Please note that I will be traveling overseas the next few days so my daily news distro may be at odd hours.

Quotes of the Day:

"The President is merely the most important among a large number of public servants. He should be supported or opposed exactly to the degree which is warranted by his good conduct or bad conduct, his efficiency or inefficiency in rendering loyal, able, and disinterested service to the Nation as a whole. Therefore it is absolutely necessary that there should be full liberty to tell the truth about his acts, and this means that it is exactly necessary to blame him when he does wrong as to praise him when he does right. Any other attitude in an American citizen is both base and servile. To announce that there must be no criticism of the President, or that we are to stand by the President, right or wrong, is not only unpatriotic and servile, but is morally treasonable to the American public. Nothing but the truth should be spoken about him or any one else. But it is even more important to tell the truth, pleasant or unpleasant, about him than about any one else."

– Theodore Roosevelt

“Words are, of course, the most powerful drug used by mankind.”

– Rudyard Kipling

"Not all insurgents fight justly, but guerrilla tactics and strategies are also not always the heinous practices that state powers often portray them to be."

– Michael L. Gross

1. NK News: Parts 1 and 2 with Russian member of Panel of Experts on Russia -nK, unification, and sanctions

2. North Korea’s Latest Missile Test Suggests Arms Race With South

3. N. Korea's sending of trash-filled balloons is 'form of soft terrorism': CSIS report

4. N.K. leader inspects munitions factory after key party meeting

5. Underground war: what threat DPRK engineer brigades pose at front in Ukraine

6. North Korea Reveals a Multiple-warhead Payload in Probable Failed Test

7. Ukraine Rumor Shows How North Korea Boosts Russia-China Axis

8. ＜Investigation＞Current living conditions of North Koreans (3) The free healthcare system that the Workers’ Party boasts has completely collapsed

9. One N. Korean worker's tale of exploitation and desperation in China

10. North Korea's new Kim Jong Un solo badge is significant

11. "North Korea's Political Prison Camp, Kwan-Li-So No. 18:" Report Rollout

12.  N. Korea's Kim says economic situations markedly on upturn at key party meeting

13. Why did NK change its policy toward South Korea?

14.  Put North Korea's human rights issue front and center

15. S. Korean military resumes artillery drills near N. Korean border

1. NK News: Parts 1 and 2 with Russian member of Panel of Experts on Russia -nK, unification, and sanctions

Part 1: "Russia-North Korea defense pact makes unification impossible, ex-diplomat says"

In interview, former Russian diplomat Georgy Toloraya suggests treaty will prevent escalation on peninsula

Part 2: "Russia was wrong to endorse wide-ranging North Korea sanctions: Russian expert"

In interview, Georgy Toloraya says sanctions should focus on nukes and voices frustration about time on Panel of Experts

Russia-North Korea defense pact makes unification impossible, ex-diplomat says

In interview, former Russian diplomat Georgy Toloraya suggests treaty will prevent escalation on peninsula

Chad O'Carroll June 27, 2024

https://www.nknews.org/2024/06/russia-north-korea-defense-pact-makes-unification-impossible-ex-diplomat-says/

Tank-trap signage promoting unification in North Korea in July 2013 | Image: NK News

Editor’s note: This is part one of a two-part interview with former Russian senior diplomat Georgy Toloraya on the implications of the new treaty signed by Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang.

Russia and North Korea’s new treaty setting forth mutual defense commitments has made Korean reunification an impossible dream, according to a veteran Russian diplomat.

Georgy Toloraya, a former Russian senior diplomat with extensive experience in the two Koreas, told NK News that the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed by Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang last week dealt a serious blow to decades of South Korean policy.

“I think that the ordinary South Korean just should think about it and say: ‘We have to forget about any Audacious Initiative or other bold policies or unification whatsoever because that’s not going to happen,'” he said, referring to the Yoon administration’s policy offering economic assistance to the DPRK in return for denuclearization steps.

The former diplomat assessed that the treaty effectively puts an end to any possibility of reunifying the peninsula by force, since any occupation of North Korea would trigger Russian assistance.

Both Koreas’ officially supported the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula for decades, until North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared reunification “impossible” in a watershed speech late last year and called for the military to prepare to “subjugate” the South in case of war.

The Yoon administration’s official policy remains to work toward a “united Korean Peninsula that is free and at peace,” though some have accused Seoul of seeking “reunification by absorption” — a goal that the government has long disavowed.

The U.S. and South Korea have also repeatedly threatened to “end the Kim regime” if North Korea uses nuclear weapons.

Now, Tolorya said he believes the Russia-DPRK military pact means South Korean leaders will have to accept that reunification is not going to happen, positing a return to a Cold War-like arrangement in which Moscow and Washington’s security assurances to their respective allies help to prevent the outbreak of war.

Georgy Toloraya speaks during an interview with NK News in Seoul in June 2024. | Image: NK News

STABILIZING FACTOR?

Despite the military focus of the new treaty, Toloraya told NK News he believes it could have a stabilizing effect on the Korean Peninsula, echoing Moscow’s official position.

He suggests that having powerful allies on both sides of the DMZ might prevent rash actions by either Korea, drawing parallels to the Cold War era.

“I’m old enough to remember that that was the name of the game for 40 years before 1990,” Toloraya said. “But every time, the big brothers, the patrons — the USSR and USA — would just pull them away from this.”

Toloraya, who organized Putin’s first visit to Pyongyang in 2000, believes Russia could play such a moderating role for North Korea again.

However, he downplayed the significance of the mutual defense language in the new treaty, which states in Article 4 that the two countries agree to provide military and other assistance if the other is attacked.

“This article mostly has a demonstrative effect, and I’m sure that it will never be implemented and that the condition of being implemented will never arise.”

The former envoy argued the treaty’s language is not unprecedented and is actually less far-reaching than the U.S. alliance agreement with South Korea. Russia’s foreign ministry has also insisted that the treaty does not seek to form a military alliance.

Though things have changed since the end of the Cold War, Toloraya dismissed concerns about a potential proxy conflict on the peninsula despite the ongoing confrontation between Russia and the West over Ukraine.

“Any war here means just destroying both Koreas … You cannot really take over South Korea, and that’s not (Russia’s) goal or North’s goal. And now you cannot take over North Korea.”

ECONOMIC POTENTIAL

Tolorya told NK News that economic aspects of the agreement could prove consequential — though not without risk for the Russian side.

The former diplomat highlighted past successes like “compensation deals” where the USSR invested in equipment for the production of goods for the Russian market, such as car batteries, ball bearings and textiles.

“The problem is that it needs initial investment from Russia, and this investment is a risky one,” he noted.

“We know from our own experience that even with all of the goodwill and political will on both sides, it’s still very hard to implement given the business climate, let alone some of the peculiarities of Korean businessmen in keeping their obligations.”

Despite the challenges, Toloraya sees potential for cooperation in mineral resources, labor resources and information technology. He suggested that exploitation of North Korea’s mineral wealth could follow models explored in the mid-2010s, while acknowledging the need to navigate international sanctions.

Labor resources represent another significant opportunity, according to Toloraya, who sees potential for in-country DPRK projects, particularly in textiles. 

He also raised the possibility of cooperation on infrastructure and logistics, though he downplayed the significance of a pledge to build a new bridge between Russia and North Korea. 

“I’m not even sure how useful … the motorway bridge will be because there’s not enough cargo to carry over it,” he said, suggesting its value might be more symbolic than practical.

But Toloraya said economic cooperation will require sustained political support and won’t be especially lucrative. “It may be profitable in the long run, but that won’t come in a day.”

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

The Russia-DPRK treaty includes provisions that could have far-reaching implications for foreign policy and public discourse, including articles that prevent support for “unilateral coercive measures” and agreements that infringe on their sovereignty.

Toloraya said such language likely came from the DPRK side and could relate to concerns about foreign activities on Russian soil.

“I really think that North Koreans might be frustrated by all these South Korean pastors working with the refugees and having some plots in the Russian Far East and watching North Korea from there,” he said.

Russia arrested a South Korean pastor working with defectors in the Far East earlier this year, accusing him of espionage. His organization denied the allegations.

Article 18 of the treaty also includes language about protecting the “dignity and image of sovereign states,” and Toloraya acknowledged the potential for broad interpretation.

Even comments in Moscow by a South Korean ambassador “calling some kind of actions by Kim Jong Un a provocation” could potentially fall afoul of this article, he said. 

Toloraya added that he thinks there’s still room for “interpretation and explanation, although I presume there’ll be much more work for diplomats to explain.”

Georgy Toloraya speaks during an interview with NK News in Seoul in June 2024. | Image: NK News

CHINA CONCERN

Zooming out, Toloraya suggested that China, North Korea’s primary ally, won’t be thrilled about the new treaty with Russia.

“If I put myself in Chinese shoes… if Russia would see this kind of activity of China in some neighboring, very dependent country like Belarus, for example, it wouldn’t be happy,” he said.

He suggested that China’s main concern would be the DPRK’s increased independence. “It will listen less to China and may act in a way the Chinese wouldn’t like,” he explained.

