Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"A free press can, of course, be good or bad, but most certainly without freedom, the press wll never be anything but bad."

– Albert Camus

"A true man hates no one."

Napoleon

The indigenous Cherokee elder, Stan Rushworth, once said “the difference between a Western settler mindset of, I have rights and an indigenous mindset of I have an obligation.” Instead of thinking that I am born with rights, I choose to think that I was born with obligations to serve past, present, and future generations, and the planet herself.”

1. 2024 ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 11, 2024

3. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 11, 2024

4. Opinion: The world’s dangerous place has only gotten more dangerous

5. U.S. Spy Agencies Say Netanyahu’s Leadership ‘in Jeopardy’

6. A TikTok Ban May Be Easier in Theory

7. Taiwan’s Incoming VP Is on a Low-Profile Visit to Washington

8. Pentagon unveils $850 billion budget request amid spending uncertainty

9. Top Polish leaders to visit White House, hoping to spur US to help Ukraine more

10. "Tip of the Spear" - February 2024 | SOF News

11. Gaza war may stoke ‘generational’ terrorism threat, top intel official says

12. The Diplomatic Reserve Corps: A Bold Vision for American Diplomacy

13. A Call for All Americans To Help Stop Veteran Suicides

14. So, a Pier for Hamas it is ...you're paying for it - you might as well get briefed on it – CDR SALAMANDER

15. Opinion: The world’s dangerous place has only gotten more dangerous

16. BROKEN TRACK: Why the Iron Knights chose to speak out about suicides

17. Win-Wind: How a Bipartisan SHIPS Act Could Meet China and Climate Challenges

18. The Battle of Avdiivka and Its Lessons on Withdrawal Under Pressure

19. Winning the Operational Air Campaign, But Losing the Information War: The Israeli Air Force’s X Narratives

20. Removing the Trojan Horse from America’s ports

21. Biden Draws a ‘Red Line’ for Israel

22. US Green Berets deploying to Taiwan's front-line

23. Why the Middle East Still Needs America

24. Victoria Nuland to exit Biden administration – a new era of US foreign policy?

1. 2024 ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The 41 page report can be downloaded at this link: https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf

The table of contents is pasted below.

I look forward to the separate country reports (if they choose to publish any).

2024 ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2024/3787-2024-annual-threat-assessment-of-the-u-s-intelligence-community

Published: 11 March 2024

Date: March 11, 2024

This report reflects the collective insights of the Intelligence Community, which is committed every day to providing the nuanced, independent, and unvarnished intelligence that policymakers, warfighters, and domestic law enforcement personnel need to protect American lives and America's interests anywhere in the world.

Download the report.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 3

FOREWORD .............................................................................................................................. 5

STATE ACTORS ........................................................................................................................ 7

China..................................................................................................................................... 7

Russia .................................................................................................................................. 14

Iran ..................................................................................................................................... 18

North Korea......................................................................................................................... 21

Conflicts and Fragility .......................................................................................................... 24

Gaza Conflict .................................................................................................................. 24

Potential Interstate Conflict .............................................................................................. 25

Potential Intrastate Turmoil .............................................................................................. 27

TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES .................................................................................................... 30

Contested Spaces .................................................................................................................. 30

Disruptive Technology ..................................................................................................... 30

Digital Authoritarianism and Transnational Repression ..................................................... 31

WMD ............................................................................................................................. 31

Shared Domains ................................................................................................................... 33

Environmental Change and Extreme Weather ................................................................... 33

Health Security ................................................................................................................ 33

Migration ........................................................................................................................ 35

Non-State Actor Issues ......................................................................................................... 36

Transnational Organized Crime ........................................................................................ 36

Human Trafficking ........................................................................................................... 37

Global Terrorism ............................................................................................................. 38

Private Military and Security Companies .......................................................................... 40

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 11, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2024

Key Takeaways:

A Ukrainian military observer offered assessments of Russian force generation and defense industrial base (DIB) capacities that are consistent with ISW’s previous assessments.
Russia’s increased defense industrial base (DIB) production is likely not sustainable in the medium and long-term as it will likely suffer from labor shortages, decreased weapons and equipment stockpiles, and an inability to completely compensate for military and dual-use items it can no longer acquire due to sanctions.
Transfers of North Korean weapons to Russia by sea have apparently resumed after a pause since mid-February 2024.
A Ukrainian military source noted that Russian forces are increasingly using grenades equipped with chemical substances in the Zaporizhia direction, in potential violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to which Russia is a signatory.
The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has summoned Russian Ambassador to Moldova Oleg Vasnetsov in response to claims that Russia will operate polling stations in pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway region Transnistria during the Russian presidential election.
Russia, China, and Iran will hold the joint Maritime Security Belt – 2024 naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman between March 11–15.
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that the West intends to use Armenia as a tool against Russia, a notable escalation in its information operations criticizing Armenian efforts to distance itself from security relations with Russia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a bill on March 11 that allows Russian authorities to further restrict actors it deems “foreign agents” to consolidate control over the Russian information space ahead of the presidential election.
France is reportedly prepared to build a coalition of countries that are open to potentially sending Western military personnel to Ukraine.
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kreminna, Bakhmut, and Donetsk City.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues efforts to cater to Russian servicemembers and their families with the promise of various social benefits.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 11, 2024

Mar 11, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 11, 2024

Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan

March 11, 2024, 6:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on March 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

A Ukrainian military observer offered assessments of Russian force generation and defense industrial base (DIB) capacities that are consistent with ISW’s previous assessments. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian military command is aiming to create a “strategic reserve” for offensive operations in spring–summer 2024 but is not planning to equip these newly formed units and formations with the doctrinally required quantities of weapons and equipment due to current Russian DIB production constraints.[1] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command only plans to equip the 27th Motorized Rifle Division — which Russia is reportedly in the process of standing up on the basis of the Central Military District’s existing 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade — with up to 87 percent of its doctrinally required amounts of weapons and equipment by the second and fourth quarters of 2024 and implied that the Russian military command has a similar goal for other new formations and units. Mashovets assessed that it is unlikely that Russian forces will be able to meet this equipment goal by the fourth quarter of 2024 given that many Russian regiments, brigades, and divisions currently operating in Ukraine only have about 30 percent of the doctrinally required amounts of weapons and equipment. Several Western and Ukrainian military officials and analysts noted that Russia’s reported tank production numbers largely reflect restored and modern tanks drawn from storage rather than new production.[2]

Mashovets’ assessment is consistent with ISW’s assessment that the Russian DIB is capable of sustaining Russia’s current tempo of operations, although not likely able to fully support a potential operational or strategic-level offensive operation using a strategic reserve of manpower 2024.[3] Reports that the Russian military is prioritizing creating new underequipped units and formations are consistent with ISW‘s assessment that Russia is prioritizing the quantity of manpower and materiel over the quality of its forces.[4] ISW continues to assess that Russia would have the opportunity to expand its DIB and amass resources if it maintains the theater-wide initiative throughout 2024, thus allowing Russia to set conditions for a future offensive operation using a larger reserve of manpower and equipment.[5]

Mashovets stated that the Russian military command intends to form the bulk of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division from the newly formed 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly staffed by degraded elements of the 21st Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment), 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and 589th Motorized Rifle Regiment.[6] Mashovets stated that Russia is currently forming its 433rd, 506th, and 589th motorized rifle regiments at the Totskoye training ground in Orenburg Oblast and the “Trekhizbenovsky“ training ground in occupied Luhansk Oblast and plans to have these units ready for combat by late spring or early summer 2024.[7] These newly formed regiments are likely meant to rapidly deploy to Ukraine to offset frontline losses and are unlikely to be staffed with high-quality recruits or operating at doctrinal end strength.[8] Although Russia likely does not have the capacity to staff and equip these new units near their intended end strength in the near term, the Russian military command almost certainly has long-term intentions to fully equip these and similar units. Mashovets noted that the Russian military command has already been forced to reconsider the formation of a number of units due to “discrepanc[ies]“ between Russia’s force-generation ambitions and realities and that Russia’s ability to deploy its strategic reserves in practice are likely limited “to a certain point.”[9] The Russian military command appears to be prioritizing short-term benefits, such as limited territorial gains, over long-term sustainability and large-scale operationally meaningful undertakings in Ukraine amid ongoing Russian reformation and reconstitution efforts. ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command’s use of ongoing force structure changes to rush newly created and understrength formations into combat in Ukraine will likely constrain the immediate efficacy of these units on the battlefield but is enough to maintain the current pace of operations.[10] The major variable likely to determine the rate at which such partially replenished Russian forces can advance this summer is the availability of materiel to Ukraine, which in turn depends heavily on the continued provision of US military assistance.

Russia’s increased defense industrial base (DIB) production is likely not sustainable in the medium- and long-term as it will likely suffer from labor shortages, decreased weapons and equipment stockpiles, and an inability to completely compensate for military and dual-use items it can no longer acquire due to sanctions. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on March 11 that a senior NATO official stated that Russia can likely sustain its current war effort for two to five more years.[11] WSJ noted that some Russian production figures, such as those for military vehicles, do not differentiate between newly produced items and refurbished ones brought out of storage, such as older, lower quality T-62 and T-54/-55 tanks. ISW has observed that reports of Russia’s reported tank “production” numbers in recent years largely reflect restored and modernized tanks drawn from storage rather than new production.[12] Open-source researchers recently analyzed satellite imagery and assessed that Russia has reportedly removed 25 to 40 percent of its tank strategic reserves, depending on the model, from open-air storage facilities since 2022.[13] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Russia and Eurasia Program Senior Fellow Dara Massicot assessed on March 8 that Russia’s “remaining inventory will dwindle in the next couple of years” if Russia continues its current tempo of operations.[14] WSJ reported that the Bank of Finland concluded that Russia may not be able to sustain its increased DIB production as the DIB takes personnel and material resources away from other sectors of the Russian economy.[15] WSJ reported that Kremlin official statements suggest that the Russian DIB is suffering from a personnel shortage of about 20 percent and that some DIB enterprise employees have recently complained about the lack of training and tools. ISW has previously assessed that Russia’s labor shortage, which is partially a result of its war in Ukraine and partially a symptom of Russia’s ongoing demographic crisis, will likely continue to complicate Kremlin efforts to balance increasing Russian economic capacity and force generation while catering to select members of the Russian ultranationalist community by disincentivizing migrant workers from working in Russia.[16] The Bank of Finland also reportedly found that Russia’s increased DIB production has focused on low-tech products, such as fabricated steel, and that Russia is still reliant on foreign suppliers for higher-tech items such as semiconductors.[17] WSJ stated that while Russia has successfully evaded sanctions and imported some products, Russia is struggling to source some necessary specialized items, such as tank optics, from third countries.

The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) reported that Russia currently has about three million rounds of old artillery ammunition in its stockpiles, but that much of it is in poor condition.[18] WSJ reported that RUSI and other Western analysts have assessed that Russia’s current domestic ammunition production is not sufficient for its war in Ukraine, so Russia will likely continue relying on supplies from partners.[19] CNN reported on March 11 that NATO intelligence estimates that Russia is producing about 250,000 artillery munitions of unspecified caliber per month totaling about three million shells per year.[20] A senior European intelligence official reportedly told CNN the US and Europe can collectively produce only about 1.2 million shells of unspecified calibers per year for Ukraine. CNN stated that the US military set a goal to produce 100,000 shells per month by the end of 2025 and noted that this is less than half of Russia’s current monthly production, but US Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology Doug Bush stated on February 5 that this goal of 100,000 shells per month by 2025 only refers to 155mm artillery shells and does not include shells of other calibers that the US produces and that Ukrainian forces use.[21] NATO intelligence estimates of Russian artillery munition production cited by CNN likely include various calibers of munitions, not just 152mm shells that are the analogue to Western 155mm shells, and is likely not a direct comparison to the West’s goals for the production of 155mm shells.

Transfers of North Korean weapons to Russia by sea have apparently resumed after a pause since mid-February 2024. North Korea–focused outlet NK Pro reported on March 11 that satellite imagery indicates that a ship resembling the Russian Lady R cargo ship arrived at North Korea’s Rajin Port on March 10 and appears to be loaded with containers that crews will likely fill with arms for delivery back to Russia.[22] NK Pro stated that objects, likely delivered to the port by train from inside North Korea, appeared at the pier at Rajin Port where ships are usually loaded before departing to Russia. The Lady R ship reportedly delivered cargo from North Korea to Russia twice in October 2023 and once in February 2024. NK Pro reported on February 29 that satellite imagery indicated that Russian ships involved in the maritime transport of North Korean ammunition and weaponry to Russia had not docked at the Rajin Port since February 12.[23]

A Ukrainian military source noted that Russian forces are increasingly using grenades equipped with chemical substances in the Zaporizhia direction, in potential violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to which Russia is a signatory. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Dmytro Lykhovyi stated on March 11 that Russian forces used at least 60 grenades equipped with a suffocating and tear-inducing substance on Ukrainian positions in the Tavriisk direction (Avdiivka through western Zaporizhia Oblast) between March 4 to March 10 alone, noting that most of these attacks occurred in the Zaporizhia direction.[24] Lykhovyi suggested that Russian forces are most likely equipping grenades with chloropicrin (PS) or a similar substance. PS is a lung-damaging riot control agent (RCA) that shares the characteristics of tear gas — it is not necessarily lethal but can have extremely irritating and harmful impacts when inhaled.[25] The CWC prohibits the use of PS and other RCAs in warfare, and Russia has been a signatory to the CWC since 1997.[26]

The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has summoned Russian Ambassador to Moldova Oleg Vasnetsov in response to claims that Russia will operate polling stations in pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway region Transnistria during the Russian presidential election. The Moldovan MFA summoned Vasnetsov to appear on March 12 in response to Moldova’s “disapproval” of claims that Russia will operate polling stations in Transnistria.[27] Regional outlet Transnistrian News claimed on March 11 that Russian citizens will be able to vote in the Russian presidential election at six polling stations in Transnistria on March 17 despite previous Moldovan rulings that Russia can only operate one polling station at the Russian embassy in Chisinau.[28] Russian Embassy Press Secretary Anatoly Loshakov appeared to deny Transnistrian News’ claim, stating that the embassy is only organizing voting at the polling station at the embassy.[29] These claims may be part of the Kremlin’s efforts to use Transnistria and pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region Gagauzia in information operations to support hybrid operations aimed at sabotaging Moldova’s EU accession process and keeping Moldova within Russia’s sphere of influence.[30]

Russia, China, and Iran will hold the joint Maritime Security Belt – 2024 naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman between March 11–15.[31] Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestia reported on March 11 that a detachment ships of Russia’s Pacific Fleet, including the Varyag Slava-class cruiser, arrived at Iran’s Chabahar Port to participate in Maritime Security Belt-2024 alongside Iranian and Chinese naval detachments.[32] The exercise, which was first held in 2019, is intended to practice safe joint naval maneuvers to ensure safe maritime economic activity.[33] The Russian Marshal Shaposhnikov Udaloy-class destroyer; the Chinese Ürümqi destroyer, Linyi frigate, Dongpinghu replenishment ship; and 10 unnamed Iranian ships, boats, and supply vessels and three naval helicopters are taking part in the exercise.[34] Representatives of Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Oman, India, and South Africa will observe the exercise.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that the West intends to use Armenia as a tool against Russia, a notable escalation in its information operations criticizing Armenian efforts to distance itself from security relations with Russia. UK Minister of State for the Armed Forces James Heappey stated on March 10 that the UK recognizes Armenia’s decision to “essentially” freeze its participation in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) “in the face of threats of relation from Russia,” while acknowledging that Armenia is not officially leaving the CSTO.[35] The Russian MFA claimed that Heappey’s statement was “direct confirmation” of the West’s intent to “turn Armenia into a tool against Moscow” and its wider “anti-Russian” efforts in the post-Soviet space and the South Caucasus.[36] The Russian MFA called on Armenian officials to “think seriously.” Senior Russian government officials have acknowledged and criticized Armenia’s lack of participation in the CSTO since Armenian President Nikol Pashinyan’s February 22 announcement that Armenia “essentially” froze its participation in the CSTO.[37] The Kremlin is likely preparing a harsher and more concerted response as Armenia continues to take measures to distance itself from Russia and signal interest in strengthening relations with the West.

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a bill on March 11 that allows Russian authorities to further restrict actors it deems “foreign agents” to consolidate control over the Russian information space ahead of the presidential election. Putin signed a bill that bans Russians from advertising the content of individuals and organizations legally designated as “foreign agents” and from advertising their own content on platforms that “foreign agents” own.[38] ISW previously assessed that this law will impact Russian opposition media’s ability to operate and report reliably in Russia and reported that at least one Russian opposition journalist has already suspended their work in Russia due to the new advertising ban.[39] ISW recently observed reports that large Russian advertising agencies have already included unilateral termination clauses in their advertising contracts in case the Kremlin designates a client as a foreign agent during the term of their contract.[40] The Russian Cabinet of Ministers also announced its support for a draft bill that would allow the Russian government to designate foreign organizations whose founders or participants are allegedly affiliated with foreign governments as “undesirable” and fine or imprison individuals found guilty of participating in their events.[41]

France is reportedly prepared to build a coalition of countries that are open to potentially sending Western military personnel to Ukraine.[42] French Foreign Minister Stéphane Séjourné announced on March 9 during a meeting with Baltic and Ukrainian officials that Ukraine could use foreign troops for operations such as demining or similar efforts and that Western personnel in Ukraine would not necessarily fight.[43] Séjourné emphasized that “it is not for Russia to tell us how we [the West] should help Ukraine in the coming months or years,” noting that Russia should not be able to control how the West responds to Russia by setting arbitrary “red lines.” Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski similarly stated on March 8 that the “presence of NATO forces in Ukraine is not unthinkable.”[44] Séjourné reiterated on March 11 that France seeks to “send strong signals” to Russia and speak to the Kremlin in the “language of balance of power.”[45]

Key Takeaways:

A Ukrainian military observer offered assessments of Russian force generation and defense industrial base (DIB) capacities that are consistent with ISW’s previous assessments.
Russia’s increased defense industrial base (DIB) production is likely not sustainable in the medium and long-term as it will likely suffer from labor shortages, decreased weapons and equipment stockpiles, and an inability to completely compensate for military and dual-use items it can no longer acquire due to sanctions.
Transfers of North Korean weapons to Russia by sea have apparently resumed after a pause since mid-February 2024.
A Ukrainian military source noted that Russian forces are increasingly using grenades equipped with chemical substances in the Zaporizhia direction, in potential violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to which Russia is a signatory.
The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has summoned Russian Ambassador to Moldova Oleg Vasnetsov in response to claims that Russia will operate polling stations in pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway region Transnistria during the Russian presidential election.
Russia, China, and Iran will hold the joint Maritime Security Belt – 2024 naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman between March 11–15.
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that the West intends to use Armenia as a tool against Russia, a notable escalation in its information operations criticizing Armenian efforts to distance itself from security relations with Russia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a bill on March 11 that allows Russian authorities to further restrict actors it deems “foreign agents” to consolidate control over the Russian information space ahead of the presidential election.
France is reportedly prepared to build a coalition of countries that are open to potentially sending Western military personnel to Ukraine.
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kreminna, Bakhmut, and Donetsk City.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues efforts to cater to Russian servicemembers and their families with the promise of various social benefits.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently made confirmed advances along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna amid continued positional engagements in the area on March 11. Geolocated footage published on March 10 indicates that Russian forces advanced east of Terny (west of Kreminna).[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that recent footage of Ukrainian forces’ attempted attacks in the Terny direction confirms that Ukrainian forces control Terny and refutes claims that Russian forces entered the settlement.[47] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces may launch a simultaneous attack on Terny and Yampolivka at an unspecified point in the future to eliminate the Ukrainian bridgehead on the right bank of the Zherebets River that Ukrainian forces have held since autumn 2022. Ukrainian and Russian forces stated that positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; west of Kreminna near Terny and Yampolivka; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[48] Elements of the Russian 7th and 123rd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps) are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Positional fighting continued in the Bakhmut area on March 11. Geolocated footage published on March 6 shows that Ukrainian forces advanced in a field north of Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut), though Ukrainian forces did not likely recently advance.[50] A Ukrainian company commander operating in the Bakhmut direction stated that Russian forces captured positions on the outskirts of Ivanivske in early March and have not advanced further since then.[51] ISW observed geolocated footage on March 3 indicating that Russian forces have advanced as far as the center of Ivanivske.[52] ISW has not observed visual evidence that Ukrainian forces have recaptured the center of Ivanivske, but they may have done so. Positional fighting continued northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske and east of Chasiv Yar; and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[53] Positional fighting also continued northeast of Bakhmut near Spirne and Rozdolivka.[54] Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Ivanivske; the Russian “Varvara” group of Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz forces and the “Maestro” Separate Reconnaissance Detachment of the “Terek” Cossack Brigade (reportedly of the volunteer Cossack Assault Corps) are reportedly operating in the Bakhmut direction; and elements of the 1436th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]] are reportedly operating south of Bakhmut near Niu York.[55]

Positional fighting continued west of Avdiivka on March 11, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed on March 10 that Russian forces advanced 280 meters along Myr Street in Orlivka, which is consistent with recent confirmed Russian advances in the settlement.[56] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have captured most of Pervomaiske (southwest of Avdiivka), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[57] A milblogger claimed on March 10 that the pace of Russian assaults in the Avdiivka direction slowed between March 3 to 10 but that Russian forces continue offensive operations west of Avdiivka on the Berdychi-Orlivka-Tonenke line despite Ukrainian counterattacks.[58] Positional fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka and Berdychi; west of Bakhmut near Orlivka and Tonenke; and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske and Pervomaiske.[59] Elements of the Russian 21st and 30th motorized rifle brigades (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) continue to operate on the Berdychi-Stepove area, and elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating in the Avdiivka area.[60]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces fighting on the Berdychi-Orlivka-Tonenke line west of Avdiivka are degraded and struggling to make significant advances.[61] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are focusing on the Orlivka-Tonenke area and are making steady tactical advances but that Russian forces overall are struggling. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces here are struggling due to degraded staff work, poor training of command staff, poor organization, and lack of coordination and communication particularly between different units. The milblogger claimed that different Russian units entrenched in basements close to each other do not communicate with each other and struggle with surveillance of their areas. The milblogger advised that Russian forces should not get bogged down on the Berdychi-Orlivka-Tonenke line but should focus on the Berdychi area instead of the entire Orlivka-Tonenke line as they are now.

