Quotes of the Day:
“Antisemitism (not merely the hatred of Jews), imperialism (not merely conquest), totalitarianism (not merely dictatorship)—one after the other, one more brutally than the other, have demonstrated that human dignity needs a new guarantee which can be found only in a new political principle, in a new law on earth, whose validity this time must comprehend the whole of humanity while its power must remain strictly limited, rooted in and controlled by newly defined territorial entities.”
— The Origins Of Totalitarianism (Harvest Book Book 244) by Hannah Arendt
https://a.co/fybnjVD
"It isn't enough to talk about peace. One must believe in it. And it isn't enough to believe in it. One must work at it."
- Eleanor Roosevelt
"I recommend that the Statue of Liberty be supplemented by a Statue of Responsibility on the west coast."
- Viktor E. Frankl
1. Yoon's spokesperson says U.S., Cheong Wa Dae to decide on allied exercise
2. Waiting for North Korea to escalate
3. Moon finally sees a threat from the North
4. Are nuclear power plants safe? (South Korea)
5. U.S. Senate to hold hearing on S. Korea ambassador nominee on April 7
6. N. Korea works with all kinds of cyber criminals, including Russians: Sullivan
7. Yoon expected to overhaul foreign, unification ministries
8. Issues in report to president are reasons for Yoon’s relocation of presidential office
9. China's envoy on N. Korea mulls visit to S. Korea: ministry
10. What President Yoon Suk-yeol’s Election Means for South Korean Democracy
11. The election of a conservative South Korean president is good news for the U.S. | Opinion
12. S. Korea pushes to unveil secret dossiers on key inter-Korean talks
13. Man of the Hour: Kim Song Nam
14. Where is Ri Yong Ho?
15. For trafficked North Korean women, the road to justice remains long
16. N. Korea ratchets up crackdowns on wealthy business people amid concerns over smuggling
17. [INTERVIEW] British envoy brings new perspectives from both Koreas
1. Yoon's spokesperson says U.S., Cheong Wa Dae to decide on allied exercise
There can only be one president at a time. Of course the Moon administration must decide on any national security issue.
I just hope there is no discussion of cancelling, postponing. or scaling back the very necessary exercise that has already been postponed to deconflict with the March presidential election.
If anyone argues that there should be a change to the exercise in the hopes of preventing an ICBM (or nuclear) test>. That would be a mistake.First, changing the exercise will not prevent a test and it will only reduce the readiness of the combined force. We should understand that is an objective of the regime - to reduce thee readiness of the ROK/US CFC for two purposes - lack of training will force US forces in the peninsula and an unready force will be unable to successfully defend the ROK when the regime orders an attack. We must never use exercises as a bargaining chip. We must sustain a high level of readiness.
Yoon's spokesperson says U.S., Cheong Wa Dae to decide on allied exercise | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, March 23 (Yonhap) -- Any decision on upcoming military exercises between South Korea and the United States will be made by Washington and the current Cheong Wa Dae, a spokesperson for President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol said Wednesday.
Kim Eun-hye made the remark when asked by a reporter whether Yoon and his transition team have expressed their views on the combined exercise reportedly planned for next month.
"The current commander-in-chief is President Moon Jae-in," she said during a press briefing. "I understand a decision will be made through consultations between the United States, the current Cheong Wa Dae and the defense ministry."
The allies are expected to hold their regular combined exercise next month at a time of rising tensions over North Korea's missile tests.
Yoon was elected after promising to "normalize" the drills, which were scaled back under the current administration to facilitate dialogue with Pyongyang.
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
2. Waiting for North Korea to escalate
Keeping its options open?
Excerpt:
Clearly, something is happening inside Pyongyang, but the language used by North Korea so far suggests it has made no decision on the party narrative.
I think it has a plan and it is the plan it has been trying to execute for decades: political warfare and development of military capability to dominate the peninsula.
But this is a very dangerous argument in the conclusion. If the regime's "pressure campaign" (e.g., Blackmail diplomacy - the use of increased tension, threats, and provocations to gain political and economic concessions) results in the US agreeing to concessions to hold negotiations then we will be in for much more of the same for the foreseeable future (or as long as the Kim family regime remains in power).Kim will assess his strategy as a success and instead of coming to negotiate in good faith Kim will double down on his political warfare strategy and blackmail diplomacy. And one last point. The US needs no "provoking" into negotiations. Since the Biden administration assumed office its policy has been that it is willing to negotiate any time, anywhere without preconditions. It is Kim Jong-un who has refused to come to the table.
Conclusion:
Finding a mutually agreeable compromise between the United States and North Korea will not be easy and its framing as “concession” or “bait” will not help. Eventually, this approach might become a self-fulfilling prophecy where not talking ends in more conflict and the very thing both sides wanted to prevent. Maybe the West needs a high degree of tension to justify such a compromise. Hopefully, this time North Korea’s alleged strategy of provoking the United States into negotiations will work.
Waiting for North Korea to escalate
With Pyongyang ramping up its missile testing, it’s unclear
whether they’re looking for a deal or a provocation.
After North Korea conducted a spate of missile tests in January, it was argued that the country had ended its self-imposed 2018 moratorium on testing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and possibly also nuclear weapons. Even the UN Secretary-General claimed that a test on 30 January had violated the moratorium, although the Hwasong-12 was only an intermediate-range missile with markedly lower distance capacity. However, one thing is certain: North Korea is measuring the limits of its moratorium. Ten days before the 30 January test, it had announced that instructions were issued to “reconsider” unilateral trust-building measures and “promptly examine” the issue of restarting all suspended activities.
Clearly, something is happening inside Pyongyang, but the language used by North Korea so far suggests it has made no decision on the party narrative.
In October last year, North Korea revealed a new ICBM, much larger than its previous two versions and at some point needing to be tested. The US Department of Defense argued that this very ICBM was used covertly as a launch vehicle in what North Korea declared was testing for military reconnaissance satellites on 27 February and 5 March. This, the US contended, must have been in preparation for a full test of the missile. The South Korean government by 14 March reportedly believed it could happen within days, which it did with another test on 16 March. But the launch failed, or was intentionally aborted, and no public information has yet been released on the type of “missile” used.
Clearly, something is happening inside Pyongyang, but the language used by North Korea so far suggests it has made no decision on the party narrative. In fact, it appears to signal that there is a volatility that may worsen in North Korea’s “preparation for a long-term confrontation with the US imperialists”. Any restoration of its nuclear test site or use of ICBM technology for launching satellites might be exactly that – preparations to conduct an actual ICBM test if no deal can be reached.
A US Air Force B-52 Stratofortress arrives in Guam for Bomber Task Force deployment, 26 January 2021 (US Indo-Pacific Command/Flickr)
North Korea used the same approach in 2020 when it pressured South Korea to stop anti-North activists sending leaflets across the border. In May of that year, the North Korean leader’s sister Kim Yo-jong issued a statement that the action had to stop or it would prompt Pyongyang to take retaliatory steps. Indeed, North Korea took action two weeks later, televising the destruction of the Inter-Korean liaison office in Kaesong that had opened not even two years earlier. But this was only a symbolic retaliation as the office had not been in use for some time. The other options Kim Yo-jong had raised would have been painful for both sides: formally cancelling the inter-Korean economic project of the Kaesong Industrial Zone already dormant since 2016 or the September 2018 inter-Korean military agreement. Hours after the liaison office was destroyed, South Korea’s Ministry of Unification announced that legislation would be introduced to parliament to ban the anti-North leaflets, which likely led to Kim Jong-un a week later officially “suspending” plans for unspecified military actions targeting the South.
Finding a mutually agreeable compromise between the United States, South Korea and North Korea will not be easy and its framing as “concession” or “bait” will not help.
