Quotes of the Day:

"Problems that remain persistently insoluble should always be suspected as questions asked in the wrong way."

- Allan W. Watts [1915-73]

"If you are going to get anywhere in life you have to read a lot of books."

- author Roald Dahl [1916-90]

"The most common way people give up their power is by thinking they don’t have any.”

- Alice Walker

1. North Korea tests long-range ballistic missile, Seoul says

2. N.K. leader watches football match with daughter in celebration of his father's birthday

3. N. Korea fires 1 apparent long-range missile toward East Sea: S. Korean military

4. North Korea and Russia are ramping up trade in oil, coal and weapons as Ukraine war sanctions send Moscow to pariah state

5. Arms, Oil, and Coal: The Tumangang-Khasan Railroad Crossing - Beyond Parallel

6. The First Ladies of North Korea: Their Roles and Meaning

7. South Korea: Why support for nukes is on the rise

8. NSC 'strongly condemns N. Korea's long-range missile launch

9. South Korea and the U.S. to conduct ‘extended deterrence’ operation exercise at U.S. nuclear submarine base on Wednesday

10. The little red books of North Korea

11. ＜Emergency Interview＞ What did you think when you saw Kim Jong-un’s daughter at the military parade? “Nobody thinks that she will become successor”

12. Interview: “We told the children we were defecting. They said ‘thank you.’”

13. ＜Inside N. Korea＞Authorities begin recruiting poverty-stricken urban dwellers to move to farms with promises of food and housing

1. North Korea tests long-range ballistic missile, Seoul says

Happy belated birthday to Kim Jong Il? (16 FEB).

But I think this one is for us:

Japan’s Defense Ministry said the missile reached an altitude of 5,700 kilometers (3,541 miles) and flew a distance of about 900 kilometers (559 miles). It was launched from Pyongyang’s Sunan area around 5:22 p.m. local time Saturday, the South Korean JCS said.

Japanese officials said the missile flew for more than 60 minutes.

North Korea tests long-range ballistic missile, Seoul says

By Yoonjung Seo, Brad Lendon and Junko Ogura, CNN

Updated 6:33 AM EST, Sat February 18, 2023

https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/18/asia/north-korea-missile-launch-intl-hnk-ml/

In January, Kim Jong Un called for "an exponential increase of the country's nuclear arsenal."

KCNA/Reuters

Seoul, South KoreaCNN — 

North Korea launched a presumed long-range ballistic missile Saturday afternoon, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said, a day after Pyongyang warned of “unprecedented strong responses” if the US and South Korea go ahead with planned military exercises.

Japanese Prime MInister Fumio Kishida said the missile landed inside Japan’s exclusive economic zone west of the northern main island of Hokkaido.

Japan’s Defense Ministry said the missile reached an altitude of 5,700 kilometers (3,541 miles) and flew a distance of about 900 kilometers (559 miles). It was launched from Pyongyang’s Sunan area around 5:22 p.m. local time Saturday, the South Korean JCS said.

Japanese officials said the missile flew for more than 60 minutes.

North Korea launched a missile last March with a slightly longer flight distance and time. That projectile was believed to be an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), its first test of such a missile since 2017.

In November, after another similar launch, Pyongyang announced the “test firing of a new kind” ICBM, which it called the Hwasong-17.

Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada said at the time it had the potential to reach the US mainland. “The ICBM-class ballistic missile launched this time could have a range of over 15,000 km when calculated based on the flight distance of this ICBM,” Hamada said in a statement. “It depends on the weight of the warhead, but in that case, the US mainland would be included in the range.”

North Korea tests its missiles at a highly lofted trajectory. If they were fired at a flatter trajectory, they would in theory have the ability to reach the US mainland.

North Korean hackers extorted health care organizations to fund further cyberattacks, US and South Korea say

Earlier this month, the Kim Jong Un regime showcased almost at least 11 advanced ICBMs at a nighttime military parade in Pyongyang in the biggest display yet of what its state-run media described as North Korea’s “nuclear attack capability.”

Analysts said those missiles appeared to be Hwasong-17s.

Ankit Panda, a nuclear policy expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said on social media that if each missile in the parade were equipped with multiple nuclear warheads, they could represent enough volume to overwhelm US ballistic missile defenses.

Saturday’s test came after the North Korean Foreign Ministry lashed out at the United States and South Korea on Friday over their plans for upcoming military exercises.

Washington and Seoul are expected to hold nuclear tabletop drills next week at the Pentagon, the South Korean Defense Ministry said Friday. The allies are also expected to hold military drills next month in the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea, in the same statement, also said it would consider additional military action if the UN Security Council continues to pressure Pyongyang “as the United States wants.”

In January, Kim Jong Un called for “an exponential increase of the country’s nuclear arsenal” and highlighted the “necessity of mass-producing tactical nuclear weapons,” according to the country’s state media KCNA.

Kim had called for the development of a new “Intercontinental Ballistic Missile system,” capable of a rapid nuclear counterstrike, according to the KCNA report.

2. N.K. leader watches football match with daughter in celebration of his father's birthday

I wonder what Kim Ju Ae thinks is more fun: watching a soccer game, watching a missile launch, or having dinner with the generals.

N.K. leader watches football match with daughter in celebration of his father's birthday | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · February 18, 2023

SEOUL, Feb. 18 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has attended a football match with his daughter in celebration of his late father Kim Jong-il's birthday, state media reported Saturday.

Kim and his daughter, known as Ju-ae, watched the match between officials of the Cabinet and the Ministry of National Defence on Friday in commemoration of the two-day national holiday that began Thursday this year, according to the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

It marked the sixth public appearance by Kim's daughter and her first in a non-military event.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) watches a sports event with his daughter and other top officials on Feb. 17, 2023, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the next day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

The KCNA report did not mention her by name but called her Kim's "beloved daughter."

In photos released by state media, Kim and his daughter watch the game in a viewing stand with other top officials, including Premier Kim Tok-hun and Jo Yong-won, secretary for organizational affairs of the Central Committee of the ruling Workers' Party.

Kim was also seen smoking a cigarette next to his daughter, believed to be around 10 years old.

The leader's sister Kim Yo-jong also attended the match, although she is pictured sitting in the back row behind the leader in a corner, according to the pictures.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) watches a sports event with his daughter and other top officials on Feb. 17, 2023, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the next day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Observers said the event appears to be aimed at displaying the legitimacy of the "Paektu bloodline" of the Kim dynasty.

"The 'Paektu bloodline' members watching a football match on the Day of the Shining Star seems to be intended to show off their legitimacy and closeness," Yang Moo-jin, president of the University of North Korean Studies, said, referring to the holiday.

The game ended in a 3-1 victory for the defense ministry. The two sides also held a tug-of-war match, in which the defense ministry team won 2-0, according to the KCNA.

A football match between staff members of North Korea's Cabinet and the Ministry of National Defence take place on Feb. 17, 2023, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the next day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · February 18, 2023

3. N. Korea fires 1 apparent long-range missile toward East Sea: S. Korean military

Perhaps this is the "unprecedentedly persistent and strong counteraction"

Excerpt: 

On Friday, Pyongyang's foreign ministry warned the South and the U.S. will face "unprecedentedly persistent and strong" counteractions should they press ahead with their planned combined military drills.

(LEAD) N. Korea fires 1 apparent long-range missile toward East Sea: S. Korean military | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · February 18, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with JCS explanation; RECASTS headline, lead)

SEOUL, Feb. 18 (Yonhap) -- North Korea fired a suspected long-range ballistic missile toward the East Sea on Saturday, the South Korean military said, its second missile provocation this year.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the launch from the Sunan area in Pyongyang at 5:22 p.m. It did not provide other details immediately.

"While strengthening its monitoring and vigilance, our military is maintaining a full readiness posture in close cooperation with the United States," the JCS said in a text message sent to reporters.

