Quotes of the Day:
"The highest form of knowledge is empathy, for it requires us to suspend our egos and live in another's world. It requires profound purpose larger than the self kind of understanding."
- Plato, The Republic
"The end of all political associations is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man; and these rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance of oppression."
- Thomas Paine
"Resistance to oppression is second nature."
- Seneca the Younger
1. N. Korea could return to dialogue with U.S., spy agency says
2. North Korea Cracks Down on Counterfeiting, on the Rise as Economy Worsens
3. New Kim Jong Un Purge Suggests North Korea Is in Deep Shit
4. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ The Reality and Causes of the Deterioration of the People's Welfare (1) Residents Impoverished by Excessive Coronavirus Quarantine.
5. ＜Inside N. Korea> The Reality and Causes of the Deterioration of the People's Welfare (2) Kim Regime Prioritizes Maintaining Order.
6. Report: North Korea informed China of plans to resume freight trains
7. Desperate N.Korea Cracks down on S.Korean Influence
8. 'Healthy' Kim Jong-un Visits Grandfather's Mausoleum
9. Panmunjom tours suspended again amid virus resurgence
10. Finance chiefs of S. Korea, U.S. hold talks on sidelines of G-20 meeting
11. Uncovering ‘true picture’ of Japan’s colonial rule of Korea
12. Kim Jong Un’s Covid-19 Go-To Move—Finger Wagging
13. 37 USFK-affiliated individuals test positive for COVID-19
14. South Korea’s push to strengthen defences could trigger reaction from North and Japan, say Chinese observers
15. Welcome to the Club: South Korea’s New Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
1. N. Korea could return to dialogue with U.S., spy agency says
Is the regime really intent on ending hostile relations with the US? What is the evidence that supports such an assessment? Of course north Korean rhetoric has long demanded an end to what is describes as the US ``hostile policy." But what does that mean? What does it want the US to do to demonstrate an end to that so-called "hostile policy?"
It demands an end to the ROK/US alliance, withdrawal of all US troops from the Korean peninsula and an end to extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella over the ROK and Japan. Why does it want those actions? So that in its calculus it will have the superior military force to execute its 4. seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the mafia like crime family cult known as Kim family regime.
We must never forget that the root of all problems in Korea is the existence of the most evil mafia- like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime that has the objective of dominating the Korean Peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.
N. Korea could return to dialogue with U.S., spy agency says | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, July 9 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's spy agency has told lawmakers that North Korea could return to nuclear dialogue with the United States as it is intent on ending hostile relations with the country, a source said Friday.
The National Intelligence Service (NIS) made the comment Thursday while debriefing the National Assembly's intelligence committee on the recent remarks from Pyongyang, the source with knowledge of the matter said.
"North Korea's consistent position is to end its hostile relations with the United States," the source quoted the NIS as reporting to the lawmakers.
The NIS said that the North appears to want an easing of sanctions to allow exports of its minerals and imports of refined oil and other daily necessities, according to the source.
"The NIS judges that if the U.S. could mention this at least verbally, the North can come out to the dialogue table," the source said.
Last month, the North's leader Kim Jong-un said in a key party meeting that the country should be ready for "both dialogue and confrontation" with the U.S., a remark construed by some as indicating openness to return to the nuclear talks stalled since early 2019.
The U.S. has offered to meet with the North "anywhere, anytime without preconditions," and said it looks forward to a positive response from Pyongyang.
However, the North's foreign minister rejected the U.S. offer for talks, saying his country is not considering "even the possibility of any contact with Washington." His statement came after Kim's sister, Yo-jong, said that the U.S. has "wrong" expectations about the dialogue.
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
2. North Korea Cracks Down on Counterfeiting, on the Rise as Economy Worsens
Counterfeiting is one of the comparative advantages of the regime. But the regime does not like counterfeiting by the "private" sector because it does not reap the rewards of such activities.
This is just another indicator that we need to observe for potential internal instability.
North Korea Cracks Down on Counterfeiting, on the Rise as Economy Worsens
North Korea has labeled counterfeiters of the country’s currency as “traitors who are aligned with external enemies” as starving citizens forge notes worth less than a dollar to buy food and other necessities, sources told RFA.
The coronavirus pandemic added to the economic squeeze of U.S. and UN nuclear sanctions, making an already bad economy even worse. The closure of the Sino-Korean border in January 2020 and the suspension of trade with China has made it harder for North Koreans who rely on the country’s nascent market economy to support themselves.
Now with food prices skyrocketing and no way to make money by trading smuggled goods from China, many citizens are resorting to small-time counterfeiting to make ends meet.
The North Korean won has an official exchange rate of about 900 to the U.S. dollar, but it is actually worth a fraction of that.
The black-market exchange rate for the currency as of Thursday is about 5,800 won per dollar according to the Osaka-based Asia Press outlet that specializes in North Korean news. The price of a kilogram (2.2 pounds) of rice in North Korea was about 6,300 won ($1.08).
Sources told RFA’s Korean Service that the government discovered hundreds of counterfeit 5,000-won ($0.86) notes, the country’s largest denomination.
“Counterfeit bills copied by a computer printer have been discovered among local market merchants since the middle of last month and have been reported to the authorities,” a resident of the capital Pyongyang told RFA’s Korean Service.
“The central government ordered law enforcement agencies to regard making counterfeit bills as an anti-socialist crime against the government system and says strong measures should be taken against such crimes,” said the source, who requested anonymity for security reasons.
According to the source, the Pyongyang counterfeiting cases are among dozens of others nationwide.
“There are many cases of the counterfeit bills being used at marketplaces or at street food vendors during the late-night hours,” said the source.
RFA reported in September that authorities arrested two people for using fake money in local markets. In one of those arrests, the counterfeiter made purchases with the fake bills from elderly merchants at nighttime, when the notes were harder to detect.
The Pyongyang source said thousands of counterfeit bills were discovered in June at national banks after collecting money from factories and businesses, including over 100 counterfeit 5,000 won notes and 70 fake 2,000 won.
“The central government has been saying that when the public sentiment is at an all-time low due to economic difficulties, using the counterfeit bills is an unforgivable act of making public sentiment even worse, thereby helping our enemies,” said the source.
“And they emphasized that those who make or use counterfeit bills are traitors who are aligned with external enemies, so they should be tracked down and rooted out,” the source said.
Authorities in North Hamgyong province in the country’s northeast have also declared an emergency over counterfeiting, a resident told RFA.
“It is difficult to catch counterfeit bill users because they mainly target vendors who sell food on the streets near the market rather than the merchants at market stands,” said the second source, who requested anonymity to speak freely.
