Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"A free press can, of course, be good or bad, but most certainly without freedom, the press wll never be anything but bad."

– Albert Camus

"A true man hates no one."

Napoleon

The indigenous Cherokee elder, Stan Rushworth, once said “the difference between a Western settler mindset of, I have rights and an indigenous mindset of I have an obligation.” Instead of thinking that I am born with rights, I choose to think that I was born with obligations to serve past, present, and future generations, and the planet herself.”

1. 2024 ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (Korea comments)

2. U.S. intel believes N.K. leader has no intentions of negotiating away nuclear program

3. 2024 Unification Ministry’s Key Policy Agenda: – A United Korean Peninsula: Pioneering Freedom and Prosperity for All South and North Koreans

4. Top U.S. General Sees Changing Nuclear Threat From North Korea

5. [Full Interview] U.S. Ambassador to Korea Philip Goldberg "The ROK-U.S. alliance will remain strong no matter who becomes the U.S. President... North Korea chooses weapons over people's livelihoods."

6. Bruce Bechtol on North Korea and the Middle East

7. Climate Change as a Path to Engagement with North Korea

8. Shady N.Korean coal vessel enters Russian port

9. Now you can subscribe to a North Korean state TV streaming service

10. S. Korean national arrested in Russia on espionage suspicions: TASS

11. New report highlights worrying trends in N. Korea’s illegal cyber activities

12. North Korea: Kim Jong Un and Kim Yo Jong’s First Messages to Japan

13. Russia resumes maritime shipments of North Korean weapons

14. Germany shares results from recent inspection of its embassy in N. Korea

15. North Korea faces serious fertilizer shortages - again

1. 2024 ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The 41 page report can be downloaded at this link: https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf

The table of contents is pasted below.

I look forward to the separate country reports (if they choose to publish any).

Reflecting my Korea bias, the north Korea report begins on page 21 and covers all the important threats from WMD to conventional to cyber to illicit activities to relations with China and support to Russia.

But it also includes this important section on"challenges." (entire section is pasted below) We have been emphasizing these points especially since COVID (but control of the population has been a key regime tenet since its inception). It fears external information and ideas and most importantly it fears the Korean people more than it fears the external military threats. Until we understand and accept this we will never be able to develop an effective strategy to solve the "Korea question." (para 60 of the Armistice)

I wish policy makers and government and military officials would read, study, understand, and internalize the excerpt below and understand how it needs to inform strategy and policy. I also think everyone would benefit from re-reading Robert Collins' seminal work, "Patterns of Collapse" to understand how the regime might collapse and understand the "indications and warnings" (I&W) that will help us anticipate collapse. I think we must focus on the I&W for regime collapse just as we observe for the I&W for an attack on the ROK. This is important because if Kim is faced with the conditions of collapse he is very likely to determine his only option will be to execute his campaign plan to unify the peninsula by force in order to ensure regime survival. By focusing equally on I&W for collapse and I&W for attack we might see the potential for an attack sooner than if we only focus on I&W for attack.

Finally, if I hear one more official say that collapse is nothing to worry about because north Korea is resilient and if they regime did not collapse in the 1990s it is not likely to collapse now, I might have to just pull a Private King and defect to the north (note sarcasm) because we will never be successful with that kind of attitude and mindset. The chances of internal instability are rising and are now much more likely than in the 1990s because of Kim Jong Un's policies, priorities, and actions.

Lastly, north Korea is not mentioned in either the interstate or intrastate conflict sections and I think this contributes to the lack of acknowledgement and understanding of threats from north Korea.

Challenges

While North Korea has managed to weather the effects of the pandemic and its extreme self- imposed isolation; in the long term, Kim will have to balance his desire for absolute state control with the negative impact upon his country’s economic well-being. The Kim regime has prioritized recentralizing authority above its population and its economy with brutal crackdowns and serious mismanagement of agriculture that probably are worsening living conditions. The North Korean regime has long feared losing control over its people and is trying to roll back the relatively modest levels of private economic activity that have arisen since the 1990s and to ensure state domination over everyday life.

The regime’s recentralization campaign is meant to ensure the long-term survival of Kim-family rule. Its intensity stems from the collapse of fellow communist dictatorships during the 1990s in which the gradual erosion of authority and infiltration of foreign ideas eventually undermined the state. The crackdown restricts livelihoods and promotes inefficient state controls, contributing to food shortages and some decline in civil order—particularly violent crime.

2024 ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2024/3787-2024-annual-threat-assessment-of-the-u-s-intelligence-community

Published: 11 March 2024

Date: March 11, 2024

This report reflects the collective insights of the Intelligence Community, which is committed every day to providing the nuanced, independent, and unvarnished intelligence that policymakers, warfighters, and domestic law enforcement personnel need to protect American lives and America's interests anywhere in the world.

Download the report.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 3

FOREWORD .............................................................................................................................. 5

STATE ACTORS ........................................................................................................................ 7

China..................................................................................................................................... 7

Russia .................................................................................................................................. 14

Iran ..................................................................................................................................... 18

North Korea......................................................................................................................... 21

Conflicts and Fragility .......................................................................................................... 24

Gaza Conflict .................................................................................................................. 24

Potential Interstate Conflict .............................................................................................. 25

Potential Intrastate Turmoil .............................................................................................. 27

TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES .................................................................................................... 30

Contested Spaces .................................................................................................................. 30

Disruptive Technology ..................................................................................................... 30

Digital Authoritarianism and Transnational Repression ..................................................... 31

WMD ............................................................................................................................. 31

Shared Domains ................................................................................................................... 33

Environmental Change and Extreme Weather ................................................................... 33

Health Security ................................................................................................................ 33

Migration ........................................................................................................................ 35

Non-State Actor Issues ......................................................................................................... 36

Transnational Organized Crime ........................................................................................ 36

Human Trafficking ........................................................................................................... 37

Global Terrorism ............................................................................................................. 38

Private Military and Security Companies .......................................................................... 40

2. U.S. intel believes N.K. leader has no intentions of negotiating away nuclear program

Yonhap's assessment of the Korean section of the IC's Annual Threat Assessment.

U.S. intel believes N.K. leader has no intentions of negotiating away nuclear program | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · March 12, 2024

WASHINGTON/SEOUL, March 11 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un "almost certainly" has no intentions of negotiating away his nuclear program and aims to use his defense ties with Russia to achieve acceptance as a nuclear state, a U.S. intelligence report said Monday.

The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment also noted that Kim will continue to pursue nuclear and conventional military capabilities that threaten the United States and its allies.

"Kim almost certainly has no intentions of negotiating away his nuclear program, which he perceives to be a guarantor of regime security and national pride," said the report, released by the office of the Director of National intelligence.

"Kim probably hopes that he can use his bourgeoning defense ties with Russia to pursue his goal of achieving international acceptance as a nuclear power," it added.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (in leather jacket) inspects a drill during a visit to a major operational training base in the country's western region on March 6, 2024, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

The report also pointed out that Pyongyang has "emerged from its deepest period of isolation," and is now pursuing stronger ties with China and Russia with the goal of increasing financial gains, diplomatic support and defense cooperation.

In response to the trilateral cooperation between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan, the North has sought to "demonstrate the danger posed by its military through missile launches and rhetoric threatening nuclear retaliation," according to the report.

"North Korea routinely times its missile launches and military demonstrations to counter U.S.–South Korea exercises in part to attempt to coerce both countries to change their behavior and counteract South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol's hard-line policies toward the North," it added.

Seoul, Washington and Tokyo have been stepping up security coordination to deal with North Korea's evolving threats and its deepening military cooperation with Russia.

On weapons of mass destruction, the report said Kim remains strongly committed to expanding the country's nuclear weapons arsenal, noting that Pyongyang has been prepared to resume nuclear tests at the Punggye-ri site since mid-2022.

"Kim will continue to prioritize efforts to build a more capable missile force -- from cruise missiles through intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and hypersonic glide vehicles -- designed to evade U.S. and regional missile defenses and imports a variety of dual-use goods in violation of UN sanctions, primarily from China and Russia," the report said.

The annual intelligence report also warned that the North will continue to engage in illicit cyber activities to fund its illegal nuclear and missile development programs.

"North Korea will continue its ongoing cyber campaign, particularly cryptocurrency heists; seek a broad variety of approaches to launder and cash out stolen cryptocurrency; and maintain a program of IT workers serving abroad to earn additional funds," it said.

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · March 12, 2024

3. 2024 Unification Ministry’s Key Policy Agenda: – A United Korean Peninsula: Pioneering Freedom and Prosperity for All South and North Koreans

The ROK seizes the moral high ground. Very timely given Kim Jong Un's recent statements on the South as the primary enemy and that he no longer seeks peaceful unification.

This is not insignificant.

The three tasks in my words:

An information campaign built on a human rights upfront approach while preparing the Korean people in the north for a free and unified Korea.

I hope US government and military officials will embrace this and no longer avoid discussion of unification. This policy supports the statements of President Biden and President Yoon in April 2023 and of President Biden, President Yoon, and Primes Minister Kishida at the Camp David Summit in August 2023.

