Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“A mind is like a parachute. It doesn’t work if it is not open.”

- Frank Zappa

“Reading is an act of civilization; it’s one of the greatest acts of civilization because it takes the free raw material of the mind and builds castles of possibilities.”

- Ben Okri

Characteristics of the American Way of War (9 of 13)

Aggressive and Offensive. Geopolitics, culture, and material endowment have combined to pull the American way of war towards an aggressive offensive style. Geopolitically viewed, the United States is effectively insular, albeit on a continental scale. Not since the War of 1812 has the country faced a serious threat in North America except, of course, from its slave-holding states in 1861-65. Because of America's geopolitical isolation, a product of geography and culture, in the 20th century the country repeatedly joined in wars that already were well underway. America had to take the initiative and move men and material across oceans. Also, it was obliged to commit to offensive operations in order to take back the gains made by enemies in Europe and Asia at the outset of their rampages of conquest. U.S. political motives may have been broadly defensive. But as was the case with Iraq's seizure of Kuwait in 1990, the principal guardian of the status quo, the United States, had no military choice other than aggressive offensive action. More often than not, an aggressor is content to take his prize and then offer an armistice and a conference to bless the crimes just committed. Prior to the creation of NATO and the subsequent U.S. commitment to maintain a substantial garrison in Europe, the American strategic role in Eurasia was notably episodic. With the exception of the nuclear-shadowed Cold War of 1947-89, a historical anomaly, when an American army is sent across an ocean its society expects it to do something important. There are many plausible explanations for the offensive preference in the American way of war; we will cite some of the more significant among them. In summary form, an aggressive offensive style:

• is required if decisive victory is to be achieved against enemies who have to be ejected from ill-gotten gains, or otherwise taught the error of their ways;

• is mandated by a domestic political context that regards American participation in war as so extraordinary an event that it has to be completed as rapidly as possible, so that a condition of peace and normalcy can be restored;

• is fitting because the United States fights only against evil regimes, and is not disposed to wage limited wars for limited political purposes, save under duress, as in Korea, 1950-53.

• is appropriate to America's strength and strengths. The United States is obliged to develop forces that are highly mobile. In a sense, the conquest of distance has been America's strategic history;

• has a record of success. It is difficult to argue with a history that appears to validate the military merits of an offensive style.

• via a succession of sometimes parallel offensive operations was the American way, briefly in 1918, and then of geopolitical necessity in 1942-45.

The American way of war can be traced back to the 18th century, if not earlier, but this monograph will content itself with noting that the illustrative apogee of that "way" occurred during World War II. America had demonstrated to observers around the globe a way of war that delivered decisive military victory. That way favored mobility, movement (not necessarily skillful maneuver), command of "the commons" (the high seas and the air), and firepower. Americans sought to take war to the enemy, as rapidly and destructively as the machines of industrial age warfare permitted. The American way was truly awesome in its ability to kill people and break things. The problem today is that if the country's strategic future is going to be plagued more and more by challenges posed by irregular enemies, America's soldiers will lack enemy targets for their traditionally preferred style of operation. As we have maintained repeatedly, COIN warfare demotes the irregular enemy to the status of a secondary objective. Aggressive offensive action against an enemy of uncertain location and identity is more likely to wreak political damage upon the COIN endeavor, a self-inflicted wound, than upon the enemy. Naturally, there is a time and place for offensive action. But, as the dominant characteristic of the official style of war, offensive action is likely to prove counterproductive against irregular enemies in many, perhaps most, circumstances. This is not to deny that irregular targets of opportunity certainly should be pursued aggressively if the enemy is foolish enough to expose himself for discrete destruction. Also, it is emphatically true that America's future strategic history is not going to be populated wholly by enemies of an irregular kind, no matter how fashionable that belief may be today.

- Colin Gray, 2006

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 14, 2023

2. New US nuclear chief takes fresh stance on sea-launched cruise missile

3. China and Russia Denounce U.S., Allies Over Submarine Deal

4. In a First, Army Selects Pilot to Command Delta Force

5. A two-front test of wills: Defeating Russia and deterring China

6. Ukraine's Military Intelligence Chief Predicts How War Will End

7. American Power and the Defense of Taiwan

8. How to Prepare for Peace Talks in Ukraine

9. The US, UK and Australia Send China a Message

10. Microsoft-backed OpenAI starts release of powerful AI known as GPT-4

11. Special Operations News Update - March 15, 2023 | SOF News

12. The top Spec Ops general on Fort Bragg crime

13. A new Pentagon map shows how China is beefing up what a top US general calls its 'dangerous position' in the South China Sea

14. China warns Philippines not to give US more access to bases

15. AUKUS: Flawed by Design?

16. China, Russia and Iran: Axis of Tyrannies presents enormous challenge to free nations

17. Strategic Amnesia: The U.S. Army’s Stubborn Rush to Its Next War

18. Artillery Shortage Hampers Russia’s Offensive in East Ukraine, Western Officials Say

19. Imposing the Past: Putin’s War for History

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 14, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2023

Key Takeaways

Prominent Russian milbloggers are reamplifying a longstanding Russian information operation that seeks to weaponize religion to discredit Ukraine.
Russian authorities continue measures to mobilize the struggling Russian defense industrial base (DIB) for a protracted war effort.
Russian Su-27 jets forced down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over the Black Sea in international airspace.
Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki stated on March 14 that Poland could supply MiG-29 multirole fighters to Ukraine within four-to-six weeks.
Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces continue building defenses along Russia’s border with Ukraine in order to pin Ukrainian troops to northern border areas.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces advanced within Bakhmut and continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka–Donetsk City frontline and in western Donetsk Oblast.
Russian forces continue fortifying rear areas in Russian occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.
United Russia Secretary Andrey Turchak announced on March 14 that the Russian State Duma will consider a law simplifying the legal recognition of missing Russian soldiers as dead.
Ukrainian partisans injured the Deputy Head of the Nova Kakhovka Occupation Military Administration in an improvised explosive device (IED) attack.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 14, 2023

Mar 14, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 14, 2023

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, George Barros, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

March 14, 5:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Prominent Russian milbloggers are reamplifying a longstanding Russian information operation that seeks to weaponize religion to discredit Ukraine. The Ukrainian Ministry of Culture issued a decision on March 9 stipulating that the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra Reserve will terminate its lease agreement with the Kremlin-affiliated Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP), meaning that the UOC MP will need to vacate the premises of the lower Lavra by March 29.[1] The Ukrainian government did not renew the UOC MP’s expired lease on the upper Lavra and allowed the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) to hold Christmas services at the Lavra on January 7, as ISW previously reported.[2] Two prominent milbloggers responded on March 14 to the latest decision requiring the UOC MP to vacate the lower Lavra by March 29 and exploited the story to accuse Kyiv of repressing freedom of religion within Ukraine.[3] Former Russian officer and convicted war criminal Igor Girkin claimed with no evidence that Kyiv will likely stage a military takeover of the Lavra because Ukrainian authorities are bent on “bloodily pitting the Russians on both sides of an artificial border” against one another.[4] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) commander and former DNR Security Minister Alexander Khodakovsky accused Ukraine of causing a “church frenzy” to divide the UOC MP and OCU dioceses and encouraged Ukrainian authorities to see past Ukrainian and Russian distinctions and exercise “restraint and Christian patience.”[5] Khodakovsky’s comment is remarkable because it is Russia’s rejection of the validity of seeing any distinctions between Russians and Ukrainians that was one of the justifications for the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine in the first place.

Both Girkin’s and Khodakovsky’s renewed exploitations of the Lavra issue are based on a misrepresentation of events and disingenuously seek to portray Kyiv as attacking religious liberty in Ukraine. The UOC MP is the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church’s subordinate element in Ukraine and provided material support for Russia’s illegal invasion of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014.[6] The UOC MP is not an independent religious organization but rather an extension of the Russian state and an instrument of Russian hybrid warfare.[7] By misrepresenting the Ukrainian government’s decision to reduce the Kremlin-controlled UOC MP’s influence in Ukraine, Russian milbloggers are amplifying a known information operation attempting to delegitimize the Ukrainian state and turn international public opinion against Ukraine.

Russian authorities continue measures to mobilize the struggling Russian defense industrial base (DIB) for a protracted war effort, including measures that will force the Kremlin to choose between having skilled workers in the DIB and skilled military personnel fighting in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed during a March 14 visit to an aviation production plant in Ulan-Ude, Buryatia, that the DIB suffers from a lack of adequately trained personnel and announced a series of reforms to attract more specialists to work at military production plants, including the reallocation of federal assets to housing and increasing pay.[8] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Tactical Missile Corporation in Moscow Oblast and called on the plant to double production even after announcing that the plant had met the requirements of the state defense order.[9] Putin also announced that the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade has prepared a list of unspecified specialties to defer from military service, which may suggest that the Kremlin is prioritizing using skilled workers in the production of Russian weapons over having skilled soldiers fight in Russia’s military.[10] Russian news outlets Interfax and RBK, the latter citing a Russian federal official, reported that the Russian Ministry of Finance is also considering issuing war bonds.[11] The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) assessed that Putin’s March 3 presidential decree on government oversight of the DIB sets conditions for the Russian Ministry of Trade and Industry to bypass DIB managers at enterprises that fail to meet Russia’s production standards.[12] The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service reported that Russian defense enterprises significantly decreased their hiring standards and now accept workers without experience and with histories of drug use, criminal records, and bankruptcy.[13] ISW has previously reported on Russia’s struggle to rejuvenate its DIB amid labor shortages and Western sanctions and its ensuing lack of success in this endeavor.[14]

Two Russian Su-27 aircraft downed a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over the Black Sea in international airspace. US General James B. Hecker stated that two Russian aircraft hit the drone nearly causing both aircraft to crash and resulting in the loss of the drone.[15] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the drone crashed due to “sharp maneuvering.”[16] The incident will not cause an escalation to direct conflict between Russia and the US. Russian forces have used coercive signaling against US and allied flights and naval vessels for decades in multiple theaters without triggering conflict.[17] The US and Russian presidents retain full freedom to choose how to respond to such incidents, and there is nothing automatic about escalation in such situations. Given President Joe Biden’s repeated commitments to avoid committing US forces to direct conflict with Russia and the Kremlin’s clear and repeatedly demonstrated reluctance to get into a war with NATO, there is no reason for incidents such as these to cause dangerous escalations.

Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki stated on March 14 that Poland could supply MiG-29 multirole fighters to Ukraine within four-to-six weeks. Morawiecki stated that Poland is ready to give Ukraine an unspecified proportion of its total fleet of 28 MiG-29 fighters to Ukraine as part of an international coalition. Slovak Defense Minister Jaroslav Nad previously signaled Slovakia’s support for providing Ukraine MiG-29 aircraft on March 9.[18] The Ukrainian Air Force operates MiG-29s and would be able to use them in counteroffensive operations if Ukraine receives them with enough time in advance of its next counteroffensive.

Key Takeaways

Prominent Russian milbloggers are reamplifying a longstanding Russian information operation that seeks to weaponize religion to discredit Ukraine.
Russian authorities continue measures to mobilize the struggling Russian defense industrial base (DIB) for a protracted war effort.
Russian Su-27 jets forced down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over the Black Sea in international airspace.
Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki stated on March 14 that Poland could supply MiG-29 multirole fighters to Ukraine within four-to-six weeks.
Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces continue building defenses along Russia’s border with Ukraine in order to pin Ukrainian troops to northern border areas.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces advanced within Bakhmut and continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka–Donetsk City frontline and in western Donetsk Oblast.
Russian forces continue fortifying rear areas in Russian occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.
United Russia Secretary Andrey Turchak announced on March 14 that the Russian State Duma will consider a law simplifying the legal recognition of missing Russian soldiers as dead.
Ukrainian partisans injured the Deputy Head of the Nova Kakhovka Occupation Military Administration in an improvised explosive device (IED) attack.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1—Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1— Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces continue building defenses along Russia’s border with Ukraine in order to pin Ukrainian troops to northern border areas. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 14 that Russian forces continue to construct fortifications along the border with Ukraine in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts and keep troops in Belgorod Oblast to perform demonstrative actions to keep Ukrainian forces from moving to other directions.[19] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may be constructing defensive fortifications to support an information operation that portrays Ukrainian forces as a direct threat to Russian territory.[20] ISW has not independently observed Russian forces deployed to these defenses, and any Russian personnel or equipment deployed to these areas would likely be better used elsewhere.

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line on March 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorichna (17km northeast) and Hryanykivka (17km northeast of Kupyansk).[21] Geolocated footage posted on March 14 showing a destroyed Ukrainian BMP-2 near defending Ukrainian soldiers indicates minor Russian advances toward Novoselivkse (14km northwest of Svatove).[22] A Russian news aggregator claimed on March 13 that Russian aviation and infantry fought near Yahidne (30km northwest of Svatove and directly east of Kupyansk). A Russian milblogger posted footage on March 14 claiming to show the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) operating near Svatove.[23] Russian forces additionally continued ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna), Chervonopopivka (6km northwest of Kreminna), Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna), Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) and Berestove (30km south of Kreminna).[24] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai reported that Russian forces in this area lose up to a company (30 to 100 personnel) per day but do not reduce the number of attacks on the Svatove-Kreminna line.[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Terny and Yampolivka (both 17km west of Kreminna) and attacked towards Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna) and Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna).[26] Geolocated combat footage posted on March 12 shows the BARS (Combat Reserve) unit “Kaskad” striking Ukrainian positions in the Serebrianske forest area southwest of Kreminna.[27]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces advanced within Bakhmut and continued ground attacks in and around the city on March 14. Geolocated footage posted on March 13 indicates that Russian forces have advanced along Sadova Street in southern Bakhmut.[28] Russian milbloggers widely claimed on March 14 that Wagner Group fighters captured the “Vostokmash” plant in the northern part of the AZOM complex in northwestern Bakhmut and posted images reportedly showing Wagner troops inside “Vostokmash.”[29] Russian sources additionally claimed that Wagner is advancing northwest of Bakhmut in the direction of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (12km northwest of Bakhmut), Zalizianske (9km northwest of Bakhmut), and Minkivka (15km northwest of Bakhmut).[30] One milblogger reported that the fighting is increasingly moving towards western Bakhmut and that Wagner fights are trying to reach the Khromove-Bohdanivka line, 5km west of Bakhmut.[31] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are conducting positional battles in and around Bakhmut and that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; north of Bakhmut near Vasyukivka (15km north); northwest of Bakhmut near Yahidne (1km northwest), Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest), Minkivka, and Hryhorivka (10km northwest), and west of Bakhmut near Khromove (5km west) and Ivanivske (5km west).[32] Russian forces have not succeeded in completing a turning movement, envelopment, or encirclement of Bakhmut as of March 14.

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline on March 14. Geolocated combat footage posted on March 13 shows that Russian troops have advanced east of Krasnohorivka (about 9km north of Avdiivka), which is consistent with Russian claims of a recent successful localized offensive in this area.[33] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Avdiivka itself; in the Avdiivka area near Kamianka (4km northeast of Avdiivka), Novokalynove (14km north of Avdiivka), and Severne (5km west of Avdiivka); on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Nevelske, Pervomaiske, and Neitalove; and on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Marinka, Novomykhailivka, and Pobieda.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continue to advance in Krasnohorivka and are trying to bypass Avdiivka by pushing northwest from the Opytne-Vodyane road.[35] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the N20 Donetsk City–Kostaintynivka–Kramatorsk highway near Kamianka.[36] Russian sources continue to claim that Russian forces are fighting within Marinka.[37]

Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack in western Donetsk Oblast on March 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Vuhledar, 30km southwest of Donetsk City.[38] Likely older combat footage posted on March 13 confirms that Russian forces have captured Neskuchne, 30km west of Vuhledar.[39] Russian milbloggers continue to claim that Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade elements are making unspecified advances in the dacha area southeast of Vuhledar.[40]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continue constructing fortifications in occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Geolocated images published on March 13 show Russian checkpoints and defensive structures south of Tokmak, Zaporizhia Oblast.[41] A Russian milblogger posted footage on March 14 purportedly visiting a Bashkort mobilized regiment and claimed that the regiment built 37km of trenches in Zaporizhia Oblast.[42] ISW previously reported that some Russian milbloggers speculate about a prospective Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine suggesting increasing concern in the Russian information space over Ukrainian combat power.[43]

Russian forces conducted routine shelling in Zaporizhia, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts on March 14.[44]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

United Russia Secretary Andrey Turchak announced on March 14 that the Russian State Duma will consider a law simplifying the legal recognition of missing Russian soldiers as dead.[45] The bill would consider a written statement from a missing soldier’s commander sufficient evidence to declare the soldier dead. The bill would also reduce the amount of time to declare a soldier as missing automatically from two years to six months, after which the soldier’s family can petition courts to declare the soldier dead.

A Russian milblogger claimed that a Russian federal subject that has taken responsibility over its unit has been successful in improving morale and comradery among the unit’s personnel. The milblogger claimed the ethnic composition of a majority Bashkort unit operating in Zaporizhia Oblast is a key factor in the regiment’s success and happiness, as these personnel already know each other and their commander.[46] The milblogger also claimed that the Republic of Bashkortostan monitors the unit and rotates out Bashkort personnel for two weeks of leave every 20 days and that many Bashkorts want to serve in this unit.

A Ukrainian official reported that the Wagner Group is recruiting in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov stated that Wagner forces are conducting a recruitment campaign in occupied Melitopol.[47] It is unclear whether Wagner’s recruitment campaign is purely online or if Wagner forces have a presence in Melitopol. ISW has previously reported on Wagner forces’ arrival in southern Ukraine.[48]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian partisans conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack against the Deputy Head of the Nova Kakhovka occupation Military Administration on March 14. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that the attack targeted occupation deputy Vitaly Gur’s car and that Gur has been hospitalized with injuries.[49] The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) conducted an information operation in August 2022 falsely claiming that Ukrainian partisans killed Gur in an effort to identify Ukrainian partisans.[50]

Russian occupation officials continue efforts to consolidate social control of occupied territories by targeting children and youth. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov posted footage on March 14 of preparations for the opening of the Zaporizhia Oblast branch of the military-patriotic “Yunarmia” branch.[51] Occupation officials are likely incentivizing involvement with the Yunarmia program in order to collect personal data on Ukrainian children upon registration with the organization and encourage children’s engagement with militarized Russian ideals. The Ukrainian Resistance Center also reported on March 14 that Russian occupation officials in Strilkove, Kherson Oblast, are forcing students and employees of educational institutions to sing the Russian national anthem during school, study the Russian constitution outside of school hours, and participate in a mandatory rhetorical extracurricular activity called “Conversations about the Important.”[52] Russian occupation officials continue to weaponize the education system in occupied areas to instill militaristic and pro-Russian sentiments in Ukrainian youth.

