Quotes of the Day:
"We have two ears and one mouth so that we can listen twice as much as we speak."
- Epictetus
"Half the world is composed of people who have something to say and can't, and the other half who have nothing to say and keep on saying it."
- Robert Frost
"The speed of communications is wondrous to behold. It is also true that speed can multiply the distribution of information that we know to be untrue."
- Edward R. Murrow-
1. N. Korea fires 4 suspected shots from multiple rocket launchers into Yellow Sea: officials
2. Time to reconstitute pressure on Pyongyang
3. North Korea preparing to test-fire 'monster missile'
4. Yoon's first response to North Korea provocations likely to determine course for next 5 years
5. Presidential office to move to Yongsan
6. [INTERVIEW] Ex-lawmaker backs presidential relocation to Yongsan
7. Hasty relocation decision - New presidential office plan lacks consensus
8. Yoon personally sells his move to Yongsan
9. Yoon confirms presidential office to relocate to Yongsan by May
1. N. Korea fires 4 suspected shots from multiple rocket launchers into Yellow Sea: officials
No need to overreact. We must understand that this is all part of increasing tensions, making threats..and conducting provocations, well you know the rest. we cannot give Kim what he wants or we will continue to see this pattern.
Note that in South Korean news, President-elect Yoon's plan to move the Presidential offices to Yongsan, and COVID rank higher in reporting than the multiple rocket launch firing.
(LEAD) N. Korea fires 4 suspected shots from multiple rocket launchers into Yellow Sea: officials | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with more details, background throughout)
SEOUL, March 20 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Sunday fired four suspected shots from its multiple rocket launchers into the Yellow Sea, South Korean military officials said, the latest show of force that could heighten tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
South Korea's National Security Council (NSC) held an emergency vice-ministerial meeting over the four shots that fell into the western waters during a span of an hour from 7:20 a.m. from an unspecified location in South Pyongan Province, according to officials.
Park Kyung-mee, presidential office spokesperson, said the NSC meeting members stressed the need to maintain "a firm defense readiness posture" based on the South Korean military's enhanced capability and the South Korea-U.S. alliance during a time of a government power transfer.
"There were shots believed to be that of North Korea's multiple rocket launchers this morning," an official of the South Korean military said.
"We are maintaining our defense readiness posture while closely following related developments," the official added.
The multiple rocket launcher firings came amid tensions on the Korean Peninsula over North Korea's tests of an intercontinental ballistic missile system on Feb. 27 and March 5.
North Korea also launched an apparent ballistic missile on Wednesday, but the missile appears to have exploded in midair at an altitude of below 20 kilometers, according to South Korea.
odissy@yna.co.kr
(END)
2. Time to reconstitute pressure on Pyongyang
I would add to my esteemed colleagues' (Anthony Ruggiero and Behnam Ben Taleblu) thoughts with recommendations for an even broader strategy. Sanctions, financial actions, and diplomatic condemnation are important for pressure on the regime but are not sufficient for exerting necessary pressure. Let me offer a few more areas for consideration.
As a baseline please refer to our monopgrah here: Maximum Pressure 2.0: A Plan B for North Korea HERE
Maximum Pressure 2.0: A Plan B for North Korea By Bradley Bowman and David Maxwell
Aggressive Diplomacy By Mathew Ha, David Maxwell, and Bradley Bowman
Military Deterrence and Readiness By David Maxwell, Bradley Bowman, and Mathew Ha
The Cyber Element The Cyber Element By Mathew Ha and Annie Fixler
U.S. Sanctions Against North Korea By David Asher and Eric Lorber
Information and Influence Activities By David Maxwell and Mathew Ha
A number of areas on which we need to focus:
First is influence operations. Information is an existential threat to the regime. This is how we pressure the elite, the military, and separate the regime from the elite and the Korean people in the north. This is because Kim Jong-un fears the Korean people more than he fears the ROK and US military threat and more than he fears sanctions. We have opportunity to now embark on a comprehensive information and influence activities campaign with the election of President-elect Yoon. He is likely to undo the ROK moratorium on (and laws against) information transmission into north Korea. It is time to stop paying lip service to information and develop a true influence strategy to support ROk and US national interests on the Korean peninsula.
We need to not only go against the regime's "all purpose sword" (cyber) but aggressively employ cyber capabilities to hinder missile and nuclear develop, erode the regime's ability to use cyber enabled economic warfare and illicit cyber activities to continue to fund the regime's royal court economy, and to support information and influence activities.
We also need to reinvigorate the Proliferation Security Initiative and actually conduct interdicting operations against north Korea shipping that is proliferating weapons to conflict zones around the world.
We also need to prevent the ship to ship transfer of sanctioned goods (primarily coal and oil) in international waters that support the regime's sanctions evasion activities.
And then there is readiness. We need to take readiness exercises off the negotiating table. They cannot be used as a bargaining chip. We must understand that Kim does not view cancelling exercises as a concession to his security need. he wants exercises cancelled for two reasons: Tor drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance and to weaken military readiness, parimarly US military readiness to make the stationing of US troops on the peninsula untenable (do not be duped by Kim Jong-un's words to the former Secretary of State that he says the US troop presence protects Korea from China and therefore he does not want their removal - this is regime political warfare).
The bottom line is a new strategy must be built on deterrence, defense, denuclearization, and resolution of the "Korea question" (para 60 of the Armistice Agreement) by employing a superior form of political warfare. It should consist of 5 lines of effort: comprehensive diplomacy, resolute alliance military strength, pressure through enforced sanctions, cyber defense and offensive operations and information and influence activities to target the regime elite , the second-tier leadership, and the population to undermine the legitimacy of the regime and separate the Kim family regime from the elite and the 2d tier leadership as well as to prepare the population for unification.