This undated file photo released by the Korean Central News Agency shows a North Korean missile launch. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

The North previously fired a short-range ballistic missile on Jan. 1.

The latest launch came two days after the South's defense ministry published its new white paper that reinstated a reference to the North's regime and military as an "enemy."

Some observers raised the possibility that the launch could be staged in protest over a series of plans by the South and the U.S. to hold high-profile military exercises.

The allies plan to conduct a table-top exercise at the Pentagon next week under the scenario of nuclear use by the North. They are also scheduled to hold the regular springtime Freedom Shield exercise next month.

On Friday, Pyongyang's foreign ministry warned the South and the U.S. will face "unprecedentedly persistent and strong" counteractions should they press ahead with their planned combined military drills.

The South's defense ministry told parliament Friday the North could engage in various provocations, like rocket launches, as it has been pushing to develop a new intercontinental ballistic missile and put a military surveillance satellite into orbit.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · February 18, 2023

4. North Korea and Russia are ramping up trade in oil, coal and weapons as Ukraine war sanctions send Moscow to pariah state

One of the axes of evil.

North Korea and Russia are ramping up trade in oil, coal and weapons as Ukraine war sanctions send Moscow to pariah state

markets.businessinsider.com · by Phil Rosen

• A new CSIS report analyzed satellite imagery that suggests significantly increased trade between Russia and North Korea.
• Wartime sanctions have pushed Moscow to turn to railroad trade with Pyongyang, the researchers wrote.
• The sanctions chokehold on Russia increases the chances that railroad deliveries are being used to ease demands for munitions.

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A new report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies highlighted an uptick in railroad trade between Russia and North Korea over recent months.

Given the abundance of sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine, it's likely the ties are helping address Moscow's surge in weapons demand with North Korea getting energy commodities in return.

"The proliferation of railcars far outnumbers the number required to support the immediate nearby towns indicating a resurgence of railroad traffic between the two countries," the authors Joseph Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha, and Jennifer Jun wrote Friday.

They added that the level of goods transfers is returning to pre-COVID levels.

Trade between North Korea and Russia hit roughly $48 million in 2019, International Trade Centre data compiled by the Wall Street Journal shows. That dropped to nearly zero in 2021, with North Korea closing off its borders during the pandemic.

North Korea previously denied claims from a November report that said it was using the Tumangang-Khasan railroad crossing to sell artillery shells and rockets to Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary force that's fighting in Ukraine.

But the White House in January released satellite imagery of trains ferrying five shipping containers between the two nations, the Washington DC-based think tank noted.

"[T]he use of the Tumangang-Khasan railroad crossing for this arms sale indicates that this border crossing has witnessed a resurgence of strategic trade, sales, and transfer between the two countries," the authors wrote.

North Korea has the opportunity to capitalize on Russia's vast energy resources amid its own limited access to global markets and trade.

Russia, for its part, has been under ongoing economic strain from its invasion of Ukraine, and has been scrambling for inventories of munitions to replenish supplies used in Ukraine.

"North Korea benefits from this type of global instability," Rand Corp political scientist Naoko Aoki said in comments to The Wall Street Journal.

Since Russia first invaded Ukraine last February, North Korean state media has voiced support for Moscow's aggression and put blame on the US.

Similarly, over recent years, Russia has sided with North Korea in geopolitical conversations over sanctions on the Kim Jong-un's regime.

markets.businessinsider.com · by Phil Rosen

5. Arms, Oil, and Coal: The Tumangang-Khasan Railroad Crossing - Beyond Parallel

If the PRC-DPRK alliance is closer than lips and teeth, what is the Russian-north Korean "friendship?"

Images and graphics at the link:

https://beyondparallel.csis.org/arms-oil-and-coal-the-tumangang-khasan-railroad-crossing/

Arms, Oil, and Coal: The Tumangang-Khasan Railroad Crossing - Beyond Parallel

beyondparallel.csis.org · by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. · February 17, 2023

Economics

An approximate count of the railcars at Khasan and Tumangang shows the movement of railcars of various types as observed in recent commercially available imagery.

Key Findings

• Analysis of recent commercially available satellite imagery of the Russia–North Korea railroad crossing suggests significantly increased energy and economic trade between the two countries as Pyongyang seeks to tighten ties with Moscow.
• The proliferation of railcars far outnumbers the number required to support the immediate nearby towns indicating a resurgence of railroad traffic between the two countries.
• The railcars observed at the crossing vary in type and suggest that the transfers of coal, oil, and other goods are returning to pre-COVID levels.
• In November 2022, the Tumangang–Khasan railroad crossing was the site of an arms transfer from North Korea to Russia, reportedly for use by the Wagner Group.
• Commercial imagery since November does not show the same type of cars at either of the rail facilities, but this does not rule out other possible arms transfers as suggested by recent White House press statements. Not all imagery of such a sensitive nature will be made available to the public.
• The increased sanctions chokehold on Russia due to the war in Ukraine increases the likelihood that the railroad traffic observed at this border crossing is also being used to both offset economic sanctions and ease surge demands for munitions, as evidenced by the Wagner Group’s acquisition of North Korean arms.

Overview

In September, newly declassified U.S. intelligence revealed that Russia was buying millions of artillery shells and rockets from North Korea. As international sanctions restrict Russia’s weapons supply chains, the country has turned to sources such as Iran and North Korea.

A few months after this revelation and in response to North Korea’s repeated denial, the White House released satellite imagery of an “initial delivery…[of] infantry rockets and missiles into Russia for use by Wagner.” The delivery, which occurred in November of last year, is believed to have supplied the Wagner Group as part of North Korea’s support for Russian operations against Ukraine.

The White House-released images show the transfer of five “Russian railcars” at the Tumangang–Khasan railroad crossing (42.415397 130.641489). The five cars traveled from Russia to North Korea on November 18, 2022, and on the next day, North Korea loaded the railcars with shipping containers and returned them to Russia.

Images released during a White House press briefing by NSC Coordinator for Strategic Communications Johns Kirby on January 20, 2023. The images, taken on November 18, 2022, show the movement of five Russian railcars from Khasan, Russia, to Tumangang, North Korea, to supply North Korean arms to Russia’s Wagner Group. (White House)

In the same Maxar image from November 18, 2022, as released by the White House, the same five Russian railcars used in the arms transfer to Russia for Wagner are seen, along with workers at the nearby open-air storage facility. (Copyright © 2023 by Maxar Technologies). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.

The United States government did not specify how these railcars were confirmed to have been involved in arms sales to Wagner, which undoubtedly involved sensitive sources and methods of intelligence. However, the use of the Tumangang-Khasan railroad crossing for this arms sale indicates that this border crossing has witnessed a resurgence of strategic trade, sales, and transfer between the two countries.

While reports often describe movement between North Korea and China or Russia, these reports cannot be consistently verified solely by publicly available satellite imagery. However, satellite imagery does provide a general idea understanding of the volume and nature of railroad traffic between countries when viewed over an extended period.

Analysis of publicly available commercial satellite imagery from November 18, 2022—the date of the White House-released images—to January 2023 shows that the number of railcars present at this border crossing far outnumbers the amount needed to support the small Russian border town of Khasan and its immediate areas. Although none of the railcars in publicly available images match the precise sizes and shapes of the railcars reportedly used in the arms sales to Wagner and the specific nature of the imaged cross-border trade is unclear, much of the railroad traffic is likely related to supporting Russia in the face of the sanctions it faces due to the conflict in Ukraine.

Background

The Tumangang-Khasan railroad crossing (42.415397 130.641489) is in the northeast corner of North Korea along the Tumen River (두만강), approximately 33 kilometers from the Rason Specialize Economic Zone and on the border with Russia. The crossing consists of the Korean-Russian Friendship Bridge, Tumangang railyard, and Khasan railyard, and is North Korea’s sole railroad crossing with Russia.