Russian forces recently marginally advanced west and southwest of Donetsk City amid continued fighting in the area on March 11. Geolocated footage published on March 11 shows that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Heorhiivka, Pobieda, and Novomykhailivka (all southwest of Donetsk City).[62] Additional geolocated footage published on March 10 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced southeast of Shevchenko (southwest of Donetsk City and southwest of Vuhledar), and a Russian milblogger claimed on March 11 that Russian forces advanced in the area.[63] Positional fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and near Heorhiivka, Pobieda, and Novomykhailivka on March 11.[64] Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Heorhiivka; elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Pobieda; and elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps, EMD) are reportedly operating near Novomykhailivka.[65]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced southwest of Velyka Novosilka amid positional fighting in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on March 11. Geolocated footage published on March 7 and 10 shows that Russian forces advanced southeast of Chervone (southwest of Velyka Novosilka and southeast of Hulyaipole).[66] Positional fighting continued south of Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine and Staromayorske on March 11.[67] Elements of the Russian 11th Air and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) continue to operate in the south Donetsk direction; elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are operating near Staromayorske; and elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are operating near Chervone.[68]

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 11, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in these areas. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces captured several unspecified positions between Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these clams.[69] Positional engagements continued near Zherebyanky (northwest of Robotyne), Pyatykhatky (northwest of Robotyne), Robtoyne, Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne), and northwest of Verbove.[70] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Dmytro Lykhovyi reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian Palantin-K electronic warfare (EW) system and a Leyer EW system in the Zaporizhia direction (likely referring to western Zaporizhia Oblast).[71]

Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast as of March 11. Positional engagements continued in left bank Kherson Oblast, particularly near Krynky.[72] Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo claimed that only scattered groups of Ukrainian servicemen remain in Krynky.[73]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 25 Shahed-136/131 drones on the night of March 10-11 and that Ukrainian forces shot down 15 drones.[74] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian drones damaged civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv and Odesa cities.[75]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 11 that Russian forces have launched 175 Shahed drones at Ukraine since March 1 and that Ukrainian forces have shot down 151 of the drones.[76]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues efforts to cater to Russian military personnel and their families with the promise of social benefits. Putin instructed the Russian Cabinet of Ministers on March 11 to create a new section of the Unified Public Services Portal (Gosuslugi) that provides Russian servicemembers fighting in Ukraine and their family members with information about social benefits, assistance, and services that are available to them.[77] The Cabinet of Ministers is also reportedly considering a proposal that will exempt the children of deceased servicemembers from paying for utilities and allows a one-time payment of 20,000 rubles (about $220) to dependents of deceased soldiers who received the “Hero of Russia“ award.[78] Putin additionally signed a decree on March 11 that extends the five-million-ruble ($55,000) payment made in the event of a soldier’s death in Ukraine to families of civilian Ministry of Defense (MoD) personnel and employees of law enforcement bodies.[79] The decree will provide the five-million-ruble payment to the families of civilian employees of the Russian MoD, any federal government agency, internal affairs agencies, the Federal Penitentiary Service, the Federal Bailiff Service, federal communications authorities, or Federal Customs Service in the event of the employee's death in the combat zone in Ukraine. The Kremlin has previously used the promise of social benefits to incentivize participation in the war and soothe domestic discontent using financial means.[80]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Note: ISW will be publishing its coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts on a weekly basis in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track developments in Ukrainian defense industrial efforts daily and will refer to these efforts in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.

European Union (EU) High Commissioner Josep Borrell stated on March 11 that the EU may use the profits from frozen Russian assets to purchase weapons for Ukraine or to help strengthen Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB), should the EU agree to use the profits from the frozen funds.[81] The EU previously adopted a decision that would allow the EU to use the profits of frozen Russian funds for the reconstruction of Ukraine.[82]

Ukraine’s European partners continue efforts to aid and supply Ukraine. British Defense Secretary Grant Shapps stated on March 7 that the United Kingdom (UK) will allocate 125 million pounds (about $160 million) to purchase 10,000 drones for Ukraine in 2024.[83] Officials from Luxembourg, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, and France announced recently that they will join the Czech initiative to fund the provision of artillery ammunition from outside the EU to Ukraine.[84] The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated on March 7 that Norway will provide $150 million to the Czech artillery ammunition initiative.[85] French President Emmanuel Macron stated on March 8 that France is negotiating with Qatar and Saudi Arabia on the return of French weapons exported to Saudi Arabia and Qatar and that France will no longer supply artillery shells and systems to these countries as part of French efforts to increase supplies to Ukraine.[86] Macron stated that Germany and Italy are also negotiating the return of weapons from Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia.

Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) are reportedly considering a “ring exchange” of German Taurus missiles for British Storm Shadow missiles as part of European efforts to arm Ukraine. British Foreign Secretary David Cameron stated on March 9 that the UK is ready to acquire German Taurus missiles to replace at least some of its stock of British Storm Shadow missiles, which the UK would then send to Ukraine.[87] German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock stated on March 11 that the ring exchange proposal would be an “option” and noted that Germany has previously conducted similar weapons exchanges.[88]

The lack of US funding for American-Canadian military aid provision agreements are reportedly delaying weapons supplies to Ukraine. Canadian Defense Minister Bill Blair stated on March 10 that the lack of US funding to finalize contracts has delayed the American and Canadian delivery of National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) that Canada and the US promised to Ukraine in January 2023.[89]

The New York Times reported on March 11 that Ukraine may receive six F-16 fighter jets in summer 2024 and that 12 Ukrainian pilots will likely be ready to fly F-16s in combat by then.[90]

Ukraine’s European allies continue efforts to shift aspects of DIB production to Ukrainian territory to support Ukraine’s DIB domestically. French Defense Minister Sébastien Lecornu announced on March 8 that three unnamed French companies will establish factories for the joint production of drone, vehicle parts, and potentially ammunition in Ukraine.[91] Lecornu noted that France and Ukraine aim to launch the first of these production facilities in Summer 2024.[92] Czech industrial-technology holding group Czechoslovak Group (CSG) is negotiating with various Ukrainian state-owned companies to transfer some part of joint munition and heavy equipment manufacturing to Ukraine by 2027.[93] CSG owner Michal Strnad stated that the Czech-Ukrainian model should follow the analogue of German arms concern Rheinmetall’s joint venture with Ukrainian state-owned DIB conglomerate Ukroboronprom, which operates exclusively within Ukraine and provides for the maintenance, assembly, and production of military vehicles.[94]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Note: ISW will be publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas twice a week in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track activities in Russian-occupied areas daily and will refer to these activities in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed on March 11 that the US plans to conduct cyberattacks against the Russian remote electronic voting system and use non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to attempt to reduce voter turnout in the Russian presidential election.[95] Russian authorities are likely setting conditions to blame a potential low voter turnout on alleged Western election tampering and for escalation with the West.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian First Deputy Defense Minister Major General Viktor Gulevich stated on March 11 that the Belarusian military is conducting combat readiness exercise, in part as a response to the NATO Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises.[96] ISW continues to assess that Russia and Belarus are attempting to misrepresent these exercises as a threat against Russia and Belarus despite the exercises’ defensive nature in response to real Russian aggression against Ukraine and overt Russian threats against NATO states.[97] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Andriy Kovalenko warned that unspecified actors may spread false information about the start of a new Russian offensive operation in the direction of Kyiv in tandem with the Belarusian military exercises.[98] Kovalenko reported that the Russian military does not have “reserves or a sufficient presence [in Belarus]” to conduct an invasion from Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

3. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 11, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-11-2024

Key Takeaways:

Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters mortared Israeli forces in Gaza City at least four times.
Central Gaza Strip: The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting Hamas’ military deputy commander, Marwan Issa, in Nuseirat.
Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in northern Khan Younis.
Political Negotiations: Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh presented Hamas’ comprehensive demands in ceasefire and hostage negotiations in a speech marking the start of Ramadan.
West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least eight times.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
Syria: Iranian officials expressed their displeasure with the Syrian Bashar al Assad regime’s failure to implement its economic agreements with Iran.
Yemen: Houthi-affiliated media reported that the United States and United Kingdom conducted airstrikes targeting three locations in Yemen.
Iran: Russia, China, and Iran will hold the joint Maritime Security Belt-2024 naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman between March 11-15.

IRAN UPDATE, MARCH 11, 2024

Mar 11, 2024 - ISW Press

Iran Update, March 11, 2024

Andie Parry, Amin Soltani, Peter Mills, Kathryn Tyson, Anne McGill, Karolina Hird, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters mortared Israeli forces in Gaza City at least four times.
Central Gaza Strip: The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting Hamas’ military deputy commander, Marwan Issa, in Nuseirat.
Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in northern Khan Younis.
Political Negotiations: Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh presented Hamas’ comprehensive demands in ceasefire and hostage negotiations in a speech marking the start of Ramadan.
West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least eight times.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
Syria: Iranian officials expressed their displeasure with the Syrian Bashar al Assad regime’s failure to implement its economic agreements with Iran.
Yemen: Houthi-affiliated media reported that the United States and United Kingdom conducted airstrikes targeting three locations in Yemen.
Iran: Russia, China, and Iran will hold the joint Maritime Security Belt-2024 naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman between March 11-15.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters mortared Israeli forces in Gaza City at least four times since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 10. The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement fired mortars targeting Israeli forces east of Beit Hanoun on March 10.[1] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah, separately claimed mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun neighborhood.[2] PIJ also claimed a mortar attack targeting IDF troops south of Gaza City.[3] The IDF reported that its Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) killed 15 Palestinian fighters south of Gaza City.[4]

An IDF Navy helicopter destroyed an unspecified Palestinian vessel near Gaza City on March 11.[5]

The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting Hamas’ military deputy commander, Marwan Issa, in Nuseirat on March 11. Israeli media reported that Issa was in an underground tunnel in Nuseirat.[6] The IDF did not confirm whether the airstrike killed Issa.[7] The airstrike killed five Palestinians and wounded ten more.[8] Israeli journalists described Issa as the third most senior official in Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[9] Issa worked closely with Hamas’ leader for the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, and the head of Hamas’ military, Mohammad Deif, to plan the October 7 attack.[10]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in northern Khan Younis on March 11. The IDF 89th Commando Brigade detained Palestinian fighters and seized weapons and other military equipment in apartment buildings in Hamad.[11] Palestinian fighters fired an anti-tank guided missile at IDF Givati Brigade soldiers in Hamad, after which IDF Maglan Unit soldiers identified and killed the fighters.[12] The Egoz Unit (89th Commando Brigade) clashed with Palestinian fighters in Hamad.[13] The IDF 7th Armored Brigade raided tunnels and weapon assembly sites in Hamad to find explosives, intelligence materials, and small arms.[14] The 7th Brigade has detained dozens of Palestinian fighters, who tried to escape with evacuating civilians since the beginning of Israeli operations in Hamad.[15] The IDF Bislamach Brigade separately targeted Palestinian fighters with aerial, sniper, and tank fire in Qarara on March 11.[16]

Palestinian militias claimed only one attack targeting Israeli forces around Khan Younis on March 11. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, targeted Israeli armor with an IED in Hamad.[17]

Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh presented Hamas’ comprehensive demands in ceasefire and hostage negotiations in a speech marking the start of Ramadan on March 10. Haniyeh presented five maximalist demands for a hostage-for-prisoner exchange. Haniyeh proposed a comprehensive ceasefire, the complete withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip, the complete and unconditional return of displaced Gazans, and the resolution of humanitarian issues, including relief, shelter, and reconstruction, and ending restrictions on the movement of people and goods out of the Gaza Strip.[18] Haniyeh said that the Hamas leadership would reject any agreement that does not meet these demands. Haniyeh’s framework is consistent with Hamas’ public demands over the past week.[19] Hamas’ unwillingness to negotiate on these issues is corroborated by statements from Israeli negotiators.[20] Some of the demands, particularly the permanent ceasefire and a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces, remain an obstacle in the ongoing negotiations.

Haniyeh also laid out a proposal for a post-war unified Palestinian government that would include Hamas. Haniyeh called for elections to form a temporary national consensus government until legislative and presidential elections and a Palestinian National Council can be held.[21] Haniyeh presented a vision of an independent Palestinian state comprised of the Gaza Strip and West Bank with the right of return and self-determination.[22] Several Palestinian factions, including Hamas, met in Moscow on February 29 to discuss the formation of a new Palestinian government.[23] Hamas claimed that the talks were constructive, but Fatah leaders were less optimistic, expressing concerns of an international boycott against any government that includes Hamas.[24] Fatah currently leads the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.

Haniyeh also called for Palestinians to “protect Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque” during Ramadan from any Israeli “conspiracies” to restrict access to these areas.[25] Haniyeh’s statement mirrors his and other Hamas leaders’ rhetoric to “storm” and “march to” al Aqsa Mosque during Ramadan over the past several weeks.[26] Haniyeh rejected the Israeli claim that Palestinian militia groups do not want a ceasefire during Ramadan because they intend to use popular anger to “revolutionize the West Bank.”[27]

Palestinian militias did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 11.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least eight times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 10.[28] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed that it detonated IEDs and fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in Tulkarm and Nablus on March 10.[29]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant stated on March 11 that Iran is actively attempting to orchestrate terror attacks by smuggling weapons into the West Bank.[30] Gallant also said that Israel must prepare for an ”increase in terror” during Ramadan, which began on March 10. Israel has repeatedly thwarted attempts to smuggle Iranian-made weapons from Jordan into Israel and the West Bank over the past year.[31]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 10.[32] Hezbollah claimed that it launched four drones targeting Israeli forces at the Kila barracks in the Golan Heights.[33] The IDF said that it detected two drone, which landed in open areas.[34]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The secretary of the Iranian Supreme Free Trade Zones Council said on March 6 that Iran, Iraq, and Syria are continuing talks to establish a trilateral free trade zone.[35] The secretary noted that the joint free trade zone would facilitate Iranian access to the Mediterranean Sea. Iran and Syria resumed negotiations over the establishment of a joint free trade zone after Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to Syria in May 2023.[36] The Supreme Free Trade Zones Council secretary said at the time that negotiations had entered a “technical and implementation stage.”[37] CTP-ISW previously assessed that a free trade zone through Iran, Iraq, and Syria would allow Iran to move materials across borders without oversight that would normally enforce sanctions on trade with Iran and Syria.[38]

Iranian officials expressed their displeasure with the Syrian Bashar al Assad regime’s failure to implement its economic agreements with Iran. A senior Iranian member of the Iran-Syria Commerce Chamber said on March 3 that Syria has not fulfilled its part of trade agreements with Iran despite “several meetings” and called on Syria to pay “special attention.”[39] The Iranian Trade Development director general for West Asia similarly noted on March 3 that Iranian exports to Syria declined in 2023.[40] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Syrian President Bashar al Assad signed 15 economic cooperations agreement in May 2023, covering banking, communications technology, energy, reconstruction, and transportation.[41]

Houthi-affiliated media reported that the United States and United Kingdom conducted airstrikes targeting three locations in Yemen on March 11.[42] The strikes reportedly occurred around Ras Issa, al Urj, and Jabanah in Hudaydah Governorate. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom have confirmed the strikes as the time of this writing.

Russia, China, and Iran will hold the joint Maritime Security Belt-2024 naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman between March 11-15.[43] Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestia reported on March 11 that a detachment ships of Russia’s Pacific Fleet, including the Varyag Slava-class cruiser, arrived at Iran’s Chabahar Port to participate in Maritime Security Belt-2024 alongside Iranian and Chinese naval detachments.[44] The exercise, which was first held in 2019, is intended to practice safe combined naval maneuvers to ensure safe maritime economic activity.[45] The Russian Marshal Shaposhnikov Udaloy-class destroyer; the Chinese Ürümqi destroyer, Linyi frigate, Dongpinghu replenishment ship; and 10 unnamed Iranian ships, boats, and supply vessels and three naval helicopters are taking part in the exercise.[46] Representatives of Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Oman, India, and South Africa will observe the exercise.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei awarded the Order of Fath medal (otherwise known as the Victory Medal) to IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami and Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi on March 10.[47] Khamenei awarded Salami and Mousavi for “improving the defense, combat, and deterrence power” of the Iranian armed forces, according to Khamenei‘s website.[48] Notable recipients of this aware include former IRGC Quds Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani, former IRGC Commander Major General Mohmmad Ali Jafari, IRGC Deputy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi, and former Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani.[49]

Western media reported on March 11 that Iran increased its export of liquefied petroleum gas by 28 percent in 2023.[50] Bloomberg noted that Iran has now become the largest Middle Eastern exporter of liquified petroleum gas, largely driven by increased production in the South Pars gas field and a greater shipping capacity between Iran and China. Iranian oil production similarly increased to an all-time high of three million barrels per day in late 2023.[51] Iran exported most of that crude to China. The National Iranian Oil Company chief executive said on March 11 that 2.5 billion barrels were added to Iran’s natural gas and crude oil reserves in 2023.[52]

The Iranian deputy foreign affairs minister for policy met with the Armenian deputy foreign affairs minister in Tehran on March 11.[53] The two officials discussed the Israel-Hamas war, economic cooperation, and regional security in the Caucasus. The Iranian official warned against foreign interference in the Caucasus, referring to the long-held Iranian assertion that Israel and Turkey are expanding their geopolitical influence there via Azerbaijan.[54] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Defense Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Gharaei Ashtiani similarly warned against extra-regional interference in the Caucasus during their separate meetings with Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan in Tehran on March 6 and 7.[55] The Iranian regime has historically accused Baku of allowing Israel to use Azerbaijani territory to launch operations against Iran.[56] Iran has provided security assistance, including drone sales, to Armenia previously as part of its effort to push back against Azerbaijan.[57]

The Iranian foreign affairs minister’s senior adviser met with the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry’s Middle East and North Africa development director in Tehran on March 11.[58] The two officials discussed the Israel-Hamas war and called for the continuation of political processes to end conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. The Iranian official warned that continued American and British strikes targeting Houthi military capabilities would “disrupt peace efforts” in Yemen. Iranian and Russian officials have engaged in political coordination vis-a-vis the Israel-Hamas war since at least October 26, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[59]

The Iranian parliament has likely approved a controversial veiling bill, although it is unclear if the regime will implement it. An Iranian newspaper reported on March 9 that Parliament approved legislation that would use facial recognition technology to fine unveiled women. This report is consistent with an Iranian parliamentarian’s March 8 claim that Parliament had approved such legislation.[60] The Guardian Council—a regime body that can overrule parliamentary legislation—has rejected prior iterations of Parliament’s hijab bill, however, making it unclear if the recent veiling bill will reach implementation.[61] Discussions surrounding mandatory veiling legislation coincide with social media reports of increased tensions between unveiled Iranian women and hardline clerics in recent days.[62]

4. Opinion: The world’s dangerous place has only gotten more dangerous

Opinion: The world’s dangerous place has only gotten more dangerous | CNN

CNN · by Fareed Zakaria · March 10, 2024

Taiwan Flag, Taipei, Taiwan. (Photo by Jose Lopes Amaral/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

Jose Lopes Amaral/NurPhoto/Getty Images

Editor’s Note: Fareed Zakaria is the host of Fareed Zakaria GPS, airing at 10 a.m. and 1 p.m. ET Sundays on CNN. Follow Fareed on X, and read news, analysis, and insights from Fareed and his team in the daily CNN newsletter Fareed’s Global Briefing. The views expressed in this commentary are his own. Read more CNN Opinion.

