Quotes of the Day:

“The enemy uses economic and political warfare, propaganda and naked military aggression in an endless combination … Our officers and men must understand and combined the political, economic and civil actions with skilled military efforts…” 

- John F. Kennedy (Kennedy letter as reproduce in the DA Office of the Chief of Information, 1962)

“Truth has to be repeated constantly , because Error also is being preached all the time, and not just by a few, but by the multitude. In the Press, Encyclopaedias, in Schools and Universities, everywhere Error holds sway, feeling happy and comfortable in the knowledge of having Majority on its side.” 

- Johann Goethe

"Great minds discuss ideas; average minds discuss events; small minds discuss people."

- Eleanor Roosevelt

1. How Can We Do What We Do Better?

2. The missile attack that wasn’t

3. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 20 (Putin's War)

4. Ukraine Is Getting Nervous About Elon Musk

5. ‘Tyranny and turmoil’ in Russian invasion, US defense secretary says

6. House GOP vs. the Pentagon: Get ready for the ‘woke’ wars

7. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (20.10.22) CDS comments on key events

8. Will the new US Congress still pay for its Pacific promises?

9. Thoughts on Xi Jinping’s Third Term

10. The Sneaky Way China Could Win a War Against America

11. Army Secretary lays out plan to overcome the Army's negative image and win over Generation Z

12. RAID AT SON TAY: U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS’ ATTEMPTED RESCUE OF POWS IN 1970

13. Readout of Secretary of Defense Travel to Indonesia

14. Notes from Central Taiwan: The unbearable lightness of being the ‘strategic ambiguity’ debate

15. Scrap the Iran nuclear deal once and for all

16. China Trying to ‘Air Brush’ Over Wolf Warrior Damage, US Ambassador Emanuel Says

17. The World Cup Spotlights Qatar’s Abuses

18. IAEA Board Votes to Censure Iran, but Accountability Requires a Snapback of UN Sanctions

19. Four ways to begin fixing the Army recruiting crisis

20. Meet Xi and Putin’s Hired Gun Inside the UN

21. Israel must reclaim its Arab citizens - opinion

22. The Strategic Backdrop of Qatar ’22: Unpacking the Geopolitical, Security, and Other Issues Surrounding the World Cup

23. Special Operations News Update - Nov 21, 2022 | SOF News

1. How Can We Do What We Do Better?

How Can We Do What We Do Better?

By Flavius Belisarius

(Editor’s Note: Flavius Belisarius reads the SWJ National Security and Korean News and Commentary daily. Below he comments on three articles from last week and provides a unique perspective worth pondering to help us answer the question of “How Can We Do What We Do Better?”)

Dave, 

I’m going to square three articles you presented in your dailies in one commentary, because all three are interrelated.  The articles are: 

America Needs futurists and Traditionalists to Think Clearly About War, by Michael Ferguson & Nicholas Rife 

Giving OSINT a Seat at the Defense Intelligence Table, by Evan Smith 

How Defense Department Planning Horizons Can Better Avoid Strategic Surprise, by Travis Reese 

All three articles indirectly ask the same question:  How can we do what we do better?  

What’s the Actual Issue?  Fear of Failure/Fear of Ignorance 

The first thing to keep in mind is there are over 5,000 years of recorded military history, starting with the battle of Kadesh.  Second, each generation studying and engaging in the science and art of warfare suffer from amnesia.  The third thing to keep in mind is one can over-think, just like one can over-engineer.   

The fear of failure is real and understandable.  If we get things wrong in the profession of arms, people die, wars are lost and national interests are compromised.  Fear of ignorance is more complex.  In the profession of arms, it surfaces in professionals not wanting to admit they either don’t know something, how something works or what will happen next.  Often the “wiz-kids” who have great ideas and/or workable & actionable theories are often shut down.  The reasons are many:  Fears of being professionally shown-up, embarrassment of not coming up with the bright idea or theory sooner or the sense of being reputationally challenged.  There are more, but these illustrate the point.    

The Once and Future Reformer      

What does reform actually mean in the professional sense?  In bureaucratic circles, “reform” can be a nasty word for anything that challenges a status quo or forces less-proficient practitioners to step out  of their comfort zones. Seniors sometimes say we need it.  Most don’t want to go down that road.  Why?  Because there usually isn’t enough clarity about what needs to be reformed and why?  How many times has someone said, “We need to get back to the basics?”  “Think outside of the box?”  “We need to tear down silos.”  All are valid points, if you know what basics require attention and the actual dimensions of the box.  Reformers whose theories were successfully  exploited by our opponents or otherwise proven effective are often praised by later generations who ask why they weren’t their voices heard before the war or national crisis.  The reason is the profession of arms can be a treacherous beast, especially when it comes to what I mentioned above – fear of the unknown or insecurity over a challenge to “conventional wisdom.”  

I said all of that to say this:  As long as career reputations, budgets and fears of failure are at play, the contents of all three articles will be rejected by the very people who should be supporting them. 

Since you sometimes quote Odd Ball, “Always with the negative waves, Moriarty,” let me dispatch with the negative waves and get down to business. 

We can get there from here.  The first thing we need to do is to stop setting-up and sitting in camps and take a good look at our own position.  The Ukrainians are doing a great job at innovating because their lives depend on it.  We haven’t been as effective in that regard, because we’ve been an uncontested superpower for 30 years.  Guess what those days are over.  I was an operator for 20 years and an “int-guy” for the last 20.  Since my current professional focus is on intelligence analysis, I will use that to address the main issues of these excellent articles. 

The most important thing is not to get locked into what I’m saying as being only intelligence focused.  Think about what I’m saying and apply it to the larger picture of a whole of force approach.          

“It’s The Economy, Stupid.” 

That simple remark during the 1992 election cycle should conceptually resonate.  That is take a step back, evaluate what’s really important and define the problem.  If you (you, in general, not you, Dave) can define the problem, your mind won’t go blank trying to over-think things.  If you can define the problem, you can apply the correct solution and that’s where innovation begins.  The problem in Afghanistan - it was defined as an “insurgency.”  Wrong.  It was a Pashtun “uprising.”  Both are violent internal instability problems requiring specific sets of solutions to solve them.  In the end, we lost a 20-year campaign in the previously titled Global War on Terror (The Artist Formally Known as Prince).  You and your JSOTF won a campaign in said war, but I digress.  Back to the  issue of defining problems: In Afghanistan, we were treating a case of halitosis with a root canal. 

I’ll address the question and the content of the three articles by the numbers.  Again, I’m facilitating this through the narrow prism of intelligence analysis, as the catalyst, to answer the question from a whole-of-force perspective. 

1.  In the operational field, we have an adage, “Amateurs talk tactics.  Professionals talk logistics.”  I say this about intelligence analysis:  Amateurs talk data.  Professionals talk Judgment.  What the “data guys” don’t get yet is that the  secret of a successful model is to mimic a living system.  They keep trying mathematical models based on data, rather than systems.  Human behavior is systematic, based on subjective probabilities.  It’s not data driven.  Analytical judgment requires structured techniques which require the use of specific regions/sub-regions of the brain.  It’s cognitive.  Of the five kinds of analytical judgment, only two are data and fact driven.  You can achieve a maximum 75% judgment accuracy in predicting human behavior using data driven models (though 75% is rarely achieved).  Living systems can boost that to over 90% accuracy and even higher (that’s proven, by the way).   

2.  Applying history isn’t about mimicry.  It’s about realizing that all human beings borrow from history (many don’t even realize it) and use what worked…with learning.  When you define the historic precedence, you can more easily “predict” the next move(s).  Remember what I said about amnesia?  You can borrow from what others have done well and learn from their mistakes.  It’s ok to admit when you (you, in general, not you, Dave) don’t know something.  That’s one of the biggest hurdles to overcome. 

3.  The main issue the “establishment” has with the so-called Futurist Camp, is they often drive off the cliff of speculation.  Futurists can be their own worst enemies.  Those in the so-called Traditionalist Camp are sometimes akin to Linus from Peanuts.  They need their security blankets.  That’s why OSINT isn’t always welcomed, because the “data guys” say they need precise data and lots of it.  Our handicap, in the 70+ years of post-World War II intelligence analysis has been an over-reliance on data.  Don’t get me wrong.  We’re second-to-none, when it comes to data collection.  Unfortunately, we swim in data and that’s where the problem comes in.  What does an over-reliance of data have to do with the Futurists vs. Traditionalist dilemma?  I’m glad you asked.  It all comes down to three words:  Phenomenology, Process and Futurity.  When you (you, in general, not you, Dave) understand the phenomenology of problem, the problem can be defined.  When you identify the process(es) at work, you can measure and predict the course of the problem, like doctors measuring and plotting the course of a disease.  That’s when you can start talking about the futurity of events.  When you know the phenomenology and the process, you don’t need loads of data.  All living systems are predictable.  That’s not theory.  That’s fact.  That’s one of the things I teach and it works. 

4.  That brings me to the issue of reducing surprise.  Guess what, a surprise is a multiplier of other effects.  It can’t be studied without reference to another action (a surprise tornado, a surprise earthquake, a surprise attack).  Surprise can’t be avoided, but the potential damage can be avoided.  The multiplier can be negated completely.  It’s important to understand that surprise also refers to alertness and readiness conditions, NOT the actions of the threat entity.  Again, surprise is not avoidable, but damage is.  By focusing on potential damage (threat) the damage and surprise conditions can be avoided.  What helps in this?  I’m glad you asked.  Understanding the phenomenology at work and the processes involved which make it work.  That’s where “Warning” and readiness come into play. 

5 (a).  Finally, our defense establishment needs to take the pressure off itself.  I will express it first, in terms of intelligence analysis.  Then operationally (from a historic perspective).  Without any use of technology, but using the techniques I teach, a large number of diverse analysts achieved between 90-95% accuracy in their judgments over a four-year period with minimal all-source information (we’re into the  fifth year now).  The constituent decision-makers didn’t think it could be done without some software application or big data platform.  The hill most intelligence analysts have to climb is suspicions of skeptical executive decision-makers who want something – a machine – that doesn’t require any deep thinking by analysts but makes accurate predictions.  All the technology of analysis  is  aimed at reducing the decision-maker’s dependence on people they don’t know.  That’s because analysts have gotten it wrong too often and most of the time when it hurts the most, in a crisis.  If decision-makers thought they  could get rid of analysts, they would do so with glee.  My goal was to find what works and apply that.  The cognitive model I teach is built from things that worked, from experience, not from theory.   

5 (b).  From an operational perspective, our defense establishment needs to give themselves a break.  “They” often criticize PME as too intellectual and not actionable.  Some say that because it takes them out  of their comfort zone.  If what the critics say is true, why would our greatest competitor seek to emulate and build from our PME?  I’ll tell you.  PME separates the professionals from the amateurs.  There are, unfortunately, many  amateurs in the senior ranks, but that’s been the case since Pharaoh led his chariot attack at Kadesh.  The reason why I said the establishment needs to give themselves a break is because in the 5,000 years of recorded military history, no one, I mean no one has gotten it right.  What has been the norm is the armed force that prevails is usually the one that makes the least mistakes in a given battle, campaign or war.  We can address the decision-making of national leadership and policymakers another time.  The bottom line  - it’s all about a willingness to learn.  We’re back to the cognitive aspect.   

Babe Ruth said it best in two quotes: 

“Never let the fear of striking out keep you from playing the game.”  

“Every strike brings me closer to the next home run.”  

