Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"An arrogant person considers himself perfect. This is the chief harm of arrogance. It interferes with a person's main task in life - becoming a better person."
- Leo Tolstoy

"When something is important enough, you do it even if the odds are not in your favor."
- Elon Musk

"Holding on to anger is like grasping a hot coal with the intent of throwing it at someone else; you are the one who gets burned."
- Buddha


1. Yoon to announce his picks for senior secretaries, top security adviser
2. Yoon's foreign policy mentor appointed to lead national security
3. North Korea leader Ri Pyong Chol's public appearance hints at new weapons testing
4. Experts Urge US to Confront N. Korea Missile Program
5. Opinion – South Koreans Support Unification, But Do They Support Integration?
6. S. Korea's exports up 12.6 pct in April, trade deficit widens on high energy prices
7. Changes to the KPA Corps Command | North Korea Leadership Watch
8. Changes in the Central Committee | North Korea Leadership Watch
9. S. Korea deploys homegrown radar system to Air Force
10. A unified Korea would be a good thing
11. Pyongyang continues strict COVID-19 measures as Seoul lifts mask requirement outdoors
12. Mend ties with Japan
13. Public residence, authoritarian legacy





1. Yoon to announce his picks for senior secretaries, top security adviser
At least one familiar name and face. Note two former journalists. Hopefully this will bode well for a return to freedom of the press.

Yoon to announce his picks for senior secretaries, top security adviser | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 주경돈 · May 1, 2022
SEOUL, May 1 (Yonhap) -- President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol will unveil his picks for senior presidential secretaries as well as his top security adviser on Sunday, the presidential transition committee said.
Chang Je-won, who is serving as Yoon's chief of staff during the transition period, and Kim Dae-ki, who has been tapped as Yoon's first of chief of staff in the incoming office, are expected to announce the list of Yoon's top aides in a press conference scheduled at 2 p.m.

For the chief of the national security office, Yoon reportedly selected former Vice Foreign Minister Kim Sung-han, who currently heads the foreign affairs and security subcommittee of Yoon's transition team.
Kim Tae-hyo, who served as presidential secretary on national security strategy between 2008 and 2012, has been reportedly tapped as the first deputy director of the national security office, while Shin In-ho, former risk management officer at the office, has been reportedly named the second deputy director.
For the head of the presidential security service, Kim Yong-hyun, former operations director at the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has been reportedly selected to serve the job.
For senior secretaries, Yoon reportedly picked former Vice Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok as his senior economic secretary and Ahn Sang-hoon, a professor of social welfare at Seoul National University, as his senior social secretary.
Former lawmaker Lee Jin-bok is expected to be named as senior political secretary, while Choi Young-bum, a journalist-turned-vice president at Hyosung Group, is expected to be named as senior communications secretary.
For senior civil society secretary, former lawmaker Kang Seung-kyoo is widely considered a candidate.
Kang In-sun, a former journalist at South Korea's Chosun Ilbo newspaper who currently works as Yoon's spokesperson for foreign press, has been reportedly tapped as the presidential office's spokesperson.
Yoon is expected to have only five senior secretaries during his term following his plan to downsize the presidential office.
While the current President Moon Jae-in had eight senior secretaries and three offices under him, Yoon is expected to reduce them to five secretaries and have two offices -- chief of staff and the national security offices.
kdon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 주경돈 · May 1, 2022


2. Yoon's foreign policy mentor appointed to lead national security

Yoon's foreign policy mentor appointed to lead national security
The Korea Times · May 1, 2022
National Security Director nominee Kim Sung-han speaks during a press conference at the presidential transition committee office in Tongui-dong, Jongno District, Seoul, Sunday. Joint Press Corps

Presidential office to become slimmer, with fewer senior secretaries

By Nam Hyun-woo

Kim Sung-han, a professor at Korea University and former vice foreign minister, will serve as national security adviser to President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol, Yoon's chief of staff Chang Je-won announced, Sunday.

Along with Kim, Chang announced the appointments of a pack of presidential aides who have been widely anticipated. Following the nominations, the current post of chief of staff for policy will be abolished, and the number of senior presidential secretaries will be decreased.

"Kim, who served as the second vice foreign minister, has his expertise in diplomacy and national security," Chang said during a press conference. "His competence in both theory and policy making will make him the best fit for the role of control tower for national security."

Kim's nomination had been expected, as he has been advising the president-elect on foreign and national security policies since the presidential election campaign period.

Kim served as the second vice minister from 2012 to 2013 and built his career as a specialist in South Korea-U.S. relations. He is known as an advocate for a stronger Seoul-Washington alliance, which matches Yoon's idea of having the alliance as the foundation of Korea's foreign policy.

"(The Yoon administration) will drive inter-Korean relations based on the firm principle of facilitating peace and prosperity through denuclearization," Kim told reporters after his nomination. "Rather than becoming a passive pursuer, we will approach inter-Korean matters on an equal footing."

With Kim leading the Office of National Security, Sungkyunkwan University professor Kim Tae-hyo was named as first deputy director of national security, in charge of national defense and cybersecurity. Shin In-ho, a former Army major general and head of Eulji Research Institute under the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, was nominated as the second deputy director, in charge of foreign policy and unification strategies.

Traditionally, the post of first deputy director of the Office of National Security has been filled by former generals or defense specialists, while the second deputy director has mostly been filled by foreign affairs experts.

Under Yoon's presidency, however, national security adviser nominee Kim told reporters that the first deputy director will be in charge of foreign policy and national security, while the second deputy director will handle national defense.

From top left are National Security Director nominee Kim Sung-han, first deputy director of national security nominee Kim Tae-hyo, second deputy director of national security nominee Shin In-ho, Presidential Security Service head nominee Kim Yong-hyun and senior secretary for political affairs nominee Lee Jin-bok. From bottom left are senior presidential secretary for civic and social agenda nominee Kang Seung-kyoo, senior security for public relations nominee Choi Young-bum, senior secretary for economic affairs nominee Choi Sang-mok, senior secretary for society nominee Ahn Sang-hoon and spokesperson nominee Kang In-sun. Courtesy of presidential transition committee

Former lawmaker Lee Jin-bok was named as senior secretary for political affairs. Lee is a three-term lawmaker serving in the National Assembly from 2008 to 2020, and Chang described him as a "reasonable and balanced" figure.

Along with them, former lawmaker Kang Seung-kyoo was named as senior presidential secretary for civic and social agenda, and former editor-in-chief of broadcaster SBS Choi Young-bum was nominated as senior secretary for public relations.

Former Vice Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok was tapped as senior secretary for economic affairs. Ahn Sang-hoon, a professor of social welfare at Seoul National University, was named as senior secretary for society. Chosun Ilbo newspaper former deputy managing editor Kang In-sun will become Yoon's first spokesperson.