As part of this strategy the Alliance must take a human rights upfront approach because human rights are not only a moral imperative, they are a national security issue. Kim Jong-un denies the human rights of the Korean people living in the north so that he can remain in power. Human rights cannot be sacrificed for the pursuit of denuclearization negotiations. We should also remember that when we talk about the north’s nuclear program it reinforces regime legitimacy. However, we expose human rights abuses and crimes against humanity and inform the Korean people in the north about their basic human rights it is an existential threat to the regime.
A political strategy alone will not defeat the Kim family regime's political warfare strategy. We need a superior form of political warfare.
A wise Korea hand once said to me that just about everything that could be tried with north Korea has been tried and all we can do is keep repackaging previous actions in new ways to try to achieve some kind of progress.
But we need to thoroughly assess the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. and then develop a new strategy that will result in a new acceptable, durable political arrangement that will protect, serve, and advance US and ROK/US alliance interests.
A key initial effort of the Biden administration with the election of Yoon should be a thorough review of alliance strategies with a focus on assessing the fundamental assumptions upon which ROK and US policies and strategies are based. The Moon Administration has been laboring under the erroneous assumption that Kim Jong-un supports President Moon’s vision of peace and reconciliation and that there can be north-South engagement on reciprocal terms. A thorough analysis and understanding of the Kim family regime will reveal the Kim family regimes’ strategy is to use political warfare to subvert the South Korea nation and when conditions are right to use force to unify the peninsula under northern rule. Basing policy and strategy on the Moon administration’s assumptions is the path to failure on the Korean peninsula. Biden and Yoon have an opportunity to get on the right path together.
We need to return to fundamentals and answer these questions:
1. What do we want to achieve in Korea?
2. What is the acceptable durable political arrangement that will protect, serve, and advance US and ROK/US Alliance interests on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia?
3. Who does Kim fear more: The US or the Korean people in the north? (Note it is the Korean people armed with information knowledge of life in South Korea)
4. Do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the mafia like crime family cult known as Kim family regime?
5. In support of that strategy do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the objective to split the ROK/US Alliance and get US forces off the peninsula? Has KJU given up his divide to conquer strategy - divide the alliance to conquer the ROK?
The answers to these questions should guide us to the strategy to solve the "Korea question" (para 60 of the Armistice) and lead to the only acceptable durable political arrangement: A secure, stable, economically vibrant, non-nuclear Korean peninsula unified under a liberal constitutional form of government with respect for individual liberty, the rule of law, and human rights, determined by the Korean people. In short, a United Republic of Korea (UROK)
Again, there is no silver bullet to the north Korea problem. This is why we need to focus on the long-term solution to the security and prosperity challenges on the Korean peninsula. That is to focus on resolving the Korean question, "the unnatural division of the peninsula.” Solve that and the nuclear issues and the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity will be fixed. The question to ask is not what worked and what did not, but whether our action advanced our interests and moved us closer to the acceptable, durable political arrangement that will protect, serve, and advance US and ROK/US alliance interests?
We should never forget these two points:
1. The root of all problems in Korea is the existence of the mafia- like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime that has the objective of dominating the Korean Peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.
2. The only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear program and military threats as well as the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people living in the north by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a United Republic of Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, and human rights as determined by the Korean people. In short, a United Republic of Korea (UROK).
Time to reconstitute pressure on Pyongyang
The Hill · by Anthony Ruggiero and Behnam Ben Taleblu, opinion contributors · March 19, 2022
A “saturation attack” describes simultaneous launches aimed at overwhelming an adversary’s defenses and crippling their capability and will to respond. Amid Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine and Iran’s launching of ballistic missiles near a U.S. facility in Iraq, North Korea appears intent to pile on, having just launched another ballistic missile Tuesday.
The Biden administration cannot afford to let North Korea extort it while it is distracted by other foreign policy crises. The time to reconstitute pressure on Pyongyang is now.
On March 10, Pentagon press secretary John Kirby declared that Pyongyang’s post-Beijing Olympics launches on Feb. 26 and March 4 were testing components of a new ICBM “likely to evaluate this new system before conducting a test at full range in the future, potentially disguised as a space launch.” An unnamed senior administration official called North Korea’s actions “a serious escalation.” Initially, Pyongyang framed the March test as part of a larger effort to develop a “reconnaissance satellite.”
The latest tests follow Pyongyang’s escalatory January replete with seven missile tests including the Jan. 30 launch of a intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of targeting Guam last tested in September 2017. North Korea has conducted at least 12 missile launches this year.
Domestically, Kim might be seeking to use missile tests to distract from deteriorating economic and public health conditions, as well as to make good on pledges to upgrade Pyongyang’s nuclear, missile, and military capabilities per a potentially pre-planned test schedule. Looking abroad, beyond attempting to blackmail the U.S. into economic relief, he could use these tests to measure the mettle of new conservative South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol, who will enter office this May.
Regardless of motivation, Pyongyang’s missile escalation is a harbinger of resumed long-range ballistic missile and potentially even nuclear testing to come. Traditionally, the Kim regime felicitates anniversaries with missile or nuclear tests or military parades. April 15 – the 110th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il-Sung, North Korea’s founder and grandfather of the current leader – may be a major flashpoint. South Korean sources believe it could be even sooner.
The Biden administration should not drown out the impact of its military drills and limited designations by doubling-down on engagement. Instead, it should reconstitute diplomatic and economic pressure on North Korea.
Committing to denuclearization, the Biden administration put all its eggs in the engagement basket in 2021 by encouraging Kim to negotiate without preconditions. Kim rebuffed these advances as a “façade,” commencing his own pressure policy with missile launches and threats.