Russian occupation officials continue efforts to facilitate the financial and economic integration of occupied areas into the Russian system. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky stated on March 14 that pensioners must reapply for pensions by applying to the Russian Social Fund, in accordance with Russian legislation on provision of pensions.[53] By registering with the Social Fund, pensioners will provide personal information to the Russian occupation authority, and will likely only receive pension payments in rubles, which allows Russian occupation officials to coercively consolidate control of occupied areas at the expense of vulnerable pensioner populations. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin additionally met with Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Industry and Trade Denis Manturov on March 13 to discuss major developments in the industrial sector and integration of enterprises in occupied Donetsk Oblast into the Russian industrial sphere.[54]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Belarusian maneuver elements continue conducting exercises in Belarus. A mechanized element of the Belarusian 6th Mechanized Brigade conducted a combat readiness check on March 13 and will deploy to an unspecified area for further exercises.[55] The Belarusian Ministry of Defense announced on March 14 that the Belarusian military will continue conducting combat readiness checks as part of a planned Belarusian military call-up of Belarusian reservists in March 2023.[56]

The Kremlin continues to expand its control over the Belarusian information space under the rubric of military cooperation. Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Spokesperson Inna Gorbacheva and Belarusian military correspondents from the Belarusian MoD’s Vayar military news agency and VoenTV television channel met with correspondents from Russian state media RT and Russian milblogger Gleb Ervie at the Sputnik News press center in Minsk, Belarus, on March 14.[57] Gorbacheva stated that Belarusian military correspondents should improve their professional skills by learning from their Russian colleagues.[58] The Kremlin will likely further expand its control over the Belarusian information space — a campaign that Moscow intensified in August 2020 when Russian state media assumed direct control over Belarusian state media during the height of protests against Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko.[59]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://news.church dot ua/2023/03/10/zapovidnik-nadislav-kijevo-pecherskij-lavri-chergovij-ultimatum/#2023-03-14; https://strana dot best/news/427729-upts-nazvala-nezakonnym-trebovanie-pokinut-territoriju-kievo-pecherskoj-lavry.html; https://lavra dot ua/uk/zapovidnik-nadislav-kiyevo-pecherskij-lavri-chergovij-ultimatum/; https://mkip.gov dot ua/news/8776.html

[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010723

[3] https://t.me/strelkovii/4199; https://t.me/aleksandr_skif/2619

[4] https://t.me/strelkovii/4199

[5] https://t.me/aleksandr_skif/2619

[6] https://www.aei.org/op-eds/how-kremlin-uses-the-church-in-europes-east/

[7] https://www.aei.org/op-eds/how-kremlin-uses-the-church-in-europes-east/;... eu/the-great-orthodox-battle-amid-the-russian-invasion/

[8] https://ria dot ru/20230314/opk-1857826443.html; https://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70675

[9] https://t.me/mod_russia/24809

[10] https://ria dot ru/20230314/otsrochka-1857834657.html

[11] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/03/14/kak-bylo-posle-voyny-zaymy-na-vosstanovlenie-narodnogo-hozyaystva-minfin-predlozhil-vypuskat-v-rossii-patrioticheskie-obligatsii; https://www.interfax dot ru/business/890924; https://www.rbc dot ru/finances/14/03/2023/641053319a794781dcfb28f4?from=from_main_10

[12] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1635535592518828033/photo/1; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[13] https://szru.gov dot ua/news-media/publications/130323-ukraina-i-svit--proty-rosiiskoi-ahresii-sanktsii-v-dii

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[15] https://www.eucom.mil/pressrelease/42314/russian-aircraft-collides-into-...

[16] https://t.me/mod_russia/24818

[17] https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA198-9.html; https://twitt...

[18] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/slovak-defence-minister-says-time-d...

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kQByt7TEN6VTACGGJq...

[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qoQRmN2rvpXewa9xQv...

[22] https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/status/1635564188280946688

[23] https://t.me/sashakots/38842

[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qoQRmN2rvpXewa9xQv...

[25] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/9241

[26] https://t.me/readovkanews/54617; https://t.me/wargonzo/11381

[27] https://twitter.com/War_cube_/status/1635406666501091329?s=20; https://twitter.com/War_cube_/status/1635406865353027584?s=20; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/40398

[28] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1635421996162109440?s=20; https... https://twitter.com/M0nstas/status/1635382808280702976

[29] https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1635594754011574273 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/80401; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/80398; http... https://t.me/milchronicles/1665

[30] https://t.me/readovkanews/54617; https://t.me/wargonzo/11381

[31] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46061

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kQByt7TEN6VTACGGJq...

[33] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1635423504395804681?s=20; https... https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1635417123744022528?s=20

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kQByt7TEN6VTACGGJq...

[35] https://t.me/readovkanews/54617

[36] https://t.me/wargonzo/11381

[37] https://t.me/wargonzo/11381; https://t.me/readovkanews/54617

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qoQRmN2rvpXewa9xQv...

[39] https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1635338847117557760; https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/status/1635334029435338753

[40] https://t.me/readovkanews/54617; https://t.me/grey_zone/17740; . http... https://t.me/milinfolive/97879

[41] https://twitter.com/tiamat007/status/1635317428820508673?s=20; https://...

[42] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7332

[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kQByt7TEN6VTACGGJq...

[45] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/03/14/gosduma-uprostit-priznanie-pogibshimi-uchastnikov-voyny-v-ukraine-eto-pomozhet-ih-semyam-bystree-poluchit-kompensatsionnye-vyplaty

[46] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7329

[47] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/1513

[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[49] https://www.facebook.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid02gvNQTahijjfXF4kBWsZLA...

[50] https://t.me/hueviyherson/36382; https://t.me/bazabazon/16333; https:/... dot ru/social/2022/09/12/15438517.shtml; https://www.1tv dot ru/news/2022-09-12/437544-instsenirovka_vo_imya_spaseniya_zamglavy_novoy_kahovki_vitaliy_gura_kotorogo_schitali_pogibshim_zhiv; https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/08/06/na-pivdni-odrazu-dva-gaulyajtera-perebuvayut-u-vazhkomu-stani/ ; https://ria dot ru/20220806/pokushenie-1807714966.html?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop; https://t.me/rian_ru/173599; https://real-vin dot com/na-hersonshhine-ubit-gauljajter; https://news.liga dot net/politics/news/v-novoy-kahovke-podstelili-vidnogo-kollaboranta-on-v-bolnitse-v-tyajelom-sostoyanii; https://ru.slovoidilo dot ua/2022/08/06/novost/bezopasnost/xersonshhine-ubili-vysokopostavlennogo-kollaboranta-vitaliya-guru; https://focus dot ua/voennye-novosti/524630-v-hersonskoy-oblasti-sovershili-pokushenie-na-kollaboranta-guru-chto-izvestno-video; tass dot com/world/1490371

[51] https://t.me/vrogov/8126

[52] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/03/14/vorog-zajmayetsya-rusyfikacziyeyu-ukrayinskyh-ditej-na-tot/

[53] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/864

[54] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3250

[55] https://t.me/modmilby/24423

[56] https://t.me/modmilby/24426

[57] https://t.me/modmilby/24444; https://sputnik dot by/20230314/voennye-umeyut-govorit-o-mire-kak-nikto-drugoy--gorbacheva-1073204623.html

[58] https://t.me/modmilby/24444; https://sputnik dot by/20230314/voennye-umeyut-govorit-o-mire-kak-nikto-drugoy--gorbacheva-1073204623.html

[59] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-mos...

New US nuclear chief takes fresh stance on sea-launched cruise missile

Defense News · by Bryant Harris · March 14, 2023

WASHINGTON — The new head of U.S. Strategic Command, which oversees the country’s nuclear arsenal, is taking a less forceful tone on developing the sea-launched cruise missile than his predecessor, who was an unabashed champion of the program.

Gen. Anthony Cotton neither endorsed nor repudiated the sea-launched cruise missile nuclear program, commonly called SLCM-N, in a February letter to Congress. The letter — entered into the congressional record during Cotton’s testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee last week — and the Biden administration’s proposed nuclear arsenal budget for fiscal 2024 lay the groundwork for another tussle with Congress over whether to proceed with SLCM-N.

“A low-yield, non-ballistic nuclear capability to deter, assure and respond without visible generation (similar to the characteristics of SLCM-N) offers additional options and supports an integrated deterrence approach,” Cotton wrote. “It is one of several possible nuclear or conventional capabilities the U.S. could develop to enhance strategic deterrence.

“I support funding to address the full range of possible options to address this challenge in a rapidly changing security environment with the backdrop of multiple adversaries.”

Congress authorized $25 million for continued SLCM-N research and development when it passed the FY23 National Defense Authorization Act in December. By contrast, the Biden administration’s FY24 budget request for the National Nuclear Security Administration does not include SLCM-N funding.

Proponents of SLCM-N in Congress heavily relied on Cotton’s predecessor, Adm. Charles Richard, to argue in favor of what they view as gaps in the United States’ low-yield, unobservable nuclear capabilities. In his own letter to Congress in June, Richard wrote that he supports SLCM-N despite the Biden administration’s attempts to cancel it, citing “the current situation in Ukraine and China’s nuclear trajectory.”

Richard retired when Cotton assumed leadership of Strategic Command in December.

“Cotton, who’s taking a more measured approach, is still open to it, but he’s not the adamant supporter that Richard was at all,” said Stephen Young, who lobbies for the Union of Concerned Scientists, a nuclear nonproliferation advocacy group. “He’s not wedded to that as the only possible way to fill that gap.”

Young noted that the W76-2 warhead equipped on submarine-launched ballistic missiles already provides the U.S. with a low-yield, unobservable capability — even if the country doesn’t have cruise missiles with those specific functions. Additionally, he argued that the U.S. is building the low-yield B61-12 gravity bomb that can launch from the new B-21 stealth bomber as a non-ballistic nuclear option.

“To me it’s a huge stretch to have to have all these things,” said Young, arguing that SLCM-N is “a nuclear warfighting tool that we don’t need” to achieve deterrence.

The proposed FY24 nuclear weapons budget also includes funding to maintain the B83 megaton gravity bomb, which is 80 to 100 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, during World War II. The Biden administration wants to retire the B83, per its Nuclear Posture Review, but has yet to lay out a time frame to do so.

In the meantime, Congress used the FY23 defense authorization bill to prevent its retirement until the Pentagon identifies a replacement capability to strike hard and deeply buried targets.

“We are going to have to figure out how we are going to continue [with] what capabilities we have to go after [hard and deeply buried targets], whether conventional or nuclear,” Cotton told the Senate Armed Services Committee last week.

But Young argued that “there are very few scenarios where” the U.S. would want to strike hard and deeply buried targets using the B83 given the immense level of destruction that would ensue.

“If you want to hit the various facilities in North Korea and drop the larger bomb, you’ve got fallout — all of South Korea and Japan,” Young said.

About Bryant Harris

Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered U.S. foreign policy, national security, international affairs and politics in Washington since 2014. He has also written for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.

3. China and Russia Denounce U.S., Allies Over Submarine Deal

We have their attention!

China and Russia Denounce U.S., Allies Over Submarine Deal

Beijing and Moscow express concern over weapons proliferation from Aukus arrangement

https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-and-russia-denounce-u-s-allies-over-submarine-deal-acdb18ee?utm_source=pocket_saves

By James T. AreddyFollow

March 14, 2023 5:29 pm ET

Moscow joined Beijing in criticizing as provocative and destabilizing a plan set this week to speed the sale of U.S. nuclear-powered submarines and technology to Australia, with both U.S. rivals expressing concern that the arrangement risks further proliferation of weapons.

President Biden hosted Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak on Monday in San Diego as they moved ahead with the submarine plans within their existing alliance and a grouping known as Aukus.

As part of Mr. Biden’s focus on strengthening alliance ties in the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. will sell as many as five U.S. Virginia-class submarines to Australia to provide it with nuclear-powered subs in the 2030s. Mr. Biden said the submarines won’t carry nuclear weapons.

Submarine production would later shift to Britain and Australia, which would incorporate American technology into a new design. Those subs are projected to enter the Australian fleet in the 2040s.

China has been highly vocal in its opposition to Aukus since the security arrangement was announced in September 2021.

The security pact reflects “a typical Cold War mentality,” a spokesman for China’s Foreign Ministry, Wang Wenbin, told a regular briefing in Beijing on Tuesday. He claimed the cooperation undermines international agreements to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Virginia-class submarine USS North Dakota. The U.S. is expected to sell as many as five of these nuclear-powered submarines to Australia.

PHOTO: US NAVY/REUTERS

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Moscow has “a lot of questions” connected with nuclear nonproliferation because of plans of the U.S.-UK-Australia grouping. “Of course, special transparency is needed here,” he told reporters Tuesday.

The three countries formed a trilateral security alliance in 2021 called Aukus—an acronym for Australia, the U.K. and the U.S.

President Biden, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, left, and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak at a summit meeting.

PHOTO: STEFAN ROUSSEAU/ZUMA PRESS

Ties have remained warm between Moscow and Beijing, although they don’t have a formal military alliance.

China’s Mr. Wang told reporters that the Aukus submarine cooperation will involve “the transfer of large amounts of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium from nuclear weapon states to a nonnuclear weapon state, which poses a serious nuclear proliferation risk and violates the purpose and object of the [nonproliferation treaty].”

In Beijing’s view, Aukus may trigger nuclear proliferation, encourage an arms race and undermine regional prosperity and stability, in addition to heralding a new Cold War, according to statements published by its Foreign Ministry.

Mr. Wang said Tuesday that the three countries “have totally disregarded the concerns of the international community and gone further down the wrong and dangerous path.”

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov cited the Aukus pact, as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s increasing attention to Asia, as evidence that the Anglo-Saxon world “is making a very serious bid for confrontation for many, many years to come.” He added, “I can’t imagine how the great Asian civilizations will simply take it.”

The USS Sterett and submarine USS Charlotte as President Biden, U.K. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced the submarine deal at Naval Base Point Miramar in San Diego.

PHOTO: ETIENNE LAURENT/SHUTTERSTOCK

A report this week from Daniel Russel, vice president for International Security and Diplomacy at New York-based Asia Society Policy Institute, predicted that Aukus will encourage Beijing to spend more on its own submarines and anti-submarine programs. “For China, drawing European powers like the U.K. deeper into Asia’s security mix may be even more disturbing than the prospect of Australia acquiring nuclear-powered submarines,” he said.

Submarines are already a major focus of China’s fast-expanding navy, the world’s largest. The People’s Liberation Army is expected to maintain 60 to 70 submarines through the 2020s, and already has 12 nuclear-powered submarines, according to a U.S. Defense Department study published last year.

—Evan Gershkovich in Moscow contributed to this article.

Write to James T. Areddy at James.Areddy@wsj.com

4. In a First, Army Selects Pilot to Command Delta Force

Excerpts:

E Squadron’s ascent was marked by what the retired special operations aviator called a “long history of infighting as to whether or not that little organization … belonged in Delta,” because Delta, being primarily a ground organization, “didn’t provide the oversight” of aviation-specific issues and regulations. “A senior aviation commander needs to know the right questions to ask when confronted by people requesting to deviate from regulations,” the retired special operations aviator said.

The solution to keeping E Squadron in Delta was to make command of the squadron a second command, meaning that its leader had already commanded another battalion-level aviation unit, and therefore would have a higher “level of maturity” and experience when taking over E Squadron, the retired special operations aviator said.

Notable E Squadron alumni include Gen. (retired) Dick Cody, a former Army vice chief of staff, who commanded the unit, as did the current Army G-8, Lt. Gen. Erik Peterson. Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville served as the unit’s S-3, or director of operations, early in his career.

Now the selection of a former E Squadron commander to lead the Army’s most elite direct-action force has validated the work of many to build and maintain the unit’s unique capabilities, according to the former Delta ground squadron officer. “It shows how far the development of air squadron has come over the years,” he said.

In a First, Army Selects Pilot to Command Delta Force

“Everyone is flabbergasted”

https://thehighside.substack.com/p/in-a-historic-first-the-next-commander

Sean D. Naylor

Mar 14

Courtesy of DVIDs, Photo by Cpl. Joseph Abrego

In a historic first, the Army has selected an aviation officer as the next commander of Delta Force, its premier ground special operations unit.

The officer, a “well respected” colonel who is Delta’s current deputy commander and previously commanded the unit’s air squadron, will take command in June, according to a former Delta member. The High Side is choosing not to release the incoming commander’s name.

The assignment is a recognition that Delta’s role, and therefore its commander’s responsibilities, have evolved significantly during its 45-year-plus history.

Since its inception in late 1977, Delta (the full name of which is 1^st Special Forces Operational Detachment – Delta) has always been commanded by a colonel with a ground warfare background, typically from the Army’s infantry or Special Forces branches. In recent decades, 75^th Ranger Regiment alumni have dominated the unit’s officer ranks, so the news that the board that selects lieutenant colonel and colonel-level commanders for the Army’s special mission units, or SMUs (pronounced “smoos”), had picked an aviator came as a shock to many Delta veterans.

“The SMU board made a hard decision which I’m sure was very unpopular in the SF and Ranger world,” a former unit member said. “Talk about a paradigm shift … It’s a big shift in mentality.”

“Everyone is flabbergasted”

Delta has four “line” ground squadrons (A, B, C and D) and a reconnaissance squadron (G Squadron), each commanded by a lieutenant colonel, but only one air squadron, named E, or Echo, Squadron. “I’m sure a lot of A, B and C Squadron commanders are upset by it,” said the former Delta member, who said he was “shocked” when he heard the news, adding that he was not alone. “I think everyone is flabbergasted that he had a chance and that he won.”

The Army’s special mission unit board consists of senior officers who have all served in a SMU. The board selects the squadron and unit commanders for Delta and the intelligence special mission unit nicknamed Task Force Orange, as well as for the 1^st Battalion of the 160 Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne). (Army Special Operations Command, which exercises administrative control over Delta, did not respond to a request for comment from The High Side.)