2024 Unification Ministry’s Key Policy Agenda

A United Korean Peninsula:

Pioneering Freedom and Prosperity

for All South and North Koreans

2024 Charts the Course of Unification Grounded in Liberal Democracy

https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&mode=view&cntId=54295

March 8, 2024

The Ministry of Unification announces the unveiling of three key tasks aimed at laying the foundation for a united Korean Peninsula that is free and at peace:

1. To accurately understand and disseminate information about the realities of North Korea as the beginning phase toward unification.

2. To continue efforts to enhance human rights conditions in North Korea and foster positive change within the country.

3. To empower North Korean residents with hope by supporting North Korean defectors in successfully settling down and integrating into society while building capacity for unification.

The Ministry of Unification, led by Minister Kim Yung Ho, announces the 2024 Unification Ministry’s Key Policy Agenda on March 8, 2024. Under the fundamental direction of establishing a sturdy foundation for a united Korean Peninsula that is free and at peace, the Ministry has identified three key tasks and twelve sub-tasks.

“Unification represents a mission to promote the universal values of freedom and human rights.”

Unification Minister Kim Yung Ho briefed President Yoon Suk Yeol on the direction of unification policies, including follow-up measures to the March First Independence Movement Day address, at the Yongsan Office on March 7. Minister Kim emphasized that unification serves as both a historic national mission, ensuring the freedom and prosperity of 26 million North Korean residents, and a global mission, advancing universal values of freedom and human rights. The Minister affirmed the Government’s commitment to advancing unification policies, which includes fostering change in North Korea and strengthening our society’s unification capabilities.

Minister Kim underscored the significance of the current moment, noting that despite the Kim Jong Un regime’s declaration of the Republic of Korea (ROK) as an enemy state and the formal abandonment of the idea of a unified nation, it is imperative for our Government to assert our vision of unification while upholding national unity in an unwavering manner.

The unification policy extends into the daily lives of the people, caring for their livelihoods and aiming for a brighter future.

The Ministry of Unification has aligned its direction with the people-centered policy of the Yoon administration. The Ministry strives to approach the general public and provide necessary services and information; acknowledge those suffering from pain inflicted by the North and promote change; and support the successful settlement of North Korean defectors while pursuing future oriented unification policies.

The Ministry plans to expand nationwide services to the general public, allowing them to engage with unification issues and embrace unification culture in their daily lives. Additionally, the Ministry aims to fulfill its national obligations toward abductees, detainees, prisoners of war, and separated families who have suffered due to North Korea’s actions. Furthermore, the Ministry is committed to closely attending to the livelihoods of North Korean defectors. Simultaneously, by providing settlement support for North Korean defectors, the Ministry seeks to contribute to resolving societal challenges such as social integration and balanced regional development, thereby advancing a future-oriented unification policy.

The 2024 Unification Ministry’s Key Policy Agenda comprises the following tasks.

❙ Task 1. Understand and Raise Awareness of North Korea

Recognizing that the foundation of unification lies in comprehending and accurately conveying the realities of North Korea, our first primary focus for this year is on understanding and raising awareness of North Korea.

Sub-task 1. Disseminate Awareness of North Korean Human Rights Issues at Home and Abroad

“ The Ministry aim s to shed light on the human rights situation of North Korean residents, who are also citizens of the Republic of Korea.”

The Ministry’s objective for this year is to advance with the acquisition of land and architectural planning for the establishment of the National North Korean Human Rights Center in Seoul by 2026. Building on last year’s release of the inaugural North Korean Human Rights Report, the Ministry will publish the 2024 edition this year. The English version will be concurrently released, expanding to address key issues such as (1) the implementation status of the “Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Act” of the North, (2) the exploitation of North Korean overseas workers, (3) forced repatriation, (4) the impact of COVID-19, and more. Furthermore, a diverse array of initiatives will be launched to bolster the efforts of civil society organizations dedicated to improving North Korean human rights and to engage young individuals and non-Korean residents in the ROK in addressing North Korean human rights issues.

Sub-task 2. Develop Content Depicting North Korea’s Reality and Pursue Initiatives to Enhance Understanding of North Korea

“ The Ministry will create comprehensive materials and content to accurately depict the reality of North Korea, informing the public.”

The Ministry of Unification utilized testimonies and surveys of North Korean defectors to publish the Report on North Korean Economy and Society as Perceived by 6,351 Defectors on February 6. Expanding on this effort, we are arranging lectures, academic conferences, and briefings for international organizations and diplomatic missions. Additionally, the Ministry intends to host nationwide talk concerts (public speaking events) on stories about North Korea throughout the year together with North Korean defectors. Furthermore, the Ministry aims to create various types of video content involving North Korean defectors and ROK citizens from all walks of life in the planning process, to be shared both domestically and internationally through YouTube.

Sub-task 3. Establish Correct Historical, National, Security, and Unification Perspectives for Future Generations

“ The Ministry will foster future generations with accurate awareness both inside and outside schools, in collaboration with local communities.”

Recognizing that today’s youth and young adults will shape and inhabit a unified Korea, the Ministry is dedicated to bolstering unification education to cultivate accurate historical and unification perspectives. To accomplish this objective, the Ministry of Unification plans to enrich the content of our yearly basic unification education textbooks, which are distributed to frontline educational institutions, by integrating constitutional values. Additionally, we aim to bolster teachers’ proficiency in unification education and directly engage in devising unification education programs to convey accurate historical perspectives. Notably, this year, we intend to launch new experiential education programs on unification and security at 50 locations nationwide, strengthening the governance of unification education through coordination with various levels of schools and regional unification education hubs*.

* 10 Regional Unification Education Centers, 13 Regional Unification Halls, approximately 1,000 Unification Education Commissioners, 8 Unification Leadership Universities, etc.

Sub-task 4. Expand Public Services in Providing Information Resources on North Korea

“ The Ministry will utilize big data to portray North Korea and facilitate the exploration of unification in cultural spaces.”

The Ministry is committed to enhancing public access to information about North Korea. The Ministry of Unification has improved the functionality of the ‘North Korea Information Portal’ (tentative name) with AI capabilities, which has been operational since March. The Ministry will continue to refine and expand our online services. Additionally, we are facilitating the construction ofthe Unification Information Resource Center,a specialized library on unification and North Korea, in Goyang, Gyeonggi-do, aiming for completion by 2027. Furthermore, we will ensure that comprehensive information about North Korea reaches the public through various media channels.

❙ Task 2. Induce Change in North Korea

The Ministry will unwaveringly pursue a principled North Korea policy to lead in improving human rights and inducing changes in North Korea. In particular, the Ministry aims to help North Korean residents confront the issues of totalitarianism and oppressive governance and understand the root causes of poverty, thus striving to realize a “free, unified Korean Peninsula where the people are its rightful owners.”

Sub-task 1. Strengthen Pressure for North Korean Human Rights Improvement

“ The Ministry will help North Korean residents awaken to human rights and drive change in North Korea.”

The Ministry will empower North Korean residents to develop awareness of human rights by enhancing their access to information and supporting efforts to effectively identify human rights abuses by the North Korean authorities. Given that this year offers numerous opportunities to address North Korean human rights issues, the Ministry will proactively engage with the international community to advocate for improvements. The Ministry plans to expand the scope of the International Dialogue on North Korean Human Rights, first convened in December last year, by holding it biannually. Furthermore, the Ministry will incorporate the discourse that enhancing North Korean human rights will lead to resolving North Korea’s nuclear issue and realizing eventual unification into education materials on unification and security for wider dissemination.

Sub-task 2. Strengthen Efforts to Address Human Rights Abuses Against ROK Citizens by North Korea

“ The Ministry is committed to fulfilling our national duty by ensuring that not a single citizen’s suffering is left behind .”

The Ministry will work with the international community to raise awareness of the issues concerning ROK nationals who have been abducted, detained, and captured as prisoners of war by North Korea, applying pressure on the regime. The Ministrywill also foster national consensus through cultural approaches such as the forget-me-not project and exhibitions. Additionally, we will conduct investigations in collaboration with relevant agencies to provide substantial assistance to the 98 families of abduction victims after the Korean War who have not applied for compensation. Meanwhile, considering the aging* separated families, the Ministry will shorten the survey cycle from five to three years and conduct the fourth survey of separated families (originally planned for 2026) two years earlier, expanding support for genetic testing for second and third-generation separated families and those living abroad.

*Among applicants for separated family reunions, only 29% are confirmed to be alive, with those aged 80 and above comprising 68% of the survivors, and those aged 100 and above accounting for 2.2%.

Sub-task 3. Uphold a Principles Based North Korea Policy to Drive Change

“ The Ministry will firmly respond to wrongful actions and prioritize security, the cornerstone of people’s livelihoods.”

The Ministry will decisively address North Korean provocations and threats while firmly maintaining a principles based approach to North Korea policy. We will respond promptly to North Korea’s attempts to destabilize our society and engage in psychological warfare, rallying public opinion behind national unity. The Ministry will take legal measures against North Korea’s illegal infringement of our properties, such as the unauthorized operation of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, and collaborate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to block North Korea’s illicit financial channels. All the while, the Ministry’s stance on dialogue with North Korea without preconditions remains unchanged.

❙ Task 3. Strengthen Unification Capabilities

The Ministry will provide policy support for the successful settlement of North Korean defectors, while promoting their integration experiences within society to foster tangible progress in the unification progress. The Ministry will also undertake various initiatives to enhance national unification capabilities and establish a firm foundation for unification both nationally and internationally.

