Quotes of the Day:
“For all societies have some view of the past; one that shapes and is shaped by their collective consciousness, that both reflects and reinforces the value-systems which guide their actions and judgments; and if professional historians do not provide this, others less scrupulous or less well qualified will.”
- Michael Howard during a 1981 lecture at Oxford University
*The Lessons of History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 13.
"Time is the coin of your life. It is the only coin you have, and only you can determine how it will be spent. Be careful lest you let other people spend it for you."
- Carl Sandburg
"You have your way. I have my way. As for the right way, the correct way, and the only way, it does not exist."
- Friedrich Nietzsche
1. UKRAINE CONFLICT UPDATE 10
2. RUSSIA-UKRAINE WARNING UPDATE: RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 27
3. Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threat shows how much is going wrong for him in Ukraine
4. What kind of resistance can Ukraine mount?
5. A Serious Threat or a Strategic Success? The Pros and Cons of Paramilitarising a Civilian Population in Ukraine
6. Ukrainian garrison at Snake Island surrenders to Russian Armed Forces — Defense Ministry
7. Russian TV Uses Tucker Carlson and Tulsi Gabbard to Sell Putin’s War
8. Removal of Russian banks from SWIFT system: 5 things to know
9. Chinese banks restrict lending to Russia, dealing blow to Moscow
10. Ukraine Leads the World
11. Russian advance slowed by Ukrainian resistance and logistical setbacks, U.S. defense official says
12. Why Is Russia's UN Ambassador Talking About 'Dirty Bombs'?
13. Ukraine fights unconventional cyber war
14. Putin Accidentally Started a Revolution in Germany
15. Russia Stumbles in Biggest Test of Its Military Force
16. Ukraine Conflict Update - Feb 28, 2022 - SOF News
17. Want to go fight for Ukraine? Here’s what to do.
18. White House seeks $3.5 billion for Pentagon in Ukraine response package
19. ‘The Ghost of Kyiv’ is the first urban legend of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
20. The Ukraine crisis and the international law of armed conflict (LOAC): some Q & A
21. Former national security adviser: 'Putin got a lot more than he bargained for' (HR McMaster)
22. Joe Biden Has Only Days to Avoid Becoming Jimmy Carter
23. Can Intelligence Tell How Far Putin Will Go?
24. The New Russian Sanctions Playbook - Deterrence Is Out, and Economic Attrition Is In
25. Ukraine Crisis of 2022: The Final Battle of the Cold War
26. Vladimir Putin’s grand plan is unravelling7.
27. FDD | Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine May Supercharge Nuclear Proliferation
28. FDD | Erdogan Moves to Censor Western Media But not Russian Propaganda
29. Neutral Swiss poised to freeze Russian assets - president
30. Kosovo asks U.S. for permanent military base, speedier NATO membership
31. China can break SWIFT sanctions but at a high cost
1. UKRAINE CONFLICT UPDATE 10
UKRAINE CONFLICT UPDATE 10
Institute for the Study of War, Russia Team
February 27
This daily synthetic product covers key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine.
Key Takeaways February 27
- Russian President Vladimir Putin put Russia’s nuclear and strategic missile forces, described as “deterrence forces,” on their highest alert status in response to “aggressive statements in the West” on February 27.
- Russian forces likely conducted an operational pause on the Kyiv axis on February 26-27 to deploy additional supplies and forces forward. Russian forces will likely resume offensive operations against Kyiv in the next 24 hours.
- Russian forces largely conducted an operational pause on their current broad front of advance between Chernihiv and Kharkiv. Ukrainian forces continue to delay and inflict losses on the Russian advance but will likely not be able to halt further advances if the Kremlin commits additional reserves.
- Russian forces entered the city of Kharkiv for the first time on February 27 but remain unlikely to take the city without the use of heavier firepower.
- Russian forces have encircled Mariupol from the west and began initial assaults on the city. Russian forces have not made any major territorial gains from the east in Donbas after four days of fighting. Russian forces likely intend to pin Ukrainian forces in place on the line of contact to enable Russian forces breaking out of Crimea to isolate them.
- Russian forces continued to advance north from Crimea towards Zaprozhia and, in conjunction with Russian advances on Mariupol, threaten to isolate Ukrainian forces on the line of contact in Donbas if they do not withdraw.
- Russian forces failed to seize Kherson after Ukrainian counterattacks reclaimed it on February 26. An unknown concentration of Russian forces remains on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River and threatens Mikolayiv, however.
- Russian successes in southern Ukraine are the most dangerous and threaten to unhinge Ukraine’s successful defenses and rearguard actions to the north and northeast.
- The Belarusian government is setting information and legal conditions to justify a Belarusian offensive against Ukraine and the imminent deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus as of February 27.
- US and allied sanctions against Russian banking will likely crush Russian foreign currency reserves, depleting the value of the ruble and risking Russian hyperinflation.
- The European Union announced direct military aid to Ukraine for the first time in EU history on February 27.
- Germany announced a dramatic reorientation of its foreign policy to mitigate the threat that Russia poses to Germany and its allies. Germany will prioritize military spending and energy independence despite short-term economic costs.
Key Events February 26, 5pm EST – February 27, 5pm EST
Military events:
The Russian military has likely recognized that its initial expectations that limited Russian attacks would cause the collapse of Ukrainian resistance have failed and is recalibrating accordingly. The Russian military is moving additional combat resources toward Ukraine and establishing more reliable and effective logistics arrangements to support what is likely a larger, harder, and more protracted conflict than it had originally prepared for. The tide of the war could change rapidly in Russia’s favor if the Russian military has correctly identified its failings and addresses them promptly, given the overwhelming advantage in net combat power Moscow that enjoys. Ukrainian morale and combat effectiveness remain extremely high, however, and Russian forces confront the challenge of likely intense urban warfare in the coming days.
Russian forces largely conducted an operational pause on February 26-27 but will likely resume offensive operations and begin using greater air and artillery support in the coming days. Russian airborne and special forces troops are engaged in urban warfare in northwestern Kyiv, but Russian mechanized forces are not yet in the capital. Russian forces conducted limited attacks on the direct approaches to Kyiv on both banks of the Dnipro River, but largely paused offensive operations in northeastern Ukraine. Russian forces likely paused to recalibrate their – to date largely unsuccessful – approach to offensive operations in northern Ukraine and deploy additional reinforcements and air assets to the front lines.
Russian ground forces are advancing on four primary axes, discussed in turn below:
- Kyiv Axis: Russian forces likely conducted an operational pause on the Kyiv axis on February 26-27 to deploy additional supplies and forces forward. Russian forces will likely resume offensive operations against Kyiv in the next 24 hours. Russian forces committed additional reserves to fighting west of Kyiv. Russian troops have not yet committed heavy armor and artillery forces to fighting in Kyiv and will likely need to do so to take the city. Ukrainian forces are unlikely to capitulate.
- Northeast Axis: Russian forces largely conducted an operational pause on their current broad front of advance between Chernihiv and Kharkiv. Russian forces entered the city of Kharkiv for the first time on February 27 but remain unlikely to take the city without the use of heavier firepower. Ukrainian forces continue to delay and inflict losses on the Russian advance but will likely be unable to halt further advances if the Kremlin commits additional reserves. Russian forces in northeast Ukraine have been halted on a line roughly running down the P67 highway since roughly 11am local time on February 26.[1] Russian forces in northeast Ukraine continue to face morale and supply issues, likely due to poor planning and ad hoc command structures, as ISW previously forecasted.[2]
- Donbas Axis: Russian forces have encircled Mariupol from the west and began initial assaults on the city. Russian forces have not made any major territorial gains from the east in Donbas after four days of fighting. Russian forces likely intend to pin Ukrainian forces in place on the line of contact to enable Russian forces breaking out of Crimea to isolate them. The Russians may be content to leave them there while concentrating on capturing Kyiv and imposing a new government on Ukraine. They may alternatively seek to encircle and destroy them or force them to surrender.
- Crimea Axis: Russian forces continued to advance north towards Zaprozhia and threaten to isolate Ukrainian forces on the line of contact in Donbas if they do not withdraw. Russian forces failed to seize Kherson after Ukrainian counterattacks reclaimed it on February 26. An unknown concentration of Russian forces remains on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River and threatens Mikolayiv, however.
Russian Activity
Russian President Vladimir Putin put Russia’s nuclear and strategic missile forces, described as “deterrence forces, on their highest alert status in response to “aggressive statements in the West” on February 27.[3] Putin’s announcement followed a meeting with Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Chief of Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov wherein Putin cited “illegitimate sanctions” and aggressive NATO statements against Russia as motivating factors for his decision.[4] White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki accused Putin of "manufacturing threats that don’t exist in order to justify further aggression.”[5] US Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield called the move "totally unacceptable” and accused Putin of using "whatever tools he can to intimidate Ukrainians and the world.”[6]
Russian and Ukrainian delegations agreed on February 27 to negotiate “without preconditions” on Russia’s war against Ukraine in Gomel, Belarus, on February 28.[7] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky agreed with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko that Ukrainian and Russian delegations would meet on the condition that Belarus will ground all planes, helicopters, and missiles before the Ukrainian delegation’s arrival in Gomel.[8] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky stated the parties “can achieve a constructive result by the end of the day” while Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that Moscow does not plan to suspend Russia’s military operation during the negotiations.[9] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated Ukraine will “hear what Russia has to say” but will not “give up one inch of Ukrainian territory.”[10] Russian State Duma Committee on International Affairs Head Leonid Slutsky emphasized on February 27 that Russia must find a “constructive approach” with the Ukrainian delegation in Belarus. Slutsky also threatened that Ukraine will bear responsibility of unspecified "further events" if negotiations fail.[11] US Ambassador to the United Nations Linda-Thomas Greenfield stated the US “will look forward“ to the negotiations' outcome on February 27.[12]
Kremlin-sponsored media claimed Russian President Vladimir Putin has a “historic responsibility” to reunite Russia and Ukraine on February 26-27. Russian state news agency RIA Novosti published and retracted an essay on February 26 claiming “Ukraine has returned to Russia” and resolved the “national humiliation” that Russia suffered when Ukraine left the Soviet Union.[13] The essay claimed that Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus jointly operate in a new world order, where the Russian bloc challenges the West. RIA Novosti retracted the essay one minute after publishing, indicating it was likely prewritten ahead of an anticipated swift Russian victory and was published accidentally.[14] Russian television amplified the possibility of “NATO-Russia war” in reports about Putin putting nuclear and strategic missile forces on alert.[15] Prominent Russian Propagandist Dmitry Kiseyov said that thousands of Russian nuclear missiles can completely wipe out the US and NATO because “no one needs the world without Russia in it.”[16] Russian media is justifying the Kremlin’s failure to gain control over Ukraine by claiming that Ukrainian ”nationalists” are escalating aggression against the Russian Armed Forces and civilians, while Ukrainian military forces massively surrender.
Russian oligarchs openly called on the Kremlin to end Russia’s war in Ukraine for the first time on February 27 as Russian protests continued to grow despite intensifying crackdowns. Russian Alfa-Bank co-owner Mikhail Fridman and Russian industrialist Oleg Deripaska became the first two Russian oligarchs to openly call on the Kremlin to end the war in Ukraine on February 27.[17] Thousands of Russian citizens continued holding countrywide protests against Russia’s war in Ukraine, with Russian authorities detaining over 2,000 Russian protesters from 48 different demonstrations across Russia on February 27 alone.[18] The Kremlin will likely intensify crackdowns against anti-war protesters. Russia’s Prosecutor General threatened high treason charges against any Russians who provide “assistance to a foreign state" during the Russia’s "special operation" in Ukraine on February 27.[19]
Belarusian Activity
The Belarusian government is setting information conditions to justify a Belarusian offensive against Ukraine and the imminent deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus as of February 27. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko said on February 27 that he would ask Russian President Vladimir Putin to deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus if the United States or NATO deployed nuclear missiles to Poland and Lithuania.[20] Lukashenko‘s official press pool claimed Lukashenko and Putin agreed to deploy "weapons that neither the Poles nor the Lithuanians would want to fight” - likely implying nuclear weapons - to Belarus on February 27.[21] Lukashenko slandered Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as “little Napoleon” and implied current Russian operations in Ukraine is just the first phase of Russian aggression.[22] Lukashenko accused Ukrainians of planning terrorist attacks against Belarus and threatened a “special operation” in Ukraine but claimed there are no Belarusian soldiers, armor, or vehicles in Ukraine as of February 27.[23] Lukashenko said that Belarus will not betray Russia by “allowing attacks” by western states against Belarus.[24] Lukashenko admitted that Russian soldiers in Belarusian territory fired two or three rockets at Chernobyl around 23:00 on February 23, but claimed that he did not give the order to fire and that the strikes were a response to alleged Ukrainian provocations.[25] Lukashenko claimed that Belarusian troops along the southern border with Ukraine are protecting against Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group penetrations.[26] Meanwhile, a Belarusian Commander of the Brest Air Assault Brigade, Valery Sakhashchik, called on Belarusian servicemembers sitting in the woods near Ukrainian border to refuse to fight in Ukraine.[27] Sakhaschchik stated that Belarus will lose its dignity for generations to come fighting in a war against a country that has never harmed Belarusian sovereignty.
Belarus adopted a new constitution on February 27, likely granting Russia more direct military control over Belarus.[28] Russian and Belarusian media reporting on the referendum was abnormally sparse on February 27. Belarusian citizens protested against Russia’s war in Ukraine at multiple referendum polling places across Belarus on February 27.[29] Official Belarusian sources have not confirmed whether the constitution adopted on February 27 is the same one that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko proposed on December 27, 2021.[30] The December 27 proposed constitution advanced the Kremlin’s campaign to deepen Russian control over Belarus by removing the constitution’s clause about Belarus being a “neutral” state and a nuclear-weapons-free zone. Lukashenko offered to host Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus in November 2021 and repeated similar offers on February 27, 2022. The Kremlin may have leveraged its military pressure in Belarus to extract an even more Kremlin-preferable constitution that cements Kremlin control over Belarus’ government.
Ukrainian Activity
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced Ukraine is creating a volunteer-based International Legion of Territorial Defense of Ukraine to capitalize on the success of civilian forces in slowing the advance of Russian troops and organize international volunteers on February 27.[31] The New York Times reported that “due to strong resistance of the civilian population, units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard, and the National Police, [Russian] attempts to take control of large cities were unsuccessful.”[32] The Washington Post reported that civilian defense forces apprehended and detained a Russian armored vehicle in Sumy.[33] The New York Times reported that civilians in Dnipro worked to provide a military hospital with water and clothes and manufactured Molotov cocktails and firebombs to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
US Activity
US and allied sanctions against Russian banking will likely crush Russian foreign currency reserves, depleting the value of the ruble and risking Russian hyperinflation.
- The United States, Canada, and European allies removed select Russian banks from the SWIFT global financial network and agreed to additional measures that could significantly increase economic pressure on Russia on February 26. Those measures included freezing Russian Central Bank assets that could otherwise be used to mitigate the effect of sanctions on Russia’s economy.[34]
- Russian citizens are searching for hard currency, particularly dollars, in anticipation of hyperinflation caused by US and allied sanctions. The Financial Times reported that many Russian banks in Moscow ran out of cash on February 27, the first day after the United States and its allies announced sanctions against Russia’s Central Bank.[35]
- Japan announced it will join Western states in limiting Russian access to SWIFT on February 27.[36] The United States commended Japan’s decision and emphasized the unity of the G7 states in sanctioning Russia.[37]
- The European Commission announced on February 27 that it will ban Belarusian exports to the EU due to Belarusian participation in and support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Sanctioned products include mineral fuels, tobacco, wood and timber, cement, iron and steel.[38]
- The US Treasury Department is in the early stages of considering sanctions against Russian cryptocurrency usage. Sanctions against Russian holders of cryptocurrencies would be unprecedented and difficult for the United States to enforce, but could limit Russia’s ability to monetize its energy production capabilities to mitigate US and allied sanctions.[39]
- The US Ambassador to the United Nations told CNN that sanctions on Russia’s energy sector are not off the table but that the United States will work to limit the impact of its sanctions on the US economy.[40]
- Norway announced on February 27 that it would divest its sovereign wealth fund from any Russian assets.[41]
- British Petroleum (BP) announced on February 27 that it would divest itself from its $14 billion stake in the Russian state-owned oil company Rosneft. The UK government likely pressured BP to divorce itself from Rosneft; BP’s 19.75% stake in Rosneft made up more than half of BP’s oil reserves.[42]
NATO and EU Activity
The European Union announced it will directly provide military aid to Ukraine for the first time in EU history on February 27. Australia, Spain, Romania, Poland, and Denmark also announced additional military aid to Ukraine on February 27.
- European Union Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the EU will ban all Russian aircraft from EU airspace, finance weapons donations to Ukraine, expand sanctions on Belarus, and ban Russian state-funded broadcasters Russia Today and Sputnik on February 27.[43] Von der Leyen’s announcement marks the first time the EU will finance the purchase and delivery of military equipment to a country under attack. EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell stated EU members will provide Ukraine with fighter jets.[44] Some European countries which operate older jet fighters used by Ukraine are reportedly considering providing them directly to Ukraine.
- Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced that Australia will work with NATO to help supply lethal weapons to Ukraine.[45]
- The Ukrainian Armed Forces stated that Australia is providing Ukraine with unspecified “military assistance” on February 27.[46]
- Spain sent military equipment, including personal protective gear, to Ukraine on February 27.[47]
- The Romanian government announced on February 27 that it will send ammunition and military equipment to Ukraine and expressed Romania’s readiness to receive wounded Ukrainian soldiers.[48]
- Polish National Defense Deputy Minister Marcin Ociepa announced that a convoy carrying unspecified ammunition arrived in Ukraine on February 27.[49]
- The Ukrainian Armed Forces announced that the Ukrainian Air Forces received a “large batch” of air-to-air missiles from an unspecified western country on February 27.[50]
- Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu called Russia’s invasion of Ukraine a war on February 27, thereby allowing Turkey to block certain warships involved in conflict from the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits under the 1936 Montreux Convention.[51] Banning warships from the straits would inhibit Russian access to the Black Sea. Ukraine asked Turkey to deny passage to Russian vessels on February 24.[52] The closure is symbolically important for Turkey‘s relationship with Ukraine but is unlikely to limit Russian naval capabilities in the Black Sea, as much of Russia’s naval capabilites are already concentrated in the region.
- Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen announced Denmark will donate 2,700 anti-tank weapons to Ukraine on February 27.[53]
- US Democratic Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer stated the Biden administration will ask Congress for $6.4 billion dollars in economic and military aid for Ukraine.[54]
- Finnish Defense Minister Antti Kaikkonen stated Finland is considering directly sending weapons to Ukraine on February 27. Finland does not historically export weapons to war zones.[55]
The European Union, Canada, and the United Kingdom have banned all Russian-owned, registered, and controlled aircraft from their airspace as of February 27.[56] Russia may ban all EU-based airlines from its airspace in coming days, further harming its domestic economy and currency supplies in coming months.
- Many EU states, including the UK, Norway, Iceland, and North Macedonia announced flight restrictions prior to the comprehensive EU announcement.[57]
- Russian President Vladimir Putin responded with counter-restrictions against participating countries’ airlines on February 24 and 25.[58]
Other International Organization Activity
N/A
Individual Western Allies’ Activity
Germany is reorienting its foreign policy to prioritize defense spending, European security interests, and energy independence despite potentially high economic costs to Germany. German politicians expressed broad political support for this fundamental reorientation of German foreign policy, which will prioritize mitigating the threat Russia poses to Germany and its allies.
- German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced Germany would immediately invest $113 billion into its military on February 27.[59] This new investment fund is equivalent to almost 200% of current annual German military spending. Scholz called the construction of new ships tanks, aircraft, and armed drones a top priority for Germany. Scholz stated the new military equipment will be built in Europe in partnership with other European countries, particularly France.[60]
- Scholz pledged to increase Germany‘s contribution to reinforcing NATO’s eastern flank in Lithuania, Slovakia and Romania.[61] Scholz stated Germany has increased its number of troops deployed in Lithuania and expanded an air policing mission in Romania. Scholz stated he plans to set up a new task force in Slovakia and use the German navy to assist with policing in the Mediterranean and the Baltics. He stated that the German Airforce is prepared to defend the airspace of Eastern European countries that border Russia.
- Scholz pledged to raise annual Germany military spending to over 2% of GDP.[62] This additional military spending is separate from the $113 billion investment fund.
- Germany plans to build two Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) ports in Brunsbuttel and Wilhelmshaven, northern Germany, and to create a strategic natural gas reserve, limiting long-term German reliance on Russian energy imports. Scholz stated that Germany’s energy policy must consider not only the economy and climate, but also security concerns.[63]
- Scholz’ shift secured broad non-partisan support among German politicians. Social Democratic Party (SPD) Parliamentary bloc Chairman Rolf Mutzenich and CDU leader Friedrich Merz expressed support for increased defense spending.[64] Finance Minister and German Liberal Democratic Party (FDP) member Christian Lidner called increased military spending “an investment in [Germany’s] freedom.”[65]
Other International Activity
Ukrainian refugee flows increased on February 27 as several international states sent humanitarian aid shipments. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi announced that 368,000 Ukrainians fled Ukraine as of February 27.[66] Approximately 300,000 have sought refuge in EU member states.[67]
- European Union Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson warned EU members to expect millions of Ukrainian refugees on February 27.[68]
- Likely Russian cyber actors attacked a Ukrainian border control station with data-wiping software on February 25, slowing Ukrainian refugee flows into Romania. The Ukrainian government’s cyber service expects similar attacks in the future, which will exacerbate backlogs at border stations already struggling to process refugees leaving Ukraine.[69]
- The US Agency for International Development and the US Department of State announced additional humanitarian assistance for Ukraine totaling $54 million on February 27.[70]
- The World Health Organization warned of looming medical oxygen supply shortages in Ukraine on February 27.[71]
- Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced that Japan will extend $100 million in emergency humanitarian aid to Ukraine.[72]
- Spain dispatched a cargo plane carrying medical equipment to Ukraine on February 26.[73]
- Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett announced that Israeli will send 100 tons of humanitarian aid to Ukraine on February 27.[74]
- Romanian Government Spokesperson Dan Kerbunaru announced that Romania will supply fuel and medical equipment exceeding $3.3 million to Ukraine on February 27.[75]Hungary, Poland, and Austria are running daily evacuation trains to and from Chop, Ukraine as of February 27. [76]
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Ukraine filed a complaint against Russia to the International Court of Justice for manipulating the term “genocide” to justify its aggression against Ukraine on February 27. Zelensky requested the court to immediately order Russia to halt its invasion and said that he expected trials to start next week.[77]
[9] https://tass dot ru/politika/13882589; https://iz dot ru/1297901/ekaterina-postnikova/soitis-s-mirom-kak-rf-i-ukraina-pytalis-nachat-peregovory.
[19] https://tvrain dot ru/news/genprokuratura_prigrozila_rossijanam_delami_o_gosizmene_za_pomosch_inostrannym_gosudarstvam-548779/?from=rss; https://meduza dot io/news/2022/02/27/genprokuratura-poobeschala-proverit-na-gosizmenu-kazhdyy-fakt-okazaniya-pomoschi-inostrannomu-gosudarstvu-vo-vremya-spetsoperatsii.
[20] https://reform dot by/299699-lukashenko-dogovorilsja-s-putinym-o-razmeshhenii-vooruzhenija-v-belarusi; https://ria dot ru/20220227/belorussiya-1775364384.html
[26] https://reform dot by/299822-minoborony-vs-belarusi-ne-uchastvujut-v-operacii-na-donbasse
[28] https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/golosovanie-na-respublikanskom-referendume-po-izmeneniyam-i-dopolneniyam-v-konstituciyu-belarusi; https://reform dot by/299655-referendum-nachalsja-v-belarusi; https://meduza dot io/news/2022/02/27/v-belarusi-prohodit-osnovnoy-den-golosovaniya-po-izmeneniyu-konstitutsii
[76] https://hromadske dot ua/posts/ukrzaliznicya-do-avstriyi-ugorshini-abo-polshi-mozhna-viyihati-zalizniceyu-yaksho-ye-biometrichnij-pasport; https://t dot me/UkrzalInfo/1190
2. RUSSIA-UKRAINE WARNING UPDATE: RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 27
RUSSIA-UKRAINE WARNING UPDATE: RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 27
Mason Clark, George Barros, and Katya Stepanenko
February 27, 4pm EST
The Russian military has likely recognized that its initial expectations that limited Russian attacks would cause the collapse of Ukrainian resistance have failed and is recalibrating accordingly. The Russian military is moving additional combat resources toward Ukraine and establishing more reliable and effective logistics arrangements to support what is likely a larger, harder, and more protracted conflict than it had originally prepared for. The tide of the war could change rapidly in Russia’s favor if the Russian military has correctly identified its failings and addresses them promptly, given the overwhelming advantage in net combat power Moscow enjoys. Ukrainian morale and combat effectiveness remain extremely high, however, and Russian forces confront the challenge of likely intense urban warfare in the coming days.
