Quotes of the Day:
Gen. Cornwallis after Yorktown:
"I wouldn't call this a defeat. Our mission was to punish the Americans for dumping our tea in Boston Harbor. We accomplished that so now we're leaving. We'll still maintain a robust 'over the horizon' capability to burn down the White House.”
- Mike Glenn channelling Cornwallis' ghost
If you don’t give people information, they make up something to fill the void”
- Carla O’Dell
“One of the most effective ways to learn about yourself is by taking seriously the cultures of others. It forces you to pay attention to those details of life which differentiate them from you”
- Edward T. Hall
1. U.S. draft bill seeks possible inclusion of S. Korea in 'Five Eyes' intelligence sharing program
2. House committee passes defense bill with no lower limit for USFK troops: source
3. Unification ministry closely watching N. Korea for signs of military parade preparation
4. ROK military reveals strategic ballistic missile is nearing completion
5. Afghanistan, Korea and America
6. North Korea steps up efforts to draw attention from US
7. Phased approach to North Korea's nuclear program gaining traction
8. Afghanistan and alliance
9. Coronavirus: why did North Korea turn down 3 million Sinovac vaccine doses?
10. N.K. leader chairs politburo meeting to discuss antivirus efforts, food shortage
11. N.Korea's Kim calls for preventing natural disasters and COVID-19 outbreaks
12. Kim orders tougher virus steps after N. Korea shuns vaccines
13. U.S. to Include Korea in 'Five Eyes' Spying Pact
14. How North Korea’s founding father, Kim Il-sung, came to power
15. Kim Jong Un Warns on ‘Abnormal Climate,’ Orders Land Overhaul
16. North Korea Investigates Youth Who Avoid Hard Labor Mobilization Drives
1. U.S. draft bill seeks possible inclusion of S. Korea in 'Five Eyes' intelligence sharing program
From a ROK perspective and a ROK/US alliance perspective this is a much more important congressional action than the troop floor restriction.
U.S. draft bill seeks possible inclusion of S. Korea in 'Five Eyes' intelligence sharing program | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 (Yonhap) -- A draft bill from the U.S. House of Representatives would require the U.S. administration to consider expanding its intelligence sharing program to include South Korea and three others if enacted, the bill showed Wednesday.
The National Defense Authorization bill for fiscal year 2022, submitted by the subcommittee on intelligence and special operations, seeks to expand the so-called Five Eyes, the U.S.' intelligence sharing program that currently involves Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand.
"The committee directs the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, to provide a report to the House Committee on Armed Services, the Senate Committee on Armed Services, and the congressional intelligence committees, not later than May 20, 2022, on current intelligence and resource sharing agreements between the United States and the countries of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom; as well as opportunities to expand intelligence sharing with South Korea, Japan, India, and Germany," it says.
The House Committee on Armed Services began reviewing the bill on the day, along with those submitted by other subcommittees, to create its final draft for FY22 National Defense Authorization Act.
The intelligence subcommittee bill, if included in the final draft and enacted, would require the U.S. government to study the benefits of expanding the Five Eyes arrangement, "including the nature of insights that each of these countries may be in a position to contribute."
In a related move, the bill also seeks to require the commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, in consultation with the commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), to submit a report on the U.S.' intelligence collection capabilities and activities in the area of USFK operation.
South Korea and the U.S. are said to be closely cooperating on military intelligence under their more than seven-decades old alliance.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
2. House committee passes defense bill with no lower limit for USFK troops: source
No longer needed.
U.S. Congress had prohibited the use of the U.S. defense budget to reduce the number of USFK troops for three consecutive years through its annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
"Both U.S. Congress and the administration are saying the clause has been removed because it is no longer needed," the informed source here said earlier, while speaking on condition of anonymity.
U.S. Congress began adding a lower limit for the 28,500-strong USFK in 2018, when former President Donald Trump began to use USFK as a bargaining chip in talks with South Korea over Seoul's share of the cost to maintain U.S. forces.
The source earlier noted the lower limit for U.S. troops in Germany has also been removed from the draft NDAA for the next fiscal year. Trump had also threatened to reduce the U.S. troop level in Germany unless Berlin paid more for the cost of stationing U.S. troops there.
House committee passes defense bill with no lower limit for USFK troops: source | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Sept. 2 (Yonhap) -- The U.S. House committee on armed services passed a defense authorization bill Thursday that does not specify a lower limit for the number of U.S. forces stationed in South Korea, an informed source said.
Committee Chairman Adam Smith (D-WA), who sponsored the draft National Defense Authorization Bill, however, has said the lower limit for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) has been removed because it was no longer necessary.
U.S. Congress had prohibited the use of the U.S. defense budget to reduce the number of USFK troops for three consecutive years through its annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
"Both U.S. Congress and the administration are saying the clause has been removed because it is no longer needed," the informed source here said earlier, while speaking on condition of anonymity.
U.S. Congress began adding a lower limit for the 28,500-strong USFK in 2018, when former President Donald Trump began to use USFK as a bargaining chip in talks with South Korea over Seoul's share of the cost to maintain U.S. forces.
The source earlier noted the lower limit for U.S. troops in Germany has also been removed from the draft NDAA for the next fiscal year. Trump had also threatened to reduce the U.S. troop level in Germany unless Berlin paid more for the cost of stationing U.S. troops there.
Meanwhile, an annex has been added to the draft bill that would, if enacted, call on the U.S. administration to consider expanding its intelligence sharing program, Five Eyes, to include South Korea and three other countries, the source told Yonhap News Agency.
The Five Eyes program currently involves Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand and the U.S.
The final draft has yet to be released.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
3. Unification ministry closely watching N. Korea for signs of military parade preparation
And why the Unification Ministry? Why not the Ministry of Defense and the National Intelligence Service? Why doesn't the Ministry of Unification focus on what should be its main mission: planning for eventual unification?
Unification ministry closely watching N. Korea for signs of military parade preparation | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Sept. 3 (Yonhap) -- The unification ministry said Friday it will closely watch North Korea for any signs they are preparing a military parade to celebrate major national anniversaries after a large number of troops were reportedly detected in Pyongyang.
Earlier, 38 North, a U.S. website monitoring the North, said troop formations were observed at an airfield in Pyongyang. Sources in Seoul also said about 10,000 troops have been observed in Pyongyang in a sign that North Korea is preparing a military parade ahead of its state and ruling party founding anniversaries on Sept. 9 and Oct. 10, respectively.
"The unification ministry will closely watch for any signs, without prematurely determining, of the possibility of the North holding a military parade," Cha Deok-cheol, deputy spokesperson of the unification ministry, told a regular press briefing.
North Korea recently warned of a "serious security crisis" in protest over the combined military exercise staged last month by South Korea and the United States.
