Enter the Dragon . . . or the Wolf

If professional wrestling’s history of borrowing from international politics to develop its characters were extended to today’s strategic rivalry, what might a Chinese Communist Party heel look like? Four options stand out, each embodying a different aspect of competition with China: ideological, economic, technological, and geopolitical. Each in turn creates a morality play in which a sage plays out in the ring that visualizes and describes larger social and political currents.

First, ideological competition enters the ring. Imagine a heel called “the Chairman”—a character that pretends to be a member of the Chinese Communist Party sent to teach America a lesson. He would wear a Mao-like suit and lecture the audience that America is in decline, that its children are dumber than their Chinese counterparts, and, true fighting words, its men are getting weak.

The Chairman would claim that America is a decadent mess. His arrogance would whip the crowd into a frenzy as he lectured onlookers on the greatness of modern China, a point already on display in Chinese Communist Party propaganda and United Front activities. The rivalry would be a war of ideas more than a clash of military force.

Second, economic competition enters the ring in the form of “the Boss.” True to the history of wrestling as a morality play about class relations, the true villain would be a Chinese business tycoon connected to the communist party that brags about how many American jobs he stole by setting up a global network of factories. He would mock middle-class and blue-collar tastes as cheap and burn dollar bills to show his contempt for the continued preeminence of the US currency and treasury markets. And he would be sneaky, constantly cutting deals with other wrestlers, especially Europeans, and turning even some good guys bad with his deep pockets and willingness to bribe his way to the top.

The Boss would capture the audience’s eye outside the ring. During interviews and backstage video he would be seen cutting shady deals. In the ring, he would use money and power to humiliate his opponents. The heel would swagger into the ring with expensive clothes and flare, indicative of China’s status as an economic superpower.

Third, technological competition enters the ring. This time, the heel is called the “the Dragon.” Building on thousands of years of Chinese learning, the Dragon is wise and, in today’s era, empowered by the latest technologies. He would use AI, biotechnology, and other emerging technologies to gain advantages over his foes.

The Dragon would wear a modern, nano tech–enabled outfit that might camouflage him in the ring while offering him greater resistance to the blows of American wrestlers. US strength and power would be neutralized, at times sneakily, with the latest in bioweaponry, and AI would enable new training regimens targeting each of his major muscle groups. Similar to Ivan Drago, chief antagonist of Rocky IV, he would likely be portrayed as using advanced science to train and hone his combat skills.

Last, geopolitical competition enters the ring: “the Wolf.” Building on the smash action hit from China, Wolf Warrior, this heel would wear military fatigues and swagger his way into the ring. He would dazzle audiences with acrobatics and defeat larger, ripped American wrestlers playing on a David vs. Goliath theme.

The Wolf would focus on the military dimension of great power competition. In place of the war of ideas would be the threat of a new superpower embodied in one man. In some ways, his character is less complex leaving the audience to crave his finishing moves more than his entrance and antics. The rivalry would be performed in the final minutes of the battle inside the ring, distinguishing him from the endless speeches and intrigue associated with the Chairman or the morality plays of the Boss.

Who Is the Next Hulk Hogan?

These villains are, in a campy way, terrifying, and an accurate wrestling depiction of the US foreign policy process would at times involve Uncle Sam headbutting the Great Wall. However, it’s important to recognize that these villains’ American, free-world counterparts would have several advantages that could, and even should, lead to triumph in the long term.

The first is that US wrestlers would be superior on allies. They should have more friends willing to lend a hand—or a chair—when needed. This was always an American strength and China has few powerful friends, at least compared with the United States. The allies, however, should represent new realities. “The Mate” from Australia and (for once, please sweet Jesus, nonracist) representatives from India, Japan, and South Korea would be important partners in the fight. It could also see the famed British Bulldog resurrected.

Second, many of China’s advantages are American advantages too. Ideology is an American strength, and US core tenets of freedom and opportunity remain popular worldwide, despite the malaise at home. Although the United States does not bribe its way to access as China does in its foreign policy, America’s economic power is still massive, while China’s economy is sputtering (would one of the Boss’s credit cards max out?). Although China is making great strides in technology, so too is the United States, and America’s open society gives it many innovation advantages. Cunning has never been a strong suit of American foreign policy, but dedication and learning are—we might not out-trick the Wolf, but we can persevere in the face of trickery and eventually turn the tables.

Although the Chairman, the Boss, the Dragon, and the Wolf may never grace the professional wrestling stage, pop culture will always reflect the real world—and in turn shape how we see the real world going forward. If pop culture does so intelligently, engagingly, and even humorously—if the characteristics of America’s rivals are clearly conveyed—a more informed public gives policymakers in a democracy the backing to respond to these rivals and compete effectively.

Daniel Byman is a senior fellow with the Warfare, Irregular Warfare, and Terrorism Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and a professor in the Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service.

