Quotes of the Day:
“Be practical as well as generous in your ideals. Keep your eyes on the stars, but remember to keep your feet on the ground.”
- Theodore Roosevelt
“That’s why the philosophers warn us not to be satisfied with mere learning, but to add practice and then training. For as time passes we forget what we learned and end up doing the opposite, and hold opinions the opposite of what we should.”
- Epictetus
"In truth, knowledge is a great and very useful quality; those who despise it give evidence enough of their stupidity. Yet I do not set its value at that extreme measure that some attribute to it."
- Michel de Montaigne
1. South Korea's second space rocket launch successfully puts satellites in orbit
2. It’s Time to Start Worrying About North Korea Again (Sorry)
3. N. Korea may be conducting unnecessary construction at nuclear test site to confuse observers
4. Yoon says his administration may revisit 2019 deportation of two North Korean fishermen
5. Double Asymmetry: The Inevitability of an Arms Race on the Korean Peninsula
6. Several soldiers die during construction accidents in Pyongyang's Hwasong District
7. Unification minister expresses willingness to hold talks with new N. Korean counterpart
8. Defense minister, U.S. Pacific Fleet commander reaffirm firm defense posture
9. Bromance? Putin and Kim take on the world, critics fear Ukraine war has boosted alliance
10. A new Quad? Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand eye four-way anti-China summit on sidelines of Nato meet
11. North Korea abruptly stops importing Covid-19 containment goods from China
12. Inside North Korea’s global cyber war: The intersection of hacking and organized crime
1. South Korea's second space rocket launch successfully puts satellites in orbit
South Korea's second space rocket launch successfully puts satellites in orbit
SEOUL, June 21 (Reuters) - South Korea's second test launch of its domestically produced Nuri rocket successfully placed several satellites in orbit on Tuesday, officials said, taking a major step in efforts to jumpstart its space programme after a first test failed last year.
The rocket lifted off from Naro Space Center on the southern coast of South Korea at 4 p.m. (0700 GMT). A 162.5-kg (358 lb)satellite designed to verify the rocket's performance successfully made contact with a base station in Antarctica after entering orbit, officials said.
The rocket also successfully placed a 1.3-ton dummy satellite and four small cube satellites developed by universities for research, into orbit.
"The sky of the Korean universe is now wide open," Science and ICT Minister Lee Jong-ho told a briefing. "Our science and technology has made great strides."
The three-stage KSLV-II Nuri rocket, designed by the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) to eventually put 1.5-ton payloads into orbit 600 to 800 km (370 to 500 miles) above the Earth, is a cornerstone of the country’s ambitious goals for 6G networks, spy satellites, and even lunar probes.
It uses only Korean rocket technologies, and is the country's first domestically built space launch vehicle. South Korea’s last booster, launched in 2013 after multiple delays and several failed tests, was jointly developed with Russia.
President Yoon Suk-yeol watched the launch from his office and thanked everyone involved as he was briefed by Lee and others about the success, vowing to keep an election pledge to create a new agency to take charge of space affairs, according to a statement by his office.
"Now the road to space from our land has been opened," Yoon said. "It was the product of 30 years of daunting challenges. From now on, the dreams and hopes of our people and our youth will extend into space."
1/4
South Korea’s domestically produced Nuri space rocket lifts off from its launch pad at the Naro Space Center in Goheung County, South Korea, June 21, 2022. Mandatory credit Korea Pool/Yonhap via REUTERS
In Nuri's first test in October, the rocket completed its flight sequences but failed to put the test payload into orbit after its third-stage engine burned out earlier than planned.
Engineers adjusted the helium tank inside Nuri's third-stage oxidizer tank to address that problem, Yonhap news agency reported.
KARI has said it plans at least four more test launches by 2027. Nuri is key to South Korean plans to eventually build a Korean satellite-based navigation system and a 6G communications network. The country also plans to launch a range of military satellites, but officials deny the Nuri has any use as a weapon.
South Korea is also working with the United States on a lunar orbiter, and hopes to land a probe on the moon by 2030.
After Tuesday's successful launch, the U.S. Embassy in Seoul said on Twitter it is looking forward to U.S.-South Korea cooperation in space.
Space launches have long been a sensitive issue on the Korean peninsula, where North Korea faces sanctions over its nuclear-armed ballistic missile programme.
In March, South Korea's military separately oversaw what it said was its first successful launch of a solid-fuel space-launch rocket, another part of its plans to launch spy satellites.
In recent years, South Korea and the United States agreed to scrap bilateral limits on Seoul's missile and rocket development, clearing the way for new civilian and military launches.
Reporting by Josh Smith and Hyonhee Shin, Editing by William Maclean and Bradley Perrett
2. It’s Time to Start Worrying About North Korea Again (Sorry)
The pendulum swings.
But we should not get our hopes up about Choe Son Hui as the new foreign minister. I am glad Kaplan stresses the 8th Party Congress to determine the regime's intent.
Even so, there is at least one intriguingly hopeful sign. At a party conclave last week, Kim overhauled his national-security team,
naming Choe Son Hui as his foreign minister. Cho is seen as an America specialist; she has taken part in negotiations with the U.S. and other Western nations before. This could be a sign that Kim is interested in reviving negotiations.
However, Kim also said at the
party congress a year-and-a-half ago that North Korea would need nuclear weapons “as long as there is imperialism on this planet,” and he deemed the U.S. as “the biggest enemy” to “the development of our revolution.”
A State Department spokesman said last month, on the eve of Biden’s trip to Asia, that the president remains
“open to dialogue” with North Korea “without preconditions” as long as the talks were serious. However, U.S. officials have also said the goal of serious talks must be “complete, verifiable, irreversible disarmament.” If Biden is still serious about that, and if Kim still believes he needs nukes as long as imperialism (meaning the United States) is on this planet, then talks seem rather futile. Maybe one side or the other can budge, but it’s not clear what would budge them—especially as long as Washington is still enmeshed in a neo-cold war with both Russia and China.
When Biden took office a year-and-a-half ago, he thought that he could leave behind the ancient squabbles of the Middle East, restore U.S. ties with a peaceful Europe, and focus—to the extent foreign policy needed focus—on the new “Indo-Pacific” alliance with Japan, Australia, and India. He didn’t anticipate the biggest war in Europe since 1945, Afghanistan’s return to the dark ages,
Iran’s renewed effort to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels—and now the resumption of what looks like North Korea’s nuclear quest.
Presidents can try to set their agenda, but the rest of the world—and the world right now is particularly unruly—gets a vote.
My summary of the 8th Party Congress. These are important points to keep in mind as we move forward with a strategy to deal with the regime.
North Korea Strategy Reaffirmed by 8th Party Congress
- Political Warfare
- Subversion, coercion, extortion
- “Blackmail diplomacy” – the use of tension, threats, and provocations to gain political and economic concessions
- Example: Kim Yo-jong threats in June – ROK anti-leaflet law in December
- Negotiate to set conditions - not to denuclearize
- Set Conditions for unification (domination to complete the revolution)
- Split ROK/US alliance
- Reduce/weaken defense of the South
- Exploit regional powers (e.g, China and Russia)
- Economics by Juche ideology – the paradox of “reform”
- Illicit activities to generate funds for regime
- Deny human rights to ensure regime survival
- Continue to exploit COVID threat to suppress dissent and crack down on 400+ markets and foreign currency use
- Priority to military and nuclear programs
- For deterrence or domination?