Last October, North held a massive military parade to mark the 75th party founding anniversary and unveiled a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), and several other advanced military assets.
The North's latest military parade was held in January right after its rare party congress. During the event, leader Kim Jong-un pledged to bolster the country's nuclear arsenal.
kokobj@yna.co.kr
(END)
4. ROK military reveals strategic ballistic missile is nearing completion
"capable of destroying enemy targets with a force of strategic nuclear weapons"
If I can develop a missile with a warhead that is equal or superior to a tactical nuclear weapon, why would I need to have tactical nuclear weapons?
ROK military reveals strategic ballistic missile is nearing completion
Posted September. 03, 2021 07:41,
Updated September. 03, 2021 07:41
ROK military reveals strategic ballistic missile is nearing completion. September. 03, 2021 07:41. by Kyu-Jin Shin newjin@donga.com.
The Korean military is reportedly in the process of building a ballistic missile capable of destroying enemy targets with a force of strategic nuclear weapons. The military embarked on developing a ground-to-ground missile on which a warhead weighing up to three tons may be installed, which is now nearing completion. If the plan can be completed as expected, the Korean armed forces will have possessed a ballistic missile stronger than the Hyunmoo-2 ballistic missile developed last year, which is capable of carrying a warhead weighing up to two tons.
In the “2022-2026 National Defense Mid-Term Plan” released on Thursday, the Ministry of Defense stated that it will develop missiles capable of destroying mines and buildings with higher precision as the bilateral South Korea-U.S. missile guidelines will end in May 2022. “We will develop various types of strategic missiles with stronger destructive force, including a ground-to-ground and a submarine-launched ballistic missile,” the ministry announced, alluding to field deployment of the ballistic missile within five years after test launch.
The Ministry of Defense also proclaimed that it would raise monthly wages for soldiers to 676,100 won for a sergeant in 2022 and gradually up to one million won by 2026. The basic meal allowance for soldiers, which currently stands at 8,790 won a day, will increase by 70% to around 15,000 won by 2024.
The army organizational overhaul will be expedited in preparation for reduction in army strength. The defense ministry plans to gradually cut back a standing force until next year and maintain a regular force members of 500,000. In addition, the number of cadets in the armed forces which stood at 196,000 in 2017 (taking up 31.6% of the regular force) will be increased to 202,000 (40.5% of the regular force) by 2026. The ministry analyzed that the defense budget would exceed 70 trillion won in 2026, for the first time in the history.
5. Afghanistan, Korea and America
Excerpts:
Afghanistan was high again on the U.S.-Korea agenda by 2009. I was ambassador in Seoul when President Obama’s Special Representative for Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke visited in April; as we rode from Incheon airport together I got an impassioned preview of his message to Korean officials about President Obama’s resolve to counter terrorism and improve conditions in Afghanistan and Central Asia more broadly. By 2010, with the National Assembly’s approval, South Korea expanded its presence in Afghanistan to include substantial support for a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) including soldiers, police and aid personnel.
Afghanistan was an early and important recipient of South Korea’s growing overseas development assistance (ODA). Koica opened an office in Kabul in 2002, and aid amounts and activity continued, despite security challenges and program delays. In 2013, Afghanistan was the largest recipient of Korean bilateral grant aid. It was also in work together in Afghanistan that Korea forged a relationship with NATO, a partnership that continues to broaden, as seen by Korea’s participation in a NATO foreign ministers’ meeting last year.
Since 2001, I have watched South Korea’s contributions to the U.S.-led effort in Afghanistan. I saw its emerging global confidence and identity, its burgeoning soft as well as hard power, and the growth of people-to-people ties, notably in Central Asia. I’m thinking of the quick and effective action of the Korean government in evacuating to Korea Afghans who had supported the Korean presence in Afghanistan, along with their families, and the open-hearted welcome they are receiving in Korea. Building on this, I hope Korea can play a leading role in providing opportunities for the Afghan people who have lost so much, particularly women and girls, to access education.
Thursday
September 2, 2021
Afghanistan, Korea and America
Kathleen Stephens
The author was U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea from 2008 to 2011. She is the president of the Korea Economic Institute of America located in Washington, D.C.
August 2021 was a dreadful month. It was a summer already defined by inexorable reminders that we are not done with Covid-19 and have only begun to reckon with climate change. Now, as August ends, the precipitous collapse of the two-decades-long U.S.-led effort in Afghanistan brings new both short and long term challenges and uncertainties. With Afghanistan in Taliban hands, the U.S. — and the rest of the world — face immediate humanitarian, migration and security challenges, while grappling with as-yet unclear longer-term implications of what appears to many as an ignominious American defeat.
President Biden has insisted that his decision to implement the Trump Doha agreement and withdraw U.S. forces was the right one, supported by American public opinion and the need to focus on higher strategic priorities at home and abroad. But Biden infuriated European and other allies with a lack of coordination and consultation, and heaped excessive blame and little compassion on the Afghans themselves. Worse, Washington did not anticipate and was unprepared for the rapidity of the Afghan military and state collapse and the Taliban advance. As the administration scrambled to send troops back in and organize an airlift to evacuate Americans, vulnerable Afghans, and other partners, President Biden’s reputation for competence and seasoned judgment suffered. The Aug. 26 bombing outside Kabul airport killing at least 13 Americans and hundreds more others made for the deadliest day for American forces in Afghanistan in a decade, and the darkest day in Biden’s not yet year-old presidency.
A baby is handed over to the American Army over the perimeter wall of the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, Afghanistan, during an evacuation on Aug. 19.Hundreds of Afghans who helped at the Korean embassy, hospital and other missions in Kabul arrive at the Incheon International Airport on Aug. 26. The Korean government plans to allow them to stay here long-term and engage in job activity. [REUTETS/YONHAPJOINT PRESS CORPS]
More encouraging is that, despite poor planning and worsening chaos on the ground, the airlift itself has been a logistical success in moving many to safety. The Biden team is scrambling to fix some of its own early mistakes. Other governments, and private citizens in America and throughout the world, have mobilized to address the humanitarian crisis. This must continue.
Meanwhile, in the world of foreign policy and national security scholars, journalists, former officials, and the like, a debate is raging on the whole Afghanistan enterprise, and by extension on America’s past and future global role. Was the U.S. wrong to go into Afghanistan 20 years ago? Did we get it wrong from the start? Or was it the pivot to Iraq that took attention off Afghanistan? What are the lessons learned? Nation-building: too much or too little, or just impossible? What about Pakistan? Our relative ignorance of Afghan history and culture, of regionalism versus central authority? What are the implications of the U.S. defeat for Afghanistan, the region, the world, and the U.S.? For U.S. credibility, and perceptions of U.S. reliability? What will August 2021 look like 20 years from now?