“People are using counterfeit money more these days because the economic situation is getting more difficult each day because of the coronavirus and the border closure. As the number of starving houses who cannot even afford food for the day goes up, some are making and using counterfeit bills as a last resort, even though they know it is a felony.”
Though North Korea is now trying to punish citizens for their small-scale counterfeiting during dire economic times, not long ago the government was notorious for forging foreign currency on a massive scale. For decades under a sophisticated counterfeiting program, Pyongyang printed almost perfect $100 bills which U.S. officials classified as “supernotes.”
Experts believe that North Korea at times printed $25 million in supernotes per year since the 1970s, but after a string of arrests in the mid-2000s, counterfeiting of notes sharply decreased.
But in 2017, AFP reported that a new supernote had been found by forgery experts in Seoul, who suspected that the notes were North Korean in origin.
Reported by Myung Chul Lee for RFA’s Korean Service. Translated by Jinha Shin. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
3. New Kim Jong Un Purge Suggests North Korea Is in Deep Shit
No censorship or restriction on titles in the Daily Beast.
The Party-Military-Kim Jong-un relationship is key to stability and regime survival.
Quote from "Should The United States Support for Korean Unification And If So, How?"
Regime collapse is defined as the loss of central governing effectiveness of the regime, combined with the loss of support and coherency of the military and security services. Although bottom-up internal resistance could lead to regime collapse, the regime’s demise is more likely to result from its inability to support the military and security services. Regime collapse is a result of friction within the regime elite and “deprioritization” of key military units. Regime collapse would likely lead to internal conflict, as actors fight to retain power and resources. In the worst case, when faced with significant internal or external pressure and the threat of regime collapse, Kim Jong-un might make the decision to execute his campaign plan to reunify the peninsula under his control, thus ensuring survival of his family’s regime (in his calculus). However, if collapse occurs without a direct attack on the ROK, the ROK–U.S. alliance, the UN Command, or both (and possibly also China) will likely have to conduct stabilization operations in the North to prevent spillover, establish security, restore stability, and relieve humanitarian suffering. Again, once the security situation is stabilized there could be a return to the ideal path to reunification. All of the planning and preparation that has taken place would still have value and could still be applied. Furthermore, many of the preparations could help mitigate the negative effects of regime collapse. (page 144-145, http://icks.org/n/data/ijks/1482467285_add_file_7.pdf)
I know I keep posting these graphics but I think we have to keep in mind the potential contingencies. And I will continue to beat the drum that we need to observe for the conditions of instability and regime collapse. I am not saying when or if north Korea will collapse but if it does it will be catastrophic and the ROK/US alliance must be prepared for it.
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New Kim Jong Un Purge Suggests North Korea Is in Deep Shit
North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un has demoted his country’s highest-ranking military leader in the onset of a purge of those held responsible for a mysterious “great crisis.”
The blame game indicates that North Korea is “facing major economic and health issues because of COVID,” said Bruce Bechtol, a former Pentagon intelligence analyst and author of numerous books and studies on North Korea’s leadership. “They have done their best to hide it... [but] the country is in big trouble right now.”
Having “already reshuffled positions,” said Bechtol, “The next big step would be an uptick in executions in order to assign blame.”
The dismissal of Ri Pyong Chol from the politburo of the Workers’ Party was confirmed in a photograph released by North Korea showing dozens of top party officials at an elaborate ceremony marking the 27th anniversary of the death of Kim Il Sung, founder of the North Korean regime and Kim’s grandfather. Conspicuous in the picture is Kim’s younger sister, Kim Yo Jong, who’s not on the politburo but still believed to be the country’s second most powerful leader.
In an ongoing campaign to rein in the power of the armed forces, Ri is pointedly in civilian garb in the formal group photograph in the shrine where the bodies of Kim’s grandfather and father, Kim Jong Il, lie embalmed under glass. His uniform would have displayed his rank as a marshal above a chest full of military medals.
The exact nature of the crisis is not clear, but the armed forces are widely blamed for not distributing foodstuffs to a populace perpetually underfed if not starving. That failure is assumed to have been one big reason for downgrading top military leaders.
North Korea “is in economic trouble” from sanctions plus “China’s failure to provide a big food shipment,” said analyst Shim Jae-hoon, formerly with Yale Global. “Food shortage is turning acute now. Kim must guard his dwindling hard currency lest he runs out of emergency funds.”
“People are dying for lack of food and medicine,” wrote Jiro Ishimaru for Asia Press, a news agency in Osaka, Japan, that often reports on the suffering of North Koreans. “Since the beginning of June, the lives of the North Korean people have been deteriorating.”
Ishimaru blamed the crisis on Kim Jong Un for having “closed the borders to prevent the spread of the coronavirus, preventing people from coming in and out of the country.” He said he obtained information through a Chinese cellphone smuggled into North Korea. News of North Korea’s troubles is still getting out that way despite severe punishment, including death, for those caught using Chinese mobiles.
The campaign against North Korea’s military leadership also affected the standing of numerous others, notably Pak Jong Chon, shown in the picture still in uniform but with a somewhat less exalted military rank.
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“With his shoulder insignia changed, it appears Pak was demoted from marshal of the Korean People’s Army, the highest military rank under Kim Jong Un, to vice-marshal,” according to NK News, an independent website in Seoul. Also, “Defense Minister Kim Jong Gwan appeared to have lost his vice-marshal rank. His shoulder insignia showed four stars instead of the marshal’s star.”
The reshuffling at the top made clear Kim’s discontent with the military leadership, over which he has to exercise firm control to be sure of his omnipotence, on top of a purge typical of Kim’s dynastic rule.
Kim Jong Un “seems to have resumed a reign of terror by purging scores of officials over his own disastrous failings amid a growing food shortage,” said the conservative Chosun Ilbo, South Korea’s biggest-selling newspaper.
The paper quotes Rodong Sinmun, North Korea’s major party newspaper, as warning officials not to be “losers of the revolution.” Magnanimously, Rodong Sinmun said “mistakes made in the process are forgivable” but then added, ominously, that “causing critical harm to our party, country and people due to irresponsibility and negligence of duty is never acceptable.”
Kim Jong Un’s decision to honor the anniversary of the death of his grandfather simply rather than mark the occasion with another display of military prowess adds to the impression of a desperate effort to shore up the economy while downplaying the armed forces. Both Ri and Pak were major figures in the program for test-firing ballistic missiles and developing nuclear warheads, which has been out of the news of late while Kim tries to fire up his economy.
