Quotes of the Day:

"Books are the carriers of civilization. Without books, history is silent, literature dumb, science crippled, thought and speculation at a standstill." 

– Barbara Tuchman

"I know of no single formula for success. But over the years I have observed that some attributes of leadership are universal and are often about finding ways of encouraging people to combine their efforts, their talents, their insights, their enthusiasm and their inspiration to work together." 

– Queen Elizabeth II

"Any intelligent fool can make things bigger, more complex, and more violent. It takes a touch of genius - and a lot of courage - to move in the opposite direction." 

- E. F. Schumacher

1. Exclusive: Trump launched CIA covert in

16. fluence operation against China

2. Are China and the Philippines on a Collision Course?

3. Noble Dreaming (Gaza and Israel)

4. I commanded a Marine V-22 squadron. Here’s what I learned

5. Presence of U.S. Army Special Forces on outlying islands confirmed

6. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 14, 2024

7. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 14, 2024

8. Big Appeal, and Big Question Marks, in Possible TikTok Sale

9. China Signals Opposition to Forced Sale of TikTok in the U.S.

10. Questions Persist as Israel Signals Support for More Aid for Gaza

11. Bloomberg reports Biden to award Samsung $6 billion in chip incentives

12. If the US bans TikTok, China will be getting a taste of its own medicine

13. USSOCOM Comments On The Navy’s Expeditionary Sea Bases (ESB)

14. Playing Both Sides of the U.S.-Chinese Rivalry

15. Russia Steps Up Spy War on West

16. Americans’ views of foreign alliances growing increasingly divided

17. How Biden's 'A-team' squandered its foreign policy opportunity

18. Special Operations Forces Secure the Arctic | SOF News

1. Exclusive: Trump launched CIA covert influence operation against China

• United States

Exclusive: Trump launched CIA covert influence operation against China

https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-launched-cia-covert-influence-operation-against-china-2024-03-14/?utm

By Joel Schectman and Christopher Bing

March 14, 20246:06 AM EDTUpdated 15 hours ago

Republican presidential candidate and former U.S. President Donald Trump hosts a campaign rally at the Forum River Center in Rome, Georgia, U.S. March 9, 2024. REUTERS/Alyssa Pointer/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

WASHINGTON, March 14 - Two years into office, President Donald Trump authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to launch a clandestine campaign on Chinese social media aimed at turning public opinion in China against its government, according to former U.S. officials with direct knowledge of the highly classified operation.

Three former officials told Reuters that the CIA created a small team of operatives who used bogus internet identities to spread negative narratives about Xi Jinping’s government while leaking disparaging intelligence to overseas news outlets. The effort, which began in 2019, has not been previously reported.

During the past decade, China has rapidly expanded its global footprint, forging military pacts, trade deals, and business partnerships with developing nations.

The CIA team promoted allegations that members of the ruling Communist Party were hiding ill-gotten money overseas and slammed as corrupt and wasteful China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which provides financing for infrastructure projects in the developing world, the sources told Reuters.

Although the U.S. officials declined to provide specific details of these operations, they said the disparaging narratives were based in fact despite being secretly released by intelligence operatives under false cover. The efforts within China were intended to foment paranoia among top leaders there, forcing its government to expend resources chasing intrusions into Beijing’s tightly controlled internet, two former officials said. “We wanted them chasing ghosts,” one of these former officials said.

Chelsea Robinson, a CIA spokesperson, declined to comment on the existence of the influence program, its goals or impacts.

A spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said news of the CIA initiative shows the U.S. government uses the “public opinion space and media platforms as weapons to spread false information and manipulate international public opinion.”

The CIA operation came in response to years of aggressive covert efforts by China aimed at increasing its global influence, the sources said. During his presidency, Trump pushed a tougher response to China than had his predecessors. The CIA’s campaign signaled a return to methods that marked Washington’s struggle with the former Soviet Union. “The Cold War is back,” said Tim Weiner, author of a book on the history of political warfare.

Reuters was unable to determine the impact of the secret operations or whether the administration of President Joe Biden has maintained the CIA program. Kate Waters, a spokesperson for the Biden administration’s National Security Council, declined to comment on the program’s existence or whether it remains active. Two intelligence historians told Reuters that when the White House grants the CIA covert action authority, through an order known as a presidential finding, it often remains in place across administrations.

Trump, now the Republican frontrunner for president, has suggested he will take an even tougher approach toward China if re-elected president in November. Spokespeople for Trump and his former national security advisers, John Bolton and Robert O’Brien, who both served the year the covert action order was signed, declined to comment.

The operation against Beijing came with significant risk of escalating tensions with the United States, given the power of China's economy and its ability to retaliate through trade, said Paul Heer, a former senior CIA analyst on East Asia who learned of the presidential authorization from Reuters. For example, after Australia called for an investigation inside China probing the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, Beijing blocked billions of dollars in Australian trade through agricultural tariffs.

Trump’s 2019 order came after years of warnings from the U.S. intelligence community, and media reports, about how China was using bribery and threats to obtain support from developing countries in geopolitical disputes as it attempted to sow division in the United States through front groups.

China’s Foreign Ministry said Beijing follows a “principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and does not interfere in the domestic affairs of the United States.”

A year earlier, Trump gave the CIA greater powers to launch offensive cyber operations against U.S. adversaries after numerous Russian and Chinese cyber attacks against American organizations, Yahoo News reported, opens new tab. Reuters could not independently confirm the existence of the earlier order.

Sources described the 2019 authorization uncovered by Reuters as a more ambitious operation. It enabled the CIA to take action not only in China but also in countries around the world where the United States and China are competing for influence. Four former officials said the operation targeted public opinion in Southeast Asia, Africa and the South Pacific.

“The feeling was China was coming at us with steel baseball bats and we were fighting back with wooden ones,” said a former national security official with direct knowledge of the finding.

Matt Pottinger, a senior National Security Council official at the time, crafted the authorization, three former officials said. It cited Beijing’s alleged use of malign influence, allegations of intellectual property theft and military expansion as threats to U.S. national security, one of those former officials said.

Pottinger told Reuters he would not comment on the “accuracy or inaccuracy of allegations about U.S. intelligence activities,” adding that “it would be incorrect to assume that I would have had knowledge of specific U.S. intelligence operations.”

Covert messaging allows the United States to implant ideas in countries where censorship might prevent that information from coming to light, or in areas where audiences wouldn’t give much credence to U.S. government statements, said Loch Johnson, a University of Georgia political scientist who studies the use of such tactics.

Covert propaganda campaigns were common during the Cold War, when the CIA planted 80 to 90 articles a day in an effort to undermine the Soviet Union, Johnson said. In the 1950s, for example, the CIA created an astrological magazine in East Germany to publish foreboding predictions about communist leaders, according to declassified records.

The covert propaganda campaign against Beijing could backfire, said Heer, the former CIA analyst. China could use evidence of a CIA influence program to bolster its decades-old accusations of shadowy Western subversion, helping Beijing “proselytize” in a developing world already deeply suspicious of Washington.

The message would be: “‘Look at the United States intervening in the internal affairs of other countries and rejecting the principles of peaceful coexistence,’” Heer said. “And there are places in the world where that is going to be a resonant message.”

U.S. influence operations also risk endangering dissidents, opposition groups critical of China and independent journalists, who could be falsely painted as CIA assets, said Thomas Rid, a professor at Johns Hopkins University who wrote a book on the history of political warfare.

Get weekly news and analysis on the U.S. elections and how it matters to the world with the newsletter On the Campaign Trail. Sign up here.

Schectman and Bing reported from Washington. Additional reporting by Liz Lee in Beijing. Editing by Don Durfee and Blake Morrison.

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles., opens new tab

Christopher Bing

Thomson Reuters

Award-winning reporter covering the intersection between technology and national security with a focus on how the evolving cybersecurity landscape affects government and business.

2. Are China and the Philippines on a Collision Course?

Excerpts:

What are the implications of these rising tensions for the United States as the Philippines’ only treaty ally?

Cheng: China’s efforts to expand its control of the South China Sea are a distinct threat to both U.S. and global interests. China’s efforts to dominate what has sometimes been termed the carotid artery of global trade threatens the sea lanes of communications of Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, all key U.S. allies and partners. A successful Chinese effort would also signal to other neighbors that, even with its economic and other troubles, China is ascendant, and able to gain through gray zone tactics and intimidation what it does not have legal right to.

As important, if China succeeds in making the South China Sea part of its territorial waters (in de facto if not de jure fashion), this will set a dangerous precedent for other international common spaces. China is already striving to create a Chinese “intranet” that it controls from the hardware to the software and apps, rejecting the concept of a “free and open Internet” much as it rejects the idea that the world’s oceans are “free and open” lanes of commerce. Worse, China is setting its sights on the Moon, with an ambitious program of robotic and manned missions. There are already concerns that China will try to apply gray zone tactics, such as those being employed in the South China Sea, to effectively lay claim to key areas of the Moon (such as the potentially water-rich poles), or vital areas of space (such as the gravitationally stable Lagrange Points). China’s success in the well-established maritime realm can only embolden its comparable efforts in such new areas as outer space.

Are China and the Philippines on a Collision Course?

China’s gray zone operations risk a war that could draw in the United States.

Thursday, March 14, 2024 / BY: Dean Cheng; Carla Freeman, Ph.D.; Brian Harding; Andrew Scobell, Ph.D.

usip.org

On March 5, Chinese coast guard vessels sideswiped a Philippine patrol vessel and used water cannons against another boat carrying a Filipino admiral and provisions to Filipino service members stationed at the Philippine-occupied Second Thomas Shoal, or Ayunyin Shoal, in the South China Sea. Manila, which calls the sea the West Philippines Sea, has been pushing back against China’s so-called ten-dash line through which Beijing stakes claim to much of the sea, including land parcels.

In a statement following the March 5 incident, State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller condemned Chinese actions and said the United States is obliged by commitments made in the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty to come to the Philippines’ defense in the event of “armed attacks on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft — including those of its Coast Guard — anywhere in the South China Sea.”

Meanwhile, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. plans to meet U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on March 19 to discuss security matters.

USIP’s Andrew Scobell, Dean Cheng, Brian Harding and Carla Freeman discuss the latest developments in the South China Sea.

Why are China and the Philippines on a collision course in the South China Sea?

Scobell: China’s latest efforts to prevent the Philippines from resupplying its detachment of marines stationed at Second Thomas Shoal represents a significant escalation of its aggressive and coercive actions. Available evidence suggests that China’s objective is to dislodge the Philippine marines, and there appears to be a greater sense of urgency in recent months.

Beijing is practiced at coordinated maneuvers by Chinese coast guard ships, maritime militia vessels (which appear as fishing boats), combined with People’s Liberation Army Navy ships. China’s “gray hulls” usually remain in the background with the “white hulls” and fishing boats taking the lead in harassing Philippine ships. This allows Beijing to apply armed force while keeping its actions just below the threshold of war.

Beijing has repeatedly sought to disrupt Manila’s resupply efforts in the past. However, recent actions represent a qualitative shift in China’s behavior, which can be characterized as gray zone operations on steroids.

Cheng: China is sustaining its longstanding effort to dominate the South China Sea, based on its “historical claims” (a line of argument that the Permanent Court of Arbitration rejected in 2016) and the so-called ten-dash line, whose meaning China has deliberately kept vague and amorphous.

China’s efforts include building artificial islands atop coral reefs and other features, and the use of legal warfare (in this case, a heavy reliance on the China Coast Guard) and gray zone tactics (the exploitation of its substantial maritime militia) to coerce other claimants.

What is worrisome is that China’s efforts against the Philippines raise the real risk of escalation to include the United States. While the United States has refrained from making any formal statements regarding sovereignty over any of the South China Sea geographic features, the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty indicates that hostile actions against Philippine government ships and aircraft would be grounds for invoking that treaty’s mutual defense provisions. China is undertaking risky moves by engaging Philippine efforts to resupply its garrison on Second Thomas Shoal.

More problematically, Beijing has warned that efforts to counter Chinese actions are viewed as the source of risk and potential escalation. In comments this past week directed at Manila and New Delhi, Beijing has warned that it is the latter who are elevating tensions as the Philippines and India act to counter China’s provocative actions in their respective border areas.

What is China doing to manage these rising tensions in the South China Sea?

Harding: News emerged this week that China has shared numerous proposals with the Philippines on ways to manage tensions. While the text of these concept papers is not public, they presumably begin with the premise that China has “indisputable sovereignty” based on historic claims and that the Philippines’ rights under international law do not exist. The Philippines has rejected these entreaties.

Ultimately, Manila puts little stock in China’s words and is instead judging China by its actions around Ayunyin and Scarborough Shoals, and it is not blind to Chinese pressure on Taiwan and the Senkakus. At a high-profile press conference on March 6 in Manila, Philippines National Security Council Spokesperson Jonathan Malaya put it succinctly, “If China desires some improvement or progress in resolving this maritime dispute in a peaceful and orderly manner we demand that they match their words with their actions.”

The Marcos administration has calculated that the best strategy is to proactively show the world through media what China is doing and to build a network of friends that can support them. This approach is bearing fruit, at least in terms of a flurry of new security partnerships. Changing Chinese behavior has proven more difficult.

How do these tensions between China and the Philippines impact regional security relationships?

Freeman: Rising tensions between the Philippines and China over disputed maritime claims have added to the volatility of a region already fraught with risks of conflict. A desire to deter China’s assertive use of its growing military capabilities has led to a cascade of new or expanded security relationships largely aimed at combatting the threat from China.

In addition to the revivified U.S.-Philippines alliance — one of many upgrades in security ties between the United States and its allies and partners in the region — new intraregional security partnerships are emerging. In January, Vietnam and the Philippines began unprecedented security cooperation between their coast guards. In September 2023, Manila and Canberra upgraded their ties to a strategic partnership. Beyond these developments, other major security actors in the region have begun engaging new security partners across the region. Seoul launched a Korea-ASEAN Regional Solidarity Initiative, which places an emphasis on defense ties as well as cooperation on strategic issues. Last year, Japan expanded aid to Bangladesh, Malaysia and Fiji, as well as the Philippines, to develop their defense capabilities.

Although these initiatives are modest in impact, and in principle most states continue to give voice to the concept of ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] centrality, there is no question that these relationships reflect the difficulty ASEAN faces in developing a regional strategy to address the threats posed by China’s sovereignty claims. The emerging noodle bowl of security ties across the region will test ASEAN’s ability to preserve its centrality in the security arena in the years ahead.

What are the implications of these rising tensions for the United States as the Philippines’ only treaty ally?

Cheng: China’s efforts to expand its control of the South China Sea are a distinct threat to both U.S. and global interests. China’s efforts to dominate what has sometimes been termed the carotid artery of global trade threatens the sea lanes of communications of Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, all key U.S. allies and partners. A successful Chinese effort would also signal to other neighbors that, even with its economic and other troubles, China is ascendant, and able to gain through gray zone tactics and intimidation what it does not have legal right to.

As important, if China succeeds in making the South China Sea part of its territorial waters (in de facto if not de jure fashion), this will set a dangerous precedent for other international common spaces. China is already striving to create a Chinese “intranet” that it controls from the hardware to the software and apps, rejecting the concept of a “free and open Internet” much as it rejects the idea that the world’s oceans are “free and open” lanes of commerce. Worse, China is setting its sights on the Moon, with an ambitious program of robotic and manned missions. There are already concerns that China will try to apply gray zone tactics, such as those being employed in the South China Sea, to effectively lay claim to key areas of the Moon (such as the potentially water-rich poles), or vital areas of space (such as the gravitationally stable Lagrange Points). China’s success in the well-established maritime realm can only embolden its comparable efforts in such new areas as outer space.

usip.org

3. Noble Dreaming (Gaza and Israel)

Excerpts:

Palestinians have yet to be given a chance to enjoy those rights by those who use them as cannon fodder, expropriate their food and medicine, and reduce them to misery. Fellow Muslims on Iran’s payroll have shown them far less empathy than do Jewish medical personnel who save Palestinian lives in Israeli hospitals, and soldiers who seek to keep Palestinian civilian casualties at a minimum while fighting to free innocent Jewish hostages, including women, little children, and grandparents, who are severely maltreated in captivity.

Basic rights and freedoms must never be taken for granted. When lost, recovering them is hardly guaranteed. Americans would do well to remember that, because whether we realize it or not, we too are in the line of fire. Iran’s leadership considers Israel merely the Little Satan; Big Satan is none other than America. The growing alliance of this barbaric Islamist regime with Russia, China, and North Korea, all of which deny their own populations the most basic rights, does not bode well. Israel is currently fighting not only for its own survival but also for ours.

