Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

 "I attribute my success to this — I never gave or took any excuse." - Florence Nightingale

"The Bill of Rights is the United States. The United States is the Bill of Rights. Compromise the Bill of Rights and you dissolve the very foundation upon which the Union stands… Nowhere in the Bill of Rights are the words ‘unless inconvenient’ to be found." 
- A. E. Samaan, historian

"If we look to the answer as to why for so many years we achieved so much, prospered as no other people on earth, it was because here in this land we unleashed the energy and individual genius of man to a greater extent than has ever been done before. Freedom and the dignity of the individual have been more available and assured here than in any other place on earth." 
-Ronald Reagan, 1981


1. S. Korea grants special pardon to ex-President Park Geun-hye
2. Former leftist lawmaker Lee Seok-ki paroled
3. S.Korea's Moon pardons disgraced Park amid tight presidential race
4. A Bipartisan Consensus on South Korea’s Foreign Policy?
5. What South Korea Can Learn From India on Diplomatic Balancing
6. Special pardon in dispute: Moon should take responsibility for fallout from pardon
7. Pardon politics free Korea’s disgraced ex-leader Park
8. Female North Korean soldier attempts to end her life after suffering from five separate sexual assaults
9. EDITORIAL | Enhancing Kim Jong Un’s Dictatorship Cannot Lead to a Brighter Future for North Korea
10. North Korea’s Military Capabilities
11. US ambassadorial vacancy could send bad message: experts
12. The first of 43,000 names of Korean War dead are added to the conflict’s memorial in Washington
13. S. Korea, China discuss Olympics, end-of-war declaration in high-level talks




1. S. Korea grants special pardon to ex-President Park Geun-hye
As there is approval for the pardon of former President Park we should also consider who else was pardoned (but not mentioned in this report from the semi-official Yonhap news.)

Lee Seok-ki is a convicted traitor. An article from 2015: "Former South Korean Lawmaker’s Treason Conviction Upheld" https://www.wsj.com/articles/former-south-korean-lawmakers-treason-conviction-upheld-1421913674?st=zn82337eswmmdlf

(3rd LD) S. Korea grants special pardon to ex-President Park Geun-hye | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 장동우 · December 24, 2021
(ATTN: CLARIFIES 4th para; UPDATES with more details from 14th para; ADDS photo)
SEOUL, Dec. 24 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's government on Friday announced a special pardon for Park Geun-hye, the former president currently serving a 22-year prison term for corruption, saying that pardoning Park would help bolster national unity.
Park has been serving a combined 22-year prison sentence since March 2017 after being impeached and removed from office over far-reaching corruption charges and an influence-peddling scandal.
The 69-year-old former president was included in a list of 3,094 pardon beneficiaries who are scheduled to be released on New Year's Eve. The amnesty was decided in consideration of her deteriorating health.
This year, Park was hospitalized three times due to chronic shoulder and lower back pain. In 2019, she received shoulder surgery. She is expected to be released from state custody at Samsung Medical Center in southern Seoul, where she is currently receiving treatment, according to officials.
Granting a pardon to Park is expected to have a significant impact on next March's presidential election, as Park has commanded the support of voters in Daegu and North Gyeongsang Province, a stronghold of the main opposition People Power Party.

The government also announced it will exonerate Han Myeong-sook, former prime minister during the liberal Roh Moo-hyun administration who was convicted of bribery and has served her full prison sentence.
Han, who served as prime minister from 2006 to 2007, was imprisoned from 2015-2017 after being convicted of accepting about 900 million won (US$795,000) in illegal political funds from a late businessman while in office.
She has long claimed innocence, arguing that she never accepted the money and that the charges against her were fabricated as part of political revenge by a conservative government against the Roh administration.
Former President Lee Myung-bak, who is currently serving a 17-year prison sentence over embezzlement and bribery convictions, was excluded from the pardon.
The government said the decisions were made as a means of overcoming a nationwide crisis prompted by the COVID-19 pandemic by moving forward from "the unfortunate history of the past and achieving a grand unity among the people."

In a government briefing, Justice Minister Park Beom-kye said the former president's pardon was discussed during a two-day meeting of the ministry's amnesty review committee earlier this week. The minister said the health factor "was a very important criterion" in the amnesty decision.
On the exclusion of Lee from being offered amnesty, the minister said the circumstances surrounding the two former presidents "were different" and added the government had to take into consideration the "public sentiment" in reaching its decision.
The government also decided to exonerate 315 people convicted of election irregularities, and either pardon or exonerate 65 activists convicted of their connection with anti-government protests. Some 983,000 non-felony offenders in cases, such as traffic violations, will also be offered clemency.
In response to her pardon, Park thanked Moon for making the decision "despite difficulties" and also expressed gratitude to the public, according to Yoo Yeong-ha, a lawyer and a close aide of Park. Yoo conveyed Park's message to reporters at Samsung Medical Center.
Park will likely continue to receive hospital treatment for the time being, Yoo explained. Where she will stay after leaving the hospital remains unclear for now, as Park's private home in southern Seoul was auctioned off to an unrelated private citizen, Yoo added.
"We are looking into where she could stay after leaving (the hospital)," Yoo said. Park plans to focus on regaining her health and doesn't plan to meet politicians or any other people at the hospital, he added.

odissy@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 장동우 · December 24, 2021


2. Former leftist lawmaker Lee Seok-ki paroled


I wonder if President Park's pardon was calculated to bury this lede. I would rather see a criminal pardoned rather than a traitor. Do we think he has been rehabilitated and is no longer a threat to South Korea? Has he got his mind right or has he been so thoroughly "endoctrinated" that he cannot possibly change?

Recall these words:

“An opinion can be argued with; a conviction is best shot."
— T.E. Lawrence

“A trained and disciplined guerrilla is much more than a patriotic peasant, workman, or student armed with an antiquated fowling-piece and home-made bomb. His endoctrination begins even before he is taught to shoot accurately, and it is unceasing. The end product is an intensely loyal and politically alert fighting man.” 
- Brig Gen S.B. Griffith in the Introduction to Mao’s On Guerrilla Warfare, 1961.

“In a national insurrection the center of gravity to be destroyed lies in the person of the chief leader and in public opinion; against these points the blow must be directed.” 
- Clausewitz, 1833.The Encyclopedia of Nineteenth-century Land Warfare: An Illustrated World View By Byron Farwell, page 424.

Former leftist lawmaker Lee Seok-ki paroled
koreaherald.com · by Shim Woo-hyun · December 24, 2021
Published : Dec 24, 2021 - 17:10 Updated : Dec 24, 2021 - 17:11
Lee Seok-ki, a former left-wing lawmker who had been sent to prison on charges of plotting a rebellion to overthrow the South Korean government in case of a war with North Korea, hugs one of his supporters after being released from a prison in the central city of Daejeon on parole on Dec. 24, 2021. (Yonhap)

Lee Seok-ki, a former left-wing lawmaker who was imprisoned for plotting a rebellion against the South Korean government in case of a war with North Korea, was released on parole Friday.

Lee was released from a detention center in Daejeon with an ankle bracelet that allows officers to monitor offenders on parole. Previously, Lee refused to wear the ankle bracelet.

Upon his release, Lee criticized the government’s announcement that came earlier in the day, which granted a special pardon to former President Park Geun-hye.

Lee was indicted in September 2013, during the Park’s administration, on charges of conspiring with a clandestine organization to overthrow the government if a war broke out in the Korean Peninsula.

In 2014, Lee was sentenced to 12 years in prison, but a high court remitted the term to nine years. Lee was also given an additional eight-month prison term for embezzling hundreds of million won for his campaigns for a municipal election in 2010 and a gubernatorial election in 2011.

Meanwhile, the main opposition People Power Party strongly criticized the decision to grant parole to Lee.

Won Il-hee, a spokesperson at the election committee of the People Power Party, criticized the Moon Jae-in administration’s decision, saying it is directly against the ruling made by the country’s judiciary.

By Shim Woo-hyun (ws@heraldcorp.com)
3. S.Korea's Moon pardons disgraced Park amid tight presidential race
It will be interesting to see how this influences the March presidential election in Korea.