Benjamin Jensen is a senior fellow in the Futures Lab at the CSIS and the Petersen Chair of Emerging Technology and a professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps University, School of Advanced Warfighting.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Adam Schultz, White House

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Daniel Byman, Benjamin Jensen · July 9, 2024

16. High-Tech American Weapons Work Against Russia—Until They Don’t

High-Tech American Weapons Work Against Russia—Until They Don’t

Moscow is learning how to defeat Western precision munitions in Ukraine

https://www.wsj.com/world/us-weapons-russia-ukraine-0eed240c?mod=hp_lead_pos7&utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru

By Yaroslav TrofimovFollow

July 10, 2024 12:01 am ET

The Excalibur artillery round performed wonders when it was introduced into the Ukrainian battlefield in the summer of 2022. Guided by GPS, the shells hit Russian tanks and artillery with surgical precision, as drones overhead filmed the resulting fireballs.

That didn’t last.

Within weeks, the Russian army started to adapt, using its formidable electronic warfare capabilities. It managed to interfere with the GPS guidance and fuzes, so that the shells would either go astray, fail to detonate, or both. By the middle of last year, the M982 Excalibur munitions, developed by RTX and BAE Systems, became essentially useless and are no longer employed, Ukrainian commanders say.

Several other weapons that showcased the West’s technological superiority have encountered a similar fate. Russian electronic countermeasures have significantly reduced the precision of GPS-guided missiles fired by Himars systems, the weapon credited for reversing the momentum of the war in Ukraine’s favor in the summer of 2022, Ukrainian military officials say.

A brand-new system, the Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb munition, manufactured by Boeing and Sweden’s Saab, has failed altogether after its introduction in recent months, in part because of Russian electronic warfare, Ukrainian and Western officials say. It is no longer in use in Ukraine pending an overhaul.

The Pentagon declined to discuss the performance of specific U.S. weapons systems, citing operational security.

Some of the other Western precision weapons, provided more recently, continue to strike high-value Russian targets. U.S.-made ATACMS ballistic missiles and the Storm Shadow cruise missiles manufactured by Franco-British-Italian defense company MBDA have devastated several airfields, command centers and communications facilities in Russian-occupied Crimea and other parts of the country this year. A number of Russia’s vaunted S-400 air defense batteries were among the successful hits.

For these weapons, too, it’s only a matter of time before Russia learns how to reduce the effectiveness and improve interception rates, Ukrainian military officials and Western defense experts say. 

 Stop

An Excalibur round destroys a Russian TOR air defense missile system in Ukraine in February 2023.  Ukrainian Military

“We should assume that adaptation will always occur, and the Russians have adapted to a variety of things,” said Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. “The capabilities will be most effective immediately after they are introduced, and adversaries will develop countermeasures over time.”

Precision vs. mass

Russia’s success in electronic countermeasures—closely watched by China, with whom Moscow is believed to share some of its battlefield lessons in dealing with Western weaponry—poses a strategic problem for the U.S. and allies.

Western military doctrine has long relied on a belief that precision can defeat mass—meaning that well-targeted strikes can cripple a more numerous enemy, reducing the need for massive expenditure on troops, tanks and artillery.

That proposition, however, had not been tested in a major war until Ukraine. The introduction of Western weapons there showed that what may have worked against Saddam Hussein’s army, the Taliban or Islamic State guerrillas won’t necessarily perform against a modern military like Russia’s or China’s.

“We have probably made some bad assumptions because over the last 20 years we were launching precision weapons against people that could not do anything about it,” said retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, a former commander of the U.S. Army in Europe. “Now we are doing it against a peer opponent, and Russia and China do have these capabilities.”

One of the lessons learned in Ukraine is about the continuing importance of old-school unguided artillery shells, the manufacturing of which is only now beginning to pick up in the U.S. and Europe after decades of decline, said Lt. Gen. Esa Pulkkinen, the permanent secretary of Finland’s defense ministry. “They are immune to any type of jamming, and they will go to target regardless of what type of electronic warfare capability there may be,” he said.

William LaPlante, the U.S. deputy secretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, acknowledged in recent remarks Russia’s successes in disrupting precision munitions. “The Russians have gotten really, really good,” he said.

Cat-and-mouse game

In every war, the introduction of a new weapons system prompts the enemy to develop countermeasures to blunt its effect, sparking a cycle of innovation in a cat-and-mouse game that goes back to the invention of the spear and the shield. 

Russia has upgraded and revised its Iranian-designed Shahed drones as the Ukrainians adopted new ways of detecting and shooting them down. Russia is also constantly improving its cruise and ballistic missiles to make it more difficult for Ukraine’s Western-supplied air defenses to intercept them, Ukrainian Air Force spokesman Yuriy Ignat said after a Russian barrage killed 33 people Monday in Kyiv.

For Ukraine, time is an essential factor—and the carefully limited and gradual introduction of many Western systems has provided Russia with the ability to minimize their impact. “Warfare is about the speed of adaptation,” said retired Air Marshal Edward Stringer, a former head of operations at the British Ministry of Defense. “If you drip-feed an antibiotic weekly, you’ll actually train the pathogen—and we have trained the pathogen….We didn’t need to give them that time, but we did.” 

The debris of a downed Russian Shahed-136 drone near Kyiv last year. PHOTO: OLEG PETRASYUK/EPA-EFE/SHUTTERSTOCK

Anna Gvozdiar, Ukraine’s deputy minister of strategic industries—an agency that oversees the country’s defense manufacturing—said she was frustrated by the inability of some Western manufacturers to adapt. “We learn faster because we are on the front line, we have to make decisions to survive,” she said. 