However, Toloraya believes that the overarching importance of Russia-China relations will prevent any public display of discontent from Beijing. 

“Russia-Chinese relations globally are so important now for both countries that this is one of the things that even if the Chinese have some grudge, they won’t show it.”

He likened Russia’s role to that of “an ambulance” providing emergency treatment for North Korea, while China remains “the doctor who treats her day by day.”

Nevertheless, he stressed that Russia and China will need to actively communicate to prevent Pyongyang from playing them off each other as it did in the past.

Edited by Alannah Hill 

Russia was wrong to endorse wide-ranging North Korea sanctions: Russian expert

In interview, Georgy Toloraya says sanctions should focus on nukes and voices frustration about time on Panel of Experts

Chad O'Carroll July 2, 2024

https://www.nknews.org/2024/07/russia-was-wrong-to-endorse-wide-ranging-north-korea-sanctions-russian-expert/

Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un before the Russian president's departure at Sunan International Airport on June 19, 2024 | Image: Rodong Sinmun (June 20, 2024)

Editor’s note: This is part two of a two-part interview with former Russian senior diplomat Georgy Toloraya on North Korea sanctions and his time on the U.N. Panel of Experts on the DPRK. The first part can be read here. 

Russia made a mistake when it agreed to impose sanctions on North Korea that went beyond specifically targeting its nuclear weapons program to include missiles and overseas workers, Russia’s former member to the U.N. Panel of Experts told NK News.

Georgy Toloraya, who served as Russia’s expert on the Panel of Experts on North Korea from 2019 until its dissolution this year, said the problems began with Resolution 1718 in 2006.

“I thought it was a mistake for Russia to vote for the 1718 Resolution because it included missiles,” the former diplomat told NK News. “The 1718 Resolution was adopted as a response to the nuclear test, so it should concentrate on nuclear issues and prevention of nuclear proliferation … not delivery systems.”

Toloraya said the demand to suspend all ballistic missile-related activities, in place since 2006, led to a cascade of subsequent problems due to the fact that “anything could be a means of delivery” in North Korea’s nuclear program, including “drones, cars, ships.”

“For the next 18 years, the missile issue was the most widely quoted violation case for any discussion in the United Nations,” he said, stating that there were discussions on DPRK missile tests every “two months” during his time on the Panel of Experts.

“(This) wouldn’t have happened if there were no missiles in this initial (1718) resolution,” he said. “And then it might have been much more effective because there wouldn’t be so much controversy and so much frustration on the part of China and Russia in implementing this resolution.” 

Russia and China have unsuccessfully tried to weaken U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolutions several times. Moscow also controversially vetoed the annual extension of the Panel of Expert’s mandate in March, after the U.S., U.K. and France rejected a joint proposal with China to introduce sunset clauses to the North Korea sanctions regime.

Toloraya criticized the inclusion of restrictions on North Korean workers in a 2017 resolution as well, stating this had “no relevance to the missile program, to the nuclear program.” 

According to the Panel’s last report, 100,000 North Korean workers remained employed overseas in 2023, generating an estimated $500 million in annual revenue for the heavily sanctioned nation. Resolution 2397 banned DPRK overseas labor on the grounds that it raises funds for the regime’s nuclear weapons program. 

Despite expressing regret about many aspects of UNSC sanctions, Toloraya said nuclear-related sanctions on the DPRK still have their place.

“(The) nuclear nonproliferation system is the basis for global strategic stability,” he said, making it “the most important issue with respect to North Korea.” 

But he claimed that the U.S. “artificially” introduced another issue into the sanctions regime over time — “the hidden agenda of stiffening the regime of isolation and undermining the regime so that North Korea would collapse.”

All existing UNSC sanctions on the DPRK passed with the support of all five permanent members, including Russia.

Georgy Toloraya speaks during an interview with NK News in Seoul in June 2024. | Image: NK News

REFLECTIONS ON THE PANEL

Looking back at his time on the Panel, Toloraya expressed frustration that the U.N. expert team focused too much on issues he considered of minor importance to the overall sanctions regime.

“The goal of the sanctions is to prevent, first of all, nuclear and, (secondly), missile development … We were spending too much time looking at how oil comes into North Korea, where ships go,” he said.

In contrast, there was no real success on the most important Panel of Expert priority, he noted. 

“We couldn’t ever for the five years (I was there) see any kind of real documents concerning technology transfer, or transfer of the materials which were used for the missiles and nuclear weapons,” he said. 

Even though a network to acquire vital components and technologies for developing the DPRK nuclear program undeniably exists, Toloraya said the Panel was unable to monitor it.

Overall, the former member said his hope to change things for the better when he first joined the Panel eventually waned. 

“I wouldn’t say that I felt I was doing the right thing all the five years I’ve been there.”

That’s because initially, he had “expectations that we could change something in the sanctions regime, in humanitarian issues and make some sort of conditions for the dialogue and diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula under the U.N. umbrella.”

“Well, I found out that the Panel was pretty prejudiced against North Korea,” he said. “It’s an important instrument, but when it has the real goal of trying to counter North Korea, to be against North Korea in every possible aspect, it just doesn’t bring much positive effect.”

Together with his China’s representative, Toloraya said he tried to make the Panel’s conclusions more objective. “What my Chinese colleague and I tried to do was to make the Panel conclude … based on facts, not just ideas.”

“Too often, the reports of the Panel would be just promoting a member country source without any comment,” he complained.

Former U.N. Panel coordinator Eric Penton-Voak, by contrast, accused Toloraya and his Chinese colleague of regularly obstructing the Panel’s work and sabotaging its investigations.

• READ MORE: Ex-UN expert says China, Russia sabotaging North Korea sanctions investigations

LOOKING FORWARD

With the Panel of Experts on North Korea disbanded, Toloraya said the future of sanctions monitoring is uncertain but that individual member states should still be able to draw attention to issues.

“Most of the Panel materials came from the member states’ intelligence, and it’s still there,” he said. “So I think the sources will be there, and it will be publicized, and we will read much of the same stuff in the newspapers, only without reference to U.N. authorization.”

Looking ahead, Toloraya said the entire sanctions regime “will just perish or should be reconsidered totally,” describing it as a time of reckoning for those interested in sanctions pressure on the DPRK.

“I think that if the U.S. and other allies will be wise enough, it’s just time to talk seriously about the North Korean sanctions regime and the goals of it,” he said

The expert suggested that lifting some sanctions that don’t change the overall picture “could make North Korea much more cooperative in terms of dialogue and for moving toward some positive agenda.”

As such, Toloraya emphasized that future sanctions enforcement should focus on preventing North Korea from modernizing its nuclear weapons and developing its nuclear potential. 

Consequently, the monitoring of “choke points, technology transfers, and materials transfers” should be a key priority for the international community, he said.

Asked if Russia and China now effectively recognize the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state, Toloraya dismissed the idea, stating that is not the case.

“The nonproliferation treaty and the nonproliferation regime, it’s about… rules which are to be obeyed,” he said. “Everybody knows well that Israel has nuclear weapons. It doesn’t prevent anybody from closing their eyes on it. And I think it would be the same with North Korea.”

However, Toloraya said the international community should recognize that North Korea is no longer a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

“I think it’s time to recognize that they walked out of NPT legally. And according to Article 10, due to the national interest threat, they walked out. And so they’re no longer members of NPT and should be treated as such.”

He said this may provide space for “some kind of Indo-Pakistani” type cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which carries out inspections and monitoring of nuclear facilities around the world.

“I think that North Korea might be ready for that.”

Edited by Alannah Hill

2. North Korea’s Latest Missile Test Suggests Arms Race With South

North Korea’s Latest Missile Test Suggests Arms Race With South

By Choe Sang-Hun

Reporting from Seoul

July 2, 2024

Updated 8:06 p.m. ET

The New York Times · by Choe Sang-Hun · July 2, 2024

The North said it tested a missile with a “super-large warhead” on Monday. The South has similar missiles, meant to target underground bunkers.

Listen to this article · 3:50 min Learn more

South Korean media covered North Korea’s latest missile test on Tuesday, using file video from an earlier launch.Credit...Ahn Young-Joon/Associated Press

By

Reporting from Seoul

July 2, 2024, 2:38 a.m. ET

North Korea said on Tuesday that it had tested a new ballistic missile with a “super-large warhead,” the most recent development in an arms race with South Korea as the countries vie to introduce weapons of increasingly destructive power.

Two of the new missiles, known as the Hwasong-11Da-4.5, were launched on Monday, each with a dummy warhead that weighed 4.5 tons, the North’s official Korean Central News Agency said. Ballistic missiles often carry warheads that weigh less than a ton.

South Korea already has similar missiles that can deliver large warheads. Col. Lee Sung-jun, a spokesman for the South’s military, said the North’s Hwasong-11 series missiles were believed to be capable of carrying payloads of half a ton to 2.5 tons, but that it was “theoretically possible” to modify them to deliver a 4.5-ton payload.

But Colonel Lee accused North Korea of deceptively exaggerating its capabilities in the Tuesday report. One of the two missiles the North launched on Monday crashed in an empty field after an “abnormal” flight, he said.

