Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Insurgent’s actions are similar in character to all others fought by second rate troops: they start out full of vigor and enthusiasm, but there is little level-headedness and tenacity in the long run."

– Clausewitz, On War

"Failure is the key to success; each mistake teaches us something."

– Morihei Ueshiba

“We’re developing a new citizenry. One that will be very selective about cereals and automobiles, but won’t be able to think.”

- Rod Serling

1. ASD SO/LIC, USSOCOM and USCYBERCOM Senate Testimony 10 April 2024

2. Hamas May Not Have Enough Living Hostages for Cease-Fire Deal

3. Biden Aims to Project United Front Against China at White House Summit

4. Former top military officers push back on Trump immunity claim

5. Esper: Former military leaders should stay out of Trump immunity debate

6. Eggs, Ammo and Underwear: Inside Ukraine’s New Push Against Military Graft

7. The Very High Stakes of Failing to Help Ukraine

8. Moscow Uses Russian Orthodox Church as Covert Foreign Policy Tool in Ukraine and the West

9. US, Japan announce generational upgrade to alliance amid China threat

10. Xinhua Commentaries: “Exposing the Three Major Political Deficits of the U.S.”

11. The Other Russian Dissident Putting His Life on the Line

12. Army ‘feeling a lot better’ with recruiting this year, Wormuth says

13. United States-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement | The White House

14. FACT SHEET: Japan Official Visit with State Dinner to the United States | The White House

15. Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio of Japan in Joint Press Conference

16. House Lawmakers Strike Down FISA Renewal Measure

17. AUKUS Partners Focus on Indo-Pacific Security in Shaping Joint Capabilities

18. Assemble the Bodyguard of Lies: Strengthening US Military Deception Capabilities

19. Don’t Count on Us: Canada’s Military Unreadiness

20. Leadership, Culture, and the Military Cyber Workforce

21. Information warfare becoming a critical submarine capability: Aeschbach

22. Terrorists on the Rampage

23. Secretive US cyber force deployed 22 times to aid foreign governments

24. Risk, Rumors, and Reprisals: The Imagined Side of Professional Writing

1. ASD SO/LIC, USSOCOM and USCYBERCOM Senate Testimony 10 April 2024

View the nearly 3 hour hearing at this link: https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/to-receive-testimony-on-the-posture-of-united-states-special-operations-command-and-united-states-cyber-command-in-review-of-the-defense-authorization-request-for-fiscal-year-2025-and-the-future-years-defense-program

The ASD SO/LIC and CDR USSOCOM 17 psge joint statement for the record is here: https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/download/fenton-statement-4/10/2024

The CDR USCYBERCOM statement for the record is here: https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/download/haugh-statement-4/10/2024

Here are my 4 tweets from the testimony yesterday:

@DavidMaxwell161

CDR, USSOCOM (my paraphrase): A SOF renaissance is taking place - tied to its history from the OSS - to create advantages and options for the US and allies and dilemmas for adversaries as it has always done- this is in SOF's DNA. #USSOCOM

@DavidMaxwell161

A great statement from the Commander USSOCOM and acknowledged by a Senator as an important recruiting message: "To those listening today, considering service to our nation, know the profound sense of calling, purpose, and fulfillment those serving in uniform share."

@DavidMaxwell161

Thank you to Senator Ernst at the SASC hearing for USSOCOM for acknowledging the passing of COL Ralph Puckett, "The Ranger" and last surviving MOH recipient from the Korean War. #USSOCOM

@DavidMaxwell161

Although I am very focused on the excellent and important #USSOCOM & #ASDSOLIC testimony in today's SASC hearing, I am very impressed with General Haugh of #CYBERCOM. I am learning a lot from his testimony as he does a great job of explaining cyber to the American people.

Here are some of the Irregular Warfare excerpts from the ASD SO/LIC and USSOCOM Joint Statement:

Modernized and updated authorities enable SOF to campaign effectively against state and non-state actors and achieve an outsized impact across multiple mission sets and domains. We greatly appreciate Congress’ support in codifying Section 1202 authority under 10 U.S.C. 127d (Irregular Warfare), which will improve the range of options to impose costs on malign actors. Other authorities, such as 10 U.S.C. § 127f (Clandestine Operational Preparation of the Environment and Non-conventional Assisted Recovery) and FY 2020 NDAA Section 1057 (Intelligence / Counterintelligence) are valuable in illuminating and countering malign influence and preparing for potential future military operations.

Irregular warfare is a critical tool for campaigning across the spectrum of conflict, enhancing interoperability and access, and disrupting competitor warfighting advantages while reinforcing our own. To further institutionalize irregular warfare across the Joint Force, SO/LIC is updating policy, informing doctrine, and modernizing irregular warfare education and training. As part of this effort, in close coordination with the Joint Staff, SO/LIC recently updated DoD’s definition of irregular warfare to better reflect the role of the Joint Force. Irregular warfare activities impose costs on our adversaries, strengthen our network of allies and partners, and interrupt our adversaries’ decision cycle.

Irregular warfare is a fundamental component of the DoD’s contributions to a larger whole-of- government approach to strategic competition. Through the conduct of irregular warfare education and training, along with joint and combined activities and operations, our allies and partners are better equipped to deter and resist aggression from the PRC, Russia, Iran, and other malign actors. Irregular warfare enhances posture and options to counter an adversary’s gray zone activities and their counter- intervention strategies. Consequently, an enhanced understanding of irregular warfare will bolster deterrence and make large scale conflict less likely. While SOF may perform the preponderance of the DoD’s irregular warfare operations and activities, it remains the responsibility of the entire Joint Force. Shared investments in irregular warfare across the DoD will enhance interoperability and disrupt our competitors’ advantage.

ASD SO/LIC Service like responsibilities:

ADVANCING CIVILIAN-MILITARY PARTNERSHIP

SO/LIC and USSOCOM make up the SOF enterprise, and we continue to strengthen our civilian-military partnership to ensure SOF are fully integrated into the Department’s analytical, planning, programming, and budgetary processes. With responsibilities for oversight of SOF organization, training, and equipping, the ASD(SO/LIC) reports directly to the Secretary of Defense and represents the SOF enterprise in a variety of decision-making bodies alongside the Secretaries of the Military Departments and other Office of the Secretary of Defense components. At the same time, the ASD(SO/LIC) serves as the Department’s principal advisor for a range of issues relevant to SOF, such as counterterrorism, irregular warfare, information operations, civilian harm mitigation and response, counter-small unmanned aerial systems (C- sUAS) prior-to-launch, counternarcotics, counter-transnational organized crime, counter threat finance (CTF), stabilization, civil affairs, and peacekeeping. With these mutually supporting roles, SO/LIC is uniquely positioned within DoD to optimize the integration of SOF capabilities into defense planning and analytical processes that shape SOF’s role within the Joint Force.

Over the past year, SO/LIC has continued to enhance the Service-like side of its organization. For example, SO/LIC has realigned its Irregular Warfare Technical Support Directorate under its Service-like functions, enhancing its integration with SOF and leveraging its extensive international partnerships. The Deputy Secretary has allocated additional Senior Executive Service (SES) positions to SO/LIC, which will materially enhance how SO/LIC can execute its Service-like responsibilities. Within the next few months, SO/LIC will have grown from one to four SES leaders dedicated to its Service-like responsibilities. With USSOCOM’s support, we have added the first-ever SOF senior enlisted advisor in SO/LIC to contribute a SOF-specific perspective to departmental decision-making on the welfare of our service members and civilian personnel, alongside the senior enlisted leaders of the Services. Reinforcing our priority on people, SO/LIC has also established a new directorate focused exclusively on Manpower and Force Resiliency. Through a reinvigorated Special Operations Policy Oversight Council and participation in other DoD decision-making bodies, we continue to deepen our engagement with the Military Departments and Combatant Commands in caring for our people and in addressing shared challenges.

Some of the many comparative advantages of SOF include "generational partnerships," and connective tissue to the interagency. I do not think we can empshisie enough the importance of generational partnerships.

Strengthening Partnerships

Extensive partnerships are the cornerstone of SOF’s contributions to integrated deterrence, C- VEO, and crisis response. Unparalleled integration and interoperability with allies and partners, the interagency community, and the Joint Force are all characteristics that SOF have strengthened over the past two decades. While the shared challenge of countering violent extremism facilitated unprecedented levels of operational partnerships, these mutually beneficial relationships have now extended to the full range of SOF operations globally, including integrated deterrence and irregular warfare capabilities. Small footprint and persistent low-cost SOF deployments allow our allies and partners to build capacity and bolster their security to prevent wider conflict.

SOF’s generational partnerships across the globe provide the Joint Force an asymmetric advantage. In 2023, SOF formations executed 168 Joint Combined Exchange Training iterations in 76 countries, training more than 2,000 U.S. SOF personnel alongside more than 7,500 allies and partners. Through persistent engagement, SOF have fostered extensive interoperability with allied and partner SOF, deepened by operating shoulder-to-shoulder during combat and other high-risk operations for over two decades. Authorities under 10 U.S.C. § 333 (Building Partner Capacity) and 10 U.S.C. § 322 (SOF Training) are the foundation of SOF’s generational relationships to further enhance collaboration and promote interoperability. Additionally, Headquarters USSOCOM hosts 28 foreign liaison officers who provide a level of trust that cannot be surged during a crisis.

An enduring advantage for the United States is its unrivaled network of CT partners who continue to bring bespoke capabilities and remain committed to countering terrorists that threaten all our citizens. SO/LIC and USSOCOM closely coordinate with these partners to ensure unity of effort, streamlined communication, and common priorities. In every CT campaign, we find capable and willing allies, dedicated to the defeat of terrorist organizations, and ready to partner with us in our efforts. Operations supported by 10 U.S.C. § 127e (Counterterrorism) are an example of partner forces providing flexible options to apply pressure against violent extremists in otherwise inaccessible, contested, and ungoverned areas—while reducing risk to U.S. forces.

Moreover, SOF serve as added connective tissue to the interagency community for the Department and a force multiplier for integrated deterrence. Integration with U.S. interagency partners—such as the Department of State, the Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the National Counterterrorism Center, among many others—enhances the U.S. Government’s response to various threats and efforts to mitigate instability over the past year. As an example, USSOCOM CTF analytical support led to high-level indictments of Chinese companies that import fentanyl precursors to the Homeland and was lauded by the Drug Enforcement Administration for supporting the identification and distribution of fentanyl and other drug trafficking, including a global money-laundering network. FBI recognized CTF analysts at Special Operations Command-Pacific for their support to investigations involving Chinese transnational organized crime groups linked to PRC malign influence networks.

USSOCOM and USCYBERCOM Senate Testimony 10 April 2024

Date: Wednesday, April 10th, 2024

Time: 09:30am

Location: Room SD-106 Dirksen Senate Office Building

2. Hamas May Not Have Enough Living Hostages for Cease-Fire Deal

So should we assume those 40 women, children, elderly, and sick were brutally murdered like other Israelis?

Hamas May Not Have Enough Living Hostages for Cease-Fire Deal

The group is in discussions with Israel over releasing 40 women, children, elderly and sick captives

By Summer SaidFollow

, Nancy A. YoussefFollow

and Jared MalsinFollow

Updated April 11, 2024 6:03 am ET

Fears are rising over the fate of the remaining hostages held in Gaza after Hamas said it was unsure whether it could bring forth 40 Israeli civilian captives as part of a U.S.-backed cease-fire proposal, according to officials familiar with the negotiations.

The 40 hostages, including women, children, elderly men, and those in fragile health, would be released under a U.S.-supported plan for a six-week cease-fire in the war in Gaza. In exchange, Israel would release hundreds of Palestinian prisoners.

Instead, the militant group has been unable to confirm that it has enough civilian hostages to fulfill its end of the deal in the initial phase of the proposed plan, complicating talks toward a possible cease-fire in the six-month-old war that has left much of Gaza in ruins.

A Hamas official said the group wouldn’t commit to releasing 40 living hostages but could commit to 40 hostages total, which could mean dead or alive.

The admission by the militant group, which took more than 240 hostages during its lethal Oct. 7 attack on Israel, has heightened fears among families of the hostages, who are piling pressure on the Israeli government to cut a deal with Hamas that would pause the fighting and free at least some of the remaining captives.

Hadas Kalderon’s husband Ofer remains captive in Gaza. PHOTO: ABIR SULTAN/EPA-EFE/SHUTTERSTOCK

“Every day without a deal endangers them. For half a year, they have been toying with their lives, permitting their blood to be spilled,” said Hadas Kalderon, the mother of two children who were kidnapped by Hamas and later freed, speaking at a protest outside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office on Tuesday. The children’s father remains in captivity.

The Israeli government has rejected the families’ accusation that it hasn’t made the hostages a priority and says freeing the captives is a top priority of the war. Both Israel and Hamas responded critically to a new U.S. cease-fire proposal this week.

The Israeli military declined to comment on estimates of how many hostages may remain alive. The Israeli prime minister’s office declined to comment on the matter.

The exact number of hostages still alive is a central issue in the negotiations toward a cease-fire deal. Proposals by the U.S. and Arab states envision Israel releasing Palestinian prisoners, in varying numbers, in return for different types of Israeli hostages including civilians, female soldiers, male soldiers and the bodies of dead captives. Ambiguity around the number of living hostages and their identities could impede progress in the talks.

Separately, U.S. intelligence reports indicate that an attack on Israeli assets by Iran or its proxies could be imminent, U.S. officials said Wednesday, as the top American military commander for the Middle East headed to Israel to coordinate a response.

Iran has publicly threatened to retaliate for a strike in Syria on an Iranian diplomatic building in Damascus last week, presumed to be the work of Israel, that killed top Iranian military officials, including a senior member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ elite Quds Force.

The U.S. alert offers yet another sign of how Israel’s war in Gaza following the Oct. 7 attacks has spread into a regional conflict, which in turn is complicating a resolution of disputes between Israel and Hamas. Among those, hostages remain at the forefront.

The city of Khan Younis, in southern Gaza, has been largely destroyed over the course of Israel’s six-month war. PHOTO: FATIMA SHBAIR/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Around 130 remaining hostages taken in the attack are still in Gaza. Of those, Israeli officials have publicly confirmed that 34 are dead, but Israeli and American officials estimate privately that the number of deaths could be much higher. More than 100 other hostages were freed in a weeklong cease-fire deal with Hamas in November.

U.S. and Israeli officials believe that some of the remaining hostages are being held by Hamas and used as human shields around the group’s leadership, which Israeli officials believe is hiding in tunnels in southern Gaza.

Some U.S. estimates indicate that most of the hostages are already dead, U.S. officials familiar with the intelligence said. They stressed, however, that U.S. visibility on the hostages is limited and depends, in part, on Israeli intelligence. Some were likely killed during Israeli strikes on Gaza, the officials said, while others have died from health issues, including injuries suffered during their initial capture.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence declined to comment.

The latest estimates mark a notable increase from recent U.S. assessments. As recently as February, Israeli and U.S. officials believed that at least 50 hostages had been killed, suggesting that roughly 80 remained alive.

The site of a strike that took place last week on an Iranian diplomatic building in Syria. PHOTO: AMMAR SAFARJALANI/XINHUA/ZUMA PRESS

The majority of the dead died as a result of wounds they suffered during the Oct. 7 attack. Others were already dead when militants took their bodies into Gaza and some are believed to have been killed by Hamas in captivity. The Israeli military in December also said it mistakenly shot and killed three hostages. At least one died in a failed Israeli rescue mission.

Hamas officials for weeks have told negotiators that the group was unable to confirm how many hostages remain alive, according to Arab mediators talking directly to the group. Egypt and Qatar are acting as intermediaries in negotiations between Hamas and Israel.

At times, Hamas argued that providing information on the remaining hostages would mean giving up leverage in the negotiations, the mediators said. Hamas also repeatedly said that it needs a pause in fighting, a few days long, to track and collect the hostages. The group made the same argument before it agreed to the November cease-fire deal. That agreement also eventually collapsed, marking the end of the cease-fire, in part because Hamas failed to produce a list of 10 living civilian women and children held in Gaza.

Mediators believe that the majority of the remaining hostages who remain alive are younger male hostages, including soldiers.

One solution to Hamas’s refusal to provide a list of 40 civilian hostages slated for release in the initial phase of the deal would be to include captive Israeli soldiers in the initial batch. Hamas has been reluctant to do that because it is demanding a much higher price for the soldiers, including the release of Palestinian prisoners serving long sentences on terrorism-related charges.

Marwan Barghouti, pictured in 2003 PHOTO: TAL COHEN/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Hamas has also sought a deal that would end the war in Gaza and demanded a full Israeli withdrawal from the enclave. The group also aims to negotiate the release of senior Palestinian political and militant leaders, including Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti, as a part of the final phase of a potential cease-fire deal with Israel, according to officials familiar with the talks.

In Israel, a forensic medical committee is tasked with determining hostage deaths from afar using classified intelligence. Members of the committee mostly rely on security-camera footage and videos from devices recovered in Gaza as the war has progressed.

It was the committee that determined the deaths of 34 hostages taken on Oct. 7, most of whom died in the attack, according to Ofer Merin, director-general at Shaare Zedek Medical Center in Jerusalem and a member of the committee.

Determinations of death must meet a high bar and are never based on one piece of intelligence alone. Israel has separately recovered the bodies of 12 other hostages, bringing the total number of hostages who are confirmed dead to 46.

“It’s been six months since these people were taken into Gaza. These families have no second in the day or a second in the night that their minds are calm. They are in constant agony,” said Merin.

Some of the hostages released by Hamas in November were transported to an Israeli army base by bus. PHOTO: MENAHEM KAHANA/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Families of some American hostages have increased their public pressure on the Biden administration to do more to secure their loved ones’ release. On Tuesday, Vice President Kamala Harris met with some of these families.

“There’s no question the war must be won and Hamas must be eradicated. But the hostages are running out of time,” Orna Neutra, the mother of Israeli-American hostage Omer Neutra, told CNN’s “State of the Union.” “It’s not clear whether the Israeli administration has the priority right.”

Rachel Goldberg-Polin, whose 23-year-old son, Hersh Goldberg-Polin, is being held by Hamas, described the White House meeting as a “productive” discussion but also said the families “want results.”

Harris “underscored that President Biden and she have no higher priority than reuniting the hostages with their loved ones. She also reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to bring home the remains of those who have been tragically confirmed to be deceased,” the White House said in a statement after the meeting.

Rachel Goldberg-Pol, whose son is being held in Gaza, spoke at a rally calling for the release of the hostages. PHOTO: RON ADAR/SOPA IMAGES/ZUMA PRESS

Anat Peled contributed to this article.

Write to Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com, Nancy A. Youssef at nancy.youssef@wsj.com and Jared Malsin at jared.malsin@wsj.com

3. Biden Aims to Project United Front Against China at White House Summit

This may be one of the most important summits in the 21st Century as Japan and the Philippines are geostrategically key to not only a free and open INDOPACIFIC but also the defense of Taiwan and any conflict with the PRC.

It will be interesting to read the joint statement later today or tomorrow.

Biden Aims to Project United Front Against China at White House Summit

President Biden has invited the leaders of Japan and the Philippines to the White House, where they will discuss security in the South China Sea.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/11/us/politics/biden-japan-philippines-summit.html

President Biden hosted Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan at the White House on Wednesday and announced measures to foster greater military cooperation with Japan.Credit...Haiyun Jiang for The New York Times

By Michael D. Shear

Reporting from Washington

April 11, 2024, 5:05 a.m. ET

President Biden intends to use a first-ever joint meeting with the leaders of Japan and the Philippines on Thursday to send a blunt diplomatic message to an increasingly aggressive China: Beijing’s harassment of Philippine ships in the South China Sea is a violation of international law and must stop.

In recent months, Chinese coast guard ships have been ramming Philippine vessels, blasting them with water cannons and aiming lasers at their crews in what the United States condemns as “coercive and unlawful tactics” in one of the most crucial waterways in the world.

So far, the Chinese provocations, asserting disputed claims to the international waters, have fallen short of the kinds of attacks that would trigger the military defense pact that the United States and the Philippines signed in 1951. But Biden administration officials said the meeting of the three leaders on Thursday is intended to demonstrate to China even stronger military and diplomatic unity among the leaders of the three allies.

One U.S. official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss the meeting in advance, called the issue of security in the South China Sea a “pillar” of the discussions between Mr. Biden, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan and President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. of the Philippines.

“The U.S., Japan, and the Philippines are three closely aligned maritime democracies with increasingly convergent strategic objectives and interests,” Jake Sullivan, the president’s national security adviser, said on Tuesday. “Just this past week, our three countries and Australia held joint naval drills in the South China Sea.”

Officials said there would be similar drills in the months ahead as the nations continue to assert the freedom of travel through international waters that China claims as its own. They called Thursday’s meeting at the White House a demonstration of support from Mr. Biden and Mr. Kishida for the Philippines in its clashes with China.

China has asserted greater control over the South China Sea over the years, trying to expand its military footprint in the region.

The meeting of the three leaders comes a day after Mr. Biden hosted Mr. Kishida at the White House for meetings and a state dinner. The two men discussed China’s military and economic aggression but also announced a series of new initiatives to foster more cooperation on the economy, space exploration, technology and research.

Officials said a similar list of announcements was expected to follow Thursday’s meeting between the three leaders.

The leaders were set to announce new investments in infrastructure projects in the Philippines aimed at improving what they called “high-impact” project such as ports, rail, clean energy and semiconductor supply chains.

They were also expected to unveil new efforts by the United States and Japan to install radio access network technology in the Philippines, a modernization effort that will improve the ability of people to communicate wirelessly throughout the region, officials said.

Officials said there would also be other announcements about collaboration among the three nations on global humanitarian assistance efforts and on even greater cooperation among the militaries of the three countries.

Michael D. Shear is a White House correspondent for The New York Times, covering President Biden and his administration. He has reported on politics for more than 30 years. More about Michael D. Shear

4. Former top military officers push back on Trump immunity claim

The 38 page amicus brief can be accessed here: https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/23/23-939/307029/20240408130715170_No.%2023-939bsacRetiredFour-StarAdmiralsAndGenerals.pdf

STATEMENT OF INTEREST1

Amici are retired four-star admirals and generals, and former secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. They served under each President from John F. Kennedy to Donald J. Trump.

Amici are deeply interested in this case because presidential immunity from criminal prosecution would threaten the military’s role in American society, our nation’s constitutional order, and our national security. It also would have profoundly negative effects on military service members, who answer to the orders of the President as Commander-in-Chief. This submission is based on amici’s collective experience serving in and leading our military, as well as their collective interest in safeguarding our national security. Amici’s short biographies listed below only begin to describe their distinguished service to our country.

Admiral Steve Abbot, United States Navy (Retired), graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1966, deployed to Vietnam, and began a career of 34 years with the U.S. Navy. His final active-duty tour was as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command from 1998 to 2000. Following his retire- ment, Admiral Abbot served as Deputy Homeland Security Advisor to President George W. Bush from 2001 to 2003.

Admiral Thad Allen, United States Coast Guard (Retired), retired in 2010 as the 23rd Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard. Admiral Allen led the federal responses to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. He led Atlantic Coast Guard forces in response to the 9/11 attacks and coordinated the Coast Guard response to the Haitian Earthquake of 2010.

Former Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and served in the Army on active duty from 1978 to 1983. He served in two Senate-confirmed positions in the Clinton Administration, including as Secretary of the Army, and in the Obama White House as an Assistant to the President and Director of the White House Military Office.

General George Casey, United States Army (Retired), enjoyed a 41-year career in the U.S. Army. He is an accomplished soldier and an authority on strategic leadership. During his tenure as the Army Chief of Staff, he is widely credited with restoring balance to a war-weary Army and leading the transfor- mation to keep it relevant in the 21st century. Prior to this, General Casey commanded the Multi-National Force – Iraq, a coalition of more than 30 countries.

General Peter Chiarelli, United States Army (Retired), was the Deputy G3, Operations, Training, and Mobilization, commanding the Army Operations Center in the Pentagon during the 9/11 terrorist attacks and for the first two years of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. He commanded at all levels, deploying and commanding the 1st Cavalry Division in Iraq in 2004- 2005 and Multinational Corps Iraq in 2006. General Chiarelli was Senior Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and served as the 32nd Vice Chief of Staff of the Army for almost four years before retiring in 2012 with almost 40 years of service.

General Carlton W. Fulford, Jr., United States Marine Corps (Retired), received his commission in June 1966, following graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy. He served as a platoon and company commander in Vietnam. Over the next four decades, he served as Commanding Officer, Task Force Ripper during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm; Commanding General, First Marine Expeditionary Force; Commanding General, Third Marine Expeditionary Force; Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Pacific; and Director, The Joint Staff. General Fulford retired as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command in 2002.

General Michael Hayden, United States Air Force (Retired), entered active military service in 1969. During his career, he rose to the rank of four- star general and served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. General Hayden also served as Commander of the Air Intelligence Agency and held senior staff positions at the Pentagon, Headquarters U.S. European Command, and the National Security Council.

Former Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James served as the 23rd Secretary of the Air Force, nominated by President Barack Obama and confirmed by the Senate in 2013. Previously, Ms. James worked as the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs before being nominated by President Bill Clinton and confirmed by the Senate in 1993 as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.

General John Jumper, United States Air Force (Retired), is an Air Force Fighter Pilot, Instructor, and Commander, accumulating more than 1,400 combat flying hours and serving as the 17th Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force. He has commanded a fighter squadron, two fighter wings, a numbered Air Force,

U.S. Air Forces in Europe, and Allied Air Forces Central Europe, and he was Commander of the Air Combat Command, the Air Force’s largest command. General Jumper went on to serve at the Pentagon as Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and as the Senior Military Assistant to two Secretaries of Defense.

General Charles Krulak, United States Marine Corps (Retired), served as 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps. General Krulak’s long and distin- guished military career included two tours of duty in Vietnam and service as commanding general of the 2nd Force Service Support Group during the Gulf War. His other commands include commanding general of the Marine Forces Pacific; director of the USMC Force Structure Planning Group, where he developed the strategic vision of the U.S. Marine Corps for the 21st century; and deputy director of the White House Military Office.

Admiral Samuel Jones Locklear, III, United States Navy (Retired), graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1977. He served for 39 years and retired as commander of U.S. Pacific Command. His prior commands include Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, U.S. Naval Forces Africa, and Allied Joint Force Command Naples; Commander, U.S. 3rd Fleet; and Commander, Nimitz Strike Group.

Former Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus served as the 75th Secretary of the Navy from 2009 to 2017, the longest to serve as leader of the Navy and Marine Corps since World War I. Before his appointment as Secretary, he held a number of leadership positions, including serving as the Governor of Mississippi and Ambassador to Saudi Arabia.

General Robert Magnus, United States Marine Corps (Retired), was the 30th Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. He enlisted in the Naval Reserve while a junior in high school. He was commissioned in 1969 and was designated as a Naval Aviator. He served as Commander, Marine Corps Air Bases Western Area, and Deputy Commander, Marine Forces Pacific. When he retired in 2008 after 38 years of distinguished service, he was the last active-duty officer of the Marine Corps who had served during the Vietnam War.

General Craig McKinley, United States Air Force (Retired), retired as a four-star general in November 2012 after 38 years of service. His last assignment was as the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, where he also served as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this capacity, he was a military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, and he was the Department of Defense’s official channel of communi- cation to the Governors and to State Adjutants General on all matters pertaining to the National Guard.

Admiral John B. Nathman, United States Navy (Retired), graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1970 and qualified as a Naval Aviator in 1972. He served in a variety of sea, shore, and joint assignments, and he flew over 40 different types of aircraft in his career. Admiral Nathman served as the 33rd Vice Chief of Naval Operations from August 2004 to February 2005 and subsequently assumed command of

U.S. Fleet Forces Command. He retired in May 2007.