I’ll close with a perspective from what teach analysts: 

Analysis enables people and organizations to act and/or solve problems when information is incomplete or contradictory.  There’s never just one answer or outcome.  That’s why there’s an absolute requirement for judgment accuracy. 

DOL, 

Flavius Belisarius

2. The missile attack that wasn’t

As one of my many mentors used to say about information: WESK - "who else should know? " Why was this information not disseminated in a timely manner among friends?

The missile attack that wasn’t | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · by Slawomir Sierakowski · November 21, 2022

The rocket strike that killed two Poles near their country’s border with Ukraine on 15 November proved to be a test not so much of defence policy as of the information policy of Poland, Ukraine and NATO. Only the Americans passed. The European allies and Ukraine floundered, revealing a shocking lack of preparation for a scenario that could have been predicted almost from the beginning of the war.

Poland is the largest country on NATO’s eastern flank and serves as the most important logistical hub for a war that concerns almost the whole world. Firmness and unity on the part of the West are essential to Ukraine’s defence and Russia’s defeat, which may decide the fate of the world for decades. Tuesday’s explosion in Poland, however, surprised everyone except the United States, and triggered an astonishing sequence of events, driven by astonishing bungling.

Poles learned about the rocket impact, which took place at 3.40 pm, a little before 8.00 pm from the Associated Press. The Polish government remained silent until after midnight, when the foreign ministry issued a statement claiming that the incident involved a ‘Russian-produced missile’ and demanding an explanation from Russia’s ambassador. The government placed some military units on combat alert.

Then, when Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki and President Andrzej Duda addressed the public, they didn’t explain the origin of the rocket, fuelling widespread suspicion that this had been an attack (intentional or not) by Russia. Many of the three million Ukrainians living in Poland, 85% of whom are women and children, came to believe that the war they fled was about to catch up with them.

When Poles received new information, it was from the Americans. At 4.00 am, Polish time, President Joe Biden revealed that the missile was probably fired by Ukrainian air-defence forces in the face of a Russian barrage. Duda mentioned this only on the afternoon of 16 November, when the public was reassured for the first time that ‘Poland was not the target of an attack by Russia.’

In the meantime, confusion among Poland’s European NATO allies was growing. Some had already accused Russia, and some heads of government convened extraordinary government meetings, as in Hungary.

Latvia’s defence minister, Artis Pabriks, identified the missile as ‘Russian’ on Twitter, a statement he repeated on CNN. Jana Cernochova, the Czech Republic’s defence minister, called the incident an ‘unnecessary provocation’ by Russia. Bulgaria’s president, Rumen Radev, described the explosion as ‘unacceptable’. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda stated that ‘Tuesday’s explosions in Poland mean a new phase in Russia’s war against Ukraine. NATO must respond accordingly’, and called on NATO to deploy more anti-missile systems on NATO’s eastern flank.

The impression that Russia really had struck Poland was strengthened by the Russian foreign ministry. In the immediate aftermath of the initial US reporting on the explosion, the Russians applied their usual formula and alleged a Western provocation.

By contrast, the Western responses, however misguided, were right about the sole party responsible for the missile strike. As NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg emphasised, ‘Ukraine has the right to defend itself against Russia’s illegal war of aggression.’

But then came an unexpected rift between NATO leaders and Ukraine. ‘I have no doubt that it was not our rocket,’ President Volodymyr Zelensky declared, adding that Ukraine had evidence and demanding access to the investigation. Surprised, Poland and its NATO allies refrained from commenting on Zelensky’s statement, evidently waiting for greater messaging coherence.

Zelensky’s rigidity may also reinforce the impression among some Western leaders that the Ukrainian authorities are behaving arrogantly while Europe is not only paying for arms and humanitarian aid, but also suffering from record inflation, which in Poland is approaching 20%. For example, if Hungary under its pro-Russian prime minister, Viktor Orban, had been in Poland’s position—serving as the main conduit for armaments, energy, food and other supplies flowing to Ukraine—Russia almost certainly would have prevailed by now.

Following the latest Russian missile barrage, the EU should strengthen the ninth package of sanctions against Russia, which Orban has predictably opposed. But the explosion in Poland may make Hungary—Poland’s closest ally within the EU—more compliant.

Another obvious consequence should be NATO’s strengthening of air defences over its eastern flank. Warsaw, the Polish capital, has only a Soviet-era system, built in the 1960s and 1970s. Poland has purchased eight Patriot anti-missile batteries from the US, but they won’t arrive for another decade, and the two that are already in place won’t be ready to use until 2023, at the earliest.

The transport routes carrying US arms to Ukraine and the transmission line that connects Ukraine with the EU’s energy system (which, incidentally, runs very close to the site of the recent explosion) are well within range of the Russian missiles raining down on the other side of NATO’s eastern border. The recent explosion in Poland was an accident. The next one may not be.

Zelensky knows this, so he has already begun to say that he is not completely sure about the origin of the rocket that fell in Poland. The origin may not have been Russia, but the explosion certainly originated there.

aspistrategist.org.au · by Slawomir Sierakowski · November 21, 2022

3. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 20 (Putin's War)

Maps/graphics:  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-20

Key inflections in ongoing military operations on November 20:

• The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 20 that Russian special services are planning false flag attacks on Belarusian critical infrastructure facilities to pressure the Belarusian military to enter the war in Ukraine.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff added that Ukrainian officials have not observed the formation of any Belarusian assault groups.[19] ISW continues to assess that it is unlikely that Belarusian forces will invade Ukraine.
• Russian and Ukrainian sources reported ongoing fighting along the Svatove-Kreminna line on November 20.[20] Russian sources noted that deteriorating weather conditions are impacting hostilities.[21]
• A Ukrainian military official stated that Ukrainian forces have liberated 12 settlements in Luhansk Oblast since the start of the eastern counteroffensive.[22]
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed to strike a Ukrainian troop concentration in the area of Novoselivske, Luhansk Oblast.[23] The Russian MoD previously claimed to repel Ukrainian attacks on the settlement, and this claim might indicate that Ukrainian forces advanced to the settlement.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and western Donetsk directions.[24]
• Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces continued to transfer some forces from the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River to other operational directions, but still maintain a significant force presence in southern Kherson Oblast.[25]
• Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that shelling damaged the infrastructure of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).[26] One Russian milblogger claimed that the shelling came from Russian-controlled territory south of the plant, but most Russian sources accused Ukraine.[27]
• Russian occupation officials may have purged the occupation Mayor of Enerhodar Alexander Volga.[28] Some Russian sources claimed that Volga received a promotion within the occupation administration.[29]
• Russian military officials continued mobilization measures amid reports of ongoing resistance and poor conditions.[30]

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 20

Nov 20, 2022 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 20

Kateryna Stepanenko, Frederick W. Kagan, and Grace Mappes

November 20, 9:15 ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, November 20. This report discusses the rising influence of the milblogger (military correspondent or voenkor) community in Russia despite its increasingly critical commentary on the conduct of the war. The milblogger community reportedly consists of over 500 independent authors and has emerged as an authoritative voice on the Russian war.[1] The community maintains a heavily pro-war and Russian nationalist outlook and is intertwined with prominent Russian nationalist ideologists. Milbloggers’ close relationships with armed forces – whether Russian Armed Forces, Chechen special units, Wagner Group mercenaries, or proxy formations – have given this community an authoritative voice arguably louder in the Russian information space than the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Russian President Vladimir Putin has defended the milbloggers from MoD attacks and protected their independence even as he increases oppression and censorship throughout Russia.

The Kremlin has allowed the ever-growing informal milblogger community to gain a quasi-official but independent position despite otherwise increasing domestic repression and censorship. The Kremlin has historically promulgated its state narrative via Russian federal outlets, TV, and print media, but has allowed the highly individualistic and often critical milblogger community to put forth its own narratives regarding this war. The milblogger community is composed of a wide range of characters ranging from those who support the Kremlin while criticizing the Russian military command to some who have directly blamed Russian President Vladimir Putin for Russia’s consistent military failures in Ukraine. That the Kremlin tolerates the miblogger community is astonishing given its censorship of other more traditional outlets including opposition and foreign media.

Russian milbloggers are not merely cheerleaders for the war – they are emerging as a group with a distinct voice within Russia. Milbloggers offer a highly informal platform that differs dramatically from the Russian MoD’s structured presentation of the war. Milbloggers largely publish self-authored content on Russian social media platforms such as Telegram, VK, and RuTube in a casual and approachable manner. Most prominent milbloggers either operate on the frontlines or have sources within Russian military structures, which allows them to form assessments based on first-hand accounts independent of MoD information and censorship.

The milbloggers are not fully separate from the Russian government, however. Russian investigative outlet The Bell, for example, uncovered that the creator of one of the most influential Russian Telegram channels, Rybar, is a former employee of the Russian MoD’s press service.[2] Other milbloggers are correspondents of Russian state media outlets such as Komsomoslkaya Pravda, Ria, and RiaFan where they maintain their highly opinionated coverage of the war and even offer recommendations to improve the conduct of the Russian military campaign. Some proxy officials from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts also operate as milbloggers because they voice their opinions, share analysis from other milbloggers, and disseminate footage from the frontlines independent of the Kremlin and often at odds with the official MoD and Kremlin lines.

Select milbloggers are now holding official positions within the Kremlin. Putin has promoted some prominent milbloggers with large numbers of followers in order to reach the nationalist constituency to which they speak and most importantly to prevent this group from turning against Putinism. Putin appointed a prominent Russian milblogger and correspondent for Komsomolskaya Pravda, Alexander (Sasha) Kots as a member of the Russian Human Rights Council on November 20, for example, as ISW has previously reported.[3] Putin has met individually with some Russian milbloggers and invited them to attend his annexation speech on September 30.[4] Putin’s engagements with these milbloggers have not softened their commentary on the war, however. They continue to criticize the Russian war effort and especially the Russian MoD even as Putin defends and promotes them.

Some Russian milbloggers have close ties with prominent nationalist ideologists. Nationalist and former member of the Russian State Duma Zakhar Prilepin (known for creating a volunteer battalion in occupied Donetsk Oblast in 2017) and founder of the modern-day National Bolshevik Party Eduard Limonov reportedly celebrated Russian milblogger Semyon Pegov (known under the alias Wargonzo).[5] Milbloggers also host podcasts with widely known Russian neo-nationalists such as Alexander Dugin and perestroika-era Soviet TV personality Alexander Lyubimov.[6] The milbloggers’ affiliation and mutual promotion with these figures foster a maximalist goal of full Russian supremacy in Ukraine within the information space. Dugin even directly blamed Putin for Russia’s military failures following the Russian withdrawal from Kherson City, in fact, criticizing Putin for failing to embrace Russian nationalist ideology fully enough.[7] Dugin’s criticism did not lead other milbloggers to criticize Putin explicitly, but neither did the milbloggers defend Putin against Dugin’s critique or attack Dugin.