2022 has fared no better. Per a readout of National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s March 14 meeting with Chinese Communist Party Politburo Member Yang Jiechi, which followed the ICBM news, Washington did not mention or condemn any of Pyongyang’s missile tests from 2022. This is an unforced error and sends Kim a message that Washington is too burdened by other crises to respond to North Korea.
And while laudatory, the administration’s sanctions against North Korea’s missile and WMD procurement networks on Jan. 12 and March 11 risk appearing as an occasional slap on the wrist rather than the opening salvo of a larger offensive imposing costs on the Kim regime for its political warfare strategy.
Some may pejoratively ask if North Korea has anything left to sanction. But the UN Panel of Experts, a group that investigates UNSCR implementation, routinely identifies areas in reporting where UN sanctions on North Korea are waning. The group’s work is impactful, which is one reason why China is focused on reducing its role.
In addition to working with Congress to implement many of the mandatory North Korea sanctions that Congress enacted, the Biden administration could rebuild a North Korea pressure policy in three key areas based on the Panel’s reports.
First, Washington should enforce existing sanctions related to Pyongyang’s import of refined petroleum beyond the UN cap. The Biden team should also target North Korea’s export of coal, which is prohibited by the UN sanctions.
Second, the United States should target North Korea’s overseas network of representatives, which Pyongyang uses to procure prohibited and controlled items and to find creative ways to generate and repatriate revenues. The Biden administration’s Jan. 12 sanctions highlighted the network’s role by exposing five North Korean officials, one based in Russia and four in China, engaged in illicit procurement activity.
Third, Washington must reduce Pyongyang’s access to the international financial system. Both the Obama and Trump administrations sanctioned Chinese financial institutions, entities, and individuals to send a message to Beijing. It will take the same action by Biden to ensure China reins in Pyongyang.
Lastly, the administration needs to rebuild the diplomatic coalition that would condemn North Korea’s actions, reduce its diplomatic presence overseas and in Pyongyang, and fully implement UN and U.S. sanctions.
At a UNSC meeting on Jan. 20, the administration issued a strong condemnation of Pyongyang’s missile launches. But less than half of the council’s members supported the statement. A similar statement issued on Feb. 4 raised the total supporters to more than half. But China and Russia prevented a formal response to Pyongyang’s UN sanctions violations. A statement on Feb. 28 took a step back to less than half the council, including U.S. partners like the UAE, not agreeing. The U.S. also failed on March 8 to get support for a similar resolution of condemnation.
While it is unclear why the United States has been unable to convince even friendly countries to join it, if Washington is focused on continuing an engagement-centric policy, it will not convince others to counter Pyongyang.
The Biden administration has a lot on its foreign policy plate. But there is no time like to present for a more robust North Korea policy, especially as Kim prepares to introduce more advanced missiles into the equation.
Anthony Ruggiero is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (@FDD). He previously served in the U.S. government for more than 19 years, most recently as senior director for counterproliferation and biodefense on the U.S. National Security Council. Follow him on Twitter @NatSecAnthony.
Behnam Ben Taleblu is a senior fellow at FDD, where he covers Iranian political and security issues as well as functional issues like nonproliferation and arms control. FDD is a Washington, D.C.-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
The Hill · by Anthony Ruggiero and Behnam Ben Taleblu, opinion contributors · March 19, 2022
3. North Korea preparing to test-fire 'monster missile'
First they are preparing us to think they are going to fire this missile. Before they do they will provide us the opportunity to provide concessions in return for not firing it. But every test is always about advancing their military capabilities. Political warfare and developing advanced military capabilities to dominate the peninsula are not mutually exclusive.
North Korea preparing to test-fire 'monster missile'
North Korea will likely test fire a new “monster missile” in the next few weeks, Washington has warned, in what would be a major escalation of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programme.
The massive Hwasong-17 was first unveiled at a military parade in 2020 but has not been test-fired since. It is potentially capable of carrying multiple warheads to anywhere in the US.
“The purpose of these tests, which did not demonstrate [intercontinental ballistic missile] range, was likely to evaluate this new system before conducting a test at full range in the future, potentially disguised as a space launch,” said the Department of Defence in a statement.
Experts believe that Hwasong-17 will get its debut in the coming weeks, ahead of the April 15 ‘Day of the Sun’ national holiday when North Korea marks the birth anniversary of Kim Jong-un’s grandfather, Kim Il-sung.
In response, South Korea and the US said they were considering the resumption of their “Blue Lightning” joint military drills involving American nuclear-capable bombers on the Korean Peninsula.
If the US warnings are true, it would be Pyongyang’s first ICBM test since tensions last skyrocketed in 2017 and is a sign of how much the situation on the Korean peninsula has deteriorated in recent months.
On top of several high-profile tests involving hypersonic weapons and a long-range cruise missile, the North also appears to be restoring underground tunnels in Punggye-ri, a nuclear test site that was reportedly decommissioned in May 2018.
“A new crisis with North Korea is quickly brewing,” according to Ankit Panda, a senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Kim is fixated on “bigger-ticket items that could significantly harm US, South Korean, and Japanese interests by expanding the quality and quantity of the nuclear threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear forces,” he said.
The Hwasong-17 has since been dubbed a “monster” by analysts since it was first displayed in 2020, due to its enormous diameter of almost 2.5 metres and total mass when fully fuelled of up to 110,000 kg.
Its transporter vehicle requires 11 axles and, said Mr Panda, it is “the largest liquid-propellant missile deployed in a road-mobile configuration in human history”.
Of particular concern if it becomes operational is its ability to launch multiple warheads, inflicting more devastation and making it easier to evade missile defence systems.
Nuclear disarmament talks with Seoul and Washington collapsed in February 2019, and since January 2021 Kim has been signalling his intention to eventually return to full-scale ICBM testing.