At 8 p.m. ET and PT tonight on CNN, Fareed’s latest special report, “Taiwan: Unfinished Business,” will examine the complicated history and present dangers surrounding Taiwan.

CNN —

A couple of years ago, the Economist declared on its cover that Taiwan — a tiny island, home to 24 million people — was “the most dangerous place on Earth.”

The reasons it came to that conclusion remain sound. In fact, they have only grown stronger recently.

The backdrop to the tensions over Taiwan is, of course, the expanding geopolitical rivalry between China and the United States. Ever since the rise first of Chinese leader Xi Jinping and then of former US President Donald Trump, both nations have fundamentally shifted their attitudes towards the other — from benign, to wary, to hostile.

Perhaps the extraordinary and rapid growth of China and the reality of America’s dominant status made this inevitable. A rising power faces an established one, creating a situation that may be, in the words of author and Harvard international security scholar Graham Allison, “destined for war.”

exp China taiwan tensions will ripley pkg 030312aseg1 cnni world_00011405.png

video

But are we destined for war? The US and China are unusual in that while they are increasingly geopolitical rivals, they are also deeply intertwined economically.

One example: During the Cold War, at the peak of US-Soviet trade, the two countries exchanged $5 billion dollars of goods with each other in one year. China and the US do $5 billion in trade every few days. And that number has not dropped that much even as tariffs, bans and restrictions on trade have grown in recent years.

In addition, China does not seem to be a revolutionary state, seeking to overthrow the international system and present the world with an alternative ideology to America. That ideological rivalry, at the heart of the Cold War, is largely absent today.

US President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping walk together after a meeting during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders' week in Woodside, Calif., on November 15, 2023.

Brendan Smialowski/AFP/Getty Images

One thing that is present, however, is nuclear deterrence. China and the US both have large arsenals, which should have the effect they have had elsewhere — from the US and Soviet Union to Pakistan and India — in deterring all-out war.

And yet … and yet: There is the problem of Taiwan that sits at the heart of US-China relations.

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China has never accepted that Taiwan can be an independent country. This is not a Xi Jinping innovation. It is in the constitution of the People’s Republic of China. Every Chinese leader beginning with Mao Zedong has affirmed the goal of reunifying the two, but in the past, Communist China believed that it could wait because time was on its side. Eventually, the mainland with its massive economy and billion-plus population would draw the tiny island of 24 million into its orbit.

That was the thinking. But that premise is proving untrue.

Taiwan has developed into a feisty democracy with a political culture defined by its political system in stark contrast to China. Over the past few decades, Taiwan has gotten more determined not to reunify with China. So, Xi must be looking at this situation and feeling that time is not on his side. That perhaps it would be better to act sooner than later.

For America and its many allies in Asia, Chinese aggression to retake Taiwan would be unacceptable. Washington has been willing to accept China’s claims on Taiwan as long as it did not use coercion to achieve them.

This picture shows a general view of Kinmen, China.

John Mees/CNN

Taiwan policy, for all sides, has been about tolerating fantasies about the future as long as there are no practical changes in the present. Most people in Taiwan simply want to maintain the status quo and keep things going as they are. While the recent elections on the island brought to power for a third term a party that is closely associated with the idea of an independent Taiwan, it’s worth noting that it got only 40% of the vote, with the other 60% going to two candidates with less independence-minded positions.

What does all this mean? That this issue will need to be managed rather than solved — and managed very carefully by both Beijing and Washington. This is one place on Earth where there should be little room for macho rhetoric and provocative actions. All three sides should keep talking to ensure there are no misperceptions or miscalculations.

None of this is morally satisfying. But the stakes are high enough that one thing is clear: Were these tensions to be mismanaged, were this conflict to turn into war, it would be lose-lose-lose for all three parties; indeed, the whole world would suffer cataclysmic consequences. Better to kick this can down the road as long as possible — and hope it does not explode.

CNN · by Fareed Zakaria · March 10, 2024

5. U.S. Spy Agencies Say Netanyahu’s Leadership ‘in Jeopardy’

Excerpts:

“Netanyahu’s viability as leader as well as his governing coalition of far-right and ultraorthodox parties that pursued hard-line policies on Palestinian and security issues may be in jeopardy,” said the assessment, part of a 40-page report on global threats from Gaza and Ukraine to terrorism and cyberspace that was released Monday.

“Distrust of Netanyahu’s ability to rule has deepened and broadened across the public from its already high levels before the war, and we expect large protests demanding his resignation and new elections,” it continued. “A different, more moderate government is a possibility.”

U.S. Spy Agencies Say Netanyahu’s Leadership ‘in Jeopardy’

The annual threat assessment also questions Israel’s ability to eliminate Hamas

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-spy-agencies-say-netanyahus-leadership-in-jeopardy-669d72a1?mod=hp_lead_pos5

By Warren P. Strobel

March 11, 2024 8:16 pm ET

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu PHOTO: RONEN ZVULUN/POOL/SHUTTERSTOCK

WASHINGTON—A new U.S. global intelligence assessment says that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s hold on office “may be in jeopardy” and suggests Israel will fail to achieve its aim in the Gaza war of completely eliminating Hamas.

While challenges to Netanyahu’s continuation in power have been widely discussed since Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack on Israel, it appeared unusual for American spy agencies to offer their analysis of an allied leader’s political prospects in an unclassified document.

“Netanyahu’s viability as leader as well as his governing coalition of far-right and ultraorthodox parties that pursued hard-line policies on Palestinian and security issues may be in jeopardy,” said the assessment, part of a 40-page report on global threats from Gaza and Ukraine to terrorism and cyberspace that was released Monday.

“Distrust of Netanyahu’s ability to rule has deepened and broadened across the public from its already high levels before the war, and we expect large protests demanding his resignation and new elections,” it continued. “A different, more moderate government is a possibility.”

President Biden and Netanyahu have been increasingly locked in a war of words over Israel’s military offensive in Gaza, with the U.S. president warning against an Israeli attack on the southern Gaza city of Rafah. Netanyahu appeared to dismiss those concerns in an interview with Politico on Sunday.

Biden warned Israel against a Rafah operation unless it took steps to protect civilians, calling it a “red line” and leaving open the possibility that he would withhold some types of U.S. military assistance if the operation went ahead.

The 74-year-old Israeli prime minister became the country’s longest-serving leader by focusing on security, but he oversaw Israel’s worst-ever security failure on Oct. 7, when major lapses allowed Hamas to attack southern Israel and kill 1,200 people.

Public opinion has turned sharply against him, and large-scale protests calling for his ouster have occurred in Israel. Netanyahu’s rule depends on avoiding snap elections and keeping his narrow parliamentary majority intact. He has vowed to stay on until he has led Israel to “total victory” over Hamas. Netanyahu’s hope, analysts say, is a visible victory, such as killing the group’s top leaders in Gaza, that could help his popularity bounce back.

He is also under pressure from within Israel’s three-member war cabinet, which includes his two major rivals, Benny Gantz, leader of the National Unity Party, and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant.

If elections were held now, polls say Gantz would easily defeat Netanyahu’s Likud. Gantz hasn’t ruled out working with the Palestinian Authority after the Gaza war and working toward a Palestinian state. Netanyahu is at odds on the issues with the White House, which favors a Palestinian Authority role in postwar Gaza and renewed diplomatic discussion on an independent Palestinian state.

The U.S. intelligence report, called the Annual Threat Assessment, comprises the views of all American spy agencies.

Israel will have difficulty vanquishing Hamas, it suggests.

Israel “remains focused on destroying Hamas, which its population broadly supports,” it states. “Moreover, Israel probably will face lingering armed resistance from Hamas for years to come, and the military will struggle to neutralize Hamas’s underground infrastructure, which allows insurgents to hide, regain strength, and surprise Israeli forces.”

Leaders of U.S. intelligence agencies, including CIA Director William Burns and National Intelligence Director Avril Haines, testified about the report Monday before the Senate Intelligence Committee. Senators didn’t ask about the section covering Netanyahu’s political future during the hearing, which was interrupted several times by protesters denouncing U.S. support for Israel.

Burns told the senators he was continuing to negotiate, along with Israeli, Egyptian and Qatari counterparts, a three-part diplomatic plan that would see some Hamas hostages released in return for Palestinian prisoners held by Israel; a six-week cease-fire; and a surge in humanitarian assistance. Hamas has yet to agree to the plan.

“We’re going to continue to work hard at this,” Burns said. “I don’t think anybody can guarantee success.”

Write to Warren P. Strobel at Warren.Strobel@wsj.com

Appeared in the March 12, 2024, print edition as 'U.S. Spy Report Sees Netanyahu’s Leadership in Peril'.

6. A TikTok Ban May Be Easier in Theory

Excerpts:

The U.S. has targeted plenty of Chinese companies before, most notably Huawei and Chinese chip makers, with significant impact. Advanced chip-making tools can’t be exported to China while companies like Huawei are restricted from buying advanced chips based on American technologies. Given U.S. dominance in key parts of the semiconductor supply chain, Washington’s scope to squeeze downstream companies is sizable.

But TikTok is a much thornier issue. First, there are the legal questions. A federal judge recently blocked a Montana state ban, saying it probably violated the First Amendment and citing a “pervasive undertone of anti-Chinese sentiment.” And the conservative majority on the Supreme Court, which is considering separate laws attempting to restrict social-media platforms’ editorial discretion, has often been strongly supportive of First Amendment arguments.

Then there are the practical issues. The proposed legislation may force app stores to remove TikTok. But restricting access through web browsers or already-installed apps—which would be necessary to really limit the platform’s reach—would represent another level of intrusive regulation.

A TikTok Ban May Be Easier in Theory

America has squeezed Chinese companies before—but TikTok is a thornier issue

https://www.wsj.com/tech/a-tiktok-ban-may-be-easier-in-theory-09277584?mod=hp_lead_pos6

By Jacky Wong

March 12, 2024 5:00 am ET

A fast-track House bill appears to have caught TikTok off guard. PHOTO: ORE HUIYING/BLOOMBERG NEWS

The move to ban TikTok or force a sale is gaining steam in Congress again. Carrying through with it would mean opening several cans of worms—practical, legal and political.

Discussion of a U.S. ban for TikTok—owned by China’s Bytedance—has dragged on for years. But a new fast-track House bill, now set for a vote Wednesday, appears to have caught the short-video platform off guard. The company has appealed to its users to contact their congressmen but that seems to have backfired by raising hackles on both sides of the aisle.

The U.S. has targeted plenty of Chinese companies before, most notably Huawei and Chinese chip makers, with significant impact. Advanced chip-making tools can’t be exported to China while companies like Huawei are restricted from buying advanced chips based on American technologies. Given U.S. dominance in key parts of the semiconductor supply chain, Washington’s scope to squeeze downstream companies is sizable.

But TikTok is a much thornier issue. First, there are the legal questions. A federal judge recently blocked a Montana state ban, saying it probably violated the First Amendment and citing a “pervasive undertone of anti-Chinese sentiment.” And the conservative majority on the Supreme Court, which is considering separate laws attempting to restrict social-media platforms’ editorial discretion, has often been strongly supportive of First Amendment arguments.

Then there are the practical issues. The proposed legislation may force app stores to remove TikTok. But restricting access through web browsers or already-installed apps—which would be necessary to really limit the platform’s reach—would represent another level of intrusive regulation.

The politics of a real ban also seem likely to be highly toxic for significant parts of the voter base: Banning millions of mostly young users from their favorite app, many of whom are already incensed over the Biden administration’s handling of the war in Gaza, would be a heavy political lift—especially right before a presidential election. President Biden has said he would sign a ban if it reaches his desk. But the fact that the Biden campaign joined TikTok in recent weeks highlights the dilemma.

A forced sale, which the bill stipulates would need to come in less than six months, would be a preferable solution for Washington. But that wouldn’t be easy either. There is no doubt there would be many suitors but Beijing probably wouldn’t allow it to happen. In fact, it has long said it would oppose any forced sale. Losing revenue from a shuttered U.S. TikTok would be a blow for ByteDance, particularly given the recent struggles of China’s economy, but probably not catastrophic. The company’s finances aren’t public, but over 80% of its revenue still came from China in 2022, according to technology news outlet the Information.

Taiwan’s Incoming VP Is on a Low-Profile Visit to Washington

Private trip by Bi-khim Hsiao will include meetings with U.S. officials about new government’s agenda, say people familiar with her plans

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/taiwans-incoming-vp-is-on-a-low-profile-visit-to-washington-ed59d07b?mod=hp_lead_pos11

By Lingling Wei

in New York and Joyu Wang

in Taipei

March 12, 2024 3:05 am ET

Bi-khim Hsiao at an election night rally in Taipei in January. PHOTO: AN RONG XU/BLOOMBERG NEWS

Taiwan’s vice president-elect is in Washington this week for a low-profile visit, according to people with knowledge of the matter, a trip that comes at a delicate time in the Biden administration’s dealings with China.

Bi-khim Hsiao, who served as Taipei’s representative to the U.S. from mid-2020 until late last year, is on a private trip in the U.S. capital to pack belongings she left behind to campaign with president-elect Lai Ching-te, the people said, though she also plans to meet with U.S. officials while there.

Hsiao, who will be sworn in with Lai in late May, plans to discuss the new Taipei government’s agenda with members of the Biden administration, the people said. Hsiao plans to travel to several capitals in Europe, also in a private capacity, after her Washington visit, the people said.

It couldn’t be determined with whom Hsiao planned to meet. Asked about her travel plans at a regular press briefing on Tuesday, Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry said it had no information to provide.

A spokesman for the ruling Democratic Progressive Party said it also had no details to disclose as Hsiao is traveling in a personal capacity. The de facto U.S. embassy in Taipei, the American Institute in Taiwan, didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment.

Beijing keeps a close eye on any contact between Taiwanese and U.S. officials. China’s Communist leadership has long claimed the self-governed democratic island as part of China despite having never ruled there. Chinese leader Xi Jinping has vowed to eventually impose control over the territory, by force if necessary, and spoke at length about the island’s status with President Biden during a summit in California in November.

Lai Ching-te and Bi-khim Hsiao at a press conference after their election victory in January. PHOTO: DANIEL CENG/SHUTTERSTOCK

Wary of China’s reaction, officials in Washington and Taipei are trying to keep Hsiao’s visit under wraps, the people familiar with the matter said.

Since Taiwan’s presidential election in January, both Washington and Taipei have taken care not to antagonize Beijing, which has been sending boats and aircraft on regular incursions into waters and airspace near the island.

With Russia’s war on Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas conflict dragging on, the Biden administration sees it in the U.S. interest to try to avoid sparking new conflict across the 100-mile Taiwan Strait separating the island from mainland China. Chinese leaders, meanwhile, have sought to keep relations with the U.S. on a relatively even keel as they wrestle with a slowing economy.

Bonnie Glaser, the managing director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, said China’s increasingly aggressive posture toward Taiwan has made deterrence challenging. Still, “everybody is trying to preserve a modicum of stability” before president-elect Lai’s inauguration on May 20, Glaser said.

“I think Beijing will appreciate the efforts by both Taiwan and the U.S. to keep Hsiao’s visit low key,” Glaser said.

However, the semi-international tour by Hsiao likely would still upset the Chinese leadership that for years has tried to keep Taiwan a local matter, according to Chinese analysts.

Beijing is particularly suspicious of Lai, whom it sees as a more fervent advocate of Taiwanese independence than Taiwan’s departing president, Tsai Ing-wen, though both are members of the DPP. After the State Department congratulated Lai and Hsiao on their election victory, China’s Foreign Ministry rebuked it for sending “a gravely wrong signal to the ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces.”

U.S. officials privately have also expressed concerns over Lai, worried that he is more likely than Tsai to provoke Beijing despite his pledge to maintain the status quo established by his predecessor.

The Taiwan Strait separates the island from mainland China. PHOTO: NG HAN GUAN/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Hsiao is viewed in Taipei as someone who is trusted in Washington and can help Lai manage Taiwan’s relationship with the U.S.

In the past, many countries were reluctant to develop ties with Taipei for fears of offending Beijing and losing access to China’s markets. But with Beijing’s relations with the West straining and China ramping up pressure on Taipei, many have set aside such fears.

Taipei received an outpouring of congratulatory messages in the wake of its presidential election, from policymakers in Brussels and other capitals in Europe and Asia.

The island has long largely depended on America’s military and diplomatic support for its security. The broadened international support shows that many nations beyond the U.S. now have a stake in trying to help preserve the uneasy seven-decade coexistence of Taiwan and China.

Europe realizes “a potential war in the Taiwan Strait would not only disrupt trade with East Asia, it could also cut global production chains, reshape Asia’s security architecture, and bring severe consequences to the EU economy,” Philippe Le Corre, senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute, wrote in a recent report.

Under Tsai, the DPP has taken a position of maintaining the island’s political autonomy from the mainland and standing up to Beijing’s pressure while strengthening its relations with the U.S. and nations in Europe and Asia.

In his acceptance speech in January, Lai said he has “an important responsibility to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait” and called for dialogue with China to “replace confrontation.”

During Tsai’s rule, Beijing has persuaded 10 states to cut diplomatic ties with Taipei as part of efforts to marginalize Taiwan on the global stage. It chalked up a victory when Taiwan lost diplomatic recognition from the Pacific island nation of Nauru.

But that doesn’t mean Taiwan is losing its international appeal. While the number of governments maintaining official diplomatic relations with Taipei has fallen to a dozen, Le Corre wrote in his report, “at the same time, unofficial forms of diplomatic ties have increased.”

Write to Lingling Wei at Lingling.Wei@wsj.com and Joyu Wang at joyu.wang@wsj.com

8. Pentagon unveils $850 billion budget request amid spending uncertainty

Pentagon unveils $850 billion budget request amid spending uncertainty

Defense News · by Noah Robertson · March 11, 2024

The Pentagon released its fiscal year 2025 funding request, officially beginning one of the most chaotic budget seasons in recent memory.

The top line for national defense is $895.2 billion, and the Pentagon’s share of that will be just under $850 billion. These figures are lower than projected in the request for fiscal 2024, due to a deal struck to avoid a government default.

That deal capped spending for the upcoming fiscal year, amounting to a small drop in defense funding when adjusted for inflation. Hence the inevitable question leading up to this year’s request was what accounts would have to slim down. The answer is mainly those for procurement and research, development, testing and evaluation. The previous year’s ask for those accounts was $315 billion. This year’s is $310.7 billion, and that doesn’t account for inflation.

An inside look at the Department of Defense's budget request for next year- from program cuts to barracks improvements. Our reporters weigh in.

Divided out, the total includes $167.5 billion for procurement and $143.2 billion for RDT&E for FY25. Among the weapons systems trimmed to reach that lower-than-planned number are a Virginia-Class nuclear-powered submarine and a slew of F-35 fighter jets. The request for munitions also fell slightly — to $29.8 billion from $30.6 billion in FY24.

Every year’s budget request is a planned, but not final, roadmap that adjusts to direction from Congress. This year’s is even less certain, since the FY24 budget cycle has yet to close and could force more detours.

Congress has yet to pass an FY24 defense budget, now almost six months into the government fiscal year, which started Oct. 1. For the Pentagon, this presents two major risks: a full-year continuing resolution and the threat of a sequester. According to last year’s default deal, if lawmakers fail to pass all of their annual spending bills by April 30, there will be an automatic government-wide spending cut of 1%.

At the same time, the Pentagon is also trying to plan around a mammoth national security supplemental that’s also frozen in Congress. The bill contains billions in aid for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan along with money for the American defense industry. The department is counting on that money in part to continue support its partners in need during wartime and to pay back some of its own bills. Those include a more costly force presence in Europe during the war in Ukraine and some of the cost incurred by U.S. Central Command after war broke out in the Middle East.

The department has about a $10 billion bill outstanding to replenish munitions sent to its partners around the world, said a senior defense official briefing reporters on the budget.

“The big issue before us is: Is Congress going to pass the supplemental or not?” the official said.

Last week, at a conference hosted by the defense analysts McAleese and Associates in Washington, ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee Rob Wittman, R-Va, said that the House wouldn’t act on that supplemental until its other spending bills have passed.

And while the Pentagon hasn’t drafted another supplemental request in this budget, it may well need one this year to pay for its bills being totaled in Europe and the Middle East.

“That would be a later decision,” the official said.

A blip or a trend?

Because of the confusion around this fiscal year’s budget, the department had to make careful assumptions about how Congress will act in the near future.