Following the nominations, the post of chief of staff for policy, which supervises economic policy, will be abolished, reducing the number of chief of staff-level aides from three to two. Currently, the presidential office of President Moon Jae-in has three chief of staff-level aides ― chief of staff Yoo Young-min, chief of staff for policy Lee Ho-seung and national security adviser Suh Hoon.

Also, the number of senior secretaries will be trimmed to five from eight, as part of Yoon's pledge to have a smaller presidential office.

"So far, Cheong Wa Dae (the current presidential office) has been taking control of the overall administration, limiting the government's role as executing Cheong Wa Dae's orders," Chang said. "So we decided to have a slimmer presidential office to enable the administration to be more creative and innovative in policymaking. The office will focus on coordinating their work."


The Korea Times · May 1, 2022


3.  North Korea leader Ri Pyong Chol's public appearance hints at new weapons testing

Personnel is policy.
North Korea leader Ri Pyong Chol's public appearance hints at new weapons testing


Last Updated: 30th April, 2022 08:50 IST
North Korea Leader Ri Pyong Chol's Public Appearance Hints At New Weapons Testing
North Korea Marshal Ri Pyong who was away from the public eyes for more than six months made a re-appearance at a military parade organised on April 25.
Written By

Image: AP


Giving birth to fresh speculations over more weapon testing, North Korean Marshal Ri Pyong who was away from the public eyes for more than six months made a re-appearance at a military parade organised on April 25. Notably, he is known for his leading role in the country's nuclear and missile development under the leadership of Kim Jong-un and now his re-appearance gives a major hint of further weapon testing.
As reported by North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency, he was among the dignitaries who were participating in the nighttime military parade staged in central Pyongyang in the presence of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. They were gathered to commemorate the 90th founding anniversary of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army (KPRA).
Notably, Pyong was dismissed from all of his posts last year after being accused of neglecting his official duties.
On the other hand, Kim who standing just beside Pyong delivered a speech at the parade and asserted that his regime will bolster the nation's nuclear capabilities.
Kim Jong-un warns about using nuclear weapons if threatened
While delivering his speech, the North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un warned yet again that the North could go on to use its nuclear weapons if threatened, as he went on to praise his top military officials over the staging of a massive military parade in the capital.
Kim expressed a “firm will” to continue developing his nuclear-armed military so that it could “preemptively and thoroughly contain and frustrate all dangerous attempts and threatening moves, including ever-escalating nuclear threats from hostile forces, if necessary,” the North’s official Korean Central News Agency said Saturday.
KCNA said Kim called his military officials to praise their work on Monday’s parade, where the North showcased the biggest weapons in its military’s nuclear program, including intercontinental ballistic missiles that could potentially reach the U.S. homeland and a variety of shorter-range solid-fuel missiles that pose a growing threat to South Korea and Japan.
Image: AP

First Published: 30th April, 2022 08:50 IST


4. Experts Urge US to Confront N. Korea Missile Program
I previously sent out their Foreign Affairs article which is at this link: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2022-04-29/north-koreas-missile-message

Experts Urge US to Confront N. Korea Missile Program
Written: 2022-04-30 13:32:25 / Updated: 2022-04-30 13:37:10


Photo : YONHAP News
U.S. experts argue that Washington must make room in its top national security priorities to address an enormous and mounting security problem, North Korea.

In the Foreign Affairs magazine released Friday, Katrin Katz and Victor Cha from the Center for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS) said that as the world is transfixed by the war in Ukraine, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un seemed to sense an opportunity.

They said that since the Russian invasion began, Kim has tested a slew of ballistic missiles, including hypersonic and long-range weapons, with relatively little international scrutiny.

They said President Joe Biden’s national security team has been understandably preoccupied with Ukraine but North Korea’s nuclear missile technology is rapidly advancing and demands urgent attention.

They said that without a change in U.S. strategy or an unexpected diplomatic breakthrough, Kim Jong-un could eventually achieve his goal of being able to strike the U.S. with a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile.

The authors pointed out that the U.S. must make room in its top security priorities to address North Korea. They said the North's missile development not only endangers America but could also imperil the U.S.-led alliance system in Asia by stirring doubts about the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence

They said it also gives Pyongyang new means to intimidate and coerce South Korea and Japan.

Katz and Cha argued that if Washington hopes to maintain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific area, and the world, it must confront North Korea’s ballistic missile program, and take immediate steps to contain it, before it is too late.

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5. Opinion – South Koreans Support Unification, But Do They Support Integration?

Yes there should be no doubt that unification will be hard which is why the Ministry of Unification should be dedicated to deep planning for it and work to mitigate the issues and identify and solve the potential problems and work to avoid the pitfalls.

But I would ask, if not unification, then what? What happens after war and the defeat of the nKPA and the destruction of the regime? What happens after the regime collapse in internal instability? What happens if new leadership emerges that seeks peaceful unification?