Russian forces largely conducted an operational pause on February 26-27 but will likely resume offensive operations and begin using greater air and artillery support in the coming days. Russian airborne and special forces troops are engaged in urban warfare in northwestern Kyiv, but Russian mechanized forces are not yet in the capital. Russian forces conducted limited attacks on the direct approaches to Kyiv on both banks of the Dnipro River, but largely paused offensive operations in northeastern Ukraine. Russian forces likely paused to recalibrate their – to date largely unsuccessful – approach to offensive operations in northern Ukraine and deploy additional reinforcements and air assets to the front lines.
Russian forces from Crimea slowly pushed north toward Zaporizhie and the southeastern bend of the Dnipro River and east along the Azov Sea coast toward Mariupol on February 27. Russian forces advancing east from Crimea began initial assaults against Mariupol the morning of February 27. These advances risk cutting off the large concentrations of Ukrainian forces still defending the former line of contact between unoccupied Ukraine and occupied Donbas.
Ukrainian resistance remains remarkably effective and Russian operations especially on the Kyiv axis have been poorly coordinated and executed, leading to significant Russian failures on that axis and at Kharkiv. Russian forces remain much larger and more capable than Ukraine’s conventional military, however, and Russian advances in southern Ukraine may threaten to unhinge the defense of Kyiv and northeastern Ukraine if they continue unchecked.
KTs
- Russian forces likely conducted an operational pause on the Kyiv axis on February 26-27 to deploy additional supplies and forces forward. Russian forces will likely resume offensive operations against Kyiv in the next 24 hours. Russian troops have not yet committed heavy armor and artillery forces to fighting in Kyiv and will likely need to do so to take the city.
- Russian forces largely conducted an operational pause on their current broad front of advance between Chernihiv and Kharkiv. Ukrainian forces continue to delay and inflict losses on the Russian advance but will likely not be able to halt further advances if the Kremlin commits additional reserves.
- Russian forces entered the city of Kharkiv for the first time on February 27 but remain unlikely to take the city without the use of heavier firepower.
- Russian forces have encircled Mariupol from the west and began initial assaults on the city. Russian forces have not made any major territorial gains from the east in Donbas after four days of fighting. Russian forces likely intend to pin Ukrainian forces in place on the line of contact to enable Russian forces breaking out of Crimea to isolate them.
- Russian forces continued to advance north towards Zaprozhia and, in conjunction with Russian advances on Mariupol, threaten to isolate Ukrainian forces on the line of contact in Donbas if they do not withdraw.
- Russian forces failed to seize Kherson after Ukrainian counterattacks reclaimed it on February 26. An unknown concentration of Russian forces remains on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River and threatens Mikolayiv, however.
- Russian successes in southern Ukraine are the most dangerous and threaten to unhinge Ukraine’s successful defenses and rearguard actions to the north and northeast.
- Russian troops are facing growing morale and logistics issues, predictable consequences of the poor planning, coordination, and execution of attacks along Ukraine’s northern border.
- Russian air and missile strikes targeted a Ukrainian airbase in western Ukraine to ground the remaining Ukrainian air force the night of February 26-27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian forces conducted 5 air and 16 missile strikes across Ukraine from midnight to 1pm local time, February 27.[1] Russian strikes targeted the Ivano-Frankivsk airfield, home to Ukraine’s 114th Tactical Aviation Brigade.[2] Russian forces continue to refrain from using the full array of air and missile capabilities available to them. Russian forces will likely increase their use of fires in coming days to overcome heavier-than-anticipated Ukrainian resistance, however.
- Russian forces in northeast Ukraine continue to face morale and supply issues, likely due to poor planning and ad hoc command structures, as ISW previously forecasted.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported Russian forces are “experiencing an acute shortage of fuel and food“ and are increasingly using Belarusian rail networks to supply Russian forces in Ukraine.[4]
Russian ground forces are advancing on four primary axes, discussed in turn below:
- Kyiv;
- Northeast front;
- Donbas (NOTE: Russian forces advancing out of Crimea have now encircled Mariupol from the west, and this section will now discuss those forces as part of the Donbas axis); and
- Crimea-Kherson.
1) Kyiv axis:Russian forces likely conducted an operational pause on the Kyiv axis on February 26-27 to deploy additional supplies and forces forward. Russian forces will likely resume offensive operations against Kyiv in the next 24 hours. Russian forces committed additional reserves to fighting west of Kyiv. Russian troops have not yet committed heavy armor and artillery forces to fighting in Kyiv and will likely need to do so to take the city. Ukrainian forces are unlikely to capitulate.
- Russian forces continue to assault Kyiv on a narrow front on the western bank of the Dnipro River. The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian forces remain concentrated in the Pripyet marshes in “northern operational areas” (likely around Chernihiv and Sumy) at 11am local time on February 27.[5] The Ukrainian General Staff reported at 1pm local time that Ukrainian forces continue to successfully defend the outskirts of Kyiv. No Russian forces have entered the central city as of this time. Russian forces have not yet committed heavy armor and artillery to urban fighting in Kyiv.
- Ukrainian forces retain defensive positions in western Kyiv Oblast. Ukrainian forces reported halting Russian advances in Bucha, west of Kyiv. Several videos emerged on February 27 of destroyed Russian motor rifle and VDV (Airborne) elements in the town.[6] Russian forces additionally entered Borodyanka on February 27.[7] Ukrainian forces conducted a counterattack against Russian VDV forces in Irpin on February 27.[8]
- Russian forces committed reserves from the 36th Combined Arms Army to fighting along the western flank of Kyiv. The Ukrainian General Staff reported 36th CAA elements deployed to Bucha, Kapitanivka and Belogorodka, on the western outskirts of Kyiv.[9] Russian forces are additionally deploying engineering and bridging units to the western approach to Kyiv.[10] These elements may enable a wider Russian effort to encircle Kyiy further west than Russia’s currently narrow axis of advance into the city.
- Russian forces assembled additional reserves and combat support elements in Belarus on February 26-27. The Russian air force deployed ten helicopters of the 15th Army Aviation Brigade and two An-124 transport aircraft to the Machulishchi airfield in Minsk on February 27.[11] A large column of Russian vehicles was observed moving southeast from Minsk through Babruysk on February 27.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported Russian forces are “experiencing an acute shortage of fuel and food“ and are increasingly using Belarusian rail networks to supply Russian forces in Ukraine.[13] Russia redeployed a tactical aviation group of Su-34 aircraft from the Moscow region to the Baranovichi airfield in Belarus.[14] These aircraft will likely increase tactical air support to Russian operations in Kyiv in the next 24 hours.
2) Northeast axis: Russian forces largely conducted an operational pause on their current broad front of advance between Chernihiv and Kharkiv. Russian forces entered the city of Kharkiv for the first time on February 27 but remain unlikely to take the city without the use of heavier firepower. Ukrainian forces continue to delay and inflict losses on the Russian advance but will likely not be able to halt further advances if the Kremlin commits additional reserves.
Russian forces did not secure any major advances in northeastern Ukraine on February 26-27 and likely conducted an operational pause to bring forward supplies and reinforcements. The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian elements from the Central Military District attacked Ichnya in the direction of Kyiv on February 27.[15] Ukrainian forces reportedly repelled a Russian assault near Pryluky by the 2nd and 4th Tank divisions in Sumy Oblast as of 10am local time on February 27.[16] Ukrainian forces claimed to destroy an entire BTG of the 4th Guards Tank Division near Slobozhanskyi, approximately 80km west of Kharkiv, on February 27.[17] Russian forces in northeast Ukraine have been halted on a line roughly running down the P67 highway since roughly 11am local time on February 26.[18]
- The Ukrainian General Staff reported that 14 Russian BTGs, including but not entirely drawn from the 41st Combined Arms Army, resumed attacks towards Kyiv along the east bank of the Dnipro River from the north at 10am local time on February 27 after an operational pause on February 26.[19] A Russian attempt to seize the encircled city of Chernihiv failed as of 10am local time on February 27.[20]
- Light Russian forces entered downtown Kharkiv on February 27 but have not yet secured the city. Ukrainian forces claimed to repel attacks by Russian motor rifle elements (including the 25th Motor Rifle Brigade, with Ukrainian forces taking confirmed prisoners) the night of February 27 after heavy fighting.[21] Russian forces began shelling of residential areas of the city throughout February on 27.[22] Russian forces are deploying additional artillery assets including thermobaric artillery to the Kharkiv axis as of February 27.[23] Russian forces likely seized Kup’yans’k, southeast of Kharkiv, on February 27.[24]
3) Donbas axis:Russian forces have encircled Mariupol from the west and began initial assaults on the city. Russian forces have not made any major territorial gains from the east in Donbas after four days of fighting. Russian forces likely intend to pin Ukrainian forces in place on the line of contact to enable Russian forces breaking out of Crimea to isolate them. The Russians may be content to leave them there while concentrating on capturing Kyiv and imposing a new government on Ukraine. They may alternatively seek to encircle and destroy them or force them to surrender.
- Russian forces advancing on Mariupol from the west, through Berdyansk, likely began initial assaults on the city on February 27.[25] Russian artillery systems redeployed from Melitopol towards Mariupol the night of February 26.[26] Russian forces likely seek to pin Ukrainian forces in place in Mariupol. Russian forces could alternatively attempt to reduce the Mariupol pocket in the next 48 hours.
- US intelligence sources reported 2,000 Russian Naval Infantry conducted a landing west of Mariupol and began advancing on the city throughout February 27.[27] This operation is likely Russia’s first commitment of its Naval Infantry to operations in southern Ukraine.
- Russian forces did not conduct any major attacks along the line of contact in Donbas or in Luhansk Oblast on February 27. Ukrainian forces remain largely in place on the line of contact in Donbas. ISW’s initial assessment that Russian forces would likely attempt an envelopment through Luhansk Oblast was incorrect.[28] Russian forces likely seek to achieve a larger envelopment using forces breaking out from Crimea and currently advancing on Mariupol from the west.
4) Crimea axis: Russian forces continued to advance north towards Zaprozhia and threaten to isolate Ukrainian forces on the line of contact in Donbas if they do not withdraw. Russian forces failed to seize Kherson after Ukrainian counterattacks reclaimed it on February 26. An unknown concentration of Russian forces remains on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River and threatens Mikolayiv, however.
- Russian forces from the 20th Motor Rifle Division advanced north towards Zaprozhia from Melitopol on February 27.[29] These forces likely seek to take Zaprozhia in the coming days. They may then either continue north to Dnipro City, or pivot east to isolate Ukrainian forces in Donbas.
- Russian forces failed to take Kherson on February 27, but the Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian forces are regrouping for an offensive towards Kherson and Mykolayiv.[30] Ukrainian forces repelled a second Russian attempt to seize Kherson on February 27.[31] ISW cannot confirm the extent of possible Russian advances into the city. Ukrainian air defenses remain active in the city, however shooting down an Su-25 and a Mi-24 on February 26.[32] A Ukrainian TB2 drone additionally struck a Russian column near the Kherson airport on February 27.[33]
- An unknown concentration of Russian forces remains west of the Dnipro River and entered the outskirts of Mykolayiv on February 27.[34] Russian forces assaulting Kherson likely seek to support these forces to continue advances west towards Odesa.
- The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet left port to strike the Ukrainian Navy on February 27.[35] ISW cannot confirm the extent or focus of Russian naval operations.
Russian forces may additionally be preparing for an additional line of advance from Belarus into Western Ukraine. ISW previously reported a Russian armored column assembling in Stolin, Belarus on February 25 to support a possible advance into Rivne Oblast, in western Ukraine.[36] Russian forces have not launched a ground attack as of publication. A Russian offensive in western Ukraine would likely seek to cut Ukraine off from ground shipments of Western aid through Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary.
Immediate items to watch
- Russian forces will likely resume major offensive operations on February 28 after a temporary operational pause.
- Russian forces advancing north and east from Crimea threaten to cut off Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine if Kyiv des not withdraw them in the coming days.
- Russian forces face growing morale and supply issues but will likely be able to overcome these handicaps.
- Russian forces continue to refrain from using their likely full spectrum of air and missile capabilities. The Ukrainian air force also remains active. Russian operations will likely steadily wear down Ukrainian air capabilities as well eventually taking the Ukrainian air force out of the fight.
- Russia has sufficient conventional military power to reinforce each of its current axes of advance and overpower conventional Ukrainian forces defending them.
3. Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threat shows how much is going wrong for him in Ukraine
Sun Tzu is having a chuckle.
Three strikes and you are out.
Excerpts:
Mr Putin’s first mistake was to underestimate his enemy.
Mr Putin’s second mistake was to mismanage his own armed forces.
And his third mistake was to underestimate the West.
Conclusion:
The next day these sanctions met with a furious Russian response. Mr Putin, having consulted his military chiefs, put the country’s nuclear forces on higher alert. He was equating economic sanctions with nuclear war.
That is not only morally wrong, but it also raises the prospect of a catastrophic escalation. That does not make the West’s use of sanctions a mistake. Mr Putin’s belligerence is evidence of how dangerous he is. Backing away for fear of what he might do would only invite the next enormity.
Instead, Russia’s warning must be countered by the unambiguous declaration in the UN Security Council and by all nuclear powers, including China and India, that issuing nuclear threats is unacceptable. At the same time, senior American officers need to remain in close contact with their Russian counterparts, to warn them that they will be held personally accountable for their actions. The world cannot afford for Mr Putin to miscalculate again.
Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threat shows how much is going wrong for him in Ukraine
No plan of battle survives contact with the enemy, but his has fared worse than many
Feb 27th 2022
THE RUSSIAN invasion of Ukraine is not going to plan. In Kharkiv, the country’s second city, Ukrainian defences appear to have repulsed a major assault. In the south Vladimir Putin’s forces have taken territory, but partly by avoiding Ukrainian towns. Around Kyiv, Ukrainian forces have foiled numerous attacks. In the capital itself, Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, has cut a defiant figure. In contrast to the drug-addicted Nazi Mr Putin describes in his speeches, Mr Zelensky has taken his place at the head of a nation buoyed by courage and patriotism.
The war is still in its first week. Russia’s president can summon reserves of military force that he could yet use to surround Ukrainian cities, including Kyiv, at terrible cost to civilians and the soldiers of both sides. It is still a war that Mr Putin may well win, in that he could eventually impose a puppet government in Kyiv or Kharkiv, the original Soviet capital of Ukraine.
Yet, in a broader sense, the moment Mr Putin is obliged to wage such a war of attrition, he will already have lost. In Ukraine the patriotic spirit forged from his targeting of cities and their inhabitants has already ensured that any government which rules in his name will be seen as illegitimate. Across much of the world, he would become even more of a pariah. And at home, he would preside over a society strangled by sanctions and trampled under his repressive regime.
It seems ever clearer that the Russian elite is appalled—and impoverished—by his paranoid adventurism. The worse his plans go in Ukraine, the sooner cracks will start to appear in his regime and the more the Russian people will take to the streets. If Mr Putin is to hold on to the Kremlin, he may be obliged to impose terror of a severity that Russia has not seen for decades.
Mr Putin’s first mistake was to underestimate his enemy. Perhaps he believed his own propaganda: that Ukraine is not a real country, but a fake erected by the CIA and run by crooks who are despised by the people they govern. If he expected Ukraine to collapse at the first show of Russian force, he could not have been more wrong.
Mr Putin’s second mistake was to mismanage his own armed forces. His air force has so far failed to dominate the skies. He has laboured to reassure his people that Russia is not engaged in a war, but just what he calls a “denazification” operation. Soldiers, unsure of what they are supposed to be doing, have turned up in Ukraine expecting to be welcomed as liberators. If he orders troops to slaughter their Ukrainian kin in large numbers, they may not obey. If many of his troops die in the attempt to crush Ukrainian cities, as is likely, he will not be able to cover it up at home.
And his third mistake was to underestimate the West. Again, perhaps he believed that it was too decadent and self-absorbed to muster a response. As a dictator who may find it hard to understand that people’s faith in democracy is genuine, he has almost certainly been surprised by the upwelling of popular support for Ukraine—the support that sees Londoners stand to the Ukrainian anthem and the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin lit up in the blue and gold of the Ukrainian flag.
Inspired by Ukrainian courage and urged on by their own citizens, Western governments have at last found the will to fight back. They have rightly refrained from direct military action against Russia, such as imposing a no-fly zone. Instead, at their third attempt, on February 26th, they agreed on genuinely powerful sanctions, against Russia’s central bank and its financial system. These may block access to the country’s reserves and undermine its banks.
The next day these sanctions met with a furious Russian response. Mr Putin, having consulted his military chiefs, put the country’s nuclear forces on higher alert. He was equating economic sanctions with nuclear war.
That is not only morally wrong, but it also raises the prospect of a catastrophic escalation. That does not make the West’s use of sanctions a mistake. Mr Putin’s belligerence is evidence of how dangerous he is. Backing away for fear of what he might do would only invite the next enormity.
Instead, Russia’s warning must be countered by the unambiguous declaration in the UN Security Council and by all nuclear powers, including China and India, that issuing nuclear threats is unacceptable. At the same time, senior American officers need to remain in close contact with their Russian counterparts, to warn them that they will be held personally accountable for their actions. The world cannot afford for Mr Putin to miscalculate again. ■
Our recent coverage of the Ukraine crisis can be found here
4. What kind of resistance can Ukraine mount?
It is looking like a pretty good one so far.
Excerpts:
Armed resistance against an occupying power would not be new to Ukraine. During and after World War II, the Ukrainians resisted Nazi and later Soviet forces More recently, voluntary units played a role in Ukraine’s ability to respond to the military crisis in eastern Ukraine in 2014.
The law establishing Ukraine’s national resistance strategy only entered into force in January 2022. There is little time to implement the comprehensive resistance efforts the law envisions, given the ongoing Russian attack. The new law gave the commander of the armed forces authority to manage territorial defense through the commander the Territorial Defense Forces, or TDF, and the resistance movement through the commander of Special Operations Forces.
...
In sum, Ukraine’s armed resistance fight will likely unfold in a complex and dynamic environment with operations by several military and paramilitary forces. Although the war has already started, Ukraine will have to make further investments in the preparation and training of civilians, either as mobilized forces or members of voluntary forces, to wage a comprehensive resistance campaign.
What kind of resistance can Ukraine mount?
Although the armed forces of Ukraine have about 209,000 active duty personnel with better training, experience and weapons than in battles with Russian forces around 2014-2015, they are heavily outmatched. Ukraine has also been increasing its reserve forces with several hundred thousand personnel, many with recent military service. President Zelenskyy called reservists to active duty on Feb. 22 to rapidly reinforce combat units and support regional defense efforts.
Nevertheless, a large-scale Russian military action could quickly seize much of the eastern part of the country. A Russian occupation would be much more difficult and costly. Elements of the armed forces could sustain a defense of unoccupied parts of Ukrainian territory and work with other military forces and volunteers to pursue an insurgency in areas under Russian control.
Armed resistance against an occupying power would not be new to Ukraine. During and after World War II, the Ukrainians resisted Nazi and later Soviet forces More recently, voluntary units played a role in Ukraine’s ability to respond to the military crisis in eastern Ukraine in 2014.
The law establishing Ukraine’s national resistance strategy only entered into force in January 2022. There is little time to implement the comprehensive resistance efforts the law envisions, given the ongoing Russian attack. The new law gave the commander of the armed forces authority to manage territorial defense through the commander the Territorial Defense Forces, or TDF, and the resistance movement through the commander of Special Operations Forces.
The TDF is tasked with providing immediate defense of the population and infrastructure, helping maintain civil order, supporting operations of the regular armed forces, and assisting in the formation of centers of resistance in case of an occupation. The TDF, if and when fully established, could add 25 regional, light infantry brigades with over 150 battalions. The core of the force is planned to consist of 10,000 active duty troops, expanding to 130,000 after mobilization. The bulk of the force would consist of voluntary formations of civilians, particularly those with military or law enforcement experience, willing to support armed defense of their country without joining the military force full time. Zelenskyy recently ordered military exercises for these volunteers.
About 400,000 Ukrainian personnel have served in the military campaign against separatists in eastern Ukraine. Those not still in the service who have returned to their communities provide a pool of experienced fighters who could support a range of resistance and unconventional warfare efforts. The Ukrainian parliament has authorized volunteer, paramilitary forces the right to use small arms, which are now being distributed, and personal hunting weapons. The immediate focus is to establish the territorial units in the areas on the border with Russia and Belarus. However, it will likely require many months for the TDF to achieve full operational capability.
In the second day of Russia's incursion into Ukraine, troops attempted to defend the capital as battles were fought on multiple fronts.
Another force engaged in conventional and resistance efforts is the National Guard of Ukraine. With authorized strength of 60,000, the NGU was created in combat conditions in the wake of Russia’s intervention in the Donbas region. While its mandate is to protect the country’s constitutional and territorial integrity and maintain public order and safety, one of the goals was to improve the coordination and government control of the voluntary militia units engaged in the fighting in eastern Ukraine.
Battle-hardened with improved weaponry and training, its armored, mechanized and light infantry battalions could be capable elements of Ukrainian armed resistance.
Since 2015, the U.S. and other Western militaries have been training various Ukrainian forces at the Yavoriv Combat Training Center in western Ukraine. Over time, the program evolved from direct training of National Guard units to mentoring Ukrainian instructors to train regular Army, Special Operations Forces, National Guard and naval infantry units with the goal of enhancing Ukraine’s self-defense capabilities, readiness and long-term force development. U.S. and other Western military trainers have been withdrawn from Yavoriv and repositioned elsewhere in Europe.
RELATED
A Russian amphibious assault is underway in Ukraine, pushing thousands of Russian naval infantry from the Sea of Azov onto land west of port town Mariupol.
Ukraine’s president has announced general mobilization for 90 days. How many Ukrainian citizens would fight or support a resistance under a wide-scale occupation remains unclear. Although approximately one-third of the respondents of a recent poll said they could engage in armed resistance.
Opinion polls only capture a snapshot of time and may not withstand the reality of war. Yet, they and the reports on mobilization could be an indicator of the number of Ukrainians who might join the resistance.
Resistance-capability development and the actual fight may include a variety of risks and requirements, such as the need to ensure careful vetting of personnel to avoid insider threats and accidents; the need to maintain popular support; and the requirement for solid training and exercise programs for voluntary forces.
Armed resistance may also create additional risks during wartime: increased attempts by Russia to penetrate Ukraine’s military structures and sabotage operations, and the potential that armed resistance may increase the risk that the adversary may retaliate against civilians, or at least the civilian supporters of the armed resistance fighters.
Meanwhile the existence of numerous resistance groups that may not be coordinated and may lose the ability to communicate under electronic warfare effects, may increase the level of battlefield confusion and thus may hamper Ukraine’s ability to achieve its overall strategic goal.
While the Ukrainian government has taken steps to improve its control over volunteer militia groups by integrating them into state organizations, it is unclear how successful these efforts have been. Some groups have been previously surrounded by controversies, with reports about a lack of control by Ukrainian authorities, poor discipline, political extremism and even human rights violations. For example, the U.S. Congress in 2018 banned American assistance to the Azov Battalion due to the group’s far-right nationalist alliances.
In sum, Ukraine’s armed resistance fight will likely unfold in a complex and dynamic environment with operations by several military and paramilitary forces. Although the war has already started, Ukraine will have to make further investments in the preparation and training of civilians, either as mobilized forces or members of voluntary forces, to wage a comprehensive resistance campaign.
Previous research by the think tank Rand on historic aspects of armed resistance concluded that, overall, such efforts have limited chances of imposing decisive costs on a highly capable occupier, especially if the aggressor is committed to total victory. Our research also found that external military and political support, or the lack thereof, can have a decisive impact on the outcome of the conflict.
While Ukraine has considerable internal resources and human capacity to raise the costs of a Russian occupation, sustaining a national resistance would almost certainly require significant international support. This could include political support, economic assistance and military assistance in the form of providing weapons, communications equipment, intelligence and training.
Stephen J. Flanagan is a senior political scientist at the think tank Rand, where Marta Kepe is a senior defense analyst.
5. A Serious Threat or a Strategic Success? The Pros and Cons of Paramilitarising a Civilian Population in Ukraine
Yes, demobilization is complex and hard.