It’s Time to Start Worrying About North Korea Again (Sorry)
While the eyes of the world have been focused on Ukraine, Kim Jong Un has been testing missiles at an alarming rate.
JUNE 20, 202211:39 AM
Slate · by Fred Kaplan · June 20, 2022
Rocket man has been firing rockets. JUNG YEON-JE/Getty Images
While all eyes have been glued on the war in Ukraine, North Korea has been busy. Kim Jong-un’s weapons scientists have test-launched 31 ballistic missiles so far this year compared with 25 in all of 2019, which was a record-setter up till then. On June 5 alone, they fired eight short-range missiles, all successfully, in the space of a mere 35 minutes. They also seem to be preparing to detonate a nuclear bomb, which would break a four-year moratorium that they’ve observed on testing nukes.
Yet at the same time, North Korea is in the throes of a COVID crisis, with no vaccines or mask mandates to counter it. Its closed-border policy of the past two years—put in place to prevent an outbreak—has triggered a food shortage. And at a party conclave last week, Kim reshuffled his national-security team, suggesting…well, it’s not clear what. But one possibility is that it signaled a renewed appetite for negotiations and possible desire for international assistance, even if some of his fiery rhetoric suggested otherwise.
Some have seen Kim’s activities—the surge in missile tests, the possible revival of nuclear tests, the possible gambit for more aid—as a response to our own activities or as a dramatic way of seeking attention. But more likely, it’s just Kim being Kim, tossing up his mix of aggressive actions and appeals for help, with the implicit threat that if he doesn’t get help, he’ll behave more aggressively still.
Back in January 2021, at the 8th Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party, Kim laid out a policy of retrenchment—an end to his experiments with reform, the re-ascension of politics over economics, and the re-assertion of power to meet power. Key to this agenda was an elaborate list of new weapons systems, including nuclear weapons.
Since then, his weapons scientists have been going down the list, ticking off every project. This started before Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. While the public rollout of this effort coincided with the defeat of Donald Trump, who saw Kim in an absurdly rosy light, a 2020 United Nations report concluded that Kim continued his missile activity, without any slowdown, during Trump’s term. Daniel Sneider, lecturer of East Asian Studies at Stanford University, told me, “There hasn’t been a shift.”
The war in Ukraine may have affected Kim’s actions in one sense. The intensifying hostility between the U.S. and Russia, as well as the continued chill with China, has widened his latitude. In May, both Russia and China vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution that would have levied more sanctions against North Korea for a recent missile test. Both of Kim’s main allies have long been ambivalent about his aggressive actions, but they’re fine with more missile tests if they deepen the insecurity of the U.S. and our allies in the region. (Will their attitudes shift if North Korea resumes testing nuclear bombs? The answer, Sneider says, will tell us “whether Russia and China are still responsible nuclear powers.”)
None of this much alters North Korea’s ability to attack the United States. They have tested six intercontinental ballistic missiles this year—not enough for the missiles to be reliable by American standards, but if Kim’s goal is simply to deter the U.S. from invading North Korea, he probably has enough.
However, he has been testing a lot more short-range missiles—which could hit South Korea, Japan, and U.S. military bases in the region—and the newer models, which are propelled by solid fuel, are more accurate and reliable. Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, finds the pace and sophistication of these new weapons “a little alarming,” as they suggest Kim may seem them not merely as deterrents but as weapons he might someday use.
Lewis’ colleague, Jonathan Pollack, says they might be accelerating the program as a sign of “stress paranoia”—to “show that North Korea isn’t weak, so ‘don’t mess with us.’”
Either way, the possibility of mutual miscalculation is concerning. Almost immediately after North Korea rapidly test-fired eight short-range ballistic missiles earlier this month, the U.S. and South Korea responded by firing eight short-range ballistic missiles of their own even more rapidly—in the space of 10 minutes—in what a U.S. diplomat in Seoul called a “swift and forceful response.” Most of us may have let North Korea drift from our minds, but those in charge of monitoring all threats are watching carefully and acting promptly.
In this sense, North Korea’s stepped-up aggressiveness may be a separate miscalculation. In part as a response to these moves, South Korea’s conservative party was returned to power in elections last month. While the previous president, Moon Jae-in, was desperate for détente with the north at almost any price, the new president, Yoon Suk Yol, has no interest in reviving talks—and is much more keen to solidify South Korea’s alliance with the United States.
One day before North Korea’s eight-missile-test day, the U.S. and South Korea held a joint naval exercise for the first time since Trump canceled them back in 20189. The exercise took place near Okinawa, Japan, quite a distance from North Korea; the missile tests had to have been planned well before then, so couldn’t be seen as a reaction. Still, Kim and his advisers—who worked hard to sever ties between Washington and Seoul while Trump and Moon were in office—surely took notice.
“For the first time, maybe ever, South Korea is viewing the region’s politics in global terms,” Sneider told me. Its leaders—and also Japan’s, who are also shaken by the geopolitical shifts—will attend NATO’s summit at the end of the month. This will be the first time that America’s European and Asian allies have met together in a security meeting. In this sense, Russia’s and China’s tolerance—even encouragement—of Kim’s hijinks may have been a miscalculation as well.
Even so, there is at least one intriguingly hopeful sign. At a party conclave last week, Kim overhauled his national-security team, naming Choe Son Hui as his foreign minister. Cho is seen as an America specialist; she has taken part in negotiations with the U.S. and other Western nations before. This could be a sign that Kim is interested in reviving negotiations.
However, Kim also said at the party congress a year-and-a-half ago that North Korea would need nuclear weapons “as long as there is imperialism on this planet,” and he deemed the U.S. as “the biggest enemy” to “the development of our revolution.”
A State Department spokesman said last month, on the eve of Biden’s trip to Asia, that the president remains “open to dialogue” with North Korea “without preconditions” as long as the talks were serious. However, U.S. officials have also said the goal of serious talks must be “complete, verifiable, irreversible disarmament.” If Biden is still serious about that, and if Kim still believes he needs nukes as long as imperialism (meaning the United States) is on this planet, then talks seem rather futile. Maybe one side or the other can budge, but it’s not clear what would budge them—especially as long as Washington is still enmeshed in a neo-cold war with both Russia and China.
When Biden took office a year-and-a-half ago, he thought that he could leave behind the ancient squabbles of the Middle East, restore U.S. ties with a peaceful Europe, and focus—to the extent foreign policy needed focus—on the new “Indo-Pacific” alliance with Japan, Australia, and India. He didn’t anticipate the biggest war in Europe since 1945, Afghanistan’s return to the dark ages, Iran’s renewed effort to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels—and now the resumption of what looks like North Korea’s nuclear quest.
Presidents can try to set their agenda, but the rest of the world—and the world right now is particularly unruly—gets a vote.
Slate · by Fred Kaplan · June 20, 2022
3. N. Korea may be conducting unnecessary construction at nuclear test site to confuse observers
Regime political warfare. All warfare is based on deception.
Excerpts:
According to a high-ranking Daily NK source in North Korea on Friday, North Korea has completed the final technical preparations at its nuclear test site at Punggye-ri, Kilju County, North Hamgyong Province. All North Korea would need to do is place nuclear material in the tunnel and seal it to carry out a nuclear test at any time.