Now it seems he is finally ready.
“The check is coming soon, I suspect. Given the US assessment of the two most recent tests, I’d expect the odds of a full-scale ICBM test involving the new Hwasong-17 booster to be quite likely,” said Mr Panda.
If it does, we may not know about it immediately.
The tests on February 26 and March 5 are now believed to be preliminary launches to test parts of the ICBM were initially concealed as reconnaissance satellite development tests and analysts believe any future launches may be conducted the same way.
The test would be a major escalation for the North Korean regime.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visits the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground in Tongchang-ri, North Korea Credit: Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP
Unlike his father, who used missile testing sparingly and for political purposes, “Kim Jong-un is actually trying to get these missiles and technology to an operational level,” said Jenny Town, director of the Stimson Centre’s 38 North Programme.
“He is testing for performance. It’s not for political showmanship.”
With little reason to come back to the negotiating table right now, Kim is looking to take advantage of current events, both regionally and globally.
South Korea has just elected a hawkish new president, Yoon Suk-yeol, who wants closer ties with the US and a stronger stance against Pyongyang. Kim is hoping to put him on the back foot from day one and “demonstrate that he has strategic dominance over South Korea,” said Patrick Cronin, the Asia-Pacific Security Chair at the Hudson Institute.
“Yoon is an inexperienced politician, he’ll be surrounded by great experts, but from day one it will be a baptism of fire for him.”
The conflict in Europe is also diverting attention from Pyongyang. Kim is looking to use “the diversion of Moscow’s war in Ukraine to get away with a lot,” he added.
But it was a strategy that could rebound.
“There is a heavy appetite for strengthening defences, in Congress, in Seoul, in Tokyo, in Canberra, in Europe,” said Mr Cronin. “North Korea is playing with fire.”
4. Yoon's first response to North Korea provocations likely to determine course for next 5 years
Yoon's first response to North Korea provocations likely to determine course for next 5 years
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol / Korea Times photo
By Kang Seung-woo
Amid signs of North Korea abandoning its self-restraint in regards to testing long-range missiles and nuclear weapons, President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol's pledge to take a tougher stance and bolster South Korea's deterrence against its northern neighbor ― in close cooperation with the United States ― is likely to prolong the period of non-engagement between the two Koreas under his new administration.
Furthermore, Yoon has filled the foreign policy subcommittee of his transition team with officials from the former Lee Myung-bak government, who pursued confrontational policies that almost pushed the two Koreas to the brink of war.
With the new conservative administration to be inaugurated in May, Pyongyang is likely to test how much bandwidth the Yoon administration will allow in dealing with its provocative actions, and diplomatic observers say how the new government responds to this initial saber-rattling will set the tone for inter-Korean interactions for the next five years.
"Relations between the two Koreas once President-elect Yoon takes office will entirely depend on Pyongyang," said Ramon Pacheco Pardo, a professor of international relations at King's College London.
"If North Korea goes down the test route, then I would expect the Yoon government to focus on deterrence, sanctions and denunciation of Pyongyang's human rights abuses above all. This would strain relations," he said.
Soo Kim, a former CIA analyst now with the RAND Corporation, said that the Kim Jong-un regime will renew tensions on the Korean Peninsula and watch for the response from the new South Korean government.
Traditionally, North Korea has attempted to gauge the response of new South Korean administrations with weapons demonstrations.
"Kim may seek to test the limits of the Yoon administration with provocations of varying intensity," Soo Kim said.
"So the real test lies in how the Yoon administration will respond. If there's no commensurate action to sustain the rhetoric, then this will simply underscore vulnerabilities, which Kim Jong-un is likely to take advantage of."
She added that Seoul will need to pursue measures, both unilaterally and in close coordination with allies and partners, which will curb Kim's appetite for tension and aggression.
"How the Yoon administration responds to North Korea's first set of provocations will set the course of inter-Korean interactions for the next five years," she noted.
From the start of the year, North Korea has launched missiles on 10 occasions, including one failed test Wednesday, and threatened that the country will lift its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear weapons and long-range missile tests.
Speculation is rife that the totalitarian state may launch an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or even detonate a nuclear bomb on the occasion of founder Kim Il-sung's birthday, which falls April 15. In January, the North said it may consider restarting "all temporarily suspended activities."
In addition, the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence has predicted that North Korea could resume nuclear weapons and ICBM testing this year.
Although Yoon may adopt a hardline stance toward North Korea, a dramatic change from outgoing President Moon Jae-in's policy of reconciliation toward the North, the incoming president needs to take advantage of the Biden administration's approach to the country.
The Biden administration has urged the North Korean regime to return to negotiations, stressing that it is ready to meet the country unconditionally ― although the Kim regime has yet to respond to the repeated calls.
"I don't think that Yoon will want a repeat of the clashes of 2010 or the tensions of 2017. Thus, I think that he will leave the door open to dialogue," Pacheco Pardo said.
"Also because the Biden administration has signaled that it is open to talk with Pyongyang even before it takes steps towards denuclearization ― something that Obama did not do. Thus, Yoon has an incentive to try to work with Biden to address the North Korea nuclear issue."
Pacheco Pardo also said it would not be a bad deal for North Korea to improve ties with the conservative South Korean government.
"From Pyongyang's perspective, improving relations with South Korea during a conservative administration would make sense," he said.
"This would facilitate the survival of any inter-Korean dialogue and peace process if a liberal president takes over in South Korea later on. So Pyongyang may think that it is in its interest to try to improve relations with Seoul while Yoon is in office."
5. Presidential office to move to Yongsan
And with this decision the President-elect should ask for the rok/US CFC to remain in Seoul.
