Quotes of the Day:

"Though we may be outnumbered and outgunned, the power of truth and justice is on our side."

 – Kim Chwa-chin

"Start where you are. Use what you have. Do what you can." 

– Arthur Ashe

"Our power is our ability to decide." 

– Buckminster Fuller

1. Former North Korean official: “We need to scare North Korea with a show of force…” “Military response is best”

2. US imposed highest number of sanctions on DPRK under US President Biden last year

3. #NorthKorea: Promoted (nK and Russian cooperation)

4. N. Korea threatens U.S. envoy for N.K. human rights with insulting remarks

5. Why North Korea Has Resumed Sending Workers Abroad

6. US raises concerns about cozying relations between Russia and North Korea

7. EU Proposes Sanctioning North Korea for Sending Russia Missiles

8. Establishment of S. Korea-Cuba diplomatic relations likely to deal 'blow' to N. Korea: official

9. Sorry Kim, Your Pal Cuba Just Made Friends With South Korea

10. The Arsenal of Autocracy

11. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ South Korea is the enemy…Trends in North Korea after Kim Jong Un’s “One Korea” announcement (1) People are surprised and confused as government tries to get them to understand policy shift

12. Kim Jong-un's new multi-purpose game plan and year of living dangerously

13. Clicking foreign media still cause to die in North Korea

14. N Korea peddles illicit gambling sites to South’s criminal ring

15. Biden Has Allowed the North Korean Portfolio to Deteriorate

1. Former North Korean official: “We need to scare North Korea with a show of force…” “Military response is best”

Ri Jong Ho and I were interviewed regarding our recent essay at the National Interest: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/real-reason-north-korea-threatening-war-209331

This is a Google translation of the VOA article.

Former North Korean official: “We need to scare North Korea with a show of force…” “Military response is best”

https://www.voakorea.com/a/7488367.html

2024.2.15

• Cho Sang-jin

It has been suggested that the best way to stop North Korea's series of provocations is a strong physical response. The argument is that the North Korean leadership will stop its current offensive only when it feels fear enough to threaten its survival. Reporter Cho Sang-jin reports.

Ri Jeong-ho, a former senior economic official in Office 39 of the Workers' Party, said that what the North Korean leadership fears most is a scenario in which the United States takes an actual military response.

On the 13th, Mr. Lee Jeong-ho, who published a joint contribution containing 'Response Strategy to North Korean Provocations' with David Maxwell, Vice President of the Asia-Pacific Strategy Center, a military expert and former ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Operations Staff, said in a phone call with VOA on the 14th that North Korea is threatening South Korea. He argued that if an artillery fire or missile provocation is launched, an 'immediate and decisive military response' must be taken, such as an immediate strike at the starting point.

[Recording: Mr. Lee Jeong-ho] “When conducting a nuclear test or launching a missile, we need to show them that we intercept the missile or strike the origin or leadership when provoked so that they are not scared and try to carry out a nuclear provocation like now. There are no brakes in this situation. “I think they can make such reckless provocations because there are no restrictions.”

Mr. Lee Jeong-ho.

In an article contributed to 'National Interest', an American diplomatic and security magazine, Lee Jeong-ho and Vice President Maxwell pointed out that there is a growing possibility that North Korea's Kim Jong-un will define South Korea as the 'main enemy' and carry out unprecedented provocations.

He pointed out, “The U.S.-ROK alliance must provide an immediate and decisive military response to Kim Jong-un’s reckless provocations and clearly demonstrate that it cannot survive if nuclear weapons are used.”

In particular, he criticized the fact that the United States and South Korea have not responded properly to North Korea's provocations over the past several decades, weakening deterrence against North Korea and providing an excuse for Kim Jong-un to misjudge the situation.

It is pointed out that Chairman Kim's actions in escalating the threat of provocation against South Korea are the result of his belief that the United States and South Korea will not actually attack him.

Ri Jeong-ho said North Korea is also very fearful of the deployment of U.S. strategic assets on the Korean Peninsula that could neutralize its nuclear capabilities.

At the same time, he suggested that there is a need to strengthen deterrence against North Korea by resuming large-scale joint military exercises such as 'Team Spirit' exercises in the future.

[Recording: Mr. Lee Jeong-ho] “When I was in North Korea, the United States would conduct team sprint training and regular ROK-US joint exercises in March, and each time, 2 to 3 aircraft carriers would arrive, such as B-52 or B. “I was scared when strategic bombers like the -1B came in, but as they continue to decrease, it means that the North Korean leadership is no longer afraid of them.”

David Maxwell, Vice President, Asia-Pacific Strategy Center

Deputy Representative Maxwell, who co-wrote the contribution with Lee Jeong-ho, also said in a phone call with VOA, "Historically, over the past 30 years, the U.S.-ROK alliance has never demonstrated a strong deterrent against North Korea," and that deterrence is not a conciliatory response, but only when there is a strong response. He said it was possible.

[Recording: Deputy Representative Maxwell] “You know that Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong UN know that they must not attack when the alliance is strong and team spirit is when the alliance demonstrates the military capability to defeat North Korea. I think it is the best way to reduce tensions because if we don't respond, then North Korea is going to continue to conduct provocations. They’re going to continue to push the envelope and make things more dangerous.”

Deputy Representative Maxwell said, “Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un know that they should not attack when their allies are strong,” and emphasized the need for responses such as conducting large-scale joint exercises.

At the same time, he said that a strong military response would be the best way to ease tensions because not responding to provocations would give North Korea the wrong signal that it can continue to do so. “It’s effective,” he said.

Deputy Representative Maxwell said that cooperation on policy proposals with a former high-ranking North Korean official who is familiar with North Korea's internal psychology would be a very special and meaningful example.

[Recording: Vice President Maxwell] “I learned a lot from RI Jeong Ho. I've talked to him a lot over the last few years so he really helps me to understand the North Korean situation. He really is able to describe, you know, the broken promise that Kim Jong UN has made to the Korean people in the North that nuclear weapons and missiles would bring peace and prosperity. So it really is, I think an important message for us to understand what is happening inside North Korea.”

“The person who can best explain that Kim Jong-un’s promise to the North Korean people that nuclear weapons and missiles would bring peace and prosperity is a ‘broken promise’ is Mr. Ri Jeong-ho.”

“His insight is important in understanding what is happening inside North Korea, and will also play a big role in refining the U.S. and South Korea’s policies toward North Korea,” he said.

Regarding the views of the two experts that a strong and decisive military response can deter North Korea's provocations, Bruce Bennett, a senior researcher at the Rand Institute and an American military expert, said that the United States and South Korea will immediately counterattack when North Korea provokes them and escalate tensions with North Korea in the next step. It was suggested that a multi-step plan should be established to prevent this.

[Recording: Senior Researcher Bennett] “So you've got to be prepared to say, look, if you strike one of the targets in South Korea, the first thing we're going to do is we're going to hit back and destroy this in North Korea. And then if you decide to escalate, we're prepared to hit that as the next step. So we’ve got to be trying to deter him not just at the first level but at several levels to affect his willingness to escalate.”

Senior Researcher Bennett emphasized that the starting point for this will be for the United States and South Korea to demonstrate to North Korea in a direct and practical way that they have the capability to inspect ballistic missile defenses, shoot down unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and strike North Korea at its origins. I did.

On the other hand, some in Washington are of the opinion that a cautious and moderate response is needed, saying that military response by the United States and South Korea to North Korea's provocations is being caught up in North Korea's intention to intensify tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

In an interview with VOA last November, former commander of U.S. Forces Korea Robert Abrams suggested that the U.S. and South Korea find a better solution than military confrontation in response to North Korea's declaration of annulment of the September 19 inter-Korean military agreement and continued provocations, raising tensions. .

He said, “Both the South Korean military and the U.S. Forces Korea must monitor North Korea’s activities very closely and find options to ensure a stable situation.”

In response to this point, Lee Jeong-ho said, “I think that view makes sense in the short term,” but added, “If it has continued for the past 30 years and has not led to a change in North Korea’s behavior, it should be considered that it is time to devise a military response plan.” “He said.

At the same time, North Korea said it had neither the capacity nor the courage to confront the military response of the United States and South Korea.

[Recording: Mr. Lee Jeong-ho] “That could be discussed in a year or two, but for the past 30 years, I have been cautious, fearing that North Korea will continue to do so and increase tensions, but nuclear weapons and missiles have evolved greatly. The dictator is a coward and not brave. But if I stay still like I am now, I will become reckless. If Korea retaliates against that, do you really think they can fight back? When you're not ready? “You have to respond strongly and break their will to feel threatened.”

The U.S. and South Korean governments have been pursuing measures to respond to North Korea's missile attacks by going beyond simple defense and responding with 'repulsion'.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy John Plum attended the 'Missile Defense Review Report (MDR)' conversation hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington in 2022 and said that in the event of a North Korean missile attack, all available assets will be mobilized to strike the origin of the provocation. He hinted at a policy of overwhelming retaliatory measures.

“We must pursue a comprehensive repulsion strategy beyond relying solely on defense,” said Assistant Secretary Plum, emphasizing that action should be taken not only on the ‘left side of launch’ strategy, which refers to the stage before a missile launch, but also on the ‘right side of launch,’ which refers to immediately after launch. there is.

South Korea is also emphasizing its willingness to strike a strong response to North Korea's provocations against South Korea.