S.Korea's Moon pardons disgraced Park amid tight presidential race
Reuters · by Hyonhee Shin
SEOUL, Dec 24 (Reuters) - South Korea's President Moon Jae-in granted a pardon to former President Park Geun-hye, who was in prison after being convicted of corruption, the justice ministry said on Friday, amid a tight presidential race.
Park, 69, became South Korea's first democratically elected leader to be thrown out of office when the Constitutional Court upheld a parliament vote in 2017 to impeach her over a scandal that also landed the heads of two conglomerates, including Samsung, in jail.
She was brought down after being found guilty of colluding with a friend to receive tens of billions of won from major conglomerates mostly to fund her friend's family and nonprofit foundations.
In January, South Korea's top court upheld a 20-year prison sentence for Park on the graft charges that finalised her downfall, bringing an end to the legal process.
Park's lawyer Yoo Yeong-ha said Park had offered an apology for causing concern to the public and thanked Moon for making a difficult decision.
Moon's office said pardoning Park was intended to "overcome unfortunate past history, promote people's unity and join hands for the future."
"I hope this would provide a chance to go beyond differences in thoughts and pros and cons, and open a new era of integration and unity," his spokeswoman quoted him as saying.
Moon had previously pledged not to pardon those who were convicted of corruption. But many supporters and politicians of the conservative main opposition People Power party have called for Park's pardon ahead of the March presidential election, citing her deteriorating health and deepening political strife.
South Korean ousted leader Park Geun-hye arrives at a court in Seoul, South Korea, August 25, 2017. REUTERS/Kim Hong-Ji/File Photo
Opposition lawmakers have said that Park has experienced health problems while in prison, including undergoing shoulder surgery.
Park's imprisonment had become a political hot potato that divided the country, with conservatives having weekly rallies in downtown Seoul urging her release and criticising Moon until the COVID-19 pandemic emerged.
A poll by Gallup Korea in November showed 48% of respondents were opposed to pardoning Park and Lee, but the numbers have dropped from around 60% early this year.
Kim Mi-jeong, 42, a resident of the southern city of Gwangyang, said Park's pardon was timely. Jang Yun-soo, from Hwaseong on South Korea's west coast near Seoul, said her release was politically motivated.
The flag bearer of Moon's ruling Democratic Party, Lee Jae-myung, and People Power's candidate Yoon Suk-yeol are seen neck and neck in recent polls.
Lee said he understood Moon's "agony" and respected his decision for national unity, but Park should offer a sincere apology for the scandal.
Yoon said Park's pardon was welcome albeit late, but did not elaborate on reporters' questions over whether her potential resumption of political activity.
Park's predecessor, also conservative Lee Myung-bak, who is also imprisoned on corruption charges, was not pardoned.

Reporting by Josh Smith and Hyonhee Shin; Additional reporting by Yeni Seo and Dogyun Kim Editing by Matthew Lewis, Gerry Doyle and Michael Perry
Reuters · by Hyonhee Shin


4. A Bipartisan Consensus on South Korea’s Foreign Policy?

I hope neither are paying lip service to the alliance. I fear that could be so for candidate Lee but I also have a lot of confidence in Ambassador Wi Sung-lac as I have spent a bit of time with him over the last few years at conferences in Korea and California (and outside of formal conferences as well having drinks in Santa Monica for example.) He has always struck me as a conservative thoughtful Korean patriot who values the alliance. I hope he wields a lot of foreign policy influence over Lee.

Excerpts:
But observers can gain insight into the candidates’ outlook through documents that their campaigns have put forward. Lee announced his “Unification and Diplomacy Initiative” (full text in Korean available here; a summary in English is here) in August and Yoon put forward his “Audacious Diplomacy: National Interest First” (full text in Korean here) in September.
While there are some differences in the foreign policy platforms of the two main contenders, it is the commonalities that are most striking. For example, they both strongly support the U.S.-ROK alliance. Subverting characterizations by casual outside observers of Korean progressives as skeptics of the South Korea-U.S. alliance, Ambassador Wi Sung-lac, foreign policy adviser to Lee, said “simply put, the United States is our ally, and China is not our ally, it’s a partner.” Wi also added that “from the values perspective, the U.S. and Korea share a lot of values, and as candidate Lee mentioned many times, the Republic of Korea has maintained an alliance with the United States for the past seven decades and we have promoted the same values.”
A Bipartisan Consensus on South Korea’s Foreign Policy?
The foreign policy platforms of the two leading candidates in South Korea’s upcoming presidential election are more alike than they are different.
thediplomat.com · by Hae Kyung Ahn · December 24, 2021
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The campaign for South Korea’s presidency is heating up and will climax with an election on March 9, 2022. One month after the ruling Democratic Party selected former Gyeonggi province governor Lee Jae-myung as its official candidate, the main opposition People Power Party chose former Prosecutor General Yoon Suk-yeol to face off against Lee. As both candidates lack experience in international affairs, questions hang over their views on foreign policy issues.
But observers can gain insight into the candidates’ outlook through documents that their campaigns have put forward. Lee announced his “Unification and Diplomacy Initiative” (full text in Korean available here; a summary in English is here) in August and Yoon put forward his “Audacious Diplomacy: National Interest First” (full text in Korean here) in September.
While there are some differences in the foreign policy platforms of the two main contenders, it is the commonalities that are most striking. For example, they both strongly support the U.S.-ROK alliance. Subverting characterizations by casual outside observers of Korean progressives as skeptics of the South Korea-U.S. alliance, Ambassador Wi Sung-lac, foreign policy adviser to Lee, said “simply put, the United States is our ally, and China is not our ally, it’s a partner.” Wi also added that “from the values perspective, the U.S. and Korea share a lot of values, and as candidate Lee mentioned many times, the Republic of Korea has maintained an alliance with the United States for the past seven decades and we have promoted the same values.”
Similarly, Yoon’s camp has advanced a position on North Korea that goes against the “take no prisoners” stereotype often attributed to the conservative camp’s posture. While Yoon strongly insists on Pyongyang’s denuclearization, he has also expressed possible support for unconditional humanitarian assistance to North Korea and inter-Korean joint economic development to prepare for the post-denuclearization era. Moreover, Yoon vows to expand cultural exchanges, including youth and student exchanges, a position also endorsed by his opponent Lee. He has even mentioned setting up a sustainable trilateral diplomatic office with representatives of both Koreas and the United States in Panmunjom. In a recent interview, Yoon said he would meet Kim Jong-un if it was not “for show.”
In reference to South Korea’s relations with China and Japan, Yoon’s pledge of strengthening strategic cooperation with China and establishing future-oriented Japan-South relations is again almost the same as Lee Jae-myung’s position. Yoon’s foreign policy adviser Kim Sung-han described Seoul’s continued cooperation with China on the basis of mutual respect as a core tenant of Yoon’s foreign policy.
This apparent consensus is driven by electoral consideration as both candidates’ pledges are made primarily to satisfy both conservatives and progressives in the middle of the ideological spectrum. Neither side wishes to lose votes because of their foreign policy. This has led to policy positions that give something to everyone while offending no one. In the end, the question is how consistently the foreign policy platforms of the candidates would be carried out when they actually take office at the Blue House.
A country’s foreign policy is shaped by various factors and processes. According to American political psychologist Margaret Herman’s cognitive idiosyncrasy theory, the political leader’s personal characteristics are one factor that affects their governments’ foreign policy behavior.
For the first time in the history of South Korean presidential elections, the two candidates are political outsiders. They have no experience in the National Assembly and they have a weak support base within their parties because of their brief political careers. They also haven’t held any official positions dealing with foreign policy issues. Moreover, unlike past presidential elections of South Korea, regionalism and ideology are not shaping the platforms of the parties in the upcoming election. Therefore, it is likely that the candidates’ personal characteristics and histories will have a significant influence in shaping their foreign policy outlook.
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Lee and Yoon have starkly different personal backgrounds that have likely shaped their beliefs, motives, and decision-making styles. Lee grew up in poverty working as a child laborer at a factory, which left him with a permanent injury to his arm. He taught himself law, passed the country’s notoriously difficult bar exam, and worked as a human rights lawyer. Lee rose through the political ranks as an outsider, a status that might help him maintain distance from the anti-incumbent sentiment.
Meanwhile, Yoon is from an affluent family with parents who taught at universities. Yoon studied law as an undergraduate at the Seoul National University, which at the time only accepted the top 1 percent of South Korea’s students. After passing the bar, he spent his entire career at prosecutors’ offices, which have been criticized for having excess political influence and meddling in domestic politics.
There are questions on whether the winner will trace the same path as late President Roh Moo-hyun. When Roh was selected as the ruling party candidate in 2002, some Korean observers worried that the international community would whisper “Roh Who?” – a sarcastic reference to the “Jimmy Who?” campaign video that sought to introduce the relatively-unknown Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter to the American people in the 1976 presidential election.
Even after Roh won the election, distrust, dissatisfaction, and anxiety about South Korea’s foreign policy, especially toward the alliance with the United States, loomed over his administration. In extreme cases, some U.S. officials reportedly called their foreign affairs counterparts in the Blue House “Taliban” due to attitudes that were perceived as anti-American. However, contrary to these concerns, the Roh administration pursued many pro-U.S. policies such as initiating the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and deploying troops to assist the U.S. occupation of Iraq. These decisions were made at the risk of losing his domestic political base because Roh thought it was necessary for the future of South Korea.
In this instance, the president’s own personal disposition – even though he was an outsider – favored the pursuit of a foreign policy that was consistent with preceding administrations’ postures. Perhaps the country’s incumbent foreign policy doctrine is pragmatic enough and sufficiently consistent with its external demands that it acts as guardrails against any dramatic changes motivated by ideological shifts.
Then will this be the course that the next administration takes? Many will claim to know, but no one will know for sure. The keyword running through Lee’s foreign policy is “practical” and Yoon emphasized prioritizing “national interest” over other matters when implementing foreign policy. There’s no doubt that South Koreans would want their next president to shape and implement “pragmatic diplomacy” based on “national interest.” It would be interesting to watch how the winner adjusts and refines his foreign policy pledges after the election.
Hae Kyung Ahn
Hae Kyung “Haley” Ahn is program advisor at the Korea Economic Institute (KEI). Prior to joining KEI, she spent two decades working at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul. Haley holds a Ph.D. in political science from Ewha Womans University and a Master’s degree in International Studies from Yonsei University.
thediplomat.com · by Hae Kyung Ahn · December 24, 2021

5. What South Korea Can Learn From India on Diplomatic Balancing

But they both have such different security and geo-political situations, conditions, and history. For one huge difference South Korea was never part of the non-aligned movement and has been a US ally since 1953. 