Putin has likely blocked MoD attempts to purge or otherwise control the milbloggers. ISW reported on October 14 that unspecified Russian senior officials within the Russian MoD attempted to criminally prosecute the most prominent milbloggers.[8] Russian milbloggers publicly criticized the Russian MoD for the censorship attempt, continued their normal war coverage, and did not report receiving criminal charges. Unknown Russian officials had previously attacked Russian milbloggers by accusing them of revealing Russian positions to Ukrainian forces.[9] Putin has apparently stood by the milbloggers, however, recently commenting on the importance of transparency and accuracy in war reporting—a comment that could only have been aimed at the milblogger coverage.[10]

The prominence of the milblogger community is likely a direct result of the Kremlin’s failure to establish an effective Telegram presence stemming from Putin’s general failure to prepare his people for a serious and protracted war. Russian media statistics center Brand Analytics noted that between the start of the war on February 24 and October 1, the number of Russian bloggers on Telegram increased by 58% while the use of banned Western social media platforms such as Instagram and Twitter decreased markedly.[11] Telegram also has the highest percent increase of daily published content (23%) compared with to other Russian social media outlets over that period. The Bell noted that Rybar’s following increased sharply in September and October to over a million followers amidst partial mobilization and the start of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the east and south.[12] The growth of Telegram and the case of Rybar highlight Russians’ distrust of the Kremlin’s official narratives and search for more accurate reporting. The Ukrainian government, it is worth noting, took the opposite approach. Instead of attempting to centralize reporting on the war, Kyiv tasked all regional officials to start official Telegram channels to provide information regarding the war in real time.[13]

The Kremlin struggles to emulate the success of Russian pro-war siloviki figures online. Chechen leader and silovik Ramzan Kadyrov is the most followed Russian milblogger with over three million followers on Telegram. Kadyrov’s Telegram channel closely resembles the other milbloggers’ in format and features Kadyrov’s video rants, combat footage, and unfiltered opinions on the course of the “special military operation.”[14] Kadyrov’s channel, however, has a more coherent narrative than the individual milbloggers given his personal interests in promoting his troops.[15] Wagner Group-affiliated milbloggers also promote mercenary forces at the expense of criticizing the Russian MoD and traditional forces.[16] Prominent Kremlin state TV propagandists Vladimir Solovyov and Margarita Simonyan, on the other hand, only have 1.4 million and 500,000 followers on Telegram respectively and have begun echoing some Russian milblogger critiques on their Telegram channels.[17] The Russian MoD channel has even fewer followers on Telegram than Solovyov and Simonyan despite the growth of the platform – only 480,000.

Putin continues to double down on support for the independence of milblogger reporting even as he doubles down on efforts to mobilize the Russian population for war. These two phenomena are almost certainly related. Putin likely recognizes that the Kremlin and especially the MoD has lost whatever trust many Russians may have had in the veracity of its claims as well as the need to rely on such voices as pro-war Russians find authentic to retain support for the increasing sacrifices he is demanding. Putin’s defense of the milbloggers’ criticisms of his chosen officials is remarkable. It suggests that he sees retaining the support of at least some notable segment of the Russian population as a center of gravity for the war effort if not for the survival of his regime and that he is willing to endure critiques from a group he perceives as loyal to secure that center of gravity. Will the milbloggers remain loyal to Putin and the war effort if the Russian military continues to struggle and suffer setbacks? How will Putin react if they do not? These questions could become significant as Putin increases his demands on his reluctant population to provide cannon fodder for a failing war.

Key inflections in ongoing military operations on November 20:

• The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 20 that Russian special services are planning false flag attacks on Belarusian critical infrastructure facilities to pressure the Belarusian military to enter the war in Ukraine.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff added that Ukrainian officials have not observed the formation of any Belarusian assault groups.[19] ISW continues to assess that it is unlikely that Belarusian forces will invade Ukraine.
• Russian and Ukrainian sources reported ongoing fighting along the Svatove-Kreminna line on November 20.[20] Russian sources noted that deteriorating weather conditions are impacting hostilities.[21]
• A Ukrainian military official stated that Ukrainian forces have liberated 12 settlements in Luhansk Oblast since the start of the eastern counteroffensive.[22]
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed to strike a Ukrainian troop concentration in the area of Novoselivske, Luhansk Oblast.[23] The Russian MoD previously claimed to repel Ukrainian attacks on the settlement, and this claim might indicate that Ukrainian forces advanced to the settlement.

• Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and western Donetsk directions.[24]

• Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces continued to transfer some forces from the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River to other operational directions, but still maintain a significant force presence in southern Kherson Oblast.[25]
• Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that shelling damaged the infrastructure of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).[26] One Russian milblogger claimed that the shelling came from Russian-controlled territory south of the plant, but most Russian sources accused Ukraine.[27]
• Russian occupation officials may have purged the occupation Mayor of Enerhodar Alexander Volga.[28] Some Russian sources claimed that Volga received a promotion within the occupation administration.[29]
• Russian military officials continued mobilization measures amid reports of ongoing resistance and poor conditions.[30]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[2] https://meduza dot io/news/2022/11/19/the-bell-vyyasnil-imya-sozdatelya-rybarya-eto-31-letniy-byvshiy-sotrudnik-press-sluzhby-minoborony; https://thebell dot io/sozdatel-rybarya-prodolzhenie-rassledovaniya-the-bell

[3] https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/2022/11/17/15798235.shtml; https://meduza dot io/news/2022/11/17/putin-isklyuchil-pravozaschitnikov-iz-soveta-po-pravam-cheloveka-i-vklyuchil-v-nego-korrespondenta-komsomolskoy-pravdy-aleksandra-kotsa

[5] https://russiapost dot info/politics/voenkor

[6] https://tlgrm dot ru/channels/@wargonzo/9273

[11] https://br-analytics dot ru/blog/rus-social-media-sept-2022/

[12] https://thebell dot io/kto-vedet-voennyy-telegram-kanal-rybar-rassledovanie-the-bell

[13] https://www.kmu.gov dot ua/news/shchob-uniknuti-fejkiv-koristuyemos-oficijnimi-dzherelami

[14] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/2911; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3009; https://meduza dot io/news/2022/10/25/kadyrov-nazval-slabym-otvet-na-obstrely-territorii-rossii-prizval-stirat-s-zemli-goroda-i-nazyvat-spetsoperatsiyu-voynoy; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3039; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/2962; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3049; https://t.me/kavkazrealii/11790; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3057; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3064

[18] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/rosiiski-spetssluzhby-planuiut-provokatsii-na-biloruskykh-obiektakh-krytychnoi-infrastruktury-zokrema-na-biloruskii-aes.html; https://t.me/energoatom_ua/10758

[22] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/11/20/u-luganskij-oblasti-12-naselenyh-punktiv-pid-ukrayinskym-praporom-sergij-cherevatyj/

[25] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/11/20/na-pivdni-krayiny-vorog-pereformatovuye-svoyi-syly/; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TebQeoRSt6RjoUSCp2p...; EEQL9h13rVLNZRrmC7fjqm9LwAF6C42wmzQwJqBZhG3cUijhl

[30] https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/12763; https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/12764; https://notes.citeam dot org/mobilization-nov-18-19; https://t.me/istories_media/1749; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vwp3hev42TuhzQE5EE...; https://t.me/akashevarova/5882; https://t.me/akashevarova/5882; https://t.me/readovkanews/47261; https://ngs55 dot ru/text/politics/2022/11/15/71815355/; https://kostroma dot today/news/v-stroj-53-letnego-kostromicha-s-opuxolyu-mobilizovali-i-muchayut/

understandingwar.org

4. Ukraine Is Getting Nervous About Elon Musk

I would be nervous too. I would not trust him to do the right thing.

But I will give him this. He provided a critical capability that has been instrumental in this war. We need to learn from that for the future and instead of depending on someone like Musk we need to figure out how to provide this capability when and where necessary in future contingencies and conflicts. 

Ukraine Is Getting Nervous About Elon Musk

Kyiv is looking for alternatives to Musk’s Starlink internet terminals and worrying about rising misinformation on Twitter.

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

HALIFAX, Canada—Starlink's satellite-based internet hotspots have been the "signal of life" for beleaguered Ukrainians, but the unpredictable behavior of CEO Elon Musk has the Ukrainian government looking for alternatives, a deputy prime minister said.

As well, Musk's drastic changes at Twitter have Kyiv worried that the social-media platform will become a “major source” of media manipulation, Olha Stefanishyna, Ukraine’s deputy prime minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration told reporters at the Halifax International Security Forum here.

Stefanishyna said the Ukrainian government had begun procuring “some elements of equipment"—mostly European, but she also said she was working with American partners. These Starlink alternatives are “not as sophisticated" but are “something that would allow us to substitute and to make sure that at least at the level of the government communications and government connection, we preserve the sustainability.”

Still, she said, “Starlink has been the signal of life for Ukraine.”

Indeed, the service has been praised by Ukrainian battlefield commanders, U.S. service personnel who work with them from beyond Ukraine’s borders, and U.S. information technology contractors in Ukraine. And it has enabled Ukrainian citizens to remain in contact with the outside world.

But Stefanishyna said working with a billionaire who seems to reverse his decisions daily, even hourly, presents some challenges.

“We're talking about the CEO or a private company. So it's not [government-to-government, or G-to-G] format or [government-to-business, or G-to-B]. It’s G-to-B but B is uncertain.”

In October, Pentagon officials also said they would look for Starlink alternatives after Musk declared that he would no longer subsidize Ukrainians’ use of his service. (The “operation has cost SpaceX $80 million and will exceed $100 million by the end of the year,” he tweeted.) Musk later reversed this and he would continue to fund Starlink service in Ukraine. Other entities are also kicking in money to keep the bits flowing.

Adding to that feeling of uncertainty is Musk’s chaotic Twitter presence.

“We are worrying that the Twitter will become a major source of manipulation because now we'll see that that it has been used by Elon Musk just to test the manipulation limit,” she said, a reference to an October 3 tweet in which Musk blithely suggested that Crimea be handed over to Russia and new elections take place in annexed regions, despite the illegal forcible transfer of millions of Ukrainians into Russia precisely to change the political reality on the ground in these regions and international recognition that Crimea is part of Ukraine. Observers on Twitter pointed out that Musk’s statement was wildly uninformed and repeated Kremlin talking points.

Compare the Musk of Oct. 3 with the Musk of February, who surprised many around the world when he announced that he would send Starlink terminals to Ukraine. Even the form of announcement, a tweet in response to another tweet from Ukraine’s deputy minister of digital information Mykhailo Fedorov, looked spontaneous. But according to Stefanishyna, it was Ukrainian Starlink employees who first approached the government, encouraging them to make the request.

“They promoted this idea. They reached us,” she said.

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

5. ‘Tyranny and turmoil’ in Russian invasion, US defense secretary says

Excerpts:

Austin said nuclear weapons need to be responsibly controlled, and not used to threaten the world.

“Ukraine faces a harsh winter. And as Russia’s position on the battlefield erodes, Putin may resort again to profoundly irresponsible nuclear saber-rattling,” he said

Austin also compared Russia to China, saying Beijing is trying to refashion both the region and the international system to suit its authoritarian preferences. He noted China’s increasing military activities in the Taiwan Strait.

“Beijing, like Moscow, seeks a world where might makes right, where disputes are resolved by force, and where autocrats can stamp out the flame of freedom,” he said.

Austin called Putin’s invasion the worst crisis in security since the end of the Second World War and said the outcome “will help determine the course of global security in this young century,” Austin said.

‘Tyranny and turmoil’ in Russian invasion, US defense secretary says

militarytimes.com · by Rob Gillies, The Associated Press · November 20, 2022

HALIFAX, Nova Scotia — U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin warned Saturday Russia’s invasion of Ukraine offers a preview of a world where nuclear-armed countries could threaten other nations and said Beijing, like Moscow, seeks a world where might makes right.

Austin made the remarks at the annual Halifax International Security Forum, which attracts defense and security officials from Western democracies.