Presidential office to move to Yongsan
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol shows an artist's impression of the new presidential office during a press conference at the presidential transition committee office in Samcheong-dong, Jongno District, Seoul, Sunday. Joint Press Corps
President-elect pushes ahead with relocation plan despite backlash from ruling and minor opposition parties' claims of budget waste
By Nam Hyun-woo
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol announced his administration will relocate the presidential office and residence from Cheong Wa Dae in central Seoul's Jongno District, to the defense ministry compound in Yongsan District.
"Given the public inconvenience and the purpose of giving Cheong Wa Dae back to the people, I believe it's the right choice to make a prompt decision to move to the headquarters of the Ministry of National Defense in Yongsan," Yoon said during a press conference.
"I am well aware of concerns over the hasty relocation as my term will begin in just 50 days… However, once I get into Cheong Wa Dae, it will be harder for me to move out of the complex, which is the symbol of Korea's imperial presidency."
He said he will start his presidency on May 10 at the new office, which sits next to U.S. Army Garrison Yongsan, and the Cheong Wa Dae site will be opened to the public. The defense ministry will be moved to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) headquarters, which is also inside the compound, and the JCS will move to the Army Public Affairs Division building for a while before relocating to the Namtaeryeong area in southern Seoul.
The front gate and main building of Cheong Wa Dae in Jongno District, Seoul / Yonhap Cheong Wa Dae is a complex of multiple buildings including the presidential residence and office and other facilities for presidential aides and security personnel. It has been the office for all presidents of Korea since the country's establishment in 1948.
Throughout history, the presidential office has had a symbolic status as the seat of presidential power, and presidential aides also enjoyed strong authority through this system. This oftentimes resulted in infighting between presidential secretaries and Cabinet members, raising concerns over "imperial" presidential power.
During his campaign, President-elect Yoon vowed to move the presidential office in order to end the country's legacy of imperial presidencies and have the presidential office more open to the public to enhance his communication with the people.
Initially, Yoon promised to set up a presidential office at the Government Complex in Gwanghwamun, which is close to Cheong Wa Dae, but ultimately decided on the defense ministry building, citing the difficulties of moving existing ministries in the Government Complex and public inconvenience due to security procedures for the President.
"Moving into Yongsan had been one of the options during the campaign," Yoon said. "While the defense ministry has existing security facilities, such as an underground bunker, and plenty of space for the defense ministry to move, the Government Complex in Gwanghwamun will require a new building for the foreign ministry, and we have to use facilities in Cheong Wa Dae again."
An artist's impression of the new presidential office, which will be set up at the Ministry of National Defense headquarters in Yongsan District, Seoul. Courtesy of presidential transition committee According to the transition committee, the new presidential office is expected to be set up on the second floor of the defense ministry building. Offices of the presidential chief of staff and other secretaries will also be installed on the same floor, in a way similar to the West Wing of the White House, to enable faster communication between Yoon and his aides.
In Cheong Wa Dae, the presidential office was located in the main building, while offices of the secretaries were typically in separate buildings. Consequently, staffers had to visit the presidential secretaries to discuss state affairs, stirring controversy over the power of the secretaries. During the Park Geun-hye administration, they were referred to as the "door handles" to the president. President Moon Jae-in instead kept his office in one of the buildings for secretaries to avoid this problem.
While revealing the concept for the new presidential office, Yoon also said his administration will set up a park surrounding the office by using the nearby U.S. Army land which is scheduled to be returned to Korea, so people can see the President working.
Yoon said the plan will cost 49.6 billion won ($40.8 million). He will finance this from the state reserve fund, which is managed by the minister of economy and finance, and its use is subject to the minister's review and the President's approval. The transition committee anticipated that the proposal will be approved during a Cabinet meeting this week.
Ministry of National Defense headquarters in Yongsan District, Seoul / Yonhap Yoon's plan has faced a strong backlash from the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), which estimated the relocation may cost up to 1 trillion won. The ruling party also raised doubts whether moving into a military compound can serve Yoon's purpose of improving public communication.
"The President-elect said he wants to move out of Cheong Wa Dae for better communication, but moving into a military fortress means deepening the lack of communication," Rep. Kim Byung-joo said.
Despite the doubts, Yoon said he decided to move to Yongsan because improving communication with the public and departing from the imperial presidency style are also "urgent" tasks for the President.
"I do believe your mind is controlled by the space you have," Yoon said. "If I don't make a decision now, it will be harder for the country to leave the legacy of imperial presidencies."
Though Yoon stressed the importance of communication with the people, doubts are already growing over his pledge, as the transition committee plans to prohibit rallies and protests in the vicinity of the new presidential office.
Before the COVID-19 pandemic, there had been public rallies and protests in front of Cheong Wa Dae and nearby Gwanghwamun. Throughout the Moon administration, conservative civic groups have held rallies against the liberal administration there, and after former President Park Geun-hye's scandalous actions were revealed, massive candlelit protests filled Gwanghwamun Plaza.
Presidential office in the main hall of Cheong Wa Dae / Yonhap
6. [INTERVIEW] Ex-lawmaker backs presidential relocation to Yongsan
[INTERVIEW] Ex-lawmaker backs presidential relocation to Yongsan
Cheong Wa Dae will be disappeared from history as President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol unveiled a plan on Sunday to relocate the presidential office into Yongsan, Seoul. / Yonhap
By Kang Hyun-kyung
Former lawmaker Kim Young-woo / Courtesy of Kim Young-woo Kim Young-woo, 55, a former three-term lawmaker who served as the chairman of the National Assembly's National Defense Committee, presented a favorable view of the proposed relocation of the presidential office to the Ministry of National Defense compound amid heated debate.
If implemented as planned, Kim said the nation might benefit from moving to the site in Yongsan District.