Some of Ukraine’s Western partners are taking notice. In January, Stockholm launched a government initiative to make sure that Sweden’s own defense manufacturers react more quickly to the lessons learned in Ukraine. “One of the things that is really amazing is the Ukrainian ability to innovate and how quickly their innovation cycles are moving. The things that would take five years to develop in Sweden are done in five weeks in Ukraine,” Sweden’s Defense Minister Pål Jonson said in an interview. “Aggressively attacking bureaucracy is vital if you want to be good on innovation.”

When it comes to Ukrainian-made weapons like drones, models that worked just a few months earlier are no longer efficient on the battlefield because of the constantly evolving technology, said a Ukrainian intelligence official. “It’s like updating software on your phone—we and the Russians have to do it every month, to keep up,” the official said. “But when we get weapons from the West, the manufacturer put in its software many years ago, and rarely wants to change anything.”

Ukrainian troops prepared drones before operations against Russian forces last year. PHOTO: MANU BRABO FOR WSJ

Many of the American weapons provided to Ukraine, especially under the presidential drawdown authority, are older systems that are being phased out by the U.S. military and replaced with more modern, and usually more expensive, products that aren’t necessarily shared with Kyiv. That provides few incentives for manufacturers to upgrade legacy precision munitions, said an executive at a U.S. defense company.  

Leading U.S. defense manufacturers RTX and Boeing referred all questions to the Pentagon. A spokesperson for Lockheed Martin, which manufactures GMLRS missiles for Himars, replied to a query about these munitions’ battlefield performance by saying that “questions about U.S. or foreign military operations are best addressed by those governments.”   

A U.S. defense official said that the Pentagon is “very aware” of the continuously evolving electronic-warfare threat posed by Russia in Ukraine and has worked closely with Ukraine and defense industry partners to rapidly address threats and ensure that American precision weapons remain effective in a very complex electronic-warfare environment. In some cases, working with industry, the U.S. has been able to provide options for Ukrainian forces within hours or days, the official added.

While Moscow has had successes against older generations of Western precision weapons, some of the more sophisticated systems are being withheld precisely so that Russia—and through it, China—wouldn’t develop effective countermeasures, military officials say. In a potential war, the U.S. and allies would have much more powerful capabilities, starting with massive air power.

“We don’t want to overlearn lessons from Ukraine,” LaPlante, the deputy secretary of defense, said at a presentation in April. “They are fighting, necessarily so, in the way that we would not necessarily fight.”

Ukrainian soldiers prepared to reload a Himars system with ammunition in September 2022. PHOTO: ADRIENNE SURPRENANT/MYOP FOR WSJ

Some Ukrainian officials and Western military analysts, however, say they are dismayed by what they perceive as U.S. military officials and defense companies minimizing the problems faced by precision-guidance systems in Ukraine or ascribing them to poor training of Ukrainian troops.

“There is quite a bit of learning, but unfortunately the U.S. military is also learning things about this war that are not necessarily true, and what is being learned is filtered through the conceit that many of the problems faced by the Ukrainian military would not be faced by the U.S. armed forces, or could be easily overcome,” said Michael Kofman, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment who has frequently visited Ukrainian front-line units.

Cold War development

Russia’s focus on electronic warfare dates back to the development of Western precision weapons in the final decade of the Cold War, a breakthrough that disrupted the balance of power created by the Soviet and Western nuclear arsenals.

Weapons like Excalibur and the GMLRS missiles were designed decades ago—and so it’s not surprising that Russian electronic warfare equipment, specifically created to counter this threat, proved able to do so once deployed on a large scale.

Many modern Western precision munitions rely, at least in part, on satellite navigation to hit their targets. By the summer of 2023, the Russians focused on using their mass of electronic-warfare capabilities to jam or spoof satellite navigation within a belt some 40 miles wide along the 800-mile-long front line.

Russia’s own precision munitions, such as Krasnopol shells, rely on laser designation by Orlan-30 drones that continued to operate without GPS guidance. The U.S. has supplied Ukraine with comparable M712 Copperhead artillery rounds, but Ukrainian forces rarely use them because of a shortage of compatible drones to designate targets, Ukrainian troops say. 

Visitors looked at a Russian Orlan-30 drone during a forum outside Moscow last year. PHOTO: YURI KOCHETKOV/EFE/ZUMA PRESS

More recently, Russia introduced at scale the enhanced Kometa-M satellite guidance kit that’s far more resistant to Ukrainian jamming and that has allowed Russian glide bombs to be used to devastating effect against Ukrainian positions.

Russian interference proved particularly successful with Excaliburs, which used fuzes programmed to explode at a certain altitude, and because of GPS tampering failed to detonate altogether, Ukrainian troops say. Other precision-guided artillery shells, such as the Bonus rounds produced by France and Sweden, have also been rendered less effective by Russian jamming.

The picture is more complex with GMLRS munitions for Himars. Deviation varies depending on distance—with shorter-range strikes more susceptible to GPS spoofing—and can reach several dozen yards, Ukrainian soldiers say. That’s a big issue for the M31-type GMLRS missile with a unitary warhead, which was used to great success in 2022 to target Russian bunkers, command centers, pontoons, weapons depots and hardened equipment.