Sub-task 1: Enhance Support Systems and Strengthen Settlement Assistance for North Korean Defectors

“ The Ministry is committed to upgrading policies to provide effective support for North Korean defectors.”

The Ministry, upon designation of July 14 as North Korean Defectors’ Day,will commemorate their successful settlement stories and convey messages of hope to the 26 million North Korean residents. Through collaboration with entities such as the Peaceful Unification Advisory Council and the Presidential Committee of National Cohesion, the Ministry will launch mentoring initiatives and social awareness campaigns to highlight the invaluable contributions of North Korean defectors to our society. As we prepare to introduce the Fourth Master Plan for Settlement Support of North Korean Defectors (2024-2026), our focus will shift from individual-centered to family-centered support, with a particular emphasis on empowering the lives of female defectors, who make up 75% of the total. Furthermore, we will continually enhance the support system for North Korean defectors, including legislative reforms aimed at addressing any existing gaps in settlement assistance.

Sub-task 2. Strengthen Self-Reliance and Self-Sufficiency Support for North Korean Defectors and Offer Intensive Assistance to Crisis Households

“ The Ministry is committed to addressing the blind spots in settlement support and providing thorough assistance.”

Recognizing that quality employment is key to successful settlement, the Ministry will enhance vocational training from the foundational education phase at the Settlement Support Center for North Korean Refugees (Hanawon) and modernize advanced vocational training programs (currently offering 15 options) to meet current demands. Our efforts will persist in tailoring employment and entrepreneurship support policies through the employment assistance program (“Employment Success Package”). Moreover, the Ministry will facilitate North Korean defectors’ acquisition of professional qualifications and completion of higher education programs to cultivate expertise across various domains.

The Ministry will target deficiencies within the existing settlement support system, including bolstering education and vocational training support for third-country-born children and fostering collaboration among government agencies, public institutions, and specialized psychological treatment facilities (in the private sector) to establish a systematic approach for trauma therapy at different settlement stages. Additionally, plans are in place to establish a trauma treatment center for North Korean defectors at the Hanawon branch in Hwacheon by the end of this year. The Ministry will continue to monitor and provide proactive support for households categorized as high-risk crisis groups under government management while utilizing this year’s newly established financial incentive (“Fresh Start Incentive”) to enhance the self-reliance of North Korean defectors.

Sub-task 3. Establish a Peaceful Unification Foundation Based on a Liberal Democratic Order

“ The Ministry will build a unification foundation rooted in the constitution, reflecting the future desired by our citizens.”

The Ministry’s strategy involves articulating a vision of a unified Korean Peninsula that is free and at peace, drawing strength from President Yoon Suk Yeol’s philosophy of freedom, and fostering discourse to support new initiatives for unification. The Ministry will promote unification discourse and hold public debates and cultural events to underscore the profound interconnectedness of the unification issue with every facet of everyday lives. Furthermore, with the forthcoming inauguration of the Gangwon Province Unification Plus Center in Chuncheon as the second regional hub later this year, the Ministry anticipates an expansion of regionally-tailored unification administrative services.

Sub-task 4. Advance Unification Capabilities Across All Fronts

“ The Ministry will robustly enhance unification capabilities to instill confidence among our citizens.”

The Ministry will devise and execute a comprehensive plan to bolster unification capacities across diverse sectors and phases at governmental levels, all in pursuit of a unification grounded in liberal democracy. By fortifying the upcoming second-term Unification Future Planning Committee, set to commence in March, with members comprising North Korean defectors, youth, foreigners, and academic experts, the Ministry aims to craft a unification pathway that resonates with the majority of Korean Peninsula residents.

Sub-task 5. Strengthen Solidarity with the International Community to Foster a Favorable Environment for Unification

“ The Ministry will spearhead and promote unification policies endorsed by the international community.”

The Ministry will convene the ‘International Dialogue on Unification Cooperation’ (tentative name), engaging nations that share our values, such as the United States, Japan, and European countries. Furthermore, we will strengthen collaboration with embassies in the ROK as well as the United Nations Command and its member states. Concurrently, the Ministrywill disseminate the vision of unification based on liberal democracy, as articulated in the Camp David Principles and the President Yoon’sMarch First Independence Movement Day address. As a pioneering step, we will launch the inaugural ‘Global Survey on Unification Awareness’ (tentative name), aiming to rally international support for the necessity and significance of unification on the Korean Peninsula. Additionally, the Ministry will actively pursue diverse public diplomacy initiatives, reaching out to overseas research institutions, expatriate communities, and international students studying in the country to effectively raise awareness about unification.

* Unofficial translation

4. Top U.S. General Sees Changing Nuclear Threat From North Korea

First, I disagree with Ankit Panda. There is no daylight between the ROK and US about responses to north Korea. Unfortunately that is old think.

However, I would like to point out our problem with the use of the word "provocation." This has become such an overused word that everything north Korea does is called a "provocation." What General Kang (The Deputy Commander of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command) really means is that any provocation that is a kinetic lethal attack on the South will generate a decisive response from the South and the Alliance (at the time and palace of the attack). When we use provocation for any test firing of weapons in the north with the rhetoric of a stern strong response we undermine our credibility when there is no response other than statements or perhaps a call for new sanctions (which will never happen at the UN due to China and Russia supporting the north). We need more precision when using the word "provocation."

It is good to see those ROK/US CFC patches on the shoulders of the CINC and DCINC in the photos at the link. (the pre-Rumsfeld names for the Commander and Deputy Commander of CFC).

Excerpts:

Gen. Kang Shin-chul calls North Korea’s weapons a practical, obvious and clear threat. The South Korean four-star general compared the counter strategy to trying to achieve a stalemate in chess. “That’s a metaphor, but we are trying to create a situation where the other side can’t use its nukes,” said Kang, the deputy commander general for the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command, which directs both countries’ troops in the event of war.

The command has operational control of more than 600,000 active-duty military personnel from both countries, plus more than 3.5 million South Korean reservists. “If North Korea provokes, we can be stronger and subdue them completely,” Kang said.

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, a conservative who backs a tough line with the North, says peace is built through strength. He has vowed that Seoul’s response to any Pyongyang provocation would be multiple times as hard.

The elevated tension between the two Koreas goes beyond tough words. They each in recent months have launched spy satellites into space. In January, the two countries exchanged live-fire drills, one after another. A years-old inter-Korean accord that was meant to tone down military hostilities has been ripped up, resulting in border soldiers on both sides carrying arms once again.

The South Korean emphasis on a disproportionate response to any North Korean provocation does raise some concern for the U.S., which may not want to see a limited attack escalate into a broader conflict, said Ankit Panda, the Stanton senior fellow in the nuclear-policy program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Hashing out what might be an acceptable response for all scenarios remains a work in progress for Washington and Seoul, he added.

“I do think there is some daylight here between the two countries,” Panda said.

Top U.S. General Sees Changing Nuclear Threat From North Korea

Head of American forces in South Korea says ‘readiness is perishable,’ as joint exercises double in scale

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/top-u-s-general-sees-changing-nuclear-threat-from-north-korea-4788270a?mod=Searchresults_pos2&page=1

By Timothy W. Martin

Follow | Photographs by Tina Hsu for The Wall Street Journal

March 11, 2024 6:00 am ET

Gen. Paul J. LaCamera at Command Post Tango, a decades-old wartime bunker outside Seoul, on Saturday.

COMMAND POST TANGO, South Korea—The top U.S. military official in South Korea said his thinking has changed on deterring North Korea’s nuclear weapons.

In the past, efforts were dedicated to halting Pyongyang’s development of nuclear capabilities. Now the focus is on preventing Kim Jong Un from using the weapons.

“We have to assure him that positive will be met with positive actions, and negative will be met with negative,” said Gen. Paul J. LaCamera, the four-star general who leads the roughly 28,500 American military personnel stationed in South Korea, in a rare interview.

The stick in that equation is on display this month, as the U.S. and South Korea conduct expanded annual springtime drills. This year, the number of field exercises has roughly doubled, as have participating troops. An unprecedented 12 United Nations Command member states are involved, including France, Canada and the Philippines.

The 11-day training, which ends Thursday, spans land, sea, air, cyber and space operations. The drills practice shooting down North Korean missiles, bombing targets and firing shells.

In an interview at a top-secret bunker complex built underneath a mountain outside Seoul, LaCamera said the exercises are aimed at responding to a vast array of potential threats from Kim’s military. He has urged his soldiers to grab lessons from the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, as the nature of combat evolves.

“We cannot have a failure of imagination,” the 60-year-old LaCamera said. “It’s just that simple.”

Gen. Paul J. LaCamera leads the roughly 28,500 American military personnel stationed in South Korea.

The decades-old wartime bunker is called “Tango”—short for Theater Air Naval Ground Operations—and features a labyrinth of passageways. With exercises under way, U.S. and South Korean soldiers filed through the large underground facility, where packages of Raisin Bran were as plentiful as ramen. The facility is reportedly designed to withstand a tactical nuclear strike.

Wearing a camouflage uniform, LaCamera, who has led combat troops in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, stood in what would be the primary command-and-control room for armed conflict with North Korea. “This is the center, this is the brain,” he said. “These are the people that make all the magic happen.”