However, despite the fact that the Seventh Regiment of the First Brigade and the 131st Nuclear Guidance Bureau — sent to Punggye-ri to restore the tunnels and install equipment — have completed their duties, they are being kept at the site. North Korean authorities have even ordered the Seventh Regiment to build a metal fence near the site.
Ordinary North Koreans already have a difficult time getting anywhere near the Punggye-ri test site due to the rugged terrain and multiple layers of security checkpoints that surround it. Despite this, the authorities ordered the erecting of the fence ostensibly to bolster security.
In fact, the Seventh Regiment is rarely tasked with simple construction duties like erecting metal fences. It is a specialized technical unit mobilized only during important weapon development tests that require strict security.
N. Korea may be conducting unnecessary construction at nuclear test site to confuse observers - Daily NK
North Korean authorities have ordered the Seventh Regiment to build a metal fence near the test site, despite the fact the unit rarely engages in such work
The entrance to a tunnel at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. (Joint Press Corps)
Military units remain at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site despite North Korea having completed technical preparations for its seventh nuclear test. The units appear to be carrying out unnecessary construction near the test site to confuse outside observers.
According to a high-ranking Daily NK source in North Korea on Friday, North Korea has completed the final technical preparations at its nuclear test site at Punggye-ri, Kilju County, North Hamgyong Province. All North Korea would need to do is place nuclear material in the tunnel and seal it to carry out a nuclear test at any time.
However, despite the fact that the Seventh Regiment of the First Brigade and the 131st Nuclear Guidance Bureau — sent to Punggye-ri to restore the tunnels and install equipment — have completed their duties, they are being kept at the site. North Korean authorities have even ordered the Seventh Regiment to build a metal fence near the site.
Ordinary North Koreans already have a difficult time getting anywhere near the Punggye-ri test site due to the rugged terrain and multiple layers of security checkpoints that surround it. Despite this, the authorities ordered the erecting of the fence ostensibly to bolster security.
In fact, the Seventh Regiment is rarely tasked with simple construction duties like erecting metal fences. It is a specialized technical unit mobilized only during important weapon development tests that require strict security.
Many soldiers in the area think the order is strange, according to the source.
“In the past, when the preparations for a nuclear test were complete, [the authorities] would leave one platoon at the site and withdraw the rest. But this time, they are leaving two whole units at the site, even though the preparations are complete,” said the source. “It appears they plan to expand preparations for nuclear tests. Or it’s just for show.”
The source’s report suggests that the authorities are either stationing the technical units at Punggye-ri to prepare for another nuclear test or are engaged in unnecessary construction to confuse South Korean and US intelligence agencies using satellites to watch North Korea’s activities.
Meanwhile, some North Koreans say at least two additional nuclear tests are “necessary” this year, including a test of a small tactical nuclear weapon along with that of a thermonuclear device.
The source said that North Korean authorities have already carried out six tests of nuclear detonation devices. He noted that four of the six tests were successful, but which of the tests succeeded and which failed remains unknown.
Leading US and Chinese foreign policy and security officials — including US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Yang Jiechi, a member of the Chinese Communist Party’s politburo — discussed the North Korean nuclear issue during a meeting in Luxembourg on June 13.
At the meeting, Sullivan expressed concern over China’s use of its veto to shoot down a UN Security Council proposal to place sanctions on North Korea, stressing that the North Korean nuclear issue was an area where Washington and Beijing could cooperate.
China, meanwhile, says a relaxation of sanctions on North Korea is needed to resolve the nuclear issue. North Korea’s ultimate decision whether to carry out a test may be influenced by China given that a nuclear test would signal a significant challenge to Chinese foreign policy.
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
4. Yoon says his administration may revisit 2019 deportation of two North Korean fishermen
Another tragic action by the previous administration.
Yoon says his administration may revisit 2019 deportation of two North Korean fishermen
Published : Jun 21, 2022 - 15:09 Updated : Jun 21, 2022 - 19:05
Yoon speaks to reporters at the lobby of the presidential office in Yongsan on Tuesday morning. (Yonhap)
South Korea may revisit another controversial North Korea decision made during the Moon Jae-in administration, President Yoon Suk-yeol hinted Tuesday.
Speaking to reporters, Yoon said his administration may look into the 2019 repatriation of two North Korean fishermen who sailed into South Korean waters. The two, aged 22 and 23, said they wished to defect to South Korea in handwritten statements.
In less than five days of their capture, South Korea deported both after concluding they were criminals who murdered their captain and crew to flee North Korea. They were handed over to North Korean soldiers through Panmunjom, part of the Demilitarized Zone, by special police forces while blindfolded and tied with ropes.
This marked the first time in history that South Korea rejected North Korean defectors and forcibly repatriated them. Neither of the two men knew they were being returned home, and one of them collapsed at the sight of North Korean soldiers, according to lawmakers who were briefed by officials at the time.
“The Constitution dictates that defectors are our people too. A lot of people are questioning the legitimacy of the decision to send them back to North Korea, when it’s a duty of the state to protect its people,” Yoon told reporters.
North Korean defectors, human rights activists and legal experts have since decried South Korea’s failure to provide the two fishermen with a due process of law -- access to a lawyer and a court -- and protect them in face of a highly likely execution upon repatriation.
The president’s remarks on Tuesday come amid a recent reversal of an early conclusion by South Korean maritime and military authorities that Lee Dae-jun, a fisheries official shot dead and burned by North Korean troops at sea in 2020, was an attempted defector.
“There is no evidence that the missing official intended to defect to North Korea,” said Park Sang-chun, chief of the Incheon Coast Guard, in a bombshell announcement on June 16. The Coast Guard in Incheon had investigated the case since its onset.
Also on Tuesday, Yoon said there were concerns about disclosing records marked as “special intelligence,” in response to the opposition Democratic Party of Korea’s calls on the current administration to provide evidence that Lee had not tried to defect.
“Rather than saying there’s no evidence that it was a defection, present evidence that it wasn’t in fact a defection,” Democratic Party Rep. Ko Min-jung, who served as spokesperson for Moon’s Cheong Wa Dae, said in a radio interview earlier the same day.
The Democratic Party, which continues to stand by the accusation that the slain official sought to defect to North Korea, has refused to cooperate with requests to release information on the government’s handling of Lee’s killing, which remains archived as part of Moon’s presidential records.
Unlocking presidential records requires approval from two-thirds of the National Assembly, whose majority is controlled by the Democratic Party, or a warrant from the chief justice of a high court. But laws prevent a court warrant from being issued if doing so is deemed a potential threat to national security or diplomatic relations.
Lee’s family was expected to file a lawsuit against former Cheong Wa Dae officials on Wednesday for possible interference in the initial responses. Kim Ki-yun, a lawyer working with the family, pointed to the Defense Ministry’s June 16 release stating that the ministry had been following guidelines from Moon’s office in its responses.
As a candidate, Yoon promised Lee’s family that he would help find the truth behind the killing. Last week, the presidential office withdrew the preceding administration’s appeal of a lower court ruling granting the family access to some Cheong Wa Dae and Coast Guard records.
The ruling People Power Party launched a fact-finding task force Monday to examine the two national security incidents that took place during the Moon presidency. “We need to get to the bottom of what led to the inhumane decision that drove a South Korean citizen to death,” said floor leader Kwon Seong-dong.