But while Delta’s aviators are stunned but “happy” that the board selected one of their own to command the unit, the former Delta member said, the ground squadron operators have adopted a “wait and see” attitude because they “know he’s a good guy.”

“The guys inside the unit seem to be okay with it,” said a retired special operations aviator. And a former Delta troop commander (the squadrons are subdivided into troops) said that on a recent visit to the Delta headquarters he detected no negativity over the selection of the next commander.

For some special operations aviation officers, the decision is just a question of fairness. Noting that Delta has five ground squadrons (plus a support squadron) and one air squadron, the retired special operations aviator said that “based on these numbers” it would “stand to reason” that an E Squadron alumnus should command the unit “periodically.”

Others saw a validation of Delta’s – and the wider Army’s – system for promoting and assigning officers. “It shows the strength of our system and our selection process,” said a former ground squadron officer. “We select the right person for the job. That doesn’t mean it has to be the right door-kicker.”

The former Delta troop commander concurred. “In some ways it’s significant” that for the first time the board selected an aviation officer, the former troop commander said. However, he added, “if he’s the best officer for the position, he’s the best officer for the position.”

One reason why the ground operators have been more accepting of the news about the new commander than might have been expected earlier in Delta’s history is because the unit commander’s job has changed over time.

Established as the U.S. military’s premier hostage-rescue force in the wake of several major airline hijackings and other terrorist attacks, by the time of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks Delta was just one of several special mission units in the growing empire run by Joint Special Operations Command, which the Pentagon created more than three years after Delta. In the years after 9/11, JSOC (pronounced “jay-sock”) became the U.S. military’s main effort in its counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, meaning it – and Delta – had to quickly transform from formations structured for short, occasional missions to organizations designed for year-round operations.

“A strategic-level command”

Under the command of then-Lt. Gen. Stan McChrystal, JSOC put Delta in charge of the command’s operations in the Iraq theater of operations, a role it has continued to fill in both Iraq and Syria in the war against the Islamic State. The Delta commander’s job has thus evolved from one that required close oversight of missions that were inherently tactical, albeit with potential strategic consequences, to one of running an unrelenting transnational campaign. “It’s a strategic-level command,” said the former ground squadron officer. “The unit commander really becomes the [joint task force] commander in Iraq and other places.”

As another former Delta member said, “he’s not leading assaults, he’s managing a unit.”

In addition, according to the former ground squadron officer, the fact that, unlike a regular infantry brigade with its hundreds of junior enlisted soldiers, Delta’s squadrons are composed mostly of senior non-commissioned and field grade commissioned officers means that Delta commanders traditionally have not interfered much with their subordinates’ tactical decisions. “At the troop level, we never had a discussion with the unit commander about things like that,” he said. Meanwhile, from the perspective of officers and NCOs in squadron headquarters, the Delta commander’s job “was keeping JSOC off our backs.”

The incoming commander’s aviation experience will be an asset when it comes to coordinating the use of aerial “enablers,” particularly intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, according to former special operators. “It’s very easy for a ground guy to be parochial and go, ‘Oh, he’s not a ground operator,’” said the former ground squadron officer. “But at the same time, the ground operators, their biggest issues are what are these assets and enablers that can support the ground, and a[n aviation] guy like that can be very beneficial.”

The former E Squadron commander should have little trouble asserting his authority over the seasoned NCOs of the ground squadrons, even though the selection process for E Squadron differs markedly from the grueling “Long Walk” for ground operators, according to the former troop commander. “Assessment and selection [for the air squadron] is different because it’s for a different formation,” he said. “I don’t think it’s a big deal that they haven’t done that.”

E Squadron began life in 1981 as a small separate unit named Seaspray that flew clandestine and covert missions both for military special operators and for the CIA. It was based at Fort Eustis, Virginia, close to the CIA training facility known as “The Farm” at Camp Peary, Virginia.

After a year under the command of the 160^th(then called Task Force 160), in 1989 Seaspray became Delta’s aviation element and was renamed E Squadron. But it remained at Eustis, about 200 miles away from the rest of Delta, which has always been located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. E Squadron was often known by its longtime cover name, Flight Concepts Division, and in official unclassified publications its commander was referred to as the division’s director.

Although E Squadron, which includes multiple rotary and fixed-wing troops, draws many of its personnel from the better-known 160^th, its missions differ significantly from its larger cousin. Whereas the 160^th is a purely overt military organization, E Squadron’s ability to provide both air crews and aircraft with fictitious intelligence-style backstories, or “covers,” made it one of the U.S. government’s few “covered air” units. As I describe in my book “Relentless Strike – The Secret History of Joint Special Operations Command,” the squadron has traditionally had “three basic missions: ‘sensor’ – visual reconnaissance and surveillance missions … ; ‘shooter’ – using civilian-style helicopters as attack aircraft; and ‘transport’ – moving special mission unit operators and other sensitive personnel covertly.”

It was the squadron’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support to Delta’s missions hunting war criminals in the former Yugoslavia that began the process of bonding it more closely with the rest of the unit, according to the former ground squadron officer. “It actually started in the late Nineties in the Balkans, because we were so tightly tied in with the ISR aircraft that they were flying over there for us,” he said.

The integration of E Squadron increased even further after the Sept. 11 attacks. “After 9/11, we, the ground elements, made a conscious decision” to involve the air squadron more closely in day-to-day unit business, the former ground squadron officer said. “It’s easy when people are geographically separated not to be integrated, but we made a conscious decision to do that, and they did too.”

E Squadron’s ascent was marked by what the retired special operations aviator called a “long history of infighting as to whether or not that little organization … belonged in Delta,” because Delta, being primarily a ground organization, “didn’t provide the oversight” of aviation-specific issues and regulations. “A senior aviation commander needs to know the right questions to ask when confronted by people requesting to deviate from regulations,” the retired special operations aviator said.

The solution to keeping E Squadron in Delta was to make command of the squadron a second command, meaning that its leader had already commanded another battalion-level aviation unit, and therefore would have a higher “level of maturity” and experience when taking over E Squadron, the retired special operations aviator said.

Notable E Squadron alumni include Gen. (retired) Dick Cody, a former Army vice chief of staff, who commanded the unit, as did the current Army G-8, Lt. Gen. Erik Peterson. Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville served as the unit’s S-3, or director of operations, early in his career.

Now the selection of a former E Squadron commander to lead the Army’s most elite direct-action force has validated the work of many to build and maintain the unit’s unique capabilities, according to the former Delta ground squadron officer. “It shows how far the development of air squadron has come over the years,” he said.

5. A two-front test of wills: Defeating Russia and deterring China

Conclusion:

While other NATO members are doing more than they have in decades, thanks to the efforts of the Trump and Biden administrations and Putin’s latest blatant aggression, they need to do more as long as the Russian threat to their individual and collective security persists. But more than weapons, the Western will to resist aggression will determine the outcome. To avoid a two-front war, the West must win the two-front test of wills.

A two-front test of wills: Defeating Russia and deterring China

BY JOSEPH BOSCO, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 03/14/23 10:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3898611-a-two-front-test-of-wills-defeating-russia-and-deterring-china/?utm_source=pocket_saves

Last October, a group of 30 congressional Democrats wrote to President Biden quoting his commitment to avoid direct military conflict with Russia and “World War III, something we must strive to prevent.”

They noted Biden’s call for an end to the fighting: “There’s going to have to be a negotiated settlement here [but] Vladimir Putin doesn’t have a way out right now, and I’m trying to figure out what we do about that,” he said.

They urged the president to push for immediate negotiations, saying, “It is America’s responsibility to pursue every diplomatic avenue to support such a solution that is acceptable to the people of Ukraine.”

Though some administration statements also seemed to be pressing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to scale back his intentions to expel Russian forces from all occupied Ukrainian territory, the letter was widely seen as undermining Ukraine’s position and caused a strong backlash in the Congress and the White House. It was retracted days later.

On the Republican side, a smaller number of House members also began to waver regarding support for Ukraine, voicing concerns about the escalating financial costs of the conflict and seeking greater accountability for U.S. funding.

Despite these outliers, overwhelming majorities of both parties in the House and Senate strongly support the U.S. weapons flow to Ukraine and, if anything, criticize it as being too slow and limited.

Last week, however, Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) went beyond the financial issue and derogated the U.S. effort directly on national security grounds. He argued that managing and utilizing America’s finite military capacities is a zero-sum game and he criticized those who want to spend resources now in Ukraine, instead of husbanding them for a possible conflict with China. “They want us to believe we can fight an endless proxy war in Ukraine,” he said. “And somehow, this won’t impact our ability to deter China from invading Taiwan.”

While most observers lament the nation’s political divisions, Hawley complains of the opposite — the bipartisan consensus that prevails on defending both Ukraine and Taiwan. “Curiously enough, this story of American omnicompetence isn’t really partisan,” he said “… [N]eoconservatives on the right, and liberal globalists on the left … make up the ‘Uniparty’ — the D.C. establishment that transcends all changing administrations.”

Hawley employs language that resonates with longstanding leftist attacks on the United States. “We hear a lot these days about something called the ‘rules-based international order,’” he said. “… It is a kind of American liberal empire. … That imperial project failed. It failed disastrously.”

China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin agree with Hawley’s condemnation of moralistic American overreach. “[T]he advocacy of democracy and human rights must not be used to put pressure on other countries. … Such attempts at hegemony pose serious threats to global and regional peace and stability and undermine the stability of the world order,” they declared in their joint statement proclaiming a “no-limits strategic partnership” weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022.

Hawley’s broadside at the “Uniparty’s” strategic foreign policy failures is only half-right. He correctly identifies the colossal misjudgment on China, saying: “All the way back in December 2001, we admitted China into the World Trade Organization [WTO]. The Uniparty wanted to believe that … maybe we could democratize China. Maybe, if we brought China into the global economic order, horrors like Tiananmen Square could be a thing of the past. … That was a catastrophic mistake.”

When I testified against China’s entry into WTO before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2000, Chairman Jesse Helms asked if I thought its admission “would change China.” I said I feared “it would change us.”

Yet, in the past six years, the foreign policy establishment has revised its assessment of both China’s growing capabilities and its hostile intentions. The precedent-breaking policies and speeches by officials in the Trump administration, extended through Biden’s alliance-building and focus on the existential competition between democracies and dictatorships, have governments around the world responding to China’s threats in order to protect the very rules-based international order that Hawley mocks.

The so-called Uniparty is finally getting China right — though important segments of the business community in the U.S. and abroad still put profits before national security interests.

Similarly, regarding Ukraine, the foreign policy establishment has awakened to the need to confront Putin’s revanchist ambitions — after allowing him to invade and occupy large swaths of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014.

But Hawley sees no nexus between the aggression of one dictator and that of another, even when they pledge support for each other’s ambitions — or when the same tyrant carries out his aggression in phases, as Putin did, or incrementally, as Xi is doing.

“Right now, we have Uniparty leaders and former NATO brass telling us that defending Ukraine is basically the same thing as deterring China — that if one dictator is allowed to seize territory by force, it’ll embolden others, and so stopping Vladimir Putin is basically the same thing as stopping Xi Jinping,” Hawley said.

“This is the Uniparty’s magical thinking at work. It’s rooted in the fanciful idea that if we want to stop tyrants, all we need to do is show them we’re not afraid — that if we stand up to one bully, all the others will just slink away. That’s Hollywood. That’s not reality.”

That’s also not exactly what anyone is saying. The history of World War II, the Korean War and the Cold War shows what happens when aggression goes unchecked — the world gets more of it, not less.

When Xi sides with Russia on Ukraine— “[China] oppose[s] further enlargement of NATO and call[s] on the North Atlantic Alliance to abandon its ideologized cold war approaches” — and when Putin “confirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China” — the interconnection between revanchist Russian and Chinese Communist Party aggression could not be clearer.

But Hawley does make a valid point on NATO burden-sharing: “We cannot meet Ukrainian, Taiwanese and our own military requirements all at the same time, for the foreseeable future. And, frankly, we shouldn’t have to. Some of the world’s wealthiest nations are our allies in Europe. But right now, we’re the only ones doing the heavy lifting. In fact, we’ve sent more weapons to Ukraine than all of Europe has, combined.”

While other NATO members are doing more than they have in decades, thanks to the efforts of the Trump and Biden administrations and Putin’s latest blatant aggression, they need to do more as long as the Russian threat to their individual and collective security persists. But more than weapons, the Western will to resist aggression will determine the outcome. To avoid a two-front war, the West must win the two-front test of wills.

Joseph Bosco served as China country director for the secretary of Defense from 2005 to 2006 and as Asia-Pacific director of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from 2009 to 2010. He served in the Pentagon when Vladimir Putin invaded Georgia and was involved in Department of Defense discussions about the U.S. response. Follow him on Twitter @BoscoJosephA.

6. Ukraine's Military Intelligence Chief Predicts How War Will End

Excerpts:

Budanov predicts that the coming months will see decisive battles that will significantly impact how this war ends. And his prediction about the end leads right back to Crimea, the area of Ukraine that was taken by Russian force in 2014, with no real cost imposed by the rest of the world.

“It all started there, and it will end there, with the return of Crimea,” he tells The Cipher Brief. “Because in any other case, we will only be postponing the conflict for the future and I don’t think anyone will allow this. What forms and methods will we use to achieve this goal? The answer is any option that allows us to regain control is acceptable to us. That means force and diplomacy. The war did not only begin in Crimea for me. This is where it started for our whole country and the Russian Federation, too. And this is where it will end.”

Ukraine's Military Intelligence Chief Predicts How War Will End

MARCH 13TH, 2023 BY THE CIPHER BRIEF | 0 COMMENTS

thecipherbrief.com · March 13, 2023

Kyiv, Ukraine – As Ukraine announces a planned counteroffensive in the Spring, the head of the country’s Main Intelligence Directorate, Major General Kyrylo Budanov, is predicting that the coming battles will be ‘decisive’.

It’s not the first prediction that the general, who has grown up professionally in the ranks of military intelligence, has made. He is one of the few members of President Volodymyr Zelensky’s inner circle who – just over a year ago – didn’t believe that Russia was simply ‘training’ the troops that were assembling along Ukraine’s border, as Moscow falsely claimed. Budanov was one of the few who warned President Zelensky that Russia was preparing to launch an invasion.

“I was relying only on facts,” he says, speaking from the heavily fortified headquarters he now calls both office and home, near Ukraine’s capital. “All the information that we had, all the available data, was pointing to an invasion.”

A year later, as the media speculated about a new Russian offensive that could give President Vladimir Putin a much-needed win to mark the anniversary of the invasion, Budanov dismissed the notion of a ‘mythical Russian offensive’.

“The so-called Russian offensive is already underway,” he told The Cipher Brief in mid-February, before some of the heavier recent fighting began. “It is taking place on the territory, mostly now, of Donetsk Oblast, and in principle, there is nothing new in it. It will go on as it is going on now. But this dramatically differs from what the media is saying. People are waiting for some mythical date when a thousand tanks will move forward, and 400 planes will advance at 4 a.m. It won’t happen that way.”

If it seems like Budanov sees this war through a no-nonsense filter, it’s probably because he does. His headquarters, tucked deep inside a fortified island compound, is encircled by armed guards, concrete blocks and barbed wire fencing. In the lobby outside his office, armed guards greet visitors entering the dimly-lit reception room with an eye of suspicion. That could be in part, because of the many reported assassination attempts made against him, something the general brushes off.

“I’ve been through a certain number of them,” he says, “so it doesn’t surprise me at all. When people go to work like this, they should realize that this is basically an inherent part of their future life.”

On the day The Cipher Brief visited, Budanov’s assistant sat behind a large wooden desk near the door to the main office. Two men, dressed in suits and ties, looked uncomfortably out of place, shifting their weight from one foot to another, standing almost in the shadows. The only light in the room emanated from a large TV screen that was playing a Shrek movie with the volume turned down. “Who are the men in suits,” we asked our interpreter. “Probably here trying to sell him something,” he whispered back.

Ukraine is certainly in the market for military technology that can push this war toward a faster end by ensuring a Russian defeat. So far, aid from western countries has come at a slower pace than what is transpiring on the battlefield. It’s no secret that President Zelensky has used his charisma on the world stage in every forum imaginable to ask for more equipment, including tanks and F-16 fighter jets. Budanov says Kyiv also needs artillery systems because at the moment, there is a lack of artillery barrels. Attack helicopters would also be helpful, he tells us.

“Taking into account that we are preparing to take back territories that are being temporarily occupied, we need more capabilities for offensive actions,” he says. “Air defense allows us to provide cover for operations like this.”

Officials in Kyiv have also been asking for Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) that are capable of reaching deep into Crimea, where Iranian drones are routinely launched in support of the Russian invasion (drones that were detected circling the capital city on one of the nights The Cipher Brief was there).

“As we prepare to regain control of the temporarily uncontrolled territories, we need everything possible to conduct an offensive operation,” Budanov says. “We need air defense equipment to cover our troops as they advance and to cover important facilities in all other parts of Ukraine.”

Budanov also says that alliances with western intelligence agencies have proven extremely effective in this war, though he says sometimes, his troops need faster access to satellite imagery because of how quickly things are moving on the battlefront.

“Cooperation with the military intelligence community and with the United States of America, is of the highest priority for us,” he says. “This may come as a bit of a surprise, but we don’t just receive intelligence. They also receive data from us. This is actually a real alliance.”

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Budanov says that intelligence sharing and cooperation has only increased since the start of the war, particularly in the areas of early warning, offering him and his senior leaders a much more comprehensive picture of what’s happening in the air and space above Ukraine and parts of Russia.

“This is very important for us,” he says, “because let’s just say, from the moment the missile is prepared and launched, to its actual arrival at the target, a little time passes. Sometimes we see it, sometimes we don’t, and our partners help to complete this picture so that we have time to prepare and take necessary actions.”

Budanov spoke with The Cipher Brief from his office, where the windows were piled high with sandbags. They reach high enough to keep out most of the light, which seems to be a comfortable environment for the general.

As he talked about what his country needed to win this war, two frogs kept in a dark corner aquarium tried in vain to climb the slippery walls. When the war started, Budanov and his wife made the decision to move to the compound for the duration of the war and they brought the frogs with them because, as he explains, he couldn’t leave them behind.

Across from his massive desk, another large screen hangs on the wall – this one filled with maps and what appear to be satellite images. And in another corner, stands a cage with two chirping birds.

“It’s a live detector of poisonous substances,” he explains. “These birds are very susceptible. If they detect the slightest concentration of a poisonous substance, they will die immediately.”