Through it all, his younger sister, Kim Yo Jong, ranks high as an adviser and policy-maker. She was among the speakers at the recent meeting of the party’s central committee at which her brother blasted the party faithful for having been “lazy,” precipitating “a significant crisis for the country and people.” Kim Yo Jong is the daughter-in-law of Choe Ryong-hae, the country’s second-highest leader as head of the standing committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly. Choe’s relationship with Kim Yo Jong, as well as his lineage as the son of an ally of Kim Il Sung against the Japanese in China before the Japanese surrender in 1945, fortifies the power structure.
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“Is she a Catherine de’ Medici or just a Kellyanne Conway, or something in between?” asked David Straub, a former senior U.S. diplomat in Seoul. “I doubt that anyone outside the inner circle in Pyongyang knows. But since the dynasty is so important and she appears to be close personally to Kim Jong Un, I assume she is quite powerful but only by extension and her own apparent ruthlessness.’”
Big brother, meanwhile, “bears full responsibility for this gratuitous measure” of shutting the North’s borders, said Straub. “Did he do so because he is arbitrary and anti-scientific,” Straub asks, “or was it somehow part of an effort to impose greater control over the party and people?
“They are very worried about the COVID situation,” Victor Cha, the Georgetown professor in charge of Korea issues at the influential Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, told The Daily Beast. They’re “still without any vaccine support,” he noted, “and feeling pressure to open some trade with China.” Then too, “Smuggling may have led to some transmission” of the disease—“hence the castigation of party officials.”
In the process, Kim Jong Un sees the chance to tighten his grip on power.
“I believe that the economy is faltering in large part because Kim is trying to strengthen his control of the country by breaking the spread of capitalism, outside influence, and economic independence of the rich,” Bruce Bennett of the RAND Corporation told The Daily Beast, but “Kim’s efforts are undoubtedly destabilizing.” Also interesting, he added, is “Kim’s decision to blame his elites for many of these problems rather than blaming the United States, the traditional scapegoat of problems in North Korea.”
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Meanwhile, fear has to be spreading through the ranks.
The reshuffling “is beyond doubt a portent of elites purges to come,” said Lee Sung-yoon, at the Fletcher School of Tufts University. “In North Korea, demotion, scapegoating, punishment, reinforcement of terror, and promotions are often delivered as a single package.” The “grave situation” that Kim mentioned, Lee told The Daily Beast, “likely refers to an exaggerated pretext for requisite harsh measures rather than a major COVID outbreak.”
There is yet another reason for concern: Kim’s health. His appearance leading the entourage at the shrine to his father and grandfather dispelled rumors that he might have suffered a cerebral hemorrhage, but the photograph of him front and center at the memorial showed he had indeed lost more than 40 pounds. Now believed to pack about 300 pounds on his five-foot-eight-inch frame, he apparently went on a weight-loss campaign while out of public view for nearly three weeks.
“A careful review of comments in the North Korean media, plus Kim’s recent political behavior and likely intentions, suggest that Kim’s weight loss is intentional and related to health concerns,” wrote Dr. Kenneth Dekleva of the University of Texas Southwestern Medical School on the website of 38North, which tracks North Korea for the Stimson Center in Washington. “A desire on his part to improve his health... and his actual health have huge political implications for the Korean Peninsula.”
4. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ The Reality and Causes of the Deterioration of the People's Welfare (1) Residents Impoverished by Excessive Coronavirus Quarantine.
These are the effects of Kim Jong-un's deliberate policy decisions. The suffering is not caused by sanctions or the international community. It is solely caused by the decisions Kim Jong-un makes.
＜Inside N. Korea＞ The Reality and Causes of the Deterioration of the People's Welfare (1) Residents Impoverished by Excessive Coronavirus Quarantine. ISHIMARU Jiro
Few residents on the Yalu Riverside, only soldiers in masks are conspicuous. Photograph of Sinuiju City from the Chinese side in July 2021 （ASIAPRESS）
There has been an extreme decrease in information coming from within North Korea. Since the Kim Jong-un regime closed the Chinese border last January to prevent the influx of the coronavirus, there has been an almost complete absence of human traffic. No tourists, foreign media, or businesspeople have been allowed to enter the country for a year and a half, and North Koreans have hardly been allowed to leave.
Even the Choson Sinbo, the official newspaper of the Korean Confederation in Japan, and Russian News Agency TASS of the friendly country of Russia has been without a representative. The Chinese Xinhua News Agency replied that they could not confirm the withdrawal of their reporters in Pyongyang.
International mail has also come to a complete halt due to the refusal to accept mail from China. All the international organization employees stationed in Pyongyang have left the country, and the number of officers has dropped to zero. The number of diplomats has also been greatly reduced. Since I started covering North Korea in 1993, I have never experienced such a strict and prolonged "national isolation".
As live information from inside North Korea has dried up, ASIAPRESS has managed to keep in touch with our reporting partners living in various parts of North Korea using Chinese cell phones that we brought in. However, we are struggling to cover the area because of the intense crackdown on radio wave detection. In addition, we are receiving from inside the bizarre "national isolation" is the plight of the residents.
◆Excessive control and pharmaceuticals have disappeared.
As of the beginning of July 2021, there is no indication that the coronavirus infection has spread within North Korea. It can be said that this is the result of the success of the powerful measures that strongly paralleled border blockades and domestic controls. Although it is difficult to believe the North Korean authorities claim that there have been no cases of infection, there has been some easing of controls recently, such as the resumption of face-to-face classes at schools and the mobilization of urban residents to help farmers.
Although there has been no COVID-19 outbreak, there is widespread unrest in the country. A side effect of the strong quarantine measures has been a severe economic deterioration, and the situation has already reached the humanitarian crisis level. "I'm more afraid of hunger than of Coronavirus." This is what the residents feared a year ago, and it has come true. Examples of this will be discussed later.
After the news of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan, China, last January, the North Korean authorities quickly banned foreigners from entering the country. In addition, all trade ports on the border rivers of Yalu River and the Tumen River were blocked, and imports and exports were strongly restricted. And that's not all. The government also imposed excessive and violent restrictions on movement within the country, quarantined anyone with a cold-like symptom such as a cough, and locked down residential areas for two weeks. The economy quickly cooled off.
Firstly, Chinese products skyrocketed due to the suspension of imports. The price of cooking oil, seasonings, etc., increased several dozen times. Due to the disruption of medicine imports from China, many elderly people are dying from tuberculosis, injuries, food poisoning, colds, and other diseases that cannot be treated.
The ban on the movement of people and goods to other provinces has led to a sharp decline in jobs in transportation and cargo handling. Many factories and mines have reduced or stopped operations because they are no longer receiving machine parts, raw materials and supplies from China.
The stagnation of market activities led to a sharp decrease in ordinary people's cash income. It also reduced the income of the police, the government, and the leaders of the Workers' Party of Korea, who relied on bribes. The circulation of both money and goods was stagnant, and the impoverishment deepened day by day. As in Japan, it was the vulnerable groups, such as the elderly, single mothers, and families with sick members, who were the first to fall into distress.