5. Double Asymmetry: The Inevitability of an Arms Race on the Korean Peninsula
I hope not, but I do fear an "arms race" is inevitable. The Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia: the land of no good options.
Excerpts:
Under these conditions of double asymmetry, a continued, unabated arms race on the Korean Peninsula is a near-certainty. South Korea won’t be confident that its conventional weapons will ever be enough to deter North Korea’s nuclear threats, while North Korea will continue to feel vulnerable not only to the American nuclear umbrella, but also to the South’s far superior conventional capabilities. Unlike arms races in a single domain where parity can be measured with relative confidence and the adversaries can reach a new equilibrium, double asymmetry makes it hard for either side to feel confident their military might will have a deterrent effect on the other. For this reason, the current situation on the Korean Peninsula may be arguably even more precarious and persistent than an arms race between nuclear powers.
What does this mean for U.S. policy? Unfortunately, Washington does not seem to have any good options to alleviate the pressures at play in the arms race. Denuclearizing North Korea has been tried and failed. At this point, an arms-control deal with North Korea seems like a more feasible goal, but signing one would make Seoul feel more insecure and accelerate its military buildup even further. Washington can assure South Korea of America’s security guarantee only so much, but not enough for Seoul to renounce the path forward to developing autonomous self-defense.
Double Asymmetry: The Inevitability of an Arms Race on the Korean Peninsula - War on the Rocks
On June 6, South Korea and the United States test-fired eight ballistic missiles, a day after North Korea test-fired eight of its own ballistic missiles, offering a snapshot of an arms race that has been going on for some time. Since 2019, North Korea has resumed testing its missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles it tested earlier this year, lifting its 2017 self-imposed moratorium on nuclear weapons and missile tests. Just during the first half of 2022, it has test-fired over 30 missiles, breaking its 2019 record of 25. A seventh nuclear test seems imminent judging from recent activities at North Korea’s Punggye-ri nuclear testing site. After Kim Jong Un defended his acceleration of the arms buildup at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea last week, North Korea’s provocations will likely continue. South Korea, for its part, is also accelerating its military buildup, seeking more sophisticated ballistic missiles, including submarine-launched ballistic missiles and hypersonic cruise missiles, as well as missile defense systems. The country’s new president, Yoon Suk-yeol, has vowed to construct a powerful military.
Driving the arms race on the Korean Peninsula is what I call a “double asymmetry of power”: an asymmetry at both the nuclear and conventional levels. North Korea is enhancing its nuclear and missile capabilities in order to secure a survivable nuclear arsenal vis-à-vis the United States. Lacking a nuclear option, South Korea is seeking to counter North Korea’s nuclear threats with sophisticated conventional capabilities. Lagging far behind South Korea in terms of conventional capabilities, North Korea is seeking to modernize its conventional weapons, as well. Due to the power imbalance at both the nuclear and conventional levels, and the difficulty in assessing the power balance across the conventional and nuclear domains, neither country is likely to feel assured of its security, and thus will continue to enhance its military capabilities to deter the other side’s threats.
The North’s March Toward a Survivable Nuclear Arsenal
North Korea is advancing its nuclear and missile capabilities to deter the United States. It is believed that North Korea has not yet acquired the ability to launch a nuclear attack against the United States in light of North Korea’s 2017 ICBM test that failed on the reentry phase. The re-entry vehicle technology protects a nuclear warhead from the intense heat and vibrations generated when a long-range missile re-enters the Earth’s atmosphere. One of the three missiles North Korea launched on May 25 seems to have been aimed at testing its re-entry vehicle technology (this missile had a flight path described as a “double arc” with the missile ascending and descending twice, which may indicate a re-entry vehicle breaking off from the missile.) In addition, North Korea needs to enhance its second-strike capability: the ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons against a nuclear attack. Its recent test of the Hwasong 17 missile may be aimed at filling this gap. Much attention has been paid to the size of the Hwasong 17 — it is the largest ICBM ever developed (hence the name, “monster missile”). The size matters because the missile can carry a large payload, potentially including multiple re-entry vehicles, which complicates a missile-defense system’s job of shooting down all of them at once. The fact that the missile was tested from a mobile launcher makes it even more difficult for missile-defense systems to target. North Korea’s recent testing of a submarine-launched ballistic missile and hypersonic glide vehicles could also pose threats to missile-defense systems. All of these are aimed at enhancing North Korea’s second-strike capability.
A Nuclear Option for the South?
To counter North Korea’s nuclear threats, South Korea has relied on extended deterrence from the American nuclear umbrella. The credibility of extended deterrence, however, has been questioned time and again, and is further undermined now that North Korea is inching closer to acquiring the capability to launch a nuclear attack against the United States and securing a second-strike capability. If North Korea can pose direct nuclear threats to the United States, defending South Korea may become too costly for the United States.
Due to this uncertainty, South Korea is looking at ways to develop its own capability to counter North Korea’s nuclear threats. The most effective way to balance nuclear capabilities would of course be to develop its own such weapons. According to a recent Chicago Council survey that my colleagues and I conducted, 71 percent of South Koreans supported nuclear armament. The public overwhelmingly preferred an independent arsenal (67 percent) over hosting a deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons (9 percent). The South Korean public’s support for nuclear weapons, especially their indigenous development, is robust.
Of course, we should distinguish what the public wants from what leaders can do. In reality, it is highly unlikely that Seoul will go nuclear, because the costs outweigh the benefits. Should South Korea decide to develop its own nuclear weapons, the United States would likely withdraw its security guarantee. Although South Korea has advanced nuclear technologies, it lacks the fissile material production capability, and Seoul would still need three to five years to acquire a workable nuclear arsenal. During this period, South Korea would be critically vulnerable to North Korea’s nuclear threats. That is to say, in the short term, South Korea’s nuclear armament would decrease rather than increase its security. Also, it’s likely that damage to South Korea’s export-dependent economy in the form of sanctions would be significant. Sanctions against South Korea imposed by China alone in the wake of the deployment of the American Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system were severe enough. The prospect of facing large-scale multilateral economic sanctions is likely to erode support for nuclear armament, when it comes down to it.
Given the enormous security and economic costs associated with nuclear armament, another option for South Korea is nuclear hedging: maintaining a viable option for the relatively rapid acquisition of nuclear weapons but stopping short of their development. Though it’s hard to prove, President Moon Jae-in seems to have pursued such an option by preparing to build nuclear-powered submarines, ostensibly to counter North Korea’s submarine-launched ballistic missile capability. But this could in fact have been to acquire the ability to produce nuclear fissile materials as fuel for submarines — fuel that could later be converted into nuclear weapons. Combined with the country’s ballistic missile program, this would make it possible for South Korea to acquire a workable nuclear arsenal in short order.
However, Washington remains against South Korea’s development of nuclear-powered submarines. Seoul has been trying to acquire U.S. consent but hasn’t been successful. The nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and South Korea prohibits the latter’s use of nuclear technology for military purposes. As such, nuclear hedging is not yet feasible.
South Korea’s Conventional Deterrence: Will This Really Work?