ESSAY MARCH 14, 2024

Noble Dreaming

https://lawliberty.org/a-noble-dream/?utm

juliana geran pilon

In “Time for Two States,” Rachel Lu observes that after the shocking events of October 7, “the sequence of events was somewhat predictable. Israel retaliated. It was clear they would win.” Well, maybe not win, exactly. But definitely, “Israel’s war with Hamas is reaching its final stages.” If only it were. According to the Wall Street Journal, “Israelis have made only partial progress in finding and destroying Hamas’s vast tunnel network [i.e., 350 miles of tunnels under an area 30 miles by 8 miles].” It is exceptionally treacherous. No one can reliably anticipate the potential damage, reports the Journal.

Still, Ms. Lu’s optimism is undaunted. She concludes that “however the end game plays out, the IDF should soon have its victory.” I sincerely pray that she may be right. One must hope that Hamas’s Gaza leader, Yahya Sinwar, is wrong to believe that it is Hamas who is actually winning despite the major losses it has clearly suffered. After all, all it has to do, says Sinwar, is “declare a historic victory by outlasting Israel’s firepower and claim the leadership of the Palestinian national cause.”

It is in that context that one must evaluate Ms. Lu’s view that “there is no reasonable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian problem that does not involve two sovereign states.” Fair enough. But the question is: when and in what circumstances? Definitely not now, argues Israeli historian Gadi Taub. In a powerful article published February 12, 2024, in Tablet Magazine, Taub writes that “compelling as it is as a debating strategy, or a form of self-therapy, [the two-state formula] is no solution at all … a noble dream … but just that—a dream.” A lifelong liberal, he had shared that dream with many other Israelis until October 7, which was the nation’s wake-up call, a living nightmare for all but a negligible number of the mislabeled “woke.”

Palestinian self-rule is undoubtedly preferable to most alternatives. But as the former head of the East Jerusalem mission of the Quartet (consisting of the US, EU, UK, and Russia) Envoy Robert Danin told reporters on March 1, 2024:

[Palestinians] don’t want the Israelis there, but they don’t want the Palestinian Authority either; the PA doesn’t care about Gaza. They don’t want Hamas either. They want to have a voice for themselves.

Will that voice be allowed to be heard? For unless and until it does, any two-state solution is predicated on premises that are at best dubious and at worst delusional.

Recent surveys indicate that a majority of Palestinians support Hamas and approve of the October 7 massacres. These include the populations under the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) jurisdiction, which they detest as corrupt and weak. Hence, the Biden administration’s plan to put the PA in charge of Gaza is utterly unrealistic, argues Taub. “There is no such thing as a ‘revitalized’ Palestinian Authority, because there is no one who wants to ‘revitalize’ it in such a way as to make it conform to Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s sales pitch.” Under the circumstances, Israelis “believe that turning Judea and Samaria into another Hamastan to satisfy those who see the massacre as an inspiration and its perpetrators as role models would be suicidal. Who in their right mind would inflict the ensuing bloodshed on their partners, children, friends, and parents?” For Ms. Lu, therefore, to argue that the only way to peace “probably will not be possible without a good-faith commitment on Israel’s part to work towards a two-state solution,” must be seen in the proper context.

Israel is currently fighting not only for its own survival but also for ours.

Since the 1917 Balfour Declaration proclaimed that the British government “view with favor the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in their homeland,” the Jews have hoped that their two-thousand-year-old exile would finally end. They sought to live alongside their neighbors as best they could. Yet in all that time, writes Taub, “there never was a Palestinian leadership ready to recognize the legitimacy of a Jewish nation-state. That is a constant fact of life in the conflict.” Israel never denied the Palestinians a right to govern themselves. By contrast, “the Arab side has rejected any and all partition plans starting with the Peel Commission in 1937, the United Nations partition resolution of 1947, and all the way through the various American mediation plans and Israeli offers, and those offered by Israeli leaders.” Israel’s “land-for-peace” strategy, whereby it relinquished territory it had acquired after pushing back Arab military attacks in exchange for accepting its right to exist, was an utter failure.

Ms. Lu concludes her article by reminding her readers that “we should bear in mind that citizenship, and the basic rights and freedoms that go with it, really aren’t the kind of thing that a person should have to earn.” A commendable ideal, without a doubt. One shouldn’t have to earn rights that America’s founders, invoking the key commandment of Genesis, declared self-evident. But since when have basic rights and freedoms not been earned at the steep price of its defenders’ lives? Since when has freedom, that most fragile of human blessings, not had to be earned again and again?

Palestinians have yet to be given a chance to enjoy those rights by those who use them as cannon fodder, expropriate their food and medicine, and reduce them to misery. Fellow Muslims on Iran’s payroll have shown them far less empathy than do Jewish medical personnel who save Palestinian lives in Israeli hospitals, and soldiers who seek to keep Palestinian civilian casualties at a minimum while fighting to free innocent Jewish hostages, including women, little children, and grandparents, who are severely maltreated in captivity.

Basic rights and freedoms must never be taken for granted. When lost, recovering them is hardly guaranteed. Americans would do well to remember that, because whether we realize it or not, we too are in the line of fire. Iran’s leadership considers Israel merely the Little Satan; Big Satan is none other than America. The growing alliance of this barbaric Islamist regime with Russia, China, and North Korea, all of which deny their own populations the most basic rights, does not bode well. Israel is currently fighting not only for its own survival but also for ours.

Juliana Geran Pilon is a senior fellow at the Alexander Hamilton Institute for the Study of Western Civilization. She is the author of several books, including The Utopian Conceit and the War on Freedom (2019) and her newest book, An Idea Betrayed: Jews, Liberalism, and the American Left (2023)

4. I commanded a Marine V-22 squadron. Here’s what I learned

I commanded a Marine V-22 squadron. Here’s what I learned

marinecorpstimes.com · by Lt. Col. Douglas Thumm (retired) · March 13, 2024

In early December 2016, “Flight Quarters” sounded again for the 134th consecutive day of Operation Odyssey Lightning ― the fight against the Islamic State in Libya, or ISIL.

Our Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 264 (Reinforced) was providing support for the mission from the Mediterranean, Arabian and Red Seas. On the final day of our six-month deployment, I thought back to all we had accomplished on this deployment, much of it due to the incredible capability of the MV-22 Osprey and its crew.

Over four combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, I flew the CH-46E Sea Knight and MV-22B Osprey, but this deployment was different.

Normally, we operated from various amphibious ships during the day and night, with replenishments at sea occurring every seven to 10 days.

RELATED

V-22 Osprey fleet will fly again, with no fixes but renewed training

The V-22 is allowed to fly again, and the services will each implement their own training and maintenance protocols to get the fleet back to operations.

But in this deployment, that battle rhythm was not fast enough to maintain the needed momentum, parts, missiles, bombs and equipment for the ships, the aircraft and the ground vehicles, so our Ospreys became critical to ensuring the operational tempo did not miss a beat.

During our deployment, AV-8B Harriers and AH-1W Cobras had conducted offensive air support from U.S. Navy ships.

Collateral damage during these operations is always a significant concern. To ensure accuracy, tailkits were needed on the 500-pound bombs the Harriers were carrying. Onboard supplies ran critically low.

The only answer, short of moving the ship closer to Sigonella in Sicily, Italy, (which would shorten the period Harriers could remain on station) was to send the Ospreys on the 700 nautical mile round trip from ship to shore to keep the Harriers armed and ready.

Even when part of the amphibious ready group and Marine expeditionary unit moved into the Red Sea, our Ospreys continued to fly more than 800 nautical miles a day, several days a week. Those sorties delivered vital logistics support to Djibouti, for further movement to Sigonella, Italy, in Sicily, and follow-on replenishment for the other amphibious ships off the coast of Libya.

Very simply, the Osprey made the entire mission possible.

That’s because the radius of the Osprey expanded the fleet’s logistics range by more than 3.5 times its predecessor. And when we connected with KC-130 aerial refueling aircraft we were able to extend the available range even further.

Our unsung capability also was invaluable in transporting leadership from shore to ship.

When U.S. Navy flag leadership needed to move quickly from Italy to a U.S. Navy ship hundreds of miles away, they looked to the Ospreys.

The speed, range and flexibility of the V-22 provided strategic leaders with decision space because they could travel from the helicopter pad at their headquarters to a small aviation-capable command ship hundreds of miles away. When their meeting finished, they could fly back on those same V-22s.

No longer did leadership have concerns about the distance from shore or lost time lingering on a ship away from their headquarters.

Our six-month deployment in 2016 with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit provided a glimpse of the importance of the V-22 to connect land-based supply hubs with naval aviation kinetic fires through long-range aerial resupply ― and it offers lessons for the future.

In the current and future fight, those supply hubs will be land- and sea-based, highlighting the importance of the V-22 as a connector for aircraft carriers and Lightning carriers against adversaries with more robust coastal defenses.

Fast forward to the following year, where my V-22 squadron was again indispensable to the mission. Only this time, it would be in a humanitarian role.

When Hurricane Maria devastated Puerto Rico in 2017, my squadron flew eight Ospreys to South Florida and then to the northwest corner of the island. The V-22s supported the entire geographic surface of Puerto Rico, while also providing long-range logistics to the U.S. Virgin Islands.

The positive impacts were evident everywhere we went. Some areas of Puerto Rico lacked sufficient food and potable water for weeks after the disaster. In some cases our ability to reach austere locations meant we were the first response they had encountered in the weeks following the devastating hurricane.

Our ability to reach remote locations across Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands was salvation that was clear on the faces of the men, women and children we aided. For our squadron and the two others on that mission, it was an experience we’ll never forget.

Before flying the Osprey, I had participated in combat medical evacuations and direct-action raids with the CH-46E Sea Knight transport helicopter, spanning the entire perimeter of Iraq. Later, I did the same in the MV-22B Osprey. I have seen success on a tactical, operational and strategic level in both aircraft.

Don’t get me wrong, I love the Phrog, as the Sea Knight is known. But as I tell everyone who asks, I would never go back.

For the past 18 years, I have been fortunate to be a member of the V-22 community. Thinking back to that final day of our deployment, it was then that I fully appreciated the opportunities created by the Osprey’s revolutionary capabilities.

Lt. Col. Douglas Thumm (retired) is a former V-22 Osprey squadron commander. He is still a contract flight instructor with the V-22.

5. Presence of U.S. Army Special Forces on outlying islands confirmed

Presence of U.S. Army Special Forces on outlying islands confirmed - Focus Taiwan

focustaiwan.tw · by Link · March 14, 2024

Taipei, March 14 (CNA) Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng (邱國正) on Thursday confirmed that U.S. Army Special Forces personnel are stationed on Taiwan's outlying islands and said their presence was part of an exchange and was meant to be a "learning opportunity" for Taiwan's armed forces.

The defense minister made the remarks after he was asked by reporters on the sidelines of a legislative hearing to comment on recent media reports that American Army Special Forces, commonly known as the "Green Berets," are training Taiwanese troops in Kinmen and Penghu.

Chiu said the U.S. presence was meant to help Taiwan's armed forces identify any weaknesses or blind spots, and to allow forces to engage in exchanges with friendly teams or countries.

Such deployments allow the two sides to observe and learn from each other and address any issues, the minister said, adding that these exchanges "do not involve any proposals regarding the purchase of military equipment."

U.S. military news outlet SOFREP earlier this month said military instructors from the U.S. Army Special Forces had "started to take up permanent positions" at the Taiwanese Army's amphibious command centers in Kinmen and Penghu, and that their missions include regular training and exercises alongside Taiwan's elite forces.

These deployments, according to the report, were carried out per the U.S. 2023 National Defense Authorization Act.

The Act requires the U.S. secretary of defense, in consultation with "appropriate officials in Taiwan," to establish a comprehensive training, advising, and institutional capacity-building program for Taiwanese military forces, consistent with the U.S.' Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act.

One type of training offered by the American Army Special Forces involves teaching their Taiwanese counterparts how to operate the Black Hornet Nano, a compact military unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and creating necessary guidelines and manuals, according to the report.

According to SOFREP, the Taiwanese Aviation and Special Forces Command proposed acquiring the micro drone from the U.S. through military sales avenues.

A Pentagon spokesperson earlier this month declined to comment on specific operations, engagements, or training when asked to comment on the issue.

The presence of U.S. Special Forces on Taiwan soil was first confirmed by President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) in an interview with CNN in 2021, although no information on their location was released.

(By Sean Lin and Matt Yu)

Enditem/kb

focustaiwan.tw · by Link · March 14, 2024

6. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 14, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev posted a detailed call for the total elimination of the Ukrainian state and its absorption into the Russian Federation under what he euphemistically called a “peace formula.” Medvedev’s demands are not novel but rather represent the Kremlin’s actual intentions for Ukraine—intentions that leave no room for negotiations for purposes other than setting the precise terms of Ukraine’s complete capitulation.
• Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on March 14 that unspecified Ukrainian units that have been deployed to frontline for a long time have started rotations.
• Russian forces may be currently committing tactical and operational reserves to fighting in eastern Ukraine in an effort to maintain and potentially intensify the tempo of ongoing Russian offensive operations.
• The Russian ability to make significant gains is still dependent on the level of Western support for Ukraine, however, and continued delays in Western security assistance will increase the risk of operationally significant Russian gains in the long run.
• Reported Russian transfers of tactical reserves to new areas of the frontline demonstrate Russia’s likely ability to dynamically balance and reweight their offensive efforts.
• British outlet The Times reported on March 14 that the British government believes that Russia deliberately jammed the satellite signal on a plane carrying British Defense Secretary Grant Shapps back to the UK from Poland.
• Continued limited raids from Ukrainian territory into Russian border regions will likely force the Kremlin to choose between paying a reputational or resource cost in responding to the incursions.
• The Kremlin must choose a balance between acceptable reputational and resource costs, but the Kremlin may not suffer as high a reputational cost in 2024 as it did in 2023 due to ongoing censorship efforts.
• Russian forces advanced west of Avdiivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued positional engagements across the theater on March 14.
• Russian regional governments have reportedly increased economic incentives for Russian volunteers to sign contracts for military service.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 14, 2024

Mar 14, 2024 - ISW Press

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 14, 2024

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan

March 14, 2024, 8:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:00pm ET on March 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev posted a detailed call for the total elimination of the Ukrainian state and its absorption into the Russian Federation under what he euphemistically called a “peace formula.”[1] Medvedev’s demands are not novel but rather represent the Kremlin’s actual intentions for Ukraine — intentions that leave no room for negotiations for purposes other than setting the precise terms of Ukraine’s complete capitulation. Medvedev begins the “peace plan” by rhetorically stripping Ukraine of its sovereignty, referring to it as a “former” country and placing the name Ukraine in quotation marks. Medvedev laid out the seven points of his “peace formula,” which he sardonically described as “calm,” “realistic,” “humane,” and “soft.”[2] The seven points include: Ukraine’s recognition of its military defeat, complete and unconditional Ukrainian surrender, and full “demilitarization”; recognition by the entire international community of Ukraine’s “Nazi character” and the “denazification” of Ukraine’s government; a United Nations (UN) statement stripping Ukraine of its status as a sovereign state under international law, and a declaration that any successor states to Ukraine will be forbidden to join any military alliances without Russian consent; the resignation of all Ukrainian authorities and immediate provisional parliamentary elections; Ukrainian reparations to be paid to Russia; official recognition by the interim parliament to be elected following the resignation of Ukraine’s current government that all Ukrainian territory is part of Russia and the adoption of a “reunification” act bringing Ukrainian territory into the Russian Federation; and finally the dissolution of this provisional parliament and UN acceptance of Ukraine’s “reunification” with Russia.[3]

The tone of Medvedev’s post is deliberately sardonic, and the calls he is making appear extreme, but every one of the seven points in Medvedev’s “peace formula” are real and central pieces of the Kremlin’s ideology and stated war aims and justifications — Medvedev just simplified and synthesized them into a single brutal Telegram post. The first two of the seven points call for the complete military defeat, disarmament, “demilitarization,” and “denazification” of Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin identified the full “demilitarization” (stripping Ukraine of all its military and self-defense capabilities) and “denazification” (complete regime change) as Russia’s main goals in Ukraine when initially announcing the invasion on February 24, 2022. Putin and other Kremlin officials have frequently re-emphasized these goals in the subsequent two years of the war.[4] Medvedev’s calls for the resignation of all Ukrainian authorities and the creation of a new provisional government are calls for regime change simply made with more specificity about the methods. The demand that any successor state to Ukraine be forbidden to join military alliances without Russian permission is a call for Ukraine’s permanent neutrality, a demand that Putin and other Kremlin officials reiterate regularly.[5]

Putin established the principles that align the Kremlin’s objectives in Ukraine with Medvedev’s seven points in Putin’s 2021 essay “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians.” Putin claimed in that article that Ukrainians and Russians are historically one united people who were violently and unjustly separated by external nefarious forces.[6] Putin used this essay to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty and claims over its own political, social, historical, linguistic, and cultural development — all suggestions that underpin Medvedev’s calls to dissolve Ukraine as a legal entity and fully absorb it into the Russian Federation. Putin and other Russian officials have long set informational conditions to define Ukraine as an integral and inseparable part of Russian territory and set Russia’s goal in Ukraine as “reuniting” Ukrainian territories with their supposed historic motherland.[7] Medvedev’s “peace formula” makes explicit and brutal what Putin and the Kremlin have long demanded in somewhat more euphemistic phrases: that peace for Russia means the end of Ukraine as a sovereign and independent state of any sort with any borders. Those advocating for pressing Ukraine to enter negotiations with Russia would do well to reckon with this constantly reiterated Russian position.