After becoming a brigadier general more than a decade ago, LaCamera recalled the wording on a coin he possessed back then: Adapt or Perish. Now, he often encourages troops with another quip: “Readiness is perishable.”

Thorny Inter-Korean Tensions

Kim has given officials in Washington and Seoul plenty of reasons recently to prepare for a potential clash.

The North Korean leader has abandoned hopes of peaceful reunification, declared South Korea his country’s No. 1 enemy and vowed to “thoroughly annihilate” Seoul and Washington should either attempt an attack. The 40-year-old dictator has told his people to prepare for war and in recent days oversaw North Korean artillery drills aimed at the enemy’s capital, and the mock takeover of a South Korean border-guard post, state media reported.

Gen. Kang Shin-chul calls North Korea’s weapons a practical, obvious and clear threat. The South Korean four-star general compared the counter strategy to trying to achieve a stalemate in chess. “That’s a metaphor, but we are trying to create a situation where the other side can’t use its nukes,” said Kang, the deputy commander general for the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command, which directs both countries’ troops in the event of war.

Gen. Kang Shin-chul of South Korea said North Korea’s weapons are a clear threat.

The command has operational control of more than 600,000 active-duty military personnel from both countries, plus more than 3.5 million South Korean reservists. “If North Korea provokes, we can be stronger and subdue them completely,” Kang said.

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, a conservative who backs a tough line with the North, says peace is built through strength. He has vowed that Seoul’s response to any Pyongyang provocation would be multiple times as hard.

The elevated tension between the two Koreas goes beyond tough words. They each in recent months have launched spy satellites into space. In January, the two countries exchanged live-fire drills, one after another. A years-old inter-Korean accord that was meant to tone down military hostilities has been ripped up, resulting in border soldiers on both sides carrying arms once again.

The South Korean emphasis on a disproportionate response to any North Korean provocation does raise some concern for the U.S., which may not want to see a limited attack escalate into a broader conflict, said Ankit Panda, the Stanton senior fellow in the nuclear-policy program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Hashing out what might be an acceptable response for all scenarios remains a work in progress for Washington and Seoul, he added.

“I do think there is some daylight here between the two countries,” Panda said.

Gen. Paul J. LaCamera overlooks operations at Command Post Tango.

Pyongyang’s antagonism toward Seoul aims to weaken what is a concern for Kim: the Yoon administration’s bolstered three-way military ties with the U.S. and Japan, which provide a unified front against North Korea, said Sydney A. Seiler, a former U.S. national intelligence officer for North Korea.

“If South Korea looks like they’re shooting off for revenge, and not coordinating with the U.S., it can actually do more harm than good,” said Seiler, a senior adviser of the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank.

A fair fight?

Both LaCamera and Kang said their countries remain aligned and focused on sharpening readiness to dissuade Kim from bad behavior.

North Korea has advanced its nuclear and weapons capabilities with impunity in recent years. The regime has unveiled new generations of its intercontinental ballistic missiles, which have the range to strike the U.S. mainland. Pyongyang has sharpened regional attack power that threatens Tokyo, Seoul and the soldiers under LaCamera’s direction. Those efforts include recent tests of cruise missiles that the Kim regime claims are nuclear-capable.

LaCamera grew circumspect when asked where Kim might instigate an inter-Korean clash. “I focus on capabilities,” he said. “If I could read minds, I would be in a different business.”

Regarding Kim’s fledgling relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, LaCamera opted for a more maximalist presumption of what the two countries might be up to, in terms of how North Korea’s military capabilities might be improving with Russian assistance. But he declined to go into specifics.

Regardless of North Korea’s advancements, LaCamera said: “I’m not looking for a fair fight.”

[Full Interview] U.S. Ambassador to Korea Philip Goldberg "The ROK-U.S. alliance will remain strong no matter who becomes the U.S. President... North Korea chooses weapons over people's livelihoods."

Registered 2024.03.10 18:33 / Modified 2024.03.10 19:39

https://news.tvchosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2024/03/10/2024031090094.html?Dep0=chosunnews&Dep1=related&Dep2=related_all

Reporter Lee Chae-rim

The interview with U.S. Ambassador to Korea Philip Goldberg was conducted for about an hour at the U.S. Embassy residence in Jeong-dong, Seoul, on the afternoon of the 8th.

View the original article

https://news.tvchosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2024/03/10/2024031090084.html

Below is the full interview.

- The third Democracy Summit is scheduled to be held in Seoul this month. What message will President Biden specifically emphasize at this meeting?

=I am very happy and grateful to President Yoon Seok-yeol and the Korean government for hosting the 3rd Democracy Summit. The United States held the first and second democracy summits. Korea's hosting of the Democracy Summit this time will be an opportunity to demonstrate the qualities of a democratic country as a global hub.

In the United States, a large delegation led by Secretary of State Blinken will actively participate. During the conference, the U.S. Embassy in Korea will also hold an event with youth. We will hold side events that will raise issues related to youth, women, and LGBTQ, and emphasize inclusion.

What President Biden will emphasize at this summit is that we live in a world where democratic and authoritarian governments are in conflict, and what benefits democratic countries provide to the people. Citizens of democratic countries have important values such as freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion.

- This year’s theme is ‘Democracy for future generations.’ I don't think democracy for future generations and the democracy we need in the present are very different, but can we say this is a topic that includes concerns that totalitarianism may spread to other countries in the future?

= That's right, that's what I'm worried about. Populism and authoritarianism, which are anti-democracy, tend to attract people.

Authoritarian systems cannot guarantee long-term economic benefits to people. We also want to emphasize that it cannot provide values such as freedom, democracy, and participation in civil society.

There is competition in the world now with authoritarian countries that do not provide those values to their citizens and do not allow freedom of speech or religious freedom. This is a value that will be shared by Korea, the United States, and the people of countries participating in the Democracy Summit.

- President Yoon Seok-yeol proposed holding trilateral talks between Korea, the United States, and Japan in Seoul at Camp David last year. Of course, there is a possibility that the leaders will meet at other occasions, such as multilateral talks, but it is true that there are also expectations for a Korea-U.S.-Japan standalone meeting. Is there any chance of it being held this year?

= I was also there during the state visit to Washington last year. President Biden also greatly appreciated President Yoon’s invitation. As you know, this is a very busy year due to elections in both countries. We need to look at the schedules of busy leaders. The leaders of Korea, the United States, and Japan will meet, but it is not yet known when and how.

- In an interview last month, he said, ‘No matter who becomes the U.S. president, the ROK-U.S. alliance will continue to be strong.’ Is your position on this the same? Last week, the rematch between former President Trump and President Biden was finally confirmed. There are concerns in Korea about Trump's re-election. What do you think?

= What I said during that interview and my current position are the same. The ROK-US alliance enjoys bipartisan support in our Congress and among the general public. The trilateral relationship between Korea, the United States, and Japan receives great support from both parties regardless of party in our Congress.

I believe that the relationship between the two countries and the three countries will continue not only for this reason but also for other reasons. It is in the interests of each country. The contents included in last year's 'Washington Declaration', 'Joint Statement on State Visits', and 'Camp David Agreement' include not only military and security relations, but also various areas of cooperation. Of course, considering North Korea's provocations and threats, it makes a lot of sense for us to work together and face those challenges together.

However, (bilateral and trilateral relations) also include new areas of cooperation such as science and technology. For example, while utilizing the advantages of artificial intelligence technology, issues such as imitating other people's voices using AI technology in political campaign videos are also important issues that need to be addressed. This too is an issue faced by democratic countries.

The three universities, Seoul National University, the University of Tokyo, and the University of Chicago, have signed a new agreement to develop relationships in quantum physics technology and are also collaborating on cybersecurity.

North Korea is earning foreign currency by stealing cryptocurrency and falsely employing IT personnel overseas. We must face this situation together.

Some are security-related, but some are related to other issues we will be dealing with in the 21st century. For these reasons, I believe that the ROK-US alliance will remain strong regardless of who is elected.

-Last week, South Korea and the United States appointed a delegation to negotiate defense cost sharing. Korean media analyzed it as 'an early start due to concerns about former President Trump's re-election.' Can this start of negotiations be considered an ‘early start’? What is your stance on this?

=I think the starting point of these negotiations is commensurate with the time needed to reach a very technical agreement. Negotiations must technically examine exactly how much defense costs are and how the burden will be divided. The current SMA expires in 2025, and it will take time to reach a full agreement. Therefore, it makes sense to start as early as possible and discuss any disagreements together so that a good solution can be reached as quickly as possible. This issue is a sensitive one for both the United States and Korea. The United States wants the alliance to reach a fair agreement based on real cost sharing.

-There was a foreign media report that the United States was 'pressuring Korea, Germany, and Japan to join in regulating semiconductor technology against China.' Is this true, and if true, why is the participation of allies in regulation important?

= Creating a so-called ‘small yard, high fence’ around the latest semiconductor technology is beneficial to everyone. Because semiconductors can be used for purposes we all oppose. Semiconductors can be used for military purposes, surveillance, and even to disrupt other systems. The U.S. government is cooperating with governments in Korea, Japan, and Europe on that goal. However, this does not mean that we will stop trading with China or that we will not manage our relationship with China maturely. We want to protect cutting-edge technologies from falling into the ‘wrong hands’ to be used against us. Also, the semiconductor technology discussed here is not all semiconductor technology, but only applies to truly 'cutting-edge' technology.