That said, the author makes some good points for consideration.

Excerpts:
From one perspective, South Korea might be perceived as an inconsistent ally that “cherry picks” areas of security cooperation. However, following India’s example, South Korea could communicate an alternative perspective that its selective independence in certain diplomatic areas would enhance ROK-U.S. cooperation in other policy areas, particularly over North Korea. Even more so than India, which is not a formal U.S. ally, South Korea could convince the United States to regard its East Asian ally not as a wavering link in the U.S. alliance network but as an asset – an “engagement card” the alliance can play in approaching China.
Skeptics might raise questions over how long India or South Korea could maintain a diplomatic balance between rival powers. Russia might eventually strategically align fully with China to counter the U.S., compelling India to take an unequivocal stance. As China’s regional neighbor, South Korea might eventually face a direct threat from China’s regional policy and be compelled to counteract. Even so, another lesson from India’s diplomacy with Russia is that, even if decoupling and realignment are inevitable, it need not be done prematurely or rashly. Seoul could convince the United States that a gradual process of economic realignment would help South Korea become a more effective ally in responding to regional challenges, including China. And the .U.S could nurture this transition through patience and facilitating economic and strategic alternatives for its ally.




What South Korea Can Learn From India on Diplomatic Balancing
India’s diplomacy with Russia and the U.S. holds lessons for Seoul’s China-U.S. balancing act.
thediplomat.com · by Jong Eun Lee · December 22, 2021
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One of South Korea’s major strategic challenges today is maintaining a diplomatic balance between its two major foreign partners, the United States and China. While its alliance with the U.S. is vital to South Korea’s strategic security, China is South Korea’s largest trade partner. With the increase in geopolitical competition between the two global powers, the South Korean government has walked a tight rope, emphasizing the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance and the pragmatic necessity of maintaining cooperative economic relations with China.
Despite the careful balancing act, South Korea could face pressure from either side. From the United States, South Korea could face pressure to participate in the U.S.-led Quad or to join international efforts condemning China’s domestic human rights records and military exercises against Taiwan. From China, South Korea has already faced warnings not to participate in the U.S.-led missile defense program or establish a trilateral security framework with the U.S. and Japan.
As South Korea navigates through China-U.S. strategic competition, Korean policymakers could apply lessons from India’s similar diplomatic balancing between the U.S. and Russia. India has, in recent years, expanded its security partnership with the United States to counter security challenges from China. India has joined the Quad, supported the U.S. policy of protecting a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” and has secured the U.S. designation of a “major defense partner,” which has allowed India to acquire cutting-edge U.S. military technology. However, India continues to maintain a strategic partnership with Russia, despite escalating Russia-U.S. tensions over Russia’s military buildup near the Russia-Ukraine border. On December 6, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi held a summit in New Delhi, signing multiple trade and arms deals that extended the bilateral military-technological cooperation framework. This year, India also expects to receive the Russia-made S-400 air defense system under a deal signed in 2016.
India’s diplomatic balancing also faces pressure from both its partners. In 2017, the U.S. Congress passed the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which imposes sanctions on foreign entities that trade with Russia’s military sector. As a result, India’s continued arms trade with Russia could risk U.S. sanctions. India and other Quad member states could also receive a U.S. request to issue a joint public statement condemning Russia’s military activities on the Russia-Ukraine border. On the other side, Russia has expressed criticisms over India’s increasing security involvement with the United States in the Indo-Pacific.
Despite such pressures, India has successfully expanded its economic and security alignment with the U.S. while also maintaining its 50-year-old “special and privileged partnership” with Russia. The U.S. government is expected to grant India a waiver from CAATSA sanctions despite the continued India-Russia arms trade. Recently several U.S. senators introduced a new bill that would permanently exempt India and other Quad member states from the CAATSA sanctions. India has carved an “autonomous space” for cooperation with Russia in its strategic partnership with the U.S. by communicating two arguments.
First, India has argued that, despite ongoing efforts to diversify its military suppliers, India’s military platform still relies on Russian maintenance and supplies. Abrupt termination of the arms trade could negatively impact India’s military capacity, increasing India’s security vulnerability to China and Pakistan. U.S. policymakers have also noted that India’s arms trade with Russia has steadily decreased over the years. Rather than prematurely pressuring India to suspend its arms purchases from Russia and risk India’s security anxiety, U.S. policymakers appear more inclined to wait for India to become militarily less dependent on Russia gradually.
Second, India has argued that its partnership with Russia could influence the latter’s strategic alignment with China. By playing on Russia’s interest in its major arms buyer, India could dissuade Russia from supporting China’s regional policy, which threatens India’s security, thereby driving a wedge between China and Russia. Through participating in multilateral forums backed by Russia, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, India could prevent China, another participant, from dominating these forums. And even if India fails to keep Russia strategically distant from China, some U.S. experts have acknowledged benefits in tolerating India’s independent foreign policy: “India’s relationship with Russia…serves as an example to other countries that want to promote shared interests with the US but that don’t want to appear to pick sides or join a treaty alliance.”
South Korea could apply similar arguments to diplomatically maneuver between the United States and China. While affirming the priority of the ROK-U.S. alliance, Korean policymakers could convince their American counterparts that carving out “autonomous space” for South Korea’s diplomacy toward China would ultimately benefit U.S. regional strategy. First, South Korea is still in the early stage of diversifying its trade networks away from the Chinese market. Premature disruption of bilateral trade would damage South Korea’s economy more than China’s and could cripple South Korea’s capacity to contribute to the regional and global order. Should the U.S. show patience toward South Korea’s gradual decoupling of its economic dependence from China, Seoul would become a more effective partner in the future for the U.S.
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Second, South Korea’s partnership with China could mitigate the latter’s strategic alliance with North Korea. By influencing China to take a more nuanced approach toward security situations in the Korean Peninsula, Seoul could dissuade the former’s one-sided support for the DPRK regime. South Korean policymakers could convince the U.S. that South Korea is the most qualified actor to drive a wedge between China and North Korea. Therefore, it is in the U.S. strategic interest to grant its ally diplomatic independence in engaging with China.
From one perspective, South Korea might be perceived as an inconsistent ally that “cherry picks” areas of security cooperation. However, following India’s example, South Korea could communicate an alternative perspective that its selective independence in certain diplomatic areas would enhance ROK-U.S. cooperation in other policy areas, particularly over North Korea. Even more so than India, which is not a formal U.S. ally, South Korea could convince the United States to regard its East Asian ally not as a wavering link in the U.S. alliance network but as an asset – an “engagement card” the alliance can play in approaching China.
Skeptics might raise questions over how long India or South Korea could maintain a diplomatic balance between rival powers. Russia might eventually strategically align fully with China to counter the U.S., compelling India to take an unequivocal stance. As China’s regional neighbor, South Korea might eventually face a direct threat from China’s regional policy and be compelled to counteract. Even so, another lesson from India’s diplomacy with Russia is that, even if decoupling and realignment are inevitable, it need not be done prematurely or rashly. Seoul could convince the United States that a gradual process of economic realignment would help South Korea become a more effective ally in responding to regional challenges, including China. And the .U.S could nurture this transition through patience and facilitating economic and strategic alternatives for its ally.
Jong Eun Lee
Jong Eun Lee is a Ph.D. candidate and also an adjunct faculty member at the American University School of International Service. Prior to this, he served as a South Korean Air Force intelligence officer.
thediplomat.com · by Jong Eun Lee · December 22, 2021

6. Special pardon in dispute: Moon should take responsibility for fallout from pardon

Is not nearly everything in politics politically motivated?
Special pardon in dispute
The Korea Times · December 24, 2021
Moon should take responsibility for fallout from pardon

President Moon Jae-in has decided to extend a special pardon to former President Park Geun-hye, who has been serving a combined 22-year prison term for corruption. Announcing the plan for amnesty, Moon cited the need for the nation to "tide over the past's pain and jointly move forward toward a new era." As Moon put it, we hope the recent pardon will help boost national unity.

Park was impeached and displaced from the presidency, dubbed as the main culprit of what the Moon Jae-in administration described as "accumulated evils." She was put behind bars for 57 months in total. This sentence is a relatively longer period in prison compared to former Presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, who stayed about two years in prison before being released on pardons from then-President Kim Young-sam.