Given the uncertainty of extended deterrence and the lack of a viable nuclear option of its own, South Korea is, for now, pursuing the so-called three-pronged defense strategy of conventional deterrence to counter the North’s nuclear threats. It consists of the Kill Chain strategy (preemptive strikes against North Korean nuclear missiles prior to launch), the Korean Aerial Missile Defense system, and the Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation strategy (in essence a decapitation strategy aimed at taking out the North Korean leadership). Moon described it in watered-down terms, such as “strategic strike system,” in order not to provoke Pyongyang, but Yoon recently reinstated the original names.
In order for conventional deterrence to work, it must convince Pyongyang of the prospect of its success. For that, South Korea needs a larger and more capable arsenal of conventional assets. For Kill Chain, South Korea is developing cruise missiles with high precision as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets that enable detection of North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities. South Korea is enhancing its missile defense capabilities by developing its indigenous assets as well as purchasing more American ones. For the decapitation strategy, South Korea requires ballistic missiles, bunker busters, and high-explosive shells, with which it can strike potential North Korean elites’ hideouts as soon as Pyongyang demonstrates its intention to use a nuclear weapon.
Deterring nuclear use with conventional weapons is challenging, however. The third prong, the decapitation strategy, has the best chance of deterring, although it’s still not a sure thing. Given that North Korea’s center of gravity is its leadership, taking out the country’s leaders would inflict unacceptable harm, in which case the logic of deterrence would hold. Indeed, Pyongyang has taken South Korea’s decapitation strategy seriously. For some time, it has sought to acquire South Korea’s operational plans for decapitation, and just last month, the South Korean media reported that a South Korean army captain transferred part of the plan to a North Korean operative. On the other hand, the effectiveness of Kill Chain is questionable. Even with enhanced surveillance capabilities, detecting and tracking North Korean missiles is difficult given the North’s ability to launch missiles from submarines and road-mobile launchers. Even if detection is feasible, it would be challenging for Seoul to strike North Korea’s missile launchers and command and control within a short time frame. The utility of missile defense is also dubious in light of North Korea’s development of hypersonic and multiple re-entry vehicles. Hence, understandably, skepticism abounds whether Seoul can ever deter nuclear threats with conventional weapons.
Nonetheless, Seoul cannot simply rely on America’s extended deterrence without exploring deterrence of its own. South Korea will likely seek to make its conventional deterrence as credible as possible, even if it may never be truly able to counter threats posed by North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.
Nukes May Not Be Enough: North Korea’s Conventional Modernization
North Korea, for its part, is seeking to enhance its own conventional capabilities in response to South Korea doing so. Nuclear weapons are not a cure-all — they do not necessarily eliminate all security threats, and conventional capabilities are still important in countering low-level confrontations. North Korea’s conventional capabilities significantly lag behind those of South Korea. Much of its conventional weapons are outmoded, and its soldiers are malnourished. North Korea’s defense spending is far lower than South Korea’s. To put things into perspective, South Korea’s 2020 defense budget was $45.7 billion, about 1.5 times North Korea’s entire GDP that year, which was $27.4 billion. Plus, a large portion of North Korea’s defense budget goes into its nuclear and missile programs. Therefore, North Korea is seeking to close the gap in conventional power. On the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea in October 2021, North Korea displayed new or updated conventional weapons, including multiple-launch rocket systems, short-range ballistic missiles, air-defense radar vehicles, anti-tank missiles, and smoke grenade launchers. Still, North Korea has a long way to go to catch up with the South.
Under these conditions of double asymmetry, a continued, unabated arms race on the Korean Peninsula is a near-certainty. South Korea won’t be confident that its conventional weapons will ever be enough to deter North Korea’s nuclear threats, while North Korea will continue to feel vulnerable not only to the American nuclear umbrella, but also to the South’s far superior conventional capabilities. Unlike arms races in a single domain where parity can be measured with relative confidence and the adversaries can reach a new equilibrium, double asymmetry makes it hard for either side to feel confident their military might will have a deterrent effect on the other. For this reason, the current situation on the Korean Peninsula may be arguably even more precarious and persistent than an arms race between nuclear powers.
What does this mean for U.S. policy? Unfortunately, Washington does not seem to have any good options to alleviate the pressures at play in the arms race. Denuclearizing North Korea has been tried and failed. At this point, an arms-control deal with North Korea seems like a more feasible goal, but signing one would make Seoul feel more insecure and accelerate its military buildup even further. Washington can assure South Korea of America’s security guarantee only so much, but not enough for Seoul to renounce the path forward to developing autonomous self-defense.
Lami Kim is an assistant professor and director of Asian Studies Program at the U.S. Army War College and a U.S.-Korea NextGen Scholar at Center for Strategic and International Studies. This piece is based on her presentation at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of the U.S. government.
6. Several soldiers die during construction accidents in Pyongyang's Hwasong District
No OSHA in north Korea.
The greater the suffering the greater the push to make the people and the military work harder. How much harder can the military be pushed (let alone the general population)? When will the military los coherency and break down? When will Kim lose the support of the military?
Excerpts:
He added that, “People are being driven to work late into the night, but it seems impossible to avoid accidents because people aren’t machines.
“It’s hard to ensure construction quality and speed while keeping to [basic] construction principles,” he continued. “With these latest falls, there should be more efforts to prevent accidents, but military commanders are still just calling for a race against time. So it appears accidents will be unavoidable in the future, too.”
Meanwhile, construction worker-soldiers are not receiving supplies provided by the Pyongyang branch of the Socialist Women’s Union of Korea and local inminban (people’s units).
Accordingly, some of the soldiers tasked with building the homes in Hwasong are starving from lack of food, with some soldiers even collapsing from hunger.
Despite this, unit commanders are continuing to press soldiers into the construction effort, telling them that they “have no right to collapse until you’ve completed the orders handed down by the Supreme Commander [Kim Jong Un],” the source said.
Several soldiers die during construction accidents in Pyongyang's Hwasong District - Daily NK
Most of them fell as they were working on upper floors without proper personal safety equipment or wearing safety hooks
Soldiers working on the construction of homes in Hwasong District. (Rodong Sinmun - News1)
A number of soldiers mobilized for construction work in Pyongyang’s Hwasong District have recently died from falls, Daily NK has learned.
According to a Daily NK source in North Korea on Friday, five soldiers mobilized for interior and exterior construction work at new apartments in the district have died in falls this month alone.
Most of them fell as they were working on upper floors without proper personal safety equipment or wearing safety hooks.
Yet, the commanders of military units mobilized for the construction continue to throw soldiers into the project with a single-minded focus on results, indifferent to safety measures. Moreover, commanders appear to be blaming the falls on the victim’s own mistakes.
In fact, the commander of the unit whose soldiers died in falls gathered his soldiers the day after one of the accidents and told them to “get their heads on straight.”
“If you strictly follow safety regulations, accidents won’t happen. Accidents are always the result of your own carelessness. If you die, it’s your loss,” he told them.
The source said the Central Committee is calling for workers to double or triple the speed of construction, so “military construction workers have no choice but to do plastering work all night.”
He added that, “People are being driven to work late into the night, but it seems impossible to avoid accidents because people aren’t machines.
“It’s hard to ensure construction quality and speed while keeping to [basic] construction principles,” he continued. “With these latest falls, there should be more efforts to prevent accidents, but military commanders are still just calling for a race against time. So it appears accidents will be unavoidable in the future, too.”