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on March 14 that unspecified Ukrainian units that have been deployed to the frontline for a long time have started rotations.[8] Syrskyi stated that these unit rotations, during which deployed units will be replaced at the front with fresher units, will help stabilize the operational situation but did not specify where along the frontline Ukrainian forces were conducting the rotations in order to preserve Ukrainian operational security.[9] Ukrainian forces would likely be unable to conduct significant rotations in areas where the Ukrainian command assesses the situation is difficult or at risk of a Russian breakthrough. The reported beginning of Ukrainian rotations suggests that the Ukrainian command believes that the situation on whatever unspecified sector(s) of the frontline where the rotations will occur has stabilized sufficiently for Ukrainian troops to rotate.

Russian forces may be currently committing tactical and operational reserves to fighting in eastern Ukraine in an effort to maintain and potentially intensify the tempo of ongoing Russian offensive operations. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 14 that the Russian military command is committing tactical and operational reserves to Russian offensive efforts in the Lyman direction, near Bakhmut, and west and southwest of Donetsk Oblast to prevent Ukrainian forces from further stabilizing the frontline in these areas.[10] Mashovets stated that many of these reserves were meant to exploit an envisioned Russian breakthrough of Ukrainian defenses, not necessarily to support current Russian offensive operations against stabilizing Ukrainian defensive positions.[11] Mashovets stated that Russian forces recently committed additional elements of the 3rd Army Corps (AC) to fighting southwest of Bakhmut; an unspecified reserve regiment of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 10th Tank Regiment (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC) to fighting southwest of Donetsk City; and elements of the 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA]) to the Lyman direction.[12] Mashovets added that Russian forces still possess appropriate reserves to further intensify offensive operations but that these reserves would likely be inadequate to permit the Russian military to collapse Ukrainian defenses.[13] Russian forces have previously struggled to achieve more than gradual marginal tactical gains in Ukraine since mid-2022, and the introduction of tactical or even limited operational reserves in itself does not change Russian prospects for operationally significant gains because Russian forces have not yet demonstrated the capability to conduct sound mechanized maneuvers to take large swaths of territory rapidly.[14]

The Russian ability to make significant gains is still dependent on the level of Western support for Ukraine, however, and continued delays in Western security assistance will increase the risk of operationally significant Russian gains in the long run. Ukrainian materiel shortages resulting from delays in Western security assistance may be making the current Ukrainian frontline more fragile than the relatively slow Russian advances in various sectors would indicate.[15] Well-provisioned Ukrainian forces have proven that they can prevent Russian forces from making even marginal gains during large-scale Russian offensive efforts, and there is no reason to doubt that Ukrainian forces with sufficient Western security assistance would be able to stabilize the current frontline.[16] Difficult weather and terrain conditions in spring 2024 will likely constrain effective mechanized maneuver on both sides of the line and further limit Russian capabilities to make significant tactical advances while the ground is still muddy.[17] Russian forces are likely committing tactical and operational reserves to sustain the tempo of their offensive operations to press current advantages against ill-provisioned Ukrainian forces before ground conditions slow the overall operational tempo in Ukraine. Russian forces may also seek to maintain the tempo of their offensive operations through spring 2024 regardless of difficult weather and terrain conditions in an effort to exploit Ukrainian materiel shortages before promised Western security assistance arrives in Ukraine. Russian forces are reportedly preparing for a new offensive effort in late May or summer 2024, and Western security assistance to Ukraine will likely play a significant role in determining the prospects of that effort.[18]

Reported Russian transfers of tactical reserves to new areas of the frontline demonstrate Russia’s likely ability to dynamically balance and reweight its offensive efforts. Mashovets’ reporting about the transfer of elements of the DNR’s 10th Tank Regiment to southwest of Donetsk City and elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army’s (GTA) 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment to the Lyman direction are notable as these elements were likely reserves in other directions where Russian forces are conducting offensive operations.[19] Elements of the 10thTank Regiment participated in the seizure of Avdiivka in mid-February and appear to have rested and likely partially reconstituted in the past month, and the commitment of these elements southwest of Donetsk City instead of west of Avdiivka suggests that the Russian command does not want to intensify the tempo of offensive operations near Avdiivka at the expense of a decreased operational tempo southwest of Donetsk City. Russian forces apparently reconstituting in the Avdiivka area can likely allow Russian forces to intensify efforts to push further west of Avdiivka at a moment of the Russian military’s choosing, and the Russian military command may have decided that this potential reserve is sufficient without the elements of the 10th Tank Regiment.[20]Elements of the 1st GTA have been responsible for Russian offensive operations northwest of Svatove since the start of the Russian winter-spring 2024 offensive effort on the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis in January 2024, and the 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment was likely meant as a reserve to support those offensive operations.[21] The transfer of the elements of the 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment to the Lyman direction may suggest that Russian forces are currently prioritizing advances in the Lyman direction over advances elsewhere along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. These tactical transfers are relatively minor but are examples of the way in which the Russian military command can choose to increase or decrease commitment to operations anywhere along the line at will due to the operational flexibility offered by Russia’s possession of the theater-wide initiative.[22]

British outlet The Times reported on March 14 that the British government believes that Russia deliberately jammed the satellite signal on a plane carrying British Defense Secretary Grant Shapps back to the UK from Poland.[23] The Times reported that British officials believed that Russian jammed the satellite signal of a Royal Air Force (RAF) Dassault 900LX Falcon jet transporting Shapps, his staff, and select journalists back to the UK after Shapps observed NATO Steadfast Defender exercises in Poland. The signal jamming reportedly impacted GPS signals for about 30 minutes as the jet flew near Kaliningrad, also preventing passengers from accessing the internet on their mobile phones. Data from the GPSJAM GPS interference tracking site show that much of northern and central Poland and the Baltic Sea region experienced high levels of GPS jamming on March 13.[24] ISW previously reported that widespread GPS disruptions across the Baltic region and much of Poland in late December 2023 and early January 2024 may have been linked to Russian electronic warfare (EW) activity in Kaliningrad.[25] It is unclear if Russian forces deliberately targeted Shapps’ plane, but considering the recent rates of GPS interference in this region that have been likely linked to Russian EW activity, Russia could well have targeted the RAF jet for informational and political effects. Russia may have been reacting to Shapps’ recent announcement extending the deployment of British Sky Saber air defense systems in Poland through the end of the year, which pro-Kremlin milbloggers amplified likely as part of the information operation to portray the West as threatening Russia.[26]

Continued limited raids from Ukrainian territory into Russian border regions will likely force the Kremlin to choose between paying a reputational or resource cost in responding to the incursions. Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), continued to claim that likely elements of the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) continued attacks on Russian border settlements, primarily Tetkino, Kursk Oblast and Kozinka and Spordaryushino, Belgorod Oblast on March 14, but that Russian border guards repelled the attacks.[27] The milbloggers claimed that these likely RDK and LSR forces conducted a low-altitude helicopter landing near Kozinka in the evening and that Russian forces continued defending against the incursion.[28] A prominent Russian milblogger criticized the Russian military command because Russian border regions cannot “breathe free” in the third year of the war and claimed that “someone” committed a “strategic miscalculation” by deciding to withdraw Russian forces all the way back to the Russian border when withdrawing from northern Ukraine in the first months of the war, making the border the frontline.[29] The milblogger called for the Russian military to implement “corrective measures” that would somehow push the frontline at least 40 kilometers from the Russian border and into Ukraine. Another milblogger criticized Russian forces for not establishing barricades in certain border settlements to prevent attacks from Ukrainian territory.[30] These criticisms highlight the Kremlin’s current dilemma in light of such cross-border incursions. The Kremlin must balance between the reputational cost of accepting that pro-Ukrainian forces will sometimes be able to conduct minimally effective cross-border raids into Russia while conserving its military resources for use in Ukraine and the resource cost of allocating additional forces and means to border security to reassure the Russian populace at the expense of its military operations against Ukraine. Russia previously allocated Rosgvardia and some Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz elements to border security following May 2023 cross-border incursions without meaningfully impacting its military operations in Ukraine and could feasibly chose to make the same choice now.[31]

The Kremlin must choose a balance between acceptable reputational and resource costs, but the Kremlin may not suffer as high a reputational cost in 2024 as it did in 2023 due to ongoing censorship efforts. The Russian military command’s failure to protect Russian border regions from Ukrainian and pro-Ukrainian attacks has become a point of neuralgia for the Russian information space, and this neuralgia reached a boiling point resulting from RDK and LSR raids into Belgorod Oblast in late May and early June 2023.[32] Russian ultranationalists heavily criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) failure to protect Russians within Russia, including criticizing Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov by name.[33] This throughline is notably similar to that of Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and his supporters when Prigozhin launched his armed rebellion and march on Moscow soon after these raids on June 24, 2023, intending to unseat Shoigu and Gerasimov for continued military failures that traded Russian lives and military competency for personal gain.[34] The Kremlin has since cracked down on the Russian information space’s complaints against the MoD, actively censoring certain fringe and extreme milbloggers through arrests or other measures, encouraging self-censorship and compliance among the remaining milbloggers, and disbanding the Wagner Group following the rebellion.[35] The Russian milblogger response to the March 2024 border raid thus far is relatively neutral compared to its response to previous border raids, indicating that the Kremlin’s efforts to directly and indirectly censor the ultranationalist community has tempered milbloggers’ willingness to respond publicly to military failures. The milbloggers who criticized the Russian response on March 12–14 did not place blame directly on the MoD, Shoigu, Gerasimov, or other prominent military figures by name, title, or epithet, instead writing in the passive voice or blaming a vague “someone.”[36] The majority of the Russian milblogger responses criticized Ukraine and the RDK and LSR rather than the Russian military command and praised the Russian forces defending against the attacks.[37]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev posted a detailed call for the total elimination of the Ukrainian state and its absorption into the Russian Federation under what he euphemistically called a “peace formula.” Medvedev’s demands are not novel but rather represent the Kremlin’s actual intentions for Ukraine—intentions that leave no room for negotiations for purposes other than setting the precise terms of Ukraine’s complete capitulation.
• Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on March 14 that unspecified Ukrainian units that have been deployed to frontline for a long time have started rotations.
• Russian forces may be currently committing tactical and operational reserves to fighting in eastern Ukraine in an effort to maintain and potentially intensify the tempo of ongoing Russian offensive operations.
• The Russian ability to make significant gains is still dependent on the level of Western support for Ukraine, however, and continued delays in Western security assistance will increase the risk of operationally significant Russian gains in the long run.
• Reported Russian transfers of tactical reserves to new areas of the frontline demonstrate Russia’s likely ability to dynamically balance and reweight their offensive efforts.
• British outlet The Times reported on March 14 that the British government believes that Russia deliberately jammed the satellite signal on a plane carrying British Defense Secretary Grant Shapps back to the UK from Poland.
• Continued limited raids from Ukrainian territory into Russian border regions will likely force the Kremlin to choose between paying a reputational or resource cost in responding to the incursions.
• The Kremlin must choose a balance between acceptable reputational and resource costs, but the Kremlin may not suffer as high a reputational cost in 2024 as it did in 2023 due to ongoing censorship efforts.
• Russian forces advanced west of Avdiivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued positional engagements across the theater on March 14.
• Russian regional governments have reportedly increased economic incentives for Russian volunteers to sign contracts for military service.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional engagements continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 14, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported fighting northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; northwest of Svatove near Stelmakhivka and Tabaivka; west of Svatove near Pershotravneve; west of Kreminna near Terny and Yampolivka; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[38] Russian sources claimed that “pro-Russian partisans” conducted arson attacks against Ukrainian positions near Petropavlivka, Podoly, and Kurylivka (all northeast of Kupyansk), and near Kivsharivka and Novoosynove (southeast of Kupyansk) and forced Ukrainian troops to withdraw from some limited positions.[39] ISW has not seen any visual evidence of such purported arson attacks, nor of any Ukrainian withdrawals from these areas. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces resumed offensive efforts on the left (north) bank of the Siversky Donets River, in the Serebryanske forest area, and towards Hryhorivka (all southwest of Kreminna).[40] Mashovets also noted that elements of the 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District) are operating in this area, meaning that the Russian military command laterally redeployed them away from the Kupyansk direction.[41]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Positional fighting continued near Bakhmut on March 14, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional fighting continued northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske and east of Chasiv Yar; southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka; and south of Bakhmut near Niu York.[42] Positional fighting also continued northeast of Bakhmut near Verkhnokamyanske.[43] Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps), including its 1008th, 1194th, and 1442nd motorized rifle regiments and its 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, are reportedly operating near Klishchiivka and Andriivka (both southwest of Bakhmut).[44] Elements of the Russian 200th Naval Infantry Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating near Bohdanivka.[45]

Russian forces recently advanced further into Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka) amid continued positional fighting west of Avdiivka on March 14. Geolocated footage published on March 13 and 14 shows that Russian forces advanced along Myr and Kazberov streets in central Berdychi.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced further into Pervomaiske (southwest of Avdiivka), though ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[47] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Berdychi and Novobakhmutivka; west of Avdiivka near Orlivka, Tonenke, and Semenivka; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske, Vodyane, and Nevelske.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Nevelske despite the Russian Ministry of Defense‘s (MoD) claim of capturing the whole settlement on March 12.[49]

Positional fighting continued west and southwest of Donetsk City on March 14, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed on March 13 that Russian forces marginally advanced north of Heorhiivka (west of Donetsk City), but ISW has observed no visual confirmation of this claim.[51] Positional fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka, Pobieda, and Volodymyrivka (southeast of Vuhledar on the T0509 Vuhledar-Volnovakha-Mariupol highway).[52] A Ukrainian officer operating in the area stated that Russian forces have concentrated roughly 50,000 personnel in the Novopavlivka direction (west of Donetsk City through the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area) and transferred tactical reserves to the area after capturing Avdiivka, though the precise geographical span that the Ukrainian officer referred to is unclear.[53] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) continue to operate near Krasnohorivka, and elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD] operate near Vuhledar.[54]

Positional fighting continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on March 14. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported positional fighting south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske; southeast of Velyka Novosilka near Novodonetske and south of Zolota Nyva; and southeast of Hulyaipole north of Novoselivka.[55] Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) continue to operate near Velyka Novosilka.[56]

Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Dmytro Lykhovyi stated that Russian forces intensified offensive operations in Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts (parts of which comprise the Tavriisk direction from Avdiivka to western Zaporizhia Oblast) on the morning of March 14.[50] Lykhovyi stated that Russian and Ukrainian forces participated in 13 simultaneous combat engagements as of 0800 local time on March 14, including 12 that were still ongoing in Donetsk Oblast and one in Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Geolocated footage posted on March 14 shows that Russian forces recently advanced west of Verbove (east of Robotyne) in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[57] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to counterattack northwest of Verbove but were unsuccessful.[58] Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and Verbove.[59] Elements of the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are continuing to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[60]

Russian sources accused Ukrainian forces of targeting the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) with drones on March 14.[61] Kremlin newswire TASS posted pictures that allegedly show a crater in the ground by the ZNPP following the purported attack.[62] Russian-appointed ZNPP head Yuri Chernichuk stated that the alleged attack did not cause any physical harm to the ZNPP or its employees.[63] Russian sources frequently accuse Ukrainian forces or acting irresponsibly around the ZNPP in an attempt to paint the Russian occupation of the plant as legitimate and safe and undermine Ukraine’s legitimate concerns and legal claims to the ZNPP.[64]