On the 14th, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Kim Myung-soo visited the Army's 5th Corps Aviation Wing and inspected the preparedness for enemy provocations on the spot. He ordered that if there were North Korean aircraft carrying out provocations against South Korea, "we will quickly sortie, chase them until the end, and shoot them down without hesitation." This was revealed.

Chairman Kim continued at the Drone Operation Command, saying, “In modern warfare, drones are the main operational means of deterring and attacking asymmetric threats from the enemy in times of emergency,” and emphasized, “If the enemy provokes, we must strongly punish it so that it can never do so again.” .

This is Cho Sang-jin of VOA News.

2. US imposed highest number of sanctions on DPRK under US President Biden last year

US imposed highest number of sanctions on DPRK under US President Biden last year

Independent sanctions against North Korea or its affiliations, which amounted to one in 2021 and nine in 2022, rose to eleven last year

By Laura Geigenberger - February 14, 2024

dailynk.com

US imposed highest number of sanctions on DPRK under US President Biden last year - Daily NK English

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un reads a letter from U.S. President Donald Trump. (Rodong Sinmun)

According to a list compiled by the U.S Department of State, the United States responded with sanctions on average once a month to North Korea’s missile launches and cybercrimes between January and November last year, to “deprive the DPRK of the funds to advance its destabilizing missile and weapons of mass destruction programs.” During this period, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed a total of 33 sanctions against individuals, companies, and organizations in seven countries, among them China, Russia, and the DPRK itself.

Independent sanctions against North Korea or its affiliations, which amounted to one in 2021 and nine in 2022, rose to eleven last year – the highest number of sanctions under U.S. President Joe Biden and the second-highest since 2018, when North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests had also intensified.

“The DPRK’s illicit weapons of mass destruction and missile programs threaten international security and regional stability,” said Brian E. Nelson, undersecretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, on Mar. 1, 2023. “The United States remains committed to targeting the regime’s global illicit networks that generate the revenue for these destabilizing activities.”

Sanctions were directed at both companies and organizations as well as individuals

The actions by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) were primarily directed at both companies and organizations as well as individuals that generate illicit proceeds to support the North Korean government or are suspected of trafficking weapons, munitions, and military equipment through North Korea.

In March, for example, the OFAC imposed sanctions on the Chilsong and Korea Paekho Trading Corporations, among others, “for being agencies, instrumentalities, or controlled entities of the Government of North Korea or the Workers’ Party of Korea.”

In May, the United States and the ROK took their first bilateral cybercrime action against North Korean national Shim Hyun-Seop, who is also currently wanted by the FBI for his involvement in the illicit financing of North Korea. In addition, the United States announced trilateral sanctions with South Korea and Japan in August following Pyongyang’s (failed) launch of a spy satellite. The punishments were directed against several individuals and companies that had reportedly supported North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.

In November, the US, South Korea, Japan, and Australia also jointly imposed sanctions for the first time against eight North Korean representatives abroad who, according to them, were involved in profitable activities for North Korea and had procured missile technology for the regime. The four countries thereby reacted to the launch of another reconnaissance satellite, which North Korean state media said had transmitted photos of US military facilities in Japan and Guam, as well as of the White House and the Pentagon.

Edited by Robert Lauler.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Laura Geigenberger

Laura is a journalist with passions for history, politics, international relations and languages. She studied American Studies and Journalism in Germany and Sweden and currently works in Munich for newspapers, public radio and television, and - on a volunteer basis - for Daily NK.

dailynk.com

3.  #NorthKorea: Promoted (nK and Russian cooperation)

My latest interview on the John Batchelor Show with Gordon Chang discussion north Korea and Russia cooperation. https://audioboom.com/posts/8458157-northkorea-promoted-david-maxwell-vice-president-of-the-center-for-asia-pacific-strategy-g

#NorthKorea: Promoted. David Maxwell, vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, @GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill

#NorthKorea: Promoted. David Maxwell, vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, @GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill

https://www.ft.com/content/ac923f3a-b6d6-4de2-bd21-01e18f9806ce

https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/13/politics/us-concerns-russia-north-korea-relations/index.html

4. N. Korea threatens U.S. envoy for N.K. human rights with insulting remarks

This is an indication just how afraid the regime is of a human rights upfront approach. Ambasador Turner (and Ambassador Lee from South Korea) is having an effect.

N. Korea threatens U.S. envoy for N.K. human rights with insulting remarks | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · February 15, 2024

SEOUL, Feb. 15 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Thursday released a barrage of harsh-worded insults against the U.S. special envoy for North Korean human rights who is visiting Asia on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of a landmark U.N. report on the North's rights abuses.

The U.S. State Department earlier said Ambassador Julie Turner would visit South Korea and Japan from Monday through Feb. 22. Her visit came on the 10th anniversary of the release of the 2014 U.N. Commission of Inquiry (COI) report on the North's human rights violations.

The North's Korea Association for Human Rights Studies said Turner has "proved to be number one in implementing the current U.S. administration's illegal policy hostile" against the North and has become the "first target" of the country's will to take the "toughest counteraction" against the U.S.

The North derided that former U.S. human rights envoys resigned without "any success or achievement," and vowed "merciless punishment" against Turner whom it called a "human rights strangler" and "apostle of aggression."

North Korea has long been accused of grave human rights abuses, ranging from holding political prisoners in concentration camps to committing torture and carrying out public executions.

The COI report, issued in 2014, specifically held the North Korean regime responsible for "widespread, systematic and gross" violations of human rights.

Still, North Korea claims its people are freely enjoying genuine human rights.

Ambassador Julie Turner, U.S. special envoy for North Korean human rights, speaks at a forum organized by the Institute for Korean Studies at George Washington University in Washington in this Oct. 20, 2023, file photo. (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · February 15, 2024

5. Why North Korea Has Resumed Sending Workers Abroad

Why North Korea Has Resumed Sending Workers Abroad

BY JON HERSKOVITZ / BLOOMBERGFEBRUARY 14, 2024 9:15 PM EST

TIME

Kim Jong Un has sent new batches of his workers overseas since relaxing pandemic border controls and launched a fresh crackdown on his people, according to the U.S. point person for North Korean human rights.

“What we’ve seen is that the human rights situation in North Korea has worsened,” Julie Turner, the State Department’s special envoy on the country’s human rights issues, told reporters Wednesday during a visit to Tokyo. “Covid-19 allowed the North Korean government to tighten many of the controls inside North Korea,” she said.

North Korea has sent its workers to Russia and China for years, where they earn hard currency desperately needed by Pyongyang in defiance of United Nations resolutions that ban the moves. Kim has recently stepped up cooperation with Russia through the transfer of arms to help President Vladimir Putin in his war on Ukraine, the U.S. has said.

Late last year, Kim’s regime began allowing workers, diplomats and students stranded abroad due to his decision to close the borders during the pandemic to return home. He now appears to be sending workers abroad, Turner said.

“There is certainly a process going on right now to bring many of those individuals home, but at the same time we are seeing movements of new groups of workers being dispatched overseas,” she said.

Turner did not specify where the workers may be going, but added Russia is a country of concern and there are still many North Korean workers who have remained in China.

Around 300 workers from North Korea arrived in Russia by train this month, Yonhap News of South Korea reported Wednesday, citing Cho Han-bum, a senior research fellow at the state-funded Korea Institute for National Unification.

Governments in the U.S. and Europe for years have condemned North Korea for what they see as chronic and systematic human rights abuses. The U.S. State Department’s most recent annual report on human rights said there are credible reports of arbitrary killings, forced disappearances and a network of political prisons engaged in torture in North Korea.

Kim’s regime has bristled at any criticism of its human rights record for decades. The state’s propaganda apparatus in December carried a report that accused Turner of “staging various sorts of fanatical anti-DPRK ‘human rights’ rackets,” that are intended to demonize Pyongyang and bring down the leaders of the country formally known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Turner said the comments indicate North Korea is paying attention to what the U.S. has been saying about the human rights situation under Kim.

Kim oversaw tests Wednesday of what North Korea said were new types of cruise missiles designed to defend against an invasion and frustrate “the adventurous attempt of the enemy navy,” the official Korean Central News Agency reported. It was the fifth such barrage of cruise missiles fired off in the past several weeks.

TIME

6. US raises concerns about cozying relations between Russia and North Korea

The axis of totalitarians.

US raises concerns about cozying relations between Russia and North Korea | CNN Politics

amp.cnn.com · by Katie Bo Lillis · February 13, 2024

CNN —

North Korea watchers in Washington have fixated recently on Pyongyang’s abrupt destruction last month of a key monument dedicated to reunifying the Korean Peninsula — a move that some outside analysts view as a precursor to war with South Korea amid typically bellicose rhetoric from leader Kim Jong Un.

But US officials and North Korea analysts who spoke to CNN on the condition of anonymity say the uproar over the reunification arch obscures a far greater strategic threat: North Korea’s burgeoning partnership with Russia.

Intelligence officials in Washington are increasingly concerned about the growing ties between North Korea and Russia, and the long-term implications of what appears to be a new level of strategic partnership between the two nations, according to multiple officials familiar with the latest intelligence.

Russia has repeatedly fired North Korean-supplied short-range ballistic missiles at Ukrainian targets in recent weeks. In January, high-ranking North Korean and Russian diplomats met in Moscow in advance of what North Korean state media says is a forthcoming visit to Pyongyang by Russian President Vladimir Putin himself — his first in more than 20 years.