The United States has accused North Korea of supplying Hwasong-11 missiles to Russia for use against Ukraine. Both Pyongyang and Moscow have denied trading in arms, which would violate United Nations Security Council resolutions imposed on the North because of its nuclear weapons program.

The launch Monday was the second major weapons test reported by the North since its leader, Kim Jong-un, hosted President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia for talks in Pyongyang on June 19. Last week, North Korea claimed for the first time that it had tested technology for launching several nuclear warheads with a single missile; the South cast doubt on that report, too.

South Korea, citing the North’s growing nuclear threat, has ramped up its own military spending in recent years. That includes its development of ballistic missiles with large warheads, meant to target underground bunkers where North Korea keeps its nuclear arsenal, and where its political and military leaders could hide in the event of war. The South has also procured American stealth jets.

In 2020, the South said it had developed a ballistic missile with “one of the largest warheads in the world.” In 2021, Mr. Kim vowed to develop a “super-large nuclear warhead,” and later that year, North Korea said it had launched a new ballistic missile that could carry a 2.5-ton warhead.

South Korean defense officials later said they were developing a ballistic missile with an even bigger warhead. South Korean news outlets said it could carry a payload of up to eight tons.

Mr. Putin’s visit to Pyongyang last month triggered fears in the region that Russia would help North Korea develop its missiles in return for large shipments of artillery shells, ballistic missiles and other conventional munitions for Russia’s war of attrition in Ukraine. Mr. Kim and Mr. Putin also signed a treaty that included a pledge of mutual defense if either country were attacked.

North Korea said its missile test this week was a success “of great significance.” The results were reported to a plenary meeting of the ruling Workers’ Party’s Central Committee that ended on Monday, the state media report said. It said the Hwasong-11Da-4.5 would be tested again later this month.

Mr. Kim has used Workers’ Party meetings to issue policy goals and to tighten his grip on power. For the first time, state media photos from the latest meeting showed delegates wearing pins bearing Mr. Kim’s image, like the ones they have worn for years to honor Mr. Kim’s predecessors as supreme leader, his father and his grandfather.

Choe Sang-Hun is the lead reporter for The Times in Seoul, covering South and North Korea. More about Choe Sang-Hun

See more on: Kim Jong-un

The New York Times · by Choe Sang-Hun · July 2, 2024

3. N. Korea's sending of trash-filled balloons is 'form of soft terrorism': CSIS report

I forward the CSIS report yesterday.

N. Korea's sending of trash-filled balloons is 'form of soft terrorism': CSIS report | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · July 3, 2024

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, July 2 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's obnoxious sending of trash-filled balloons to South Korea is a "form of soft terrorism," a U.S. think tank report said Tuesday, stressing it should not be taken lightly though it reflects the recalcitrant regime's "weakness" and "insecurity."

Victor Cha, senior vice president for Asia and Korea chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and Andy Lim, an associate fellow with the CSIS Korea Chair, released the report that analyzed Pyongyang's campaign involving garbage-filled balloons in a question-and-answer format.

The North has floated such balloons to the South, taking issue with South Korean activists' sending of anti-Pyongyang leaflets to the North. The South Korean military took care of the balloons, but they caused public security jitters particularly among people near the border regions.

"While these balloons reflect North Korean weakness and insecurity, they should not be taken lightly. The trash-filled balloons and the damage they do is a form of soft terrorism," the report said.

"Just imagine if they put unidentifiable white powder in the balloons instead; it would create panic in South Korea among the public and impact the foreign capital in the country's economy," it added.

Bundles of trash tied to a balloon sent by North Korea are seen in a rice paddy in Incheon, west of Seoul, in this file photo taken June 10, 2024. (Yonhap)

South Korea's reciprocation with anti-North Korea loudspeaker broadcasts along the border could escalate inter-Korean tensions, the report warned, noting that Kim Yo-jong, the influential sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, threatened in the past to destroy the speakers with military fire.

"This would amount to dangerous escalation alongside the recent GPS signal jamming, encroachments into the DMZ, and missile demonstrations," the report said. DMZ stands for the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas.

The report cast Pyongyang's end to unification rhetoric and its launching of garbage balloons as a "preemptive action" designed to undercut South Korea's new forthcoming unification policy that highlights the values of freedom and human rights -- ideas that could awaken more North Koreans to the absence of those values in their tightly controlled country.

"Kim Jong-un wants to preempt this by cutting off all ties with South Korea and removing the notion of unification from the minds of the North Korean people," it said.

The report also called the North's sending of trash an "explicit acknowledgment of the bankruptcy of their ideology."

"They know that sending leaflets about Kimilsungism is laughable in South Korea," it said. "This would not have been the case during the early Cold War days when the North Korean economy was doing better than South Korea and there was strong labor and radical student support for Marxist-Leninist ideals. Now, the alternative is to send trash."

Kimilsungism refers to the ideology established by Kim Il-sung, North Korea's founder and grandfather of the current leader.

The report refuted some Korea watchers' claim that the North Korean leader "has made a strategic decision to go to war."

"First, if Kim Jong-un were really preparing for war, it is unlikely that he would be selling all of his ammunition to Russia. Second, if war were really in the cards, Kim would not be decoupling from South Korea. North Korea's strategic deception tactics are all about misleading its adversaries," it said.

"If war were imminent, North Korea would not be telegraphing future aggression -- it would be duplicitously calling for inter-Korean peace initiatives, just as it did on the eve of the Korean War."

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · July 3, 2024

4. N.K. leader inspects munitions factory after key party meeting

(LEAD) N.K. leader inspects munitions factory after key party meeting | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · July 3, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with more info throughout; ADDS photo)

SEOUL, July 3 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has visited major munitions and machinery factories, calling for efforts to expand production in the overall economic sector, according to state media Wednesday.

The inspection took place Tuesday, a day after North Korea wrapped up four days of a plenary meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

Accompanied by party officials, Kim visited a defense industrial enterprise, which the North said plays a key role in bolstering the country's defense capabilities.

This photo, provided by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on July 3, 2024, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) inspecting a major defense industrial plant the previous day. The inspection took place right after the final day of a plenary meeting of the eighth Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

He stressed the need for party officials to "thoroughly study and arm themselves in order to properly organize and guide the modernization of production lines at all units in the economic field," the KCNA said.

Later in the day, Kim also visited major machine and medical appliance factories.

During the latest plenary meeting, Kim expressed his satisfaction with the economic performance in the first half of the year, saying the country's economic situations are markedly on an upturn.

The inspection appears to be aimed at encouraging party officials to expand the modernization of the defense industry to other economic sectors.

Photos released show that Kim was accompanied not only by top party officials and close aides from relevant sectors but also by many other officials.

Given reports that the visit took place right after the plenary meeting, it appears that Kim led the participants of the meeting to the factory for an observational tour.

North Korea has been intensifying its efforts to revitalize the defense industry, with experts suggesting that this is not only for strengthening its defense capabilities but also to benefit from Russia's ongoing war with Ukraine.

Kim had previously visited key defense industry facilities multiple times in May.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (2nd from L) visits a major industrial plant on July 2, 2024, in this photo provided by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

khj@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · July 3, 2024

5. Underground war: what threat DPRK engineer brigades pose at front in Ukraine

Interesting assessment. I wonder how many people are reading Korean War history for lessons in modern war.

Underground war: what threat DPRK engineer brigades pose at front in Ukraine

https://global.espreso.tv/russia-ukraine-war-major-checherynda-warns-about-potential-threat-from-north-korean-engineering-brigades-at-front?utm

2 july, 2024 tuesday

14:15

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR

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Ukrainian major Yehor Checherynda discusses the military threat to Ukraine if North Korea sends engineering brigades to the Russian-Ukrainian front

He shared his opinions with Espreso TV.

"There is information that five engineering brigades may be coming here from North Korea. How are they dangerous? During the Korean War, tunnel warfare was used very actively. It was a Korean invention, where underground engineering brigades dug barracks and control centers for themselves at a depth of 80-100 meters, making them absolutely safe from American air raids. They also dug tunnels through which they entered the enemy's rear. This is a tactic the Russians have now used in Toretsk, particularly during their last offensive campaign, and previously in Avdiivka," noted Checherynda.

According to him, the North Koreans can apply this experience to the Russian-Ukrainian war, which would pose a lot of threat.

"We can read about the war between North and South Korea and the use of these underground tunnels to break through to the enemy's rear. Unfortunately, the Koreans have experience in this area, and Ukrainian Defense Forces must take this into account to prevent such operations on Ukrainian territory," he said.

The DPRK army consists of 1.2 million personnel, the serviceman noted: "Perhaps they will build something for the main forces. However, the appearance of North Koreans in the Ukrainian war is definitely a violation of international norms and standards. The size of the DPRK army is 1.2 million, which is a considerable force. The world community should take this into account."