Former Secretary of the Navy Sean O’Keefe began his public service career in 1978 at the Department of Defense and as U.S. Senate staff until his appoint- ment as the Department of Defense Comptroller and Chief Finance Officer in 1989. Subsequently, President George H.W. Bush named him the 69th Secretary of the Navy. Secretary O’Keefe also served in President George W. Bush’s Administration as Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the 10th Administrator of NASA.

Admiral Bill Owens, United States Navy (Retired), retired in 1996 as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He began his career as a nuclear submariner, spending a total of 4,000 days—or more than ten years—aboard submarines, including duty in Vietnam. Admiral Owens was a senior military assistant to two Secretaries of Defense and served as commander of the U.S. 6th Fleet during Operation Desert Storm.

Admiral Scott Swift, United States Navy (Retired), served in the U.S. Navy for more than 40 years, rising from his commission through the Aviation Reserve Officer Candidate program to become a Navy light attack and strike fighter pilot. He held command seven times, completing his uniformed career as the 35th Commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet in 2018.

General Charles F. Wald, United States Air Force (Retired), served over 35 years, with more than 3,600 flying hours and 430 combat hours, and retired as a four-star general. General Wald commanded the 31st Fighter Wing at Aviano Air Base, Italy, where he led one of the initial strike packages for NATO in the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict. In September 2001, General Wald led the development of the coalition response and air campaign against the Taliban in Operation Enduring Freedom. In his last position, he served as deputy commander of U.S. European Command.

Former top military officers push back on Trump immunity claim

BY NICK ROBERTSON - 04/09/24 9:32 AM ET

https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/4582454-former-top-military-officers-push-back-on-trump-immunity-claim/?utm

More than a dozen retired four-star generals, admirals and other former military leaders filed an amicus brief with in the Supreme Court on Monday, arguing against former President Trump’s claims of immunity in his criminal cases.

The group said Trump’s claims “would threaten the military’s role in American society, our nation’s constitutional order, and our national security,” and would have a “profoundly negative effects on military service members.”

The former president’s attorneys have argued that the charges against Trump related to the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol should be thrown out because he was acting as president at the time. Prosecutors have denounced the idea as a “novel and sweeping” claim.

The brief’s signatories include former CIA Director Michael Hayden, retired Adm. Thad Allen and retired Gens. George Casey, Carlton Fulford, Craig McKinley and Charles Krulak.

The group argued that granting Trump immunity against the criminal claims could open the door to future executive intervention in the country’s elections and could put national security at risk.

“The notion of such immunity, both as a general matter, and also specifically in the context of the potential negation of election results, threatens to jeopardize our nation’s security and international leadership,” the brief reads. “Particularly in times like the present, when anti-democratic, authoritarian regimes are on the rise worldwide, such a threat is intolerable and dangerous.”

The group also wrote that if the court agrees with Trump’s argument, it will destroy the relationship between the commander in chief and the military, because the president would not have to follow law, while the military still would.

The situation could end up “creating the likelihood that service members will be placed in the impossible position of having to choose between following their Commander-in-Chief and obeying the laws enacted by Congress,” the brief says.

Former President Trump makes comments following a pretrial hearing in a hash money case in criminal court on March 25 in New York City. (Photo by Curtis Means-Pool/Getty Images)

There is a national security risk as well, the group argued, with challenges to the peaceful transition of power putting the entire country at risk in what is already an opportune moment for foreign powers to strike.

“Foreign countries also closely observe American elections, and domestic conflict on U.S. soil — especially conflict related to the peaceful transition of power — only encourages our foreign adversaries,” the brief reads.

Presidential immunity would “inexorably lead to deep divisions between the armed forces’ political and military leaders and would place servicemen and women in the impossible position of either ignoring presidential orders they are sworn to obey or committing crimes at the President’s behest in violation of their oath — for which they may be prosecuted,” the group added.

The former officers also contended that any change in the assumption of immunity could erode the public’s trust in the military as an institution.

The Supreme Court is set to begin arguments on the immunity claims April 25, with the landmark decision likely to be handed down by the end of June or sooner.

The trial for Trump’s federal election subversion case was slated to start in early March, but proceedings are currently on hold while the Supreme Court weighs the immunity challenge. Several critics of the former president, the presumptive GOP nominee, have contended his immunity push is another way to delay his trial until after the November election.

Trump is facing four felony counts accusing him of being involved in a conspiracy to defraud the United States. Prosecutors allege he stood at the center of a campaign to block the certification of votes for President Biden that day.

5. Esper: Former military leaders should stay out of Trump immunity debate

Esper: Former military leaders should stay out of Trump immunity debate

BY TARA SUTER - 04/09/24 3:42 PM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4583467-esper-former-military-leaders-should-stay-out-of-trump-immunity-debate/?utm

Former Trump Defense Secretary Mark Esper said former military leaders should not get involved in the debate over presidential immunity as it relates to former President Trump Tuesday.

“I would prefer to see retired admirals and generals not get involved in these issues,” Esper said on “CNN This Morning” with anchor Kasie Hunt.

Esper’s comments follow a Supreme Court amicus brief filed Monday by more than a dozen retired four-star generals, admirals and other former military leaders in which they stated their opposition to the former president’s immunity claims in criminal cases. In their brief, the group of former military leaders said Trump’s claims “would threaten the military’s role in American society, our nation’s constitutional order, and our national security.”

Hunt also noted an argument made by Trump’s legal team a few months ago that a president could order SEAL Team Six to kill a political opponent and not get prosecuted due to an ex-executive having expansive immunity from criminal prosecution.

“The hypothetical… SEAL Team Six being used to take out… it’s just ridiculous,” Esper responded. “So I — look, the President… my view doesn’t have that type of immunity.”

Esper, a now frequent critic of Trump, has said he will not vote for his old boss but has also appeared hesitant to commit to voting for President Biden

“I’m not there yet,” Esper said after recently being asked by comedian Bill Maher on his HBO show, “Real Time with Bill Maher,” if he would vote for the current president. “I’m definitely not voting for [former President Trump], but I’m not there yet.”

6. Eggs, Ammo and Underwear: Inside Ukraine’s New Push Against Military Graft

Eggs, Ammo and Underwear: Inside Ukraine’s New Push Against Military Graft

Renewed efforts to overhaul procurement follow a series of scandals that provoked outcry in Ukraine and disquiet among allies

https://www.wsj.com/world/eggs-ammo-and-underwear-inside-ukraines-new-push-against-military-graft-8b47b6d9?mod=hp_listb_pos1&utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm

By Isabel ColesFollow

and Ievgeniia Sivorka

April 9, 2024 9:00 am ET

KYIV, Ukraine—Masked Ukrainian security officers have raided properties, seized wads of cash and detained suspects in a recent crackdown on graft in the purchase of goods for the military ranging from eggs to artillery shells.

At the same time, a quieter operation is being waged by a new team of professionals including a former energy executive called Maryna Bezrukova. From her office in a gleaming business center in Kyiv, she is on a quest to save money and ensure new arms contracts are untainted.

“We need to change the system,” said Bezrukova, who became head of Ukraine’s Defense Procurement Agency earlier this year. “Unless we change the system, nothing will happen.”

As Ukraine faces setbacks on the battlefield in the third year of Russia’s invasion, attention has turned to corruption that is corroding support for the war effort at home and abroad.

Allegations of graft have helped galvanize Republican opponents of military aid to Kyiv, who are holding a $60 billion package hostage to their demands for tighter border control. Short of munitions and men, Ukrainian forces are struggling to hold the line against a much larger enemy. Corruption is also denting morale and making it harder to persuade more Ukrainians to risk their lives.

Maryna Bezrukova was appointed after a number of procurement scandals in Ukraine. PHOTO: EMANUELE SATOLLI FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Ukrainian anticorruption activists say the steely-eyed Bezrukova has what it takes to challenge entrenched interests and shady middlemen while negotiating arms deals worth billions of dollars. Her efforts to clean up arms procurement could prove more meaningful than the recent spate of arrests, they say. But the scale of the challenge is huge. “Of course, it’s not easy,” said Bezrukova, likening her mission to sewing a parachute while in freefall.

The appointment of Bezrukova follows a series of procurement scandals that erupted after Ukrainian investigative journalists revealed the Defense Ministry had purchased eggs at more than twice their market price. President Volodymyr Zelensky fired the country’s defense minister in an effort to quell a furor in Ukraine and disquiet among Western allies.

Since then, law enforcement has carried out a number of corruption-related arrests. Among the most high-profile cases is that of businessman Ihor Hrynkevych, whose companies won contracts to supply clothing and underwear to the armed forces despite previously being involved in construction.

The Very High Stakes of Failing to Help Ukraine

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/11/opinion/dan-coats-ukraine-russia-aid.html

April 11, 2024, 5:05 a.m. ET

A group of military volunteers called Driving Ukraine lights flares to signal the arrival of aid at the Ukrainian border.Credit...Dom Marker

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By Dan Coats

Mr. Coats, a former senator from Indiana, served as the director of national intelligence from 2017 to 2019.

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Since Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, a rare consensus has formed in Washington around this conviction: America must provide military support to Ukraine’s resistance. Three administrations and large majorities of both parties in Congress have consistently held that President Vladimir Putin’s aggression cannot be tolerated. When has such deep solidarity last occurred on any difficult subject?

Now members of Congress are arguing that we must turn away from spending more money to help Ukraine, choosing instead to focus on our own needs, pursuing our own interests. This is a false choice.

The choices facing America are always based on the same foundation: what best serves our nation. The choice is not America first or something else first. America is always first. The real question, in this complicated and uncertain world, is what course of action will most likely serve our core national interests — security and economic prosperity.

Those interests are inextricably linked to the strength of our global alliances and the international system of law and cooperation in which American democracy survives and prospers. And the strength of those networks, in turn, depends on our role as a trusted ally and friend, on our credibility and — frankly — on our virtue.

In the 80 years that the Soviet Union and then Russia has been our strategic competitor, the United States has spent an incalculable amount to defend ourselves. We have spent trillions of dollars on America’s nuclear defense alone, with primarily one other nuclear-armed state in mind.

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Ukraine’s effort to defend itself against Mr. Putin’s advance has degraded Russia’s military more than anyone thought possible when the full invasion of Ukraine began just over two years ago. In blunt dollar terms, helping Ukraine in that defense is by far the least expensive way to weaken Russia’s military and discourage Russian aggression, thereby protecting ourselves and our allies.

The opposite is also true. If Mr. Putin succeeds, the high anxiety in Europe over his next steps will justifiably continue to grow — and expensive imperatives will follow. Anticipating the next possible phase of Mr. Putin’s campaign to reimpose the Russian hegemony of the Cold War era will force NATO to greatly increase its defense budget, plunging the world into an arms race like those leading up to the world wars. Those who do not see the link between European security and our own are not living in the real world.

This is a moment that is heavy with potential consequences for America’s role in the world, for our power to shape future events and for our ability to live securely within our own borders. It is by no means certain that the pending aid package for Ukraine passed by the Senate will even come to a vote in the House and if it does, what its prospects will be. What happens next will determine whether our potential adversaries will be encouraged in their aggressive designs or intimidated by our collective resolve to resist them. It will determine whether our friends and allies will be strengthened by our determination or frightened by the collapse of American will.

Image

Volunteers placed a giant replica bulletproof vest bearing the words “She Needs Armor Too” on the statue of Princess Olga in Kyiv. Credit...Dom Marker

The potential consequences of failing to help Ukraine resist Russia’s raw territorial aggression are not limited to Europe. China is watching closely to see how firmly America supports, or not, its friends these days. Our allies are watching too, including Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. All three are nervous about China’s regional ambitions — and dependent on America as a security partner.

This is the context in which the Ukraine aid package that is now before the House must be assessed. This isn’t about the money. It is about American steadfastness, something that is now in question because of another partisan contest. Ukraine and the tens of millions of people living there have become pawns for political maneuvering in Washington.

And while these maneuvers are not new to me or to the American public these days, usually the stakes are not so high. Our failure to help Ukraine resist; our complicity in allowing naked territorial aggression succeed; our undermining of NATO security; our tacit encouragement for China to potentially follow Russia’s lead; and most of all, our abandonment of people of courage and hope, and who love America, would together be a colossal strategic blunder.

This is not the time for political games. It is time for America to do what we all know is right.

More about the war in Ukraine

Opinion | Stacy Schiff

America Was Once the Country Begging Richer Allies for Help

April 7, 2024

Opinion | The Editorial Board

Help Ukraine Hold the Line

April 6, 2024

Opinion | Olena Stiazhkina

We Ukrainians Are Fighting to Be Free

Feb. 19, 2024

Dan Coats was director of national intelligence from 2017 to 2019, after serving in the U.S. Senate from Indiana from 1989 to 1999 and again from 2011 to 2017. He was also the American ambassador to Germany from 2001 to 2005. He is a senior policy adviser at the King & Spalding law firm.

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8. Moscow Uses Russian Orthodox Church as Covert Foreign Policy Tool in Ukraine and the West

ROC: Russian Orthodox Church.

Excerpt:

The ROC plays a pivotal role in Moscow’s hybrid war against Ukraine and the West. Through the church’s influence, the Kremlin seeks to revive Russia’s great-power status, eradicate Western influence, and disrupt the current world order. The church’s prolonged recruiting efforts represent a core element of Russia’s long-term grand strategy to sow division in the West. This year, many Western countries will hold important elections that will decide the outcome of the European security architecture. Governments in the West can prepare for the rise in anti-Western propaganda and Kremlin influence operations by combating the ROC’s sizable spy network.

Moscow Uses Russian Orthodox Church as Covert Foreign Policy Tool in Ukraine and the West

jamestown.org · by Nicholas Chkhaidze · April 10, 2024

Executive Summary:

The Kremlin is actively using the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) to drum up support for the war in Ukraine and to spread its influence abroad.
Moscow has long used the ROC to achieve its goals by establishing spy networks throughout the post-Soviet space and the West.
The ROC, under Patriarch Kirill, seeks to revive Russia’s great-power status, eradicate Western influence, and disrupt the current world order.

On March 27, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) adopted an ideological policy document at the World Russian People’s Council that recognizes Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a “holy war” and “a new stage in the national liberation struggle … against the criminal Kyiv regime and the collective West.” The document also asserts the church’s sole authority over modern-day Ukraine. It goes on to outline the “Russian world” (russkiy mir) concept as “wider than the state borders of both the present-day Russian Federation and greater historical Russia.” The ROC claims that the primary aim of Russian foreign policy should be the “re-unification of the Russian people” while maintaining its place as a “leading center of a multipolar world.” Additionally, the mandate discusses the so-called “trinity doctrine,” which erroneously claims the “Russian nation” consists of ethnic Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian subgroups (Russian Orthodox Church, March 27). Patriarch Kirill and his church have played a central role in drumming up support for the war effort and projecting Russian influence abroad. The patriarch’s approval of this latest edict points to the ROC’s commitment to winning the Kremlin’s “long war” against Ukraine and sowing discord in the West.

Moscow claims that it is waging a war not only against Ukraine but also with the collective West. Kremlin propaganda asserts that the wider conflict is necessary to defend Russia’s great-power status and cause a split in the Western world. Within this wider strategy, the ROC actively uses its influence abroad to try to reestablish Russia’s sphere of influence over the countries of the post-Soviet space. Russian President Vladimir Putin constantly condemns the West for “denying moral principles and all traditional identities” while presenting Russia as the keeper of the “Christian values that form the foundation of Western civilization.” (Kremlin.ru, September 19, 2013). The Kremlin leader’s words, however, ring false when Patriarch Kirill describes Moscow’s war as a “metaphysical battle against an ungodly international order” and Russian Orthodox priests sanctify the many atrocities committed by Russian forces against the Ukrainian people (Russian Orthodox Church, March 8, 2022).

The Kremlin has long used the ROC as a tool for achieving certain national security and foreign policy goals. In 2000, Putin introduced the new Russian National Security Concept that included a separate doctrine on “spiritual security” (see EDM, January 21, 2000; BITS, accessed April 8). The document stated that safeguarding Russian security also entails protecting the “historical, spiritual, cultural, and ethnic heritage of all Russians.” The 2000 concept, along with subsequent national security concepts, have consistently illustrated the lack of separation between church and state in projecting Russian power and influence abroad and achieving Putin’s megalomaniacal desires.

In Kyiv, the ROC has worked tirelessly to undermine successive Ukrainian governments’ efforts to maintain the country’s national identity and culture as distinct from Russia. The church has attempted to stymie Ukraine’s integration with the West, denouncing the 2004 Orange Revolution and 2014 Euromaidan protests (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 21, 2004; Euromaidan Press, August 28, 2014). Moscow fears that “the loss of Kyiv,” which represents “the foundation of Russian civilization” in the minds of the Russian elites, will be followed by “the separation of Orthodox Christians” and the eventual demise of the Russian world (UCMC, May 28, 2021).

The ROC has also been instrumental in establishing spy networks throughout the post-Soviet space and in the West. The Kremlin has used the church’s influence in its efforts to recruit spies in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere. Clergy members in some countries have even been accused of working with and running recruitment schemes for Russian intelligence and security groups (Agentura, September 18, 2023). Other countries claim that ROC representatives are working with the Russian security services to promote the Kremlin’s agenda and hire informants. For example, in September 2023, Bulgaria deported Russian Archimandrite Vassian and two Belarusian priests for “serving Moscow’s geopolitical interests” (Ukrainska Pravda, September 21, 2023). The Bulgarian National Security Service stated that the clerics had been deported because they represented a danger to national security by deliberately attempting to sway Bulgaria’s political structures to suit the Kremlin’s objectives in Europe. Vassian is also persona non grata in North Macedonia for openly advocating for official Russian policy and trying to cause a split in the Macedonian Orthodox Church.

Official investigations in the United States have revealed that Russia has sought to infiltrate Orthodox churches to recruit intelligence assets, with around 2,300 congregations potentially compromised (Ukrinform, September 18, 2023). In September 2023, ROC priest Dmitry Petrovsky was accused of recruiting among Orthodox clergy in the United States. Earlier, in May 2021, Petrovsky’s computer had been searched upon entering the country. Files were found that contained extensive dossiers on prominent Orthodox priests in the United States and biographies on their families. US authorities claimed that the information could be used as potential blackmail to pressure clergymen into cooperating with Russian intelligence. One file marked “confidential” seemingly laid out the specific areas of cooperation between the ROC and Russian security services. The document stated, “It is possible to involve employees of the Russian Orthodox Church in operational activities only with the direct sanction of the patriarch. The nature of such activities is controlled by the special staff of the Russian Orthodox Church to prevent and avoid negative consequences for the church” (Meduza, September 20, 2023).

The response of some in the West to Ukraine’s efforts to ban the Moscow-linked Ukrainian Orthodox Church, separate from the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, and expel its priests points to the effectiveness of the ROC’s efforts (see EDM, January 25, March 7, 2023). Some Western analysts have tried to portray Ukraine as an opponent of religious freedom (Info Navigator, February 8, 2024). Russian propaganda portraying Ukraine as religiously repressive corresponds with this sentiment, which the Kremlin seeks to capitalize on through the ROC’s influence. Despite the strong relationship between Moscow, the security services, and the church, the European Union has been unable to censure senior clergymen because of Hungary’s objection to “breaching freedom of religion” (Anadolu Agency, June 3, 2022).

The ROC plays a pivotal role in Moscow’s hybrid war against Ukraine and the West. Through the church’s influence, the Kremlin seeks to revive Russia’s great-power status, eradicate Western influence, and disrupt the current world order. The church’s prolonged recruiting efforts represent a core element of Russia’s long-term grand strategy to sow division in the West. This year, many Western countries will hold important elections that will decide the outcome of the European security architecture. Governments in the West can prepare for the rise in anti-Western propaganda and Kremlin influence operations by combating the ROC’s sizable spy network.

jamestown.org · by Nicholas Chkhaidze · April 10, 2024

9. US, Japan announce generational upgrade to alliance amid China threat

Excerpts:

Many of these changes altered Japanese defense policy that had been in place since after the Second World War, when Japan demilitarized and adopted a pacifist constitution.

“What Japan’s has been doing over the past few years is nothing short of astounding — just unthinkable even a few years ago,” said Toshi Yoshihara, a China expert at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. “And I credit the Chinese for that. No one has done more to get Japan to modernize and get serious about defense than China itself.”

US, Japan announce generational upgrade to alliance amid China threat

Defense News · by Noah Robertson · April 10, 2024

The leaders of America and Japan unveiled a lengthy list of defense agreements Wednesday in what U.S. President Joe Biden called “the most significant upgrade in our alliance since it was first established.”

The two countries will improve their respective command-and-control systems, form an industrial council to build weapons together, network their missile defense systems with Australia’s and start a joint exercise with the United Kingdom, among other agreements. For the first time, America will also adjust its force structure in Japan to better work with Tokyo’s defense forces.

“This is about restoring stability in the region, and I think we have a chance of doing that,” Biden said at a Wednesday press conference with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in the White House Rose Garden.

The subtext in Biden’s comment is China, which over the last 15 years has grown far more powerful and aggressive. The change has worried the U.S. that China is trying to push it out of the region, isolate allies like Japan and potentially take Taiwan — which China considers a rogue province — by force.

There may be no better case study than Japan. In the last several years, it’s doubled a cap on defense spending from 1% to 2% — a share it plans to spend by 2027. Japan also entirely revised its national security strategy, scrapped limits on defense exports and bought weapons, such as the Tomahawk missile, that allow it to strike back if attacked.

Many of these changes altered Japanese defense policy that had been in place since after the Second World War, when Japan demilitarized and adopted a pacifist constitution.

“What Japan’s has been doing over the past few years is nothing short of astounding — just unthinkable even a few years ago,” said Toshi Yoshihara, a China expert at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. “And I credit the Chinese for that. No one has done more to get Japan to modernize and get serious about defense than China itself.”

Speaking with reporters ahead of the event, senior administration officials said the new agreements won’t take effect for months.

Earlier in the week, defense officials from Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. said Japan and other countries may later join part of the AUKUS defense pact, an agreement to share nuclear-powered submarines and other defense technology. Any openings would be for AUKUS’ second pillar, which concerns advanced technology like artificial intelligence and hypersonic missiles.

“What we’re all focused on is demonstrating to our respective populations early victories on pillar two,” Australia’s Minister for Defense Industry Pat Conroy told Defense News in an interview.

Kishida is in the nation’s capital for a state visit — one of Washington’s top honors. He’s the fourth leader from the Indo-Pacific to do so during the Biden administration, and the White House cites that number as a sign of its commitment to the region.

Biden and Kishida will also meet later this week with Ferdinand Marcos, president of the Philippines, in the three countries’ first trilateral summit.

About Noah Robertson

Noah Robertson is the Pentagon reporter at Defense News. He previously covered national security for the Christian Science Monitor. He holds a bachelor’s degree in English and government from the College of William & Mary in his hometown of Williamsburg, Virginia.

10. Xinhua Commentaries: “Exposing the Three Major Political Deficits of the U.S.”

A friend and China hand flagged this. I think it is very much worth reading. I wish the American people, our political leaders and elite, and the members of the Republic and Democratic parties could read these critiques and reflect upon them.

I think it is useful to read how our adversary views us.

Xinhua Commentaries: “Exposing the Three Major Political Deficits of the U.S.”

http://chinascope.org/archives/34704

{Editor’s Note: On each of the three consecutive days March 17th through March 19th, Xinhua News Agency published a commentary criticizing the U.S. from angles of ideology, image, and leadership, respectively. On March 20th, Xinhua published a summary article with highlights from the prior three articles. The following is a translation of the summary article. [1]}

March 20, 2024

The so-called Third “Democracy Summit” organized by the United States was held in South Korea from March 18th to 20th. However, twenty-one years ago, on March 20th, the U.S. invaded Iraq; and to this day the Iraqi people are still suffering the consequences of “exported American-style democracy.” While chanting slogans such as “freedom,” “democracy,” and “rules-based international order,” the United States is in reality dividing the international community and maintaining hegemony in the name of democracy.

“American-style democracy,” which is not worthy of its name, lost its credibility long ago. The U.S. prioritizes its own interests above those of the world, not hesitating to provoke conflicts and hatred so as to maintain its hegemonic order and undermine global cooperation. The U.S. has repeatedly defied the historical trend of global peace and development. As a result it has developed severe deficits in its ideology, image, and leadership, truly becoming a “deficit empire.”

“Ideological Deficit”: Bipolar Confrontation Leads to No Way Out

{Editor’s Note: the term “bipolar” here refers to the idea that power in the international system is concentrated at two poles (China and the U.S.) rather than being unipolar or multipolar.}

The global loss of credibility of the United States stems from the inherent defects of the capitalist system itself and the decline of its ideology. Selfishness, bipolar confrontation, and arrogance have prevented this superpower from breaking away from its demonic ideas of “America First” and “American exceptionalism.” They have caused [the U.S.] to resist the trend of global, mutual development. Is the U.S. truly able to provide advanced ideas to lead the development of humankind in this era?

The extreme selfishness of “America First” runs counter to the trend of win-win cooperation seen in the globalized era. American political elites are not interested in enlarging the cake of mutual development. Rather, they are interested in wooing a few countries to form small groups so as to control and suppress competitors, using means such as “decoupling,” technological blockades, indiscriminate sanctions, and economic coercion.

Such bipolar “friend or foe” thinking is incompatible with the pursuit of peaceful development in a multipolar world. From its direction of the Cold-War “freedom from dictatorship” drama, to its concoction of today’s phony “democracy against authoritarianism” narrative, the U.S. has been unable to escape the ideological shackles of its Cold War mentality and zero-sum thinking.

Such self-centered arrogance leads the U.S. to declare a “clash of civilizations,” which is fundamentally at odds with history’s current of multipolar development and peaceful coexistence. The U.S. considers itself “God’s chosen people” and always regards Western “liberal democracy” as the only model for modern civilization, fantasizing about global “uniformity” through American-style ideological “assimilation.” But history is now demonstrating that human civilization can only thrive through harmonious coexistence and mutual development. Pursuing unilateralism and a unipolar world, forcefully promoting one civilization, one path, and one model — this will only lead the world into the pain of conflict and the agony of exhaustion.

For the full text, please read: “Xinhua Commentary | Bipolar Confrontation Leads to No Way Out – Exposing the ‘Ideological Deficit’ in American Politics.” [2]

“Image deficit”: When Saying One Thing And Doing Another, One Cannot Foster Trust

For many years, the United States has whitewashed itself with titles such as “the beacon of democracy,” “the guardian of human rights,” “the melting pot of races,” etc. American politicians, armed with these slogans, mobilize propaganda tools to sell American values everywhere. However, the U.S., which speaks well but acts badly, cannot gain others’ trust. Its constructed “good image” has been repeatedly exposed as a facade.

The U.S. claims to be a “model of democracy,” but such “American-style democracy” has left the following “spectacles” to the world: thousands of people’s besieging Capitol Hill, George Floyd’s tragic cry of “I can’t breathe” before his death, and Iraqis’ weeping due to the traumas of the U.S. war… Inherent problems with American-style democracy abound, yet American politicians are keen to “promote democracy” worldwide, bringing chaos and disaster to many countries.

The U.S. flaunts itself as a “defender of human rights,” but its domestic human rights situation continues to deteriorate. It has deployed troops to Afghanistan, invaded Iraq, bombed Syria, and imposed sanctions on Cuba, Iran, and other countries for decades. The U.S. has repeatedly committed serious human rights violations such as torture and assassination. Since the outbreak of a new round in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in October of last year, the U.S. has repeatedly obstructed the United Nations Security Council from passing resolutions on a ceasefire. The international community has increasingly recognized the hypocrisy of the U.S.’ “human rights advocacy.”

The “image deficit” of the U.S. is also reflected in the lip service paid to maintaining “the rule-based international order.” In reality, it seeks selfish gains through use of its own “home rules,” applies international rules selectively based on its needs, and engages in pseudo-multilateralism and group politics.