Ukrainian military officials confirmed that Russian forces conducted a limited and unsuccessful raid across the Dnipro River on March 13.[65] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian reconnaissance group that attempted to land on the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast near the Antonivsky Bridge, forcing the group to retreat to their original east (left) bank positions.[66] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces conduct frequent raids along the Dnipro River using small boats but suffer heavy losses when trying to maneuver between islands on the river.[67] Limited positional engagements continued in east bank Kherson Oblast.[68] A Russian milblogger complained that heavy Ukrainian cluster munition and drone use are inhibiting Russian forces’ ability to take new positions in Krynky.[69]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 36 Shahed-136/131 drones at Ukraine overnight on March 13 to 14, 22 of which Ukrainian air defenses destroyed.[70] Russian sources claimed that the Shahed strike targeted radio towers and communications equipment in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts and a metallurgical plant in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[71]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian regional governments have reportedly increased economic incentives for Russian volunteers to sign contracts for military service. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on March 14 that Russian regional governments have increased one-time payments for signing a contract by a factor one and a half, or 225,000 rubles ($2,460), on average.[72] Vazhnye Istorii noted that Astrakhan and Nizhny Novgorod oblasts offer 500,000 rubles ($5,465) for signing a contract whereas Moscow Oblast offers 800,000 rubles ($8,744), suggesting that there is wide variance of economic incentives by Russian federal subject.[73]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Note: ISW will be publishing its coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts on a weekly basis in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track developments in Ukrainian defense industrial efforts daily and will refer to these efforts in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Note: ISW will be publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas twice a week in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track activities in Russian-occupied areas daily and will refer to these activities in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian officials continue to seize on foreign volunteers fighting with Ukrainian forces to falsely cast the war in Ukraine as an international confrontation with the West and neighboring countries. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) released an infographic on March 14 claiming to detail the number of foreign “mercenaries” who have served with Ukrainian forces and the number who have died in Ukraine since the start of the of the full-scale invasion.[74] The MoD claimed that Polish, Georgian, American, British, Romanian, German, and French citizens represent the majority of foreign volunteers fighting with Ukrainian forces.[75] The Russian military has increasingly coerced migrants living in Russia and other foreigners from abroad to fight with Russian forces in Ukraine.[76]

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kremlin officials continue efforts to portray Russia’s March 17 presidential election as free and fair to legitimize Putin’s assured next term as president.[77] Russian Central Election Committee (CEC) Chairperson Ella Pamfilova claimed that unspecified actors are attempting to prevent Russians living abroad from voting, and this claim is likely a part of an information operation alleging that the West is trying to discredit Russia’s presidential election.[78]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian Security Council Deputy Secretary Major General Alexander Neverovsky reiterated on March 14 that Belarus does not intend to fight in Russia’s war in Ukraine. Neverovsky stated to Belarusian border guards that Belarus does not “need” the war in Ukraine despite attempts to “drag” Belarus into the war.[79] ISW continues to assess that Belarus is highly unlikely to enter the war in Ukraine and will likely continue to support Russia’s war effort through military production, training, and sanctions evasion schemes.[80]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

7. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 14, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-14-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: Hamas reportedly killed the head of a local clan in Gaza City likely as part of Hamas’ effort to reassert its authority in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in several sectors of Khan Younis.
• Political Developments: Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas appointed the current chairman of the Palestinian Investment Fund, Mohammad Mustafa, as the new PA prime minister. Abbas tasked him with forming a new government that will seek to rebuild the Gaza Strip after the war.
• Yemen: The Houthi movement launched an anti-ship ballistic missile targeting an unspecified vessel in the Red Sea. US CENTCOM reported that US forces destroyed four drones and a surface-to-air missile in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.
• Iraq: Head of the Iraqi National Masses Party Ahmed Abdullah al Jubouri nominated Badr Mahmoud al Fahal for governor of Salah ad Din Province.
• West Bank: Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least five times in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.

IRAN UPDATE, MARCH 14, 2024

Mar 14, 2024 - ISW Press

Iran Update, March 14, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Peter Mills, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Elizabeth Volynsky-Lauzon, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Hamas reportedly killed the head of a local clan in Gaza City on March 13 likely as part of Hamas’ effort to reassert its authority in the northern Gaza Strip.[1] Hamas targeted the head and other members of the armed Dughmush clan amid local accusations that the clan stole humanitarian aid and cooperated with Israel.[2] The clan responded to the killing by vowing to retaliate and declaring Hamas members and positions as “legitimate target[s].”[3] Hamas denied reports that its forces killed the clan members.[4]

Hamas has sought to reconstitute militarily and rebuild its governing authority in the northern Gaza Strip since Israeli forces reduced their presence there in December 2023. CTP-ISW has reported extensively on how Hamas fighters have infiltrated areas in the northern strip that Israeli forces previously cleared. Israeli Army Radio reported in January 2023 that the Israeli military establishment believes that Hamas is trying to restore its control over the civilian population in the northern Gaza Strip partly by rehabilitating local police there.[5] The Civil Police and the Hamas-controlled Interior Ministry‘s Internal Security Forces both employ fighters from the Hamas military wing.[6] The killing of the members of the Dughmush clan further demonstrates that Hamas fighters remain present in at least some areas of the northern strip.

Hamas may be targeting political opposition as part of its effort to consolidate its power in the northern Gaza Strip. An Israeli academic reported that Hamas killed the Dughmush members after they expressed readiness to be part of a new administration in the Gaza Strip.[7] Tension between Hamas and the Dughmush clan is not unprecedented, as they have periodically clashed since Hamas took power in the Gaza Strip in 2007. The clan reportedly has affiliations with Salafi-jihadi groups as well as organized crime and arms trading in the Gaza Strip. Hamas reportedly warned Palestinians against cooperating with Israel earlier this week and that Hamas would treat those who did with “an iron fist.”[8] Hamas has a long history of violently suppressing political opposition in the Gaza Strip.[9]

Hamas’ killing of the Dughmush clan members risks further eroding the security situation there as humanitarian aid enters the northern Gaza Strip. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on March 13 that “criminal gangs” and “ordinary civilians” are resorting to looting humanitarian aid.[10] He warned that lawlessness, insecurity, and desperation remain hurdles to delivering aid to Gazans. Intercommunal violence within the Gaza Strip between Hamas and clans, such as the Dughmush, could further threaten the secure delivery of aid into the area. These challenges could become particularly acute if Hamas and its rivals compete with one another to control the flow of aid in the strip. Israel is currently deciding whether to open a crossing directly into the northern Gaza Strip based on an assessment of how securely the convoys can reach civilians.[11]

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: Hamas reportedly killed the head of a local clan in Gaza City likely as part of Hamas’ effort to reassert its authority in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in several sectors of Khan Younis.
• Political Developments: Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas appointed the current chairman of the Palestinian Investment Fund, Mohammad Mustafa, as the new PA prime minister. Abbas tasked him with forming a new government that will seek to rebuild the Gaza Strip after the war.
• Yemen: The Houthi movement launched an anti-ship ballistic missile targeting an unspecified vessel in the Red Sea. US CENTCOM reported that US forces destroyed four drones and a surface-to-air missile in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.
• Iraq: Head of the Iraqi National Masses Party Ahmed Abdullah al Jubouri nominated Badr Mahmoud al Fahal for governor of Salah ad Din Province.
• West Bank: Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least five times in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The IDF 162nd Division engaged Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip on March 14. The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) attacked a nearby Palestinian militia cell with tank fire.[12] The IDF Air Force separately conducted an airstrike targeting a Palestinian fighter.[13]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in several sectors of Khan Younis on March 14. The IDF 7th Brigade (36th Division) located a three-man Palestinian militia cell in Bani Suheila, eastern Khan Younis, and directed tank fire targeting them.[14] The IDF LOTAR counterterrorism unit conducted “special and targeted” missions in Khan Younis and raided several Hamas-affiliated military buildings.[15] The IDF Givati Brigade (162nd Division) raided buildings and destroyed rocket launchers in Hamad, northern Khan Younis.[16] The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which is a leftist-Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, clashed with Israeli forces in Hamad.[17] Israeli forces initially expanded clearing operations to the neighborhood on March 3.[18]

The Israeli Army Radio cited an IDF lieutenant colonel on March 14 saying that Israeli forces have engaged “high-quality” members of Hamas’ elite Nukhba force in Hamad.[19] The IDF officer highlighted that the Palestinian fighters are working in organized cells with a structured command system. He also noted that Israeli forces encountered the highest concentration of Palestinian snipers in Hamad. There have been at least three clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters daily since Israeli forces advanced into the neighborhood, which is a small part of Khan Younis.

The IDF said on March 13 that it plans to move civilians from Rafah to “humanitarian enclaves” in the central Gaza Strip before any Israeli offensive into Rafah.[20] There are approximately 1.4 million displaced Palestinian civilians currently in Rafah.[21] The Israeli government has been clear on its intentions to expand clearing operations into the Central and Rafah Governorates.[22] The IDF spokesperson said that Israel would work with the international community to provide civilians with food, temporary housing, and establish field hospitals in the “enclaves.” The spokesperson noted that Israel would advance into Rafah depending on ideal, unspecified conditions.

The IDF confirmed on March 14 that it is preparing for the arrival of humanitarian aid via the maritime corridor to the Gazan coast.[23] The first ship of its kind left Cyprus on March 12, towing a barge containing food from the World Central Kitchen organization, funded by the United Arab Emirates and Cyprus.[24] The IDF said that the shipment is happening in coordination with the Israeli defense establishment and Defense Ministry.[25] Maxar published satellite imagery captured on March 14 that reveals the new jetty under construction on the coastline in southern Gaza City. The jetty is also north of the IDF-constructed road splitting the northern and central Gaza Strip.[26]

The IDF said senior US military officials will visit Israel in the coming days to coordinate the construction and protection of a temporary pier to facilitate aid shipments into the Gaza Strip.[27] Israel said that they will discuss protecting the pier from potential Hamas attacks.[28] US CENTCOM announced on March 9 that a US Army logistics support vessel departed from Virginia to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea with the first load of equipment to establish a temporary pier to deliver humanitarian supplies to the Gaza Strip.[29]

Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas appointed the current chairman of the Palestinian Investment Fund, Mohammad Mustafa, as the new PA prime minister on March 14. Abbas tasked him with forming a new government that will seek to rebuild the Gaza Strip after the war.[30] Mustafa is a longtime adviser to Abbas and is also tasked with facing mounting pressure to reform the PA.[31] Former PA Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh announced his cabinet’s resignation in late February amid calls for leadership changes.[32] His replacement follows the PA and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) indicating that they may reform themselves and are trying to unify Palestinian factions, including Hamas.[33] An unspecified source with direct knowledge stated that Qatar urged Abbas to appoint Hamas-accepted individuals to the new government, which Abbas apparently rejected.[34]

An Arab-Israeli citizen killed one individual and injured three others, including an IDF soldier, in a stabbing attack in southern Israel.[35] The IDF shot and killed the perpetrator.[36] Israeli media identified the perpetrator as Fadi Abu Altyaf, who lived in the Gaza Strip until moving to Israel in 2019.[37] A Palestinian militia praised Altyaf for his attack, although no militia has claimed affiliation with him at the time of this writing.[38]

The IDF reported that Palestinian fighters attempted to launch mortars into Israeli territory from the central Gaza Strip targeting a town in southern Israel on March 13.[39] The fighters targeted Nahal Oz in southern Israel, and but the mortars fell near the Gaza Strip.[40] The IDF identified the Palestinian militia cell responsible for the attack in the northern Gaza Strip and directed an airstrike targeting them.

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least five times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 13.[41] PIJ and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades detonated IEDs and fired small arms targeting Israeli forces who were conducting raids in Nablus on March 13.[42] Israel forces detained 13 wanted individuals as part of a "brigade operation to counter terrorism in Jericho" in the West Bank.[43]

Hamas reiterated its call for Palestinians and Israeli Arabs to “defend” al Aqsa Mosque ahead of the first Friday of Ramadan on March 15.[44] Hamas previously called on March 9 and 13 for Palestinians to escalate attacks targeting Israeli forces during Ramadan.[45] Hamas encouraged Palestinians to, “remain there for days and nights.”[46]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 13.[47] Hezbollah claimed that it conducted attacks targeting Israeli military positions in al Malikiyah and on Karantina hill along the Israel-Lebanon border.[48] Hezbollah also claimed attacks targeting two Israeli military positions in Shebaa Farms.[49]

The IDF Air Force intercepted near Kafr Blum a drone that an unspecified actor launched from Lebanon into Israel.[50]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it launched a drone targeting the IDF Palmachim airbase on March 13.[51] The group released a video showing the launch of at least one drone.[52] CTP-ISW cannot verify whether the attack occurred or struck its intended target. Neither Israeli media or officials have acknowledged any attack at the time of this writing.

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Head of the Iraqi National Masses Party Ahmed Abdullah al Jubouri nominated Badr Mahmoud al Fahal for governor of Salah ad Din Province on March 14.[53] Fahal is a member of the Accountability and Justice Commission that the Shia Coordination Framework — a coalition of loosely aligned pro-Iranian political parties – has weaponized to sideline political opposition.[54] The National Masses Party won five of the 15 provincial seats in Salah ad Din Province.[55]

Iraqi President Abdul Rashid previously rejected Jubouri for governor of Salah ad Din Province in February 2024, citing a 2008 law, which bars convicted felons from holding office.[56] Jubouri was convicted in 2017 for abusing his role as governor of Salah ad Din Province, misusing federal funds, and appropriating lands for personal use.[57] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Jubouri in 2019 for corruption, including the misappropriation of funds and government resources for personal benefit.[58] The Treasury Department reported that Jubouri has also “accomodat[ed]” Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to secure personal interests.

Russian state media claimed on March 14 that the Houthis successfully tested an unspecified hypersonic missile and that the group is preparing to use this missile as part of its attacks targeting international shipping and Israel.[59] The Houthis have used ballistic missiles that travel at hypersonic speeds, defined as greater than Mach 5, but it is extremely unlikely that the Houthis possess working hypersonic glide vehicles.[60]

The Houthi movement launched an anti-ship ballistic missile targeting an unspecified vessel in the Red Sea on March 13.[61] US CENTCOM reported that the missile did not impact any ship or cause damage or injuries.

CENTCOM reported on March 13 that US forces destroyed four drones and a surface-to-air missile in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.[62]

Houthi-controlled media claimed that the United States and United Kingdom conducted four airstrikes targeting Bayt al Faqih, near Hudaydah, and Hudaydah International Airport on March 14.[63]

The Financial Times reported that the United States held secret, Oman-brokered talks with Iran in January 2024 to convince Tehran to pressure the Houthis to stop attacking ships in the Red Sea.[64] White House Middle East adviser Brett McGurk and acting Special Envoy for Iran Abram Paley led the American delegation. Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Policy Ali Bagheri Kani led the Iranian delegation. Iranian state media denied the report, citing an “informed” source.[65]

8. Big Appeal, and Big Question Marks, in Possible TikTok Sale

But if China will not allow the algorithm and proprietary TokTok information to be sold, why buy TikTok?

Big Appeal, and Big Question Marks, in Possible TikTok Sale

Wall Street is abuzz about a potential deal, but the large price tag for the app is one of many factors that could limit the number of suitors.

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Former Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin told CNBC that he was “trying to put together a group to buy TikTok, because they should be owned by U.S. businesses.”Credit...Erik Tanner for The New York Times

By Lauren Hirsch and David McCabe

March 14, 2024

TikTok is one of the most popular and largest social media apps around the globe — with great brand recognition and loyal users.

It may also be one of the hardest to sell.

That’s the conundrum facing TikTok as Washington lawmakers push a bill that would force the app’s Chinese parent company, ByteDance, to sell it or face having it banned in the United States. The bill passed the House on Wednesday but could face an uphill climb in the Senate.

Rumors are already swirling on Wall Street about who could be interested in buying TikTok. The rumblings grew louder on Thursday after Steven Mnuchin, a former Treasury secretary, told CNBC that he was “trying to put together a group to buy TikTok, because they should be owned by U.S. businesses.” Mr. Mnuchin said he had spoken to a “combination of U.S. investors” about such a deal.

But any potential buyer could confront several roadblocks. The Chinese government could block the sale. The U.S. president, according to the bill passed by the House, would have to affirm that a deal cut the app off from ByteDance.

And then there is the price tag — almost certainly a large one. The research firm CB Insights recently estimated that ByteDance was worth $225 billion, though it is less clear how much the U.S. version of TikTok would cost on its own.

The price would limit the pool of potential buyers to a coalition of private equity firms; a corporate behemoth, like Microsoft; or a combination of the two. But it is unclear if antitrust regulators would allow a large company like Microsoft — or Alphabet, which owns YouTube — to buy the app.

A spokesman for the Federal Trade Commission declined to comment. The Justice Department declined to comment.

The last time TikTok was for sale, ByteDance spoke to Microsoft about a potential deal before selecting Oracle, the cloud computing company. Oracle brought in Walmart as a partner, but just as the two appeared poised to buy a stake in the app, the deal collapsed amid geopolitical pressure.

Oracle did not respond to a request for comment. Microsoft, which also considered buying the app in 2020, declined to comment.

TikTok has said the legislation is unnecessary because the app does not pose a risk to Americans’ data and does not skew its feed at to the whims of the Chinese government. It has proposed a plan that would store U.S. user data on domestic servers controlled by Oracle.

Our business reporters. Times journalists are not allowed to have any direct financial stake in companies they cover.