This sequence of events during 2020 looks surprisingly similar to North Korea’s behaviour this year. While the possibility was raised that the red line of an ICBM or nuclear test could be crossed, the leadership opted for a missile test just below that line on 30 January. But media reports have continuously stressed that an ICBM test is not a matter of if, but when. That the 80th birthday of Kim Jong-un’s father on 16 February passed without any provocative events was attributed to the country’s deference to China, which was hosting the Olympics that week. Now analysts look to the 110th birthday of his grandfather on 15 April. But there is also the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army on 25 April, with other dates important to the North Korean leadership scattered throughout the year.
While precautions such as US Air Force spy planes sent on reconnaissance near North Korea in January, or B-52 bombers called to Guam on 16 February to show America’s “commitment to the region” might only marginally antagonise and not further escalate the situation, neglecting diplomatic solutions surely will do so. At least, this has been continuously stressed by North Korea. For US policymakers, this puts them in a tough position in which they need to break out of a cycle of provocations, sanctions and tests. Politicians might not be willing to look for a compromise when they believe it will be derailed even in its early stages by an ICBM test, while bureaucrats are less likely to propose diplomatic solutions or even consider them in these circumstances. Public opinion, too, may not favour compromise when it is shaped only by alarmist reporting.
Finding a mutually agreeable compromise between the United States and North Korea will not be easy and its framing as “concession” or “bait” will not help. Eventually, this approach might become a self-fulfilling prophecy where not talking ends in more conflict and the very thing both sides wanted to prevent. Maybe the West needs a high degree of tension to justify such a compromise. Hopefully, this time North Korea’s alleged strategy of provoking the United States into negotiations will work.
3. Moon finally sees a threat from the North
Conclusion:
No wonder a growing number of people attribute Moon’s last-minute transposition to the need to block the relocation of the presidential office. Any possible security vacuum must be fixed by a face-to-face meeting between Moon and Yoon, not by an embarrassing presidential grandstanding.
Tuesday
March 22, 2022
Moon finally sees a threat from the North
The sincerity of messages from political leaders or even ordinary people depends on consistency. No matter how stirring the language may be, people doubt a speaker’s sincerity if their words are inconsistent. What makes us think of this are recent remarks by President Moon Jae-in — with 48 days left before his term expires.
On Tuesday, Moon stressed the significance of his responsibility as head of state to carry out what the Constitution demands from him. “There should not be any vacuum in protecting national security, the economy and public safety,” he said. Throughout a meeting with his aides, the president emphasized how unstable the situation is on the Korean Peninsula due to North Korean threats. In an earlier meeting with related ministers, Moon expressed concerns about President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol’s plan to relocate the presidential office to the Ministry of National Defense building. He said it could cause a “security vacuum at times when our defense capability should be reinforced to address a deepening security crisis in the peninsula.” His remarks are obviously aimed at putting the brakes on Yoon’s relocation plan.
At first glance, Moon’s comments seem legitimate given concerns about a possible security vacuum. But it has to be pointed out that he has made an art of keeping mum about provocations from North Korea in the past.
Even this year, the Moon administration did not define the North’s endless missile launches as “provocations” nor denounce them. Seoul repeatedly abstained from voting on UN resolutions to condemn them. After Kim Yo-jong, the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, criticized South Korea for using the term “provocation,” senior security officials of the Moon administration toned it down to a “threat.” The government nearly kept silent even after North Korea blew up the inter-Korean liaison office in Kaesong. Even after a South Korean fisheries official was brutally killed by the North Korean navy, the government did not raise any substantial complaint.
Instead, the administration was engrossed with trying to get an end-of-war declaration by interpreting the North’s provocations as requests for dialogue. On Memorial Day, President Moon said the 1950-53 Korean War resulted from North Korean forces’ “advance to the South,” not from its aggression. The president did not attend the funeral of Korean War hero Gen. Paik Sun-yup. Instead, he said the Korean military started with Kim Won-bong, an independence fighter-turned-official in Pyongyang who helped North Korea invade South Korea.
No wonder a growing number of people attribute Moon’s last-minute transposition to the need to block the relocation of the presidential office. Any possible security vacuum must be fixed by a face-to-face meeting between Moon and Yoon, not by an embarrassing presidential grandstanding.
4. Are nuclear power plants safe? (South Korea)
And my concern is with the worst case. What happens if north Korea attacks the ROK with some 23 -24 nuclear power plants in South Korea? What are the contingency plans for defense of the nuclear power plants? Putin's War should give everyone a wake-up call.
Are nuclear power plants safe?
By Kim Sun-ae
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol pledged to raise the proportion of nuclear power in Korea's electricity generation from the current level of 25-29 percent to 30-35 percent by 2030. He also said that he would restart building Sin Hanul reactors 3 and 4 whose construction has been suspended. But is it safe to use nuclear power?
On March 4, when a wildfire occurred in Uljin, North Gyeongsang Province, the fire spread close to the fences of Hanul Nuclear Power Plant. If the fire had damaged the power plant, it could have become an even more tragic situation than now.
Scientists predict that climate change will increase the frequency of wildfires and typhoons, both of which can damage nuclear power plants. According to climate scientists, global warming raises the number of lightning strikes. Warming causes more water vapor in the atmosphere, and water vapor is the fuel for thunderstorms. So the warmer it gets, the more lightning strikes are expected. Increased lightning strikes would lead to more wildfires.
Also, nuclear power plants are not safe in the case of other natural disasters including earthquakes. Think of the Fukushima nuclear accident caused by the great earthquake and tsunami in 2011. Although 11 years have passed, the problem is still ongoing. Water has been irradiated constantly from the nuclear power plant, and about 70 percent of people who evacuated their homes after the accident could not return yet.
Moreover, a strong earthquake occurred again in Fukushima this March. The disaster temporarily stopped the operation of part of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant facilities for cooling spent nuclear fuel. These accidents show that nuclear power plants are vulnerable to natural disasters such as earthquakes.
In addition to natural disasters, war is another factor which threatens the safety of nuclear power plants. Recently Russia seized control of Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. This situation and the continuing tragic war, which Russia must stop, show the high risk associated with nuclear power plants all over the world in the event of a military aggression.
In particular, Korea is not free from this risk. The country is surrounded by strong nations: China, Russia and Japan. Furthermore, South and North Korea did not end the Korean War formally. Given the circumstances, South Korea cannot ensure the safety of its nuclear power plants.
If one of the power plants happens to be attacked, it will be a complete catastrophe. In this small country, we have too many nuclear power plants. In the case of a nuclear accident, no one will be safe. Thus, it is wise not to build new nuclear power plants.
Even if no accident occurs during the operation of nuclear power plants, radioactive substances in spent nuclear fuel can have a half-life of as high as 24,000 years. When we think of the future of our children, our nieces and nephews and our grandchildren, what will be the right decision?
Kim Sun-ae (blog.naver.com/dancinglf) is a writer and translator.
5. U.S. Senate to hold hearing on S. Korea ambassador nominee on April 7
U.S. Senate to hold hearing on S. Korea ambassador nominee on April 7 | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, March 23 (Yonhap) -- The U.S. Senate is scheduled to hold a confirmation hearing on Philip Goldberg, nominated as Washington's ambassador to South Korea, next month, according to a related panel.
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations made public its schedule for the hearing to open at 10 a.m. on April 7 (local time) via its website. Hearings on the nominees to become ambassadors to Australia, the Philippines, Norway and South Korea will be held together.
In February, President Joe Biden announced his pick of Goldberg, a career diplomat who was once in charge of enforcing North Korea sanctions, as the new top U.S. envoy in South Korea.
The post has remained vacant for more than a year since the departure of Harry Harris that was timed with Biden's inauguration.
Goldberg worked as coordinator for the implementation of U.N. sanctions on North Korea from 2009-2010 for its nuclear and long-range missile tests.
(END)
Related Articles
6. N. Korea works with all kinds of cyber criminals, including Russians: Sullivan
Be prepared to see north Korea employ its all purpose sword for dual purposes - support to the regime as well as possibly indirect support to Russia.