• On June 19, Vladimir Putin visited the DPRK at the invitation of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. The countries signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement that provides for mutual assistance in the event of an attack on one of the signatories. At the same time, the DPRK leader expressed "unconditional support" for Russia in the war with Ukraine.
• Later, the North Korean state agency published the clauses of the agreement between Russia and the DPRK on a comprehensive strategic partnership. In particular, it refers to cooperation in warfare, science, and economy.
• On June 20, Vladimir Putin said that South Korea would face decisions that Seoul would not like if it supplied Ukraine with lethal weapons.
• In addition, Defense Express military expert Ivan Kyrychevskyi believes that North Korea may resort to sending its expeditionary corps to participate in the war on the side of Russia.
• Recently, Pentagon spokesman Major General Pat Ryder said that North Korean troops would become "cannon fodder" if sent to fight alongside Russian forces in Ukraine.
• On July 2, the U.S. Department of Defense announced that it had no confirmation of the DPRK's sending troops to Russia.

6. North Korea Reveals a Multiple-warhead Payload in Probable Failed Test

North Korea Reveals a Multiple-warhead Payload in Probable Failed Test

https://www.38north.org/2024/07/north-korea-reveals-a-multiple-warhead-payload-in-probable-failed-test/

• BY: VANN H. VAN DIEPEN
• JULY 2, 2024

On June 26, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) launched a test missile that probably used the first stage of a Hwasong-16 solid-propellant intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and a new payload section. Pyongyang’s claim that the launch was a “separation and guidance control test of individual mobile warheads” as part of “securing the MIRV capability” appears credible.[1] North Korean media reported the test successfully released three independently targeted warheads and a decoy. Initial photo and video evidence indicated the booster probably performed correctly and did not rule out—but could not confirm—warhead releases. Thermal video of the test released by the Republic of Korea’s (ROK or South Korea) military on June 28, however, indicates the booster most likely failed at about a 100-kilometer (km) altitude and probably did not deliberately release reentry vehicles or decoys. Therefore, the test probably failed, and if so, North Korea mischaracterized the results—as it has sometimes done in the past.

Given the apparent failure, the test’s main significance is in showing that North Korea remains committed to developing multiple-warhead missiles and seemingly believes its efforts are far enough along that a flight test was warranted. The mention of releasing a payload decoy, which is a sensible means of trying to divert missile defenses, is also significant. However, if the booster failed prior to releasing its payload, the test would not have provided any important data for improving MIRV technology.

North Korea will almost certainly continue multiple warhead testing, perhaps relatively soon. At least several successful flight tests of longer duration and higher altitude over a minimum of a few years are likely before North Korea operationally deploys multiple warheads—especially if it is seeking MIRVs rather than less complex multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs). Assistance from Russia or entities in China could accelerate the timeline somewhat.

Successful MIRV development would underscore North Korea’s technical prowess and would further complicate the task of allied missile defenses. If North Korea ends up fielding a true MIRV, not just an MRV, there is the added military benefit of one missile being able to attack several widely spaced targets, thus increasing the “productivity” of each missile—especially the number of targets that a surviving missile force can retaliate against after absorbing a first strike. MIRVs also have the potential to significantly boost the number of deployed North Korean warheads for a given number of missiles and launchers, especially for ICBMs. But this depends on how the North chooses to allocate its relatively limited nuclear warhead production among many different weapons systems.

What Did North Korea Launch?

On June 26, the North conducted a missile test launch. Pyongyang reported in a June 27 press statement that the launch used “the first-stage engine of an intermediate-range solid-fuel ballistic missile.” An accompanying photo showed what appeared to be the first stage of a Hwasong-16 (HS-16) solid-propellant IRBM just after ignition, topped with a payload section covered by a payload shroud. In its two previous launches, the two-stage HS-16 had instead carried a maneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV) or a boost-glide vehicle (BGV), both termed “hypersonic missiles” by North Korea. This may explain why initial South Korean reporting of the launch characterized it as a suspected hypersonic missile. The use on June 26 of only the first stage of the HS-16—which probably is based on the first stage of the HS-18 three-stage solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)—and a payload section not previously flown on the HS-16 suggests the missile was a specially configured test vehicle.

The North Korean characterization of the test missile appears to be accurate. The US and former Soviet Union often used test boosters modified from operational missiles and space-launch vehicles to conduct developmental reentry vehicle (RV) testing. The vehicle depicted in the North Korean photo is consistent with the claimed purpose, and the initial South Korean reporting of a “hypersonic” test is consistent with an HS-16 first stage having been used.

What Was the Purpose of the Launch?

North Korea reported that the launch was a “separation and guidance control test of individual mobile warheads” as part of “securing the MIRV capability.” Pyongyang claimed that “separated mobile warheads” were sent to “three coordinate targets,” along with a “decoy.”

This is the first mention by North Korea of multiple warhead development since Kim Jong Un reported in January 2021 that “the sector of national defence scientific research was conducting research into perfecting the guidance technology for multi-warhead rocket at the final stage.” MIRVs make sense for North Korea, particularly as a means of complicating missile defenses, and movement toward MIRVs had long been expected by outside analysts, even before Kim’s report.

This history, in combination with the depiction in the North Korean photo of a test missile with a payload section capable of housing MRV or MIRV warheads (although it could also house a single warhead), lends credence to the North Korean assertion that the development of multiple warheads was the purpose of the test.

Was the Test Successful?

North Korea reported that the test was successful, with the three warheads “guided correctly” and the release and effectiveness of the decoy “verified by anti-air radar.” It published a photo labeled “individual mobile warhead separation,” appearing to demonstrate the faint contrail of a very small object out in front of the main rocket plume and the brighter contrail of a larger object parallelling the main plume. It also released a photo captioned “decoy separation,” which appeared to show an object at the head of the main rocket plume curling away from it.

South Korea reported early on that the launch had failed in flight, exploding and scattering fragments over a wide area. Such a failure is consistent with the very short flight duration reported by Japanese government sources (six to 11 minutes) and the short distance between launch and impact points reported by the ROK (250 km). Moreover, Pyongyang has yet to release any video of the flight, and the depicted plumes all appear to have been within the Earth’s atmosphere, consistent with reporting from Japan’s Ministry of Defense that the launch’s maximum altitude was about 100 km (the point at which the international definition of the atmosphere ends). The short flight time and low altitude would be very unusual for MIRV testing, which normally occurs in the vacuum of space and needs time for the post-boost vehicle (PBV, or MIRV “bus”) that usually targets and releases the individual warheads to separate from the booster and conduct the necessary maneuvers.

On the other hand, the contrail photos released by North Korea and distant video of the flight taken by South Korean civilians did not show a large explosion from a catastrophic in-flight failure. Moreover, the reported trajectory would be consistent with ensuring ground-based radars in North Korea could observe any release of warheads and decoys, and South Korea has had a long history of denigrating even well-documented North Korean missile and space achievements.

In light of the above information, most outside observers judged as of June 27 that the booster probably functioned normally but were unable to confirm if multiple warheads had been released, although that appeared possible.

This situation changed markedly on June 28, when the South Korean government released thermal video excerpts reportedly taken by front-line military units. The clips show the missile climbing abnormally, rolling along its horizontal axis, tumbling out of control and exploding into multiple pieces.[2]

Based on the updated information, and in the absence of any North Korean corroboration of success, it appears most likely that the booster failed at about a 100-km altitude after much of its propellant had been expended, producing a relatively small-scale explosion and probably did not deliberately release reentry vehicles or decoys. (Such objects could have been part of the debris from the explosion.) The test probably failed, and if so, North Korea mischaracterized the results—as it has sometimes done in the past.

What Is the Significance of the Test?

Given the apparent failure, the test’s main significance is in showing that North Korea remains committed to developing multiple-warhead missiles more than three years after Kim’s mention of that objective and seemingly believes its efforts are far enough along that a flight test was warranted. That said, because of the stage at which the probable booster failure occurred, we do not know whether the test would have released MRVs or the claimed MIRVs, or whether it would have involved a PBV—which, with its associated maneuvering, guidance, and control, is the most technically challenging aspect of MIRVing.

The dimensions and mass of any multiple reentry vehicles carried are also unknown. This information would shed light on whether they were only test articles intended to validate a PBV and successful warhead releases or if they were meant to represent operationally deployable RVs. In the latter case, size and weight data would have implications for the number of warheads a given missile type could carry, the associated nuclear yield, and the operational risk of deploying such RVs without full-scale flight testing on ICBM-range trajectories (because smaller nuclear RVs are likely to be less robust and thus riskier to rely on operationally without such testing).

Another significant item is the North’s mention of releasing a payload decoy, which is a sensible means of trying to divert missile defenses that all major missile powers have employed on their strategic missiles. This, too, has long been expected by outside analysts. But the type, size/weight, verisimilitude and sophistication of any decoy are all unknown. The North’s claim that the decoy was monitored by an “anti-air radar” underscores the challenge it faces in gauging whether its decoys would be effective in fooling purpose-built Western anti-missile radars. Indeed, it is quite likely that alliance missile defense and intelligence-gathering sensors would acquire much more and better data on decoy (and MIRV) flights than the North Koreans could.

Although it is often said that test failures nonetheless produce worthwhile data that help improve and advance a missile program, that may not be the case this time. If, in fact, the booster failed prior to releasing any PBV or dispensing any warheads or decoys, then the failed test would not have provided any significant data in improving MIRV or payload development. The North would certainly have gathered data on the booster, but it has already been flown successfully on two launches of the full-up HS-16 IRBM and three of the HS-18 ICBM.