◆Increasing number of beggars and prostituted women
What do people do when they have difficulties in living? Our reporting partners explained as follows:
"When we run out of cash, we borrow rice or corn from our neighbours or acquaintances. If that becomes too difficult, we pawn or sell our household goods. It is a common sight to see a debt collector barging in and taking all the household goods that have been pledged as collateral down to the pots and pans. The last resort is to turn to crime or sell the house."
In North Korea, houses are state-owned and cannot be bought and sold without permission. Still, since the 1990s, transactions have been conducted by buying and selling certificates of residence registration, called "entry certificates," and a housing market has been established.
Those who have sold their houses have no choice but to pay money to secure a place to sleep in someone else's warehouse or go to the streets. Since early summer last year, we have received reports of an increase in the number of "kochebi" (vagrants) from all over the country. The sight of abandoned children and older people begging in the marketplace has become commonplace, reminiscent of the great famine of the late 1990s.
What was heart breaking was the report that women's prostitution was on the rise in every city.
"There are married women who commute from rural areas to urban areas for prostitution. In the cities, there are also small prostitution organizations that send women to their clients by communicating with them on cell phones. Most of them are between 20 and 30 years old, and many poor girls are still as young as children. Because of the recent crackdown, they usually ride their bicycles through introducers to the places they are called to. Most of them are cheating partners of executives and rich people. They get 20 Chinese yuan per visit, or 30 to 50 yuan if you are lucky. Some men even give them 300 yuan a month to live nearby. It's hard to sell your body in North Korea. I can't imagine how hard life must have been for them to turn to prostitution." (1 yuan is about 0.15 USD) Continue ２>>
5. ＜Inside N. Korea> The Reality and Causes of the Deterioration of the People's Welfare (2) Kim Regime Prioritizes Maintaining Order.
It is all about maintaining order. Kim Jong-un fears the Korean people in the north more than the US. He must maintain control over the population by denying their human rights and executing a deliberate policy of total oppression.
To emphasize this I will reprise this from yesterday's dispatches:
As we wrote in our Plan B recommendation for a strategy for north Korea:
Any effective approach toward North Korea should be based on two new assumptions. The first recognizes that Kim will give up his nuclear program only when he concludes that the cost to him and his regime is too great – that is, when he believes possession of nuclear weapons threatens his survival. But external pressure alone, although important, will almost certainly fail to create the right cost-benefit ratio. It is the threat from the North Korean people that is most likely to cause Kim to give up his nuclear weapons.26 As former CIA analyst Jung Pak of the Brookings Institution has argued, “Kim fears his people more than he fears the United States. The people are his most proximate threat to the regime.”27 The ROK-U.S. alliance has yet to adopt a strategy with this in mind.
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/12/3/maximum-pressure-2/
And the Korean people in the north are the most dangerous to the regime when they are armed with information.
＜Inside N. Korea> The Reality and Causes of the Deterioration of the People's Welfare (2) Kim Regime Prioritizes Maintaining Order. ISHIMARU Jiro
The Yalu River is lined with barbed wire. A "buffer zone" has been established in the name of blocking the influx of coronavirus from China, and residents are not allowed to approach the zone. Photograph of Sinuiju City from the Chinese side in July 2021 (ASIAPRESS).
When people are unable to afford to eat, they turn to illegal activities. In addition to prostitution as I mentioned above, methamphetamine trafficking, theft, and robbery were rampant. The authorities were on the lookout for border crossings, defections, and smuggling into China, and created buffer zones and increased military forces throughout the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. They even issued a proclamation that anyone who approached the area would be punished by military law and shot without warning.
It's not just about crime. The Kim Jong-un regime is well aware that poverty creates disorder in the social order, and it has begun to tighten controls. For example, it has cracked down on "absenteeism" and "vagrancy" among workers at state enterprises.
Most of the state-owned enterprises in North Korea have been without food rations or fair pay for a long time. If people stay in such workplaces, they will lose their livelihoods. Some people have taken time off work to go into business or to gather wild vegetables. The authorities tightened up the inspection of attendance every morning and sent the "absentees" to short-term forced labour camps called labour training units. The police have been mobilized to detect people wandering away from their places of residence.
In North Korea, the primary method of people's governance is to have people live in a designated place and work in a workplace assigned by the government. During the famine of the late 1990s, known as the "North Korean famine," people left their workplaces and moved around the country to work on economic activities to survive. Many people fled to China. There was a breakdown of order where the state power could not control the people. Kim Jong-un's regime must be taking that as a lesson.
◆100% of rations paid to public officials
In order to maintain order, it is necessary to guarantee the livelihood of the policing personnel. When ASIAPRESS looked into the rationing situation of the police, secret police, party and government officials, and teachers from March to June this year, we found that almost 100% of the rationing, not only for themselves but also for their families, was a mixture of white rice and corn by default. The monthly ration is about 18 kilograms for the individual and 7 to 8 kilograms for the family. However, a person cannot survive on rice alone. Even if they receive the stipulated salary, they can barely afford to buy one kilogram of rice. Salt, soap, firewood for cooking and heating, coal, etc. must be purchased in cash. With a huge slump in business and a decrease in bribes, but their lives are getting harder.
◆Workers who are malnourished and unable to go to work
What about public state-owned enterprises? Since last year, we have been investigating a large iron mine in Musan County, North Hamkyung Province. Since the beginning of this year, rations have not been provided for a few days a month. A reporting partner who surveyed in June reported as follows:
“There are many workers who are malnourished and cannot go to work. Even when workplace executives and police officers visit their homes to send them to work, they leave when they see there is nothing to eat.”
Rural areas are also suffering. Households that have run out of cash and grain are called " food insecure households," and the number of food-insecure households is increasing in farming villages during the " polikoge" period when people have eaten up their share of last autumn's harvest. In a cooperative farm in North Hamkyung Province, where I visited for a survey, the number of food-insecure households was about 30%.
“It's not that the country is pretending to ignore it, it's that it's ordering the top officials of the Labour Party to feed the 'Food Insecure Households' even if they have to pay for it themselves, and it's that it's forcing the party members to contribute food at businesses and farms. But such methods are only a temporary fix. But these methods are only a temporary fix. I'm having a hard time, but there is a limit to what I can give,” the reporting partner lamented.
（Continue）
6. Report: North Korea informed China of plans to resume freight trains
Will this be enough to help the broken north Korean economy or will it be too little too late?
The regime must believe it can control the flow of goods into the north.