- Some argue that it is time to start disarmament negotiations with North Korea. They probably believe that sanctions against North Korea are not effective. I know this is not the official position of the U.S. government, but what do you think about these growing voices?

= Our goal is denuclearization, and we are interested in the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful, stable, and denuclearized state. The fact that experts said such things at some think tank meetings cannot be seen as leading to a change in government policy. oneThe United States is a strong ally and will continue extended deterrence for the protection and safety of the Korean people.

Sanctions against North Korea are a tool, but they cannot be a solution to everything. I think the sanctions actually had some effect. But it will not be enough as long as there is a regime in North Korea that has no interest in the well-being of its people, food supplies, medical care, and their well-being, and uses weapons of mass destruction in the name of the well-being of its own people.

6. Bruce Bechtol on North Korea and the Middle East

Dr. Bechtol's next book that he is co-authoring with an Iran expert will be on north Korea and Iran.

Bruce Bechtol on North Korea and the Middle East

by Marilyn Stern

Middle East Forum Webinar

February 26, 2024

https://www.meforum.org/65645/bruce-bechtol-on-north-korea-and-the-middle-east

Bruce Bechtol, professor of political science at Angelo State University, spoke to a February 26 Middle East Forum Podcast (video). The following summarizes his comments:

North Korea's significant role in the violence roiling the Middle East was most recently evident in Hamas's October 7 attack against. North Korean F-7 rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) sold to the terror group were fired at kibbutzim in southern Israel during Hamas's incursion. An Israel Defense Force's (IDF) investigation revealed Korean writing on the F-7s trigger mechanism, proving its origins – "it's not a smoking gun, it's a smoking Howitzer." As early as 2014, a deal with North Korea brokered through a Lebanese front company supplied Hamas with multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), rockets, and laser-guided (specifically produced by North Korea) anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) that Hamas has used against Israel.

Gaza's vast tunnel network "look[s] almost exactly" like the tunnels under the demilitarized zone [DMZ] in Korea for a reason. North Korea gave Hamas the technical support and training for construction of its extensive tunnel system within which the terror group can hide. The arms smuggled into the Gaza Strip go through Sudan and through tunnels under Egypt's border with Gaza. The huge cache of weapons in Hamas's possession points to the ineffectiveness of Egypt's interdiction.

North Korea has no compunction selling weapons to terrorist groups. Thus, countries such as Israel and the U.S. must consider North Korea's proliferation of weaponry "an existential national security threat" they have yet to address through "proactive means." Washington has been "slow" to focus on Pyongyang, ostensibly because the U.S. is in "sensitive talks" with the regime about its nuclear program. Yet, North Korea still has nuclear weapons, and it is destabilizing not only the Middle East, but also Sub-Saharan Africa.

In his 2018 book, North Korean Military Proliferation in the Middle East and Africa, Bechtol details North Korea's supply of weapons to Hamas, which is but one of the Iranian regime's many proxies receiving North Korean weaponry and destabilizing the region. Other Iranian proxies receiving North Korean weaponry include Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen. Therefore, "destroying North Korea's illicit arms networks in the Middle East runs through Iran."

Syria purchased Scud-C missiles from North Korea with the billions of Saudi dollars awarded to the Assad regime for fighting against Iraq in the Gulf War. Later, the North Koreans built a fabrication facility for the missiles with North Korean parts and technical assistance. Syria has been testing Scud-D missile systems purchased from Pyongyang for years, and with North Korea's assistance, Syria used them during the early stages of the Syrian Civil War.

Using military subsidies from Iran, Syria paid North Korea to upgrade its capabilities by resupplying Assad's military forces with chemical weapons. In 2007, Israel destroyed Syria's nuclear reactor that was built with North Korea's assistance. In 2016, North Korea supplied Syria with a variety of artillery systems, including ATGMs, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and machine guns. Pyongyang also provided two battalions of special operations forces that fought for Syria in Aleppo. By 2018, North Korea "was proliferating hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of conventional and unconventional weapons a year" on behalf of Syria during the Civil War. In 2019, hundreds of North Korean workers arrived in Syria and have remained there until this day.

From the 1980s to 2000, North Korea provided Hezbollah with arms and training. However, in the 2000s, Pyongyang aided Iran's proxy by "building a large underground network in Southern Lebanon" with the capacity to contain extensive command and control, arms, and comprehensive support systems. Although "Hezbollah is way more developed militarily than Hamas," destruction of both movements' tunnels can be aided by human intelligence gained from captured fighters who provide information on tunnel layouts, and by "seismic equipment" Israel uses to detect underground activity in tunnel locations.

A 2022 report by Israel's Alma Research and Education Center stated that Hezbollah had reached a $13 million dollar deal with a North Korean front company to build a "45-kilometer tunnel system" that was completed in 2021. The Korean front companies launder Hezbollah's payments through Lebanese, Iranian, or Emirati banks, which in turn launder these funds through China. North Korea then obtains these funds through third-party intermediaries.

In the past, the U.S. Treasury Department could interrupt the laundering process by sanctioning banks. Post-COVID, however, the North Koreans deal in Bitcoin, which is much more difficult to trace. Bechtol's book, Rogue Allies: The Iran-North Korea Nexus, co-authored by Anthony Celso and due out this fall, details North Korean and Iranian money laundering using cryptocurrencies in cyberspace. It is on record that North Korea conducts more international crime using cyber theft "than any other entity on Earth."

North Korea gave Hamas the technical support and training for construction of its extensive tunnel system within which the terror group can hide.

The Alma report stated that Syrian forces, as noted earlier, "provided Hezbollah with Scud-D missiles" and described chemical weapons in the hundreds, equipped with North Korea's assistance and Iranian chemical weapons experts. These weapons are warehoused near the Syrian border with Israel. Increasingly, Hezbollah's huge number of weapons has been a financial boon for North Korea's "industrial military complex."

In Yemen, the previous government had Scud-Cs, which the Houthis captured when they gained the advantage in the Civil War. The Iranians provided its Houthi proxy with the technical training to deploy the Scuds against the Saudis and Qataris. Tehran has since provided the Houthis with an updated version of the Scud-C. In 2019, the Houthis reached a deal, either directly or through the Iranians, to purchase tanks, trucks, machine guns, artillery and "more than one type of ballistic missile" from the North Koreans.

The proliferation of North Korean weaponry contributes to violence and instability in the Middle East. It behooves the U.S. to address this North Korean proliferation of weaponry that has been ongoing in the region since 2011.

Marilyn Stern is communications coordinator at the Middle East Forum.

Related Topics: Gaza, Hamas, Iran, Israel & Zionism, Israel-Hamas War, Lebanon, Syria

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The Middle East Forum, an activist think tank, deals with the Middle East, Islamism, U.S. foreign policy, and related topics, urging bold measures to protect Americans and their allies. Pursuing its goals via intellectual, operational, and philanthropic means, the Forum recurrently has policy ideas adopted by the U.S. government.

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7. Climate Change as a Path to Engagement with North Korea

If we support unification of Korea we should support reforestation of the north. This is one of the major problems in the north.

Although we use the Chinese adage as a metaphor - "When is the best time to plant a tree? 20 years ago. When is the next best time? Right now." We can apply it literally in the case of north Korea.

Given the nature of the Kim family regime I am not optimistic that it will engage on this issue but it could be one area that civil society could pursue. But again, if you read the ODNI's Annual Threat Assessment the regime fears any outside information and with engagement comes information and influence.

Climate Change as a Path to Engagement with North Korea

The United States, South Korea and the international community could start by providing support for reforestation in North Korea.

https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/03/climate-change-path-engagement-north-korea

Monday, March 11, 2024 / BY: Troy Stangarone

PUBLICATION TYPE: Analysis

Reforestation in North Korea

During the North Korean famine of the 1990s, the collapse of the public food distribution system accelerated deforestation in the country. Desperate North Koreans cut down trees, even on mountainsides, to make space for cultivable land and for fuel. Estimates of the overall losses of forest cover vary, but there is agreement by North Koreans and outside experts that North Korea has undergone a significant level of deforestation since the 1990s.

Addressing this challenge has been a point of emphasis under Kim Jong Un. He has referred to this effort as “a war to improve nature,” and shortly after he came to power, the regime took an initial step, ordering residents not to reclaim land on slopes of more than 15 degrees to prevent landslides and erosion. In 2015, Pyongyang put in place a plan to reforest North Korea over 10 years, while Kim, in his New Year’s address, stated: “We must carry out a strong battle in reforestation so that the mountains’ green forests turn into lush mountains of gold.” In a speech later that year, Kim noted that deforestation has increased North Korea’s susceptibility to flooding, mudslides and soil erosion, which all have a negative impact on the economy. It is one of the few times the regime has acknowledged economic challenges beyond the context of outside forces.

In subsequent years, North Korea has made some progress on reforestation. After declining by an annual average of 0.8 percent from 2001 to 2015, forest coverage in North Korea increased by 0.2 percent per year through 2019. As of 2019, forest coverage had been restored to 45 percent of North Korea’s surface, though much of the effort has been near major cities such as Pyongyang and Kaesong, along with tourist areas.