One example is aid to Taiwan. For the first time, the official said, the FY25 budget includes funding to replace weapons sent to Taiwan, starting at $500 million. The official said the Pentagon would have preferred to make that closer to $1 billion — the yearly amount its allowed to donate — but was more conservative because of this year’s spending caps.

The $500 million will go to Taiwan regardless of whether Congress gives the department extra money to do so — like a vacation that would come out of one’s saving account if they didn’t get a raise. There’s money for such a drawdown in the supplemental, and the department is framing its own commitment as a gesture to Congress.

“We, knowing that the authorization [to donate kit to Taiwan] is there and wanting to show that we agree with it, have made the decision to put some money in whether or not the supplemental passes,” the official said.

Another case is the Pentagon’s account for munitions. The previous budget requested money to issue a set of seven long-term contracts for precision weapons in an effort to give the defense industry a steadier long-term commitment. This budget assumes that Congress will approve those five-year contracts, the official said, and hence doesn’t ask for any more.

“With almost everything [we are] not trying to guess exactly what they’re going to do but have predicated that they’re ... going to largely approve what we asked for,” the official said.

Perhaps the biggest assumption is the department’s expectations for its budget in future years. The slide used to show their estimates is nearly the same as the previous year’s, except instead of a steady rise from FY24 on it has a divot that reflects this year’s spending caps.

But the ceiling only lasts one year, and the Pentagon plans to return to funding projections from before the default deal going forward. In other words, the department considers its FY25 top line a blip not a trend.

“We don’t have any insight into what that next two-year [debt ceiling] deal might look like, so that could get revisited,” the official said. “But our message is that we need to get back on plan.”

About Noah Robertson

Noah Robertson is the Pentagon reporter at Defense News. He previously covered national security for the Christian Science Monitor. He holds a bachelor’s degree in English and government from the College of William & Mary in his hometown of Williamsburg, Virginia.

9. Top Polish leaders to visit White House, hoping to spur US to help Ukraine more

Perhaps they need to visit Congress as well.

Top Polish leaders to visit White House, hoping to spur US to help Ukraine more

AP · by AAMER MADHANI · March 12, 2024

WASHINGTON (AP) — President Joe Biden is hosting Poland’s president and prime minister for White House talks on Tuesday with the Polish leaders looking to press Washington to break its impasse over replenishing funds for Ukraine at a critical moment in the war in Europe.

Ahead of the visit, President Andrzej Duda called on other members of the NATO alliance to raise their spending on defense to 3% of their GDP as Russia puts its own economy on a war footing and pushes forward with its plans to conquer Ukraine. Poland already spends 4% of its own economic output on defense, double the current target of 2% in NATO.

“The war in Ukraine has clearly shown that the United States is and should remain the leader in security issues in Europe and the world,” Duda said in an address to Poland on Monday. “However, other NATO countries must also take greater responsibility for the security of the entire alliance and intensively modernize and strengthen their troops.”

In a Washington Post opinion piece to spotlight his call for greater NATO spending, Duda argued that Russia was switching its economy to “war mode,” allocating close to 30% of its annual budget to arm itself.

“This figure and other data coming out of Russia are alarming,” Duda wrote. “Vladimir Putin’s regime poses the biggest threat to global peace since the end of the Cold War.”

The Biden administration suggested Duda’s call to raise the defense spending target for NATO countries may be, at least for the time being, overly ambitious.

”I think the first step is to get every country meeting the 2% threshold, and we’ve seen improvement of that,” State Department spokesman Matthew Miller said. “But I think that’s the first step before we start talking about an additional proposal.”

Biden invited Duda and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk for meetings to mark the 25th anniversary of Poland’s accession to NATO, a historic step Poland took into the West after breaking free from Moscow’s sphere of influence after decades of communist rule.

The visit also comes amid a standoff in Washington between Biden, a Democrat, and House Republicans on Ukraine funding. House Republicans have blocked a $118 billion bipartisan package that includes $60 billion in Ukraine funding, as well as funds for Israel, Taiwan and U.S. border security.

Speaking to reporters before boarding his plane in Warsaw, Duda said while the talks in Washington would celebrate an anniversary, they would above all focus on European security going forward and “about Russian imperial policy, which has returned.”

The visit also gives Biden another opportunity to showcase how his view of NATO, a 32-member transatlantic military alliance, contrasts with that of the likely 2024 Republican presidential nominee, Donald Trump.

Trump has said that when he was president, he warned NATO allies that he “would encourage” Russia “to do whatever the hell they want” to countries that are “delinquent” in meeting the alliance’s defense spending target. White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said the visit by the Polish leaders was an opportunity to reflect on the countries’ shared “ironclad commitment to the NATO alliance, which makes us all safer.”

Fear is deepening across Europe about Ukraine’s fate as its ammunition stocks run low and as Russia makes gains on the battlefield in Ukraine, reversing its weak military performance at the start of a war launched in February 2022.

Duda and Tusk, who are also scheduled to meet with U.S. lawmakers while in Washington, are expected to add their voices to calls for House Speaker Mike Johnson, R-La., to advance a Senate-passed aid package. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Italian Premier Giorgia Meloni have also visited Washington in recent weeks to emphasize the impact the country’s impasse on Ukraine funding is having on Europe.

“The situation is really dire on the frontline,” said Michal Baranowski, managing director of Warsaw-based GMF East, part of the German Marshall Fund think tank. “We are not talking about something that can be fixed by June or July but needs to be fixed in March or April.”

During his State of the Union address last week, Biden said, “If anybody in this room thinks Putin will stop at Ukraine, I assure you: He will not.”

It is the first time in a quarter-century for a Polish president and prime minister to be in Washington at the same time and the first for both leaders to be welcomed at the White House at the same time, according to Polish media. The gesture is widely seen as an acknowledgment of the seriousness of this historical moment, with Russian strength growing as that of Ukraine wanes.

AP · by AAMER MADHANI · March 12, 2024

10. "Tip of the Spear" - February 2024 | SOF News

Access it here: https://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/69835

"Tip of the Spear" - February 2024 | SOF News

sof.news · by DVIDS · March 11, 2024

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has posted online its February 2024 issue of Tip of the Spear. This is a news rollup of the major SOF component commands and the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs). Some interesting reading in the articles listed below.

SOCAFRICA supports Equatorial Guinea with humanitarian assistance
SOCEUR – “Family is Forever – a Life of Service”
Partnership Training in Korea
Army’s ‘Triad Partnership’ with cyber and space
Fires Center named after legendary Ranger
SEALs and Cypriot Navy train together in Mediterranean
SEALs train during Exercise Dragon Trident
NSW free falls with Allied Partners in Greece
Air Commando Heritage celebrated by 352nd SOW
Understanding AFSOC’s adaptive airborne enterprise
CSAR operations during Raven 24-3
ASD SO/LIC visits MARSOC
NATO Secretary General visits USSOCOM

*****

Tip of the Spear, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), February 2024, PDF, 40 pages.

https://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/69835

Photo: A Navy combatant craft returns to the USS John P. Murtha, not pictured, during Operation Polar Dagger in the Bering Sea, Aug. 28, 2023. The operation is designed to sharpen joint special operations integration and provides the forces the opportunity to test new capabilities and advance response options. Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Joshua Samoluk.

sof.news · by DVIDS · March 11, 2024

11. Gaza war may stoke ‘generational’ terrorism threat, top intel official says

Excerpts:

Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.), a stalwart backer of Israel, prodded Burns and Haines to refute critics’ allegations that Israel is “exterminating the Palestinian people” with its military campaign.

The officials declined to do so. Burns said that while the administration understands “Israel’s need” to respond to the brutal attack it suffered on Oct. 7, “I think we all also have to be mindful of the enormous toll that this has taken on innocent civilians in Gaza.”

“Is Israel starving children in Palestine, or Gaza?” Cotton asked, apparently referring to reports by the United Nations and humanitarian aid organizations, as well as some Democratic lawmakers, that Israel’s refusal to allow the necessary volume of food aid into Gaza is causing a preventable famine.

“The reality is that there are children who are starving,” Burns said. “They’re malnourished, as a result of the fact that humanitarian assistance can’t get to them. It’s very difficult to distribute humanitarian assistance effectively, unless you have a cease-fire.”

Gaza war may stoke ‘generational’ terrorism threat, top intel official says

Senior U.S. intelligence officials testified before Congress about two wars, a rising China and the threat of artificial intelligence to U.S. national security

By Shane Harris, Abigail Hauslohner and Ellen Nakashima

March 11, 2024 at 6:48 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Shane Harris · March 11, 2024

The top U.S. intelligence official on Monday warned that the war in Gaza could embolden terrorist groups, which are aligned in their opposition to the United States for its support of Israel.

“The crisis has galvanized violence by a range of actors around the world. And while it is too early to tell, it is likely that the Gaza conflict will have a generational impact on terrorism,” Avril Haines, the director of national intelligence, told an annual hearing on global security threats.

The Oct. 7 attack on Israel by Hamas has inspired fresh threats to the United States by al-Qaeda and Islamic State-affiliated groups, Haines said, while Iranian-backed militant groups have used “the conflict as an opportunity to pursue their own agenda” against the United States. “And we have seen how it is inspiring individuals to conduct acts of antisemitism and Islamophobic terror worldwide,” she added.

U.S. officials say more than 30,000 people have been killed in Gaza. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed in an interview Sunday with Axel Springer, the parent company of Politico, that Israel had killed approximately 13,000 Palestinian fighters, a claim that could not be independently verified.

The hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee is the rare occasion when the top leaders of the major U.S. intelligence agencies testify in an open hearing about a range of global challenges and hotspots. Their testimony was accompanied by the release of an annual report from the intelligence community.

“The Gaza conflict is posing a challenge to many key Arab partners, who face public sentiment against Israel and the United States for the death and destruction in Gaza, but also see the United States as the power broker best positioned to deter further aggression and end the conflict before it spreads deeper into the region,” the report stated.

CIA Director William J. Burns updated lawmakers on negotiations for a cease-fire in Gaza, which would be accompanied by an influx of humanitarian aid and the release of hostages held by Hamas in exchange for Palestinian prisoners in Israel.

Burns, who has traveled to the Middle East eight times in recent months as the administration’s point person in talks to free more than 100 hostages still in Gaza, returned from his latest negotiating session in Doha, Qatar, on Saturday night. He spoke with measured hope that the cease-fire agreement could be “the first step toward what might be more enduring arrangements over time.”

“I don’t think anybody can guarantee success,” he added. “What I think you can guarantee is that the alternatives are worse for innocent civilians in Gaza who are suffering under desperate conditions, for the hostages and their families who are suffering, also under very desperate conditions, and for all of us.”

The intelligence officials tried to steer clear of the debate over the war that has roiled U.S. politics and put the Biden administration in the difficult position of supporting an ally that faces growing condemnation from the United Nations and international human rights groups, as well as liberal American voters, over the war’s civilian death toll and creeping famine. The White House has warned Israel not to move its operations into the city of Rafah, along the border with Egypt in Gaza’s far south. Israeli forces see the city — where as many as 1.5 million Palestinians have gathered, fleeing bombardment — as a last bastion of Hamas fighters that they must neutralize.

Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.), a stalwart backer of Israel, prodded Burns and Haines to refute critics’ allegations that Israel is “exterminating the Palestinian people” with its military campaign.

The officials declined to do so. Burns said that while the administration understands “Israel’s need” to respond to the brutal attack it suffered on Oct. 7, “I think we all also have to be mindful of the enormous toll that this has taken on innocent civilians in Gaza.”

“Is Israel starving children in Palestine, or Gaza?” Cotton asked, apparently referring to reports by the United Nations and humanitarian aid organizations, as well as some Democratic lawmakers, that Israel’s refusal to allow the necessary volume of food aid into Gaza is causing a preventable famine.

“The reality is that there are children who are starving,” Burns said. “They’re malnourished, as a result of the fact that humanitarian assistance can’t get to them. It’s very difficult to distribute humanitarian assistance effectively, unless you have a cease-fire.”

The witnesses, who included the directors of the FBI, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, spoke about a panoply of challenges, from an ambitious China to the proliferation of artificial intelligence and the continuing threat of cyberespionage and warfare. Brett Holmgren, the State Department’s top intelligence official, said that the power of AI could “lower the barrier” for U.S. adversaries to engage in election interference.

Burns minced no words on the importance of U.S. assistance to Ukraine, which is currently stalled amid a divisive debate on Capitol Hill.

With a steady supply of U.S.-provided military equipment, “Ukraine can hold its own on the front line from 2024 and into 2025,” Burns said. Kyiv could continue deep strikes into Russia and also conduct operations against Russia’s naval forces in the Black Sea, putting Ukrainian forces in a position potentially “to regain the offensive initiative” early next year, he added.

But Ukraine faces “a much grimmer future” should that aid not arrive, and would probably “lose significant ground” to Russia, Burns said.

“That would be a massive and historic mistake for the United States,” he said. What’s more, failure to help defend Ukraine would “stoke the ambitions of the Chinese leadership” to make aggressive moves on Taiwan, Burns added.

“The Ukrainians are not running out of courage and tenacity. They’re running out of ammunition. And we’re running out of time to help them,” Burns said.

The Washington Post · by Shane Harris · March 11, 2024

12. The Diplomatic Reserve Corps: A Bold Vision for American Diplomacy

The Diplomatic Reserve Corps: A Bold Vision for American Diplomacy

By Katie Azelby

March 12, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/03/12/the_diplomatic_reserve_corps_a_bold_vision_for_american_diplomacy_1017635.html?mc_cid=700d492f42&mc_eid=70bf478f36

Tensions in the Middle East, creeping coups d’états in Africa, and once-in-a-lifetime climate disasters happening everywhere: The globe is teetering on a diplomatic tightrope. These challenges beg the question: do we have a modern Diplomatic Corps capable of managing the crises of the 21st century?

A Diplomatic Reserve Corps (DRC) provides a better answer. We need a system that is responsive and flexible. We need to seamlessly integrate experienced professionals capable of deploying where and when needed most. This isn't about scrapping the past; it's about modernizing the present and ensuring our Foreign Service can meet future crises. The future of U.S. diplomacy hinges on our ability to adapt, and there is no time to waste.

A robust and agile diplomatic service is essential to protect national security. Quickly unfolding crises such as the 2021 Afghanistan evacuation underscore the need for a modernized Diplomatic Corps. When they occur, the State Department cobbles together volunteers such as short-term hires, willing retired professionals, and contractors. All of which leave behind important roles, creating a cycle of vacant positions. These solutions are also costly and unsustainable in a complex and demanding global environment. Instead of struggling with patchwork solutions, we need a bold vision: a Diplomatic Reserve Corps made up of professionals whose skills are tailored to meet complex challenges.

The DRC is feasible because its plans are ready. In a 2022 report titled “Blueprints for a More Modern U.S. Diplomatic Service,” a team led by two former undersecretaries of State crafted a detailed strategy for Reserve implementation. The model is based on the historically successful Military Reserve Corps. Just like the military, the DRC would leverage on-demand expertise and sustain continued capabilities for forces on the ground. It is a vision that has already been road-tested.

The DRC is essential because it increases diplomatic responsiveness. The DRC would allow for surge capacity during periods of conflict and political upheaval. Diplomatic reservists would fill the gaps where frontline diplomats are most needed, ensuring consistent diplomatic efficiency abroad.

The DRC is vital because it brings diplomats closer to the average American. According to a 2022 RAND report, Americans have a limited understanding of how diplomacy fits into U.S. foreign policy. The DRC would strengthen ties between diplomats and citizens. Like the military, the creation of "hometown diplomats" would increase the visibility of the Diplomatic Corps and their essential work, bringing diplomacy into every community.

Critics may scoff at the initial investment needed to modernize the Foreign Service; however, they miss the larger picture. This is not simply an expenditure but a strategic investment in long-term savings. Consider the billions spent in Afghanistan and elsewhere reacting to crises and scrambling to patch diplomatic holes. The Blueprints estimate the cost at about $45 million–half the cost of a single F35 fighter jet. Let us not forget the historical parallel: Similar concerns were raised when the Army Reserve Corps was formed in 1908. Yet, its adaptability during the two World Wars proved invaluable. The time of reactive diplomacy has passed, and we can no longer afford to play catch-up.

We have entered a period of seemingly never-ending conflict. The question isn't if we need a modernized Diplomatic Corps, but when. We no longer have the privilege to respond to crises as they occur. The Diplomatic Reserve Corps is an investment in peace, stability, and a future where America remains a leader on the world. The demands of the 21st century demand a 21st century Diplomatic Corps. Together, let us build it, brick by diplomatic brick, and pave the path for a more secure and peaceful world.

Katie Azelby is the Program Associate for the American Academy of Diplomacy. She is currently pursuing her master’s at George Washington University in Public Administration with a focus on Foreign Policy & National Security.

13. A Call for All Americans To Help Stop Veteran Suicides

Excerpts:

While I did not know Mike Day, I worked with a few of his former teammates while serving with the Naval Special Warfare Command at the same time he was deployed to Fallujah. In communicating our shared grief over this soul taken too soon, we have realized that more can be done to combat the crisis of Veteran suicides, and every American can play a part:

Check in on the Veterans in your life. If you have a Veteran in your social circle or family, look for the warning signs—verbally or behaviorally—that precede most suicides. Many individuals who are suicidal may only show warning signs to those closest to them. Even then, without understanding them, they can be tragically overlooked.
Have the courage to speak up about suicide. Once you observe the warning signs, it is essential to act, either directly or through a trusted intermediary. There is a widespread stigma associated with suicide, and as a result, many people are afraid to speak about it. Talking about suicide not only reduces the stigma, but also allows individuals to seek help, rethink their opinions, and share their story with others.
Support a Veterans assistance organization. There are hundreds of organizations in the U.S. working to prevent Veteran suicides. For instance, when I led the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), we partnered with the nonprofit Force Blue, whose purpose is to help special forces Veterans cope with PTS through efforts that support NOAA’s ocean conservation mission. Whether by volunteering, advocacy, or donations, there are many ways to make a difference through a support group that best fits you.
Call on Congress to do more to support our Veterans. While the Veterans Administration has made great progress by establishing the Staff Sergeant Parker Gordon Fox Suicide Prevention Grant Program, we must seize every opportunity, such as encouraging Congress to pass the Don Young Veterans Advancing Conservation Act which seeks to improve Veteran mental health by training and deploying them to restore the health of America’s oceans, coasts, and Great Lakes.

A Call for All Americans To Help Stop Veteran Suicides

By Tim Gallaudet

March 12, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/03/12/a_call_for_all_americans_to_help_stop_veteran_suicides_1017629.html?mc_cid=700d492f42&mc_eid=70bf478f36

Later this month will mark a year from a day that shocked the Veteran community. On March 27, 2023, I along with many Americans were saddened to learn of the unfortunate passing of Navy SEAL Veteran Douglas “Mike” Day. In 2007, Day gained considerable recognition when he was shot 27 times at close range while leading a counterterrorism raid in Fallujah, Iraq. Demonstrating unimaginable courage, he was the first to enter a 12-foot by 12-foot room, withstood a withering assault from four heavily armed terrorists, and endured a grenade blast which briefly knocked him unconscious. He quickly regained consciousness and proceeded to eliminate each assailant with a pistol after his rifle was shot away from his grip. Even more remarkable, he rescued six women and children in the structure afterward and, incredibly, exited the scene and boarded a medical evacuation helicopter under his own power. This stunning act of bravery earned Senior Chief Petty Officer Day a Silver Star – the nation’s second highest award for valor.

It took Day nearly two years to physically recover from his wounds, which he described in his moving memoir Perfectly Wounded. After retiring from the Navy in 2010, he continued along the path of service by acting as a case manager and care advocate for other injured service members.

Like so many Veterans, Day was diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), terrible and invisible wounds that even he - a wounded warrior’s warrior – could not overcome, ultimately causing him to take his life. In the U.S., Veterans are 1.5 times more likely to die by suicide than non-Veteran adults. Research shows that there were on average 17.5 veteran suicides per day in 2021, the latest year that data is available. The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs’ Under Secretary for Health, Shereef Elnahal, recently declared that even one Veteran dying by suicide is too many, and I wholeheartedly agree.