Korea is frequently invoked in these discussions, often as a model of successful “nation-building” for which the U.S. takes or shares credit, and/or of the U.S. staying the course with a security presence for decades absent complete success. The other recurring theme is around the topics of American relative decline, and of perceptions of diminished American credibility and commitment to allies including South Korea. Essays with titles like “Seoul Isn’t Kabul” and “How the Afghanistan Withdrawal Looks from South Korea, America’s Other Forever War,” are coupled with statements from National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan that the U.S. has “no intention of drawing down forces” in South Korea.
My own sense from reading the Korean press is that some of these concerns are felt more in the U.S. — and in Europe where the anxiety in NATO is acute — than in Korea. But conversations on these topics need to go beyond the inward-looking circles within our own capitals; Americans need to hear more Korean voices.
I’ve been thinking about another perspective that could use more attention and reflection, at least in the U.S. That is how Korea’s bumpy but significant 20-year engagement in Afghanistan reflected a more mature partnership with the U.S. but also shaped and mirrored its emerging identity as a global middle power.
After the Sept. 11 attacks of 2001, South Korea under President Kim Dae-jung was quick to send engineers and medics to support the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan. This was despite domestic political sensitivities in Korea about participating in an overseas military campaign; after the Vietnam War, where more than 300,000 South Koreans served and some 5,000 died, it was over a quarter century before Seoul sent 400 soldiers in 1999 to support a UN force stabilizing East Timor. President Roh Moo-hyun made another important if difficult political decision in 2003 to send more South Korean medics and engineers to join the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq, with South Korea becoming the third largest troop contributor to the Iraq coalition before ending its mission peacefully in 2008.
But in Afghanistan, in 2007 a private church group of 23 Koreans were taken hostage by the Taliban, and two hostages executed, before the Korean government negotiated their release. As an American diplomat I empathized with the difficult position of the Korean government; private citizens against their government’s advice had put themselves in harm’s way, and the government had to balance aiding its citizens held hostage with the risks of encouraging further hostage-taking. Seoul did secure the release of the hostages, but reduced its presence in Afghanistan to a small civilian hospital in Bagram.
Afghanistan was high again on the U.S.-Korea agenda by 2009. I was ambassador in Seoul when President Obama’s Special Representative for Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke visited in April; as we rode from Incheon airport together I got an impassioned preview of his message to Korean officials about President Obama’s resolve to counter terrorism and improve conditions in Afghanistan and Central Asia more broadly. By 2010, with the National Assembly’s approval, South Korea expanded its presence in Afghanistan to include substantial support for a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) including soldiers, police and aid personnel.
Afghanistan was an early and important recipient of South Korea’s growing overseas development assistance (ODA). Koica opened an office in Kabul in 2002, and aid amounts and activity continued, despite security challenges and program delays. In 2013, Afghanistan was the largest recipient of Korean bilateral grant aid. It was also in work together in Afghanistan that Korea forged a relationship with NATO, a partnership that continues to broaden, as seen by Korea’s participation in a NATO foreign ministers’ meeting last year.
Since 2001, I have watched South Korea’s contributions to the U.S.-led effort in Afghanistan. I saw its emerging global confidence and identity, its burgeoning soft as well as hard power, and the growth of people-to-people ties, notably in Central Asia. I’m thinking of the quick and effective action of the Korean government in evacuating to Korea Afghans who had supported the Korean presence in Afghanistan, along with their families, and the open-hearted welcome they are receiving in Korea. Building on this, I hope Korea can play a leading role in providing opportunities for the Afghan people who have lost so much, particularly women and girls, to access education.
6. North Korea steps up efforts to draw attention from US
Maybe the regime will get the message. The US is not going to prematurely lift sanctions in return for simply a promise to talk or even talks. Sanctions will not be lifted until the regime demonstrates substantive and verifiable action toward denuclearization of the north.
It is time for Kim to act as a responsible member of the international community and come to the negotiating table. The US has made it clear that it is ready to negotiate anywhere and anytime without preconditions. The regime should stop playing games and come to the negotiating table to see what kind of deal can be made.
I disagree with Professor Park. Is there such a thing as a safe and effective "provocation?" I do not think this restart of the reactor will achieve the effect Kim desires.
Excerpt
"Both the nuclear reactor and preparation for a military parade are North Korea's way of showing off to gain an upper hand in future negotiations with the U.S.," said Park Won-gon, a professor at Ewha Womans University.
"They are safe yet effective measures to pressure the U.S."
Again, if the regime is "jittery" about the US all it needs to do is come to the negotiating table and work on a deal. But it is good that the regime realizes the Biden administration is not going to be duped by Kim's political warfare strategy and blackmail diplomacy.
"Given that North Korea is well aware that the Biden administration will not get drawn into Pyongyang's intention, the North is likely to be jittery about it," Park added.
North Korea steps up efforts to draw attention from US
A commercial satellite image by 38 North shows North Korean troops preparing for a military parade in Pyongyang. Yonhap
Pyongyang anxious about no action from US
By Kang Seung-woo
North Korea appears to have increased its provocative military activities on purpose in a bid to get the attention of the Joe Biden administration, according to Pyongyang watchers.
According to 38 North, a U.S.-based website specializing in the North Korean regime, troop formations were observed at Mirim Airport in Pyongyang, earlier this week, raising speculation that the country is preparing for a military parade ahead of its state and ruling party founding anniversaries on Sept. 9 and Oct. 10, respectively. The airfield has served as a rehearsal ground for large-scale military parades.
"This could indicate an upcoming military parade in Oct, as we saw in 2020," it said on Twitter, Thursday.
"The unification ministry will closely watch any signs, without prematurely determining, of the possibility of the North holding a military parade," Cha Deok-cheol, deputy spokesperson of the unification ministry, told a regular press briefing, Friday.
The observation by a commercial satellite image followed a recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report indicating that North Korea has restarted its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon.
However, some are questioning whether North Korea intentionally displayed its activities to pressure the United States to re-focus on its nuclear issue given that it could have hid the activity of the nuclear reactor by operating it underground. Currently, Washington is busy grappling with the fallout from its withdrawal from Afghanistan.
"Both the nuclear reactor and preparation for a military parade are North Korea's way of showing off to gain an upper hand in future negotiations with the U.S.," said Park Won-gon, a professor at Ewha Womans University.
"They are safe yet effective measures to pressure the U.S."
On Thursday, the North Korean foreign ministry issued a statement denouncing the U.S. policy toward the totalitarian state for adopting the "strategic patience" policy once pursued by the Obama administration.
The policy meant no engagement with the reclusive state as long as its leadership persisted with nuclear weapons development and ballistic missile testing, but many critics say the policy failed to address the North's growing nuclear and missile programs.
"A typical example is that of a Member of the European Parliament from a political party of the Netherlands, which censured the current U.S. administration for following the strategic patience policy," it said via the state-run Korean Central News Agency.