A Serious Threat or a Strategic Success? The Pros and Cons of Paramilitarising a Civilian Population in Ukraine | Small Wars Journal
A Serious Threat or a Strategic Success? The Pros and Cons of Paramilitarising a Civilian Population in Ukraine
By Dale Pankhurst
The decision by the Putin regime to initiate a Russian military invasion of the Ukraine has sparked the worst security crisis on the European continent since the Second World War. Despite fears of a sweeping and quick Russian military victory over its forces, the Ukrainian State has so far managed to launch strong and determined resistance against Russian troop movements and tank columns. This resistance has slowed down Russian advances towards the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, and other strategic towns and cities. Much of these tactical successes are due to recent military assistance provided by Western states, including the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Anti-tank weapon systems, including Javelin and NLAW anti-tank missiles, have caused significant logistical problems for Russian military supply chains as their frontline forces advance deeper into Ukraine.
With Russian forces presently engaged in a battle for the capital city of the Ukraine, Kyiv, the Ukrainian Government mobilised and conscripted all males between the age of 18 and 60 years-old. The Ukrainian State has also began paramilitarising the civilian population, handing out over 18,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles to its citizens in Kyiv alone. The Government is also encouraging citizens to engage vastly superior Russian forces with Molotov cocktails with local civilian populations and even breweries now manufacturing petrol bombs en masse.
These decisions are usually taken by a Government in a last ditch attempt to save their sovereignty from a foreign invader. So far, these paramilitarisation processes have helped slow any Russian military victory. Mass mobilisation of the civilian population complementing a Ukrainian Army engaging a vastly superior military force through semi-guerrilla warfare with small arms and anti-tank weapons systems has thus far been a serious stumbling block for Russian military forces. Much of the contemporary focal point of the Ukrainian Government and the West is rightly focused on the very survival of the Ukrainian State. Notably, it seems the paramilitarisation of the civilian population by the Kyiv Government has been a tactical success in their defensive strategy.
The problem is the issues paramilitarisation leads to in any post-war society. The State-led creation of vast civilian militias inevitably means there is now a country awash with assault rifles and other weapons of war. Retrieving these weapons will be next to impossible for the Kyiv Government in any post-war setting. The spectrum of pro-state militias established long before the Russian invasion (some of whom are anti-government and neo-Nazi) will benefit from the release of armaments into the civilian population. Secondly, the proliferation of arms in the civilian population will also benefit any international and/or criminal organisations that exist throughout Ukraine. Law enforcement agencies (both Ukrainian and international) will have to ensure they are braced for difficulties in combating rejuvenated criminal gangs in any post-war scenario that will inevitably refuse to hand over any weapons they have secured.
To deal with any post-war security threat emanating from non-state armed groups mobilised during the war, the Ukrainian State will need to ensure robust demobilisation processes are put in place to disarm pro-government civilian militias. Alternatively, integration processes should be established to absorb civilian militias into the regular Ukrainian armed forces should these groups refuse to disarm. This tactic was successful in neutralising the threat posed to the Ukrainian Government from the far-right Azov Battalion militia that emerged as a strong non-state armed force after the 2014 Euromaidan revolution. Recognising the potential threat posed to the Ukrainian Government by the Azov Battalions, the Ukrainian State moved quickly to integrate the vast majority of the militia into its regular armed forces.
Should Ukraine fall, these problems will be for Moscow or a pro-Russian Ukrainian regime to deal with. Grappling with a population that has undergone a State-led paramilitarisation process during a foreign invasion may lead to a protracted anti-Russian insurgency through which pro-Ukrainian militias will have access to a vast range of weapons with no shortage of ammunition (and perhaps continued logistical and technical support from Western states).
If Ukraine manages to successfully repel the Russian invasion or secure a peace agreement, the Kyiv Government will have to ensure proper demobilisation structures are put in place. The onus is also on those Western states who donated vast arsenals of weapons to Ukraine to aid Kyiv in those processes. Failure to do so may lead to a proliferation of non-state armed groups and a security headache for the Kyiv administration from internal non-state threats.
About the Author(s)
Dale Pankhurst is an ESRC NINE DTP Ph.D. candidate at Queen's University Belfast under the supervision of Dr Andrew Thomson and Dr Mike Bourne. He previously completed both his BA in International Politics and Conflict Studies and his MA in Politics at Queen's, receiving the Frank Wright Prize for excellence during postgraduate study. His PhD research project investigates complexity and variation in state-pro-government militia relationships.
6. Ukrainian garrison at Snake Island surrenders to Russian Armed Forces — Defense Ministry
This a report from the Russian Defense Ministry through the Russian TASS news agency. It is of course completely at odds with the Ukrainian report that 13 Ukrainians were killed by the RUssians after they told them to"eff off."
Note the multiple propaganda messages - the compassion to allow them to surrender and that they will soon be returned to the families (In what: body bags?)
According to the defense MInistry Russian troops are not targeting Ukrainian cities and are no threats to civilians.
I guess the defense Ministry is really out of touch with their troops in Ukraine.
Ukrainian garrison at Snake Island surrenders to Russian Armed Forces — Defense Ministry
MOSCOW, February 25. /TASS/. The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) garrison of 82 servicemen at the Snake (Zmeiny) Island in the Black Sea voluntarily surrendered to the Russian Armed Forces, Russian Defense Minister Major General Igor Konashenkov announced Friday.
"In the area of the Snake Island, 82 Ukrainian servicemen laid down their weapons and voluntarily surrendered to the Russian Armed Forces. Currently, they are signing written vows to reject military resistance. They will be returned to their families shortly," Konashenkov said.
According to the spokesman, 11 Ukrainian servicemen of the UAF 53rd Armored Brigade surrendered near Nikolayevsk. One UAF Marine unit from the 36th Marine Brigade contacted the DPR People’s Militia and requested a corridor to the republic. After they surrender their weapons, they will be able to return to their families.
"Once the situation in the combat area is stabilized, all surrendered Ukrainian servicemen will be let go home," the spokesman underscored.
Russian President Vladimir Putin said in a televised address on Thursday morning that in response to a request by the heads of the Donbass republics he had made a decision to carry out a special military operation in order to protect people "who have been suffering from abuse and genocide by the Kiev regime for eight years." The Russian leader stressed that Moscow had no plans of occupying Ukrainian territories.
When clarifying the developments unfolding, the Russian Defense Ministry reassured that Russian troops are not targeting Ukrainian cities, but are limited to surgically striking and incapacitating Ukrainian military infrastructure. There are no threats whatsoever to the civilian population.
7. Russian TV Uses Tucker Carlson and Tulsi Gabbard to Sell Putin’s War
I do not think they can be called useful idiots. They surely must know what they are doing.
Russian TV Uses Tucker Carlson and Tulsi Gabbard to Sell Putin’s War
In the hours since Russia launched its military assault on Ukraine, the news on Russian state television has been dominated by official statements and reports from war correspondents. But in the days leading up to the attack, as the state broadcaster worked to tarnish Ukraine and cast American criticism of President Vladimir Putin as hysterical, its producers borrowed heavily from another source: Fox News.
At least four times this week, Russian news reports have featured translated clips of Tucker Carlson or his guest Tulsi Gabbard, a former Democratic U.S. representative, attacking the Biden administration.
What’s more, one report broadcast on Russian television’s main channel Sunday did more than just quote Carlson: It developed and sharpened a political attack on a prominent Democratic senator that Carlson had just hinted at.
On Sunday, Russian state TV translated this Tucker Carlson rant: "They're promoting war, not to maintain the democracy that is Ukraine. Ukraine is not a democracy. It has never been a democracy in its history and it's not now. It is a client state of the Biden administration." pic.twitter.com/36fziEks90
— Robert Mackey (@RobertMackey) February 24, 2022
“These people are so ghoulish,” Carlson said of U.S. officials who provided military aid to Ukraine. “Of course they’re promoting war,” Carlson continued, as his comments were translated into Russian, “not to maintain the democracy that is Ukraine. Ukraine is not a democracy. It has never been a democracy in its history, and it’s not now. It’s a client state of the Biden administration.”
The Russian broadcast cut away from Carlson’s monologue at this point to show Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s appearance at the United Nations that day. But that exactly echoed the next part of the original Fox News broadcast, which also showed Blinken on screen as Carlson mocked his warning that Russia might stage a false flag attack and blame it on Ukraine as a pretext for war.
An hour later, the evening news program on Russia’s main state television channel used a longer excerpt from the same Carlson monologue and shaped its own report to amplify the Fox News host’s attack on a Democrat. In the original Fox News broadcast, Carlson had suggested that Sen. Richard Blumenthal, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee who worked to arm Ukraine with Javelin anti-tank missiles, was only doing so because of donations from American defense contractors like Raytheon.
Last week, Tucker Carlson suggested Sen. Richard Blumenthal might have pushed to arm Ukraine to aid a campaign donor, Raytheon. Then on Sunday, Russian state TV devoted a segment to Raytheon, Blumenthal and Ukraine, even quoting Carlson in translation. pic.twitter.com/yMTOxsKYuN
— Robert Mackey (@RobertMackey) February 24, 2022
Before quoting Carlson’s comments, the Russian report noted that Blumenthal had received hundreds of thousands of dollars in campaign donations from Raytheon and referred to Blumenthal’s false claim that he had served in Vietnam. The Russian broadcast then cut to a part of Carlson’s program in which he showed viewers video of Blumenthal telling MSNBC about the need to supply Javelin missiles to Ukraine. Carlson was then shown laughing at Blumenthal. “So that guy, who lied about his own war service, is pretty excited at the thought of Ukrainians fighting and dying in the streets,” Carlson scoffed.
After cutting away from Carlson, the Russian correspondent noted that President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump had also received hundreds of thousands of dollars in campaign contributions from Raytheon.
On Wednesday night, just hours before Putin ordered the attack on Ukraine to begin, two excerpts from Carlson’s most recent program were featured in Russian state television’s 8 p.m. and 9 p.m. news broadcasts.
Carlson had started his show Tuesday night with a sarcastic monologue in which he told viewers: “Democrats in Washington have told you it’s your patriotic duty to hate Vladimir Putin. It’s not a suggestion. It’s a mandate. Anything less than hatred for Putin is treason. Many Americans have obeyed this directive. They now dutifully hate Vladimir Putin. Maybe you’re one of them. Hating Putin has become the central purpose of America’s foreign policy. It’s the main thing that we talk about. Entire cable channels are now devoted to it. Very soon, that hatred of Vladimir Putin could bring the United States into a conflict in Eastern Europe.”
Carlson’s comments were so welcome in Moscow that an excerpt from that rant with Russian subtitles was quickly produced by the Russian-language service of RT, the government-funded network formerly known as Russia Today.
Russian state broadcaster RT just published Tucker Carlson’s rant to defend Putin with Russian subtitles pic.twitter.com/atmHt4TlmS
— Rag?p Soylu (@ragipsoylu) February 23, 2022
During the 8 p.m. news bulletin on Russian state television Wednesday, as Russians tried to make sense of what was about to happen, a dubbed version of Carlson’s monologue was offered to them as an explanation.
On Tuesday, Tucker Carlson claimed that "Democrats in Washington have told you it's your patriotic duty to hate Vladimir Putin." Within hours, the Fox clip was on Russian state TV's evening news broadcast, used to suggest US opposition to Russia's attack on Ukraine is irrational. pic.twitter.com/lGzp7PZhaK
— Robert Mackey (@RobertMackey) February 24, 2022
An hour later, Russian television’s main evening news program featured another clip of Carlson’s show from the previous night, an excerpt from his discussion of possible economic sanctions on Russia with Gabbard, who is now a frequent Fox guest and was given a prime speaking slot at the Conservative Political Action Conference this weekend.
Like Carlson, Gabbard sought to blame the U.S. and NATO for supposedly provoking Putin’s attack on Ukraine and suggested that Americans would suffer from higher energy prices if Russia was sanctioned for invading Ukraine.
On the eve of war, Russian state TV showed a translation of Tulsi Gabbard's Fox News criticism of Biden's threat to sanction Russia for attacking Ukraine. "Sanctions don't work. This is whole problem with the Biden administration: they are so focused on how do we punish Putin." pic.twitter.com/pjXxtIrK1h
— Robert Mackey (@RobertMackey) February 24, 2022
“These sanctions don’t work,” Gabbard told Carlson in an exchange screened for Russians. “What we do know is that they will increase suffering and hardship for the American people. And this is whole problem with the Biden administration: They are so focused on how do we punish Putin that they don’t care and are not focused on what is actually in the best interests of the American people.”
Russian officials have not been shy about pointing out that fuel prices are likely to spike in Europe and the United States if sanctions are imposed on its vast oil and gas industry. State television reports from Washington on the crisis have repeatedly included close shots of high gas prices and suggested that they could go higher.
On Thursday, after Russia launched its military assault on Ukraine, Gabbard posted the video of her comments about sanctions on Twitter and suggested, without evidence, that doing anything to press Putin to stop the invasion of Ukraine could lead to a nuclear war.
Biden/Harris tell us we must bear the cost to defend freedom in Ukraine. But while you & your family struggle w/ higher prices, the Power Elite won’t suffer at all. And if the conflict goes nuclear they’ll be safe in bunkers while you, I, & our loved ones are left without shelter pic.twitter.com/75abm9rY35
— Tulsi Gabbard ? (@TulsiGabbard) February 24, 2022
Gabbard returned to Carlson’s show Thursday night; during her appearance, she blamed Biden for not preventing the war, which she said he could have done by giving in to Putin’s demand to rule out the possibility of Ukraine ever joining NATO.
Tulsi: I do not in any way support Putin’s decision to go into Ukraine… If President Biden and NATO had done what you were just talking about in agreeing we’re going to take NATO off the table for Ukraine… this situation could’ve been prevented… pic.twitter.com/espPertdud
— Acyn (@Acyn) February 25, 2022
8. Removal of Russian banks from SWIFT system: 5 things to know
Removal of Russian banks from SWIFT system: 5 things to know
Russian financial institutions handle about $46 billion of forex transactions a day
MITSURU OBE, Nikkei staff writer
February 27, 2022 11:07 JST
In a joint statement, the leaders of the European Commission, France, Germany, Italy, the U.K., Canada, and the U.S. said they would take the economic measures to "hold Russia to account and collectively ensure that this war is a strategic failure for Putin."
Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, said that cutting Russian banks out of the system will stop them from conducting most of their financial transactions worldwide and effectively block Russian exports and imports.
French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire on Friday called the exclusion of Russia from SWIFT as "the financial nuclear weapon."
Here are 5 things to know about SWIFT:
What is SWIFT?
SWIFT stands for the Society of Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications. Founded in 1973, SWIFT is a messaging system that allows banks to send money to each other. It is used by more than 11,000 financial institutions in more than 200 countries. It uses standardized, secure codes that allow institutions to send and receive information, such as instructions for transferring money across borders.
What will happen if Russia gets disconnected from SWIFT?
Russian banks will no longer be able to make payments for trade and financial activities, effectively preventing the country from exporting commodities such as oil, coal and natural gas. It would also prevent Russia from importing key technologies such as semiconductors and machinery for its own industries.
Russian financial institutions handle about $46 billion worth of foreign exchange transactions per day -- 80% of which are denominated in U.S. dollars. SWIFT handles 42 million remittances per day, of which Russian financial institutions accounted for 1.5% as of 2020.
How does it impact other countries?
There will be blow back because the move will disrupt the flow of oil and gas from Russia to other countries. The EU, for example, depends on Russia for 40% of its natural gas imports.
Also, European banks are among the biggest creditors to Russia, accounting for a large part of $121 billion that Russia owes to foreign banks, according to the Bank for International Settlements. The removal of Russia from SWIFT will leave the question of how Moscow will make repayments on its foreign debt.
Why now?
The West has already imposed a series of sanctions, including asset freezes and a ban of transactions with Russia's state-owned banks. But these measures have done little to stop Russia from escalating its attacks on Ukraine.
How effective would it be?
It is unclear. Russia has been under economic sanctions since its annexation of Crimea in 2014, but that hasn't stopped Russian President Vladimir Putin from expanding the invasion of Ukraine.
North Korea has also shown the limits of economic sanctions. The country is completely cut off from the international economic system, but the Kim Jong Un regime continues to survive and keeps testing and developing new weapons.
Russia could also turn to China for trade, entirely bypassing the dollar-based transaction network.
9. Chinese banks restrict lending to Russia, dealing blow to Moscow
This should be a significant development if accurate.
Chinese banks restrict lending to Russia, dealing blow to Moscow
Posted on AllSides February 25th, 2022
From The Right
(AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein / AP Newsroom)
Two Chinese state-owned banks will restrict financing for Russian commodity purchases, suggesting there are limits to Beijing's support for Moscow as the Kremlin confronts severe economic sanctions over its attack of Ukraine.
Offshore units of Industrial & Commercial Bank of China have stopped issuing U.S. dollar-denominated letters of credit for purchases of physical Russian commodities ready for export, while the Bank of China has also limited funding, according to Bloomberg News, citing people familiar with the matter.
Power The Future executive director Daniel Turner and Fox Business contributor Scott Martin discuss the effect of Biden's policies on inflation on 'Fox Business Tonight.'
Yuan-denominated letters of credit are still available for some clients, pending approval from senior executives.
Chinese President Xi Jinping (AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein / AP Newsroom)
The move comes after Russia launched a wide-scale invasion into Ukraine, shattering three decades of peace in Europe and eliciting a slew of condemnations and financial penalties from the U.S., European Union and other nations.
It was a surprising twist and points to potential cracks showing in the relationship between Moscow and Beijing. The two countries are frequently geopolitical allies who have united in the past against the U.S.; they have formed increasingly close bonds over recent years, with Russia a key supplier of energy to China.
At the same time, China's biggest banks hold billions of Russian assets. Beijing has also provided Moscow with tens of billions in funding over the years.
Russian President Vladimir Putin (Evgeniy Paulin, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP / AP Newsroom)
But Beijing ultimately has closer economic ties to Western nations, who are much bigger export customers for China, major sources of technology and investment, and also control China's access to the international dollar system.
China has pledged to maintain normal trade with both Russia and Ukraine, despite the latest restrictions from two of its largest state-owned banks.
The leaders of the two nations – Xi Jinping of China and Vladimir Putin of Russia – spoke on Friday, during which Xi reportedly urged Putin to solve the crisis with negotiations.
Ukrainian soldiers take positions in downtown Kyiv, Ukraine, Friday, Feb. 25, 2022.(AP Photo/Emilio Morenatti) (AP Newsroom)
"The situation in eastern Ukraine has undergone rapid changes, drawing great attention from the international community. China’s position would be based on the right and wrong in relation to the Ukraine issue itself," Xi told Putin on Friday, Chinese state broadcaster CCTV reported. "China supports Russia and Ukraine in resolving the issue through negotiation."
10. Ukraine Leads the World
I hope we learn a lot from the Ukrainians.
Excerpts:
The threats shouldn’t stop the growing support for Ukrainian resistance. The stakes of this war are very high, including for American interests. Mr. Putin is trying to restore Greater Russia and make himself the dominant European state and a global power. He wants a new world disorder.
If he succeeds in Ukraine, breaking NATO will be his next ambition. The people of Ukraine are showing a too complacent West what it means to fight for freedom.
Ukraine Leads the World
The brave resistance to Putin is an inspiration and lesson to the world.
WSJ · by The Editorial Board
President Joe Biden, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky
Photo: Bastiaan Slabbers/NurPhoto/Getty Images; Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images; Irina Yakovleva/TASS/ZUMA Press
Vladimir Putin’s Ukraine invasion isn’t going according to his script, and for that the world owes a great debt to the heroic people of that besieged country of 41 million. Their resistance against fearsome odds is an inspiration and has awakened the world to the menace of the Kremlin autocrat. Ukraine deserves more support to raise the costs of war for Mr. Putin with arms, the toughest sanctions, and global ostracism.
***
Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky is proving to be the man for the moment as he rallies his country and the world to resist the invasion. “I need ammunition, not a ride,” Mr. Zelensky said, in a line for the ages, in response to a U.S. offer to help him leave Kyiv to escape a possible assassination.
His leadership has put to shame the New York Times op-ed last week that ran under the headline, “The Comedian-Turned-President Is Seriously in Over His Head.” His pleas on behalf of Europe’s principles have helped to persuade European leaders that Ukraine’s fight is also theirs.
The state of the battlefield is confusing as always in war, but the main news so far is the success of the Ukrainian resistance. Russia still doesn’t appear to control a major city, and on Sunday Ukrainian forces repelled an attempt to take Kharkiv, the second-largest city. This operation was supposed to be a quick Russian march to Kyiv followed by a frightened surrender and the installation of a puppet government. Most Western analysts predicted the same.
They underestimated the tenacity of Ukrainians. The sight on TV and social media of Ukrainian civilians preparing to defend their cities is something to behold. Men with desk jobs are grabbing rifles, and teachers are making Molotov cocktails. This is a lesson in the price of freedom that ought to instruct Westerners offended by “microaggressions.” Real aggression is a tank rolling down your street.
But Ukrainians shouldn’t have to fight urban battles with bombs made in their kitchens, and Europe and the U.S. are finally sending the weapons to Ukrainians that should have been provided long ago. The U.S. is providing some $350 million more in military aid, and the Biden Administration is asking Congress for another $6.4 billion for humanitarian and military assistance. Congress should approve the request this week.
Even the Germans are stepping up, with Chancellor Olaf Scholz saying Berlin will provide 1,000 antitank weapons and 500 Stinger missiles. The Netherlands is chipping in 200 Stingers and 50 Panzerfaust 3 antitank weapons with 400 rockets. Sweden is sending antitank weapons, and many other countries are also contributing.
Former Ukraine Defense Minister Andriy Zagorodnyuk tells us there’s an urgent need for bulletproof vests and helmets. The U.S. can also provide communications gear like tactical radios that will help small groups of Ukrainians carry out operations against Russian troops. As the war continues, the U.S. and NATO will need to develop means of supply from havens in Poland and other border nations. Air drops shouldn’t be ruled out.
Europe, the U.S. and Japan are also strengthening sanctions in a meaningful way. The weekend decision to ban select Russian banks from the Swift financial clearinghouse is a positive step, though it looks like it will still exempt energy transactions. That is an unfortunate bow to the dependence of Western Europe on Russian natural gas. It will diminish the impact of the Swift sanction because energy exports are Mr. Putin’s main financial lifeline.
Much of the world is also increasingly isolating Russia and Russians from travel and commerce. Sports leagues are refusing to compete in Russia, companies are refusing to do business, and Europe and Canada have closed off their airspace to Russian airlines. These may seem like symbolic gestures, but they send a message to the Russian people that their ruler is taking them down a blind alley.
***
Despite the good news, Ukraine’s position remains perilous. Russian forces are still besieging several cities, including Kyiv. Mr. Putin is ruthless, as he showed in a Chechnya campaign that reduced cities to rubble. He could do the same in Ukraine if he feels defeat would jeopardize his political control inside Russia.
On Sunday Mr. Putin put his nuclear forces on high alert in response to what he called threatening comments from NATO leaders. But no one is threatening Russia. It’s tempting to dismiss this as more of Mr. Putin’s intimidating talk, except the Russian’s public statements have been erratic and extreme.
The threats shouldn’t stop the growing support for Ukrainian resistance. The stakes of this war are very high, including for American interests. Mr. Putin is trying to restore Greater Russia and make himself the dominant European state and a global power. He wants a new world disorder.
If he succeeds in Ukraine, breaking NATO will be his next ambition. The people of Ukraine are showing a too complacent West what it means to fight for freedom.
Copyright ©2022 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
WSJ · by The Editorial Board
11. Russian advance slowed by Ukrainian resistance and logistical setbacks, U.S. defense official says
Amateurs talk tactics. Professionals talk logistics.
Russian advance slowed by Ukrainian resistance and logistical setbacks, U.S. defense official says
The Russian forces invading Ukraine have faced more resistance than the U.S. believes Russia anticipated, a senior defense official said Sunday morning. The Russian forces have advanced toward three cities, including Kyiv, but have not yet captured a city since invading.
"The Ukrainians are putting up a very stiff and brave and heroic resistance, but we are only in Day Four, and I would be reluctant to provide an estimate of how many more days there are and what those days are going to look like," the senior defense official said.
The U.S. Defense Department estimates about two-thirds of the combat power Russia had arrayed around Ukraine's borders have now been committed inside Ukraine. That leaves about one-third that have yet to enter the country, which is a significant amount of power still at the ready.
The Russian advances on both Kharkiv and Kyiv have been slowed by fuel and logistical shortages and by the stiff and "creative" resistance by the Ukrainians, according to the official.