While I did not know Mike Day, I worked with a few of his former teammates while serving with the Naval Special Warfare Command at the same time he was deployed to Fallujah. In communicating our shared grief over this soul taken too soon, we have realized that more can be done to combat the crisis of Veteran suicides, and every American can play a part:

Check in on the Veterans in your life. If you have a Veteran in your social circle or family, look for the warning signs—verbally or behaviorally—that precede most suicides. Many individuals who are suicidal may only show warning signs to those closest to them. Even then, without understanding them, they can be tragically overlooked.
Have the courage to speak up about suicide. Once you observe the warning signs, it is essential to act, either directly or through a trusted intermediary. There is a widespread stigma associated with suicide, and as a result, many people are afraid to speak about it. Talking about suicide not only reduces the stigma, but also allows individuals to seek help, rethink their opinions, and share their story with others.
Support a Veterans assistance organization. There are hundreds of organizations in the U.S. working to prevent Veteran suicides. For instance, when I led the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), we partnered with the nonprofit Force Blue, whose purpose is to help special forces Veterans cope with PTS through efforts that support NOAA’s ocean conservation mission. Whether by volunteering, advocacy, or donations, there are many ways to make a difference through a support group that best fits you.
Call on Congress to do more to support our Veterans. While the Veterans Administration has made great progress by establishing the Staff Sergeant Parker Gordon Fox Suicide Prevention Grant Program, we must seize every opportunity, such as encouraging Congress to pass the Don Young Veterans Advancing Conservation Act which seeks to improve Veteran mental health by training and deploying them to restore the health of America’s oceans, coasts, and Great Lakes.

When speaking on a podcast about his seven years of work with the United States Special Operations Command Care Coalition, Mike Day gave a glimpse of his humility and spirit when he half-joked, “I was a better social worker than SEAL.” While his former teammates disagree, he acknowledged that his advocacy for hundreds of special operations service members with the organization had a healing effect on his own mental and physical injuries.

The tragic turn of Mike Day’s survivor story underscores the difficulty in identifying and addressing Veteran suicide. When those who help others also need assistance, we know that not enough is being done. By directly supporting Veterans and suicide prevention programs for them, we can ensure an enduring legacy for this American hero’s life of service, both on the battlefield and at the home front.

Rear Admiral (U.S. Navy, ret.) Tim Gallaudet, Ph.D., is the Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors for Force Blue. He is a former acting and Deputy Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Acting Under Secretary and Assistant Secretary of Commerce, and Oceanographer of the Navy.

14. So, a Pier for Hamas it is ...you're paying for it - you might as well get briefed on it – CDR SALAMANDER

Graphics and video at the link:

https://cdrsalamander.substack.com/p/so-a-pier-for-hamas-it-is?publication_id=247761&post_id=142499648&isFreemail=true&r=qypmi&triedRedirect=true&mc_cid=700d492f42&mc_eid=70bf478f36

So, a Pier for Hamas it is

...you're paying for it - you might as well get briefed on it

CDR SALAMANDER

MAR 11, 2024

A lot of people spent the weekend scratching their heads over this;

The U.S. military will build a temporary port on Gaza's Mediterranean coast to receive humanitarian aid by sea, President Joe Biden said in his State of the Union speech on Thursday.

Planning for the operation, initially based on the island of Cyprus, does not envision deployment of U.S. military personnel in Gaza.

Biden's announcement came as he seeks to cool anger among many in his Democratic Party over his support for Israel in its offensive in Gaza since Oct. 7, given the steep toll on civilians in the Palestinian enclave.

Ships are already underway;

The U.S. Army has dispatched a ship to send humanitarian aid to Gaza, Central Command (CENTCOM) said on Sunday, days after President Joe Biden vowed to build a temporary pier to supply the besieged enclave.

The General Frank S. Besson left Joint Base Langley-Eustis in Virginia "less than 36 hours after President Biden announced the U.S. would provide humanitarian assistance to Gaza by sea," CENTCOM said in a statement.

It will take a few weeks to make the transit from Virginia to the eastern Mediterranean. The 37-year old Besson can’t even break 12-knots fully loaded.

…and yes my friends - the Army has its own navy. Let’s take a quick look at the Besson.

Yep’r, that 243 foot, 4,200 ton ship is commanded by … a Warrant Officer. Discuss amongst yourselves.

If you’re wondering what she looks like putting a JLOTS in place;

This will take about 1,000 personnel to accomplish. I don’t know a single maritime professional who thinks this is a good idea given the location and conditions ashore, but orders are orders. Make the best attempt you can.

An interesting note; this is not a Navy operation, but an Army operation. Remember what I told you about the fate of the East Coast Amphibious Construction Battalion TWO (ACB2) last summer? This story aligns well with the Anglosphere’s problem with seablindness we discussed on yesterday’s Midrats with James Smith.

As for my general thought on doing this? I’ll avoid the politics as much as I can, but I have concerns.

Generally speaking, no operation starts out on the right foot with a lie.

“We’re not planning for this to be an operation that would require U.S. boots on the ground,” said a senior administration official.

I’m not mad at the official. They are just making sure their statement is in line with higher direction and guidance. President Biden was clear in his SOTU speech;

The United States has been leading international efforts to get more humanitarian assistance into Gaza. Tonight, I’m directing the U.S. military to lead an emergency mission to establish a temporary pier in the Mediterranean on the coast of Gaza that can receive large shipments carrying food, water, medicine, and temporary shelters.

No U.S. boots will be on the ground.

You cannot build a pier, even JLOTS, without putting boots on the ground. Just look at the above picture again.

Did no one brief the President or those who approved the speech even this one little slide?

I feel real sorry for the Operational Planners.

In an area thick with poorly controlled hostile forces with everything from snipers to ATGM, how do you work this force protection problem?
What are your ROE if you take fire? What if you are confronted with a wave of people wanting refuge on the ship? What if ship’s company goes missing ashore?
This is at the far end of the Mediterranean…in spring. Storm season is past, so hopefully the weather will cooperate.

I almost made this post about what a bad idea this was, but the die is cast and all we can do now is trust that those tasked with planning will do the best they can with what they’ve been provided, and those who have to execute the mission are both good and lucky. Such activities, from Lebanon to Libya, do not turn out all that well in this part of the world. A lot can and will happen in the weeks it will take to get there, so perhaps fate will help.

I’ll just let the meme I created as a pre-planned response over on X for the last few months speak for me on the broader issue.

For those who need more details than the back of the cocktail napkin outline so far, there is no way I could do a better job than our friend Sal Mercogliano did this weekend.

All you need is in his video below.

15. Opinion: The world’s dangerous place has only gotten more dangerous

Opinion: The world’s dangerous place has only gotten more dangerous | CNN

CNN · by Fareed Zakaria · March 10, 2024

Taiwan Flag, Taipei, Taiwan. (Photo by Jose Lopes Amaral/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

Jose Lopes Amaral/NurPhoto/Getty Images

At 8 p.m. ET and PT tonight on CNN, Fareed’s latest special report, “Taiwan: Unfinished Business,” will examine the complicated history and present dangers surrounding Taiwan.

CNN —

A couple of years ago, the Economist declared on its cover that Taiwan — a tiny island, home to 24 million people — was “the most dangerous place on Earth.”

The reasons it came to that conclusion remain sound. In fact, they have only grown stronger recently.

exp China taiwan tensions will ripley pkg 030312aseg1 cnni world_00011405.png

video

But are we destined for war? The US and China are unusual in that while they are increasingly geopolitical rivals, they are also deeply intertwined economically.

US President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping walk together after a meeting during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders' week in Woodside, Calif., on November 15, 2023.

Brendan Smialowski/AFP/Getty Images

And yet … and yet: There is the problem of Taiwan that sits at the heart of US-China relations.

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That was the thinking. But that premise is proving untrue.

This picture shows a general view of Kinmen, China.

John Mees/CNN

CNN · by Fareed Zakaria · March 10, 2024

16. BROKEN TRACK: Why the Iron Knights chose to speak out about suicides

BROKEN TRACK: Why the Iron Knights chose to speak out about suicides

armytimes.com · by Davis Winkie · March 12, 2024

When Staff Sgt. Colton Herzing sat down with Army Times at an Atlanta restaurant in February, the 27-year-old tank commander knew he was taking a risk.

“I’m comfortable with you publishing anything that I’m saying, regardless of the repercussions that may come of it,” Herzing said.

Although Army regulations permit soldiers to speak with reporters, those who publicly comment on policy or controversial topics can face reprisal from their leadership. Veterans who do so risk ostracization or impact to civilian employment.

Despite knowing the dangers of doing so, Herzing was one of eight current or former members of 1st Battalion, 66th Armor Regiment who agreed to speak under their names in Broken Track, Army Times’ investigation of elevated suicide rates among tankers and other members of armor brigades. More than 50 additional soldiers from various tank brigades talked to Army Times and provided verification of their identities, but they requested anonymity in the investigation.

BROKEN TRACK: Suicides & suffering in Army’s exhausted armor community

An Army Times data analysis found that armor brigades and tankers experienced higher suicide rates than the rest of the Army.

Some of the Iron Knights spoke on the record — a journalism term meaning that they allowed their names to appear in the story — because of loyalty to one another.

Capt. Dave Wright, an infantry officer now assigned to Fort Wainwright, Alaska, went on the record when he learned that a fellow officer from the battalion, Capt. Nick Bierwirth, was doing so. Bierwirth is now a space officer in the Army Reserve.

Former Sgt. Kyle Goddard said Wright and Bierwirth’s examples motivated him to reveal his name. “[Their courage] tells you everything you need to know about them,” he said. Former infantry Sgt. Dan Lewis, cited Goddard and Wright as inspiration for coming forward.

“I just figured everyone else is sharing their names, so why shouldn’t I?” said Chief Warrant Officer 2 Trevor Nelson, who was a sergeant first class in the battalion.

Sgt. Collin Pattan, a combat medic, said he shared his experiences so his soldiers — and readers — would feel empowered to seek mental health treatment. “I’m hoping that we get into a culture of making sure that the people around you are okay. And I hate that it took losing so many people for me to get there,” he said.

BROKEN TRACK: How Army Times discovered high tank unit suicide rates

Army Times built its own database of military death records to investigate suicide in armor units.

Many of the soldiers also said they wished to honor those who died.

“Who’s going to carry people’s memories if [people] don’t know about them?” asked Goddard, a former infantryman.

Wright said he believed he “owes it” to the dead to speak up. “The families in America that give their soldiers up to do this job deserve to have them come home when there’s not a war,” he added.

But most of all, the Iron Knights said they want Army Times readers — and Army senior leaders — to believe their stories of struggle and address the systemic suicide risk posed by tank units’ operational tempo and maintenance demands.

“When I read the news and I see ‘an anonymous source,’ I get skeptical about what they’re saying,” said Nelson. “Putting my name to it, a reader can know I mean what I say … I’m hoping that your article prompts senior leaders to come to the ground level to see for themselves how things are going in the units.”

Pattan said he believes in the Army’s leadership, but he doesn’t know if they fully grasp armor units’ daily problems.

Sgt. Collin Pattan (R) shakes hands with Army Secretary Christine Wormuth (L) in an undated photograph. (Courtesy of Collin Pattan)

Bierwirth said he feels “the armor community needs to address the issues it has.”

“We’re currently failing service members and veterans: we aren’t walking the walk,” argued Lewis. “These issues are endemic, and … we really need a good, long look in the mirror to face our issues and address them.”

Former Spc. Garrett Shiemke, a Bradley mechanic, said he wants his story to “help unfuck” life in armor units.

“The Army is not tanks. The Army is not Bradleys,” said Wright. “The Army is people … and it’s not even wartime.”

Editor’s Note: If you or a loved one is experiencing thoughts of self-harm or suicide, you can confidentially seek assistance via the Military/Veterans Crisis Line by calling 988 and dialing 1, via text at 838255 or chat at http://VeteransCrisisLine.net. You don’t need to be a VA beneficiary to use the service.

About Davis Winkie

Davis Winkie covers the Army for Military Times. He studied history at Vanderbilt and UNC-Chapel Hill, and served five years in the Army Guard. His investigations earned the Society of Professional Journalists' 2023 Sunshine Award and consecutive Military Reporters and Editors honors, among others. Davis was also a 2022 Livingston Awards finalist.

17. Win-Wind: How a Bipartisan SHIPS Act Could Meet China and Climate Challenges

Excerpts:

Conclusion

Bipartisan shipbuilding legislation is politically achievable and necessary. Two previous industrial policy bills, the CHIPS Act and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, were able to pass with support from both aisles of Congress. To address challenges from China and climate, the United States should embrace a proposal first made by retired U.S. Navy Capt. Jerry Hendrix and pass a bipartisan SHIPS Act that provides funding for both military and civilian shipbuilding.

With China-related issues a rare point of bipartisan agreement, and offshore wind potentially galvanizing constituencies that have been lukewarm about the need for military shipbuilding, there is a real chance that Congress could pass legislation that provides significant national security, economic, and climate benefits. It’s time for the United States to start building military and civilian ships to address two critical national security challenges.

Win-Wind: How a Bipartisan SHIPS Act Could Meet China and Climate Challenges - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Joseph Webster · March 12, 2024

The United States faces two serious challenges: China and climate change. Ships can help solve both of them.

China is run by an authoritarian and increasingly militarily capable government determined to reshape the international order. Climate change, meanwhile, threatens future generations — and our own. Expanding military shipbuilding will mitigate these risks by deterring a quarantine, blockade, or invasion of Taiwan. Similarly, targeted industrial policy could render the economics of offshore wind more viable, improving the energy security of U.S. allies and partners. The United States should advance its comprehensive security interests by strategically and selectively increasing fiscal support for its shipbuilding industry.

U.S. navalists have cautioned about insufficient shipbuilding capacity, but these warnings have fallen flat across successive administrations. Now it’s time for a new approach. Different elements of the U.S. political system are drawn to shipbuilding for their own reasons. The U.S. Navy needs more ships to overcome its pacing challenge. U.S offshore wind development, meanwhile, is a critical decarbonization technology, but its development has been hampered by insufficient vessels, especially wind turbine installation vessels. Conditions for shipbuilding could be ripe for a breakthrough. A marriage of convenience between China hawks and climate hawks could enable the United States to finally begin to address its military and civilian shipbuilding shortfalls.

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China Has an Alarming Shipbuilding Advantage

China’s military and civilian naval project is impressive — and alarming. From 2025 to 2030, the Chinese fleet is projected to increase by eight ships per year, on average, reaching 435 ships, while the U.S. Navy fleet size is expected to shrink to 290 ships. Moreover, the U.S. fleet has dispersed responsibilities and applies 60 percent of its assets to the Indo-Pacific. The Chinese navy is larger than the U.S. equivalent, is building ships at a faster rate, and can concentrate on fewer problems.

China’s dominant civilian shipbuilding program further bolsters its military potential, as retired U.S. Navy Capt. Thomas Shugart and others have warned. Almost every Chinese ship is constructed in prime yards servicing both military and civilian vessels, while the Chinese military’s war planning incorporates civilian-class ships, such as roll-on/roll-off ferries.

China’s output of these civilian-class ships is prodigious. China’s shipbuilders accounted for 49 percent of the global market share in the first eight months of 2023, while its new orders and holding orders represented 68.8 percent and 53.9 percent of the world’s total, respectively.

Beijing’s advantage in certain civilian ship classes is stark. While U.S. shipyards delivered only a single deep-draft civilian vessel in 2020, Chinese shipyards were constructing 514 civilian container ships — a single vessel type — in August 2022. China had 84 ships capable of installing wind turbines in October 2022, or about 45 percent of the existing fleet; it also accounts for 90 percent of all offshore wind turbine installation vessels under construction. The United States has no existing wind turbine installation vessel capacity and is currently onlyconstructing a single vessel.

China’s advantages in civilian shipbuilding are due to many factors, but subsidies play a leading role. One Center for Strategic and International Studies report estimated that Beijing supplied roughly $132 billion between 2010 and 2018 for its shipyards. China’s massive subsidies for shipbuilding not only benefit its commercial shipping industry but also constitute indirect, stealthy military spending, especially since its notionally civilian shipyards would help repair the Chinese fleet in wartime.

Taken together, China’s military and potentially dual-use civilian shipbuilding capabilities pose major direct and latent risks to U.S. and allied forces. The United States should overcome this challenge, in part, by increasing the size of its own fleet.

A New Approach to Shipbuilding

U.S. navalists are in near-universal agreement over the need to expand the fleet, while even casual observers grasp the arithmetic of China’s naval buildup. The U.S. Navy needs more ships, and better capabilities, as soon as possible. Despite the scale and urgency of the problem, the U.S. response to the shipbuilding crisis has been woefully inadequate across several U.S. administrations. Rather than serve as modern-day Cassandras, navalists should adopt a new strategy. Forging a bipartisan coalition around greater military and civilian shipbuilding — especially offshore wind — could dramatically improve the U.S. Navy’s deterrence posture vis-à-vis the Chinese military while enhancing the energy security of the United States and its allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific and Europe.

Securing greater military naval capabilities requires strengthening the civilian shipbuilding complex. The U.S. civilian shipbuilding complex’s shambolic state threatens the Navy’s ability to compete with China, as the civilian and military shipbuilding sectors are distinct but complementary (at least in the West; China, as mentioned, employs dual-purpose shipyards). Western civilian and military shipyards have different acquisition processes, design and construction parameters, workforces, and security needs. Additionally, an expanded civilian shipbuilding sector would compete with the military industrial base for personnel and resources such as steel.

Nevertheless, there are important complementarities between U.S. civilian and military shipbuilding. Just as the civil aviation industry creates synergies with the military, a stronger civilian shipbuilding sector would likely, over time, expand the labor pool for U.S. government ship construction and sustainment and preserve shipyards, creating something akin to a “defense industrial base reserve.”

A vibrant civilian shipbuilding sector could also create competition and lead to a more efficient military shipbuilding sector, as there are only four prime contractors operating America’s seven shipyards. Senator Jack Reed and Senator Jim Inhofe’s analysis of the business of Navy shipbuilding notes that its cost index outpaced general economic inflation by 1.2 percentage points per year. A stronger civilian shipbuilding sector could increase the number of shipbuilding “primes,” foster competition, restrain costs, and, all things being equal, drive down per-unit costs for the U.S. Navy.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, expanding fiscal support for civilian and military shipbuilding could find bipartisan support, especially if offshore wind is prioritized. While the Democratic and Republican parties might have shifting positions on the role of the United States in the world, both sides are largely united in opposition to the Chinese government, even as they disagree on the appropriate responses. Public polling suggests Republicans prioritize higher military spending, while Democrats prefer to counter Beijing through leadership of a world alliance of democracies, including on issues such as climate change.

Democracies operate by finding consensus and compromise. While the upcoming election cycle will likely prove to be the most divisive in living memory, shipbuilding could be an area of bipartisan compromise. Republicans, such as former U.S. national security adviser Robert O’Brien, have called for a bipartisan agreement on expanding military shipbuilding. Democrats, meanwhile, are disproportionately represented along the coasts, prioritize decarbonization, and are highly supportive of offshore wind development, which is severely constrained by shortfalls in U.S. civilian shipbuilding. Since both U.S. political parties share an interest in expanding domestic shipbuilding, it may be possible to reach some sort of bipartisan consensus despite profound levels of polarization.

Maritime Synergies

Expanding U.S. shipbuilding via a bipartisan agreement is politically achievable, militarily necessary, and climatically critical. While the United States shouldn’t attempt to match China subsidy-for-subsidy, smart, targeted industrial policycould accelerate the U.S. and potentially the global offshore wind industry. Offshore wind, while critical for the energy security and climate objectives of the United States and its allies and partners across Europe and the Indo-Pacific, has faced tremendous difficulties in the United States, thanks in large part to the U.S. civilian shipbuilding sector’s shortfalls.

The civilian shipbuilding sector’s deficiencies harm U.S. maritime industries, especially offshore wind. The U.S. civilian shipbuilding sector is a laggard in producing vessels, but century-old legislation also prevents U.S. companies from procuring ships from elsewhere, as the Jones Act of 1920 requires that all U.S. vessels providing coastwise shipping services be U.S.-built, -owned, -flagged, and -staffed.

Leaving aside the debate over whether the Jones Act achieves its objectives, the U.S. offshore wind sector has undeniably been damaged by weaknesses in U.S. shipbuilding capacity. Domestically produced wind turbine installation vessels can cost 50 percent more than international vessels and deliver less capability.

Ship shortages were a major factor leading to high-profile offshore wind project cancellations in New Jersey, while the U.S. Department of Energy’s latest offshore wind market report warns that global vessel shortages and Jones Act constraints could lead to higher expected costs for U.S. offshore wind projects, along with schedule overruns.

Moreover, the looming offshore wind vessel shortage is not merely confined to the United States. Industry bodies predictthat Europe will see shortages before the end of the decade, while the consulting firm Wood Mackenzie sees installation vessels as a major supply chain constraint outside of China. Wood Mackenzie warns that just 25 percent of the wind turbine installation capacity needed by 2030 is in operation today.

U.S. shipbuilding shortages could also prove to be a major constraint if the U.S. and European offshore wind markets standardize wind turbines at large sizes. U.S. testing sites and ports are currently not configured for some of the larger, more efficient — and costly — turbines, while existing barges, tugboats, and other vessels could become obsolescent if turbine sizes continue to expand. While the costs and benefits of industrialization of turbines and components require further study, insufficient shipbuilding capacity could emerge as an even greater obstacle if the United States and its allies and partners seek to standardize at larger turbine sizes.