N. Korea works with all kinds of cyber criminals, including Russians: Sullivan | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, March 22 (Yonhap) -- North Korea possesses significant cyber capabilities and works with all kinds of cyber criminals including those from Russia, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said Tuesday.
The remarks came after President Joe Biden warned of Russian cyber attacks.
"All I can say generally is that North Korea cyber capabilities have been manifest in the world and they work with all kinds of cyber criminals around the world, including Russian cyber criminals," Sullivan said in a press briefing.
Sullivan did not provide any other details, saying "I've got nothing further for you on that today."
Biden on Monday told American businesses to be alert for cyber attacks by Russia.
"And what I want to mention very much, very quickly with you all is one of the tools he's most likely to use, in my view, in our view, is cyber, cyber attacks," the U.S. president said before a business meeting in Washington, adding the Russians have a "very sophisticated cyber capability."
North Korea is said to operate an army of over 7,000 trained hackers, with many of them based in China and Russia.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
7. Yoon expected to overhaul foreign, unification ministries
Back to MOFAT! (if I was going to "satirize" acronyms I would be saying MOFAT means "more fat." - apologies for sarcasm).
For the MOU it should not have any role in foreign policy or intelligence. It must have a single focus on planning and preparing for unification. It must prepare the entire peninsula for unification along the four paths to a United Republic of Korea (UROK): (1) peaceful, (2) war, (3) regime collapse, and (4) new leadership inside the north that seeks unification.
It must plan for the complete integration of the major lines of effect, political, economic, cultural, legal, and security in all paths to unification. It must have a major in information and influence activities in the north target the regime elite, the 2d tier leadership, and the Korean people in the north. In addition, it must provide unification education to the Korean people in the South and prepare the people on both sides of the DMZ for unification.
Yoon expected to overhaul foreign, unification ministries
Foreign Ministry may regain trade; Unification Ministry predicted to reduce roles
Published : Mar 23, 2022 - 14:47 Updated : Mar 23, 2022 - 17:16
Ahn Cheol-soo, chairman of the transition committee, presides over the general meeting of the presidential transition committee on Monday. (Yonhap)
Speculations are rising that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification could see major changes under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration.
The Foreign Ministry may regain trade functions from the Industry Ministry with growing importance on economic security. The Unification Ministry, meanwhile, appears likely to see its role reduced amid increasing tensions with the North.
Talk of the transfer of trade affairs dates back to the promises made by Ahn Cheol-soo, chairman of the transition committee, when he was a presidential candidate. In December, he pledged to transfer the trade work of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “to respond efficiently” in the era of science, technology, economy and diplomacy.
On Tuesday, Ahn held a meeting with the committee’s foreign affairs members. They exchanged opinions on the causes of the current government’s “diplomatic failure” and discussed “functional organizational arrangements” according to the trend of the times, according to the committee’s spokesperson. The functional organizational arrangements are interpreted as the reorganization of the foreign affairs and industry ministries.
Ahn and the committee members said the key to future security lies in “securing strategic materials” as well as a military power. Securing strategic supplies is related to economic security, such as supply chains.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also seeks to integrate diplomacy and trade functions, stressing “economic security” as the US-China conflict intensifies and global supply chain issues arise.
In the previous Kim Dae-jung and Lee Myung-bak administrations, diplomacy and trade co-existed under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Since 2013 during the Park Geun-hye administration, industry and trade have been overseen by the Industry Ministry.
The Industry Ministry, however, has expressed concerns over the reshuffle.
They say industry and trade functions should “co-exist” considering major domestic industries are seeking to expand globally. Officials say the Industry Ministry has more professional knowledge and economic understanding for trade, and they worry that trade issues could take a backseat if approached too much from a diplomatic and political perspective.
The transition committee plans to finalize the reorganization plan after receiving reports from each ministry. The presidential transition committee is expected to receive reports from the two ministries on Thursday.
The Ministry of Unification, which is in charge of inter-Korean relations, is also expected to be reorganized and change its policy under Yoon’s administration, which takes a hard-line stance toward North Korea.
Yoon has not explicitly expressed his position on the ministry, but some lawmakers from the People Power Party and its party leader Lee Jun-seok have backed abolishing the department, saying that the ministries of unification and gender have “ended their lives.”
On Wednesday, Shin Yong-hyun, a spokesman for the transition committee, said in a briefing that the Ministry of Unification “will not be abolished.”
“The Ministry of Unification should strengthen inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation and humanitarian efforts under the principle that the ministry should regain its functions,” Shin said.
As tensions grow over North Korea’s repeated provocations, Yoon’s administration is expected to focus more on principle rather than flexibility in terms of policies toward the North.
In the organization chart of Yoon’s transition committee, the word “unification” does not appear in any of the seven branches. The foreign affairs and security branch also put more weight on diplomacy and security than on North Korea relations.
Observers noted that the Unification Ministry could be reorganized focusing on North Korean human rights and support projects for defectors, which Yoon promised, instead of inter-Korean economic, cultural and social exchanges.
8. Issues in report to president are reasons for Yoon’s relocation of presidential office
Hmmm... process or personality. What was the cause of the president-elect's frustration - the presidential administrative processes or the personality of the president?
Issues in report to president are reasons for Yoon’s relocation of presidential office
Posted March. 23, 2022 07:49,
Updated March. 23, 2022 07:49
Issues in report to president are reasons for Yoon’s relocation of presidential office. March. 23, 2022 07:49. by Kwan-Seok Jang jks@donga.com.
“It will make things more inconvenient for me but I don’t work that way.” It was reported that President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol’s experience during his years in prosecution with the investigation into the presidential report system within Cheong Wa Dae affected his decision to relocate the presidential office.
“The president-elect was deployed as the head of the special investigation into suspicions related to Choi Soon-sil and former President Park Geun-hye’s whereabouts for seven hours on the day of Sewol ferry’s sinking. He thoroughly investigated the overall report system within Cheong Wa Dae,” said a key person close to Yoon. “He directly found out how reporting was delayed or distorted moving through the layers of Cheong Wa Dae’s report system from a presidential secretary to the secretarial office with regards to the ‘doorknob trio,’” the source added. “It is true that Yoon’s decision to move out of Cheong Wa Dae has been partially affected by such experience.”
In December 2016, Cheong Wa Dae’s report system became a point of controversy in the parliamentary special investigation committee tasked with probing into the manipulation of state administration. “How do you make a written report to the president? Does a lieutenant colonel of the Office of National Security run to the president or is it sent by fax?” a member of the committee asked.
“We ride a bicycle sometimes or simply run other times,” said Kim Jang-soo, the then-head of the Office of National Security. The working environment in Cheong Wa Dae where written reports are made by people riding a bicycle from the secretarial office to the presidential office in the main building or a president’s official residence and it is hard to check if a president has read reports left a strong impression in the president-elect.
“Reports cannot be made in a practical manner if reports to president can only be made with appointments in advance,” Yoon said recently to his people, reportedly. “It would be better for presidential advisors to work closely with president and communicate frequently.”
9. China's envoy on N. Korea mulls visit to S. Korea: ministry
China's envoy on N. Korea mulls visit to S. Korea: ministry | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, March 23 (Yonhap) -- The top Chinese envoy on the North Korean nuclear issue is considering a trip to South Korea in the near future, as Seoul and Beijing are in relevant consultations, according to Seoul's foreign ministry Wednesday.
If Liu Xiaoming, special representative on Korean Peninsula affairs, visits here, he is expected to hold a meeting with his South Korean counterpart, Noh Kyu-duk.
No specific schedule has been set yet, with bilateral consultations on it under way, the ministry said.
Noh and Liu have held several rounds of phone and virtual consultations in response to a recent spate of North Korean missile launches.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
10. What President Yoon Suk-yeol’s Election Means for South Korean Democracy
Good insight and analysis from Dr. Draudt.