North Korea’s Interest in Climate Change

Climate change is one of the few areas where North Korea proactively engages the international community. It is a member of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and in its 2016 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) at the Paris climate talks, Pyongyang said: “Integrating climate change considerations into relevant socio-economic development strategies and plans is considered as one of the important measures to ensure the sustainable development in DPR Korea.”

North Korea committed to reducing emissions by 8 percent by 2030 and up to 40.25 percent with international support in its initial NDC in 2016. In a 2019 update to that commitment, North Korea increased the goal for its own reductions by 16.4 percent over the same time period. But in a 2021 update to its U.N. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Pyongyang lowered its domestic goal to a 15.63 percent cut and 50.34 percent cut if international assistance is provided.

North Korea indicated in its 2016 NDC that it planned to achieve its goals through the management and development of forests in a sustainable manner, along with an increase in renewable energy, improved climate and environmental laws, and enhanced cooperation with the international community. The 2019 update emphasized a significant push for forest restoration and, again, a turn to clean energy technologies, while the 2021 U.N. SDGs report notes that Pyongyang’s greenhouse gas emissions reductions are reflected in its National Forestation Strategy (2015-2044).

While North Korea’s own track record raises concerns regarding follow-through, the UNFCCC annual Conference of the Parties (COP) is one of the few high-level international conferences in which Pyongyang regularly participates. At COP 27, North Korea released a statement calling for developed countries to fulfill their responsibilities in addressing climate change and for practical and concrete measures to be taken to address the issue. While this is largely in line with other developing countries, Pyongyang likely has its own practical, domestic reasons for wanting to see progress on climate change.

The U.S. intelligence community has identified North Korea as one of 11 countries most vulnerable to climate change, a vulnerability Pyongyang acknowledges. North Korea’s initial NDC estimates that the average temperature in the North will rise by 2.8 to 4.7 degrees Celsius over this century compared to the last three decades of the 20th century. Rising seas are estimated to result in the loss of 67 to 89 meters of North Korea’s east coast, while the west coast is expected to see coastal erosion between 670 and 890 meters by the end of the century. More directly of concern, flooding is expected to be more severe in the rainy season and droughts more severe in the spring. Both will contribute to flooding, land loss and potentially decreased agricultural production, which are already significant problems today.

Practical Projects for Engaging North Korea on Climate Change

North Korea’s own domestic needs and its willingness to engage on climate change internationally create potential areas for engagement on climate change through U.N. climate credits, specifically carbon dioxide removal credits.

At COP26, countries agreed to a rulebook for Article 6.2 carbon credits from the Paris Climate Accord. To qualify under Article 6.2, any credits would need to result in the removal or reduction of emissions, be permanent projects that would not occur without outside funding and utilize a conservative baseline to measure the emissions reductions. At COP27, new language was added to Article 6.4 to allow for mitigation contribution carbon credits. This change addresses long-standing concerns about double counting of emissions reductions in voluntary carbon markets by companies purchasing carbon credits. It allows purchasers to claim a contribution to helping a country achieve a domestic target without claiming to offset their own emissions. This change opens the door for potential private sector engagement in climate change projects in North Korea should the security and sanctions situation change in the future.

With North Korea already focused on reforestation, carbon credits could be a tool for engaging North Korea on climate change while encouraging sustainable change in North Korea in relation to forest preservation. North Korea also has prior experience in utilizing U.N. carbon credits and has previously received funding from the U.N.’s clean development mechanism, a carbon offset program.

South Korea is also a good partner for engagement with North Korea on reforestation. Not only does Seoul have a strong record on reforestation itself, but at COP26 South Korea included cooperation on reforestation in third countries, including North Korea, as one of the means through which it expected to achieve 5 percent of its emissions reductions by 2030. South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s administration has maintained South Korea’s willingness to cooperate with North Korea on forestry issues.

How Would Cooperation Work in Practice?

South Korea, the United States and other interested countries would provide support for reforestation in North Korea, including technical expertise, the transfer of saplings and other supplies needed for reforestation. The parties would need to seek an exemption from the 1718 Committee — the committee was set up in 2006 to oversee sanctions measures imposed by the U.N. Security Council on North Korea — for any necessary financial transfers and for North Korea to collect revenue from the carbon credits that the governments involved would commit to purchase as long as North Korea maintained a certain level of forest cover. Some of this could be mitigated if funds from any carbon credits were provided through barter rather than financial transfers. The program would use satellite monitoring of forests to ensure compliance by North Korea.

Earnings from any carbon credits could be disbursed to North Korea through the Green Climate Fund. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, Pyongyang approached the fund about training and capacity building for accessing climate finance to support other projects under North Korea’s NDC, such as “agriculture, forestry, energy, waste management and disaster risk management.”

If cooperation on reforestation is successful, the United States, South Korea and the international community should consider other climate-related projects. Wind power is another potential area of cooperation, though more complex from the perspective of existing sanctions due to the need for investment in physical infrastructure. Kim has previously called for North Korean energy independence and the development of North Korea’s offshore wind resources is one area where North and South Korea could share the benefits of cooperation. North Korea’s 2016 NDC calls for the construction of 500 megawatts of offshore wind farms in the West Sea/Yellow Sea. In addition to the West Sea/Yellow Sea, a global estimate by the International Atomic Energy Agency suggests that North Korea also has significant potential for offshore wind power in the East Sea/Sea of Japan. Similar to Pyongyang’s arrangement with Beijing to provide China with hydroelectric power, a percentage of the wind power could be routed to South Korea allowing both countries to benefit.

After an initial flurry of activity under the Trump administration, engagement with North Korea has stalled. With the incentives for North Korea to return to talks diminishing with Russia’s embrace of North Korea as an arms supplier, it will be important for Washington, Seoul and others to find ways to engage Pyongyang. Climate change, and specifically the issue of reforestation, may be one area where the interests of all three countries align and potential progress could be made.

Troy Stangarone is senior director and a fellow at the Korea Economic Institute.

8. Shady N.Korean coal vessel enters Russian port

Shady N.Korean coal vessel enters Russian port

https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2024/03/12/5OIMFZXTSVBETNJ5KJO7XNOM5Y/

By Kim Myeong-jin,

Woo Ji-won

Published 2024.03.12. 15:00

Updated 2024.03.12. 15:22

Satellite image taken on March 10, 2024 shows the North Korean cargo ship "Kum Ya" (IMO: 9004073) docked at the port of Vanino in Russia. /RFA

A North Korean cargo ship known for smuggling coal in violation of U.N. sanctions sailed into a Russian harbor, the U.S.-based Radio Free Asia (RFA) said on Mar.12.

Marine Traffc’s vessel tracking data indicates that the North Korea-owned vessel “Kum Ya” docked at Pier 17 (PPK-3) in the port of Vanino, Russia, on Mar. 6 at 5:19 a.m., RFA said.

A photograph from Planet Labs on Mar.10 captures a ship with the same identification signal as Kum Ya.

The U.N. listed Kum Ya as an illegal coal carrier for alleged coal smuggling to China in 2021. U.N. Security Council resolutions 1718 and 2397 explicitly limit the trade of North Korean coal.

Pier 17, the docking location of the cargo vessel, is recognized as the “coal pier,” according to RFA.

Despite the absence of indications of coal being loaded or unloaded, RFA noted, “Such a move raises suspicions of illegal coal transfer, especially given the heightened concerns about arms trade between North Korea and Russia.”

9. Now you can subscribe to a North Korean state TV streaming service

I subscribe to a lot of news services but this is one I will not spend money on.

Now you can subscribe to a North Korean state TV streaming service

Content typically includes propaganda about leaders and bad news about other countries.

https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/streaming-03112024171310.html

By Jamin Anderson for RFA Korean

2024.03.11

The homepage for the pro-North Korea organization Chollima Front in Poland.

RFA screenshot

For the first time, subscribers around the world can pay to watch North Korean state-run TV.

Called Shiwani TV, the service will livestream Korean Central Television from a pro-North Korean organization based in Poland called Chollima Front for 19 euros (US$21) a month, which includes radio as well.

The programs typically include propaganda about supreme leader Kim Jong Un or other top officials, bad news about other countries – thought to instill fear among North Koreans that the outside world is largely unsafe – and stories confirming the policies that the government wants to push.

For just radio service from the radio stations Korean Central Broadcasting and Voice of Korea, it’s 9 euros ($10) a month. The content will be digitized from their satellite and shortwave broadcasts and streamed online.

“We will actually offer our service to everyone who pays for it,” a representative of Shiwani TV told RFA Korean, asking not to be identified by name. “We believe that everyone should have access to high-quality television, regardless of their location, political views, party or organizational affiliation, or contacts.”

The service will be available worldwide, including in the United States as well as in South Korea, where it may run counter to national security laws and therefore be illegal to access – which the Shinwani TV official said shouldn’t be a problem.

‘Technically illegal’

“In South Korea … it’s technically illegal to access content from North Korea, but [the laws] date back to 1948 before the internet era,” the representative said. “People aren’t prosecuted for private consumption of North Korean content these days.”

Additionally, Shiwani TV is not under South Korean jurisdiction as it is based in Poland, the representative said.

The plan has the support of North Korean authorities, he said. The North Korean Embassy in Poland is aware of the plan and has reacted very positively, he added.

The service may fill gaps left by the closure in January of two North Korean state-run news websites, when Kim Jong Un called for a “fundamental turnaround” in its stance toward reunification, reversing its previous campaign to be reunified with the South.