Opinion – South Koreans Support Unification, But Do They Support Integration?
e-ir.info · April 24, 2022
Despite decades of division, the assumption remains that Korean unification will occur. However, this overlooks important aspects of what unification will look like and the willingness of South Koreans to acclimate to such a drastic change. After decades of hostility from the North Korean government, there may be lingering biases against former North Korean citizens even with unification. The massive income disparity may not only play a role in South Koreans’ willingness to support a unification for which they will be held financially responsible, but may also shape views of North Koreans more broadly. Additionally, the quality of the education systems in each country differs on such a scale that many North Korean arrivals struggle to find jobs in South Korea for their very limited skill sets. This raises the question: how unified would Korea really be when deep divisions on identity endure?
We conducted an original web survey to gauge South Korean willingness for different aspects of social and structural integration if unification occurred. Administered by Macromill Embrain from March 11-16, 2022, and with quota sampling on age, gender, and region, we asked 1,107 South Korean citizens ‘if unification occurs, would you be willing to…
  • move to North Korea
  • see a physician educated in North Korea
  • send your child to school with North Korean children
  • support a combined military with former North and South Korean soldiers
The data (see below) suggests South Koreans would hold less than favorable views of North Koreans in a post-unification scenario. First, 42.91% of respondents were unsupportive of any of the four post-unification scenarios proposed, providing further evidence for the claim that South Koreans will remain cautious if not distrustful of North Koreans. Additionally, while a 10.66% of survey respondents said they would be willing to move to North Korea, a mere 9.03% would see a physician educated in the North, and just 12.29% would allow their children to attend school with a North Korean child. When broken down by gender, we generally find men more willing to do all four proposed integration items, the most notable differences on moving (14.36% vs. 7.01%) and on a combined military (52.81%), while 48.38% of women were not supportive of any of the four measures, compared to 37.39% of men. Such low rates contrast with decades of survey data that suggest general favorability towards eventual unification. In fact, our results find that even among those that claimed support for unification, three quarters or more were unwilling to do the first three activities proposed. The results also suggest the importance of moving away from abstract support for unification, itself likely propped in part due to social desirability biases, towards explicit actions and policies that would impact the daily lives of South Koreans post-unification.
In his book Preparing North Korean Elites for Unification, Bennett specifically mentions that physicians will be an important group to co-opt post-unification. However, according to the data, that may be a politically difficult task. North Korea’s medical system is ill equipped and understaffed. The fundamentals of medicine are unlikely to differ across the demilitarized zone (DMZ); however, people may be uneasy about seeing physicians that have not worked with contemporary practices or worked in less than optimal conditions where the patients provide their own tools. In addition, unification will result in an influx of new patients seeking serious medical care. Therefore, South Korean officials will have to work harder to help these individuals transition, helping to decrease the deficit of medical professionals. One possible solution would be that the South Korean government and NGOs could help by providing instructors and paying for the “updating” of North Korean medical practice.
Unification could also lead to more issues in the future regarding education and the workforce. If South Koreans are not willing to send their children to school with North Koreans or move to North Korea, their education will not be at the same level, with the poorer North having to rebuild their education system. However, this could get better over time, seeing that, according to our own survey, that over half of South Koreans said that they would be comfortable with the integration of North Koreans in the workforce, marrying into South Korean families, and living in the same vicinity.
In addition to the possible lower level of education, many South Koreans believe that it is important to abide by the South Korean political and legal system in order to be considered Korean (about 93.4%). Especially considering North Korea’s historically hostile relations, as well as a growing sense of civic identity over a purely ethnic conception of the nation, South Koreans after unification may not accept North Koreans as the same.
In regards to how this could play out, reunification in Korea could learn from German reunification. In Germany, only 41% of East Germans believe that their lives have improved since reunification. Many East Germans also face second-class status in reunified Germany. This kind of issue could also occur in a unified Korea, especially considering that many South Koreans would not be willing to send their children to school with North Korean children, nor go to a North Korean physician.
Surprisingly, 48.6% of respondents supported the combination of North and South Korean armed forces, with slightly higher rates among men (52.81%). This may be a function of both male experience with conscription and its declining support among the population. In a survey taken by Gallup Korea in 2021, 42% of participants indicated support for conscription, which is nearly six points lower than in 2016 and fourteen points less than in 2014. South Korea is also rapidly approaching a point where there will be a deficit between conscripts needed and those who are eligible. Voters and politicians of both major parties have become more supportive of military reform. This would include measures such as an all-volunteer force and allowing women to take part in conscription. It is very possible that South Koreans could see a combined force as a way to end the need for conscription altogether or fill future holes in personnel, especially as the perceived main threat for South Korea would no longer be North Korea.
Post-unification, one of the most important issues that South Korean officials will have to deal with will be the way they handle the North Korean army. With nearly 1.28 million active-duty personnel, a dismantled North Korean army could mount an insurgency movement in the North. One solution proposed by Bennett is to co-opt much of the leadership of the North Korean military. Considering that most North Korean men spend much of their lives in the military, a combined force could be a stepping-stone to civilian life in a newly unified Korea. While older members may see unification as a time to retire, younger professionals may see it as a way to move up. As this survey indicates, there is already a strong base of support across parties to build from.
Our survey results highlight the need to reevaluate preparation for unification and conceptualize it not just as the end of conflict, but also as the start of new sources of tension. Despite support in general for unification, these tensions could impact diverse areas from the military to education, health care and others that we did not directly address in the survey. Unification will change core aspects of Korean life and should promote policies that can help mitigate these tensions, rather than letting these issues to simply solve themselves over time.

Further Reading on E-International Relations
e-ir.info · April 24, 2022

6. S. Korea's exports up 12.6 pct in April, trade deficit widens on high energy prices


(2nd LD) S. Korea's exports up 12.6 pct in April, trade deficit widens on high energy prices | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 오석민 · May 1, 2022
(ATTN: ADDS more details, comments in 5th para, last 12 paras)
By Oh Seok-min
SEOUL, May 1 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's exports rose 12.6 percent in April from a year earlier on the back of brisk demand for chips and petroleum products, but the trade deficit widened on soaring global energy prices, data showed Sunday.
Outbound shipments stood at US$57.69 billion last month, up from $51.23 billion a year earlier, according to the data compiled by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy.
It is the highest tally for any April since the ministry began compiling related data in 1956. The previous record was set in April 2021.
April marked the 18th consecutive month that the country's exports have logged an on-year expansion. Exports also posted double-digit growth for the 14th month in a row last month.
The average daily export volume also advanced 15 percent on-year to $2.45 billion last month, the data showed.
The accumulated exports for the first four months of this year came to $230.6 billion. It is the first time ever that the figure for the January-April period surpassed the $200 billion mark, according to the ministry.
But high global energy prices also pushed up the country's imports last month, leading the country to post a trade deficit for the second consecutive month.
Imports grew 18.6 percent on-year to $60.35 billion, and the trade deficit came to $2.66 billion, up from a deficit of $140 million the previous month.
Dubai crude, South Korea's benchmark, rose to $102.82 per barrel in April on average from $62.92 a year earlier.
South Korea depends on imports for most of its energy needs, and the country's energy imports more than doubled on-year to $14.81 billion in April, the ministry said.

By item, overseas demand for the country's key export items grew amid a global economic recovery.
Sales of semiconductors climbed 15.8 percent on-year to $10.82 billion in April, marking the 22nd straight month of on-year expansion, according to the ministry.
Exports of petroleum products spiked 68.8 percent to $4.96 billion last month, and those of petrochemicals went up 6.8 percent to $4.98 billion.
Steel products also saw their sales overseas jump 21.1 percent on-year to $3.37 billion last month, and auto sales expanded 6.1 percent to $4.4 billion.
Computer and bio sectors enjoyed 56.4 percent and 14.2 percent on-year growth in April, respectively.
But exports of auto parts fell 4.8 percent on-year to $1.94 billion, and the overseas sales of ships tumbled 16.6 percent to $1.02 billion last month, the data showed.
By nation, exports to the United States went up 26.4 percent to $9.55 billion last month, extending their on-year growth for the 20th month in a row.
Sales in ASEAN soared 37.3 percent on-year to $11.17 billion, and those in the European Union rose 7.4 percent to $5.54 billion, the industry said.
ASEAN comprises Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam.
But shipments to China fell 3.4 percent on-year to $12.94 billion due mainly to the country's lockdown of Shanghai and other major cities over the fast spread of COVID-19.
Exports bound for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) also sank 46.5 percent to $610 million in April amid the crisis surrounding Ukraine, the ministry said.
"The solid exports growth came despite growing global uncertainties, such as the prolonged war in Ukraine and the lockdown in China amid the pandemic," Industry Minister Moon Sung-wook said.
Moon voiced concerns over global inflation woes, unstable supply chains and the gloomy forecast for global economic growth as risks to the Korean economy and vowed active support to exporters and efforts to reform the country's trade structure.
graceoh@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 오석민 · May 1, 2022

7. Changes to the KPA Corps Command | North Korea Leadership Watch

I would send them Samsung phones as congratulatory gifts.