The Biden administration is concerned enough that national security adviser Jake Sullivan raised the issue with the Chinese foreign minister during a January meeting, a senior White House official told reporters late last month.

If North Korea is able to use a tighter relationship with Russia to loosen China’s influence, officials fear, that could remove what some believe has been an important handbrake on Pyongyang’s nuclear testing program.

“I think [Kim] is constantly looking for some kind of an edge,” a senior defense official said.

A senior administration official told reporters in late January, “We are deeply concerned about the recent testing of weapons. We are deeply concerned about the growing relationship between Russia and the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] and what that might mean for Mr. Kim’s intentions.”

Jeffrey Lewis, a North Korea expert and professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, said Pyongyang has long sought to balance Chinese influence over its affairs by pursuing dialogue with other nations — including the Soviet Union and, later, the United States. North Korea’s newly forged transactional partnership with Moscow is best understood as Kim seizing an opportunity to give himself maneuvering room with China, Lewis and others said.

Risks to the US

The risks that relationship poses to US interests are numerous, according to multiple analysts both inside and outside of government.

Although Lewis and others believe the US often overestimates the degree of control Beijing has over North Korea, it does have influence and seeks to ensure stability on the peninsula. But North Korea is “terrified that the Chinese are going to functionally take over the country, not with an army, but culturally and financially,” Lewis said. Russia is “a very natural alliance that allows them to reduce their dependency on China,” he said.

An infusion of Russian cash — and potentially Russian technology — in exchange for North Korean missiles could also jumpstart North Korea’s defense industrial base, allowing Pyongyang to update its stockpiles of conventional munitions and giving its economy a much-needed boost. That, in turn, could accelerate its missile development program.

Trade with Russia could also further weaken the sanctions regime the US has placed on North Korea, also accelerating its economy and potentially bolstering its arms development program.

And perhaps most alarmingly, North Korean missiles on the Russian battlefield could act as an advertisement for further sales to other rogue regimes.

“These are credible battlefield tools, and should North Korea succeed in selling these, it would enable them to build more and help in their domestic deployment — and, of course, have a snowball effect to find even more customers,” said Sydney Seiler, the national intelligence officer for North Korea at the National Intelligence Council until 2023.

Lewis, Seiler and others cautioned that none of these outcomes are foretold. As always with North Korea, deciphering how the hermit kingdom may respond is like reading chicken bones.

But within government, officials are watching the dynamic closely.

For weeks, a blog post on an influential North Korea watchers website written by two former analysts circulated within the US government. It warned that Pyongyang’s decision to abandon reunification was a clear signal that North Korea had made the “strategic decision to go to war.”

The problem, according to more than half a dozen US officials familiar with the latest US intelligence, was that the piece was wrong.

“I do not think [Kim] has made a strategic decision to conflict,” the senior defense official said. “I have not seen anything indicative of strategic conflict.”

Kim doesn’t seem to be preparing an attack

Five US officials told CNN the US has seen no signs Kim is preparing for a potential attack on South Korea, or a broader provocation involving nuclear weapons.

If anything, some analysts believe, North Korea’s public statements signal that North Korea is abandoning its reunification policy in pursuit of peace on the peninsula.

Kim’s “No. 1 priority is the sustainment of his regime,” the defense official said. “That’s not a shift — that’s been a strategic priority of his entire family since the Korean War.”

Lewis, Seiler and others said Kim is very consistent in publicly messaging his intentions. In speeches announcing the abandonment of reunification, Kim made clear that he was not seeking war with South Korea.

“Kim went out of his way to explicitly say that one implication of rejecting reunification was that he was also rejecting reunification by force — so the clear message was that North Korea would not initiate a war with South Korea,” Lewis said, adding that it was “the weirdest reassurance in history.”

That does not mean Pyongyang might not launch lower-level attacks short of all-out war, analysts said — something North Korea occasionally does for reasons that can be opaque to US intelligence.

Pyongyang often uses military exercises in the region conducted by the US, South Korea and Japan beginning this time of year as an opportunity to engage in what the US terms “provocative” actions.

“But it’s not war. We’re not headed to war,” Seiler said. “We are headed to what I think would be a higher-tension season, but if we stay the course, we’ll come out the other end OK.”

In 2010, North Korea shelled a South Korean island, and the two sides exchanged artillery fire that killed troops on both sides. But the conflict never escalated.

The senior defense official said that, for now, the US does not see any indicators that North Korea is preparing for anything like that, but noted, “I get paid to think about such possibilities.”

North Korea is also unlikely to step back from its missile development program — something that defense officials watch with alarm, even as they broadly believe Pyongyang views the program as defensive rather than offensive.

Officials still believe North Korea could be poised to carry out another nuclear test.

And Pyongyang has made notable improvements in the solid fuels used for shorter- and longer-range missiles. Because solid fuels can be stored in the field for weeks at a time, US officials are concerned the improved technology will allow North Korea to move its missiles around and hide them from foreign surveillance more easily.

“Their increasing and continual launching of missile tests — that I think is the most concerning part,” the senior defense official said. “I worry about errant missiles going off to potentially hit a populated area. Even if not deliberate, that’s an action that could be devastating.”

amp.cnn.com · by Katie Bo Lillis · February 13, 2024

7. EU Proposes Sanctioning North Korea for Sending Russia Missiles

EU Proposes Sanctioning North Korea for Sending Russia Missiles

By Alberto Nardelli

February 14, 2024 at 5:03 AM EST

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-14/eu-proposes-sanctioning-north-korea-for-sending-russia-missiles?sref=hhjZtX76

The European Union has proposed sanctions on North Korea for providing Russia with missiles used against Ukraine, according to documents seen by Bloomberg.

The bloc has proposed listing North Korea’s defense minister and the Missile General Bureau, the government body that oversees the nation’s ballistic missile program.

“Ballistic missiles designed, developed and produced” by North Korea have been used against Ukraine by Russian armed forces, the document says.

North Korea has also provided Russia with hundreds of thousands of rounds of artillery ammunition. Thanks to that support, as well as Moscow’s ability to source restricted parts through third countries, Russia has been able to ramp up its production of ammunition well beyond what Ukraine gets from its allies.

Read More About The EU’s Proposed SanctionsEU Proposes Curbs on Three Chinese Firms for Aiding RussiaEU Sanctions Set to Target Russian Military and Tech FirmsUkraine Tells Allies Troops Are Outgunned Three-to-One by Russia

The effect of potential measures against North Korea, which include a travel ban and asset freeze, is likely to be mostly symbolic. The proposed sanctions, which need the backing of all member states to be adopted and could change before then, include listing dozens of individuals and entities involved in producing and sourcing weapons as well as components and machines needed to build them. The measures also look to target several Russian officials.

The bloc has also proposed export restrictions on companies in China and India for the first time over their alleged role in supplying Russia with banned technologies and electronics, Bloomberg previously reported.

The EU is aiming to approve the sanctions package, which would be its 13th since Russia invaded Ukraine, by the second anniversary of the war later this month.

8. Establishment of S. Korea-Cuba diplomatic relations likely to deal 'blow' to N. Korea: official

Interesting. IS the ROK deliberately trying to undermine north Korea's international legitimacy and its desire to be a leader in the (old) non aligned movement?

Is the ROK playing Baduk (Chinese Go) and placing its stones all over the global map (board). It seems to have just potentially captured some "territory" on the board.

Establishment of S. Korea-Cuba diplomatic relations likely to deal 'blow' to N. Korea: official | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · February 15, 2024

By Lee Haye-ah

SEOUL, Feb. 15 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba will likely deal a "blow" to North Korea, given the close brotherly ties Pyongyang and Havana have maintained for decades, a senior presidential official said Thursday.

Years of secret negotiations and visits went into the formal establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations, which was sealed Wednesday by an exchange of diplomatic notes between the two countries' representatives to the United Nations in New York.

President Yoon Suk Yeol (Yonhap)

The decision reduced to one the number of U.N. member states South Korea has yet to establish diplomatic ties with, namely Syria.

"The establishment of South Korea-Cuba diplomatic relations was a long-cherished wish and task in South Korean diplomacy," the official told reporters. "It appears that it will be inevitable that North Korea will be dealt a considerable political and psychological blow."

Cuba and North Korea described their relations as those of "brotherly solidarity" in a bilateral treaty signed on the occasion of then Cuban President Fidel Castro's visit to the North in March 1986.

"The reason Cuba was unable to readily agree to diplomatic relations despite having positive feelings toward South Korea amid hallyu and other various circumstances was because of its relationship with North Korea," the official said, referring to the Korean Wave, or the global popularity of Korean pop culture.

"This is the completion of our diplomacy vis-a-vis the socialist bloc that was friendly toward North Korea, including countries in Eastern Europe in the past," the official said, claiming the establishment of South Korea-Cuba diplomatic relations clearly shows where the tide is heading in history and to whom it is turning.

Asked whether there was any communication between the two countries' leaders ahead of the announcement, the official said President Yoon Suk Yeol was briefed in detail on the latest developments as they happened but had no direct contact with his counterpart, Miguel Diaz-Canel, due to the absence of diplomatic relations.

The final agreement was reached over the recent Lunar New Year holiday and reported to the president by phone, the official said.

The United States was also informed of the decision before the announcement.