According to Cheong Wa Dae spokesperson Park Kyung-mee, Moon cited Park's deteriorating health as a major factor in determining the pardon. Given this, the pardon seems to be appropriate from a humanitarian perspective. In fact, Park expressed gratitude to Moon for the amnesty via her lawyer. Despite such positive aspects, criticism is growing over the decision.

For starters, the pardon appears to have been politically motivated, since it came with only 75 days left before the March 9 presidential election. Early this year, then chief of the ruling Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) Lee Nak-yon raised the issue of releasing Park. But Moon rejected the request then by saying, "it is not proper to talk about the issue now" during his New Year press conference. This slight dealt a critical blow to Lee, who had been the leading presidential aspirant of the ruling party.

In addition, Moon's decision to offer amnesty will likely trigger a dispute within the ruling party, as its presidential candidate, Lee Jae-myung, has expressed grievances over the move. During a press briefing convened to announce his policies on national defense, Friday, Lee was asked about his opinion of the pardon. In an apparent show of displeasure, Lee said, "How on Earth is it useful to comment on an already concluded issue?" He went on to say that despite the special pardon, the judgment on Park "from the perspective of history and the people will continue to remain."

Moon should explain his reasons for exonerating former Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook, who was convicted of bribery. Han has yet to pay a forfeit even though she served her full prison sentence. As the head of state, Moon is authorized to offer such a special pardon. However, such authority should be exercised in accordance with the principles of the rule of law.

The decision for amnesty will likely offer little help in terms of enhancing national unity. On the other hand, it will fan controversy over the appropriateness of the decision, as well as internal fighting within the ruling party. It is Moon himself who should take full responsibility for the possible fallout from the decision. He needs to answer the question of whether or not the special pardon was meant to guarantee his safety after retirement by ending the political saga with Park.



The Korea Times · December 24, 2021


7. Pardon politics free Korea’s disgraced ex-leader Park

It is complicated. I do not think we in the US really understand the complex relationships within Korean politics.

Excerpts:
Following political machinations in 2020 and early this year, the special investigator who was one of the key figures behind Park’s downfall, Yoon Seok-youl, is now the presidential candidate of the right-wing opposition, the People Power Party.
After Moon took power in 2017, he appointed Yoon prosecutor general. But Yoon proved to be independently minded. He staunchly defended the prosecution in defiance of President Moon’s attempts to reform the institution in a high profile battle that saw two of Moon’s justice ministers resign.
Yoon resigned this year, and – largely on the basis of his successful battle with Moon, and despite his political inexperience – won the candidacy of the PPP, the successor to Park’s party.
Ergo, the return of Park to the public arena amid the election campaign could work to the benefit of the left-wing governing party, the Democratic Party of Korea, rather than the party she formally headed, whose current candidate was a key player in her overthrow.
“I think it could benefit both parties, according to which narratives they spin,” said David Tizzard, a professor of Korean Studies at Seoul Women’s University. “For the People Power Party it will be a boon for them, for their supporters and for the Democratic Party of Korea. It will be good optics, showing their generosity and their efforts toward reconciliation.”
As an aside, one of the reasons that Kim Jong-un likely will never allow unification is his fear of what will happen to him. He looks at South Korea and sees how they put former presidents in jail and must wonder what would happen to him in United Republic of Korea (UROK). 


Pardon politics free Korea’s disgraced ex-leader Park
Right-wing figurehead Park Geun-hye’s release from prison could benefit left-wing candidate in South Korea’s upcoming election
asiatimes.com · by Andrew Salmon · December 24, 2021
SEOUL – On the same day a gob-smacked world learned that Suga, a member of the mega-group BTS, had come down with Covid-19, one of the most dramatic political-judicial episodes in the history of South Korea was concluded.
Park Geun-hye, 69, the former South Korean president who was impeached, thrown out of office and jailed against a backdrop of incendiary political fireworks in 2017, was pardoned on Friday amid a fraught national election campaign.
Her upcoming release – part of a customary New Year’s Eve pardon program that, this year, included 3,094 beneficiaries – surprised most with its timing but was hardly unexpected. Multiple disgraced high-profile figures, from ex-presidents to corporate tycoons, have benefitted from similar pardons in the past.

Even in a democracy noted for lively politics, the downfall of the conservative Park was spectacular. It came in the wake of a spiraling scandal that sucked in multiple ministers, officials and the de facto head of Samsung, galvanizing the nation and leading to million-person candle-lit demonstrations in central Seoul in 2016.
The conservative Park’s fall paved the way for liberal President Moon Jae-in to enter the presidential Blue House in 2017. Moon’s constitutionally mandated single term expires next May, after a presidential election on March 9.
Questions hang over the timing of Park’s pardon, given that South Korea is in the midst of a neck-and-neck presidential election campaign. The release of Park may provide Moon, constitutionally restricted to a single term in office, with a modicum of insurance against political revenge after he exits office.
In a political irony, the conservative Park’s release could also – due to personality politics that cross-ideological firewalls – benefit the left-wing governing party rather than the right-wing opposition.
South Korean President Park Geun-Hye during an address to the nation in 2016. Photo: Agencies
The princess who lost her throne
“President Park is a part of South Korea’s biggest political dynasty – like the Kennedys or the Bush family,” Lew Han-jin, a supporter of Park and a political columnist, told Asia Times.

She was the eldest daughter of Park Chung-hee, perhaps the most important and divisive figure in the history of South Korea, a nation founded in 1948.
Park, a general who seized power via a coup d’etat in 1961, led South Korea’s modernization drive until his assassination in 1979. His eradication of poverty, emplacement of national infrastructure and championing of industrial conglomerates transformed an agrarian backwater into an economic powerhouse.
Those successes made the strongman a figurehead of the right.
But on the negative side of the ledger – his youthful service as an officer in the Imperial Japanese Army, and his suppression of political freedoms and abuse of human rights while in the presidential Blue House – made him a villain in the eyes of the left.
He was assassinated in 1979. His daughter took power, by democratic means, in 2013.

As well as being something of a princess to older, conservative South Koreans, she was seen as a brilliant election strategist. She entered her father’s former compound on a wave of hope that she could return the country to the kind of growth rates it had seen under him.
But the daughter – always a distant figure, and far from a people person – appeared to lack her father’s personal charisma, fierce grip and political smarts.
In 2016, news broke that her friend Choi Soon-sil – whose late father had been a spiritual advisor to Park in her youth – was leveraging her closeness to the president for corrupt ends. The media, sniffing blood, went into attack mode. Allegations cascaded.
Choi’s corrupt scheming to raise funds for the benefit of herself and her equestrian daughter embroiled everyone from Park to Samsung heir Lee Jae-young. And when it was reported that Park was managing presidential affairs from her boudoir, accusations arose that her crony was a shadowy puppet master setting national policy.
Massive – but peaceful – demonstrations took place, Saturday after Saturday, in central Seoul. Park’s attempts to placate the public with apologies fizzled.

As her ratings plunged, her party, always riven by factionalism, deserted her and South Korea’s first female leader became the first president ever to be successfully impeached. After being toppled, she was tried and jailed on charges of abuse of power and corruption.
Throughout, Park maintained her innocence, claiming she was the victim of a political conspiracy. After being sentenced to 22 years, she refused to take part in further judicial processes.
In the face of this unrepentant non-defense, the judiciary brought more and more charges, taking her compound sentence to more than three decades, but never managed to find the funds she supposedly embezzled.
Eventually, it seized her home and auctioned it to pay some of her fines.
Park has suffered a range of reported health problems during her confinement, part of which was spent in hospital, rather than prison. Those issues were cited as a “very important criterion” for Friday’s pardon.
Former president Park Geun-Hye visits the grave of her father, Park Chung-Hee, in 2012. Photo: AFP / Jung Yeon-je
‘Pardon politics’
Pardons, issued either by the president or the justice ministry, provide an ameliorating factor in what some consider a highly vindictive – and others a highly democratic – system of justice that often culls those in power.
The most famous pardoning was the lifting of, respectively, death and life sentences passed down on two former generals and presidents, Chun Do-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, who held power in consecutive terms between 1980 and 1992. Their exoneration was taken by former opposition firebrand Kim Dae-jung, just before he ascended to the presidency in 1997.
Kim, who had been victimized by the authoritarian governments of the past, took his decision on the basis of national unity. Echoing that precedent, the government Friday cited “grand unity among the people” in addition to the state of her health, for the pardon of Park.
And it is not only presidents.
In recent years, there has been a slew of pardons for the tycoons leading such major corporations as Samsung, Hyundai and SK. Though jailed or given suspended sentences for a range of corporate malfeasances, their sentences have been nullified by judges who frequently cite their importance to the national economy.
A crafty ploy?
Regardless of these multiple precedents, cynics in Seoul’s coffee shops and social media chatrooms are wondering if there was a Machiavellian political motive behind Friday’s pardon.
Following political machinations in 2020 and early this year, the special investigator who was one of the key figures behind Park’s downfall, Yoon Seok-youl, is now the presidential candidate of the right-wing opposition, the People Power Party.
After Moon took power in 2017, he appointed Yoon prosecutor general. But Yoon proved to be independently minded. He staunchly defended the prosecution in defiance of President Moon’s attempts to reform the institution in a high profile battle that saw two of Moon’s justice ministers resign.
Yoon resigned this year, and – largely on the basis of his successful battle with Moon, and despite his political inexperience – won the candidacy of the PPP, the successor to Park’s party.
Ergo, the return of Park to the public arena amid the election campaign could work to the benefit of the left-wing governing party, the Democratic Party of Korea, rather than the party she formally headed, whose current candidate was a key player in her overthrow.
“I think it could benefit both parties, according to which narratives they spin,” said David Tizzard, a professor of Korean Studies at Seoul Women’s University. “For the People Power Party it will be a boon for them, for their supporters and for the Democratic Party of Korea. It will be good optics, showing their generosity and their efforts toward reconciliation.”
Former South Korean president Lee Myung-bak arrives at a court to in Seoul on September 6, 2018. Photo: AFP / Jung Yeon-je
A further issue is the party’s key players largely hail from the supporters of Park’s predecessor in the Blue House, Lee Myung-bak.
Lee, who is serving a 17-year rap on corruption charges, did not receive a pardon on Friday. Lee and Park had led competing factions.
But some are confident Park – if she decides to speak out, which is not clear at present – will prioritize politics before personalities and factions.
“Prior to the [parliamentary election in April] President Park had released a message saying she wants the conservatives to unite,” Lew said. “I think she is bigger than her own well-being, and I think she will take a stance if the election is close.”
asiatimes.com · by Andrew Salmon · December 24, 2021