Changes to the KPA Corps Command | North Korea Leadership Watch
Changes to the KPA Corps Command
Kim Jong Un and KPA service branch and corp commanders pose for a commemorative photo (Photo: KCNA)
Now that Pyongyang watchers have processed, analyzed and digested the munitions which the Korean People’s Army [KPA] paraded through Kim Il Sung Square on 25 April (Monday), attention has now shifted to personnel. During the last calendar year, and most certainly since the last large parade in October 2020, there have been numerous changes to the KPA Corps Command. Acquiring current and accurate information about corps commanders can be quite difficult and these DPRK state media disclosures can be viewed as part of Kim Jong Un’s long-term process of normalizing the regime and giving it a relative degree of transparency.
KPA General Staff Department Operations Bureau Choe Tu Yong (right) salutes during the 25 April 2022 parade marking the 90th anniversary of the KPRA (Photo: KCNA).
The most important personnel change publicized during the 25 April parade was the appointment of Colonel General Choe Tu Yong (Ch’oe Tu-yo’ng) as director of the KPA General Staff Department [GSD] Operations Bureau. Col. Gen. Choe previously served as commander of the II Army Corps. Heading GSD OPS is traditionally one of the key high command positions in North Korea’s armed forces.
II Army Corps: Ryo Chol Ung (replaces Choe Tu Yong)
III Army Corps: Ri Kyong Chol (replaces Ui Song Il)
V Army Corps: Choe Gil Ryong (replaces Ri Thae Sop)
VIII Army Corps: Kim Hak Chol (replaces Pak Myong Su)
X Army Corps: Ko Myong Su (replaces Ri Yong Chol)
XII Army Corps: Ko In Chol (replaces Ri Pong Chun)
Recent articles


8. Changes in the Central Committee | North Korea Leadership Watch

Personnel is policy. Some good information in the changes and history of changes in the Central Committee