A U.S. and global shortage of wind turbine installation vessels and other offshore wind-relevant ships would slow the industry’s development, delaying innovation and hindering swift learning curve improvements. Moreover, America’s inability to produce civilian ships for its maritime industries is not only preventing the deployment of domestic clean electricity generation capacity and accelerating the threat of climate change. It’s also damaging U.S. national security interests in the primary theaters of the Indo-Pacific and Europe. If global offshore wind development is slowed, European energy security will suffer, and Taiwan will be more vulnerable to coercion.

Key Indo-Pacific democracies, especially Taiwan, are highly dependent on maritime energy imports and have few viable indigenous energy alternatives to offshore wind. America’s northeastern Asian allies, Japan and South Korea, are energy-poor nations that rely on imports for over 90 percent of their energy and natural resources consumption. Taiwan, meanwhile, imported nearly 97 percent of its energy in 2022. These economies have virtually no hydrocarbon resources, limited solar irradiance, slow-to-average onshore wind speeds, and significant land use constraints. While each of these Indo-Pacific economies should adopt nuclear energy to the maximal extent possible, offshore wind might be the more politically palatable and lower-cost technology.

Offshore wind is also critical to Europe’s energy security and decarbonization plans. The European Union’s energy import dependency rate stood at 55.5 percent in 2021, before Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. Weaning Europe, especially German industry, off Russian natural gas will require investments in energy efficiency, heat pumps, and the deployment of renewables — especially offshore wind. European countries have set a goal of deploying 111 gigawatts of offshore wind energy by 2030, up from the European Union’s existing offshore wind installed capacity of 14.6 gigawatts in 2021. Indeed, offshore wind is already helping reduce Europe’s exposure to Russian natural gas imports, especially during peak winter demand periods.

The United States, as the world’s largest and most innovative economy, will play a major role in determining the future of the global offshore wind sector. The U.S. offshore wind sector will accelerate or slow global offshore wind because markets are linked. Each offshore wind market has its own distinct characteristics, such as permitting challenges, and international trade in wind turbines is constrained by unfavorable weight-to-value ratios.

Still, different offshore wind markets are tied to one another. Learning by doing, technological improvements, and economies of scale drove the levelized cost of electricity for offshore wind lower by 59 percent from 2010 to 2022. Without a global improvement in the industry’s economics, it’s doubtful that we would have seen the construction of projects as far-flung as the United Kingdom to Taiwan to New England.

The United States has largely been on the sidelines of offshore wind: While it is finally beginning to deploy utility-scale capacity, it has lagged the rest of the world. By 2022, the United States cumulatively deployed only 42 megawatts of offshore wind capacity, versus a total world offshore wind capacity of 64,320 megawatts. Had the United States more aggressively installed offshore wind, the global industry would be much more advanced, costs would likely be substantially lower, and U.S. allies across the Indo-Pacific and Europe likely would have installed more capacity.

The U.S. — and therefore the global — offshore wind industry’s future rate of growth will also have major implications for climate change, a nontraditional national security threat. Offshore wind, unlike other renewable technologies, provides semi-baseload power, meaning it produces more consistent generation patterns. Moreover, offshore wind’s generation tends to peak in winter months, matching peak electricity demand periods (while Taiwan enjoys outstanding offshore wind speeds in the winter, it’s worth noting that its wind speeds slow considerably in the summer, when the island’s electricity needs peak). Given the technology’s high-capacity factors and the widespread geographic availability of the resource, including in regions that lack viable renewable alternatives, offshore wind is a highly promising energy security and decarbonization technology.

The U.S. offshore wind complex faces more than just one bottleneck, and improving shipbuilding will not be a panacea. Permitting problems persist, interest rates are elevated, and steel costs in the United States are often disproportionately high. Still, setbacks to the U.S. offshore wind industry, especially from vessel shortages, will slow global offshore wind’s development across Europe and the Indo-Pacific, threatening U.S. comprehensive security interests.

Conclusion

Bipartisan shipbuilding legislation is politically achievable and necessary. Two previous industrial policy bills, the CHIPS Act and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, were able to pass with support from both aisles of Congress. To address challenges from China and climate, the United States should embrace a proposal first made by retired U.S. Navy Capt. Jerry Hendrix and pass a bipartisan SHIPS Act that provides funding for both military and civilian shipbuilding.

With China-related issues a rare point of bipartisan agreement, and offshore wind potentially galvanizing constituencies that have been lukewarm about the need for military shipbuilding, there is a real chance that Congress could pass legislation that provides significant national security, economic, and climate benefits. It’s time for the United States to start building military and civilian ships to address two critical national security challenges.

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Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and edits the independent China-Russia Report. This article represents his own personal opinions.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Joseph Webster · March 12, 2024

18. The Battle of Avdiivka and Its Lessons on Withdrawal Under Pressure

Excerpt:

The Battle of Avdiivka will certainly be studied for decades to come to come with a plethora of lessons for military professionals. Among the most immediately apparent are those that relate to the challenges of withdrawing forces—but also of the imperative of being able to do so when battlefield conditions require it. After all, the loss of Avdiivka after its resolute defense for so long is surely a bitter pill to swallow, but the Ukrainian withdrawal’s successful execution preserves experienced manpower and meaningful military capacity that can be brought to bear in the future. Two of the most critical components to that operation were effective planning and the proper allocation of key enablers—lessons the US Army should be learning now. A withdrawal does not intrinsically mean a defeat, but failing to train, plan, and resource a withdrawal could result in one.

The Battle of Avdiivka and Its Lessons on Withdrawal Under Pressure - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Ryan N. Forte · March 12, 2024

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For nearly a decade, the Ukrainian city of Avdiivka has been at the center of armed conflict. Situated in Donetsk oblast, it sat along the front lines between Ukrainian forces and Russian-backed separatists since 2014. In 2017, it was the site of one of the largest battles of the period before Russia’s large-scale 2022 invasion. Since that invasion, Russian forces have fought to seize control of the city. In March 2023, Ukrainian forces warned that is could become a “second Bakhmut.” Assaults intensified through the fall of last year, and last month, the Ukrainian military’s commander-in-chief, Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi, ordered the complete withdrawal of all Ukrainian forces in Avdiivka.

The battle for the small city, consisting of a prewar population of thirty-two thousand people, holds a number of important lessons on the conduct of modern war. But the most recent lessons from the city are among the most important. Syrskyi’s decision to conduct a retrograde was an enormous one. The capture of Avdiivka could serve as a significant propaganda victory for Russia and may make the city a base for future Russian offensive operations. But it also preserved important combat power. The withdrawal of Ukrainian defenders serves as a textbook example for the US Army of the challenges, requirements, and risk mitigation considerations involved in successful execution of such an operation.

Withdrawing from Avdiivka

Although reporting is still emerging regarding its final stages, the Battle Avdiivka provides an important case study of a withdrawal under pressure. After months of stiff resistance, the vast commitment of Russian resources and manpower—with reports of nearly fifteen thousand assault troops that included special operations and airborne personnel—was overwhelming Ukrainian defensive positions and threatening ground lines of communication. Logistical limitations, specifically the difficulty of adequately resupplying artillery and air defense munitions, hampered effective defensive efforts. The Institute for the Study of War highlighted how Russia capitalized on these vulnerabilities by establishing limited and localized air superiority over the city, which enabled routine usage of glide bombs on Ukrainian positions. Entering February, the possibility of a complete encirclement of Ukrainian defenders required a decision from Syrskyi to withdraw to “to avoid encirclement and preserve the lives and health of service personnel.”

The first challenge facing those organizing the withdrawal was task-organizing Ukrainian forces appropriately to execute this operation. In early February, the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade was deployed to Avdiivka to act as the security force to enable the 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade’s retrograde by engaging with Russian forces on several axes. Fierce fighting continued for days as Ukrainian forces fell back to new defensive lines. Russian sources claimed a vast encirclement had enabled Russian forces to capture hundreds of Ukrainian troops due to a chaotic retreat, but the claims have thus far lacked concrete evidence. Ukrainian reporting and available imagery largely indicate a successful withdrawal, although there are possible indications of the capture of wounded personnel. Withdrawal from the completely encircled “Zenit” position in the southeastern outskirts of Avdiivka was a particularly difficult affair for Ukrainian forces, with witness reporting of a disorganized nighttime movement under attack from Russian artillery, direct fire, unmanned aerial vehicles, and loitering munitions.

Despite the challenges, the operational intent set by Syrskyi to preserve combat power by saving Ukrainian service members’ lives was met. Most defenders reached newly established positions and are prepared for future operations. One cannot underestimate the psychological toll of the decision to withdraw. The 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade had defended Avdiivka for nearly two years, demonstrating immense sacrifice and experiencing untold suffering to hold this piece of Ukraine. And this account—both the challenges Ukrainian forces encountered and the overall successful accomplishment of Syrskyi’s intent—demonstrates the clear obstacles that a withdrawal under pressure poses.

Lessons for the US Army

The strategic impact of withdrawing from Avdiivka in relation to the overall outcome of the war is far too early to tell. However, the battle provides initial lessons for the US Army. Field Manual 3-0, Operations defines retrograde as a “type of defensive operation that involves the organized movement away from the enemy.” The manual further breaks down retrograde into three variations—delay, withdrawal, and retirement. Looking specifically at withdrawal, chapter 11 of Field Manual 3-90, Tactics provides greater detail on general considerations, organization of forces, control measures, and techniques. It specifies that a withdrawing force consists of a security force, a main body, and a reserve. One of the manual’s key highlights is that withdrawals are “inherently dangerous because they involve moving units to the rear and away from an enemy force.” In short, a withdrawal under enemy pressure can be one of the most dangerous operations a unit might be required to execute on the modern battlefield. Given the danger and complexity involved, important efforts have been made to extract lessons from historical cases of retrograde operations. But we can—and should—seek to do the same from reports of contemporary cases, like Avdiivka. Two lessons, in particular, stand out.

The first lesson from Avdiivka centers on effective planning. Before finalizing the decision to an execute a withdrawal, units involved need to organize their forces, establish control measures, and ensure mechanisms to maintain operational security throughout. Timely and deliberate coordination between subordinate and adjacent units is critical to preserve combat power over the operation’s duration. In Avdiivka, the challenge of coordination was compounded by the entry of a new unit, the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, in early February to serve as the security force enabling the withdrawal of the 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade that had long defended the city. Primary and alternate routes need to be established, as does the timing of their use, recognition signals, and methods of communication. For example, if an element of the withdrawing force’s main body begins its movement before the security force is in position to effectively support, it may be preemptively engaged and destroyed during this period of vulnerability. Potentially most challenging, medical evacuation procedures must be addressed in detail, to include designated vehicles, routes, and link-up points. Based on available time and enemy action, the ability to evacuate all casualties may not be possible, which is reported to have been the case in at least one Ukrainian position in Avdiivka. If time is available, detailed rehearsals at echelon should occur. Like most rehearsals, final gaps in the plan can be identified and mitigated, while also building shared understanding at all levels. The sheer multitude of planning considerations in a dynamic situation that can deteriorate rapidly presents a major problem set for a commander and his or her staff to overcome.

The second major lesson from Avdiivka emphasizes the proper prioritization and allocation of key enablers and weapon systems. The assigned security force must be able to maintain contact with the enemy until ordered to disengage to enable the main body movement away from enemy forces. To accomplish this task, in which the security force is potentially outnumbered or outgunned, it will need prioritization from higher echelons for key enablers and weapons systems, such as air defense, fuel depots, and counterbattery radar. In the final weeks of the Battle of Avdiivka, major shortages of Ukrainian artillery ammunition led to leaders to prioritize it for high-value targets, with small unmanned aerial vehicles used to strike targets of lower priority, such as infantry formations. Despite resource shortfalls, Ukrainian military leaders were able to adjust prioritization of key weapon systems to maintain indirect fire effects that effectively enabled friendly movement and maneuver. For the withdrawing force’s main body, which will likely be exposed during its movement to the new defensive line, the most important resources to prioritize are protection assets, especially portable air defense systems to mitigate enemy unmanned aerial vehicles and whatever close air support aircraft and helicopters are available. The withdrawal force may even require mobility assets, as the enemy may launch scatterable mines on likely routes that lead to the new defensive line. Without allocation of key enablers to both the main body of the withdrawing force and the security force, the operation may not achieve the conditions necessary for the withdrawal, compromising the entire mission.

The Battle of Avdiivka will certainly be studied for decades to come to come with a plethora of lessons for military professionals. Among the most immediately apparent are those that relate to the challenges of withdrawing forces—but also of the imperative of being able to do so when battlefield conditions require it. After all, the loss of Avdiivka after its resolute defense for so long is surely a bitter pill to swallow, but the Ukrainian withdrawal’s successful execution preserves experienced manpower and meaningful military capacity that can be brought to bear in the future. Two of the most critical components to that operation were effective planning and the proper allocation of key enablers—lessons the US Army should be learning now. A withdrawal does not intrinsically mean a defeat, but failing to train, plan, and resource a withdrawal could result in one.

Ryan N. Forte is a senior military intelligence captain assigned to Fort Liberty, North Carolina, with experiences at the company, battalion, brigade, and task force level.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: npu.gov.ua

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Ryan N. Forte · March 12, 2024

19. Winning the Operational Air Campaign, But Losing the Information War: The Israeli Air Force’s X Narratives

Excerpt:

Conclusion

Apart from a few tweets that sought to personalize the war by highlighting Israeli airmen and how Hamas’s brutal attack has shaped the course of their lives, the dominant narrative of the IAF’s X thread was to showcase explosions of entire buildings that seem to belie any attempts at proportionality or precision. The IAF’s use of information has not come across as well-tuned and appears to ignore the necessity of winning global hearts and minds. Instead, by showing an air campaign that many perceive as lacking precision and proportionality, the IAF comes across as seeking revenge against the Palestinian people—exactly the wrong narrative it should be sending. In an era of strategic competition in an interconnected world, the IAF’s messaging undercuts the emphasis democracies have placed on reducing collateral damage in what is an increasingly urban battlespace.

It is understandable that the nation of Israel is hurting after Hamas’s October 7 attacks, but the IAF’s actions—reinforced by its own clumsy narrative—might eventually undermine Israel’s strongest supporters. The IAF failed to craft its narratives of airpower for Western audiences. As some have argued, “successful insurgents, and now successful counter-insurgents, seek to persuade an audience in such a way that the political message delivered is an end in itself.” Israel may or may not achieve its operational goal of destroying Hamas, but it is well on the way to losing the strategic information war.

Winning the Operational Air Campaign, But Losing the Information War: The Israeli Air Force’s X Narratives - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Heather Venable · March 12, 2024

In the week before Hamas undertook a brutal terrorist operation against Israel, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) feed on X (Twitter) understandably contented itself with the usual topics of air forces around the world. On October 3, avid followers could download attractive pictures of airplanes on “Wallpaper Wednesday.” Another post wished a happy Independence Day to its air force friends in Germany while one showed both female and male airmen walking on the flight line while celebrating “Mean Girls Day,” a reference to the U.S. movie of the same name. The IAF posted each tweet in English, suggesting its attempts to reach a bilingual audience at home or perhaps even more a Western audience abroad. Of the three tweets, the most popular–the IAF’s well wishes to the German Air Force– received a total of almost 200,000 views. The sole post in Hebrew that day netted the lowest views at about 10,800.

Since the attacks on October 7, the IAF has shown a different face to the world, which, in some ways, is understandable, given the circumstances, yet in other ways, remains troubling. Once well-known for the warnings it provided to civilians by the so-called tactic of “knocking on the roof,” the IAF has now abandoned that cautious approach as official policy in the wake of Hamas’ terrorist attacks, except in rare circumstances.

Now, it increasingly looks like the IDF has rolled back the clock to an era before collateral damage concerns muddied one of the original intents of precision weapons: more efficient destruction of targets. In one 12-second video from the IAF, they show the impact of a bomb followed by an enormous cloud of smoke, suggesting an entire building’s destruction. Setting aside the tremendous ethical implications of potentially flattening one-fourth or more of Gaza, as some journalists have suggested while citing United Nations reports, much of the IAF’s X campaign serves as an example of what not to do in the age of social media weaponization. This approach has further isolated Israel from Western supporters with an almost total elimination of English-language tweets.

The IAF’s X Campaign in Response to the Hamas Attack on October 7

The IAF initially responded to the horrific Hamas attacks in a measured and brief way. Though posted only in Hebrew, translating the IAF’s posts is as simple as allowing Google Translate to provide English text almost instantaneously, which resulted in “The Air Force is now attacking targets of the terrorist organization Hamas in the Gaza Strip. More details to come.” Whatever the limitations of Google Translate might be, this article deems all results of Google Translate as “accurate” because they represent how recipients read the message rather than reflect the message the IAF intended to send. In other words, any public relations campaign must be deft and agile to ensure that the message can be conveyed clearly and not get lost in translation among key audiences who speak different languages.

Subsequent tweets that day disseminated more problematic messages, as IAF quickly amplified its response by mismatching its videos and its wording while showing the deaths of individual people. About two hours after its initial response, the IAF posted a subsequent update in Hebrew followed by one in English announcing that “dozens” of aircraft had begun counterattacking Hamas. Less than three hours later, anyone could view the results of those attacks, including direct hits on vehicles presumably filled with Hamas terrorists. Only one hour later it posted another tweet in Hebrew, this one claiming to have “attacked 17 military compounds and 4 operational headquarters.” The accompanying minute-long video, however, primarily showed individuals being targeted. First, the headline’s focus on buildings did not match the video’s emphasis on people. Second, the viewer was expected to assume that the casualties were legitimate targets and not innocent civilians caught in the wrong place at the wrong time in one of the most densely urban populations in the world; a leap of faith that would likely not be taken in the emotionally charged information warfare ecosystem.

This is not the first time Israel has made significant missteps in the information arena. In May of 2021, the IAF bombed a building in Gaza after determining through the tactic of “knocking on the roof” that two foreign newspapers had offices there, a decision that Israel deemed legal by international law although a few advisors dissented, worrying about “PR damage.” The IDF subsequently posted videos showing the building before and after being destroyed, a move that Hidai Zilberman, the IDF’s spokesperson at the time, opposed. Taken together, this event led some to conclude that Israel lacked a deft touch with public affairs.

Searching for Narratives of Precision and Proportionality

Based on media reports during the first three weeks of the campaign, the IAF was hard to distinguish as a Western air force seeking to wage precision air war. If one wanted to accept the Israelis’ claim that the media was biased, however, one would only have to examine the IAF’s X feed to see the likelihood of vast civilian casualties. In the days after the initial attack, the videos showed entire buildings being destroyed. On October 8, for example, the IAF tweeted a motivational post about Israeli airmen “continuing with all their might,” showing men and women preparing fighter aircraft. While one might view this post as an understandable attempt to shore up morale at home, the fact that Israel tweeted this post only in English suggests it was intended for foreign audiences. Another post on that day included the first official response by an IDF spokesperson, offering the explanation that, “Our Air Force is attacking hundreds of Hamas and Islamic Jihad targets in Gaza. We follow international law, while exercising our right and responsibility to protect our civilians.”

However, the posts’ imagery did not reinforce suggestions of respect for the principle of proportionality. It is true that proportionality–or the idea that damage to human life and property must not be “excessive” in proportion to the expected military advantage–is difficult to quantify. But this subjective evaluation can be placed against the IAF’s own self-selected video footage. A few hours after an IDF spokesperson stressed adherence to international law, the IAF’s X feed released a multiple-tweet thread explaining how the IAF had struck 150 targets in Shuja’iyya, one of Hamas’s “terror nest[s].” Recorded from a significant distance away, the accompanying video merely displays a series of consecutive explosions, which undermines the IDF spokesperson’s claims of adherence to international law and misses an opportunity to reinforce their message with more thoughtfully chosen footage. The next post also failed in this manner, with the translation from Hebrew to English stating that the IAF had used “[a]bout a hundred tons of ammunition.” 100 tons of bombs is equivalent to 200,000 pounds of bombs. Taking the average bomb as being a 500-pound bomb, this bombload equates to 400 bombs dropped that day, raising questions as to the extent to which the IAF had up-to-date intelligence and proper time for targeting. Accompanying photos also showed entire buildings placed in “red” prior to destruction, with a small target symbol placed over each in case the viewer might have any doubt as to the buildings’ fate.

Expecting Israel to achieve the same level of precision as the U.S., which has demonstrated the capability to destroy targets while preserving nearby structures, might be considered unreasonable by some, who suggest that the public’s standard for precision weapons has become too high. Mike Benitez and Mike Pietrucha, for example, argue that the “unanticipated product of the precision revolution was the mistaken belief that these weapons could be used to make warfare less messy by limiting collateral damage.” And, admittedly, despite its high standard for precision, the U.S. has also failed in its precision targeting due to improperly vetted intelligence, among other targeting and tactical errors.