8. Female North Korean soldier attempts to end her life after suffering from five separate sexual assaults

And we just recently watched this video from the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (www.hrnk.org) from a former nKPA soldier who told her story of abuse here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MCsbikKfWLc&list=FL3fu5rXx0ma6f9Ze3C1i-MA&index=8&t=1s

Of course we are all focused on Chinese tennis start Peng Shuai but these atrocities are committed every day in north Korea.

I do not think we need to be reminded of this but I will write it again anyway:

The root of all problems in Korea is the existence of the most evil mafia- like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime that has the objective of dominating the Korean Peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State. 


Female North Korean soldier attempts to end her life after suffering from five separate sexual assaults
Her alleged assailants include a high ranking cadre in the General Political Department

By Seulkee Jang - 2021.12.24 2:38pm
A North Korean military unit is in an uproar after a female soldier recently attempted suicide after allegedly suffering from sexually assault by five of her superiors in five separate instances. The military authorities, however, have attempted to minimize the incident by giving the woman an early discharge.
According to a Daily NK source in North Korea on Wednesday, the female soldier — a phone operator at the headquarters of the Seventh Corps in Hamhung, South Hamgyong Province — was in critical condition after she attempted suicide at a military hospital in mid-December.
Despite suffering severe blood loss, she could not receive an infusion due to a lack of donor blood. In the end, she reportedly lost consciousness.
The soldier explained her decision in a densely worded, 12-page suicide note. 
Given that she began the note with the words, “Petition Letter,” the soldier apparently wanted to inform the authorities of everything that happened to her after she entered the army and see that such things never happened again in the military.
The soldier — identified simply as “A” and hailing from South Hwanghae Province — enlisted in the military when she was 17, and had been serving as a telephone operator in the Seventh Corps for six years.
Her nightmare began immediately after she was deployed to her unit after basic training. For close to a year, she was repeatedly and allegedly sexually assaulted by a political guidance officer in his early 40s identified by his family name of Kim. The officer was a major at the time.
After the assaults, Kim told A he would take care of her, but he cut contact with her after he entered a “political university,” which trains political officers for the North Korean military.
The second alleged assailant — a lieutenant colonel at the time identified by his family name of Han who was the deputy head of the manpower department — raped A in his office. Han also said he would take care of her and even promoted her to a cadre-level rank, but he continued to sexually assault her afterwards.
Now a political worker in terms of rank, A applied to a political university in hopes of preventing sexual assaults on female soldiers, having suffered sexual assaults herself.
However, the head of the cadre department — a colonel at the time identified by his family name of Jo — omitted A’s application and told her to come to an office in a bunker if she wanted to go to the university.
Sensing what was up, A borrowed a mobile phone from the wife of an officer — a woman with whom she was close as they were from the same town — to record what might happen in the office.
Jo was reportedly waiting for her in the bunker office — a headquarters operations office in times of war — dressed only in his underwear, and allegedly demanded sex from the very start of the encounter. He presented a stack of one hundred KPW 5,000 bills and told her he would get her into the ruling party and pay her university tuition. When she refused, however, he tore off her clothes.
A female North Korean soldier at the Woljong Buddhist Temple located in Jol Valley near Mt. Kuwol. / Image: Roman Harak, Creative Commons, Flickr
However, when he found the phone in her clothes recording their conversation, he beat her. Then he found the owner of the phone and threatened her to keep quiet.
Abandoned by even the woman with whom she was close, A reportedly felt psychologically tortured due to a sense of betrayal and isolation.
Not long after, Kim — the man who had previously assaulted her — appeared at the Seventh Corps as a General Political Bureau inspector.
A General Political Bureau cadre who came with Kim — a senior colonel identified by his family name of Jo — lured A to the room in which he was staying. He allegedly attempted to rape her, but failed due to her strong resistance. However, in addition to torn clothing, A suffered injuries and she admitted herself into a military hospital.
A applied for a discharge in October, feeling she needed to get out of the army as quickly as possible. However, the military said it could not grant her discharge while she was physically and psychologically unstable, delaying her discharge until February of next year.
A tried to endure the situation until her discharge, but her misfortune did not end there. A major in charge of the internal medicine department of the hospital — a man identified by his family name of Ryom who doubled as party cell secretary — allegedly raped her again after giving her sleeping medication.
When A woke up, she realized she had been raped while she was unconscious. Dejected, she attempted suicide.
Word has been spreading that a female soldier attempted suicide after leaving behind a note explaining the injustices inflicted on her.
Faced with this situation, military authorities began investigating her allegations. However, the assailants have so far received no punishment other than temporary suspensions or transfers.
The source said that because the assailants include a high ranking cadre in the General Political Department, the case will likely conclude with mere slaps on the wrist.
Meanwhile, on the brink of death, A received notification on the morning of Dec. 20 that she had been discharged.
Because the North Korean military hardly ever discharges soldiers in December, when the army is conducting winter training, the discharge notification is considered extraordinary.
The source claimed that the discharge notification means A is now a civilian, and that the military rushed to discharge her to minimize the incident.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Seulkee Jang is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about her articles to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

9. EDITORIAL | Enhancing Kim Jong Un’s Dictatorship Cannot Lead to a Brighter Future for North Korea

I like the way the editorial board of the Sankei Shimbun is thinking in its subtitle and conclusion. It just does not go far enough.

I will write this again:

Bottom Line: The only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear program and military threats as well as the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people living in the north by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a United Republic of Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, and human rights as determined by the Korean people. In short, a United Republic of Korea (UROK).

EDITORIAL | Enhancing Kim Jong Un’s Dictatorship Cannot Lead to a Brighter Future for North Korea
The only way to relieve the hardships of the North Korean people and develop the country is to abandon dictatorship, release all of the abductees, and give up the regime’s nuclear and missile forces.

Published 2 days ago on December 23, 2021By Editorial Board, The Sankei Shimbun
japan-forward.com · by Editorial Board, The Sankei Shimbun · December 22, 2021

~~

~
It has been 10 years since the death of Kim Jong Il, general secretary of the North Korean Workers Party, and the ascendancy of his third son, Kim Jong Un. The country is now on its third supreme leader from the Kim family.
Statues of President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il on the 68th founding anniversary of the DPRK. Undated photo released by North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) via Reuters.
Becoming a dictator three years after he was unofficially named his father’s successor, with no time to gain sufficient political experience, Kim Jong Un has executed aides and relatives, and carried out a string of purges, including assassinations abroad. Just like his father and grandfather Kim Il Sung, Jong Un is someone who does not hesitate to engage in a regime of terror.
North Korea’s military continues to be a threat to peace and stability in Japan and the regions. It has promoted the development of nuclear weapons and missile technology, refusing to listen to the international community’s call for the abandonment of those weapons.
Kim Jong Un’s regime is also responsible for unilaterally announcing the suspension of investigations under the Stockholm Agreement, which agreed to reopen the probe into the fate of the Japanese abductees. The young supreme leader also continues to adamantly refuse to release the abduction victims.
Map of confirmed victims abducted by North Korea
The past 10 years have been a cruel and fruitless decade for the international community including Japan, for the abduction victims who remain captives of the Kim regime, and for the people of North Korea who are suffering under inhumane oppression.
Although he studied abroad in Switzerland and since becoming a dictator in his twenties, Kim Jong Un has not once relented on giving utmost priority to enhancing North Korea’s nuclear and missile forces.
Four nuclear tests have been carried out by Kim since 2013. He fired off a new intercontinental ballistic missile in 2017, and declared his country’s nuclear force complete.
A North Korean missile launch in September 2021
Next, he turned his attention to diplomatic offensives. Kim agreed that the Korean Peninsula should be denuclearized when he met up with South Korean President Moon Jae In, and again during a meeting with then-President Donald Trump at the first ever United States-North Korea summit. But his words turned out to be nothing but deception.
Since the failure of the negotiations with the US, North Korea has repeatedly tested new weapons, such as submarine-launched ballistic missiles and irregular trajectory ballistic missiles.
As for its economy, the country is in a state of collapse as a result of United Nations sanctions and border lockdowns due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Kim Jong Un provides guidance on nuclear weapons program [KCNA photo via REUTERS]
The Supreme Leader of North Korea shed tears and apologized for not being able to resolve the hardships inflicted upon the North Korean people, but they were nothing but a facade.
At the Workers’ Party of Korea Congress in January 2021, Kim was elected general secretary, a title which his late father held. From around this time, the pronoun “chief,” synonymous with his grandfather President Kim Il Sung, has been used to address Jong Un. Yet, enhancing Kim’s dictatorship cannot lead to a brighter future for North Korea.
Japanese rescue of North Koreans abandoning a sinking North Korean ship in October 2019.
The only way to relieve the hardships of the North Korean people and develop the country is to abandon its dictatorship. Kim Jong Un needs to end his oppressive regime, release all of the abductees, and give up the nuclear and missile forces.