Beijing could apply additional government scrutiny. This week, Wang Wenbin, a spokesman for China’s foreign ministry, condemned U.S. lawmakers’ push to force a sale or ban of TikTok, though he stopped short of saying the country would outright prevent such a move.

Analysts are skeptical that the Chinese government would allow such a move to happen.

“You’re telling me China’s going to sell this amazing company to a U.S. company, just so they can take the profitability benefit and give up all of the geopolitical benefits of it being banned?” said Rich Greenfield, an analyst at LightShed Partners.

It is unclear how advanced Mr. Mnuchin’s discussions with investors are, and whether the participants have taken the formal steps necessary to pursue a possible transaction, like hiring a financial adviser or making a formal approach to ByteDance. A spokesman for Mr. Mnuchin declined to comment.

Mr. Mnuchin has a long history with TikTok. As Treasury secretary from February 2017 to January 2021, he led the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, a group of federal agencies that vets international involvement in American companies. CFIUS was behind the government’s push to get ByteDance to sell its TikTok business in 2020.

Mr. Mnuchin, a former Goldman Sachs partner, now runs a private equity firm, Liberty Strategic Capital. It is one of many private equity firms facing a downturn in deals, amid rising regulatory pressure and rising interest rates. The firm recently put up $450 million to buy the beleaguered New York Community Bank.

For TikTok’s U.S. investors, which include the Susquehanna Investment Group and General Atlantic, a sale would almost certainly be preferable to a ban. These investors could opt to roll their stake in ByteDance over to any new owner. General Atlantic declined to comment, and a representative for Susquehanna did not respond to a request for comment.

“I have to think that most of the private investors in TikTok, who include a number of Americans, would want to see a divestment rather than a ban, because a ban is going to destroy a lot of value given the size and value of TikTok’s U.S. user base,” said Peter Harrell, a former national security official in the Biden administration.

Lauren Hirsch joined The Times from CNBC in 2020, covering deals and the biggest stories on Wall Street. More about Lauren Hirsch

David McCabe covers tech policy. He joined The Times from Axios in 2019. More about David McCabe

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TikTok Under Scrutiny

The popular video app, which is owned by the Chinese company ByteDance, is under pressure amid concerns over the handling of users’ data.

• Efforts to Ban TikTok: Over the last year, lawmakers in the United States, Canada and Europe have escalated efforts to restrict access to the app, citing security threats. Here is what to know.
• In the United States: The House passed a bill with broad bipartisan support that would force TikTok’s Chinese owner to sell its hugely popular video app or be banned in the United States. The move escalates a showdown between Beijing and Washington over the control of technologies that could affect national security, free speech and the social media industry.
• How TikTok Shares User Data: Internal documents show how TikTok employees have regularly posted user information, including the driver’s licenses of American users, on a messaging and collaboration tool called Lark.
• First U.S. Ban: In November, a federal judge blocked Montana’s statewide ban of TikTok from taking effect, at least temporarily preventing the nation’s first such prohibition on the app.
• The Stakes: Even as U.S. officials are focused on the dangers of TikTok, many users disagree with those concerns. We spoke with nine young Americans about how a ban would change their lives.

Related Content

9. China Signals Opposition to Forced Sale of TikTok in the U.S.

China Signals Opposition to Forced Sale of TikTok in the U.S.

Beijing’s stance leaves few options for app owner ByteDance

https://www.wsj.com/tech/tiktok-ban-chinese-owners-bytedance-1a857a06?mod=hp_lead_pos1

By Raffaele Huang

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March 15, 2024 12:18 am ET

TikTok’s Los Angeles office. PHOTO: RINGO CHIU/ZUMA PRESS

SINGAPORE—The Chinese government is signaling that it won’t allow a forced sale of TikTok, limiting options for the app’s owners as buyers begin lining up to bid for its U.S. operations.

Chinese officials have criticized the U.S. for its moves targeting the short-video-sharing app. They have also sent signals to TikTok’s owner, Beijing-based ByteDance, that company executives have interpreted as meaning the government would rather the app be banned in the U.S. than be sold, according to people familiar with the matter.

That leaves ByteDance in a bind as TikTok faces the most serious threat yet to its existence in America, its biggest market where it has 170 million users.

Zhang Yiming, then chief executive officer of ByteDance, in 2019. PHOTO: GILLES SABRIE/BLOOMBERG NEWS

From left, former Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and Bobby Kotick, former CEO of Activision Blizzard. PHOTO: ASSOCIATED PRESS, BLOOMBERG NEWS

In Washington, the House voted overwhelmingly to approve a bill on Wednesday that requires ByteDance to sell off TikTok or face a ban, contending that collection of American user data by its owners poses a national security risk. TikTok has said it won’t share the data with the Chinese government even if Beijing demands it.

The bill faces a showdown in the Senate, where lawmakers have signaled a more cautious approach. President Biden has said he would sign a bill if it reached his desk.

During a routine news conference on Thursday, a spokesman for China’s Ministry of Commerce said the U.S. should “stop unreasonably suppressing” TikTok, adding: “The relevant party should strictly abide by Chinese laws and regulations.”

The comment was seen by some ByteDance executives as reinforcing Beijing’s message to the company that it would face regulatory hurdles if it sought to divest TikTok, the people said. Last year, China warned that a sale or divestiture of TikTok would involve exporting technology and would have to be approved by the government.

Internally, ByteDance founder Zhang Yiming, who holds a significant stake in the company, hasn’t indicated that he is engaging in any conversations with external buyers about selling TikTok, people familiar with the matter said. 

Former Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said Thursday that he is putting together a consortium to try to buy TikTok. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Bobby Kotick, the former chief executive of videogame publisher Activision, has approached Zhang.

Any price tag is estimated to be more than $100 billion. TikTok’s revenue was around $20 billion last year, but it hasn’t made a profit, people familiar with the matter said.

TikTok is back in the crosshairs of geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and China, having survived several regulatory challenges in the past. In 2020, then-President Donald Trump tried to ban the app via an executive order, but it was blocked by the courts.

Since then, TikTok is struggling to implement an operation code-named Project Texas to fence in American user data. Company executives were once confident that it could reach a deal with U.S. regulators to operate in the country. But scrutiny has grown, leading its CEO to appear before Congress twice in the past year. Montana also passed a law to ban the app, a move that is being disputed by TikTok in the courts.

Last year, ByteDance’s spending on lobbying efforts in the U.S. rose 77% to $8.74 million, according to OpenSecrets, a nonpartisan platform tracking political spending. It has turned the lobbying focus to the Senate since the legislation is expected to face a steeper path there than in the House.

TikTok’s global success is seen in China as a rare triumph for a country that has for decades been the world’s factory floor but struggled to build its own tech brands.

“Policymakers in Beijing view the bill as an attempted robbery of this prized asset, and they won’t stand for it,” said Tom Nunlist, a Shanghai-based tech policy analyst at Trivium China, a consulting firm.

TikTok’s aggressive push to rally U.S. users to call their House representatives to complain about the bill sparked a backlash in the U.S. but has won praise from Chinese state media and on China’s internet. The hashtag #TikTokUsersBombardUSCongressOfficesWithCalls went viral on China’s X-like social platform 

Weibo over the weekend.Some Weibo users said the U.S. attempt to force a sale amounted to theft and they wanted ByteDance to fight back harder.

“Just like Huawei, TikTok didn’t do anything wrong,” one user posted. Telecoms giant Huawei Technologies has faced years of restrictions from the U.S. over allegations it can share sensitive information with the Chinese government, which the firm denies.

Other Weibo users, however, likened TikTok facing a ban in the U.S. with Western apps including Facebook and X being unavailable in China. TikTok also isn’t available inside China, where ByteDance operates Douyin, a sibling app that uses a similar algorithm structure to recommend content but is subject to Communist Party censorship. 

TikTok’s collection of American user data poses a national security risk, some lawmakers contend. PHOTO: NATHAN HOWARD/BLOOMBERG NEWS

If TikTok is banned in the U.S., it will pave the way for more such actions against Chinese companies on national-security grounds, Trivium’s Nunlist said. 

President Biden last month ordered the Commerce Department to open an investigation into foreign-made software in cars, citing Chinese technology as a potential national-security risk.

As long as ByteDance remains firm, willing to shut down TikTok rather than give up ownership, it will create pressure on lawmakers and the Biden administration over the political risks of removing the app, Hu Xijin, the former editor in chief of the Communist Party-backed Global Times, wrote in a Sunday column published by the nationalist tabloid.

China has a say in any TikTok sale because it added content-recommendation algorithms, a secret sauce of TikTok’s success, to an export-control list in 2020 when the Trump administration was pushing for a sale of its U.S. operations. 

Steven Mnuchin Says He’s Forming a Group to Buy TikTok

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Steven Mnuchin Says He’s Forming a Group to Buy TikTok

Play video: Steven Mnuchin Says He’s Forming a Group to Buy TikTok

Former Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said he is putting together a consortium to buy TikTok. The comments came a day after the House passed a bill that would ban TikTok in the U.S., or force its sale to a non-Chinese owner. Photo: Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images

“China’s top leaders will likely prioritize national dignity ahead of ByteDance’s financial interests,” Gabriel Wildau, managing director of advisory firm Teneo, wrote in a note to clients Thursday.

TikTok might have a stronger hand in the U.S. now that it has beefed up efforts to engage users and businesses there, which company executives and analysts say could make a ban more difficult to enact. President Biden’s election campaign joined the app on Super Bowl Sunday. 

TikTok Chief Executive Shou Zi Chew has posted more frequently on his personal TikTok account, which has 3.8 million followers. In September, TikTok rolled out its e-commerce business, TikTok Shop, in the U.S. and has around 200,000 vendors.

It also faces stronger rivals, with Instagram’s Reels and YouTube Shorts providing popular alternative platforms for short videos.

Rachel Liang and Grace Zhu contributed to this article.

Write to Raffaele Huang at raffaele.huang@wsj.com

TikTok Under Scrutiny

Coverage and analysis of the Chinese-controlled video app, selected by editors

Mnuchin Says He Is Putting Together a Group to Buy TikTok

House Passes Bill to Ban TikTok or Force Sale

How TikTok Was Blindsided by Possible Ban

Trump Sees TikTok Ban as ‘Tough Decision’

Why Some Young Adults Are Saying No to TikTok

Ban on TikTok May Be Easier in Theory

What Will Happen to the TikTok Creators?

World’s Biggest Music Company Battles TikTok

Corrections & Amplifications

Bobby Kotick is the former CEO of Activision Blizzard. A caption in an earlier version of this article incorrectly said he was the current CEO. (Corrected on March 15)

10. Questions Persist as Israel Signals Support for More Aid for Gaza

Questions Persist as Israel Signals Support for More Aid for Gaza

Aid organizations and U.N. officials say the new efforts by land, air and sea are too small and inefficient to meet the enormous needs of Gazan civilians.

• https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/14/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-aid.html

A truck carrying humanitarian aid bound for Gaza, at the inspection area at the Kerem Shalom crossing in southern Israel, on Thursday.Credit...Carlos Garcia Rawlins/Reuters

By Cassandra Vinograd

• March 14, 2024

Israel’s military on Thursday said it supported new initiatives to get humanitarian assistance into Gaza by land, air and sea, just hours after the military’s chief spokesman said it was trying to “flood” the enclave with sorely needed aid.

Israel has endorsed three new aid efforts over the past week — a ship carrying food approaching the coast off Gaza; airdrops by foreign countries; and an initial convoy of six trucks crossing directly from Israel into northern Gaza, where aid agencies say hunger is severest, for the first time since Oct. 7.

The public signaling from Israeli officials follows increasingly urgent calls from the United States and other allies for Israel to do more to alleviate the humanitarian crisis wrought by its invasion. The United Nations has warned parts of Gaza are on the brink of famine.

Dahlia Scheindlin, an Israeli political analyst and a columnist at Haaretz, said that Israel is coming under pressure from all sides and that images emerging from Gaza of emaciated, starving children may have been “a tipping point” for policymakers. “There’s a limit to how much opprobrium Israel is willing to take and stand behind and say we are in the right,” she said.

Aid organizations and U.N. officials say the new efforts are too small and inefficient to meet the enormous needs of Gazan civilians. They have argued that it would be better for Israel to ease entry restrictions for trucks at established crossing points into the enclave, and do more to speed the delivery of goods inside Gaza.

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Airdrops are ineffective and largely symbolic, these groups say, able to deliver just a fraction of the food that a truck convoy can haul. Setting up the infrastructure for aid deliveries by sea will be expensive and take time: U.S. officials have said that it could be weeks before a floating pier for maritime aid is up and running.

“Air and sea is not a substitute for land and nobody says otherwise,” Sigrid Kaag, the U.N. humanitarian and reconstruction coordinator for Gaza, said last week.

But overland deliveries also face challenges that critics say Israel needs to try to address.

Israel’s bombardment of Gaza has damaged the roads that aid trucks travel on. Civil order has broken down. Desperate Gazans have looted and pulled food from trucks. Convoys have come under fire.

In addition, humanitarian agencies have said that stringent Israeli inspections have created bottlenecks for aid trucks at the two open crossings into the enclave, which are both in the south, far from the north where the greatest food shortages are.

Israel has insisted throughout the war that it is committed to allowing as much aid into Gaza as possible. and it has blamed delays on the U.N. staffing and logistics.

“The issue isn’t the scanning and delivery of aid to Gaza, it’s how much the U.N. can collect and deliver within Gaza,” Col. Elad Goren, an official at the Israeli agency that oversees policy for the Palestinian territories, known as COGAT, told reporters on Thursday.

The new aid efforts are not immune to some of the same logistical challenges. Israel has said it will continue to conduct strict inspections of supplies entering Gaza, arguing that Hamas could divert items for its use. Food being dropped by air or sea must still be distributed on the ground.

But Israel has appeared increasingly eager to demonstrate support for the initiatives. On Wednesday, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant visited northern Gaza and viewed preparations for a new maritime humanitarian route, calling aid “a central issue,” according to a statement from the defense ministry. Then, the chief military spokesman, Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari, told reporters that Israel plans to “flood” northern Gaza with aid and scale up entry points, The Associated Press reported.

On Thursday, the Israeli military posted videos and photos of airdrops and trucks entering northern Gaza, saying it “continues to expand its efforts to enable the entry of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip” by air, land and sea.

Ms. Scheindlin, the political analyst, said it’s striking how “all of a sudden, humanitarian aid became important.”

One reason is “certainly” the American calls for Israel to do more to protect civilians, she said. There is also a recent interim ruling from the International Court of Justice hanging over Israel. The court ordered Israel to take steps to prevent its troops from committing genocide in Gaza and to increase the amount of humanitarian aid reaching the territory’s civilians.

“There is an awareness that the international community is watching,” she said.

Adam Sella contributed reporting.

A correction was made on March 14, 2024: An earlier version of this article misstated the title of Col. Elad Goren. He is an official at COGAT, not its head.

When we learn of a mistake, we acknowledge it with a correction. If you spot an error, please let us know at nytnews@nytimes.com.Learn more

11. Bloomberg reports Biden to award Samsung $6 billion in chip incentives

Bloomberg reports Biden to award Samsung $6 billion in chip incentives

https://www.chosun.com/english/industry-en/2024/03/15/QPVX6P74IRFL5OYTZSBTC3QRAM/

By Kim Hyo-sun,

Yeom Hyun-a

Published 2024.03.15. 17:21

The Biden administration in the United States reportedly plans to grant Samsung Electronics subsidies exceeding $6 billion (7.96 trillion won), according to Bloomberg on Mar. 15, citing several sources.

The Delight Shop logo displayed at Samsung Electronics' Seocho office in Seoul, March 7, 2024./Yonhap News

These subsidies, earmarked by the U.S. government for Samsung, stem from the U.S. Chips Act. This act enables the Department of Commerce to offer financial incentives for semiconductor manufacturing and research and development, encouraging firms to invest within the U.S.

It is suggested that these funds will assist Samsung in broadening its U.S. presence beyond the previously announced Texas facility. In 2021, Samsung announced plans to construct a new semiconductor factory worth $17 billion in Taylor, Texas, complementing its existing plant in Austin, Texas.

The Department of Commerce is poised to disclose subsidy arrangements for key players in the advanced semiconductor industry by the month’s end.

In a previous report, Bloomberg noted that Samsung Electronics plans to secure several billion dollars in subsidies under the U.S. Chip Act. It also mentioned that Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturer TSMC might receive over $5 billion, and Intel, an American corporation, could be awarded upwards of $10 billion in subsidies.

12. If the US bans TikTok, China will be getting a taste of its own medicine

If the US bans TikTok, China will be getting a taste of its own medicine

https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/14/tech/china-reactions-tiktok-potential-ban-intl-hnk/index.html?utm

Analysis by Laura He, CNN

 5 minute read 

Updated 12:20 PM EDT, Thu March 14, 2024

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Here's what could happen if the TikTok bill is passed and made law

02:18 - Source: CNN

Editor’s Note: Sign up for CNN’s Meanwhile in China newsletter which explores what you need to know about the country’s rise and how it impacts the world.