"He ridiculed the United States for acting stupidly while impatiently waiting for the collapse of the DPRK till now even in the face of the great pressure from the Afghan crisis."
The DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the official name of North Korea.
Park said the North Korean regime may be anxious about the U.S. negligence over its issue.
"North Korea may be fretting about no action from the U.S.," the professor said.
In fact, Noh Kyu-duk, South Korea's chief nuclear negotiator, met with his U.S. counterpart Sung Kim earlier this week following the IAEA report, but they did not issue a statement on the issue.
"Given that North Korea is well aware that the Biden administration will not get drawn into Pyongyang's intention, the North is likely to be jittery about it," Park added.
7. Phased approach to North Korea's nuclear program gaining traction
I very much doubt the Biden administration is going to agree to an interim deal that recognizes north Korea as a nuclear power.
I can see the possibility of a step by step, action for action, phased approach but that should not include recognition as a nuclear power. And a phased approach, if implemented, should not result in Kim effectively "playing" the US . I think Kim's strategy and objectives and the nature of the Kim family regime are fully understood by the Korea team in the administration and they will not allow the US to be played. Lucy has had to leave the field without jher football and no Charlie Brown is going to be able to kick it at will.
Phased approach to North Korea's nuclear program gaining traction
South Korean nuclear envoy Noh Kyu-duk, left, speaks in front of the U.S. Department of State building in Washington, Monday, after meeting with his U.S. counterpart Sung Kim on North Korea. Yonhap
Interim deal may recognize Pyongyang as nuclear power
By Kang Seung-woo
Grappling with the fallout from its withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States is weighing the possibility of shifting its tone on North Korea's nuclear program ― in other words, seeking to maintain the status quo on the Korean Peninsula rather than aggressively pursuing complete denuclearization.
Under the circumstances, diplomatic observers believe that the Biden administration is open to reaching an interim deal, which means that the two sides would take simultaneous steps that could lead to the denuclearization of North Korea and they believe are more practical and realistic.
Last week, when Sung Kim, the U.S. special representative for North Korea, visited Seoul, he indicated that Washington would want to stably manage the situation on the Peninsula due to the crisis in Afghanistan.
According to Rep. Tae Yong-ho, a former North Korean diplomat who defected to South Korea in 2016, the U.S. nuclear envoy delivered a conciliatory message to the Kim Jong-un regime that the U.S. could compensate for its absence of military provocations at this point ― in spite of a recent International Atomic Energy Agency report suggesting that North Korea has restarted its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon.
In addition, the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS), published July 30, said the Biden administration is likely to pursue a phased approach to the North Korean nuclear issue, offering some partial sanctions relief in exchange for steps toward denuclearization.
"The Biden administration does have the option of just forgetting about North Korea in the short to medium term," said Harry Kazianis, a senior director of Korean Studies at the Center for the National Interest.
"If the administration gets sucked back into Afghanistan and feels it does not have the time or the political capital to try and push for a deal with North Korea, it could simply opt not to rock the boat and hope the status quo holds, even if that means a North Korea that builds more and more nuclear weapons."
Joseph DeTrani, a former U.S. special envoy to the six-party talks, said, "A step-by-step approach to complete and verifiable denuclearization is something I would support."
He added, "It is similar to what we had with the six-party talks Sept. 19, 2005 Agreement of an action for action, commitment for commitment path to the complete dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons and facilities."
The six-party talks on the denuclearization of the peninsula is a multilateral forum, composed of the U.S., China, Russia, Japan and the two Koreas, that has been suspended since 2008.
Ramon Pacheco Pardo, a professor of international relations at King's College London, said the U.S. has already settled on a step-by-step approach.
"The ultimate goal will always remain denuclearization. But statements by Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary of State Antony Blinken in years past suggest that they knew that outright denuclearization wasn't realistic," said Pacheco Pardo, who doubles as the KF-VUB Korea chair at the Brussels School of Governance.
"Since the Biden administration took office, the U.S. has signaled its willingness to negotiate. To me, this suggests that the administration has accepted that a step-by-step approach is the only viable way to address the North Korean nuclear issue."
Former chief U.S. nuclear negotiator Robert Gallucci said if talks do ever begin again, the U.S. should not characterize initial incremental moves, such as partial sanctions relief for some restraint in the nuclear weapons area, as "abandoning the denuclearization objective." "A 'reciprocal process' aimed at normalization and denuclearization can begin with small steps," he added.
However, there are lingering concerns that, should the U.S. adopt the action-for-action process with the Stalinist state, it would have to formally recognize the country as a nuclear state ― a status the country has aggressively sought.
"We should never accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state," DeTrani said. "Indeed, this is North Korea's goal: A normal relationship with the U.S. and acceptance as a nuclear weapons state."
This image shows North Korea's main nuclear complex in Yongbyon, north of Pyongyang. YonhapPacheco Pardo also said the North Korean regime will not be able to gain such recognition from the U.S. ― although Washington is well aware of a nuclear North Korea.
"I don't think that the U.S. will ever accept North Korea as a nuclear power de jure," he said. "But the U.S. and the international community at large have been living with a nuclear North Korea since 2006. So de facto, we are living with a nuclear North Korea. I think that in the U.S. there is finally recognition of this fact. And the Biden administration probably knows this deep inside."
Kazianis said there are massive political ramifications from admitting that North Korea is already a nuclear weapons state.
"The U.S. could craft an interim deal that takes the idea of full North Korea denuclearization and puts it at the end of the long-term diplomatic normalization process that could take years or even a decade. That way, other benchmarks would be how success is graded ― like ending the Korean War, conventional arms control, diplomatic liaison offices, and capping the North's nuclear program," he said.
"What Team Biden could do is move the nuclear goalposts if you will; this way, America can always say it wants denuclearization, but will turn the goal into something more aspirational and not so etched in stone. That makes the most sense as North Korea will not ever just surrender its nuclear weapons for what amounts to Washington's promise that the benefits will someday, somehow, follow."
The nuclear talks have been deadlocked since the Hanoi summit between the U.S. and North Korea ended without a deal in February 2019.
Experts advised the U.S. to try to engage North Korea even if it remains to be seen whether such pursuits will pay off.
"The best thing Team Biden can do is actually show some interest ― which right now, they clearly are not, as their North Korea policy amounts to two words: let's talk," Kazianis said.
"However, there is a big catch to this in that Washington is not detailing its vision about what a new U.S.-North Korea relationship would look like under Joe Biden. That means Pyongyang will once again have to risk political capital to tease out a deal over many months."
Pacheco Pardo also said, "It makes sense for the Biden administration to continue to insist that the door for negotiations with North Korea remain open. This will force Pyongyang to make a choice. But escalating tensions will lead nowhere, as 2017 showed."