Meanwhile, construction worker-soldiers are not receiving supplies provided by the Pyongyang branch of the Socialist Women’s Union of Korea and local inminban (people’s units).
Accordingly, some of the soldiers tasked with building the homes in Hwasong are starving from lack of food, with some soldiers even collapsing from hunger.
Despite this, unit commanders are continuing to press soldiers into the construction effort, telling them that they “have no right to collapse until you’ve completed the orders handed down by the Supreme Commander [Kim Jong Un],” the source said.
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
7. Unification minister expresses willingness to hold talks with new N. Korean counterpart
We should remember what the function of the United Front Department (UFD) is:
- The United Front Department (UFD) overtly attempts to establish pro-North Korean groups in the ROK, such as the Korean Asia-Pacific Committee and the Ethnic Reconciliation Council. The UFD is also the primary department involved in managing inter-Korean dialogue and North Korea's policy toward the ROK.
- The 225th Bureau is responsible for training agents to infiltrate the ROK and establish underground political parties focused on subversion and fomenting unrest and revolution.
Subversion
- The undermining of the power and authority of an established system or institution.
-
As in: "the ruthless subversion of democracy"
- Ideological War – a choice between:
- Shared ROK/US Values
- Freedom and individual liberty, liberal democracy, free market economy, rule of law, and human rights
- Kim family regime (KFR) “values”
- Juche/Kimilsungism/now "KIMJONGUNISM," Socialist Workers Paradise, Songun, Songbun, Byungjin, and denial of human rights to sustain KFR power
- nK engages in political warfare and active subversion of the ROK
Political Warfare: Political warfare is the use of political means to compel an opponent to do one's will, based on hostile intent. The term political describes the calculated interaction between a government and a target audience to include another state's government, military, and/or general population. Governments use a variety of techniques to coerce certain actions, thereby gaining relative advantage over an opponent. The techniques include propaganda and psychological operations (PSYOP), which service national and military objectives respectively. Propaganda has many aspects and a hostile and coercive political purpose. Psychological operations are for strategic and tactical military objectives and may be intended for hostile military and civilian populations. Smith, Paul A., On Political War (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1989), p. 3. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a233501.pdf
Unification minister expresses willingness to hold talks with new N. Korean counterpart | Yonhap News Agency
By Yi Wonju
SEOUL, June 21 (Yonhap) -- Unification Minister Kwon Young-se said Tuesday he is ready to meet North Korea's new point man handling inter-Korean affairs at "any time in any format" to discuss pending issues on the Korean Peninsula.
Kwon extended the overture during his first press conference since taking office last month, citing the recent appointment of Ri Son-gwon, the North's former foreign minister, as the head of the United Front Department (UFD) in charge of cross-border relations. Choe Son-hui was promoted to the post of foreign minister, replacing Ri, in a reshuffle Pyongyang announced on June 11 following a key Workers' Party meeting.
"I will try harder to shift the currently chilled inter-Korean ties into a phase of dialogue," Kwon said. "As unification minister, I am willing to meet with the head of UFD, Ri Son-gwon, any time in any format."
If realized, the two sides could discuss a broad range of issues from the nuclear issue to talks on cooperation on healthcare, a senior ministry official said later on condition of anonymity.
"Some observers say that the appointment of Ri Son-gwon and Choe Son-hui, known for their hard-line stance (on Seoul and Washington), could mean a further chill in relations. But as they have experience leading negotiations with the U.S. and South Korea, a completely different picture is also possible," he said.
The official, however, stressed that Kwon's remarks do not necessarily suggest that he is making an "official" offer of dialogue to the North.
"We're not even saying whether it's official or not," he said. "We're just saying that let's meet first to discuss any issue related to the two Koreas."
On the odds of the North carrying out another nuclear test, Kwon said Pyongyang appears to be "physically ready" and is waiting for a last-minute "political decision" to do so. He was responding to news reports that the North has completed preparations at its northeastern testing site in Punggye-ri.
The minister added that he thinks the nuclear testing could be carried out "all of a sudden" or it may go even "further past March next year."
The South Korean government is reviewing an option of imposing its own sanctions on the North in case of its nuclear testing, Kwon said.
(END)
8. Defense minister, U.S. Pacific Fleet commander reaffirm firm defense posture
Excerpt:
During the meeting held at Lee's office in Seoul, the minister said that the security situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula is "graver than ever" due to the continued provocations from North Korea and stressed that the U.S. Pacific Fleet plays a pivotal role in countering such threats.
Defense minister, U.S. Pacific Fleet commander reaffirm firm defense posture | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, June 21 (Yonhap) -- South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup had a meeting Tuesday with U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander Adm. Samuel Paparo, in which they reaffirmed the allies' commitment to a firm combined defense posture against North Korean threats, his office said.
During the meeting held at Lee's office in Seoul, the minister said that the security situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula is "graver than ever" due to the continued provocations from North Korea and stressed that the U.S. Pacific Fleet plays a pivotal role in countering such threats.
He added that Seoul has been striving to expand its own role in maintaining regional peace and security, as shown in its plan to participate in a U.S.-led Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) scheduled to run from June 29 through Aug. 4 in waters off Hawaii.
Paparo described cooperation between the navies of the two countries as one of the most successful examples of the alliance and vowed continued efforts to bolster the partnerships.
The admiral was on his third visit to Seoul since assuming the post in May of last year. He also plans to meet with Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Won In-choul and Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Lee Jong-ho.
(END)
9. Bromance? Putin and Kim take on the world, critics fear Ukraine war has boosted alliance
I would bet Putin and Russia would believe this is the US intent even if the administration never uttered a single word. I tire of the argument that our rhetoric causes Putin to act the way he does. I think the headline editor might have overstepped. I do not think Russia and north Korea have a formal alliance. But of course they have long been aligned and their relationship could be considered almost on the level of an alliance. But it is not a formal one.
Moscow believes that the U.S. seeks Russia’s destruction and regime collapse, based on several statements from Biden administration officials who indicated that U.S. goals in the Ukraine conflict are to defeat Russia, degrade its military, and weaken its economy.
In his congratulatory message to Putin on Sunday, Kim expressed confidence that the relations between Russia and North Korea will only deepen, calling them "tactical-strategic collaboration" for the cause of defending global justice."
Bromance? Putin and Kim take on the world, critics fear Ukraine war has boosted alliance
Heritage Foundation Senior Fellow Brent Sadler expects North Korea to launch another missile test as President Biden finishes his visit to Japan.
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On Sunday, North Korean President Kim Jong Un sent a "warm" message to Russian President Vladimir Putin congratulating him on Russia’s National Day, a holiday that marks Russia’s independence from the USSR, according to both countries' state news agencies.
The Korean leader expressed "full support" to the Russian president, the "friendly" Moscow government, and the Russian people, praising Putin for his "leadership and great success in carrying out the just cause of protecting justice and his country’s dignity and security," in an apparent reference to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Putin and Kim Jong Un's relationship has become closer. (getty Images | istock)
Kim’s gesture on Sunday is the latest sign of a deepening relationship between the two countries, which view the United States as their mortal enemy and which both present a serious and deeply frightening nuclear threat to the United States.
The ties between Kim and Putin have been growing for the past several years, but since Moscow launched its military offensive against Ukraine, the relationship appears to be strengthening and has the potential to turn into a long-term partnership of a strategic nature. Both Russia and North Korea are under severe economic sanctions because of their disruptive geopolitical behavior.