For the full text, please read: “Xinhua Commentary | When Saying One Thing And Doing Another, One Cannot Foster Trust – Exposing the ‘Image Deficit’ in American Politics.” [3]

“Leadership deficit”: Hegemonic logic leaves no room for a rules-based order

In the current, rapidly-accelerating evolution of the world, the U.S. still clings to an anachronistic, hegemonic logic. It indulges itself in the unrealistic delusion that it is “leading” the world, satisfying its ego by living in a beautiful fantasy land. Little does it know that the international community is increasingly realizing that the U.S. is undeserving of its self-proclaimed “leading position” and that its global leadership has incurred significant deficits.

The U.S.’ leadership deficit lies in its failure to shoulder the responsibilities of a major power and demonstrate its role as a major player in times of crisis. Faced with global crises, the U.S. does not only shirk responsibilities and evade obligations; it also follows its own selfish interests to obstructs the formation of global concerted efforts [to address such crises]. It fails to deliver the contribution that a “leader” should, and it fails to meet international expectations.

The U.S.’ leadership deficit lies in its prioritization of “interests” over “justice,” intending to drag the world into a contest over existing [limited] resources rather than promoting the mutual development and increasing the prosperity of all countries. Currently, the world economy is weak and fragile, and many problems require the joint efforts of all countries. However, the U.S. stubbornly adheres to “selfishness,” using hegemony to prioritize national interests over global interests, shifting its domestic confrontations and risks to the entire world. Such “leadership” is not only morally lacking but also harms others in the long run.

The U.S.’ leadership deficit also lies in its inability and unwillingness to promote and lead the reform of global governance systems and the international order. To this day, U.S. officials and scholars still shamelessly boast that the world would descend into chaos if not for the leadership of the U.S. However, the reality is that more and more countries are courageously saying no to the U.S.’ “leadership.” They are calling for the establishment of global governance systems and a more just and reasonable international order, aiming for wholistic global development.

For the full text, please read: “Xinhua Commentary | Hegemonic Logic Leaves No Room for a Rules-Based Order – Exposing the ‘Leadership Deficit’ in American Politics.” [4]

Endnotes:

[1] Xinhua, “Xinhua News Agency Exposes the ‘Three Major Deficits’ of the American Politics,” March 20, 2024.

http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/20240320/f5dcd90dd74d4c19b959f35652726592/c.html

[2] Xinhua, “Xinhua Commentary | Bipolar Confrontation Leads to No Way Out – Exposing the ‘Ideological Deficit’ in American Politics,” March 17, 2024.

http://www.news.cn/world/20240317/fed6419105dc4ebca45139e2e2a613cb/c.html

[3] Xinhua, “Xinhua Commentary | When Saying One Thing And Doing Another, One Cannot Foster Trust – Exposing the ‘Image Deficit’ in American Politics,” March 18, 2024.

http://www.news.cn/world/20240318/fe602801856a46dda9bdad46537a4815/c.html

[4] Xinhua, “Xinhua Commentary | Hegemonic Logic Leaves No Room for a Rules-Based Order – Exposing the ‘Leadership Deficit’ in American Politics,” March 19, 2024.

http://www.news.cn/world/20240319/f147348cf7e54c7f8d1cfbe0ee553b98/c.html

11. The Other Russian Dissident Putting His Life on the Line

Will or can there be effective resistance in Russia?

The Other Russian Dissident Putting His Life on the Line

Vladimir Kara-Murza risked everything by following Navalny into prison, compelled by history and his own forebears’ suffering

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/the-other-russian-dissident-putting-his-life-on-the-line-f7f228ab?mod=hp_lead_pos8

By Matthew Luxmoore

Updated April 11, 2024 12:04 am ET

Five days after Alexei Navalny died in a Russian prison, another critic of President Vladimir Putin appeared in a grainy video link from his Siberian jail, dressed in a black prison uniform against the stark white walls of his cell.

“If we submit to despondency and fall into despair, then this is exactly what they’re counting on,” the emaciated prisoner told a Moscow court hearing in February. “Our main duty to our dead comrades is that we continue our work, with even greater dedication than before.”

What made Vladimir Kara-Murza’s remarks so striking wasn’t so much the tone of defiance, or the seemingly insurmountable odds of standing up to Putin, in power since 2000.

It was that Kara-Murza could be the next Russian dissident to die behind bars.

Serving out a 25-year sentence for criticizing the Kremlin and its war in Ukraine, he is feeling the effects of two poisonings in 2015 and 2017 that have shredded his nervous system, much like the attack Navalny endured before he was jailed. He has twice been in a coma and his doctors say he could die within two years without proper treatment.

Kara-Murza with his wife Evgenia and their children and pictured in a Moscow hospital in 2017 after he was poisoned for a second time.

The conditions in which he is being held are harsh even by Russian standards. Kara-Murza says he has been placed repeatedly in solitary confinement for minor infractions such as failing to fully button up his shirt or wake up at 5 a.m. without an alarm. Every hour on the hour, a speaker mounted on the wall of his prison cell broadcasts Russian news bulletins. This is how he learned of Navalny’s death in February.

By then, his polyneuropathy, the condition affecting his nervous system, was causing him to lose sensation in his limbs. In December, his feet temporarily swelled up so much that he couldn’t put on his shoes. His wife, Evgenia Kara-Murza, said tests conducted by a prison neurologist showed that his nerves were slowly dying.

Friends and family are urging the U.S. and U.K. to include the dual British-Russian citizen and U.S. resident in any prisoner swaps agreed with Russia, including those that may involve The Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich, an accredited journalist and U.S. citizen who has been held for over a year on an espionage allegation that he, the Journal and the U.S. government vehemently deny.

Kara-Murza during a video broadcast of his hearing at a court in Russia in February. PHOTO: ASSOCIATED PRESS

As avid students of Russia’s dissident movement through the ages, both Navalny and Kara-Murza knew they could be killed or forced to endure life-threatening conditions in remote prison camps as punishment for challenging Putin’s authority. Navalny returned to Moscow in January 2021 after recovering in Germany from what doctors said was a poisoning with a Soviet-era nerve agent. Russian authorities had made clear their intention to jail him, and he was arrested after he got off the plane.

While Navalny made global headlines with his grassroots campaign against the Russian leader, Kara-Murza posed a different kind of threat. A journalist-turned-political operative, he specialized in connecting opposition groups and forging international ties while living in the U.K. and U.S., lobbying for sanctions on the Kremlin to loosen its stranglehold over Russia’s political system. Supporters say that if Navalny deserved to become president in a freer Russia, 42-year-old Kara-Murza—with his fluent English and deep contacts in the West—would have made the perfect foreign minister.

Thousands of people defied the threat of arrest by attending the funeral of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny in Moscow in March. PHOTO: ANDREI BOK/ZUMA PRESS

But like many others—rights groups say there are now almost 700 political prisoners in Russia—he concluded that sacrificing himself would be the price he would have to pay to galvanize opposition to Putin.

“If you’re calling on your fellow citizens to stand up to the system, you have to lead by example and share the risks,” Kara-Murza wrote in a letter to the Journal from prison last month.

“The Putin regime survives and feeds on the fear it instills in our society,” he continued. “But fear, like blackmail, is only effective if people choose to succumb to it. And we must choose not to.”

Kara-Murza was born into a long line of dissidents, the son of a muckraking journalist and great-grandson of a Latvian revolutionary. His mother remarried to an Englishman in the 1990s and moved the family to England, where Kara-Murza attended Cambridge University and received British citizenship. He launched a career in journalism and, back in Russia, made a failed bid for political office in 2003.

As Russia lurched toward authoritarianism under Putin, Kara-Murza’s closest friends were targeted. When opposition leader Boris Nemtsov was gunned down outside the Kremlin in February 2015, Kara-Murza rushed to the scene where he saw his mentor’s body being cordoned off by police.

Kara-Murza with Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov in Washington, D.C., in 2014. Kara-Murza at a memorial for Nemtsov, who was gunned down in Moscow in 2015.

Three months later, Kara-Murza was in a meeting in Moscow when he suddenly lost consciousness. Placed on life support in hospital, he experienced multiple organ failure and was put in a coma for weeks. His Russian doctors told him he had been poisoned, and tests in several Western labs later confirmed this.

Kara-Murza spent a year walking with a cane and fighting to regain feeling in his hands and feet, playing guitar and walking on shells along the beach near the family’s Virginia home. In 2017, on another trip to Russia, he was poisoned again.

The toxins used in those poisonings, and the identity of the perpetrators, have remained a mystery. Russian authorities refused to launch probes into either incident.

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, friends pleaded with Kara-Murza to leave Russia. Putin had introduced sweeping new laws to stamp out any opposition. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a former Russian oil tycoon who spent 10 years in prison for opposing Putin’s government, said he warned Kara-Murza that he wouldn’t hold out in a Russian prison on account of his ailing health.

In late March, over dinner in London, financier Bill Browder asked the Russian to consider his family. Kara-Murza had been instrumental in helping Browder lobby for the introduction of Western sanctions against Russian human-rights violators as part of the Magnitsky Act.

“I said to him: ‘The worst that happens is you get killed, and the best that happens is you get arrested,’ ” Browder recalled in an interview. “He was unmoved by that.”

Two weeks after the dinner with Browder, Kara-Murza was back in Moscow. In an interview with CNN soon after, he accused Putin of killing his opponents and said the Kremlin chooses poison as a favored method of assassination because it gives it plausible deniability.

“This regime that is in power in our country today is not just corrupt, it’s not just kleptocratic, it’s not just authoritarian,” he said. “It is a regime of murderers.”

Noting that Kara-Murza was speaking from Moscow, the anchor asked whether he was concerned that if he is targeted again, he will die. “I’m a Russian politician, it’s my home country,” Kara-Murza answered. “The biggest gift we could offer the Kremlin is to give up and run.”

Hours later, as he returned home from a meeting, he was arrested and charged for his work with a banned opposition group. Investigators later added a charge of treason and another of disseminating allegedly false information about the Russian military.

Evgenia Kara-Murza in Washington, D.C. in 2023. She has worked tirelessly to publicize her husband’s plight. PHOTO: ANDREW CABALLERO-REYNOLDS/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Evgenia Kara-Murza’s mobile phone shows a photo of the couple together for an interview with AFP on the sidelines of the Geneva Summit for Human Rights and Democracy, in 2023. PHOTO: FABRICE COFFRINI/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

In his final statement before the court, Kara-Murza was defiant. “I blame myself for only one thing,” he said. “That over the years of my political activity I have not managed to convince enough of my compatriots and enough politicians in democratic countries of the danger that the current regime in the Kremlin poses for Russia and the world.”

The court ruled that Kara-Murza had undermined Russia’s sovereignty and security “motivated by political hatred and hostility.” He was sentenced to 25 years in prison in April 2023 and sent to Omsk in Siberia, some 1,700 miles from Moscow.

Kara-Murza says his only possessions are a mug, toothbrush, bar of soap, two towels and two books. Pictures of his children aren’t allowed. The hard bed he sleeps on is folded away for 16 hours of the day and no natural light enters his cell. Daily exercise is limited to an hour and a half of pacing around a tiny courtyard where the sky is visible through bars in the ceiling.

Evgenia, his wife, has worked tirelessly to publicize her husband’s plight, traveling from the couple’s Virginia home to Western capitals, and urging the Biden administration to designate Kara-Murza as “wrongfully detained,” a status that commits it to seek his release.

A cross-party group of U.S. lawmakers pushed for Kara-Murza’s inclusion in the 2022 U.S.-Russia prisoner swap deal that ultimately only brought home the women’s basketball star Brittney Griner. The State Department has said Kara-Murza is a “political prisoner” who should be freed.

In his letter to the Journal, Kara-Murza said three things keep him going: his Christian faith, a sense that he is on the right side of history and a strong conviction that Putin’s government will collapse.

“Whatever this regime does, it cannot stop the future,” he wrote, citing the thousands of young people who came out for Navalny’s funeral in Moscow. “And even if they kill us all, others will take our place.”

The last time Kara-Murza was able to speak with his family was in December, when prison authorities allowed him a 15-minute phone call.

“I picked up, I heard his voice, I told him I loved him, and I passed the phone right away to the kids,” said Evgenia Kara-Murza, who is caring for the couple’s three teenage children. “I had a timer on, because I couldn’t allow any one of our kids to speak to their father for longer than five minutes.”

Write to Matthew Luxmoore at matthew.luxmoore@wsj.com

12. Army ‘feeling a lot better’ with recruiting this year, Wormuth says

Hopefully it is "more than a feeling." (with apologies to Boston, IYKYK)

We have not heard much from our leadership about recruiting.

Army ‘feeling a lot better’ with recruiting this year, Wormuth says

Stars and Stripes · by Corey Dickstein · April 10, 2024

Sgt. Maj. of the Army Michael Weimer joined senior leaders of the U.S. Army Recruiting and Retention College and the U.S. Army Recruiting Command at a Dec. 21, 2023, ceremony at Olive Theater, Fort Knox, Ky., to honor the newest members of the recruiting force. (U.S. Army Recruiting Command)

Army Secretary Christine Wormuth told House lawmakers on Wednesday that her service is “feeling a lot better” about recruiting this year after missing its goal for new soldiers for two consecutive years.

“I don’t want to be overconfident,” the Army’s top civilian told members of the House’s defense appropriations subpanel while testifying alongside Gen. Randy George, the Army’s chief of staff. “But I think we both feel that we have a good shot at making that goal this year, which I think would be very, very important.”

That goal, she added, is to ship 55,000 new recruits to Army basic training by Sept. 30, the end of fiscal 2024, and fill its delayed-entry coffers with another 5,000 recruits who would move to initial entrance training later. Meeting that basic recruiting goal would match the Army’s enlistment efforts from fiscal 2023, when it sent about 55,000 recruits to initial military training, falling about 10,000 short of its goal of 65,000. But that was an improvement from fiscal 2022, when the Army shipped fewer than 45,000 new recruits to basic training, falling 15,000 short of its goal.

Pentagon officials have noted in recent years that the military recruiting environment is among the worst in U.S. history. Only about 23% of Americans between the ages of 17 to 24 qualify for military service, fewer than previous generations, according to Defense Department data. Among them, only about 9% has shown interest in the military, the data shows.

To counter the problem, the Army has launched myriad of new recruiting programs aimed at beefing up and professionalizing its recruiting force. Wormuth said Wednesday that the service has begun one of those newer efforts to build a corps of permanent enlisted and warrant officer recruiters in lieu of soldiers temporarily taking recruiting assignments.

The first tranche of soldiers who will train to work in those new specialties have been selected and will complete their training and reach recruiting stations by the end of summer, she said.

“We’re picking soldiers that are a little bit more inclined to be good salespeople for the United States Army,” Wormuth said, noting the recruiting course is also getting longer and more difficult. “So, we’ve really updated that and again, I think that’s helped our recruiters be more effective in the field.”

Rep. Mike Garcia, R-Calif., said he was worried outside factors could impact military recruiting. His home state, he noted, adopted a $20 minimum wage for fast food workers this month — a pay rate more than double what the most junior troops make early in their careers.

“We’re competing from a recruitment perspective with fast food workers, right, and those guys aren’t putting their lives on the line every day like our soldiers are,” said Garcia, a former Navy pilot. “Right now if you’ve asked an 18-year-old if he wants to go work at the In-N-Out [Burger] for $22 an hour or join the Army for the equivalent of $12 an hour, you’re going to get 95% of them going to In-N-Out even if they love the country, even if they want to serve — they just can’t afford to go join the Army right now. And that’s a fundamental problem.”

Garcia proposed Congress adopt a bill to bolster pay for junior troops in the ranks of E-1 to E-6, starting service members at about $31,000 per year in basic pay. A similar measure was included in the House version of the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, the annual bill that sets lawmakers’ spending and policy priorities for the Pentagon. But the measure did not make the final NDAA that passed in December.

Garcia asked for Wormuth’s help in pushing for the measure to become law later this year.

“We need help on this,” he said. “We need more pull from the secretaries, we need more pull, frankly, from the president in prioritizing this pay gap right now. … There’s other things driving the recruiting problems … but the pay is significant.”

Stars and Stripes · by Corey Dickstein · April 10, 2024

13. United States-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement | The White House

A lot to parse here (and in the fact sheet) We should see some important analysis by all the Japan hands in the coming days.

United States-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement | The White House

whitehouse.gov · by The White House · April 10, 2024

Global Partners for the Future

Over the course of the last three years, the U.S.-Japan Alliance has reached unprecedented heights. We arrived at this historic moment because our nations, individually and together, took courageous steps to strengthen our collective capacity in ways that would have seemed impossible just a few years ago. Today, we, President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. and Prime Minister KISHIDA Fumio, celebrate this new era of U.S.-Japan strategic cooperation during the Prime Minister’s Official Visit and State Dinner in Washington, D.C.—and pledge that the United States and Japan will continue our tireless work, together and with other partners, to realize a free and open Indo-Pacific and world.

In this new era of U.S.-Japan cooperation, we recognize that global events affect the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific, and that developments in our shared region reverberate around the world. We are therefore working together, across all domains and at all levels, to build a global partnership that is fit for purpose to address the complex, interconnected challenges of today and tomorrow for the benefit of our two countries and the world. As our Alliance cooperation reaches new heights, we are expanding our engagement to reflect the global nature of our partnership.

At the core of our cooperation is a shared commitment to work with like-minded partners and multilateral institutions to address common challenges and to ensure a world that is free, open, connected, resilient, and secure. These joint efforts are based on our shared fundamental respect for international law, including the protection and promotion of human rights and dignity, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, and the prohibition on acquisition of territory by force. Our purpose as partners is to uphold and bolster the free and open international order based on the rule of law that has allowed so many nations to develop and prosper, and to ensure our Alliance is equipped to tackle the challenges of the 21st century.

To advance our global partnership, today we announce several new strategic initiatives to strengthen our defense and security cooperation; reach new frontiers in space; drive technology innovation; bolster economic security; accelerate climate action; partner on global diplomacy and development; and fortify the ties between our peoples. Through our global partnership, we are also synchronizing our strategies, and our two nations have never been more united as we work together to address the most pressing challenges and opportunities of the future.

Strengthening our Defense and Security Cooperation

The core of our global partnership is our bilateral defense and security cooperation under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which is stronger than ever. We affirm that our Alliance remains the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. President Biden reiterated the unwavering commitment of the United States to the defense of Japan under Article V of the Treaty, using its full range of capabilities, including nuclear capabilities. Prime Minister Kishida reaffirmed Japan’s unwavering commitment to fundamentally reinforce its own defense capabilities and roles, and to enhance its close coordination with the United States under the Treaty.President Biden also reaffirmed that Article V applies to the Senkaku Islands. We reiterated our strong opposition to any attempts by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion in the East China Sea, including through actions that seek to undermine Japan’s longstanding and peaceful administration of the Senkaku Islands. We welcome the progress in optimizing Alliance force posture in areas including the Southwestern Islands to strengthen U.S.-Japan deterrence and response capabilities, and we confirm the importance of further advancing this initiative.

The United States welcomes the steps Japan is taking to fundamentally enhance its defense capabilities, including its plans to increase the budget for its defense capabilities and complementary initiatives to two percent of GDP in Japanese Fiscal Year (JFY) 2027 in accordance with Japan’s National Security Strategy, its decision to possess counterstrike capabilities, and its plans to stand up the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) Joint Operations Command to enhance command and control of the JSDF. Together, these initiatives elevate our defense ties to unprecedented levels and launch a new era of U.S.-Japan security cooperation, strengthening our Alliance and contributing to stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Today, we announce several new strategic initiatives to further advance our Alliance. Recognizing the speed at which regional security challenges evolve and to ensure our bilateral Alliance structures meet these critical changes, we announce our intention to bilaterally upgrade our respective command and control frameworks to enable seamless integration of operations and capabilities and allow for greater interoperability and planning between U.S. and Japanese forces in peacetime and during contingencies. More effective U.S.-Japan Alliance command and control will strengthen deterrence and promote a free and open Indo-Pacific in the face of pressing regional security challenges. We call on our respective defense and foreign ministries to develop this new relationship through the Security Consultative Committee (our security “2+2”). In support of this vision, we also reaffirm our goal to deepen Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance cooperation and Alliance information sharing capabilities, including through the Bilateral Information Analysis Cell.

We will also continue to implement efforts to strengthen our Alliance force posture, build high-end base capabilities, and increase preparedness that are necessary to deter and defend against threats. We resolve to deepen bilateral cooperation toward the effective development and employment of Japan’s suite of counterstrike capabilities, including the provision of U.S. materiel and technological support to enhance Japan’s indigenous stand-off programs. The United States expressed its commitment to start the training pipeline and ship modifications for Japan to acquire operational capability of the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) system. We also reaffirmed our pursuit of a Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) cooperative development program to counter high-end, regional hypersonic threats.

As our countries strengthen our bilateral ties, we will continue to build our relationships with like-minded partners in the region. Today, we announce our vision to cooperate on a networked air defense architecture among the United States, Japan, and Australia to counter growing air and missile threats. Recognizing Japan’s strengths and the close bilateral defense partnerships with the AUKUS countries, AUKUS partners – Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – are considering cooperation with Japan on AUKUS Pillar II advanced capability projects. Continuing the momentum from the Camp David Summit, we welcome progress on establishing an annual multidomain exercise between the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Recognizing the commitments made in the Atlantic Declaration and the Hiroshima Accord, and as the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions become ever more interlinked, we welcome the announcement of regular U.S.-Japan-UK trilateral exercises, beginning in 2025, as we enhance our shared and enduring security. Building on the announcement at the Australia Official Visit in October to pursue trilateral cooperation with Japan on unmanned aerial systems, we are exploring cooperative opportunities in the rapidly emerging field of collaborative combat aircraft and autonomy.

The United States welcomes Japan’s revision of the Three Principles on the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and its Implementation Guidelines, which bolsters cooperation through joint development and production to enhance our deterrence capabilities in the region. To leverage our respective industrial bases to meet the demand for critical capabilities and maintain readiness over the long term, we will convene a Forum on Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition and Sustainment (DICAS) co-led by the U.S. Department of Defense and Japan’s Ministry of Defense to identify priority areas for partnering U.S. and Japanese industry, including co-development and co-production of missiles and co-sustainment of forward-deployed U.S. Navy ships and U.S. Air Force aircraft, including fourth generation fighters, at Japanese commercial facilities, in coordination with relevant ministries. This forum, in conjunction with our existing Defense Science and Technology Cooperation Group, will better integrate and align our defense industrial policy, acquisition, and science and technology ecosystems. The DICAS will provide updates on progress to the foreign and defense ministers in the security “2+2.” We also commit to establishing a working group to explore opportunities for future fighter pilot training and readiness, including AI and advanced simulators, and co-development and co-production of cutting-edge technologies such as common jet trainers to maintain combat-ready next-generation fighter airpower.

We reaffirm the critical importance of continuing to enhance U.S. extended deterrence, bolstered by Japan’s defense capabilities, and will further strengthen bilateral cooperation. In this regard, we call on our respective foreign and defense ministers to hold in-depth discussions on extended deterrence on the occasion of the next security “2+2” meeting.

We continue to deepen our cooperation on information and cyber security to ensure that our Alliance stays ahead of growing cyber threats and builds resilience in the information and communication technology domain. We also plan on enhancing our cooperation on the protection of critical infrastructure.

Recognizing the importance of rapidly responding to frequent and severe climate change-related and other natural disasters, we plan to explore cooperation on the establishment of a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief hub in Japan.

In order to maintain deterrence and mitigate impact on local communities, we are firmly committed to the steady implementation of the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan in accordance with Okinawa Consolidation Plan, including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko as the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.

Reaching New Frontiers in Space

Our global partnership extends to space, where the United States and Japan are leading the way to explore our solar system and return to the Moon. Today, we welcome the signing of a Lunar Surface Exploration Implementing Arrangement, in which Japan plans to provide and sustain operation of a pressurized lunar rover while the United States plans to allocate two astronaut flight opportunities to the lunar surface for Japan on future Artemis missions. The leaders announced a shared goal for a Japanese national to be the first non-American astronaut to land on the Moon on a future Artemis mission, assuming important benchmarks are achieved. The United States and Japan plan to deepen cooperation on astronaut training to facilitate this goal while managing the risks of these challenging and inspiring lunar surface missions. We also announce bilateral collaboration on a Low Earth Orbit detection and tracking constellation for missiles such as hypersonic glide vehicles, including potential collaboration with U.S. industry.

Leading on Innovation, Economic Security, and Climate Action

The United States and Japan aim to maximally align our economic, technology, and related strategies to advance innovation, strengthen our industrial bases, promote resilient and reliable supply chains, and build the strategic emerging industries of the future while pursuing deep emissions reductions this decade. Building on our efforts in the U.S.-Japan Competitiveness and Resilience (CoRe) Partnership, including through the U.S.-Japan Economic Policy Consultative Committee (our economic “2+2”), we intend to sharpen our innovative edge and strengthen our economic security, including by promoting and protecting critical and emerging technologies.

The United States and Japan welcome our robust economic and commercial ties through mutual investment, including Microsoft’s $2.9 billion investment in Japan on AI and cloud infrastructure, workforce training, and a research lab; and Toyota’s recent additional $8 billion battery production investment for a cumulative $13.9 billion investment in North Carolina. Japan is the top foreign investor in the United States with nearly $800 billion in foreign direct investment, and Japanese companies employ nearly 1 million Americans across all 50 states. Similarly, as a top foreign investor in Japan for many years, the United States is supporting Japan’s economic growth, and as two of the world’s largest financial sectors, we commit to strengthening our partnership to bolster cross-border investment and support financial stability. As robust and creative economies, we also plan to accelerate investment in our respective start-up environments to foster innovation through the “Japan Innovation Campus” in Silicon Valley and the “Global Startup Campus” to be established in Tokyo, and in companies that take actions toward sustainable value creation (SX). We welcome our new Japan-U.S. personnel exchange programs on startups and venture capital firms under the Global Innovation through Science and Technology (GIST) initiative.

We are committed to strengthening our shared role as global leaders in the development and protection of next-generation critical and emerging technologies such as AI, quantum technology, semiconductors, and biotechnology through research exchange and private investment and capital finance, including with other like-minded partners. We welcome our collaboration on AI for Science between Riken and Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) founded on the revised project arrangement.

We applaud the establishment of $110 million in new AI research partnerships – between the University of Washington and University of Tsukuba and between Carnegie Mellon University and Keio University – through funding from NVIDIA, Arm, Amazon, Microsoft, and a consortium of Japanese companies. We are committed to further advancing the Hiroshima AI Process and strengthening collaboration between the national AI Safety Institutes.

Building on our long history of semiconductor cooperation, we intend to establish a joint technology agenda for cooperation on issues such as research and development, design, and workforce development. We also welcome the robust cooperation between and with our private sectors, especially in next-generation semiconductors and advanced packaging. We also plan to work together along with like-minded countries to strengthen global semiconductor supply chains, particularly for mature node (“legacy”) semiconductors through information-sharing, coordination of policies, and addressing vulnerabilities stemming from non-market policies and practices. We also celebrate the signing of a Memorandum of Cooperation between Japan’s National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) and the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as a first step in bilateral cooperation on quantum computing.

Building on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) and our respective leadership of the G7 and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) last year, we continue to advance resilience, sustainability, inclusiveness, economic growth, fairness, and competitiveness for our economies We applaud the recent entry into force of the IPEF Supply Chain Agreement. We will continue to seek cooperation on critical minerals projects, including those along the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment Lobito Corridor, and through the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) as well as the Partnership for Resilient and Inclusive Supply-chain Enhancement (RISE). We are cooperating to deter and address economic coercion, through our bilateral cooperation as well as through our work with like-minded partners including the G7 Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion. We are working to uphold a free, fair and rules-based economic order; address non-market policies and practices; build trusted, resilient, and sustainable supply chains; and promote open markets and fair competition under the U.S.-Japan economic “2+2” and the U.S.-Japan Commercial and Industrial Partnership. We will advance our commitment to operationalize data free flow with trust, including with respect to data security. We will also discuss the promotion of resilient and responsible seafood supply chains.