The Tumangang railyard (42.417307 130.618461) is physically North Korea’s largest rail facility connecting to another country and includes a sizable petroleum products storage facility. In a 2018 report, previous to COVID-19, the Tumangang facilities were assessed to be active year-round, with approximately 45 – 80 locomotives and railcars of various types present at any given time. Of these, approximately 40 – 50 percent of the railcars were tank cars, likely used to support the movement of petroleum products as part of Russian energy assistance to the country. Although imagery over the past three years shows a decrease in the presence of railcars at the border as North Korea halted trade with the outside world, the railyard has seen a significant increase of activity over the past few months, including the construction of disinfection and quarantine structures.

Overview of the Tumangang-Khasan railroad crossing area, December 15, 2022. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2023). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.

Analysis of Recent Railcar Traffic

A review of more than 35 publicly available commercial satellite images of the border crossing and the two railyards acquired between November 2022 and January 2023 shows a significant level of railcar presence. Specifically, the number of railcars seen at the Khasan railyard far outnumber those required to support the small town of Khasan and its immediate areas, making it highly probable that the railcars are related to a resurgence of cross-border trade. Among the reviewed, images of sufficient quality were used to approximate the count of railcars using measurements of railcar lengths.

It Is important to note that none of the railcars seen in publicly available imagery resembled the exterior and measurement of the railcars involved in the reported arms sales to Wagner seen in the White House-released images. Additionally, the type of railcars—boxcars, ore cars, and likely petroleum tank cars—indicate that traffic between the two countries varies in the type of goods transported.

Close-up view of the Khasan rail facility, December 15, 2022. Ore cars and boxcars are seen at the station. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2023). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.

Close-up view of the Tumangang rail facility, December 15, 2022. Oil/petroleum tank cars seen at the station. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2023). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.

Tracking cross-border railcar movement on a daily basis is extremely challenging, if not impossible, using currently available commercial satellite imagery. However, an example of such traffic from Russia to North Korea was captured in December 2022. A Maxar image acquired on December 7, 2022, show several railcars, among which are three green boxcars with a smaller white railcar. A Planet image captured the following day, on December 8, 2022, of the Tumangang rail facility shows that these four railcars had been moved here and remain in the same order.

An approximate count of the railcars at Khasan and Tumangang shows the movement of railcars of various types as observed in recent commercially available imagery. Box cars (dashed lines) were seen at both Khasan and Tumangang. However, ore cars were only observed at Khasan, and oil/petroleum tank cars were only seen at Tumangang. An inconsistent pattern of railcar movement is typical at this border crossing, partially due to changes to export and usage cycles, as well as the limitation of commercial satellite imagery availability.

Close-up view of the Khasan rail facility, December 7, 2022. Three boxcars and a tank car are first seen at Khasan before traveling to North Korea by the next day. (Copyright © 2023 by Maxar Technologies). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.

Close-up view of the Tumangang rail facility, December 8, 2022. The same three boxcars and a tank car first seen at Khasan are seen at Tumangang. (Copyright © 2023 by Planet). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.

In the past, the trade between the two countries mainly served to support North Korea through the import of goods and energy assistance. However, today, the increased sanctions chokehold on Russia due to the war in Ukraine increases the likelihood that the traffic at the Tumangang–Khasan railroad crossing is also be used to both offset economic sanctions and ease surge demands for munitions, as evidenced by Wagner’s acquisition of North Korean arms.

While satellite imagery alone cannot conclusively identify the contents of the railcars traveling between the two countries, future observation of railcar traffic at the Tumangang-Khasan railroad crossing can provide a broad but useful indicator of the changing volume of trade activity between the two nations.

Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is an internationally recognized analyst, award-winning author, and lecturer on North Korean defense and intelligence affairs and ballistic missile development in developing countries. He is concurrently senior fellow for Imagery Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Security (CSIS); and senior adviser and imagery analyst for the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). Formerly, he has served as founder and CEO of KPA Associates, LLC, publisher and editor of KPA Journal, senior imagery analyst for 38 North, chief analytics officer and co-founder of AllSource Analysis, Inc., and senior all-source analyst for DigitalGlobe’s Analysis Center.

Victor Cha is senior vice president for Asia and Korea Chair and the inaugural holder of the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Jennifer Jun is project manager and research associate with the iDeas Lab and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Headline image Copyright © Airbus DS 2023

Special thanks to William Taylor for markups.

References

1. Julian E. Barnes, “Russia Is Buying North Korean Artillery, According to U.S. Intelligence,” The New York Times, September 5, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/05/us/politics/russia-north-korea-artillery.html.
2. “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and NSC Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby,” The White House, January 20, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2023/01/20/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-and-nsc-coordinator-for-strategic-communications-john-kirby-8/; DPRK Today, “Press Statement by Director General of U.S. Affairs of DPRK Foreign Ministry,” KCNA Watch, January 30, 2023, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1675076920-465635286/press-statement-by-director-general-of-department-of-u-s-affairs-of-dprk-foreign-ministry%e2%80%8b/.
3. “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and NSC Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby,” The White House, January 20, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2023/01/20/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-and-nsc-coordinator-for-strategic-communications-john-kirby-8/.
4. Ibid.
5. Victor Cha, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., and Marie DuMond, “Making Solid Tracks: North Korea’s Railway Connections with China and Russia,” Beyond Parallel, January 7, 2019, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/making-solid-tracks-north-koreas-railway-connections-china-russia/.
6. Colin Zwirko, “EXCLUSIVE: Photos reveal North Korean COVID ‘isolation ward’ on Russian border,” NK News, December 29, 2022, https://www.nknews.org/pro/exclusive-photos-reveal-north-korean-covid-isolation-ward-on-russia-border/.

beyondparallel.csis.org · by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. · February 17, 2023

6. The First Ladies of North Korea: Their Roles and Meaning

But there is precedent in north Korea to name a successor. Kim Il Sung named Kim Jong Il to be his successor in 1973-74 and he had 20 years to prepare and to consolidate power (i.e., eliminate opposition).

Excerpts:

I argue there is no reason to believe Kim Jong Un’s son, if he has one, will be introduced on a speedier timeline. Kim Jong Un likely believes he has years, even decades, to prepare. Announcing his son too early would only invite the threat of alternative power bases arising around his son.

If that is the case, it is obvious why his daughter Ju-ae is seen in public with her dad frequently. It is for the same reason Kim Yo Jong is the Regime messenger, Ju-ae will not succeed her father. No one in North Korea thinks she will. But she is useful for the messages the Regime wants to send.

At present, I don’t believe North Korea is primed to accept a female heir, nor do I think Kim Jong Un intends to try. I could be wrong about that, and if I am I will be the first to acknowledge it and write a piece explaining where my analysis went wrong.

The First Ladies of North Korea: Their Roles and Meaning

19fortyfive.com · by Anthony W. Holmes · February 17, 2023

The First Ladies of North Korea are again frequently turning up in global coverage of the reclusive state. I found myself intrigued by the media response to Kim Yo Jong, DPRK Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un’s sister, and now his daughter Ju Ae.

Kim Yo Jong came to international prominence while I was still special advisor for North Korea in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 2017-2021. There are obvious and undeniable reasons to track her statements and political movements. Her familial relationship to the Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un matters a great deal in North Korea’s hereditary absolute monarchy. After all, direct lineage to Regime demiurge Kim Il Sung is the source of legitimacy.

Since Kim Jong Un’s rise to power, most DPRK-watchers know Kim Yo Jong for her venom-filled threats against South Korea and the United States about the fortieth or so “red line” we have crossed that will merit our “remorseless punishment.” Many presumed she was being prepared to succeed her brother because at the same time the press was agog over the persistent health rumors and months-long disappearances from the public eye that have plagued Kim Jong Un.