A deviation of some 10 to 30 yards for that munition is the difference between a hit and a miss. The reduced precision is less of a problem for the M30-type GMLRS missile, which upon impact sprays a wide area with a shower of tungsten balls. Ukraine is continuing to use that munition to hit Russian artillery positions as part of counterbattery fire, Ukrainian soldiers say. 

For both types of missiles, precision can be improved with better electronic-warfare reconnaissance and more advanced tactics, soldiers say.

A Ukrainian reconnaissance unit commander who guided some 300 Excalibur rounds onto Russian targets in 2022 and 2023 remembered fondly just how devastating that munition used to be. “It’s cheap, it’s versatile, it was the real weapon of victory,” he said. “It could become that again if it were modernized to adapt to the changed battlefield. But, as far as we know, it’s not being modernized.”

Alistair MacDonald contributed to this article.

Write to Yaroslav Trofimov at yaroslav.trofimov@wsj.com

17. Army Advocates Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence by Soldiers as Other Services Are Hesitant

Army Advocates Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence by Soldiers as Other Services Are Hesitant

military.com · by Steve Beynon · July 9, 2024

The Army wants its leaders to tout the use of generative artificial intelligence to the rank and file as a means to make work easier for soldiers, according to a new memo, even as other services have been hesitant to approve those tools for regular use.

The service, not typically known for embracing the bleeding edge of new technology, appears to be the first military branch to encourage the use of commercial AI such as ChatGPT, though troops may already be leaning on it to write memos, award recommendations and, most notably, complete evaluations, among other time-consuming administrative tasks.

But services such as the Space Force and Navy have urged caution or outright barred use of the tools, citing security concerns, as AI has swept through the internet and consumer technology in the U.S. and around the world, promising to automate many tasks that have so far been performed only by people.

"Commanders and senior leaders should encourage the use of Gen AI tools for their appropriate use cases," Leonel Garciga, the Army's chief information officer, wrote in a memo to the force June 27.

Garciga wrote that the tools offer "unique and exciting opportunities" for the service, but he also highlighted that commanders need to be cognizant of how their troops are using the tools and ensure that their use sticks to unclassified information.

Artificial intelligence, once the realm of science fiction, became widely available to the public in 2021 as part of a program that could generate pictures from text prompts. The so-called generative AI has continued to advance, with new programs such as ChatGPT springing up, and is capable of producing not only pictures but also writings and video using commands or requests.

The Defense Department is heavily invested in AI technologies that some believe may be critical in future conflicts. But the military has wrestled with the question of how much troops should use commercial AI tools such as Google Gemini, Dall-E and ChatGPT.

"The Army seems ahead in adopting this technology," said Jacquelyn Schneider, a fellow at the Hoover Institution, whose research has focused on technology and national security.

Generative AI can potentially be used for wargaming and planning complex missions. In Ukraine, AI is already being used on the battlefield, serving as a kind of Silicon Valley tech rush for autonomous weapons.

There are some cybersecurity risks associated with AI when it comes to the military. The data troops input teaches those tools and becomes part of the AI's lexicon.

But for the rank and file, its use would mostly be more mundane and practical -- writing emails, memos and evaluations. Much of the nonclassified information used for administrative purposes, particularly evaluations, likely wouldn't pose a security threat.

"For something like performance evaluations, they probably don't have a lot of strategic use for an adversary; we may actually seem more capable than we are," Schneider added, referring to how the evaluations can bolster a service member's record with inflated metrics.

However, the Space Force in September paused the use of AI tools, effectively saying that security risks still needed to be evaluated. Before that, Jane Rathbun, the Navy's chief information officer, said in a memo to the sea service that generative AI has "inherent security vulnerabilities," adding they "warrant a cautious approach."

The Pentagon and the services now appear to be divided on the use of generative AI, with two ideas being true at once: Those tools come with cybersecurity risks, and the quick and widespread adoption among the public means they're here to stay.

Last year, the Pentagon stood up Task Force Lima to employ generative AI in the services and assess its risks.

"As we navigate the transformative power of generative AI, our focus remains steadfast on ensuring national security, minimizing risks, and responsibly integrating these technologies," Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks said last year when announcing the establishment of the task force.

The Army has yet to develop clear policy and guardrails for AI use, a process that could still be years away and follow the guidance of the Pentagon's AI task force. Developing guardrails can be further complicated as AI continues to evolve.

"It would be interesting to see what the limits are," Schneider said. "What are the missions that it's still too risky to use generative AI? Where do they think the line is?"

The service has already used AI to write press releases meant to communicate its operations to the public, typically through journalists -- which may lead to ethical concerns at news outlets on whether communications from AI are acceptable.

"With governmental sources, the potential to dodge accountability also worries me," Sarah Scire, deputy editor for the Nieman Lab, which covers the journalism industry, told Military.com. "If the AI-produced press releases or posts contain lies or falsehoods -- also sometimes known as hallucinations -- who is responsible?"

military.com · by Steve Beynon · July 9, 2024

18. Understanding the next era of warfare

Excerpt:

The bottom line: Governments and militaries that grasp these challenges and master the changes will dominate the future.