"Considering the unique security challenges facing the nation, I think the new President working in a space adjacent to the office of the defense minister could be effective," he told The Korea Times over the phone.
His remarks about the unique security challenges refer to how South Koreans are living with increasing threats from North Korea.
Kim, however, warned of the possible fallout from a hasty relocation, saying that policymakers need to implement it with a thorough plan, after careful consideration of all related factors and risks it could entail.
"Someone (referring to the President-elect's spokesperson Kim Eun-hye) said that the relocation will be done 'before the spring flowers fall.' If they push it through on such a short timeline, significant procedural flaws will be unavoidable. I think they don't need to rush," he said.
The relocation of the presidential office and residence has emerged as one of the hotly debated post-election issues, as President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol reiterated that he has no intention to live and work in the current site, located in Jongno District behind Gyeongbok Palace at the foot of a mountain. Last Wednesday, spokesperson Kim told reporters that the chances of the new President beginning his work in the current Cheong Wa Dae are "zero."
On Sunday, Yoon unveiled a plan to relocate the presidential office and residence to Yongsan District, which would require the defense ministry to relocate to the current site of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be relocated in turn elsewhere.
Despite the President-elect's strong will to find an alternative location for the presidential office and residence, the relocation plan has faced criticism from the ruling Democratic Party of Korea (DPK).
In a statement, DPK chief spokesperson Koh Yong-jin called the relocation plan hasty, chaotic and contradictory. "It is highly doubtful that the Ministry of National Defense site is really a suitable place for public communication," he said, reproaching the President-elect's procedure for moving forward as unilateral.
But ex-lawmaker Kim did not see it that way. He said the relocation could help the new President work more effectively as commander-in-chief as the location will make it easier for him to work closely with the defense minister in case of contingency.
He urged President Moon and the ruling DPK to support the relocation.
"President Moon had wanted to end the era for Cheong Wa Dae, but he couldn't do it. Then, isn't it right for him to help the new president finish the job?" he asked, referring to the Moon's 2017 pledge to move the presidential office and residence to Gwanghwamun.
Kim seemed mindful of a shift in South Korea's security environment following a series of tests of North Korea's increasingly sophisticated missile and nuclear capabilities.
Last week, President-elect Yoon named former Vice Foreign Minister Kim Sung-han, former presidential secretary on national security strategy Kim Tae-hyo, and Gen. Lee Jong-sup, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the transition committee members to handle foreign policy and security. The media dubbed Yoon's picks of the three as "the Return of the MB men." "MB" stands for the first name of the conservative former President Lee Myung-bak. The three all served under the Lee administration.
Kim said that Yoon and his foreign policy team will be working under fresh pressure to thwart security threats from North Korea, mainly because there have been significant changes in North Korea's military capabilities since the 2008-13 Lee Myung-bak administration.
Kim said the foreign policy team under the Yoon government will need to bolster the South Korea-U.S. alliance as stressed by the President-elect several times during his campaign, as well as restore close ties with "like-minded countries" such as free democracies to better handle security threats posed by North Korea.
Joining the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, known as the Quad, is one of the options the new government should consider seriously, he said.
The Quad is a United States-led strategic security dialogue among three countries in the Indo―Pacific region ― Australia, India, and Japan ― and is maintained by talks between member countries.
Kim's remarks on joining the Quad seem to refer to formalizing South Korea's membership in the Quad Plus, a broader network of like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Some of the countries that have been named for the Quad Plus are South Korea, New Zealand and Vietnam.
"The Quad members are countries that share a lot of values with South Korea. They are free democracies and value human rights, so having partnerships with those countries would help the nation gain support from them in a time of crisis," Kim said.
The former lawmaker said emphasized the significance of forging new security partnerships with like-minded countries, in light of what's happening in Ukraine.
Kim claimed that Ukraine is in a lonely fight to protect itself from Russian invasion, partly because the East European country had no official security alliance with other countries. "Many countries are cheering for Ukraine, but few countries give them real help other than diplomatic rhetoric," he said.
Regarding the limited roles of the United States and European countries in helping war-torn Ukraine, U.S. President Joe Biden explained that third countries' direct involvement in the confrontation could trigger World War III and that the expansion of the war is one reason the U.S. government cannot send troops to Ukraine.
7. Hasty relocation decision - New presidential office plan lacks consensus
The president-elect is starting his term generating controversy.
Hasty relocation decision
New presidential office plan lacks consensus
On Sunday, President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol announced a decision to relocate the presidential office from Cheong Wa Dae to the Ministry of National Defense building in Yongsan, central Seoul. The decision is part of his campaign pledge to move out of a symbol of the "imperial" presidency and better communicate with the people.
Yoon said he will start his five-year presidency at the office to be created on the second floor of the defense ministry building after his inauguration on May 10. He plans to use one of the government's official residences in Hannam-dong, close to the ministry, as his residence. With the relocation, Cheong Wa Dae will be opened fully to the public on the same day.
In the lead-up to the March 9 election, Yoon had initially promised to relocate the presidential office to the Government Complex in Gwanghwamun. Several days after he won the election, his plan changed due to problems with presidential escorts, security, protocol and traffic. His transition team presented two options: move to the adjacent Ministry of Foreign Affairs building, or to the defense ministry compound.
Finally Yoon choose the defense ministry building after taking into consideration all the problems, including security issues and relocation costs. If his decision is put into action, the defense ministry will move into the Joint Chiefs of Staff building in the compound. Then the Joint Chiefs of Staff is likely to be relocated to the Capital Defense Command compound in Namtaeryeong, southern Seoul.
We positively assess Yoon's strong determination to keep his campaign promise. As he stressed, the relocation of the presidential office carries a symbolic meaning as it is designed to end the status of an emperor-like president. The country's heads of states have so far been criticized for wielding unrestricted authority and monopolizing power at Cheong Wa Dae, reminiscent of a royal palace in a secluded location.