“Russia’s invasion offers a preview of a possible world of tyranny and turmoil that none of us would want to live in. And it’s an invitation to an increasingly insecure world haunted by the shadow of nuclear proliferation,” Austin said in a speech.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III delivers remarks at the Halifax International Security Forum in Halifax on Saturday, Nov.19, 2022. (Andrew Vaughan /The Canadian Press via AP)

“Because [Russian President Vladimir] Putin’s fellow autocrats are watching. And they could well conclude that getting nuclear weapons would give them a hunting license of their own. And that could drive a dangerous spiral of nuclear proliferation.”

Austin dismissed Putin’s claims that “modern Ukraine was entirely created by Russia,” calling it a vision of “a world in which autocrats decide which countries are real and which countries can be snuffed out.”

He added that the war “shows the whole world the dangers of disorder. That’s the security challenge that we face. It’s urgent, and it’s historic.

But we’re going to meet it. ... The basic principles of democracy are under siege around the world,” he said.

RELATED

White House requests $38 billion more in Ukraine aid

If Congress passes the request, it would bring the Ukraine aid total to more than $100 billion since March amid growing House Republican resistance.

U.S. President Joe Biden last month declared that the risk of nuclear “Armageddon” is at the highest level since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis; Russian officials have raised using tactical nuclear weapons after suffering massive setbacks in the nearly nine-month invasion of Ukraine.

While U.S. officials for months have warned of the prospect that Russia could use weapons of mass destruction in Ukraine in the face of battlefield setbacks, Biden administration officials have repeatedly said nothing has changed in U.S. intelligence assessments to suggest that Putin has imminent plans to deploy nuclear weapons.

CIA Director Bill Burns recently met with his Russian intelligence counterpart to warn of consequences if Russia were to deploy a nuclear weapon in Ukraine.

Austin said nuclear weapons need to be responsibly controlled, and not used to threaten the world.

“Ukraine faces a harsh winter. And as Russia’s position on the battlefield erodes, Putin may resort again to profoundly irresponsible nuclear saber-rattling,” he said

Austin also compared Russia to China, saying Beijing is trying to refashion both the region and the international system to suit its authoritarian preferences. He noted China’s increasing military activities in the Taiwan Strait.

“Beijing, like Moscow, seeks a world where might makes right, where disputes are resolved by force, and where autocrats can stamp out the flame of freedom,” he said.

Austin called Putin’s invasion the worst crisis in security since the end of the Second World War and said the outcome “will help determine the course of global security in this young century,” Austin said.

RELATED

Pentagon says Poland blast likely caused by Ukrainian missile

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin became the latest U.S. official to back Poland’s preliminary conclusion.

Austin said the deadly missile explosion in Poland this week is a consequence of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “war of choice” against Ukraine. “The tragic and troubling explosion in Poland this week reminded the whole world of the recklessness of Putin’s war of choice,” Austin said.

On Tuesday, two workers were killed when a projectile hit a grain-drying facility close to Poland’s border with Ukraine. While the source of the missile is under investigation, NATO officials have said they suspect it was fired from a Ukrainian missile battery.

Officials from Poland, NATO and the United States have blamed Russia for the deaths in any case, saying a Ukrainian missile would not have misfired had the country not been forced to defend itself against heavy Russian attacks that day.

Russian officials have cast the conflict as a struggle against NATO — though Ukraine is not a NATO member even if it has been receiving aid from NATO member states.

Austin said NATO is a defensive alliance and poses no threat to Russia.

“Make no mistake: we will not be dragged into Putin’s war of choice. But we will stand by Ukraine as it fights to defend itself. And we will defend every inch of NATO territory,” Austin said.

A Polish investigation to determine the source of the missile and the circumstances of the explosion was launched with support from the U.S. and Ukrainian investigators joined the probe on Friday.

Andriy Yermak, head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, said in an interview broadcast live at the forum that “It’s not right to say it’s a Ukrainian rocket, or a Russian rocket, before the investigation is over.”

In its 14th year, about 300 people gather each year at Halifax International Security Forum held at Halifax’s Westin hotel, where about 13 Ukrainian refugees now work.

6. House GOP vs. the Pentagon: Get ready for the ‘woke’ wars

I think the GOP will waste time and resources on this and embarrass themselves.

House GOP vs. the Pentagon: Get ready for the ‘woke’ wars

By CONNOR O’BRIEN

11/18/2022 05:44 PM EST

Politico

Empowered Republicans plan to rough up the brass over vaccine mandates, diversity initiatives and more.

“I’ve watched what the Democrats have done in many of these, especially in the NDAA and the wokeism that they want to bring in there,” Kevin McCarthy told reporters on Capitol Hill. | Samuel Corum/Getty Images

11/18/2022 05:44 PM EST

Republicans are six weeks away from taking over the House, but they’re already previewing a clash with the Pentagon over its Biden-era policies.

This week, would-be House Speaker Kevin McCarthy said Congress should delay the National Defense Authorization Act until next year, citing the need for the new majority to crack open the bill and try to roll back policies meant to make the service more inclusive.

“I’ve watched what the Democrats have done in many of these, especially in the NDAA and the wokeism that they want to bring in there,” McCarthy told reporters on Capitol Hill this week. “I actually believe the NDAA should hold up until the first of the year, and let’s get it right.”

He didn’t cite a specific issue, but Republicans use the term wokeism to refer to a Fox News-fueled litany of complaints against Defense Department policies — from vaccine mandates to efforts to root out extremism to a push to create more diversity in the ranks. All are framed as distractions that weaken the military and keep it from being able to counter China.

DoD has defended its policies, saying diversity and awareness programs strengthen the force, give it a broader pool of potential troops amid a military-wide recruiting crisis, and have no bearing on units’ abilities to defend the nation.

The Republicans’ complaints on these issues aren’t new. Nor is their focus on the culture wars. For two years, conservatives have had Twitter-ready exchanges with Pentagon leaders during hearings that were called for some other reason, usually the budget. But because they’re in the minority, Republicans haven’t been able to make much of a dent in how the Defense Department handles its troops.

All of that changes on Jan. 3, when those same Republicans gain the power to call their own hearings on topics of their choosing, push through legislation and put their concerns front and center.

Rep. Michael Waltz (R-Fla.), a House Armed Services member who has pushed to ban the teaching of critical race theory at service academies, accused the administration of “a progressive, socially-driven agenda that is being forced on the military.”

“They’ve gone this direction,” Waltz said in an interview, referring to the Biden administration. “But yes … we are going to provide oversight and we are going to legislate it.”

Ranking Republican Mike Rogers of Alabama, who will chair the Armed Services Committee next year, said the Biden administration wants “to force their political agenda onto our servicemembers” rather than focusing on military threats.

“Republicans are seeking to hold the Biden administration accountable for the improper use of DoD resources to implement far-left initiatives that have nothing to do with national security,” Rogers said in a statement.

Democrats, meanwhile, are ready to fire back, eager to remind current and future GOP leaders that there are real-world consequences to holding up the defense policy bill over wedge issues.

“If you kick it off four, five, six months, you are really damaging the United States military. So I hope Kevin McCarthy understands that,” House Armed Services Chair Adam Smith (D-Wash.) said Wednesday at POLITICO’s Defense Summit. “You are damaging the United States military every day past October 1st that you don’t get it done, and certainly more so every day past January [1st].”

“We’re going to get it done this year because that’s the right thing to do,” he added.

Race, vaccines, abortion

Republicans’ attack line against the Pentagon began not long after Biden took office last year. In March, Biden hailed the military’s efforts to make its forces more gender inclusive, noting the services were “designing body armor that fits women properly, tailoring combat uniforms for women, creating maternity flight suits [and] updating requirements for their hairstyles.”

Fox News’ Tucker Carlson ridiculed Biden on his next show. “So, we’ve got new hairstyles and maternity flight suits. Pregnant women are going to fight our wars. It’s a mockery of the U.S. military,” he said.

The comments prompted a rare public rebuke from the military, and the Pentagon’s then-spokesperson John Kirby.

Kirby told reporters that “the diversity of our military” is “one of our greatest strengths” and that “we still have a lot of work to do to make our military more inclusive, more respectful of everyone, especially women.”

“But what we absolutely won’t do is take personnel advice from a talk show host or the Chinese military,” Kirby said. “Now, maybe those folks feel like they have something to prove. That’s on them. We know we’re the greatest military in the world today, and even for all the things we need to improve, we know exactly why that’s so.”

Lawmakers quickly picked up the storyline and made it more of a problem for top Pentagon leaders last June. At the time, Waltz tangled with Joint Chiefs Chair Gen. Mark Milley following reports that professors at the military service academies had discussed critical race theory with their students.

“I personally find it offensive that we are accusing the United States military ... of being ‘woke’ or something else because we’re studying some theories that are out there,” Milley told the lawmakers.

While his response went viral, he also became a greater target of the right.

“To all our service academies, I would just say you might want to pump the brakes on hiring, you know, five new ‘DEI professors’ or creating new departments,” Wisconsin Rep. Mike Gallagher, the top Republican on the panel that handles military personnel issues, said in September. DEI refers to diversity, equity and inclusion. “Because I guarantee you when Congress is controlled by Republicans, as it will be in the new year, we’re going to push back on this and expose this ideology for the distraction from war fighting that it is.”

Republicans are also set to use their majority to attempt to pare back the administration’s Covid-19 vaccine mandate for military personnel. Though service members are required to take any number of vaccines and the military is clear about what it means to disobey orders, Republicans have ripped the rule for forcing troops out of the service and have offered several proposals to undo the penalties for personnel who don’t get the shot. Previous attempts at softening the rules were voted down during defense bill deliberations in June on near party-line votes.

Rogers led GOP members in a letter to Austin in September pressing for details on when the mandate will end — seizing on Biden’s comments in September that the “pandemic is over” — or an explanation for why it will stay in place. The lawmakers also expressed particular frustration with denials of troop requests for religious exemptions.

Republicans will likely also seek to use defense legislation next year to block a new Pentagon policy to cover troops’ travel expenses to obtain abortions, contending it politicizes the military. The memo from Austin, released less than three weeks before the midterms, is aimed at shoring up access for service members stationed in states where abortions are banned.

They are also likely to push to kill or curtail Pentagon efforts to shift toward renewable energy and combat climate change, including programs to expand the use of electric vehicles. Republicans similarly took aim at alternative fuels programs during the Obama administration, arguing they are costly and hinder military readiness.

In reality, efforts to attack those issues on annual defense legislation will either die or be softened in the Senate, which remains under Democratic control and where bipartisan support is needed to pass bills regardless of which party is in power.

And while they may vote for those proposals, GOP leaders on House Armed Services and its subcommittees may not be keen to embrace culture war issues if they threaten passage of the defense policy bill, one of the few major bills that reliably become law each year.

“Will there be tangential debates on all of these other issues? Yes,” said Rudy deLeon, a former House Armed Services staff director and senior fellow at the liberal Center for American Progress. “But I think taking care of the force at a time when there’s such global turbulence ... will be their priority.”

Yet Republicans could squeeze out some small wins in a divided government, predicted Thomas Spoehr of the conservative Heritage Foundation.

“You can’t hit home runs when the margins are so small,” Spoehr said. “But I think you’re going to see some doubles and singles from Republicans.”

For instance, Democratic lawmakers agreed to a provision in last year’s defense bill that bars dishonorable discharges for troops forced out solely for defying the vaccine mandate. Waltz also pointed to a provision he sponsored this year requiring the Army to set gender-neutral fitness standards for combat jobs. The provision made it into the House-passed defense bill.