What Is Likely to Happen Next?

If the June 26 test failed during booster operation prior to payload deployment, North Korea would probably try to replicate it relatively soon, either after a brief evaluation of any booster failure or simply relying on the overall good track record (by Pyongyang’s standards) of the HS-16/HS-18 first stage.

If there was a failure during payload operation—or if the most recent South Korean video evidence is wrong and the test functioned as intended—then the North is likely to take more time to evaluate and tweak the payload.

Even if it was not a failure, this first test was too short in duration and at too low an altitude to have provided much benefit to multiple warhead missile development. At least several successful flight tests of longer duration and higher altitude, over at least a few years, are likely before North Korea operationally deploys multiple warheads, especially if it is seeking MIRVs rather than less complex MRVs.

Assistance from Russia or from entities in China could somewhat accelerate the timeline but would not obviate the likely need for at least a few successful flight tests.

Why Are North Korean MIRVs Important?

Successful development of MIRVs would underscore the technical prowess of North Korea’s missile program and boost the regime’s domestic and international prestige. From a military standpoint, MIRVs and even MRVs would further complicate the task of allied missile defenses by forcing them to cope with more relatively small objects in the same timeframe—not to mention throwing decoys into the mix. If North Korea ends up fielding a true MIRV, not just an MRV, there is the added military benefit of one missile being able to attack several widely spaced targets, thus increasing the “productivity” of each missile—especially the number of targets that a surviving missile force can retaliate against after absorbing a first strike.

MIRVs also have the potential to significantly boost the number of deployed North Korean warheads for a given number of missiles and launchers, especially for ICBMs. But this depends on how the North chooses to allocate its relatively limited nuclear warhead production among many different, mostly single-warhead, weapons systems (ICBMs, IRBMs, medium- and short-range ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, unmanned underwater vehicles, etc.). It remains to be seen how many multiple-warhead nuclear missiles the North chooses to deploy.

1. [1]
2. Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) allow one missile to directly strike several widely separated targets, unlike multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs) that are dispensed shotgun-style without individual targeting.
3. [2]
4. Minji Lee, “S. Korean military unveils video of N.K. missile exploding in midair,” Yonhap News Agency, June 28, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240628006100315; and John Feng, “North Korean Missile Spirals out of Control and Explodes: Video,” Newsweek, June 28, 2024, https://www.newsweek.com/south-korea-releases-video-north-korea-missile-explosion-1918594.

7. Ukraine Rumor Shows How North Korea Boosts Russia-China Axis

Wise counsel here:

There are lies, damn lies and rumors about North Korea. So treat recent reports that Pyongyang will send troops to aid Russia’s assault on Ukraine with more than a grain of salt.

Some excerpts that highlight the axis of aggressors/dictorators, etc.

Excerpts:

But this new alliance is, nonetheless, a stark manifestation of today’s most important strategic phenomenon — the emergence of a new axis of revisionist powers — and a reminder of how astonishing its recent development has been.

...

There is, if anything, more to these dealings than meets the eye. Russia and China are cooperating on shadowy defense-technological projects — involving development of helicopters, tactical missiles and missile-launch early warning systems, among other capabilities — that alarm US officials because they may hasten Beijing’s military development in destabilizing ways.

North Korea and Iran are presumably instructing Putin’s newly isolated government in the dark art of sanctions evasion, a discipline in which these rogue states truly are world leaders. North Korea could also dispatch some of its excess workers to man Russian military production lines. Meanwhile, Pyongyang and Tehran are learning valuable lessons from how Russia has used their drones and missiles in Ukraine.

...

The US isn’t facing a random assortment of challenges, but a cohering league of foes. That’s the fundamental strategic reality whoever wins the presidency in November must confront.

Ukraine Rumor Shows How North Korea Boosts Russia-China Axis

The idea of Kim Jong Un sending troops to aid Russia is far-fetched, but his regime has skills that gravely increase the threat to the West. 

July 2, 2024 at 5:00 PM EDT​

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-07-02/ukraine-war-north-korea-boosts-china-russia-iran-axis?sref=hhjZtX76&embedded-checkout=true

By Hal Brands

Hal Brands is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist and the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.

There are lies, damn lies and rumors about North Korea. So treat recent reports that Pyongyang will send troops to aid Russia’s assault on Ukraine with more than a grain of salt.

Yet the summit that spurred those rumors, and the North Korea-Russia military alliance it produced, are part of something very real and very worrying — the tightening of ties between America’s adversaries.

Those relationships are racing ahead in ways virtually no one would have predicted a few years ago. The US needs to get ready for a world in which they keep advancing, in surprising and disturbing ways.

The rumors about a potential North Korean deployment to Ukraine were the echo of a remarkable meeting in Pyongyang. Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un pledged to continue building a relationship that has given Russia shells, missiles and bullets for use in Ukraine, in exchange for Russian help with North Korea’s weapons programs and diplomatic support in its confrontation with the international community.

The two leaders also shocked most foreign-affairs analysts by signing a mutual defense treaty that pledges one country to aid the other if it is attacked.

“Relations between our countries have risen to a new high level of alliance,” Kim declared. “This is truly a breakthrough document,” Putin agreed, one that will raise relations “to a new qualitative level.”

The circumstances in which the mutual defense provisions might be invoked are hazy; the pact seems to have been written so that it does not obligate North Korean intervention in Ukraine.

But this new alliance is, nonetheless, a stark manifestation of today’s most important strategic phenomenon — the emergence of a new axis of revisionist powers — and a reminder of how astonishing its recent development has been.

Three years ago, who would have predicted that Russia and China would announce a strategic partnership with “no limits” and “no forbidden areas,” which Putin would then use as diplomatic cover for invading Ukraine? That Putin’s armies would then be sustained by vast quantities of artillery shells, drones and missiles from Iran and North Korea, and by copious economic and technological support from Beijing? Or that Putin would develop what US officials have called a “full-fledged defense partnership” with Iran and sign a formal defense pact with North Korea?

There is, if anything, more to these dealings than meets the eye. Russia and China are cooperating on shadowy defense-technological projects — involving development of helicopters, tactical missiles and missile-launch early warning systems, among other capabilities — that alarm US officials because they may hasten Beijing’s military development in destabilizing ways.

North Korea and Iran are presumably instructing Putin’s newly isolated government in the dark art of sanctions evasion, a discipline in which these rogue states truly are world leaders. North Korea could also dispatch some of its excess workers to man Russian military production lines. Meanwhile, Pyongyang and Tehran are learning valuable lessons from how Russia has used their drones and missiles in Ukraine.

Case in point: Iran’s attack on Israel in April looked suspiciously like Russia’s attacks against Ukraine, in which drones and slow-flying cruise missiles saturate a country’s air defenses, clearing a path for fast-flying ballistic missiles to pound the target. Iran’s attack failed, but only thanks to the extraordinary efforts of a rival alliance: The US and its partners shot down most of Tehran’s drones before they reached Israeli airspace.

It’s true, of course, that there is little trust within these autocratic relationships. But don’t underestimate the damage that even the most dysfunctional revisionist pacts can cause. Those who ridicule the idea that Iran, North Korea, China and Russia constitute a meaningful coalition might consider this: There is significantly more direct cooperation, in defense-technological and diplomatic terms, among this pack of revisionists than there was in the late 1930s among the countries that would eventually make up the World War II-era Axis.

Avril Haines, America’s top intelligence official, has warned that Russia could aid China in a war with the US in the Western Pacific — if not by intervening directly, then through cyberattacks that disrupt American mobilization or military operations, or simply by positioning Russian forces menacingly in Eastern Europe to thrust a two-front dilemma upon an overtaxed superpower.

Perhaps Iran will have greater Russian support in its next nuclear crisis with the West. Perhaps Russia will trade away more sophisticated defense technology in exchange for the autocratic aid it desperately needs in Ukraine. Or perhaps the next move will, once again, take many observers by surprise.

Nonetheless, Washington needs to get serious about the challenges autocratic alignment presents. Current Pentagon strategy documents stubbornly insist that the threats posed by US rivals are distinct, and that the US must maintain a single-minded focus on its chief competitor, China. But this simply means America hasn’t really priced in the problem of the instability convulsing all three key regions of Eurasia right now — much less that its enemies, far from scrupulously respecting regional boundaries, are finding ever-more creative ways of helping one another.

The US isn’t facing a random assortment of challenges, but a cohering league of foes. That’s the fundamental strategic reality whoever wins the presidency in November must confront.

Brands is also a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, the co-author of “Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China” and a member of the State Department's Foreign Affairs Policy Board. He is a senior adviser to Macro Advisory Partners.

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

Hal Brands is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist and the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.

8. ＜Investigation＞Current living conditions of North Koreans (3) The free healthcare system that the Workers’ Party boasts has completely collapsed

Another indicator of potential instability.