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · February 15, 2024

9. Sorry Kim, Your Pal Cuba Just Made Friends With South Korea

Some of the US anti-Cuba folks might pan this because a US ally is establishing diplomatic relations with a US adversary. But I think the broader political warfare effort by the ROK against the north may be more useful than the ROK simply ignoring Cuba because the US does not like Cuba.

Sorry Kim, Your Pal Cuba Just Made Friends With South Korea

By Jon Herskovitz

February 15, 2024 at 12:48 AM EST

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-15/cuba-gets-a-new-friend-south-korea-breaking-a-cold-war-freeze?srnd=politics-vp&sref=hhjZtX76

South Korea established formal diplomatic relations with Cuba, a country whose steadfast loyalty to North Korea had for decades apparently kept it from forging ties with Seoul.

South Korea’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement the two countries’ representatives to the United Nations exchanged diplomatic notes in New York on Wednesday to establish ambassador-level relations. Cuba became the 193rd country to establish official ties with South Korea, it said.

Havana had been one of the few global outliers when it came to forging ties with South Korea, setting itself apart from North Korea’s two biggest backers — the Soviet Union and China, which established formal relations more than 30 years ago as the Cold War ended and they looked to South Korea as a powerful partner for trade.

The announcement had been kept secret to prevent any interruption by North Korea, Yonhap News agency reported, citing sources it did not name. Cuba saw the move as a way of expanding trade with one of the world’s largest economies while South Korea saw the agreement as helping to raise its global profile, Yonhap said, citing unspecified observers.

North Korea’s propaganda apparatus frequently lauds what leader Kim Jong Un has called “precious traditions of friendship” with Havana and their work together to defend what he has called the “dignity” of their joint socialist cause.

In the wake of North and South Korea reaching an agreement that led to the two countries jointly being admitted to the United Nations in 1991, most member states were able to establish diplomatic ties with both parties.

On the same day that Havana signed the deal with Seoul, North Korea’s official media reported that leader Kim received floral baskets from military attaches corps, including long-time partners Vietnam, Russia, China and Cuba, all of which have a strong diplomatic presence in Pyongyang.

— With assistance from Shinhye Kang

10. The Arsenal of Autocracy

Excerpts:

Thus far, Washington has been reluctant to enact and enforce unilateral secondary sanctions on certain entities engaged in business relationships that lead back to North Korea, choosing instead to designate individuals and entities in limited, occasional cases. Although the UN Panel of Experts has identified Asia as the number one location for North Korean sanctions evasion, with China the center of evasion activities, Washington appears reluctant to designate Chinese entities for fear that doing so could have wide-ranging consequences for U.S.-Chinese relations. At a time when Washington’s attention is focused on events in Europe and the Middle East, it is also natural to wonder if the United States has the bandwidth to combat Pyongyang’s global proliferation activities as a priority.

Yet these concerns must be weighed against the near certainty of increased risks if North Korea’s behavior goes unchecked. The extent of global problems is such that it may be natural to see North Korea as a secondary problem that is not on the scale of Russian aggression, violence in the Middle East, or China’s threats to Taiwan. But this is a shortsighted approach—one that neglects to consider that the problems North Korea poses to U.S. interests and the global order are directly connected to these other challenges. The scale of the threat demands that Washington be less sensitive about imposing sanctions on entities that do business in or with Iran, Russia, and other North Korean partners. Washington unilaterally sanctioned Russian banks in 2018 for facilitating North Korean WMD financial activity. With fresh evidence of the North Korean arms trade emerging, the U.S. Treasury must take further action, and partners and allies should do the same.

Pyongyang’s integration into an emerging authoritarian axis has empowered it to expand its proliferation, procurement, and provocations while also strengthening the international order’s other adversaries. Developing and executing a reinvigorated international strategy to counter North Korean proliferation would not be a distraction from defeating Russia, stabilizing the Middle East, or even deterring Chinese aggression. Rather, it is vital to making progress on these goals.

The Arsenal of Autocracy

How North Korean Weapons Fuel Conflict—and How to Stop the Flow

By Jonathan Corrado and Markus Garlauskas

Foreign Affairs · by Jonathan Corrado and Markus Garlauskas · February 15, 2024

North Korea’s leadership thrives in moments of global upheaval. And as wars rage in the Middle East, Europe, and Africa, Pyongyang has seized its opportunity to spread death and destruction through arms sales. Although the Kim regime has been systematically isolated from the international community, regularly denies that it is supplying weapons overseas, and is prohibited by UN Security Council resolutions from buying or selling various arms, it has nonetheless become a de facto arsenal for the United States’ adversaries.

Pyongyang’s weapons are everywhere. Its shells are fueling Russian President Vladimir Putin’s brutal war on Ukraine, with over a thousand containers of military aid arriving since September 2023. North Korean rocket-propelled grenades were likely fired by Hamas in their October 7 assault against Israel. North Korean multiple-rocket launchers, AGP-250 glide bombs, and 122-millimeter guided rockets have even been reported in the hands of a Sudanese paramilitary group.

The Kim regime stands to benefit tremendously—financially, strategically, and technologically—from resurgent arms trade relationships. Urgent action is needed to stop this trade and its destabilizing effects. To fight it, the United States must mobilize a coalition to increase international awareness of the scale of the problem, and strengthen detection, oversight, and sanctions compliance. If these steps are not taken, then North Korea will be able to finance further weapons testing and development, gain access to dangerous new technologies, launder its ill-gotten profits, and spread mayhem and destruction.

A NEW NATION

The conventional wisdom in Seoul and Washington is that North Korea is isolated and cash-strapped, and so both governments typically interpret news from the secretive country in the light of their assumption that it is a weak, second-tier threat. Such optimism, however, is unwarranted. Although North Korea’s population may be isolated from the free flow of information and trade, and the Kim regime a global pariah, Pyongyang’s links to authoritarian regimes are powerful and growing stronger. North Korea now counts China, Iran, Russia, and Syria among its friends and partners. Beijing and Moscow have, in particular, gone from grudging participants in Western attempts to pressure Pyongyang into curbing its illicit weapons programs to openly supporting the Kim regime. Putin has received missiles from North Korea and even gone so far as to publicly discuss sharing weapons technology with Pyongyang, both of which are prohibited by UN Security Council Resolutions that Russia voted for.

North Korea is no longer a country seeking sanctions relief or one hungry for improved relations with the United States. Instead, it now confidently forecasts the gradual decline of U.S. power and the resurgence of challengers, including Russia. To that end, Pyongyang is trying to engage an authoritarian network to weaken Washington’s position. As North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui warned in October 2023, “if peace and security in the region are endangered due to the persistent moves of the United States, Japan and South Korea for instability, [North Korea and Russia] will act as a powerful strategic stability element to contain such [a] situation.”

Arms sales are central to this strategy. Pyongyang has long sold weapons to adversaries of the United States, its friends, and its allies. For example, North Korea has championed violence against Israel since at least the early 1970s because of its identity, in the regime’s words, as an “imperialist satellite state.” Former North Korean leader Kim Il Sung welcomed Yasser Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, to Pyongyang in 1984 and provided a steady stream of weapons to the PLO. Both of Kim’s successors have continued his policy. Since 2014, for example, North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un has reportedly been sending rockets to Hamas.

ARMS ACROSS THE WATER

North Korea derives multiple benefits from its arms sales. First, and perhaps foremost, they generate valuable income. With little to offer for legitimate trade, North Korea’s illicit weapons dealing is a rare opportunity to acquire hard currency, which it can then use to fund its own weapons programs. The arms trade also allows the regime to build relationships with trading partners and to gain access to restricted technologies. In exchange for North Korean weapons, for example, Moscow may be supporting Pyongyang’s space and missile programs. Part of the recent summit between Putin and Kim took place at a Russian spaceport, where Putin hinted at Russia–North Korean military cooperation, saying that Kim showed a “big interest in rocket technologies.” The U.S. government assesses that North Korea is seeking fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and armored vehicles, as well as ballistic missile production equipment from Russia in exchange for arms. Moscow could also help North Korea develop the technology to launch missiles with multiple warheads to overwhelm U.S. and allied missile defenses. Moscow has been helping Pyongyang in other areas and, this month, The New York Times reported that a Russian bank has unfrozen $9 million of North Korean assets for the purchase of crude oil. North Korea has also been permitted to open a bank account at a Russian financial institution, thereby facilitating the country’s return into the global financial system, which had been restricted by UN sanctions.

Weapons sales also serve the Kim regime’s strategic goals by fueling confrontations and conflicts that chip away at international order and challenge the United States and its allies. North Korea’s arms exports, for example, help prop up the new authoritarian axis, which emerged following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The most important part of this axis is the Chinese-Russian relationship, which Beijing and Moscow claim has “no limits” and which has led China to supply Russia just about everything it needs to sustain its war, short of lethal aid. But North Korea has also been an essential contributor, sending over a million artillery shells to Moscow, according to South Korean and Ukrainian officials, thereby helping the Russian military sustain its operations.

North Korean support for Russia’s war against Ukraine has caused Kim’s stock to rise in Moscow. A recent surge of intense diplomacy with the Kremlin, capped by a leader-level summit with Putin, has allowed Kim to hedge against his overdependence on Beijing. In a letter to Putin last year, Kim described the North Korean–Russia relationship in terms usually reserved for his country’s ties with China. Although both Pyongyang and Moscow have publicly denied any arms deals, Kim offered his “full and unconditional” support for the Kremlin during a six-day trip to Russia last summer. One month later, the White House released satellite imagery showing a sea and rail link that is being used to deliver North Korean artillery and missiles to Russia. To fulfill future orders, North Korea has been running its factories at full capacity, according to a South Korean official. It is producing short-range ballistic missiles and tank ammunition for Russia, and may also be sending multiple rocket launchers, antitank and antiaircraft missiles, and field artillery.