Regardless of whether the IAF has access to enough precision weapons to employ them a majority of the time, there is something that is completely in its control: projecting consistent imagery of precise operations. Yet, a video from October 9, shared multiple times on its feed, showing the collapse of several adjacent, apartment-sized buildings, indicates that the IAF does not want to promote a narrative of precision. This is further supported by another video released the same day, which, by zooming out to show a broad swath of Gaza, reveals extensive destruction of large buildings. Two additional posts on October 9–one an English-subtitled video and one in Hebrew, demonstrated a desire to reach both of its target audiences. Both videos showed the destruction of large buildings. The footage contains added wording, most of which received labels like “military headquarters” before showing attacks on what are problematically labeled as “high-rise buildings,” opening the IAF to criticism for attacking civilian instead of military targets. It is correct to point out that Hamas deliberately uses civilian infrastructure as a kind of protection for its facilities. The point, though, is that the IAF has a choice about the narratives it disseminates, and it could make smarter decisions regarding precision, especially if it wanted to retain public support across the globe.

Subsequent tweets, some accompanied by video, only raised further and unhelpful questions about how carefully the IAF was planning and launching attacks against Gaza. One video showed repeated strikes and highlighted a targeting crosshair and a subsequent explosion. These were intended to demonstrate precision, but other clips from the video seemed to suggest bombs had gone astray. Even more troubling was the IAF’s October 12 tweet where it self-reported that it dropped 6000 bombs since the terrorist attack, with no emphasis on precision or effect. The IAF failed to demonstrate any actual productive effects resulting from the strikes. Moreover, anti-Israeli commentators quickly compared it to the U.S.-led coalition dropping 5000 bombs per month at the peak of its air war against ISIS, and suggesting the IAF was carpet bombing Gaza. As recently as October 20, for example, the IAF claimed to have destroyed dozens of “operational headquarters.” Close followers of the IAF may perhaps be forgiven for wondering how many operational headquarters Hamas can possibly have.

The same day it even tweeted an image of a fighter aircraft with bombs that appear to be unguided, a story that multiple Western news organizations quickly disseminated, including Business Insider. Journalists subsequently gave Israel the opportunity to set the matter straight, but it declined to comment.It is one thing to struggle with an opponent regarding truth in information battles. It is another to generate one’s own self-generated soundbite that undercuts claims the IAF makes on and off X about precision difficult to believe.

Continuity and Change in the IAF’s X Narrative, October 2023-March 2024

Videos of destroyed buildings continue to dominate the IAF’s X feed. IAF also shows some specific defensive actions in response to rocket attacks by Hamas and Hezbollah. The IDF’s most popular Tweets combine short messages stressing defending the homeland with attractive photographs of fighter jets. A tweet of this type on October 19 received 433,000 views, with another similar one receiving about 230,000 views. Fighters are apparently more evocative than air defense weapons, with one tweet comparatively receiving about 50,000 views, which aligns with a rough average for the IAF’s tweets since the campaign began.

Since the first weeks of the campaign, the IAF’s approach has not changed significantly except in one important area. It continues to showcase repeated photographs of aircraft, many in settings removed from combat. It also continues to highlight its destruction of buildings. However, since January, it now almost always posts exclusively in Hebrew. The rare Tweets in English focus on conveying messages of precision, which is difficult to reconcile with the satellite imagery of Gaza today. Having not tweeted in English in almost six weeks now shows an increasingly self-isolated IAF that rarely bothers to connect with a broader audience.

Information is a strategic weapon and militaries must include those who decide how to convey and disseminate information in the highest planning circles. They should also provide the decision makers the tools to respond as quickly and effectively as possible with truthful, accurate, and effective information. It is also important to establish and maintain a level of trustworthiness, a past shortcoming that may have undermined the credibility of Israel’s self-reporting.

Conclusion

Apart from a few tweets that sought to personalize the war by highlighting Israeli airmen and how Hamas’s brutal attack has shaped the course of their lives, the dominant narrative of the IAF’s X thread was to showcase explosions of entire buildings that seem to belie any attempts at proportionality or precision. The IAF’s use of information has not come across as well-tuned and appears to ignore the necessity of winning global hearts and minds. Instead, by showing an air campaign that many perceive as lacking precision and proportionality, the IAF comes across as seeking revenge against the Palestinian people—exactly the wrong narrative it should be sending. In an era of strategic competition in an interconnected world, the IAF’s messaging undercuts the emphasis democracies have placed on reducing collateral damage in what is an increasingly urban battlespace.

It is understandable that the nation of Israel is hurting after Hamas’s October 7 attacks, but the IAF’s actions—reinforced by its own clumsy narrative—might eventually undermine Israel’s strongest supporters. The IAF failed to craft its narratives of airpower for Western audiences. As some have argued, “successful insurgents, and now successful counter-insurgents, seek to persuade an audience in such a way that the political message delivered is an end in itself.” Israel may or may not achieve its operational goal of destroying Hamas, but it is well on the way to losing the strategic information war.

Dr. Heather Venable is an Associate Professor of Military and Security Studies at the Air Command and Staff College where she is the course director for Airpower Strategy and Operations. She is also a non-resident fellow at the Modern War Institute.

These views do not represent the Department of Defense, the U.S. Air Force, nor Air University.

Main image: An Israeli F-35I Adir assigned to 140 Squadron, Nevatim Air Base, Israel taxis out for a mission during Red Flag-Nellis 23-2 at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, March 15, 2023. Red Flag is an opportunity to build on the success of JUNIPER OAK 23-2, JUNIPER FALCON, and additional combined exercises to enhance interoperability with Israel, strengthen bilateral cooperation, and improve capabilities in ways that enhance and promote regional stability and reinforce the United States’ enduring commitment to Israel’s security. (U.S. Air Force photo by William R. Lewis)

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20. Removing the Trojan Horse from America’s ports

Removing the Trojan Horse from America’s ports

c4isrnet.com · by Jiwon Ma and Mark Montgomery · March 11, 2024

The Greek legend of the Trojan horse is a tale of deception, a story children everywhere learn as youngsters. Yet America seems to have forgotten what befell Troy, and, consequently, has instead welcomed Trojan horses into ports around the country, according to Pentagon officials. The software embedded in Chinese-made cranes for loading and unloading cargo could possess clandestine abilities capable of providing the Chinese Communist Party with real-time visibility into port operations. Armed with this data, the CCP could track the movement of military equipment and commercial cargo, or, even worse, disrupt operations at major U.S. ports. This is a grave risk to national security and to the American economy.

Concerns about the security of America’s ports are not new. After Sept. 11, 2001, the federal government required port authorities and vessel operators to take steps to identify and mitigate physical threats and, eventually, cyber threats as well. But progress on the latter has stalled, at least in part because the U.S. Coast Guard – the federal agency tasked with working with private companies as the sector risk management agency for the maritime industry – lacks the authorities and resources to help the industry understand and remediate the threats posed by Chinese-made cranes.

Last year, Congress had the opportunity to strengthen these efforts by banning new foreign-made cranes and software at all U.S. ports. The legislation failed to gain enough support, and ultimately was left out of the annual defense authorization act. As a partial solution, however, Congress banned the Department of Defense, federally funded ports, and commercially operated strategic seaports from using Chinese-made logistics management software. The law also required an intelligence community assessment of threats posed by Chinese cranes, which now account for more than 80 percent of cranes in strategic ports.

Not waiting for the results of this report, last week, the Biden administration wisely issued an executive order granting the U.S. Coast Guard greater authority to respond to cyber risks to the nation’s maritime infrastructure. The Coast Guard can now require port operators and vessel owners to implement (as yet unspecified) security measures to “prevent, detect, assess, and remediate” active cyber threats.

To implement this, the Biden administration has tasked the Coast Guard with issuing a maritime security directive outlining risks posed by Chinese cranes and establishing minimum cybersecurity requirements for all maritime infrastructure. The Commander of Coast Guard Cyber Command noted that cyber protection teams have conducted threat assessments of, and looked for malicious cyber activity on, nearly 50 percent of the Chinese-made cranes used in U.S. ports. Their findings will help guide the new security directive.

The new executive order also empowers the Coast Guard’s captains of the port. These are federal maritime security coordinators who are responsible for ensuring the safety and security of designated ports. The executive order now clarifies their role to include the responsibility for inspecting the data, information, and digital systems of ports and vessels.

This increased authority enables the Coast Guard to conduct effective vulnerability assessments. The captains collaborate closely with the cyber protection team by sharing cyber threat intelligence, conducting joint risk assessments, and developing strategies for incident response. Improved insights into the current threat landscape could improve the internal Coast Guard partnerships.

In response to reporter questions, Biden administration officials deny that there will be requirements to remove Chinese cranes. Instead, the administration reaffirmed plans to mobilize $20 billion for U.S. port infrastructure over the next five years. It is not at all clear what percentage of this $20 billion will be used for explicit cybersecurity purposes. Instead, the White House pointed to an announcement by a U.S. subsidiary of the Japanese company Mitsui that the company will manufacture ship-to-shore cranes on U.S. soil, marking the first instance of domestic production in 30 years.

In addition to the steps the White House outlined, the Coast Guard should work with industry partners to utilize the Port Infrastructure Development Program and the Port Security Grant Program through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. These competitive grants are for modernization and resilience improvement, including for the digital systems and cybersecurity supporting port operations. Congress should ensure that a significant percentage of investments from these grants are allocated to cyber risk mitigation.

Meanwhile, the captains of the port will require exceptional cybersecurity talent to support their increased responsibilities. The Coast Guard employs civilian cyber advisors, who provide contextual information on cyber-related matters in designated ports. Working with the private sector, the Coast Guard could benefit from a workforce rotational program with portable credentialing. This could help build the pipeline of maritime-specific cybersecurity expertise.

While the Biden administration seems to be putting its money where its mouth is, the real test will be the president’s fiscal year 2025 budget, due later this month. The administration has granted the Coast Guard numerous new authorities and responsibilities to improve its support to port operators, but they are only half of the battle. The Coast Guard also needs the resources – namely, the money and the personnel to be able to execute the mission. Historically, the dollars have not followed the tasking; the 2025 budget will need to break that trend.

Strategies to reduce the vulnerability of this dependence on Chinese hardware and software are imperative. The Trojan horse is not just a fabled tale, but a real threat lurking within American ports.

Jiwon Ma is Senior Policy Analyst at the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mark Montgomery is CCTI’s senior director and also directs CSC 2.0, which works to implement the recommendations of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, where he previously served as executive director.

21. Biden Draws a ‘Red Line’ for Israel

Should we be drawing red lines at all? But if we do, should webe drawing red lines for our friends, partners, and allies?

Biden Draws a ‘Red Line’ for Israel

He ignores that the Jewish state can’t defeat Hamas without taking Rafah.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-draws-an-odd-red-line-for-israel-rafah-war-7209c91e?utm

By The Editorial Board

Updated March 11, 2024 8:40 am ET

Displaced Palestinians talk to Egyptian soldiers at the border fence between Gaza and Egypt, Rafah, Feb. 16. PHOTO: MOHAMMED ABED/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

President Biden likes to say that no President has been a better friend to Israel, but of late he doesn’t sound like it. He beat up Israel’s leaders in his State of the Union speech, criticized its war strategy in Gaza with regularity, and on the weekend called Israel’s plans to clear Hamas from its last stronghold in the city of Rafah a “red line” that Israel shouldn’t cross.

“It is a red line, but I am never going to leave Israel. The defense of Israel is still critical. So there is no red line I am going to cut off all weapons, so they don’t have the Iron Dome to protect them,” Mr. Biden said on MSNBC. “But there’s red lines that if he crosses,” without finishing his train of thought, before adding “you cannot have 30,000 more Palestinians dead.”

As is often the case, it’s hard to tell what Mr. Biden means. He wants fewer civilian casualties in Gaza, but so does Israel since the diplomatic consequences fall on the Jewish state, not on Hamas. That’s why Israel has held off on its Rafah campaign until it can put together a plan to let civilians find refuge to the city’s north.

The best way to protect civilians would be for Egypt to let them cross the border into Sinai until the fighting stops. But Mr. Biden hasn’t been willing to lean on Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, despite some $1.3 billion in annual U.S. military aid to Cairo.

Israel can’t avoid a Rafah campaign if it wants to achieve its war aim of destroying Hamas. Surely Mr. Biden knows this. The U.S. didn’t let ISIS retain its stronghold in Mosul in Iraq, and the siege of that city also had unintended civilian casualties.

Mr. Biden and the White House are also letting everyone know they’re especially unhappy with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Mr. Biden was overheard saying after his State of the Union speech that Mr. Netanyahu needs a “come to Jesus moment” with the U.S. President. Mr. Netanyahu should bring his whole war cabinet. As our Elliot Kaufman reports from Israel (see nearby), Mr. Netanyahu’s domestic political opponents also want to clear Hamas from Rafah.

Mr. Biden’s vocal criticism of Israel can’t be separated from his desire to appease his party’s increasingly insistent anti-Israel wing. He wants to avoid a protest spectacle at the Democratic convention in August, and he’s worried about losing Michigan as young people and Arab-Americans defect. It sounds like his Israel policy increasingly runs through Dearborn, Mich.

This also explains the urgent efforts to negotiate a cease-fire and hostage swap that Israel keeps accepting but Hamas rejects. Mr. Biden’s new proposal to have U.S. troops build an offshore pier to deliver aid to Gaza is also in part a U.S. domestic political play.

There are costs to this Dearborn strategy toward Israel—not least its message to Hamas and its backers in Iran that their strategy of putting civilians in harm’s way is working politically. Why agree to a hostage swap if their current strategy is driving a wedge between Israel and the U.S.?

Mr. Biden’s red-line threats don’t help Israel or his political standing at home. The best way he can help himself politically is to let Israel win the war as rapidly as possible.

US Green Berets deploying to Taiwan's front-line - Asia Times

US special forces now permanently assigned to train Taiwanese troops on islands just 10 kilometers from mainland China

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · March 12, 2024

US Special Operations Forces (SOF) have been permanently assigned to Taiwan’s frontline islands, preparing elite Taiwanese units for possible island defense and guerilla warfare operations against a Chinese invasion.

This month, SOFREP reported that US Army SOFs have been deployed to Taiwan for ongoing training under the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). US troops on Kinmen will be situated just ten kilometers from mainland China.

SOFREP states that the US military advisors will take permanent positions at the Taiwanese Army’s amphibious command centers in Kinmen and Penghu, conducting regular training exercises alongside Taiwan’s elite forces.

The collaboration includes training Taiwanese counterparts to use the Black Hornet Nano, a compact military unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and creating operational guidelines and training manuals for the drone. The Taiwanese Aviation and Special Forces Command has proposed acquiring the drone directly from the US through military sales avenues.

SOFREP states that the NDAA outlines a framework for deploying US personnel to Taiwan, focusing mainly on military training without immediate plans to station civilian US officials.

It mentions that reports indicate a growing presence of the US Special Operations Forces Liaison Element (SOFLE) in Taiwan, with plans to station small teams from the 1st Special Forces Group’s 2nd Battalion, Alpha Company, on the self-governing island.

It says that these three military teams, composed of three US Army Green Berets, will conduct joint training missions at Taiwan’s 101st Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion and Airborne Special Service Company.

SOFREP mentions that the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense has emphasized the goal of these exchanges is to bolster Taiwan’s training, readiness and institutional capabilities, which it says aligns with annual plans to ensure national and regional security.

Taiwan’s frontline islands of Kinmen and Penghu are critical for its defense, with SOFs playing a vital role in a protracted island defense strategy.

In a February 2023 Asia Society article, Andrew Chubb notes that Kinmen and its surrounding islands are exceptionally well-fortified, with protruding geography and rocky geology enabling deep entrenchment of hardened Taiwanese positions.

Chubb mentions that any attempt to dislodge Taiwanese forces would likely entail fierce fighting and that the battle fate of Kinmen’s 60,000 civilian population could provide a ready rallying cry for wider Taiwan if China invades.

As with Kinmen, Chubb notes that Penghu is a critical target for China’s island seizure operations. He mentions that Taiwanese resistance on Penghu, spearheaded by the Penghu Defense Command armed with tanks, long-range radar, anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles, would be a prelude to any full invasion of Taiwan.

Chubb states that multiple analyses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strategy for Taiwan generally concur that occupation or neutralization of Penghu would be critical for any cross-strait assault.

However, he notes that seizing Penghu and the surrounding islands would present severe challenges to the PLA due to the significant civilian population and entrenched Taiwanese forces.

He also mentions that a successful Chinese occupation of Penghu would prompt Taiwanese countermeasures but the extent of US support to Taiwan in that situation is unclear.

As for the role of Taiwanese special forces in the defense of Kinmen and Penghu, Stavros Atlamazoglou mentions in a January 2023 Business Insider article that Taiwan’s 101st Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, analogous to the US Navy SEALs, would spearhead the defense of Kinmen and Penghu, fighting a delaying action to buy time for US and allied intervention.

While Atlamazoglou notes that the Taiwanese SEALs may not be able to do much aside from impose high costs on a vastly superior PLA invasion force, their small numbers, rich skill set, inherent flexibility and unconventional mindset would make them the perfect guerillas, disappearing into the countryside after the first few hours of a Chinese invasion to wage a guerilla war.

Aidan Greer and Chris Bassler note in a December 2022 Modern War Institute article that Taiwanese SOFs on Kinmen and Penghu, given sufficient US and allied support, could provide critical intelligence and targeting for America’s strike platforms.

Should China eventually occupy Taiwan, the latter’s SOFs could reorganize into stay-behind forces hidden behind enemy lines, imposing costs, causing delays and sowing confusion.

In a November 2023 War on the Rocks article, Brian Petit mentions that Taiwan, unable to afford military parity with China and facing likely occupation if the latter invades, has considered or already has a stay-behind force concept. Petit mentions that stay-behind forces can operate under decapitation, pacification, subjugation and liberation scenarios.

In a decapitation scenario involving pre-emptive strikes that quickly eliminate the national leadership, Petit says stay-behind forces can maintain resistance cohesion while staying off the occupier’s target list.

He says that in a pacification scenario where the occupier aims to mollify or pacify the population, stay-behind forces can monitor the former’s behavior to devise an effective resistance strategy.

Petit mentions that in a subjugation scenario where the occupier uses terror, violence and repression to crush resistance, the best course of action for stay-behind forces is to flee to more permissive environments.

In a liberation scenario, he says stay-behind forces can provide intelligence and perform delaying actions to support the arrival of a liberation force.

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In those scenarios, Taiwan’s SOFs can also form the nucleus of a possible Taiwanese deterrence strategy through popular resistance, raising the prospect that China will have to confront a hostile population if it invades and occupies the island.

That would increase the costs of an invasion and subsequent occupation, forcing China to rethink or scale down its military objectives against Taiwan.

However, Lumpy Lumbaca notes in a September 2023 Modern War Institute article that Taiwan’s resistance movement should not solely rely on military force but also would need civilian support.

Lumbaca notes that Taiwan’s popular resistance strategy has four general objectives: supporting or enabling the defeat of the Chinese occupation force, maintaining the people’s morale, inspiring other countries to support Taiwan and harassing and disrupting PLA and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) operations.

Taiwanese soldiers repelling a simulated amphibious invasion by China. Image: X Screengrab

However, he adds that Taiwan’s specific resistance objectives will depend on the changing circumstances of a possible Chinese occupation.

He notes that if occupying forces are poorly organized, the resistance might focus on defeating China’s forces outright. If the occupation timeline is extended, he says the resistance might need to focus on harassing and disrupting while maintaining the people’s morale.

Lumbaca stresses that the victory of a Taiwanese resistance movement is reliant on various factors such as the duration of the occupation, the strength and size of the occupying force, the level of support from the local population and the international community’s response in terms of diplomacy, information, military and economic assistance.

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asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · March 12, 2024

23. Why the Middle East Still Needs America

Excerpts:

It is tempting to look at the U.S. role in the Middle East and see only failures, for there are many. Yet amid these failures are successes, big and small. Many of the most important accomplishments involve preventing disasters that, because of the U.S. presence, never occurred: vital achievements, but ones that are hard to boast about.

Policymakers and the public alike must have realistic expectations about what the United States can accomplish in the region in the coming years. Its problems are large, enmities run deep, and the U.S. presence has shrunk notably in the past decade. Yet further reducing the U.S. role is perilous. This critical but unstable region could become far more chaotic and war-prone, with anti-American regimes becoming stronger and more entrenched. A limited American presence, for all its problems, is better than none at all.