RELATED:
(Read the Sankei Shimbun editorial in Japanese at this link.)

10. North Korea’s Military Capabilities

 A very useful and handy reference from the Council on Foriegn relations especially for the press, pundits and non-Korea specialists.

Please go to the link to view the graphics. 


North Korea’s Military Capabilities

North Korea has embarked on an accelerated buildup of nuclear weapons and the modernization of its already large conventional force.
Vehicles carry missiles during a military parade in Pyongyang. Sue-Lin Wong/Reuters
WRITTEN BY
CFR.org Editors
UPDATED
Last updated December 22, 2021 9:30 am (EST)


Summary
  • North Korea could have more than sixty nuclear weapons, according to analysts’ estimates, and has successfully tested missiles that could strike the United States with a nuclear warhead.
  • It has the world’s fourth-largest military, with more than 1.2 million personnel, and is believed to possess chemical and biological weapons. 
  • Despite UN Security Council sanctions and past summits involving North Korea, South Korea, and the United States on denuclearization, Pyongyang continues to test ballistic missiles.
Introduction
The United States and its Asian allies see North Korea as a grave security threat. North Korea has one of the world’s largest conventional military forces, which, combined with its missile and nuclear tests and aggressive rhetoric, has aroused concern worldwide. But world powers have been ineffective in slowing its path to acquire nuclear weapons.
While it remains among the poorest countries in the world, North Korea spends nearly a quarter of its gross domestic product (GDP) on its military, according to U.S. State Department estimates. Its brinkmanship will continue to test regional and international partnerships aimed at preserving stability and security. Negotiations on denuclearization have remained stalled since February 2019.
What are North Korea’s nuclear capabilities?
The exact size and strength of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal are unclear. However, analysts say Pyongyang has tested nuclear weapons six times and developed ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States and its allies Japan and South Korea.
Pyongyang could have between twenty and sixty assembled nuclear weapons, according to various estimates by experts. U.S. intelligence officials estimated in 2018 that North Korea has enough fissile material—the core component of nuclear weapons—for sixty-five weapons, and that every year it produces enough fissile material for twelve additional weapons. A 2021 RAND Corporation report projected that North Korea could have around two hundred nuclear weapons and hundreds of ballistic missiles stockpiled by 2027. The regime possesses the know-how to produce nuclear bombs with weapons-grade uranium or plutonium, the primary elements required for making fissile material.
North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests, first in October 2006 and then in May 2009 under former Supreme Leader Kim Jong-il. Under Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-il’s son who assumed power in late 2011, the nuclear program markedly accelerated. Kim has directed four nuclear tests—in February 2013, January and September 2016, and September 2017—and more than 125 missile tests, far exceeding the number of trials conducted under his father and grandfather, North Korea’s founder, Kim Il-sung.

With each test, North Korea’s nuclear explosions have grown in power. The first explosion in 2006 was a plutonium-fueled atomic bomb with a yield equivalent to two kilotons of TNT, an energy unit used to measure the power of an explosive blast. The 2009 test had a yield of eight kilotons; the 2013 and January 2016 tests both had yields of approximately seventeen kilotons; and the September 2016 test had a yield of thirty-five kilotons, according to data from the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a Washington, DC-based nonpartisan think tank. (For comparison, the U.S. bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, the first atom bomb, had an estimated yield of sixteen kilotons.)
The nuclear test carried out on September 3, 2017, was significantly larger, experts say, and indicated that the country has developed much more powerful bomb-making technology. Estimates from seismic activity led observers to conclude that the explosion likely exceeded two hundred kilotons. An explosion of such a size gives credence to North Korea’s claims of having developed a hydrogen bomb. 
North Korea has not conducted a nuclear test since then. In 2018, North Korea said it shut down its main nuclear-material production site, the Yongbyon reactor complex, following the country’s summits that year with the United States and South Korea. But in August 2021, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that North Korea had again started producing fissile material at Yongbyon.
Some experts caution that it is only a matter of time before North Korea completes its nuclear force. “We’re going to have to learn to live with North Korea’s ability to target the United States with nuclear weapons,” said Jeffrey Lewis of the Middlebury Institute of Strategic Studies.
What missiles has North Korea tested?
North Korea has tested more than one hundred ballistic missiles with the ability to carry nuclear warheads, including short-, medium-, intermediate-, and intercontinental-range missiles and submarine-launched ones.
The regime successfully tested intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), each capable of carrying a large nuclear warhead, in July and November 2017. Pyongyang said that in its November test of the Hwasong-15 ICBM, the missile hit an altitude of 4,475 kilometers (2,780 miles), far above the International Space Station, and flew about 1,000 kilometers (590 miles) before landing in the sea off Japan’s coast. Analysts estimate the Hwasong-15 has a potential range of 13,000 kilometers (8,100 miles) and, if fired on a flatter trajectory, could reach anywhere on the U.S. mainland. American analysts and experts from other countries still debate the nuclear payload that North Korea’s ICBMs could carry, and it is still unclear whether the ICBMs have the capability to survive reentry. A confidential U.S. intelligence assessment from 2017 reportedly concluded that North Korea had developed the technology to miniaturize a nuclear warhead to fit its ballistic missiles. 
North Korea’s Expanding Missile Range
Missile models’ first known successful test dates with estimated maximum ranges
April 9, 1984
Hwasong-5
300 km
May 29, 1993
No-dong
1,500 km
July 4, 2017
Hwasong-14
10,000 km
November 28, 2017
Hwasong-15
13,000 km
Sources:  Nuclear Threat Initiative; Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Kim halted missile testing in late 2017 amid a thawing of relations with the United States and South Korea. But North Korea resumed testing in mid-2019, months after negotiations between Kim and U.S. President Donald Trump in Hanoi, Vietnam, broke down. Later that year, Pyongyang conducted an underwater launch of a ballistic missile, its first such test in three years. 
Since then, North Korea has unveiled several new ballistic missiles. The first, shown during an October 2020 military parade, was an ICBM larger than the Hwasong-15. It has not been named or tested, but analysts say it could potentially carry multiple nuclear warheads or decoys to confuse missile defense systems. A new Pukkuksong-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile was also displayed in October 2020, and its successor, Pukkuksong-5, was unveiled in January 2021. Experts estimate the Pukkuksong-5 has a range of around 3,000 kilometers (1,864 miles), which would allow it to strike Guam. Experts say neither missile has been tested yet.  
In 2021, Pyongyang tested short-range ballistic missiles that are solid fueled, advancing a technology that makes missiles easier to transport and faster to launch. In addition, it tested a more maneuverable long-range cruise missile, which can frustrate missile defense systems if launched in tandem with ballistic missiles. In September, North Korea for the first time test-fired missiles from a railcar launcher, which makes them less detectable by the United States and its allies.
There remain significant unknowns surrounding the accuracy of North Korea’s ballistic missiles. Observers have said that these missiles are usually inaccurate because of their reliance on early guidance systems acquired from the Soviet Union. However, some defectors and experts say North Korea has begun using GPS guidance, similar to that of China’s navigation system, raising questions about the provenance of the system and whether North Korea’s arsenal of missiles is more accurate and reliable than previously believed.
Have other countries aided North Korea’s nuclear program?
The program is predominantly indigenous but has received external assistance over the years. Moscow, for instance, assisted Pyongyang’s nuclear development from the late 1950s to the 1980s: it helped build a nuclear research reactor and provided missile designs, light-water reactors, and some nuclear fuel. In the 1970s, China and North Korea cooperated on defense, including on the development and production of ballistic missiles [PDF]. North Korean scientists also benefited from academic exchanges with Soviet and Chinese counterparts. Though the exchanges may not have been explicitly tied to weapons development, the information learned from research sharing and visits to nuclear facilities could have been applied to a militarized nuclear program, according to Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., an analyst of North Korean defense and intelligence affairs.
Pakistan also emerged as an important military collaborator with North Korea in the 1970s. Bilateral nuclear assistance began when scientists from the two countries were both in Iran working on ballistic missiles during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). In the 1990s, North Korea acquired access to Pakistani centrifuge technology and designs from scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who had directed the militarization of Pakistan’s nuclear program. Pyongyang also received designs for a uranium warhead that Pakistan had likely obtained from China. In exchange, Pakistan received North Korean missile technology. It remains unclear whether Khan acted directly or indirectly on the behalf of the Pakistani government. (Khan’s multinational network also illicitly sold nuclear technology and material to buyers, including Iran and Libya.) The nuclear know-how gained from Pakistan likely enabled North Korea to operate centrifuges and thereby pursue a uranium route to the bomb.
Third parties have also facilitated Pyongyang’s program through the illicit shipment of metal components needed for centrifuge construction and nuclear weaponization. North Korea has developed covert networks for the procurement of technology, materials, and designs to boost its conventional and nuclear weapons programs since the 1960s. These networks, once primarily in Europe, have shifted to Asia and Africa, and goods are often traded multiple times before reaching North Korean hands, says Bermudez.
What punitive steps has North Korea faced?
North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and its missile tests and first nuclear test in 2006 prompted the UN Security Council to unanimously adopt resolutions that condemned North Korea’s actions and imposed sanctions against the country. The Security Council has steadily ratcheted up sanctions through subsequent resolutions in the hopes of changing Pyongyang’s behavior. These additional measures ban arms sales to North Korea, as well as any financial assistance and the sale of materials and technology that could be used for ballistic missiles or nuclear weapons. The measures also impose restrictions on select luxury goods and other foreign trade, as well as inspections of cargo bound for North Korea. Though sanctions have curtailed North Korea’s access to materials, it is difficult to regulate all international cargo deliveries.
Separately, North Korea has a record of missile sales and nuclear technology sharing with countries including Egypt, Iran, Libya, Myanmar, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, and Yemen. It has secretly transferred “nuclear-related and ballistic-missile-related equipment, know-how, and technology,” the United Nations has reported. Given North Korea’s economic constraints, fears abound that North Korea could resort to selling more nuclear material and knowledge, thereby enhancing the potential for nuclear terrorism.