Report: North Korea informed China of plans to resume freight trains
By Elizabeth Shim flip.it2 min
China’s links to North Korea could be reopened to trade, according to a Japanese press report Friday. File Photo by Stephen Shaver/UPI | License Photo
July 9 (UPI) -- Land-based trade could resume between China and North Korea in late July after months of little to no activity, according to a Japanese press report.
Yomiuri Shimbun reported Friday that the reopening of a China-North Korea railway could take place later this month, citing a Chinese trade official at the border. The source said the North Korean authorities reached out to China to notify them of their plans to resume activity.
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Trains running between the Chinese city of Dandong and the North Korean border town of Sinuiju are expected to transport into the North essential supplies, including food, chemical fertilizers and medication. The goods are expected to undergo a weeklong "quarantine" at a facility before being distributed inside North Korea, the report said.
Kim Jong Un warned last month the country faces a "tense" food shortage. Yomiuri's source said that there are rumors that in Pyongyang there are "people who can only eat one meal a day.
"They seem to be starving," the source said.
Shipping routes have reopened but maritime trade has been limited to a few ports. Ships leaving North Korea's Nampo port may have been docking at the Chinese port of Dalian, according to Seoul Pyongyang News last month.
North Korea has been blocking trade because of the coronavirus pandemic. Kim has blamed officials for a "grave incident" connected to COVID-19.
It is unclear whether an outbreak has occurred, however.
Lee Sang-keun, director of strategic research on the Korean Peninsula at Institute for National Security Strategy in Seoul, said Friday that North Korea's decision to hold large meetings without masks is an indicator that the country has not had a problem containing the virus, South Korean news service Newsis reported.
The resumption of land-based trade could be postponed until a later date. According to Yomiuri's source, the "sense of crisis over COVID-19 in North Korea is deep-rooted" and could delay plans, the report said.
7. Desperate N.Korea Cracks down on S.Korean Influence
Control of information is a key line of effort to the regime's strategy to prevent resistance.
Interestingly, the regime fears the Korean people in the north most of all. It is the existence and example of the success of South Korea that the regime fears the people will long for. The very existence of the successful South is an existential threat to the Kimfamily regime.
Desperate N.Korea Cracks down on S.Korean Influence
The North Korean regime is cracking down yet again on corrupting South Korean influences in increasingly frantic attempts to divert attention from its own failings.
The National Intelligence Service told the National Assembly Intelligence Committee on Thursday that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has ordered a more aggressive defense of "socialism" that entails a widespread crackdown on South Korean-style clothing, parlance and behavior among young North Koreans.
People Power Party lawmaker Ha Tae-keung quoted the NIS as saying the popularity of South Korean TV dramas and music in North Korea has led to an increasing use of South Korean behaviors and fashion.
But he added that North Korean youngsters keep defying the rules. Even lovers who embrace in the street can be accused of anti-revolutionary behavior, and using South Korean phrases can land people in prison for up to two years.
The crusty, backward regime is clearly worried that young North Koreans pose a danger to its survival. They grew up buying South Korean products in open-air markets and accessing foreign information and could yet spell the collapse of the Kim regime, which has run the economy into the ground.
Last December, it introduced a law that makes use of South Korean-style expressions and music punishable with hard labor.
Kim last week fired several senior officials for unspecified mishandling of the COVID-19 crisis, and state media have been spewing out dire warnings against any slackening in revolutionary fervor.
8. 'Healthy' Kim Jong-un Visits Grandfather's Mausoleum
I think this is an iconic photo. Some assess the party changes (purges?) mean ensuring the dominance of civilian control over the military, but I think that misses the nature of the regime. The party and the military are inextricably linked and intertwined and whether military leaders are wearing uniforms or civilian clothes, the party has and always will control the military and the military is the party's (and Kim Jong-un's) army. Remember there are three chains of control of the military- the traditional military chain of command, the political chain of control, and the security chain of control.
I like the visual below to see the inter-mixing of those in military uniforms and civilian clothes. But also not the military on the flask on both sides protecting or reigning in those in the main "formation."
'Healthy' Kim Jong-un Visits Grandfather's Mausoleum
July 09, 2021 10:25
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visited the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun in Pyongyang on Thursday to mark the 27th anniversary of regime founder Kim Il-sung's death.
The portly leader looked a little trimmer than before his reappearance last month, confirming earlier pictures that suggested he has lost weight and sparked speculations about his health.
A National Intelligence Service officer told the National Assembly here on Thursday, "Kim Jong-un seems to have lost 10 to 20 ㎏ since February last year. He walks briskly and seems to have no problems getting around."
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (center) pays tribute at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun in Pyongyang on Thursday, in this photo from the North's official Rodong Sinmun.
The event also confirmed a substantial reshuffle at the top of the North Korean regime. Ri Pyong-chol, who used to be one of the five members of the standing committee of the politburo, was seen standing in the third row in a Mao suit instead of the uniform of the marshal of the Army.
Pak Jong-chon, the chief of the General Staff of the Army who was promoted to marshal alongside Ri last October, is seen wearing the insignia of a vice marshal behind Jong Kyong-thaek, a three-star general and the minister of State Security Department.
Kim Jong-un's younger sister Yo-jong stood in the fourth row and Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui, who was rumored to have been punished over a failed summit with U.S. President Donald Trump in 2019, right at the back.
- Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com
9. Panmunjom tours suspended again amid virus resurgence
Panmunjom tours suspended again amid virus resurgence | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, July 9 (Yonhap) -- Tours to the truce village of Panmunjom have been suspended again due to coronavirus concerns, the unification ministry said Friday, shortly after health authorities here decided to impose the toughest virus curbs in the greater Seoul area.
The ministry made the announcement to suspend the program starting Friday after South Korea saw the highest-ever daily COVID-19 cases since the outbreak of the pandemic last year. Authorities raised virus curbs to Level 4 in Seoul and the neighboring Gyeonggi Province and Incheon on Monday for two weeks.
"Our ministry has temporarily suspended the Panmunjom tours starting from July 9 in accordance with the Level 4 rules in the greater Seoul area," the ministry said.
"The measure was taken considering the safety of the people as the top priority and in close consultation with the relevant authorities," it added.
The ministry said it will resume the tours when the COVID-19 restrictions ease.
Tours to Panmunjom were temporarily suspended earlier this week after two members of the United Nations Command came into contact with a coronavirus patient. The UNC had said that it will resume the tours once it is certain that there is no additional risk.
The tours had resumed in April after a monthslong suspension due to the COVID-19 situation in line with eased social distancing guidelines.
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
10. Finance chiefs of S. Korea, U.S. hold talks on sidelines of G-20 meeting
We are engaging our allies across the spectrum of national power. Economic engagement is a key line of effort for alliance relations.