SMASHING THE NETWORK

So far, the importance of the rapidly worsening problem posed by North Korea’s growing relationships with other authoritarian regimes is under-appreciated in Washington. Discussion about North Korea by U.S. commentators on North Korea policy—the authors included—almost invariably focuses on ways to meet the direct challenge to deterrence posed by Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal, rather than the indirect threat caused by other types of proliferation or by the network that North Korea is building. Some prominent North Korea experts have even been debating whether or not Pyongyang has made the strategic decision to go to war. But preparing to deter and defeat aggression cannot come at the expense of dealing with the real and present threat posed by North Korean proliferation. A new strategy is needed to deal with this worsening problem; past policies will not be sufficient to reverse these worrying trends.

Creating such a strategy will not be easy. Washington’s primary tool for countering Pyongyang is sanctions, and North Korea’s sanctions-evasion techniques are well honed, are sophisticated, and often involve tremendous effort and ingenuity. Using front and shell companies, foreign partners, and diplomatic cover, as well as by false flagging vessels and changing ship ownership on registrations, North Korea has disguised many illicit transactions as innocent ones—or hidden them entirely. And now that China and Russia are increasingly willing to partner with North Korea directly, it has become far simpler for Pyongyang to conduct its illicit activities and engage in sanctions-violating transactions.

But that does not mean the situation is hopeless. Where the political will to combat North Korean proliferation is lacking—as is the case in Beijing and Moscow—it is vital for the United States and its allies to highlight these violations. They should do so by condemning the purchasers of North Korean arms and calling on them to abide by unanimously adopted UN resolutions prohibiting such transactions. Although this is unlikely to cause Moscow to change course, Western condemnation could nonetheless impose reputational costs upon Russia and China that can be reversed only by returning to compliance, serving as a warning to other countries. At the same time, the United States must continue to mobilize friends and allies including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United Kingdom to conduct joint maritime patrols to monitor for illicit North Korean transactions.

North Korea’s sanctions-evasion techniques are well honed, are sophisticated, and involve tremendous effort and ingenuity.

This effort is already beginning. In January, Japan, South Korea, and the United States conducted large-scale combined naval exercises to deter North Korean aggression, and they practiced responding to nuclear, missile, and underwater threats. The navies also conducted joint drills on “advanced maritime communication operations, maritime interdiction operations training, air combat drills, staff exchanges and integration,” according to the U.S. Navy. This was a good start, but because North Korea’s networks are global, the U.S.-led effort needs more partners and a greater reach. Its coalition of nations must also partner with private-sector and nonprofit groups to map out North Korean proliferation networks and associates.

Training and support will be vital to this effort. The United States and its partners already fund and provide training programs to educate governments about the risks of North Korean proliferation. They have also devised techniques for effective screening and detection. But 90 percent of low-income countries and 50 percent of middle-income countries were found to be noncompliant or only partially compliant with a Financial Action Task Force recommendation for implementing sanctions related to all weapons of mass destruction. In part, this seems to stem from the complexities of compliance, and organizations including Compliance and Capacity Skills International and the Royal United Services Institute have created resources and training to increase understanding. Their training workshops have helped countries to identify sanctions evaders by adopting a more nuanced approach that goes beyond merely looking at screening lists. More funding will be vital to increasing these programs’ effectiveness.

But screening will not be enough. Pyongyang uses intermediaries and false flags to disguise its vessels. And lax enforcement and reporting practices at transport hubs help North Korea’s advanced sanctions-evasion techniques. Less than five percent of the individuals and entities mentioned in UN Panel of Experts reports are officially designated by UN sanctions, according to an investigation by the Royal United Services Institute. That is partially because UN sanctions on North Korea have not been updated since 2018, due to Chinese and Russian opposition. In addition, North Korea is increasingly conducting its illicit activities online, and it has been able to steal more than $3 billion through crypto heists. Action is needed at the government-to-government level to improve enforcement, along with expanded engagement with private-sector entities that may not even realize that they are participating in North Korean projects.

To generate the necessary political momentum for change, Washington and its allies should seek to focus global attention on North Korea’s illicit activities and on its partners. This should be done by condemning Pyongyang’s activities in as specific terms as possible in major multilateral and bilateral statements—as was done in the G7 Foreign Ministers Joint Statement in November 2023, which called on “UN Member States to fully and effectively implement all relevant [UN Security Council Resolutions]” and “strongly condemn[ed] arms transfers from North Korea to Russia”—and by increasing cooperation with other like-minded countries. Japan and South Korea both having seats in the UN Security Council in 2024 provides a good opportunity to shine light on this topic. More global attention will help raise the issue’s profile and encourage countries to cooperate on counterproliferation. Those that refuse will run the risk of ostracization—and although Beijing and Moscow may not be afraid of the costs of being uncooperative, smaller countries and companies may be.

THE COST OF INACTION

Thus far, Washington has been reluctant to enact and enforce unilateral secondary sanctions on certain entities engaged in business relationships that lead back to North Korea, choosing instead to designate individuals and entities in limited, occasional cases. Although the UN Panel of Experts has identified Asia as the number one location for North Korean sanctions evasion, with China the center of evasion activities, Washington appears reluctant to designate Chinese entities for fear that doing so could have wide-ranging consequences for U.S.-Chinese relations. At a time when Washington’s attention is focused on events in Europe and the Middle East, it is also natural to wonder if the United States has the bandwidth to combat Pyongyang’s global proliferation activities as a priority.

Yet these concerns must be weighed against the near certainty of increased risks if North Korea’s behavior goes unchecked. The extent of global problems is such that it may be natural to see North Korea as a secondary problem that is not on the scale of Russian aggression, violence in the Middle East, or China’s threats to Taiwan. But this is a shortsighted approach—one that neglects to consider that the problems North Korea poses to U.S. interests and the global order are directly connected to these other challenges. The scale of the threat demands that Washington be less sensitive about imposing sanctions on entities that do business in or with Iran, Russia, and other North Korean partners. Washington unilaterally sanctioned Russian banks in 2018 for facilitating North Korean WMD financial activity. With fresh evidence of the North Korean arms trade emerging, the U.S. Treasury must take further action, and partners and allies should do the same.

Pyongyang’s integration into an emerging authoritarian axis has empowered it to expand its proliferation, procurement, and provocations while also strengthening the international order’s other adversaries. Developing and executing a reinvigorated international strategy to counter North Korean proliferation would not be a distraction from defeating Russia, stabilizing the Middle East, or even deterring Chinese aggression. Rather, it is vital to making progress on these goals.

• JONATHAN CORRADO is Director of Policy for the Korea Society.
• MARKUS GARLAUSKAS is Director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. He led the U.S. intelligence community’s strategic analysis of North Korea from 2014 to 2020 as the National Intelligence Officer for North Korea.

Foreign Affairs · by Jonathan Corrado and Markus Garlauskas · February 15, 2024

11. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ South Korea is the enemy…Trends in North Korea after Kim Jong Un’s “One Korea” announcement (1) People are surprised and confused as government tries to get them to understand policy shift

Is the regime's propaganda campaign unraveling? When you change a theme and message that is 70 years old it is only logical that it would cause confusion among such a heavily indoctrinated population. Could this lead to internal instability?  

＜Inside N. Korea＞ South Korea is the enemy…Trends in North Korea after Kim Jong Un’s “One Korea” announcement (1) People are surprised and confused as government tries to get them to understand policy shift

asiapress.org

Women hold a meeting in a cornfield. They appear to be members of the women’s league mobilized for harvest work. Taken on the Chinese side across from Sakju County, North Pyongan Province, in late September 2023. (ASIAPRESS)

Late last year, Kim Jong-un declared that "South Korea is the enemy” and that unification with the South is no longer possible, essentially formalizing North Korea’s “one Korea” policy. This was an abandonment of the North Korean regime's signature policy of peaceful and autonomous reunification of the Korean people. How is this change in course explained and propagandized in North Korea, and how have the people received it? We asked our reporting partners in North Korea about the situation and found that a massive propaganda campaign has been underway since the beginning of the new year. Meanwhile, bewilderment is spreading among the population. (By KANG Ji-won ／ISHIMARU Jiro)

◆ Propaganda about “enemy South Korea” began in the early days of this year

In his report to the Plenary Session of the Workers' Party Central Committee held from December 26 to 30 last year, Kim Jong Un described inter-Korean relations as "hostile bilateral relations, not kinship or homogeneous relations.” In a speech to the Supreme People's Assembly on January 15, he said, "I think the phrases 'sovereignty, peaceful reunification, and national unity' of the 'northern half' in the constitution should be deleted," which made clear his “two states” narrative. In North Korea, the first week of January reportedly saw an intensive campaign of propaganda and explanation about the plenary session’s results.

According to reports from reporting partners in the northern provinces of North Hamgyong, Yanggang, and North Pyongan, learning about the "One Korea" policy is continuing in all workplaces, schools, and social organizations such as women's and youth associations, as well as in criticism sessions held every Saturday and on Friday afternoons.