11. US ambassadorial vacancy could send bad message: experts

Yes it would be nice to have an ambassador to the ROK. If I were king for a day the first appointments of ambassadors would be to all our allied countries. Those nominations should be ready to go on day one of any new administration.

But I also am not sure we should be making too much of this. Yes, we should be concerned that this could be an election issue. But I also think that we have had sustained high level diplomatic, military, national security, intelligence community, and economic engagement since day one of the Biden administration. We have an experienced Korea team in place.

I am curious as to why it is taking so long for these appointments.

But it would be great to have a US Ambassador to the ROK in place as well as an Ambassador for north Korean human rights as required by Congress.
US ambassadorial vacancy could send bad message: experts
The Korea Times · December 23, 2021
President Moon Jae-in presents outgoing U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Harry Harris with a farewell gift of Andong soju at Cheong Wa Dae, Jan. 19. Courtesy of Cheong Wa Dae

Ambassador appointment after South Korean presidential election would be mistake

By Kang Seung-woo

Amid a lengthy absence of a U.S. ambassador to South Korea, diplomatic observers are expressing disappointment that U.S. President Joe Biden, who is moving fast to reinvigorate its alliances and partnerships after the tumult of Donald Trump's presidency, has yet to nominate an ambassador to South Korea, adding that the vacancy could deliver a negative message in terms of South Korea-U.S. relations.
In addition, they also concurred that it would not be desirable for the U.S. to push back the appointment until after the South Korean presidential election in March after which the stance of a new administration will be more clearly defined.
According to the American Foreign Service Association, Biden has appointed officials to 80 out of 190 U.S. ambassadorial posts since his inauguration, Jan. 20.
Since the last U.S. ambassador to South Korea, Harry Harris, resigned and left the country on Jan. 20, the post has remained unfilled, with U.S. Charge d'Affaires to Korea Christopher Del Corso currently serving as acting ambassador.

However, the extended vacancy is raising speculation that the U.S. having no nominee for South Korea reflects Washington's frustration with Seoul's policy position and gives cause for concerns about their alliance or the Asian ally's "downgraded" importance to the U.S. Additionally, last week's Senate confirmations of its ambassadors to China and Japan are adding fuel to such concerns here.

"I think it is very disappointing that the Biden administration has yet to appoint an ambassador to South Korea. There have been unnecessary holdups in the Senate to confirm nominees but that is no excuse for not nominating someone," U.S. Naval War College Professor Terence Roehrig said.

"I doubt it's any sort of payback for U.S. disappointment with any South Korean policy position, but it is very disconcerting given the administration's efforts to revitalize U.S. relations with allies and partners."

Daniel Sneider, a lecturer on international policy at Stanford University, also said, "I am deeply disappointed that this nomination has not been made yet, given Korea's importance to the United States as a key ally, and its strategic role, not only in Asia but globally."

He added: "This should be a priority for an administration that claims to want to make the Asia Pacific region the central focus of American foreign policy."
Harry Kazianis, senior director of Korean Studies at the Center for the National Interest, said the Biden administration had proven that the Korean Peninsula was not a major focus in their overall foreign policy thinking.

"This has been proven in the clumsy way in which the administration's new Korea policy was rolled out to now having no ambassador in Seoul," Kazianis said.
"Simply put: the Biden administration has settled for a status-quo on the peninsula whereby North Korea can have nuclear weapons as long as it does not test ICBMs or atomic arms. And that is a grave mistake that could come back to haunt Washington in the months and years to come."

Soo Kim, a former CIA analyst now with the Rand Corporation, said it was not a good sign for the alliance between South Korea and the U.S.

"It certainly does not reflect the best when it comes to perceptions about U.S.-ROK relations. In fact, the extended vacancy may even perpetuate suspicions or doubts about the bilateral relations," she said. The ROK stands for the Republic of Korea, South Korea's official name.

"It may signal to the South Koreans that Seoul's importance to Washington has been 'downgraded' somewhat ― particularly when compared to U.S. relations with Japan, for instance. That Washington has named an ambassador to one key Asian ally while leaving the other vacant raises eyebrows among some, without a doubt."
She also said the extended vacancy may be a U.S. effort to signal to South Korea its position on some of the more strategically decisive issues the Moon Jae-in administration has taken.

In fact, President Moon said earlier this month that South Korea was not considering joining the U.S.-led diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics, while preserving a balancing act between the U.S. and China due to the latter's status as Seoul's largest trading partner.

"Seoul's decisions ― and even reticence ― on some of the touchier issues gave cause for concerns about the state of the alliance. On matters where alignment between Washington and Seoul actually counted ― North Korea's nukes, Seoul being able to stand up to China more firmly, the Moon administration's position on human rights in North Korea, for instance ― the Moon administration had decided to sit back or pursue steps that were counterproductive to alliance interests," she said.

"This may not have been well-received by the Biden administration."

Kim also said that South Korea had to pick up on these signals and take the right steps to rectify relations with Washington.

"Thus far, the Moon administration has taken steps that give cause for concern about the state of the alliance ― rather than allaying these worries," she added.
Sneider also said the delayed nomination may be due to the U.S. government's practice of sending career diplomats to South Korea given that the post is also required to deal with the sensitive issue of North Korea's nuclear programs.

"I am aware that they would like to give this post to a career diplomat, as has been the case until recently, and are looking for someone who is senior enough to fill this important position," he said.

"Despite the pledges from Secretary Blinken and others to make more appointments at the senior level from the ranks of the Foreign Service, we still see way too many political appointees. Korea has traditionally been a post where deep career experience is seen as essential and I hope that continues to be the case."
Election issue

Amid the extended delay, there is speculation that the U.S. government may nominate its ambassador to South Korea after its presidential election, scheduled for March 9, 2022.

But the experts said that would be a mistake.

"It is also a mistake to wait until after the March presidential election to nominate an ambassador; the election has nothing to do with the importance of having a high-level U.S. representative on the ground in Seoul," Roehrig said.

"Moreover, having nominees for Japan and China but not South Korea sends a very bad message; close U.S.-South Korea relations are crucial and should be treated as such."

Kazianis expressed a similar view.

"I think waiting until a new president comes to Blue House is a mistake," he said, referring to the nickname of the South Korean presidential office of Cheong Wa Dae. "Any new ambassador needs time to form relationships with his colleagues in the government he is working with. Waiting over a year after Biden took the oath of office as president makes Korea look like a part of the world he does not care about. And, sadly, that seems to be the case these days."

However, Kim said a post-election appointment may be conducive to the alliance although it depends on who takes command of Cheong Wa Dae.
"If the Biden administration appoints a new ROK ambassador after Seoul's presidential election, perhaps it could help in resuscitating the alliance ― a much-needed breath of fresh air between the two countries," she said.