We hope that Yoon will carry out his relocation plan smoothly to realize his goal of serving the nation and the people better by restoring democratic values in the truest sense. Yet, he has some hurdles to overcome down the road. First he is pushing for the relocation plan too hurriedly, so he could not afford to hold sufficient discussions and build a national consensus over the matter. The ruling Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) is against his plan, saying that there is no difference between Cheong Wa Dae and the newly selected site for the presidential office as both are secluded from the public.
A successful relocation depends on how the Moon Jae-in administration and the DPK will cooperate with Yoon and his transition committee. Most of all, Yoon needs an emergency government budget to complete the relocation plan which he estimated will cost 49.6 billion won ($40.8 million). But the costs could rise further; some DPK lawmakers argue that the plan might require as much as 1 trillion won. Yoon should make efforts to persuade President Moon and DPK legislators to support his relocation plan.
Also worrisome is that the relocation issue might turn into a political football between the outgoing administration and the incoming one. Many DPK lawmakers as well as other critics are against the relocation plan, saying that the country should instead focus on fighting the COVID-19 pandemic, improving the people's livelihoods and speeding up economic recovery.
Another problem is a potential weakening of security posture against North Korea which is reportedly seeking to resume its ICBM launches and nuclear tests. Yoon and his transition team should go all-out to ensure that there is no security lapse in the process of moving the presidential office into the defense ministry compound.
8. Yoon personally sells his move to Yongsan
Sunday
March 20, 2022
Yoon personally sells his move to Yongsan
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol announces his decision to relocate the new presidential office to the Defense Ministry compound in Yongsan District in a press conference at his transition team's headquarters in Samcheong-dong, central Seoul, Sunday. [NEWS1]
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol announced Sunday that the presidential office will be relocated to the Defense Ministry compound.
Yoon revealed his final decision in a press conference Sunday morning after deliberating between the Foreign Ministry in Gwanghwamun and the Defense Ministry in Yongsan District in central Seoul.
"It is a difficult task, but it is a decision made for the future of the country," Yoon told reporters at his transition team's office in Samcheong-dong in Jongno District. "Taking into consideration people's convenience and [the pledge] to open up the Blue House to the public, we decided it was right to move forward with the decision to swiftly relocate to Yongsan's Ministry of National Defense compound."
Yoon plans to begin work at the new presidential office in Yongsan on May 10, straight after his inauguration.
The Blue House compound, in turn, will be fully opened to the public at the beginning of his term, he said.
During the campaign, Yoon pledged to move the presidential office to the central government complex in Gwanghwamun, downtown Seoul, to make it less isolated and more approachable to the public and the press.
Addressing concerns that the Defense Ministry is also relatively isolated, Yoon said a public park will be built on land expected to be returned from the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) later this year, to make the new presidential office more accessible to the public.
He shared plans to surround the presidential office with a low fence, as close to the main building as possible, to make it more approachable, similar to the White House in Washington.
Yoon's task force reviewed options to move the presidential office and found that moving into Gwanghwamun's Foreign Ministry would have brought considerable inconveniences to the residents and workers around there because of security issues, and would be more expensive.
The president-elect said that the Yongsan area, also home to the USFK's former garrison, was chosen because no new security regulations would be needed in the neighborhood if the presidential office is moved there.
He said the Defense Ministry is already equipped with underground bunkers, helipads and underway passages, adding that in times of emergency, the National Security Council can be convened there without any problem.
In contrast, the Gwanghwamun government complex does not have such facilities and there be difficulty relocating Foreign Ministry personnel. The 18-story Foreign Ministry is adjacent to the central government complex, near many other high-rise commercial buildings in downtown Seoul. Also, a Gwanghwamun presidential office would require the continued use of some Blue House facilities.
When asked why he made a campaign pledge switcheroo, Yoon said he learned new information after he was elected, explaining, "After I was briefed as president-elect, I learned the 'Gwanghwamun era' would almost certainly be a disaster for the citizens."
He pointed out as an example that if telecommunication services are blocked even for a few seconds or minutes in the area for security reasons, "it could cause considerable damage for companies or financial institutions" in the Gwanghwamun area.
Yoon said the core of his pledge was to "return the Blue House to the people."
He was adamant he would never move into the Blue House, calling it a "symbol of imperialism."
Yoon noted that presidential aides' offices were too far away, while the press was located in a separate building in the compound.
The traditional Korean-style Blue House compound, located in northern Gwanghwamun, at the foot of mountains behind Gyeongbok Palace, includes the main office, the official residence, the Yeongbingwan state guest house, Yeomingwan presidential secretariat, the Chunchugwan press center and outdoors gardens such as Nokjiwon.
It is the site of Korea's Goryeo (918-1392) and Joseon (1392-1910) era palaces and the location of the Japanese governor-general's official residence during Japan's 1910-1945 colonial rule of Korea. The venue was used as the Korean president's residence and office after the country's liberation and renamed Cheong Wa Dae, or the Blue House, in 1960. The iconic two-story main office building with the blue tile roof was completed in 1991.
Yoon's residence will likely be the official residence of the Army chief of staff, located three to five minutes by car from the defense ministry in nearby Hannam-dong. He has also reviewed the residences of the foreign minister and defense minister, located in the same neighborhood.
A view of the Ministry of National Defense compound in Yongsan District, central Seoul, Sunday. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]
Yoon gave detailed plans for the new Yongsan presidential office.
A new press center will be located on the first floor of the presidential office building, giving journalists more access to the president, said Yoon.
His transition team estimates that the cost of relocating to the Defense Ministry will be around 49.6 billion won ($40.9 million), while moving to the Foreign Ministry would cost twice as much.