In addition to study materials published by the central government, which are explained to each organization by the administration and party officials, North Koreans are asked to compete in question-and-answer presentations. Companies are also conducting lessons about the new policy in the “reading hours” held during mornings before work. A reporting partner in Hyesan told ASIAPRESS about the propaganda training methods in her women's association, saying:

"In the Women's League, we are forced to compete with presentations based on what we memorized in teams. We also have to write a resolution that reflects our ideas and spirit, and the chairperson of the Women's League and the cadres from the municipal party organization review, evaluate, and rank them. The winner of a particular week gets a commendation, so it’s a big deal. Those who didn't memorize it have to study at night. Everyone who can read is required to do it.

“In the Women's League's study group, we are told, 'No matter what the situation, we must be ready to stand up when the Party and the country demand it; we want peace, but we are ready to fight. We must have the right attitude towards the enemy."

North and South Korean leaders embrace at the second Panmunjom summit in May 2019. (Cheong Wa Dae)

◆ Confusion and surprise at announcement that “South Korea is the enemy”

The formalization of the "One Korea" policy seems to have come as a surprise to people. ASIAPRESS asked another reporting partner in Yanggang Province in late January how the policy had been received.

-- Kim Jong-un said that the South and North are not the same people, they are enemies.

When President Moon Jae-in came here and went to Mount Paektu with Kim Jong-un (September 2018), it seemed like the two Koreas were going to be reunified soon, and there would be a lot of economic cooperation. That’s why I was a little surprised when (Kim) said that South Korea is an enemy, that they are not the same people anymore, and that they are not our partners in unification.

In the past, we were taught that we needed to liberate the people of South Korea, that the country is full of beggars and the oppressed, but in reality, they are living much better than us. What can we liberate now? -- I don't think there's any alternative (to the South) now.

A propaganda leaflet prepared by the North Koreans after relations with South Korea deteriorated. A cigarette butt was intentionally placed in the photo of President Moon Jae-in's face. The leaflets were not distributed. Published in the Rodong Sinmun in June 2020.

-- Kim Jong-un called South Korea the Republic of Korea. Why do you think that is?

He's been calling it South Chosun (Korea), not the Republic of Korea (the official name of the country), and I think it's because he doesn't think he's going to get any help from the South in the future.

-- Kim Jong-un has abandoned unification, denied that they are even his own people, and declared them to be something to be fought. Are there any related moves?

At this point, there's nothing special, except that he's asking them to prepare for war mobilization and to participate properly in drills.

-- How do the authorities explain the new policy?

In recent (late January) meetings, they often give lectures on the current situation and the imperialists' drive for global hegemony. What they emphasize many times is that we have been complacent because we have lowered our guard toward hostile countries. At the Women's League’s Saturday study on January 20, that’s what the head of the party propaganda department in Hyesan said.

-- Why are North Korea’s leaders in such a hurry to abandon the principle of national reunification, which their predecessors, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, have been calling for?

The official told us that because of the sanctions against the DPRK, we can't even implement our policies properly, which has led to challenges in North-South cooperation. He emphasized that our policies can only be achieved by defeating the United States. Until then, South Korea is the one to keep in check.

He went on to say, "Until now, we have been making efforts, always showing kindness and understanding (to South Korea), but our enemies have taken advantage of that and have been threatening us from the outside and constantly subverting us from the inside.” He also said “we were fooled by the enemy. We must not be fooled again.”

They also frequently lecture on decadent Korean culture and the weakness of the capitalist world. At the January 20 study session, we learned about the experiences of people who have returned to North Korea after defecting, discussing, and reading out individual (and collective) resolutions that claimed that the illusion of capitalism is a dangerous idea that harms them and their families. (To be continued in the next installment)

* ASIAPRESS communicates with reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.

A map of North Korea (ASIAPRESS)

asiapress.org

1​2. Kim Jong-un's new multi-purpose game plan and year of living dangerously

Kim is on a campaign to try to recover from his multiple policy and strategy failures and broken promises to the Korean elite and people.

Kim Jong-un's new multi-purpose game plan and year of living dangerously

The Korea Times · February 15, 2024

By Yun Byung-se

Yun Byung-se

Fierce debates are under way in the United States and South Korea about North Korea’s latest moves and bluster. It is neither about missiles nor nuclear weapons, nor is it about the timing of the seventh nuclear test.

Rather, it is about Kim Jong-un’s redefinition of the inter-Korean relationship as “two belligerent states at war,” in a big departure from the decades-long principle of unity of the same Korean nation.

Defining South Korea as “enemy number one,” Kim announced that North Korea “will accelerate preparations for a major upheaval to secure the entire territory of the South by mobilizing all physical means and capabilities including nuclear forces." Various follow-up measures are now pacing on military, diplomatic and inter-Korean fronts to materialize his new declaration.

Such a turn of events triggered a diverse range of opinions within the academic and policy communities about possible scenarios and corresponding responses going forward.

A school of thought first held by a handful of former American policymakers equated Kim’s statements with “a strategic decision to go to war with South Korea” and a move towards Russia. One even warned that “nuclear war could break out in Northeast Asia in 2024.” They tend to lean towards the normalization of the North Korea-U.S. relations or compromising on nuclear issues.

The second school of thought, mostly held by conservative experts in the U.S. and South Korea, posits that while 2024 will be a year of living very dangerously, the prospect of a full-fledged war waged by Pyongyang is an overstatement. They point out that such a move will spell the end of the regime, given the unprecedentedly robust deterrence posture of the U.S. and South Korea.

The third school of thought, entertained by both conservative and progressive experts in Washington and Seoul, warns of high-intensity or hybrid provocations short of war. Some even anticipate a scenario beyond the level of torpedoing the ROK Navy ship Cheonan or the bombardment of Yeonpyeong island in 2010.

Last month, President Yoon Suk Yeol also warned of North Korea's "numerous provocations" such as “armed actions near the border, drone intrusions, cyber-attacks or spreading fake news to interfere in April's general elections.”

What is reassuring is that the ROK–U.S. authorities and their partners are continuously updating their assessment of various scenarios and gearing up integrated deterrence as well as intensive diplomatic and intelligence efforts.

Alongside such reassessments, Kim’s new game demands thorough and cool-headed analyses of the key factors that motivate and embolden the North Korean leader at this particular juncture.

First and foremost, the latest move represents his shrewd game plan to exploit ongoing polycrises around the world. The prolonged Ukraine-Russian War, intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition and forthcoming elections in South Korea and the U.S. are a few examples.

It is no wonder that Kim joined the chorus of calls that the current international order is a “New Cold War” because this is the most favorable external environment since he took power in 2012. In an increasingly fragmenting world, he is in high demand from Russia and China who see more value in North Korea vis-a-vis their confrontations with the U.S.

China changed its distancing policy in 2018 when it was caught off guard by the announcement of the first U.S.-DPRK summit. Beijing rushed to invite Kim over and it became Pyongyang’s quiet patron ever since.

Now, Russia took over the baton regarding major patronage in a suspicious deal with North Korea during Kim’s visit to Russia last September. Moscow’s need for North Korea’s surplus munitions for use on the Ukraine front and Pyongyang’s desire for Russian economic and military technology assistance are the key drivers. In this sense, some regard the Russo-North Korean relationship as transactional or marriage of convenience, rather than a strategic partnership or alliance.

However, caution is in order here. It may go beyond our imagination. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made it clear in Pyongyang last October that their bilateral relationship has “reached a qualitatively new and strategic level.” President Putin’s impending visit to Pyongyang will be a crowning moment in upgrading their relations to unprecedented heights. As Kim dubbed this relationship as a foremost one, Putin’s visit is likely to not only expand the scope of their agenda but also institutionalize such bonds perhaps in strategic and other dimensions as Lavrov already hinted at.

Such an evolving relationship, combined with the no limit Russo-Chinese strategic partnership, also has reverberating geopolitical implications in the region. The formation of a trilateral strategic partnership among these three countries in any form could give North Korea ample maneuvering room. Kim will no longer need to bother about sanctions, tech high-jacking, or even food and energy emergencies, which are available from its cohorts. As a matter of fact, the U.N. Security Council has been paralyzed in the face of North Korea’s blatant violations concerning its resolutions since 2018.

For him, the U.S. presidential election could be another opportunity to tilt the balance to his advantage and deal with the U.S. directly. Regardless of who wins, Kim will try to close out South Korea and seek nuclear weapon state status using its nuclear and missile capabilities as bargaining chips. A nuclear arms reduction deal will be a good deal for him. No deal or no negotiation will not matter to him either, as long as he can continue to bulk up his nuclear arsenal and rely on renewed solidarity with two big saviors to counter ROK-U.S.-Japan security ties.

Last, but not least, since a bipartisan top priority of the U.S. in the coming decade will remain the Sino-American strategic competition, Kim will keep this precious wild card to pull in China and play the U.S. against its allies and partners. His eyes will also be focused on how conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, the Red Sea, and the Taiwan Strait will divert attention and resources away from the Korean Peninsula.

As described above, there will be “known unknowns’ and “unknown unknowns” in our reading of Kim’s calculus. Nevertheless, we will surely be able to outsmart and outmaneuver North Korea. The year 2023 was a historic year for the ROK-U.S. alliance and the trilateral security partnership between the ROK, the U.S. and Japan. We should further solidify such achievements in a coherent and irreversible way to navigate the troubled waters to a secure future.

The latest announcement on the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and Cuba, North Korea's cherished brother country, augurs well.