As we think about unification this is one area where it would be important to engage early and now. The people in north Korea need medical help. The system has collapsed. During the process of unification medical care will be a challenge. If the private sector and NGOs could help the medical system now it would pay off during the unification process. Unfortunately it is unlikely the regime will allow significant outside assistance because it would reveal to the outside world how broken the regime's medical care is.

＜Investigation＞Current living conditions of North Koreans (3) The free healthcare system that the Workers’ Party boasts has completely collapsed

asiapress.org

Society / Economy

2024.07.03

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(FILE PHOTO) A hospital room in a small town in Ryanggang Province. A patient lies face down in the corner. Photo by ASIAPRESS, April 2015

＜Investigation＞Current living conditions of North Koreans (1) Poor infrastructure…conditions surrounding water, electricity, heating, and restrooms

＜Investigation＞Current living conditions of N. Koreans (2) How is public education corrupting

Free health care, along with compulsory education, is a staple of the North Korean regime’s socialist propaganda. But in the current North Korean context, health care is less an issue of socialist superiority than an example of a failed system. In the third part of a series of investigations into the real lives of North Koreans conducted by ASIAPRESS reporting partners from March to May this year, we look at the reality of health care in North Korea. (JEON Sung-jun / KANG Ji-won)

Regarding health care, we heard from “A,” who lives in Ryanggang Province, and “B,” who lives in North Hamgyong Province.

◆The medical system has collapsed, with people forced to hand over bribes to get prescriptions

B said hospital treatment used to be free, but the biggest change in recent years has been the need to pay for medicine.

“They used to prescribe medicine, give injections, and you had to bribe them for the medicine. Now they just give you a prescription, but you have to buy the medicines yourself, and what the hospitals give you is just ordinary saline and treatment, so it doesn’t mean much.”

B elaborated on the broken healthcare landscape, saying that doctors are more popular for their diagnosis-related documents than for their treatment.

“Doctors are popular because of the certificates. If you don’t show up for work, you are punished as unemployed and absent without leave, so people often pay bribes to get certificates through hospitals and clinics.”

According to a recent survey by ASIAPRESS, while companies provide limited rations, such as one week’s worth of food per month, this is not enough to sustain life. As a result, people prefer to engage in economic activities outside the workplace rather than go to work, where they are expected to provide their labor without being paid.

However, not going to work is illegal and subject to crackdowns, so many people come to the hospital to get a certificate that will help them get away with it.

◆Government strongly cracks down on private sales of medicine

A details how the distribution and supply of medicine in North Korea today is very different from the past:

“Drugs can only be purchased from pharmaceutical factory outlets outside hospitals. In dangerous situations, such as an emergency accident or unconsciousness, medicine is provided at the hospital.”

In the past, if you were treated in a hospital, you could get almost free medicine from the hospital pharmacy with a prescription, but now hospitals only accept prescriptions, and you have to buy medicine at your own expense from the pharmaceutical company outlets.

He noted that the sale and distribution of medicines by individuals is punishable by law.

“The act of individuals making money with national medicines is severely punished, including the seller and buyer, the source and the person who stole it, and there is even a 50,000 won reward for reporting the illegal sale of medicines, so there are very few private sales anymore.”

Penicillin made at a pharmaceutical factory in Sunchon. It is said to have a bad reputation due to many fakes and poor efficacy. Photo taken from inside North Korea in 2015 (ASIAPRESS)

◆Illicit drugs are used due to shortages of legitimate drugs

However, in North Korea, where there is an absolute shortage of medicines, access to legitimate medicines is limited. Unlike in the past, private distribution of medicines has been severely restricted, leaving the population with a shortage of medicines.

This has led to a resurgence in the abuse of drugs such as opium for medical purposes, B said. In North Korea, opium is widely used for medical purposes because it is recognized by people for its effectiveness against various diseases.

Although not directly related to medicine, the use of a stimulant called “bingdu” (meth) is also on the rise.

“Bingdu has been in short supply because of COVID (imports from China), but I’ve heard it’s been selling for 400-500 yuan per gram lately, mostly to officials and people with money.”

＜Inside N. Korea＞Opium addicts rise again as stimulants remain almost completely unavailable…Why? The police quickly clamp down on manufacture of drug

※ 1 yuan is about 189 Korean won.

B says that government control over drugs has been tightened recently, “to the point where they are now talking about a two-year re-education sentence for those who distribute, rather than those who use.

However, B adds that stimulant use is not as prevalent as it used to be because people are struggling to make ends meet and don’t have as much money.

Based on the reporting partners’ investigations, free medical treatment seems to be a thing of the past in North Korea. But that is not necessarily a bad thing. It would be a good thing if the country could move away from its obsession with “free treatment” and establish a health care system that actually helps people’s health, even if it requires people to pay for it.

Kim Jong Un at the groundbreaking ceremony for the Pyongyang General Hospital in March 2020. More than four years after the groundbreaking, there is still no news of its completion. (Korean Central News Agency)

(End of series)

※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.

＜Investigation＞Current living conditions of North Koreans (1) Poor infrastructure…conditions surrounding water, electricity, heating, and restrooms

＜Investigation＞Current living conditions of N. Koreans (2) How is public education corrupting

asiapress.org

9. One N. Korean worker's tale of exploitation and desperation in China

​The Korean people in the north cannot catch a break. They need the help of all of us.

One N. Korean worker's tale of exploitation and desperation in China - Daily NK English

Yong-hee's story is a prime example of how North Korean female workers dispatched to China were placed in poor conditions during the COVID-19 period

By Kim Jeong Yoon - July 3, 2024

dailynk.com · by Kim Jeong Yoon · July 3, 2024

FILE PHOTO: A window of a factory staffed by North Koreans in China. (Daily NK)

In the fall of 2020, at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, a Chinese middle manager approached Yong-hee (pseudonym), a North Korean worker in her 20s dispatched to China and working at a seafood processing factory in Dalian, and whispered quietly:

“Yong-hee, instead of just suffering here, how about hiding for a while at the house of my relative in the countryside? He wants to take a North Korean woman as his bride. If you just give him one child, he’ll give you RMB 80,000 [USD 11,200]. With that money, you can go straight back to North Korea, spend a short time in prison, and then live well without struggling like you are now. Think it over and come to me anytime.”

Yong-hee’s heart wavered momentarily. After the COVID-19 outbreak, living conditions at the factory had been deteriorating day by day, and as factory work decreased, she could not even save money. She had been thinking that it would be better to earn money even if it meant doing hard labor for more than 13 hours a day.

In the summer of 2021, Yong-hee developed COVID-19 symptoms. Although she received a brief examination at a temporary clinic, she did not receive adequate medication or treatment. Weakened by malnutrition, Yong-hee collapsed several times. However, she could not even think about treatment because she had no money for the hospital. Her work team was not in a position to collect money to send her to the hospital either, so she was forced to painfully endure her suffering.

Yong-hee decides to accept the offer

Around this time, as contact with her family in North Korea was also cut off, Yong-hee fell into deeper despair. While the anxiety of not knowing when the pandemic would end was great, the longing for her family and the guilt of not being able to earn money as a worker in China made it even harder for her.

Eventually, Yong-hee decided to run away. She made up her mind to accept the Chinese middle manager’s offer, secretly leave the factory, and marry a Chinese man. However, her plan to leave the site was exposed to another North Korean female worker in the same work team. This fact was reported directly to the superiors, and as a result, Yong-hee was confined in a small space within the factory.

In the fall of 2023, Yong-hee was repatriated to North Korea. During the interrogation process after repatriation, she said: “I’m not the only female worker in China who tried to escape and hide in the country.” She was treated as if she had lost her mind and then classified as a “No. 49 subject” and sent to a mental hospital.

Yong-hee’s story is a prime example of how North Korean female workers dispatched to China were placed in poor conditions during the COVID-19 period. Although the pandemic has ended, North Korean female workers dispatched to China are still being forced into long hours of labor and used as tools to earn foreign currency for the North Korean regime.

Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Kim Jeong Yoon · July 3, 2024

10. North Korea's new Kim Jong Un solo badge is significant

The top priority for the regime is enhancing Kim Jong Un's reputation and demanding loyalty from every Korean in the north.

North Korea's new Kim Jong Un solo badge is significant - Daily NK English

This year, North Korea has intensified its efforts to promote Kim Jong Un, explicitly distinguishing him from previous leaders

By Gil-sup Kwak - July 3, 2024

dailynk.com · by Gil-sup Kwak · July 3, 2024

A North Korean official at the June 30 party meeting wearing a Kim Jong Un badge. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)

North Korea’s Korean Central TV broadcast news of the second day of the Eighth Party Central Committee’s 10th Plenary Session on June 30, showing party officials attending the session wearing a Kim Jong Un portrait badge on their left chests.

Significance

North Korea is a hereditary dictatorship based primarily on the manipulation and idolization of symbols. Therefore, portraits and badges of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are core symbols that are constantly present in people’s lives, at work and at home (portraits) and on clothing (badges).

However, for the first time it has been confirmed that Kim Jong Un’s solo badge has replaced a badge with portraits of both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il (known as the “double portrait”). This is no small event. In short, Kim Jong Un has openly revealed his intention to “break away from previous generations and stand completely on his own,” a direction he has been cautiously pursuing for some time.