1 hour ago -World

Understanding the next era of warfare

https://www.axios.com/2024/07/10/us-military-future-weapons-ai-warfare?utm

• Colin Demarest

Illustration: Annelise Capossela/Axios

Conflicts abroad and defense-contract competitions at home illuminate in real time the future of America's war machine.

Why it matters: Today's closely watched fights are shaping those of tomorrow, and the pace of battlefield innovation is only accelerating.

• Cheap, abundant drones are devastating far more expensive systems in Eastern Europe. In waters off Yemen, they embroil the U.S. Navy in fighting so intense it's been compared to World War II.
• Disinformation campaigns shape international perceptions, including in Africa, where Russia's playbook colors a U.S. withdrawal from Niger.
• Directed-energy weapons that fry electronics from afar and intercept overhead threats are leaping from sci-fi to reality. Powerful lasers and microwaves are headed to the greater Middle East.
• Data is currency — or ammunition, depending who you ask. And artificial intelligence is parsing it all to aid maintenance, targeting and every application in between.
• Increasing access to overhead imagery empowers commanders on the front lines and hobbyists at home to keep tabs on movements halfway across the globe. You are always being watched.
• Nuclear arsenals are growing as transparency shrinks. While the U.S. and Russia boast by far the largest numbers, other players such as China and North Korea are inching upward.

Our Future of Defense coverage (sign up here) will regularly explore these themes:

• The unmanned obsession. With advances in drones, robotics, wayfinding and more, militaries are increasingly deploying uncrewed technologies. What's next, and where is the line drawn when time comes to kill?
• Transparent battlefields. Hiding is becoming impossible. Infrared imaging, deep sensing, satellite photography, open-source intelligence and more all betray troop positions.
• Industry disruptors. A consolidated defense industry, long dominated by a handful of household names, is being rattled by small, scrappy competitors and Silicon Valley speed. (I'll be digging into this next week.)
• The digital and physical confluence. Cyber, electronic and information warfare are having a hot moment. Coupled with high-fidelity simulation and gaming and software-defined hardware, the digital world is turning the physical tide.
• AI boom or bust. AI is reshaping daily lives. Its military applications promise to be far more radical. One question stands out: What does global governance look like?

• Seamless connectivity. The Pentagon wants all its forces interlinked — a multibillion-dollar push to outwit the People's Liberation Army known as CJADC2. Reaching that nirvana, though, is complicated by cost and collaboration, as well as a history of networking blunders.
• A new space race. A global surveillance and communications competition is underway, abetted by a booming commercial sector and a hunger for faraway insights. As one expert told me: "Space capabilities are the difference between being a regional power and being a global power."
• Munitions, munitions, munitions. Conflicts chew through stockpiles that then demand replenishment. Those who control the requisite resources and maintain healthy supply lines will have an upper hand.
• Workforce woes. The U.S. military is struggling to recruit enough people. How can the all-volunteer force survive, and how do recruiters connect with Gens Z, Alpha and beyond? (One Army leader has suggested the metaverse.)

The bottom line: Governments and militaries that grasp these challenges and master the changes will dominate the future.

19. Exclusive | Was fallen Chinese defence minister Wei Fenghe compromised by hostile force?

Exclusive | Was fallen Chinese defence minister Wei Fenghe compromised by hostile force?

• A rare form of words that the Communist Party normally only applies to those accused of betrayal was used in the indictment against him

China’s Communist Party

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William Zheng

+ FOLLOWPublished: 6:00am, 10 Jul 2024

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3269799/official-indictment-fallen-chinese-defence-minister-wei-fenghe-may-include-coded-hint-he-was?module=flexi_unit-focus&pgtype=homepage&utm

Of the all top generals who fell in Xi’s war against corruption, Wei was the only one described as “zhongcheng shi jie” or “ being disloyal and losing one’s chastity”.

The hard-to-translate phrase “shi jie” has its origins in Chinese history, where it was used to describe the moral degradation of the scholar-gentry who formed the ruling class.

In the fourth century BC the word “jie” was a bamboo or bronze sceptre representing royal authority – while “shi” means to lose – so a betrayal or defection would imply the loss of this jie.

Later in the Song dynasty (which ruled from the 10th to 13th centuries), it referred to women perceived as unchaste, such as widows who remarried.

China watchers familiar with the Communist Party’s history note that it has used the phrase as a euphemism for betraying the party and being compromised by a hostile force.

A search of statements published by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), the top civilian anti-corruption body, and its military counterpart shows that Wei is the only person to whom the phrase has been attached in the last decade.

A political scientist from Beijing’s Renmin university said the characters“shi jie” are most prominently associated with former Communist Party leaders such Xiang Zhongfa or Gu Shunzhang, who defected to the Kuomintang, or Nationalists, the Communists’ bitter rivals during the civil war.

10:14

‘No one is safe’: China purges record number of ‘tiger’ officials in 2023

‘No one is safe’: China purges record number of ‘tiger’ officials in 2023

“Ask any party historian, what are the names that pop out in their mind when you mention ‘shi jie” to them, they will tell you the story of Xiang Zhongfa, who was regarded as a major disgrace to the party,” said the researcher, who requested anonymity.