The United States and Japan recognize that the climate crisis is the existential challenge of our time and intend to be leaders in the global response. Towards our shared goal of accelerating the clean energy transition, we are launching a new high-level dialogue on how we implement our respective domestic measures and maximize their synergies and impacts, including the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act and Japan’s Green Transformation (GX) Promotion Strategy aimed at accelerating energy transition progress this decade, promoting complementary and innovative clean energy supply chains and improving industrial competitiveness. Today we announce Japan joins as the first international collaborator of the U.S. Floating Offshore Wind Shot. We intend to work together towards global ambition in line with the Wind Shot, taking into consideration national circumstances, through the Clean Energy and Energy Security Initiative (CEESI) to pursue innovative breakthroughs that drive down technology costs, accelerate decarbonization, and deliver benefits for coastal communities. The United States welcomes Japan’s newly-launched industry platform, the Floating Offshore Wind Technology Research Association (FLOWRA), aiming to reduce costs and achieve mass production of floating offshore wind through collaboration with academia.

We are further leading the way in developing and deploying next generation clean energy technology, including fusion energy development through the announcement of a U.S.-Japan Strategic Partnership to Accelerate Fusion Energy Demonstration and Commercialization.

The United States remains unwavering in its commitment to support the energy security of Japan and other allies, including its ability to predictably supply LNG while accelerating the global transition to zero-emissions energy and working with other fossil energy importers and producers to minimize methane emissions across the fossil energy value chain to the fullest extent practicable.

We intend to advance widespread adoption of innovative new clean energy technologies, and seek to increase the globally available supply of sustainable aviation fuel or feedstock, including those that are ethanol-based, that show promise in reducing emissions.

We are also working to align global health security and innovation, including in such areas as pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response and promoting more resilient, equitable, and sustainable health systems. Today, we announce that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and the Japan’s Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency (PMDA) intend to collaborate and exchange information on oncology drug products to help cancer patients receive earlier access to medications and to discuss future drug development and ways to prevent drug shortages. We welcome PMDA’s future representative office in Washington, D.C., to facilitate this cooperation.

Partnering on Global Diplomacy and Development

The challenges we face transcend geography. The United States and Japan are steadfast in our commitment to upholding international law, including the UN Charter, and call for all Member States to uphold the Charter’s purposes and principles, including refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. We remain committed to reforming the UN Security Council (UNSC), including through expansion in permanent and non-permanent categories of its membership. President Biden reiterated support for Japan’s permanent membership on a reformed UNSC.

We reaffirm our commitment made in Hiroshima last year and are determined to further promote our cooperation in the G7 and work together with partners beyond the G7.

We emphasize the importance of all parties promoting open channels of communication and practical measures to reduce the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation and to prevent conflict in the Indo-Pacific. In particular, we underscore the importance of candid communication with the PRC, including at the leader level, and express the intent to work with the PRC where possible on areas of common interest.

We emphasize the importance of all States being able to exercise rights and freedoms in a manner consistent with international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), including freedom of navigation and overflight. We strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion, including destabilizing actions in the South China Sea, such as unsafe encounters at sea and in the air as well as the militarization of disputed features and the dangerous use of coast guard vessels and maritime militia. The PRC’s recent dangerous and escalatory behavior supporting its unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea as well as efforts to disrupt other countries’ offshore resource exploitation are inconsistent with international law as reflected in UNCLOS. We also emphasize that the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award is final and legally binding on the parties to that proceeding. We resolve to work with partners, particularly in ASEAN, to support regional maritime security and uphold international law.

We emphasize that our basic positions on Taiwan remain unchanged and reiterate the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of global security and prosperity. We encourage the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.

We continue working together with partner countries to make concrete progress in strengthening the international financial architecture and fostering investment under the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment. We are committed to delivering better, bigger, more effective multilateral development banks including through our planned contributions that would enable more than $30 billion in new World Bank lending and securing ambitious International Development Association and Asian Development Fund replenishments. We also emphasize the importance of private sector investment in the Indo-Pacific. We welcome the announcement of Google’s $1 billion investment in digital connectivity for North Pacific Connect, which expands the Pacific Connect Initiative, with NEC, to improve digital communications infrastructure between the United States, Japan and Pacific Island Nations. Building on the U.S.-Australia joint funding commitment for subsea cables last October, the United States and Japan plan to collaborate with like-minded partners to build trusted and more resilient networks and intend to contribute funds to provide subsea cables in the Pacific region, including $16 million towards cable systems for the Federated States of Micronesia and Tuvalu.

We reaffirm our steadfast commitment to the Quad and its shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific that is stable, prosperous, and inclusive which continues to deliver results for the region. We reiterate the Quad’s unwavering support and respect for regional institutions, including ASEAN, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and the Indian Ocean Rim Association. We also reaffirm our support for ASEAN centrality and unity as well as the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Southeast Asian countries are critical partners in the Indo-Pacific and the U.S.-Japan-Philippines trilateral aims to enhance trilateral defense and security cooperation while promoting economic security and resilience. Japan and the United States reaffirmed our intention to work to support the region’s priorities as articulated through the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, including through the PIF as the Pacific’s preeminent institution as well as through the Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP).

As we pursue our shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, we continue to build strong ties between key, like-minded partners in the region. Building on the historic success of the Camp David Trilateral Summit, the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea continue to collaborate on promoting regional security, strengthening deterrence, coordinating development and humanitarian assistance, countering North Korea’s illicit cyber activities, and deepening our cooperation including on economic, clean energy, and technological issues. The United States and Japan also remain committed to advancing trilateral cooperation with Australia to ensure a peaceful and stable region.

We reaffirm our commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea in accordance with relevant UNSC resolutions. We strongly condemn North Korea’s continued development of its ballistic missile program—including through launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and space launch vehicles using ballistic missile technologies—which poses a grave threat to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and beyond. We call on North Korea to respond to continued, genuine offers to return to diplomacy without preconditions. We call on all UN Member States to fully implement all relevant UNSC resolutions, especially in light of Russia’s recent veto. We urge North Korea to cease illicit activities that generate revenue for its unlawful ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction programs, including malicious cyber activities. President Biden also reaffirms U.S. commitment to the immediate resolution of the abductions issue, and the two sides commit to continuing joint efforts to promote respect for human rights in North Korea.

We continue to stand together in firm opposition to Russia’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, its strikes against Ukraine’s infrastructure and the terror of Russian occupation. We are committed to continuing to impose severe sanctions on Russia and provide unwavering support for Ukraine. Together, we reiterate our call on Russia to immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw its forces from within the internationally recognized borders of Ukraine. Any threat or use of nuclear weapons in the context of its war of aggression against Ukraine by Russia is unacceptable. We also express serious concerns about growing North Korea-Russia military cooperation, which is supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and threatens to undermine peace and stability in Northeast Asia as well as the global non-proliferation regime.

As the linkages between the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific regions have become stronger than ever, our two countries look forward to continuing to work together to enhance Japan-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and NATO-Indo-Pacific Four partnerships.

We once again unequivocally condemn the terror attacks by Hamas and others on October 7 of last year, and reaffirm Israel’s right to defend itself and its people consistent with international law. At the same time, we express our deep concern over the critical humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip. We affirm the imperative of securing the release of all hostages held by Hamas, and emphasize that the deal to release hostages would bring an immediate and prolonged ceasefire in Gaza. We affirm the imperative of realizing an immediate and sustained ceasefire in Gaza over a period of at least six weeks as part of a deal that would release hostages held by Hamas and allow for delivery of essential additional humanitarian assistance to Palestinians in need. We underscore the urgent need to significantly increase deliveries of life-saving humanitarian assistance throughout Gaza and the crucial need to prevent regional escalation. We reiterate the importance of complying with international law, including international humanitarian law, as applicable, including with regard to the protection of civilians. We remain committed to an independent Palestinian state with Israel’s security guaranteed as part of a two-state solution that enables both Israelis and Palestinians to live in a just, lasting, and secure peace.

We reaffirm the importance of supporting inclusive growth and sustainable development in Latin America and the Caribbean. We continue to enhance policy coordination in the region, in particular on Haiti and Venezuela. We also recognize that promoting the stability and security for Haiti is one of the most pressing challenges in the Western Hemisphere, and we continue to support Haiti in restoring democratic order.

We also support African aspirations for peace, stability, and prosperity based on the rule of law. We continue to work together to support the democratic process and economic growth through our respective efforts, including our cooperation with African countries, Regional Economic Communities, the African Union, and multilateral organizations.

The United States and Japan are resolved to achieve a world without nuclear weapons through realistic and pragmatic approaches. It is critical that the overall decline in global nuclear arsenals achieved since the end of the Cold War continues and not be reversed, and the PRC’s accelerating build-up of its nuclear arsenal without transparency nor meaningful dialogue poses a concern to global and regional stability. We reaffirm the importance of upholding the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and for the pursuit of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In promoting this universal goal of achieving a world without nuclear weapons, Japan’s “Hiroshima Action Plan” and the “G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament” are welcome contributions. The two leaders also welcomed the U.S. announcement to join the Japan-led “Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Friends” initiative. We reaffirm the indispensable role of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, committing to fostering innovation and supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency’s efforts in upholding the highest standards of safety, security, and safeguards. President Biden commended Japan’s safe, responsible, and science-based discharge of Advanced Liquid Processing System treated water at Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station into the sea. Our two countries plan to launch the Fukushima Daiichi Decommissioning Partnership focusing on research cooperation for fuel debris retrieval.

To effectively address the myriad challenges outlined above, our global partnership is launching a Deputy Secretary of State/Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs-level dialogue involving our respective aid agencies to align our diplomatic and development efforts globally.

Fortifying People-to-People Ties

People-to-people exchanges are the most effective way to develop the future stewards of the U.S.-Japan relationship. In this regard, we recognize the achievements of exchange programs between our two countries, including the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Programme, KAKEHASHI Project, the Japan Foundation’s programs, and the U.S.-Japan Council’s TOMODACHI Initiative, and commit ourselves to providing more opportunities to meet today’s needs, including through enhanced subnational exchanges on critical issues such as climate and energy. We also recognize the important role civil society has played in strengthening the U.S.-Japan relationship over the past 170 years, including the 38 Japan-America Societies across the United States, the Asia Society, and the 29 America-Japan Societies across Japan.

Building on the Memorandum of Cooperation in Education signed between us on the sidelines of the G7 Leaders’ Summit in Hiroshima, today we announce our commitment to increase student mobility through the new $12 million “Mineta Ambassadors Program (MAP)” education exchange endowment administered by the U.S.-Japan Council for U.S. and Japanese high school and university students who will “map” the future of the relationship with support from Apple, the BlackRock Foundation, Toshizo Watanabe Foundation, and other founding donors. In this regard, we also welcome Japan’s new initiative to expand scholarship for Japanese students through the Japan Student Servicers Organization.

We recognize the significant contributions made by the binational Japan-U.S. Educational Commission (Fulbright Japan) over the past 72 years. We welcome recent changes to upgrade the program by reopening scholarships to Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM) fields for the first time in 50 years, with the first STEM students on track to participate in academic year 2025-26, as well as removing the tuition cap for Japanese Fulbright participants to attract the highest quality students and researchers.

Celebrating the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the Mansfield Fellowship Program, we honor the legacy of Ambassador Mansfield’s contributions through the University of Montana Mansfield Center and Mansfield Foundation. The two leaders also welcome the creation of the Government of Japan endowed Mansfield Professor of Japanese and Indo-Pacific Affairs at the University of Montana.

Upon the 100th anniversary of the birth of the late Senator Daniel K. Inouye, who made incredible contributions to our bilateral relationship, we praise the efforts of Japanese American leaders to build a bridge between the two countries and to address common community issues, including through support to the U.S.-Japan Council’s newly launched TOMODACHI Kibou for Maui project. We also share the recognition on the importance of exchanges between our legislatures. We acknowledge the importance of language study, particularly in person, to develop long-term ties and announce a new Memorandum of Cooperation to increase opportunities for the number of exchange visitors from Japan to share their specialized knowledge of Japanese language and culture in the United States, as well as welcome efforts to expand the Japanese Language Education Assistant Program (J-LEAP).

The two leaders also affirm that women in leadership remain their focus and reaffirm our pledge to achieving gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls in all their diversity. We welcome close cooperation on Women, Peace, and Security and Women’s Economic Empowerment initiatives and efforts to promote women and girls’ full, equal, and meaningful participation and leadership in public life.

Finally, we emphasize the need to build a diverse pipeline of future U.S.-Japan experts who understand and support the Alliance. Our peoples form the core of our Alliance, and we reaffirm our commitment to forge ever-closer bonds for generations to come.

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Through our shared and steadfast commitment, we have taken bold and courageous steps to bring the U.S.-Japan Alliance to unprecedented heights. In so doing, we have equipped our partnership to protect and advance peace, security, prosperity, and the rule of law across the Indo-Pacific and the globe so that everyone benefits. Today, we celebrate the enduring friendship among our peoples—and among ourselves—and pledge to continue our relentless efforts to ensure that our global partnership drives future peace and prosperity for generations to come.

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whitehouse.gov · by The White House · April 10, 2024

14. FACT SHEET: Japan Official Visit with State Dinner to the United States | The White House

Again a lot of details here. Our key question is not answered: What will be the new Japan--US military common relationships? What does upgrading mean? There is no mention of a US four star commander in Japan (unless I missed it).

Excerpts:

Upgrading Alliance Command and Control: The United States and Japan intend to bilaterally upgrade our respective command and control frameworks to enable seamless integration of operations and capabilities and allow for greater interoperability and planning between U.S. and Japanese forces in peacetime and during contingencies. More effective U.S.-Japan Alliance command and control provides strengthened deterrence and promotes a free and open Indo-Pacific in the face of pressing regional security challenges. In order to support this initiative, they reaffirm to deepen Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) cooperation and Alliance information sharing capabilities, including through the Bilateral Information Analysis Cell.

FACT SHEET: Japan Official Visit with State Dinner to the United States | The White House

whitehouse.gov · by The White House · April 10, 2024

Today, President Biden welcomed Prime Minister Kishida of Japan for an Official Visit with State Dinner to celebrate the deep and historic ties between our two countries. This visit also reflects the upward trajectory of the U.S.-Japan Alliance as it evolves into a global partnership that promotes a shared vision of progress and prosperity for the future. The two leaders’ ambitious efforts span the depth and breadth of the Alliance to include cooperation on defense and security; space; advanced technology and economic cooperation; diplomacy and development; and people-to-people ties.

This bilaterally coordinated fact sheet provides an overview of political understandings that were affirmed or reaffirmed during the Official Visit with State Dinner, as well as plans for further cooperative activities between the United States and Japan.

DEFENSE AND SECURITY COOPERATION

Our defense and security ties form the core of our Alliance and are the cornerstone of regional peace and security. Recognizing that the Alliance has reached new heights, we plan to further bolster our defense and security cooperation to allow for greater coordination and integration.

Upgrading Alliance Command and Control: The United States and Japan intend to bilaterally upgrade our respective command and control frameworks to enable seamless integration of operations and capabilities and allow for greater interoperability and planning between U.S. and Japanese forces in peacetime and during contingencies. More effective U.S.-Japan Alliance command and control provides strengthened deterrence and promotes a free and open Indo-Pacific in the face of pressing regional security challenges. In order to support this initiative, they reaffirm to deepen Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) cooperation and Alliance information sharing capabilities, including through the Bilateral Information Analysis Cell.

Exploring Advanced Capabilities Cooperation under AUKUS Pillar II: Recognizing Japan’s strengths and the close bilateral defense partnerships with the AUKUS countries, AUKUS partners – Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – are considering cooperation with Japan on AUKUS Pillar II advanced capability projects.

Bolstering Regional Networked Security: As our two countries deepen cooperation and coordination within the Alliance, we also look to expand our efforts to enhance regional security. The United States and Japan intend to work together toward our vision to cooperate on a networked air defense architecture, incorporating future capabilities with Australia. We will explore enhanced cooperation, including missile defense information sharing to counter growing air and missile threats. As our two countries look to ensure a secure and peaceful region, the United States and Japan plan to conduct deterrence operations to address escalatory or provocative activities around Japan.

Deepening U.S.-Japan Defense Industry Cooperation: The United States and Japan plan to leverage our respective industrial bases to establish an Alliance defense production capacity to meet the demand for critical capabilities over the long term. We will convene a Forum on Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition and Sustainment (DICAS) co-led by the U.S. Department of Defense and Japan Ministry of Defense to identify priority areas for partnering U.S. and Japanese industry, including on co-development, co-production and co-sustainment. As a part of this mutually beneficial effort, we announce our intention to explore co-production of advanced and interoperable missiles for air defense and other purposes to further bolster the Alliance deterrence posture. Our two countries also commit to establishing a working group to explore opportunities for future fighter pilot training and readiness, including AI and advanced simulators, and co-development and co-production of cutting-edge technologies such as common jet trainers to maintain combat-ready next-generation fighter airpower.

Leveraging Regional Maintenance and Repair Capabilities: The U.S. Department of Defense plans to work with U.S. Congress to authorize the U.S. Navy to use private shipyards to conduct maintenance and repairs of 90 days or less on U.S. Navy ships deployed to the Indo-Pacific from homeports in the United States, including Guam. Additionally, the U.S. Navy continues to review opportunities to conduct maintenance and repair of forward-deployed U.S. Navy ships at Japanese commercial shipyards. The United States and Japan plan to explore the possibility of conducting maintenance and repair on engines of Japan-based U.S. Air Force aircrafts including fourth generation fighters. Supporting the new DICAS’s oversight of co-sustainment, the two countries will convene the first Working Group for Ship Repair in Japan by June 2024 to coordinate future maintenance and repair opportunities

Enabling Japan’s Stand-off Defense and Counter-hypersonic Capabilities: The United States continues to support Japan’s capability development, highlighting the signing of the Letter of Offer and Acceptance for Japan to acquire U.S. Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles and the start of a training pipeline and ship modifications for Japan to acquire operational capability. The United States and Japan plan to also continue to pursue cooperative development of a Glide Phase Interceptor program to counter hypersonic threats, which aims to strengthen regional deterrence and build on long-standing missile defense cooperation between the two countries.

Advancing Trilateral Cooperation: The United States and Japan with Australia intend to seek to advance trilateral intelligence reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) operational coordination, including by identifying key capabilities to integrate into exercises and training. Building on the announcement at the Australia Official Visit in October 2023 to pursue trilateral cooperation with Japan on unmanned aerial systems (UAS), our three countries are pursuing cooperative opportunities in the rapidly emerging field of collaborative combat aircraft and autonomy. Continuing the momentum from the Camp David trilateral summit, we welcome progress on establishing an annual multidomain exercise between the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Recognizing the commitments made in the Atlantic Declaration and the Hiroshima Accord, and as the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions become ever more interlinked, both countries welcome the announcement of regular U.S.-Japan-UK trilateral exercises, beginning in 2025, as they enhance their shared and enduring security.

Deepening Cooperation on Information and Cyber Security: The two countries pledge to continue to deepen their cooperation on information and cyber security to ensure the Alliance stays ahead of growing threats and builds resilience in the information and communication technology (ICT) domain. They plan to also enhance their cooperation on the protection of critical infrastructure. The United States and Japan plan to establish a working group of relevant experts to develop an action plan on achieving mutual recognition on cybersecurity labelling schemes for Internet of Things.

Boosting our Humanitarian Response Capacity: Recognizing the importance of rapidly responding to frequent and severe climate change-related and other natural disasters, we plan to explore cooperation on the establishment of a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief hub in Japan.

Deepening U.S.-Japan Defense Science and Technology Cooperation: The United States and Japan continue to evolve bilateral science and technology cooperation through the Defense Science and Technology (S&T) Cooperation Group (DSTCG). Co-chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)) and the Commissioner for the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA), the DSTCG aims to better integrate and align U.S. and Japan defense S&T ecosystems.

Mitigating Impacts on Local Communities: In order to maintain deterrence and mitigate impact on local communities, we are firmly committed to the steady implementation of the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan in accordance with Okinawa Consolidation Plan, including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko as the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.

Cooperation on Environmental Issues: The United States and Japan affirm the importance of continued bilateral coordination on stable stationing of USFJ, including on environmental cooperation.

SPACE COOPERATION

As we further strengthen the foundation of our alliance, we also are looking to the future. Our two countries will continue to pioneer and lead on space exploration to include on the Moon.

Signing of Historic Lunar Surface Exploration Implementing Arrangement: The United States and Japan signed a historic implementing arrangement for human spaceflight cooperation on the Moon. Japan will provide and maintain a pressurized rover to support astronauts living and working on the Moon, while the United States will allocate two astronaut flight opportunities to the lunar surface for Japan on future Artemis missions. The shared goal is fora Japanese national to be the first non-American astronaut to land on the Moon on a future Artemis mission. This pressurized rover is intended to enable astronauts to travel farther and work for longer periods on the lunar surface.

Negotiating a Space Technology Safeguards Agreement: The United States and Japan commenced negotiations on a space technology safeguards agreement which is designed to provide the legal and technical framework for U.S. commercial space launch from Japan. The space technology safeguards agreement has the potential to open new commercial opportunities in a range of advanced technologies related to space.

Expanding Space Science Cooperation: Building on the 2023 U.S.-Japan Framework Agreement, Japan will participate in NASA missions, including Dragonfly and the Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope. Dragonfly is NASA’s robotic mission to Saturn’s moon Titan to investigate its habitability and prebiotic chemistry wherein Japan will provide a seismometer to Dragonfly’s suite of scientific instruments. The Roman Space Telescope is NASA’s flagship next generation observatory; Japan will contribute hardware to support the Coronagraph instrument as well as ground station support. The United States and Japan plan to also collaborate on JAXA’s Next-generation Solar-observing Satellite, SOLAR-C, which is intended to investigate the mysteries of solar atmospheres by conducting spectroscopic observations of UV radiations from the Sun.

Deepening Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) Constellation Cooperation: The United States and Japan announced their intention to collaborate on a future Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) detection and tracking constellation. This includes cooperation on demonstration, bilateral analysis, information sharing, and potential collaboration with the U.S. industrial base. The integration between U.S. and Japanese constellations of LEO satellites provides an opportunity to improve communications and increase the resilience of both nations’ space capabilities.

Enhancing Satellite Cooperation: The United States and Japan announced the completion of three new operational ground stations for Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) in Alaska, California, and Guam. The new ground stations will enhance Japan’s ability to monitor and maintain the accuracy of QZSS. Furthermore, Japan will launch two QZSS satellites hosting payloads from the Department of Defense by March 2026.

ECONOMIC, TECHNOLOGY, AND CLIMATE COOPERATION

Technology innovation will drive the alliance in the 21st century. Our two countries pledge to continue to work closely together on critical and emerging technologies such as AI, quantum, semiconductors, and clean energy. Our enhanced collaboration and investment in these technologies provide opportunities for greater ties and prosperity for both of our countries as we seek to secure our economic and technological futures.

Economic Cooperation

Major Commercial Deals: The private sector in both of our countries recognize the incredible opportunities and promise of growing our commercial ties, especially in areas such as critical and emerging technologies. We welcome the establishment of a Japan Innovation Campus supporting Japanese startups in Silicon Valley and the “Global Startup Campus” in Tokyo, and support accelerating investment in our two countries to foster innovation. We also welcome the following major new and recent commercial deals, among the many, that demonstrate our strong and vibrant economic ties:

Private Sector Investment

Microsoft has announced it will invest $2.9 billion over the next two years in Japan in artificial intelligence (AI) and cloud computing and data centers, an expanded digital skilling program to train more than three million people, the founding of a Microsoft Research lab in Japan, and cybersecurity cooperation with the Government of Japan to enhance Japan’s cybersecurity resilience.
Google plans to invest $1 billion in digital connectivity for North Pacific Connect, which expands the Pacific Connect Initiative, with NEC, to improve digital communications infrastructure between the United States, Japan, and Pacific Island Nations.
Daiichi Sankyo intends to invest $350 million in constructing a new manufacturing building, laboratory and warehouse at its facility in New Albany, Ohio. Daiichi Sankyo estimates the creation of 900 jobs across the United States over three years.
Amazon Web Services (AWS) has announced it will invest approximately $15 billion in Japan by 2027 to expand existing cloud infrastructure to serve as the backbone for AI and other digital services in the country. AWS estimates this planned investment could contribute up to $37 billion to Japan’s GDP and support an estimated average of more than 30,500 full-time equivalent jobs in local Japanese businesses each year.
Toyota has announced an additional investment of nearly $8 billion that it expects will add an estimated 3,000 more jobs to increase capacity to support battery electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid vehicles battery production in Greensboro, North Carolina. This is Toyota’s first automotive battery plant in North America, and the plant’s total investment is now nearly $13.9 billion; Toyota expects it will create an estimated 5,100 jobs.
Honda Aircraft Company has announced an additional investment of $55.7 million for production of its new HondaJet 2600 model in North Carolina. It brings the total investment in the HondaJet business in North Carolina to $573.4 million. UBE Corporation has invested $500 million in its Waggaman, Louisiana, a Justice40 community, electrolyte solvent facility project for batteries which it expects to create 60 new jobs.
Yaskawa Electric Corporation is investing approximately $200 million in new manufacturing facilities for robotics and semiconductor motion solutions in the states of Wisconsin and Ohio which is expected to employ about 1,750 workers and increase the Yaskawa footprint in the United States by about 25 percent.
MITSUI E&S, its U.S.-based subsidiary PACECO, and Brookfield are working together to reestablish final assembly of port cranes in California. This is the first time since 1989 that the United States has had this capacity, and it is expected to contribute to securing the safety of U.S. port infrastructure.
FUJIFILM Corporation announced an investment of $200 million in two U.S. subsidiaries to expand its global cell therapy contract development and manufacturing (CDMO) capabilities. The investments are earmarked for Madison, Wisconsin and Thousand Oaks, California, and FUJIFILM estimates the investment could create up to 160 new jobs.

Collaborative Government-Private Sector Engagement:

General Atomics Aeronautical Systems plans to provide two MQ-9B SeaGuardian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) which will add high performance and surveillance ability to the Japan Coast Guard (JCG). This project will provide $152 million in U.S. exports and is expected to support 700 U.S. jobs.
As the first foreign company named as a trusted partner in Japan’s Moonshot program of Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST) on quantum computers, Infleqtion will collaborate with the Japanese Institute of Molecular Science (IMS) on developing a powerful quantum computer using Infleqtion’s quantum technology.
Quantinuum, a U.S. quantum computer manufacturer, plans to provide RIKEN, a Government of Japan National Research and Development Agency, exclusive access to and use of a quantum computer for a period of five years – representing $50 million in quantum service exports.

Enhancing Financial Sector Cooperation: The United States and Japan are committed to strengthening our partnership to bolster cross-border investment and support financial stability. To this end, we intend to organize a roundtable this year, convening public and private sector stakeholders to discuss capital markets integration, identify potential key reforms, and bring to bear expertise from our respective financial sectors and regulatory authorities.

Engaging on Sustainable Investment: The United States and Japan pledge to continue to collaborate and build upon their foundation of successful public-private sector engagement. This initiative enables dialogues and forums through which to share best practices and promote mutually beneficial opportunities for U.S. and Japanese businesses in the areas of sustainable investment, risk management, and corporate value creation. By the end of next year, we intend to jointly host one or more roundtables to connect U.S. and Japanese private sector companies with investment opportunities while promoting sustainable value creation (SX).

Building Transparent, Resilient, and Sustainable Supply Chains: The United States and Japan welcome the initiation of discussions between the U.S. Department of Commerce and Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) under the framework of the U.S.-Japan Economic Policy Consultative Committee (our economic “2+2”) to accelerate joint efforts to address supply chain challenges and opportunities in mutually determined strategic sectors, such as current-generation and mature-node (“legacy”) semiconductors, along with like-minded countries, as appropriate. Both sides seek to cooperate to address supply chain vulnerabilities, such as those posed by non-market policies and practices, including by gaining a better comprehension of such vulnerabilities in strategic sectors.