8. Afghanistan and alliance
A thoughtful essay from a good friend. We should reflect on this. But I will say our actions in Afghanistan do not foreshadow actions that might be taken with our allies. The administration intends to sustain and even enhance the strength of our alliance partnerships. But we must understand the concern among our allies.
Excerpts:
An even bigger concern I have is the negative impact the recent developments in Kabul can have on the strength of the alliance. The most potent foreign policy theme pronounced by Biden has been "the U.S. is back." Now, in the aftermath of Kabul, the sincerity and the capacity of the U.S. behind this objective are being questioned even in the capitals of important U.S. allies. I do not think this helps the strategic interests of U.S. allies in any manner.
Watching the heart-wrenching scenes in Kabul, I cannot suppress my own deep sense of frustration. A recurring question in my mind is if the withdrawal from Kabul could have been arranged in a better way. Even President Biden, while emphasizing the inevitability of the decision to withdraw, acknowledges the failure of intelligence.
Having said that, the anger, frustration and self-questioning must not spill over and lead to questioning Biden's intention to stop the long-overdue bleeding in U.S. military and political resources and renew U.S. leadership around the world, based on strengthened relations with allies.
Graham Allison, a Harvard academic who coined and widely circulated the concept of the Thucydides trap several years ago, recently had this to say: "Biden deserves praise, not scorn, for taking a calculated risk in order to extract the U.S. from a failing effort in a misguided mission."
Afghanistan and alliance
By Ahn Ho-young
President Joe Biden announced on April 14 that the withdrawal of U.S. forces will begin on May 1, in line with an agreement Trump's administration made with the Taliban. Since then, the Taliban began a strikingly rapid advance across the country, taking one regional capital after another, and reached the doorsteps of Kabul by Aug. 14. Next morning, it released a statement that "our forces do not want to enter Kabul through military means."
At the time, I sincerely hoped that this pause of the Taliban's advance and Afghan resistance would provide sufficient time to evacuate foreigners and Afghan citizens who had worked with the foreign community. However, on the same day, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani fled the country, and Kabul fell to the Taliban.
This started the stampede of the foreign community and tens of thousands of Afghans to the Karzai Airport in the hopes of flying out of Afghanistan. In the following two weeks, the U.S. and other countries could evacuate more than 100,000 foreigners and Afghans. However, there still remain a large number of foreigners and Afghans wishing to leave the country.
Afghans in particular braved grave risk to their life, passed through Taliban checkpoints, got to the airport, had to bear the threat of terrorist attacks and desperately waited for a chance to get out. This was a heart-wrenching scene of Kabul I read about and watched on TV every day.
Given the enormity of the tragedy, the blame game has started in Washington, D.C., and in many other places including the capitals of some U.S. allies. In the process, heavy blame is dumped on President Joe Biden. It looks unavoidable for some time. As Biden said in his speech on Aug. 16, "the buck stops with me" as president of the U.S. Getting the blame for making painful decisions should be part of the job. However, I wonder if all this blame game is fair or helpful, especially with respect to U.S. allies.
A frequent complaint from some NATO allies seems to be that they were not consulted sufficiently about the U.S. decision. I do not know the extent or the depth of consultation at this time. What I remember from my days as Korean ambassador in Brussels in 2011-12 was the constant process of consultation among NATO ambassadors.
At that time, Korea used to operate a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in the Parwan province of Afghanistan as a member of the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), and I used to attend NATO council meetings held in the ISAF format.
The ISAF was a genuinely multi-national institution, with the participation of all 28 NATO member countries and 24 non-NATO countries. During my time at ISAF meetings, the main theme of discussion was transition and transformation ― transition of ISAF responsibilities to Afghan forces and government by the end of 2014, after which ISAF forces would cease their combat mission and play only an advisory role.
Every ISAF meeting used to repeat the mantra of "In Together, Out Together," meaning that all the decisions and implementation of decisions would be made collectively by all members.
In fact, I, as a representative of a non-NATO country, envied the depth of consultation among NATO member countries. Most, if not all, NATO members used to have their offices at the NATO headquarters building, which enabled NATO diplomats and military personnel to live, work, dine and communicate in the same building.
It is because of this memory from my days in Brussels that it is not easy for me to understand some NATO allies' complaints about the lack of consultation provided by the U.S. If it was not sufficient, I think the main reason was because the U.S. itself was taken by surprise by the sudden collapse of Kabul as any other country was. I read even the Taliban was surprised.
An even bigger concern I have is the negative impact the recent developments in Kabul can have on the strength of the alliance. The most potent foreign policy theme pronounced by Biden has been "the U.S. is back." Now, in the aftermath of Kabul, the sincerity and the capacity of the U.S. behind this objective are being questioned even in the capitals of important U.S. allies. I do not think this helps the strategic interests of U.S. allies in any manner.
Watching the heart-wrenching scenes in Kabul, I cannot suppress my own deep sense of frustration. A recurring question in my mind is if the withdrawal from Kabul could have been arranged in a better way. Even President Biden, while emphasizing the inevitability of the decision to withdraw, acknowledges the failure of intelligence.
Having said that, the anger, frustration and self-questioning must not spill over and lead to questioning Biden's intention to stop the long-overdue bleeding in U.S. military and political resources and renew U.S. leadership around the world, based on strengthened relations with allies.
Graham Allison, a Harvard academic who coined and widely circulated the concept of the Thucydides trap several years ago, recently had this to say: "Biden deserves praise, not scorn, for taking a calculated risk in order to extract the U.S. from a failing effort in a misguided mission."
Ahn Ho-young (hyahn78@mofa.or.kr) is president of the University of North Korean Studies. He served as Korean ambassador to the United States and first vice foreign minister.
9. Coronavirus: why did North Korea turn down 3 million Sinovac vaccine doses?
My question is even more to the point: How long can the Korean people in the north survive with the borders remaining closed?
As an aside, it is interesting that China cannot even achieve a soft power win with its only ally.
Excerpts:
Nagi Shafik, the former project manager for the World Health Organization office in Pyongyang, said the North could be hesitant to roll out vaccines due to reports of rare complications and efficacy concerns that have been highlighted elsewhere.
“It may sound strange, but when trying to understand, I think perhaps they are concerned about the possible side-effects of the AstraZeneca vaccine,” Shakif said. “As for the Sinovac, perhaps they think, like many other countries in the world, it is not efficient enough.
“The real question for me: for how long will the borders be closed?”
Coronavirus: why did North Korea turn down 3 million Sinovac vaccine doses?