The homepage of Shiwani TV, a paid subscription service that would stream North Korean state media, (RFA screenshot)

“They are aware of the service, and their acknowledgment stems from the understanding that it has become increasingly difficult to find high-quality television recordings online since the closure of Korean websites uriminzokkiri.com, dprktoday.com, etc.,” the Shiwani TV official added.

The representative said the service will have no contractual relationship with North Korean authorities, the embassy, or any North Korean national, the organization will not pay video usage fees. He also said that the organization is confident it will meet its subscription goals, without elaborating what those goals were.

‘No one is interested’

On its website, Chollima Front says it is an independent organization for the study of North Korean culture and its founding Juche ideology of self-reliance, regardless of politics. The organization says it fights against disinformation while sharing reliable news about North Korea.

Chollima Front has approximately 12 members, mostly Polish, but also includes Germans and Canadians.

“Chollima Front is very small organization whose members are a few young Polish people with communist political views,” a Polish North Korea and East Asia studies scholar, who requested anonymity for personal safety, told RFA, “They are in touch with North Korean Embassy in Warsaw.”

He emphasized that the organization does not have much influence.

“No one in Poland is interested in North Korean culture, especially in comparison to South Korean culture,” he said.

The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not respond to RFA’s inquiry about whether it was aware of Shiwani TV’s launch plan.

The Polish Embassy in the United States thanked RFA for the information regarding the launch of the service and said it has alerted the “appropriate parties.”

Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.

10. S. Korean national arrested in Russia on espionage suspicions: TASS

Spy vs Spy north of the north Korean border in Russia (and in China as well I am sure).

I am sureprised there are not more reports such as this.

(LEAD) S. Korean national arrested in Russia on espionage suspicions: TASS | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · March 11, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with more info)

SEOUL, March 11 (Yonhap) -- A South Korean national was arrested in Russia early this year on espionage suspicions, the Russian news agency TASS reported Monday.

The person surnamed Baek was detained in Vladivostok and transported to Moscow late last month for investigation on suspicions of passing classified state information to a foreign intelligence agency, TASS said, citing law enforcement authorities.

It marks the first time a South Korean has been arrested in Russia on spying suspicions.

The Lefortovo Court in Moscow extended the detainment period of the arrested South Korean to June 15 in a closed-door hearing.

Citing Seoul's participation in international sanctions against Moscow following its invasion of Ukraine, Russia designated South Korea as an "unfriendly" nation in 2022.

This EPA image, not directly related with the news story, shows a Russian police car. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · March 11, 2024

11. New report highlights worrying trends in N. Korea’s illegal cyber activities

We must defend against the all purpose sword by going on the offensive.

New report highlights worrying trends in N. Korea’s illegal cyber activities

The report suggests that North Korea is trying to increase the success rate of cyberattacks by diversifying money laundering across different services

By Abhishek Sharma -

March 12, 2024dailynk.com

New report highlights worrying trends in N. Korea’s illegal cyber activities - Daily NK English

The Cybercrimes 2024 report published by Chainalysis, a blockchain data platform has again highlighted some interesting trends concerning North Korea cyberattacks. The report has identified a substantial decrease in money laundering by North Korean hackers like the Kimsuky and Lazarus. The hacked amount is almost USD 1 billion in 2023 as compared to USD 1.7 billion in 2022, a sharp decline in the total laundered amount. However, even though the stolen fund’s amount has dropped, the attempted number of hacks reported has risen sharply reaching 20, increasing by five more compared to 2022 and 11 more than in 2021.

For North Korea, Decentralized Finance (DeFi) protocols are an important source of funding; last year it was among one of the important actors that drove an increase in illicit funds heists from DeFi hacking. However, this year, as stated in the report, the DeFi hacks are no longer the leading method used to obtain illegal funds. The decrease appears to be due to the number of DeFi activities and the DeFi operators getting ““better at smart contract security,” the report said. In 2023, North Korea stole USD 428.8 million through DeFi protocols compared to USD 1.1 billion stolen in 2022.

Apart from DeFi protocols, “mixers” have been North Korea’s next most favored means to steal funds thanks to strong financial privacy rules in the international sphere. The Cybercrimes 2024 report shows that North Korea continues to use new mixer services for laundering funds. However, new mixers such as YoMix have replaced older ones like Sindbad after it was sanctioned by the OFAC last year. In 2023, the use of mixers for transfer saw a decline from USD 504.3 million to USD 1 billion in 2022, as stated in the report.

Earlier, Sindbad was the preferred mixer used by North Korean hackers. The Sindbad mixer was used to launder portions of USD 100 million, USD 620 million, and USD 100 million in different heists. Before that, two other mixer services, Tornado Cash and Blender.io were sanctioned by the OFAC. Bledner.io and Tornado Cash were used by North Korea to launder USD 20.5 million and USD 100 million respectively.

Hackers diversify methods to move and launder money

Another tool used by North Korea to mount heists is “cross-chain bridges,” which are meant to transfer blockchain assets or cryptocurrency between blockchain networks. The report shows that cross-chain bridges were used more frequently by international hackers in the past year, with the bridges used to transfer illicit funds increasing from USD 312.2 million in 2022 to USD 743.8 million in 2023. Evidence suggests that North Korean hackers were among those who utilized the cross-chain bridges the most. The Cybercrimes 2024 report identified multiple uses of cross-bridge protocols to move funds associated with the 2022 Harmony hack. The funds were moved through different blockchains from Bitcoin to Avalanche, converted to stablecoins, and again moved from the Avalanche blockchain to TRON Blockchain.

Mixers and Crypto bridges have continued to be a part of the North Korean strategy to launder illicit money, highlighting that the means to launder remain the same but the methods used may change. This shows two important things about how North Korean hackers function: 1) they are able to adapt quickly to changes; and 2) they are searching for new avenues to launder stolen money. The DPRK’s strategy is representative of the flexibility shown by state-affiliated hackers attempting to keep ahead of regulations and law enforcement.

The 2024 Cybercrimes report allows us to conclude that North Korea is trying to increase the success rate of cyberattacks by diversifying money laundering across different services, particularly as it faces more constraints from regulatory frameworks and intensifying efforts by law enforcement. That North Korean hackers continue to adapt and find new ways to circumvent stringent rules show their desperation to collect funds, which then get funneled into the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missiles weapons program. The globe’s increasing digitalization only raises more concerns about the risks posed by North Korean cybercrimes.

Edited by Robert Lauler.

Abhishek Sharma

Abhishek Sharma is a PhD Scholar in Korean Studies at Delhi University where his doctoral thesis examines the Strategic Utility of North Korean cyber capabilities. He is also a Research Associate at the Centre for Air Power Studies, based in Delhi, India. His research interests focus on the intersection of geopolitics and cyber capabilities, cybercrimes, and AI in the Indo-Pacific region. He can be reached at gr.abhi96(at)gmail.com.

March 12, 2024

dailynk.com

12. North Korea: Kim Jong Un and Kim Yo Jong’s First Messages to Japan

Excerpt:

With the possibility of Trump once again becoming president, North Korea may be looking to resume negotiations with the United States. However, it cannot afford to repeat the mistake of the Hanoi summit, and it has no intention of making concessions itself. Still, it is natural to think that if talks between the United States and North Korea were to resume, Japan-North Korea relations should also be improved to the extent possible to prevent obstruction from a hardline Japan. Although Japan does not have the influence to advance United States-North Korea relations, it remains more than capable of disrupting them.

North Korea: Kim Jong Un and Kim Yo Jong’s First Messages to Japan

thediplomat.com

What does the North Korean leadership have in mind?

By ISOZAKI Atsuhito

March 10, 2024

This photo provided on Aug. 14, 2022, by the North Korean government, Kim Yo Jong, sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, delivers a speech during the national meeting against the coronavirus, in Pyongyang, North Korea, on Aug. 10, 2022,

Credit: Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP

Kim Yo Jong, vice department director of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and the powerful sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, has traditionally been critical of both the United States and South Korea. On February 15, she turned her attention to Japan and issued a message.

In response to Prime Minister Kishida Fumio’s statement at the Budget Committee of the Lower House that the current state of Japan-North Korea relations “must be changed boldly,” she stated, “It is my opinion that if Japan makes a political decision to open up a new way of mending the relations through its courteous behavior and trustworthy action on the basis of courageously breaking with anachronistic hostility and unattainable desire and recognizing each other, the two countries can open up a new future together.”

However, she went on to say that, “If Japan drops its bad habit of unreasonably pulling up the DPRK over its legitimate right to self-defense and does not lay such a stumbling block as the already settled abduction issue in the future way for mending the bilateral relations, there will be no reason for the two countries not to become close and the day of the prime minister’s Pyongyang visit might come.” (The DPRK is an abbreviation for North Korea’s formal name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.)

This sets a high hurdle to clear before the two countries can have their first summit meeting in 22 years. The North Koreans are well aware that Japan cannot abandon the abduction issue and so their mention of it deliberately makes it challenging for Japan to move forward.

As already reported by the Asahi Shimbun, there is no doubt that Japan and North Korea have been in contact with each other in a third country since last spring, but in fact Japan has done no more than ask to be able to send a special envoy to Pyongyang. This is why North Korea is exploring the seriousness of Kishida’s intentions, not only on the abduction issue but also on whether it is has a broader vision for improving Japan-North Korea relations.