I never thought this was likely. For one, there was a strange element of wish fulfillment to this speculation, as if editorial pages viewed Kim Yo Jong succeeding her brother as absolute ruler of the Hermit Kingdom to be somehow and oddly progressive. Did they expect her to make structural reforms, relax oppression, or reopen the country to the world? I am sure there are some third wave feminist denuclearization advocates who would argue that her ascension would resolve the peace process.

In my assessment, Kim Yo Jong’s media prominence reflects the opposite of the idea that she is a serious contender to replace her brother. She is used as a Regime mouthpiece to convey messages that have the official imprimatur, not only from her official positions but also in her familial status. She can issue the Regime’s trademark bombastic and pugilist tone with undeniable rhetorical authority. Kim Yo Jong is still a Kim family member after all. No one could doubt that her words are meant to convey authority.

Importantly, she can do so in a way that does not commit the Supreme Leader to a course of action. A Kim Yo Jong warning invites the adversary to respond “before it is too late.”

Using Kim Yo Jong in this way actually adds to Kim Jong Un’s mystique: i.e., he does not speak often, but when he does, thou shalt listen.

The Regime is media savvy (its crude insults notwithstanding). As someone who has actually met and negotiated with North Koreans, I can tell you the leadership knows exactly how we perceive them and use this to their advantage. A Kim Yo Jong statement can lead to a flurry of activity in Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo.

When I was special advisor for North Korea, a media alert on either Kim’s statement about military action or, in one specific example, the impending destruction of the Kaesong Liaison Office, could get me to drop what I was doing in the middle of the evening and either head to work or start sending emails to the higher-ups in the Department.

Beyond this “clearly official but not final” Regime spokeswoman role, Kim Yo Jong likely functions as a chief of staff and gatekeeper for the military, state, and party apparatus. In North Korea, one’s official position is not as important as their proximity to the leader, which Kim Yo Jong is probably charged with guarding. Kim Jong Un would only trust her in this role if she were both viewed as supremely loyal while also not considered too ambitious and a serious candidate to succeed him.

So what about his daughter Ju Ae? Are her frequent appearances with her father a sign of likely succession planning? Also, I do not think so.

Some of the speculation about Kim’s daughter appearing in public is because it feels unusual. And it is. For all of his many faults, Kim Jong Un has worked to demystify his image in the country. With that comes a demystification of the Regime’s members.

Whereas his grandfather Kim Il Sung was the infallible, near-divine founder of the State possessed of all worldly virtues, his son and second-generation ruler Kim Jong Il was a demigod whom nature itself knelt before and celebrated. Kim Jong Il’s chief virtue, the propagandists crafted, was supernatural concern for his people. Working himself to death in constant struggle for them is what killed him according to the official hagiography.

Kim Jong Un appears to shun these characterizations. It still creeps in occasionally with the way he tries to emulate Kim Il Sung in dress and mannerism. However, Kim Jong Un is presented as a family man embodying the virtues of the Korean people. He suffered COVID-19 and the economic crises with his people. He celebrates major milestones with them.

Kim is believed to have three children, one of which is reportedly a son. If the son exists, it is almost certain he has not yet been revealed. North Korea likes to practice what Morgan Clippinger called in 1981 quasi-religious and gnostic “semi esoteric communication.”

Before Kim Jong Il’s unveiling as heir apparent, state media referred to him as the “glorious party center” among other titles less befitting a human being than an institution. Kim Jong Il was more than a man, he was an idea incarnate.

Kim Jong Il had three known sons, one of whom Kim Jong Un had murdered in a Malaysian airport. By all accounts, Kim Jong Un had been heir presumptive for some time, and his father was grooming him for his arrival on the national scene. However, Kim Jong Il’s rapidly deteriorating health meant Kim Jong Un did not have time for a methodical coming out party.

I argue there is no reason to believe Kim Jong Un’s son, if he has one, will be introduced on a speedier timeline. Kim Jong Un likely believes he has years, even decades, to prepare. Announcing his son too early would only invite the threat of alternative power bases arising around his son.

If that is the case, it is obvious why his daughter Ju-ae is seen in public with her dad frequently. It is for the same reason Kim Yo Jong is the Regime messenger, Ju-ae will not succeed her father. No one in North Korea thinks she will. But she is useful for the messages the Regime wants to send.

At present, I don’t believe North Korea is primed to accept a female heir, nor do I think Kim Jong Un intends to try. I could be wrong about that, and if I am I will be the first to acknowledge it and write a piece explaining where my analysis went wrong.

A 19FortyFive Contributing Editor, Anthony W. Holmes is a Florida-based senior non-resident fellow at Project 2049 and was special advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs from 2017-2021. You can connect with him on LinkedIn.

19fortyfive.com · by Anthony W. Holmes · February 17, 2023

7. South Korea: Why support for nukes is on the rise

Is the ROK/US Alliance fragile? My assessment is that it is not. However, there is a perception among some and perhaps many that the US commitment may be waning - despite the fact that we have 28,500 troops on the peninsula.  

I think this is more emotion and bias than objectivity. One should be able to see the commitment with the amount of resources that continue to be committed to ensure readiness and interoperability (to include with strategic assets). The return to a high state of combined readiness as well as the focus on extended deterrence and activities to support that and the sustained high level engagement across the elements of national power (diplomatic, economic, and military) all indicate the importance of the linchpin alliance to the national security and prosperity of both countries. But alas, there are actions that bring into question our commitment, namely the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the slow start of support to Ukraine, even if these are apples to oranges comparisons.  

LAstly we should keep in mind that these perceptions are exactly the kind of effects Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy are designed to create. Two major objectives of the strategy is to weaken the ROK government and society and to drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance. We must recognize the regime strategy, understand it, expose it, and attack with a superior political warfare strategy. 

When you contribute to the friction in the alliance you are supporting Kim Jong Un's strategy. That does not mean you cannot or should not criticize ROK or US strategy and actions or both, because we need that debate and transparency and we need to live within our values which includes criticism of the government through freedom of speech. I just wish critics would caveat their criticisms with an acknowledgement of the regime's strategy and remind people that our alliance is stronger because of criticism and it will not be weakened as Kim desires. It is helpful to inoculate the public (and the pundits, press, and politicos) in both the ROK and US against the regime strategy.

Excerpts:

Others in the South have been alarmed at the perceived fragility of the security alliance that has tied the US to Seoul since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.

While in power, President Donald Trump strong-armed Seoul into sharply increasing the amount it paid to keep US troops in the South by threatening to withdraw US forces from the peninsula.

More recently, questions have been asked about Washington's commitment to the alliance as trade frictions have grown.

South Korea: Why support for nukes is on the rise – DW – 02/17/2023

DW

A new study indicates that more than 76% of South Koreans believe the nation should develop and deploy its own nuclear weapons to serve as a deterrent, with China seen as the biggest threat to peace in the region but North Korea also a constant cause for concern.

Perhaps surprisingly, analysts point out, support for an independent nuclear capability has support from across the political spectrum in South Korea.

Conservatives insist an arsenal of nuclear weapons is necessary to fend off the threat posed by Beijing. China has in recent years been aggressively expanding its control of the South China Sea, is demanding control over Taiwan and has made increasingly bold territorial claims against many of its neighbors, including South Korea.

The unpredictable Kim Jong Un-led regime in Pyongyang has also been investing heavily in its nuclear and long-range missile capabilities in recent years, with analysts predicting an eighth underground nuclear test at the North's Punggye-ri proving grounds in the coming months.

Fragility of the alliance with US

Others in the South have been alarmed at the perceived fragility of the security alliance that has tied the US to Seoul since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.

While in power, President Donald Trump strong-armed Seoul into sharply increasing the amount it paid to keep US troops in the South by threatening to withdraw US forces from the peninsula.