- North Korea claims to be Covid-free and requested that the shots from the Covax Facility be redirected to countries experiencing surges
- Kim Jong-un touted ‘our style’ of pandemic control, and analysts say safety and efficacy fears, showing self-isolation works and ‘saving face’ could explain the move
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Published: 3:15pm, 3 Sep, 2021
For North Korea, the threat posed by Covid-19 could hardly be more stark. The impoverished country’s health care system is dilapidated and overstretched, while its 26 million people are especially vulnerable to disease due to chronic undernourishment that the UN estimates affects more than 40 per cent of the population.
Still, the isolated state ruled by Kim Jong-un, which claims to be Covid-free, has been loath to accept help from the outside world, repeatedly shunning offers of life-saving vaccines.
This week, Unicef said the North had requested that nearly 3 million doses of the Chinese-made Sinovac vaccine be redirected to other countries “in view of the limited global supply of Covid-19 vaccines and recurrent surge in some countries”.
The North’s Ministry of Public Health said it would continue to communicate with the Covax Facility, the international distribution scheme that allotted the jabs, about taking delivery of vaccines in the “coming months”, according to Unicef.
Pyongyang earlier refused offers of the AstraZeneca vaccine because of concerns over rare side-effects, a South Korean think-tank affiliated with Seoul’s spy agency revealed in July. And Russia’s foreign ministry said that same month that Moscow had repeatedly offered to supply its home-grown vaccines. Kim’s regime has yet to give any indication it has accepted its Cold War ally’s help.
North Korea sealed its borders in January 2020 and has not reported any cases of Covid-19, a record widely doubted by observers given the infectiousness of the coronavirus and the country’s vast land border with China.
Kee Park, a lecturer at Harvard Medical School who has made numerous humanitarian trips to North Korea, said he believed Pyongyang wanted to send the message that its self-imposed isolation had kept it safe.
“Their confidence in their public health measures also allows them to take a more patient approach to see what, if any, issues arise with these new vaccines as they get rolled out,” Park said.
“They have also spoken out against vaccine inequities at the World Health Assembly a few months ago and this gesture is consistent with their concern that poor countries with significant outbreaks should be provided with vaccines.”
A health official sprays hand sanitiser at the entrance of Phyongsong city in south Phyongan Province, North Korea, as part of pandemic-prevention measures. Photo: AP
On Thursday, Kim told officials to double down on “our style” of pandemic control, according to the state-run Korean Central News Agency.
North Korea, which promotes an ideology of self-reliance known as juche, is known for shunning the international community, earning the moniker of “the hermit kingdom”.
During the 1990s, the North downplayed food shortages until a widespread famine that killed an estimated 240,000-3.5 million people forced it to seek international assistance.
“Saving face is a strong cultural motivator for Koreans,” said Dan Chung, executive director of Crossing Borders, a US-based Christian aid group that works with North Korean refugees. “Though it seems as if North Koreans are reaching out for help, a moment later they could indicate the exact opposite. This makes helping North Korea all the more complex.”
Chung pointed to accounts of the 1990s famine, during which international aid workers reported being led on scripted tours of the capital that concealed the extent of the crisis.
“When UN officials arrived, they were taken on the standard tour of North Korea,” he said. “They were shown the thriving, healthy people of Pyongyang and were not able to venture outside of their carefully guided tour. They left confused. Some were convinced there was no famine.”
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un scolds officials for ‘great crisis’ caused by coronavirus lapse
Despite the North’s reputation for secrecy, Kim Jong-un has acknowledged the growing economic toll of the country’s isolation, with speeches in recent months describing a “crisis of hardships” and “tense” food situation.
North Korea’s trade with China, which accounts for about 90 per cent of total volumes, fell to a record low in the first half of 2021, according to Chinese customs data. China’s exports to its neighbour declined more than 85 per cent to US$56.77 million over the period, while imports fell 67 per cent to US$8.96 million, according to the figures.
South Korea’s central bank estimated in July that the North’s gross domestic product contracted 4.5 per cent in 2020, the steepest decline since 1997.
Chronic food insecurity has been made worse by droughts and typhoons, as well as international sanctions targeting the Kim regime’s illicit nuclear and missile programmes. In July, the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization said the North could suffer a food shortage of 860,000 tonnes in 2021.
Nagi Shafik, the former project manager for the World Health Organization office in Pyongyang, said the North could be hesitant to roll out vaccines due to reports of rare complications and efficacy concerns that have been highlighted elsewhere.
“It may sound strange, but when trying to understand, I think perhaps they are concerned about the possible side-effects of the AstraZeneca vaccine,” Shakif said. “As for the Sinovac, perhaps they think, like many other countries in the world, it is not efficient enough.
“The real question for me: for how long will the borders be closed?”
10. N.K. leader chairs politburo meeting to discuss antivirus efforts, food shortage
Kim seems to be holding a lot more meetings than his father. The old adage may apply: "Any problem can be made insoluble if enough meetings are held to discuss it."
But on a serious note this appears to be another indicator of how distracted Kim must be with internal problems.
N.K. leader chairs politburo meeting to discuss antivirus efforts, food shortage | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Sept. 3 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un presided over a politburo meeting to discuss key issues, such as nationwide anti-coronavirus measures and farm production, state media reported Friday.
Kim also discussed measures to thoroughly boost production of consumer goods and implement a land management policy, during the enlarged politburo session of the Workers' Party held Thursday, according to the Korean Central News Agency.
"Saying that the present dangerous situation of the worldwide pandemic which keeps spiraling out of control demands tighter nationwide epidemic prevention, he emphasized that all the party organizations and officials should reexamine the national epidemic prevention system and the work in this field, and conduct an intense political offensive to strain and awaken the epidemic prevention front once again," the KCNA said.
He stressed that tightening epidemic prevention is a task of "paramount importance" and warned officials against letting down their guard for "even a moment under the present situation."
Kim also set forth tasks to successfully conclude this year's farming and to "make a breakthrough in settling the food problem of the people."
He then instructed officials to push ahead with increasing the grain yield "as much as possible before harvesting" to achieve the planned grain production goal.
"He emphasized the need to ensure as shrewd organization and commanding as possible to fully mobilize labor force and means to harvesting and threshing, to ensure responsible state provision of farming materials and equipment and to improve grain transport, processing and supply," the KCNA said.
The KCNA said the enlarged meeting dealt with "an organizational issue" but did not provide further details.
The meeting comes as the North struggles to cope with its chronic food shortage, aggravated by flood damage in agricultural fields, amid the prolonged coronavirus pandemic.
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
11. N.Korea's Kim calls for preventing natural disasters and COVID-19 outbreaks
Preventing natural disasters? - Sorry Mr. Kim, mother nature's power trumps Juche.