Kim Yo Jong, who reiterated her previous claim that the abduction issue “had already been settled,” concluded by saying that “[t]his is just my personal view only and I am not in the position to officially comment on the relations between the DPRK and Japan.” By refraining from making this a statement of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, whose words carry absolute weight, and instead making it the “personal view” of his sister, there is a possibility that North Korea’s response may change in the future depending on the Japanese position.

Some analysts believe that this exceptional statement was triggered by the establishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and South Korea, but the change in North Korea’s stance toward Japan should be viewed in the context of a series of developments, such as a statement by Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Pak Sang Gil in May 2023 and a condolence message from Kim Jong Un in January this year.

The statement issued in the name of Pak Sang Gil on May 29, 2023 asserted, “It is the stand of the DPRK government that if Japan tries to make a new decision from a broad perspective of recognizing each other as it is intact in conformity with the changed international trend and the times, not being shackled by the past, and seeks a way out for improving the relations, there is no reason for the DPRK and Japan not to meet.” The fact that this came from the vice minister of foreign affairs, an official who is high ranking both in name and substance, rather than a regular “researcher of the Institute for Japan Studies under the DPRK Foreign Ministry” or an “international commentator,” attracted more attention than did the relatively amicable nature of the message.

Then, on January 5, 2024, Kim Jong Un sent a message of sympathy to “Your Excellency Fumio Kishida” in connection with the Noto Peninsula earthquake. This was the first message that Kim had sent to a Japanese prime minister, so it came as a major surprise. Since then, the ruling party newspaper, the Rodong Sinmun, has studiously refrained from criticizing the Kishida administration by name.

The possibility that this was an attempt at catching Kishida’s eye and inducing new developments in Japan-North Korea relations can’t be ruled out. At the very least, there is no doubt that North Korea is more interested in Japan than it has been previously. The short-term intention is to separate Japan, the United States, and South Korea, but more important is the long-term perspective.

In 2018, only Japan expressed strong concerns about the first-ever North Korea-United States Summit, which was held in Singapore. When then-U.S. President Donald Trump, angered by North Korea’s attitude, spoke of canceling the summit, then-Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, welcomed the news. Subsequently, however, Japan continued to seek ways to obstruct the conclusion of any agreement between the United States and North Korea, working through John Bolton, who was Trump’s national security advisor at the time. It was not until sometime after the breakdown of the second summit in Hanoi that Abe, who had been asserting that “dialogue for dialogue’s sake is meaningless,” began to speak to Kim Jong Un about unconditional dialogue, a policy change that North Korea dismissed as “brazen-faced.”

With the possibility of Trump once again becoming president, North Korea may be looking to resume negotiations with the United States. However, it cannot afford to repeat the mistake of the Hanoi summit, and it has no intention of making concessions itself. Still, it is natural to think that if talks between the United States and North Korea were to resume, Japan-North Korea relations should also be improved to the extent possible to prevent obstruction from a hardline Japan. Although Japan does not have the influence to advance United States-North Korea relations, it remains more than capable of disrupting them.

Authors

Guest Author

ISOZAKI Atsuhito

ISOZAKI Atsuhito is a professor at Keio University.

thediplomat.com

13. Russia resumes maritime shipments of North Korean weapons

Russia resumes maritime shipments of North Korean weapons

The Russian cargo ship Lady R has returned to the North Korean port of Rason, which is used to supply weapons from the DPRK to the Russian Federation. This probably signals the resumption of the naval operation after a month-long pause

global.espreso.tv

The South Korean media outlet NK Pro reports.

Satellite images indicate that the ship is carrying containers that may contain weapons for the war against Ukraine. Russian ships involved in the maritime transportation of North Korean ammunition and weapons to Russia have not docked in this port since February 12.

The Lady R ship delivered cargo from North Korea to Russia twice in October 2023 and once in February 2024.

Objects began appearing again at the North Korean pier between March 8 and 9 and more by March 10, indicating that containers were arriving by train from North Korea to be prepared for shipment.

NK Pro's analysis shows that the Lady R picked up containers at Russia's eastern port on February 8 before dropping anchor in waters east of Vladivostok around February 10.

It remained there for weeks, but disappeared from the site between March 7 and 9, shortly before arriving in Rason. Its deck appears to have been full of weapons containers throughout the time it was anchored there.

In early March, an investigation revealed that the supply of weapons by sea from North Korea to Russia had stopped due to delays in production, logistics or other problems.

global.espreso.tv

14. Germany shares results from recent inspection of its embassy in N. Korea

Germany shares results from recent inspection of its embassy in N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · March 12, 2024

SEOUL, March 12 (Yonhap) -- A senior German official briefed a South Korean official on the outcome of his delegation's recent inspection of its embassy in North Korea, the foreign ministry said Tuesday.

Earlier in the day, German State Secretary of the Federal Foreign Office Thomas Bagger also discussed bilateral ties and regional security in his talks with First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Hong-kyun in Seoul.

Last month, the German delegation visited Pyongyang to inspect the site of its embassy for the first time since it was closed in 2020 amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

Bagger shared the results of the inspection and said Germany will maintain close communication with Seoul regarding the issue, the ministry said in a press release, without providing further details.

During their talks, Kim also expressed his hope that the two countries bolster ties not only in trade and investment but also expand their cooperation to areas like climate change and high-tech industries.

First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Hong-kyun (R) poses for a photo with German State Secretary of the Federal Foreign Office Thomas Bagger (C) and German Ambassador to South Korea Georg Schmidt prior to their talks in Seoul on March 12, 2024, in this photo provided by the ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · March 12, 2024

15. North Korea faces serious fertilizer shortages - again

I fear we could see a famine that might be worse than the Arduous March of the 19990s.

North Korea faces serious fertilizer shortages - again

With even South Pyongan Province - part of the country's breadbasket - facing serious shortages, the situation is likely much worse in other parts of the country

By Seulkee Jang - March 12, 2024

dailynk.com

North Korea faces serious fertilizer shortages - again - Daily NK English

Farmers working with masks on a collective farm in Pyongwon in March 2020. (Rodong Sinmun-News 1)

As North Koreans begin planting wheat and barley, the first crops of the year, the country is once again facing a severe fertilizer shortage. The amount of fertilizer supplied to farms in South Pyongan Province this spring is less than half of the amount supplied last spring.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, a source in South Pyongan Province told Daily NK on Mar. 7 that the province’s agricultural management committee conducted a survey of fertilizer supplies to farms in the province in mid-February. The committee found that less than 50% of the planned amount of fertilizer had been delivered.

There were also regional disparities within the province. Farms in the breadbasket counties of Mundok, Sukchon, Pyongwon and Chungsan received an average of 50% of the planned amount, but farms in the central highlands counties of Yangdok, Maengsan, Pukchang and Tokchon received much less.

“We’ve always received about 60% of the fertilizer we need for the year around this time, but this time we didn’t even get the fertilizer we need to plant the seedlings. At the moment, we’re also not receiving adequate supplies of locally produced fertilizer,” the source said.

The agricultural management committees in each province provide farmers with 60% of the fertilizer they need for a year’s planting around February each year, while farmers are supposed to provide the remaining 40% from their own resources, the source explained.

But this year, the farms received only about half the usual amount, or 30% of the fertilizer they need for the year, he said. This leaves the farms with a serious fertilizer deficit for the spring planting season, which is about to begin.

The North Korean authorities boasted that they had increased the production of nitrogen fertilizer by 100% as one of the “remarkable achievements in the whole people’s economy” summarized at the Ninth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which was held at the end of December 2023.

But the reality is that even farms in South Pyongan Province – home to some of North Korea’s best-known fertilizer facilities, including the Sunchon Phosphate Fertilizer Plant and the Namhung Youth Chemical Complex – do not receive an adequate supply of fertilizer. If even South Pyongan Province is facing this situation, the fertilizer shortage in other parts of the country could be much more severe.

Limited to nitrogen fertilizer

The main reasons for North Korea’s fertilizer shortage are believed to be the lack of imported materials needed to produce fertilizer and the aging equipment used to produce it. Despite these difficult circumstances, North Korea is calling for an improvement in agricultural productivity.

A related problem is that North Korea focuses exclusively on producing nitrogen-based fertilizer because it is unable to produce potassium-based fertilizer on its own. The Namhung Youth Chemical Complex and the Hungnam Fertilizer Complex, North Korea’s largest fertilizer plants, are both known to produce nitrogen fertilizer.

“There has to be a proper mix of organic and inorganic fertilizers, but North Korea is focused solely on producing nitrogen fertilizer. That’s the only fertilizer it can produce on its own, as it lacks the raw materials and technology needed to produce [other types of] fertilizer,” said Cho Chung-hui, head of the research arm of the South Korean non-government organization Good Farmers and an expert on North Korean agriculture.

“The fact that almost all fertilizer used in North Korea is nitrogen-based is another reason why it’s hard [for the North] to make its farms more productive,” Cho said.

Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.

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Seulkee Jang

Seulkee Jang is one of Daily NK’s full-time reporters and covers North Korean economic and diplomatic issues, including workers dispatched abroad. Jang has a M.A. in Sociology from University of North Korean Studies and a B.A. in Sociology from Yonsei University. She can be reached at skjang(at)uni-media.net.