A convoy of military trucks parked in a street in Mykolaivka, Donetsk region, the territory controlled by pro-Russian militants, eastern Ukraine, Sunday, Feb. 27, 2022. Fighting also raged in two eastern territories controlled by pro-Russia separatists. AP
The Russian advance forces are still about 30 kilometers outside of Kyiv. There are indications that some reconnaissance elements are inside Kyiv's city center putting up a fight but the main forces are still 30 kilometers away, which is about where the forces were on Saturday too.
One change that concerns U.S. officials is the first indications the Russians are adopting siege tactics in Chernihiv, on the way to Kyiv, for a full out effort to capture it. The Russians have started firing rockets, which are imprecise weapons, inside the city that risk hitting civilian infrastructure.
On Sunday, Russian President Vladimir Putin put Russia's nuclear deterrent on high alert in response to statements by Western countries and NATO. The senior defense official said the move was "unnecessary and escalatory" since Russia is not under threat by NATO or Ukraine.
Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin learned of Putin's decision from his announcement, the defense official said. Putin's announcement came just before Austin hosted an operations and policy synchronization meeting attended by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, combatant commanders, as well as senior policy leaders. The leaders discussed Putin's announcement during the meeting.
The Russian invasion into Ukraine advances along three lines of assault. One, north to south, from Belarus towards Kyiv. Another, northeast to south, towards Kharkiv. And a third from the South towards central Ukraine. The southern advance has forked, with some Russian forces headed northwest towards Kherson and others splitting off northeast towards Mariupol.
On Saturday, the Russians used an estimated four landing ships to conduct an amphibious assault about 70 kilometers from Mariupol with several thousand naval infantry troops. They have advanced about 20 kilometers since then, and are about 50 kilometers out from Mariupol.
The U.S. government on Sunday advised Americans in Russia to "leave immediately," according to an advisory posted by the State Department. The State Department is urging citizens to leave Russia now because an increasing number of airlines are canceling flights into and out of Russia, and numerous countries have closed their airspace to Russian airlines
CBS News reporter covering the Pentagon.
12. Why Is Russia's UN Ambassador Talking About 'Dirty Bombs'?
Isn't Chernobyl one giant dirty bomb?
Why Is Russia's UN Ambassador Talking About 'Dirty Bombs'?
Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has been giving the world a crash course in Kremlin techniques of propaganda, misinformation, disinformation, and misdirection — for anyone not already well aware. We have heard plenty about this in recent weeks, not least from the Biden administration, which has been declassifying and releasing to the press information on what they’ve called Russia’s playbook.
A big feature of this playbook is projection: in this case the process of displacing onto someone or something else what Russia itself is actually planning, or doing. We saw this in spades during Putin’s runup to the invasion of Ukraine, as he mustered his strike force along Ukraine’s land borders and coastline. Russia accused Ukraine and NATO of threatening its security, broadcasting a narrative that at the extreme suggested Russia was in danger of an invasion from Ukraine, or NATO. The opposite was true: It was Russia threatening and preparing to invade Ukraine, threatening NATO, and staging provocations.
Russia’s narrative was patently ridiculous, but for Putin such things have their uses — for domestic propaganda, for muddying the waters, for distracting the debate from the realities, and for laying the groundwork for Russia’s staged provocations. In this case, Russia stirs up trouble and blames it on Ukraine, as Russia has been doing for years in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region.
In that vein, there’s an item that caught my attention last Friday, near the end of a United Nations Security Council emergency meeting on Ukraine. I mention it here not because I have any further information on this score. I stress that this is solely a heads up, in light of Russia’s record of projection and staged provocations.
The setting was the UN Security Council chamber, Friday evening, Feb. 25 — two days after Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine. Russia has the rotating presidency of the Security Council for the month of February, and Russia’s ambassador to the UN, Vassily Nebenzia, was presiding. He described Russia’s invasion as a justified humanitarian intervention, saying Russia was not bombing cities or targeting civilians.
Ukraine does not currently hold one of the 10 rotating seats on the council, but Ukraine’s ambassador to the UN, Sergiy Kyslytsya, was present to make a statement. Kyslytsya tore into Russia and Nebenzia, telling Russia’s ambassador “Your words have less value than the hole in a New York pretzel,” deploring Russia’s attack on Ukraine, citing some of the horrors, and mentioning among other things a concern about Russia’s capture of the Chernobyl nuclear plant — site of the huge nuclear accident under the USSR in 1986, and still a dangerous repository of radioactive material.
Russia’s ambassador, Nebenzia, then dropped into his closing remarks that Russian paratroopers had taken Chernobyl because Russia “does not want Ukraine to generate a dirty bomb.”
In view of Russia’s record of provocations and projection, that left me wondering if we should all be alert to what I hope would be an unthinkable Russian provocation. Russia right now is looking dreadful on the world stage; a brutal power ruled by a dictator with an army now killing people in a neighboring country, in service of his messianic claims. Ukraine, by contrast, is making a heroic defense. The Kremlin must be looking for ways to try to flip that picture.
Which leads me to a dread question. Is it possible that Russia might have its own dirty bomb, with plans to use it somewhere and blame it on Ukrainians?
I hope not. I stress that I have no further information on this score, except the patterns of Russia’s playbook, and the implication by Russia’s ambassador that we should be worried about a dirty bomb. This is not an accusation, certainly not some sensational revelation. But it is worth tucking away, as one more thing to keep in mind.
Mr. NEBENZIA (Russian Federation), Council President for February, re-taking the floor in his national capacity, while noting that there is much on which to comment following the statement by the representative of Ukraine, said he would “leave the boorishness” on the latter’s conscience. He also pointed out that units of a Russian paratrooper division took control of the area surrounding the Chernobyl power plant on 24 February. The Russian Federation “does not want Ukraine to generate a dirty bomb”, he said, and personnel are monitoring the radioactive situation. He went on to recall that the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said that the level of radiation at the power plant is low and does not pose a threat to the population.
13. Ukraine fights unconventional cyber war
It is a multi domain war.
Ukraine fights unconventional cyber war | PublicWire | Emerging Market Stock News 24/7 | Investor Relations US Stock Market
Compared to the conventional ground warfare now under way, Ukraine’s online campaign to fight the invasion may be highly unconventional.
As Quartz reports, it has been conducting meme warfare on Twitter, with political cartoons and jokes about President Putin and Russia. Then there is catfishing. The New York Post says Russian soldiers have been communicating with Ukrainian women on Tinder, opening up the possibility for military intelligence to set up fake profiles and find out troop locations and movements.
Reuters reports the government of Ukraine is asking for volunteers from the country’s hacker underground to fight a cyber war. A defensive unit would protect infrastructure such as power plants and water systems. The offensive volunteer unit would help Ukraine’s military conduct digital espionage operations against the invading Russian forces.
While the spectre of a nuclear conflagration is confining the armed conflict to Ukraine’s borders, there is nothing to stop it spreading online. One of the most chilling fears is that a regional conflict could escalate into an invisible global confrontation in cyber space, writes John Thornhill.
For years, Russia has been the world’s most active nation state hacker, responsible for more than half of such cyber attacks. Its top three target countries have been the US, Ukraine and UK. Some commentators have argued that it is only a matter of time before the west experiences a “cyber Pearl Harbor”.
14. Putin Accidentally Started a Revolution in Germany
Putin Accidentally Started a Revolution in Germany
The invasion of Ukraine is triggering a dramatic reversal of Berlin’s grand strategy.
By Jeff Rathke, the president of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies at Johns Hopkins University.
By Jeff Rathke, the president of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies at Johns Hopkins University.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz delivers a speech on the Russian invasion of the Ukraine during a meeting of the German federal parliament, the Bundestag, at the Reichstag building on February 27, 2022 in Berlin. Hannibal Hanschke/Getty Images
German politics is normally characterized by a cautious continuity, finely balanced and slow to adapt to changing circumstances. But it remains able to surprise. In the past week, Chancellor Olaf Scholz and his government have carried out a revolution in Germany’s foreign policy, discarding in a matter of days the outmoded assumptions of Berlin’s post-Cold War dreams and setting a course for confrontation with Russia that will bring dramatically increased resources and modernize the country’s armed forces.
Each day has brought new breaks with German tradition. On Feb. 27, in an extraordinary session of the German parliament (the first-ever Sunday meeting), Scholz described the Russian attack on Ukraine as a “turning point” that required a German national effort to preserve the political and security order in Europe. Scholz announced the creation of a one-time 100 billion euro ($113 billion) fund for the German military this year and committed Germany to spending 2 percent of GDP on defense henceforth. He highlighted Germany’s contributions to NATO and expanded commitments, including its deterrent presence in Lithuania and making German air defense systems available to Eastern European member states. He underscored Germany’s nuclear role in NATO and indicated that the government would likely acquire F-35 aircraft instead of the previously planned F/A-18 Super Hornet purchase. The chancellor emphasized Berlin’s responsibilities within NATO but in a departure from the style of German defense policy also defined these measures as ensuring Germany’s national security. Decades of German taboos and sensitivities dissolved amid applause from the mainstream parties and the pro-Ukrainian chants of upwards of half a million demonstrators throughout central Berlin.
And that was just Sunday. The day before, the government dropped its position as one of the last trans-Atlantic holdouts against excluding Russian banks from the SWIFT financial messaging system, and the Defense Ministry announced that it would provide 1,000 anti-tank systems and 500 Stinger anti-aircraft weapons to Ukraine, reversing the Germany’s long-standing policy against providing arms to crisis zones. (Berlin also lifted key holds on third countries providing German-origin equipment to Ukraine.) Those historic moves came on top of the tough economic sanctions imposed by the European Union on Moscow within 24 hours of the start of the Russian invasion—measures that will hit Germany, too, since Russia is one of its top five export and import partners outside the EU. It was only five days ago, on Feb. 22, that Scholz decided to halt the certification process for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.
And that was just Sunday. The day before, the government dropped its position as one of the last trans-Atlantic holdouts against excluding Russian banks from the SWIFT financial messaging system, and the Defense Ministry announced that it would provide 1,000 anti-tank systems and 500 Stinger anti-aircraft weapons to Ukraine, reversing the Germany’s long-standing policy against providing arms to crisis zones. (Berlin also lifted key holds on third countries providing German-origin equipment to Ukraine.) Those historic moves came on top of the tough economic sanctions imposed by the European Union on Moscow within 24 hours of the start of the Russian invasion—measures that will hit Germany, too, since Russia is one of its top five export and import partners outside the EU. It was only five days ago, on Feb. 22, that Scholz decided to halt the certification process for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.
In seven days, Germany has axed its biggest Russian energy project, imposed sanctions that will cause significant pain at home, and instituted a course that will make Germany the largest European defense spender, with the most advanced aircraft and a growing forward presence in Central and Eastern Europe. One can wonder whether Germany’s dedicated detractors in Washington will notice. How did it happen so quickly, when German officials had so tenaciously defended their status quo policies for so long?
The brazen brutality of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine is the most important reason. Scholz and his government made every diplomatic effort to avert war, including Scholz’s Feb. 15 visit to Moscow, in which he tried to save the Minsk Process. Putin advanced his perceived grievances and distorted history—which Scholz later characterized as “ridiculous”—and through his recognition of the breakaway regions in Donetsk and Luhansk effectively killed the Minsk agreements. Scholz and German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock knew from personal experience that Russia had closed off the paths of diplomacy.
Germany’s new political alignments paved the way for this revolution. Scholz’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) governs with the values-driven Greens and the liberal Free Democrats, both of which advocate a tougher line toward Moscow. The government’s energy transformation ambitions, which set a 2045 carbon neutrality target, have now acquired a national security dimension. This may complicate the near-term certainty of adequate natural gas provision, but German Economy and Climate Minister Robert Habeck of the Greens has seized on the Russia crisis as additional justification to accelerate the transition to renewables and building out the energy grid. Scholz formulated the goal for Germany to build two liquefied natural gas terminals “as soon as possible” as part of a national effort to overcome its dependence on individual suppliers.
Within his own party, the pragmatist Scholz has advocated a reassessment of the SPD’s outdated approach to Russia, based on mutual economic dependence and the legacy of arms control. Putin’s invasion presented Scholz with an opportunity to wipe the slate clean, and he lost no time. Faced with indefensible Russian actions, the “dialogue” wing of the SPD has seen its arguments crumble. The most visible advocate for pro-Russian positions, ex-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of the SPD, has come under fire from the entire party leadership for his positions on the boards of Russian energy corporations such as Nord Stream AG, Rosneft, and just recently Gazprom (although that is still pending). Schröder has in a matter of weeks gone from being one of Russia’s most valuable assets in Germany to a political liability.
Lastly, some credit goes to the Biden administration. Despite pressure from the U.S. Congress and foreign-policy community, U.S. President Joe Biden carefully built a partnership on Russia policy—first with Chancellor Angela Merkel through the July 2021 joint statement on energy security and later by defending Germany’s approach, including during Scholz’s Feb. 7 visit to Washington. Biden faced backlash from Republicans and some Democrats, but he realized that a change in Germany’s Russia policy would have to come from Berlin, not be imposed by Washington. If Biden had given in to the calls for unilateral U.S. sanctions on Nord Stream 2, he would have engendered a defensive response from the German government that would have rendered inconceivable Scholz’s comprehensive Russia turnabout.
Change comes to German policy in ways similar to Ernest Hemingway’s description of bankruptcy: first gradually, then suddenly. That’s how it was with Merkel’s 2011 accelerated phaseout of nuclear power after the Fukushima disaster, her 2015 decisions that led to more than 1 million refugees coming to Germany from Syria and elsewhere, and the COVID-19 EU economic support package, in which Germany for the first time supported the issuance of common EU debt.
The road ahead for Scholz’s government will not be easy. Germany’s economic entanglement with Russia is extensive, and it will be costly to decrease dependency. The risk of inflation and impact of energy shortages on German industry could become a political liability that the opposition (including the extreme-right Alternative for Germany) will try to exploit. Building the military that Scholz sketched will take significant time, and the Defense Ministry has struggled in recent years to turn growing budgets into deployable capabilities. Rooting out Russian influence in German politics will be contested. But there can be no mistake: Scholz has bolstered the trans-Atlantic pillar of German policy and positioned Berlin to be a stronger leader of Europe and a bulwark against Russian bullying for decades to come.
Jeff Rathke is the president of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He also served for 24 years as a foreign service officer with the State Department.
15. Russia Stumbles in Biggest Test of Its Military Force
Lack of training? Ineffective doctrine or doctrine not effectively employed? Failure at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels?
Russia Stumbles in Biggest Test of Its Military Force
Initial setbacks spur fears that Russians will step up firepower
WSJ · by Michael R. Gordon, Max Colchester and Daniel Michaels
A large convoy of Russian ground forces, comprising hundreds of military vehicles, as seen northeast of Ivankiv, Ukraine, on Sunday and moving toward Kyiv, about 40 miles away.
Photo: Satellite image 2022 Maxar Technologies
Russia holds many military advantages over Ukraine’s forces. One third of Russia’s combat power near Ukraine is still outside the country, the Pentagon says, and has yet to enter the fray. The next few days could prove pivotal, as Russian President Vladimir Putin ponders whether to take a more aggressive approach to bludgeon Mr. Zelensky’s government into submission, potentially causing more civilian casualties.
The Russian military has a prodigious array of artillery, rockets and air power. Employing these weapons, however, would only further antagonize the population that Moscow is hoping to draw into its sphere of influence and make it harder for the Kremlin to control a country of 44 million.
Since the start of the conflict, Russia has fired more than 320 missiles. Its ground forces have advanced from Belarus to within 30 kilometers of Kyiv’s city center. Russian forces have also moved swiftly from their bases in Crimea and carried out a rare amphibious landing from the Sea of Azov.
Now, the Pentagon says there are signs that Russia is resorting to more firepower, including rockets, in its attempt to take Chernihiv, a city 150 kilometers northeast of Kyiv.
Mick Ryan, a retired Australian Army major general who has studied advanced warfare, says Russia’s failure so far to achieve decisive gains and its potential depletion of precision-munition supplies “probably will force them to use older weapons that are less precise and more deadly.”
“In the next 72 hours I expect greater lethality on the battlefield,” he added.
Russian soldiers near Armiansk, Crimea, on Friday heading toward Ukraine.
Photo: stringer/Shutterstock
Western analysts say that there are few parallels between Russia’s approach so far in Ukraine and how it would face off against a NATO force, where mass firepower would be used from the outset and the potential use of nuclear weapons could also be threatened.
The Russian military has improved considerably since its wars to subdue insurgents in Chechnya, which lasted until 2000, and intervention eight years later in Georgia, which succeeded in securing two breakaway regions.
Russia’s operations since then had been limited and sometimes were carried out in areas where there was a reservoir of support. In 2014, the Russians quietly infiltrated Crimea with special forces, naval infantry and intelligence operatives and secured the peninsula with nary a shot. That same year, Russia intervened in the Donbas region in southeast Ukraine and marshaled a proxy force of separatists.
Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria to buttress Syrian President Bashar al-Assad showcased its air power and long-range missile capability. In contrast to the invasion of Ukraine, however, the Syria operation didn’t include the deployment of a large number of Russian ground forces or combat against an organized army.
“This isn’t the small, handpicked Syria task force that was lavished with support and made relatively few mistakes,” said Dara Massicot, an expert on the Russian military at the Rand Corporation, referring to Russia’s attack on Ukraine. “A force of this size is too large to hide readiness and personnel problems within the Russian military.”
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow in October 2015.
Photo: Alexei Druzhinin/Zuma Press
Ukraine’s forces have their problems too. Mr. Zelensky’s reluctance to order a general mobilization until late last week delayed the call-up of reservists and consequently the movement of some units into defensive positions, said Phillip Karber of the Potomac Foundation, a policy center.
The longstanding U.S. policy of modulating the supply of arms to Ukraine so as not to provoke Russia has also affected the country’s military capability. Stinger antiaircraft systems weren’t sent to Ukraine until January when the Biden administration approved a request by Latvia and Lithuania to provide the U.S.-made systems from their arsenals. The U.S. has since opted to send antiaircraft missiles from its own inventory. Experts say, however, that it takes time to distribute the weapons and train Ukrainian forces in how to use them. The U.S. hasn’t outfitted the Ukrainians with antiship missiles.
The Ukrainian forces have benefited from the U.S., British and other allied training, however, as well as U.S. intelligence about Russia military moves. The Ukrainians have also been adept at moving their surface-to-air systems and turning them off at times to make them harder to be targeted by the Russians, Western analysts say. As a result, Russia has yet to achieve air superiority in the country.
A senior U.S. defense official said Sunday that the Russians have been frustrated by the slow pace of their offensive but will try to adjust their strategy and tactics in the face of setbacks. “To some degree, they’ve done it to themselves in terms of their fuel and logistics and sustainment,” the official said. “We would expect them to learn from these issues and adapt to them and try to overcome them.”
James Hackett, Senior Fellow for Defense and Military Analysis at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think tank in London, noted that Russia still retains advantages in personnel and equipment, though movement could now be more difficult than before since bridges have been destroyed and the Ukrainians have had time to better prepare defenses.
The course of the conflict, analysts say, will now turn on whether Ukraine can hold Kyiv and what kind of guerrilla battle the Ukrainians can maintain in the longer run.
Jack Watling, an expert on land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute, a British defense think tank, says that his analysis before Russia’s invasion had been that Ukraine’s conventional forces would hold out for 10 days before shifting to more unconventional resistance warfare.
Previous conflicts, Mr. Watling said, have shown that “the Russians always take more military losses than they should.” But a question is how much public support Mr. Putin will have at home, as the war drags on and Russian soldiers die.
Moscow’s hope, he said, had been to avoid this prospect by planning a “shock and awe” demonstration that involved rapid advances and the seizure of a few key objectives in the hope the Zelensky government would quickly surrender or flee.
“That failed,” he said.
Corrections & Amplifications
Gen. Valery Gerasimov is Russia’s top military officer. An earlier version of this article incorrectly spelled his last name as Gerisimov. Separately, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s first name was incorrectly omitted in an earlier version of this article. (Corrected on Feb. 27 and Feb 28.)
WSJ · by Michael R. Gordon, Max Colchester and Daniel Michaels
16. Ukraine Conflict Update - Feb 28, 2022 - SOF News
Ukraine Conflict Update - Feb 28, 2022 - SOF News
sof.news · by SOF News · February 28, 2022
Curated news, analysis, and commentary on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Information on Russian offensive operations, Ukrainian defense, NATO response, aid to Ukraine, and the humanitarian issues associated with the conflict.
BLUF: The Russian offensive has stalled, for now. The advanced formations have outrun the supply and logistical convoys. The forward units are lacking food, ammunition, and fuel. The Ukrainian forces are fighting fiercely, making this a costly campaign for the Russians. The Ukrainian Air Force is still taking to the air and the Ukrainian air defense system is still operational, although both have been degraded. NATO is assisting with intelligence and providing weapons, supplies, and munitions. The international community has implemented economic and other types of sanctions against Russia. Russian nuclear forces were put on a higher state of alert.
Russian Offensive. The pace of the invasion has slowed down with the Russians taking an operational pause in some areas to allow reinforcements, supplies, and fuel to catch up with the forward units. It is expected that the Russian advance will resume on many fronts with heavy fighting taking place in different cities and regions. Offensive operations against Kyiv may resume in the next 24 hours. The Russians are conducting operations to capture the city of Kharkiv in northeast Ukraine and Mariupol along the Sea of Azov. A frustrated Russian military may soon resort to greater use of its multiple launcher rocket systems and artillery – which would be devastating in areas with a large civilian population.
A Closer Look. A number of military analysts have taken the opportunity to pontificate on the Russians lack of success on the battlefield. Mark Antonio Wright does this in his article “Why the Russians are Struggling”, National Review, February 26, 2022.
Crimea Axis of Advance. The Russians are having some success in the Crimea ‘axis’ of attack. A worry for the Ukrainians is if this success from the south results in a pincer movement that would isolate the Ukrainian forces in the east from the rest of the country. Early reports on Monday indicate that Russian forces have crossed the Dnieper River in southern Ukraine and are advancing north of Nova Kakhovka.
Russian Casualties. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense provides data on Russian casualties each day. As of the morning of February 28 Russia has lost 816 APCs, 191 tanks, 60 fuel trucks, 29 planes, 29 helicopters, 74 artillery pieces, 21 Grad rocket launchers, 2 naval vessels, 3 drones, and 1 Buk missile system. There have been 5,300 personnel casualties.
Missile Strikes and Rocket Attacks. The Russians continue to conduct missile strikes on selected targets throughout Ukraine. The UKR MoD stated that Russian missiles launched from Belarus struck the Zhytomyr Airport in northwest Ukraine on Monday (Feb 28). One type of missiles that the Russians are using from Belarus is the Iskander ballistic missile system. In the past 24 hours the city of Kharkiv in northeastern Ukraine has experienced attacks by multiple launcher rocket systems. Rocket systems are not only found in the Russian army. Western armies have them as well – one example is the United Kingdom’s M270 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS).
Russian SOF. Working in the interior of the country are Russian Spetsnaz units conducting a variety of special operations missions. There are reports that they are doing deep reconnaissance, sabotage, and other missions. One social media report says the Russian SOF are installing fluorescent beacons to help orient tactical aircraft in flying routes and finding targets.
Odessa Assault? A prize capture for the Russians would be the Black Sea port of Odessa. There is a Ukrainian naval base there and the city sits on the east-west coastal road along the Black Sea. OSINT reports indicate that a morning assault will take place on Monday (Feb 28).
Ukraine Defense. The Ukrainians continue to put up a stiff resistance to the Russian invasion. The citizenry has mobilized and some are undergoing a quick train up with newly issued weapons and equipment. The Ukrainians appear to be using the equipment they have to good use. This includes the anti-armor weapons and air defense weapons. Of note are Turkish drones that are being used to hit Russian targets and conduct reconnaissance.
High Morale. The country’s leader has the world riveted on how he is leading from the front – and he is being referred to as the Lion of Kyiv. The ability to deny the Russians a quick victory has hardened the resolve of the Ukrainians, over 50,000 military reservists and 50,000 Territorial Defense volunteers have been mobilized in the past two days. The stiff Ukrainian defense has prompted the west to step up with lethal aid. At the same time the country is looking for some additional help from Europe and the United States. It is also willing to accept help from individuals who want to go to Ukraine and fight the Russians. “Want to go fight for Ukraine? Here’s what to do.”, Military Times, February 27, 2022. Some social media accounts say that Ukrainian members of the French Foreign Legion will leave the French service to return home to fight the Russians.
The Cyber War. The Russians are doing their best to downgrade the communications and internet capabilities of Ukraine. Social media reports say that the websites and email servers of Ukrainian embassies and consulates around the world have been disrupted. Hackers from Belarus are helping the Russians out in this effort. NATO countries, for the most part, are putting up cyber ‘defensive shields’. They may also be engaging in offensive cyber operations. Read more in “Poland Army adds new cyber component with offensive capabilities”, The Record, February 8, 2022.