N.Korea's Kim calls for preventing natural disasters and COVID-19 outbreaks
North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un leads the first workshop of the commanders and political officers of the Korean People's Army (KPA) in Pyongyang, North Korea in this image supplied by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency on July 30, 2021. KCNA via REUTERS
SEOUL, Sept 3 (Reuters) - North Korean leader Kim Jong Un urged efforts to prevent natural disasters or coronavirus outbreaks from damaging the economy as he convened a meeting of the ruling party's politburo, state media reported on Friday.
Economic plans dominated the agenda at the meeting held in Pyongyang on Thursday, KCNA news agency reported.
The country's economy has been battered by international sanctions and self-imposed border and movement lockdowns aimed at preventing a coronavirus outbreak. Seasonal heavy rains and typhoons have raised further concerns about damage to food supplies.
"(Kim) underlined the need to take thorough-going measures to overcome abnormal climate the danger of which has become higher in recent years," KCNA said.
Among the work Kim called for were river improvement, reforestation for erosion control, dyke maintenance and tide embankment projects.
North Korea has not confirmed any COVID-19 cases, but closed borders and imposed strict prevention measures, seeing the pandemic as a matter of national survival.
"The present dangerous situation of the worldwide pandemic which keeps spiralling out of control demands tighter nationwide epidemic prevention," Kim said, according to KCNA. "Tightening epidemic prevention is the task of paramount importance which must not be loosened even a moment under the present situation."
According to international officials, North Korea has turned down shipments of China's Sinovac Biotech COVID-19 vaccine, as well as doses of AstraZeneca's vaccine. read more
Reporting by Josh Smith Editing by Alistair Bell
12. Kim orders tougher virus steps after N. Korea shuns vaccines
I do not know if the Korean people in the north can take any more harsh population and resources control measures to defend against COVID. Do the Korean people have a breaking point or are they the most resilient people inthe word who can suffer hardship on a scale we cannot even imagine?
Tougher virus steps is code for exerting stronger control over the Korean people. Kim must fear internal instability. Maybe he is assessing the potential for it.
Kim orders tougher virus steps after N. Korea shuns vaccines
AP · by HYUNG-JIN KIM and KIM TONG-HYUNG · September 3, 2021
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ordered officials to wage a tougher epidemic prevention campaign in “our style” after he turned down some foreign COVID-19 vaccines offered via the U.N.-backed immunization program.
During a Politburo meeting Thursday, Kim said officials must “bear in mind that tightening epidemic prevention is the task of paramount importance which must not be loosened even a moment,” the official Korean Central News Agency reported Friday.
While stressing the need for material and technical means of virus prevention and increasing health workers’ qualifications, Kim also called for “further rounding off our style epidemic prevention system,” KCNA said.
Kim previously called for North Koreans to brace for prolonged COVID-19 restrictions, indicating the nation’s borders would stay closed despite worsening economic and food conditions. Since the start of the pandemic, North Korea has used tough quarantines and border closures to prevent outbreaks, though its claim to be entirely virus-free is widely doubted.
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On Tuesday, UNICEF, which procures and delivers vaccines on behalf of the COVAX distribution program, said North Korea proposed its allotment of about 3 million Sinovac shots be sent to severely affected countries instead. North Korea was also slated to receive AstraZeneca shots through COVAX, but their delivery has been delayed.
According to UNICEF, North Korea’s health ministry still said it would continue to communicate with COVAX over future vaccines.
Some exports believe North Korea may want other vaccines, while questioning the effectiveness of Sinovac and the rare blood clots seen in some recipients of the AstraZeneca vaccine.
The previously allocated 1.9 million AstraZeneca doses would be enough to vaccinate 950,000 people — only about 7.3% of the North’s 26 million people — meaning North Korea would still need much more quantities of vaccine to inoculate its population.
Leif-Eric Easley, a professor of international studies at Seoul’s Ewha Womans University, said North Korea is likely angling to receive more effective jabs from COVAX and then strategically allocate them domestically.
“Pyongyang appears to have issues with COVAX involving legal responsibility and distribution reporting requirements. So it might procure vaccines from China to deliver to border regions and soldiers while allocating COVAX shots to less sensitive populations,” Easley said.
“The Kim regime likely wants the most safe and effective vaccine for the elite, but administering Pfizer would require upgraded cold chain capability in Pyongyang and at least discreet discussions with the United States. The (Johnson & Johnson) option could also be useful to North Korea given that vaccine’s portability and one-shot regimen,” he said.
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In a recent U.N. report on the North’s human rights situation, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres asked North Korea to “take all necessary measures, including through international cooperation and assistance, to provide access to COVID-19 vaccines for all persons, without discrimination.”
He also asked North Korea to form a plan to enable diplomats and aid workers to return to the North and revive humanitarian aid distribution systems as soon as possible in conjunction with its COVID-19 vaccine rollout.
After their meeting in Seoul last month, Sung Kim, the top U.S. diplomat on North Korea affairs, and his South Korean counterpart Noh Kyu-duk told reporters that they discussed humanitarian cooperation with North Korea in providing anti-virus resources, sanitation and safe water.
AP · by HYUNG-JIN KIM and KIM TONG-HYUNG · September 3, 2021
13. U.S. to Include Korea in 'Five Eyes' Spying Pact
Key points:
The alliance aims to build a united front against China and Russia.
The committee said the "threat map" has been changed significantly since the launch of "Five Eyes" and the main threat now comes from China and Russia. It reiterated the importance of closer cooperation in the face of rivalry between superpowers and need to tighten alliances with other democracies with similar beliefs.
U.S. to Include Korea in 'Five Eyes' Spying Pact
The U.S. House of Representatives wants to include Korea and three other countries in the "Five Eyes" intelligence-sharing alliance. It currently includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the U.K.
The House Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations stressed the need to include Korea, Germany, India and Japan in the alliance when it submited last month a draft amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for next year.
"The committee directs the director of national intelligence, in coordination with the secretary of defense, to provide a report... not later than May 20, 2022, on current intelligence and resource sharing agreements between the United States and the countries of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom; as well as opportunities to expand intelligence sharing with South Korea, Japan, India, and Germany."
The alliance aims to build a united front against China and Russia.
The committee said the "threat map" has been changed significantly since the launch of "Five Eyes" and the main threat now comes from China and Russia. It reiterated the importance of closer cooperation in the face of rivalry between superpowers and need to tighten alliances with other democracies with similar beliefs.
14. How North Korea’s founding father, Kim Il-sung, came to power
This short 5 minute video is very well done and worth the time to watch for those with an interest in Korean history.
How North Korea’s founding father, Kim Il-sung, came to power
The Kim family have ruled North Korea for over seven decades but how did the original "Great Leader" get the job?
Questions surround the early days of Kim Il-sung and his dynasty.
102-year-old Professor Kim Hyung-suk came from the same village, and met him as he was starting out on his rise to power.
Witness History: The stories of our times told by the people who were there.