Conclusion:
One thing is certain: South Korea’s standing as a procedural democracy is in fine order. Over 77 percent of eligible Koreans voted in the March 9 election, the second highest rate since democratization (and just barely short of the record of 77.2 percent turnout, set in 2017). However, scholars have argued that over the past decade or so, South Korea has experienced a decline in other important characteristics of democracy, including freedom of expression, judicial constraints on the executive branch, and erosion of civil society participation.
As I wrote for The Diplomat in following the impeachment of Park Geun-hye in 2017, the question for South Korean democracy at the time would be whether Park was scapegoated for corruption and abuse of power or whether her impeachment would lead to broader institutional reforms to check the power of the presidency. In many counts, we’re back to these same stakes five years later.
What President Yoon Suk-yeol’s Election Means for South Korean Democracy
Yoon has two important tasks in front of him: mending emergent social divisions and making institutional changes to prevent – not just punish – corruption.
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Earlier this month South Korea elected Yoon Suk-yeol of the conservative People Power Party (PPP) its next president, by a margin of less than 1 percent. The contentious election was rife with pandering, issue-baiting, and mudslinging. South Korean voters resented the fact that they were forced to choose between two unlikable candidates. Moreover, the campaigns revealed – or perhaps fueled – deep social divisions in the country.
Yoon has both the opportunity and challenge to reform the presidency in South Korea. In this sense the outcome of the election is a strong test for South Korea’s democracy. To prevent democratic backsliding and foster the domestic “regime change” that he promised, Yoon has two important tasks vis-à-vis domestic politics in front of him: mending emergent social divisions and making institutional changes to prevent – not just punish – corruption.
Partisan Politics and Social Divisions
First, President-elect Yoon will need to address the country’s widening political fault lines. Historically, South Korean voters divide along regional lines. Partisan regionalism has roots in the authoritarian rule of Park Chung-hee (r. 1963-1979), who drew support, staff, and advisers from his home region of Yeongnam, the southeastern provinces. Opposition to Park and the progressive foundations of the democratization movement rallied in Honam, the southwestern provinces. This “South-South divide” (Namnam galteung) also manifested in this year’s election, particularly among Koreans aged 40 and older.
However, much more pronounced were divisions by generation and gender. The so-called gender conflict (jenda galteung) suggests that gender issues need to be addressed for both men and women. For Koreans in their 20s, support for the two major party candidates divided along gender. Around 60 percent of Gen Z women supported progressive candidate Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party, while 60 percent of their male counterparts supported Yoon.
Political Corruption: Reform or Retribution?
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Second, Yoon needs to gain public trust by living up to his promise to mend the country’s wounds. In his victory speech, Yoon aimed to set a tone that he would win gracefully. “Our competition is over for now… We have to join hands an unite into one for the people and the country,” he said.
Yoon is a newcomer to politics, having spent most of his career as a public prosecutor. He played a central role in several high-profile cases, including the attempt of the National Intelligence Service to influence the 2012 election and the impeachment of Park Geun-hye, the previous conservative president, in 2017. Yoon, who was appointed by outgoing President Moon Jae-in, also investigated Moon’s cabinet officials, including his close adviser and briefly-serving justice minister, Cho Kuk.
South Korean modern history is littered with corruption. Every president since democratization in 1987 has been implicated in corruption or bribery scandals. But the tendency in the country’s strategy has been to target individual perpetrators rather than tackle the difficult but necessary structures and institutions that not only permit but encourage corruption and duplicity. Many in South Korea see Yoon, the former prosecutor, as a symbol of justice and fairness following decades of scandals, lies, and corruption.
Yoon’s campaign promised to investigate the alleged wrong-doings of the Moon administration – a promise that drew cheers from his supporters and set off alarms within the ruling party. Yoon will walk a thin line between investigating specific instances of corruption and using anti-corruption campaigns as cover to punish erstwhile political rivals.
South Korean Democracy Going Forward
One thing is certain: South Korea’s standing as a procedural democracy is in fine order. Over 77 percent of eligible Koreans voted in the March 9 election, the second highest rate since democratization (and just barely short of the record of 77.2 percent turnout, set in 2017). However, scholars have argued that over the past decade or so, South Korea has experienced a decline in other important characteristics of democracy, including freedom of expression, judicial constraints on the executive branch, and erosion of civil society participation.
As I wrote for The Diplomat in following the impeachment of Park Geun-hye in 2017, the question for South Korean democracy at the time would be whether Park was scapegoated for corruption and abuse of power or whether her impeachment would lead to broader institutional reforms to check the power of the presidency. In many counts, we’re back to these same stakes five years later.
11. The election of a conservative South Korean president is good news for the U.S. | Opinion
Lawrence Peck tracks north Korean subversive activities in the ROK and the US and identifies those who have sympathy or provide support for north Korea.
Conclusion:
The purpose of these revelations regarding some of Yoon's extremist critics is not necessarily meant to impugn all of those who may oppose him or disagree with his proposed policies. However, it is certainly important to note that there are pro-North Korea individuals among his outspoken foes in the U.S. whose extremism is relevant to whether or not their professed declarations of concern about Yoon are credible or worthy of serious consideration. This caveat applies all the more to those of Yoon's critics, the ones who condemn his strong stance against North Korea and China, who have ties to the outgoing South Korean administration which was opposed to Yoon and connections with officials of the North Korean regime engaged in intelligence-related work. Most Americans would no doubt agree that the real "threat to peace" is not Yoon, South Korea or the U.S., but rather the fundamentally criminal nature of the North Korean regime, which continues its cyber-attacks, weapons proliferation to other rogue regimes, missile launches and other types of provocations, as well as its horribly brutal treatment of its own people.
The election of a conservative South Korean president is good news for the U.S. | Opinion
Newsweek · by Lawrence Peck , Advisor, North Korea Freedom Coalition On 3/22/22 at 7:00 AM EDT · March 22, 2022
In South Korea, conservative Yoon Suk-yeol was recently elected president after a particularly contentious campaign. Yoon was justifiably viewed by many leading Korea-watchers in the U.S. as a more pro-U.S. and anti-China candidate than his left-wing opponent Lee Jae-myung, who was correctly seen as being less antagonistic toward China and North Korea. Yoon had campaigned on improving defense- and security-related ties with the U.S. and Japan and more closely coordinating policies with those allies to counter the increasing aggressiveness of China and ongoing provocations by North Korea. The policy proposals of Lee, essentially a continuation of what supporters termed engagement and critics challenged as appeasement of North Korea by outgoing leftist President Moon Jae-in, were apparently rejected by South Korean voters, as were Lee's generally redistributionist domestic economic policy proposals.
Lee's campaign was also dogged by a land development corruption scandal, negatively impacted by widespread public sentiment against the Chinese government. In spite of Moon's attempts by means of various concessions to coax the North to finally take serious steps toward its promises to denuclearize, the North's dictator Kim Jong-un has consistently refused to meet all obligations, while continuing provocations, from killing South Korean citizens to launching various types of missiles. While Yoon supported the decision by a previous conservative administration to deploy the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system to protect Korea against North Korean missiles, which was a position supported by a majority of the public, Lee had opposed that deployment decision based in part on strong Chinese objections, as did far-left forces in Korea. In addition, Lee also damaged his cause by having made negative remarks about Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, whereas Yoon had stressed that the Russian invasion of Ukraine had demonstrated the importance of even further strengthening the U.S.-South Korea alliance.
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol speaks during a press conference on March 20, 2022, in Seoul, South Korea. Jung Yeon-Je - Pool/Getty Images
On the domestic front, Yoon, who said he was a fan of free-market advocate Milton Friedman, had proposed eliminating the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, which some of his opponents falsely characterized as being indicative of a supposed intent to somehow curtail women's rights. Voters apparently rejected that slander, just as American voters in 1980 did not give any credence to the claim that because Ronald Reagan had proposed eliminating the U.S. Department of Education, that supposedly meant that he was somehow opposed to Americans being well-educated or that he sought to in some manner curtail Americans' educational opportunities. Lee's tax and real estate-related proposals were feared by businesses and property owners, and his plans for a basic income to be provided to all citizens apparently did not sway voters to a sufficient degree to bring him victory.