Xiang was the only general secretary, or head of the party, to defect in its history. He revealed all he knew about the party and its secret services to his Kuomintang captors in June 1931 just days before his execution. This gave them a chance to uproot the whole underground Communist network in Shanghai.

Gu, who once headed the party’s spy network, also defected to the KMT after his capture.

His defection led to the arrest of many prominent Communist leaders and even future premier Zhou Enlai only narrowly escaped. For that, Gu was often termed as “the most dangerous traitor in the history of the CCP” and often described as an example of “shi jie” in official histories or media reports.

Hong Kong military commentator Liang Guoliang said such a rare and harsh accusation suggests “Wei’s crimes are probably beyond taking bribes”.

He also contrasted it with the statement about Li, which although it was equally stern in tone, said only that he had “abandoned his original aspirations and lost his party principles” – a standard line used to criticise those who give or receive bribes.

“What exactly happened is certainly top secret and we won’t know what actually happened. But the term ‘shi jie’ seems to suggest that Wei’s conduct might have allowed China’s enemies to gain an advantage from it,” Liang said.

Wei was the first officer promoted to the rank of full general by Xi, who hosted a promotion ceremony for Wei only ten days after he became the head of the party and the military in November 2012.

Three years later he became the first head of the rocket force and was appointed defence minister in 2018 after Xi began his second term as president.

His two successors as commander of the rocket force, Zhou Yaning and Li Yuchao, were both ousted last year.

Alfred Wu, an associate professor at the National University of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy said the language seems to indicate “an external element” in Wei’s misdeeds.

“The word ‘shi jie’ is not applicable when the CCDI is only describing wrong behaviour that caused internal harm within the party or within China,” Wu said.

07:00

China airs 4-part anti-corruption series on prime-time TV amid renewed crackdown on graft

China airs 4-part anti-corruption series on prime-time TV amid renewed crackdown on graft

The statement also said Wei had “betrayed the trust” of the party’s central leadership and the CMC, “seriously polluting the political environment of the military, and causing great damage to the party’s cause, national defence and military construction, as well as the image of its senior leaders”.

Li and Wei will also face criminal charges from military prosecutors.

They are the latest senior PLA officers to be brought down in the ongoing anti-graft campaign.

Nine generals, including the former rocket force heads as well as a former air force chief and a number of CMC officials from the equipment development department were dismissed from the National People’s Congress in December.

Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has shown no signs of slowing down after entering its second decade. Last year the CCDI set a new record for the number of senior officials being investigated for corruption, while the first six months of this year set a further record for the numbers targeted.

South China Morning Post · July 10, 2024

​20. What we know — and don’t know — about Hezbollah’s weapons arsenal

Please go to the linkto fiwe the proper format with all the graphics and maps.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/07/10/hezbollah-weapons-israel-war-border-nasrallah/?utm

What we know — and don’t know — about Hezbollah’s weapons arsenal

The Lebanese militant group has guided and unguided rockets, antitank artillery, ballistic and antiship missiles, as well as drones equipped with explosives.

By Mohamad El Chamaa and Samuel Granados

July 10, 2024 at 2:00 a.m. EDT

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After nine months of cross-border conflict with Hezbollah, Israel says it is preparing for a full-scale war in Lebanon, warning the time for diplomacy is running out.

Hezbollah, a militia and political party that grew out of Lebanon’s civil war to become one of the strongest non-state actors in the Middle East, has been preparing for this moment since 2006, when Israeli forces last invaded the country.

It has received large shipments of rockets and drones from Iran, its principal patron, and has more recently begun to produce its own weapons. The group also boasts air defense capabilities, which most militias don’t have.

Reported attacks since Oct. 7

Incidents include airstrikes and

shelling, as well as drone, artillery

and missile attacks.

20 MILES

IDF

LEBANON

Hezbollah

Baalbek

Beirut

Mediterranean

Sea

Sidon

Damascus

Nabatieh

Tyre

Golan

Heights

SYRIA

( Annexed by Israel

in 1981. Not internationally

recognized.)

Haifa

Nazareth

I S R A E L

JORDAN

WEST

BANK

Source: ACLED. Data as of June 28

The group’s arsenal includes guided and unguided rockets, antitank artillery, ballistic and antiship missiles, as well as explosives-laden drones — portending a complex, multi-front conflict that could reach far into Israeli territory.

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Analysts estimate Hezbollah has between 130,000 and 150,000 rockets and missiles, more than four times as many as its ally Hamas was believed to have stockpiled before the war in Gaza. And the Lebanese group says it commands more than 100,000 soldiers, well over double the high-end estimates of Hamas’s prewar fighting force.

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Most of Hezbollah’s weapons are lower-grade, unguided munitions, which could threaten Israel’s aerial defense systems if unleashed in large numbers. Even more concerning for Israel are precision munitions the group has said it possesses.

Hezbollah keeps a tight lid on its arsenal, leaving weapons experts to guess about the full extent of its capabilities. Much of what is publicly known comes from statements by the group, and its leader, Hasan Nasrallah, who says his fighters have only used “a portion of our weapons” in escalating attacks on northern Israel since Oct. 8.