The Senate Armed Services Committee in July backed language in a report accompanying its defense bill that called for an end to Pentagon anti-extremism efforts — a surprising vote that saw independent Sen. Angus King side with Republicans.

Relitigating Afghanistan

Personnel policies aside, Republicans have also promised to intensify their scrutiny of the Biden administration’s handling of the chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The effort is likely to be spearheaded by Michael McCaul of Texas, who is set to lead the House Foreign Affairs Committee. McCaul sent a letter to Secretary of State Antony Blinken last month requesting the State Department preserve all documents related to the U.S. withdrawal, a move laying the groundwork for a full-tilt investigation when Republicans take over in January. But several committees will likely probe the Afghanistan withdrawal and its aftermath, including the Armed Services, Intelligence and Oversight and Reform panels.

“House Republicans, if given the opportunity to hold the majority next Congress, will demand answers, hold open hearings, and ultimately provide the American people with the transparency they deserve,” McCarthy and top Republicans from those four committees promised in a Fox News op-ed in August.

Republicans on the House Armed Services Committee, however, have been the most unified in their push to rewrite Biden’s Pentagon spending plans. Rogers and other Republicans argue the administration’s budgets fall short of the cash needed to confront threats from China and Russia and keep up with high inflation, and have pushed for 3 to 5 percent annual inflation-adjusted growth in military spending.

But the substance may be tough in the tightly divided House, where Republicans can lose only a few votes. They can count on some Democratic support, but they’ll also have to sell their plan to conservatives, such as the House Freedom Caucus, who want to slash federal spending and will have tremendous influence in internal party deliberations.

Rogers warned in the runup to the midterms that a narrow GOP majority would be “a disaster” for their agenda, including defense spending.

“It’ll be just like when we were in the majority last time,” Rogers said. “We’ll be paralyzed. On everything.”

POLITICO

Politico

7. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (20.10.22) CDS comments on key events

CDS Daily brief (20.10.22) CDS comments on key events

Humanitarian aspect:

Since October 10, Russia has carried out about 300 strikes on Ukraine's energy system using missiles, artillery, and drones, Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko said.

As of October 20, the police found 1,365 bodies of civilians killed during the occupation.

Staring at 11:24 p.m. on October 19, planned power outages began in Kyiv to avoid accidents. Kyiv residents are urged to consume electricity sparingly - turn on energy-consuming devices one at a time, and reduce electricity consumption as much as possible from 5:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. Businesses are asked to limit the external lighting of offices, restaurants, and shopping centers. On October 20, buses will run on 21 out of 38 city electric bus routes to save electricity in the city. Scheduled blackouts are also introduced in Kharkiv, Poltava and Sumy Oblasts.

On the night of October 20, the Russian military struck an industrial enterprise, and an energy infrastructure facility in the Kryvy Rih district, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, head of the Oblast Military Administration Valentyn Reznichenko said. No one was injured, but there was serious damage. However, the night passed without emergencies in the rest of the Oblast's districts.

Deputy Head of the Office of the President Kyrylo Tymoshenko said that this morning, around 07:20, Russian terrorists launched a rocket attack on the territory of a specialized children's school in the village of Komyshuvakha, Donetsk Oblast. No victims were reported.

Russian troops shelled Mykolaiv from S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems on the morning of October 20, the head of Mykolaiv Oblast Military Administration, Vitaly Kim, said. No victims and destruction. "They only spoil our lawns," Kim joked.

To date, 544 towns and villages have been de-occupied in Kharkiv Oblast. Thirty-two remain under temporary occupation, which is a little less than 2%, Oleg Sinegubov, head of the regional military administration, said.

In the de-occupied Lyman of Donetsk Oblast, law enforcement officers completed the exhumation at the site of the largest mass burial: they discovered the bodies of 111 civilians and 35 military personnel, the National Police reported.

22 places of torture have been identified in the liberated parts of Kharkiv Oblast, Volodymyr Tymoshko, head of the Main Directorate of the National Police in the Kharkiv Oblast, told a press briefing. They were identified based on the testimony of witnesses or victims. The torture chambers were found in Vovchansk (2), Kupyansk (4), Shevchenkove (2), Izyum (4), Kozachya Lopan (3), Liptsy, Velykiy Burluk, Pisky-Radkovsky, Borova etc. According to Tymoshko, it is

currently impossible to name the total number of people who went through these torture chambers, since some people are currently in the Russian Federation.

Occupied territories:

The probability that the Russian occupiers will fire on the civilian population of Kherson Oblast is high, Ukrainian General Staff warns. On the morning of October 19, the occupying forces sent messages around the occupied territories calling for the evacuation of the Nova Kakhovka residents, allegedly due to a planned shelling by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. A similar assessment was shared by the Institute for the Study of War. The Russian forces are setting information conditions for a false flag attack on the Kakhovka HPP to justify or cover up their retreat in Kherson Oblast. On the evening of October 20, President Zelenski said that the dam and equipment of Kakhovka HPP were mined and that Russia was preparing for a manmade disaster.

The Russian occupation forces are starting to flee from the city of Enerhodar, where Zaporizhzhya NPP is located, NAEC "Energoatom" said. Yesterday, October 19, and on the night of October 20, they started moving looted property from the places of their compact residences and the occupying "administration" of the city. Local residents recorded a mass robbery of the Skifsky hotel. The Russian invaders "took it out and packed everything they could into buses and trucks: TVs, refrigerators, furniture, kettles and other household items", the message from Energoatom reads.

According to the legally elected Mayor of Melitopol, Ivan Fedorov, schools in the city are "guarded" by armed military personnel, mostly Chechens. In the morning, after the classes start, they lock the schools, preventing parents from entering the building. Then, after an additional check, they let the students out at the end of the school day. Fedorov also said that the occupying forces come to people's houses, break down doors, and take people captive. Over the past two weeks, they have taken hundreds of people and released only a few. Fedorov believes that with martial law's introduction, terror will only increase.

Operational situation

(please note that this part of the report is mainly on the previous day's (October 20) developments)

It is the 240th day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to protect Donbas"). The enemy tries to maintain control over the temporarily captured territories. It concentrates its efforts on disrupting the counteroffensive actions of the Ukrainian troops and at the same time, does not give up attempts to conduct the offensive in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka directions.

The Russian military shells the positions of the Ukrainian troops along the entire contact line, fortifies defensive positions and frontiers in certain directions, and conducts aerial

reconnaissance. In violation of the norms of international humanitarian law, the laws and customs of war, it strikes critical infrastructure and residential quarters.

Over the past day, the Russian forces have launched 3 missile and 20 air strikes and fired up to 10 MLRS rounds. Up to 20 towns and villages were hit by the Russian fire, particularly Terny, Bakhmut, Vuhledar and Komyshuvakha of Donetsk Oblast. Near the state border, the villages of Mykolaivka and Kostobrody of Chernihiv Oblast, Dvorichne, Krasne and Strilecha of Kharkiv Oblast were shelled with mortars and barrel artillery. Attack UAVs were used.

The Russian military has once again launched a massive attack on the civilian infrastructure of Ukraine using attack UAVs. The Ukrainian Defense Forces shot down 15 out of 20 UAVs.

The military and political leadership of the Russian Federation are officially ending the partial mobilization. At the same time, the forced delivery of subpoenas to certain categories of Russian citizens continues. In the Mosrentgen settlement of Moscow Oblast, the mobilized were placed in the deployment point of the 27th separate motorized rifle brigade for medical examination and subsequent transportation to the combat zone. Significant problems arise in the course of implemented mobilization measures.

The occupation authorities continued the forced mobilization of the male population in the temporarily occupied territories. At the same time, the evacuation of the civilian population began in separate directions.

The aviation of the Ukrainian Defense Forces made 6 strikes over the past day. Hits on 2 areas of enemy weapons and military equipment concentration, 2 strongholds, and 2 Russian anti-aircraft missile systems are confirmed. Ukrainian air defense units shot down 15 "Shahed-136" unmanned aerial vehicles.

Over the past day, Ukraine's missile forces and artillery hit 1 command post, 2 areas of manpower, weapons and equipment concentration, and 2 Russian ammunition depots.

The Republic of Belarus continues to support the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The threat of the Russian Armed Forces resuming the offensive on the northern front is growing. The western part of Ukraine may be chosen as the direction of attack to cut the main logistical arteries of the weapons and military equipment supply to Ukraine from partner countries. On the Republic of Belarus territory, aviation and other units of the Russian Armed Forces are being deployed at the relevant airfields and other military infrastructure facilities, particularly those transferred under the full control of the Russian army. As a part of the same effort, preparations for covert mobilization are being carried out on the territory of the Republic of Belarus. At the same time, this country continues to provide its territory for ballistic missile and UAV launches.

The Republic of Belarus has deployed Russian MiG-31 aircraft at its airfields, which can be armed with Kinzhal-type cruise missiles.

The defense forces are taking measures to ensure reliable protection of the Ukrainian state border and the city of Kyiv from the north.

The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remain low.

Kharkiv direction

• Zolochiv-Balakleya section: approximate length of combat line - 147 km, number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 10-12, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 13.3 km;

• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd, and 197th tank regiments, 245th motorized rifle regiment of the 47th tank division, 6th and 239th tank regiments, 228th motorized rifle regiment of the 90th tank division, 1st motorized rifle regiment, 1st tank regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 6th Combined Arms Army, 27th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Tank Army, 275th and 280th motorized rifle regiments, 11th tank regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division of the 11 Army Corps, 7th motorized rifle regiment of the 11th Army Corps, 80th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps, 2nd and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 1st Army Corps of so-called DPR, PMCs.

The Russian forces fired at the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces with mortars, barrel and rocket artillery in the areas of Zarichne, Bilohorivka, Torske, Terny and Yampolivka.

Kramatorsk direction

● Balakleya - Siversk section: approximate length of the combat line - 184 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17-20, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;

● 252nd and 752nd motorized rifle regiments of the 3rd motorized rifle division, 1st, 13th, and 12th tank regiments, 423rd motorized rifle regiment of the 4th tank division, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, 35th, 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 3rd and 14th separate SOF brigades, 2nd and 4th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Army Corps, 7th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Army Corps, PMCs.

There is no change in the operational situation.

Donetsk direction

● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 235 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 17 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th tank regiment of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th, and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet," 336th separate marines brigade, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The Russian military fired from tanks and rocket artillery in the areas of Bakhmut, Soledar, Zelenopillya and Yakovlivka.

Zaporizhzhia direction

● Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 29th Combined Arms Army, 38th and 64th separate motorized rifle brigades, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37 separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 136th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps, 39th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 68th Army Corps, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, and 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The Russian forces did not conduct active offensive actions. They inflicted fire damage on the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces and civilian infrastructure in the areas of more than 35 towns and villages along the entire line of contact.

Tavriysk direction

-   Vasylivka – Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line – 296 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 42, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 7 km;

-  Deployed BTGs: 114th, 143rd, and 394th motorized rifle regiments, 218th tank regiment of the 127th motorized rifle division, 57th and 60th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 37th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 429th motorized rifle regiment of the 19th motorized rifle division, 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments of the 20th motorized rifle division, 34th and 205th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division, 10th, 16th, 346th separate SOF brigades, 239th air assault regiment of the 76th Air assault division, 217th and 331st parachute airborne regiments of the 98th airborne division, 108 air assault regiment, 171st separate airborne assault battalion of the 7th Air assault division, 11th and 83rd separate airborne assault brigade, 4th military base of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 7 military base 49 Combined Arms Army, 224th, 237th and 126th separate coastal defence brigades, 127th separate ranger brigade, 1st and 3rd Army Corps, PMCs.