Finance chiefs of S. Korea, U.S. hold talks on sidelines of G-20 meeting | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, July 10 (Yonhap) -- Top economic policymakers of South Korea and the United States have held talks over bilateral economic cooperation and global issues, the finance ministry said Saturday.
Finance Minister Hong Nam-ki and Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen held the meeting in Venice, Italy, on Friday (local time) on the sidelines of the Group of 20 (G-20) meeting of top finance and economic officials, according to the Ministry of Economy and Finance.
They shared the need for efforts to swiftly produce tangible results over follow-up measures to the Korea-U.S. summit held in May, including vaccine cooperation.
Hong expressed South Korea's intent to cooperate for a U.S.-backed global infrastructure initiative, called the Build Back Better World (B3W), for developing countries.
Both countries also agreed to cooperate on the issue of Iran's funds frozen in Seoul. South Korea is seeking to use a Swiss channel backed by the U.S. in a bid to use part of the money for Swiss companies' sale of humanitarian items to Iran.
The finance chiefs also discussed major G-20 agenda items, including climate change and the overhaul of a global corporate tax scheme, according to the ministry.
Hong held separate meetings with Turkey's Finance Minister Lutfi Elvan and his Italian counterpart, Daniele Franco, to discuss ways to bolster economic cooperation.
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
11. Uncovering ‘true picture’ of Japan’s colonial rule of Korea
We do need to understand this period of history to understand the contemporary political and security situation.
Moreover, he emphasized that previous studies on Korea’s colonial era were mostly based on how the Western powers viewed South Korea. Most of the time the Korean issue was regarded as one of the “problems of the colonies” -- it was put on the back burner and only dealt with as part of the wider area of East Asian affairs.
“In order to get a true picture of Korea during this time, it is important to consider both international perspectives and bilateral relations between Japan and Korea,” he said. “Getting a full scope of perspectives is important, because there are areas that need to be reevaluated and modified from prejudice and skewed interpretations.”
Understanding the Korean independence movement is also critical, he stressed, as it at times represented the voice of Korea and its bid for independence on the international stage.
The book, at 496 pages, weaves together vast archival records from Korean, Japanese, Chinese, American and British sources during this period, particularly showing how British and American state officials viewed Korea under Japanese rule.
[Herald Interview] Uncovering ‘true picture’ of Japan’s colonial rule of Korea
Published : Jul 7, 2021 - 14:20 Updated : Jul 7, 2021 - 17:08
Professor Ku Dae-yeol poses with his new book “Korea 1905-1945: From Japanese Colonialism to Liberation and Independence,” during an interview with The Korea Herald. (Park Hyun-koo/The Korea Herald)
The four decades between 1905 and 1945, starting when Korea was forced to sign the Eulsa Treaty, which made it a protectorate of Japan, is largely considered a lost period in the history of the country’s foreign policy.
As a result of the 1905 treaty -- which laid the foundation for the country’s subsequent annexation in 1910 -- Korea was stripped of its diplomatic sovereignty, losing its voice and representation on the international stage until its liberation in 1945.
With Japan’s voice replacing Korea’s during those decades, some may wonder whether Korea’s foreign policy under Japan’s colonial rule could be considered a valid subject for academic research in international relations. And if so, what would it mean? These are some of the questions Ku Dae-yeol, professor emeritus at Ewha Womans University, has pondered for decades.
“Korea 1905-1945: From Japanese Colonialism to Liberation and Independence,” published in April by Renaissance Books, is the product of Ku’s lifelong study of this subject. It delves into Japan’s colonial rule of Korea and what it meant for Korea’s foreign relations, a topic that has largely been neglected by scholars of Korean foreign affairs.
“Strictly speaking, international relations do not exist without a nation-state, which is the main actor,” Ku told The Korea Herald in a recent interview. “But we also have to consider the fact that Korean people have lived for centuries on the peninsula and continued to live during this period, and in the perspective of international politics, the strategic and geopolitical value of the peninsula and the residents still remain valid.”
Moreover, he emphasized that previous studies on Korea’s colonial era were mostly based on how the Western powers viewed South Korea. Most of the time the Korean issue was regarded as one of the “problems of the colonies” -- it was put on the back burner and only dealt with as part of the wider area of East Asian affairs.
“In order to get a true picture of Korea during this time, it is important to consider both international perspectives and bilateral relations between Japan and Korea,” he said. “Getting a full scope of perspectives is important, because there are areas that need to be reevaluated and modified from prejudice and skewed interpretations.”
Understanding the Korean independence movement is also critical, he stressed, as it at times represented the voice of Korea and its bid for independence on the international stage.
The book, at 496 pages, weaves together vast archival records from Korean, Japanese, Chinese, American and British sources during this period, particularly showing how British and American state officials viewed Korea under Japanese rule.
The book is divided into two parts -- the first part detailing the period of annexation up until the 1930s, and the second part in the 1940s. It also covers how the policies of the US, China, the UK and the Soviet Union toward Korea changed and what role those countries played in the liberation, as well as in the subsequent division of the two Koreas.
“What is unusual about Korean diplomatic history is the extraordinary extent to which outside powers shaped Korea’s domestic political landscape,” Ku wrote in the book. For this reason, he believes a thorough examination of the outside powers’ perceptions and reactions toward Korea is critical in understanding today’s diplomatic challenges.
12. Kim Jong Un’s Covid-19 Go-To Move—Finger Wagging
Ah the finger waving strategy. This should be added to the international affairs lexicon.
I am suspect of analysis that assesses Kim Jong-un is not solely in charge or is somehow sharing power. The system does not work that way.
Excerpts:
Mr. Kim has broken from a couple of ruling traditions in North Korea—an air of infallibility and a tendency to micromanage. Unlike his father and grandfather, the North Korean leader has allowed that he may be more human than deity. He has admitted mistakes and apologized. He shed tears at a military parade last year. He even allowed the country’s state media to air remarks lamenting that he had lost weight amid the country’s food crisis.
At the same time, he has given subordinates more authority to manage daily affairs in the military, economy and elsewhere. He has attended fewer marquee events and delegated more site-inspection visits. Photos of North Korean leaders touring newly built sites have long been a fixture of the country’s propaganda.
“Kim Jong Un has been indicating for a while that he’s not the only person leading this country, that there is a group of people in charge,” said Ramon Pacheco Pardo, KF-VUB Korea chair at the Brussels School of Governance. “But there are people who have not done their job right and now he’s blaming them.”
Kim Jong Un’s Covid-19 Go-To Move—Finger Wagging
North Korean dictator has demoted officials, criticized technocrats as the country struggles with pandemic
WSJ · by Timothy W. Martin
North Korean state media, reporting on the meeting, didn’t specify what had gone wrong. Mr. Kim fired a variety of officials, in what was the biggest leadership shake-up in nearly a decade, according to an analysis by Tae Yong Ho, a former senior North Korean diplomat who defected and is now an opposition lawmaker in South Korea.