Critical and Emerging Technology and Innovation

Strengthening Artificial Intelligence Research Collaboration: Building on the landmark university-corporate strategic partnerships in quantum computing and semiconductor engineering launched on the sidelines of the G7 Leaders’ Summit in Hiroshima, the United States and Japan welcome a new $110 million joint Artificial Intelligence partnership with the University of Washington and University of Tsukuba as well as Carnegie Mellon University and Keio University through funding from NVIDIA, Arm, and Amazon, Microsoft, and a consortium of Japanese companies. This innovative partnership is expected to advance AI research and development and enhance U.S.-Japan global leadership in cutting-edge technology. We welcome the initiation of AI and quantum technology cooperation between Japan’s National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) and NVIDIA, exploring the potential cooperation in the field of computing and development. We welcome the new Project Arrangement on high-performance computing and AI between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Japan’s Ministry of Education Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) and the new Memorandum of Understanding on AI for Science between Argonne National Laboratory and RIKEN to foster collaboration. We welcome cooperation between U.S. and Japanese companies toward the development of foundation models for generative AI, including contribution of NVIDIA’s GPUs to Japanese computational resources companies such as Sakura Internet and Softbank and other computational resources from Google and Microsoft to Japanese AI foundation models development companies.

Launching Quantum Technology Partnerships: To promote our bilateral industrial cooperation on quantum computing, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) intends to partner with Japan’s National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) to build robust supply chains for quantum technology and related standardization. The University of Chicago, the University of Tokyo, and Seoul National University established a partnership to train a quantum workforce and strengthen their collective competitiveness in the global economy.

Enhancing Cooperation on Semiconductors: Building on our long history of cooperation on semiconductor technology, we welcome the initiation of discussions among Japan’s Leading-Edge Semiconductor Technology Center (LSTC) and U.S. research initiatives, such as the U.S. National Semiconductor Technology Center (NSTC) and the U.S. National Advanced Packaging Manufacturing Program (NAPMP), toward the creation of an agenda for U.S.- Japan cooperation, including an R&D roadmap and workforce development. We welcome robust U.S.-Japan private sector cooperation, especially in next-generation semiconductors and advanced packaging. U.S. and Japanese companies are exploring the wide range of possibilities available through optical semiconductors through partnerships like the Global Innovative Optical and Wireless Networks (IOWN) Forum.

The U.S. Department of Labor plans to invite Japanese counterparts in the semiconductor sector to participate in technical workshops with the U.S. private sector and educational institutions to discuss optimal ways to train the next generation of designers, builders, and professionals in advanced semiconductor research and manufacturing.

Strengthening Cooperation for Safe, Secure and Trustworthy AI: The United States and Japan are committed to further advancing the Hiroshima AI Process by expanding support from partner governments and AI actors. The United States and Japan acknowledged and plan to support each other in establishing national AI Safety Institutes and committed to future collaboration, including on interoperable standards, methods, and evaluations for AI safety. A crosswalk of Japan’s AI Guidelines for Business with the NIST AI Risk Management Framework is currently underway and is designed to promote interoperability in our policy frameworks for AI.

Reducing AI Risks and Harms from Synthetic Content: The United States and Japan pledge to cooperate on reducing risks and harms of AI-generated content. The countries commit to provide transparency to the public, to the extent possible and appropriate, by authenticating and labeling official government produced content as well as detecting and identifying AI-generated content and content altered or manipulated by AI. Both governments plan to take steps independently and cooperatively on technical research and standards development.

Establishing a New Science and Technology Partnership: The United States and Japan announce a partnership to catalyze innovation, facilitate knowledge exchange, and promote entrepreneurial endeavors that contribute to the advancement of science and technology, and through the State Department’s Global Innovation through Science and Technology (GIST) program. The United States and Japan also endorse joint efforts among their universities and companies to foster human capital for the purpose of increasing governability on digital and emerging technologies under the initiative of U.S.-Japan Digital Innovation Hub and Advanced Technology Workshop

Expanding National Science Foundation Collaboration: The United States and Japan welcome the signing of the Memorandum of Cooperation between the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST) to partner on NSF’s Innovation Corps (I-Corps) program. This entrepreneurship training program aims to strengthen lab to market transition by helping researchers more effectively target their discoveries to customer needs. Through the Global Centers program, NSF has committed $25 million in awards for bioeconomy research and JST will support at least three awards. The two agencies also plan to collaborate on research on the designing materials which will revolutionize our engineering future.

Strengthening International Joint Research in Scientific and Technological Fields: The United States and Japan welcomed strengthening collaboration between the national research institutes and universities in science, technology, and innovation as well as the exchange of researchers through joint research to promote U.S.-Japan talent mobility and circulation, such as the Adopting Sustainable Partnerships for Innovative Research Ecosystem (ASPIRE) in eight areas: AI and information, biotechnology, energy, materials, quantum, semiconductors, telecommunications, and healthcare. We welcome further bilateral collaboration on global ocean observation and Arctic research. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and Fukushima Institute for Research, Education and Innovation (F-REI) are pursuing a Memorandum of Cooperation to establish a collaborative relationship to increase opportunities for joint research in select topics including energy, robotics, radiation science, nuclear disaster response, and agriculture.

Promoting Open and Interoperable Approaches to Telecommunications Networks: As the world becomes more interconnected, the United States and Japan pledge to continue to promote open, standards-based approaches to telecommunications networks that are interoperable, secure, and multi-vendor in nature. The United States and Japan intend to explore opportunities to promote Open RAN commercialization in third countries, including Indo-Pacific countries. The United States and Japan commit to continuing to engage both bilaterally and with like-minded partner countries through fora such as the Quad.

Climate and Clean Energy

Expanding U.S.-Japan Clean Energy and Climate Cooperation: The United States and Japan are launching a new high-level dialogue on our two countries’ implementation of respective domestic measures and maximize respective synergies and impacts, including the Inflation Reduction Act and Green Transformation (GX) Promotion Strategy, aimed at accelerating energy transition progress this decade, promoting complementary and innovative clean energy supply chains, and improving industrial competitiveness. For the advancement of the U.S.-Japan Climate Partnership, recalling relevant CMA decisions, we further plan to aggressively implement our 2030 nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and develop ambitious 2035 NDCs in line with a 1.5C warming limit. We encourage all major economies to submit bold, 1.5C-aligned 2035 NDCs that reflect economy-wide absolute reduction targets including all greenhouse gases, sectors, and categories, and commit to prioritizing concrete and timely steps towards the goal of accelerating the phase-out of domestic unabated coal power. The United States and Japan intend to also work together to secure a successful outcome at the 29th UN Climate Change Conference on a new collective quantified goal that reflects a realistic increment and broadened contributor base.

Expanding Quality Infrastructure Investment: The United States and Japan plan to work together and with partner countries in strategic economic corridors on fostering investment under the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI), including cooperation in the Indo-Pacific through the PGI-IPEF InvestmentAccelerator. Our two countrieswill continue to seek cooperation on critical minerals and other projects, including those along the PGI Lobito Corridor. The United States and Japan have worked to establish a Blue Dot Network Secretariat at the OECD to certify quality infrastructure projects.

Building Resilient Critical Mineral Supply Chains: The United States and Japan resolve to explore joint projects, including through the Minerals Security Partnership and the Partnership for Resilient and Inclusive Supply-chain Enhancement (RISE), including ones that diversify key supply chains of critical minerals, and support recycling efforts for electrical and electronic scrap in the United States, Japan, and other Indo-Pacific likeminded partners. To that end, the United States welcomes the MOU between the Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOGMEC) and La Générale des Carrières et des Mines (GECAMINES) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in alignment with our shared commitment with PGI’s development of the Lobito Corridor.

The United States and Japan intend to continue facilitating $170 million in annual U.S. e-scrap exports to Japan for environmentally sound recycling under the OECD Council Decision on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Wastes Destined for Recovery Operations and strengthen cooperation through facilitating a policy dialogue on increasing circularity of critical minerals and raw materials, which are indispensable for decarbonization and reducing negative environmental impacts.

Deepening Energy Cooperation: Both of our countries recognize the importance of clean energy as we look to combat the effects of climate change and lay the groundwork for clean and resilient economic growth this century. The United States and Japan announced the U.S.-Japan Strategic Partnership to Accelerate Fusion Energy Demonstration and Commercialization. The United States and Japan reaffirmed their commitment to accelerating the global transition to zero-emissions energy and working with other fossil energy importers and producers to minimize methane emissions across the fossil energy value chain to the fullest extent practicable. Both countries also intend to support the establishment of green shipping corridors including a new grain corridor to support global efforts to decarbonize the international shipping sector.

Today we announce Japan joins as the first international collaborator of the U.S. Floating Offshore Wind Shot. Japan recognizes the ambition of the U.S. Floating Offshore Wind Shot, which aims to reduce the cost of floating offshore wind in deep waters by more than 70 percent and reach 15GW of U.S. domestic deployment by 2035. Through the partnership, the United States and Japan will collaborate to make progress towards global ambition in line with the U.S. Floating Offshore Wind Shot, taking into consideration national circumstances, to accelerate breakthroughs across engineering, manufacturing, and other innovation areas that dramatically reduce the cost of floating offshore wind in deep waters by 2035. The United States and Japan announced they would report publicly on progress each year through CEESI. To work towards global ambition, Japan will contribute with its efforts of “the Vision for Offshore Wind Industry” and approximately 120 billion yen through the Green Innovation Fund. The United States also welcomes Japan’s newly-launched industry platform, the Floating Offshore Wind Technology Research Association (FLOWRA), aiming to reduce costs and achieve mass production of floating offshore wind through collaboration with academia. The United States will continue its efforts under the Department of Energy’s Strategy to Advance Offshore Wind Energy to leverage more than $5.8 billion in cumulative public and private sector supply chain investments under the Biden-Harris Administration. We also intend to advance research and development for perovskite solar cell technology through the Green Innovation Fund and the Perovskite PV Accelerator for Commercializing Technologies (PACT) Center, led by Sandia National Laboratory.

Expanding Infrastructure to Support Clean Energy: Our two nations acknowledge the need to expand and modernize power grids and energy infrastructure to keep pace with our ambitious goals for renewable energy deployment. We plan to explore means to boost investment in our power grids and share best practices for grid modernization. We also look to expand the use of market-based power purchase agreements by companies and industries to assist access to clean energy, including from both large nuclear reactors and advanced and small modular reactors (A/SMRs), as they attempt to meet their own decarbonization goals and drive innovation in power intensive industries such as Artificial Intelligence, quantum computing, and data centers.

Partnering to Deploy Safe and Secure Nuclear Energy: The United States and Japan recognize the crucial role of civil nuclear power to meet our overarching climate goals, as affirmed in our participation in the COP28 pledge to triple globally installed nuclear energy by 2050. In pursuit of this vision, the United States applauds the Prime Minister’s plan to restart nuclear reactors to meet its 2030 decarbonization goals. Our two countries acknowledge the transformational opportunities presented through our continued cooperation on A/SMRs, and affirm our continued partnership on joint efforts both bilaterally and multilaterally to deploy A/SMRs this decade.

Our two countries plan to launch the Fukushima Daiichi Decommissioning partnership with Tokyo Electric Power Company and U.S. national laboratories to deepen research cooperation for the steady implementation of decommissioning the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, especially for fuel debris retrieval. Recognizing the important role of nuclear energy to both accelerate the energy transition and enhance energy security, the United States and Japan also resolve to promote public-private investment in enriched uranium production capacity free from Russian material.

Improving Methane Emissions Data: The United States and Japan are collaborating, including with other international partners, to share greenhouse gas emissions satellite observations data and make it freely available to the public, including providing greenhouse gas information to governments in low- and middle-income countries to support the development of climate mitigation policies. The United States and Japan intend to also leverage existing efforts, such as the International Methane Emissions Observatory, to develop and disseminate accurate, transparent methane emissions data to support methane reduction interventions globally.

Carbon Management: The United States and Japan reaffirm our commitment to the Carbon Management Challenge, Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM) Carbon Capture Utilization and Storage (CCUS) Initiative, and to the Mission Innovation CDR Launchpad in the pursuit of developing carbon management technologies to support achieving the Paris Agreement goals. Additionally, the United States commits to supporting collaboration with Japanese counterparts to evaluate the potential for cross-border carbon dioxide transport and storage hubs between Alaska and Japan. For example, the United States is pursuing carbon dioxide shipping feasibility studies and tools such as life cycle assessment and technoeconomic analysis that can aid in this goal. We welcome the progress of ongoing projects in carbon capture, utilization, and storage, as well as carbon recycling, between U.S. and Japanese companies. On e-methane, Japanese companies have signed Letters of Intent (LOIs) with U.S. companies to avoid CO2 double counting.

Sustainable Aviation Fuel: The United States and Japan reaffirm our joint aim of decarbonizing the aviation industry, including the goal of net-zero emissions by 2050. We recognize the importance of realizing the U.S. Sustainable Aviation Fuels (SAF) Grand Challenge 2030 goal of three billion gallons of SAF that, compared to a petroleum-based jet fuel baseline, will provide a significant reduction in lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions, as well as Japan’s 2030 target of replacing 10% of the fuel consumed by Japanese airlines with SAF. To support achieving these goals, the United States pledges to seek to support the increase of globally available supplies of SAFs or feedstocks, including those that are ethanol-based, and commit to working in ICAO to identify solutions that accurately measure and actively reduce the carbon intensity of global SAF feedstocks and products. Simultaneously, Japan commits to advancing R&D efforts to develop and commercialize SAF technologies, including Alcohol-to-Jet (ATJ), through support measures by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.

Collaborating on Hydrogen and its Derivatives, and Geothermal: We welcome the progress of collaboration between U.S. and Japanese companies on building hydrogen hubs, and shared expectations for further cooperation to build a large-scale and resilient global supply chains based on carbon intensity and to expand utilization of hydrogen. A Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) on Geothermal Energy was signed between DOE-METI at the G7 Ministers’ Meeting on Climate, Energy and Environment in Sapporo in April 2023. Through this MOC, the United States and Japan have been exploring next steps for collaboration.

Investing in U.S. Infrastructure: The U.S. Department of Transportation and Japan’s Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism welcomed Amtrak’s leadership of the Texas Central High Speed Rail Project, utilizing Shinkansen technologies, which was recently selected for the Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) Corridor Identification and Development grant program. The successful completion of development efforts and other requirements would position the project for potential future funding and financing opportunities.

Biotechnology, Biopharmaceutical, and Health-Related Cooperation

Tackling Cancer Together: In alignment with the Biden Cancer Moonshot to end cancer as we know it, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and Japan’s Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency (PMDA) intend to collaborate and exchange information on oncology drug products. Specifically, under initiatives Project Nozomi and Project Orbis, FDA and PMDA intend to work to enable earlier access to cancer medication for patients and hold discussions on future drug development, including multiregional clinical trials and ways to prevent drug shortages.

Advancing Pharmaceutical Innovation: The United States and Japan welcome the Japan’s Pharmaceutical and Medical Devices Agency (PMDA)’s intent to establish an office in the Washington, D.C. metro area. This office provides opportunities to enhance PMDA’s cooperation with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and facilitate information sharing with private industry.

Opening of CDC Regional Office: The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) opened a Regional Office for East Asia and the Pacific in Tokyo in February. This new regional office provides support to 26 countries and territories in the region to strengthen core global health security capacities and collaboration to improve detection, rapid response to disease threats, and knowledge and information exchange.

Global Health Collaboration: The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs will continue to discuss ways to advance shared global health priorities.

Expanding Biotechnology and Healthcare Cooperation: The United States and Japan welcome the launch of a new U.S.-Japan biotechnology and healthcare discussion, focused on promoting responsible development, protecting key technologies, and establishing reliable and secure supply chains. The exchange prioritizes efforts to advance industrial competitiveness, including joint events in close partnership with relevant U.S. and Japanese ministries and agencies, as well as academic and private sector partners. It also bolsters work to prioritize the safe, secure, and responsible development and use of emerging biotechnology through close policy coordination.

DIPLOMACY, DEVELOPMENT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

As global leaders, the United States and Japan remain committed to ensuring a peaceful and stable Indo-Pacific region with a conviction that the security in Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions are interlinked. Beyond these regions, our two countries recognize the global challenges we jointly face and reaffirm commitments made at the G7 Hiroshima Summit in upholding the rule of law, which protects all nations, especially the vulnerable, and continued cooperation with partners beyond the G7. To that end, we intend to launch a new strategic dialogue to coordinate global diplomacy and development efforts and to be held at the Deputy Secretary of State/Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs level. Our two countries remain committed to supporting Ukraine’s right to self-defense and its long-term security and economic recovery. The United States has contributed $74.6 billion in humanitarian, development, military, and economic assistance to Ukraine, and Japan has been providing continuous support to Ukraine, a commitment of which adds up to $12.1 billion in total. We are also committed to addressing the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Japan has provided approximately $107 million in support of the Palestinian people and the United States has contributed $180 million in humanitarian assistance for civilians in Gaza since October 7, 2023. Moreover, the United States and Japan underscore the importance and urgency of the situation in Haiti and reiterate our support to the mandate of the UN-authorized Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission to Haiti.

Investing in the Indo-Pacific: The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) have renewed an MOU that enables greater collaboration in financing projects in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

The United States and Japan acknowledge the importance of improving the Amata Kabua International Airport in the Republic of Marshall Island (RMI) in support of sustaining RMI’s economy.

Building on the U.S.-Australia joint funding commitment for subsea cables last October, the United States and Japan will collaborate with like-minded partners to build trusted and more resilient networks and intend to contribute funds to provide subsea cables in the Pacific region, including $16 million towards subsea cable systems for Tuvalu, which will connect it for the first time in history, as well as the Federated States of Micronesia. In addition, Taiwan also plans to provide funding to deliver connectivity to Tuvalu.

In southeast Asia, the United States has announced $5 million in new funding to the Japan-U.S.-Mekong Power Partnership (JUMPP), which puts the U.S. commitment to $35 million since JUMPP’s launch in 2019. The $5 million helps fulfill Vice President Harris’ announcement that she plans to work with U.S. Congress to harness up to $20 million in new JUMPP funding. The U.S. and Japan’s work in the Mekong region has supported over 100 technical cooperation projects to expand cross-border power trade and clean energy integration in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Strengthening the International Financial Architecture: The United States and Japan intend to continue our collaboration to strengthen the international financial architecture and support developing countries to promote our shared values. This includes advancing the MDB Evolution agenda, planned contributions that would enable more than $30 billion in new lending headroom at the World Bank to support low- and middle-income countries in addressing global challenges, securing ambitious International Development Association and Asian Development Fund replenishments, addressing debt vulnerabilities that are holding back low- and middle-income countries’ growth potential and ability to invest in critical areas like climate and development including through advancing debt treatment through the G20 Common Framework and enhancing debt transparency, and solidifying the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a quota-based institution at the center of the global financial safety net.

Deepening our Commitment to Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy: President Biden commended Japan’s safe, responsible, and science-based discharge of Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) treated water into the sea. The two leaders welcomed that the U.S. Department of Energy and Japan’s MEXT have removed all excess highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the Kyoto University Critical Assembly and Japan Atomic Energy Agency’s Japan Materials Testing Reactor Critical Assembly to the United States and a new joint commitment to convert the Kindai University Teaching and Research Reactor from HEU to low-enriched uranium fuel and to return its HEU to the United States. The United States also joined the Japan-led “Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) Friends” effort to demonstrate our shared commitment toward disarmament.

Combatting Gender-Based Online Harassment and Abuse: Recognizing the importance of partnerships to combat technology-facilitated gender-based violence, including the Global Partnership for Action on Gender-Based Online Harassment and Abuse, the United States and Japan concur to strengthen our work at the nexus of gender equality and digital technology. These efforts underscore our commitments to advance our shared values, including human rights and gender equality, and further Women, Peace, and Security goals in an increasingly technology-dependent world.

Countering Foreign Information Manipulation: The United States and Japan are committed to working together and last year committed to the joint U.S.-Japan Memorandum of Cooperation on Countering Foreign Information Manipulation. The United States and Japan recognize that foreign information manipulation poses a challenge to the Indo-Pacific region and beyond and warrants enhanced bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

Partnership to Combat Commercial Spyware: Japan has joined the Joint Statement on Efforts to Counter the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware. The United States and Japan are committed to implementing domestic controls and building the international coalition to combat the misuse of such surveillance tools that pose a threat to our mutual national security interests and that enable human rights abuses.

Countering the Growing Threat of Transnational Repression: The United States and Japan are committed to reinforcing our partnership on countering transnational repression. To effectively address the rising concern of transnational repression globally it will take a coordinated multilateral response.

Bolstering Whole-of-Society Resilience: The United States and Japan welcome the National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Resilience, Japan’s MEXT, and NVIDIA’s efforts on joint research and development on nation-scale resilience.

Building Resilient and Responsible Seafood Supply Chains: Our two countries pledge to work together, as part of the efforts under the Task Force on the Promotion of Human Rights and International Labor Standards in Supply Chains, led by the U.S. Trade Representative and METI, to explore ways to combat forced labor and advance responsible labor practices in seafood supply chains. We also intend to build resilient seafood supply chains through strengthened trade channels and increased business opportunities.

Strengthening Food Security and Sustainable Agriculture: To enhance existing food security efforts, the United States and Japan recently launched the U.S.-Japan Dialogue on Sustainable Agriculture, and we plan to continue joint research on reducing greenhouse gas emissions from agricultural production. Together, we intend to promote new technologies and climate-smart production practices to build sustainable and resilient agriculture and food systems able to feed a growing global population while conserving natural resources and mitigating climate change. As an example, the United States and Japan intend to be founding contributors to the Vision for Adapted Crops and Soils seed and soil health research This research helps bolster diverse food production in developing partner countries.

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE TIES

Our people-to-people ties serve as the bedrock of our Alliance. Civil society has been one of the driving factors of our close relationship over the past 170 years. Our two countries recognize the legacy of Ambassador Mansfield, the longest-serving U.S. Ambassador to Japan and his incredible contributions to the relationship through the Mansfield Center and Mansfield Foundation.

The success of the Alliance is due to the bonds between our peoples, and our two governments recognize the achievements of organizations and programs, such as Fulbright Japan, the JET Programme, the Japan Foundation, the KAKEHASHI Project, and the U.S.-Japan Council’s TOMODACHI Initiative, Asia Kakehashi Project +(Plus), and their contributions to the alliance. Our two countries celebrate the unique and historic role of the 38 Japan-America Societies located throughout the United States and 29 America-Japan Societies across Japan.

This year is the U.S.-Japan Tourism Year 2024, ahead of Japan hosting the 2025 World Expo in Osaka. For the first time since 1988, the United States approved federal funding to support the design, build, and operation of the U.S. Pavilion at the World Expo.

Our two countries remain steadfast in our commitment to foster close connections, and to promote close ties between current changemakers and future generations of leaders.

Boosting Educational Exchanges: The United States and Japan announce a new $12 million “Mineta Ambassadors Program (MAP)” education exchange endowment administered by the U.S.-Japan Council for U.S. and Japanese high school and university students who will “map” the future of the relationship, with support from Apple, the BlackRock Foundation, Toshizo Watanabe Foundation, and other founding donors. As a long-term investment in U.S.-Japan relations, the endowment plans to increase exchange opportunities in both directions. In this regard, we also welcome Japan’s new initiative to expand scholarship for Japanese students through the Japan Student Servicers Organization. We also recognize the importance of educational cooperation among high schools and universities between the two countries and enhance mid-to-long term educational exchange, including those seeking degree certificates or professional training and internship opportunities. The two governments also announce the restart of STEM scholarships in Japan via the Fulbright Program for the first time in 50 years, ensuring our flagship education exchange program supports our most important economic security priorities, and removal of the tuition cap for Japanese Fulbright participants.

Engaging the Next Generation of Leaders: President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida applaud the Japanese American National Museum’s new Toshizo Watanabe Democracy Fellowship to promote global democracy and strengthen U.S.-Japan ties. Beginning with an eight-person pilot program this summer, this new Fellowship is designed to provide opportunities for Japan’s future leaders to experience the United States, network with Japanese leaders and others who seek to strengthen democracy and the bilateral relationship and develop a cohort of up-and-coming professionals who have to promise to become advocates for stable and secure democracies in the years ahead.

We applaud the efforts of the U.S.-Japan Council’s exchange program of local high school students and leadership/professionals for Maui reconstruction. We also welcome Japan’s intention to broaden the scope of the invitation program for Japanese American leaders to raise their next generation.

Promoting Exchanges among Professionals: We welcomed the initiative of the Japan Foundation that is promoting exchanges among professionals and practitioners addressing common issues facing the Indo-Pacific region, such as climate change and disaster management, and we look forward to further development in the future. The two leaders also welcomed the establishment of the Mansfield Professor of Japanese and Indo-Pacific affairs.

Women, Peace and Security (WPS): The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Parliamentarians’ Network Japan hosted U.S. WPS Caucus Member Rep. Sydney Kamlager-Dove and Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women’s Issues Geeta Rao Gupta on April 3-4 for a legislative exchange to reaffirm our shared commitment to promote WPS globally.

Increasing Exchange Opportunities for Japanese Language Specialists in the United States: The United States and Japan signed a memorandum of cooperation to expand exchange opportunities for Japanese language specialists to observe U.S. institutions and methods in the United States and share their specialized knowledge of Japanese language education with U.S. colleagues. We also emphasize the value of in-person learning for Japanese language in the U.S. and welcome efforts to expand the Japanese Language Education Assistant Program (J-LEAP).

Enhancing Cultural and Educational Interchange: The United States and Japan reaffirmed their confidence in the role of the U.S.-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange (CULCON) in further enhancing people-to-people ties. The United States and Japan also welcomed the inaugural U.S.-Japan High Level Policy Dialogue on Education and instruct the respective departments and ministries to accelerate the preparation of the second dialogue to examine and follow up on the issues raised above. We also acknowledge the importance of cultural exchanges including through promoting creative and cultural content industries such as in music, movies, animation and manga.

Strengthening Tourism Ties: To coincide with the U.S.-Japan Tourism Year, Airbnb has announced it will commit $1 million to an International Visitors Leadership Program to bring Japanese tourism professionals to the United States to study best practices on rural tourism and support local economies in each nation.

The United States also welcomes Japan’s intention to support the National Park Service as it begins a multi-year rehabilitation project around the Tidal Basin and West Potomac Park. Each year, millions of visitors from around the United States and indeed the world visit the National Mall for the Cherry Blossom Festival. These cherry trees, first gifted by the people of Japan to the United States in 1912, are an enduring reminder of the close bonds of friendship between Americans and Japanese.

Expanding Global Entry Program: The United States welcomes Japan’s expected full membership this year in Customs and Border Protection’s Global Entry program, a Trusted Traveler Program that allows expedited clearance for pre-approved, low-risk travelers upon arrival at U.S. airports. Japan’s full inclusion in Global Entry provides opportunity to bolster our countries’ security while facilitating travel and commerce between our nations.

Strengthening the Resilience of Democracy: President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida welcomed the launch of the U.S.-Japan Strategic Dialogue of Democratic Resilience and reaffirmed their commitment through the second round of the Strategic Dialogue on March 8, 2024.

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whitehouse.gov · by The White House · April 10, 2024

15. Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio of Japan in Joint Press Conference

And some Q&A.

The "2+2" will be the forum to work out the new command relationships.

Excerpt from the Prime Minister's remarks:

I explained that, based on our national security strategy, Japan is determined to strengthen our defense force through position of counterstrike capabilities, increase our defense budget and other initiatives, and was reassured by President Biden of his strong support for such efforts.

In such context, we confirmed again the urgency to further bolster the deterrence and response capabilities of our alliance and concurred on reinforcing our security and defense cooperation to increase interoperability between the U.S. forces and our self-defense forces, including the improvement of our respective command-and-control frameworks.

We will be discussing the specifics as we plan for the next Japan-U.S. two-plus-two.

Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio of Japan in Joint Press Conference | The White House

whitehouse.gov · by The White House · April 10, 2024

Rose Garden

1:23 P.M. EDT

PRESIDENT BIDEN: Please, have a seat.

It’s an honor to stand here today with the Prime Minister of Japan, President Kishi- — Prime Minister Kishida.

When I became president, I said that the United States would rebuild the muscle of our demo- — democratic alliances and we’d stand shoulder to shoulder with our allies again, because our alliances are America’s greatest asset. The relationship with Japan is powerful proof of that — that in investing in our alliance and raising our collective ambitions, we yield remarkable results.

Over the last three years, the partnership between Japan and the United States has been transformed into a truly global partnership. And that’s thanks in no small part to the courageous leadership of Prime Minister Kishida. And I mean that sincerely.

Together, our countries are taking significant steps to strengthen defense and security cooperation, we’re modernizing command and control structures, and we’re increasing the interoperability and planning of our militaries so they can work together in a seamless and effective way.

This is the most significant upgrade in our alliance since the end — since it was first established.

I’m also pleased to announce that for the first time, Japan and the United States and Australia will create a networked system of air, missile, and defense architecture. We’re also looking forward to standing up a trilateral military exercise with Japan and the United Kingdom.

And our AUKUS defense partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom is exploring how Japan can join our work in the second pillar, which focuses on advanced capabilities, including AI, autonomous systems. All told, that represents a new benchmark for our military cooperation across a range of capabilities.

On the economic front, our ties have never been more robust. Japan is the top foreign investor in the United States. Say that again: Japan is the top foreign investor in the United States. And we, the United States, are the top foreign investor in Japan. Nearly 1 million Americans work in Japanese companies here in the United States.

And to name just one example, a few months ago, Toyota announced an $8 billion investment in a massive battery production facility in North Carolina, which will inc- — employ thousands of people. The Prime Minister is going to travel to North Carolina tomorrow to visit that project.

Don’t stay. Don’t stay. We need you back in Japan. (Laughter.) They’ll probably try to keep you.

We also affirmed the science and education ties between Japan and the United States. Those tries — ties stretch up to the moon, where two Japanese astronauts will join future American missions, and one will become the first non-American ever to land on the moon.

And they reach into the high schools and universities, as well, where the Mineta Ambassadors — Minetas Program exists, named for our dear friend Norm Mineta. We’re going to invest in new student exchanges, help train the next generation of Japanese and American leaders.

We also discussed developments in the Middle East, including our shared support for a ceasefire and a hostage deal and urgent efforts to deal with the humanitarian crisis that exists in Gaza.

We also want to address the Iranian threat to launch a sign- — they — they’re threatening to launch a significant attack on Israel. As I told Prime Minister Netanyahu, our commitment to Israel’s security against these threats from Iran and its proxies is ironclad. Let me say it again: ironclad. We’re going to do all we can to protect Israel’s security.

And, finally, I want to commend the Prime Minister himself. He is a statesman. Command — you know, the fact is that you condemned Putin’s invasion of — brutal invasion of Ukraine when it happened. You pledged more than $12 billion in aid; prioritizing nuclear nonproliferation at the United Nations Security Council; standing strong with the United States as we stand up for freedom of navigation, including in the South China Sea and as we maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits; and taking the brave step of mending ties with the Republic of Korea so we can all stand shoulder to shoulder together.

Tomorrow, we will both be joined by another good friend, President Marcos of the Philippines, for a trilateral summit — the first of its kind.

And through it all, our commitment to the defense of Japan under Article 5, including the Sena- — excuse me — Senkaku Islands, is unwavering.

Mr. Prime Minister, through our partnership, we have strengthened this alliance. We have expanded our work together. We have raised our shared ambitions. And now, the U.S.-Japan alliance is a beacon to the entire world.

There’s no limit to what our countries can and our people can do together.

So, thank you for your partnership, your leadership, and your friendship.

And now, over to you, Mr. Prime Minister.

PRIME MINISTER KISHIDA: Thank you, Joe.

(As interpreted.) President Biden and I have met and talked countless times and confirmed our shared notion that we are at crucial crossroads and that Japan-U.S. partnership is immensely important.

The international community stands at a historical turning point. In order for Japan, the U.S., the Indo-Pacific region, and, for that matter, the whole world to enjoy peace, stability, and prosperity lasting into the future, we must resolutely defend and further solidify a free and open international order based on the rule of law.

And again, today, I told the President that now is the time to demonstrate the true values that Japan and the United States can offer as global partners, that we must together fulfill our responsibilities to create a world where human dignity is upheld and that Japan will always stand firm with the United States.

I explained that, based on our national security strategy, Japan is determined to strengthen our defense force through position of counterstrike capabilities, increase our defense budget and other initiatives, and was reassured by President Biden of his strong support for such efforts.

In such context, we confirmed again the urgency to further bolster the deterrence and response capabilities of our alliance and concurred on reinforcing our security and defense cooperation to increase interoperability between the U.S. forces and our self-defense forces, including the improvement of our respective command-and-control frameworks.

We will be discussing the specifics as we plan for the next Japan-U.S. two-plus-two.

The President and I went on to discuss various specific challenges faced by the international community.

First, we confirmed that unilateral attempts to change status quo by force or coercion is absolutely unacceptable, wherever it may be, and that we will continue to respond resolutely against such action through cooperation with allies and likeminded nations.

From such perspective, we agreed that our two countries will continue to respond to challenges concerning China through close coordination. At the same time, we confirmed the importance of continuing our dialogue with China and cooperating with China on common challenges.

We also underscored the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits and confirmed our position to encourage peaceful resolution of the Cross-Straits issue.

The situation in North Korea, including nuclear and missiles development, was brought up as well. We welcomed the progress seen in many areas of cooperation based on the outcome of the Japan-U.S.-ROK summit last August and concurred to coordinate even more closely as we face serious concerns under the current state of affairs.

President Biden once again demonstrated his strong support towards the immediate resolution of the abduction issue.

We reaffirmed the importance of realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific based on the rule of law and concurred to maintain close collaboration through various opportunities, including the Japan-U.S.-Philippines summit, which is planned for tomorrow.

Regarding Russia’s aggression of Ukraine, based on

a recognition that Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow — taking the issue as our own problem for Japan, I expressed our resolution to continue with stringent sanctions against Russia and strong support for Ukraine. And we concurred to maintain close partnership with likeminded countries.

On the situation in the Middle East, I expressed my respect for the efforts of President Biden towards the release of the hostages, improvement of the humanitarian situation, and for calming down the situation. I then explained how Japan is continuing diplomatic efforts to improve the humanitarian situation and to realize a sustainable ceasefire

and agreed to continue close cooperation towards the improvement of the situation, the realization of a two-state solution, and the stabilization of the region.

Regarding the economy, we firstly concurred that for both of us to lead the global economic growth together, the promotion of investment in both directions is important. I explained how Japanese businesses are making a significant contribution to the U.S. economy by the investment and the creation of jobs, to which President Biden agreed.

In order to maintain and strengthen the competitive edge in the area of advanced technologies and to respond appropriately to issues such as economic coercion, non-market policies and practices, and excess capacities and to overcome the vulnerability of the supply chains and to lead a sustainable and inclusive economic growth, we affirmed that the collaboration of Japan and the United States is indispensable.

In addition, we concurred to advance our cooperation in the areas such as decarbonization, AI, and start-ups.

There was a huge achievement also in the area of space. In the first half of the 1960s, when I was in the United States, it was the dawn of space development in the United States. I am one of all those who were so excited in the U.S. by the spectacular challenge in space.

The implementing arrangement has been signed on this occasion and the provision of the lunar rover by Japan and the allocation of two astronaut flight opportunities to the lunar surface to Japan were confirmed. Under the Artemis program, I welcome the lunar landing by a Japanese astronaut as the first non-U.S. astronaut.

We also discussed the efforts towards a world without nuclear weapons. We affirmed the realistic and practical endeavors of nuclear disarmament, including the issuance of the G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision last year. And I welcomed the participation of the United States in the FMCT Friends, which was launched by my initiative.

Lastly, in order to further strengthen the people-to-people bond, which is the cornerstone of our unwavering Japan-U.S. relationship, we affirmed to further promote people-to-people exchanges.

As the outcome of our meeting today, we will issue the joint statement titled “The Global Partners for the Future.” This is the expression of the determination of Japan and the United States to maintain and strengthen a free and open international order based on the rule of law that underpins the peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community and states the guiding principles.

With our partnership, we will defend the future of Japan and the United States, the Indo-Pacific, and the world and make that future all the more prosperous.

PRESIDENT BIDEN: Thank you. Now we’ll take a few questions.

Jordan Fabian of Bloomberg.

Q Thank you, Mr. President. Last month, you predicted the Federal Reserve would cut interest rates thanks to falling inflation. But today, data showed that inflation rose more than expected for the third straight month. So, how concerned are you about the fight against inflation stalling? And do you stand by your prediction for a rate cut?

PRESIDENT BIDEN: Well, I do stand by my prediction that before the year is out there will a rate cut. This may delay it a month or so. I’m not sure of that. I don’t — we don’t know what the Fed is going to do for certain.

But, look, we have dramatically reduced inflation from 9 percent down to close to 3 percent. We’re in a situation where we’re better situated than we were when we took office where we — inflation was skyrocketing. And we have a plan to deal with it, whereas the opposition — my opposition talks about two things. They just want to cut taxes for the wealthy and raise taxes on other people.

And so, I think they’re — they have no plan. Our plan is one I think is still sustainable.

Q Mr. Prime Minister, you said that the Nippon Steel acquisition of U.S. Steel is a private matter. But I’m wondering: Did you discuss the matter today with President Biden? And do you believe that politics are influencing President Biden’s decision to oppose the deal?

And I wouldn’t mind, Mr. President, if you answer that one too.

PRIME MINISTER KISHIDA: (As interpreted.) On the issue that you have raised, we understand that discussions are underway between the parties. We hope these discussions will unfold in directions that would be positive for both sides.

Japan believes that appropriate procedures based on law is being implemented by the U.S. government. Japan is the largest investor to the United States. Japanese businesses employ close to 1 million workers in the United States. And investment from Japan to the U.S. can only increase upwards in the months and years to come.

And we wish to cement this win-win relationship. Thank you.

PRESIDENT BIDEN: I stand by my commitment to American workers. I ca- — a man of my word, I’m going to keep it. And with regard to that, I stand by our commitment to our alliance. This is exactly what we’re doing — a strong alliance as well.

Q Nakakuki of Kyodo News. My question is to both Prime Minister Kishida and President Biden. At the summit, you confirmed your strong objections against unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion by China and agreed on reinforcing response capabilities.

Under current circumstances, should Japan and the United States bolster defense capabilities? China may become more preoccupied in military expansion and intensify its coercive behavior. That is the risk of (inaudible). In order to avoid divide and expa- — avoid the divide, how should Japan and U.S. respond?

PRIME MINISTER KISHIDA: (As interpreted.) Let me then take that question first. At this summit, we confirmed that the United States and Japan will resolutely defend and bolster a free and open international order based on the rule of law and that Japan and the United States, as global partners, shall work together for that purpose.

On challenges concerning China, including the point you raised on objecting to unilateral attempts to change status quo by force or coercion, we concurred that Japan and the United States as global partners shall work in close coordination.

And also, as I said previously, we will continue our dialogue with China and we will cooperate with China in tackling common challenges. And the President and I confirmed the importance of such dialogue as well.

Based on the solid trust with our ally, the United States, we will continue to call on China to fulfill its responsibilities as a major power.

Japan’s policy, which I have consistently embraced, is to comprehensively promote the mutual strategic relationship we have with China and establish a constructive and stable Japan-China relationship through efforts by both sides. That has been my consistent position that I have upheld. We will continue to seek close communication with China at all levels.

That’s it for me.

PRESIDENT BIDEN: You know, first of all, we keep improving our lines of communications with one another — and that’s the United States and China. We — I’ve met — I’ve recently spoken at length with President Xi. And we’ve agreed that we would, number one, have personal contact with one another whenever we want to discuss to anything so there’d be no — nothing lipped — nothing slips between, as they say — between the cup and the lip, so we know exactly what the other team is thinking. Number one.

And so, we had a long discussion last — now almost — I guess almost two weeks ago now. And — the best way to reduce the chances of miscalculation and misunderstanding. That’s number one.

Number two, in our alliance we have with Japan — is a purely defensive in nature. It’s a defensive alliance. And the things we discussed today improve our cooperation and are — and are purely about defense and readiness. It’s not aimed at any one nation or a threat to the region. And it — it doesn’t have anything to do with conflict. And so, this is about restoring stability in the region. And I think we have a chance of doing that.

Okay. Third que- — the next question. Who — who do I call on next? Hang on a second. I got my list here. Hang on. I apologize.

Aurelia of AFP.

Q Thank you. My first question would go to both of you, Mr. President and Mr. Prime Minister. Is there a path for Japan to become a full member of AUKUS?

And I would have a second question for you, Mr. President. You’re now saying that Benjamin Netanyahu is making a mistake in Gaza. What are you willing to do to make him change his strategy? And would you consider conditioning military aid to Israel? Thank you.

PRIME MINISTER KISHIDA: (As interpreted.) Thank you. Your question about AUKUS, I will respond. Our country — we want to contribute to the peace and stability of the region. And therefore, we have consistently supported AUKUS.

Having said that, the participants of AUKUS — U.S., UK, Australia — with such countries’ bi- — bilateral relationship or in multilateral occasions, we have established various relationships. But for Japan, to have a direct cooperation with AUKUS, nothing has been decided at this moment.

Going forward with U.S., UK, or with Australia — with such countries, in bilateral or multilateral frameworks, we will continue our cooperation so that they will continue to be considered.

At the moment, about the relationship between Japan and AUKUS, that’s it.

PRESIDENT BIDEN: With regard to my discussions with Bibi Netanyahu — Prime Minister Netanyahu, as well as our relationship with Israel, I have been very blunt and straightforward with the Prime Minister, as well as his War Cabinet, as well as the Cabinet.

And the fact of the matter is that Bibi and I had a long discussion. He agreed to do several things that related to, number one, getting more aid — both food and medicine — into Gaza and reducing significantly the attempts — the civilian casualties in any action taken in the region.

And thus far — and we — and it’s tied to the hostages. There are a number of hostages that are being held by a — by the — Hamas. And just yesterday, we were meeting with the Vice President and our National Security Advisor before that, and they — and there are American hostages as well. And they know how committed we are — the whole team — to getting their loved ones home, and we’re not going to stop until we do.

The new proposal on the table — Bill Burns led the effort to — for us, and we’re grateful for his work — there’s a now — up to Hamas. They need to move on the proposal that’s been made. And as I said, it would get these hostages home where they belong but also bring back a six-week cea- — ceasefire that we need now.

And the fact is that we’re — they’re getting in somewhere, in the last three days, over a hundred trucks. It’s not enough. But it needs to be — be more, and there’s one more opening that has to take place in the north.

So, we’ll see what he does in terms of meeting the commitments he made to me.

Okay —

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: This will be the last reporter.

PRIME MINISTER KISHIDA: (As interpreted.) Mr. Shimizu, please.

Q (As interpreted.) Thank you. Shimizu of NHK. I ask the question to both of you.

As Prime Minister Kishida mentioned, the abduction issue of North Korea, I believe, was discussed. Prime Minister, you have expressed your wish to have a direct engagement with Kim Jong Un. But they say that abduction is already result, which means that they are refusing. During the meeting, what did you tell President Biden about the outlook of a summit? And what engagement did you ask President Biden?

President Biden, my question: What did you hear from Prime Minister Kishida? And what is your observation and feeling, your President, with the nuclear missile issues? What is your position? Do you support the summit between Japan and North Korea? Thank you.

PRIME MINISTER KISHIDA: (As interpreted.) First of all, if I may start, regarding my summit meeting with President Biden about North Korea, including the missile and nuclear issues we have discussed, and regarding the increasingly worrying situation, we have agreed to continue a close coordination.

And on top of that, we concurred that the window of a discussion with North Korea is open. And we discussed that Japan, U.S. — Japan, U.S., and ROK will continue to work closely together.

I also asked for the continued understanding and cooperation for the immediate resolution of the abduction issue. And President Biden once again gave myself a very strong assurance regarding the recent announcement by North Korea.

I will refrain from commenting on each and every announcement by North Korea. But as I have been mentioning repeatedly, based on the perspective that the establishment of a meaningful relationship between Japan and North Korea is in the interest of both Japan and North Korea and that it could be hugely beneficial to the peace and stability of the region, my policy is to aim for a summit meeting with North Korea to resolve various issues and will advise high-level consultation directly under my instruction. And that remains unchanged.

That is my response.

PRESIDENT BIDEN: We did discuss this issue. We both agreed the DPRK must — must also address the serious human rights and humanitarian concerns of the international community, including the immediate resolution of the abduction issue.

But, you know, the Prime Minister has just spoken to the potential of what his plans may mean. But welcome — I welcome the opportunity — we welcome the opportunity of our allies to initiate dialogue with the Democratic Republic of Korea.

As I’ve said many times, we’re open to dialogue ourselves at any time wi- — but without preconditions from the DPRK.

So, I have faith in the — in the — Japan. I have faith in the Prime Minister. And I think his seeking a dialogue with them is a good thing. It’s a positive thing.

Thank you.

Q Sir, on the issue of abortion —

Q What will you do if Israel invades Rafah?

Q On the issue of abortion, sir, what do you say to the people of Arizona?

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: This concludes the press conference. Thanks, everybody.

Q Mr. President, are the American hostages alive?

Q What will you do if Israel invades Rafah?

(Cross-talk.)

PRESIDENT BIDEN: Why doesn’t everybody holler at once?

Q I’ll ask you briefly. On the issue of abortion, sir, respectfully, what do you say to the people of Arizona right now who are witnessing a law go in place that dates back to the Civil War era?

PRESIDENT BIDEN: Elect me. I’m in the 20 — it’s the 20th century — 21st century, not back then. They weren’t even a state. I find —

Q Sir, how does the —

PRESIDENT BIDEN: I —

Q What will you do if Israel invades Rafah?

Q Mr. President, how does the war in Ukraine come to an end?

(Cross-talk.)

PRESIDENT BIDEN: Thank you. Thank you all very much. Thank you.

Q Sir, how does the —

(Cross-talk.)

Q Can you elaborate on what mistake Netanyahu is making, sir?

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: Thanks, everybody.

Q How does the war in Ukraine come to an end, sir?

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: This concludes the press conference.

(Cross-talk.)

PRESIDENT BIDEN: By the House — by the Hou- — the war in Ukraine comes to an end by the House Leader allowing a vote. There’s overwhelming support for Ukraine among the majority of Democrats and Republicans. There should be a vote now.

(Cross-talk.)

Q Are the American hostages alive?

Q Will you reconsider the LNG export ban, sir?

PRESIDENT BIDEN: There is no ban to Japan.

1:53 P.M. EDT

whitehouse.gov · by The White House · April 10, 2024

16. House Lawmakers Strike Down FISA Renewal Measure

A blow to national security?

Obviously our adversaries know their calls are likely to be intercepted so they have developed alternative methods of communication (though I recell times when our enemies could not overcome the temptation to use their cell phones overseas). But surely because of public knowledge of 702 they have taken measures to mitigate the effects of US surveillance activities.

But if I wanted to execute a deception operation against our adversaries, I would ask Congress to publicly repeal the provision and then find a new way to legally intercept the calls of foreign actors" e.g., Some new legislation that does not expose the activity or a perhaps Presidential finding for covert intercept operations? I am sure if 702 is repealed there will soon be a spike in communications that would be very valuable if intercepted. Of course we would not be capable of doing this because such deception would soon be exposed.

House Lawmakers Strike Down FISA Renewal Measure

Forbes · by Cailey Gleeson · April 10, 2024

Topline

House lawmakers voted against a procedural measure that would have begun debate to reauthorize Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, hours after former President Donald Trump encouraged lawmakers to “KILL FISA.”

Key Facts

The measure, backed by House Speaker Mike Johnson, R.-La., and President Joe Biden, would have extended intelligence officials’ ability under Section 702 of the controversial FISA Act to conduct “targeted surveillance” of non-U.S. citizens overseas using an FBI database, which critics say can tangentially collect data from citizens who communicate with non-U.S. targets.

It was blocked in a 193-228 vote with 19 Republican lawmakers voting against it, as a cohort of GOP members have repeatedly raised concerns that current provisions in the bill don’t go far enough to protect the privacy of U.S. citizens—including pushing for the inclusion of a warrant requirement.

Section 702 of FISA is set to expire on April 19, after Congress extended the funding deadline in December following multiple failed attempts to pass the bill amid Republican infighting and debate over the warrant provision.

What To Watch For

With Section 702 set to expire in a little over a week, it is unclear exactly what lawmakers will do to get it reauthorized, though Johnson reportedly said lawmakers will “regroup and reformulate another plan” ahead of a closed-door meeting later on Wednesday, according to Politico. However, the Biden administration reportedly expects it would remain operational for another year despite its looming expiration, according to CBS News .

Chief Critic

Trump claimed Wednesday that the law “was illegally used against” him to spy on his campaign, in reference to the Justice Department’s 2020 findings that the FBI improperly obtained two of four warrants while investigating a former campaign associate—but the warrants were acquired under a different section of FISA that is not currently up for reauthorization.

Crucial Quote

“I voted NO on the rule for FISA,” Rep. Tim Burchett, R-Tenn., said in a post on X. “We should NOT be spying on Americans, especially without a search warrant.”

Key Background

Congress first authorized FISA Section 702 in 2008, according to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, with the intent to monitor noncitizens outside of the U.S. The law has become increasingly controversial since its inception, with critics claiming its wide-ranging nature can lead to collection of U.S. citizens’ data, according to NBC News. A May 2023 report from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court found the FBI misused the tool nearly 300,000 times between 2020 and early 2021, including collecting information on Jan. 6 rioters and Black Lives Matter protesters.

Tangent

In late March, Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene, R-Ga., filed a motion to vacate Johnson’s speakership after he brought a $1.2 trillion funding package to the floor to avoid a partial government shutdown. Greene reportedly said she told Johnson she was "watching what happens" in regard to the FISA reauthorization bill—and Ukraine funding—ahead of Wednesday’s FISA vote, according to Axios.

AUKUS Special Operations Forces in Strategic Competition, Integrated Deterrence, and Campaigning: Resistance to Malign Activities - Security & Defence PLuS Alliance

https://securityanddefenceplus.plusalliance.org/essays/aukus-special-operations-forces-in-strategic-competition-integrated-deterrence-and-campaigning-resistance-to-malign-activities/

Some key points for a SOF focus:

•Harness the Asia relationships of SOF from the three nations

•Counter and exploit OBOR

•Historical permanent detachments – possible models could be adapted for the future

–46th SF Co – Thailand

–Taiwan SF Resident Detachment

–SF Detachment Korea (still in operation)

–SAFASIA – Okinawa, Japan

•Develop concepts of resilience and resistance to malign activities

–Resistance Operating Concept

•Porcupine Defense – Taiwan

•Unconventional Deterrence and Resilience (Bob Jones)

•1st SF Command – cross functional teams (SF, PSYOP, CA)

AUKUS Partners Focus on Indo-Pacific Security in Shaping Joint Capabilities

defense.gov · by Joseph Clark

Maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific serves as the key factor driving the selection of advanced capabilities to pursue as part of the AUKUS security partnership between the U.S., U.K. and Australia, senior officials said yesterday.

Justin McFarlin, deputy assistant secretary of defense for international and industry engagement, detailed the top criteria for decision makers as the three countries begin to partner with industry in shaping the path forward for enhancing joint capabilities and interoperability under the partnership.

"It's really about maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific," McFarlin said in underscoring the overarching intent behind the security partnership during a panel discussion at Sea-Air-Space 2024, an exposition hosted by the Navy League at National Harbor, Maryland.

Leaders Meet

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III; Richard Marles, Australian deputy prime minister and defense minister of Australia; and Grant Shapps, the U.K. secretary of state for defense, answer questions during a press conference at Moffett Field, Calif, Dec. 1, 2023.

Download: Full Size (1.26 MB)

Photo By: Chad J. McNeeley, DOD

VIRIN: 231201-D-TT977-1410Y

The partnership was agreed to in September 2021, kicking off a multiphased approach to fostering technology exchanges among the three countries and building Australia's nuclear-powered submarine force.

Under the plan's first pillar, Australia will purchase three Virginia-class, conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines in time to replace its current fleet of diesel electric subs in the 2030s.

Team at Sea

Sailors with the USS Annapolis and Australian port services crew members prepare the Annapolis to moor alongside Diamantina Pier at Fleet Base West in Rockingham, Australia, March 10, 2024.

Download: Full Size (1.31 MB)

Photo By: Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Kaitlyn E. Eads

VIRIN: 240310-N-WH681-1025Y

The three countries will also develop a state-of-the-art platform designed to combine and leverage their shared submarine technology. The "SSN-AUKUS," as the future platform is known, is slated to be fielded by the U.K. in the 2030s and by Australia in the 2040s.

Spotlight: AUKUS: The Trilateral Security Partnership Between Australia, U.K. and U.S.

The second pillar of the agreement is focused on developing joint capabilities to further enhance interoperability among the participating nations with a focus on cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and additional undersea capabilities.

McFarlin said that as the U.S., U.K. and Australia further define their technology requirements under the second pillar, they remain laser focused on selecting technology that is relevant to all three nations while maintaining a focus on the Indo-Pacific.

"Our focus is maintaining the peace and stability in that region," he said.

Additionally, McFarlin said the technology selected must add mutual value to all participating nations.

"As we look at new opportunities, we're very focused on what is [the] AUKUS difference that's going to cause this to be better trilaterally, rather than if it's just bilateral or one country doing it," he said.

Shimon Fhima, the director of strategic programs for the U.K. Ministry of Defense, also described his focus on selecting technology that will pay dividends across all three countries with a focus on maintaining regional security.

"In thinking about the capabilities that we invest in, it has to be something that will maintain the strategic balance of security in the Indo-Pacific," he said.

Spotlight: Focus on Indo-Pacific

Fhima echoed McFarlin in describing his criteria for capabilities that add value to warfighters across the partnership.

"It's really important that we've got to be better together," he said. "Therefore, the sum of our parts must be far greater than us working it individually."

Submarine Tour

Navy Cmdr. James Tuthill, commanding officer of the USS Annapolis, conducts a tour of the submarine for Australian government officials at Fleet Base West in Rockingham, Australia, March 12, 2024.

Download: Full Size (1.44 MB)

Photo By: Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Kaitlyn E. Eads

VIRIN: 240312-N-WH681-1054Y

McFarlin and Fhima were joined during the panel by Michael Vaccaro, the U.S. State Department's deputy assistant secretary for defense trade controls, and Stephen Moore, the first assistant secretary for AUKUS advanced capabilities for the Australian Department of Defense.

The officials spoke one day after the three nations' defense ministers announced that they are considering cooperation with Japan in pursuing advanced capabilities specifically under the second pillar of AUKUS.

In a joint statement on Monday, the defense ministers cited Japan's "strengths and its close bilateral defense partnerships with all three countries" as factors in the decision.

In a joint press conference with Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio at the White House today, President Joe Biden said the potential inclusion of Japan in the pursuit of advanced capabilities under AUKUS adds to significant steps in strengthening defense cooperation.

Tune in as I hold a joint press conference with Prime Minister Kishida Fumio of Japan. https://t.co/K9TPlzeAoc

— President Biden (@POTUS) April 10, 2024

In addition to exploring Japan's potential cooperation in the AUKUS partnership, Biden announced that the U.S., Japan and Australia will partner in creating a networked air defense architecture. The U.S. and U.K. will also be standing up trilateral military exercises with Japan.

"All told, that represents a new benchmark for our military cooperation across a range of capabilities," Biden said.

During Tuesday's panel, the officials noted that expanding AUKUS Pillar 2, to include additional partners has been a consideration from the start and that the three countries looked forward to further discussions with Japan on how they might cooperate on particular projects.

defense.gov · by Joseph Clark

18. Assemble the Bodyguard of Lies: Strengthening US Military Deception Capabilities

If only...