Israel’s military has retaliated with intense strikes on Lebanon, mostly in the south, using fighter jets, tanks, Hermes drones and white phosphorus munitions.

Tens of thousands of civilians have been displaced on both sides of the border.

At least 94 civilians and more than 300 Hezbollah fighters have been killed in Israeli strikes in Lebanon, according to figures compiled by The Washington Post. The attacks have caused $1.5 billion in damages and have destroyed around 1,700 buildings, the Lebanese government estimates.

Israeli officials say Hezbollah attacks have killed 18 soldiers and 12 civilians. They have also damaged hundreds of homes and ignited fires that burned more than 40,000 acres.

Smokes rises on Thursday from a fire in northern Israel that started after a Hezbollah attack. (Anadolu/Getty Images)

Rockets and missiles

Hezbollah first started hitting northern Israel a day after Hamas-led militants stormed the country and killed some 1,200 people. The group has said it will continue fighting until Israel agrees to a cease-fire in Gaza.

Hezbollah has used different short-range missiles and rockets, at first targeting tanks and other technical equipment near the border before progressing to attacks on military barracks and bases.

On Nov. 11, Nasrallah revealed Hezbollah was using Burkan rockets. An improvised rocket-assisted munition that can be easily assembled, the Burkan has become a “signature weapon of Iran-supported groups in the region,” according to Fabian Hinz, a defense and military analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Attacks reported since Oct. 7

Hezbollah

IDF

Hezbollah’s known rocket and missiles

Max. range (in miles)

ALMAS 10

FALAQ 7

BURKAN 6

FATEH-110 186

SAYYAD-2C 62

KATYUSHA 25

Litani River

Tyre

RAAD 43

Metula

Shebaa

Farms

Dan

Snir

LEBANON

Qiryat

Shmona

Dafna

Beirut

LEBANON

Qlaileh

DETAIL

Meiss

El Jabal

Golan

Heights

10

Jordan

River

25

Haifa

Tayr Arfa

Naqoura

Bint Jbeil

Aitaroun

Yarine

62

Ayta ash Shab

Shtula

Rmaych

Yaroun

Tel Aviv

Avivim

WEST BANK

Golan

Heights

Shlomi

LEBANON

Jerusalem

ISRAEL

Netu’a

GAZA

Ma’alot-Tarshiha

ISRAEL

ISRAEL

6.2 Miles

Hatzor

Haglilit

186

Safed

Abu Snan

9.9 Miles

Rame

Nahariya

Deir el-Asad

Acre

Karmiel

Source: ACLED. Data as of June 28

Note: The Golan Heights were seized by Israel in 1967 and illegally annexed in 1981.

The Alma Research and Education Center, an Israeli think tank, says the weapon can be fired from a ground launcher and can cause “extensive destruction” up to 500 feet from the point of impact.

Gen. Mounir Shehadeh, a former Lebanese government coordinator to the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Lebanon, said the Burkan was first used and tested by Hezbollah in Syria — where Nasrallah deployed fighters to prop up President Bashar al-Assad during the country’s civil war.

Nasrallah also revealed in November that the group was using Katyusha rockets. Originally made by the Soviet Union and copied by Iran, they can travel 12 to 24 miles and are fired in a series.

Although they are unguided, Hinz says Hezbollah “can fire lots of them because they are cheap and, until certain ranges, they work.”

In an interview with Hezboallah’s Al-Manar TV in early July, an artillery officer, identified as Hajj Muhammad Ali, speaking with his face blurred and voice altered, said the group is capable of firing 100 Katyushas at a time from truck-mounted launchers.

Iranian-made Raad rockets were used by Hezbollah in a deadly attack on the Israeli port city of Haifa during the 2006 war, but have not been unleashed yet during this round of fighting.

In January, after Israel killed top commander Wissam Tawil, Hezbollah started showcasing more sophisticated rockets, including the Iranian-made Falaq model. This was followed by camera-equipped Almas weapons, guided antitank missiles that can pierce heavy armor.

Larger guided ballistic missiles, like the Fateh 110, present a greater threat, with a range of up to 185 miles, potentially putting Tel Aviv, and even Jerusalem, in the crosshairs. Similar missiles were used by Iran in an unprecedented — but well-telegraphed — aerial attack against Israel earlier this year, giving the Israeli military time to intercept them. It’s unclear what impact they might have if launched from across the border in Lebanon, especially in large numbers.

Nasrallah said in 2018 that Hezbollah possesses precision-guided munitions (PGMs), but the group has never tested or showcased them in public. More recently, in 2022, he claimed Hezbollah has the ability to “transform our rockets ... into precision missiles” with the help of Iranian experts.

Analysts say he could be referring to something like the Spice kits the United States provides to Israel to retrofit “dumb bombs” into precision munitions.

PGMs are more effective because they “they’re equipped with active seekers,” said Shaan Shaikh, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and deputy director of its Missile Defense Project.

“Nasrallah has talked about it, the [Israel Defense Forces] has raised concerns. ... But it’s hard to say anything definitive without proof,” he added.