One of the demoted appears to have been North Korea’s top military official, Ri Pyong Chol. On Thursday, state media published photographs of Mr. Kim at Kim Il Sung’s mausoleum, a visit marking a major holiday on the anniversary of his grandfather’s death. Mr. Ri appeared in plain clothes and stood two rows back from his customary spot next to the North Korean leader.
Ri Pyong Chol, flanked by military officials wearing belts, applauded after the launch of a tactical guided projectile on March 25.
Photo: kcna/Reuters
The overhaul was in part due to an effort by Mr. Kim to reshape the way the North Korean government operates.
“Kim Jong Un is rewriting the internal dynamics of the regime,” said Ken Gause, a North Korea leadership expert at CNA, a Virginia-based nonprofit think tank. “This is about trying to make the system work better, though he is very upset that it’s not working.”
Mr. Kim has broken from a couple of ruling traditions in North Korea—an air of infallibility and a tendency to micromanage. Unlike his father and grandfather, the North Korean leader has allowed that he may be more human than deity. He has admitted mistakes and apologized. He shed tears at a military parade last year. He even allowed the country’s state media to air remarks lamenting that he had lost weight amid the country’s food crisis.
At the same time, he has given subordinates more authority to manage daily affairs in the military, economy and elsewhere. He has attended fewer marquee events and delegated more site-inspection visits. Photos of North Korean leaders touring newly built sites have long been a fixture of the country’s propaganda.
“Kim Jong Un has been indicating for a while that he’s not the only person leading this country, that there is a group of people in charge,” said Ramon Pacheco Pardo, KF-VUB Korea chair at the Brussels School of Governance. “But there are people who have not done their job right and now he’s blaming them.”
Staff sprayed disinfectant at a primary school in Pyongyang as an anti-pandemic measure.
Photo: Jon Chol Jin/Associated Press
The grievance that led to him to lambaste top officials late last month appears to be linked with false reporting of the country’s military rice reserves, according to the analysis by Mr. Tae, the South Korean lawmaker.
Mr. Kim had likely ordered the military to tap into its own rice reserves for public distribution, Mr. Tae wrote, and the actual supply was lower than what senior officials had reported. Typically, the military would just turn to China for a quick replenishment, but the borders remain closed due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
“If Kim realized this time that he had been receiving false reports, it would be an incident calling for anger and agitation,” Mr. Tae wrote.
On Thursday, South Korea’s spy agency told lawmakers that Mr. Kim’s wrath may have resulted from poor rice-reserve management, plus delays in opening a new disinfection center near the Chinese border.
The isolated country has grown even more insular during the pandemic, fearful of how severe outbreaks could ravage its decrepit health system. That has choked off critical cross-border commerce with China. Pyongyang doesn’t appear interested in nuclear talks with Washington that could relax sanctions and ease some of the economic pressure.
Visitors looked into North Korea from the Unification Observation Post in Paju, South Korea, on June 17.
Photo: Ahn Young-joon/Associated Press
Demanding better policy implementation—and as a result, shifting fault away from himself—represents one of the few options Mr. Kim has left.
The North Korean leader needed to send a message to his ruling class about accountability, said Lee Ho-ryung, a senior research fellow at the Seoul-based Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, a state-run think tank.
“If Kim does not get immediate support from his elite group, he cannot manage and reconcile the incremental complaints of the North Koreans,” Ms. Lee said.
Until Covid-19 vaccines become widely available, the Kim regime is effectively stuck in place, since reopening borders even partially would be too risky due to infrastructure vulnerabilities, widespread malnutrition and an elderly population, said Jiho Cha, an expert on North Korea’s healthcare system.
“They don’t have any other option but to keep the borders shut,” said Dr. Cha, who is a global health scholar at the University of Manchester.
Paralyzed by pandemic countermeasures, North Korea’s on-the-ground situation has grown harsher. Mr. Kim’s recent weight loss—estimated by Seoul’s spy agency at between 22 and 44 pounds—was packaged by state media as an emblem of the nation’s continuing struggles. Prior estimates put Mr. Kim’s weight at 310 pounds or more.
North Korea’s food supply has been crimped by last year’s summer floods that hurt agricultural production. But prices for rice and corn haven’t surged, according to Kang Mi Jin, a defector who monitors the country’s economy and regularly speaks with North Koreans.
Times are tight, though, with some having to sell their motorcycles or air conditioners for cash, she added. Informal marketplaces, where many North Koreans make a living, have seen their selling hours reduced as the venues are disinfected in the mornings, and their profits are limited by government price fixing, said Ms. Kang, who works for Daily NK, a Seoul-based publication.
“But if I ask them what food they’re putting on the table, it’s not much different than before,” Ms. Kang said.
North Koreans paying homage to the bronze statues of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.
Photo: Cha Song Ho/Associated Press
—Dasl Yoon contributed to this article.
WSJ · by Timothy W. Martin
13. 37 USFK-affiliated individuals test positive for COVID-19
Every time I see reports like these I ask, were these personnel vaccinated? I would think that if they have not that we should be highlighting the fact they had not received vaccinations. The fact that we do not highlight this makes people wonder if they became infected after receiving the vaccine and this makes us question the efficacy of vaccinations and provides ammunition to the anti-vaccination faction in the US.
37 USFK-affiliated individuals test positive for COVID-19 | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, July 10 (Yonhap) -- Thirty U.S. Forces Korea service members and seven other affiliated people tested positive for COVID-19 this week, the U.S. military said Saturday, amid a massive spike in virus infections across South Korea.
The 30 service members were either from Camp Casey and Camp Hovey in Dongducheon, 40 kilometers north of Seoul; Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, about 70 kilometers south of Seoul; the adjacent Osan Air Base; and the K-16 Air Base in Seongnam, south of Seoul, according to USFK.
The remaining cases were three Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) stationed at Camp Casey; two Korean civilian employees at Camp Humphreys, and two family members at K-16, it added.
All of them tested positive between Monday and Wednesday, and they are in isolation at Camp Humphreys, Osan Air Base and at a facility designated for Korean nationals, the USFK said.
The latest cases raised the total number of infections among the USFK-affiliated population to 1,009, most of whom tested positive upon their arrival here from the U.S.
The total caseload surpassed the 1,000 mark since the USFK reported a first confirmed case in February last year.
The USFK has reported cluster infections across the nation in recent weeks, though it completed vaccinating more than 80 percent of its population. On Friday, it toughened its antivirus rules for two weeks, banning its people from visiting bars and clubs and mandating mask wearing regardless vaccination status.