Changes in the Central Committee | North Korea Leadership Watch
Changes in the Central Committee
View of the Central Committee Department buildings on Ch’angkwang Street (a/k/a the Central Party Complex)
Ri Pyong Chol (Ri Pyo’ng-ch’o’l) returned to North Korean public life, following a ten-month absence. Going back to 2014, Ri was the leading official in the country’s missile and WMD development and production. To that effect, he held a series of successive leadership positions in the DPRK defense industry and wider national security community. His career advancement culminated during 2020 when he was given the title of KPA Marshal, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission [CMC] and joined the Workers’ Party of Korea [WPK] Political Bureau Standing Committee (presidium). Ri retained these various political offices following the 8th Party Congress. In June 2021, Ri was tossed out of office during a Political Bureau meeting where senior officials were upbraided for “extreme negligence and deliberate idleness” which contributed to “a crucial case of creating a great crisis in ensuring the security of the state and safety of the people.”
Pak Jong Chon (L) and Ri Pyong Chol (R) salute during the 25 April parade (Photo: KCNA).
Ri’s return occurred during the 25 April (Monday) parade which commemorated the 90th anniversary of the foundation of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army. On the parade review platform, Ri joined the man who replaced him, Pak Jong Chon (Pak Cho’ng-chon). Pak himself had been away from the public view since January 2022.
In an interesting circumstance, Ri Pyong Chol and Pak Jong Chon both currently have the title of WPK Secretary, making them members of the Central Committee Secretariat, and are both members of the Political Bureau Standing Committee (presidium). This brings the total Standing Committee membership up to six (6). Pak Jong Chon, however, has been identified as CMC Vice Chairman meaning that Pak retains a political office he assumed from Ri.
Pak’s absence from the public aspects of DPRK political culture was over two months. This is roughly the same amount of time of Higher Party School courses which DPRK elites undergo when they are between jobs. And yet, Pak seemingly has the same job and political offices he held prior to going to ground. During the 25 April parade, he performed the formal review and presentation of the Korean People’s Army [KPA] participants. It was also Pak Jong Chon, not Ri Pyong Chol, who attended a commemorative, studio photo-op with KPA commanders on 28 April. Pak’s disappearance from public view occurred around the same time as construction resumed at the P’unggye-ri Nuclear Test Site. So, Pak may not have been sent packing to the Higher Party School after all.
The placement of Ri Pyong Chol and Pak Jong Chon on both the Secretariat and the Political Bureau Standing Committee has been interpreted by ROK Pyongyang watchers under the principle of “personnel as policy.” With KJU’s speech, other forms of strategic rhetoric (like Kim Yo Jong communique) and ongoing test activity, two dedicated natsec and/or defense industry officials on two of the party’s top power organizations might be viewed as a literal doubling of efforts. According to a post-parade research note, Pak and Ri are now divided between military affairs and defense industry.
Ri Pyong Chol (6th L) and Pak Jong Chon (7th R) pose for a commemorative photo with WPK Munitions Industry Department personnel who participated in the 25 April parade marking the KPRA’s 90th anniversary.
The question, over the short-term is: how will policy and execution work be divided between Pak and Ri? Will it fall along system-based lines whereby one assumes responsibility for conventional weapons and the other for strategic weapons? Will one have a policy writ entirely consumed by the defense industry, while the other will take on military affairs with some involvement in the defense industry? Will one focus on research and development [R&D], and the other on production and deployment? Has the defense industry become the size of a Hwasongpho-17 and requires two executive-level officials to run things? One way we can observe this with some degree of analytical accuracy will be forthcoming test events where DPRK state media identifies the various participants.
Membership on the Political Bureau Standing Committee as of 26 April 2022 (Photo graphic: Yonhap).
The Ri Pyong Chol-Pak Jong Chon double act is not the only purported change in the Central Committee. Earlier in April, Daily NK [DNK] had a duo of reports which detailed downsizing within the Central Committee apparatus. One indication of a downsizing effort is the assignment of Central Committee cadres to lead the prosecutors’ offices in KPA service branch headquarters (Navy, Air, Strategic Force) and corps units of the KPA’s ground forces. This probably indicates institutional downsizing. On the other hand, this might be part of a planned effort which began with last year’s establishment of the WPK Justice Department. There might be a group of seasoned cadres being turned out of that department and sent to KPA units. This is a relatively small population–no more than about 30 cadres–which is a drop in the bucket if the primary reason is downsizing.
DNK also reports** that the Central Committee is merging departments and shedding between 300 and 350 cadres. The report claimed that this reorganization effort was scheduled to occur in time for the 10th anniversary of Kim Jong Un [KJU] assuming the leadership of the party. There has not been any further reporting or additional information about this organizational restructuring either through ROK media sources like DNK, or DPRK state media. As a place where policy is formulated and implemented, the Central Committee Departments are places of actual power and decisionmaking in DPRK politics. Changes to their organizational structure and personnel (even rumint) are significant developments.
According to the DNK report, at least two of the Central Committee’s 20-odd departments were ordered to consolidate. As a result of this restructuring, about 300 cadres—who are middle managers within these departments—will migrate out of the Central Committee to lower-level party organizations in Pyongyang (i.e., city district, or kuyo’k, committees, dong committees, etc.) or production units that are directly subordinate to the WPK and/or Central Committee.
The consolidation of Central Committee Departments is a change which Pyongyang watchers will be able to notice over the short term. It might be indirectly disclosed in state media, such as when a director or deputy director of a department is identified attending a state event or contributes an essay to Rodong or Minju. It might also resurface either in DNK (or a similar media outlet) once the decision (s) is implemented, or it could be the subject of briefings or parliamentary testimony by ROK Government officials.
Based on a number of reasons, the chief of which is past practice in the Central Committee, the departments undergoing consolidation are probably related to economic policy, or managing party funds and economic activity. Going back to the establishment of the WPK Planning and Finance Department in 2005 (see appended chronology), all but two consolidations of Central Committee Departments took place in economic policy-focused departments or the party funds departments. In 2005, the WPK Economic Affairs Department [EAD], the WPK Agriculture Department and the Economic Policy Inspection Department merged to form the WPK Planning and Finance Department. This department was gradually disbanded, first with the reversion to the WPK Economic Affairs Department in 2014, followed by the revival of the WPK Agriculture Department in 2016. Office #39, which manages party funds and the related economic activity, merged with Office #38 from 2008-2010 and then between 2015 and 2016.
Jon Hyon Chol
The most likely scenario is that the Economic Policy Inspection Department has merged with the EAD. In January 2021, Jon Hyon Chol was appointed DPRK Vice Premier and identified in state media as head of something called the WPK “Economic Policy Office.” Jon has retained his slot in the DPRK Cabinet, but there has been no further mention of the Economic Policy Office. The EAD attracted negative attention following the end of the 8th Party Congress in January 2021. A little under a month after the party congress closed, the newly-appointed EAD Director, Kim Tu Il, was publicly removed from office for lack of compliance with Central Committee’s (and KJU’s) policy directive. Kim was replaced by WPK Secretary O Su Yong. O had served as EAD Director beginning in 2014 and had moved on to Chairman of the Second Economic Committee. O is certainly influential as a policymaker and KJU advisor.
One of the reasons cited for merging departments in the DNK report is the high degree of redundancy in submitting official reports. When looking at all of the Central Committee Departments, these are the two departments whose responsibilities overlap (the Economic Policy Inspection Department essentially backstops EAD’s oversight of macroeconomic policy) and where redundant upline reporting would exist. The WPK Secretariat has bifurcated positions in which WPK Secretaries interact, and might possibly supervise, more than one Central Committee Department. Reports from the EAD and Economic Policy Inspection Department, in this dynamic, are submitted to O Su Yong. The Economic Policy Inspection Department has twice merged into larger economic policy departments, in 2005 (as mentioned above) and during the mid-1990s.
A wild, yet probable, scenario might involve elements of Office #39 merging into the WPK Light Industry Department [LID]. As noted above, Office #38 merged with Office #39 twice in less than 10 years. Economic production units under Office #38 (under the auspices of the Rakwo’n Guidance Bureau and the Moran Guidance Bureau) are part of, or link with, those under the LID. Office #39 also links with LID production units, but LID is a modest portion of Office #39’s more diverse production and trade activity. Among these economic production units and these departments, one is also likely to encounter redundant reporting practices.
WPK Economic Affairs Secretary O Su Yong watches the Sun’s Day procession (Photo: KCTV screengrab)
The WPK Agriculture Department might have migrated back to the EAD, but this seems unlikely. Agricultural and food production policies promulgated during the 8th Party Congress were probably predicated on the continued existence of the party Agricultural Department. It is also unlikely that the Agricultural Commission, a national level industry guidance commission, would not have not have been established during early 2022 without a dedicated Central Committee Department underpinning it.
Another possible, but unlikely merger may have occurred between the Central Committee’s two administrative technical services departments, the WPK General Affairs Department [GAD] and the WPK Document Archives. From a cosmetic perspective, this would be an easy merger because document and records collections are part of GAD’s overall mission which is managing communications and document delivery (along with other administrative and technical services) in the Central Party. That said, GAD and Document Archives link directly with KJU’s Personal Secretariat. Personnel, particularly individuals ranked as cadres, working in the Document Archives interact with and have access to wads of sensitive information about the party and party members. If 300-350 cadres are being transferred out of the Central Committee apparatus, it is highly improbable they would be individuals who know the party’s secrets or, in the case of GAD cadres, those who know the mechanics of the Central Committee’s nodes of reporting and control.
Merging Central Committee Departments bucks the organizational trend against consolidation which began at the 8th Party Congress. During the party congress, at least two new Central Committee Departments (the Justice Department and the Discipline Investigation Department) were established. They are spin-offs of the WPK Organization Guidance Department [OGD] and were created in concert with structural changes to the WPK Central Auditing Commission and the WPK Central Inspection (Control) Commission. It is highly unlikely, given the size and bureaucratic reach, that KJU or the core leadership would undo these changes so quickly. In a series of basic intelligence materials distributed by the ROK Ministry of Unification [MOU] in early 2022, the Central Committee also has an Arts and Culture Department. This would represent another bureaucratic spinoff from the WPK Propaganda and Agitation Department [PAD]. So, the trend in building and maintaining the Party Central Committee’s institutions has been away from merger and consolidation. When assessing these more forward-facing departments, the only probable merger would be if the Arts and Culture Department reverted back to PAD as a subordinate section.
Aside from an overall tightening of control, there are three reasons cited for this organizational and personnel change. As mentioned above, one motivation for this reorganization effort is redundancy in the number of reports being submitted. The most salient reason in the estimation of DNK’s source (and the report’s author) is that the Central Party Supply does not have enough food and household resources to ladle out to mediocre cadres. As such, hundreds of cadres who have “done little, but protect their positions for the last ten years” will be moved to other party secretary positions at locales which have dedicated food and household supplies, but are not part of the Central Party Supply distribution network. The second reason is that at a later point in 2022 the county and city party organizations (i.e., county and city WPK committees) will be restructured which might open up vacant positions for former (and migrated) Central Committee cadres.
With these stated reasons, there are other effects of this reorganization and personnel shuffle. Cadres transferred from the Central Committee to lower-level posts might be replacing incompetent or inexperienced party secretaries. This would represent a culling of the herd. In early 2020, there was a major scandal involving cadres’ training institutions which was the subject of a Political Bureau meeting. Cadres’ training institutions not only educate and train the WPK’s political managers, but are also involved (in coordination with the WPK Organization Guidance Department and the WPK Cadres’ Affairs Department) placing them in jobs. This personnel shuffle might be the result of a process that began two years ago.
Conversely, it could create a generational change effect in the ranks of the party’s middle management. Officials who were in Central Committee cadres’ position “in the last ten years,” are closer to retirement or promotion. If a population like this migrates from the Central Committee, would this eventually result in this older cohort staying in the lower-level secretary’s positions? At some point in the future, perhaps with the convocation of the 9th Party Congress in 2026, will 300-350 cadres’ positions be newly created (or repurposed)? Who will fill those positions? Perhaps, a younger generation of cadres.
Chronology of Central Committee Department Changes (2005-2022)
2005: WPK Finance and Planning Department created. It consolidates the WPK Agricultural Department, the WPK Economic Affairs Department and the Economic Policy Inspection Department.