Assemble the Bodyguard of Lies: Strengthening US Military Deception Capabilities - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Fabian Villalobos, Scott Savitz · April 11, 2024

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Deception is as old as warfare. Ancient tales across cultures describe cunning and creative tactics, such as the Trojan Horse, employed to defeat adversaries. The deceiving force gains advantage by both confusing the adversary and preserving its combat power. Ultimately, deception is a critical combat enabler that requires deliberate planning, creative practitioners, and limited resources.

And yet, US military deception capabilities have been allowed to atrophy—despite the proven value of deception, which can be traced to the US military’s earliest operations. General George Washington’s surprise crossing of the Delaware during the American Revolution originally included a clever diversion. Allied deceptions in World War II caused German commanders to anticipate attacks in the wrong places, most notably leading them to concentrate forces at Calais when the Allies landed at Normandy.

Deception also enabled rapid victory with limited casualties during Operation Desert Storm. Intelligence indicated that Saddam Hussein expected an amphibious landing from the Persian Gulf and a drive north into Kuwait by coalition forces from Saudi territory. Capitalizing on that intelligence, the United States signaled this intent with decoys while disguising the movement of its forces to the west for a surprise “left hook” that cut off Iraqi forces within Kuwait. This induced the collapse, mass surrender, and flight of Iraqi forces within four days of ground combat. Deception planners used Magruder’s Principle—named for a general from the American Civil War—to reinforce Saddam Hussein’s preexisting beliefs to deceive him and achieve victory.

Despite the profusion of unmanned systems, satellite constellations, sensors, and other methods of tracking troop movement over the last thirty years, Magruder’s Principle and other deception techniques are still applicable today. Military forces must still deceive and assume they are being deceived. Ukraine demonstrated deception’s enduring relevance in November 2022, when it continually indicated that it planned to push against Russian forces in eastern Ukraine, then made a surprise thrust to the south.

Despite these demonstrations of deception’s continued value, the US military’s institutional preparedness to conduct deception operations has declined. As General Charles Q. Brown, now chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, observed in 2019, “We’ve done some of these things in the past, in World War II, for example. It’s not something that we think about as much anymore.” That he made those comments and called for strengthening deception capabilities while serving as commander of Pacific Air Forces attests to their particular utility in modern operational environments characterized by potential adversaries’ antiaccess and area-denial systems. American dominance in conventional warfare has contributed to perceptions that deception is unnecessary, or is a technique for weaker powers. But successful deception activities enhance force protection, preserve combat power, and add complexity for the adversary—facts that are often underappreciated.

Today’s ubiquitous sensors make it harder to completely conceal forces. It is eminently possible, however, to exploit enemy sensor networks by providing them with false information. Deceptive techniques can include concealing real capabilities while projecting the existence of false ones, exaggerating the size of military forces, conveying false intentions, pretending to be in alternate locations, and fostering complacency through routine activity to mask a surprise attack.

Approaches like Magruder’s Principle play on the adversary’s psychological need for consistency. There are other ways to manipulate judgment as well that build on the psychological research of Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, and others. For example, when people are exposed to a particular numerical value or interpretation of an image, they become anchored to it—meaning that they are reluctant to shift away from it. Providing false information early can cause an adversary to be hesitant to recognize real information even when it does emerge, as was the case for Saddam Hussein.

Successful deception requires ample preparation. Materiel, like tailored decoys and camouflage, must be on hand and ready to deploy. The importance of materiel capability should not be overemphasized, however; deception is ultimately about storytelling in ways that the adversary finds compelling, with materiel only a means to that end.

It’s personnel that are most essential. During World War II, the US and British deception efforts employed artists, directors, actors, fiction writers, and others to conjure and communicate audacious stories. Today’s geopolitical challenges likewise demand skilled and creative storytellers who are armed with detailed intelligence about US adversaries.

These storytellers would have to collaborate with military leadership to, first, refine ideas, and then to spread the deception. Synchronizing these efforts across multiple commands requires extensive coordination across the intelligence community and operators and must ensure resourcing is available to see a deception through.

All this will require practice. Deception programs should be regularly integrated into training programs and military exercises. That gives deception planners experience with conjuring and implementing elaborate ruses—and units experience with trying to recognize such deceit.

Few aspects of warfare are as valuable as efforts to deceive adversaries. The US military inevitably will face rivals who use deception to their advantage, so it should once again hone its own subterfuge skills—from the lowest levels, to gain a tactical edge, to the highest, to achieve strategic surprise. As Winston Churchill observed, in wartime, the truth is so precious that it must be protected by a bodyguard of lies.

Fabian E. Villalobos is an engineer at the RAND Corporation and professor of policy analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School whose research focuses on the intersection of technology, economics, and geopolitics. You can follow him on Twitter or Linkedin.

Scott Savitz is a senior engineer at the RAND Corporation, focusing on ways of improving operational effectiveness.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Sgt. Zoe Morris, US Army

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Fabian Villalobos, Scott Savitz · April 11, 2024

19. Don’t Count on Us: Canada’s Military Unreadiness

Uh oh.

Conclusion:

Unless the Canadian Armed Forces solve their personnel crisis, they may not be able to operate the new equipment that is being procured. As pressure on serving personnel increases due to shortfalls within the ranks, more members will be inclined to leave. This is the death spiral the defense minister warned about. While money is not a panacea, spending 2 percent of gross domestic product in defense could help address the shortage of personnel and crumbling infrastructure, as well as acquiring the missing capabilities to sustain operations in the current threat environment. But Canada first needs to solve its structural defense planning issues and, as important, its complacent and self-righteous attitude regarding a military reputation it let slip long ago.

Don’t Count on Us: Canada’s Military Unreadiness - War on the Rocks

PHILIPPE LAGASSÉ AND JUSTIN MASSIE

warontherocks.com · by Philippe Lagassé · April 11, 2024

Canada’s military is in a “death spiral.” This is how Minister of National Defense Bill Blair described the state of Canada’s armed forces at last month’s Ottawa Conference on Security and Defense. Blair’s comments referenced the military’s dire recruitment and retention crisis. The Canadian Armed Forces are short 16,000 people — about 15 percent of their authorized strength of 71,500 regular forces and 30,000 primary reserve forces. Despite efforts such as opening the military to permanent residents, there’s no indication that the situation will improve. Less than 1 percent of applications from permanent residents to join the regular force were accepted, with 15,000 applicants walking away amid the 18- to 24-month-long application process. While the Canadian government has signed several high-profile contractsfor new equipment such as F-35s, Predator drones, and P-8A Poseidons, at this rate, there may not be anybody to use these capabilities when they come online.

Allies and critics are rightfully calling on Canada to meet the 2 percent of gross domestic product spending target agreed to by NATO, but the Canadian military’s troubles are deeper than insufficient funds. Canada’s ability to meaningfully contribute to major allied operations is in doubt for the foreseeable future. Despite increased defense spending by 70percent between 2017 and 2026, an internal report on the readiness of the Canadian Armed Forces was released to the media the same week that Blair made his remarks. The report paints a bleak picture: Most of Canada’s major fleets are unavailable or unserviceable. Indeed, on average, only 45 percent of Canada’s air force fleet is operational, while the Royal Canadian Navy can operate at 46 percent of its capacity and the army at 54 percent. This means that even Canada’s minor military projection ambition — which consists of only three frigates, two fighter jet squadrons, and one mechanized brigade — is not assured. As the ninth largest economy in the world and twelfth largest per capita, Canada actually contributes little to allied security and cannot be relied upon to sustain its own limited ambition.

There are few indications that things will get better soon. On 8 April 2024, the Canadian government announced more than $72 billion in new defense funding over the next two decades. This is projected to bring Canadian military expenditures to a peak of 1.76 percent of gross domestic product in 2029. This is a welcome injection of funds on top of the nearly $215 billion the Canadian government is expecting to invest in the armed forces over the next 20 years. Most of this new spending, however, is years away and won’t address the military’s immediate woes. To be blunt, Canada’s military is in an atrocious state and is barely holding on. The roots of this crisis are found in Canada’s strategic culture and decades-old decisions about defense. The way out of the crisis, meanwhile, is paved with seemingly insuperable obstacles, including a chronic shortage of personnel, an inability to spend funds quickly, a lack of bipartisan agreement on military requirements, and a culture of reactiveness and unpreparedness toward new geopolitical challenges.

Even if vital reforms and budget increases were made today, they would take years to implement and at least a decade to rehabilitate the armed forces. For Canada, this is all the more reason to start as quickly as possible. For Canada’s allies, it is further reason to have realistic expectations about Canada’s military contribution over the coming years. In short, don’t count on Canada until structural reforms are implemented.

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Canada and National Defense

To understand Canada’s current military crisis, it is important to recognize how little importance Canadians ascribe to defense. Although recent polls indicate that attitudes are changing, particularly among conservative-leaning voters, Canadians have rarely seen defense as a priority. Surrounded by three oceans and neighboring the world’s largest military power, Canadians have rarely thought that defense spending was a worthwhile investment, particularly when compared with popular social programs. There have been exceptions, of course. Canada contributed heavily to both world wars. The Korean War prompted Canada to invest heavily in its military and to forward-deploy forces to western Europe during the early Cold War. Once an adversary was defeated or the threat appeared to cool down, however, Canadians have allowed defense spending to stall and its military capabilities to decline. Notably, after the initial surge in spending that followed the Korean War, Canadian defense spending began a slow but steady decline starting in the late 1950s. The Canadian military underwent a major recapitalization in the mid-1970s, but it never again matched the peacetime capacity that it briefly enjoyed in the early Cold War.

Both Canadian leaders and the voting public have been happy to coast on the military reputation that the country earned more than 70 years ago. Like an out-of-shape former high school star athlete who clings to their glory days, Canadians still imagine themselves as they were back then, not as they are now, although a growing number think their country’s reputation has worsened lately. Worse still, Canadians and their leaders believe that their allies see them how they see themselves. The result has been a mix of smugness and complacency that has prevented Canada from confronting the true extent of its military decline.

Faced with today’s worsening international security environment, Canadians are again realizing that they should step up militarily. But the decades-long neglect of their armed forces will make it far harder for Canada to make meaningful contributions to international peace and security in the coming years. Although the roots of this crisis date back the Cold War, the Canadian Armed Forces’ current situation is best understood with references to the decades that followed it.

The Peace Dividend

When the Cold War ended, Canadian governments eagerly sought a peace dividend. Canada’s finances were an utter mess at the time, and the defense budget was an easy source of discretionary spending that could be cut. In the mid-1990s, the Canadian defense budget was slashed by 30 percent. But the downward trend had already begun, with defense expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product steadily declining from 2.11 percent in 1986 to 1.11 percent in 2005. The government reduced the size of the force by one-third, from 90,000 active troops in 1990 to 62,000 in 2005. Ottawa held back on major recapitalizations during this period, ensuring that there would eventually be a bow wave of projects in need of dire attention. In many ways, the Canadian military is still living with the effects of this era, in terms of not only the talent who exited, but also the stress placed on infrastructure, equipment, and people.

In spite of these cuts, the government committed the Canadian Armed Forces to a high operational tempo, deploying the military in the Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq. On average, Canada contributed over 4,300 troops annually to military operations abroad during the 1990s. This contrasts with a respective average of 3,400 in the 2000s and 1,600 in the 2010s. Dramatic cuts in the size of the force and its capabilities, as well as a shift from taking part in United Nations peace operations to NATO and U.S.-led offensive operations, explain this trend downward.

Recapitalization Plans Falling Short

After 9/11, Canadian defense spending slowly crept up, particularly after the military was deployed to Kandahar, Afghanistan. Not only did this mission remind Canadians of the dangers associated with an under-equipped military, but also the “Global War on Terror” led to greater interest in military service. Military expenditures grew from 1.11 percent of gross domestic product in 2004 to 1.38 percent in 2009. In constant U.S. dollars, expenditures in this period underwent a growth of 34 percent. Successive governments began to approve new capabilities as well. Starting in the mid-2000s, Canada acquired C-17 strategic airlift planes, C-130J tactical lift aircraft, and Chinook medium-lift helicopters. The authorized size of the regular force grew by 13 percent, from 62,000 in 2005 to 70,000 in 2008. It grew slightly more to 71,500 in 2017 and has remained the same in Canada’s 2024 defense update. Therefore, the size of Canada’s authorized force has remained about the same despite the seismic changes of the threat environment since the 2000s.

Toward the end of the 2000s, a defense malaise set in. The war in Afghanistan had inflicted relatively heavy casualties on a force and country that had not suffered major losses since the Korean War. Canada suffered the third largest share of casualties per capita (following Denmark and Estonia) during the war in Afghanistan (158 soldiers and 7 civilians). Political opposition to the war was also notable, pushing the government to look for an exit strategy. In 2011, Canada was the second ally after the Netherlands to withdraw from Afghanistan before the end of NATO’s combat mission in 2014. This is significant given that Canada has taken part in every NATO operation since its creation.

Capital projects faced mounting costs, leading to the cancellation of a much-vaunted joint support ship. In an effort to rebuild the Canadian shipbuilding industry following this cancellation, a national shipbuilding strategy estimated at $33 billion was put in place. The strategy has since begun to deliver four Arctic offshore patrol vessels (two more are expected this year), but the construction of 15 Canadian surface combatants, based on the Type 26 hull and intended to replace Canada’s fleet of 12 frigates and four destroyers, has yet to begin. Estimated at $26 billion in 2015, the acquisition of Canada’s main combat ships is now expected to cost more than $80 billion, which makes some question its affordability. As worrisome, the delivery of the first ship is expected in 2032 and the last in 2050, about six decades after Canada commissioned its frigates between 1992 and 1995.

A fleet of 15 ships is considered by many as the minimum required to meet the Canadian government’s commitments, which include deploying three ships in the Indo-Pacific region on an annual basis, as well as partaking in NATO’s standing maritime groups on a rotational basis. For the first time since Russia’s annexation of Crimea and amid its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Canada was unable in 2022 to take part in NATO’s maritime task forces because of insufficient serviceable ships to undertake both NATO and Indo-Pacific commitments. Yet the Canadian government committed in 2019 an extra high-readiness frigate to NATO, for a total of three, as part of the latter’s readiness initiative to have 30 naval combat vessels ready to use in 30 days (in addition to 30 battalions and 30 air squadrons). This was before NATO’s decision in June 2022 to boost its rapid reaction force from 40,000 troops to over 300,000. Given the slow procurement pace and absence of any sense of urgency in the face of its obsolescent fleet, Canada will continue failing to meet its already small target of having three frigates available for operations at any point in time, to say nothing of actually increasing its ambition level to a consequential force.

The situation is not better with regard to Canada’s air force. When the government attempted to acquire 65 F-35 combat jets in 2010, critical reports from the office of the auditor general and parliamentary budget officer pushed the government to reset the process. Twelve years later, the F-35 won a competition that was eventually held, but the first delivery is expected in 2026 and the new fleet will only achieve full operational capability in 2034. This will be more than 50 years after Canada introduced its first CF-18 Hornet to its fighter aircraft fleet. It is unclear how many will remain serviceable by this time.

In 2016, the Canadian government announced it would explore buying 18 new Super Hornet fighter aircraft to close a newly found “capability gap” in Canada’s air force fleet. The government increased the fleet’s operational requirements to sustain the highest North American Aerospace Defense Command alert level — which is about 36 aircraft, with 12 operational aircraft — simultaneously to a squadron of six fighter jets to NATO operations in Europe. After a trade dispute with Boeing, the Canadian government pulled out in 2017 from the purchase of Super Hornets. It did, however, maintain its higher operational requirements by vowing to purchase 88 fighters (instead of the 65 originally planned). However, Canada then doubled to 12 combat aircraft its commitment to NATO as part of the latter’s 2019 readiness plan. It remains doubtful whether the new fleet size will be able to meet both North American Aerospace Defense Command and NATO commitments simultaneously in the face of the new threat environment. In the meantime, Canada’s lack of air crews will jeopardize its capacity to sustain its small Defense Command commitment while training crews for a new fleet of F-35s.

The new fighter competition was part of a recapitalization the Canadian Armed Forces launched in 2017. Under the Strong, Secure, Engaged defense policy announced that year, the government outlined a capital program totaling more than $160 billion over 20 years. In 2022, the government further committed another $40 billion to modernize the North American Aerospace Defense Command alongside the United States. All told, the expected capital expenditure for defense until 2037 is expected to reach $215 billion. This rapid and substantial acceleration in capital spending has raised concern from the parliamentary budget officer, who questions Canada’s ability to manage such an increased procurement activity. Furthermore, due to procurement delays, 62 percent of the planned expenditures are now expected to occur after 2027. Given the high inflation rates in the defense industry, additional appropriations will probably be necessary to maintain the current planned acquisitions. In other words, Canada’s current defense policy is fiscally unsustainable.

This recapitalization plan has led to contracts for new capabilities. Over the past two years, Canada has contracted to acquire new air-to-air refueling and VIP transport aircraft, a fleet of P-8s, light trucks, Predator drones, and a suite of land command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. Still more procurements are on the way and will continue to be made into the 2030s. The government’s April 2024 defense policy update, for instance, is committing tens of billions of additional dollars for new tactical helicopters, defense infrastructure, long-range missiles, artillery ammunition, satellites, airborne early-warning aircraft, and a cyber command, among other things. Since all these initiatives are on top on what has already been announced since 2017, these new announcements are good news, but remain decades away.

In the meantime, however, the age of the Canadian military’s existing equipment is having a predictable effect on serviceability. Older fleets require more maintenance and repair. Parts for older and smaller fleets are difficult to secure. Indeed, the 2024 defense policy update sets out $9.9 billion to keep Canada’s existing warships afloat and supplied and another $8.9 billion to sustain its military equipment. The ongoing recapitalization will alleviate this challenge over the coming decade, but the Canadian Armed Forces’ readiness will be hobbled for many years because of procurement decisions that were put off for too long.

While the capital side of things has a glimmer of hope, a sense of despair surrounds the wider Canadian military. The regular force has been short of personnel for years. Military bases and housing have been allowed to fall into significant disrepair, and personnel policies have not kept pace with the expectations and demands of contemporary work and family life. A strong economy has meant that military members were offered attractive opportunities in the civilian world, without the sacrifices the military imposed on them. When the COVID-19 pandemic hit, the Canadian Armed Forces were already in a fragile state. Increased domestic deployments during COVID-19 and the tight labor market that followed made the situation worse. Truth be told, many militaries are short of personnel and having difficulty recruiting since the pandemic. But the Canadian military appears to be faring particularly poorly. Indeed, a lack of technicians across the force has likely exacerbated the serviceability challenges facing its major fleets.

Still another challenge has been the sexual misconduct crisis surrounding the Canadian military in recent years. Several military leaders were either charged or forced to resign in light of sexual misconduct allegations made against them. Given the number of cases, fixing the Canadian Armed Forces’ culture with respect to sexual misconduct has been the current government’s top military priority. The sexual misconduct crisis has made the Canadian military’s recruitment and retention challenges worse. A cloud has been hanging over the institution for several years now, which has led younger Canadians to question whether they should join and perhaps compelling serving members to look elsewhere.

“Exploring Options”

As part of its 2024 defense policy update, the Canadian government outlined several capabilities that it plans to “explore,” meaning that most are not even at the options analysis phase and have yet to be budgeted. These include new submarines, main battle tanks, light armored vehicles, surveillance and strike drones, and artillery. As well, the policy mandates the defense department to explore counter-drone capabilities and long-range air- and sea-launched missiles.

While all these capabilities are essential in the current threat environment, the case of the submarines is particularly glaring. Given that the cost of replacing Canada’s four aging diesel-electric submarines has been pegged at somewhere between $60–$100 billion, the government’s decision to merely “explore” options isn’t all that surprising. As noted, the new policy already includes more than $70 billion in new spending over 20 years; an additional $60–$100 billion was clearly deemed too much. Given that the ongoing modernization of Canada’s Victoria-class submarines is expected to keep them operational until the mid-2030s, the lack of funding for a replacement option in a policy update looking into the mid-2040s may result in Canada losing this capability. This capability gap will occur despite the government recognizing the need for submarines to “detect and deter maritime threats, control our maritime approaches, and project power and striking capability further from our shores, at a time when Russian submarines are probing widely across the Atlantic, Arctic and Pacific Oceans and China is rapidly expanding its underwater fleet.”

On the personnel front, the new defense policy presents a few ideas, but none that promise to rapidly reverse the Canadian Armed Forces’ dwindling numbers. Ottawa is still examining options and has yet to budget for greater compensations and benefits for personnel and work-life balance for the troops. Of note, the policy outlines a probationary period for new recruits to get them in uniform sooner, along with more career control for those already serving. Just as important, the new policy pledges to expand the civilian defense workforce, with a view toward augmenting the department’s capacity to support the armed forces and handle the ever-present procurement and infrastructure projects. Coupled with the shortfall in military personnel, the civilian defense workforce has been stretched to the limit as it has tried to implement the recapitalization of the Canadian Armed Forces. Until the civilian side of the equation can handle more programs, the defense department and armed forces will continue to have trouble spending the additional money they’ve been allocated.

Conclusion

Where does this leave the Canadian military today? Its existing fleets are increasingly difficult to service and maintain, either owing to a lack of personnel or as a function of their age. Canada has had to scale back its participation in major military exercises, and its contributions to allied operations are consistently anemic. A lack of personnel and fleet serviceability is constraining the number and size of the operations that the military can undertake. In 2023, the Canadian Armed Forces conducted a record of 141 days in operations supporting civilian authorities against natural disasters. The increasing frequency and intensity of domestic needs due to climate change are challenging for the Canadian military’s limited capacity. Internationally, only 58 percent of Canada’s committed “force elements ready to meet NATO notice move” are deployable. This means that Canada’s 3,400 troops supposedly on a higher state of readiness may not be able to support the 1,200 currently deployed in Latvia to help deter and defend against Russian aggression. Yet as a framework nation for NATO’s enhanced forward presence in Latvia, Canada is expected to boost NATO’s battle group to brigade level by doubling its deployed force in the Baltic country. Canada’s capacity to sustain this commitment is uncertain given its chronic readiness problems. Despite pleas from Washington, moreover, Canada has refused to lead a mission to Haiti — not only because Ottawa does not want to accept the risks involved, but also because the military is in no position to mount a significant intervention. Canada is instead merely supplying 70 troops to train Jamaican troops for a mission to Haiti. This will continue to expose the country to fierce critiques from Washington, and most notably Trump-aligned Republicans, while further undermining Canada’s reliability toward its European allies.

Unless the Canadian Armed Forces solve their personnel crisis, they may not be able to operate the new equipment that is being procured. As pressure on serving personnel increases due to shortfalls within the ranks, more members will be inclined to leave. This is the death spiral the defense minister warned about. While money is not a panacea, spending 2 percent of gross domestic product in defense could help address the shortage of personnel and crumbling infrastructure, as well as acquiring the missing capabilities to sustain operations in the current threat environment. But Canada first needs to solve its structural defense planning issues and, as important, its complacent and self-righteous attitude regarding a military reputation it let slip long ago.

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Philippe Lagassé is associate professor and the Barton chair at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University.

Justin Massie is full professor and head of the department of political science at the Université du Québec à Montréal and codirector of the Network for Strategic Analysis.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Philippe Lagassé · April 11, 2024

20. Leadership, Culture, and the Military Cyber Workforce

Excerpts:

Building a common culture could begin with forging a common experience. U.S. Cyber Command, the National Security Agency Cybersecurity Directorate, and the Cyber National Mission Force might consider creating a common training experience for junior officers slated for a cyber billet — like a Captain’s Career Course or Expeditionary Warfare School for joint cyber officers. Similar to the Army’s Ranger School and the Navy’s SEAL training, a common training experience creates opportunities for officers to form bonds with each other and also link generations through a shared experience. Considering cyber operations officers come from all of the services, the opportunity to learn leadership fundamentals in a cohort setting will prepare officers to understand their roles and how to work together.

The cyber officer training curriculum must include technical fundamentals, but this should not be the sole focus. Cyber operations — both offensive and defensive — is often the art of the possible, and officers responsible for planning and executing cyber operations should understand the full range of factors, to include technical, legal, strategic, tactical, and, most importantly, human factors. This course curriculum should include deep dives on the role of cyber operations across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. The ability to lead and conduct novel missions across the levels of warfare can be leveraged as an advantage to keep junior officers in the military, as such experiences are not readily available in the private sector. This more problem-focused training model can stand out as more rewarding and engaging than the private sector’s model of chasing expensive online credentials.

To prevail in the competition against the business world over a fixed pool of cyber talent, the military might be wise to heed the advice of that world’s premier strategist, Michael Porter: “Competitive strategy is about being different. It means deliberately choosing a different set of activities to deliver a unique mix of value.” While necessary, re-engineering benefits and personnel management policies alone will not be sufficient to sustain a healthy cyber workforce. Rather, the military cyber community — regardless of whether it becomes its own service or remains spread among the current services — should embrace and even enhance the unique aspects of military life when compared to the private sector. Consequently, differentiation rather than optimization should be the path forward for the cyber workforce.

Leadership, Culture, and the Military Cyber Workforce - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Nicholas Romanow · April 11, 2024

Every military leader emphasizes the importance of cyber operations, but there is a perennial shortage of qualified personnel in the military cyber community, across all the services. As calls for a “Cyber Force” grow louder, the armed services will only become more pressed to improve the three interrelated processes of recruiting, training, and retaining talent to lead the execution of cyber missions.

Talent management debates often fixate on the private sector’s advantage over the military in offering higher salaries and better benefits. In the context of officer talent management, such a focus overlooks what attracts young people toward military service in the first place. While the U.S. military can certainly optimize personnel policies, it should not downplay the intangible factors that the military offers young Americans, specifically opportunities to lead others and be part of a unique tradition and culture.

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Recruit, Train, Retain: The Cyber Talent Management Triad

Talent management (in other contexts referred to as human resources or personnel management) requires getting the right personnel into the right roles in the right numbers. This includes bringing enough people into an organization (recruiting), ensuring those people have the requisite skills and knowledge for their respective roles (training), and ensuring an adequate number of those people remain in the organization to help shape that organization’s future (retention). While operational units have been created for cyber operations at all echelons — from the combatant command all the way down to mission teams — the responsibility for recruiting, training, and retention remains with the services. While a hypothetical future cyber force would surely assume this responsibility, the current health of the military cyber workforce remains a clear and present issue for the services to manage.

Successful recruiting, training, and retention efforts for cyber personnel will require resolving (or at least managing) the competing priorities that exist within these three tasks. From a crude bureaucratic lens, talent management can be simplified as filling billets with adequate numbers of properly trained individuals. This imperative can drive bureaucracies to broaden their talent pool by reducing the selectively of their recruiting criteria and the rigor of their training. This approach overlooks the importance of developing leaders who can maintain and enhance the long-term well-being of an institution. If personnel are treated like rows on a spreadsheet, they might as well take their talents to a large corporation that can compensate them better.

It also overlooks the inherent interdependence among the three tasks: A failure in one of these tasks can undermine the other two. This is most obvious when low retention creates personnel shortages, which in turn rushes the onboarding and training processes. But poor training or a slow and ineffective recruiting process can also undermine retention when the costs of tolerating bureaucratic issues outweigh the benefits of service. In short, cutting corners on any single task within the larger human capital enterprise risks creating a talent management “tailspin” whereby all the health of the workforce suffers.

Especially for a relatively young military community like the cyber community, culture can be driven by the quality of personnel. A community of individuals who feel unqualified, unprepared, and therefore unappreciated will soon foster a disgruntled culture. A corrosive culture, in turn, will drive personnel to look for employment elsewhere. While the cyber community is not the only military community that often finds its personnel aggressively recruited by the private sector, the cyber community also competes for talent within itself. For example, cyber personnel often receive different pay and benefits despite performing the same roles, based on their respective service’s policies. While this affords opportunities for experimentation across the services, it risks dividing limited resources in situations where a common standard across the joint force may be preferable.