In the U.S., the Korean election campaign and Yoon's victory have produced rather predictable reactions, with conservative and most moderate, mainstream Korea experts favoring Yoon as one whose policies with regard to both North Korea and China would be more in line with those of the U.S., and leftist Korea-watchers opposing Yoon and favoring Lee for that same reason. It must be pointed out, however, that not all of Yoon's opponents in the U.S. are what one would term ordinary left-of-center individuals or the typical supporters of Lee's party. Some of Yoon's most vocal and strident critics here have been pro-North Korea activists and other far-left extremists who, for example, are opposed to the presence of U.S. forces in South Korea, opposed to South Korea's cooperation with the U.S. and its regional allies against Chinese aggressiveness, and in some cases have even condemned what they term U.S. "militarism" and "imperialism" and hold that North Korea's actions are to be blamed on what they and the Chinese and North Korean regimes similarly denounce as the alleged "Cold War mentality" and "hostile policies" of the U.S. government. These critics of Yoon are not run-of-the-mill or mainstream opponents of his policies or supporters of Lee, but rather radical fringe organizations and activists who are in sympathy with the North Korean regime and constantly deny or make excuses for its crimes.
Some of those most stridently condemning Yoon's election are pro-North Korea individuals who have co-authored a report opposing sanctions on North Korea which was funded by the outgoing leftist South Korean government of Moon, and other sympathizers with and apologists for North Korea who have for years been collaborating with North Korean intelligence agents based at the North's Mission to the United Nations in New York City.
The purpose of these revelations regarding some of Yoon's extremist critics is not necessarily meant to impugn all of those who may oppose him or disagree with his proposed policies. However, it is certainly important to note that there are pro-North Korea individuals among his outspoken foes in the U.S. whose extremism is relevant to whether or not their professed declarations of concern about Yoon are credible or worthy of serious consideration. This caveat applies all the more to those of Yoon's critics, the ones who condemn his strong stance against North Korea and China, who have ties to the outgoing South Korean administration which was opposed to Yoon and connections with officials of the North Korean regime engaged in intelligence-related work. Most Americans would no doubt agree that the real "threat to peace" is not Yoon, South Korea or the U.S., but rather the fundamentally criminal nature of the North Korean regime, which continues its cyber-attacks, weapons proliferation to other rogue regimes, missile launches and other types of provocations, as well as its horribly brutal treatment of its own people.
Lawrence Peck serves as an advisor to the North Korea Freedom Coalition, the largest network of North Korea human rights groups in the U.S.
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.
Newsweek · by Lawrence Peck , Advisor, North Korea Freedom Coalition On 3/22/22 at 7:00 AM EDT · March 22, 2022
12. S. Korea pushes to unveil secret dossiers on key inter-Korean talks
This will be interesting. I hope they will also release others up through 2000 and the first north-South summit as well as those associated with the movie, Spy Gone North.
S. Korea pushes to unveil secret dossiers on key inter-Korean talks | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, March 23 (Yonhap) -- The South Korean government is seeking to reveal historic records on inter-Korean talks that have been kept secret for half a century, an informed source said Wednesday, a move that could offer a chance for the public to get a better glimpse into some watersheds in tumultuous ties between the two Koreas.
Earlier this year, the Ministry of Unification set up a guideline to establish a legal basis on disclosing the documents on past inter-Korean talks, and it is currently conducting an internal review, according to the source, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.
The dossiers that may be unveiled include those on the 1972 meeting in Pyongyang between then North Korean leader Kim Il-sung and Lee Hu-rak, then head of South Korea's state intelligence agency. Kim is the North's founding leader and late grandfather of Kim Jong-un, who is at the helm of the country.
In their historic meeting, the two sides agreed upon the July 4 inter-Korean joint communique, the first agreement signed by South and North Korea since the division of the peninsula.
In accordance with the guideline, the ministry has formed a 10-member panel to review documents and other materials to be revealed first that date back to the period of 1971-91.
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
13. Man of the Hour: Kim Song Nam
Man of the Hour: Kim Song Nam | North Korea Leadership Watch
Man of the Hour: Kim Song Nam
Kyodo
On 11 March, Syrian Ambassador to the DPRK, Tammam Sulaiman, went around the Mansudae Assembly Hall for a series of goodbye visits with his DPRK counterparts. One of Ambassador Sulaiman’s fare well interactions was with Workers’ Party of Korea [WPK] International Affairs Department [IAD] Director Kim Song Nam (Kim So’ng-nam).
Kim Song Nam is typical of civilian DPRK elites who have risen to top positions under Kim Jong Un [KJU]. He has risen gradually and successively in his career. He has deep institutional knowledge (i.e., knows where the bodies are buried) and practical career experience and/or accomplishments. He has worked in close quarters with all three Kim’s which means he knows how to convey information and advice to KJU in a way that holds the Suryo’ng’s attention.
Termed North Korea’s “China master” by PRC policy elites, Kim Song Nam has spent his entire career in successive positions at IAD. He was born in North P’yo’ngan Province in 1953 and studied as a university and graduate student in China for several years. There is no evidence or sourcing which claims that Kim is related to, or from, one of the DPRK’s revolutionary families and further research and data collection about his origins is necessary. However, given that Kim began his post-secondary education and career at a time when the So’ngbun caste system was in full effect, Kim most likely comes from the upper-echelon “core class.”
Kim Song Nam worked as an IAD protocol cadre. In this position, Kim was tasked as a subject matter expert on China and worked as a Chinese language interpreter for interactions and events between DPRK and Chinese elites. He would eventually serve as an interpreter for late DPRK President Kim Il Sung and late DPRK leader Kim Jong Il. The IAD’s influence on North Korean foreign policy waned during the early 1990s. With Kim Jong Il’s penchant for stovepiping and informal control networks, IAD was charged to coordinate relations with friendly “fraternal” countries like China and Cuba, took on civilian-staffed intelligence tasks, and also served as a personnel bench for foreign policy cadres who ended up being assigned to the Foreign Ministry or the United Front Department [UFD]. As a China hand, Kim remained at IAD during this institutional nadir. This gave him time to hone his knowledge and develop social ties with other influential elites like the late Kim Yang Gon (Kim Yang-ko’n).
During late 2009, the IAD was repurposed. This was due in large part to China granting the DPRK’s request for party-to-party relations (WPK–>CPC), as against state-to-state relations (i.e., between foreign ministries). IAD was given a permanent director and Kim Song Nam was appointed a deputy director. In that position, Kim would travel on all four of Kim Jong Il’s unofficial foreign visits during 2010 and 2011. Kim was part of Choe Ryong Hae’s (Ch’oe Ryo’ng-hae) delegation to China in May 2013, and led a separate IAD delegation during July 2013.
At the 7th Party Congress in May 2016, Kim was elected to alternate (candidate) status on the Central Committee. He was upgraded to full Central Committee membership in April 2018, between after KJU’s first and second meetings with Xi Jinping, and two months prior to the convocation of the Singapore Summit. Kim Song Nam would be promoted to IAD Senior Deputy (1st Vice) Director in September 2018. He was a member of KJU’s travel party to the Hanoi Summit in February 2019. On 10 March 2019, Kim was elected a deputy to the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly [SPA].
In January 2021, at the Central Committee’s sideline plenum during the 8th Party Congress, Kim Song Nam was appointed IAD Director, replacing Ri Su Yong (Ri Su-yo’ng). In contrast to his two immediate predecessors as IAD boss, Kim was not immediately granted Political Bureau status. Curiously, it took seven weeks for Kim Song Nam’s election to alternate (candidate) status on the Political Bureau. On 29 September, Kim replaced Ri Su Yong as Chairman of the SPA Foreign Affairs Committee. He was also elected to membership on the State Affairs Commission, the DPRK’s supreme power organization.