More recently, questions have been asked about Washington's commitment to the alliance as trade frictions have grown.

Japan, South Korea put new focus on militaries

The US has taken a firmer stance on imports of South Korean electric vehicles and is shifting away from a long reliance on Korean semiconductor manufacturers.

The sense, among some, is that if Washington cannot be trusted on trade, then how can Seoul be absolutely certain US forces will be committed in the event of another invasion from the North or a threat to South Korean national security from China?

Even some to the left of the political spectrum are throwing their support behind a homegrown nuclear capability. They say it would permit Seoul to rely less heavily on the defensive umbrella provided by the US, enable a drawdown of US military personnel and ensure that South Koreans made decisions for themselves on matters of national security.

Announced on January 30, the latest study on attitudes towards a domestic nuclear deterrent was conducted by the Chey Institute for Advanced Studies, with 60.7% of the respondents to the think tank's questionnaire saying they believe South Korea is "somewhat in need" of developing its own nuclear weapons. An additional 15.9% said a nuclear deterrent is "very much in need."

A mere 3.1% of those polled said the South has absolutely no need for its own nuclear weapons, while a further 20.3% responded that there is "little need” for a domestic nuclear deterrent.

"I believe that we are in a situation in which China is emerging and becoming a huge threat and the US is trying to compete with South Korea," said Hyobin Lee, an adjunct professor of politics at Chungnam National University.

"The fact that the US does not subsidize Korean electric vehicles and tries to compete in the semiconductors industry is creating anxiety for South Korea," she told DW.

Trust in the nuclear umbrella

"South Koreans do not trust the nuclear umbrella provided by the US," she added. "How can we trust someone for protection if they treat us as a competitor?"

Nevertheless, there is a fear that China's increasingly aggressive moves in the Indo-Pacific will ultimately lead to conflict.

"Antipathy towards China is increasing day by day," Lee said. "According to one survey, about 80% of Koreans say they have antipathy toward China, which is the highest rate in history. Many Koreans believe that there is a relatively high possibility that China and North Korea could attack South Korea."

Debate over the South's nuclear ambitions have been stoked once more by an apparently offhand comment by President Yoon Suk-yeol about the nation's defense optionsImage: YONHAP/AP/dpa/picture alliance

The Chey Institute study comes on the heels of a series of similar polls that all point in a similar direction — increasing support for a domestic nuclear capability. In recent years, research by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs put the figure at 71% of the public, while another study by the Asian Institute for Policy Studies determined the support rate to be 70.2%.

Karl Friedhoff, an author of the Chicago Council report, pointed out that the support rate for nuclear weapons is higher in the latest study, although he noted that the methodology employed differed from earlier polls.

His own study emphasized that the acquisition of nuclear weapons was "once a topic for the political fringe" but has now become a mainstream element of security discussions.

The report added that support for nuclear weapons was "robust," with far greater support for domestic control over an atomic arsenal than for Washington deploying its own weapons in South Korea to act as a deterrent.

Some 67% of the Korean public favor an independent nuclear capability, against just 9% who want the US to base its weapons in the South.

Friedhoff also suggested yet another reason for that solid support, a concept called "unwanted use theory."

According to the theory, as the credibility of US power and preparedness to use nuclear weapons from bases in South Korea increases, that paradoxically makes the South more of a target for its regional rivals, either as a pre-emptive strike or in retaliation.

Debate over the South's nuclear ambitions has been stoked once more by an apparently offhand comment by President Yoon Suk-yeol about the nation's defense options. In January, he said his nation might need to acquire a nuclear capability or, at the very least, play a more active role in managing US weapons that could be reintroduced to the South.

Prepared for North Korea's nukes

Official opposition

"The present position of the government is opposed to a domestic nuclear weapons program in South Korea," Friedhoff said. "However, they do seem to be seeking a return of tactical nuclear weapons or nuclear sharing."

Fearful of proliferation and a strong, united response from China and North Korea, the US is opposed to both options. Yet, if South Korea were to try to create its own nuclear deterrent, Friedhoff estimates it would take less than one year to develop a weapon.

"I think it is important to note that even if South Korea develops nuclear weapons, where is it going to put them?" Friedhoff said. "The land mass is restricted and any nuclear installations would be near a population center. That will draw more protests. Thus, it seems likely that any South Korean weapons program would have to be naval based."

Any plans for an independent nuclear capability would inevitably be condemned by South Korea's regional rivals, primarily North Korea and China, as a deliberate effort to destabilize the region and would likely trigger retaliatory economic sanctions from Beijing.

Japan would be likely to express its concerns, while the US can be expected to resist efforts by the South to develop and deploy atomic weapons on the grounds that it opposes nuclear proliferation.

Any such decision would also mean Seoul would be abandoning its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, with implications for its civilian nuclear energy program.

Equally, while they are significantly outnumbered, the analysts say, the 24% of the Korean public opposed to nuclear weapons have not yet begun to speak out.

"The Korean people are not in a situation where they can easily and quickly possess their own nuclear weapons, even if they want to," said Lee. "South Korea should respect the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and it will not be easy to break this promise it has signed."

Every Friday, DW Asia editors put together a collection of the week's best stories from around the continent. You can sign up here for the weekly DW Asia newsletter.

Edited by: Srinivas Mazumdaru

DW

8. NSC 'strongly condemns N. Korea's long-range missile launch

(LEAD) NSC 'strongly condemns N. Korea's long-range missile launch | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · February 18, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with more details; RECASTS headline, lead)

SEOUL, Feb. 18 (Yonhap) -- The presidential National Security Council (NSC) "strongly" condemned North Korea's latest long-range missile launch Saturday, vowing stern measures against any attempt by the North to threaten South Korea.

National Security Adviser Kim Sung-han presided over a meeting of the NSC standing committee after the North fired a long-range ballistic missile toward the East Sea.

The committee members "strongly condemned the North's latest missile firing as a grave violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions and a serious provocation that heightens tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in the region," the presidential office said in a statement.

The NSC warned North Korea will only face tougher sanctions by the international community if it continues to stage weapons provocations, while turning a blind eye to North Koreans' human rights and lives amid a chronic food shortage.

The standing members also said South Korea and the United States will strengthen defense capabilities against the North through their planned joint military exercise, including the allies' table-top exercise set for next week and regular springtime drills next month.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the launch from the Sunan area in Pyongyang at 5:22 p.m. and that the missile, fired at a lofted angle, flew some 900 kilometers.

This undated file photo released by the Korean Central News Agency shows a North Korean missile launch. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · February 18, 2023

9. South Korea and the U.S. to conduct ‘extended deterrence’ operation exercise at U.S. nuclear submarine base on Wednesday

What an excellent location. I do not recall a Korean exercise ever taking place at such a location. I am sure the counterintelligence personnel will be on the lookout for an influx of north Korean and Chinese operatives in the area.

Also note:

The military announced plans to conduct a joint Korea-U.S. exercise called Freedom Shield (FS) in mid-March. This 11-day exercise will be the longest to date and will not be divided into parts one and two. It will include large-scale outdoor maneuvering exercises, such as the combined landing exercise with twin dragons.

South Korea and the U.S. to conduct ‘extended deterrence’ operation exercise at U.S. nuclear submarine base on Wednesday

donga.com

Posted February. 18, 2023 04:16,

Updated February. 18, 2023 04:16

South Korea and the U.S. to conduct ‘extended deterrence’ operation exercise at U.S. nuclear submarine base on Wednesday. February. 18, 2023 04:16. by Sang-Ho Yun ysh1005@donga.com.