This includes 11.8 billion won to relocate the Defense Ministry into the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) building, 25.2 billion won for the remodeling of the main building, 9.97 billion won for the moving cost of the presidential security service and 2.5 billion won for the remodeling of the Hannam-dong office residence.
Yoon rejected reports that the relocation could cost between 500 billion won to 1 trillion won.
He said he will ask the current government for cooperation to use reserve funds, usually kept aside for natural disasters and other emergencies, for the relocation.
The presidential office relocation, however, means some major reshuffling within the Defense Ministry, which could cost more. The Defense Ministry will be moved to the adjacent JCS building.
"Since the return of land of nearby U.S. bases is scheduled from this year," Yoon said, "Yongsan Park can be quickly established so that the Defense Ministry can be used as a presidential office and for communication with the people."
Yun Ho-jung, head of the ruling Democratic Party's (DP) interim steering committee, in a press conference Sunday, called on Yoon to "withdraw the reckless and rushed presidential office relocation plan, which harms national security and infringes upon people's property rights."
With just 50 days left in the transition process, Yun said, "It is a national misfortune to waste precious time on his office and housing problems."
A view of the new presidential office, which will move into the main Defense Ministry building, center, and be surrounded by a public park, is shared by President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol Sunday. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]
BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]
9. Yoon confirms presidential office to relocate to Yongsan by May
Not sure how he can make this happen until he becomes president.
Yoon confirms presidential office to relocate to Yongsan by May
Yoon vows to end "imperial" presidency and return Cheong Wa Dae to people
Published : Mar 20, 2022 - 15:17 Updated : Mar 20, 2022 - 15:28
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol gives a press conference on the relocation of Cheong Wa Dae at his transition team’s headquarters in Jongno-gu, central Seoul, on Sunday. (Yonhap)
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol on Sunday confirmed the relocation of the presidential office to the Defense Ministry compound in Yongsan-gu, central Seoul, vowing to put an end to the "imperial" presidency.
In a press briefing held at the transition team’s office, Yoon said his team has decided to relocate the presidential office from the current Cheong Wa Dae compound in Jongno-gu, central Seoul, to fulfill his promise of returning the area to the general public and communicating more with the people.
Yoon said he would start his five-year term at the new presidential office in Yongsan-gu immediately after his inauguration on May 10. The Cheong Wa Dae area will be fully open to the public on the same day, he added.
"I do understand the concerns that I might be rushing to move the presidential office too hastily with just 50 days left before starting the term, but I determined that it would be much more difficult to move away from the symbol of imperial power, Cheong Wa Dae, after moving into the compound," he said.
"We believe it is right to quickly decide and move forward with the plan to move to the Defense Ministry compound in Yongsan, if we consider the discomfort the people may face and the fact that we are giving back Cheong Wa Dae to the people."
Yoon pledged on multiple occasions during the campaign that his administration would move the presidential office from the current Cheong Wa Dae compound to elsewhere to return the area to the people.
His pledge came as a response to many critics' view of Cheong Wa Dae as a symbol of an emperor-like presidency and as a place that blocks communication between the president and the general public due to its secluded location.
Yoon and key members of his presidential transition committee visited the Defense Ministry compound and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs building on Friday to determine where the new presidential office will be for the next five years under Yoon's term.
The team decided the Yongsan-gu area was the best site for relocation, as other areas would require extensive modifications and financial investment to ensure the presidential office is provided with enough security and administrative efficiency while causing no inconveniences to the public.
The new presidential office will also be close to the US Forces Korea’s former Yongsan base area, which is scheduled to be transformed into a public park after the site is fully returned to the Korean government.
Some of the area is scheduled to be open to the public in June, a month after Yoon takes office.
Yoon will move his presidential residence from Cheong Wa Dae to the official residence of the Army Chief of Staff in Hannam-dong, also located in Yongsan-gu. Officials said the commute would be around five minutes for Yoon to travel from the residence to the new presidential office.
The Defense Ministry will move its operation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff headquarters, which will be moving to the Capital Defense Command in Gwanak-gu, southern Seoul.
"The (Defense Ministry compound) is equipped with national security command facilities, which allows us to fully return the Cheong Wa Dae to the people and cause almost no inconvenience to them when running security services," Yoon said.
"The Yongsan area has already undergone development on the basis of protecting military facilities, so there will be no additional regulations imposed even if the presidential office is relocated."
Yoon is certainly not the first to attempt to relocate the presidential office, and the idea itself has been in discussion for years.
President Moon Jae-in had also vowed to move the presidential office before taking office in 2017, but withdrew the plan over logistical and security concerns. He eventually gave up the plan a year and a half later after failing to find an adequate space for affiliated facilities.
Yoon's relocation plan has faced criticism, with many questioning if the plan is feasible in terms of security, expense and efficiency.
The liberal Democratic Party of Korea has denounced Yoon and his transition team for being "hasty and impellent," and raised concerns about potentially causing a national security threat. It also accused Yoon of lacking communication with the public in making the decision.
"Is it right to forcibly decide on this nationally important issue without reaching any consensus with the people?" questioned Rep. Koh Yong-jin, a senior spokesperson for the Democratic Party, in a statement Sunday.
"President-elect Yoon said he will give up imperial power, but I want to ask back if this isn’t in fact a form of using imperial power."
Legislators with the Democratic Party also accused the plan of being overly expensive, estimating the relocation to cost as much as 1 trillion won ($825 million). But Yoon defended his idea during the Sunday briefing, saying the plan is calculated to cost 49.6 billion won.
Yoon and the presidential transition team are planning to submit a request for the relocation budget to the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The budget has to be approved by the incumbent president during a cabinet meeting.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