Some of Hezbollah’s known missiles and rockets

Type

Range

Explosive

(miles)

(lbs.)

FALAQ-1

Unguided rocket

6.2 - 6.8

110

FALAQ-2

Unguided rocket

6.2 - 6.8

265

ALMAS

Antitank missile

2.5 - 9.9

Not available

KATYUSHA

Artillery rocket

2.5 - 24.8

22 - 44

Artillery rocket

RAAD

37.2 - 43.4

110

Heavy rocket

BURKAN

Up to 6.2

661 - 1,102

358

Loitering munition

Up to 62

Not available

SAYYAD-2C

40 - 62

441

Surface-to-air missile

Antiship missile

C-802

74.5

364

Short-range ballistic missile

FATEH-110

155.3 - 186.4

992 - 1,102

Note: Illustrations are based in low resolution images and are for illustrative purposes only. Not to scale.

Sources: Hezbollah official statements, CSIS, Army Recognition, Cat-Uxo

Hezbollah is secretive about its arsenal, Hinz said. It took 13 years for the group to reveal that it used a C-802 missile to sink an Israeli ship in 2006.

Antiship missiles could also be used to hit offshore oil rigs, specifically in Israel’s Leviathan gas field — a target the group alluded to in a video last month.

Drones

Hezbollah has a large fleet of drones at its disposal, varying in size, shape and capability.

According to official statements, the group first started using explosive-laden drones on Nov. 2 in an attack on an Israeli army post in the Golan Heights, footage of which was later released on its Telegram account. The IDF said two soldiers were injured.

Hinz says the type of drone used in this and other attacks were most likely modeled after the Iranian Ababil-T drone, which the Alma Research and Education Center says can travel about 75 miles with nearly 90 pounds of explosives.

In mid-May, after Israeli forces invaded Rafah, in southern Gaza, Hezbollah unleashed a more advanced version that can fire two rockets and explode upon impact. The unmanned aerial vehicle was first used in a May 16 attack on an Israeli army garrison near the border, which injured three soldiers, the IDF said.

Some of the drones believed to be used by Hezbollah

ABABIL

Range

Max. speed

Max. ceiling

74.5 miles

190 mph

9,800 ft.

It can be equipped

with 88 pounds of explosives.

DJI PHANTOM 4

Max. speed

Flight time

Max. ceiling

45 mph

30 min.

19,685 ft.

ABABIL

RETROFITTED

DJI MAVIC PRO 2

Distance

Max. speed

Flight time

Max ceiling

11.2 miles

44.7 mph

31 min.

19,685 ft.

A video published

by Hezbollah on May 16

indicated that two S5 rockets

were fired from pipes fitted

on the UAV’s wings

HUDHUD-1

Flight time

1.5 hours

Note: Illustrations are based in low resolution images and are for illustrative purposes only.

Sources: ODIN, Alma, DJI

Although Iran is Hezbollah’s main arms supplier, the group has become more self-reliant in recent years. “Today, we in Lebanon, and for a long time, have begun manufacturing drones,” Nasrallah said in 2022, a claim he reiterated in June.

Hezbollah has also used commercial drones for reconnaissance, and to test for gaps in Israel’s aerial defenses. In late June, a drone flew undetected over Haifa for hours, recording footage of strategic sites. Alma believes it was an Iranian-made Hudhud-1 UAV; Hezbollah has not confirmed the model.

Air defenses

It is unusual for non-state actors like Hezbollah to have air defense capabilities, signaling the extent of the group’s preparedness for war.

Hezbollah has used surface-to-air munitions, most notably the Iranian-made 358 antiaircraft missile, to shoot down Israeli drones, according to Hinz.

On at least two occasions, the group also claims to have used more sophisticated munitions — likely the Iranian Sayyad-2C, Hinz said, a radar-guided missile that can reach targets at nearly 90,000 feet — against Israeli fighter jets, forcing them to retreat.

Such capabilities could present a unique, and unusual, challenge to Israel’s air superiority. “Hezbollah is far better equipped than Hamas,” Shaikh said.

Rockets fired from southern Lebanon are intercepted on Monday by Israel's Iron Dome air defense system. (Jalaa Marey/AFP/Getty Images)

Volume over quality

In early June, in response to the killing of a senior commander, Hezbollah lobbed 150 rockets and 30 drones in a single barrage, the largest such attack on Israel from the north. On Thursday, after another Israeli airstrike on a Hezbollah commander, the group upped the ante again, firing more than 200 rockets.

In an all-out war, these so-called “saturation attacks” — in which hundreds of small rockets are launched at the same time — could overwhelm Israel’s Iron Dome.

“They’ve already spent a lot of Iron Dome interceptors during the war in Gaza,” Hinz said. “How many do they have left?”

The Fateh ballistic missiles could also be unleashed in salvos, experts say, raising other critical questions about Israel’s level of preparation.

“How effective are David’s Sling and Arrow interceptors against these missiles?” Shaikh wondered, referring to Israel’s defense systems for medium- and long-range missiles. “Can the IDF detect, track and fire on these missiles while they’re being prepped for launch?”

“There’s a lot we don’t know.”

Lior Soroka in Tel Aviv contributed to this report.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com