Social and News Media. Social media platforms usually try to stay neutral in conflicts, but Russia’s blatant aggression is hard to ignore. Google has temporarily disabled two features of Google Maps for Ukraine. One is live traffic data and the other is Live Busyness. Google says the change was made to keep Ukrainians safe. Facebook has pulled the ad feature from many Russian FB accounts. The European Union has banned Russia Today and Sputnik, the two biggest propaganda news outlets for Russia. Digital media will likely play a big role in this conflict and could mobilize public discontent on the home front in Russia. There is a lot of open source intelligence (or information) OSINT being produced by a variety of actors. Some of this OSINT relies on satellite imagery from commercial satellites that was previously only available to governments.
Negotiations? Ukrainian and Russian officials may be meeting on Monday morning (Feb 28) on the Ukrainian-Belarusian border. U.S. officials are skeptical of Russia’s intentions and believe it is just a ploy. The Ukrainian president says that taking part in the negotiations will likely not produce anything but they cannot be ignored in case there is a prospect for a cessation of hostilities. The main goal of the negotiations for Ukraine is an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine. “Ukraine and Russia to meet on Belarusian border for talks”, Washington Examiner, February 27, 2022.
EU Response. The European Foreign Ministers held a press conference after an extraordinary meeting on Sunday (Feb 27). The EU will be sending $450 million in lethal equipment to Ukraine. Poland is likely to serve as a logistics hub as it shares a long border with Ukraine. European airspace is closing down for Russian aircraft. The financial markets of Russia are being hit hard with sanctions and other punitive measures. There is concern for how Putin will respond to these sanctions, certainly he has methods of his own to strike back. Most countries in the world have come out with strong support for Ukraine. At a recent United Nations Security Council vote on a resolution about the conflict China, predictably, did not condemn the attack. Surprising some UN observers was the abstaining during the vote of India and the United Arab Emirates. President Zelensky has called for the European Union to grant it immediate membership.
NATO Response. The U.S. and other nations are keeping tabs on the military situation on the ground – and likely sending updates to Ukraine. The Global Hawk drone and JSTARS aircraft are just a few that have been in the region ‘looking in’ on things. The British have dispatched some of their RAF Typhoons to patrol NATO airspace over Poland and Romania. Prior to the invasion there were U.S. special operations forces in Ukraine working with elite Ukrainian units to enhance their special operations forces capability. It would be interesting to know what the U.S. SOF role is now? Perhaps a little remote advise and assist (RAA) is going on?
Currency. The ruble is taking a nose dive in the currency market and ATMs in Russia have gone dry. By early Monday morning it had dropped 43% in value versus the dollar. The Moscow Exchange (MOEX) will not open until Monday afternoon Moscow time.
Belarus. The country to the north of Ukraine has decided to give up non-nuclear status by voting a change to its constitution. The referendum on Sunday (Feb 27) approved a new constitution that did away with the the country’s non-nuclear status. This will allow it to host Russian nuclear weapons. Belarus is also reported to be sending paratroopers and special operations forces into Ukraine, possibly as early as Monday (Feb 28).
And Religion? As if the Ukraine conflict wasn’t complicated enough . . . now religion may be playing a role. There is a split in the Orthodox Church and it could get a little worse with the ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia. “How is Russia-Ukraine war linked to religion?“, by Peter Smith, AP News, February 27, 2022.
Nuclear Threats by Putin. On Sunday (Feb 27) Putin put Russia’s nuclear forces on a higher alert. This occurred on the same day that the Russian Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, has been fired – according to some news accounts. Some observers are a little nervous about Putin’s mental condition. Others are starting to read up on Russia’s nuclear capability and deterrence policy.
Regional Topics. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, other nations in eastern and northern Europe are on edge. Are they one of the next Russian targets? There is a lot of academic study on this topic. A recent report was done by Center for European Policy Analysis and sponsored by General Atomics and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Estonia. Read Close to the Wind: Recommendations for Baltic Sea Regional Security, CEPA, February 16, 2022. Poland has rapidly become a linchpin of U.S. military plans in Europe.
The Future? More and more Russian troops and devastating weapons will enter Ukraine and make their way to the front lines. The violence will pickup with greater casualties on each side as well as among the civilian population of the urban areas. Negotiations may be on the horizon but it is difficult to see how the two sides could come to an agreement. The talks would likely be a ploy for the Russians to buy more time to bring in additional troops, tanks, and other military assets from distant locations in Russia to Ukraine.
**********
Image: Air Force airmen load cargo for Ukraine onto an aircraft at Travis Air Force Base, California, on January 22, 2022. (Photo by Nicholas Pilch, USAF)
sof.news · by SOF News · February 28, 2022
17. Want to go fight for Ukraine? Here’s what to do.
I just hope there is not a parallel with the Spanish Civil War where a lot of foreign fighters went - We do not want to see another World War follow this.
Want to go fight for Ukraine? Here’s what to do.
Under siege by its much larger and more powerful neighbor, Ukraine has been so far able to slow down Russia’s attack, a senior U.S. defense official said Sunday morning.
But there is a long fight ahead.
“The Russians have been frustrated. They have been slowed. They have been stymied, and they have been resisted by Ukrainians, and to some degree, they’ve done it to themselves in terms of their fuel and logistics and sustainment problems,” the official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to brief reporters. “But as I said earlier, we would expect them to learn from these issues and adapt to them and try to overcome them. So I think we all need to be very sober here. in recognizing that this is combat, and combat is ugly, it’s messy, it’s bloody, and it’s not wholly predictable.
And to that end, Ukraine is calling on foreigners who want to help.
Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has created “The International Legion of Territorial Defense of Ukraine.”
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Ukraine's stiff resolve in its fight againt Russia may get a boost from those who want to come and help.
It is a new effort, a Ukrainian official tells Military Times, to help bolster the fight.
Several veterans have reached out to Military Times interested in helping Ukraine.
Before you go, this is what you need to know, according to the official, who spoke to Military Times Sunday on condition of anonymity in an interview repeatedly interrupted by ongoing airstrikes.
Here’s what veterans, other U.S. citizens or anyone else interested in helping out, need to know.
-
Apply to the Embassy of Ukraine in your country with the intention of joining the Foreign Legion of Territorial Defense of Ukraine (ask a military diplomat or consul for details). Applicants can visit the Embassy in person, call or send an email to start the process.
- Get your documents in order. This includes an ID, a passport to travel abroad, documents confirming military service or work with law enforcement agencies and participation in combat.
- Arrive at the embassy with documents for an interview with the defense attaché and the settlement of any visa issues with the consul.
- Write an application for enlistment in the Territorial Defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for military service under a contract on a voluntary basis. (This is in addition to Step 1.)
- Receive instructions on how to arrive in Ukraine and what to bring. Military clothing, equipment, helmet, body armor, combat gloves, tactical glasses, belts and vests are recommended. “It is not obligatory,” the official said, “but a foreign soldier in his national uniform looks good for the International Legion.”
- Go to Ukraine in an organized manner. Representatives of Ukrainian embassies, consulates (abroad) and Territorial Defense in Ukraine will provide assistance on the way. Contacts will be provided at the Embassy of Ukraine in your country.
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Follow for the latest Tweets on the situation in Ukraine.
Howard Altman is an award-winning editor and reporter who was previously the military reporter for the Tampa Bay Times and before that the Tampa Tribune, where he covered USCENTCOM, USSOCOM and SOF writ large among many other topics.
18. White House seeks $3.5 billion for Pentagon in Ukraine response package
And it should include funding for continued support to the resistance. Ukraine needs support across the spectrum of conflict.
Excerpts:
Likely targets for spending would be missiles and munitions to replace U.S. inventories and also to supplement the inventories of NATO allies and Ukrainian forces, Harrison said. Other funds, under the European Deterrence Initiative, could be for more resilient infrastructure in the region, improving air and missile defenses, increasing prepositioned equipment and building a larger U.S. military presence in the Baltics, Poland, Romania, and other nations.
“Beyond the specifics of what is funded, the supplemental may also serve as an important form of signaling to Russia,” Harrison said. “It would show that the United States is taking a course of action that has clear costs, has bipartisan political support, and directly improves NATO capabilities in eastern Europe. It is a credible and meaningful way of showing Russia that its actions are having the opposite intended effect.
White House seeks $3.5 billion for Pentagon in Ukraine response package
WASHINGTON ― The White House told Congress it will need $6.4 billion in new funding to respond to Russia’s war on Ukraine, including $3.5 billion for the Pentagon and another $2.9 billion to support Eastern European allies with security assistance and humanitarian aid.
The proposed $2.9 billion would be for Ukraine, Baltic countries, Poland and other affected countries and would pay for food, energy and economic assistance, as well as resources to counter Russian cyberattacks and disinformation.
Any new funds would be in addition to the $650 million in security aid and $52 million in humanitarian aid the U.S. already pledged to Ukraine over the last year as well as a prior $1 billion sovereign loan guarantee.
The proposal followed a meeting between Biden administration budget officials and congressional House and Senate leaders as well as lawmakers on key committees, Bloomberg reported.
Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., said Friday he would work with the Biden administration and across the aisle to “provide the necessary resources to respond to this unwarranted conflict, particularly to address the humanitarian crisis that is sure to escalate in the wake of Russian aggression.”
“The United States government needs to provide the necessary resources to support our allies and assist the innocent people caught in the middle of this needless calamity,” Leahy said in a statement.
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German Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht said there was a glimmer of hope, though “no certainty,” that the Russian president would shy away from crossing additional boundaries.
The details of the spending package will be negotiated and could change before they’re finalized. The Senate’s top appropriator for foreign aid, Sen. Chris Coons, D-Del., told reporters earlier in the day he thinks a bill of $10 billon or more would have strong bipartisan support.
“There is strong enthusiasm to provide ongoing resupply and training, and whatever other covert and overt support is necessary and appropriate, for the Ukrainian resistance,” Coons said. “$10 billion is probably on the low end because I’m not [including] what may be a robust defense-side request.”
Coons said the humanitarian support is needed to help Poland and other Eastern European countries cope with an expected flood of refugees from Ukraine.
Sen. Lindsey Graham, a senior Republican appropriator, has called for Congress to approve more aid to Ukraine as soon as next week, when the Senate returns from recess.
The discussion of new funding came on the same day Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy tweeted that he and Biden had discussed “concrete defense assistance,” among other matters ― and the White House confirmed the administration is talking with lawmakers to secure the aid.
“We are having ongoing conversations with Congress about additional assistance to Ukraine,” White House spokeswoman Jen Psaki told reporters on Friday. She added that the national security teams for both leaders are in close touch as the U.S. considers options for new aid.
Ukraine has been receiving a mix of military support, including U.S.-made Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and ammunition from NATO member Lithuania, and U.S.-made Javelin anti-tank weapons from Washington. Psaki told reporters U.S. military aid to Ukraine will continue.
After the Ukrainian government claimed its forces had destroyed 30 Russian tanks, 130 armored combat vehicles, seven aircraft and six helicopters on the first day of fighting, Ukraine’s ambassador to the United States Oksana Markarova declined to say how many Russian losses were due to Javelins and Stingers.
“Without disclosing what I shouldn’t be disclosing, I want to tell you that we are using them actively and very effectively,” she told reporters in Washington on Friday.
Various proposals are being floated in the wake of a joint bipartisan statement Tuesday in favor of an emergency supplemental for Ukraine. Since then, Russia launched a full-scale invasion, and Ukraine’s pleas for diplomatic, humanitarian and military aid have grown more desperate.
RELATED
“We’re examining how support can be provided in a post-invasion scenario, and no final decisions about the mechanisms have been made yet,” a U.S. official said.
An official with the White House Office of Management and Budget said that in a recent conversation with lawmakers, the administration “identified the need for additional U.S. humanitarian, security, and economic assistance to Ukraine and Central European partners due to Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified invasion.”
“As the president and bipartisan members of Congress have made clear, the United States is committed to supporting the Ukrainian people as they defend their country and democracy,” the official said in a statement. “The administration will continue to closely coordinate with our European allies and partners to assess on-the-ground needs, and remain in close touch with Congress as these needs evolve.”
Congress could meet Ukraine’s military needs with more Javelins and Stingers, but also grenade launchers, secure communications gear and other equipment for a light infantry force, according to a congressional source granted anonymity to discuss sensitive budgetary negotiations.
Over time, DoD is also likely to ask Congress to backfill operations and maintenance accounts as it mobilizes 14,000 U.S. troops in Europe to respond to the Ukraine crisis, along with six Air Force F-35 fighter jets and 32 AH-64 Army Apache helicopters.
According to Todd Harrison, director of defense budget analysis and of the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, DoD’s actual costs are relatively small for now and can be funded with existing resources.
“The direct costs of this are mainly the replacement cost of weapons transferred to Ukraine out of existing stocks and the higher operating costs of forces sent to reassure our NATO allies in the region,” Harrison said in an email. “But even some of those operating costs will be offset by reduced training costs since these deployed forces won’t be able to accomplish all of their training plans.”
Likely targets for spending would be missiles and munitions to replace U.S. inventories and also to supplement the inventories of NATO allies and Ukrainian forces, Harrison said. Other funds, under the European Deterrence Initiative, could be for more resilient infrastructure in the region, improving air and missile defenses, increasing prepositioned equipment and building a larger U.S. military presence in the Baltics, Poland, Romania, and other nations.
“Beyond the specifics of what is funded, the supplemental may also serve as an important form of signaling to Russia,” Harrison said. “It would show that the United States is taking a course of action that has clear costs, has bipartisan political support, and directly improves NATO capabilities in eastern Europe. It is a credible and meaningful way of showing Russia that its actions are having the opposite intended effect.
Joe Gould is senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national security policy, politics and the defense industry.
19. ‘The Ghost of Kyiv’ is the first urban legend of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
I want to believe too.
‘The Ghost of Kyiv’ is the first urban legend of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
I want to believe.
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As Russian missiles burned across the horizon and military aircraft prowled the skies above Kyiv, digital whispers of a lone airborne hero among the Ukrainian resistance began to emerge online. His name and his history are shrouded in mystery, but his exploits are already the stuff of modern military lore: that, with six air-to-air kills, the heroic pilot of a Ukrainian MiG-29 became the first air combat ace over European soil since World War II.
They call him ‘the Ghost of Kyiv’ — and despite thousands of digital prayers to the contrary, he is in all likelihood a work of fiction.
Based on digital activity, the first mention of the ‘Ghost of Kyiv’ appears in a series of three tweets showing a lone Ukrainian fighter jet operating over the capital:
— Aldin (@aldin_ww) February 24, 2022
— Aldin (@aldin_ww) February 24, 2022
— Aldin (@aldin_ww) February 24, 2022
These original videos were retweeted thousands of times, many of which contain messages citing ‘reports’ of a Ukrainian fighter downing several Russian fighters in air-to-air combat. Like most modern urban legends, the story was further propagated online by tech bros and lawyers-turned-Twitter-muses with large social media followings. The story only grew from there, so much so, in fact, that Spanish newspaper Marca claimed that the Ghost of Kyiv had downed two SU-35 fighters, a SU-27 fighter, a MiG-29 fighter, and two SU-25 aircraft. Even the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense appeared to feed into the story, posting footage of a MiG-29 besting a Russian aircraft that was later revealed to be from a flight simulation program.
At the moment, however, official confirmation of an air ace — the term for shooting down more than five enemy aircraft — from the Ukrainian government is, for lack of a better term, extremely sketchy. While the Ukrainian MoD on Friday hyped the story of an “air avenger” above Kyiv, the Ukrainian military’s projected Russian losses in the first two days of conflict only amounted to a reported 10 aircraft, many of which were likely downed by Ukrainian air defenses with the exception of two Russian aircraft that the Ukrainian Air Force claimed were downed by a Ukrainian SU-27 in a dogfight. Indeed, a senior U.S. defense official told reporters on Friday that Russia had not yet achieved air superiority, and that Ukrainians “still have air and missile defense capability, including aircraft … in the air that continue to engage and deny air access to Russian aircraft.” This makes the possibility of a sole air ace out of Ukraine’s potentially 98-strong fleet of combat aircraft highly unlikely.
In addition, it’s worth noting that air-to-air kills are a relatively rare occurrence in modern warfare. The most recent known instance was the shootdown of an Armenian SU-25 warplane by a Turkish F-16 fighter jet amid clashes between Azerbaijan and ethnic Armenian forces over breakaway territory Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2020. Three years prior, a U.S. Navy F/A-18 Super Hornet shot down a Syrian SU-22 fighter-bomber above Syria in the U.S. military’s first air-to-air kill since 1999. Sure, there hasn’t been a major war on European soil since the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s, but the idea of a lone fighter scoring six air-to-air kills in a single day (and in the first day of fighting, no less!) for the first time since World War II seems extremely far-fetched.
Here’s the problem with the Ghost of Kyiv. Every atom of my body tells me that this story is 99.9% bullshit, an ingenious piece of organic digital storytelling that morphed into a convenient grassroots propaganda narrative. But amid horrific images and videos of Russian aircraft allegedly firing missiles at civilian populations, I want to believe — and I know I’m not the only one.
— Matt Barry (@MBarry829) February 25, 2022
To anyone trying to downplay or deny the existence of the Ghost of Kyiv.
— PuckThePuddlePilot (@puckthepilot) February 24, 2022
The “Ghost of Kyiv” sounds like a “Ace Combat” storyline
I want so badly for it to be real
— Tom (@TomHeartsTanks) February 25, 2022
Every conflict gets the heroes it deserves, and that goes for legends as well — like that the 19th-century pirate Jean Lafitte was a battlefield hero for the United States during the Battle of New Orleans in the War of 1812, or that Mr. Rogers was a deadly sniper in Vietnam (He, in fact, was not). As the conflict in Ukraine stretches on, it’s clear that this war will be no different. The Ghost of Kyiv may be a specter of our imagination, conjured into being from three disjointed tweets, but that doesn’t make what he represents to the people of Ukraine any less real: defiant resistance in the face of certain doom. Perhaps, in that sense, the Ghost of Kyiv is real enough — for now.
What’s hot on Task & Purpose
is the executive editor of Task & Purpose. His writing has appeared in Aeon, the Los Angeles Review of Books, the New Republic, Pacific Standard, Smithsonian, and The Washington Post, among other publications. Contact the author here.
20. The Ukraine crisis and the international law of armed conflict (LOAC): some Q & A
Important background from one of our nation's foremost authorities on international law.
The Ukraine crisis and the international law of armed conflict (LOAC): some Q & A
With intense fighting underway in the Ukraine, this post in our series is designed to give brief answers to some law of armed conflict questions this invasion and subsequent crisis has generated. They are by no means full dissertations on often complicated applications of the law, but will—hopefully—help you get started with your own assessment.
Do the Geneva Conventions apply?
Yes, this is a classic state-on-state international armed conflict which, in accordance with triggers their full application. This is so even if the Russians call it a “peacekeeping” mission or whatever as Article 2 says the Conventions apply to any “armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.”
Furthermore, the Geneva Conventions have applied between Russian and the Ukraine at least since the takeover of Crimea in 2014. Why? Article 2 also says the Conventions “shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.”
This is a somewhat different body of law than that applicable to America’s post-9/11 wars. In those only common Article 3–just a sliver of the Geneva Conventions—technically applied because it is the only Article that explicitly governs conflicts involving a non-state actor. Such conflicts are considered “non-international armed conflicts” if one side is composed of non-state actors, even if the other side involves multiple countries who are “High Contracting Parties.”
Common Article 3 does provide some basic protections. Importantly, however, much—but certainly not all—of what the Geneva Conventions require in Article 2 state-on-state conflicts has migrated into what is called customary international law (CIL) applicable to non-international armed conflicts. CIL is binding on all belligerents even if not set forth in a treaty to which they are a party. One compilation of the law applicable to Article 3 conflicts is found here, and this may have application in the Ukraine in the future if the government is defeated, but an insurgency arises.
Are Ukraine and Russia parties to the Geneva Conventions and other international treaties?
Ukraine is a party to most international treaties related to armed conflict (list here). The Russian Federation is likewise a party to a range of international treaties related to armed conflict, including the four original Geneva Conventions of 1949 (list is here). Notably, however, in 2019 Russia withdrew from Protocol 1 of those conventions which contains many prohibitions intended to protect civilians during armed conflict. (See article here).
The U.S. is also not a party to Protocol 1 but accepts many of its provisions as CIL. In my opinion, the best discussion of the U.S.’s view of what is or is not CIL is found in Air Force Colonel Ted Richard’s monograph, Additionally, the U.S. Department of Defense’s perspective can found in various parts of its Law of War Manual (DoD LoW Manual).
As a general proposition, Russia does seem to recognize that CIL applies in armed conflict situations, but exactly which norms it believes apply are unclear. Consider this from a 2003 article () found in an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) publication:
[T]he Law on International Treaties that was enacted in 1995 does state in its preamble that “the Russian Federation adheres to strict observance of conventional and customary norms”. However, the very fact that customary norms are referred to only in the preamble to that law, and that it provides no further guidance as to how these norms are incorporated into Russian law, may serve as evidence of a reluctant attitude towards the integration of uncodified custom into domestic law.
If Russia violated international law by invading the Ukraine, are Russian soldiers still governed (and protected) by the law of armed conflict (LOAC)?
Yes. There are two separate bodies of law involved here. Assessing Russia’s accountability for waging of aggressive war is the purview of the jus ad bellum which governs the legality of the resort to force. Put in political terms, it determines what is an “act of war.”
The other, separate body of law is called jus in bello. The ICRC describes it as the law that “regulates the conduct of parties engaged in an armed conflict.” Here’s the key (substituting “”LOAC” for International Humanitarian Law (IHL) terminology the ICRC uses):
[LOAC] applies to the belligerent parties irrespective of the reasons for the conflict or the justness of the causes for which they are fighting. If it were otherwise, implementing the law would be impossible, since every party would claim to be a victim of aggression. Moreover, IHL is intended to protect victims of armed conflicts regardless of party affiliation. That is why jus in bello must remain independent of jus ad bellum.
To be clear, the wrongness or rightness of a belligerent’s resort to force does not determine the application of LOAC.
What is the status of the Ukrainian citizens who rise up against Russian invaders?
The Washington Post and other news outlets tell us that This raises a concept in international law many thought was an anachronism never to be seen in 21st century warfare between major nations: levee en masse. One scholar describes it as the:
…spontaneous uprising of the civilian population against an invading force – has long been a part of the modern law of armed conflict with regard to determining who may legitimately participate in armed conflict. The concept originated during the revolutionary wars in America and France, and was incorporated into the first codified rules of armed conflict. However, despite the prevalence of the category of levée en masse in the modern laws of armed conflict, there have been few, if any, instances of levée en masse taking place in modern armed conflicts.
There are LOAC requirements and implications of a levee en masse. The ICRC defines it this way:
The term applied to the inhabitants of a territory which has not been occupied, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time to organize themselves into regular armed forces. They must be regarded as combatants if they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of armed conflict. If captured they have a right to be treated as prisoners of war. The levée en masse should not be confused with resistance movements.
Note the several qualifiers for the status (e.g., acting “spontaneously”) and that it doesn’t apply to resistance movements once a country is occupied. It does, however, make the participants “combatants” which gives them immunity from prosecution by any state for, among other things, lawfully killing an enemy combatant. If captured, they get all the rights of a prisoner of war.
The DoD LoW Manual has a section devoted to this status (¶ 4.7) and points out some unique aspects not applicable to other combatants. For example, it says:
A levée en masse is a spontaneous uprising in which members have not had time to form into regular armed units. Thus, unlike other categories of lawful combatants, persons who join a levée en masse need not wear a distinctive sign nor be organized under a responsible command. The spontaneity of their response generally precludes their being able to take such measures. (Emphasis added.)
There are also downsides: persons acting as a levee en masse are lawfully targetable. I am concerned that the Russians may contend that the Ukrainian government’s “call to arms”—along with the lack of a distinctive sign designating those who have joined the levee–has turned the entire sentient adult population in the Ukraine into lawful targets.
This would be incorrect, as not everyone will join a levee en masse, and the burden remains on the attacker to have a reasonable, good faith belief that the target is a lawful one, that is, a member of a levee en masse—as difficult as that determination may be.
Still, arming and throwing untutored albeit brave persons into combat against trained and heavily armed soldiers could be costly in human capital. But with a much smaller military and without many defensive mechanisms at the onset of the invasion, the fact that the levee en masse formed certainly helped Ukraine in these early invasion stages.
But listen to this key legal note concerning who the invading force can treat as possibly belonging to a levée. The DoD LoW Manual points out “[s]hould some inhabitants form a levée en masse to defend an area, it may be justifiable for the invading force to detain all persons of military age in that area and treat them as POWs.”