Areas of more than thirty towns and cities along the contact line suffered fire damage. To conduct aerial reconnaissance, the Russian military made up to 40 UAV sorties of various types.

Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:

The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black Sea and to maintain control over the captured territories.

In the open sea, the Russian naval group is comprised of 9 ships and boats located along the southwestern coast of Crimea. Among them are 2 cruise missile carriers (a corvette of project 21631 and a 636.3 submarine) carrying a total of 12 "Kalibr" missiles.

Russian aviation continues to fly from the Crimean airfields of Belbek and Hvardiyske over the northwestern part of the Black Sea. Over the past day, 14 Su-27, Su-30, and Su-24 aircraft from Belbek and Saki airfields were involved.

The Russian military continues targeting Ukrainian ports and coastal areas with missiles and drones. Ukrainian defenders shot down 14 Iranian Shahed-136 kamikaze drones within two hours on the night of October 20 over Mykolaiv Oblast. As the Air Force Command reported, nine drones were shot down by the forces and means of the "South" Air Command air defense. The soldiers of the Navy and the National Guard destroyed two drones each, and one more was destroyed by law enforcement officers of the National Police.

According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 63% of cruise missiles are shot down by Ukrainian air defense. Since October 10, the Russian military has launched 154 missiles over Ukraine, which is an increase of almost 7 times compared to the first ten days of the month (there were 21 missiles).

Oleksandr Sukhanov, the deputy head of the Transportation Ministry of the Russian Federation, will resign due to the explosion on the Kerch Strait Bridge. Oleksandr Sukhanov primarily took care of the transport industry security issues and oversaw operations of the Government Security Department (UVO) of the Transportation Ministry, including the Kerch Strait Bridge security.

"Grain initiative": 8 million tons of Ukrainian agricultural products have already been shipped. Today, October 20, within the "Grain Initiative" framework, 2 ships with 82 thousand tons of agricultural products left the port of Pivdenyi. In particular, the ATLANTIS ALMERIA tanker and the ARIS T bulker left the port. The food is headed for countries in Asia and Europe.

8 million tons of agricultural products have already been exported since the departure of the first vessel with Ukrainian grain. A total of 362 ships with food left Ukrainian ports for the countries of Asia, Europe and Africa.

Russia is threatening to "reconsider cooperation" with the UN Secretary-General if the UN sends experts to verify the origin of the drones used by the Russian military to damage Ukraine's civilian infrastructure and strike cities. Such statements were made after a closed session of the UN Security Council, convened at the initiative of the USA, France and Great Britain. Experts assume that the statement referred to the so-called "grain initiative", launched after personal efforts and agreements with the Kremlin reached by the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres.

Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 20.10

Personnel - almost 66,650 people (+370);

Tanks 2,567 (+13);

Armored combat vehicles – 5,255 (+20);

Artillery systems – 1,646 (+9);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 372 (0); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 189 (0); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 4,005 (+6); Aircraft - 269 (0);

Helicopters – 243 (+1);

UAV operational and tactical level – 1,311 (+25); Intercepted cruise missiles - 329 (+6);

Boats / ships - 16 (0).

Ukraine, general news

In an interview with the Canadian TV channel CTV News, President Volodymyr Zelenskyi rejected Russia's accusation that Ukrainian special services organized the explosion on the Kerch Bridge on October 8. Instead, the president suggested that the explosion on the bridge could have been the result of infighting between the Russian special services and the military.

Head of the President's Office, Andriy Yermak, said that Ukraine has already destroyed almost 50% of the military potential of the Russian Federation which is NATO's main threat. "Ukraine's membership in NATO will definitely strengthen the Alliance," Yermak stressed.

According to the National Bank's forecast, inflation will accelerate to about 30% at the end of this year, but will decrease in the following years, subject to the expected decrease in security risks and a coordinated monetary and fiscal policy, the NBU Chairman Andrii Pyshnyi said at a briefing.

The President of Ukraine signed two decrees imposing sanctions against the Russian Federation, designating almost 4,000 individuals and companies. In particular, sanctions are imposed on the occupation administrations' representatives (Kyrylo Stremousov, Volodymyr Saldo, Volodymyr Rogov, Kostyantyn Ivashchenko, etc.). There are also military personnel and mercenaries (in particular, the financier of the "Wagner" group Yevhen Prigozhin), as well as mercenary recruiters (in particular, the commander of the "Palestine Liberation Army" Muhammad Al-Salti, the leader of the Syrian group Al-Ahdat al-Omaria Abu Ghani Shammut). Sanctions were also imposed against Russian propagandists Olga Skabeeva, Volodymyr Solovyov and members of his family, Tigran Keosayan. The restrictions are applied for 10 years.

42% of Ukrainians began to communicate in Ukrainian more, and 14% completely switched from Russian to the Ukrainian language, according to a survey conducted by Gradus Research ordered by "Suspilne" public TV. 54% of residents of small cities (with a population of 50 thousand and less) and 60% of residents of large cities began to communicate in Ukrainian more. Sociologists

explain this by the fact that residents of small towns often communicated in Ukrainian even before the war.

International diplomatic aspect

On the background of the increasing Russian missile and (Iranian-made) drone attacks on Ukraine's critical infrastructure, the Israeli government reiterated its policy of not supplying any weapons to Kyiv. A diplomatic note from the Ukrainian embassy in Israel was leaked, indicating the interest in obtaining air defense and anti-drone systems.

Though some experts interpreted the words of the Israeli Defence Minister that the Russian use of Iranian drones against Ukraine is a "change of paradigm" as a sign of readiness to provide anti- drone systems, it doesn't seem to be the case. And the rumors that the Minister postponed his telephone conversation with his Ukrainian counterpart five times in a row support that hypothesis.

Benjamin Netanyahu, a former Israeli Prime Minister that might return to the office again in the coming weeks, justified the refusal to send any weapons to Ukraine by the possibility of those arms falling into the wrong hands and firing back at Israel. He knows what he is talking about. After the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russians acknowledged their backwardness facing Israeli-made UAVs operated by the Georgian Armed Forces. So, they approached Israelis, asking to sell them various drones and set up their production. The Israeli government has been mulling over the proposal for quite some time, fearing letting out their technology and the possibility of weapons finding their way to their enemies. It was on Netanyahu's watch that the deal was cleared with the promise from Moscow not to send S-300 air defense systems instead, as well as clear skies over Syria. The bilateral production project was established. In 2016 the Israeli government halted the deal under US pressure; Russia supplied four S-300PMU2 batteries to Iran, and, perhaps, as gratitude, Israeli drone technology was used during an attack against Israel that same year. It was reported that in April 2022, Iran returned some S-300 systems back to Russia to be used against Ukraine, replacing them with the Iranian-made Bavar-373 system.

In a closed-door UN Security Council meeting, the US, UK, and France accused Iran of providing drones to Russia in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 of 2015, which banned the transfer of drones with a range beyond 300 km. Though the "expert briefing" laid out proof of Iranian drone supply to Russia, representatives of both countries denied their involvement. Moreover, the Russian diplomat threatened to revise Moscow's relations with the UN and not prolong the "grain agreement" if the UN sent an expert team to investigate the drone issue on the ground. There might be 450 drones that attacked Ukraine, given that the Ukrainian military claimed to shoot down 223 of them, while US officials estimate Ukraine's success rate at about 50%.

The UK introduced sanctions targeting "the individuals and businesses personally responsible for providing the drones used in these barbaric strikes." The violation of the UN Security Council Resolution might be a fatal blow to a new version of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (so- called Iran nuclear deal). The Biden Administration has been pushing for an agreement but found

resistance from the Iranian side and criticism from the Hill and the Israeli ally. If the GOP retakes the Senate in November, the draft of the JCPOA might be shelved for good. Meanwhile, the Biden administration announced several criminal charges and sanctions related to physical persons and entities engaged in a scheme of US military technologies procurement by Russia aimed at use in its war effort in Ukraine.

The UK Prime Minister Liz Truss steps down. Whoever of the Tories is at Dawning 10 after her, support for Ukraine won't be diminished. It's been speculated that Boris Johnson may try his fortune. Rishi Sunak, who lost the leadership race to Liz Truss six weeks ago, Penny Mordaunt, who came third in the summer leadership contest, and once again Ben Wallace, though he didn't make a bid last time, might be in the race. However, suppose there're general elections, just a bit less enthusiastic about supporting Ukraine. In that case, Labour might come to power (some 52% support Labour, while the popularity of the Conservative party is at 23%).

The UK Defence Minister informed the Commons about an incident with a Russian SU-27 fighter releasing a missile in the vicinity of the UK RAF RC-135 Rivet Joint, a spy plane, in the international airspace over the Black Sea. The Russians explained it was "a technical malfunction of the SU-27 fighter." It's unlikely so, given the track record of Russian jets and warships increasingly behaving recklessly and dangerously since the illegal annexation of Crimea. In June last year, the HMS Defender was reportedly shut at by the Russians while the UK warship was passing by in the vicinity of the Crimean Peninsula.

Russia, relevant news

Mobilization in Russia will exacerbate labor shortages and undermine consumer confidence, so the economy has resumed its decline, says the report compiled by the analytical department of the Central Bank of Russia. The mobilization in Russia has already hit consumer confidence and business activity and is likely to weigh on the economy in the coming months.

One trillion rubles will be allocated from the National Welfare Fund, created under the leadership of President Putin, to cover the deficit of the federal budget in 2022, according to the resolution signed by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. The amount of money in the National Welfare Fund of the Russian Federation as of October 1 was to 10.79 trillion rubles. It decreased by 1.08 trillion rubles in September.

Finnish company Orion Pharma has started the liquidation of its Russian office. It is planned to be closed by the end of 2022, the Russian newspaper Vedomosti reported citing its sources in the company.

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8. Will the new US Congress still pay for its Pacific promises?

Doubtful.

It will be a fight because the Republican House will push back.

Will the new US Congress still pay for its Pacific promises? | Lowy Institute

The Biden administration has staked $810 million on a

regional strategy and now must ensure bipartisan support.

lowyinstitute.org · by Jessica Collins

After more than a week of waiting, the Republican Party finally got over the line to win control of the US House of Representatives. It was somewhat of an expected outcome, even if not the “red wave” as predicted by pundits, but still one that can frustrate Biden’s agenda and the passage of legislation. For matters of foreign policy, this could include the “first ever” Pacific Partnership Strategy announced earlier this year, tipped to cost US$810 million. The fate of this most recent bout of Pacific promises from the United States government will be watched closely in the region.

Just two months ago, in response to a more assertive and active China in the Pacific, the Biden administration invited Pacific Island leaders to Washington to participate in a US-Pacific Island Country Summit. Biden used the meeting to commit to broader regional engagement, recognising the United States’ relative neglect of Pacific Island countries over the decades.

The resulting Pacific Partnership Strategy came laden with many promises. Highlights included opening new embassies in Solomon Islands, Tonga and Kiribati as well as a regional mission for the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in Fiji. A plan was announced to appoint a US envoy to the Pacific Islands Forum and expand the Peace Corps presence across the region.

The United States has an unfortunate history of making promises to the Pacific Islands region and not following through on them.