Why the Middle East Still Needs America

The U.S. Military Keeps a Volatile Region From Descending Into Chaos

By Daniel Byman

March 12, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Daniel Byman · March 12, 2024

If there is one aspect of foreign policy that U.S. Presidents Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden share, it is this: a desire for the United States to leave the Middle East. The Biden administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy, for example, focuses on the “pacing threat” of China and otherwise emphasizes great-power competition, not the squabbles of the Middle East. Obama and Trump similarly wanted to pivot to Asia and otherwise disentangle the United States from the region. This inclination extends beyond the Oval Office; Congress, for instance, is having trouble passing bills that would provide military aid to Israel, which once would have been a political no-brainer.

U.S. leaders are echoing public sentiment: polls show that Americans see China as the greatest threat to the United States, followed by Russia and North Korea. (Iran barely gets a mention, unlike 15 years ago, when it was enemy number one.) A Pew survey conducted in 2019 found that the majority of Americans, including most veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, think that the Iraq war was “not worth fighting.” In January this year, the deaths of three U.S. service members in Jordan at the hands of an Iranian-backed group seemed to validate the view that the price of the U.S. presence is too high, raising questions about whether the United States should maintain its military role in the region.

It is easy to understand this skepticism. The Middle East is plagued by problems: civil wars, dictatorships, terrorism, and deep anti-American sentiment, to name a few. In the face of these challenges, U.S. policy toward the region does not seem to be achieving much success—and that’s putting it mildly. For decades, the United States has backed an Israeli-Palestinian peace process that was largely stalled following some initial achievements in the 1990s, including the signing of the Oslo Accords, and now has ground to a halt amid the war in the Gaza Strip. Regime change in Iraq following the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein produced terrorism and instability. Well before Hamas’s October 7 assault on Israel, Iranian-backed militant groups regularly attacked U.S. forces in Iraq. And Middle Eastern states, in their rhetoric at least, are not particularly keen for the United States to stay. Pressure is growing in Iraq for a complete U.S. withdrawal as American forces scrap with local militias. The United States is also considering removing troops from Syria, believing that the Islamic State is sufficiently weakened and fearing potential casualties from attacks by Iranian proxy groups.

This sense of exhaustion is profound, even though the U.S. military presence in the Middle East is far smaller than in the past. Today, the United States has some 45,000 troops in the region, including around 2,500 troops in Iraq, 900 in Syria, and others stationed at bases in countries such as Bahrain, Djibouti, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. About 15,000 of these troops were deployed to the region as part of a temporary surge in the wake of October 7, before which the United States maintained around 30,000 troops. Although sizable, these forces are a fraction of the number the United States deployed in 2010, when it had over 100,000 troops in Iraq and around 70,000 in Afghanistan, as well as many more in neighboring countries. By 2015, these numbers had fallen, as the U.S. presence plunged in Iraq and decreased substantially in Afghanistan; the total fell further after the 2021 U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.

A pessimistic view of the United States’ record and prospects in the region, however, misses important, if less dramatic, U.S. achievements in the Middle East. Although these outcomes are less visible and can be difficult to quantify, a strong U.S. military presence prevents a variety of actions by adversaries and allies that might make the region even less stable and generate more civil strife, nuclear proliferation, dangerous interventions, and other grave threats. Maintaining even a limited U.S. military presence is therefore vital to mitigating these risks, even if the United States continues to fall short of its ambitious regional goals.

GET GOING WHILE THE GOING IS BAD

There is an appealing case for leaving the Middle East—or at least reducing the United States’ involvement, particularly regarding its military posture. U.S. forces in the region suffer a small but not insignificant number of casualties every year. In the last decade, the United States has lost over 140 soldiers in operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria—the majority in Afghanistan. Although U.S. deployments to Iraq and Syria today are fairly small, soldiers are at constant risk of rocket and drone attacks from Iranian-backed forces and, to a lesser degree, other anti-American groups, such as the Islamic State, known as ISIS.

In addition to wanting to avoid this human toll, the United States’ resources are needed elsewhere. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the threat Moscow poses to European security and that of the West in general. The Ukrainian war effort desperately needs U.S. munitions and other military systems. Multiple administrations have sought to pivot to China, where any conflict would require large numbers of troops and air defense, surveillance, and weapons systems given China’s strong and growing military power. Diverting aircraft carriers to deter Iran, munitions to help Israel bomb Gaza, warships to guard against Houthi missiles in the Red Sea, and troops and surveillance assets to assist in fighting the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria could leave U.S. forces and allies in other parts of the world more vulnerable to authoritarian aggression.

In providing this support, the United States assumes a degree of complicity in the deeds of its allies. The Middle East is home to numerous dictatorships whose human rights records range from spotty (Morocco) to abysmal (Saudi Arabia). The United States helps ensure their security and, in so doing, facilitates an undemocratic status quo. When Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates launched their disastrous war in Yemen in 2015, they used U.S. munitions and weapons systems in their attacks. The United States has long been an unwavering partner of Israel, a stance that is largely popular domestically but unpopular in much of the world, especially after Israel began its devastating military campaign in Gaza, which has killed at least 30,000 people so far.

Perhaps most strikingly, the United States does not seem to gain much from its efforts. Regional states shrug off U.S. human rights concerns and demands for economic reform. In February, the Biden administration called for a restoration of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and asked Israel to allow more humanitarian aid into Gaza, only to be rebuffed on both counts by the government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. U.S. strikes on Yemen similarly have not changed Houthi behavior, with the group continuing its missile and drone attacks against commercial shipping.

TAKING STOCK OF SUCCESS

These perceptions of failure are not wrong, but they paint an incomplete picture. The United States has not brought peace to the region, turned dictatorships into democracies, or otherwise transformed a perennial trouble spot into a zone of peace; but the U.S. presence, on balance, has helped preserve the United States’ interests and those of its allies.

The current war in Gaza illustrates this mixed record. The war rages on, with Palestinians suffering tremendously. But the number of civilian deaths has fallen as the United States has publicly and privately pressured Israel to reduce casualties amid an international backlash. UN data indicates that the number of Palestinians in Gaza dying each day has fallen by two-thirds since late October: the number of noncombatant deaths is still too high, but U.S. pressure appears to have altered the course of Israeli strategy, even if it may functionally be too little too late.

The United States’ efforts have also been critical in preventing a full-scale regional war. Weeks after October 7, the Biden administration stopped Israel from launching a preventive war on Hezbollah forces in Lebanon, a strike that would have dramatically expanded the scope and scale of the current conflict. Hezbollah is a far more formidable adversary than Hamas. The Lebanese group has thousands of Iranian-armed and -trained fighters and around 150,000 rockets and missiles, making it capable of striking all of Israel and overwhelming Israeli missile systems. Moreover, a war between Israel and Hezbollah would likely push Lebanon, already in economic disarray, into the abyss, turning it into a truly failed state.

The United States does not seem to gain much from its efforts in the Middle East.

The Biden administration has also moved to deter Iran, Hezbollah’s sponsor, from exploiting the current conflict. Shortly after October 7, the United States moved two aircraft carriers to the eastern Mediterranean and warned Tehran against escalating tensions with Israel. Biden has also attacked Iranian proxies in response to attacks on U.S. troops in the region. These assurances and enhanced military posture have contributed to deterrence against Iran—indeed, after a retaliatory U.S. strike on militias in Iraq and Syria, Tehran told its proxy groups in the region to scale back their attacks, wary of igniting a full-scale war with the United States. Biden’s stance also worked to reassure Israel that the United States had its back, giving it the confidence not to strike Iran in desperation.

The U.S. response to the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea has also had some successes. Leading a coalition of over 20 countries, the United States is working to protect crucial shipping lanes by shooting down Houthi drones and missiles and otherwise trying to stop attacks that emanate from Yemen. On the one hand, U.S. strikes on the Houthis have not stopped them from continuing to attack commercial shipping in the Bab el Mandeb Strait. Their attacks have damaged numerous vessels; resulted in casualties, including three sailors serving on a Liberian-owned bulk carrier; and prompted many more ships to divert to the much longer route around the Cape of Good Hope, a detour that is driving up the cost of global trade. On the other hand, the presence of the U.S.-led task force has meant that some shipping can continue; on average, over a million metric tons of trade still transit the strait each day. This is particularly critical for the economies of Egypt and Jordan, as well as Israel, which depend heavily on Red Sea ports. Even more important, the Biden administration has stood up in defense of the principle of freedom of the seas, making it clear to other potential aggressors that the United States will respond to attempts to disrupt trade and will protect allies’ economic interests when they are threatened.

The positive effects of the United States’ presence extend beyond the latest round of conflicts. Iran wields tremendous influence in Iraq, but that influence would be even stronger without U.S. forces to counterbalance it. In Iraq and Syria, U.S. troops work with local allies to fight the Islamic State. Without the United States providing intelligence, training, and firepower to its allies, the Islamic State would be far more able to regroup, which would allow it to both gain more local influence and increase its ability to conduct international terrorist attacks.

DISASTERS AVERTED?

The most important consequences of the abiding U.S. presence in the Middle East are the dangerous events that do not happen because the United States is still there. Iran, for example, might attack shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, where about 20 percent of the world’s oil consumption transits, as a way to press Israel and the United States in a far more consequential version of what the Houthis are doing in the Bab el Mandeb. Such attacks could cause global oil prices to skyrocket, potentially plunging the world into recession. Currently, the likelihood that the United States would attack Iran and forcibly open the strait makes this prospect far too risky for Tehran—as Iran learned the hard way during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, when it tried to attack shipping and lost vessels and oil platforms to a U.S.-led military response. The Biden administration’s strikes on the Houthis make U.S. warnings regarding the Strait of Hormuz even more credible.

In the absence of U.S. forces, Tehran would be freer to foment regional instability or mount aggression toward rival states, such as by overthrowing the government of Bahrain and installing a pro-Iranian Shiite-led regime, as it has attempted to do in the past. Iran would also be more likely to build nuclear weapons, believing that it would not pay a heavy price if it advanced from its current uranium enrichment activities toward weapons production Even putting aside such drastic scenarios, without a U.S. military presence to counterbalance it, Iran could further expand its influence in neighboring countries such as Iraq, with the aim of turning it into a vassal state.

Allies, too, might respond to a U.S. abandonment of the region in dangerous and self-defeating ways. Without credible U.S. security assurances, Israel—now wounded and hypersensitive to any perceived threat—could persuade itself to not only attack Hezbollah but also launch a conventional assault on the Iranian nuclear program, likely prompting Iran and the militant groups it helms to respond with full force, including terrorist attacks. Other allies that currently fall under the U.S. security umbrella, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, might want to take security into their own hands—including by trying to build, or just buy, a nuclear weapon.

A U.S. withdrawal from the region could create a power vacuum that China, Russia, or others might exploit.

Israel’s foreign policy could well become even more a prisoner of its fractious domestic politics. Israeli leaders have long used U.S. pressure as an excuse for inaction on domestic and international fronts, telling right-wing constituents that they would attack Iran or annex the West Bank but for Washington’s objections; an excuse Israeli hardliners largely accepted given the importance of the U.S.-Israeli security relationship. Without this external pressure, Israeli leaders could cave to the influence of the rising far right and move to annex the West Bank, restore settlements in Gaza, or take other inflammatory steps that would worsen regional tension.

A U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East would also have consequences for other parts of the world, such as Asia and Europe, that are more of a priority for many in Washington wary of Chinese and Russian aggression. Allies in one region are aware of Washington’s behavior in other parts of the world. U.S. support for Ukraine, for example, has reassured many who fear a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Displays of weakness, by contrast, embolden aggressors. If the United States failed to stand by an ally in the Middle East in the case of Iranian or militant aggression, it would send a message to other longtime U.S. allies around the world that the United States may not defend them should they be attacked.

Indeed, a U.S. withdrawal from the region could create a power vacuum that China, Russia, or others might exploit. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other countries will seek to deter Iran, contain terrorist groups, and fend off other threats—and if the United States cannot credibly provide security assistance and guarantees, these countries will look elsewhere. Leaving the Middle East opens the way for these rival authoritarian powers to increase their influence, which would prove a major setback in the context of great-power competition (the motivating concern for some detractors of U.S. involvement in the Middle East).

Such counterfactuals are impossible to measure, and not all these dangerous scenarios would come to pass. But even one could be catastrophic for both the region and Washington, not to mention the untold number of unimaginable crises that could proliferate if the United States decides to leave the Middle East.

KEEP BOOTS ON THE GROUND

It is tempting to look at the U.S. role in the Middle East and see only failures, for there are many. Yet amid these failures are successes, big and small. Many of the most important accomplishments involve preventing disasters that, because of the U.S. presence, never occurred: vital achievements, but ones that are hard to boast about.

Policymakers and the public alike must have realistic expectations about what the United States can accomplish in the region in the coming years. Its problems are large, enmities run deep, and the U.S. presence has shrunk notably in the past decade. Yet further reducing the U.S. role is perilous. This critical but unstable region could become far more chaotic and war-prone, with anti-American regimes becoming stronger and more entrenched. A limited American presence, for all its problems, is better than none at all.

DANIEL BYMAN is Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Foreign Affairs · by Daniel Byman · March 12, 2024

24. Victoria Nuland to exit Biden administration – a new era of US foreign policy?

Excerpts:

The general impression of Nuland is of an inveterate ‘hawk’ and Russophobe fired up by neoconservative ideology and American exceptionalism who precipitated the Russian intervention in Ukraine and is largely responsible for fuelling the ongoing war. Of course, there is no denying that Nuland played a key role in the regime change in Kyiv 10 years ago.

Nuland has had a big role in the life of Ukraine and we can only guess the massive dimensions of it. Indeed, she publicly celebrated the sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, which broke the umbilical cord tying Germany to a geopolitical alliance with Russia. Last month, after a sudden visit to Kyiv, Nuland promised some nasty surprises waiting in store for the Kremlin in the Ukraine war.

Was it the idea of combat deployment in Ukraine by NATO countries she was referring to? There are no easy answers. Well, belatedly at least, White House has intervened twice to assert that putting American troops on the ground in Ukraine is a no-go area.

The point is, it is entirely conceivable that Nuland’s exit could be a reflection of the collapse of the whole architecture of the US’ Ukraine strategy, which she designed.

Victoria Nuland to exit Biden administration – a new era of US foreign policy?

Victoria Nuland, key State Dept. leader, to exit Biden administration. A longtime diplomat, Nuland was known for her tough approach to Russia, and the Kremlin demonized her for it.

NEWSROOM

MARCH 10, 2024

moderndiplomacy.eu · by Newsroom · March 10, 2024

Victoria Nuland, key State Dept. leader, to exit Biden administration. A longtime diplomat, Nuland was known for her tough approach to Russia, and the Kremlin demonized her for it, notes ‘The Washington Post’.

One of the Biden administration’s toughest Russia hawks and the State Department’s third-ranking official, Victoria Nuland, plans to retire within weeks, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said, leaving a gap in the top ranks of U.S. diplomacy as crises in the Middle East and Ukraine threaten to become broader conflagrations.

Nuland, the undersecretary of state for political affairs, previously served as the department’s top Europe-focused diplomat during the Obama administration and was broadly popular among the agency’s rank and file. Inside a strait-laced bureaucracy that sometimes rewards blandness and caution, she stood out for her unvarnished opinions and tough approach to the Kremlin, which demonized her.

Nevertheless, Victoria Nuland once said that she could understand Russian culture better after she had worked with Russian fishermen in her 20s. According to Nuland, a joint US-Soviet enterprise allowed American sailors to fish in the 20-mile zone and deliver the catch to Soviet sailors, who were not allowed to fish in that part of the sea.

Nuland, who had served under Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott in President Bill Clinton’s administration in the 1990s, was a favorite of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and ran European and Eurasian affairs as assistant secretary of state under Hillary Clinton’s successor, John Kerry.

Nuland had served as the department’s No. 2 official, the acting deputy secretary of state, for seven months starting last year following the retirement of Wendy Sherman. She was considered a leading candidate to take over the post, but she lost an intra-administration fight to be named permanently to the job to Kurt Campbell (photo), formerly the White House’s top Asia strategist who was confirmed last month. President Biden’s decision was one of the factors in her departure. Campbell was confirmed by the Senate on February 6.

Nuland served in Moscow in the 1990s and was later the U.S. ambassador to NATO before becoming the State Department spokeswoman under Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. As the top U.S. diplomat for European affairs, she played an active role in U.S. diplomacy in Kyiv as protests against its Kremlin-friendly leader seized the country in late 2013, making her a focus of Russian frustration. Memorably, she handed out cookies and bread to encamped protesters on Kyiv’s central Maidan before the toppling of its then-president.

Nuland left the State Department in early 2017 after Donald Trump became president, then returned to the No. 3 job in 2021.

The Russian Foreign Ministry jumped on Nuland’s departure, declaring it a sign that U.S. policy toward Russia was a failure.

NYT: Victoria Nuland, “Russia Hawk”, to leave the State Department

A hard-charging diplomat and determined advocate of supporting Ukraine will step down from the department’s No. 3 post, writes ‘The New York Times’.

Ms. Nuland held numerous State Department positions, including spokeswoman, and once served as deputy national security adviser to Vice President Dick Cheney. But she made her mark as a Russia specialist who long argued for marshaling strong resistance to Moscow ‘territorial ambitions’ and foreign political influence.

As the State Department’s top Russia official during the Obama administration, she argued unsuccessfully for arming Ukraine with antitank missiles, and during the Biden administration has been among the biggest proponents of sending Ukraine more and better U.S. weapons.

She became more widely known in 2014 after referring with an expletive to the European Union in a phone call about Ukrainian politics that was recorded and leaked.

During the Biden administration, Ms. Nuland became a lightning rod for skeptics of U.S. support for Ukraine. “Nobody is pushing this war more than Nuland,” the Tesla co-founder Elon Musk wrote on the social media site X last February.

Russian officials and media outlets constantly recall the way Ms. Nuland, then the U.S. assistant secretary for European and Eurasian affairs, distributed food to protesters in Kyiv’s central square in early 2014 who eventually toppled Ukraine’s Kremlin-backed leader.

“A coup against the government happened in Ukraine in 2014 after under secretary of state Victoria Nuland handed out cookies to terrorists,” the Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov said.

Afterwards Ms. Nuland has said she passed out ‘sandwiches’, not ‘cookies’, although these were really cookies – one can see them at the historical photograph:

Ms. Nuland spoke publicly last month about the future of Ukraine, the country in which she had invested many hundreds of hours of her life.

“If Putin wins in Ukraine, he will not stop there,” she warned in remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Mr. Putin “thinks he can wait out all of us,” she said. “We need to prove him wrong.”

Victoria Nuland was the Kremlin’s ‘princess of darkness’

Victoria Nuland was the Kremlin’s princess of darkness. The departing State Department official was always ready to speak her mind, especially when it came to Russia’s malign intentions, writes ‘The Spectator’.

But Nuland was never a dominant force in the Biden administration. National security advisor Jake Sullivan has presided over Ukraine policy, including the cautious disbursement of lethal weaponry to Kyiv, a sore spot for the hawks who believe that a more aggressive posture would have avoided the current stalemate that has taken place on the front-lines. Rather than select Nuland, Biden named Kurt Campbell, a key official on the NSC, to assume the number two post at the State Department which had been held by Wendy Sherman. Campbell is best known for pushing America to pivot to Asia.

So will his ascension signify a diminution in the Biden administration’s willingness to support Ukraine, particularly with the House Republicans stymieing the passage of an aid package to Ukraine? Probably not.

Biden himself is invested in Ukraine’s success and the NSC, not the State Department, will continue to guide policy toward Kyiv. Nuland may be departing, but her stern approach toward Russia has become the credo of Biden and his cohort.

In a surprise development, US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland to retire from the foreign service. The resignation of the US Undersecretary for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland, the third highest ranking diplomat in the Biden administration, came as a bolt out of the blue, notes M.K. Bhadrakumar, Indian Ambassador and prominent international observer.

The general impression of Nuland is of an inveterate ‘hawk’ and Russophobe fired up by neoconservative ideology and American exceptionalism who precipitated the Russian intervention in Ukraine and is largely responsible for fuelling the ongoing war. Of course, there is no denying that Nuland played a key role in the regime change in Kyiv 10 years ago.

Nuland has had a big role in the life of Ukraine and we can only guess the massive dimensions of it. Indeed, she publicly celebrated the sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, which broke the umbilical cord tying Germany to a geopolitical alliance with Russia. Last month, after a sudden visit to Kyiv, Nuland promised some nasty surprises waiting in store for the Kremlin in the Ukraine war.

Was it the idea of combat deployment in Ukraine by NATO countries she was referring to? There are no easy answers. Well, belatedly at least, White House has intervened twice to assert that putting American troops on the ground in Ukraine is a no-go area.

The point is, it is entirely conceivable that Nuland’s exit could be a reflection of the collapse of the whole architecture of the US’ Ukraine strategy, which she designed.

moderndiplomacy.eu · by Newsroom · March 10, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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