What about human shields?
Russia has made vague claims about Ukrainians using human shields (see here and here) but hasn’t offered any real evidence. Of course, the use of involuntary human shields is strictly forbidden by LOAC. Human Rights Watch describes the law this way:
Belligerents are prohibited from using civilians to shield military objectives or operations from attack. “Shielding” refers to purposefully using the presence of civilians to protect military forces or areas, making them immune from attack.
Similarly, the DoD LoW Manual insists–correctly in my opinion—that “protected persons [civilians] may not be used to shield, favor, or impede military operations.” (¶ 5.12.3.4) (Keep in mind that those who join a levée en masse are no longer “protected persons” while they serve.)
What about voluntary human shields? My own view is a nuanced one (found here). The DoD LoW Manual makes this observation (¶ 5.12.3.4):
[T]he enemy use of voluntary human shields may be considered as a factor in assessing the legality of an attack. Based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case, the commander may determine that persons characterized as voluntary human shields are taking a direct part in hostilities.
The phrase “direct part in hostilities” is important because Consider then the that unarmed Ukrainian civilians are using “
There is no evidence that there is an organized effort by the Ukrainian government to try to use protected civilians as human shields to “impede military operations.” Those Ukranians who nevertheless try to use “their bodies”–with or without government involvement–to “impede” Russian military operations run the risk of finding themselves considered civilians who are taking a “direct part in hostilities.”
Such persons are subject to being targeted with lethal force, even if their effort to use “their bodies to block Russian tanks” was more of a political statement than a serious effort to physically stop the armored vehicles.
Is it legal for Russian soldiers to dress in civilian clothes to infiltrate the Ukraine?
The Washington Post reported the Ukrainian government charges that “enemy reconnaissance and sabotage groups operate insidiously, disguising themselves in civilian clothes and infiltrating cities to destabilize the situation by carrying out sabotage operations.”
The DoD LoW Manual (¶ 4.17) provides a straightforward answer:
Belligerents may employ spies and saboteurs consistent with the law of war. However, any person (including individuals who would otherwise receive the privileges of lawful combatants) engaging in spying, sabotage, or similar acts behind enemy lines, is regarded as an unprivileged belligerent while doing so. These persons forfeit entitlement to the privileges of combatant status and may be punished after a fair trial if captured.
This doesn’t mean that every soldier found behind the opposing party’s line is denied PoW status and is criminalized as a saboteur, but rather only those who act “clandestinely” by “deliberately concealing or misrepresenting one’s identity and conduct…[by wearing] a disguise, such as civilian clothes.” The Manual adds:
Persons who act openly, such as by wearing the uniform of the armed forces to which they belong, do not meet this element. For example, members of a ground reconnaissance team or couriers who wear their normal uniforms would not meet this element. In addition, observers on military reconnaissance aircraft have not been regarded as acting clandestinely or under false pretenses.
Do publishing photographs of prisoners of war violate LOAC?
Newsweek and other media sources report that various Ukrainian government entities have published photographs of persons alleged to be Russian prisoners of war. This may – or may not – violate LOAC. I addressed the law in this regard in a 2019 post (“), but let me reiterate some of it here.
Article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention (which is the provision in question here) does not prohibit, per se, the release of photos or videos of prisoners of war. Here’s what Article 13 says in relevant part: “prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.”
So, yes, sometimes releasing photos or video may constitute “insults and public curiosity” from which the prisoner is to be protected. That is not, however, always the case. One way to discern if the prohibition applies in a particular instance is to evaluate the “intent” behind a given video or photo release.
In his 2016 textbook on the law of armed conflict, Prof Gary Solis agrees, saying that whether or not a photo release amounts to violation “”
Solis adds this important observation:
[I]t may be argued that there is an overblown sensitivity to showing any photos whatsoever of captives. As long as the camera does not linger on a particular captive, show him or her in humiliating poses or situations, or use the picture for propaganda purposes, the necessary mens rea, or culpable negligence for a criminal prosecution, is absent. Even the brief image of a prisoner’s face in the context of a legitimate informational account should not lead to concern for a prisoner’s protection under the Geneva Convention.
So was there an intent to “humiliate the captive” by the Ukrainian release? To “use the picture for propaganda purposes”?
Based on the scant information found in press reports, it is close call as to whether it was permissible to distribute the photos at this point. But the case might be made that, given the potential of the Russian disinformation machine, it was important to demonstrate in advance of any allegation that the Ukrainians were taking prisoners as LOAC requires, and that the captives were in good shape.
Still, the bottom line is that prisoners of war should not be propaganda tools.
Can other countries supply weapons and war supplies to the Ukraine without being a co-belligerent in war?
President Biden committed to providing over a billion dollars in security assistance to the Ukraine, but this does not, in my view, make the U.S. a co-belligerent with the Ukraine in its war with Russia. There are, however, scholars who may differ. For example, one concluded in 2015:
[T]he systematic or substantial supply of war materials, military troops, or financial support in association, cooperation, assistance or common cause with another belligerent would make it a co-belligerent.
Nevertheless, although the U.S. and other countries may be providing substantial military supplies to the Ukraine, I don’t think that fact, alone, would be sufficient to characterize the U.S. (and NATO) as co-belligerents with the Ukraine in the war with Russia.
Determining the precise legal status of the U.S. and that of other countries supplying weaponry is tricky. The best option may be to consider the U.S. as being, technically, a neutral in the context of international law, notwithstanding its aggressive support of the Ukraine as a matter of international politics.
That, however, doesn’t end the conversation. The law of neutrality is very complex, but a traditional interpretation would say:
A neutral State violates neutrality by breaching its obligation to remain impartial and to not participate in the conflict. For instance, a State would violate neutrality by supplying warships, arms, ammunition, military provisions or other war materials, either directly or indirectly, to a belligerent, by engaging its own military forces, or by supplying military advisors to a party to the armed conflict.
However, the DoD LoW Manual notes (¶15.2.2) that “before its entry into World War II, the United States adopted a position of ‘qualified neutrality’ in which neutral States had the right to support belligerent States that had been the victim of flagrant and illegal wars of aggression.”
This is, the Manual readily acknowledges, a controversial position. It may be one that was thought to have been obviated by the emergence of the UN Charter with its Security Council system. However, given Russia’s ability to veto any Security Council action, ‘qualified neutrality’ may enjoy a renaissance in opinio juris and, especially. state practice.
Nevertheless, even assuming a breach of neutrality because of the supply of war material to the Ukraine, I don’t consider that to be enough to earn a characterization as a co-belligerent for the U.S. or it’s allied. That said, it could be possible to interpret CIL so as to make any war material (“contraband”) heading to the Ukraine subject to interdiction or even attack enroute.
Does it violate LOAC to use “ballistic missiles and other explosive weapons with wide area effects in densely populated areas”?
“The Russian military has shown a blatant disregard for civilian lives by using ballistic missiles and other explosive weapons with wide area effects in densely populated areas. Some of these attacks may be war crimes. The Russian government, which falsely claims to use only precision-guided weapons, should take responsibility for these acts,” said Agnes Callamard, Amnesty International’s Secretary General.
It is true that an indiscriminate attack on an urban area, that is, one that fails to adequately distinguish between military targets and civilian objects, would be a serious LOAC violation. However, that does not mean any use of “ballistic missiles and other explosive weapons with wide area effects” in an urban area is, ipso facto, a LOAC breach as it is possible to use them lawfully. Like so many others aspects of LOAC, the facts matter.
In 2020 the former Judge Advocate General of the Army noted that the “International Committee of the Red Cross and other nongovernmental organizations advocate regularly that wide area effect weapons in urban areas should be prohibited.” After commenting on the nature of future war, he contended that “notions that high explosives in cities violate LOAC are not just unworkable in the next war – it is not the law.”
I expand on my view here, but the key point is this:
There are plenty of weapons the ICRC wants banned from urban conflict that can be used in particular situations in full compliance with the law of war. As I’ve said before, the better way to protect civilians is not weapons’ bans, but rather strict adherence to the core principles of the law of war.
In short, I wouldn’t be surprised if in this case the Russians actually did use these weapons in an indiscriminate way, but it’s a mistake to automatically assume that the using “ballistic missiles and other explosive weapons with wide area effects in densely populated areas” always violates LOAC.
If commercial satellites, social media, and other “open source” capabilities become de factor intelligence sources for belligerent militaries, what are the LOAC implications? What about the hostile use of cyber?
There could be LOAC implications, and these are discussed in more detail in these posts: and
Furthermore, Mike Schmitt has a superb post with additional information, particularly about how the U.S. and NATO countries might react to hostile cyber operations conducted by Russia. Here’s what his article addresses:
This article examines how the feared Russian cyber operations would be characterized under international law and outlines the response options open to States targeted by them. The analysis is, among other things, a cautionary note to those who would too readily jump to describing such Russian operations as an “attack” that triggers the alliance’s collective self-defense mechanism. It is important to sort through the more likely scenarios of Russian-led activity below that threshold, as well as if that threshold is crossed. And it’s important to comprehend how the legal framework applies to Russian use of non-state actors to carry out such operations.
So, yes, you need to read it.
Are flamethrowers legal?
A recent media headline read “TOS-1 isn’t like a handheld flamethrower that you might imagine as itself spewing flames, but rather a 24 rocket system mounted on the chassis of an armored vehicle. The rockets can be incendiary or thermobaric, and here’s a description:
The TOS-1A heavy flamethrower system is intended for direct fire support of advancing infantry and main battle tanks, and moves in their combat orders. It is extremely effective against entrenched personnel. The TOS-1A is used to clear out buildings, field fortifications and bunkers. It is also effective against light armored vehicles. The heavy flamethrower system is generally similar to multiple launch rocket systems, however it fires different types of rockets and has a shorter firing range.
These are, however, terrifying weapons. A thermobaric munition is described this way:
Dubbed the ‘father of all bombs’, a thermobaric weapon works by using oxygen from the surrounding air to generate a high-temperature explosion, making it far deadlier than a conventional weapon…The so-called ‘vacuum bombs’ are capable of vapourising (sic) human bodies, crushing internal organs and reducing cities to rubble causing huge loss of life.
It is further prohibited to make any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by means of incendiary weapons other than air-delivered incendiary weapons, except when such military objective is clearly separated from the concentration of civilians and all feasible precautions are taken with a view to limiting the incendiary effects to the military objective and to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.
Thus, although the U.S. has a reservation to this prohibition that retains the right to use incendiary weapons “where it is judged that such use would cause fewer casualties and/or less collateral damage than alternative weapons,” it seems clear that there would be few instances where they could be used near civilians and still comply with LOAC’s proportionality analysis.
However, as one official put it, Russians And, that, of course, is a defining point.
Concluding thoughts
No doubt there will be more issues, and the answers above may need to be revised (and, perhaps corrected), especially as new facts come to light. Facts matter. Laws matter. Context matters.
It is extremely important that we do our best to get the LOAC right, and have it properly and fairly applied, even as we are appalled by the terrible invasion and crisis unfolding in the Ukraine.
What we pray for is that this unnecessary and life-threatening war ends quickly. While we need laws as a framework, all the laws in the world can’t take the place of the morality of respecting and valuing freedom and human life.
Remember what we like to say on Lawfire®: gather the facts, examine the law, evaluate the arguments – and then decide for yourself!
21. Former national security adviser: 'Putin got a lot more than he bargained for' (HR McMaster)
Former national security adviser: 'Putin got a lot more than he bargained for'
The Hill · by Joseph Choi · February 27, 2022
H.R. McMaster, who served as former President Trump's national security adviser, said on Sunday that Russian President Vladimir Putin "got a lot more than he bargained for" when he invaded Ukraine last week.
Appearing on CBS's "Face the Nation," McMaster said Ukrainian forces have done a "tremendous" job.
"I think Putin got a lot more than he bargained for. He's in a very difficult position," McMaster told host Margaret Brennan. "And I think anything we can do obviously financially — going after his international criminal enterprise with sanctions and so forth is important. But the support for Ukraine's ability to defend themselves is also important."
McMaster added that Putin had failed to understand that Ukraine is not an autocratic regime where a political decapitation would be effective.
"The Ukrainian people are fighting for their freedom. They're fighting for democracy. They're fighting for one another and their sovereignty and that just doesn't go away if he's able to seize Kyiv " he said. "I don't think seizing Kyiv is in the cards in the immediate future. The next 72 hours I think are going to be really critical."
Ukraine's capital city of Kyiv is still under Ukrainian control as of Sunday morning. Thousands of Ukrainians, many of whom are civilians, have taken up arms to defend the nation against Russia.
McMaster also said while discussing the Biden administration's support for Ukraine that there are multiple military options available outside of the U.S. directly going to war with Russia.
According to the former White House official, efforts could be made to reopen commercial airline flights in Ukraine in order to relieve "humanitarian suffering" as well maintain open land routes to neighboring countries like Poland, Romania and Moldova.
Another option for the U.S. to militarily support Ukraine would be to resupply Ukrainians with weapons, McMaster said.
The Hill · by Joseph Choi · February 27, 2022
22. Joe Biden Has Only Days to Avoid Becoming Jimmy Carter
I think the huge difference will be if there is success in Ukraine and the Russians are defeated. This could be a major inflection point in international relations. Unfortunately the Ukraine crisis will likely make the economy worse before it gets better.
Joe Biden Has Only Days to Avoid Becoming Jimmy Carter
Rampant inflation, foreign policy fiascoes and failed sanctions — is America back in a national malaise?
ByNiall Ferguson
February 27, 2022, 6:39 PM EST
It is just over a year since some eminent historians were comparing Joe Biden to Franklin Roosevelt or Lyndon Johnson and hailing the advent of a “transformative” presidency. My response at the time was that it was more likely to be a reprise of Jimmy Carter’s. This is starting to look as good a prediction as my Jan. 2 call that war was coming to Ukraine.
It was on July 15, 1979, that Jimmy Carter delivered what came to be known as his “malaise” address to the nation — though the word did not appear in the text. Intended as a bold, broad-brush speech about “about national concerns, the energy crisis, reorganizing the government, our nation’s economy, and issues of war and especially peace,” it has gone down in history as a political suicide note.
“It’s clear,” Carter said, “that the true problems of our nation are much deeper … than gasoline lines or energy shortages, deeper even than inflation or recession.” He quoted one of many American religious leaders and intellectuals with whom he’d recently spoken: “We are confronted with a moral and a spiritual crisis.” He went on dolefully:
A crisis of confidence … strikes at the very heart and soul and spirit of our national will. We can see this crisis in the growing doubt about the meaning of our own lives and in the loss of a unity of purpose for our nation. The erosion of our confidence in the future is threatening to destroy the social and the political fabric of America. … Our people are losing … faith, not only in government itself but in the ability as citizens to serve as the ultimate rulers and shapers of our democracy.
No one now remembers the solutions Carter proposed to the energy crisis, nor the fact that, eventually (in the 2010s), at least some of them were adopted — in particular, the development of America’s own oil and gas resources to reduce its dependence on imported oil. Although the speech was initially well-received, it was Carter’s downbeat litany of the nation’s woes that stuck. And the reason it stuck was that the man who would defeat him in the 1980 presidential election — Ronald Reagan — offered a lethal critique. “I find no national malaise,” declared Reagan. “I find nothing wrong with the American people.”
For Reagan, the problems of America had much more to do with the failure of the Carter administration to overcome the chronic problem of inflation and — more importantly — to abandon the strategy of detente with the Soviet Union that Reagan had begun criticizing under President Richard Nixon, who had initiated it.
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The reason Reagan’s critique resonated with voters was simple: There really was a clear causal link between foreign policy failures and inflation. Carter delivered his speech between two major geopolitical disasters: the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. On Feb. 11 that year, the ailing and absent Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was deposed and power handed to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. On April 1, Iranians voted to turn their country into an Islamic Republic. By the end of the year, Khomeini was installed as its “supreme leader.”
In itself, the revolution was a policy calamity in the Middle East for the U.S., which had underwritten the shah’s regime as a counterweight to Iraq (where Saddam Hussein also came to power in 1979). But the scale of the disaster was brought home to Americans in November, when revolutionary Islamist students seized control of the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took 52 of its staff hostage, in retaliation for the deposed shah’s admission to the U.S. for cancer treatment.
Meanwhile, a quite different revolution in Afghanistan led to one of the decisive events of the Cold War. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan had been established in 1978 by army officers sympathetic to Soviet communism. However, the new regime’s attempts to secularize a deeply traditional Muslim and ethnically fragmented society backfired. Convinced that Afghanistan would slip out of the Soviet sphere of influence, and aware of Central Intelligence Agency support for the antigovernment mujahideen, the senile Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev was finally persuaded by his more hawkish colleagues to intervene.
On Christmas Day 1979, Soviet airborne forces began to land in Kabul. Within days, the Afghan president had been executed — Moscow had lost all confidence in him — and 100,000 Red Army troops were in the country. (The last of them left, defeated, 10 years later.)
It is worth recalling how Carter reacted to these events. In the case of Iran, he infamously ordered a rescue mission — Operation Eagle Claw — that ended in humiliating failure on April 24, 1980, when one of the U.S. helicopters intended to evacuate the hostages crashed into a transport aircraft, killing eight American servicemen. But he also imposed economic sanctions, freezing about $8.1 billion in Iranian assets and imposing a trade embargo.
In the case of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter again opted for sanctions. He placed an embargo on shipments of commodities such as grain to the Soviet Union and suspended high-technology exports. He also boycotted the 1980 Olympics in Moscow and withdrew the SALT II treaty from consideration by the Senate.
Carter’s approval rating had touched an all-time low of 28% in June 1979 and, despite rallying briefly in early 1980, never got back above 40% as the election campaign unfolded. Inflation, which had stood at 5.2% in the month of Carter’s inauguration, hit an all-time high of 14.6% in April 1980, driven skyward by the surge in oil prices that followed the Iranian Revolution.
In January 1979, the spot crude price for a barrel of West Texas Intermediate had been $14.85. By July 1980 it had more than doubled to $39.50. Carter tried to counter inflation by nominating Paul Volcker to be Fed chair in July 1979. But, as Milton Friedman long ago taught us, monetary policy operates with long and variable lags. Inflationary expectations were not truly broken until 1982.
If all of this sounds strangely familiar, it is because we are living through our own version of these events. Karl Marx memorably observed that history repeats itself “the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.” But sometimes you just get two tragedies in succession.
Now, as then, we have witnessed a foreign power sucked into the maelstrom of Afghanistan and defeated — except that this time it was the U.S. and its allies who lost, not the Soviets. Now, as then, we have witnessed an odious regime in Moscow order the invasion of a sovereign state — except that this time it is Ukraine, not Afghanistan. Now, as then, Iran is humiliating a Democratic administration — except that this time the humiliation takes the form of reckless concessions as Team Biden attempts to resuscitate the 2015 nuclear deal in the desperate hope of lowering gasoline prices by releasing Iranian oil to the world market.
Now, as then, inflationary pressures that originated in lax fiscal and monetary policies are being exacerbated by geopolitical events, and the Federal Reserve is woefully behind the curve. Now, as then, the American public is emerging from one of its periodic bouts of introspection (“We’re so divided, it really sucks”) into one of its equally recurrent bouts of global engagement (“These bad people will be a threat to us someday if we don’t do something”). According to a new ABC poll, Biden’s approval rating is now down to 37%, compared with 50% last June.
Let me put it simply: The Biden presidency is teetering on the verge of a foreign policy cascade of disaster as bad as — and potentially worse than — Carter’s in 1979, with obvious implications for his and his party’s political future this year and in 2024. The president and his national security team have made multiple blunders since taking over from President Donald Trump, who, despite his odious admiration of Russian leader Vladimir Putin and generally erratic conduct, managed to redefine U.S. national security strategy, deter America’s principal rivals from aggression, and even to strengthen somewhat the military position of Ukraine.
After his election, Biden boasted: “America is back.” It turns out he meant “on its back.” The most salient errors of the past 13 months have been the ignominious surrender of Afghanistan to the Taliban (yes, it was Trump’s “peace” deal, but the execution errors were all Biden’s) and the naive belief that Putin could be deterred from invading Ukraine by the threat of economic sanctions, or by publicizing U.S. intelligence about invasion plans, or by somehow getting the Chinese to dissuade him.
Biden is very fortunate in the press coverage he gets from the New York Times and Washington Post, who were a great deal tougher in their coverage of Carter. This has been an unmitigated debacle, culminating not merely in the biggest war Europe has witnessed since the end of World War II but in a potentially much larger challenge to the security of the U.S. and its allies.
Let us have no illusions. Though the Ukrainian resistance to the Russian invasion is heroic — and the pitch-perfect war leadership of President Volodymyr Zelenskiy deeply impressive — there is very little chance as things stand that Putin can lose this war. His forces may have encountered more effective opposition than they expected, and they have certainly suffered much greater losses than Putin foresaw, but the Russians retain overwhelming superiority. If the Blitzkrieg fails, they can switch to pure Blitz, bombarding Ukraine into submission.
Kyiv has held out bravely. If the Ukrainians’ struggle for independence and freedom does not move you, then you have forgotten what it is to be an American. But no, wars are not won by Facebook posts, no matter how inspirational. There is every reason to fear a brutal Russian escalation that leaves multiple cities, including Kyiv, in ruins, and Zelenskiy dead or a captive.
No sanctions — not even the most stringent currently under discussion — can avert this outcome, any more than sanctions reversed the Iranian Revolution or forced the Soviets out of Afghanistan in 1979-80. In that sense, the current debate about the SWIFT global messaging and payment system is really a distraction. No amount of financial pain, whether it is inflicted on Putin personally, the Russian banks, the Russian central bank or the entire Russian population, can stop the bombardment of Kyiv. Even a ban on Western imports of Russian oil and natural gas — which remains highly unlikely, given the difficulty and cost of swiftly replacing those source of energy — would not deter Putin from pursuing his war by all means necessary to secure victory.
Putin is a student of history. He knows the fate that awaits Russian leaders who lose wars. We all recall what befell the last Romanov tsar, Nicholas II, who not only suffered defeat in World War I, but also lost the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, a defeat that triggered the first of two Russian Revolutions.
But another sobering case that Putin must ponder is the wretched fate of Nicholas I, who went to war with the Ottoman Empire in 1853 only to find Russia isolated and faced with an Anglo-French expedition to Crimea that culminated in the fall of Sevastopol. Though he died of pneumonia in 1855, it was said that the tsar refused treatment as the ignominy of losing the Crimean War was intolerable to him.
This is why Putin has so drastically upped the ante on Sunday by condemning Western sanctions as “illegitimate” and placing Russia’s deterrence — i.e., nuclear — forces on “a special regime of duty.” The real point of this threat (a classic Cold War ploy) is to deter hawks in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries from contemplating a no-fly zone over Ukraine.
There are clearly serious risks of escalation here. Putin has gambled his life on this invasion. He will certainly not hesitate to sacrifice the lives of thousands if not millions of people if he believes it is the only way to preserve his own. The fact that there is already a live cyberwar that almost certainly involves NATO countries attacking Russian websites means that the conflict has already spilled over beyond the borders of Ukraine.
Russia is using Belarus as a launchpad for its ground forces and perhaps for missiles, too. Turkey has closed the Black Sea Straits to at least some Russian naval vessels. Finland and Sweden are seriously considering joining NATO. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has just announced a long-overdue increase to the country’s defense budget, part of an astonishing sea change in German politics precipitated by this war.
Finally, there is a major danger that, if Putin is successful in his war of aggression, other dictators around the world will be emboldened to adopt similar lawless methods. The most obvious risk is that, after President Xi Jinping has secured his third term as China’s leader, he will turn to “reunification” with Taiwan, which remains his most cherished political goal. Taiwan matters more to American global predominance than Ukraine, not least because of its key role as the world’s most advanced semiconductor manufacturer. At the same time, Taiwan’s people are highly unlikely to fight as tenaciously as the Ukrainians against an invading neighbor.
When the shoes start dropping in foreign affairs, it can start to resemble a Foot Locker in an earthquake. If 1979 was Carter’s annus horribilis, 1980 was only a little better, with the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in September. (He was fortunate that the Soviets waited until 1981 to give the green light to martial law in Poland to suppress the trade union Solidarity.)
I fear 2023 could turn out much worse. And I dread a 2024 election that delivers the White House not to a new Ronald Reagan — I’m looking at you, Ron DeSantis — but back to Donald Trump. Trump’s version of the “madman theory” of foreign policy may have worked once, but it would be collective madness to risk four more years of it.