At 37-years-old, Budanov is one of the country’s youngest and perhaps most eclectic, leaders. He seems to take pride in doing things the old-fashioned way. For example, most of the intelligence that crosses his desk comes on a piece of paper.

“We do this to avoid leaks,” he says. “Everything comes only in paper form. Paper reports can only be obtained, shall we say, if you physically get them, so this way, interception is nearly impossible.”

Some of the intelligence reports that the general has been focused on over the past year, have been about the make-up of Russia’s fighting force, with much of the intelligence coming from Russians troops captured on the battlefield. Budanov said recently captured Russian soldiers hailed from a Russian Marine Unit, the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade. The brigade reportedly suffered devastating losses over the course of a recent three-week offensive in Vuhledar, a mining town along the Ukrainian-Russian border that has been demolished by fierce fighting. Media reports described the Russian unit that was lost there as an ‘elite brigade,’ but Budanov says that’s not consistent with his intelligence.

“The vast majority of people who were taken prisoner during these hostilities are only conditionally, marines,” he says. “Ninety percent of them are crew members who were taken directly from the ships. These are engineers, mechanics, and the crew of conventional warships. But since the Russian Federation has very significant problems with manning and training, they lack, quite simply, people. So, they were simply transferred to the 155th brigade and were told that from this day on, you are now marines, and the next day, relatively speaking, they went into battle.”

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While Russia is believed to be sending additional troops to replace those it lost in places like Vuldehar, Budanov doesn’t believe Moscow has reserves of well-trained fighters to draw on, leading him to another prediction.

“I am sure it will be over in a fairly short time.” he says. “I don’t share the opinion that this conflict will last long for one simple reason, Russia realizes that it cannot drag it out for long. With all their actions, they are trying to show that they are ready for a long-term conflict, but in reality, it’s the exact opposite.”

Budanov predicts that the coming months will see decisive battles that will significantly impact how this war ends. And his prediction about the end leads right back to Crimea, the area of Ukraine that was taken by Russian force in 2014, with no real cost imposed by the rest of the world.

“It all started there, and it will end there, with the return of Crimea,” he tells The Cipher Brief. “Because in any other case, we will only be postponing the conflict for the future and I don’t think anyone will allow this. What forms and methods will we use to achieve this goal? The answer is any option that allows us to regain control is acceptable to us. That means force and diplomacy. The war did not only begin in Crimea for me. This is where it started for our whole country and the Russian Federation, too. And this is where it will end.”

Follow Cipher Brief CEO & Publisher Suzanne Kelly on LinkedIn and Twitter for 30 images in 30 days: behind-the-scenes pictures from The Cipher Brief’s reporting in Ukraine

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thecipherbrief.com · March 13, 2023

7. American Power and the Defense of Taiwan

Excerpts:

The White House and the new Congress should double down on efforts to support Taiwan—including keeping the Senate bipartisan coalition that championed the Taiwan Policy Act together—and focus on what needs to be done in the time available in the new Congress. This coalition must collaborate with allies in the House of Representatives, including the new House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party.

To deter China from aggression, American leaders should work together to implement the reforms necessary to speed up arms for Taiwan for its effective defense, and to preserve American strategic interests in the region.

American Power and the Defense of Taiwan

By Matt Salmon & Shay Stautz

March 15, 2023

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/03/15/american_power_and_the_defense_of_taiwan_887323.html?mc_cid=d6bcb4203d&mc_eid=70bf478f36

Bottom Line

Washington is increasingly concerned that China will invade Taiwan at some point in the foreseeable future.
Xi Jinping views “reunifying” Taiwan with China as an existential task for the ruling Communist Party. For the United States, preserving the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is critical for American security and economic interests—any Chinese invasion of the island will almost certainly trigger American intervention in its defense.
To deter Chinese military action against Taiwan, the United States should encourage the “porcupine” arms strategy inherent in Taiwan’s “Overall Defense Concept.” Washington should also expedite arms shipments to Taipei.

American officials are increasingly concerned about China’s growing power and assertiveness. While spy balloons over the continental United States may be the current crisis, Washington should stay focused on the most likely flashpoint in the bilateral relationship: the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Taiwan Is a Critical Interest for Both Superpowers

China’s President Xi Jinping has made it clear that the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China is a top priority, ordering his military to be ready to successfully invade the island by 2027 (the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Liberation Army). Even so, any such invasion will be far from easy. To conquer Taiwan, China must invade an island 100 miles distant across historically treacherous waters and land massive forces on a remarkably limited number of well-defended beaches—all while preventing or limiting interference from the US military. Recognizing these challenges, China’s armed forces have invested heavily in capabilities that would allow it to meet Xi’s mandate by building the world’s largest navy, an increasingly modern air force, and thousands of missiles, some of which are designed to attack American bases and aircraft carriers. These forces would come to bear particularly if Taiwan explicitly moved toward independence. In 2016, Xi said, “We have the determination, the ability and the preparedness to deal with Taiwanese independence, and if we do not deal with it, we will be overthrown.”

American leaders increasingly realize the critical role Taiwan plays for US global interests. Taiwan’s geographic situation in East Asia anchors the First Island Chain, the linchpin to America’s defense of Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Further, as Chris Miller explains, the pandemic showed the world the importance of Taiwan’s production of nearly all of the world’s advanced semiconductor chips. The island accounts for 37 percent of all the new computing power in the world—every year. These factors make it increasingly unrealistic that the United States can avoid coming to Taiwan’s defense even if it wanted to. If Washington hopes to avoid a conflict with Beijing over Taiwan, it must act now to increase its deterrent against China.

Worries Are Growing in Washington

Concern over a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan has dramatically escalated recently. In May 2022, the Center for a New American Security conducted a wargame of a 2027 Chinese invasion of Taiwan that included members of Congress among the participants. Three weeks into the conflict, the game concluded with a relative stalemate after devastating mutual losses.

In early 2023, the Center for Strategic and International Studies released the results of its own war game series of a 2026 Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Its intriguing approach ran a base scenario three times and a series of variations on the base for a total of twenty-four scenarios, showing that although the United States and Taiwan prevailed, it came at a tremendous cost, including the loss of two American aircraft carriers. The scenarios assumed some key requirements for a US victory, including that it must have full use of Japanese airbases, and have the appropriate long-range anti-ship missiles—and enough of them—to destroy China’s invasion fleet from outside the perimeter it established around Taiwan. Taiwan, for its part, also needed to vigorously fight back—and have what it needs before the invasion begins, since resupply wouldn’t be possible.

Taiwan Is Running Out of Time

The worries over China’s plans for Taiwan are urgent. In 2021, Taiwan’s former defense minister Chiu Kuo-cheng said China’s capabilities to mount a “full-scale” invasion of Taiwan would be “mature” by 2025. Also in 2021, the then-commander of US Indo-Pacific Command said China could “try for Taiwan” in the next six years (by 2027), an assessment he confirmed a few weeks ago and that was supported, at least obliquely, by his successor Adm. John Aquilano, who testified that “this problem is closer than we think.” In September 2022, CIA Deputy Director David Cohen revealed that Xi ordered his military to develop the ability to capture Taiwan by 2027. Just a few weeks ago, Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Joseph Wu warned that he believes China is “more likely” to pull the trigger on Taiwan. “To me, 2027 is a year to watch out,” suggesting that Xi might use a 2027 invasion as a political distraction at home and in an attempt to show “achievement” on the five-year anniversary of his recent re-confirmation as the Chinese Communist Party leader for another five years.

Even more recently, on January 27, 2023, four-star Air Force Gen. Mike Minihan, commander of Air Mobility Command, told his officers in a memorandum to prepare for the United States to be at war with China in two years. Gen. Minihan suggested the distractions of presidential elections in both the United States and Taiwan may well provide China the opening it needs. He added, “My gut tells me we will fight in 2025.” While the Pentagon distanced itself from Gen. Minihan’s comments, it’s notable that so many different officials are making public statements warning of Chinese intentions toward Taiwan.

China Believes America Is in Decline—and Sees an Opportunity

Xi believes the United States is in terminal decline, potentially providing the opening to move on Taiwan. The 2008 global financial crisis had a dramatic impact on the Chinese Communist Party’s perception of the changing balance of power. Rush Doshi, currently a director for China at the National Security Council, wrote in his book The Long Game, that the 2008 crisis marked China’s departure from Deng Xiaoping’s “hide and bide” strategic doctrine, designed to grow China’s capabilities while avoiding provoking the American superpower. Xi, clearly, abandoned this approach. Doshi notes that “Chinese strategists would prefer that the United States graciously accept its decline” and that the United States was “spiritually exhausted, physically weak, and could no longer carry the world.” China’s perception of a weak America dramatically undermines deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.

Will America Defend Taiwan?

There are signs that America and its allies understand their interests and will act to defend them. President Joe Biden has said bluntly that America will defend Taiwan. Congress has also demonstrably supported Taiwan’s democracy, with a dramatic visit by former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi last fall. New Republican House Speaker Kevin McCarthy is scheduled to meet Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen when she visits the United States in April, and may travel to Taiwan at some point. Polls show Americans increasingly support protecting Taiwan against China.

America’s allies in East Asia recognize the increased threat from Beijing, and appreciate that any Chinese invasion of Taiwan is likely to trigger a larger, regional conflict. As a result, the United States is strengthening its commitment to defend its other allies, confirming this week it “would invoke US mutual defense commitments” in response to Chinese aggression directed at the Philippines. Australian Defence Minister Peter Dutton told The Australian in November 2022 it would be “inconceivable that we wouldn’t support the US if the US chose to take action” with regard to Taiwan. Japanese leaders have indicated they know that they would be involved in any crisis in the Taiwan Strait. In 2021 Kyoji Yanagisawa, a former deputy defense minister, acknowledged that Japan can’t avoid involvement. “Sooner or later, a Taiwan emergency will turn into a Japan emergency.”

America’s strategic interests will compel it to defend Taiwan, and its allies appreciate their stakes in such a conflict is likely to draw them in. Understanding this, the United States should step up its efforts to avoid the fight by deterring China from pulling the trigger in the first place.

American Weapons Deliveries to Taiwan

What more can the United States do to deter China from attacking Taiwan? The Center for Strategic and International Studies recommended key steps as a result of its January 2023 wargame. These measures include large investments in long-range naval precision strike systems, increased contingency planning with American allies, and increasing investment in hardening aircraft shelters in the region against Chinese missile attack, especially on Guam.

The most important recommendation is that the United States should energetically support Taiwan’s “porcupine strategy,” introduced by Taiwan’s former Chief of the General Staff Lee His-Ming in 2017 as the Overall Defense Concept. This calls for Taiwan to make it impregnable to amphibious invasion by arming itself with thousands of mobile anti-ship and anti-air weapons, sea mines, drone strike systems, and other smaller, mobile systems. While Taipei has made some progress in pursuing this strategy, it still struggles with two challenges: a continued preference for big-ticket defense systems, and US delays in delivering weapons that the Taiwanese have already ordered.

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Taiwan’s military’s preference for big-ticket defense systems like fighters, tanks, and large ships is understandable historically, but it is no longer strategically viable. Until the early years of this century, Taiwan leveraged a technological advantage developed through its arms purchases, but this advantage deteriorated quickly in the 2000s in the face of the Chinese military modernization.

Hal Brands and Michael Beckley note in Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China that Taiwan “keeps blowing more than a quarter of its annual defense budget on domestically made ships and submarines that will not be deployed for years, fighter aircraft that may not make it off the ground in a war, and tanks that cannot easily maneuver on beaches.” The wargame conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies showed that nearly all of Taiwan’s fighter aircraft (and all of Taiwan’s ships) would be destroyed in China’s missile bombardment of Taiwan and regional airbases. As a result, American officials must prevail on Taiwan’s leadership to refocus on survivable defensive systems (e.g., anti-ship, anti-air, anti-armor drones, sea mines, and missile boats). As a case in point, in January 2022, Taiwan asked the United States to explore ways to speed delivery of their $8 billion order for sixty-six F-16V fighters to be supplied by 2026. To increase deterrence, Washington should encourage Taiwan to invest in large orders of “porcupine” systems instead.

There are some signs that Taiwan is moving in the right direction. Bi-khim Hsiao, Taiwan’s representative in Washington, said last month that it is trying to shift to distributed, lower-tech weapons “as soon as possible.” Even with the United States and other allies straining global arms stocks by pouring billions of dollars worth of such weapons into Ukraine for the active fight there, Hsiao noted that “we are assured by our friends in the United States that Taiwan is a very important priority.”

While some of this backlog is the big ticket items that are less applicable to the porcupine strategy, several of those items are also exactly the type of systems and platforms that Taiwan needs. For its part, the Biden administration has approved another $1 billion in sales, most notably for more Harpoons. Javelins, Stingers, ATACMS, SLAM-ERs, Harpoons, and other unmanned systems such as Switchblades are exactly the right kinds of systems for Taiwan to purchase, but only if the United States can overcome the backlog in orders and provide them in time.

There are conflicting calculations of the true size of the US arms backlog with Taiwan, but in every estimate it is large enough to pose a huge problem for deterring Chinese aggressive action. House Armed Services Committee Member Rep. Don Bacon has cited a nearly $19 billion arms sales backlog, declaring “the US is behind in what it needs to provide for Taiwan.” While some argue these deliveries are reportedly delayed due to diversions to Ukraine, others like Jennifer Kavanagh and Jordan Cohen make a strong case that this is more of an industrial base production issue. In any case, the US arms backlog to Taiwan predates the war in Ukraine and “delays of anywhere from two to five years between sale and delivery are the norm for transfers of US weapons systems.” The “norm” is fine in periods of non-urgency, but in strategically unstable circumstances regulations must be streamlined. The United States needs to do what it can to speed this process in light of the increased possibility of conflict in the Taiwan Straits.

US arms to Taiwan are delivered primarily after Taiwanese requests are reviewed by the Defense Department, State Department, and the US Congress. This cumbersome process is followed by negotiations for contract signing, which can take years. These delays threaten Taiwan’s ability to defend itself and undermine deterrence against China. It is very clear, then, that when Taiwan is seeking the types of weapons appropriate to execute a “porcupine” strategy, the United States should encourage this by diligently clearing the backlogs, production delays or exigent diversions of these systems, even at a premium to the usual costs for such systems. This is an issue that the Congress can assist with.

Thankfully, Congress is starting to focus on this issue. House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Gregory Meeks, said the panel is “working on bills now to help expedite and to reduce red tape to get defense items that are needed out in a quicker fashion.” This includes shortening specific reviews in the process or even by designating Taiwan as a major non-NATO ally as provided for under the last Congress’ proposed Taiwan Policy Act, which passed the Senate in September 2022. Many of its provisions, including the major non-NATO ally designation for Taiwan, did not survive when elements of the Taiwan Policy Act were incorporated into the FY2023 Defense Authorization Bill as signed into law in December 2022. The bill as signed included other Taiwan Policy Act defense-specific provisions, such as requiring the Defense Department and Department of State to prioritize foreign military sales to Taiwan, for those departments to develop a list of “pre-cleared” systems for Taiwan through the Foreign Military Sales program, and prioritizing Taiwan to draw down US excess defense items, amongst other provisions. Also incorporated into the final FY23 NDAA was the Arms Exports Delivery Solutions Act, which would require “a joint Defense Department and State Department report on foreign military sales worth $25 million or more to Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, dating back to 2017.” The bill, introduced by Rep. Young Kim, requires the report to detail reasons for any delay in expected arms delivery dates to those countries while identifying interim capabilities to fill the gap caused by any backlog.

Much More to Do

The White House and the new Congress should double down on efforts to support Taiwan—including keeping the Senate bipartisan coalition that championed the Taiwan Policy Act together—and focus on what needs to be done in the time available in the new Congress. This coalition must collaborate with allies in the House of Representatives, including the new House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party.

To deter China from aggression, American leaders should work together to implement the reforms necessary to speed up arms for Taiwan for its effective defense, and to preserve American strategic interests in the region.

Matt Salmon served five terms as a congressman from Arizona, including as chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on East Asia (2015–2016), and ran for governor of Arizona in 2022. He has traveled over forty times to China and twenty times to Taiwan.

Shay Stautz ran for Congress in 2020 from Southern Arizona, but withdrew due to the restrictions of the pandemic. He represented the University of Arizona (2006-2017) and Arizona State University (2017-2019) to the US Congress, and has an MA in National Security Studies from Georgetown University. ran for Congress in 2020 from Southern Arizona, but withdrew due to the restrictions of the pandemic. He represented the University of Arizona (2006-2017) and Arizona State University (2017-2019) to the US Congress, and has an MA in National Security Studies from Georgetown University.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities.

This article appeared originally at Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI).

8. How to Prepare for Peace Talks in Ukraine

I am reminded of this quote:

If you concentrate exclusively on victory, while no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.

--B.H. Liddel-Hart2

Excerpts:

Although the contours of any deal would be determined in large part by leverage, reciprocity, negotiating skill, and quid pro quos, there are some basic principles that could help facilitate a fair and lasting agreement. For starters, once negotiations have commenced, they should continue regularly with only short, mutually agreed recesses until a final agreement can be reached. Both parties should be allowed to invite a limited number of states and international organizations to assist in negotiation, verification, monitoring, observation, and peacekeeping. And the principle that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” should apply unless the parties agree to implement some measures early—for instance, a cease-fire to enable humanitarian access.

All agreements should be made at the negotiating table, put in writing, signed by the parties, guaranteed by a UN Security Council resolution, and registered under the UN Charter. Wherever possible, the agreed-on measures should be reciprocal, such as common trade tariffs, or at least incorporate asymmetrical exchanges of concessions, such as different but complementary trade benefits when it comes to nontariff barriers. The international community should commit to financing the reconstruction of Ukraine and the rehabilitation of those affected by the war. And finally, Ukraine should have the right to apply to join any international organization or body on equal terms with other members—unless it explicitly agrees to limit this right in the peace deal.

Russia and Ukraine are not yet ready for direct talks. But with care and confidentiality, the leaders of the United States and other important third parties should accelerate their prior preparations and begin pre-negotiations. They should aim to build confidence, persuade the parties to confront harsh realities, and remove impediments to diplomatic progress. Otherwise, Russia and Ukraine could fall into a vicious cycle of self-deception, denial of diplomacy, and endless war.