Produced by: Kevin Kim and William Lee
Filmed and edited by: Kevin Kim
Published
12 hours agoSection
15. Kim Jong Un Warns on ‘Abnormal Climate,’ Orders Land Overhaul
Perhaps we can discuss north Korea joining the Paris Climate accords. Maybe that can be a start point for negotiations. (said only half in jest).
Kim could receive all the assistance the people would need if he would accept offers of aid and allow full transparency and accountability in its distribution.
By making its problems public, Kim may be sending a signal to the Biden administration to allow more assistance through international organizations like the World Food Program.
At the party meeting, Kim also called on officials to place “paramount importance” on tightening epidemic prevention, “given the further worsening worldwide health crisis,” KCNA said. Kim’s decision to shut borders at the start of the pandemic appears to have made North Korea’s food even more dire.
I harp on the regime's blackmail diplomacy- the use of increased tensions, threats, and provocations to gain political and economic concessions. But another aspect of this is using the suffering of the Korean people in the north to extract concessions from the US and international community because Kim knows that the ROK. the US, and the international community care more about the welfare of the Korean people in the north than he does. He can exploit our sympathies and tug at our heartstrings.
Kim Jong Un Warns on ‘Abnormal Climate,’ Orders Land Overhaul
September 2, 2021, 8:50 PM EDT
- Leader tells party officials to tighten epidemic prevention
- North Korea is facing worst food shortages under his rule
Kim Jong Un Source: KCNA/AP Photo
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North Korean leader Kim Jong Un urged party officials to look into massive land projects after flooding from an “abnormal climate” over the past few years has helped push his state into one of its worst food shortages under his rule.
Kim told a political bureau meeting of his ruling Workers’ Party of Korea to place all efforts into bringing in the current harvest and “make a breakthrough in settling the food problem of the people,” the official Korean Central News Agency reported Friday. He also wanted “pushing forward huge nature-remaking projects,” to mitigate damage caused by floods and typhoons, it said.
The North Korean leader has issued rare warnings of economic struggles and food shortages in the past months, perhaps to prepare his people for hard times ahead. But Kim so far has shown no indication he’s willing to sit down for discussions with U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration on reducing his nuclear arsenal in return for economic incentives.
North Korea is facing its worse food shortages in more than a decade, it said in a report to the United Nations a few months ago, giving the world notice Pyongyang is bracing for one of its biggest domestic challenges since Kim took power at the end of 2011. Kim told party leaders the dangers from what he called an abnormal climate have become higher in recent years.
Food Insecurity
North Korea’s perennial food shortages were made worse by typhoons in 2020 that wiped out crops and Kim’s decision to shut borders due to Covid, slamming the brakes on what little legal trade it has. According to the UN World Food Program, about 40% of North Korea’s population is undernourished, adding “food insecurity and malnutrition are widespread.”
By making its problems public, Kim may be sending a signal to the Biden administration to allow more assistance through international organizations like the World Food Program.
At the party meeting, Kim also called on officials to place “paramount importance” on tightening epidemic prevention, “given the further worsening worldwide health crisis,” KCNA said. Kim’s decision to shut borders at the start of the pandemic appears to have made North Korea’s food even more dire.
North Korea says it has had no cases of Covid-19, but officials from the U.S., Japan and others highly doubt the claim. Kim meanwhile, has shunned offers of vaccines through the Covax program backed by the World Health Organization, apparently because it’s unwilling to follow the organization’s instructions and rules.
North Korea most recently rejected Covax’s offer to provide around 3 million doses of Sinovac vaccines, according to NK News on Wednesday.
16. North Korea Investigates Youth Who Avoid Hard Labor Mobilization Drives
How much more can the Korean people take of Kim's rule?
North Korea Investigates Youth Who Avoid Hard Labor Mobilization Drives
Hundreds of young people are forced to “volunteer” for work in coal mines and farms.
North Korea has launched an investigation into youths from privileged families who avoid mass mobilization campaigns that send thousands of young people to “volunteer” for hard labor in coal mines and rural farms, sources in the country told RFA.
North Korea, which routinely forces citizens to provide free manual labor for government projects, farm work and industry -- labels the laborers as “volunteers” who willingly toil as an expression of their love for the country and its leaders.
Free labor is necessary for the cash-strapped government of a country with serious economic problems resulting from a prolonged suspension of trade with China due to the coronavirus epidemic and years of U.S. and UN economic sanctions over Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs.
But citizens who have connections can get out of the unpaid labor drives.
When the adult offspring of high-ranking government officials failed to show up for work duty in North Pyongan province, central party’s organization and guidance department sent agents to investigate, a resident of the northwestern region told RFA.
Sources said the investigation applied only to local officials of the provincial level or below.
“Authorities began an investigation into anti-socialist tendencies in the families of local officials… here in Sinuiju since the day after Youth Day [Aug. 28],” a resident of North Pyongan told RFA’s Korean Service Sept. 1.
According to the source, in early August North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ordered the country’s youth to volunteer for dangerous and difficult work in places like coal mines and rural farms.
“But it was reported to the central committee that only ordinary people without powerful backgrounds were forced by the authorities to volunteer, while none of the children of high-ranking officials volunteered,” said the source, who requested anonymity to speak freely.
“Despite the party’s appeal to young people to take the lead and become young heroes by building a strong socialist state, even as the country is boxed-in by U.S. economic sanctions, the fact that the children of the officials didn’t respond to the call is seen as a serious failure as they deliberately ignored party policies by taking advantage of their position,” said the source.
The authorities are now treating their investigation into the privileged youth as a fight against anti-socialism, according to the source, paying particular attention to any anti-socialist tendencies they uncover.
Another source, a resident of South Pyongan province, north of the capital Pyongyang, confirmed to RFA that authorities there were investigating the same issue.
“Hundreds of young people forcibly selected by the party and the Youth League organization have been sent to Sunchon Coal Mine and rural farms in South Pyongan province since the beginning of August … but there is no child of high-ranking officials among them,” the second source said.
RFA reported in late August that the Youth League in North Hamgyong selected 140 young people to provide free labor in coal mines and rural farms ahead of Youth Day.
Those that were selected were opposed to being sent to work under the program, for which youth from wealthy and well-connected families were not selected triggering anger among the residents.
North Korea’s Youth League organization includes all people aged 17 to 35, including factory workers, high-school and college students, and other young people not serving in the military.
North Korean state media reported Aug. 30 that Kim Jong Un met with young people who volunteered and took a photo with them.
RFA has reported on other North Korean forced labor schemes this year including mobilizing women for construction of a wall along the 880-mile Sino-Korean border, forcing students to haul gravel for school building construction and maintenance projects, and sending soldiers off to toil in mines immediately upon discharge.
Reported by Hyemin Son and Myung Chul Lee for RFA’s Korean Service. Translated by Jinha Shin. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