But she added that this will also hinge upon what kind of government is elected in March and the new government's position on the alliance.

"If the new government is merely a perpetuation of the Moon government's ethos, then alliance relations will remain tenuous ― or be even rockier," Kim said.
The U.S. Embassy here did not comment on the ambassadorial vacancy issue when contacted by The Korea Times.


The Korea Times · December 23, 2021


12. The first of 43,000 names of Korean War dead are added to the conflict’s memorial in Washington

There are many unique aspects of this. The names will be listed by rank from private to general and the 7000 plus Korean Augmentees to the US Army (KATUSA - Korean soldiers who fought as part of US Army units) will be listed in and among all the American names in proper rank order. This is the first memorial on our National Mall that will have foreign soldiers' names listed on it. This truly represents the blood alliance.

I look forward to the reopening of the newly renovated memorial on July 27, 2022.


The first of 43,000 names of Korean War dead are added to the conflict’s memorial in Washington
The Washington Post · by Michael E. RuaneToday at 10:00 a.m. EST · December 23, 2021
After the seven-ton granite block was uncrated, and the huge yellow crane had lowered it into place, workers brushed off the snow and Richard Dean walked over to look at his grandfather’s name.
“John R Lovell,” was carved in the last column of names, six from the bottom, under the heading, Colonel. He had been shot down on an intelligence mission during the Korean War. His body has never been found.
“I’m without words,” Dean, 62, said this week at the Korean War Veterans Memorial in Washington. “It’s been a very long time … And [I’m] honored to see my grandfather’s name. It’s his resting spot for right now.”
Lovell, who was killed in December 1950, is among the first of 43,000 Americans and Koreans in the U.S. service whose names are now being recorded in stone at the haunting memorial on the National Mall.
The huge block, bearing his and about 400 other names, was put into place shortly before 11 a.m. Monday on a bright but frigid morning. It had arrived by truck and was dusted with snow from the Minnesota quarrying site where it was fabricated.
Stone workers with measuring and surveying devices swarmed around it, and gave hand signals to the crane operator to make sure it was correctly placed.
Dean, in a brown hard hat, blue jeans and yellow jacket, looked on. “You’re making history today, guys,” he said.
A retired Army colonel who grew up in Wheaton, Md., he is the unpaid volunteer construction management agent for the Korean War Veterans Memorial Foundation, and a member of the foundation’s board.
He was also the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers project engineer when the memorial was constructed in the mid-1990s.
“I have a lot of history with this memorial,” he said.
“I feel overwhelmed sometimes,” Dean said. “I feel honored to be able to pay homage to the veterans … It’s from the heart … I’ve been deployed a few times, to Kosovo and Afghanistan. I know what war’s like. And I know what these guys went through.”
“When this memorial was actually being built, the veterans would come up and say ‘Where are the names of my buddies?’ ” he said. He thought they were referring to the nearby Vietnam Veterans Memorial, which lists the names 58,000 Vietnam War dead.
No, he said they told him, they meant their pals from Korea. He said there had not been enough room.
No more. Last March, officials announced that the memorial would be getting a Wall of Remembrance, like the Vietnam wall, to commemorate those who died in the Korean War.
And it was just by chance of logistics that the first block to be placed Monday bore his grandfather’s name, Dean said.
Lovell’s reconnaissance jet, an RB-45C, was shot down by enemy aircraft on Dec. 4, 1950, near the border between China and North Korea, according to the American Battle Monuments Commission.
Dean said he believes his grandfather survived the crash, but was captured and “stoned to death” by enraged North Korean civilians egged on by his captors, based on research information gathered by his mother.
The block was the first of 100 that are being added to the site in an extensive overhaul of the 26-year-old landmark just southeast of the Lincoln Memorial. The project, which got underway in March, is scheduled to be finished by July.
The National Park Service and the memorial’s foundation have said that the blocks will include the names of 36,574 Americans and more than 7,200 Koreans, who served as advisers and interpreters in what was called the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA).
But first the Pentagon had to come up with a list of names — a fraught task.
“The first names that were verified were [those from] the Marines, the Navy and the Air Force,” Dean said. They appear on 16 thinner stone panels that are being put in place this week. Each one contains about 450 names, he said.
They include the decorated Air Force pilot Maj. Felix Asla Jr. He was shot down Aug. 1, 1952, in “MiG Alley,” an area over North Korea infested with Russian-built MiG fighters flown by the enemy. His body has never been recovered.
And Col. Theron H. Whitneybell who was killed when his jet ran out gas and crashed while he was returning from a combat mission on Nov. 13, 1950. He is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.
Also, Air Force Capt. John H. Zimmerlee Jr., who had served during World War II, and had nearly been killed when the bomber he was on was brought down in the Adriatic Sea, said his son, John P. Zimmerlee.
Plucked from the water, seemingly dead, by a rescue ship, he was being readied for a burial when someone noticed that he was still alive, his son said in a recent interview.
When the Korean War broke out, he was married with two children, but was still called up.
A navigator, he was one of five men aboard a B-26 bomber on a mission on March 21, 1952. “They went out in the evening and didn’t come back,” his son said. They apparently ran into bad weather and radioed another plane.
“That was the last communication they had with anybody else,” he said. “No one has really described what their mission was all about.” His father’s body has never been recovered.
“The whole thing is really disgusting,” he said.
Regarding the memorial’s names project, he said: “It’s nice that whoever is funding this is honoring our guys. And I do appreciate that. But as a family member I really would prefer to get the information on what actually happened” to his father.
The panels listing the Army’s dead are far more numerous and are still being worked on, Dean said: “There’s roughly 27 panels that will be Army privates, and about 29 panels will be PFCs.”
Funding for the $22 million project comes from donations from the people of the United States and South Korea, the Park Service and the memorial foundation have said.
Part of the work required the installation of 178 underground pilings drilled more than 50 feet down to bedrock to support a section of the memorial that had sunk about three inches, Dean said.
The memorial’s 19 stainless steel statues depicting an American patrol during the war have been refurbished. And lighting has been improved.
The Korean War (1950-1953), was fought between forces of the United States, South Korea and their allies, and forces of communist North Korea and China.
It was a bitter, back-and-forth struggle that killed people on the ground and in the air. It claimed more than half as many Americans in three years as the Vietnam War killed in over a decade.
Thousands fell during fighting in subzero temperatures around the Chosin Reservoir, in what is now North Korea. And U.S. pilots were shot down in many forbidding places, like MiG Alley near the Chinese border.
Seven thousand Americans are still missing in action.
On Monday, as the workers finished up their measurements and declared that the placement of the first block was correct, a foreman stepped back and called out: “Ninety-nine to go!”
The Washington Post · by Michael E. RuaneToday at 10:00 a.m. EST · December 23, 2021



13. S. Korea, China discuss Olympics, end-of-war declaration in high-level talks


(2nd LD) S. Korea, China discuss Olympics, end-of-war declaration in high-level talks | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 이치동 · December 23, 2021
(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with results of talks)
SEOUL/BEIJING, Dec. 23 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and China had senior-level discussions on some sensitive pending issues Thursday during their first "strategic dialogue" in more than four years.
Holding the virtual session with South Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choi Jong-kun at the 9th Strategic Dialogue, his Chinese counterpart, Le Yucheng, talked about Beijing's preparations to host the winter Olympic games early next year, according to Choi's ministry.
In response, Choi reiterated Seoul's hope for its successful hosting of the event in line with the 2018 PyeongChang and 2021 Tokyo Olympics.
The ministry provided no further details on relevant consultations between the two sides. While the U.S. and some like-minded nations have stated plans to boycott the games diplomatically, South Korea said publicly it has yet to make a final decision on the matter.
Choi and Le also exchanged opinions on ways for cooperation to reactivate the Korean Peninsula peace process, including South Korea's push for the declaration of a formal end to the 1950-53 Korean War, the ministry said.
They agreed on the importance of managing regional security situations "with stability" and reaffirmed the shared goal of achieving the complete denuclearization of Korea and establishing permanent peace.
They agreed to continue communication, going forward, for the resumption of talks with North Korea and to develop the "strategic cooperative partnership" for "more mature and future-oriented" ties, as they mark the 30th anniversary next year of establishing diplomatic ties.
The Chinese government also expressed hope the talks will play a positive role in the development of bilateral relations.
"China and South Korea are important neighbors and partners," Zhao Lijian, spokesperson for Beijing's foreign ministry, stated earlier in the day. He noted the two sides are marking the "year of cultural exchange" together this year and in 2022.
"Next year is the 30th anniversary of China and South Korea forging diplomatic ties, and their relations have faced new, important development opportunities," he said. "(We) hope that the Strategic Dialogue this time will play a positive role in promoting communication and trust, and developing bilateral relations."
In December last year, Choi and Le held virtual talks on bilateral ties, the COVID-19 pandemic and other issues of mutual interest, but it was not a formal strategic dialogue session.

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 이치동 · December 23, 2021









V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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