So what can Biden do to salvage this situation? There is of course an urgent need to break Russia’s power as an energy exporter to Europe, which has been the key to Putin’s military buildup and to the passivity, not to say appeasement, favored by many European politicians until now. Along with Citadel’s Ken Griffin, I made the case last week for a rapid reorientation of Europe’s energy imports to U.S. natural gas. But such a shift will take years. Like sanctions — indeed, like most forms of economic warfare — it cannot decide a conflict that is raging, any more than the British blockade of Germany was the decisive factor in World War I.
To avoid the fate of Carter, I believe Biden needs to go back further in time than 1979 and reflect on how Henry Kissinger played a not dissimilar geopolitical crisis in October 1973, when a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. (If your memory needs refreshing, I recommend Martin Indyk’s excellent new book on the subject.) Recall that Israel, like Ukraine today, was not a NATO member and could expect no support from the UN Security Council, not least because of the Soviet presence as a permanent member of that body.
At the risk of over-simplification, Kissinger’s approach can be summarized as follows. First, he ensured that Israel received U.S. military arms to the extent necessary to avert defeat, but not on such a scale that they could humiliate the Arabs. Second, he seized the diplomatic initiative, ensuring that any peace would be brokered by the U.S., with the Soviets effectively excluded. Third, Kissinger was himself willing to use a heightened nuclear alert to intimidate Moscow.
These are precisely the things the Biden administration is not doing. Although the U.S. has been arming Ukraine, the amounts involved — $60 million in the fall, $200 million in December and now a further $350 million — are not nearly enough to ensure Ukraine survives the Russian onslaught. The amount needs to be at least tripled and the hardware needs to start arriving on Ukrainian soil in U.S. military aircraft, as it arrived in Israel in 1973, tomorrow. If Kyiv falls, the supplies to sustain Ukrainian resistance must continue.
In Operation Cyclone, the Carter and Reagan administrations provided $6.2 billion in military assistance to the mujahideen to help them fight the Soviets. (That’s $24 billion in 2022 dollars.) We need to help on a comparable scale brave Ukrainian partisans who continue the fight against Putin.
Secondly, if the military balance can belatedly be restored and a Russian victory averted, the U.S. needs to initiate the peace negotiations in the role of broker. That means Secretary of State Antony Blinken needs to take a crash course in shuttle diplomacy, ensuring that all the interested parties are brought on board, and that it is America and not Russia that calls the shots. Here, sanctions may provide some leverage. If they do not, there is always Defcon 3. It worked in October 1973.
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Contrary to popular belief, another loathsome Russian dictator named Vladimir — Lenin — never said: “There are decades where nothing happens, there are weeks where decades happen.” The real quote is from a letter Marx wrote to Friedrich Engels in 1863. “Only your small-minded German philistine,” declared Marx, “who measures world history by ... what he happens to think are ‘interesting news items,’ could regard 20 years as more than a day where major developments of this kind are concerned, though these may be again succeeded by days into which 20 years are compressed.”
It does feel as if 20 years have been compressed into the past week. But only by applying history from 50 years ago can Joe Biden now rescue his presidency from terminal malaise.
This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
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23. Can Intelligence Tell How Far Putin Will Go?
Assessing intention is the hardest part of any intelligence estimate.
Excepts:
Now that Russia’s military onslaught against Ukraine is underway, and Putin has ordered his nuclear forces on special alert, how far will he go? That is the intelligence foreign decision-makers a desperately searching for.
In April 1946, as the Iron Curtain went up in Europe, the new U.S. ambassador in Moscow, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, later U.S. director of central intelligence, met with Stalin in the Kremlin. The West was spying blind about his intentions for post-war Europe. The Soviet dictator doodled while the general spoke. “What does the Soviet Union want and how far is Russia going to go?” he asked. “We’re not going to go much further,” Stalin eventually replied. How far that was, though, nobody in the West knew.
The same applies to Putin’s intentions for Ukraine today. Hopefully the intelligence available to Washington today continues to be far better than it was at the onset of the first Cold War.
Can Intelligence Tell How Far Putin Will Go? - War on the Rocks
In a press conference at the end of last week, U.S. President Joe Biden said he was “convinced” that Russian President Vladimir Putin had decided to invade Ukraine. Asked why, he said simply: “We have a significant intelligence capability.”
Understanding the intentions of a foreign autocratic leader, particularly one shielded from the outside world and reliant on a small group of trusted advisors, is the Holy Grail for any intelligence service. America’s spies, and their British colleagues, appear to have succeeded in that quest. We in the public are unlikely to know how until the relevant documents are declassified decades from now. But history can offer some hints about how Biden knows what he knows and why he has chosen to disclose some of this information publicly.
Cold War archives show that accurate warnings about an adversary’s intentions and capabilities were seldom, if ever, the result of a single kind of intelligence. Rather, they were invariably achieved through combinations of intelligence from human and technical sources. Today, open-source intelligence is also playing an increasingly important role. The specific mix of intelligence sources can influence what information a government publicly shares. As demonstrated during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, presidents can best deploy intelligence in their diplomacy when the risk of burning sources is low.
The Human Factor
Human intelligence provides unique insights into what a foreign leader is thinking. This is especially the case with Putin, who, given his KGB background, is acutely aware of foreign intelligence capabilities and would resist risking interception by putting his intentions into writing before the last possible moment. Thus, even in an era of pervasive data, a human agent (or, more colloquially, a spy) with access to a foreign leader’s whispered secrets can still give unique insights into their mindset and motivations.
During the Cold War, it does not appear that any Western intelligence agency managed to recruit a spy with access to the innermost decision-making inside the Kremlin. The Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc satellite states were, at key points during the conflict, graveyards for Western spy services. Ubiquitous surveillance in countries behind the Iron Curtain, severe restrictions on movements of Western intelligence officers working under diplomatic cover there (“your papers, please”), frequent intimidation (pictures rearranged in apartments, letting you know you’ve had a visitor), and physical harassment hamstrung their abilities to recruit and meet agents. Under relentless pressure in Moscow, Western intelligence officers burned out even after relatively short periods of service. In the later Cold War, the CIA would invent ingenious and elaborate disguises for its officers just to get out of U.S. embassies behind the Iron Curtain to meet sources.
By contrast, the Soviet Union’s intelligence services were able to exploit the relative freedoms in Western countries with devastating effect, recruiting agents at the heart of their decision-making at key stages of the Cold War. Thanks to Joseph Stalin’s agents, the British and U.S. governments were effectively practicing open diplomacy towards the Soviet Union as the Cold War set in. Stalin knew more secrets about the Western powers than they ever knew about his intentions or capabilities. This is dramatically revealed in recently opened British intelligence dossiers on members of the Cambridge Five network and their Soviet handlers.
Given the colossal difficulties of human intelligence within the Soviet bloc, it is incredible that Western agencies achieved what they did. They were never able to enter the Kremlin’s inner sanctum, but they did get windows into it. Before the Cuban Missile Crisis, MI6 and the CIA ran a significant agent inside the Soviets’ Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), Oleg Penkovsky. His story has recently been portrayed in the brilliantly acted but not entirely accurate film The Courier. Penkovsky provided his British and American handlers, in safe houses in Britain and Paris and hair-raising meetings in Moscow itself, with intelligence from deep inside the Main Intelligence Directorate. Penkovsky’s espionage revealed that Soviet claims about having a vast nuclear arsenal were a bluff. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev knew that he was outgunned by the United States and, thanks to Penkovsky, President John F. Kennedy knew this too.
Penkovsky’s intelligence (codenamed IRONBARK) contributed to Kennedy’s brinksmanship during his 13-day nuclear standoff with the Soviet Union during the crisis. The intelligence that Kennedy and his advisers received was a combination of human intelligence and technical intelligence collection from CIA U-2 spy planes, as well as signals intelligence collected by the National Security Agency about Soviet vessels en route to Cuba and its missiles on the island. The Cuban Missile Crisis is a case study for how different sources of intelligence can be combined to provide decision-makers in the Oval Office with timely, relevant, and accurate insights into the intentions and capabilities of an adversary pushing to the brink of war.
Twelve years later, MI6 recruited a significant agent inside the KGB, Oleg Gordievsky. Again, his window into the Kremlin had profound consequences for the West. To MI6’s delight, Gordievsky managed to become a senior officer in the KGB’s station (“residency”) in London itself, providing his British handlers there with the motherload of real-time stolen Soviet secrets. From his position in London until his hair-raising exfiltration by MI6 from Moscow in 1985, Gordievsky revealed secrets about the Kremlin and KGB’s mindset regarding the West. According to the U.S. director of central intelligence and later secretary of defense, Robert Gates, Gordievsky’s intelligence was as “scarce as hen’s teeth.” It showed that, contrary to the Kremlin’s public bravado, Moscow was deeply afraid about the U.S. government’s overwhelming military superiority. Gordievsky warned that what Washington considered defense and security seemed to Moscow like offense and aggression. His intelligence contributed to a sea-change in President Ronald Reagan’s strategic thinking about the Soviet Union. He pulled back from his previous bellicose public comments about the Soviet Union being an “Evil Empire,” which, Gordievsky revealed, had only made the Politburo more alarmed. When Gordievsky revealed that Moscow’s intentions were driven by fear, Reagan realized he could find accommodation with the Soviet Union.
Delicate Disclosure Decisions
During the Ukraine crisis today, the U.S. government has been rolling out declassified intelligence, almost in real time, to deter Putin by preempting his plans, tactics, and strategy. This, again, is not unprecedented. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy disclosed U.S. imagery intelligence from U-2 spy planes showing Soviet missiles in Cuba. In one highly charged occasion during an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council, Soviet ambassador Valerian Zorin poured scorn on “the falsified evidence of the US Intelligence Agency.” Kennedy, who was watching the debate on television, authorized the U.S. ambassador at the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, to “stick it to him”: he produced U.S. photographs of the Soviet missiles on large easels. Stevenson humiliated Zorin before the world’s press, and Zorin was left to respond lamely, “Mr. Stevenson, we shall not look at your photographs.”
The reason why Kennedy was willing to disclose the intelligence he had on Soviet missiles in Cuba was because it did not risk blowing sources or methods not already known in the Kremlin. The hitherto top-secret U-2 spy plane program had already been exposed to the Soviet government when, two years earlier in May 1960, one of its pilots, Gary Powers, had been shot down over the Soviet Union and survived.
We do not know whether the Kremlin today knows, or can guess, the nature of the “significant intelligence capability” that the U.S. government has. Before Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. election, the CIA reportedly had a human source close to Putin, who gave it the confidence to conclude that Putin had personally ordered the intelligence operation against the United States. Following in Gordievsky’s footsteps, the CIA apparently exfiltrated that source from Russia. The CIA may have done it again now: who knows. If the U.S. intelligence capability is unknown in Moscow, Biden may be going further than Kennedy by risking a still-secret source or method to similarly “stick it” to Putin and reveal details about his ambitions.
There is some evidence to suggest that U.S. intelligence came from signals intelligence (SIGINT): intercepted communications of Russian-allied forces chatting about Ukraine invasion plans. If the capability is indeed derived from signals intelligence or technical cyber collection, it may have a shorter lifespan, which could lessen the cost of revealing it. If it is derived from a human source, however, it would raise the threshold for releasing its details, because a life would literally be at stake. Russia’s intelligence services have a long tradition of executing spies in their ranks. The KGB identified Penkovsky as a Western spy, arrested him, and executed him: most likely with a ritual bullet to the back of his neck in the basement of KGB headquarters, though rumors swirled that he was tied up with chicken wire and cremated alive in a furnace as a warning to other officers. MI6 decided to exfiltrate Gordievsky when it became clear that his life was at risk in Moscow.
New and Open Sources
Although there is much discussion about a new Cold War, the world has changed in the thirty years since the last one. Replaying the first Cold War’s best intelligence hits would be a broken record. The most important difference between now and then is the significant role of open-source intelligence in our new interconnected digital world. Ukraine is already the first TikTok war, a conflict for us all to see online. We scarcely needed secret intelligence to identify Russia’s massive military build-up on Ukraine’s borders.
During the Cold War, 80 percent of intelligence on the Soviet Union came from secret sources, with 20 percent from open sources. In today’s age of ubiquitous data, those proportions are thought to be exactly reversed. Consider satellite imagery. Until relatively recently, it used to be the sole preserve of governments, using highly classified and expensive satellite collection platforms. Now it is freely and commercially available. This is not the only arena. Outfits like Bellingcat are showing how open-source intelligence can be used to reveal Russia’s malign actives in ways that, in the past, would have been laborious operations for a foreign intelligence service.
Open-source intelligence is not, however, foolproof. Its strengths can also be its weaknesses. With the proliferation of people reporting from their phones, it is arguably easier than ever to disseminate disinformation. It is not difficult to imagine that, knowing how many eyeballs are on him, Putin would order Russian troops to do things like move in the wrong direction. TikTok videos of those troops, picked up by Western media, would then spread the deception. They would be the modern equivalent of the inflatable tanks and balsawood guns that British and U.S. intelligence used to deceive the Luftwaffe before D-Day. Another potential ploy: Knowing that Russian downstream military orders are being intercepted by every intelligence service worth the name, Russian commanders could deliberately disseminate illogical instructions. Doing something illogical is the surest way to confuse foreign spy chiefs.
At times, of course, the most useful intelligence can be the most obvious. It is rare for dictators to telegraph their intentions to the world, though in some cases they do so. If Western intelligence services had spent more time reading Adolf Hitler’s Main Kampf, they would have been better positioned to understand his intentions and capabilities before 1939. It turns out that when Putin publicly stated that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest catastrophe in the twentieth century, he meant it. He really wants to correct what he sees as the “injustices” arising from it. Putin’s long history essay published in July 2021, and then his angry speech on Monday this week after a choreographed Russian national security council meeting, are the ramblings of a fanatic. The problem for the world is that, like Hitler, this fanatic runs a country. This is why foreign intelligence services also employ psychologists to understand Putin’s mindset and how far he will likely go with a war.
How Far?
Now that Russia’s military onslaught against Ukraine is underway, and Putin has ordered his nuclear forces on special alert, how far will he go? That is the intelligence foreign decision-makers a desperately searching for.
In April 1946, as the Iron Curtain went up in Europe, the new U.S. ambassador in Moscow, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, later U.S. director of central intelligence, met with Stalin in the Kremlin. The West was spying blind about his intentions for post-war Europe. The Soviet dictator doodled while the general spoke. “What does the Soviet Union want and how far is Russia going to go?” he asked. “We’re not going to go much further,” Stalin eventually replied. How far that was, though, nobody in the West knew.
The same applies to Putin’s intentions for Ukraine today. Hopefully the intelligence available to Washington today continues to be far better than it was at the onset of the first Cold War.
Calder Walton is the assistant director of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Applied History Project, and director of research of its Intelligence Project. His new book, Spies: Russia’s Hundred Year Intelligence War with the West, will be published by Simon & Schuster (U.S.) and Little Brown (U.K.).
24. The New Russian Sanctions Playbook - Deterrence Is Out, and Economic Attrition Is In
Excerpts:
Political leaders, however, must be open about the fact that such a policy involves tradeoffs. Tightening export controls on Russia will reduce Western firms’ sales there—although, with only three percent of the world’s GDP, Russia is a small market for most companies. Cutting off Russia’s commodity exports, which would challenge the Kremlin’s ability to fund its foreign policy, would also raise prices for Western consumers in more serious ways—impacting everything from metals to gasoline.
Ultimately, however, the role of sanctions and export controls now is to change the structure of Washington and its allies’ economic relationship with Russia, ensuring that whatever trade remains benefits the United States and Europe more than it benefits the Kremlin. These measures will not be costless. But letting Putin harvest the benefits of the global economy to feed his military hasn’t been costless either.
The New Russian Sanctions Playbook
Deterrence Is Out, and Economic Attrition Is In
February 28, 2022
After Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine last week, U.S. President Joe Biden made good on his threat to impose “swift and severe consequences” on Russia’s economy. His administration has enacted a set of sanctions far stronger than those deployed in 2014, after Moscow’s last incursion into Ukraine. This latest package includes sanctions on Russian banks, debt and equity restrictions on state-owned enterprises, and unprecedented multilateral export controls designed to cut Russia’s high-tech imports in half.
These sanctions, coupled with similar measures from the European Union and other U.S. allies, will accelerate Russia’s isolation from the global economy. Such moves, however, are not a sign of policy success—despite the impressive transatlantic diplomacy. On the contrary, they represent a failure to deter Putin from invading Ukraine. It is possible that the threat of sanctions failed because Putin was determined to invade regardless of the cost. It is also possible that Putin underestimated the damage that Western sanctions would cause. The 2014 measures sent Russia’s economy into a tailspin, but the country stabilized after several years.
Just because threatening sanctions failed, however, doesn’t mean the United States should abandon them altogether. Beyond exacting a price for military aggression and signaling solidarity with Ukrainians under fire, punitive economic measures can demonstrate to Russian elites and society that Putin’s imperial fantasies have costs. Declining living standards and diminishing prospects could, in turn, weaken Putin’s domestic base of support, siphoning attention and resources away from foreign policy.
Over the long term, economic penalties can also degrade Moscow’s ability to project power abroad. With Russia’s army already deployed across Ukraine—and little prospect for a dramatic shift in Russian foreign policy while Putin is in office—sanctions are now less a tool of behavioral change than one aimed at economic and technological attrition. Their primary objective is no longer to deter Moscow from taking particular actions but to drastically alter the trade and investment links between Russia and the United States and its allies—to the latter’s geopolitical advantage.
THE FIRST WAVE
The United States and its allies had sanctions ready to go within hours of Putin’s decision to move troops into Ukraine. In the weeks before these measures were announced, the Biden administration hinted that it would target Russia’s state-owned banks and impose a bevy of technology-related export controls. It has actually gone further than that, imposing debt and equity restrictions on large state-owned enterprises in virtually every important sector of the Russian economy, including gas, diamonds, and rail transport.
The most impactful sanctions, however, have been the penalties Washington levied on Russian financial institutions. On Tuesday, after Putin recognized two breakaway regions in eastern Ukraine, the Biden administration implemented “full blocking” sanctions—a complete asset freeze and transaction ban—on VEB.RF, a bank that operates as a Kremlin slush fund with over $50 billion in assets. This marked the first time the United States had used its most fearsome sanctions cudgel against a major Russian state-owned bank.
On Thursday, after Putin ordered a full-scale invasion, Washington used that cudgel again against VTB, Russia’s second-largest bank. It also imposed a transaction ban—a less draconian but still significant limitation—on Sberbank, which is by far Russia’s largest financial institution. Through it all, the EU has remained in lockstep with the United States, levying a similar array of restrictions on Russia and agreeing not to certify the Nord Stream 2 pipeline carrying natural gas from Russia to Germany.
U.S. and EU sanctions will undoubtedly intensify in the days and weeks ahead. Over the weekend, for instance, Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the EU announced their intention to enact new measures targeting Russia’s central bank and kicking certain Russian banks off SWIFT, the interbank messaging system. Although the United States and its allies have not yet unveiled the details, these actions, in their most ambitious form, would amount to a virtual financial embargo of Russia. Putin has amassed more than $600 billion in foreign currency reserves, but a significant share of that pile could become unusable if the United States and Europe imposed severe limitations on the country’s central bank. Such measures were unthinkable a week ago. That they are coming soon indicates just how rapidly attitudes are shifting in the United States and Europe as Putin’s war gets uglier.
Sanctions are now aimed at economic and technological attrition.
Still, the recently imposed U.S. and EU sanctions on Russia are not as comprehensive as those in place against Iran. At present, only one of Russia’s five largest banks is subject to full blocking sanctions. By contrast, all major Iranian banks, including the Central Bank of Iran, are fully blacklisted. All major Iranian state-owned enterprises, including the National Iranian Oil Company, are also under full blocking sanctions. Critically, the United States has also used the threat of so-called secondary sanctions—measures targeting third parties that transact with sanctioned entities—to drastically reduce Iran’s oil exports and isolate Tehran almost entirely from the global economy. No such sanctions are currently in place against Russia.
Thus far, U.S. and EU measures against Russia have focused on the country’s financial sector while largely sparing its energy industry. Tough sanctions on oil and gas sales, by far Russia’s most valuable exports, will be politically difficult because markets are tight and the Biden administration worries about the impact on domestic gasoline prices and inflation. The EU, meanwhile, needs Russian gas to make it through the winter. Washington and its allies are therefore likely to max out sanctions on Moscow’s banking sector before considering measures that target the energy sector directly.
Nevertheless, the Ukrainian government and much of the international media have fixated on cutting Russia off from SWIFT. In truth, however, it would make little sense to cut Russia off from SWIFT unless the United States and others had already sanctioned the country’s major financial institutions. Severing SWIFT access first, without imposing maximal banking sanctions, would perversely increase demand for SWIFT alternatives, including Russia’s own interbank communications network. Because SWIFT is a communications mechanism, rather than a tool for transferring actual funds, international banks would also still be permitted to engage with their Russian counterparts; they simply couldn’t use SWIFT to facilitate their transactions. Sweeping sanctions on the Russian banking sector should therefore precede a SWIFT ban. This approach appears to be the preferred U.S. and European course of action, as states begin imposing SWIFT bans on specific sanctioned banks instead of a blanket prohibition on Russia.
A NEW SANCTIONS CALCULUS
As U.S. and EU sanctions intensify, Russia’s economy will undoubtedly suffer. The country’s stock market and the ruble will plumb new lows, inflation will jump, and financial distress will set in. Living standards will fall, and economic disruption might pressure Putin to end the war. In such a hopeful scenario, Washington and others should be prepared to relieve some of the most draconian sanctions. But this is not an outcome the United States and its allies can count on. What Washington and others can count on, however, is that sanctions will worsen Russia’s position in its long-run competition with Western countries—reducing Moscow’s overall ability to fund its military and project power. Sanctions can facilitate this process in several ways.
For one, financial penalties will slow Russia’s economic growth. The country’s economy will probably shrink this year due to Washington’s and Brussels’s existing sanctions. By throwing a wrench into the Russian financial system and further cutting Moscow off from international capital markets, the sanctions will reduce overall investment, dragging down the country’s long-run growth rate. Sanctions will also impose some costs on Western countries, too, which policymakers can’t ignore—including higher prices for Russian commodity exports such as oil, gas, and many types of metals. Nevertheless, the U.S. and European economies combined are more than 20 times as large as Russia’s economy. Even if sanctions imposed equivalent costs on them and on Russia—and usually, they hit Moscow far harder—Russia still would end up substantially worse off in relative terms.
Another way that sanctions can limit Russia’s ability to project power is by complicating Putin’s domestic calculus. Escalating economic discontent at home could spur the Kremlin to shift resources away from its military and foreign policy priorities and toward supporting living standards. Even if no such shift occurs, Putin’s domestic position will inevitably become more tenuous. Over the past decade, the Kremlin has presided over declining living standards, in large part because sanctions-induced stagnation has made it impossible for Moscow to support both domestic prosperity and an expansive foreign policy. Putin’s popularity has declined meaningfully as a result. The more attention the Kremlin devotes to controlling domestic politics, the fewer resources it has for further aggression abroad.
Sanctions can limit Russia’s ability to project power by complicating Putin’s domestic calculus.
Finally, sanctions and export controls can limit Russia’s ability to produce and develop advanced military equipment. Moscow is immensely reliant on foreign technology—including machine tools, software, and semiconductors—and Russia already struggles to produce large quantities of certain military equipment such as precision munitions. U.S. limits on technology transfers to Russia following the Kremlin’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, for instance, caused painful delays across Russia’s military-industrial complex, including the manufacture of its global positioning GLONASS satellites.
Now, the United States and its allies are again tightening controls over an even broader array of items. These technologies are relevant not only to military systems but also to civilian industries, such as aviation. Western countries should continue to broaden these controls to limit Russia’s ability to acquire advanced manufacturing, robotics, and automation skills. The lower the overall capacity of Russia’s manufacturing and technology sectors, the less able the Russian defense industry will be to acquire the expertise it needs to build advanced military equipment. To prevent Russia from developing additional manufacturing, computing, or software-programming capabilities, Washington and its allies should more fully sever these sectors from access to Western technology.
THE ESCALATION DEBATE
Given that Washington and allied states are still escalating sanctions pressure against Russia, the Biden administration will need a strategic framework for what it hopes to accomplish with future measures. Washington is past the point of hoping that sanctions can push Russia toward any specific policy. Instead, the question needs to be whether continuing a given type of trade or investment relationship will improve the United States’ position vis-à-vis Russia over the next decade. In many cases, the answer will be no.
This type of reasoning can be uncomfortable for many U.S. and European officials, who understandably prefer economic policies that leave everyone better off. The alternative vision, by contrast, is based on a zero-sum logic of power politics and implies ongoing costs for Western economies. Like it or not, however, the United States and Europe’s relationship with Russia is now mostly zero-sum. There is no doubt that Moscow sees the relationship in such terms. The sooner the United States and its allies come around to this view, the stronger their position vis-à-vis Russia will become. Any measures that are somewhat costly to Western countries but very costly to Russia leave the former better off.