Key Developments

Since taking power, Kim Jong Un has outwardly emphasized the Baekdu bloodline succession by emulating Kim Il Sung (including physique, dress, and speeches) to supplement his legitimacy. Behind the scenes, however, he has shown tendencies to break away from Kim Jong Il by purging designated protectors such as Ri Yong-ho and Jang Song-thaek, accompanying his wife and daughter to public events, normalizing party organizations, and recklessly developing nuclear weapons. Now he’s gone further and broken with both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.

Notably, this year North Korea has focused more on overtly promoting Kim Jong Un by distinguishing him from previous generations. Notable examples include: ①declaration of the “two-state narrative”; ②reconstruction and relocation of the Party’s Central Cadre School with the reintroduction of Marx-Lenin and the installation of Kim Jong Un’s portrait; ③reduction of events related to Kim Il Sung; and, ④distribution of Kim Jong Un badges.

First, the two-state narrative is a Copernican revolution that completely negates the Kim Il Sung-Kim Jong Il line and changes North Korea’s 79-year strategy toward South Korea from cooperative/forcible reunification to hostile/forcible incorporation. The destruction of the Three Charters of National Reunification Monument and the recent construction of barriers along the Military Demarcation Line are symbolic actions of this change.

Second, in February 2020, North Korea disbanded the party committee of the Kim Il Sung Higher Party School following a review of corruption-related incidents at an expanded meeting of the Political Bureau of the Workers’ Party. Finally, in 2021, the regime changed the name of the school to the Party Central Cadre School. In May of this year, the school was rebuilt and relocated, bringing back portraits of Marx and Lenin (which had disappeared since the Sixth Party Congress in 1980, when Juche was officially adopted as the guiding ideology) and placing Kim Jong Un’s portrait alongside those of his predecessors.

The return of the Marx-Lenin portraits shows Kim’s determination to compete not only with the Juche ideology of his predecessors but also with orthodox communism. Meanwhile, hanging portraits of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un together is a measure to impress upon his people that he has now reached the same level as his predecessors. It could also be an attempt to show that Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are supporting actors and Kim Jong Un is the leading actor.

Third, North Korea has canceled or scaled back events associated with Kim Il Sung this year. In February, the regime did not hold meetings to review the central government reports on the 50th anniversary of the proclamation of the program to model the whole society on Kim Il Sungism and the 60th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s announcement of the “Theses on the Socialist Rural Question in Our Country,” which were supposed to be milestone years. The name of the 112th birthday celebration of Kim Il Sung was changed from “Day of the Sun” to “April 15.”

Fourth, the 10th Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee was an important occasion to fully establish the two-state narrative presented by Kim Jong Un at the end of last year’s plenary session (including the establishment of new borders and the revision of previous policies emphasizing the nation and reunification). Wearing Kim Jong Un’s solo badge at this time implies the intention to publicly declare to the domestic and foreign audiences that from now on it is no longer the era of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, but the beginning of Kim Jong Un’s “era of independence.”

Outlook

In his 13th year in power, Kim Jong Un continues to take steps to stand alone (positioning himself as the country’s “New Sun”). While this is fundamentally based on the two-state narrative when considering domestic, inter-Korean, and international factors, the “de facto alliance treaty” that resulted from two summits with Russian President Vladimir Putin may have boosted Kim’s confidence.

Going forward, I would expect North Korea to reinforce the idolization of Kim Jong Un by expanding the distribution of his portraits and other idolization objects, and by declaring his birthday a national holiday. The regime is likely to emphasize and propagate Kim Jong Un as an outstanding ideological theorist and global leader who surpasses his predecessors through the two-state narrative, the people-first policy, and the formalization and dissemination of the new Five Major Ideas of Party Construction (political, organizational, ideological, disciplinary, and work style building).

To respond to the North Korean state’s propaganda efforts, we should gradually bring down the curtain on Kim Jong Un’s 21st century “Truman Show” by informing the North Korean people and the international community about the secrets of Kim Jong Un’s birth and his inhumane rule through both online and offline channels.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Gil-sup Kwak · July 3, 2024

11. "North Korea's Political Prison Camp, Kwan-Li-So No. 18:" Report Rollout

HRNK's new report that shows the brutality of the regime.

Please download the 65 page report here: https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Camp_18.pdf

The link to the video is below.

"North Korea's Political Prison Camp, Kwan-Li-So No. 18:" Report Rollout

Monday, July 1st, 2024

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On Thursday, June 20, HRNK featured its latest report in an ongoing effort to employ satellite imagery analysis and former detainee testimony to shed light on human suffering in North Korea's detention facilities. HRNK produced the report in collaboration with the U.S. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA). The report rollout featured the co-authors, Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., Greg Scarlatoiu, and Raymond Ha.

North Korea's Political Prison Camp ,Kwan-Li-So No. 18 (PukCh'ang)

HRNK is delighted to share a link to the event recording.

12. N. Korea's Kim says economic situations markedly on upturn at key party meeting

Wishful thinking.

(LEAD) N. Korea's Kim says economic situations markedly on upturn at key party meeting | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · July 2, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with assessment by Seoul's unification ministry in paras 15-16)

By Kim Soo-yeon

SEOUL, July 2 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has voiced his satisfaction about economic performances in the first half at a key party meeting, saying that economic situations are markedly on an upturn, Pyongyang's state media reported Tuesday.

But Kim did not issue any message targeting South Korea or the United States, nor did he reveal details about the country's push to advance its weapons arsenal Monday, the fourth and final day of a plenary meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea.

The party meeting garnered more keen attention from South Korea and other regional powers as it followed summit talks between Kim and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Pyongyang on June 19.

The two leaders' signing of a new treaty on stronger military cooperation spawned speculation the North may unveil follow-up measures to implement the deal at the party gathering.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on July 2, 2024, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un speaking at a four-day plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

North Korea discussed five agenda items at the latest party meeting, including the interim review of the implementation of state policies for this year and the issue of enforcing work discipline in key sectors, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

"In the first half of this year, it could be sensed that the country's economic situations are markedly on an upturn, compared with a year earlier," Kim was quoted as saying by the report.

"It can be said that the farming situation throughout the country up to now is also fairly good," he noted.

The North's crop production is estimated to have increased 310,000 tons on-year to 4.82 million tons last year, according to South Korea's Rural Development Administration.

Still, it was below 5.76 million tons, the annual amount that the North needs to feed its people, according to a projection by the Food and Agriculture Organization for the North.

Kim also said the country will witness the completion of new modern production bases in 20 cities and counties by the end of this year, in reference to North Korea's project to build modernized factories in 20 counties over the next decade to improve people's livelihoods.

Touching on the military, the KCNA said Kim clarified the direction of military and political activities by North Korea's all armed forces, without disclosing further details.

The North's leader called for the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) to revise the country's constitution to enhance the prestige of the state, indicating that the North's rubber-stamp parliament is expected to soon hold a key session.

Kim earlier called for revising the constitution at the next SPA meeting to define South Korea as the North's "primary foe" and clarify its territorial boundaries, including the maritime border.

At a year-end party meeting in December, Kim defined inter-Korean relations as those "between two states hostile to each other" and said there is no point in seeking unification with South Korea. During the latest plenary meeting, he did not issue any further messages showing his animosity toward the South.

The unification ministry in charge of inter-Korean affairs said North Korea rarely issued a message to South Korea or the U.S. at a June party plenary meeting in the past.

"In light of the current fluid security situation, we will continue to closely monitor why North Korea made no comments on the South and the U.S., and the possibility that it has kept them undisclosed," a ministry official said.

Meanwhile, North Korea carried out a reshuffle of party officials at the party meeting.

The North said it appointed Kim Jong-sun as a department director of the WPK's Central Committee, in what would be a rare move to name a woman in the post of a party department director.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on July 2, 2024, shows the North holding a plenary meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · July 2, 2024

13. Why did NK change its policy toward South Korea?

Also a Chinese perspective here. The "Three No's" remain in effect for CHina.

Excerpts:

Cheng Xiaohe, a political science professor at China's Renmin University, acknowledged that inter-Korea relations have complicated the U.S.-China rivalry. He talked about China's role in engaging North Korea, noting how the international community failed to take forward consensus over some issues on the Korean Peninsula and take collective actions.

"China is certainly an important stakeholder in Northeast Asia, but its role has been overshadowed by Russia," Cheng said, referring to Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent visit to Pyongyang.

"China continues with (the) 'Three No(s)' policy — no chaos, no war and no nuclear weapons. The U.S. expects China to cooperate in engaging with North Korea, but at the same time, has been isolating us diplomatically, imposing sanctions on China in an aggressive way. That poses a paradoxical question to China of how to deal with it."

Why did NK change its policy toward South Korea?

The Korea Times · July 2, 2024

Korea Economic Institute (KEI) of America President and CEO Scott Snyder, second from right, Keio University professor Junya Nishino, right, and Renmin University professor Cheng Xiaohe, left, participate in a seminar titled “Unification of the Korean Peninsula: International Cooperation and Strategy for the Future" at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, Tuesday. Courtesy of Institute of Far Eastern Studies

Experts compare escalating inter-Korean relations to new Cold War

By Kwak Yeon-soo

A new geostrategic environment, anxiety over information penetration and the widening wealth gap between the two Koreas are the reasons behind North Korea's change of policy toward South Korea, a U.S. expert said, Tuesday.