How to Prepare for Peace Talks in Ukraine

Ending a War Requires Thinking Ahead

By Thomas R. Pickering

March 14, 2023

Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine continues unabated. Seesawing military actions alternate with on-again, off-again interest in peace negotiations. But no clear end is in sight. Neither side has a realistic expectation of military victory or unconditional surrender.

All parties to the conflict have made clear that they believe it is too soon for diplomacy. But at some point, the time will come for negotiations, and it is essential that the United States plans carefully for that day. Failure to do so will condemn Washington to a hurried and poorly thought-through approach to ending the war—a mistake the United States has made in every serious conflict it has become embroiled in since 1945. No war ends without political consequences. Either the United States engages to shape those consequences to serve its interests, or others will shape the consequences in its stead.

Ending a war occurs in three phases: prior preparations, pre-negotiations, and the negotiations themselves. The first phase involves resolving internal differences of opinion and opening communications among the parties: each party irons out its own disagreements and reviews the other parties’ positions and attitudes to determine priorities and strategy. The second involves laying the groundwork for official negotiations, including by determining where and when they will take place and with whom participating. And the third involves the direct talks that most people associate with diplomacy.

Each phase of peacemaking involves choices. No process is a template for others. Decisions lead to forks in the road, which open some possibilities and close off others. Political circumstances, leverage, and changing military realties all influence preparations. Like battle plans, peace plans may not survive first contact with the enemy, but the groundwork laid in advance of negotiations will still inform decision-making and improve the odds of a favorable outcome.

FIRST THINGS FIRST

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky remain deeply committed to winning the war. Slight openings for negotiations have begun to appear, mostly thanks to Russia’s declining military prospects. These may be real openings reflecting greater willingness to talk, or they may be false ones created by two adversaries still trying to outfox each other. The two sides are currently cooperating in very limited areas: shipping grain, exchanging prisoners, and informally (and perhaps coincidentally) aligning their actions to avoid catastrophe at nuclear power stations. But for now at least, each side’s objectives still far exceed what the other appears ready to concede: for Russia, control of all of Ukraine, and for Ukraine, return of all its territory.

Prior preparations do not require the parties to fully agree on issues of substance. They don’t even require the parties to agree among themselves; that is what this phase of peacemaking is for. Early resolution, or even just understanding, of differences among key players—in the case of the United States, among the National Security Council, the State Department, and the Department of Defense—is vital for diplomatic readiness. American diplomats often say that in the course of any negotiation, up to 60 percent of what needs to be resolved involves disagreements between the administration and its own negotiating team. Early harmony among these players is not just beneficial; it is essential.

Resolving internal differences can be slow and difficult, but starting this process can signal that negotiations may become possible even when differences between the parties appear insuperable. Right now, the United States is in the early stages of prior preparation, and it has yet to resolve disagreements over the role, pace, and effect of military actions—and how they can best be timed to shape favorable outcomes, including through negotiations.

It is not yet clear when progress toward the next phase of peacemaking—pre-negotiations—will be possible. World leaders have intensified their calls for peace, and Washington and other third parties have begun informal and confidential contacts with the other parties to gauge their attitudes about diplomacy. But the road to pre-negotiations is sometimes circuitous. Efforts to get internal houses in order are extremely useful for preparing strategies, but they are also challenging, unpredictable, and constantly subject to change.

TOWARD DIPLOMACY

As Washington and the other relevant parties establish more unified positions, pre-negotiations aimed at bringing Russia and Ukraine into direct talks can receive more attention. The task will be to convince both sides that diplomacy can support and even advance their interests. U.S. officials should emphasize to their Russian and Ukrainian counterparts (and to others who might be able to influence them) that a positive military outcome will be time-consuming, expensive, and uncertain, and that diplomacy may be a surer path to getting what they want. The goal should be to focus both sides on the punishing realities of further combat and the opportunities of negotiation, and to develop a common understanding of the situation.

One practical way to do this would be to hold so-called proximity talks, which bring both parties to the same city and allow third-party intermediaries to shuttle back and forth between them, exchanging information on positions, preparing ideas, and working to foster direct contacts. This can be especially helpful when, as is the case now, domestic political considerations make it harder for the belligerents to speak directly. To start, one or more third parties deemed acceptable by Russia and Ukraine could meet individually with the leaders of both countries (or their trusted designees) to quietly explore ideas, objectives, possibilities, and attitudes, eventually identifying areas of overlap that could form the basis of agreements. These talks could also begin to set the agendas for future direct negotiations, settle logistical questions such as the time and location of meetings, and determine who aside from the warring parties will participate.

Like battle plans, peace plans may not survive first contact with the enemy.

More formal face-to-face talks could follow, also mediated by third parties. The UN secretary-general could help facilitate this process by appointing a special representative to encourage the parties and shepherd them toward direct negotiations with the help of China, India, Turkey, the United States, and other countries that might be able to facilitate an agreement. The European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe could also guide the parties toward face-to-face talks.

Starting the pre-negotiation process in an informal setting can help get the ball rolling, which is why proximity talks are often a useful tool. But too much informality can unnecessarily complicate things: it opens the door to more third parties, creates more opportunities for third-party interference, potentially prolongs negotiations, and increases the probability of misunderstandings. Even if discussions take place in a common language, multiple word meanings and ambiguities in syntax can impede progress and plant land mines that will later blow up a deal. On the other hand, using multiple languages in order to accommodate more parties poses its own difficulties.

Whether the parties are willing to move from pre-negotiations into negotiations will partly depend on events on the battlefield and perceptions of who is winning and who is losing. It will also depend on interests, international position, and pressures created by everything from sanctions to shifts in public opinion and morale. But third-party negotiators can play an essential role in keeping the peace process on track, providing positive reassurance, and supplying innovative ideas about how to overcome differences.

THE HARD PART

Once the parties agree on a process for direct negotiations, then the hard part begins. Confidentiality is usually advisable for face-to-face talks, but it is difficult to achieve. Even if the mediators have succeeded in limiting press and public access during the pre-negotiations, they will likely struggle to do so during direct negotiations.

Peace between Russia and Ukraine should, of course, be the main goal of such talks. But the United States and its European partners will also want to ensure that any peace arrangement makes the region more secure and helps stabilize the bilateral U.S.-Russian relationship, especially in the nuclear arena.

One issue that is sure to be contentious and thus require careful handling is the role of Ukraine’s economy in Europe. Some have suggested that Ukraine is well placed to become a bridge between the European Union and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union. Designing such an economic arrangement will be challenging, even though Ukrainian industry and agriculture once played a major role in the Soviet economy. Ukraine will also need a framework for rebuilding after the war, rehabilitating its population, battling corruption, and ensuring equal status for its two main languages—Ukrainian and Russian. Quebec, for all its trials, may present a useful model.

The safest way to settle territorial disputes is to ask the people what they want.

Harder will be agreeing on security relationships: should Ukraine join NATO or be pressed into the Collective Security Treaty Organization of former Soviet states? Will it make that decision after a referendum that fairly captures the views of its citizens and a waiting period of, say, ten years?

Most challenging of all—and as a result, likely to be resolved last—will be territorial questions. These will be influenced by military realities and other sources of leverage. Neither party has made enough progress on the battlefield to achieve all its territorial claims: all of Ukraine for Moscow and Ukraine’s boundaries at independence in 1991 for Kyiv.

The safest and fairest way to settle territorial disputes is to ask the people of the region what they want. Referendums are not always perfect. But carefully handled by the United Nations, they can be the best approach to facilitating self-determination. One option would be to put all occupied areas of Ukraine under a UN trusteeship and require both militaries to withdraw for a period of three to five years, after which Ukrainian citizens would vote separately in the Donbas and Crimea on whether they wanted to be part of Russia, part of Ukraine, or an autonomous region of either country. These UN-led referendums would be conducted under wide international observation to ensure that they were free and fair.

Another option would be to temporarily accept Ukraine’s February 23, 2022, borders as a line of control separating military forces and the 1991 boundaries as the official border between Russia and Ukraine until a UN-led referendum could be held to determine the status of everything between those two boundaries. Both the Donbas and Crimea would then hold popular referendums to settle their precise affiliation with Russia or Ukraine within five to seven years.

A FAIR AND LASTING DEAL

Although the contours of any deal would be determined in large part by leverage, reciprocity, negotiating skill, and quid pro quos, there are some basic principles that could help facilitate a fair and lasting agreement. For starters, once negotiations have commenced, they should continue regularly with only short, mutually agreed recesses until a final agreement can be reached. Both parties should be allowed to invite a limited number of states and international organizations to assist in negotiation, verification, monitoring, observation, and peacekeeping. And the principle that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” should apply unless the parties agree to implement some measures early—for instance, a cease-fire to enable humanitarian access.

All agreements should be made at the negotiating table, put in writing, signed by the parties, guaranteed by a UN Security Council resolution, and registered under the UN Charter. Wherever possible, the agreed-on measures should be reciprocal, such as common trade tariffs, or at least incorporate asymmetrical exchanges of concessions, such as different but complementary trade benefits when it comes to nontariff barriers. The international community should commit to financing the reconstruction of Ukraine and the rehabilitation of those affected by the war. And finally, Ukraine should have the right to apply to join any international organization or body on equal terms with other members—unless it explicitly agrees to limit this right in the peace deal.

Russia and Ukraine are not yet ready for direct talks. But with care and confidentiality, the leaders of the United States and other important third parties should accelerate their prior preparations and begin pre-negotiations. They should aim to build confidence, persuade the parties to confront harsh realities, and remove impediments to diplomatic progress. Otherwise, Russia and Ukraine could fall into a vicious cycle of self-deception, denial of diplomacy, and endless war.

THOMAS R. PICKERING is Senior Counselor at Albright Stonebridge Group. He has served for more than four decades as a U.S. diplomat, including as Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs and Ambassador to the United Nations.

Foreign Affairs · by Thomas R. Pickering · March 14, 2023

9. The US, UK and Australia Send China a Message

Conclusion:

Yes, the prospect of a fleet of nuclear submarines Down Under will make Beijing nervous. But for Washington, London and Canberra, coordinating on the world’s most advanced warfighting technology is smart strategy.

The US, UK and Australia Send China a Message

A new agreement to share the technology for nuclear-powered submarines could help ease tensions throughout the Pacific.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-03-13/us-uk-australian-nuclear-submarine-accord-sends-message-to-china?utm_source=pocket_saves&sref=hhjZtX76

ByJames Stavridis

March 13, 2023 at 5:00 PM EDT

As a US Navy admiral in command of America’s fleet of nuclear submarines, I often found myself in Point Loma, California, at the entrance to San Diego harbor. It is the home base of the Navy’s attack submarine force, whose importance is hard to overstate.

These warships are the apex predators of the high seas. They overmatch their Chinese and Russian counterparts in stealth, range and offensive firepower. When powered by nuclear reactors and freed of the necessity of ever surfacing for oxygen, Virginia-class subs are deadly killers that threaten any surface ship on the planet.

The US, UK and Australia Send China a Message

A new agreement to share the technology for nuclear-powered submarines could help ease tensions throughout the Pacific.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-03-13/us-uk-australian-nuclear-submarine-accord-sends-message-to-china?utm_source=pocket_saves&sref=hhjZtX76

ByJames Stavridis

March 13, 2023 at 5:00 PM EDT

Microsoft-backed OpenAI starts release of powerful AI known as GPT-4

Reuters · by Jeffrey Dastin

March 14 (Reuters) - The startup OpenAI on Tuesday said it is beginning to release a powerful artificial intelligence model known as GPT-4, setting the stage for human-like technology to proliferate and more competition between its backer Microsoft Corp (MSFT.O) and Alphabet Inc's (GOOGL.O) Google.

OpenAI, which created the chatbot sensation ChatGPT, said in a blog post that its latest technology is "multimodal," meaning images as well as text prompts can spur it to generate content. The text-input feature will be available to ChatGPT Plus subscribers and to software developers, with a waitlist, while the image-input ability remains a preview of its research.

The highly-anticipated launch signals how office workers may turn to ever-improving AI for still more tasks, as well as how technology companies are locked in competition to win business from such advances.

Alphabet Inc's (GOOGL.O) Google on Tuesday announced a "magic wand" for its collaboration software that can draft virtually any document, days before Microsoft is expected to showcase AI for its competing Word processor, likely powered by OpenAI. A Microsoft executive also said that GPT-4 is helping power its Bing search engine.

OpenAI's latest technology in some cases represented a vast improvement on a prior version known as GPT-3.5, it said. In a simulation of the bar exam required of U.S. law school graduates before professional practice, the new model scored around the top 10% of test takers, versus the older model ranking around the bottom 10%, OpenAI said.

OpenAI logo is seen in this illustration taken, February 3, 2023. REUTERS/Dado Ruvic/Illustration

While the two versions can appear similar in casual conversation, "the difference comes out when the complexity of the task reaches a sufficient threshold," OpenAI said, noting "GPT-4 is more reliable, creative, and able to handle much more nuanced instructions."

An online demonstration of the technology by Greg Brockman, OpenAI's president, showed it could take a photo of a hand-drawn mock-up for a simple website and create a real website based on it. GPT-4 also could help individuals calculate their taxes, the demonstration showed.

Sam Altman, OpenAI's chief executive, on Twitter called GPT-4 its model "most capable and aligned" with human values and intent, though "it is still flawed."

GPT-4 is 82% less likely to respond to requests for disallowed content than its predecessor and scores 40% higher on certain tests of factuality, the company said. Inaccurate responses known as "hallucinations" have been a challenge for many AI programs.

Microsoft stands to benefit from GPT-4's adoption, said Rishi Jaluria, an analyst at RBC Capital Markets.

The software maker not only is integrating OpenAI's latest technology into its products: its Azure cloud is powering usage of OpenAI just as budget-conscious businesses are scrutinizing IT spend in an uncertain economy, he said.

"Whenever a company uses this piece of technology," Jaluria said, "those workloads go through Microsoft Azure, and I think this is coming at a very critical time."

Reporting By Jeffrey Dastin in Palo Alto, Calif.; Additional reporting by Akash Sriram and Nivedita Balu Editing by Sharon Singleton and Marguerita Choy

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Jeffrey Dastin

11. Special Operations News Update - March 15, 2023 | SOF News

Special Operations News Update - March 15, 2023 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · March 15, 2023

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: U.S. Navy Special Warfare combat-craft crewman candidates in class 125 participate in “The Tour” during first phase of Basic Crewman Selection (BCS) training on 30 January 2023. NSWCEN provides initial assessment and selection and subsequent advanced training to the Sailors who make up the Navy’s SEAL and Special Boat communities. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Dylan Lavin, 30 January 2023)

Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).

SOF News

SAWS Exposition. The Air Force Special Operations Command and the Global SOF Foundation co-hosted the annual Special Air Warfare Symposium and exposition in Fort Walton Beach, Florida from February 28 to March 2, 2023. “Air Commandos co-host SAWS, champion transformation and partnerships”, Air Force Special Operations Command, March 3, 2023.

Fenton on FBNC Crime. The top general for the U.S. Special Operations Command, Gen. Bryan Fenton, was quizzed by a North Carolina Senator during testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 7th about crime cases at Fort Bragg. He was asked about reports of suicides, murders, overdoses, drug trafficking, and numerous arrests involving SOF personnel at FBNC. “The top Spec Ops general on Fort Bragg crime”, Army Times, March 14, 2023.

Beards Are Not Needed. The DoD’s senior enlisted service member has come out strongly against beards in the military. The ‘operator look’ – beard, baseball cap, Nine Line t-shirts – became a badge of pride in Afghanistan for SOF personnel. “Want to Grow a Beard? Not in My Military, Says Colon-Lopez. Others Aren’t So Sure”, Air and Space Forces, March 10, 2023.

“If you want to look cute with your skinny jeans and your beard, by all means, do it someplace else. But quit wasting our time on something that doesn’t have anything to do with kicking the enemy’s ass.”

SEA Ramon Colon-Lopez, March 8, 2023

MC-130J Floatplane Update. USSOCOM is continuing to look at options for a MC-130J Amphibious Capability (MAC). The program is progressing and once in place will offer the SOF community greater flexibility in mobility and tactics. “USSOCOM’s AFSOC Updates on the MC-130J Floatplane’s Status”, Naval News, March 9, 2023.

Vetting and Section 127E. There are some members of Congress that want to see human rights vetting required for security assistance provided by US special operations forces under Section 127e of Title 10, US Code. Currently the DoD Leahy Law does not apply to ‘127 echo’. “Congress Should Mandate Human Rights Vetting for Partner Forces: The Case for Closing the Section 127E Loophole”, Irregular Warfare Initiative, March 9, 2023.

Women and SOF. A report by the Government Accountability Office states that women are victims of gender discrimination in the SOF community. “Report Says Women in Special Operations Still Face Barriers”, Association of the United States Army, March 9, 2023.

SOF Training Hub in Europe. Plans to transform a rural Army garrison in western Germany into a special operations hub will be funded with money from the military’s 2024 budget. $41 million is allocated for a special operations company operations facility and $23 million for a joint parachute rigging site. The location will serve as a home for hundreds of Green Berets and SEALs. “New Baumholder special operations hub allocated $64 million in 2024 proposal”, Stars and Stripes, March 14, 2023.

Aviator Next Delta Commander? Sean D. Naylor brings us news that the Army has selected an aviation officer to head up Delta Force. Things that make you go “Hmmm”. “In a First, Army Selects Pilot to Command Delta Force”, High Side, March 14, 2023.

Profile of Chris Miller. A retired SF colonel and D.C. national security insider is picked to be Trump’s last Secretary of Defense. It was a job he probably should have delined; at least, that is what his wife thought. Read more in “Forever Warrior”, The Intercept, March 11, 2023.

SOF and “Deep Fakes”. USSOCOM may be looking to target potential enemies’ populations with propaganda and disinformation via the internet. “US Special Operations Command Wants to Use Deep Fakes as a Weapon, but that Could Create Problems”, SANDBOXX, March 13, 2023.

AFSOC Planes. Christian Orr provides us with details about the various airframes used by Air Force Special Operations Command. “The Aircraft of the U.S. Air Force’s Special Forces”, 1945, March 14, 2023.

Mike Echanis – Martial Arts Honor Scheduled. A former Special Forces soldier who died in Nicaragua in 1978 will be recognized in his hometown. “Ontario veteran Mike Echanis to be posthumously lauded for martial arts”, Argus Observer, March 10, 2023.

MH-47G Modernization. The U.S. DoD is investing more modern components to replace parts of the a SOF helicopter that are decades-long old. “More modernisation investment for US MH-47G Chinooks”, Air Force Technology, March 13, 2023.