With the turn of the New Year in 2022, the DPRK has embarked on an aggressive schedule of missile and munitions testing. The 2022 elections in the ROK installed a president-elect who places CVID and human rights to the top of the inter-Korean policy agenda. Even if the North were pursuing the bare minimum of rapprochement with the South, these are non-starters for Pyongyang. Weapons testing essentially sidelines all but the most basic foreign engagement functions of the DPRK Foreign Ministry and the inter-Korean stalemate (which will simply prolong itself over the next 3-4 years, at the least) renders UFD into a clearinghouse for interesting and provocative communique. North Korea, however, will consistently engage with China. This makes the IAD that Kim Song Nam leads the country’s lead institution for foreign policy and foreign engagement.
Recent articles
14. Where is Ri Yong Ho?
Where is Ri Yong Ho? | North Korea Leadership Watch
Where is Ri Yong Ho?
Former DPRK Foreign Minister [FM] Ri Yong Ho (Ri Yo’ng-ho) has been out of North Korean public life eye for over two years. Of course, this is one of those “drop in the ocean” observations. Senior officials across the regime disappear to different fates on a routine basis. This sometimes feeds speculation and reporting (not to mention a litany of asinine social media comments) of Pyongyang’s “reign of terror.” In contrast to other political cultures, North Korean officials generally do not move onto jobs at think tanks or membership on corporate boards when they step away from active service.
Ri Yong Ho’s last observed appearance was on the platform at the 5th plenary meeting (plenum) of the 7th Party Central Committee during December 2019. Ri was also dropped from membership on the Central Committee during the 8th Party Congress in January 2021. In contrast to other DPRK elites that fall off the radar, Ri’s absence is notable for several reasons. He held one of the top positions in the country’s external affairs apparatus. As the country’s top diplomat and a fixture in the US-DPRK interface, Ri has relationships with numerous foreign officials and private citizens. In contrast to other DPRK officials who seldom have contact with foreigners, there is a small population outside the county who are curious and concerned about Ri’s well-being. Unlike his immediate predecessor as FM, there are no indications that Ri migrated to another top job in the regime; Ri Su Yong (Ri Su-yo’ng) moved from FM to head of the Party’s International Affairs Department [IAD]. Ri Yong Ho is 65 years old which is 15 years short of the informal retirement age range of 70-80 for senior cadres. As such, Ri is too young to sit in the grandstand at state events as an honorary retired elite, in the same fashion as the last FM’s–Ri Su Yong and Pak Ui Chun (Pak U’i-ch’un).
The rationale for Ri’s removal from office as FM in 2019 was probably a combination of job performance and internal elite politics.
Ri Son Gwon and Kim Yong Chol
There is no evidence of gross incompetence on Ri Yong Ho’s part. He may have accepted responsibility for the stalemate in US-DPRK contacts following the three interactions between KJU and former President Trump and tendered his resignation. Although yarns were spun about the punishment of the DPRK’s top nuclear negotiators, Ri is only one of two who left office. Ri may also have accepted responsibility for two major personnel issues affecting DPRK diplomats–the arrest and incarceration (and probable execution) of Han Song Ryol (Han So’ng-ryo’l) during the summer of 2018 and the defection of the DPRK’s acting ambassador to Italy Jo Song Gil (Cho So’ng-gil) during early 2019.
If Ri Yong Ho resigned or dismissed due to his job performance, we might consider the environment in which either of those decisions was made. Ri may have found that he lacked sufficient political support. Ri’s entree to North Korea’s core elite derives from his father, Ri Myong Je (Ri Myo’ng-che). The elder Ri established the Kim Family’s personal and finance network in western Europe and he managed the network of residential compounds in which KJU and Kim Yo Jong (Kim Yo’-cho’ng) grew up. While Ri Yong Ho was anchored in the elite because of his familial ties, being a North Korean diplomat would have placed him under the patronage of Kim Yong Nam (Kim Yo’ng-nam) and Kang Sok Ju (Kang Sok-chu). Ri’s father and Kang Sok Ju are dead. Kim Yong Nam retired in April 2019, the same year Ri Yong Ho exited as FM. If the internal political environment following the Hanoi Summit required a scapegoat, Ri Yong Ho may have found he did not have any benefactors to advocate for him with The Center.
We might also consider how his replacement, Ri Son Gwon (Ri So’n-gwon), got the FM job. It is all but certain that United Front Department Director Kim Yong Chol (Kim Yo’ng-ch’o’l) recommended Ri Son Gwon for the FM position. Ri Son Gwon is one of the most prominent DPRK elites for whom Kim Yong Chol has served as a political benefactor in the regime. With the termination of the Hanoi Summit and a failure at rapprochement from KJU’s meeting with former President Trump during their interaction at P’anmunjo’m in June 2019, Ri Yong Ho probably found himself in direct conflict with Kim Yong Chol, possibly other top elites.
Motivations aside (Pyongyang political culture is a tad mercurial these days), there are only a limited number of scenarios as to where Ri Yong Ho has landed. If Ri engaged in an internal political showdown back in 2019, the end result was that he was expelled from DPRK political culture on a temporary basis or that he was assigned a position which would insulate him from further elite entanglements. Let us survey the landscape.
Doom and Gloom This is Pyongyang’s play of the blood in which Ri Yong Ho’s job performance, insufficient loyalty and/or a major scandal has resulted in him being incarcerated, sent down for labor education or being executed. There has not been any reporting or rumors that Ri has been executed. If Ri was sent to a detention facility or assigned to labor education (ie, hard labor) then it would indicate that protections against harsh punishments for DPRK diplomatic personnel are no longer in place. Barring incidents or allegations of financial malfeasance or providing information to foreign intelligence services, since the 1980s Foreign Ministry personnel and diplomats enjoyed protection against manual labor assignments and control zone detention.
Early Retirement Ri may have simply retired earlier than expected, either for the above-mentioned reasons or health problems. If he has retired this would beg the question of why he does not appear at state events with other retired top officials. An early retirement for someone with Ri’s career would have positive and negative effects for him. On one hand, he would be removed from the daily grind of being a core elite and all the excitement and stress that entails. On the other hand, being compelled to stay at home or improve one’s fishing skills on the Taedong can get tedious and demoralizing for a DPRK elite who used to be highly active.
Adviser’s Job Ri Yong Ho may have been assigned to another position in the regime in which his name would not appear in state media and/or attend state events. Ri might currently hold an adviser’s position, either in the Foreign Ministry or in the Central Committee apparatus. There is a precedent for an FM advisory position. Former 1st Vice Minister Kim Kye Gwan (Kim Kye-kwan) was appointed to an adviser’s position in 2019 when he was replaced by Choe Son Hui (Ch’oe So’n-hu’i) due to ill health. Ri might have been assigned a similar position, one in which he may no longer be active in policymaking on a daily basis but is kept around for his experience and expertise. Alternatively, Ri Yong Ho may have disappeared into the Central Committee or State Affairs Commission [SAC] in a similar adviser position. If this is the case, it would indicate that Ri works in Kim Jong Un’s Personal Secretariat [KJUPS] as a foreign policy adviser. It is all but certain the KJUPS stood up a National Security Council [NSC] type of office during 2018-2019. With that type of institution in place, it would need an experienced and reliable staff of advisors and subject matter experts with a similar background and experience as Ri Yong Ho.
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15. For trafficked North Korean women, the road to justice remains long
We must speak for the Koreans in the north who have no voice. A human rights up front approach from the incoming Yoon administration as well as the US is necessary.
For trafficked North Korean women, the road to justice remains long
“I feel honoured to have met so many extraordinary people across East Asia and around the world,” Sylvia Yu Friedman writes near the end of A Long Road to Justice: Stories from the Frontlines in Asia. “I’ve had the privilege of interviewing survivors of modern slavery who have experienced the unspeakable. … They have led me on a long road to justice—to tell the untold stories of human slavery survivors and to help bring attention, funding, and change to those who are suffering.”