The Deterrence Strategy Committee Table-top Exercise (DSC TTX), simulating a scenario of a North Korean nuclear attack, will be held on Wednesday at the Kings Bay Naval Base in Georgia, U.S. This would be the first TTX since the defense ministers of South Korea and the U.S. have agreed to hold an annual meeting to enhance extended deterrence at the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) last year. Representatives from both countries, including Deputy Minister for Defense Policy Heo Tae-geun, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Siddhartha Mohandas, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Richard Johnson, will be in attendance. Several officials from the U.S. Strategic Command and the Indo-Pacific Command, who oversee the country's nuclear forces, will also participate.

The Kings Bay Base houses five to six Ohio-class strategic nuclear submarines (SSBNs) of the U.S. Navy. Along with the LGM-30 Minuteman (ICBM) and strategic nuclear bombers, these submarines are considered one of the U.S.'s three major nuclear powers. Each submarine is equipped with approximately 20 multiple warhead nuclear-equipped submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) for carrying out nuclear retaliatory missions in response to an enemy nuclear attack. A military official said, “This location was chosen as the practice site to issue the strongest extended deterrence warning to North Korea. We are also planning to schedule a tour inside of the nuclear submarine after the exercise for the officials from South Korea and the U.S.”

The military announced plans to conduct a joint Korea-U.S. exercise called Freedom Shield (FS) in mid-March. This 11-day exercise will be the longest to date and will not be divided into parts one and two. It will include large-scale outdoor maneuvering exercises, such as the combined landing exercise with twin dragons.

On Friday, a spokesperson for North Korea's foreign ministry issued a threatening statement, saying “North Korea would respond with an unprecedentedly strong response.” Some analysts have raised concerns that the North may be using the joint training exercise as an excuse to justify a provocation. A military official said, “We are closely monitoring the situation, particularly regarding the launch of a new ICBM, the possibility of a seventh nuclear test, and the potential for strategic provocations or localized armed demonstrations.

한국어

donga.com

10.  The little red books of North Korea

It is hard for us to appreciate how important these Ten Monolithic Principles are to rule in north Korea.

To read about the Monolithic Guidance System (MGS) and the Monolithic Ideology System (MIS) I recommend reading Robert Collins' HRNK Report, North Korea's Organization and Guidance Department: The Control Tower of Human Rights Denial,  at this link:  https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Collins_OGD_Web.pdf

Excerpt from the below article:

The Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System (Dangui yuilsasangchegyehwangnibui 10dae wonchik) were first published in 1974 and serve a singular goal: unquestioning loyalty and obedience to Kim Il-sung, Kim Jung-il, and, now, Chairman Kim Jong-un.

It's not about faith in the one God above and forsaking all false idols, but instead a selfless devotion to the leadership of the country. You can find the Ten Principles online, including information on how they've changed over time. The most recent 2013 edition begins with the following admonition: "We must give our all in the struggle to unify the entire society with Kimilsungism and Kimjongilism." Imagine being so influential in society your very name becomes an "ism"?! Seven of the 10 principles feature those names. This illustrates the nature of the "personality cult" that exists in the country. The ruling family are the embodiment of the state. It is a theocracy in all but name. Those 10 principles, and the documents and pamphlets on which they are written, act as the most important document to a North Korean on a daily basis. And yet despite this importance, the 10 principles are not written on banners around the city. They are hidden from outsiders' eyes. The real North Korea remains, as it always has, for North Koreans only.

The little red books of North Korea

The Korea Times · February 18, 2023

Courtesy of Kelly SikkemaBy David A. Tizzard

In the department stores of Pyongyang, you will find a whole host of items for sale. These places are, on the whole, relatively well-stocked ― even carrying what looks like versions of IKEA furniture (though one would rightly question the legality of them being there). One of the more curious items for sale, however, is a little red book. Hardback and, at first glance, no different from any other diary or notepad you might find elsewhere in the world. Yet these little red books serve a special purpose: they are used for carrying out one's "life review" (saenghwal ch'onghwa). For this reason, the books are empty. A simple white canvas on which a person can confess their shortcomings and, at the same time, praise the higher powers tasked with guiding them.

Although the red books are blank and contain nothing other than empty pages, a visitor to Pyongyang is not allowed to buy one. Even emptiness is off limits to us. The books rest above a sign stating as such, tantalizingly close but yet forever forbidden. You can, however, find some examples of them online if you get your Google terms correct.

A life review doesn't sound too extraordinary to those of us used to the mind-numbing boredom and bureaucracy of modern capitalism, assigned readings of the meditations of Marcus Aurelius at school, or diligently following the instructions of the various self-help books so that we might find our inner penguin. However, the life review is a weekly duty for the people of North Korea. Where we might keep a diary or a journal in which to document our lives and seek to better ourselves for personal reasons, in North Korea the reasons are far more extrinsic. Instead of counting calories or cheat days, this is about monitoring one's ideological purity. Citizens are required to document where they have fallen short in their day-to-day actions, specifically related to the 10 guiding principles to which they are asked to adhere. People are also tasked with criticizing others based on these standards. If this already feels akin to a religious practice, that's because it is. However, although there is a clear Christian influence, particularly in the number of principles and the requirement for weekly confession, there is nothing that explicitly regulates a person's sex life or diet.

The Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System (Dangui yuilsasangchegyehwangnibui 10dae wonchik) were first published in 1974 and serve a singular goal: unquestioning loyalty and obedience to Kim Il-sung, Kim Jung-il, and, now, Chairman Kim Jong-un.

It's not about faith in the one God above and forsaking all false idols, but instead a selfless devotion to the leadership of the country. You can find the Ten Principles online, including information on how they've changed over time. The most recent 2013 edition begins with the following admonition: "We must give our all in the struggle to unify the entire society with Kimilsungism and Kimjongilism." Imagine being so influential in society your very name becomes an "ism"?! Seven of the 10 principles feature those names. This illustrates the nature of the "personality cult" that exists in the country. The ruling family are the embodiment of the state. It is a theocracy in all but name. Those 10 principles, and the documents and pamphlets on which they are written, act as the most important document to a North Korean on a daily basis. And yet despite this importance, the 10 principles are not written on banners around the city. They are hidden from outsiders' eyes. The real North Korea remains, as it always has, for North Koreans only.

It is worth saying something about this type of life. A life that many of us are not only unfamiliar with, but may simply never even comprehend. It is not, for example, South Korea under the military dictatorships of the 1980s. That was a time when certain topics were off limits (mostly the North and Marxism), but for the most part citizens were free to do as they please. Life in North Korea, however, even today is something entirely different. It is a life we will never understand. Like a frog trying to communicate with a scorpion.

In the British Secret Intelligence Service archives is a letter from the KGB double-agent Oleg Gordievsky to the MI6 director Sir Maurice Oldfield. In an effort to describe his decision to ultimately reveal the inner workings of the Soviet Union to their erstwhile Cold War enemy, as well as the psychological toll it took on the inhabitants of Moscow, Gordievsky said, "The decision has been preceded by a long spiritual struggle and by agonizing emotion, and an even deeper disappointment at developments in my own country and my own experiences have brought me to the belief that democracy, and the tolerance of humanity that follows it, represents the only road for my country. The present regime is the antithesis of democracy to an extent which Westerners can never fully grasp."

Obviously the Soviet Union is not North Korea and Pyongyang is not Moscow. The countries however share deeper connections than many casual observers may realize. The story of the North Korea starts with the Soviet occupation of the country. The responsibility of turning a zone of chaos into a functioning national unit was given to the Soviet 25th Army under the command of Colonel-General Ivan Chistyakov. North Korea was born in a time of political and social anarchy as ideological and regional factions sought power. Rather than portraits of the Kims, images of Stalin and Lenin use to adorn the walls of power. To centralize operations amidst the chaos, it was the Soviet Marshal Kirill Meretskov who chose Pyongyang over Hamhung as the nascent state's capital.