Such a shift in strategy will not be politically easy for Western democracies to make. Russia’s rulers benefit from a vast apparatus of repression that lets them suppress discontent. Western leaders, by contrast, must answer to voters who care deeply about their wallets. Such political calculations have already influenced policymaking. Sanctions designed to choke off Russian oil exports, for instance, would increase energy prices, at least in the short term. Fearing domestic backlash, many U.S. and European leaders are therefore opposed to such measures.
Political leaders must be open about the fact that sanctions involve tradeoffs.
Nevertheless, the horrifying images of Russian artillery striking Ukrainian cities provide an opportunity for Western leaders to clarify the stakes of the current crisis. Russia’s oil and gas export earnings feed Moscow’s military machine. If the United States and others managed to curtail the Kremlin’s ability to earn hard currency—which can be done most effectively by limiting oil exports—Russia’s position would be far weaker.
Political leaders, however, must be open about the fact that such a policy involves tradeoffs. Tightening export controls on Russia will reduce Western firms’ sales there—although, with only three percent of the world’s GDP, Russia is a small market for most companies. Cutting off Russia’s commodity exports, which would challenge the Kremlin’s ability to fund its foreign policy, would also raise prices for Western consumers in more serious ways—impacting everything from metals to gasoline.
Ultimately, however, the role of sanctions and export controls now is to change the structure of Washington and its allies’ economic relationship with Russia, ensuring that whatever trade remains benefits the United States and Europe more than it benefits the Kremlin. These measures will not be costless. But letting Putin harvest the benefits of the global economy to feed his military hasn’t been costless either.
25. Ukraine Crisis of 2022: The Final Battle of the Cold War
Excerpts:
Thus, from Moscow’s perspective the second Ukrainian war is the in effect the final battle of the Cold War – for Russia a time to reclaim its place on the European chessboard as a great empire, empowered to shape the Continent’s destiny going forward. The West needs to understand and accept that only once Russia is unequivocally defeated in Ukraine a genuine post-Cold War settlement will finally be possible.
Until then, Putin’s Russia will remain the militarist camp planted on the Continent’s periphery, determined to undermine peace and stability in Europe and to return it to the past where Russia would once again become the “prison of nations.” Under no circumstances can the West become complicit in this Russian project. The battle for Ukraine is one campaign Putin must lose, completely and unequivocally. The future of the West is at stake.
Ukraine Crisis of 2022: The Final Battle of the Cold War
Over the past thirty years, the West has fallen prey over and over again to mirror-imaging its adversaries, and as a result, it continues to find itself repeatedly in a situation where the same mistakes are repeated over and over again, and the same national security problem set is forced upon us yet again.
Nowhere has this been more evident than in how the West behaved in the run-up to the second Russian invasion of Ukraine.
The majority view amidst the pundit class before the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine was that the Ukrainian army was overmatched and that it would only be a matter of days before the country would collapse.
Three days into the war, none of these predictions have come true. In fact, the Ukrainian army is putting up stubborn resistance, Russia does not control the air space over the country, and its four-pronged attack axes, with their failing logistical chains, proved to have been too clever by half.
Now Putin is trying to up the ante by insinuating he would resort to nuclear weapons (sic!) – a sign of a man trapped in his own design and increasingly out of ideas on how to prevail.
It has been the patriotism and dedication to the nation that the Ukrainian people have displayed since the first shot was fired that is changing history. Suddenly the vaunted Russian army looks much less impressive, Putin’s threats sound hollow, and the West is united as it has not been for decades. Today German Chancellor Olof Scholz gave a seminal speech in the Bundestag, committing Germany unequivocally to stand by its NATO allies in opposition to Putin’s aggression.
Twenty years of Russian foreign policy that sought to sow discord within NATO and to build a bilateral relationship with Germany as a pre-condition for a new “Concert of Great Powers” in Europe lies in ruins.
Momentum is building in the opposite direction, with the West sensing how weak Russia actually is today, as though waiting for the first boy to yell that the emperor has no clothes. And so even if the invasion force overpowers the Ukrainian army in this campaign, the war will not end and the guerrilla resistance that follows will make the Soviet encroachment into Afghanistan look like child’s play.
Western Ukraine, with its supply chains anchored in Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania will have the ability to keep the fight going and to bleed the Russians without pause.
The source of Russian revisionism post-Cold War lies in Putin’s narrative of what transpired in 1990, i.e., that Russia was never really defeated, that it was betrayed by its own elites and the West. The truth was much more pedestrian – the Soviet Union simply ran out of gas, unable to stay in the game and compete with the United States at a time when the digital revolution was about to remake power indices and reshape the world.
And yet the story stuck, with Putin building his power base around this retelling of Russia’s alleged grievance. This all but guaranteed that Putin’s Russia would sooner or later re-emerge to demand its place in the sun yet again. Putin has capitalized on his narrative of grievance, transforming the three post-Cold War decades of peace in Europe into a de facto armistice, within his view – the great question of Russia’s place in the new European order unsettled and in need of adjudication.
Thus, from Moscow’s perspective the second Ukrainian war is the in effect the final battle of the Cold War – for Russia a time to reclaim its place on the European chessboard as a great empire, empowered to shape the Continent’s destiny going forward. The West needs to understand and accept that only once Russia is unequivocally defeated in Ukraine a genuine post-Cold War settlement will finally be possible.
Until then, Putin’s Russia will remain the militarist camp planted on the Continent’s periphery, determined to undermine peace and stability in Europe and to return it to the past where Russia would once again become the “prison of nations.” Under no circumstances can the West become complicit in this Russian project. The battle for Ukraine is one campaign Putin must lose, completely and unequivocally. The future of the West is at stake.
Andrew A. Michta is Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany. He is also former a Professor of National Security Affairs at USNWC and a former Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis in DC. The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
26. Vladimir Putin’s grand plan is unravelling
What is the way out for Putin?
Vladimir Putin’s grand plan is unravelling
But a cornered Russian president could become even more ruthless and dangerous
Vladimir Putin is a “genius”, chortled Donald Trump. The former US president was speaking on the very eve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — and was lost in admiration for the “very savvy” man in the Kremlin.
So what has this genius achieved? Four days into the invasion and Russian troops have failed to win the quick victory that Putin was counting on. Ukrainian resistance is much fiercer than the Russian leader anticipated, as Ukraine’s army fights back and the population mobilises. Captured Russian soldiers have been filmed complaining that they were told they were going on a training mission.
The international response has also been tougher, more co-ordinated and united than Putin bargained for. Russia is being cut out of the global financial system. Most European airspace has been closed to Russian airlines. There has been a historic reversal in German foreign and security policy — with Berlin finally sending weaponry to Ukraine and pledging to spend more than 2 per cent of gross domestic product on defence. The Nato alliance has been given a new sense of purpose. Russia is turning into a pariah, with even China failing to back it at the UN — it abstained instead.
Inside Russia itself, panicked citizens are rushing to withdraw money from banks. The rouble has plummeted in value, as has the Russian stock market. Small demonstrations against the war have broken out across the country, with the protesters swiftly arrested. Local celebrities, oligarchs and even the children of some Russian officials have condemned the conflict. Putin’s own officials look visibly uncomfortable as they take his orders in front of television cameras. The Russian official media have been left in the incredible position of denying the extent of the war, as it continues to insist that this is just a special military operation to support the breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.
Meanwhile, Ukraine itself is receiving a level of international admiration and recognition that is unprecedented since the country won independence in 1991. Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian president, once derided as a comic actor out of his depth, has won international acclaim for his inspirational leadership. His physical bravery on the streets of Kyiv is a marked contrast to the cowardice of Putin, who is too scared of a virus to allow his own officials within breathing distance. Calls for Ukraine to be put on a fast-track to EU membership are growing.
Putin has achieved all of this in a mere four days. Genius, sheer genius!
But a humiliated and cornered Putin is likely to become even more dangerous and ruthless. That was underlined on Sunday, when the Russian leader put his country’s nuclear forces on alert.
Unable to achieve the easy victory that he anticipated, Putin seems unlikely to back down. Pride, paranoia and his own personal survival point to the use of ever more radical and dangerous tactics. One senior western official predicted to me that “Putin will only dig in and this will get very ugly”.
Western security analysts have been warning of the possible use of thermobaric missiles in Ukraine — “flame-thrower” bombs which Russia has deployed in Chechnya and Syria and can cause huge loss of life. The nuclear threats that Putin is deploying, while clearly intended to intimidate, cannot be entirely discounted given his state of mind.
Since Putin himself seems highly unlikely to retreat, there appear to be few peaceful ways out of this conflict. One small ray of hope is offered by the announcement that Russian and Ukrainian negotiators have agreed to meet at the Belarus border. But there is, as yet, no sign that Putin is prepared to back away from his maximalist demands that would involve further dismemberment of Ukrainian territory and the de facto end of the country’s independence. The fact that the man originally nominated to lead Russia’s delegation is a junior former official, noted for his extreme nationalism, is not a promising sign.
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It may be that the only real route to peace would be for the Russian governing elite somehow to force Putin out of power. The videos that their leader has released showing him humiliating members of the security establishment, as he compels them to endorse his policies, are meant to demonstrate his total authority. But they also highlight misgivings within his own inner circle.
However, the current Russian system is less collective than even the post-Stalin Soviet Union. High-ranking Soviet officials were able to force Nikita Khrushchev from power in 1964. But Putin rules more like a pre-Soviet tsar. It is hard to see how internal opposition to him, within the government, can mobilise.
It is possible, however, that as the human and economic costs of the war mount it will become more difficult to contain the public protests against the conflict. Russian troops within Ukraine may also become demoralised as they take losses and are ordered to use brutal tactics against civilians. Eventually some combination of elite anxiety, military failure and popular discontent could force the Russian leader out of office. But — for now — the danger that Putin poses to Ukraine, Russia and the world is only growing.
27. FDD | Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine May Supercharge Nuclear Proliferation
Excerpts:
Depending on the reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, even some of America’s allies and partners might reconsider whether they need nuclear weapons of their own.
Moscow has blown off its Budapest Memorandum commitments, but the United States should not do the same. Strong support for Ukraine can minimize the damage to the nonproliferation regime from this latest Russian violation.
FDD | Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine May Supercharge Nuclear Proliferation
fdd.org · by Bradley Bowman CMPP Senior Director · February 25, 2022
February 25, 2022 | Policy Brief
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine violates the commitments Moscow reaffirmed in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, in which Russia pledged not to threaten or use force against Ukraine, while Kyiv relinquished the stockpile of Soviet nuclear weapons it inherited. This latest breach of the Kremlin’s agreements risks making other states more likely to pursue nuclear weapons and less likely to give them up.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, newly independent Ukraine found itself with hundreds of Soviet nuclear weapons on its territory. While Ukraine never had operational control of the weapons, there was concern that Ukraine could attempt to take control over them.
This proliferation risk led Ukraine, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom to sign the Budapest Memorandum in 1994. In connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and relinquishment of the nuclear weapons still on its territory, the United States, the United Kingdom, and particularly Russia agreed to:
- “respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine”;
- “refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine”; and
- “refrain from economic coercion” against Ukraine.
Russia violated these commitments with its 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent war in Ukraine’s Donbas region. Moscow has now broken them again as Putin conducts a major new invasion of Ukraine.
Despite a provision in the memorandum that calls for assistance by the UN Security Council if Ukraine is threatened or attacked, Kyiv will receive no help there. As a permanent member of the Security Council, Russia can use its veto to forestall any effective action by that body. Russia is even serving as president of the Security Council this month, underscoring the council’s inadequacy for addressing such great power aggression. This was on full display on Wednesday, when the Russian ambassador set aside his duties as council president to echo Putin’s grievances and mistruths even as Kyiv’s ambassador sat nearby and held his head in his hand.
The new invasion of Ukraine adds to the long list of Russian actions that violate treaties and international agreements that the Kremlin has signed — all the more ironic in light of Moscow’s demands in recent months for “legally binding” guarantees against Ukrainian membership in NATO, as well as Putin’s recent complaints that sanctions violate international law. Russia has also violated the Minsk agreements and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, among others.
Worse still, Russia’s disregard for its commitments has dangerous implications for global efforts to counter nuclear proliferation. Putin’s actions will reinforce the message that a country’s possession of nuclear weapons decreases the chance that it will suffer invasion. That will make preventing the spread of nuclear weapons more difficult.
North Korea is now even less likely to give up or roll back its nuclear weapons program. North Korea previously referenced Libya as a case study to suggest why Pyongyang should not de-nuclearize. Putin just gave Pyongyang another example to cite.
Bradley Bowman is senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Ryan Brobst is a research analyst and Anthony Ruggiero is a senior fellow. For more analysis from the authors and CMPP, please subscribe HERE. Follow Bradley and Anthony on Twitter @Brad_L_Bowman and @NatSecAnthony. Follow FDD on Twitter at @FDD and @FDD_CMPP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Bradley Bowman CMPP Senior Director · February 25, 2022
28. FDD | Erdogan Moves to Censor Western Media But not Russian Propaganda
Excerpts:
If Erdogan knows that there will be no real consequences, he will persist with his plans to block Western media outlets, whose independent reporting continues to embarrass him and his fellow autocrat Russian President Vladimir Putin. If the Biden administration wants to fulfil its promise of a human rights-centered foreign policy, it needs to stand behind the U.S. public broadcaster VOA and other Western media outlets threatened by autocratic regimes.
As for Erdogan, if he wants to prove the veracity of his statements of support for Ukraine, the least he can do is to allow Western broadcasters to continue to reach Turkish audiences unhindered so that they can push back against the propaganda spouted by Russia’s and China’s Turkish services.
FDD | Erdogan Moves to Censor Western Media But not Russian Propaganda
fdd.org · by Aykan Erdemir Turkey Program Senior Director · February 25, 2022
Turkey’s media regulator, RTUK, posted three official notifications on February 21 threatening to block Western broadcasters Deutsche Welle (DW), Euronews, and Voice of America (VOA), unless they obtain internet broadcast licenses within 72 hours. Coming on the heels of Russia’s move to withdraw the press credentials of all DW staff and shutter the German public broadcaster’s Moscow studio, Ankara’s threat is facilitating the Kremlin’s campaign to silence Western media outlets.
RTUK’s move against these American, French, and German broadcasters marks the first time Turkey’s media regulator has targeted international media outlets using an authority the country’s Islamist-ultranationalist ruling coalition created with a 2019 regulation aimed at silencing critical online reporting. Ankara has not made similar demands from either Russia’s public broadcaster Sputnik, whose Turkish service has thrived while pushing the Kremlin’s propaganda unhindered, or Beijing’s propaganda channel, China Radio International.
Both DW and VOA pushed back against Ankara by declaring they will appeal RTUK’s threatened ban. Acting VOA Director Yolanda López said, “Voice of America’s independent journalism cannot be subject to this or any government’s control which results either in censorship or even the perception of it.” DW Director General Peter Limbourg warned that RTUK’s move “does not relate to formal aspects of broadcasting, but to the journalistic content itself.” He added that the 2019 regulation “gives the Turkish authorities the option to block the entire service based on individual, critical reports unless these reports are deleted. This would open up the possibility of censorship.”
While his government joins Russia’s campaign to silence Western media, Turkey’s Islamist President Recep Tayyip Erdogan continues to pose as a critic of Moscow’s aggression. On February 25, Erdogan criticized the West for “for being late in offering its concrete support” to Ukraine. “The EU and all the rest of the West have failed to display a decisive and serious stance,” he said. Yet Erdogan has failed to take any punitive measures against Russia and refused to join in any of the Western sanctions targeting the Kremlin.
This is not the first time that Erdogan has enabled Russia by playing a spoiler role within NATO. Ankara reportedly watered down the wording of NATO’s April 15, 2021 statement expressing solidarity with the United States over Russia’s cyberattacks on U.S. government agencies. Erdogan did the same to NATO’s April 22, 2021 statement voicing concern over Russian military intelligence’s blowing up of ammunition storage depots in the Czech Republic in 2014. Ankara also blocked a NATO defense plan for Poland and the Baltic states for over six months until June 2020, prompting The New York Times to label Turkey “NATO’s ‘Elephant in the Room.’”
In response to the Erdogan government’s targeting of Western broadcasters, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 23 tweeted, “A free and independent media is critical and must not be subjected to government control or censorship. Turkey has to respect and ensure freedom of expression.” The Biden administration, however, continued its radio silence over Turkey’s democratic backsliding and abysmal human rights record.
If Erdogan knows that there will be no real consequences, he will persist with his plans to block Western media outlets, whose independent reporting continues to embarrass him and his fellow autocrat Russian President Vladimir Putin. If the Biden administration wants to fulfil its promise of a human rights-centered foreign policy, it needs to stand behind the U.S. public broadcaster VOA and other Western media outlets threatened by autocratic regimes.
As for Erdogan, if he wants to prove the veracity of his statements of support for Ukraine, the least he can do is to allow Western broadcasters to continue to reach Turkish audiences unhindered so that they can push back against the propaganda spouted by Russia’s and China’s Turkish services.
Aykan Erdemir is a former member of the Turkish parliament and senior director of the Turkey Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he also contributes to FDD’s Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP). For more analysis from Aykan, the Turkey Program, and CMPP, please subscribe HERE. Follow Aykan on Twitter @aykan_erdemir. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_CMPP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Aykan Erdemir Turkey Program Senior Director · February 25, 2022
29. Neutral Swiss poised to freeze Russian assets - president
Things are really bad for Putin when the Swiss are going to take action.
Neutral Swiss poised to freeze Russian assets - president
- Summary
- Companies
- Neutral Swiss eye adopting EU sanctions
- Freezing of Russian assets "very probable" - Cassis
- Swiss ready to help with flow of refugees
GENEVA, Feb 27 (Reuters) - Swiss President Ignazio Cassis said on Sunday that it was "very probable" that neutral Switzerland would follow the European Union (EU) on Monday in sanctioning Russia and freezing Russian assets in the Alpine country.
Cassis, interviewed on French-language Swiss public television RTS, said that the seven-member Federal Council would meet on Monday and review recommendations by the departments of finance and economy.
Asked whether Switzerland -- a major financial centre and commodities trading hub -- would follow the EU in freezing Russian assets, he said: "It is very probable that the government will decide to do so tomorrow, but I cannot anticipate decisions not yet taken."
Cassis said that Switzerland's neutrality must be preserved and it stood ready to offer its good offices for diplomacy if talks between Ukrainian and Russian officials on the Belarusian border do not succeed, for example by reaching an armistice.
"That does not prevent us from calling a spade a spade," he said.
Switzerland has walked a tortuous line between showing solidarity with the West and maintaining its traditional neutrality that the government says could make it a potential mediator.
But it faces growing pressure to side clearly with the West against Moscow and adopt punitive European Union sanctions. The government had so far said only that it will not let Switzerland be used as a platform to circumvent EU sanctions.
In the biggest peace march in decades, around 20,000 people demonstrated in the capital Bern on Saturday to support Ukraine, some booing the government over its cautious policy.
Cassis said on Sunday that Ukrainians fleeing the conflict would be welcome "for a transitional period, which we hope will be as short a possible".
Justice Minister Karin Keller-Sutter said separately that Switzerland was ready to take in those who need protection and also to support the neighbouring countries affected. "We will not leave people in the lurch," she said.
The Swiss government last week amended its watchlist to include 363 individuals and four companies that the EU had put on its sanctions list to punish Moscow. read more
Russians held nearly 10.4 billion Swiss francs ($11.24 billion) in Switzerland in 2020, Swiss National Bank data show.
($1 = 0.9252 Swiss francs)
Additional reporting by Michael Shields; editing by Emelia Sithole-Matarise and Diane Craft
30. Kosovo asks U.S. for permanent military base, speedier NATO membership
Kosovo asks U.S. for permanent military base, speedier NATO membership
PRISTINA, Feb 27 (Reuters) - Kosovo has asked the United States to establish a permanent military base in the country and speed up its integration into NATO after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Kosovo's Defence Minister Armend Mehaj said on Sunday.
The United States has already 635 soldiers in the Balkan country to maintain the fragile peace as part of a NATO peacekeeping mission. read more
"Accelerating Kosovo's membership in NATO and having a permanent base of American forces is an immediate need to guarantee peace, security and stability in the Western Balkans," Mehaj said on his Facebook page.
Kosovo has joined other countries in introducing sanctions against Russia. Mehaj has said that his government was ready to offer help for any military operation to Ukraine, should that be asked for by Washington.
Kosovo's 2008 independence is recognised by more than 110 countries, mainly Western nations, but not by Serbia or its traditional ally Russia. Four NATO members also refuse to recognise Kosovo's independence.
Kosovo is still not a United Nations member over objections from Russia.
Reporting by Fatos Bytyci; Editing by Daria Sito-Sucic and Alison Williams
31. China can break SWIFT sanctions but at a high cost
China can break SWIFT sanctions but at a high cost
Expert says CIPS payment system can replace SWIFT for Russia trade finance but could could trigger US sanctions on Chinese banks
Expert says CIPS payment system can replace SWIFT for Russia trade finance but could could trigger US sanctions on Chinese banks
China’s Cross-Border International Payments System (CIPS) can replace SWIFT for Russian trade financing, a Chinese academic told the Shanghai-based Observer news site (guancha.cn) in a February 27 interview.
Over the weekend, the United States and its allies excluded a list of Russian banks from the SWIFT, or Society for Worldwide International Financial Telecommunications, network that clears interbank payments in US dollars and other Western currencies, although Russia has not yet been subject to a blanket exclusion.
Asia Times first reported on February 25 that China’s alternative payments system could help Russia bypass Western sanctions.
In the past, exclusion from SWIFT meant complete isolation from global markets and normal trade financing, as in the case of American sanctions against Iran. But the CIPS system, which China began to develop in 2015, is now fully operational.
China might be reluctant to help Russia circumvent SWIFT sanctions, said Professor Chen Xi of the Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance at Jiaotong University in an “Observer” interview because the United States might retaliate by imposing sanctions on Chinese banks. That would have disastrous consequences, Chen added.
Risks to the financial system cut both ways, the German daily Die Welt wrote on February 27. “CIPS already handles US$50 billion of daily transactions. That is considerably less than the $400 billion of transactions that pass every day through SWIFT, but CIPS volume has increased rapidly,” the German newspaper reported.
“If Russia and China linked their systems and offered an alternative to other authoritarian states, this could threaten American domination of financial markets,” Die Welt concluded.
SWIFT sanctions on Russia put the financial ball in Beijing’s court. Photo: AFP / Demyanchuk/Sputnik
Jiaotong University’s Chen also warned that sanctions on individual banks present a risk to the Chinese payment system. “The RMB cross-border payment system still relies on banks as nodes, and these nodes can be sanctioned and pressured,” the Chinese academic said.
“For example, the payment system built by China may be independent of the SWIFT system controlled by the United States, but the intermediate nodes are all banks. The United States can sanction these banks. If no one is allowed to do business with Chinese banks, and other countries cooperate with these measures, then this system will not work.”
“Russia also built its own independent payment system,” Chen said. “It also could adopt the cross-border payment system established by China as a potential replacement for SWIFT. But the key point is that these international cross-border systems all require the participation of actual banks.
“The United States is likely to threaten all financial institutions. If anyone deals with Russia, it might sanction them. If this is the case, the big Chinese banks may not dare to deal with Russia. In this case, Russia would only be able to do business with some small banks.”
But “if the United States sanctioned Chinese banks in this way, the damage to the global economy would be too great for anyone to bear,” Chen said.
Clearing systems like SWIFT and China’s CIPS provide secure data transmission for banks that clear customer payments. They do not deal directly with goods in trade, but only with bank payments for goods in trade.
Although CIPS is under the control of the Chinese government, the Chinese banks that it serves could be subject to sanctions, at least in theory. The financial consequences of such sanctions would be enormous.
China has a net foreign asset position of $4 trillion and holds $2 trillion of US Treasury securities. It is also by far the largest exporter in the world, with 15% of global export trade compared to 8% for the United States.
“In the final analysis,” Chen explained in the Observer article, “ the game between major powers depends on strength. If the United States doesn’t need Russian resources at all, and it doesn’t need Chinese products, it certain could impose severe sanctions.
“However, given the current level of international exchange, if trade between China and Russia were cut off completely, it would take a long time for the United States to adjust to it, and the damage to supply chains would cause damage to the entire global economy.”
“A drastic measure probably would trigger a long-term financial and economic crisis, so the United States is also very hesitant to do this,” Chen concluded.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