Hong KongCNN — 

TikTok is now facing a ban in the United States, a fate that has already befallen a string of American social media giants that tried to make it in China.

On Wednesday, the US House of Representatives passed a bill which could ban TikTok in the country if its Chinese owner ByteDance doesn’t sell the app to an entity that satisfies the US government.

“The bill passed by the US House of Representatives puts the US on the opposite side of the principle of fair competition and international economic and trade rules,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said at a briefing Thursday.

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But American apps have long been barred in China. Beijing currently blocks most US social media platforms — including Google, YouTube, X, Instagram, WhatsApp and Facebook — because they refuse to follow the Chinese government’s rules on data collection and the type of content shared.

In 2010, Google pulled out from mainland China after operating there for four years. It said at the time that it was no longer willing to continue censoring results on Google.cn, citing Chinese-originated hacks on it and other US companies.

More than 10 years after that high-profile retreat, the shoe is on the other foot, even if the circumstances aren’t exactly the same.

“The TikTok bill appears likely to become law and China’s displeasure seems ironic, if not hypocritical, given its stance toward American social apps,” said Brock Silvers, managing director at Kaiyuan Capital.

Asked about China’s stance on US apps, Wang said “this is completely different” and “you can clearly see what is bullying and what is gangster logic.”

The focus is now on the US Senate, where many lawmakers said they are still evaluating the legislation. President Joe Biden has said he will sign the bill if it reaches his desk.

US officials and legislators have long expressed concerns about TikTok’s potential national security risks, including that it could share data with the Chinese government, or manipulate content displayed on the platform. But TikTok has rejected the claims.

On Thursday, following the House vote, the Chinese Commerce Ministry pledged that the country would take “all necessary measures” to safeguard its interests regarding TikTok.

The Chinese government has said it strongly opposes a forced sale of TikTok, and it has the legal ability to do so. It views TikTok’s technology as highly valuable and has taken steps since 2020 to ensure it can veto any sale by ByteDance.

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U.S. House adopts bill that could ban TikTok amid Trump resistance

03:26 - Source: CNN

Beijing’s next steps

In August 2020, following an attempt by the Trump administration to force the sale of TikTok, Beijing revised its export control rules to cover a variety of technologies it deemed sensitive, including technology that appears similar to TikTok’s personalized information recommendation services.

Years later, in March 2023, a Commerce Ministry spokeswoman said in the government’s first direct response to the matter that China would oppose any forced sale of TikTok, because a sale or divestiture of the app would involve exporting technology and had to be approved by the Chinese government. Beijing has not indicated any change to this position since then.

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A man walks past the headquarters of ByteDance, the parent company of TikTok, in Beijing. Greg Baker/AFP/Getty Images

TikTok’s algorithms, which keep users glued to the app, are believed to be key to its success. The algorithms give recommendations based on users’ behavior, thus pushing videos they actually like and want to watch.

“TikTok’s crown jewel, its AI algorithms, will put the company into a legal tug of war,” said Winston Ma, adjunct professor at New York University School of Law, adding that ByteDance is subject to Chinese laws that require it to seek Beijing’s approval before selling advanced technologies.

Silvers said it was possible that TikTok could seek a “middle ground” to try to meet US requirements for ownership, but it’s unclear whether American concerns can be mollified by cosmetic change.

He said the episode is likely to worsen relations between Beijing and Washington, which are already mired in an escalating battle over access to advanced technology such as computer chips and AI.

“Markets should expect [China to have] retaliatory actions against US firms as tech and trade issues continue on a negative trajectory,” he said.

Other apps?

If TikTok is eventually banned, more Chinese-owned apps in the US may be next in line, according to Alex Capri, a research fellow at the Hinrich Foundation and a lecturer at the National University of Singapore Business School.

“This latest episode with TikTok underscores the need for a much more robust regulatory framework in the US to address existential issues wrought by big-tech, in general,” he said.

Applications from Chinese developers popular in the US App Store or Google Play include budget retailers Temu and Shein, as well as short-form video editing app Capcut, which is also owned by ByteDance.

“This legislation marks a pivotal moment in the ongoing battle for control over emerging public opinion spaces, deepening the geopolitical contest between China and the US,” said Craig Singleton, senior China fellow at the non-partisan Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington, DC.

On Chinese social media site Weibo, hashtags related to TikTok being potentially banned in the US were trending on Thursday, generating 78 million views and thousands of discussion posts.

“Why can’t we just talk about business instead of elevating everything to the national [security] level?” said Weibo user “Mastering technology” in a post that was ranked “hot” by the platform. “Direct interference in business operations is inconsistent with the values of free market economy that the US has always advocated.”

“This is the US version of nationalism,” another user wrote.

Some online commentators urged Beijing to retaliate by taking action against US companies operating in China. But that was questioned by other users.

“We’ve already been unable to use Google, Twitter, and Facebook for more than a decade,” said one user. “I think we are way ahead of the US in blocking foreign news media [services].”

Capri said the saga exposes the “ironies and inequalities” of US-China commercial exchange.

“While China has completely banned [these] American apps, TikTok enjoys all the benefits of America’s free and open legal and political systems,” he said.

Martha Zhou in Beijing and Sophie Jeong in Hong Kong contributed to this article.

13. USSOCOM Comments On The Navy’s Expeditionary Sea Bases (ESB)

210815-N-LR905-2049 PACIFIC OCEAN (Aug. 15, 2021) – Sailors prepare to launch a rigid-hull inflatable boat (RHIB) aboard expeditionary sea base USS Miguel Keith (ESB 5), Aug. 15. Miguel Keith is underway conducting routine operations in U.S. 3rd Fleet. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jacob D. Bergh)

USSOCOM Comments On The Navy’s Expeditionary Sea Bases (ESB)

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/03/ussocom-comments-on-the-navys-expeditionary-sea-bases-esb/

Naval News asked the United States' Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) what are their thoughts on the U.S. Navy’s Expeditionary Sea Bases that are purposedly built for special operation missions and expeditionary warfare.

Peter Ong  11 Mar 2024

The Expeditionary Sea Base Vessels (ESB)

With its open mission deck and overhead flight deck amidships, the Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) gives the United States’ special operations forces a floating platform to conduct special operations, minesweeping, rotorcraft repair, refueling, and arming, and expeditionary warfare missions. ESBs can transport boat trailers and military shipping containers and Mission Modules with various mission configurations such as cargo, medical, drones, counter-drone, surveillance, and sensors.

ESBs are based on the civilian Alaska-class oil tanker hull and have a sustained speed of greater than 15 knots, a range of 9,500 nautical miles at 15 knots, and displace 90,000 tons. They are 239.3 meters (785 feet) long with a beam of 50 meters (164 feet). ESBs have no armor or automatic close-in weapons systems; however, self-defense comes from 12 crew-operated .50 caliber heavy or 7.62mm M240B medium machine gun mounts at various positions.

Regarding facilities, ESBs contain fuel and equipment storage accommodations, weapon magazines, explosive ordnance disposal magazines, mission-planning spaces, a flight briefing room, tactical command and communications center, a gym, medical facilities, mess halls and kitchens, berthing (34 crew and a 250 military detachment), hangar, ship store, planning and control spaces for Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM), and underway replenishment facilities.

The flight deck has space for four rotorcraft with two more in the hangar and can accommodate the U.S. Marine Corps’ (USMC) CH-53 for vertical airborne assault or the U.S. Navy’s MH-53E for airborne minesweeping. The flight deck only supports helicopters and tiltrotors as the ESBs do not have the aviation, lighting and signaling, and air traffic control facilities built in to accommodate the USMC’s F-35B vertical takeoff and landing stealth fighter.

As of early 2024. there are six ESBs in service or in various stages of construction: USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB 3), USS Hershel “Woody” Williams (ESB 4), USS Miguel Keith (ESB 5), and follow-on ships John L. Canley (ESB 6), Robert E. Simanek (ESB 7), and Hector A. Cafferata Jr. (ESB 8). ESBs 3 to 6 have been delivered to the U.S. Navy and ESBs 7 and 8 are currently under construction.

“The ESBs provide useful and highly demanded capabilities at a cost far below traditional amphibs,” wrote Mark Cancian, retired U.S. Marine Corps colonel and Senior Adviser, International Security Program, to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) via email to Naval News. “They can perform a wide variety of missions, from special ops to mine countermeasures in medium to low-threat environments. They allow traditional amphibious ships, which are built to military specifications, to focus on those missions that require that high level of capability.”

A future concept of an ESB Drone Mothership was proposed by NASSCO to the U.S. Navy and covered by Naval News at Sea Air Space Symposium 2022.

USSOCOM Comments on ESB

Retail Services Specialist 2nd Class Preston Burbridge, from Boise, Idaho, stands a small-caliber arms team watch while the Lewis B. Puller-class expeditionary sea base USS Hershel “Woody” Williams (ESB 4) performs a strait transit, June 17, 2022. Hershel “Woody” Williams is rotationally deployed to the U.S. Naval Forces Africa area of operations, employed by U.S. Sixth Fleet, to defend U.S., allied and partner interests. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Fred Gray IV/Released)

In late January 2024, Naval News asked the United States’ Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) what they see valuable in the ESBs.

“The Expeditionary Sea Bases (ESBs) provide a flexible, global capability that augments Special Operations Forces’ (SOF) Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) requirements but are not sufficient as standalone AFSBs for most types of operations that we execute,” said the USSOCOM spokesperson via email.  “At times there may be a need to augment on-board equipment, which is determined by mission requirements”.

 “ESBs are predominantly used for overflow deck space requirements when other naval vessels or the SOCOM Maritime Support Vessel cannot meet the deck space requirements for their missions. The biggest benefit of utilizing the ESBs is that they are not always fully engaged in operations, which provides the flexibility to direct their positions to meet emerging mission requirements. This gives SOCOM the ability to support a wide range of operations and adds significant value to SOCOM’s integrated deterrence capabilities.“

U.S. Special Operations Command spokesperson

Naval News asked the spokesperson what the SOCOM Maritime Support Vessel is and the spokesperson replied that he would look into the inquiry but the answer was not revealed before publication. Nonetheless, TheWarZone has a story on the SOCOM Maritime Support Vessel.

Before the ESBs were built, USSOCOM solely relied on the U.S. Navy’s amphibious ships such as Dock Landing Ships (LSDs) and Landing Platform Docks (LPDs). AFSB USS Ponce (LPD 15) was the precursor to the ESB design and LPD 15 decommissioned in October 2017 after 46 years in service.

A USSOCOM rotational tour on the ESB is determined by mission requirements and USSOCOM declined to give an exact segment of time.

What Have the U.S. Navy’s ESBs Hosted?

USSOCOM declined to comment on the milestones and achievements that the ESBs have achieved for the United States’ special operations forces. However, official military photos and interviews with U.S. Navy personnel have confirmed that ESBs have hosted U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and special operation forces’ cargo and attack helicopters and foreign rotorcraft on its flight deck. V-22s have also landed and taken off from the flight deck.

Watercraft carried aboard include rigid hull inflatable boats, combat rubber raiding crafts, USSOCOM Combat Craft Assault, and various types of unmanned surface vessels.

ESBs have also participated in U.S. Marine Corps’ ground force exercises and trained various special forces operators and Fleet Antiterrorism Forces. Navy medics have also visited the ESBs in addition to foreign military personnel.

AUTHORS

Posted by : Peter Ong

Peter Ong is a Freelance Writer with United States and International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) media credentials and lives in California. Peter has a Bachelor's Degree in Technical Writing/Graphic Design and a Master's Degree in Business. He writes articles for defense, maritime and emergency vehicle publications.

14. Playing Both Sides of the U.S.-Chinese Rivalry

Excerpts:

This uneven, uncertain, and potentially volatile mix of competition and complementarity in U.S. and Chinese security partnerships presents a challenge for American policymakers. Where countries are using Chinese national security concepts, tactics, and technologies to suppress human rights and tighten authoritarian control, Washington cannot and should not compete to advance the same goals.

Where Beijing is helping countries tackle legitimate security problems—such as high levels of violent crime—Washington should develop and offer alternative solutions that address these problems without enabling democratic erosion or increasing opportunities for repression. If these countries choose to continue receiving internal security assistance from China, as some probably will, the United States and its partners should work with them to establish safeguards, such as oversight bodies, to protect democracy and human rights.

First, however, the United States should do a country-by-country review to identify the countries that fall into each category. Each country will have its own set of security requirements, and each will require an individualized solution. Washington and its partners need a better understanding of how China’s security provisions meet individual countries’ demands before they can offer appropriate alternatives.

Ultimately, the United States must decide where and how to compete—and craft its partnerships in ways that both stabilize international security and protect democracy and human rights. Washington will need to get much more comfortable navigating these complex and overlapping security relationships, because this form of global competition is here to stay.

Playing Both Sides of the U.S.-Chinese Rivalry

Why Countries Get External Security From Washington—and Internal Security From Beijing

By Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Isaac Kardon

March 15, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Isaac Kardon · March 15, 2024

On a visit to Budapest in late February, China’s minister of public security, Wang Xiaohong, secured a face-to-face meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to establish a new bilateral security arrangement. China and Hungary agreed to cooperate on law enforcement, policing, and counterterrorism, putting security ties at the center of their relationship.

In many ways, it was a puzzling agreement, since Hungary is already a member of a security alliance—NATO—that protects it from armed attack. But Budapest’s pursuit of security relationships with both Beijing and Washington is a notable example of a global trend. Overlapping security relationships are increasingly common. Countries as diverse as Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam are courting Chinese and U.S. security cooperation at the same time.

This phenomenon has a simple explanation: Beijing and Washington are offering different products, reflecting their distinctive concepts of security and the types of support each is best suited to provide. The United States shores up external security, protecting its partners militarily against regional threats. China, meanwhile, provides internal security, giving governments the tools to combat social disorder and political opposition.

Even though their engagement takes different forms, the United States and China are both using security relationships to compete for influence, intensifying the U.S.-Chinese rivalry and increasing the risk of miscalculation. Through the types of support they provide to third countries, Washington and Beijing also impart their own ideas about the appropriate role of security in a society. U.S. policymakers must learn to manage this new competition—and use U.S. security partnerships to advance forms of security that do not impinge on democracy or human rights.

INTERNAL VS. EXTERNAL SECURITY

It may seem risky for a country to pursue security cooperation with two great powers that are directly competing with each other. If the country already receives reliable security assistance from one great power, exploring a partnership with the other could throw the existing relationship into jeopardy. Yet many countries are appealing to both the United States and China, rather than choosing just one. And so far, Washington and Beijing are allowing it.

Countries have been able to pursue these dual relationships because they are often not in direct competition. The United States’ primary offering is regional security: it defends allies and partners against threatening neighbors, provides extended nuclear deterrence, and combats transnational terrorist groups, leaning heavily on U.S. advantages in high-end military capabilities. Washington has built up a network of allies with mutual defense treaties and other bilateral security partnerships to address challenges to peace and stability, including threats posed by China and North Korea in East Asia, Iran in the Middle East, and Russia in Europe.

The Department of Defense usually leads U.S. international security efforts. It establishes partnerships with other countries’ defense ministries and armed forces, and uses these relationships to project U.S. military power in priority regions. Where law enforcement and intelligence cooperation factor into U.S. security partnerships, the focus is still on external threats, such as transnational terrorist organizations or drug cartels.

Many countries are appealing to both the United States and China, rather than choosing just one.

China, meanwhile, offers foreign governments domestic and regime security. Through cooperation on law enforcement and public security measures such as digital surveillance, police training, and riot management, Beijing helps its partners maintain control at home. China is not trying to replicate the United States’ network of military alliances; in the Middle East, for instance, Beijing has largely deferred to Washington’s position as a regional security leader. In its recent outreach to Hungary, too, China is not positioning itself as a substitute for U.S. military power in Europe. Instead, China’s domestic security agencies have established their own channels of bilateral cooperation focused on internal stability and political control.

There is some overlap in U.S. and Chinese security cooperation with foreign partners. Beijing does engage in traditional military outreach, selling arms to and participating in joint military exercises and training with countries such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, Iran, Myanmar, and Russia. Like the United States, China conducts regular naval diplomacy to signal its military presence and capabilities. Some countries, including Pakistan and Thailand, have received substantial military aid from both Beijing and Washington. China and the United States also both devote considerable attention to helping partner militaries develop their capacity for disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations.

But this overlap is a small piece of a larger picture in which the United States and China operate under starkly different security paradigms. Washington and Beijing have both articulated expansive national security objectives, driven in part by their perception of the other as a threat, but each country puts forward its own ideas about what security is and how to achieve it.