Yun Byung-se, a former foreign minister of South Korea (2013-17), is now Chairman of Seoul International Law Academy (SILA), a board member of the Korea Peace Foundation and a member of several ex-global leaders' forums and task forces, including the Astana Forum and its Consultative Council.

The Korea Times · February 15, 2024

13. Clicking foreign media still cause to die in North Korea

We need to pay attention.

Excerpts:

Consuming foreign media does more than just cause North Koreans to question their government’s claim that they live in an “ideal” society, striving to attain a socialist utopia. It also unsettles the government’s ability to maintain a culture of suspicion and mistrust between citizens. This could potentially generate social change.

When asked about his experience watching foreign media with friends and family before his escape, one North Korean man said: “If you’ve watched it together, then no one would report it. They’d go down for it too.” For some North Koreans, consuming foreign media is an activity that builds closeness through shared indulgence in an illegal act.

Clicking foreign media still cause to die in North Korea

Kim regime steps up brutal efforts to stamp out ‘illegal’ foreign media consumption but citizens continue to risk death by flouting the ban

asiatimes.com · by Sarah A Son

Consuming and sharing foreign media in North Korea can be punishable by death. But that did not stop more than 83% of those who escaped the country between 2016 and 2020 using increasingly sophisticated means to access foreign music, TV shows and films before they left.

According to a survey report that was released by the South Korean Ministry of Unification, illegal media consumption among those who left in the five years up to 2020 increased by 15% compared with the previous five-year period.

Since the mid-1990s, over 34,000 North Koreans have defected to South Korea. However, North Korea closed its borders during the Covid pandemic, and since then the steady flow of escapees has slowed considerably.

The number of informants has dropped and the information they bring may be somewhat dated by the time they reach the South. But many tell a common story of huddling around a TV or laptop behind locked doors, consuming foreign media that was smuggled into North Korea on USB sticks and SD cards.

Escapees also tell how knowledge of the outside has changed North Korean consumer behavior, relationships and trust in the Kim family’s regime. This has prompted North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Un, to adopt increasingly harsh measures to combat access to illegal media.

Kim’s crackdown

Research that I conducted with my colleagues in 2019 while working for a human rights documentation NGO in South Korea found that public execution had been used by the North Korean state against people convicted of consuming or disseminating foreign media. The BBC reported one such case having recently taken place.

Forcing friends and neighbors to witness the punishment of those known to them for such a crime is a powerful deterrent deployed by a state that considers outside knowledge a profound threat to its ideology and the control of its people.

People walking on the street in Pyongyang, North Korea, August 2012. Photo: Chintung Lee / Shutterstock via The Conversation

Shortly after inheriting the leadership in 2011, Kim tried a number of relatively soft approaches to controlling foreign media access, alongside continued punitive measures. They included a suite of information strategies aimed at making North Korea appear competitive and attractive in the eyes of its citizens, capable of producing its own “popular” content to rival the mighty force of the (South) “Korean Wave.”

More recently, the North Korean government has capitalized on its border closure to work harder than ever to keep foreign information out of the country. In 2020, it introduced a new “Law on the Elimination of Reactionary Thought and Culture.” This law sets out specific punishments for both viewers and distributors of foreign media, going further than the existing criminal code.

At the same time, Kim has publicly condemned K-Pop (pop music originating in South Korea) as a “vicious cancer” permeating North Korean society.

Changing hearts and minds

Testimonies published by organizations working with North Korean escapees show that consumption of South Korean television dramas has inspired young North Koreans to copy the fashion choices and catchphrases popularised by key characters.

North Korean escapees have also reported paying keen attention to the settings they saw in films and dramas. Modern streets, cars and homes, with people displaying relative freedom of choice, expression and movement, all offer North Koreans a glimpse into life under capitalism.

These depictions profoundly contradict the state’s narrative. North Korea presents the South as a depraved hellhole where people are ideologically corrupt and languishing in poverty.

A recent video from North Korea shown to me by the Korea Institute for National Unification shows that the new law on foreign media and culture is being accompanied by television campaigns.

These campaigns harshly name and shame citizens seen wearing clothing in foreign styles, particularly with English language writing or slogans – the language of the “American bastards.”

A similar campaign condemns young North Koreans for showing affection in public and mimicking “Western style” dating culture. Such behavior is criticized as corrupt and destructive to North Korean societal purity.

Building social bonds

Consuming foreign media does more than just cause North Koreans to question their government’s claim that they live in an “ideal” society, striving to attain a socialist utopia. It also unsettles the government’s ability to maintain a culture of suspicion and mistrust between citizens. This could potentially generate social change.

When asked about his experience watching foreign media with friends and family before his escape, one North Korean man said: “If you’ve watched it together, then no one would report it. They’d go down for it too.” For some North Koreans, consuming foreign media is an activity that builds closeness through shared indulgence in an illegal act.

North Korea’s borders have been closed since January 2020. Photo: Stefan Bruder / Shutterstock via The Conversation

Foreign diplomats, humanitarian aid workers and tourists are not yet allowed back into North Korea following the pandemic. So, combined with many fewer escapees arriving in the South, it is difficult to know whether foreign media access and consumption has declined since 2020.

But the Ministry of Unification has pledged to offer an update in a year’s time to evaluate the effect of the new law against foreign culture and the campaign around it.

Sarah A Son is Senior Lecturer in Korean Studies, University of Sheffield

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

asiatimes.com · by Sarah A Son

14. N Korea peddles illicit gambling sites to South’s criminal ring

More on the regime's illicit activities.

N Korea peddles illicit gambling sites to South’s criminal ring

Seoul’s spy agency has linked the sales to the office funding leader Kim Jong Un.

By Taejun Kang for RFA

2024.02.15

Taipei, Taiwan

rfa.org

A North Korean information technology group has created illegal online gambling websites and sold them to a South Korean cybercrime ring, the South’s National Intelligence Service revealed.

Gyonghung Information Technology Co., a group of 15 members based in Dandong, a Chinese border town next to the North Korean city of Sinuiju, was reportedly paid US$5,000 by an unnamed South Korean criminal organization in exchange for the development of a website and $3,000 monthly for its maintenance, the agency, known as NIS, said on Wednesday.

The company is also believed to have earned an extra $2,000 to $5,000 for increased website user traffic, involving commercial transactions via bank accounts owned by Chinese nationals and the global online payment service PayPal.

“Dandong has emerged as a base for apparel production in China, with the manpower from North Korea, and North Korean IT organizations have sprouted up and blended in among the North Korean workers in the area to make money and illegally earn foreign currencies,” said the NIS, adding that thousands of North Koreans generate income abroad through similar tactics.

Since the United Nations Security Council’s 2017 sanctions against Pyongyang, North Korean citizens have been barred from working in China, a measure aimed at curtailing the North’s ability to fund its nuclear and missile development programs. But North Korean operatives have camouflaged themselves as IT workers by fabricating their identities.

The spy agency said the Gyonghung group is believed to be under the so-called Bureau 39 of the North Korean ruling party, which is responsible for managing and raising secret funds for leader Kim Jong Un. Each member of the group sends the North Korean government about $500 per month.

The group is led by Kim Kwang Myong, a former official of Pyongyang’s main intelligence agency, Reconnaissance General Bureau. It also extorted personal information from users who accessed the websites it developed through the installation of malicious codes.

The amount of revenue generated by the entity from the South Korean criminal organization is not immediately known. However, the organization was also found to have generated profits in the trillions of South Korean won through the use of its websites, and an investigation is underway into the ring.

Edited by Elaine Chan and Mike Firn

rfa.org

15. Biden Has Allowed the North Korean Portfolio to Deteriorate

I am one of those who is wailing and gnashing my teeth over the shift to arms control (but my garments remain okay). To do so allows Kim to assess his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies as successful. And then he will double down.

Excerpts:

Suggesting that Washington switch to arms control, whether formally or informally, triggers the worst wailing, gnashing of teeth, and rending of garments imaginable. The possibility has received greater attention, but most policymakers still reject any change. Nevertheless, if the only realistic alternatives are a steadily growing illicit nuclear capability supplemented by regular threats of war, and a sharply limited nuclear arsenal but recognized nuclear status, the price of ideological purity seems much too high. A refusal to negotiate on Kim’s terms will mean a refusal to negotiate.

Indeed, it should be possible to square the circle. John Carl Baker of the U.S. Institute of Peace argued on behalf of pursuing “a realistic policy toward North Korea without rejecting commitments to nonproliferation and disarmament. A revised policy should not accept North Korea’s nuclear program but must acknowledge it in order to secure pragmatic constraints that, in the long run, will put the peninsula and the world back on the path to disarmament.” It is essential to try.

When Kim took over in December 2011, he looked nervous and uncertain, because his and the regime’s survival were uncertain. A dozen years later, North Korea is very different. Although his health remains an issue, he is in firm control at home and increasingly assertive abroad. And, he has turned the DPRK into a serious nuclear state. In 2021 he declared, “As long as nuclear weapons exist on Earth, and imperialism and the anti-North Korean maneuvers of the U.S. and its followers remain, our road to strengthening our nuclear force will never end.”

Kim has become one of the most consequential people in Northeast Asia. Washington must deal with him as he is, not as it wishes he was. If not, North Korea will soon have a viable nuclear deterrent threatening the American homeland with destruction, which could ultimately upend security structures throughout Asia and beyond.

Biden Has Allowed the North Korean Portfolio to Deteriorate

Kim Jong Un turns 40 to more fire and fury.