International SOF

UK’s SRS. The Surveillance and Reconnaissance Squadron (SRS) is primarily made up of Royal Marines from 30 Command Information Exploitation group. The unit is capable of deploying elements to work in the deep battle space for up to 90 days ahead of the main commando force. “SRS: The eyes and ears of UK Commando Force”, Forces.net, March 13, 2023.

IRGC and DPVs. Iran has acquired modern western special forces gear for underwater operations. One of its latest acquisitions is a diver propulsion vehicle. “Iran’s IRGC Special Forces Using Modern German Underwater Vehicles”, Covert Shores, March 12, 2023.

National Security

IW and Doctrine. Dr. Robert S. Burell, a historian and instructor at the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), advocates the adoption of full spectrum of conflict design to integrate the distinct ways of traditional warfare, deterrence, irregular warfare, and competition. “A Full Spectrum of Conflict Design: How Doctrine Should Embrace Irregular Warfare”, Irregular Warfare Initiative, March 14, 2023.

Paramilitary Groups. Both Russia and Iran employ paramilitary groups in foreign countries to advance their national interests. This topic is examined in detail in “Wagner Group and the IRGC: The Rise of Self-Sustaining Military Proxies”, National Interest, March 12, 2023.

CIA and Wagner Group. The Central Intelligence Agency says it is secretly helping to fight Russian mercenaries that are deployed to regional conflicts in Africa to Ukraine. In testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence CIA Director Bill Burns detailed the many activities of the Wagner Group and how his agency is working with other international allies to counter the threat the mercenary group poses. “The CIA Says It’s Already Fighting Russia’s Wagner Mercenaries Abroad”, Vice.com, March 8, 2023.

U.S. Training in Africa and Military Coups. The United States has provided training to several West African military officers who later went on to be involved in coups against their government. “Glass Houses: U.S. Military Trainees and Destabilization of African Governments”, INTELBRIEF, The Soufan Center, March 10, 2023.

‘Stay in Syria’. House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Micheal McCaul has come out against legislation that would remove U.S. armed forces from Syria. (Foreign Affairs Committee, Mar 10, 2023).

Secret Mission to Save a Fox News Correspondent. Benjamin Hall was severely injured in Ukraine. An elaborate rescue operation was developed to get him out of Ukraine and to a U.S. military hospital in Germany. Ukrainian SOF, a retired Special Forces soldier, and others all played a role. (Vanity Fair, Mar 10, 2023).

Arrow Security & Training, LLC is a corporate sponsor of SOF News. AST offers a wide range of training and instruction courses and programs to include language and cultural services, training, role playing, and software and simulation. https://arrowsecuritytraining.com/

Upcoming Events

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May 8-11, 2023. Tampa, Florida

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May 16-18, 2023. Fort Bragg, NC and via Zoom

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USASOC

May 22-26, 2023. Indianapolis, Indiana

Special Forces Association Convention

May 31, 2023. Ijamsville, MD

6th Annual Golf Tournament

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June 21-22, 2023

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August 5, 2023. Perdido Key, Florida

Deep Dive 2023 Combat Diver Reunion

CDF

Books, Pubs, Videos, and Reports

Annual Threat Assessment. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence has published its 2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. The PDF, dated February 6, 2023, is 40 pages long.

Video – Special Operations ’24 Budget on Table with House Subcommittee. Christopher Maier, ASD SO/LIC, and General Bryan Fenton, commander of USSOCOM, testify before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee for Intelligence and Special Operations. (DVIDS, Mar 9, 2023, one hour).

Podcasts

SOFCAST. United States Special Operations Command

https://linktr.ee/sofcast

The Pinelander. Blacksmith Publishing

https://www.thepinelander.com/

The Indigenous Approach. 1st Special Forces Command

https://open.spotify.com/show/3n3I7g9LSmd143GYCy7pPA

Irregular Warfare Podcast. Modern War Institute at West Point

https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/irregular-warfare-podcast/id1514636385

sof.news · by SOF News · March 15, 2023

12. The top Spec Ops general on Fort Bragg crime

The top Spec Ops general on Fort Bragg crime

armytimes.com · by Rachael Riley · March 14, 2023

Responding to North Carolina Sen. Ted Budd during a Senate Armed Services Committee meeting March 7, the top general for the U.S. Special Operations Command described recent crime cases at Fort Bragg as corrosive.

The U.S. Special Operations Command is the higher command for the Fort Bragg-based U.S. Army Special Operations Command and is led by Gen. Bryan Fenton.

Investigators question 15 Army special operators in ongoing drug probe

Investigators said this is part of an ongoing investigation.

By Rachael Riley

Fenton was pressed by Budd to address “a series of concerning incidents,” which Budd identified as reports of “suicides, murders, overdoses, drug trafficking and arrests” involving the special operations community at Fort Bragg.

Recent cases

Last month, in a letter sent to concerned senators, the Department of Defense confirmed 31 fatal drug overdoses at Fort Bragg between 2017 and 2021.

In January, more than a dozen Special Operations Command soldiers were detained by the Army Criminal Investigation Division “as part of its ongoing efforts to identify and mitigate the use of illegal narcotics,” CID officials said.

Also, on Jan. 18, 24-year-old Staff Sgt. Jimmy Lee Smith III, a culinary specialist for the 3rd Special Forces Group, was shot and killed in Raeford.

Staff Sgt. Brandon A. Amos-Dixon, a culinary specialist under USASOC, was arrested in Virginia for allegedly shooting at his fiancé and fiancé's child Jan. 18 in Harnett County.

“We know that those reports, they’re not indicative of the thousands of incredible men and women at USASOC,” Budd told Fenton before asking what “SOCOM is doing to combat these challenges.”

Not accepted

Fenton said illegal, immoral and unethical behaviors are “atypical” for the 70,000 service members who “are doing the right thing.”

“These are corrosives toward the trust and confidence this committee, the secretary (of defense) and certainly the nation has in us, and we’re laser-focused on eradicating that from SOCOM enterprise,” he said during the meeting.

Fenton denounced what he said are unwelcome behaviors in the SOCOM formation.

“First and foremost, it disrespects that type of work that our SOCOM enterprise is known for,” Fenton said.

Fenton said one case of illegal, immoral or unethical behavior is “one too many.”

While leaders recognize the service members are not immune, Fenton said, it’s being looked at “through a number of lenses.”

Leaders, Fenton said, are asking the “whole formation” to point out behaviors that “disrespect” SOCOM’s “decades of successful operations.”

The committee’s chairman, Sen. Jack Reed, a Rhode Island Democrat, said the “high profile misconduct cases have reflected poorly on the special operations community,” and merits building upon SOCOM’s 2020 comprehensive review of culture and ethics.

Fenton said reinforcement policies are in place to hold those with unacceptable behavior accountable.

“It’s been a top priority because of what it does, not only to the trust that this committee and the others have in the SOCOM team, but to our overall readiness, and that readiness is important because it needs to be a very lethal force each and every time the secretary puts us on the job,” Fenton said.

Editor’s Note: This article was published as part of content-sharing agreement between Army Times and The Fayetteville Observer.

13. A new Pentagon map shows how China is beefing up what a top US general calls its 'dangerous position' in the South China Sea

Please go to the link to view the map: https://www.businessinsider.com/pentagon-map-china-outposts-south-china-sea-spratly-islands-2023-3?utm_source=pocket_saves

A new Pentagon map shows how China is beefing up what a top US general calls its 'dangerous position' in the South China Sea

Business Insider · by Benjamin Brimelow

Structures on the artificial island built by China in Cuarteron Reef in the Spratly Islands, seen on October 25.Ezra Acayan/Getty Images

China and several of its neighbors have claimed parts of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.

A map from a recent Pentagon report shows how those countries are building outposts in the Spratlys.
While China's claims have been widely rejected, it continues to press them, at times aggressively

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In November, the Pentagon released its annual China Military Power Report, which included a number of maps to illustrate its updated assessments of the Chinese military's capabilities and reach.

One of those maps offered a detailed depiction of the Spratly Islands — a highly disputed area in the South China Sea that has been a source of tension between China and its smaller neighbours.

Six countries claim all or some of the islands and features in the Spratlys. China's land-reclamation and fortification efforts there over the past decade have made the islands it controls the best-armed and most imposing.

China shows no signs of reducing its buildup or shrinking its presence, adding even more complexity to one of the most dynamic regions in the world.

China's 'dangerous position'

Several countries claim parts of the Spratly Islands and have set up outposts there.US Defense Departments

The map — one of several in the report depicting Chinese forces — shows the current claims in the Spratly Islands as well as China's facilities there.

The territorial and continental shelf claims of China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam are shown with several overlapping lines. The map also gives rough locations for seven Chinese outposts, including three airfields, and 63 other outposts in the Spratlys.

China's outposts "are capable of supporting military operations" and "have supported non-combat aircraft," the Pentagon report says. "However, no large-scale presence of combat aircraft has been yet observed there."

The report also says that the missiles and other weapons systems at Chinese-controlled outposts are "the most capable land-based weapons systems deployed by any claimant in the disputed South China Sea to date."

Chinese military operations in the South China Sea are overseen by the Southern Theater Command, which is one of China's largest and most important theater commands.

Chinese military units assigned to the Southern Theater Command.US Defense Department

Ground, naval, and air force units of the People's Liberation Army are based along China's southern coast, including on Hainan Island, which is home to major PLA bases and hosts a PLA Rocket Force missile brigade.

The Southern Theater Command and the adjacent Eastern Theater Command would be involved in any Chinese military operation against Taiwan. Recent action by those forces around Taiwan, as well as ongoing Chinese activity in the South China Sea, has worried US commanders.

"The PLA Army and the PLA Rocket Forces and the Strategic Support Forces are in dangerous position," Gen. Charles Flynn, the commanding general of US Army Pacific, said at a think-tank event in February.

"They're rehearsing, they're exercising, they're experimenting" in the region, Flynn said, citing the PLA's activity around Taiwan following a visit by then-Speaker of the House Rep. Nancy Pelosi in August and a high-altitude spy balloon that US officials say was launched from Hainan Island in late January and drifted over North America several days later.

Both were cases of "very irresponsible and aggressive behavior," Flynn said. "The region sees that and they don't like what they see."

The Spratly Islands

Filipino fishermen sail by a Chinese coast guard ship near Scarborough Shoal on February 5.STR/AFP via Getty Images

The Spratlys are made up of islands, islets, submerged reefs, and other maritime features across roughly 158,000 square miles in the South China Sea between southern Vietnam and the Philippines.

Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam have overlapping claims to some or all of the Spratlys. All but Brunei have deployed soldiers and fortifications to back up their claims. Those disputes have turned violent at times, including deadly skirmishes between China and Vietnam in 1974 and in 1988.

In recent years, China has turned some features it controls into fully developed artificial islands, adding over 3,200 acres of land to them, constructing ports, airstrips, bunkers, radars, and jamming stations, and deploying advanced anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles.

In 2020, China created a new administrative district for the Spratlys, putting them under the jurisdiction of the city of Sansha in Hainan.

China's navy, coast guard, and maritime militia regularly patrol around the Spratlys and through the region, trying to back up its claims, often by harassing rivals.

Thitu Island on March 9.JAM STA ROSA/AFP via Getty Images

Chinese vessels have blocked oil exploration and prevented Philippine supply vessels from restocking their own outposts. Chinese ships also maintain an almost continuous presence in disputed areas, especially Scarborough Shoal and Thitu Island.

Scarborough and Thitu, also known as Pag-asa Island, are the sites of some of the most contentious encounters between China and the Philippines. Manila won a legal victory over China in 2016, when an international tribunal at the Hague ruled against many of China's claims.

Among its holdings regarding the Spratlys, the court said that the areas in question were not legally islands and thus did not grant China rights to territorial seas or exclusive economic zones. The court also held that China had violated the Philippines' rights, including by interfering with fishing activity around Scarborough Shoal.

China continues to ignore the ruling and pressure rival claimants, especially the Philippines.

In February, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel directed a "military-grade laser" at a Philippine Coast Guard ship sailing to an outpost in the Spratlys, temporarily blinding its crew. Weeks later, Chinese Coast Guard vessels demanded Philippine aircraft flying over the Spratlys leave what they called "Chinese territory."

Business Insider · by Benjamin Brimelow

14. China warns Philippines not to give US more access to bases

"Freedom of rampage."

Excerpts:

Beijing accused Washington of stirring up trouble in the region and driving a wedge between China and the Philippines.

“When talking about free and open waterways, what the U.S. has in its mind is actually the freedom of rampage of its warships in the South China Sea. The U.S. military has been coming all the way from the other side of the Pacific to stir up trouble in the South China Sea and ganging up with its allies from other parts of the world to flex [its muscles] in the South China Sea,” it said.

“We need to focus on cooperation and development, and truly safeguard, promote and build peace, stability, prosperity of our region and bring more tangible benefits to people of our two countries,” it added.

China and the Philippines have overlapping claims in the South China Sea, along with Taiwan and the Southeast Asian nations of Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam.

China warns Philippines not to give US more access to bases

Jason Gutierrez

2023.03.13

Manila

benarnews.org

Granting the United States greater access to Philippine military bases will drag the Southeast Asian nation into “geopolitical strife,” China’s embassy here has warned, claiming the move is part of a plot to contain its growing regional influence.

The embassy issued the statement a day after MaryKay Carlson, the American ambassador to Manila, said in an interview on Philippine television that the expanded access to local military facilities was meant to allow U.S. forces to respond quickly to humanitarian needs in the region.

Washington aims to “secure its hegemony and selfish geopolitical interests” by continuously upgrading its military presence in the Philippines by gaining access to more bases for military deployments, the Chinese Embassy said.

“Whereas the U.S. claims that such cooperation is intended to help the disaster relief efforts of the Philippines and some Americans even tout the EDCA sites as driver[s] of [the] local economy, it is plain and simple that those moves are part of the U.S. efforts to encircle and contain China through its military alliance with this country,” said the statement released by the embassy on Sunday.

In 2014, The Philippines and the United States signed the EDCA, or Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which supplemented the Visiting Forces Agreement of 1999. The VFA provides legal cover for large-scale joint war games between the two longtime allies.

A spokesman for the U.S. Embassy in Manila declined comment.

In February, the allies announced that Manila had agreed that American forces would have access to four more Philippine military sites they did not identify, bringing the total to nine at present.

While no names were mentioned, a governor of an area at the northern tip of Luzon island that directly faces Taiwan – Manuel Mamba of Cagayan province – testified before a Senate inquiry that he believed his jurisdiction had been selected. Another northern province, Isabela, has been identified by the local press, citing their own sources.

“If the new sites are located in Cagayan and Isabela, which are close to Taiwan, does the U.S. really intend to help the Philippines in disaster relief with these EDCA sites? And is it really in the national interest of the Philippines to get dragged by the U.S. to interfere in the Taiwan question?,” a spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy said in the statement.

“To bundle the Philippines into the chariots of geopolitical strife will seriously harm Philippine national interests and endanger regional peace and stability,” the statement warned.

The Philippines, which observes a “one-China policy,” hadearlier said that it was closely monitoring the developments in the Taiwan Strait, because thousands of Filipinos could be placed in danger if China moves to invade the island, which it considers a renegade province. There are some 150,000 Filipinos in Taiwan, the third largest contingent of migrant workers there.

The U.S. envoy Carlson, in an interview broadcast over GMA television in Manila on Saturday, declined to identify the new military bases under the expanded EDCA sites, but said they may be announced “within the next several months.”

The sites, she said, were chosen to help protect the livelihoods of Filipino fisherfolk as well as to help in humanitarian crises.

Carlson stressed that the Americans “stand at the ready to work with Philippine allies” amid continued Chinese harassment in the disputed waters of the South China Sea.

“We have your back. Our mutual goal is to deter conflict, not to instigate conflict,” the ambassador said.

Contested waterway

Meanwhile, the Chinese Embassy stressed that contrary to accusations by the Philippines, U.S. and other countries, freedom of navigation in the South China Sea was not being impeded.

Beijing accused Washington of stirring up trouble in the region and driving a wedge between China and the Philippines.

“When talking about free and open waterways, what the U.S. has in its mind is actually the freedom of rampage of its warships in the South China Sea. The U.S. military has been coming all the way from the other side of the Pacific to stir up trouble in the South China Sea and ganging up with its allies from other parts of the world to flex [its muscles] in the South China Sea,” it said.

“We need to focus on cooperation and development, and truly safeguard, promote and build peace, stability, prosperity of our region and bring more tangible benefits to people of our two countries,” it added.

China and the Philippines have overlapping claims in the South China Sea, along with Taiwan and the Southeast Asian nations of Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam.

benarnews.org

15. AUKUS: Flawed by Design?

Conclusion:

AUKUS has great potential. It could federate defense by allowing the United States and its allies to field capabilities in larger numbers and at lower cost. But that would require the United States and its allies to jointly procure systems to take advantage of economies of scale. Unfortunately, the current AUKUS approach violates this basic principle, likely leading to higher unit costs and fewer fielded systems. We can do better. And we must.

AUKUS: Flawed by Design?

By Zack Cooper

AEIdeas

March 14, 2023

https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/aukus-flawed-by-design/

The new AUKUS announcement is the latest in a string of Biden administration initiatives on the Indo-Pacific. Recent progress with Japan, the Philippines, and several Pacific Islands has been impressive. But even for someone who has long supported Australia acquiring nuclear-powered submarines and the United States forward deploying Virginia-class boats to Perth, this plan has several concerning features.

The new AUKUS plan reportedly has three phases. In the first phase, American and British attack submarines will forward deploy to Australia on a rotational basis. Australia will also invest in port facilities for nuclear-powered submarines and co-crew some allied boats so that Australian sailors can learn how to operate nuclear-powered submarines.

In the second phase, the United States will sell three to five used Virginia-class submarines to Australia. New submarines were not an option in part because Australia did not want Virginia Payload Modules. Australia will also make an investment into the US shipbuilding industry as part of this deal.

The third phase will be a mainly United Kingdom-Australia project to construct a new AUKUS-class submarine. The new class will be modeled on the British Astute-class submarine with some US elements incorporated. The boats would be built in both the United Kingdom and Australia.

But is it sensible for Australia to operate two different types of nuclear-powered submarines? This will dramatically increase the endeavor’s cost and complexity. Since Australia is only likely to operate a handful of submarines—probably less than a dozen—acquiring two different submarine types will notably increase expenses.