Only one chapter of Friedman’s book deals directly with North Koreans. Reading that chapter in 2022 is remarkable, however, and not just because of the inherent tragedy of North Korean women sold into sexual slavery. Unfortunately, many of us have been aware of this tragedy for many years and the road to justice for them still appears long, and with little sign of reaching a satisfying destination.
But this could be said about the other women who have survived the sex trade as well. The book is divided into three parts, with the first recounting the author’s experiences reporting on the sex trade in China, and a network of missionaries and NGO workers (referred to as “Door of Hope” in the book) who try to rescue those forced and/or tricked into selling their bodies. The deep-seated factors that contribute are not only financial – causing women to enter into this trade, but also men to charm and entrap them in it – but also moral: one of her sources notes those who ensnare women in the sex trade often have no conception that what they are doing is wrong.
The middle chapters document the historical issue of the sex trade in Asia, beginning with Japanese wartime “Comfort Stations,” the quest for international recognition of this atrocity, and attempts at reconciliation between Comfort Women and not only Japan’s government, but also Imperial Japanese military veterans coming to terms with their role in propping up this system. While this section may seem out of place among Friedman’s accounts of modern-day trafficking horrors, she does use it to effectively demonstrate how, when left unaddressed, such atrocities can fester and sow animosity for generations to come.
In the final section of the book she examines aspects of the problem as they exist today, and it is here where she addresses the trafficking of North Korean women, along with the trafficking of women in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia. That women, especially from the northern provinces of North Korea, are being bought and sold will come as no surprise to those who remember the report of the UN Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 2014 – some of the most terrible sections of that grim document concerned these women. Nor will it be a surprise those familiar with the defectors’ memoirs seen in recent years.
Women in North Korea’s northernmost provinces, driven by desperation that comes from food shortages and a lack of social or government support, are sold to men who abuse them, forcing them to contemplate escape, even if it means abandoning the children they’ve had with their abusive husbands. And yet the problem endures. One is tempted to say that the issue is the outside world’s lack of attention to the problem, and increased attention certainly could prove beneficial, but in reality the issue is where the trafficking takes places: China.
The People’s Republic of China was resistant to cooperation on this matter when the UNCOI was released in 2014, as seen by its veto of punitive measures that came up before the UN Security Council that year. And this was when Beijing’s relations with the US and its friends and allies were relatively good: since 2018 they have soured over issues related to trade, the PRC’s threats against Taiwan and Beijing’s own human rights record. The Communist Party of China’s vitriolic reaction to criticisms of its policies in Hong Kong and Xinjiang tell us all we need to know about how it would react to increased attention to trafficking within its borders, not to mention the treatment of North Korean women cajoled or coerced into abusive marriages to China’s “bare branches” – young men from the generation of the one-child policy who struggle to find marriage partners because their female counterparts were aborted, the victims of infanticide, or simply given away.
North Korean women at the customs office in Dandong in mid-February 2019. (Daily NK)
Is there any reason for optimism? Friedman does suggest that the PRC’s tolerance for North Koreans living in its territory is dwindling, and there is an increasing push to not only keep them out of China but punish Chinese who harbor them. There’s much evidence that the regime of Kim Jong Un has cracked down on outward migration, greatly slowing the number of defections even before it sealed the border with China in 2020, effectively trapping every man, woman and child inside its territory. These two developments should result in fewer North Korean women trafficked or forced into abusive marriages with Chinese men, fewer of them dying while attempting to escape the regimes that dehumanize them, and fewer of their children being born stateless.
But not none. Sources I’ve spoken to have said that 2020 was actually a time when North Koreans in China became more urgent to escape China but that organizations involved in helping assist evacuations began to scale back – with a then-mysterious airborne virus spreading, such reluctance is understandable, even if it had tragic consequences.
Furthermore, the prevention of abuse through even more tyrannical crackdowns by the North Korean and PRC regimes seems like less of a solution and more a case of one problem replacing another. China continues to have a large male population with unfavorable marriage prospects, North Korea is still plagued by food insecurity, and both states’ preferred responses to contingencies are to crack down ever more severely on the victims. Also, assuming the number of women escaping into North Korea has fallen, the decline may be temporary, as in times of dissatisfaction Pyongyang has allowed migration to China to function as a “safety valve” allowing malcontents to leave and not cause disruption.
Friedman notes in her chapter on North Koreans that one of the smugglers who helped her make connections with trafficked women was captured, arrested, and tortured in North Korea, and that this “further strengthened my resolve to continue putting a spotlight on trafficked women so their stories could reach people across the world and hopefully lead to positive action.”
What would positive action look like? She suggests at the end of the book that readers can start through volunteering, charitable giving, and educating each other on important issues – not just sex trafficking – but I have a few others:
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In Seoul, the incoming Yoon administration should not only increase social support for defectors, but champion their presence South of the DMZ. This will require pushing back against narratives in Seoul that support for defectors should be going to South Korean-born citizens, as well as social stigmas against women who have been trafficked or forced to perform sex acts on the internet. President-elect Yoon himself could do this, and hopefully encourage more defections, by channeling Ronald Reagan talking about immigrants.
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The US should prioritize acceptance of North Korean defectors, which has long lagged and which ground to a halt under the previous administration. Many of the North Koreans who have arrived in the US have thrived; more deserve that chance.
- South Korea, the US, and other countries where North Korean defectors are prone to settling should pump funds into providing social services for them.
- The treatment of women caught in sex trafficking – not just North Koreans – should join the oppression in Xinjiang, in Tibet, in Hong Kong and of dissidents to become part of the overall narrative regarding China’s human rights record. The Communist Party and its functionaries will certainly howl in protest, but the evidence is already overwhelming that we cannot help the victims of their oppression by pretending that it isn’t happening.
The road to justice for North Korean sex trafficking survivors is indeed long, and will remain long if we avoid walking it.
Views expressed in this guest column do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.
Rob York is director for regional affairs at the Pacific Forum in Honolulu, Hawaii, and a former production editor at the South China Morning Post. He is a Ph.D. candidate in Korean history at the University of Hawaii at Manoa.
16. N. Korea ratchets up crackdowns on wealthy business people amid concerns over smuggling
Again, the COVID paradox.The regime is deathly afraid of an outbreak yet is exploiting the opposition to exert maximum oppression of the Korean people in the north
N. Korea ratchets up crackdowns on wealthy business people amid concerns over smuggling
North Korea's leadership appears to think that if people confuse the restart of freight train service for a complete opening of the border, efforts to maintain the country’s quarantine system could be adversely affected
From a vantage point in China, apartments can be seen being built in Sinuiju’s Ponbu District. / Image: Daily NK
North Korea authorities continue to bust rich donju (North Korea’s wealthy entrepreneurial class) and security agents in regions along the country’s border with China. People speculate that the authorities have launched efforts to get control of public sentiment and to tighten internal controls.
In a telephone conversation with Daily NK on Tuesday, a source in North Pyongan Province said an inspection team that arrived in Sinuiju from Pyongyang last month has been cracking down hard on people with money. He said their primary targets are donju and security officials involved in business dealings with China.
The source said the inspectors are dragging up illegal activities committed as far back as 10 years in the past. He added that powerful people in the provincial branch of the Ministry of State Security are nervous, too, while cadres rumored to have a bit of money are coming under investigation as well.
North Korea has been conducting sweeping inspections and crackdowns this year to eradicate “anti-socialist and non-socialist” thought.
Daily NK previously reported that in January, North Korea issued a set of internal law enforcement guidelines for the first quarter of this year to regional branches of the Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Social Security, and the “unified command on non-socialist and anti-socialist behavior,” i.e., “Unified Command 82.”
These guidelines called for an “active struggle” against anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior, bolstering the role of law enforcement to promote social order and safety, and establishing a culture of law abidance and strengthening the legal system.
In particular, given how donju doing business with China and powerful security agents who permit their illegal activities are the major targets of the inspection, the effort suggests the authorities are trying to get a grip on internal conditions prior to reopening trade.