The American Conservative · by Doug Bandow · February 15, 2024

Another day, another threat from North Korea, backed (as it often is) by a ballistic missile launch. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has been increasing the frequency of provocations and drawing closer to Russia. Kim Jong-un continues to augment his arsenal at a breakneck pace, recently identifying “the launch of three new spy satellites as well as the building of drones and strengthening of the country’s nuclear weaponry as goals for this year.”

Perhaps even more menacing is the North’s dramatic U-turn on peaceful reunification with South Korea. Kim proposed revising his country’s constitution to define the Republic of Korea as Pyongyang’s “primary foe and invariable principal enemy.” Last week Kim set “as a national policy to occupy their territory in the event of” an undefined “contingency.”

Advertisement

So much for the onetime presidential friend who passed his time penning “beautiful” and “great” love letters to Donald Trump. Kim recently turned 40. Unfortunately, the older he gets, the less open the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea becomes to the world.

On December 17, 2011, a callow, ill-prepared Kim succeeded his father, Kim Jong Il. Surrounded by older mentors selected by his father to guide him, Kim fils could have ended up as little more than an empty frontman. Instead, he soon consolidated his hold on power, replacing military and political officials. Most dramatically, he executed his uncle. Contra expectations, Kim was not to be trifled with.

His time at school in Switzerland created some hope that he would liberalize his country. He evidently was different from his father and grandfather. Disney figures cavorted at an official event, and former NBA star Dennis Rodman serenaded the Supreme Leader on the latter’s birthday. Kim hosted a concert with South Korean K-pop artists and showcased his attractive wife, Ri Sol-ju, at home and abroad. More serious were his limited economic reforms and two overseas meetings with Trump.

Then came the 2019 summit crash in Hanoi. Kim responded by turning inward, a course reinforced by the Covid pandemic. He reversed economic reforms while seeking cultural isolation. In his party report two years ago, he “put an emphasis on the issue of effecting a revolutionary change in the mental and moral life of the people by pushing ahead with the eradication of non-socialist, anti-socialist practices and thorough establishment of socialist lifestyle throughout the country.” Singing or watching K-pop, which Kim labeled “a vicious cancer,” now lands teens in prison or on the execution block.

Similarly dramatic has been Pyongyang’s foreign policy shift. Kim abandoned engagement with South Korea and the U.S. He highlighted his contemptuous view of Seoul with the destruction of the Kaeson liaison building erected for inter-Korean exchanges. He recently dismissed what he termed the South’s plans for “unification by absorption” and “unification under liberal democracy.” Inter-Korean contact, Kim declared, is now “fixed into the relations between two states hostile to each other,” a dramatic repudiation of previous unification rhetoric and significant policy change.

Advertisement

Kim has similarly rejected Biden administration overtures. His rhetoric toward the U.S. has gotten ever-more truculent. At December’s party plenum, he stated:

The U.S. and its vassal forces have still perpetrated vicious anti-DPRK confrontational moves and the desperate efforts of the enemies have reached the extremes unprecedented in history in their reckless, provocative and dangerous nature. The U.S., which has caused instability and continued to aggravate the situation in the Korean peninsula, is exposing various forms of military threat to our state even at this moment when the year is falling. The U.S. has more persistently instigated the South Korean puppets and Japs, who are playing the role as the most faithful stooge and ‘running-dog’ in carrying out its hostile policy towards our Republic.

Thus, he instructed North Koreans, from soldiers to farmers, to “further accelerate the war preparations.” Amid this acceleration, he has threatened the first use of nuclear weapons. In September 2022, Kim said that the North’s nuclear status was “irreversible” and “there can be no bargaining over our nuclear weapons” despite economic sanctions. In the most recent plenum, he ordered the military to prepare plans for using nukes against the South in the event of war.

The DPRK is a nuclear power with sufficient fissile material to make at least 45 to 55 nuclear weapons, and perhaps many more. Although preparing for the North’s expected nuclear test has been a bit like watching the play Waiting for Godot, Pyongyang has advanced an expansive nuclear agenda. For instance, three years ago, “Kim announced North Korea would field a new nuclear-capable submarine, develop its tactical nuclear weapons, deploy multiple warheads on a single missile, and improve its ICBMs’ accuracy, among other goals.”

Unfortunately, when the North intends to stop expanding its arsenal is anyone’s guess. The RAND Corporation and Asan Institute for Policy Studies warned that the DPRK might build as many as 242 nuclear weapons, which would place Pyongyang among second-rank nuclear powers. That forecast is controversial, but even half as many nukes would provide a meaningful deterrent. Moreover, the North’s missile testing program has been active. Kim celebrated last year’s end with another ICBM test. The development of solid-fuel ICBMs is particularly threatening for the US.

As the DPRK’s capabilities advance, the likelihood of convincing—or coercing—him to relinquish his nation’s nukes diminishes. Of all the nuclear-armed powers, only South Africa abandoned a functioning arsenal, and Pretoria possessed just six completed weapons. The People’s Republic of China and Russian Federation offer Pyongyang two additional reasons for retaining its deterrent. Throughout the Cold War, North Korea carefully protected its independence and played its giant communist patrons against one another. Even a reunited Korea would be “a shrimp among whales” compared to Russia and the PRC, but nuclear weapons would ensure a very well-armed shrimp.

Nevertheless, neither Beijing nor Moscow has much reason to assist the U.S. against the North. Neither wanted the DPRK to have nuclear weapons, let alone the ability to send them far and wide. Russia long had little influence in Pyongyang, however, while China valued stability above denuclearization, opposing international pressure that it feared might undermine the regime.

Today, both have another reason to remain aloof—hostility toward Washington. Russia recently played the North Korea card, turning to the latter to augment its supply of munitions in the Ukraine war. What Moscow is providing in return is unknown, but Russia could assist Pyongyang with conventional weapons, including missiles, and even nuclear technology. Despite the obvious risks of doing so, American aid to Ukraine, which has resulted in the deaths of thousands of Russian military personnel, might persuade the Putin government that turnabout is fair play.

The PRC, though probably uncomfortable with Moscow’s newfound influence in the North, is more concerned with its increasingly fractious relationship with the U.S., and especially the potential for conflict over Taiwan, in which the DPRK would be a useful tool. The mere possibility of a North Korean invasion in response to South Korean support for the U.S. might help keep Seoul out of any Sino-American war.

Some observers fear that Kim might even now be planning to launch a war. Kim’s past behavior is inconsistent with such a wild gamble. Neither Moscow nor Beijing would be likely to backstop Pyongyang. He could not count on being saved if the U.S. delivered “fire and fury like the world has never seen,” as once promised by Trump.

Nevertheless, an increasingly threatening North Korea cannot help but unsettle Northeast Asia. An active response seems essential, but what? Preventive military strikes weren’t worth the risk of war in the 1990s, when a major conventional attack was the North’s potential response; they are impossible today, when North Korea could strike South Korea, Japan, and such American territories as Guam with nuclear weapons. Soon, the DPRK may be able to credibly threaten U.S. cities.

Sanctions look no more effective. American policymakers commonly call for tightening restrictions and toughening enforcement. That is no longer a viable option with Moscow and Beijing opposing U.S. policy, vetoing United Nations measures, and covertly opening their borders to Pyongyang. American policymakers insist that denuclearization is in China’s interest, but the PRC evidently believes other interests, such as thwarting American containment efforts, to be more important.

Which leaves diplomacy. That, however, is a dead-end until the North says otherwise. When it does, it is unlikely to welcome discussion of denuclearization. Most likely, Kim is developing a credible nuclear deterrent for America to increase his leverage. When he eventually comes calling, he will set terms for any deal, likely offering to trade a program cap for meaningful sanctions relief. The result would not be the preferred outcome, but it might be the best achievable outcome.

Suggesting that Washington switch to arms control, whether formally or informally, triggers the worst wailing, gnashing of teeth, and rending of garments imaginable. The possibility has received greater attention, but most policymakers still reject any change. Nevertheless, if the only realistic alternatives are a steadily growing illicit nuclear capability supplemented by regular threats of war, and a sharply limited nuclear arsenal but recognized nuclear status, the price of ideological purity seems much too high. A refusal to negotiate on Kim’s terms will mean a refusal to negotiate.

Indeed, it should be possible to square the circle. John Carl Baker of the U.S. Institute of Peace argued on behalf of pursuing “a realistic policy toward North Korea without rejecting commitments to nonproliferation and disarmament. A revised policy should not accept North Korea’s nuclear program but must acknowledge it in order to secure pragmatic constraints that, in the long run, will put the peninsula and the world back on the path to disarmament.” It is essential to try.

When Kim took over in December 2011, he looked nervous and uncertain, because his and the regime’s survival were uncertain. A dozen years later, North Korea is very different. Although his health remains an issue, he is in firm control at home and increasingly assertive abroad. And, he has turned the DPRK into a serious nuclear state. In 2021 he declared, “As long as nuclear weapons exist on Earth, and imperialism and the anti-North Korean maneuvers of the U.S. and its followers remain, our road to strengthening our nuclear force will never end.”

Kim has become one of the most consequential people in Northeast Asia. Washington must deal with him as he is, not as it wishes he was. If not, North Korea will soon have a viable nuclear deterrent threatening the American homeland with destruction, which could ultimately upend security structures throughout Asia and beyond.

The American Conservative · by Doug Bandow · February 15, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com