Russian Army soldiers stand in a military vehicle rolling during a dress rehearsal for the Victory Day military parade in Moscow, Russia, Saturday, May 7, 2022. (AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko) (AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko)
On May 9, Russia’s Victory Day, which marks USSR’s defeat of Nazi Germany, Kim also sent a congratulatory note to Putin expressing "decisive solidarity" with Russian efforts to eliminate "political and military threats and blackmail by hostile forces." This was most likely a reference to the West’s placing what is seen as "draconian economic sanctions" on Russia.
On May 26, Russia joined China in vetoing a U.S.-sponsored U.N. Security Council resolution proposing new sanctions on North Korea over its resumption of missile tests. Russia and North Korea are two of the key four state actors that present top security threats to the United States, a group that also includes China and Iran, according to the 2022 annual Threat Assessment by the DNI.
Both Russia and North Korea view nuclear use as a viable option to deter the United States from what Moscow and Pyongyang perceive as meddling with their domestic affairs in pursuit of their national interests. They each view the United States as their top threat. Both Kim and Putin have combative personal styles and seem to enjoy provoking Washington, as Moscow and Pyongyang seek to challenge U.S. global dominance.
Russia has a formidable nuclear arsenal, rivaling that of the United States. It has ratcheted up frequent nuclear threats amidst its brutal war on Ukraine, signaling its potential use if either the U.S. or NATO intervene as active combatants on behalf of Ukraine. It’s also quite probable that North Korea has some 45 nuclear warheads, according to Dr. Siegfried Hecker, a prominent U.S. expert on the country's nuclear program.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un pose for photographers during their meeting in Vladivostok, Russia, Thursday, April 25, 2019. (AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko, Pool) (AP)
Pyongyang recently has stepped up its missile testing, having conducted 31 tests this year already, compared with eight in all of 2021. In May, North Korea launched a suspected intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), in addition to two shorter-range missiles, just hours after President Biden departed from South Korea.
On June 5, North Korea fired another eight short-range missiles, the most it has launched in a single day. Days later, the Biden administration warned that North Korea was capable of carrying out a seventh nuclear test "at any time."
In addition to increasing the pace of test missile launches, Kim’s forces broadened the variety of the missiles fired this year - short-range, intermediate-range, long-range missiles capable of reaching the continental United States, and tactical missiles—as well as submarine-launched, train-launched, hypersonic, and cruise missiles.
According to RAND corporation, which assists the U.S. government with technical analysis, North Korea is on track to obtain 200 nuclear warheads within a few years, making it a mid-level nuclear power. Kim’s apparent decision to accelerate his nuclear program may have stemmed from his observation of the U.S. and NATO’s reluctance to engage militarily on behalf of Ukraine because of the fear of Russia’s employment of tactical nuclear weapons to thwart such Western intervention.
Kim’s ultimate goal is a robust nuclear weapons delivery system that can be mated with warheads that can target the U.S. homeland, with the intent of deterring the United States from ever attacking North Korea. His secondary objective is to demonstrate to South Korea and U.S. regional allies that Washington will face a tough choice of sacrificing one of its own cities if it decides to intervene against a North Korean attack.
Sharing a border with North Korea, Russia is not thrilled with Pyongyang becoming a nuclear state, but it understands that expecting Kim to abandon his nuclear ambitions is unrealistic.
The Biden administration appears to be ill-prepared to deter either of the highly risk-tolerant leaders from using nuclear weapons. U.S. warnings of a "swift and forceful response" in the event of an expected seventh nuclear test by Pyongyang, or if Russia uses atomic weapons in Ukraine are unlikely to change Putin’s and Kim’s plans and behavior.
The U.S.’s nuclear modernization appears to be behind what is required to protect the homeland from the North Korean nuclear threat. Air Force Gen. Glen Van Herck, the head of the U.S. Northern Combatant Command (USNORTHCOM), which is in charge of defending the U.S. and Canada from missile attacks, has warned that "going forward, I do believe that [the North Koreans] could exceed my capacity and capabilities." Meantime, Moscow has conducted nuclear mock-attacks on the U.S. homeland.
FILE - In this file photo taken from a video distributed by Russian Defense Ministry Press Service, on Wednesday, Dec. 9, 2020, a rocket launches from missile system as part of the drills, a ground-based intercontinental ballistic missile was launched from the Plesetsk facility in northwestern Russia. (Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP, File) (Russian Defense Ministry Handout via AP)
While neither Russia nor North Korea have actionable plans to attack the United States in a surprise "bolt out of the blue sky" strike, both envision employing nuclear weapons to deter the United States from attacking them, or if it intervenes directly on behalf of Ukraine and South Korea, in a regional conflict. Russia has already operationalized a limited nuclear warfare doctrine that envisions a detonation of a low-yield tactical nuclear warhead to signal to the U.S. and NATO its resolve to climb the escalation ladder to achieve its objectives on the battlefield. Recently North Korean officials also indicated a willingness to use small-sized tactical nuclear weapons, making the Putin-Kim partnership a grave concern.
In addition to posing a serious nuclear danger, Russia and North Korea have launched cyber-attacks on the United States and conduct cyber espionage. In recent years, Moscow has escalated cyberwarfare on U.S. soil, having struck various sectors of the economy and our critical infrastructure, including nuclear facilities, and the beating heart of the U.S. government: the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon. North Korean cyber-crime has been "extensive and long-running," and the range of these crimes is "staggering," as described by government officials."
Russia has the most formidable foreign arsenal of cyber weapons. Although North Korean cyber tools are not as sophisticated, they are capable of inflicting serious damage. Consistent with Kim’s vision of cyber as "all-purpose sword," Pyongyang’s military intelligence hackers have conducted ransomware attacks, phishing campaigns, digital bank heists and money laundering operations. Putin and Kim will almost certainly use their growing relationship to challenge U.S. policies, especially since both feel that Washington is responsible for devastating damage to their economies because of sanctions.
Moscow believes that the U.S. seeks Russia’s destruction and regime collapse, based on several statements from Biden administration officials who indicated that U.S. goals in the Ukraine conflict are to defeat Russia, degrade its military, and weaken its economy.
In his congratulatory message to Putin on Sunday, Kim expressed confidence that the relations between Russia and North Korea will only deepen, calling them "tactical-strategic collaboration" for the cause of defending global justice."
10. A new Quad? Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand eye four-way anti-China summit on sidelines of Nato meet
Quad 1 and Quad 2?
I fear the quadripartite meeting proposal by Japan is to prevent a bilateral ROK-Japan summit.
A new Quad? Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand eye four-way anti-China summit on sidelines of Nato meet
- Tokyo has sounded out Seoul about the possibility of the quadripartite meeting, according to a source close to the South Korean presidential office
- The envisaged meeting on the sidelines of next week’s Nato gathering is reportedly seen by the four nations as an attempt to keep an assertive China in check
+ FOLLOW
Published: 10:02am, 21 Jun, 2022
By KYODO South China Morning Post2 min
Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese is escorted by Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at the start of their bilateral meeting on the sidelines of last month’s Quad leaders’ summit in Tokyo. Photo: AP
Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand are considering holding a four-way summit on the fringes of a Nato leaders’ gathering in Spain next week, according to a source close to the South Korean presidential office.