2007: WPK Administration Department is spun off from the WPK Organization Guidance Department
2008: Office #38 merges with Office #39
2009: The WPK External Liaison Department and the WPK Operations Department migrate out of the Central Committee with the establishment of the Reconnaissance General Bureau under the KPA General Staff Department
2010: Office #38 is separated from Office #39
2013: The WPK Administration Department is decommissioned and its functions revert to the WPK Organization Guidance Department
2014: The WPK Economic Affairs Department is separated from the WPK Finance and Planning Department
2016: Office #38 merges with Office #39
2016: The WPK Agriculture Department and the Economic Policy Inspection Department are re-established as stand-alone institutions
2021: 8th Party Congress stands up the Justice Department (procurators) and Discipline Investigation Department
**this report is included and analyzed with the usual caveats about any single-source news items, the overall reliability of human sources and what information they have access to, blah, blah, yadda, yadda**
Recent articles

9. S. Korea deploys homegrown radar system to Air Force


S. Korea deploys homegrown radar system to Air Force
koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · April 29, 2022
South Korea has deployed a new homegrown radar guidance system to the Air Force to replace those that have been in use at military airports for more than three decades, the state arms procurement agency said Friday.
The armed service has recently received the precision approach radar (PAR) systems used by air traffic controllers to give navigational guidance to pilots for landing, according to the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA).
In 2012, DAPA and the South Korean defense firm LIG Nex1 jointly invested 20 billion won ($15.74 million) to develop the new radar system. Its development was completed in 2017.
DAPA said it plans to continue its push to indigenously develop other military radar systems so as to help strengthen the nation's overall defense capabilities. (Yonhap)
koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · April 29, 2022

10. A unified Korea would be a good thing
Good to see the Japan Times publish Professor Kelly's OpEd on a controversial subject. I am not sure I agree with some of his points (removal of US troops a "Swiss-Finnish future") but he makes some important ones.


A unified Korea would be a good thing
japantimes.co.jp · by Robert E. Kelly · April 27, 2022
Busan, South Korea – A common belief in South Korea’s debate on unification is that most foreign powers — including Japan — oppose unity.
As an international relations professor in South Korea, I encounter this belief frequently, almost as an article of faith to explain why unification has not happened despite two nationalist Korean states committed to it.
This is wrong though. Only South Korea’s autocratic neighbors oppose unification, while its democratic partners support it. Indeed, the strategic logic is obvious.
By “unification” we mean, of course, Southern-led unification. North Korea is too poor and dysfunctional to absorb South Korea and the South’s military capabilities and democratic constitution mean a Northern-led unification would require conquest and likely mass devastation. A Southern-led unification — occasioned by a Northern internal collapse — is the most likely scenario.
China’s charade
The most distinctive element of the South Korean discussion of division is the nationalist embarrassment at naming the obvious culprit — the ruling Kim family of North Korea.
This is particularly marked in the South Korean progressive camp, which reads the North as a fellow Korean state divided away from its ethnic brothers in the South by foreign intervention. It is true that the U.S. and USSR divided Korea in 1945, but at least since the end of the Cold War, North Korea’s defeat in the inter-Korean competition has been obvious. North Korea might have peacefully joined the South, as East Germany did West Germany decades ago.
Instead, the Kims have steered an extremely belligerent post-Cold War path. They permitted the starvation deaths of 10% of their population in the late 1990s. Pyongyang has pursued nuclear missiles, leading to its near-total isolation from the world, including from South Korea. It has doubled down on brutal, totalitarian control at home. Were the Kim clan to cede power, they would almost certainly wind up in post-unification jails for their human rights crimes. Why would North Korea’s elite cede their posh, gangster-ish lifestyles for that?
Outwardly, China and Russia say they support Korean unification. China particularly must keep up the charade because of its unification claims on Taiwan.
But in practice, they do nothing to help and instead keep North Korea stay afloat. Both aid North Korea to evade sanctions. Both provide a haven for illicit North Korean elite monies. Both, especially China, provide economic assistance and trade opportunities. Some 92% of North Korean trade moves through China.
Much of that is technically illegal because of the restrictive multilateral sanctions regime, but China makes little effort to enforce that. (When I flew to North Korea, I saw passengers casually walking from Beijing duty-free stores to our plane with alcohol, appliances and other banned goods.)
If China genuinely wished to help, it could do a great deal. It chooses not to. As Chinese foreign policy voices openly admit, North Korea is a “buffer.” It keeps the South Korean, American and Japanese democracies at a distance from its northeast border and it distracts allied attention from the East and South China Seas. Moscow and Beijing are happy to callously instrumentalize the suffering of North Korea’s people for their own parochial geopolitics.
This is appalling, but we should expect no better from these harsh dictatorships.
Conspiracy theories abound
Conspiracy theories about American ambitions in South Korea are widespread — especially in the movie and TV industry. Usually they turn on America controlling South Korea for containment of China or vague imperial designs in East Asia.
All of this is silly. The United States does not need South Korea to contain China. It needs Japan, the linchpin of the American alliance network in Asia, plus air and naval bases far from China, such as Guam or Singapore.
The United States will never invade China on the ground and its Korean bases are subject to Chinese missile strikes, so there is no reason for the Americans to stay in Korea after unification.
Unification would be a massive boon to the United States. It could depart Korea altogether and focus on China. Unification would eliminate a huge problem — North Korea, with its nuclear missiles, huge army, support for China and Russia, criminality, proliferation, trafficking and so on.
This applies to Japan as well. Japan-Korea tension over history often leads to conjecture that Japan opposes unification. A unified Korea, the theory goes, would target Japan with grievances over history as a glue to hold the two together.
Strategically, this would be a massive mistake. A unified, democratic Korea would be vastly less dangerous to Japan than the persistence of North Korea and the spiraling nuclear threat it poses to Japan and the region. North Korea’s naval presence, history of provocations and kidnappings, drug- and weapons-trafficking, counterfeiting and so on would all fade away.
Unified Korea’s Finnish-Swiss Future
Unified Korea would not need a U.S. presence and there would be no pressing reason for America to maintain one. With North Korea gone, U.S. and Japanese geopolitical interest in Korea would decline. Korea would likely be just another trade partner.
This would suit Korea too. Post-unification alignment with the United States, Japan, China, or Russia would pull Korea into the brewing conflict among these great powers. Korea is too small to decisively impact the course of such a conflict, but its central position would mean it would be devastated by it.
The wisest course of action would be to withdraw into a fortress neutralism. During the Cold War, Finland and Switzerland were heavily armed, to vouchsafe their sovereignty, but neutral to avoid entanglement in larger conflicts.
That is likely to unify Korea’s future, and it would be a vast improvement over the status quo.
Robert Kelly is a professor in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University in South Korea.
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japantimes.co.jp · by Robert E. Kelly · April 27, 2022