The United States is focused on regional security, developing and deploying military power to help its partners balance against, deter, and combat external threats such as Russian aggression in Ukraine and Pyongyang’s advancing nuclear and conventional military capabilities on the Korean Peninsula. The 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy emphasizes the importance of “America’s unmatched network of alliances and partnerships” and the role of its armed forces in “backstopping diplomacy, confronting aggression, deterring conflict, projecting strength, and protecting the American people and their economic interests.” It is less focused on domestic security issues, such as threats to public safety from violent crime, and—unlike U.S. strategy during the Cold War—does not promote aid to repressive internal security forces that might keep “friendly” dictators in power.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s concept of national security, however, is based on “political security”—the protection of China’s socialist system, Chinese Communist Party leadership, and Xi himself. For Xi, security requires what he has called a “comprehensive” approach that gives priority to internal threats and the security of the regime. The international dimension, which dominates U.S. national security thinking, in China serves only as “a support” for what is primarily a domestic project, according to Xi’s report to the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th National Party Congress in 2022. Both at home and abroad, China relies much more heavily than the United States does on its law enforcement, paramilitary, and secret police agencies to carry out security policy. And Beijing is increasingly ready and willing to work with partners who voice similar regime security demands.

TWO PATRONS ARE BETTER THAN ONE

Astute middle and small powers can take advantage of this uneven U.S.-Chinese security competition. As long as both great powers provide security goods without demanding an exclusive arrangement, third countries can reap the benefits.

Hungary is an illustrative case. Its China policy has long diverged from those of its European partners; Hungary was the first EU participant in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. By obstructing European aid to Ukraine and delaying Sweden’s NATO accession in tacit support of Russian objectives, Hungary has shown it is willing to play major powers off one another in order to extract concessions.

So far, Budapest has managed to maintain this balance. As a NATO ally, Hungary enjoys the external security provided by the United States. But as Orban’s government works to undermine Hungary’s democratic institutions, Budapest also benefits from a domestic security partnership with Beijing that will soon see Chinese police patrols on Hungarian streets.

It is telling that Beijing sent its domestic police chief to Budapest, not the defense or foreign minister, to discuss security cooperation. In a meeting with Wang, the Chinese public security minister, Hungary’s interior minister, Sandor Pinter, echoed Chinese official rhetoric by emphasizing “the guarantee of security and stability” as a prerequisite for good relations. At least in part, this reflects Orban’s concern that Hungary’s engagement with the United States empowers a liberal opposition that could challenge his regime. Although Budapest’s partnerships with Beijing and Washington overlap on certain issues, such as counterterrorism, Hungary generally has different reasons for maintaining each relationship and different expectations of what each security patron will provide.

Orban may be more brazen than most world leaders in flaunting Hungary’s dual security ties, but his is hardly the only country that is drawing attention and resources from both China and the United States. Vietnam is, too. Last September, while U.S. President Joe Biden was in Hanoi, the United States and Vietnam announced that they would upgrade their relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” that includes close collaboration between U.S. and Vietnamese defense institutions.

Orban attending a meeting in Beijing, April 2019

Andrea Verdelli / Reuters

Hanoi and Washington have been steadily stepping up their security cooperation over the past decade in direct response to the security threat that China poses in Vietnam’s neighborhood. Driven by Vietnam’s disputes with China over territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea, U.S.-Vietnamese defense cooperation has developed most robustly in the maritime domain. Vietnam has become a frequent port of call in recent years for U.S. aircraft carriers operating in the region.

Three months after Biden’s visit to Hanoi, it was Xi’s turn. In December, Xi made his way to the Vietnamese capital to reinforce Beijing’s own comprehensive strategic partnership with Hanoi. This time, however, the conversation focused on bolstering communist rule in both countries. Xi declared that, together, Beijing and Hanoi would “spare no effort to prevent, defuse, and contain all kinds of political and security risks,” referring not only to national security threats but also to threats to the two countries’ Communist Parties and leadership.

To address these risks, Beijing pledged to assist Hanoi with practical internal security measures, including intelligence sharing by China’s Ministry of State Security and enhanced police cooperation. The two countries agreed to joint efforts to prevent domestic instability, separatism, and “color revolution”—a term that evokes China and Vietnam’s mutual fear of foreign interference and opposition activity that could topple the ruling party and bring about democratization. In a way, Vietnam’s two security partnerships are set up to balance each other: Hanoi seeks U.S. assistance to counter an external security threat from China, and it seeks Chinese assistance to counter a threat to regime security it attributes, at least in part, to U.S. efforts to promote democracy.

Other countries also see upsides in receiving security assistance from two competing powers. The United Arab Emirates, for example, has courted Chinese support for its internal security organs, sometimes at the expense of U.S. military assistance. Djibouti has agreed to host bases for both the U.S. and Chinese militaries. Singapore has positioned itself as a security partner and valued intermediary for Washington and Beijing. Papua New Guinea recently signed security agreements with the United States and Australia but is nonetheless considering additional assistance from Beijing. The types of support each country gets from China and the United States vary, allowing them to pick and choose among great-power security offerings and settle on those that best suit their perceptions of the threats they face.

THE NEW SECURITY COMPETITION

The conventional wisdom is that countries do not want to choose between the United States and China because the United States provides security, China provides economic prosperity, and no country wants to give up one for the other. But there is no such clear tradeoff today. In the past several years, China has boosted its outreach to prospective security partners, and many foreign governments have accepted or are actively considering Beijing’s overtures, especially on matters of internal security. If these countries already have security relationships with the United States, they are usually not throwing out those commitments as they consolidate ties with China. Rather, their security relationships with Beijing and Washington are evolving in tandem as they address different concerns.

During the Cold War, Washington and Moscow provided both internal and external security assistance to their client states, and few if any countries maintained security relationships with both superpowers. In the Cold War’s later years, the United States cut back its (often unsuccessful) efforts to shore up regimes that were, in many cases, repressive dictatorships. Although Washington has not entirely withdrawn from providing internal security assistance in the decades since, it nonetheless left a gap that a rising China has gradually moved to fill.

Beijing portrays Washington’s current externally focused approach as inadequate for addressing the domestic and non-traditional security challenges that many countries face today. It offers alternative solutions under the banner of its Global Security Initiative as a way to make up for the shortfall.

In countries troubled by weak governance, Chinese security assistance may solve legitimate problems—improvements to public order and enforcement of the rule of law often benefit citizens as well as rulers. But that same aid can also enable repression and entrench nondemocratic rule. China’s police training programs, for example, might teach local law enforcement useful tactics, but they also disseminate an expansive view of political policing that can normalize and encourage repression. Similarly, a Chinese “safe city” project might contribute to urban crime control and public safety, but can also provide tools to track dissidents and subdue political opposition.

As Washington and Beijing increasingly work with the same partners, their interests may clash.

Authoritarian leaders, in particular, tend to fear that U.S. regional security assistance comes with unwelcome side effects. In their view, a partnership with the United States can be a conduit for promoting human rights and political liberties, which could make their rule less secure. Leaders in countries such as Vietnam try to offset that threat by turning to China for assistance with domestic security and political control. For its part, Beijing empathizes with Hanoi’s regime security concerns and uses this opening to advance bilateral cooperation. Indirectly, U.S. defense cooperation with autocratic countries may encourage those countries to pursue deeper internal security cooperation with China and open new avenues for Chinese influence.

U.S. and Chinese security cooperation initiatives can interact in other ways that intensify rivalry between the two countries. Strategists who argue that economic interdependence between the United States and China will make their rivalry less conflictual than the Cold War are overlooking the fundamental difference between today’s overlapping security relationships and the security blocs of the twentieth century. As Washington and Beijing increasingly provide security goods to the same partners, their interests may clash at the local level.

This overlapping presence can raise the risk of miscalculation. U.S. defense officials may be confident in their relationship with interlocutors in Hanoi, for instance, because Vietnamese defense officials may genuinely prioritize a regional security strategy to counter China’s territorial encroachment in the South China Sea. But other parts of the government in Hanoi—such as the prime minister, whose background is in domestic intelligence and security—are working closely with Beijing to ensure the survival of Vietnam’s communist regime. Washington could, as a result, overestimate its leverage: when push comes to shove, Vietnamese leaders may not choose the partner that helps them protect remote islands over the one that helps them avoid being overthrown or killed by domestic opposition.

This uneven, uncertain, and potentially volatile mix of competition and complementarity in U.S. and Chinese security partnerships presents a challenge for American policymakers. Where countries are using Chinese national security concepts, tactics, and technologies to suppress human rights and tighten authoritarian control, Washington cannot and should not compete to advance the same goals.

Where Beijing is helping countries tackle legitimate security problems—such as high levels of violent crime—Washington should develop and offer alternative solutions that address these problems without enabling democratic erosion or increasing opportunities for repression. If these countries choose to continue receiving internal security assistance from China, as some probably will, the United States and its partners should work with them to establish safeguards, such as oversight bodies, to protect democracy and human rights.

First, however, the United States should do a country-by-country review to identify the countries that fall into each category. Each country will have its own set of security requirements, and each will require an individualized solution. Washington and its partners need a better understanding of how China’s security provisions meet individual countries’ demands before they can offer appropriate alternatives.

Ultimately, the United States must decide where and how to compete—and craft its partnerships in ways that both stabilize international security and protect democracy and human rights. Washington will need to get much more comfortable navigating these complex and overlapping security relationships, because this form of global competition is here to stay.

• SHEENA CHESTNUT GREITENS is a Visiting Associate Professor at the U.S. Army War College’s China Landpower Studies Center, an Associate Professor at the University of Texas at Austin, and a Nonresident Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
• ISAAC KARDON is a Senior Fellow for China Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and an Adjunct Professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Foreign Affairs · by Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Isaac Kardon · March 15, 2024

15. Russia Steps Up Spy War on West

Russia Steps Up Spy War on West

March 12, 2024 11:33 PM

• By Henry Ridgwell

voanews.com · March 12, 2024

LONDON —

Russia has successfully relaunched its spy operations against the West after hundreds of its operatives were ejected following Moscow’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, according to analysts. They warn that the Kremlin is using a network of proxies to infiltrate European nations and carry out a range of intelligence operations.

Infiltration

In a recent report, Britain’s Royal United Services Institute, or RUSI, warned that Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU, “is restructuring how it manages the recruitment and training of special forces troops and is rebuilding the support apparatus to be able to infiltrate them into European countries.”

The operations range from the killing of political opponents based overseas to interference in foreign elections, with the aim of undermining Western unity and support for Ukraine.

A recent high-profile case was the killing of Maxim Kuzminov, a Russian helicopter pilot who had defected to Ukraine in August 2023. Kuzimov moved to Spain and started a new life under a false identity. Last month, his bullet-riddled body was found in a parking lot in the southern Spanish town of Villajoyosa. A burned-out getaway car was found nearby.

A burned car allegedly used by the perpetrators of the murder of the Russian pilot Maxim Kuzminov to escape the scene is parked outside the Spanish Civil Guard barracks, in El Campello, Spain, Feb. 14, 2024.

in the killing, but the director of Russia’s foreign intelligence service has since described Kuzminov as a "moral corpse” for defecting to the West.

Spies ejected

Analysts say the killing is the latest example of how Moscow’s intelligence operations have been reinvigorated since European governments kicked out around 600 suspected Kremlin spies in the wake of Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

“The Europeans had a sense of security that the Russian spies are not there anymore, that their capabilities have been significantly curtailed. But the problem is they have not been. They are mightier than ever,” said Marina Miron, an analyst at Kings College London’s Department of War Studies.

Russia last month intercepted a phone call between senior German air force officers discussing supplying long-range “Taurus” missiles to Ukraine. The recording was published by the state-owned broadcaster Russia Today, or RT, and was widely seen as an attempt to interfere in the German debate over arming Kyiv. Berlin has ruled out sending the weapons to Ukraine.

Ukraine warnings

Kyiv said it had warned Berlin of the dangers. “We have made multiple warnings to our German partners about the spy network of Russians that are very active in Germany. … It is well known that the Russians are listening to conversations of German officials, and we think it is not the last conversation they have [in their possession],” Ukraine’s national security adviser, Oleksiy Danilov, told The Times of London newspaper last week.

French intelligence services are investigating a Russia-backed campaign aimed at interfering in the June European elections, involving hundreds of websites promoting Russian propaganda and supporting pro-Kremlin candidates.

“We are going to step up our own efforts to expose a number of disinformation operations. And in this context, Russia is also attacking us. … Europe is under attack from an informational point of view,” French Foreign Minister Stéphane Séjourné told reporters on Feb. 17 after details of the operation were revealed.

Undermining democracy

With its army tied down in Ukraine, Russia is seeking to boost its "unconventional” operations overseas, according to the RUSI report.

Russia “has an active interest in destabilizing Ukraine’s partners, and with a slew of elections forthcoming across Europe, there is a wide range of opportunities to exacerbate polarization,” the report said.

“Moreover, with its conventional forces — so often used to coerce others — fixed by the fighting in Ukraine, the significance of unconventional operations as a lever of influence increases. This is especially important with the collapse of Russian overt diplomatic access across target countries.”

Those operations aim to disrupt democracies, according to Oleksandr V. Danylyuk, an associate fellow at RUSI and a co-author of the report.

The Russians “still invest billions into intelligence operations in Europe, developing capabilities which are designed for interference into elections; radicalization of different social, ethnic, religious groups, including minorities; investing billions into political proxies who can actually even come to power,” he told VOA.

Proxy operations

Moscow’s spy agencies are increasingly operating remotely, using non-Russian proxies to carry out operations, including organized criminals and foreign nationals.

“What is actually very important for special operations is the ability to deny the sponsorship of the government,” Danylyuk added.

Several spy networks have been uncovered in recent years. In Poland, 14 citizens from Russia, Belarus and Ukraine were convicted in December of belonging to a spy ring that was preparing acts of sabotage on behalf of Moscow, including plans to derail trains carrying military aid to Ukraine.

Trials of suspected Russian spies are ongoing in Britain, Germany, Norway and several other European countries.

“It's not any more an ideological fight,” said Danylyuk. “It’s not like ‘communism fighting capitalism,’ like the Soviets would say. It’s that authoritarian countries are trying to subvert the West as a stronghold of democracy, freedom and human rights. And this is, for them, an existential fight.”

FILE - CIA Director William Burns departs after testifying during a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the "Annual Worldwide Threats Assessment" in the Hart Senate Office Building on Capitol Hill in Washington, March 11, 2024.

‘Recruiting opportunity’

Meanwhile, William J. Burns, director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, said in January that Russia’s war on Ukraine has in turn presented an opportunity for the West to improve its intelligence capabilities.

“Disaffection with the war is continuing to gnaw away at the Russian leadership and the Russian people, beneath the thick surface of state propaganda and repression,” Burns wrote in Foreign Affairs magazine.

“That undercurrent of disaffection is creating a once-in-a-generation recruiting opportunity for the CIA. We’re not letting it go to waste.”

voanews.com · March 12, 2024

16. Americans’ views of foreign alliances growing increasingly divided

Perhaps we could call this the "Trump effect."

Americans’ views of foreign alliances growing increasingly divided

https://www.arabnews.com/node/2476016

KERRY BOYD ANDERSON

March 13, 2024

14:34

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Many Republicans are questioning how Americans benefit from some of the country’s long-standing partnerships (AFP)

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Amid struggles in the US Congress to approve funds for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan, there are growing questions about the country’s commitment to its allies and partners. This year’s presidential election is likely to exacerbate those uncertainties.

The American public remains broadly supportive of its country’s core alliances. Recent polls indicate that majorities of Americans support the US’ commitment to NATO and see its alliances with East Asian countries as beneficial. Americans are less sure about providing more aid to Ukraine, but a majority continue to back sending assistance.

However, there are growing partisan divides in Americans’ views of alliances. Voters in both parties tend to support the alliance with NATO, but Republican backing for the alliance is notably softer. A February Gallup poll found that 53 percent of Democrats support the current level of US commitment to NATO and 27 percent want to increase commitment. While 46 percent of Republicans support the current level, 26 percent want to see a decrease.

The Chicago Council Survey reported in September that 92 percent of Democrats want to maintain or increase the commitment to NATO, compared to 68 percent of Republicans. The survey noted that, in 1974, there was very little difference between the parties, with Republicans slightly more supportive of NATO than Democrats. However, since 1998, the gap has grown, as Democrats’ attitudes toward NATO became increasingly positive.

Voters in both parties tend to support the alliance with NATO, but Republican backing is notably softer

Kerry Boyd Anderson

Voters in both parties tend to have a favorable view of US alliances with East Asian countries, but Democrats are more strongly supportive. The Chicago Council Survey found that 70 percent of Democrats and 59 percent of Republicans see those alliances as beneficial for US interests. A recent study in the Texas National Security Review, “Alliance Commitment in an Era of Partisan Polarization,” suggested that Republicans and Democrats tend to support the alliance with South Korea but that Democratic support was stronger.