Scott Snyder, president and chief executive officer of the Korea Economic Institute of America, made the point as Pyongyang described Seoul as its "primary foe" and publicly declared it would no longer seek unification and reconciliation with the South.

In January, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un ordered removal of unification references from the country's constitution, dismantlement of monuments honoring the unification efforts of his predecessors and disbandment several government bodies tasked with promoting unification.

"Geostrategic environment is definitely a catalyst for North Korea's change of policy. If we think about the imbalance of the wealth gap (between the two Koreas), we have to imagine that North Korea wants to close the deficit. Strategic relationship with Russia is serving that purpose," Snyder said during a seminar titled "Unification of the Korean Peninsula: International Cooperation and Strategy for the Future" in Seoul. The event was co-hosted by the University of North Korean Studies and the East Asia Institute.

He added, "Anxieties within North Korea about information penetration is another factor. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is so focused on political loyalty. Since he doesn't have personal experience with inter-Korean competition, he's relatively unburdened by historical aspects that are the drive for unification."

During the forum, Junya Nishino, a political science professor at Japan's Keio University, said North Korea's change in policy is both defensive and offensive in nature.

"North Korea's intention is to block the inflow of South Korea's ideology and culture. It has been developing tactical nuclear weapons capable of hitting the South and (intercontinental ballistic missiles) capable of reaching the U.S. mainland. Since there are difficulties in establishing mutual nuclear deterrence with the U.S., Pyongyang wants to protect its national security by attacking Seoul as an alternative or to prevent an attack from the U.S.," Nishino said.

"North Korea also has the intention to pursue independent diplomacy without relying on South Korea. Through summits with Seoul, Pyongyang may have realized 'there is nothing we can get from South Korea. It doesn't provide us with any help. It has outlived its usefulness.'"

Cheng Xiaohe, a political science professor at China's Renmin University, acknowledged that inter-Korea relations have complicated the U.S.-China rivalry. He talked about China's role in engaging North Korea, noting how the international community failed to take forward consensus over some issues on the Korean Peninsula and take collective actions.

"China is certainly an important stakeholder in Northeast Asia, but its role has been overshadowed by Russia," Cheng said, referring to Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent visit to Pyongyang.

"China continues with (the) 'Three No(s)' policy — no chaos, no war and no nuclear weapons. The U.S. expects China to cooperate in engaging with North Korea, but at the same time, has been isolating us diplomatically, imposing sanctions on China in an aggressive way. That poses a paradoxical question to China of how to deal with it."

Snyder likened the escalating inter-Korean relations to the Cold War, saying that a new geopolitical event is necessary to bring about a dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea.

Nishino stressed that Japan and South Korea share common security threats posed by North Korea, adding that Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has been ramping up efforts to engage with Pyongyang by having behind-the-scenes talks on a possible summit.

The Korea Times · July 2, 2024

14. Put North Korea's human rights issue front and center

Put North Korea's human rights issue front and center

The Korea Times · July 1, 2024

By Lina Yoon

Lina Yoon

North Korea’s growing ties to Russia make it more important than ever for South Korea to use its influence to press for human rights in all security discussions with North Korea. And South Korea’s membership on the United Nations Security Council as an elected member makes it uniquely positioned to do so.

When North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin met in Pyongyang on June 19, they signed a comprehensive strategic partnership and pledged to expand their cooperation in military matters as well as in trade, investment, cultural and humanitarian aid ties.

Their summit came days after the United Nations Security Council met, over Russia’s objections, to debate North Korea’s systematic human rights violations and their connection to the country’s weapons program. However, days earlier, in the wake of North Korea’s May 27 attempted launch of a military satellite, the Security Council held an emergency meeting, during which South Korea said nothing about human rights.

South Korea and other U.N. member states are continuing to discuss how to respond to Russia’s veto in March that ended the mandate of the Security Council's Panel of Experts to monitor the enforcement of U.N. sanctions on North Korea. As these discussions continue, South Korea should take a leadership role at the U.N. that places human rights considerations at the center of the security discussions involving North Korea.

For over 75 years, the North Korean government has maintained a climate of fear over its people, using arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, torture and unfair trials to maintain obedience. This fear-based obedience is what has been central for North Korea to pursue and maintain a nuclear weapons program and to become a regional and international security threat.

North Korea has become more isolated, repressive and brutal, since the COVID-19 pandemic. As Human Rights Watch documented in a recent report, the North Korean government enforced stringent measures, placing extreme and unnecessary restrictions on peoples’ most basic freedoms. Measures included enhanced border controls, regional lockdowns and severe restrictions on trade and movement, ultimately tightening the government’s control over virtually every aspect of its people’s lives.

At the same time, the Security Council has grown more deadlocked, unable to reach an agreement even on issues on which it long was united — such as the danger posed by North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic weapons programs.

South Korea should consider new approaches to address these issues and explore proliferation and human rights issues. With the current deadlock in the Council, Seoul should explore options in the U.N. General Assembly to highlight how North Korea’s systemic rights violations enable its weapons program, while exacerbating its humanitarian crisis.

The Security Council’s inability to reach any agreement leaves only the General Assembly to act, and a resolution there is far more likely to pass if it covers both international security and human rights issues.

South Korea should support a U.N. General Assembly resolution that creates a new monitoring and reporting body on North Korea, integrating human rights and humanitarian issues with efforts to address the threats to peace and security posed by the government's nuclear and ballistic weapons programs.

In April 2024, the U.N. Human Rights Council, with European Union leadership and South Korea’s support, adopted a resolution boosting scrutiny of North Korea's rights record and highlighting the links between North Korea’s weapons program and human rights. The resolution was a step forward, but it was not enough.

More extensive reporting on the connections between North Korea’s rights violations, weapons proliferation activities and international peace and security issues will serve as a reminder for states that security cannot be tackled in isolation from underlying rights abuses.

A former trader, who is sometimes still able to speak with family in North Korea, told me how a relative there described it: “She said life wasn’t life ... It was not just about the economic difficulties, [it’s about] the repression, the hopelessness and the fear.”

This is among the key reasons why South Korea needs to address North Korea’s human rights abuses and threats to international peace and security — together. The issues are inexorably intertwined, both for the rest of the world and for the long-suffering people of North Korea.

Lina Yoon is the senior Korea researcher at Human Rights Watch.

The Korea Times · July 1, 2024

15. S. Korean military resumes artillery drills near N. Korean border

​Good. This is necessary.

S. Korean military resumes artillery drills near N. Korean border

donga.com

Posted July. 03, 2024 07:53,

Updated July. 03, 2024 07:53

S. Korean military resumes artillery drills near N. Korean border. July. 03, 2024 07:53. by Hyo-Ju Son hjson@donga.com.

The South Korean military has fully resumed artillery training within a five-kilometer radius south of the military demarcation line, marking the first such exercises since they were suspended in 2018. The suspension followed the September 19 Comprehensive Military Agreement, which designated this area as a zone where ground-hostile acts were prohibited. Concerns had been raised about the impact of this suspension on the military's readiness, particularly in the event of local or full-scale conflict with North Korea. The resumption of artillery training is expected to enhance the South Korean military's preparedness and response capabilities in light of potential provocations from North Korea.

The South Korean army announced that it has resumed artillery drills involving K9 and K105A1 units near the North Korean border, within five kilometers of the military demarcation line. "With the complete suspension of the September 19 agreement, military training has resumed at all training fields, allowing our soldiers to engage in more realistic exercises," the Korean Army stated.

The artillery drills began simultaneously at shooting ranges within five kilometers of the military demarcation line, including the Yeoncheon Enemy Range Shooting Range in Gyeonggi Province and the Chilseong Shooting Range in Hwacheon, Gangwon Province. The Story Shooting Range in Paju, used by the United States Forces Korea, was the only exception. Approximately 90 rounds were fired from the K9 self-propelled howitzer, South Korea's primary artillery piece, from 8 a.m. for about one hour and 20 minutes at the Enemy Range Shooting Range. Despite rain towards the end of the session, the K9s continued to fire, demonstrating a strong resolve to neutralize any threats from North Korea. At the Chilseong Shooting Range, about 40 rounds were fired from truck-mounted self-propelled howitzers from 8 a.m. for around 45 minutes.

The drills were designed to target virtual installations at the rear. An unmanned aerial vehicle monitored the impact, and if the target was not entirely destroyed, additional rounds were fired to ensure complete annihilation.

Military authorities plan to conduct regular artillery drills near the demarcation line as a warning to North Korea, which continues to engage in provocations such as ballistic missile tests, sending trash balloons, and infiltrating the demarcation line. "Today's training focused on strengthening our response capabilities and artillery accuracy in the event of enemy provocations," an army official said. "We will regularly conduct not only artillery drills but also mobile force exercises near the border to enhance our military readiness."

한국어

donga.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com