11. Pyongyang continues strict COVID-19 measures as Seoul lifts mask requirement outdoors

Is China following north Korea's lead or is north Korea following China's lead?

And of course strict COVID measures are excellent population and resources control measures that can maintain the regime's stranglehold over the Korean people living in the north.

Pyongyang continues strict COVID-19 measures as Seoul lifts mask requirement outdoors
The Korea Times · May 1, 2022
North Korean quarantine officials march during a military parade at Kim Il-sung Square in Pyongyang, April 25, in commemoration of the 90th anniversary of founding of Korean People's Revolutionary Army. Screenshot from North Korea's Korean Central Television

By Ko Dong-hwan

While South Korea's central disease control authority will be lifting the face mask mandate on May 2, as the daily numbers of COVID-19 infections have been gradually declining from their peak in March, the situation in North Korea appears to be quite the opposite.

North Korean daily newspaper Rodong Shimmun, which is the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, released a story on May 1 headlined, "Let's stay vigilant and strictly abide by quarantine regulations."

The story said that new variants that keep emerging are raising international concerns. Variants such as Omicron have increasingly infected or killed people in North Korea and countries nearby, making the disease's highly contagious situation very bad, according to the report.

Observers have said that "countries nearby" referred to China, where authorities in certain cities have been forcibly quarantining those infected with the disease as part of the country's zero-COVID strategy. According to reports, North Korea had resumed operating trains crossing its border into China but, as the disease has spread to the Chinese city of Dandong in Liaoning Province bordering North Korea, North Korea has shut down the train service again in order to protect the country from infections.

The North Korean report, citing what it claimed as advice from the World Health Organization, urged citizens to wear face masks and ventilate indoor areas as strains following the initial Omicron variant keep emerging.

"Not even a tiny crack or mistake is allowed when it comes to emergency quarantining," the report said. "Even if the mistake was as negligible as the tip of a needle, it could deal a critical blow to the country's quarantine bases. Emergency quarantining is currently the foremost priority in our country."

Observers say North Korea's key mandate to keep the public safe from the disease is being done by strictly controlling the public. The country has yet to provide the first jab of vaccinations to its citizens and has been pushing people to abide by its quarantine measures, according to reports.

South Korea, on the other hand, is taking a major step toward returning to normalcy by lifting the outdoor face mask requirement on May 2. However, the measure still stands for large gatherings of 50 or more, both outdoors and indoors.

The country previously lifted most social distancing measures on April 18, allowing more opportunities for private gatherings and increased business operating hours.
The country began requiring face masks to be worn nationwide in October 2020 due to the rising risks presented by COVID-19.

On Sunday, South Korea reported 37,771 new COVID-19 infections, marking a steady decline from the peak in mid-March, according to the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA). Sunday's tally is a marked drop from Saturday's 43,286 and Friday's 50,568.

Daily counts had, at one point, topped 600,000 in March before coming down to five digits in about a month.

As of midnight Saturday, 44.54 million people, or 86.8 percent of the population, had been vaccinated with the first two shots, and 33.12 million people had received the first booster shots, representing 64.5 percent. The number of those that received the second booster shots came to 2.11 million, the KDCA said.


The Korea Times · May 1, 2022

12. Mend ties with Japan


Korea Times editorial.

Excerpts:

Against this backdrop, it is necessary for Korea and Japan to resolve their disputes over the historical issues to put their relations back on track. Kishida was quoted as saying that the two counties can no longer delay efforts for improved relations as it is urgent to develop not only a bilateral strategic partnership but also trilateral cooperation between Seoul, Tokyo and Washington.

We could not agree more with what Kishida said. But it is disappointing to see him sticking to a previous Japanese position that Korea should first solve the problem by dropping its compensation demand. Japan should change such a stance and face up to history squarely if it really wants to mend ties with Korea. Most of all, both sides need to restore mutual trust to move toward a better future.


Mend ties with Japan
The Korea Times · May 1, 2022
Restoring trust key to future-oriented partnership

South Koreans are paying keen attention to whether Seoul can improve soured relations with Tokyo after a new conservative president takes office May 10. Recent developments are raising cautious optimism about a diplomatic breakthrough between the two countries.

President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol's delegation to Japan said April 26 that its delegates and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida agreed on the need for future-oriented relations. "We have shared the view that both South Korea and Japan, which now stand on a new starting line, should make efforts for the future-oriented development of relations and for shared interests," Rep. Chung Jin-suk, head of the delegation, said after meeting with the Japanese leader.

The delegation delivered Yoon's letter to Kishida. Chung said the letter contained a proposal to revive the spirit of a 1998 declaration between then Korean President Kim Dae-jung and then Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi. The proposal reflected Yoon's hope that Seoul and Tokyo will forge a forward-looking partnership while facing up to their shared history.