The partisan gap is especially notable when it comes to Ukraine. Polling from multiple sources shows declining Republican support for Ukraine since the war began, while Democrats tend to continue backing Kyiv. A February poll from The Associated Press-NORC found that 55 percent of Republicans say that Washington is spending too much to help Ukraine, compared to only 17 percent of Democrats who agree. A November Gallup poll found an even bigger gap, with 62 percent of Republicans saying that the US is doing too much, compared to 14 percent of Democrats.

There are some important nuances. There are differences within the parties; for example, a survey from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that a majority of Republicans who are fans of former President Donald Trump oppose aid to Ukraine, while a majority of Republicans who hold only “somewhat favorable” or “unfavorable” views of Trump support continued assistance.

Polls show that independent voters, who do not affiliate with either party, often fall somewhere in between Democrats and Republicans in their attitudes toward alliances. Nonetheless, Democrats are clearly more supportive of traditional alliances in Western Europe and East Asia than their Republican counterparts.

There are multiple potential explanations for these shifts in views among the American public. One major factor is the rhetoric of party leaders and partisan media. When Trump praises Russian President Vladimir Putin and criticizes the “endless flow of American treasure to Ukraine,” he undermines Republicans’ view of Ukraine as a worthwhile partner. Similarly, when Trump dismisses NATO’s value and questions the military alliance with South Korea, his comments erode many Republicans’ belief in the importance of those alliances. Right-wing media outlets and other Republican politicians amplify Trump’s rhetoric.

Many Republicans are questioning how Americans benefit from some of the country’s long-standing partnerships

Kerry Boyd Anderson

Meanwhile, President Joe Biden and other Democratic leaders frequently speak about the necessity of supporting Ukraine and the value of alliances in general, including NATO, which reinforces Democrats’ favorable views. Negative partisanship can exacerbate those gaps.

Trump has played a major role in reducing Republican support for Ukraine and some alliances. However, the trend of declining Republican enthusiasm for alliances predates Trump’s political rise. During the Cold War, both Republicans and Democrats saw alliances against the Soviet Union as very valuable. In the aftermath of the Cold War, questions arose about the costs and benefits of those alliances and partisan gaps in views began to expand.

Under President George W. Bush, Republicans strongly embraced unilateralism. They did not reject traditional alliances — indeed, the US worked closely with NATO in Afghanistan — but did deprioritize the importance of working with other countries.

Today, as the world shifts from a unipolar world dominated by the US toward a more multipolar world, many Republicans are questioning how Americans benefit from some of the country’s long-standing partnerships. Meanwhile, an increasing desire among Republicans (and some Democrats) to focus resources domestically rather than abroad is driving demands for other countries to do more for their own security and rely less on the US. These factors make Trump’s willingness to jettison foreign partners more acceptable to Republicans than it might have been in the past.

Changing views of alliances are already affecting US foreign policy. American allies are well aware that, if Trump wins the election, they will again face a president who has little respect for traditional partnerships. That reality is already shaping how those countries form their own foreign policy.

In Congress, many Republicans are increasingly opposed to sending more aid to Ukraine. In February, the Senate passed a bill, with bipartisan support, to provide funding for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan, but it faces steep opposition in the Republican-led House — another example of how Republicans are increasingly deprioritizing alliances and partnerships abroad.

• Kerry Boyd Anderson is a professional analyst of international security issues and Middle East political and business risk. X: @KBAresearch

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Arab News' point of view

​17. How Biden's 'A-team' squandered its foreign policy opportunity

From the Quincy Institute. 

The authors should not mis-appropriate the term "A-team." (note sarcasm)

It is the public statements of "avoid escalatory conflict" that has undermined the lofty foreign policy goals, By telegraphing our fear of escalation it provides our adversaries with a waide range of freedom of action.

Excerpts:

In addition to Joe Biden’s campaign slogan of “a foreign policy for the middle class,” Ward tries to tack on a few more principles that could define the president’s approach. “He had developed a doctrine of sorts over two years in office,” Ward writes. “Stand true with allies. Defend democracy. Avoid escalatory conflict. Preserve the rules-based order.”

On almost every count, he has failed to live up to those lofty goals.In addition to Joe Biden’s campaign slogan of “a foreign policy for the middle class,” Ward tries to tack on a few more principles that could define the president’s approach. “He had developed a doctrine of sorts over two years in office,” Ward writes. “Stand true with allies. Defend democracy. Avoid escalatory conflict. Preserve the rules-based order.”

On almost every count, he has failed to live up to those lofty goals.

How Biden's 'A-team' squandered its foreign policy opportunity

responsiblestatecraft.org · by Blaise Malley · March 14, 2024

quincyinst.org

A lot has changed since of the end of Alex Ward's The Internationalists. Not much of it is good for the administration.

1. washington politics
2. Biden Administration

Mar 14, 2024

“America was ready for renewal. The world was there to remake. There were at least two more years to get it done.”

So concludes Alex Ward’s recent book “The Internationalists: The Fight to Restore American Foreign Policy after Trump,” a detailed account of President Joe Biden’s first two years in office. Ward’s deeply reported narrative ends in late April of 2023, with national security adviser Jake Sullivan delivering a speech at the Brookings Institution that symbolically brought the neoliberal era to an end.

The story that Ward — national security reporter at Politico — tells is a compelling one. Biden’s foreign policy team — led by consummate DC insiders who dubbed themselves “the A-team” — understood their mandate as working to bring Washington out of the abyss of the Trump years. Watching Donald Trump win the White House had led to a soul-searching moment for Democrats in the foreign policy establishment, pushing those who eventually became Biden’s braintrust to embrace a new paradigm.

“Sullivan had changed during the Trump years after working to define a progressive foreign policy, one that would appeal to denizens of the heartland as well as the well-heeled and well-intentioned urban elites,” writes Ward. “The Democratic candidate, having watched his opponent in the Oval Office and the campaign trail, had also come to the conclusion that the usual message on foreign policy needed a first-page rewrite.”

The party would work to overturn what they perceived as the ills of Trumpism by re-embracing international allies and partners, and restoring American global leadership of the global “rules-based order.” But, Ward writes, “force would be used only when the foundations of the world that the United State had helped build since 1945 were at risk. Otherwise, the guns would be holstered.”

The theme that Sullivan and others settled on to define Biden’s foreign policy was “a foreign policy for the middle class.”

At times, Ward treats this approach with a critical eye, pointing to a number of inconsistencies in administration policy. But the ultimate narrative arc in the book is more clean: After a rocky start, with the nadir being the courageous but poorly managed conclusion to the United States’ two-decade war in Afghanistan, the Biden administration recovered its mojo with its response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Despite some bumps in the road, Biden and his team had begun to rebuild U.S. foreign policy, with a renewed focus on working with allies, upholding democratic norms, and protecting the so-called rules-based international order.

That story has changed dramatically since the book’s conclusion, which brings the reader up to April 2023, nearly a year ago. A lot has happened since then, and not so much in favor of Ward’s narrative arc. If it were a classic VH-1 Face the Music episode, this is the exact point where the clouds roll in on our A-Team and everything goes careening off track, perhaps forever.

And so, the response to the war in Ukraine is presented by Ward as a success. The methodical and comprehensive preparations in the months leading up to the invasion serve as a foil to the haphazard approach that marked the withdrawal from Afghanistan. According to Ward, the Biden team prepared for many possible contingencies, even though the political leadership in Ukraine was doubtful of U.S. intelligence that suggested an invasion was likely.

The final chapter of “The Internationalists,” before the epilogue that lays out Sullivan’s speech at Brookings, features Biden’s triumphant visit to Kyiv. During his address in the Ukrainian capital, says Ward, the president “wanted to prove that Bidenism worked — and the world just needed more of it.” For Biden, Russia’s invasion had served as a global test of democracy, and democracy had prevailed.

Over the last year, however, the war has reached a “stalemate” — others say a war of attrition, with Moscow winning it. Despite these changing realities, the Biden administration has proven unwilling and unable to shift its strategy or messaging away from an understanding of the war as a fight for democracy that can only be won through military means. The message is losing favor in Washington, particularly among congressional Republicans, and politics in Washington have moved slowly against continued aid for Ukraine.

Meanwhile, in its reaction to the Hamas incursion into Israel on October 7, the Biden administration has squandered any global legitimacy and consistency it had built in its first two-plus years in power, and undermined its message on the war in Ukraine.

In just over five months, the White House has laid bare the hypocrisy and inconsistency of its stated commitment to human rights and the international order and left Washington isolated on the world stage.

Things were different in May 2021 when war broke out in Gaza. Just like today, Biden chose to fully back Israel’s war publicly while reportedly pressuring the Israeli prime minister behind closed doors.

Biden chose to negotiate “methodically and quietly” with Benjamin Netanyahu and opted against playing a significant public role. The White House, according to Ward, welcomed the pressure from their left flank that played a role in the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, reached after 11 days of conflict.

It was, according to the author, indicative of Biden’s broader foreign policy vision: “Core issues that challenge the world order or America’s leadership get his full effort. Everything else, the United States will help if it can.”

The response to that war is treated by the administration as a success, as it helped keep the conflict relatively short and contained. The opposite has resulted from that strategy today. Biden continues to publicly back Israel’s war, both rhetorically and materially. Despite a breathless string of reports that Washington has privately expressed its “frustration” or “concern” with Tel Aviv, Israel’s war continues seemingly without restriction as the Palestinian death toll surpasses 30,000.

The White House has been largely dismissive of progressives calling for a sustainable ceasefire, and the risk of a regional conflagration persists.

The Biden administration’s response to what is happening in Gaza has also blatantly betrayed any ostensible commitment to human rights and international law, which had been so important to the White House when it came to Ukraine.

“The reason the administration was set to dive headfirst into intense preparations was to defend the rules-based international order,” Ward writes about Biden’s mindset after receiving intelligence that Russia might go into Ukraine in late 2021. “If Putin succeeded in wiping Ukraine off the map, the world America helped build would crumble on this administration’s watch.”

The White House has consistently made the case that the stakes of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are the future of democracy itself. The Biden administration has lambasted Moscow’s violations of international law. In April 2022, Biden even accused Vladimir Putin of committing genocide in Ukraine.

Yet when the International Court of Justice ruled earlier this year that it was “plausible” that Israel was carrying out a genocide in Gaza, the White House called the accusation “unfounded.” Administration officials have consistently refused to condemn alleged Israeli war crimes, including the bombing of hospitals and the forced displacement and starvation of the civilian population.

Instead of pushing for a ceasefire, the U.S. has continued to support Israel’s war. Biden himself often ties the wars in Ukraine and Gaza into one larger, global project, including the ongoing effort to pass a spending package that combines $60 billion in aid for Kyiv with $17 billion for Tel Aviv.

In addition to Joe Biden’s campaign slogan of “a foreign policy for the middle class,” Ward tries to tack on a few more principles that could define the president’s approach. “He had developed a doctrine of sorts over two years in office,” Ward writes. “Stand true with allies. Defend democracy. Avoid escalatory conflict. Preserve the rules-based order.”

On almost every count, he has failed to live up to those lofty goals.

18. Special Operations Forces Secure the Arctic | SOF News

Special Operations Forces Secure the Arctic | SOF News

sof.news · by DVIDS · March 14, 2024

Story by Lt. J.G. Martin L. Carey, NSWG-2.

ARCTIC CIRCLE — Recognizing the importance of the Arctic region to defense of the homeland from potential adversarial threats, elite special operations forces from the U.S. Navy, U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom recently concluded high-impact training events throughout the pan-Arctic region, stretching from Alaska, in the Arctic Circle, across Canada and into Greenland. Arctic Edge 24, a U.S. Northern Command exercise, brought together more than 400 special operations forces (SOF) to integrate, share lessons and refine their tactical effectiveness in diving operations, fast-roping from helicopters, snow mobile transits, long-range movements across the Arctic Circle, and a marquee event involving a fast-attack Submarine. These past few weeks of training epitomize an unwavering commitment to fortifying U.S. and Allied national security against potential aggression, echoing directives outlined in the National Defense Strategy and the National Strategy for the Arctic Region documents.

“Naval Special Warfare’s unique ability to conduct complex operations in the water column, and in maritime domains such as the Arctic, discourages aggression from potential adversaries,” said Capt. Bill Gallagher, Naval Special Warfare Group TWO Commodore. “Given the frequency with which we are training alongside our Allied partners and demonstrating our combined expertise in some of the most severe environments on the planet, we are sending a clear message about our warfighting ability and our preparedness to defend the homeland across the Arctic region.”

These ideals were on display during the culminating event that took the SOF commando’s training beyond the northern most point of the United States, past Uqtiagvik Alaska, deep into the Arctic Circle. Flying inside special operations MH-47G Chinook helicopters, approximately 15 SOF personnel pioneered a historic event when they hovered a few feet from the surface, off-loaded a small team to conduct an ice-depth survey and cleared a helicopter landing zone. Once cleared, the Chinooks touched down and snow mobiles exited the aircraft to retrieve an aerial package dropped nearby. The package was then driven across Arctic terrain and handed-off to personnel from the submarine USS Hampton (SSN 767). Just moments before, the Los Angeles-class fast attack submarine had surfaced through the thick sheet of ice, emerging from the sea below. This marked the first-ever integration of SOF personnel, SOF aircraft, and snow mobiles coming together to conduct an operation with a submarine that surfaced that deep in the Arctic Circle.

In recent remarks delivered at the Maritime Institute of Technology and Graduate Studies, Adm. Daryl Caudle talked about his responsibility for defending the homeland and his theory of success in the Arctic which involves maintaining an enhanced presence, strengthening cooperative partnerships and building a more capable Arctic maritime force. Caudle commands U.S. Fleet Forces and is the Navy’s Component Commander for both US Northern Command and US Strategic Command, where he oversees all maritime homeland defense including much of the Arctic. He went on to discuss some of his priorities which focus on an increased presence, campaigning through Joint training and exercises, and a close collaboration with Allies.

Artic Edge 24 reinforced this vision, bringing together Joint, Allied, conventional forces and interagency partners in the Arctic region. Arctic Edge 24 stands as a decisive demonstration of warfighting readiness, providing a platform for testing and refining capabilities in the extreme-harsh weather environment in the Arctic. The collaboration between U.S. East Coast-based Naval Special Warfare Operators (SEALs), U.S. Army Green Berets from 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, Danish Special Operations Forces, Norwegian Naval Special Operations Commandos (MJK) and United Kingdom Special Forces refined the collective capabilities of these Arctic nations to operate effectively across a range of training iterations to ensure a safe and secure pan-Arctic.

In Kodiak Alaska, SEALs, Green Berets and MJK forces conducted multiple diving operations in water temperatures of 37 degrees Fahrenheit. Deploying from beach heads and small rubber boats, the team practiced pier-side vessel ship attacks, utilizing combat swimmer infiltration method with underwater navigation to target a training ship at the pier. The group also partnered with the U.S. Coast Guard where they refined techniques of fast-roping from an MH-60T Jayhawk helicopter under rainy conditions.

Further North in Utqiagvik, Alaska, the SEALs and MJK Commandos embraced the challenges associated with temperatures of -40 degrees Fahrenheit as they prepared for the culminating event with the US Submarine Force. Leading up to that event, they conducted snow mobile familiarization training, practiced clearing ice to create a helicopter landing zone and trained on cold weather survival drills, ensuring a successful SUB/SOF integration.

Additional training occurred throughout Alaska in Anchorage, Fairbanks and Kotzebue, and Greenland, with personnel from interagency partners at the FBI and U.S. Marshals Service, United States Marine Corps, Alaska National Guard, New York Air National Guard, 19th Special Forces Group (Airborne) among others.

Safeguarding Arctic security is not merely a national endeavor but a collective responsibility. The total force contributions during Artic Edge 24 supports the strategic significance of this area and improved the Allied-Arctic-nation’s presence and operational effectiveness in the pan-Arctic region. The scenarios, simulated missions and sharing of best practices contributed to advancing the collective warfighting readiness, homeland defense and operational acumen of these elite forces in this extreme environment.

****

This article by Lt J.G. Martin Carey was originally released by Naval Special Warfare Group Two on March 12, 2024.

Photo: A C-130 Hercules assigned to the 109th Airlift Wing, New York Air National Guard, flies over East Coast-based Naval Special Warfare Operator (SEALs), Norwegian Naval Special Operations Commandos and the Los Angeles-class attack submarine USS Hampton (SSN 767) during Arctic Edge 24. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Jeff Atherton, Arctic Ocean, 9 Mar 2024)

Naval Special Warfare Group TWO produces, supports, and deploys the world’s premier maritime special operations forces to conduct full-spectrum operations and integrated deterrence in support of U.S. national objectives. For more information, visit https://www.nsw.navy.mil/.

sof.news · by DVIDS · March 14, 2024

19.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com