South Korea has experienced a surge in new cases over the past several days, with the daily figure reaching a record-high of 1,378 Saturday. The country's total caseload came to 166,722. the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA) said.
graceoh@yna.co.kr
(END)
14. South Korea’s push to strengthen defences could trigger reaction from North and Japan, say Chinese observers
No. This is Chinese propaganda. Increasing defense capabilities contributes to deterrence and the security of the ROK. This is an enemy argument to undermine the legitimacy of alliance partners and to keep the US and its alliances weak.
South Korea’s push to strengthen defences could trigger reaction from North and Japan, say Chinese observers
- Seoul successfully tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile last week as part of an ongoing drive to boost its military strength
- Nuclear-armed North Korea is the South’s biggest concern, but some analysts fear its efforts will have wider implications
+ FOLLOW
Published: 12:00pm, 10 Jul, 2021
South Korea’s push to develop its defensive capabilities saw it successfully test a submarine-launched ballistic missile last weekend, but some Chinese analysts have warned it risks a new arms race in east Asia.
Sunday’s launch from an underwater barge makes it the eighth country in the world to have mastered such a strategic capability, according to Yonhap television news, and it was one of many weapons Seoul has been developing amid a largely unnoticed arms race with North Korea.
In April, Korea Aerospace Industries unveiled the nation’s first prototype multirole fighter jet, the KF-X, which is being developed in partnership with Indonesia.
President Moon Jae-in said that the prototype “has opened a new era of self-defence and established a historic milestone for the development of the aviation industry”.
This year the country has also earmarked 3.2 trillion won (US$2.8 billion) to acquire dozens of new American combat helicopters and 24.3 billion won for Hanwha Group to develop a device that helps laser weapons target drones flying several kilometres away.
Last year the country’s Defence Minister Suh Wook told a launch ceremony for one of the country’s Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class submarines, which are designed to fire cruise and ballistic missiles, “as history tells us, peace is not just given for free. It should be made by ourselves based upon strong power.”
Sun Xingjie, a Korean affairs specialist from Jilin University in northeast China, said South Korea’s military development posed a regional security dilemma.
“I think both North Korea and Japan would be alarmed to see Seoul’s visible and meaningful military improvement. If the two countries both decide to enhance their own military power, then we will face a very awkward situation, in which every country is seeking security by acquiring more powerful military capabilities but instead makes the whole situation unsafe,” said Sun.
Song Zhongping, a former People’s Liberation Army instructor, is worried that the denuclearisation in the Korean peninsula will become more difficult in the future.
North Korea under Kim Jong-un has carried out a series of nuclear and missile tests. Photo: AP
“If Seoul’s military progress makes Pyongyang more determined to pursue more sophisticated weapons, then the peninsula is bound to be more dangerous than ever,” he said.
But other analysts said South Korea has legitimate reasons to build up its military.
The country’s biggest security threat comes from North Korea, which announced in 2017 that it had successfully tested a hydrogen bomb.
Hwang Jae-ho, director of the Global Security Cooperation Centre at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul, said Seoul’s military build-up is aimed at deterrence.
“So far, these developments are still modest in scale, especially when compared to North Korea, which has nuclear strike capabilities,” Hwang said.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un describes nation’s food situation as ‘tense’
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un describes nation’s food situation as ‘tense’
Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst specialising in Chinese security at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in Canberra, agreed. “By having a sea-based prompt-strike capability based around [submarine-launched ballistic missiles], Seoul has some potential to attack North Korean nuclear ballistic missile forces prior to launch in a damage limitation strategy.
“I suspect that this is a tactical response against a growing North Korean threat – and a hedge against future uncertainty regarding US extended nuclear deterrence security guarantees weakening, perhaps in a future administration after 2024.”
This article appeared in the South China Morning Post print edition as: missile test raises fear of regional arms race
15. Welcome to the Club: South Korea’s New Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
I wonder if the author is not a little premature. One test does not make capabilities (yet).
Welcome to the Club: South Korea’s New Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
Seoul is one of just a few countries to field an SLBM; its missile will be used to arm South Korea’s new indigenously-designed attack submarine.
South Korea recently test-fired what may very well be Seoul’s first submarine-launched ballistic (SLBM) missile. South Korean media cited a Republic of Korea (ROK) military official, who explained that the test launch came at the end of last year. The test makes South Korea the eighth country in the world to have overcome the engineering difficulties inherent to SLBM launches.
Specific details about the test are scant. However, the missile in question is reportedly a variant of South Korea’s Hyunmoo 2B missile, a relatively short-range solid-fueled ballistic missile that is equipped with a conventional high-explosive warhead. Various sources on the missile’s range differ, as several variants exist, though the missile’s upper range limit appears to be around eight hundred kilometers or about five hundred miles.
Although the ROK Navy conducted the test from an underwater launch platform, the missile is expected to ultimately arm the ROK Navy’s yet-to-be-commissioned Dosan Ahn Changho-class submarine—the first of an advanced class of attack submarines.
There are expected to be nine hulls in total, with the first submarine entering service with the RoK Navy sometime next year. Although the Dosan Ahn Changho-class submarines are diesel-electric, they are of a very advanced design and equipped with high-performance fuel cells which allow the submarine to remain submerged for extended periods of time.
The indigenously-built and designed submarines are the largest subs ever built for the ROK Navy, and the first submarines capable of vertically launching SLBMs or land-attack cruise missiles. The first submarine is expected to enter service with the RoK Navy in the very near future, possibly as soon as next month.
The submarines that comprise the Dosan Ahn Changho-class will not be identical but rather divided into several “batches” each with slightly differing characteristics. Though all Dosan Ahn Changho-class submarines will remain attack submarines, subsequent hulls are expected to incorporate a higher degree of indigenously designed sensors and combat components and will be somewhat lengthened in order to accommodate a higher number of vertical launch cells and therefore a higher number of land-attack or SLBMs.
Seoul may not be the only country on the Korean Peninsula mating SLBMs to submarines, however.
A recent report indicates that, despite the aged and decrepit nature of North Korea’s submarine fleet, the country’s navy may be taking steps to integrate SLBMs to at least one of its naval submarines. This reflects Kim Jong-un’s stated desire to field long-range ballistic missiles capable of striking the American mainland.
Though Seoul’s new submarine-launched ballistic missiles and the submarines that would launch them are still in their infancy, both developments are a significant achievement for the country and would add a potent new arrow to South Korea’s quiver.
Caleb Larson is a defense writer with the National Interest. He holds a Master of Public Policy and covers U.S. and Russian security, European defense issues, and German politics and culture.
Image: Wikimedia Commons
16.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