Bringing up the declaration is meaningful as it opened the way for improved bilateral ties. At the time, Obuchi expressed "keen remorse" and apologized for the "great damage and pain" Japan inflicted on the Korean people during its 1910-45 colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula.

Chung said Kishida also shared the understanding on the idea of inheriting and furthering the Kim-Obuchi declaration. He also said the Japanese prime minister shared the delegation's view on the need to revitalize personnel exchanges that have come to a standstill amid diplomat rows and COVID-19. It is fortunate that both sides have felt the need to mend bilateral ties which have plunged to the lowest level since the 1965 diplomatic normalization treaty. Seoul and Tokyo need to take advantage of Korea's change of government to narrow their differences over Japan's wartime atrocities and move toward reconciliation.

Bilateral ties began to deteriorate in 2017 when President Moon Jae-in scrapped a 2015 deal on Japan's wartime sex slavery issue. They worsened further in 2018 when Seoul's top court ruled that Japanese companies should pay compensation to surviving South Korean victims of Japan's wartime forced labor. The next year, Tokyo imposed export restrictions on key materials needed by Korean firms to make semiconductors and display panels in apparent retaliation to the ruling.

Against this backdrop, it is necessary for Korea and Japan to resolve their disputes over the historical issues to put their relations back on track. Kishida was quoted as saying that the two counties can no longer delay efforts for improved relations as it is urgent to develop not only a bilateral strategic partnership but also trilateral cooperation between Seoul, Tokyo and Washington.

We could not agree more with what Kishida said. But it is disappointing to see him sticking to a previous Japanese position that Korea should first solve the problem by dropping its compensation demand. Japan should change such a stance and face up to history squarely if it really wants to mend ties with Korea. Most of all, both sides need to restore mutual trust to move toward a better future.


The Korea Times · May 1, 2022

13. Public residence, authoritarian legacy


An interesting view.

Excerpts:

If public residences are really needed, they should be provided to military commanders who should be on alert 24/7 and must move swiftly in emergencies. Praetorium — the Latin for battlefield tents for ancient Roman generals in the beginning and barracks or fortresses where emperors stay later — could be the start of official residence. In Korea, they are offered to not only heads of local governments and development corporations but also to judges, prosecutors — and even to heads of branch offices of the National Intelligence Service (NIS).

Public residences in regions are the legacy of the authoritarian era, when the president offered residential convenience to officials who were ordered to work in local areas. Today, however, if you are not local residents, you cannot run in local elections for top municipal posts. Even if you live in a remote area, you can attend meetings virtually. Former U.S. House Speaker Paul Ryan slept on a cot in his Longworth House office during sessions from 2015 to 2019. Given the outdated use of public residence in Korea, the time has come to end their use.



Sunday
May 1, 2022

Public residence, authoritarian legacy
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/05/01/opinion/columns/public-residence-parks/20220501200202858.html

Hahm In-sun
The author, a former professor of architecture at Hanyang University, is the chief architect for Gwangju Metropolitan City.

After Ahn Cheol-soo, chair of President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol’s transition committee, blasted public residences for heads of municipal governments, consensus started building fast to end official residences as a perk for some central government officials. After reading a recent JoongAng Ilbo series on the matter, which compared practices at home and abroad, I cannot but wonder if Korea is mature enough to be categorized as a developed country.

If public residences are really needed, they should be provided to military commanders who should be on alert 24/7 and must move swiftly in emergencies. Praetorium — the Latin for battlefield tents for ancient Roman generals in the beginning and barracks or fortresses where emperors stay later — could be the start of official residence. In Korea, they are offered to not only heads of local governments and development corporations but also to judges, prosecutors — and even to heads of branch offices of the National Intelligence Service (NIS).

Public residences in regions are the legacy of the authoritarian era, when the president offered residential convenience to officials who were ordered to work in local areas. Today, however, if you are not local residents, you cannot run in local elections for top municipal posts. Even if you live in a remote area, you can attend meetings virtually. Former U.S. House Speaker Paul Ryan slept on a cot in his Longworth House office during sessions from 2015 to 2019. Given the outdated use of public residence in Korea, the time has come to end their use.

The father of exploiting public residence for financial gains is Chief Justice Kim Myeong-su of the Supreme Court. He provoked public outrage after allowing his son’s family to live in his public residence and permitting his daughter-in-law to use it for a dinner party with her colleagues at a law firm. The Chief Justice’s public residence is nestled in the hills of Hannam-dong, Seoul, overlooking the Han River. The district also hosts seven other public residences of Army Chief of Staff (to be used as the president-elect’s residence), defense minister, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vice commander of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, commander of the Marines, National Assembly speaker and the Foreign Minister.

The concentration of public residences for the elites in officialdom owes much to their proximity to the U.S. military base and the Ministry of National Defense building in Yongsan — and partly thanks to their easy access to the center of the city and plenty plots of land owned by the state. The location of public residences for the heads of the legislative and judiciary branches can be attributed to safety reasons, as suggested by a cluster of 54 foreign missions in Hannam-dong. That’s not all. Fourteen out of the 24 richest people having shares worth over 1 trillion won ($793.8 million) live there. Many famous entertainers also reside in the UN Village — the place for public residences for Japanese military officers during the colonial days — in Hannam-dong. The guard post at the entrance of the village turns it into a fortress.

After Yoon’s presidential office is relocated to Yongsan next month, a large patch of the district will transform into a park for civilians. It is the time to end the authoritarian legacy succinctly reflected in the concentration of foreign missions in Hannam-dong.

In the West, many former manors owned by lords in the feudal days were reborn as civilian parks. Eight big parks in London — including the Greenwitch, Hyde, and Regent’s Parks and Kensington Gardens — are all royal parks, which were used as hunting grounds or for banquets for British monarchs. The rights to a huge stretch of land was handed over to the common people after the establishment of constitutional monarchy in the 18th century. The Tiergarten in Berlin and the Luxembourg Garden in Paris also were once a part of the estates of lords or a private residence of aristocrats.

Urban parks in the West played a key role in preventing the Industrial Revolution from escalating to a proletarian revolution. But Korea’s cities have lacked such a dramatic transformation. The time has come to change luxurious public residences into parks or cultural space. If you add the space of the Blue House, Gyeongbok Palace and the Gwanghwamun Square in central Seoul, it amounts to nearly a half of Hyde Park in London. The Serpentine Galleries in the park has become an international spot for architectural experimentation over the Pavilion. Why not use the main building of the Blue House for such purposes?

Public office holders in Korea must wake up. Roman soldiers revered Pompey who lived alone in praetorium, but they loved Caesar who shared his tent with them. Leaders of this country must pay heed. 
Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.




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David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
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V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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