North Korea is apparently moving to reinvigorate trade with the restart of China-North Korea freight train service. However, the country permits imports of only a limited number of items, while putting a firm stop to smuggling by North Korean officials in China or people living in border regions.
North Korean authorities appear concerned that should locals confuse the restart of freight train service for a complete opening of the border, efforts to maintain the country’s quarantine system could be adversely affected.
In fact, North Korea recently sentenced a security official who got busted during a smuggling attempt to 15 years of forced labor. The authorities have also threatened North Korean trade officials in China, warning them against engaging in smuggling.
Some North Koreans suggest that North Korean authorities are turning people with a bit of money into sacrificial lambs to promote regime cohesion. They say the authorities can bolster the state’s assets by seizing their property, while at the same time sending a warning message to ordinary people.
Meanwhile, the inspection team in Sinuiju is reportedly demanding huge bribes to cover up wrongdoing.
Earlier this year, branches of the Ministry of State Security and Ministry of Social Security nationwide signed a written pledge that they would not accept bribes or engage in other unjust behavior during public crackdowns. Yet even units up the chain of command continue to fall victim to the temptation.
The source said the inspection has been so harsh that Ministry of State Security officials are saying they would rather just quit. He added that there is anger, too, since life was difficult enough even before the inspections.
Mun Dong Hui is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about his articles to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
17. [INTERVIEW] British envoy brings new perspectives from both Koreas
A unique perspective. I am reminded of diplomats who come to DC after serving in Pyongyang who say Pyongyang is the only city in which you have to leave to find out what is going on inside. Diplomats learn more about Pyongyang by going to Seoul and Washington because normal diplomatic activity does not take place in the north.
Tuesday
March 22, 2022
[INTERVIEW] British envoy brings new perspectives from both Koreas
British Ambassador to Korea Colin Crooks at the British Embassy in Seoul on Monday, after sitting down with the JoongAng Ilbo and the Korea JoongAng Daily for an interview. [KIM HYUN-DONG]
Colin Crooks, the British ambassador to Korea, may be the one diplomat who’s seen more of the two Koreas than most Koreans have in their lifetime.
“Having served as a diplomat on both halves of the Korean Peninsula, having visited every province in North and South Korea, is something that I am proud of because I have a deep, life-long fascination with the Korean Peninsula,” said Crooks in speaking with the JoongAng Ilbo and the Korea JoongAng Daily at the British Embassy in Seoul on Monday.
Crooks, a seasoned diplomat who began his overseas career as the second secretary at the British Embassy in Seoul in 1995, takes on a rare role as the first British diplomat to consecutively head the mission in Pyongyang and then Seoul.
Posted to Pyongyang from 2018 to 2021, Crooks was appointed the British ambassador in Seoul last summer. He arrived in the country last month to begin the second chapter of his career in Seoul.
One of the first public events to be hosted at the embassy would be in honor of the platinum jubilee of Queen Elizabeth II, whose historic visit to Korea in 1999 Crooks also helped organize. The Queen celebrated her 73rd birthday at the Hahoe village in Andong, North Gyeongsang, with the townspeople of Andong who had prepared a traditional birthday celebration for her.
“The platinum jubilee of the Queen is a remarkable achievement; it is the first time any British monarch has celebrated the 70th anniversary of accession to the throne,” he said. “My hope is that as we emerge from the Covid pandemic, we will actually be able to have a face-to-face reception, which will be an opportunity to celebrate the Queen’s service of 70 years, remember her connection to this country, and also look ahead to the world after the pandemic.”
Queen Elizabeth II, left, meets with the locals at Insadong area in central Seoul on April 20, 1999. [KIM JIN-SEOK]
Moving between one of the most controlled and repressed countries in the world and a democratic and free country just south of its border has given the top British envoy fresh perspectives on a number of issues tabled for London and Seoul, which includes the bilateral trade following Brexit and Korea’s FTA signed with Britain last year, but are not limited to matters of bilateral nature, said Crooks.
“In the U.K., our current government talks about global Britain, about Britain having global interests right across the world,” Crooks said. “I think we are also dealing here with global Korea — a Korea that is increasingly able to project its image across the world through soft power, K-pop and K-drama, a country that also increasingly defines its interests globally.”
What’s happening in Ukraine and North Korea are part of that list of common interests, he added.
“If you look at how the Korean people have responded to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the terrible things that are happening there, it shows that Korea has horizons which are global and that also offers many opportunities for the U.K. and Korea to work together,” Crooks said.
During his three years in Pyongyang, though most of the last year was spent in London after the British embassy shut down temporarily with the North’s Covid-19 border closures, Crooks was presented with rare opportunities to get a glimpse of North Korean societies as they were.
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He started sharing some of these occasions with the rest of the world through photos of North Korea and its people uploaded on his Twitter account, including those taken during a local celebration for May Day at the Moranbong Park in Pyongyang on May 1, 2019.
“People were out having bulgogi and drinking a little bit of soju and makgeolli [fermented rice wine],” he said. “They were a bit more relaxed and we were able to have some good conversations. I miss those opportunities.”
On these rare occasions, Crooks would sometimes be approached by North Koreans curious to know more about the world outside of their own.
“Once, we were in a group, and people asked about the role of women in the U.K. and Europe, compared to the role of women in North Korea,” Crooks said. “We could not hold political conversations of course, but otherwise the topics were quite wide ranging.”
Locals celebrating May Day at the Moranbong Park in Pyongyang on May 1, 2019, in this photo taken by Colin Crooks while he was British ambassador to North Korea. [COLIN CROOKS]
Having witnessed the way ordinary North Koreans try to make a living in one of the most isolated places in the world, Crooks’ concerns regarding the humanitarian situation in the country heightened in recent years as the country appeared to be backtracking on its steps toward dialogue and diplomacy, and returned to saber-rattling and military provocations.
In this year alone, the North has tested over a dozen missiles, including those on Feb. 27 and March 5 that South Korean and U.S. intelligence believe were tests of the Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the largest ICBM in the world.
“The biggest thing going on in North Korea that concerns us is their illegal nuclear programs and missile programs, which we believe need to be addressed with urgency because they threaten the security not just of the Korean Peninsula but of the region and the world,” Crooks said. “Achieving denuclearization is the central goal of our policy and of our allies.
“We do remain a country committed to diplomacy and dialogue with North Korea,” he added. “We are committed to reopening the embassy and resuming a program of dialogue and cooperation with North Korea once it’s possible.”
United Nations special rapporteur on North Korea's human rights, Tomás Ojea Quintana, in his last report to the Human Rights Council this month urged North Korea to take the offers of vaccines from the international community to help the country normalize its economic activities and movement of people.
Quintana pointed out that throughout his six-year term he has not seen the food insecurity in the nation improve, with the numbers of food-insecure people consistently above 10 million, representing over 41 percent of the country's total population.
“Since the borders have been closed for the last two years, we are worried about the plight of ordinary people in North Korea,” Crooks said. “We know that there was already food insecurity before the closure that will not have gotten any better. We do want to see an urgent assessment on the humanitarian situation once the borders reopen, and I hope that we will see a brighter future for North Korea and its people at some point before too long.”
Incoming and outgoing British ambassadors to Korea, Colin Crooks, left, and Simon Smith, right, with President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol, at the time a presidential contender, at the headquarters of Yoon's People Power Party in Yeouido, western Seoul, on Dec. 2, 2021. [YONHAP]
The top British envoy in Seoul also shared a welcoming message to president-elect Yoon Suk-yeol, who will be inaugurated in May.
“We congratulate president-elect Yoon on his victory; we were particularly pleased that our Prime Minister Boris Johnson was able to have a congratulatory phone call with the president-elect so soon after the election,” Crooks said. “The two leaders looked ahead to the rich agenda — on trade, politics, durable health, international development, climate change — there are many things that the two leaders want to accomplish together.”
BY ESTHER CHUNG [chung.juhee@joongang.co.kr]
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