The same desire to regulate the control of information continues today in North Korea as it once did in the Soviet Union. It is psychological. It is physical. And it takes place in empty little red books that we're not allowed to buy.

To learn more about these books, listen to Jacco Zwetsloot share stories about his visits to Pyongyang on the latest episode of the Korea Deconstructed podcast.

Dr. David A. Tizzard (datizzard@swu.ac.kr) has a Ph.D. in Korean Studies and lectures at Seoul Women's University and Hanyang University. He is a social/cultural commentator and musician who has lived in Korea for nearly two decades. He is also the host of the Korea Deconstructed podcast, which can be found online. The views expressed in the article are the author's own and do not reflect the editorial direction of The Korea Times.

The Korea Times · February 18, 2023

11.  ＜Emergency Interview＞ What did you think when you saw Kim Jong-un’s daughter at the military parade? “Nobody thinks that she will become successor”

＜Emergency Interview＞ What did you think when you saw Kim Jong-un’s daughter at the military parade? “Nobody thinks that she will become successor”

asiapress.org

Kim Jong-un with his daughter at the military parade. Published in the Rodong Sinmun on February 9.

The North Korean regime conducted a military parade to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Army during the evening hours of February 8. Kim Jong-un was accompanied by his wife, Ri Sol-ju, and his daughter (who the South Korean government believes is called “Ju-ae”). ASIAPRESS conducted an interview with a woman living in the northern part of the country soon after she had viewed the military parade on TV. (KANG Ji-won / ISHIMARU Jiro)

◆ Why is N. Korea holding a military parade when it can’t even feed its own people?

―― North Korea held a major military parade recently. What did you feel when you saw it?

Our lives are difficult and even if we have nuclear weapons and missiles, the most urgent thing we need is rice. It’s hard to survive, so people’s focus is on government rations; in other words, state-run stores.

※ State-run stores began selling food at prices cheaper than food found in local markets after the start of the pandemic. They have far from enough in stock to feed consumers, but ordinary people welcome them nonetheless because they lack money to buy food from markets.

―― What was the response to the military parade from people around you?

There were people who asked why (the government) is holding a military parade when all everyone is worried about is how they’ll survive this year.

◆ What did you think about KJU’s daughter, “Ju-ae?”

―― Kim Jong-un brought his daughter, “Ju-ae,” with him to the military parade. What were your thoughts about this?

There was a lot of interest toward Kim Ju-ae when she accompanied her father (back in November), but nobody showed much interest toward her this time.

―― Kim Jong-un treated her with a lot of affection.

There were people who said they thought that Kim Jong-un was trying to show that he was the same as everyone else in showing affection to his child.

◆ Is Ju-ae KJU’s successor? That can’t be, can it?

―― Some observers believe that Ju-ae appeared at the military parade in preparation for her to become her father’s successor. What do you think about that?

Her? That can’t be, can it? She’s a woman, so how could she become (a ruler of the country)? I don’t believe that anyone thinks that Ju-ae can become the fourth generation of leadership of the country. I’ve heard rumors that she’s a genius in the fields of physics and chemistry and that she is serving as an advisor to her father. I don’t know (if the rumors) are true. The authorities cracked down a lot on all the rumors that spread about Ju-ae.

―― North Koreans don’t think that Ju-ae can become her father’s successor, then?

Right now, people don’t even have enough to eat, so it’s not clear whether how many of them will survive to see Ju-ae become her father’s successor. There’s a lot of people suffering from illnesses, and many people are dying from malnutrition. The authorities conduct autopsies on people who die, but never say in the autopsies that someone has died of starvation. They just issue documents saying that everyone has died of illnesses.

In a February 10 article, Radio Free Asia (RFA) claimed that the authorities are forcing women with the name Ju-ae to change their names. The woman interviewed by ASIAPRESS for this article says that she “never heard about that government order and that it doesn’t exist, as far as I know.”

※ ASIAPRESS communicates with reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea

asiapress.org

12. Interview: “We told the children we were defecting. They said ‘thank you.’”

I look forward to reading the English translation of this book. This confirms what her husband told some of us a few years ago when he visited DC, a big part of the reason for defecting was their sons.

Interview: “We told the children we were defecting. They said ‘thank you.’”

Wife of high-profile North Korean defector tells story from her family’s perspective

By Do Hyung Han for RFA Korean

2023.02.15

rfa.org

O Hye-son is the wife of Thae Yong-ho, who in 2016 was North Korea’s deputy ambassador to the United Kingdom when the family decided to defect from the North to resettle in the South. Thae became the highest ranking North Korean official to switch sides.

Less than four years after they arrived in Seoul, Thae won a local election and became a member of the National Assembly representing the wealthy Gangnam district of Seoul.

Though South Korean and Western media have been eager to tell Thae’s former North Korean diplomat defector turned South Korean politician story, very little about the rest of the family had garnered much attention, until now.

In O’s recently published book, “The Pyongyang Lady Who Came From London,” she discusses her background as a member of North Korea’s elite class, her impressions of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, the family’s experiences abroad and how and why they decided to defect. Do Hyung Han of Radio Free Asia’s Korean Service spoke with O to learn more about her family’s story. The interview has been edited for length and clarity.

RFA: You were born into one of the more privileged classes in North Korea, the so-called “anti-Japanese partisan” class, so you grew up enjoying enormous privileges compared to most people. What is it that made you think that maybe something was not right?

O: When I was a student at the Pyongyang Foreign Language Academy, there was another person from an anti-Japanese partisan family like me, but I saw the entire family disappear overnight. No matter how much power a partisan might have, I always felt that it could happen to me like that at a moment’s notice.

When I lived in North Korea, I always thought that the hard life we all experienced would be temporary, but I realized that everything was so different when I came overseas. The way you live is different. I learned about the corruption of the Kim family in North Korea. I often thought that North Korea offered no prospects for our future.

RFA: During your first stint in the U.K., you watched your children growing up in a situation so different from North Korea, what was it like when you all had to go back in 2008?

O: My kids were glowing with happiness in the United Kingdom. They knew freedom and how to solve their problems in a democratic way. They had known nothing but happiness, but then we went back to North Korea. After a year there, they became skinny. I began to worry. “Will I lose my children? Will they become ill?”

Since my oldest child was very sick [with kidney disease], I was concerned that he would get sick again and again. My children were always frowning. Of course, they tried to hide it, but I could tell. When we lived in the United Kingdom, there were orderly norms like right and wrong. Like, if I do this, I’m a good kid and I should do such things. But North Korea is a country without laws. I felt like my children were becoming bad kids. I was upset with how things were changing like that.

RFA: In the book, you said that when you were living in the United Kingdom, you talked with your husband a lot about defecting. Specifically, when you talked about your children, you said that the conversation always ended with the decision that the children should stay abroad. Can you elaborate?

O: There is an exercise course that allows us to return in an hour from the North Korean Embassy. Every night before dinner, when we walked there, I led the conversation and talked about the uncertainties in our future. Every time, the conclusion was that we had to leave the children here, not making them go back to North Korea. Then, when North Korea told us to send my children back in, my husband asked me again if I’m really determined to defect.

RFA: What was the reaction when you told your children that the family would defect from North Korea?

O: The first thing they said was “thank you.” I didn’t know that they would react that way. I was determined that I had to take my children no matter what, but I was worried about what I should do and how I would accept it if they said no.

My child went to talk to his father and said thank you. He said, “If Dad thinks so, I’m thankful.” So we came to realize that it was something they had been waiting for.

My youngest also said thank you. Even now, they are still grateful. They say that their Mom and Dad did everything they could do for them. They said that we did everything we could to bring them to South Korea.

United Future Party candidate Thae Yong Ho, a former North Korean diplomat who defected to South Korea in 2016, reacts after he was certain to secure victory in the parliamentary election in Seoul, South Korea, April 16, 2020. Credit: Newsis via AP

RFA: If the two of you had no children, would you have still defected?