The primary drivers for this Frankenstein approach are conflicting timelines and domestic political constraints. The new AUKUS-class boats likely will not be ready until the 2040s, well after Australia’s current Collins-class boats must be retired, so an interim solution is required. Used Virginia-class boats are available sooner, but this leads to questions about why Australia chose not to field a single fleet of Virginia-class submarines.

This is where domestic politics come into play. Leaders in Canberra have promised submarine construction to South Australia. The United Kingdom and United States also want a role for their own domestic shipbuilding industries, which helps to explain how this option gained traction in capitals.

There is also a second concern from an American perspective: the United States could essential lose nearly one-tenth of its submarine fleet in the decade of its greatest need. Submarines are America’s biggest asymmetric advantage over China, but this plan could cut three to five submarines out of the U.S. force at a particularly critical time.

Of course, Australia might deploy alongside the United States in a major contingency. Yet, one should not simply assume Australia’s participation in a major conflict involving China. Canberra is acquiring submarines primarily to monitor and defend the naval approaches to its shores, so its submarines might be needed for that purpose.

Australia and the United States have fought together in every major conflict of the last hundred years, but Canberra will continue to make sovereign decisions about the use and disposition of its forces. Washington cannot treat Australian assets as equivalent to American ones.

Several years from now, when Australia’s defense budget is under strain from the cost of the Virginia-class acquisition and other soon-to-come defense initiatives, leaders in Canberra may come under pressure to rethink the third phase of this plan. If Australia already has five operational Virginia-class submarines, why not acquire a few more and defer the AUKUS-class program with its associated logistics, training, technical, and budgetary challenges?

This would require a major investment in the US submarine industrial base, which should have occurred as part of 2021’s Bipartisan Infrastructure Bill. That ship has now sailed (or rather, not sailed), but the United States still needs to bolster submarine procurement. The industrial base produces roughly 1.2 Virginia-class submarines a year, when we are supposed to be building two, and should be building three, per year.

Cancelling phase three would no doubt devastate the shipbuilding industry in South Australia and anger the United Kingdom as well, but budget constraints could still force a debate about doing so. Neither Prime Minister Scott Morrison nor his successor Anthony Albanese were willing to give up on domestic submarine production, but a future prime minister who was not directly affiliated with these decisions might see little alternative but to rethink Australia’s approach.

AUKUS has great potential. It could federate defense by allowing the United States and its allies to field capabilities in larger numbers and at lower cost. But that would require the United States and its allies to jointly procure systems to take advantage of economies of scale. Unfortunately, the current AUKUS approach violates this basic principle, likely leading to higher unit costs and fewer fielded systems. We can do better. And we must.

16. China, Russia and Iran: Axis of Tyrannies presents enormous challenge to free nations

China, Russia and Iran: Axis of Tyrannies presents enormous challenge to free nations

By Waller R. Newell and Clifford D. May - - Tuesday, March 14, 2023

washingtontimes.com · by The Washington Times https://www.washingtontimes.com

OPINION:

On Nov. 1, 1936, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini gave a speech celebrating the treaty he had signed with German dictator Adolf Hitler. “This Berlin-Rome protocol is not a barrier, it is rather an axis around which all European States animated by a desire for peace may collaborate on troubles,” he told a cheering crowd. A term was born, and a few years later, the Axis was at war with the Allies.

On Jan. 29, 2002, President George W. Bush revived the term — with a twist. He called Ali Khamenei’s Islamist regime in Iran, Saddam Hussein’s Baathist Iraq and Kim Jong-il’s Communist North Korea — three regimes collaborating against the U.S. and other free nations — the Axis of Evil.

Today, a new axis has emerged. We might call it the Axis of Tyrannies. It formed a year ago when Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an agreement stating that henceforth there would be “no limits to Sino-Russian cooperation … no forbidden zones.” The other major tyrant collaborating around this axis is Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — still evil after all these years.

While differing in important ways, these tyrants all subscribe to an authoritarian and collectivist vision of society. All are irrevocably hostile to America and, beyond that, to Enlightenment values of individual rights and democratic governance.

Modern tyrants, like ancient tyrants, wage war to win glory. But modern tyrants also have an ideological mission. They require the submergence of the individual in the collective through the progressive transformation of human nature. That is why Mussolini, a fascist dictator, praised communist dictator Vladimir Lenin as a “sculptor of men.”

For Mr. Putin, the goal is the “new world” of a Eurasianist empire; for Mr. Xi, the ceaseless extension of his totalitarian “social credit” blueprint and the replacement of the American-led liberal international order with one that is illiberal and whose rules are made in Beijing; for Mr. Khamenei, the restoration of a powerful new Islamic empire.

We believe today’s Allies have no more important mission than to stand up to today’s Axis and prevent it from achieving its goals. Whether Allied leaders and those who vote them into office will see that as their priority is difficult to predict.

One encouraging note: All three Axis regimes are enduring difficulties, none more serious than in Iran, where the Khamenei dictatorship has been beset not just by an unprecedented demand for rights — women’s rights in particular — but by opposition to clerical rule.

Nevertheless, his regime continues to threaten his neighbors. He provides funds and arms to Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and of course, Hezbollah, through which he dominates Lebanon, which is now — not merely coincidentally — a failing state.

Mr. Khamenei’s forces have propped up the mass-murdering Assad dictatorship in Syria. His weapons arm the Houthi rebels in Yemen. His Shia militias build their power in Iraq.

Most strikingly, his regime has begun supplying Mr. Putin with weapons for use in his war to conquer Ukraine — the first direct military incursion into European affairs by a Muslim power since the Ottomans. As a member of the Axis of Tyrannies, he doubtless sees this as his duty. He expects reciprocal benefits.

Mr. Xi has revived Maoism, a tyrannical ideology if ever there was one. In a little-noticed move, his official biography was amended to include detailed notes he supposedly made as a young man on Mao Zedong’s teachings.

He egregiously violated international law by abruptly ending Beijing’s treaty obligation to rule Hong Kong under the principle of “one country, two systems.” He is committing what the U.S. and other Western governments consider genocide against the Muslim Turkic people of East Turkistan, which he calls Xinjiang (Chinese for “new borders”). He is crushing Tibetan culture.

And, of course, he is threatening to invade and conquer Taiwan, which could lead to Beijing’s dominance of Asia, a steppingstone toward global dominance. Mr. Xi’s new team is being called his “war cabinet,” and he’s now reportedly considering sending advanced weapons to Russia.

When Mr. Putin invaded Ukraine, he expected — as did many others — a cakewalk. But the Russian military proved inadequate to the task, and the Ukrainians have demonstrated astonishing courage and determination in defense of the independence and freedom they have enjoyed since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Putin’s war has opened fissures at home as he attempts to balance among the regular military, provincial warlords such as Ramzan Kadyrov (a Chechen tyrant and quisling), and the Wagner Group, a private army created — in classic tyrannical fashion — by Yevgeny Prigozhin, an ex-convict who made a fortune as the Kremlin’s caterer.

Of note, the history of tyrannies run from dinner tables includes Cyrus the Great’s gardens, Stalin’s dacha, Hitler’s Alpine vacation home, and Castro’s restaurant-hopping with his entourage in Cuba. Since the tyrant “owns” the entire society, the political is absorbed into his personal household.

The Axis of Tyrannies will no doubt draw lessons from what Mr. Putin does or does not achieve. Its leaders will make decisions based on whether the Allies are steadfast in their support of Ukraine over time or confirm the prediction of 9/11 mastermind (and tyrant) Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to his CIA interrogator: “We will win because … we do not need to defeat you militarily; we only need to fight long enough for you to defeat yourself by quitting.”

Unlike elected leaders, tyrants seldom go into a comfortable retirement. Of course, that only makes them more determined and indeed desperate to prevail.

The conflict between the Axis and the free nations is likely to be long and challenging. But from the Battle of Salamis to D-Day to the fall of the Berlin Wall, tyrannies have been defeated. Though that may be a cause for optimism, it’s no justification for complacency.

• Waller R. Newell, an adjunct fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), is professor of political science and philosophy at Carleton University in Ottawa, Ontario. He is the author of “Tyranny and Revolution: Rousseau to Heidegger” [cambridge.org] and “Tyrants: Power, Injustice and Terror” [cambridge.org] (2019). Clifford D. May is the founder and president of FDD and a columnist for The Washington Times.

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17. Strategic Amnesia: The U.S. Army’s Stubborn Rush to Its Next War

Excerpts:

In the rush to shift towards INDOPACOM, the Army is failing to better itself. As can be seen in Russia's failure to achieve any strategic success in Ukraine, the definition of war is changing. Fighting is becoming more fluid and complex, even without the cyber realm. The Army would do better if it focused on learning while reconfiguring its force stance. Developing a better critical lesson from the past conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan while watching Russia's invasion of Ukraine might give the U.S. Army the edge it needs in the next fight.

This is bold and counters the prevailing winds in the Army, but as Clausewitz describes boldness in his military genius: “In other words, a distinguished commander without boldness is unthinkable. No man who is not bold can play such a role, and therefore we consider this quality the first prerequisite of the great military leaders.”[15] In changing the learning structure of the Army, one would be bold.

Strategic Amnesia: The U.S. Army’s Stubborn Rush to Its Next War

Kyle K. Rable March 14, 2023

thestrategybridge.org · March 14, 2023

In the summer of 2019, I arrived at Fort Lee to start my Basic Officer Leadership Course for Quartermaster officers. At Fort Lee, I began to see the U.S. Army transition from the counterinsurgency wars to focus on the near-peer threat. Logistics officers were to move on from Forward Operating Base (FOB) procedures to learn how to conduct supply trains moving through the different fronts of a battlefield. The only problem with this was that we, a group of brand new officers, were told that we would no longer fight a counterinsurgency. This rush to move on seemed to ignore the basic understanding of learning from the past that the Army preaches.

In the headlong rush to move past Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army's preparation for near-peer conflict means failing to institutionalize the strategic lessons learned. For example, the latest update to Field Manual (FM) 3-0 mentions Ukraine 18 times while mentioning Iraq only eight times and not discussing Afghanistan at all. In the eight times Iraq is discussed in FM 3-0, none examine counterinsurgency or nation building operations. Most of the conversation in these sections is about the 2003 invasion or the support of Iraqi forces in their fight against the Islamic State (IS) in northern Iraq. By ignoring the last 20 years of fighting, the Army is failing to prepare appropriately for the more ambiguous battlefields of today. As seen by the Russian invasion of Ukraine (i.e., the failure of Russia to achieve its objectives and the way Ukraine is arming its population) unlimited and limited war definitions should be fluid. The Army has failed to fully develop a strategic understanding of counterinsurgency wars in its rush to fight the conventional war, instead focusing on tactical improvements.

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The American military is exceptionally competent at learning tactical lessons, developing new ways to fight on the ground while producing better equipment. However, the American military consistently fails to maintain lessons learned past the tactical level of command. The current rush of the military to move past its failures of the last 20 years is reminiscent of the rush to do so post-Vietnam. American military strategic culture has consistently lacked the connection with the formulation of policy. This culture, discussed in depth in works such as Russell Weigley’s The American Way of War and Donald Stoker’s Why America Loses Wars, maintains its stranglehold on American strategists today.[1]

To understand this strategic amnesia and rushing to the next war, this paper will briefly examine the war with the largest impression on the military, World War II. It will continue from there to the Afghanistan withdrawal. This article suggests a continuity in how quickly the Army moves towards the next fight. This paper then explores the reasons behind the loss of institutional knowledge, building off the historical analysis to show how the Army fails to adapt and reassess.

Historical Background

World War II

World War II began when the imperial Japanese Army invaded Manchuria in 1931, and Nazi Germany invaded Poland in 1939.[2] America remained a non-combatant until the 7 Dec 1941 Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The American military mobilized more force than ever before, fighting from the deserts of North Africa to the island of Okinawa. The trials and tribulations of World War II are remembered fondly; every Army cadet reads Band of Brothers at least once before commissioning. However, the victory disease from the war continues to infect today.[3]

The history of World War II continues to dominate the learning institutions of the Army because it was so clearly won, in myth.[4] Large tank battles, control of the air, domination of the sea, movie-worthy airborne drops, and daring amphibious assaults are the highlighted stories of the war. While the war does deserve a place in the U.S. Army’s institutional memory, it is also important to remember what has changed. What followed the victories of WWII should have diminished the impact it had on the U.S. Army, yet it has remained on a pedestal. The stalemate and failure of the next two major wars are direct consequences of the victory disease brought on by WWII.

The Korean War

As World War II ended and relations between the communist Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States soured, the Cold War began. Soon China fell into the grip of communism. As the world spiraled closer to the possibility of all-out nuclear war, North Korea crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea, setting off the Korean War.[5] North Korea's initial push was explosive and might have culminated in the desired quick decisive victory if not for the quick deployment of U.S. and United Nations troops. In the seesaw events of the Korean War, the U.S. and North Korean/Chinese troops launched massive offensives. These culminated when U.S. troops regrouped and methodically pushed back the combined Chinese/North Korean forces and halted at the 38th parallel.

This was America’s first true lesson on limited war in the post-war period. American forces had to deal with hostile locals as they moved past the 38th parallel. The U.S. oversimplified the Chinese attack as hordes of Chinese soldiers, yet the attacks against U.S. lines were organized and pointed at breaking the defense at multiple spots. The U.S. also failed to understand how important cultural understanding was, it did not know that the occupation of U.S. troops had a negative impact on the newly formed South Korean government.[6] In continuing to rush to the next war, the Army never institutionalized the lessons learned.

The American War in Vietnam

The decolonization struggle between the Vietnamese and the French colonial government took on a Cold War framing. Once the French failed in Vietnam, the U.S. supported South Vietnam. The U.S. slowly escalated involvement until the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964, which led to the United States committing full combat troops to South Vietnam. The U.S. military failed to ever realize its nation building and counterinsurgent mission in South Vietnam. The military overused its firepower, failed to pacify the countryside, and failed to understand the culture. Under General William Westmoreland and General Creighton Abrams, the military emphasized the statistical measurement of body counts and other arbitrary statistics.[7] It was a war that held an elusive enemy that fought in unconventional ways, sometimes as conventional units from the North and sometimes as communist insurgents from the South. After many years of failing to pacify South Vietnam, the U.S. pulled out its combat forces in 1973, and in 1975 the Saigon Government fell.

The American war in Vietnam has had resounding implications on the wars that followed; however, the U.S. Army failed to learn lessons from Vietnam. As seen above, the U.S. Army failed to fully institutionalize lessons learned because it is always in a rush to move on. The Army did not believe it could learn much from a war it lost and predicted that it still needed to only face the Russian Army in large-scale combat. The Army failed to come to terms with its shortcomings, instead pretending that Vietnam was a one-off. The idea of the Vietnam Syndrome shows that the Army thought of the war only as its loss and not as a way to develop better counterinsurgency doctrine.

The End of the Cold War, Desert Storm, and GWOT

In the aftermath of Vietnam, the Army was disgraced by its loss in Vietnam, failed further during the botched Desert One rescue attempt, and fell into a malaise. However, under President Ronald Reagan, the military worked towards ending the malaise of failure. As it participated in small operations, such as Operation Just Cause, it began to feel its might again. Two major events occurred that imparted the Army with victory disease so rancid that it contributed to the failure of the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan.

The first major event was the success of the U.S. mission during Operation Desert Storm from August 1990 to February 1991. In repelling, routing, and utterly demoralizing the Iraqi Army, the U.S. Army felt it had finally kicked the Vietnam War syndrome. Unfortunately, America was drunk on its military victory and forgot the loss of Vietnam. The second event was the dissolution of the USSR and the end of the Cold War in 1991. America, so it seemed, was now the invincible superpower. Intoxicated by these two victories, the 21st century crashed into America.

This jubilation did not last long; on 11 Sept 2001, terrorists attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Beginning in October of 2001, the Global War on Terror commenced with the invasion of Afghanistan.[8] The war in Afghanistan was eerily similar to that of Vietnam. Yet, the U.S. had not learned its lessons fully and was unprepared for the pacifying mission in Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban. The United States also failed to follow the warning of Clausewitz against opening a second front, and started a second war in Iraq in 2003. The ensuing occupation of Iraq led to the creation of ISIS and other terrorist organizations, and in Afghanistan, the government made no headway into the rural areas. In the fallout of the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, it looks like the Army is preparing to continue the mistake of failing to learn.

U.S. Air Force C-17 over Afghanistan (Marcus Yam/Shutterstock)

Losing Institutional Knowledge and Forcing a Path

In providing a quick breakdown of over a century of warfare, this paper has highlighted one of the biggest shortcomings of the U.S. Army. It fails, time and again, to fully develop and digest the lessons from previous conflicts beyond the tactical level of war. In Vietnam, the Army failed to fully adapt to the war it was waging and continually tried to look for the war it wanted to fight. American combat commanders failed to embrace pacification in large numbers. In Vietnam, many tactical-level leaders found it impossible to engage and directly fight the North Vietnamese Army or South Vietnamese insurgents. While giving nothing more than lip service to winning the hearts-and-minds, the Army failed to win the American war in Vietnam.

In losing the war in Vietnam, the Army failed to learn from it. The Army never fully maintained any knowledge from the war, instead choosing to forget the loss. Due to this desire to distance itself from the failure in Vietnam, the Army failed to provide the generation that invaded and then occupied Iraq and Afghanistan with proper strategic understanding. Choosing to forget lessons learned from war, the Army failed to interact with, adapt to, and reassess strategy. Adapting strategy is vastly important to winning a war, and in the case of the Army, it fails to reassess the failures of the past.[9]

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The ability to adapt and learn are key parts of strategic planning. Without the willingness to create a profound set of lessons learned at the strategic level, the Army is doomed to repeat its failures. In Colin Gray’s Fighting Talk, he discusses in Maxim 37 that American strategists fail to develop a fuller sense of history.[10] Instead, they live in the present, and while history is not the end all be all of predicting the next fight, it can help one understand the fight better. In On War, Clausewitz uses historical analysis, from the Second Persian War to the final battle of Napoleon at Waterloo, to illustrate his theoretical ideas.[11] This is not an argument that every Army general needs to be a classically trained historian; however, this argues that every Army officer should have a grasp of history.[12]

The reason for discussing history is that the Army fails to remember its unpleasant history. Choosing instead to move on quickly, pretending that the defeat was outside of their control. The Army fails to actively collect its history at the strategic level, instead blaming outside issues. In Vietnam, the media and politicians were blamed; in Afghanistan, just choose one of the four presidents who were in office during the conflict. While shifting to project strength into INDOPACOM makes sense, ignoring Iraq and Afghanistan to do so puts the Army at a disadvantage.