Provided the funding wins Congressional approval, there will be grants and private financing for climate resilience and adaptation projects, ocean mapping support, a “Resilient Blue Pacific” economies program, as well as coastguard and law enforcement training. Initiatives in health security, tourism, cyber security and cleaning up the remnants of war also feature.

This is where a change in Congress can be destabilising to foreign policy initiatives. The administration needs US$810 million in funding to deliver on the commitments. The bulk of the money – US$600 million over ten years – will be committed to an Economic Assistance Agreement for the renewal of the South Pacific Tuna Treaty. The Treaty supports the economic development of fisheries, a major contributor to Pacific Island subsistence and national income. Other aspects will go towards climate resilience, maritime security and economic measures.

Biden enjoyed bipartisanship when the Pacific Partnership Strategy was announced. But as US foreign policy analysts pointed out, even when the Democratic Party still retained control of Congress:

sustaining focus on the region and following through on commitments is certain to be challenging. There is little expertise on the Pacific Island region across the US government; the number of staff working on the region at the State Department, USAID, and the Department of Defense is small and unlikely to grow significantly. And in an environment of scarce resources and competing priorities, funding will be a constant issue.

Competing priorities will certainly be an issue over the next two years. According to the views of Americans, the domestic economy, inflation, abortion legislation and crime are likely to dominate public debate and the legislation agenda until the presidential elections in two years’ time. Committees investigating the Biden family and their business dealings will also likely disrupt the president’s rest of term. Getting the US$810 million for Pacific funding through Congress may prove difficult.

Leaders from Pacific Island countries gathered in September at the White House for a summit with US President Joe Biden (@POTUS/Twitter)

Supporters of the bid should underscore that much of it will go towards an Economic Assistance Agreement with the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency to the tune of US$60 million annually – a small price to pay for regional security and economic development.

To ensure the Pacific Partnership Strategy funding is secured, advocates will also need to frame it in terms of domestic security (can it protect Americans?) and domestic economy (will it stave off inflation and recession?). The former could be a relatively easy sell, with one in two Americans feeling that “China’s territorial ambitions are a critical threat to the United States”, the latter more difficult because more aid funds will be spent in the short term while Americans are doing it tough. Regional security can, though, protect free and open shipping routes, supply chains and resource distribution (particularly seafood), bolstering supply and lowering prices of goods to America.

The Republican tilt towards crime and defence issues could result in expensive soft diplomacy initiatives such as tourism funding or climate change resilience projects being sidelined for harder forms of security and defence initiatives, such as Pacific Island military bases and transnational crime operations. It is telling that Guam, a US territory in the North Pacific with more than one-quarter of its land area occupied by US Air Force and Navy installations, elected a Republican delegate in the latest midterms – the first since 1993.

The United States has an unfortunate history of making promises to the Pacific Islands region and not following through on them. If a change in Congress results in budget approval for the Pacific promises, the United States will demonstrate a genuine, bipartisan willingness to contribute to regional development and security.

lowyinstitute.org · by Jessica Collins

9. Thoughts on Xi Jinping’s Third Term

Seven takeaways.

Excerpt:

Here are some takeaways from Xi’s speech and the personnel announcements.

Thoughts on Xi Jinping’s Third Term

Xi has imposed his own take on unity of the “Chinese dream.”

thediplomat.com · by KAWASHIMA Shin · November 18, 2022

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Xi Jinping’s third term as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has begun. Xi’s own speech and the personnel announcements made to date have exhibited a strong emphasis on national security to further strengthen control over Chinese society, while persuading CCP members and the Chinese people, including minority groups and the Taiwanese, to share the same “dream.” Moreover, although the unity required for this has also been a point that Xi has emphasized, personnel announcements have made it evident that this “unity” is not defined by diversity, but rather by everyone facing the same direction and supporting Xi Jinping.

Here are some takeaways from Xi’s speech and the personnel announcements.

First, the general secretary system has been favored over the party chairmanship system, meaning a collective leadership system was maintained. Almost all members of the CCP Central Committee are now people believed to belong to Xi’s faction, and none of the Central Politburo members are women. This is perhaps to show that unity means belonging to the Xi faction. However, although the decision-making process of CCP personnel affairs has always been opaque, it is even more so this time. One example: The number of Central Politburo members is now 24, one less than the usual 25.

Second, unity has been emphasized in both speeches and personnel announcements. This is probably because the CCP now thinks it is uncertain if China can achieve its goals of becoming a modern socialist country by 2035 and a great modern socialist country by 2049 amid the economic slowdown, including COVID-19, and pressure from the United States and other advanced countries. This is why it is trying to strengthen its pro-Xi definition of unity of the party and Chinese people. This is a manifestation of a sense of crisis.

Third, no successor has been appointed. If there had been two new Politburo Standing Committee members, they would have been considered de facto successors, but there were in fact four. The Central Military Commission also has no “civilians” other than Xi himself. (Xi is on the military register.) This has made it likelier that Xi Jinping will continue as general secretary for the next 10 years.

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Fourth, a number of conventions were broken, among them apparently the conventions of retirement at the age of 68 and of a former vice premier becoming the premier. Of course, it is possible that Li Qiang will be vice premier for the next few months and then become the premier in March 2023. In any case, the institutionalization within the party that had been ongoing since the eras of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao has collapsed, at least in terms of personnel matters. As a result, generational change has been delayed, and China’s “seventh generation” of 50-year-olds, mainly born in the 1970s, have missed out on becoming Central Politburo members. It may be that the Xi Jinping is distrustful of the younger generations who did not experience the Cultural Revolution.

Fifth, there are issues with responsibility for economic and fiscal affairs. Li Keqiang, Wang Yang, Hu Chunhua, and other reformists have been purged, and although He Lifeng is there, there has been a weakening of the officials in charge of the economy, which is a concern. Fewer Central Politburo members are in charge of monetary and fiscal matters. The more emphasis there is on the “common” in “common prosperity for all” (and in this context, “common” means distribution), the more the line of “reform and opening up” will be suppressed. Given that reform and opening up is what drives cooperation with the West, this will also affect foreign policy implications.

Sixth, although some words about Taiwan have been included in the Party Constitution, there has been no significant change in expression. The basic stance is to “win without fighting” by 2049. China regards the Taiwanese as a part of the Chinese nation and assumes that they will share the same “dream,” which is why the official goal is to incorporate Taiwanese society. In other words, they will push Taiwanese society toward unification by continuing to increase military pressure, to penetrate society with cyberattacks and disinformation, and to apply economic sanctions and similar measures. The problem is what will happen when Xi Jinping comes to regard this policy as being ineffective, because that is when he will likely increase the level of military pressure.

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Seventh, the question is how to deal with dissatisfaction within the party over these personnel affairs, an unemployment rate of nearly 20 percent, the economic slowdown, and social dissatisfaction with the COVID-19 countermeasures. The Xi administration will likely act preemptively against social dissatisfaction by commanding big data and whole-process democracy, while at the same time using “national security” as a shield to eliminate troublemakers through digital surveillance and control networks at the basic social level. Yet the “happy surveillance society” can only exist as long as the CCP continues to deliver on its promises of affluence and convenience. Will this continue under the new system? Is it ultimately possible for Xi Jinping’s dream to coincide with the dreams of the CCP members and the Chinese people, encompassing all ethnic groups? That will be the critical question as he begins his third term.

GUEST AUTHOR

KAWASHIMA Shin

KAWASHIMA Shin is a professor at the University of Tokyo.

thediplomat.com · by KAWASHIMA Shin · November 18, 2022

10. The Sneaky Way China Could Win a War Against America

Read Unrestricted Warfare.

Excertps:

In short, logistics is a center of gravity for the U.S. armed forces. If a foe lands hammer blow after hammer blow against the logistics fleet, it could prevail without even venturing an apocalyptic battle in the Western Pacific. For Xi Jinping & Co., employing such indirect means would chart an expedient and relatively risk-free route to victory in the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, or East China Sea. It would deny U.S. forces already in the theater adequate reinforcements while preventing Washington from keeping its commitments to Asian allies.

Military leaders like McConville and Wormuth, along with their counterparts in the sea and aviation services, say soothing things about correcting shortfalls in the supply realm. Let’s hold them to their words.

The Sneaky Way China Could Win a War Against America

19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · November 20, 2022

Kill the Logistics Fleet: The U.S. armed forces can accomplish little in the Western Pacific without ample and regular supplies of all types, from fuel to ammunition to foodstuffs. Prospective foes—read China—know this. They will go after the logistics fleet hauling matériel to the fighting forces, making it a priority target set.

And why not? That’s what I would do were I in charge of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Deprive hostile forces of what they need to accomplish their combat missions and you may as well have defeated them in a decisive battle. They slink away when they run out of supplies.

Better yet, they may never even reach the battleground.

The U.S. Army gets this. Or at least army chieftains are saying the right things. Army Chief of Staff James McConville recently told an event hosted by Politico, “we believe we’ll have what we call contested logistics” and intend to devise ways to assure that stores get through. Adds Army Secretary Christine Wormuth, supply “isn’t the sexiest thing, frankly, the Army does, but it is very important. Just look at how the Russian military in Ukraine has struggled to resupply and feed its soldiers. That shows you the importance of logistics today on a contested battlefield.”

But logistics isn’t just important; it’s central.

Military grandmaster Carl von Clausewitz depicts a combatant’s “center of gravity,” in lyrical and seemingly less-than-actionable terms, as “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.” The center of gravity derives from a belligerent’s “dominant characteristics,” and represents “the point against which all our energies should be directed” in order to triumph in battle. Once commanders have ascertained what constitutes a fighting force’s center of gravity and struck at it, they should rain “blow after blow” on it to keep the foe from recovering from the initial shock.

Clausewitz is—contain your surprise—somewhat vague and abstruse when identifying specific centers of gravity. He declares that the center of gravity resides wherever a warring state exhibits “cohesion.” Pound away at that core again and again and enemy legions lose cohesion. Either their leadership capitulates or they can no longer put up a fight. Clausewitz does go on to list candidates for the center of gravity. As a good soldier, he ranks the army as the prime center of gravity “if it is at all significant.” Next comes the capital, assuming it’s the administrative, social, and political center of the country. Then comes breaking a hostile alliance to simplify the problem. He also mentions leadership and popular opinion, almost as an afterthought.

Whatever unites a combatant is it.

Disrupting combat logistics constitutes an indirect way of assaulting U.S. Army and affiliated expeditionary forces, America’s chief center of gravity in Clausewitzian parlance. Because they only play away games at long distances from North America, U.S. forces cannot prevail without lavish support. Assailing stores ships, not to mention tanker or transport aircraft, would comport with Chinese military doctrine, which envisions waging “systems-destruction warfare” against a stronger foe operating far from home. If an enemy fights as a “system of systems,” such as a fleet, corps, or expeditionary air force, PLA commanders try to discern what binds that system of systems together, imparting cohesion. Then they attack the sinews. If successful China’s defenders dissolve the enemy force into isolated clots of combat power—small formations or individual units—that can be overwhelmed one by one.

The electromagnetic spectrum is one obvious adhesive for any military force. For fleet-tactics maven Captain Wayne Hughes the determinants of tactical and operational effectiveness are weapons range, scouting, and command-and-control. Modern forces depend on the electromagnetic spectrum for all of these functions. It’s how they detect, track, and target hostile forces at a distance. If PLA forces can disrupt U.S. use of the spectrum, they can fulfill the aims of systems-destruction warfare. But again, logistics is even more fundamental to any system of systems. Expeditionary forces stranded without seaborne or airborne supplies are by definition tactically and operationally ineffective. They accomplish nothing.