Bit by Bit: Cyber Leader Development

Rather than trying to beat the private sector model at its own game, a more sustainable talent management strategy should embrace the unique characteristics of military service that attract young people in the first place. For young officers, there are two key components that differentiate the military experience from the experiences of their counterparts in the private sector: opportunities to lead and service culture. These two factors are mutually reinforcing: Leaders must serve as stewards of their community’s culture, and the community’s culture encompasses the norms and values that shape how leaders are developed. Moreover, leadership development and cultural stewardship also enable success within the three fundamental talent management tasks. Strong leaders and a strong culture are needed to inspire young people to join, develop them into leaders in their own right, and provide steady intrinsic motivation for these leaders to continue serving.

Despite the technical nature of the field and the Hollywood image of the “lone hacker,” cyber leaders — like other military occupations — need to be able to make decisions and enable teams to accomplish what they would not be able to accomplish on their own. Like any other warfare area, this is a team sport, and teams almost always need leadership and direction to be successful. Leader development can take both formal and informal forms. An officer’s leadership abilities are tested and developed “on the job” through experience over time and mentorship. In order to assist this process, models have been created for leadership development, such as the Army “Be-Know-Do” model. Be-Know-Do is a holistic framework for officers to consider how their current attributes, knowledge, and actions impact their development as leaders. From the organizational level, the model helps leaders set standards and expectations for future leaders to prepare to accept more responsibility.

This model helps articulate an end-state for an organization to move towards in recruiting, training, and retaining leaders by answering the following questions: What attributes should recruiters seek in prospective officers? What knowledge and skills should be instilled in new officers? And how should officers demonstrate their suitability to being promoted and retained? Considering these questions simultaneously rather than separately can help craft a more comprehensive talent management approach. A more integrated approach signals that the organization is invested in its leaders’ development, rather than treating the recruiting, training, and retention processes as just more “boxes to check off” to remain compliant in a faceless bureaucratic apparatus.

The cyber community can also leverage the Be-Know-Do model to articulate how being a military cyber officer is distinct from being a cyber professional in the private sector. Officers are not just more senior practitioners in a given warfare area — they are responsible for leading teams of technical experts in order to accomplish assigned missions. A basis of technical knowledge is just a starting point for the officer, who must also understand the authorities and broader operational and strategic implications of the actions they direct. Lastly, cyber officers can be responsible for much more than just network security, including a range of offensive, defensive, and intelligence-gathering purposes. These distinctions provide a more concrete vocabulary for the military cyber community to pitch itself as a unique and possibly better opportunity for young people to become cyber professionals and serve their country.

Building a Cyber Culture

While the lack of a “Cyber Force” precludes a cyber service culture, nurturing a distinctive and attractive culture remains critical in order to pitch to young people that being a military cyber officer is not like any other job, as well as in maintaining cohesion across a community that is currently administratively dispersed across all of the services.

A RAND study comparing the cultures of the traditional military services (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force) and U.S. Special Operations Command reveals how they all compete against one another for resources, roles and missions, and personnel. This report’s inclusion of Special Operations Command alongside the services is important because it reveals how a relatively young military organization can forge its own culture in order to attract and retain personnel from both within and outside the military. While others have compared cyber operations to special operations, from a cultural standpoint, the special operations and cyber communities are largely alike in that personnel within these communities have more in common with each other than with colleagues from their services. For example, an Army and a Navy cyber officer likely have more common experiences than a Navy cyber warfare engineer and a Navy surface warfare officer, besides initial ascension experiences like the Naval Academy or Officer Candidate School.

While commonalities exist, the cyber community cannot and should not attempt to replicate the special operations community’s culture. Compared to the earlier discussion of cyber talent management challenges, the talent management landscape for the special operations community is starkly different. The RAND report notes that, “Due to its elite reputation and secretive, direct action missions, [special operations has] little trouble drawing far more applicants than it can select.” A cyber community should aspire to be inclusive, rather than exclusive. As Max Smeets argues in these same pages, the field of military cyber is much broader than the single work-role of the “hands-on-keyboard” cyber operators — information technicians, lawyers, planners, analysts, and administrators also fill vital roles in supporting and executing a cyber operation. In addition, the cyber community should not be treated as synonymous with a specific organization or place of duty. While U.S. Cyber Command is the central coordinating entity for cyber operations, personnel who perform duties in cyberspace for organizations outside of the command’s direct auspices should not be excluded from the military’s big-tent cyber community.

Finally, a significant part of a service’s self-perception rests on how the community represents itself to the rest of the military as well as the general public. When members of the military cyber community go home at night, what do they tell their friends and families about what they did that day? Seeing as the average American likely owns multiple internet-connected devices, a more compelling explanation than “It’s classified.” would help the military cyber community better explain how it contributes to national security. This further underscores the reality that technical knowledge alone is not enough for cyber leaders — in order to help shape the culture, leaders in the cyber community ought to be able to clearly and concisely communicate the community’s role in combatting malicious cyber activity. Hopefully, very few Americans will ever find themselves being targeted with a foreign country’s military munitions — however, virtually every American citizen and company is a potential target of a foreign cyber operation. For better or worse, culture is determined not just by dynamics within the community, but also by the community’s image in the broader military and public landscape.

Competing Is About Being Different

While being two distinct goals, developing leaders and developing a culture are interdependent processes. Leaders are responsible for creating and maintaining a healthy culture and, in turn, the health of a culture in part determines the quality and quantity of the pool of leaders available to assume leadership roles in the future. Placing leadership and culture at the center of the military’s talent management strategy for cyber professionals serves to sharply distinguish the benefits of the military experience from the more material advantages of a private sector cyber career.

Building a common culture could begin with forging a common experience. U.S. Cyber Command, the National Security Agency Cybersecurity Directorate, and the Cyber National Mission Force might consider creating a common training experience for junior officers slated for a cyber billet — like a Captain’s Career Course or Expeditionary Warfare School for joint cyber officers. Similar to the Army’s Ranger School and the Navy’s SEAL training, a common training experience creates opportunities for officers to form bonds with each other and also link generations through a shared experience. Considering cyber operations officers come from all of the services, the opportunity to learn leadership fundamentals in a cohort setting will prepare officers to understand their roles and how to work together.

The cyber officer training curriculum must include technical fundamentals, but this should not be the sole focus. Cyber operations — both offensive and defensive — is often the art of the possible, and officers responsible for planning and executing cyber operations should understand the full range of factors, to include technical, legal, strategic, tactical, and, most importantly, human factors. This course curriculum should include deep dives on the role of cyber operations across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. The ability to lead and conduct novel missions across the levels of warfare can be leveraged as an advantage to keep junior officers in the military, as such experiences are not readily available in the private sector. This more problem-focused training model can stand out as more rewarding and engaging than the private sector’s model of chasing expensive online credentials.

To prevail in the competition against the business world over a fixed pool of cyber talent, the military might be wise to heed the advice of that world’s premier strategist, Michael Porter: “Competitive strategy is about being different. It means deliberately choosing a different set of activities to deliver a unique mix of value.” While necessary, re-engineering benefits and personnel management policies alone will not be sufficient to sustain a healthy cyber workforce. Rather, the military cyber community — regardless of whether it becomes its own service or remains spread among the current services — should embrace and even enhance the unique aspects of military life when compared to the private sector. Consequently, differentiation rather than optimization should be the path forward for the cyber workforce.

Become a Member

Nicholas Romanow is a cryptologic warfare officer stationed at Ft. Meade. He currently serves as the operations officer for the National Security Agency’s Cybersecurity Collaboration Center. He is a graduate of the University of Texas at Austin and was previously an undergraduate fellow at the Clements Center for National Security.

The views expressed belong solely to the author and do not reflect official views of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or part of the U.S. government. A version of this paper was presented at the Naval War College Cyber and Innovation Policy Institute Summer Workshop. The author would like to thank the attendees and the faculty for their input on this paper.

Image: Staff Sgt. Devin Boyer

warontherocks.com · by Nicholas Romanow · April 11, 2024

21. Information warfare becoming a critical submarine capability: Aeschbach

What kind of information warfare or what part of it? Certainly not the PSYOP and influence piece.

Excerpt:

Tenets of information warfare — situational awareness, assured command-and-control, and the melding of intel and firepower — have enabled U.S. forces to swat down overhead threats in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. They have also assisted retaliatory strikes across the Greater Middle East.

Information warfare becoming a critical submarine capability: Aeschbach

c4isrnet.com · by Colin Demarest · April 10, 2024

NATIONAL HARBOR, MD. — Demand for information warfare capabilities is growing and will stake a larger presence among the undersea community in the near future, according to one U.S. Navy commander.

“I can’t say it enough. We are in demand, more in demand than we’ve ever been, and that will continue to increase,” Vice Adm. Kelly Aeschbach, leader of Naval Information Forces, said at the Sea-Air-Space conference going on this week in Maryland, just outside the nation’s capital. “My sense is, in the partnership we’ve had, we will have a persistent and growing presence within submarine crews over the coming years.”

The service in 2022 embedded information warfare specialists aboard subs to examine how their expertise aids underwater operations. A follow-up effort is now on the books, with information professional officers and cryptologic technicians joining two East Coast-based subs: the Delaware and the California.

The trials have so far proven fruitful, according to Aeschbach, who is colloquially known as “IBoss.” That said, staffing and other resources need considering before any sweeping moves are made.

“It’ll be a slow evolution, I think, as we build out that capacity,” Aeschbach said. “Part of that’s just the reality, as we’ve talked about today, of some of the choices we have to make about investment.”

Del Toro asks Navy contractors to consider taxpayers over shareholders

Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro said he needs companies to deliver their weapons, warships, aircraft and more on time and on budget and without excuses.

The Navy is also introducing information warfare systems into its live, virtual and constructive environments. The first few, focused on cryptology, meteorology and oceanography, will be uploaded in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2025, service officials have said. Other disciplines include communications, cryptology and electronic warfare, or the ability to use the electromagnetic spectrum to sense, defend and share data.

Tenets of information warfare — situational awareness, assured command-and-control, and the melding of intel and firepower — have enabled U.S. forces to swat down overhead threats in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. They have also assisted retaliatory strikes across the Greater Middle East.

Aeschbach cited as an example the USS Carney’s performance. The guided-missile destroyer and its crew spent the past six months intercepting attack drones and missiles launched by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen.

“Carney had the means to put the right weapon on the target through kinetic means,” Aeschbach said. “She also had the ability to defend herself. And, in all of that, the only part that I tell people is not information warfare is the operator pressing the button to release the missile.”

About Colin Demarest

Colin Demarest is a reporter at C4ISRNET, where he covers military networks, cyber and IT. Colin previously covered the Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration — namely Cold War cleanup and nuclear weapons development — for a daily newspaper in South Carolina. Colin is also an award-winning photographer.

22. Terrorists on the Rampage

Excerpts:

Since September 11, 2001, law enforcement and counter-terrorism officials have rightly placed significant emphasis on characterizing and disrupting terrorist plots and organizations, including support networks providing financing, recruits, and propaganda. However, the unique characteristics of rampage terrorism make the phenomenon difficult to prevent. A terrorist needs no support structure to simply grab a knife off the kitchen table and set out to inflict violence. At the same time, law enforcement and security agencies would have minimal opportunity to identify, intercept, and disrupt the attack. Instead, law enforcement should focus on countering influencers and building civil defense and resilience.

Law enforcement officials and civil society can and should target individuals, media outlets, and social forces that encourage or enable rampage terrorism. For example, the Yemeni branch of al-Qaeda encouraged readers to carry out vehicle ramming attacks in the 2010 issue of Inspire magazine. Rampage attacks are sustained only as long as the terrorist keeps fighting, so law enforcement officials should work to improve response times through community engagement, better analysis of rampage targets, greater law enforcement presence, and improved physical defense. In the aftermath of attacks, community leaders, law enforcement, and policymakers should aim to support social resilience and a return to normalcy in order to limit the strategic benefits to terrorists. There is not much glory in dying for a cause if society ignores it.

Terrorists have adopted rampage terrorism as a tactic for centuries. Practitioners and scholars need to better understand how and why the phenomenon occurs and how best to counter it.

Terrorists on the Rampage - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Zak Kallenborn, Gary Ackerman, Herbert Tinsley · April 11, 2024

The following is derived from “The Logic of Rampage Terrorism,” recently published in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. The authors would like to thank Daniel Lebowitz, Jacob Ware, attendees of the 2023 U.S. Military Academy at West Point Security Seminar, and reviewers from Studies in Conflict and Terrorism for their feedback.

Around 7:58 p.m. on March 22, 2024, four gunmen entered the Crocus City Hall in Krasnogorsk, Moscow Oblast, Russia, and started shooting. For about 20 minutes, the attackers moved through the entertainment complex, killing civilians gathered to hear Soviet-era rock group “Picnic.” Russian authorities claimed 143 people died and that 11 people were arrested, including the four gunmen. The Islamic State Khorasan claimed responsibility for the attack, which American intelligence confirmed.

This attack bears hallmarks of a distinct subset of terrorist threats: rampage terrorism. Rampage terrorism involves assaults wherein assailants are physically present, harm targets of opportunity, and continue until they are subdued, killed, give up, or otherwise choose to end the aggression. Rampage terrorism includes methods such as mass shootings, vehicle rammings, and stabbings. Such attacks, low in operational costs, pose significant challenges due to their spontaneous nature and minimal logistical requirements. In addition to the Crocus City Hall incident, notable examples of rampage terrorism include the 2016 tragedy at the Pulse Nightclub in Orlando, where 49 lives were lost in a mass shooting, and the dual assaults in Norway in 2011, where a car bomb in Oslo was followed by a mass shooting at a youth camp, culminating in 67 deaths.

The Logic of Rampage Terrorism

Rampage terrorism allows terrorists to conduct attacks without investing significant resources, with instruments readily available to them—such as firearms, knives, vehicles, and the like. Rampage attacks do not necessarily require either sophisticated organizational structures with well-defined roles that law enforcement can penetrate and disrupt, or sophisticated technologies and technical know-how. Often, minimal preparation is necessary. For example, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, the perpetrator of the July 14, 2016, vehicle attack in Nice, France, appears to have become radicalized and planned his attack only a few weeks prior. The attack killed 86 people and injured 450.

Rampage attacks let terrorists combat their ideological enemies directly. Rampage terrorists might see themselves as warriors fighting a righteous war. Numerous terrorist, insurgent, and general historical conflict narratives promote the idea of the warrior fighting for a noble cause. In Dominic Behan’s famous Irish rebel song written for his father Stephen, a former member of the Irish Republican Army, Behan writes, “Come out ye’ black and tans! Come out and fight me like a man!”—the “black and tans” referring to the notorious British soldiers recruited to the Royal Irish Constabulary to fight in the war of Irish independence. Rampage terrorists may see themselves as carrying on this tradition, fighting their adversaries “like a man,” instead of hiding behind bombs or other remote weapons. Further, the ubiquity of cell phones, social media, and 24/7 news coverage means the rampage may be captured and disseminated across the globe in real time. The attacker can inspire others through the real or perceived heroism of risking one’s life for the cause.

Tactically, terrorists who fight their adversaries head-on can be flexible and adapt to defensive measures. In July 2016, Michael Xavier Johnson attacked police officers at El Centro College in Dallas, Texas, possibly based on support for black nationalism and anger over police shootings. Johnson consciously moved between shooting positions to convince police officers there were multiple shooters. At one point, he broke a glass door in a failed attempt to enter the college building—instead, he took a different entrance, resulting in a multi-hour standoff with police, until a robot-mounted explosive killed him.

The flip side of tactical flexibility is uncertainty and risk, which can mean an attack may end prematurely. In May 1984, Corporal Denis Lortie stormed the Quebec Parliament, intending to kill members of the National Assembly but instead shooting several staff members. However, the parliament’s Sergeant-at-Arms, Rene Jalbert, talked him down, and Lortie surrendered to the police. At times, terrorists engaging in rampage attacks have received special training to reduce the risk of premature disruption. Islamic State recruits were given the option of becoming regular fighters, suicide bombers, or “Inghimasi.” The Inghimasi received special training as commando forces to stay alive as long as possible and maintain momentum during an attack. Even if the attack does not end prematurely, the inevitability of the attackers, victims, and bystanders capturing portions of the attack on cellphones and posting to social media increases the likelihood of terrorists being identified and caught. Russian claims to have caught the four suspects of the Crocus City Hall attack, three of whom reportedly confessed, are plausible. However, the evidence of torture and claims of Ukrainian involvement cast some doubt on those confessions.

Terrorist organizations may face challenges in sustaining rampage attacks due to the high risk of capture or death, necessitating a renewable pool of operatives for continued operations. The arrest of Anders Breivik, responsible for the 2011 attacks in Norway, effectively neutralized his “group.” While his actions might motivate future assailants, Breivik’s influence over their strategy, operations, or tactics ceased with his capture. Conversely, terrorist groups with substantial manpower and logistical support, such as Hamas, demonstrate the capability to execute multiple, extensive rampage attacks. The October 7, 2023 coordinated assault on Israel involved a widespread campaign against civilians, highlighting Hamas’s ability to absorb significant operational losses due to its large number of fighters.

Countering the Rampage

Since September 11, 2001, law enforcement and counter-terrorism officials have rightly placed significant emphasis on characterizing and disrupting terrorist plots and organizations, including support networks providing financing, recruits, and propaganda. However, the unique characteristics of rampage terrorism make the phenomenon difficult to prevent. A terrorist needs no support structure to simply grab a knife off the kitchen table and set out to inflict violence. At the same time, law enforcement and security agencies would have minimal opportunity to identify, intercept, and disrupt the attack. Instead, law enforcement should focus on countering influencers and building civil defense and resilience.

Law enforcement officials and civil society can and should target individuals, media outlets, and social forces that encourage or enable rampage terrorism. For example, the Yemeni branch of al-Qaeda encouraged readers to carry out vehicle ramming attacks in the 2010 issue of Inspire magazine. Rampage attacks are sustained only as long as the terrorist keeps fighting, so law enforcement officials should work to improve response times through community engagement, better analysis of rampage targets, greater law enforcement presence, and improved physical defense. In the aftermath of attacks, community leaders, law enforcement, and policymakers should aim to support social resilience and a return to normalcy in order to limit the strategic benefits to terrorists. There is not much glory in dying for a cause if society ignores it.

Terrorists have adopted rampage terrorism as a tactic for centuries. Practitioners and scholars need to better understand how and why the phenomenon occurs and how best to counter it.

Zachary Kallenborn is the Lead Researcher at Looking Glass USA, a counter-drone consultancy and investment firm. He is also affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Schar School of Policy and Government, the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, and the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).

Gary A. Ackerman is an Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Research in the College of Emergency Preparedness, Homeland Security and Cybersecurity at the University at Albany (SUNY), where his research focuses on assessing emerging threats and understanding how terrorists and other adversaries make tactical, operational, and strategic decisions, particularly regarding innovating in their use of weapons and tactics.

Herbert Tinsley is a Ph.D. student at the School of Government and Public Policy at the University of Arizona. He is pursuing research on professionalization and innovation in non-state militant groups, with particular interest in those phenomena’s effects on organizational dynamics and uses of terrorism.

Main Image: Crocus City Hall, Moscow (Photo by Artyom Svetlov via Wikimedia)

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.

23. Secretive US cyber force deployed 22 times to aid foreign governments

The "other" national mission force.

BZ to them.

Secretive US cyber force deployed 22 times to aid foreign governments

c4isrnet.com · by Colin Demarest · April 10, 2024

U.S. cyber specialists toiled in more than a dozen countries last year as part of a push to fortify networks and expose tools used by hackers, according to the leader of Cyber Command and the National Security Agency.

The so-called hunt-forward missions, conducted by CYBERCOM’s elite Cyber National Mission Force, or CNMF, totaled 22 deployments, with some happening simultaneously across the world, Air Force Gen. Timothy Haugh said in testimony submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 10.

“Enhancing the security of government, private sector and critical infrastructure systems grows ever more imperative,” said Haugh, who took the helm at CYBERCOM and NSA in February. “Foreign adversaries continuously update how they operate, and frequently work through American-owned networks and devices.”

Hunt-forward missions are executed at the invitation of a foreign government and are not always disclosed. They’re part of CYBERCOM’s persistent engagement strategy — a means of being in constant contact with adversaries and ensuring proactive, not reactive, moves are made.

Timothy Haugh, then a lieutenant general, speaks Sept. 12, 2023, at a conference in National Harbor, Maryland. (Colin Demarest/C4ISRNET)

Haugh’s disclosure offers a rare look at the CNMF workload, which is often nebulous, as some countries prefer to keep quiet the digital cooperation.

The mission force has in the past worked with Ukraine, ahead of Russia’s invasion; Albania, on the heels of Iranian cyberattacks; and Latvia, where malware was unearthed. Other previous deployments included Estonia, Croatia, Lithuania, Montenegro and North Macedonia.

The Defense Department sought $14.5 billion for cyber activities in fiscal 2025. The figure is about $1 billion more than the Biden administration’s previous ask. It is also up from FY23, when it sought $11.2 billion.

“We work every day against capable and determined cyber actors, many of them serving adversary military and intelligence services,” Haugh said. “Our operational experience reinforces the importance of campaigning globally in and through cyberspace across the conditions of competition, crisis and armed conflict.”

About Colin Demarest

24. Risk, Rumors, and Reprisals: The Imagined Side of Professional Writing

I never once had any issue with the chain of command for any of my writing. But then I guess that must mean I must not have been taking any risks.

Risk, Rumors, and Reprisals: The Imagined Side of Professional Writing

hardingproject.com · by Brennan Deveraux

With the Army’s renewed emphasis on professional writing, a disturbing narrative will likely resurface that publishing is dangerous to an author’s career. While many have articulated the benefits of joining the professional discourse, myself included, prospective authors may imagine backlash from a poorly received article. To take a public stance and challenge the status quo is terrifying; it is the status quo for a reason, after all. Consequently, a rumor, fueled by anecdotal stories, permeates across the force that authors who go against established norms will face career-altering reprisals. While this risk is blown out of proportion, there are gray areas authors should consider before diving into controversial topics.

Origin Stories

The Army lauds prominent historical figures like George Patton and Dwight Eisenhower for challenging Army doctrine and publishing critical articles during the interwar period a century ago. Less often discussed is the controversy surrounding these efforts. At the time, Major General Charles Farnsworth, the Chief of the Infantry, threatened to court martial Eisenhower if he continued publishing ideas that undermined established infantry doctrine. While the court martial did not come to fruition, this example is a troubling reminder that an argument, regardless of its merits, may anger people of influence. A response to a professional article may become a personal matter if perceived as an affront to someone’s life work or if it could endanger their livelihood. While few historical examples highlight officers being reprimanded at the institutional level for their ideas, except when the comments were illegal, anecdotes are much easier to come by.

An Anecdote or Two

Publishing an article is not all congratulations and high-fives—but publishing has opened more doors for me than it closed. Sometimes people vehemently disagree with a published piece. These people generally fit into one of three categories: the defense community audience, an invested group like members of a specific branch, or individuals in the chain of command. While I never thought I was writing anything controversial, I have angered someone in each of these categories by crafting arguments on topics such as the Army’s body composition program, the service’s pursuit of long-range missiles, artillery employment, and incentivizing leadership. I often dismiss the negative comments I receive, laughing at being called a “candy man” or a “Russian propagandist.” When these comments came via email, I usually responded, “Thanks for reading my article.” As shown by my lighthearted response, I did not put much weight into the comments of strangers. Maybe I should. I have heard horror stories, the friend of a friend who was “blacklisted” in their community by some powerful colonel or senior Army civilian. However, a recent survey and my experiences suggest negative experiences are rare, with my writing more often opening doors.

The only time my writing came with a career risk was during the pre-publication process. As a young staff captain, I shared an early draft of an article about changing rocket artillery qualification tables with my chain of command. It was not well received. My battalion commander directed me to stand down. This was an eye-opening experience. I realized it was great to challenge the Army, but going directly against something the chain of command is passionate about could have repercussions. Fortunately, there is a way to approach this diplomatically. I chose to wait and published the article three years later. Others chose to write under a pseudonym.

Eddard Stark

While not standard practice today, authors can publish their articles with certain venues under a pen name.1 Most authors will never need to do this; your article is not as controversial as you think it is. But the option exists, perpetuating the fear of reprisals. Why else would they advertise it? War on the Rocks, for example, allows “writers to use pen names in the rare cases when their careers or personal safety would be at serious risk as a result of publishing an article on a specific topic.” In 2018, an Air Force colonel used this policy to speak out against the service’s management of its senior leaders. Colonel Jason Lamb wrote numerous articles under the Game of Thrones pseudonym Ned Stark before revealing his identity. But Lamb’s ideas did not receive the outrage he expected. Instead, the Air Force Chief of Staff offered Ned Stark a job and asked him to “please just keep writing. Your chief is reading and listening.” The institution wants dialogue, even if a select minority of leaders do not.

Conclusion

Publishing has an inherent risk; write enough, and someone will get angry. However, the dangers of professional writing are severely exaggerated and outweighed by the countless benefits. Conduct pre-publication reviews, bounce ideas off your boss or mentor, challenge ideas instead of people, and ignore reprisal rumors. Careers do not end over well-crafted arguments and good intentions, even if you have heard it happened to someone your friend’s friend used to work with.

MAJ Brennan Deveraux is a Strategist and Art of War Scholar serving as a National Security Researcher at the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the US Government.

Pseudonyms like “Captain Tenderhide” and “Private Heelclicker” were actually quite common in Army journals a century ago.

hardingproject.com · by Brennan Deveraux

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

ADVANCING CIVILIAN-MILITARY PARTNERSHIP

Strengthening Partnerships

Hamas May Not Have Enough Living Hostages for Cease-Fire Deal

The group is in discussions with Israel over releasing 40 women, children, elderly and sick captives

Biden Aims to Project United Front Against China at White House Summit

STATEMENT OF INTEREST1

Former top military officers push back on Trump immunity claim

Esper: Former military leaders should stay out of Trump immunity debate

Eggs, Ammo and Underwear: Inside Ukraine’s New Push Against Military Graft

Renewed efforts to overhaul procurement follow a series of scandals that provoked outcry in Ukraine and disquiet among allies

The Very High Stakes of Failing to Help Ukraine

Moscow Uses Russian Orthodox Church as Covert Foreign Policy Tool in Ukraine and the West

US, Japan announce generational upgrade to alliance amid China threat

Xinhua Commentaries: “Exposing the Three Major Political Deficits of the U.S.”

The Other Russian Dissident Putting His Life on the Line

Vladimir Kara-Murza risked everything by following Navalny into prison, compelled by history and his own forebears’ suffering

Army ‘feeling a lot better’ with recruiting this year, Wormuth says

United States-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement | The White House

FACT SHEET: Japan Official Visit with State Dinner to the United States | The White House

Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio of Japan in Joint Press Conference | The White House

House Lawmakers Strike Down FISA Renewal Measure

Topline

Key Facts

What To Watch For

Chief Critic

Crucial Quote

Key Background

Tangent

Further Reading

AUKUS Special Operations Forces in Strategic Competition, Integrated Deterrence, and Campaigning: Resistance to Malign Activities - Security & Defence PLuS Alliance

AUKUS Partners Focus on Indo-Pacific Security in Shaping Joint Capabilities

Assemble the Bodyguard of Lies: Strengthening US Military Deception Capabilities - Modern War Institute

Don’t Count on Us: Canada’s Military Unreadiness - War on the Rocks

Leadership, Culture, and the Military Cyber Workforce - War on the Rocks

Information warfare becoming a critical submarine capability: Aeschbach

Terrorists on the Rampage - Irregular Warfare Initiative

Secretive US cyber force deployed 22 times to aid foreign governments

Risk, Rumors, and Reprisals: The Imagined Side of Professional Writing

Origin Stories

An Anecdote or Two

Eddard Stark

Conclusion