The envisaged meeting on the sidelines of the transatlantic security alliance gathering is seen by the four nations as an attempt to keep an assertive China in check in the Indo-Pacific after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine heightened concerns about its implications for a region where Beijing has been expanding its influence.
Japan has sounded out South Korea about the possibility of the quadripartite meeting, the source said on Monday.
Leaders from the four nations are expected to deepen cooperation in realising a free and open Indo-Pacific and may discuss increased support for Pacific island nations, sources familiar with the matter said.
China and the South Pacific nation of Solomon Islands signed a security treaty earlier this year that would reportedly allow the deployment of Chinese troops, a development, if realised, that would spark concerns among regional powers such as Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Japan.
Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand are not members of Nato but have been invited as partners to the summit to be held in Madrid on June 29 and 30.
The four-way meeting would add a new dimension to the multilateral cooperation framework in pursuit of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Japan and Australia are part of the Quad framework with India and the United States.
South Korea has been exploring the possibility of a summit between Yoon Suk-yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in Madrid but the outlook remains uncertain, with a senior Japanese government source saying, “nothing is decided”.
As bilateral relations remain frosty over wartime issues that date back to the 1910-1945 Japanese colonisation of the Korean peninsula, no bilateral summit talks have been held since 2019.
But Yoon, who took office in May with a pledge to strengthen ties with the US and Japan, has been seeking to improve Seoul-Tokyo ties in a “future-oriented” fashion.
Kishida has also stressed the need for dialogue even though Tokyo does not plan to budge on its stance that the ball is in South Korea’s court and issues related to wartime compensation have been settled by bilateral agreements.
11. North Korea abruptly stops importing Covid-19 containment goods from China
North Korea abruptly stops importing Covid-19 containment goods from China
The Straits Times2 min
A sign showing a scene of medical product transportation in Pyongyang, North Korea, on May 23, 2022. PHOTO: REUTERS
BEIJING (REUTERS) - North Korea abruptly stopped importing Covid-19 prevention and control products from China in May, trade data released by Beijing showed, after the country bought face masks and ventilators from its neighbour in previous months.
Daily new cases of fever in North Korea, as reported by its state news agency, KCNA, have been declining since the reclusive country first acknowledged in mid-May that it was fighting a Covid-19 outbreak. But it has yet to reveal how many of those cases tested positive for the coronavirus.
North Korea did not import any face masks, thermometers, rubber gloves, ventilators or vaccines from China in May, according to data released by Chinese customs on Monday (June 20).
That compared with imports of more than 10.6 million masks, nearly 95,000 thermometers and 1,000 non-invasive ventilators from China in January-April.
South Korea and the United States have offered to provide help, including vaccines, but Pyongyang has not responded.
As Pyongyang has never directly confirmed how many people have tested positive for the virus, the World Health Organisation said in June that it assumed the situation was getting worse, not better.
Overall, China's exports to North Korea slumped 85.2 per cent to US$14.51 million (S$20.11 million) in May from US$98.1 million in April.
The top export items were soybeans, granulated sugar, soybean meal and wheat flour.
North Korea bought US$2.97 million worth of soybeans, $US2.64 million of granulated sugar, US$1.49 million of soybean meal and US$846,598 of wheat flour in May, the Chinese customs data showed.
Chinese foreign ministry confirmed on April 29 that China had suspended cross-border freight train services with North Korea following consultations due to Covid-19 infections in its border city of Dandong.
12. Inside North Korea’s global cyber war: The intersection of hacking and organized crime
And north Korea has only improved its cyber capabilities since.
Inside North Korea’s global cyber war: The intersection of hacking and organized crime
Geoff White shares findings about the notorious Lazarus Group
While the vast majority of citizens in North Korea don’t have access to the global internet, the country has become a hacking superpower — but how?
Speaking at the TNW Conference 2022, Author and Investigative Journalist Geoff White addressed this perplexing contradiction.
“The case of North Korea is unique in the world, and therefore its computer hackers are absolutely unique in the world as well,” he explained.
The fact that most governments employ computer hackers isn’t news. They employ them to obtain advantageous information that they can use to advance their country’s position.
As per White, North Korean hackers do something slightly different. They go after cash as well.
That’s because North Korea is economically isolated from the rest of the world, as it’s subject to international financial sanctions. It needs to find alternative monetary resources.
“So the accusation is it’s tasked its government hackers to go out and steal money for the regime,” White added. “Researchers call these hackers the Lazarus Group.
But hacking is just the start of it. If I hack your bank accounts, and I steal your money, that’s fine, but I’ve got to put it somewhere. I’ve got to launder the money and I’ve got to get access to it. Computer hackers aren’t necessarily the best at all of that other stuff.
But I’ll tell you who is… organized criminals. And so North Korea’s hackers have started working with organized crime, which can provide the necessary networks.
To elaborate how the country’s government hackers get into bed with organized criminals, White provided the TNW audience with two examples of alleged North Korean cyberattacks.
1. Cosmos Co Op bank
Back in 2018, the Lazarus Group infiltrated the Indian bank through phishing emails sent to employees.
Once inside the bank’s system, they navigated their way to the ATM payment system and manipulated every ATM withdrawal request that went into Cosmos Co Op bank.
They took the details of 450 genuine legitimate account holders (account number, pin code, personal data, etc.), and they sent those details to their accomplices around the world. Then, they had their accomplices create fake cloned ATM cards for those accounts.
That way, they made $11 million, withdrawn in 29 countries — within two hours and 13 minutes.
The question here is who coordinated the attack, White noted.
Based on investigators’ findings, it’s Park Yin Hyok. According to the US Department of Justice, he’s a member of the elite North Korean hacking unit.
But how could he coordinate the attack in 29 different countries from Pyongyang, North Korea’s capital city? For that he needs accomplices and what’s the best place to look? The dark web, of course.
There he found someone calling himself “Big Boss,” who turned out to have the necessary skill set. He can clone cards and also has a network of runners — money mules, who can go to the ATMs and make withdrawals.”
2. The Bank of Valletta
The first cooperation of the Lazarus Group and Big Boss was so successful that in 2019 they attacked the Bank of Valletta in Malta.
Once again, they found their way into the bank through phishing emails. But this time the hackers didn’t do any ATM withdrawals. White’s theory is that they used SWIFT, seeking to bypass the previous challenge of somehow sending the cashed out money to North Korea.
Now the problem with SWIFT is that you need a bank account to put the money into. But which account were they going to use? Kim Jong-un courtesy of Pyongyang central bank? I don’t think so.
They needed accounts that they could put the money in, and then launder it through. Luckily for the hackers, Big Boss had the perfect man for the job: “HushPuppi.” He had bank accounts around the world that can be used for money laundering.
This time they stole $13 million. Luckily, Big Boss was arrested shortly after in the US for another criminal activity, which led to the arrest of HushPuppi as well in Dubai.
While both are sentenced to prison, Park Yin Hyok is yet to face justice. “For its part, North Korea says these allegations are a smear campaign by the US and that they have nothing to do with these computer hacking campaigns,” White explained.
If you’re interested in finding out more about the activities of the Lazarus Group, you listen to Geoff White’s podcast The Lazarus Heist, or read his homonymous book.
Published June 20, 2022 - 3:31 pm UTC
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