Why did the Army actively ignore the lessons from Vietnam and fail to implement them in Afghanistan and Iraq? It can be pointed to the last conflicts discussed in the above section: the end of the Cold War and the success of Desert Storm. The victory disease of winning these two conflicts infected the Army. With the end of the Cold War, America saw itself as the only dominant force in the world. However, the Army rested on the presumption that the next conflict would be with a near-peer in the late 1990s, just to spend the next two decades fighting counterinsurgencies. In failing to fully develop the lessons from Vietnam, the Army failed to allow officers and planners to be better prepared. Having failed to properly create lessons learned, the Army led itself into another failure. It is again attempting to do this; in moving as quickly as it can in structure and memory from Afghanistan and Iraq, it is dooming younger officers and leaders to the same fate. Clausewitz says that each war does have something different about it, but that the theory of strategy and war has a general and universal element— and thus, studying the most current conflict without rushing to the next is important in developing strategy.[13]

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This rush to fight the near-peer threat is symptomatic of the preferred American way to fight. Andrew Krepinevich’s The Army and Vietnam discusses the desire of the Army officers in Vietnam to fight large-scale battles, not the war in front of them. This obsession with fighting large-scale battles has continued in the American psyche today. The Army needs to give up on rushing to war and instead focus part of its institutional strength on remembering war, on facilitating a proper understanding of the strategic and policy history. The problem is that the Army fails to learn strategic lessons and only pays lip service to teaching strategy to its officers, instead choosing to focus on operational art. It fails to teach younger officers how to be strategic leaders.

Conclusion

On 30 Aug 2021, the last United States forces left the ground at the Kabul airport; the concurrent fall and total collapse of the Afghan government spelled the final blow to the American mission in Afghanistan. In scenes reminiscent of the fall of Saigon in 1975, America's military once again failed to achieve total pacification. A cycle of rushing to forget the implications of the defeat began—revisionist generals went on talk shows to proclaim that all they needed was more time, treasure, and blood. Instead of truly searching for the lessons in the loss of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, the Army has shifted the blame and rushed to look for a war it could win.

This spells a disaster for the Army and seems to be the only path known to today's leaders. It has been almost 50 years since the fall of Saigon, and the Army as an institution repeated the same mistakes in Afghanistan. They are poised to fail to learn and hope not to have to fight that type of war anymore. When I heard that explained at my Basic Officer Leader Course, I was lost; how could they know?

In exploring the last century or so of American military history, it is easy to see the pitfalls that the Army has hit. It managed to fail to remember Vietnam comprehensively, as America occupied Afghanistan and Iraq. In each case, the wars are separated by victories on the part of the United States. In each case, the Army suffered from victory disease and pushed the losses to the outside.

Not only does the Army need to better institutionalize learning from more current conflicts and not rush to its next war, but it also needs to revamp its education system to better prepare officers for this education. The current system fails to introduce young officers to strategic thought and theory, instead ignoring any talent and relegating them from learning. Demanding memorization of FM 3-0 does not make for better planners. As Clausewitz indicates, doctrine is more of a guide than a rule, and strict adherence to doctrine does not make one a military genius.[14]

In the rush to shift towards INDOPACOM, the Army is failing to better itself. As can be seen in Russia's failure to achieve any strategic success in Ukraine, the definition of war is changing. Fighting is becoming more fluid and complex, even without the cyber realm. The Army would do better if it focused on learning while reconfiguring its force stance. Developing a better critical lesson from the past conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan while watching Russia's invasion of Ukraine might give the U.S. Army the edge it needs in the next fight.

This is bold and counters the prevailing winds in the Army, but as Clausewitz describes boldness in his military genius: “In other words, a distinguished commander without boldness is unthinkable. No man who is not bold can play such a role, and therefore we consider this quality the first prerequisite of the great military leaders.”[15] In changing the learning structure of the Army, one would be bold.

Kyle Rable is an officer in the U.S. Army and is currently a Ph.D. Student at Texas Tech University studying military history. He received his BA from the University of Toledo and his MA from Bowling Green State University. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of Texas Tech University, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Header Image: U.S. Marines conduct vehicle recovery drills, Camp Pendleton, California, 2021 (Joel Rivera-Camacho)

Notes:

[1] Russell Weigley, The American Way of Way: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973.) and Donald Stoked, Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and U.S. Strategy from the Korean War to the Present(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

[2] Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, Volume II,364-451.

[3] See: Elizabeth Same, Looking For The Good War: American Amnesia and the Violent Pursuit of Happiness (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,2021).

[4] See: Samet, Looking For The Good War: American Amnesia and the Violent Pursuit of Happiness.

[5] William Stueck, Rethinking The Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History (Princeton: Princeton University Press,2002).

[6] Stueck, Rethinking The Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History, 185-206.

[7] See Greg Daddis No Sure Victory and Andrew Krepinevich The Army and Vietnam.

[8] Andrew Bacevich, America’s War For The Greater Middle East: A Military History (New York: Random House, 2017)227-228.

[9] George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2014),363-380. See also, Krepinevich The Army and Vietnam.

[10] Colin Gray, Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy (New York: Potomac Books, 2009) 151-154.

[11] Carl Von Clausewitz, Howard, Paret, Brodie On War, 867-870.

[12] Carl Von Clausewitz, Howard, Paret, Brodie On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) 168-169.

[13] Carl Von Clausewitz, Howard, Paret, Brodie On War, 717-718.

[14] Carl Von Clausewitz, Howard, Paret, Brodie On War, 162-164.

[15] Carl Von Clausewitz, Howard, Paret, Brodie On War,223-227.

thestrategybridge.org · March 14, 2023

18. Artillery Shortage Hampers Russia’s Offensive in East Ukraine, Western Officials Say

I guess they really do need north Korean help.

Artillery Shortage Hampers Russia’s Offensive in East Ukraine, Western Officials Say

Moscow instructs manufacturers to double production of precision-guided weapons

https://www.wsj.com/articles/acute-artillery-shortage-is-hampering-russias-offensive-in-east-ukraine-western-officials-say-6f2fb94a?page=1

By Matthew LuxmooreFollow

in Dnipro, Ukraine, and Evan GershkovichFollow

in Moscow

Updated March 14, 2023 2:47 pm ET

Shortages of artillery shells are hampering Russia’s grinding advance in eastern Ukraine, Western officials said on Tuesday, as Moscow pushes to capture the city of Bakhmut after months of heavy fighting and Kyiv gears up for a counteroffensive.

Russian ammunition shortages have in recent weeks worsened to the extent that extreme rationing of artillery shells is likely in force on many parts of the front, the U.K.’s Defense Ministry said on Tuesday in its daily intelligence briefing. Other European defense officials agreed with the assessment, with one stressing that Russia was working with partners including North Korea to buy ammunition quickly while it scaled up production.

The U.K. said that artillery rationing on the front lines was a major reason for Russia’s recent failures to make military gains in Ukraine, adding that Moscow was likely resorting to use of old munitions stock that had previously been categorized as unfit for deployment in the war.

On Tuesday, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu instructed Russian arms producers to double their production of precision-guided weapons during a visit to Tactical Missiles Corporation JSC in Korolyov, a city outside Moscow, Russian state media reported.

How Russia Lost Dozens of Tanks in a Costly Battle in Eastern Ukraine

Imposing the Past: Putin’s War for History - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Jade McGlynn · March 15, 2023

A great deal has been written about Vladimir Putin’s relationship with history: the way it fascinates him, the way it inspires him, and the way it distorts his thinking. Yet, insightful as much of this analysis is, it does not always convey the extent to which Putin is actually fighting the West over control of historical narratives. It’s not simply that Putin believes history has destined Russia for greatness. He also believes that appreciating this fact is a prerequisite for fulfilling it.

For the past decade, Russian politicians and state-aligned media have insisted that foreigners are waging a forever war against Russian history, allegedly aimed at destroying the very essence of Russian identity. In response, the Russian state has launched an onslaught of historical propaganda aimed at convincing Russians that they are part of a great nation resisting historical and cultural colonization. Putin invaded Ukraine, at least in part, to impose his view of the past on a country that he feared was wilfully and maliciously misremembering it.

The Importance of Russian History

In 2016, right outside the Kremlin, Putin unveiled a statue of Grand Prince Vladimir, the ruler of the Orthodox medieval polity of Kyivan Rus. It stands at a petty 10 centimeters taller than Ukraine’s statue of the same Grand Prince. Ukrainian and Russian historians have long sparred over the legacy of this medieval empire. To Putin, Rus is the first Russian state and the common point of origin for both Ukrainians and Russians. Furthermore, it is proof that Ukraine, as a country, people, culture, and identity, does not really exist. It is important for Russia’s leaders to maintain this belief because, if Ukraine is a separate nation and culture, then Russia’s claim to the civilizational legacy of Kyivan Rus would disappear with it, undermining the foundations on which the Russian state has constructed its post-Soviet identity.

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But this is only one part of Putin’s narrative. The Great Patriotic War, Russia’s term for the Soviet Union’s war against the Nazis from 1941 to 1945, lies at the center of Russian memory politics and post-Soviet identity. Having nationalized the Soviet victory as a Russian one, the Kremlin sees the victory over Nazism as having confirmed Russia’s right to a sphere of influence — a right also endowed by Russia’s inheritance of Kyivan Rus. To question this post-1945 right, or to sully the memory of the Great Patriotic War in any way, regardless of accuracy, is criminal — in the literal sense. In 2020, Vladimir Putin ushered in sweeping new legislative amendments that amounted to a new Russian constitution and included codification of the duty to ‘defend historical truth’ and ‘protect the memory’ of the Great Patriotic War. Such phrasing reinforces the notion that memory and truth are under threat by alternative — Western — versions of the past.

In the Russian official memory — and law — there is no space for the Red Army’s mass rapes in Berlin or the post-1945 Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe. In this context, restrictive legislation did not come out of the blue: the Russian government, media, and — to some extent — public had carefully laid the groundwork for it far in advance, working as memory makers to push history into the heart of Russian political and popular culture. The efforts they undertook formed part of the Kremlin’s intensive use of selective history to define what it means to be Russian, to justify its own rule, and to project power at home and abroad. And it worked. Arguably, the only truly unifying national idea for many Russians is the Great Patriotic War: it is one of the few topics on which almost all Russians agree, with 89 percent feeling pride in the Great Victory according to a poll conducted in September 2020.

Of course, historical propaganda is hardly unique to Russia. Glorifying the past is a fundamental facet of building national identities. Wars over historical narratives between and within societies are increasing around the world, from the battle between President Trump’s 1776 Commission and the 1619 Project to China’s rediscovery of World War II as a new form of anti-Western nationalism. As the historian Margaret Macmillan has argued, in secular societies in particular, history is frequently used to provide morality tales previously sourced from religion. Indeed, the active discursive reconstruction of the past has played an especially emphatic role in the post-communist space that emerged after 1989, as countries looked to create new futures but needed new pasts to justify them.

That said, these narratives play a special role in modern Russia. After the fall of communism, Russia was not in the same position as the other post-Soviet states. As the heir to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it proved unable to reject the Soviet legacy entirely or cast itself as the occupied, rather than the occupier. Moreover, Russia was and is too ethnically and religiously diverse for either religion or ethnicity to function as a cohering element. Managing ethno-nationalism had been a political priority between 2006 and 2012 and continued to be a prominent concern at the beginning of Putin’s third term. Although the government has flirted with ethnocentrism, notably during the annexation of Crimea in early 2014, outright ethno-nationalism has played a limited role in government discourse. Instead, there has been an imperial nationalism, with ethnic Russians as the primus inter pares, even referred to as the “state forming people” within the constitution.

Thus the invocation of history as the basis for Russian national identity has the advantage of meeting a wide range of demands: it appeals to the hereditary and genealogical elements of ethnic nationalism while still reflecting the polyethnic nature of the Russian Empire and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Russia’s political system, presidentialism, and prioritization of state over society have made it almost impossible to create a civic identity, which would require a popular political engagement and civil society, both of which the Kremlin has dismantled. Likewise, there is no coherent ideological set of principles to govern the way people live, as there was in the communist era. This only reinforces the significance of history in creating a unifying national concept or an answer to the question of why Russians belong together as a nation. Cultural memory and a sense of shared history are the only feasible options.

In his study of Soviet and post-Soviet historical narratives, the academic Thomas Sherlock demonstrates how the delegitimization of the Soviet past that took place under Mikhail Gorbachev had a deeply destabilizing effect on Soviet society, even contributing to the Soviet Union’s downfall. In many ways, the Russian establishment under Putin has set about reversing this destabilization, but this has not always equated to reinstating the old history. Instead, it has focused on reinstating old attitudes towards history, denigrating the critical approaches seen during the perestroika era.

Beyond Kyivan Rus’ and the Great Patriotic War, which function respectively as the foundation stone and ultimate, incontrovertible proof that Russia is special, the actual events that constitute the historical narrative matter very little. New bits can always be added, provided that they can be interpreted in such a way as to support three core arguments. These arguments are: Russia needs a strong state; Russia has a special path of development; and Russia is a messianic great power with something unique to offer the world. Whether the celebration of the state in question relates to Stalin or Tsar Nicholas I is less important than that the strength of the state being celebrated.

The government’s intensive use and propagation of selective interpretations of history to define what it means to be Russian, to justify its own rule, and to project power at home and abroad shift the focus from ‘what’ is known towards the ‘act’ of knowing and performing that knowledge. Put another way, within certain limits, it doesn’t matter whether you believe, or what you believe, it matters that you say and act as if you believe it. Ultimately, this is about Russian identity construction. The problem is that this identity has been, and is being, constructed atop Ukraine.

Imposing History

In 2012, Putin announced that strengthening national consciousness would be a priority for his coming term, declaring that the definition of Russian identity was vague and needed refining. He chose to refine it around a confected but emotionally powerful common past, declaring 2012 the Year of History and setting up new historical societies responsible for churning out blockbuster war films, exhibitions, museums, military history children’s clubs and camps, and World War II theme parks.

Subsequently, the Russian government created a multitude of different memory-centered activities and practices, offering plenty of opportunities for people to engage with history and, in so doing, bring to life its assertion that the Kremlin was leading Russian citizens to greater historical awareness and cultural consciousness. Most prominent among such bodies are the so-called government-organized non-government organizations, such as the Russian Military Historical Society and Russian Historical Society. Although clearly controlled by the government, these organizations present themselves as independent civil society bodies, disguising the state’s involvement in memory politics. In just seven years, between 2013 and 2020, the Russian Military Historical Society produced 3,000 memorial plaques, 650 open lectures, 600 documentaries and films, 300 monuments, 251 military history tours, 213 military history festivals, 155 military history camps, 70 conferences, 40 forty exhibitions; nine themed trains, seven historical commissions, six historical web portals, four museums, and countless branded exercise books, pencil cases, and pens.

The government has also commandeered genuine civil society commemorations, as exemplified by the hostile takeover of the nationwide Immortal Regiment movement, a procession developed by independent journalists in Tomsk to encourage people to retain personal memories of family members involved in the Great Patriotic War effort. When it became popular, the government cloned the organization and forced many volunteers to join its new, highly politicized, variant, where Putin now marches at the head of the Victory Day procession with various world leaders.

The Russian government has utilized historical interpretation as a byword for patriotic awareness, to spin a narrative of Russian counter-revolutionary consciousness against Western cultural colonization, which is (allegedly) most egregious in the sphere of historical falsification. The 2021 Russian National Security Strategy dedicates an entire section to cultural and spiritual values and historical truth, arguing that Russian identity and Russian people were under constant attack from efforts to distort and falsify Russian history. These threats emanate not only from the West but also from its agents in Russia (and what the Kremlin considers to be Russia), who are supposedly waging a campaign of cultural colonization.

As Putin wrote in his essay on the Historical Unity of Russia and Ukraine in June 2021, “Ukraine’s ruling circles decided to justify their country’s independence through the denial of its past…. They began to mythologize and rewrite history, edit out everything that united us.” He blames Western forces for pushing Ukraine to rewrite history. The Russian president is articulating an often repeated idea, namely that Western culture had caused countries to forget their own historical value, as happened to Russia in the 1990s. However, this process, under Putin’s ‘historical renaissance’, was being remedied.

Despite the supposed magnitude of the threat, Putin insists that Russia remains uniquely positioned to maintain its cultural sovereignty due to its attainment of cultural consciousness. To attain cultural consciousness is to be aware of history’s structural importance to everyday factors. It is to recognize attempts to distort history as attempts to distort reality and to reject them accordingly. Russia’s knowledge and experience of history are supposedly providing the nation with protection against cultural colonization and assuring its continued cultural sovereignty.

Able to resist the types of cultural colonization and historical alienation to which other countries have fallen prey, Russia now has a mission to help others rediscover their own cultural consciousness — to awaken them from an American-imposed cultural slumber. This argument has been promoted widely in the media since the 2015 intervention in Syria and depicts Russia as a beacon of cultural consciousness, showing other countries how to reconnect with and remain faithful to their history and heritage. It is this narrative that allows the Kremlin to claim it knows Ukraine’s true identity better than Ukrainians, and that Russia was best placed to restore and protect that identity in 2022. The battle is not only to convince Ukrainians of their history but, by doing so, to save and protect a particular understanding of Russian history, which depends on Ukrainian subservience.

Russia’s hubristic ‘special military operation’ to denazify Ukraine floundered on contact with real Ukrainians, who turned out to be very different from those constructed in the Kremlin’s mythomaniac minds. Russia found in Ukraine a nation where it believed there was not one. And yet recognizing this would have a deeply destabilizing impact on official conceptions of Russia’s identity. It would ultimately require rewriting Russian history and national identity from scratch — which is exactly what Putin is fighting against. In fighting to impose its memory on Ukraine, Russia is risking not only its future but also its past. Unfortunately, this could make for a long war.

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Jade McGlynn is the author of Russia’s War and a Research Fellow at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Jade McGlynn · March 15, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 14, 2023

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Artillery Shortage Hampers Russia’s Offensive in East Ukraine, Western Officials Say

Moscow instructs manufacturers to double production of precision-guided weapons

Imposing the Past: Putin’s War for History - War on the Rocks