O: I don’t think so because we have family members in North Korea. I think mothers have strength because they have children. With no fear, I must do whatever I can for my children, no matter what. I could not let my children live such a terrible life [in North Korea.]

RFA: In the book, you evaluated Kim Jong Un as “a dictator who surpasses his predecessors.” In what way is he worse than his father Kim Jong Il, or his grandfather Kim Il Sung?”

O: He’s ruthless. There is a documentary film that showed how he guided the training of the People’s Army units. It’s a film meant to introduce Kim Jong Un. He instructed the training of the military units onsite. The training regimen he led was a round-trip long distance swim in which generals older than himself were made to wear military uniforms and then had them swim to and from a destination out at sea. As I watched it, I thought that even Kim Jong Il had never driven such older people so hard into the sea.

RFA: In your book, you said that Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un have turned North Korea into a large prison. What exactly do you mean?

O: First of all, you can’t go out, you can’t come in. You can’t hear things freely. You listen to this. You don’t listen to that. You can sell this or you can wear that. You are allowed to say these things. What country regulates life in such ways? You can only control people like that in prison. Don’t look, don’t listen. I think it’s wrong to treat North Koreans this way.

RFA: What made you decide to write the book? Also, what plans do you have for the future?

O: The reason I wrote this book is to cherish freedom. I wrote it with the hope that the readers would also cherish freedom. What I wish for in the future is that I would be able to tell people more about the lives of North Koreans and to write something that connects the broken physical and emotional bonds between the people of North and South Korea.

RFA: Your father passed away before you defected. What would he say if he saw how you and your family were living today?

O: I think he would say “Good job, I’m glad you left, and I hope you live well.”

Translated by Claire Shinyoung Oh Lee and Leejin J. Chung. Edited by Eugene Whong.

rfa.org

13. ＜Inside N. Korea＞Authorities begin recruiting poverty-stricken urban dwellers to move to farms with promises of food and housing

＜Inside N. Korea＞Authorities begin recruiting poverty-stricken urban dwellers to move to farms with promises of food and housing

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(FILE PHOTO) An elderly woman collecting grains from a field that has already been harvested. Taken by ASIAPRESS at a farm field in Sinuiju, North Pyongan Province, in November 2012.

◆ Poverty-stricken urban dwellers head to farms, which offer conditions that are little better

After the authorities in North Hamgyung Province began recruiting people living in urban areas to migrate to farm villages with promises that the state would provide them with food and housing, there has been a flood of people suffering from poverty interested in the offer. North Korea’s collective farms continue to suffer from a chronic shortage of labor, and the rise in urbanites suffering poverty due to the economic troubles of the past several years seemed to offer a solution for the labor shortage. However, there are already problems emerging in how well farming communities can accommodate the influx of volunteers. (KANG Ji-won / ISHIMARU Jiro)

In Hoeryong, North Hamgyung Province, the authorities made attractive promises to people as they began efforts to recruit them for migration into farming communities. These promises included guaranteed housing, three months’ worth of food, and land people can farm on freely with any cost to themselves. In regards to the recruitment efforts, an ASIAPRESS reporting partner gave the following report earlier this month:

“The efforts to recruit urbanites for migration to farms began with a Workers’ Party order. The recruitment efforts are focusing on the younger generation. Recruiters are focusing on people under difficult circumstances working at state-run factories and enterprises and are offering them three months’ worth of corn, a place to live, and 120 pyeong (around 4,269 square meters of land) of farmland free of charge. There’s a lot of people applying for the opportunity from among those suffering from poverty. (Recruiters) say that people will be placed the farming community of their choice.”

The trend in China-North Korea trade figures over time based on statistics collected by the Chinese customs service.

◆ The shocking decline in the quality of life for urbanites

Most of North Korea’s state-run enterprises have slowed or stopped operations, and have long failed to provide even wages or food distributions to their employees. The male breadwinners of families have been forced to head to work with almost no pay, meaning that many wives have been pushed to earn money for their families at local markets. There have also been many cases where men pay their workplaces to turn a blind eye to them taking on jobs elsewhere, such as working on construction sites or transporting people or things around.

However, North Korea’s economic situation changed with the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in January 2020. Trade with China came to almost a complete halt, and North Korea’s government restricted movement and private economic activities under the pretext of preventing the spread of the disease. A major depression in economic activities began in the cities, and people’s cash income fell dramatically.

The poverty that hit urbanites who had lost their cash incomes was shocking. In the fall of 2020, mass crowds of people appeared in farming communities throughout the country every day to pick up grains from the ground. There were even people who wandered around farming communities saying that they would do some work in exchange for food. There have also been people who have died of starvation and illness among the country’s vulnerable classes of elderly and the sickly. A reporting partner in Hoeryong gave this account:

“Even within downtown Hoeryong, there’s a lot of people who can’t earn anything no matter what they do. People say that the only way to survive this year is to farm. The country will soon experience the barley hump, and people just can’t see a way forward. There are people starving to death. The government’s offer of three months of food means that you won’t face starvation in the immediate term, and that’s why everyone who is suffering is trying to go to the farms.”

※ Barley hump: a period of food shortages around the spring when people have eaten all that was harvested in the previous fall.

(FILE PHOTO) A young boy wandering around with a sack. There are many people living in tremendously unsanitary conditions. Taken by ASIAPRESS in September 2013 in Pyongsong, South Pyongan Province.

◆ The situation at collective farms that have begun accepting urbanites

In February, collective farms began accepting poverty-stricken people from the cities. Recently, an ASIAPRESS reporting partner visited a mid-sized farm in a part of North Hamgyung Province to investigate the situation there. The reporting partner found that the authorities had ordered farm managers to take good care of people volunteering for service at the farms as part of efforts to increase the number of volunteers.

That being said, the reporting partner made clear that the process of the farms accepting people from the city has not been smooth sailing.

“People from the city who arrived at the farm looked just like homeless people. They hadn’t even brought blankets, and all they had brought with them was a couple of burlap bags.”

Moreover, the “good treatment” promised to the volunteers came to terms with the realities of the farms. An important issue was food.

“There was a promise to provide three months’ worth of corn (to the volunteers), but the farm had such a lack of grains to provide them that farm managers ordered farmers to provide each household (of volunteers) with five kilograms of corn, beans and grains.”

The bigger issue, however, was housing. The authorities had promised volunteers would be given housing, but the reporting partner said that the farm in question did not have any housing prepared for the volunteers. Volunteers were either placed in public-use facilities on the farm or were given rooms in the houses of farms.

“They told the volunteers to just endure things for now because they’ll get houses in the spring, but it is only natural that the farmers hate being shacked up with the volunteers, who are little more than homeless people. The farm managers are trying to persuade the farmers to accept the situation by offering them food and firewood in exchange for lending space for the volunteers to live.”

◆ The reason why urban dwellers are heading to farms

Farmers are the poorest class in North Korean society and are even called nongpo, a term that, while it can also refer to farmland, also means “blister.” People born in farming communities have little hope of making a break from life on the farm given it is almost impossible for them to migrate to cities. Moving from the city to the farm or vice versa is considered a “change in social class,” meaning that farmers at the lowest rungs of the social ladder have no hope of becoming urban dwellers (This reality was starkly seen during the DPRK’s major famine of the late 1990s)

In fact, that urbanites are going to farms in droves does not mean that life on the farms has improved. Farmers are still forced to live difficult lives. Urban dwellers, however, are finding that living on the farms is better than wandering the streets in hunger given the fact they have no other way to earn a living.

As of February 14, ASIAPRESS was unable to confirm whether the government policy of moving people from cities to the farms in North Hamgyung Province is a nation-wide policy or not.

※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.

Map of North Korea ( ASIAPRESS)

asiapress.org

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com