U.S. Sailors watch from a landing craft as they pull away from the forward-deployed amphibious assault ship USS Essex (LHD 2) off the coast of Cambodia in the Gulf of Thailand, March 2, 2011. Essex is the lead ship of the Essex Amphibious Ready Group and was participating in Maritime Exercise 11, a theater security cooperation visit to improve capabilities of the United States and Royal Cambodian Armed Forces. (DoD photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Adam M. Bennett, U.S. Navy/Released).

In short, logistics is a center of gravity for the U.S. armed forces. If a foe lands hammer blow after hammer blow against the logistics fleet, it could prevail without even venturing an apocalyptic battle in the Western Pacific. For Xi Jinping & Co., employing such indirect means would chart an expedient and relatively risk-free route to victory in the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, or East China Sea. It would deny U.S. forces already in the theater adequate reinforcements while preventing Washington from keeping its commitments to Asian allies.

Military leaders like McConville and Wormuth, along with their counterparts in the sea and aviation services, say soothing things about correcting shortfalls in the supply realm. Let’s hold them to their words.

Everything could depend on it.

Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Nonresident Fellow at the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. The views voiced here are his alone. Holmes is also a Contributing Editor to 19FortyFive.

19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · November 20, 2022

11. Army Secretary lays out plan to overcome the Army's negative image and win over Generation Z

I was going to make a snarky comment and say "Okay, Boomer"because it is usually a boomer who talks about what the other generations want. But the Secretary is not a boomer but instead she is from Gen X (born 1969).

• Baby Boomers: born 1946 to 1964. ...
• Generation Jones: born 1955 to 1965. ...
• Generation X: born 1965 to 1980. ...
• Xennials: born 1977 to 1983. ...
• Millennials: born 1981 to 1996. ...
• Generation Z: born 1997 or after. ...
• Generation Alpha: born 2010 or after.

Excerpts:

“[Parents are] worried that if [their] kid joins the Army they’re going to suffer psychological harm or they’re going to be sexually harassed,” she said. “So we have to put our money where our mouth is — actions speak louder than words. We have got to show results in this area and not just talk about it.”

Some of those solutions are policy changes, such as new regulation for suicide prevention. Wormuth said that the Army is currently working on hiring and training workers to help in that field, with a goal of hiring 200 more in 2023.

Despite the challenges, Wormuth argued that the Army is a fit for Gen Z. The job is to “reintroduce” the Army to younger Americans, to win them over.

Army Secretary lays out plan to overcome the Army's negative image and win over Generation Z

“They want community. They want purpose. They want what they’re doing to matter”

BY NICHOLAS SLAYTON | PUBLISHED NOV 19, 2022 1:29 PM

taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton · November 19, 2022

Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth acknowledged that the Army has struggled to recruit from Generation Z. But on Friday, she laid out potential ways for the service branch to overcome young Americans’ doubts in the Army.

Stars and Stripes first reported on Wormuth’s comments. The Army Secretary was speaking at a dinner hosted by the think tank the Center for New American Security on Friday, Nov. 18. She laid out the challenges the Army was facing in recruiting. The Army had aimed to recruit 60,000 new soldiers in the previous fiscal year. It only got 45,000. The Army’s total force is approximately 465,000.

“It’s a pretty big shortfall,” Wormuth said, according to Stars and Stripes. The Army was facing a series of obstacles in making the service appealing. Some of those challenges have been clear for months. In May, Wormuth told Task & Purpose that the Army needed to do more to address concerns about assaults, sexual harassment and suicide within Army ranks.

While speaking at the dinner, Wormuth said that those challenges have become a part of the Army’s public image as a whole. As a result, she said, only 9 percent of Generation Z, the youngest generation eligible to serve in the military, are interested in doing so.

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“[Parents are] worried that if [their] kid joins the Army they’re going to suffer psychological harm or they’re going to be sexually harassed,” she said. “So we have to put our money where our mouth is — actions speak louder than words. We have got to show results in this area and not just talk about it.”

Some of those solutions are policy changes, such as new regulation for suicide prevention. Wormuth said that the Army is currently working on hiring and training workers to help in that field, with a goal of hiring 200 more in 2023.

Despite the challenges, Wormuth argued that the Army is a fit for Gen Z. The job is to “reintroduce” the Army to younger Americans, to win them over.

“They want community. They want purpose. They want what they’re doing to matter,” she said at the dinner.

Despite the military’s need to recruit from the younger generation of Americans, the Department of Defense’s own assessments of Gen Z have not been the most positive. Most of the criticism has been toward Gen Z’s physical abilities. A release from earlier this year called out “the Nintendo Generation” and its sedentary lifestyle, which the military said hurts their skeleton’s durability. Another report found that only 23% are eligible to serve, based on academic and fitness scores. As a result, the Army has tried ways to overcome that, both through offering enlistment bonuses as well as launching a training program for potential soldiers ahead of boot camp.

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Want to write for Task & Purpose? Click here. Or check out the latest stories on our homepage.

taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton · November 19, 2022

12. RAID AT SON TAY: U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS’ ATTEMPTED RESCUE OF POWS IN 1970

On this day 21 November 1970.

Photos, maps, and graphics at the link.

https://www.historynet.com/son-tay/

Posted inSTORIES

RAID AT SON TAY: U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS’ ATTEMPTED RESCUE OF POWS IN 1970

The Son Tay raid became a blueprint for special operations forces, such as the 2003 rescue of Army Pvt. Jessica Lynch, captured during the Iraq War, and the 2011 Osama bin Laden raid

By EILEEN BJORKMAN12/9/2020

On Nov. 20, 1970, at 6 p.m., U.S. Special Forces Sgt. Terry Buckler reported to an auditorium at Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base. Hours earlier, he had been fed a sleeping pill and steak for lunch and told to get some sleep. Army Col. Arthur “Bull” Simons, deputy commander of the operation Buckler had been training for, entered with Lt. Col. Elliot Sydnor Jr., the operation’s ground force commander. Simons pulled out a map of North Vietnam. Hanoi was circled, with the town of Son Tay nearby.

Simons tapped Son Tay and said: “That’s where we’re going tonight, guys. We are going to rescue as many as 70 POWs. Americans have a right to expect this from their fellow soldiers. We have a 50-50 chance of not making it back. If you do not want to go, now is the time to say so.”

As Buckler remembers, “That auditorium got dead silence for about five seconds and then you thought a cannon got shot. These guys jumped out of their seats, hugging and yelling, ‘Let’s go get ’em!’” Soldiers who had trained as alternates for months were disappointed that no one dropped out.

Everyone, from President Richard Nixon to individual raiders, recognized the moral imperative of the mission and the need to live up to the U.S. military’s ethos to “leave no man behind.” They also realized that when the rescued prisoners of war revealed the brutal treatment they had received in captivity it could help turn world opinion against the North Vietnamese and force them back to the stalled Paris peace talks.

In May 1970, intelligence analysts in a unit keeping tabs on POWs noticed photos of new construction at a compound in Son Tay, along with POW uniforms laid out to dry on the ground in a manner spelling a code for search and rescue. A dirt pile resembled a “K,” meaning “Come get us.”

The prison, 23 miles northwest of Hanoi, was relatively isolated by a river bend with only one bridge to the north. About 12,000 enemy troops lurked at military facilities within a 15-minute drive. The raid was planned to take place within 26 minutes—before enemy reinforcements could be alerted and arrive.

THE RAIDERS WOULD HAVE ABOUT ONE MINUTE ON THE GROUND TO OVERWHELM GUARDS NEAR THE PRISONERS. THAT ONE MINUTE DROVE EVERY PLANNING DECISION.

A helicopter was needed to drop a main assault force inside the prison walls, which contained three guard towers and 40-foot high trees. The Air Force’s HH-53 “Super Jolly Green Giant” search and rescue helicopters were the best choice for inserting the raiders and returning the freed POWs. However, the HH-53 was too big to land inside the prison itself. A smaller helicopter, the UH-1 “Huey,” was selected to perform that task. Planners expected the UH-1’s rotor blades would be damaged from hitting a building while landing inside the compound, rendering it unable to take off again; the raiders would need to destroy the Huey instead.

Five propeller-driven A-1E Skyraider attack planes would circle above the prison to hold approaching ground forces at bay if needed. Two MC-130E Combat Talon transport planes, packed with highly classified equipment designed for precise navigation and stealth operations, would lead the Skyraiders, the Huey and Super Jolly helicopters to the prison.

Attacking at night, a one-quarter moon just above the horizon would offer good visibility while still providing night cover in clear skies. These conditions determined the time window for the prison raid—two five-day periods in late October and late November, predicted to be the driest months.

Air Force Brig. Gen. LeRoy Manor was appointed overall mission commander. Manor and Simons, his Army counterpart, decided all raiders would be volunteers. Simons interviewed about 200 men at Fort Bragg in North Carolina, asking questions designed to obscure mission details, such as: “Have you ever had scuba training?” At 20, Buckler was the youngest raider of the 82 enlisted men and 15 officers selected for training. When he was asked to make a will before he left, the sergeant realized this mission would be somewhat different from previous operations.

Manor had an especially difficult task. He had to coordinate the planning with Air Force special operators strung across Florida, South Carolina and Germany. He also needed crews for four types of aircraft. But Manor had no problem recruiting volunteers, even though he told them only they would be flying a dangerous mission.

Except for a handful of senior officers and planners, the raiders had no idea where they were going or exactly what they would do. Two counterintelligence agents constantly monitored the activities of the team, listening in on phone calls and rifling through trash cans to make sure no information leaked.

Training began in September at Eglin Air Force Base’s Duke Field in the Florida Panhandle. The raiders practiced in a full-scale mock-up of the prison camp built from 2-by-4s and cloth so it wouldn’t show up on spy satellites that occasionally flew overhead. Because the North Vietnamese guards might be standing close to POWs, Simons insisted on accurate shooting.

Some creative supply troops purchased night scopes advertised in a hunting magazine, with the result that the raiders’ accuracy dramatically improved. The CIA also provided a more detailed model of the prison camp on a large sheet of plywood. The CIA’s version, named “Barbara,” was so realistic that during the raid Buckler spotted a bicycle leaning against a building in the exact spot as on the model.

The ground plan called for three platoons consisting of 56 Special Forces soldiers in total. Blueboy Platoon, with 14 men, was the assault unit in the Huey that would blast a hole in the southwest corner of the wall for the POWs to escape through.

The 22-man Greenleaf Platoon in a Super Jolly would provide security support to the east and north, such as clearing buildings and blowing up the bridge. Redwine Platoon, the command party headed by Sydnor in another Super Jolly, was to secure the area to the south of the prison and prepare a landing area for the helicopter pickups. Buckler was assigned to Redwine as a radio operator. Each platoon trained for backup plans. If one team didn’t make it to Son Tay, the raid could still be executed.

The MC-130E Combat Talon planes and helicopter crews flew training routes around Florida, Georgia and Alabama. To lead the slower-moving helicopters, the MC-130E had to fly at 121 mph, nearly its stall speed. Some helicopters drafted in the wake of the plane’s wing so they could fly a bit faster than their normal power allowed.

The helicopters also could not climb at the faster speeds, so Maj. John Gargus, an MC-130E navigator, planned a route that began at a higher altitude and occasionally descended as the aircraft closed in on the target. However, the MC-130E’s radar and navigation equipment degraded at the slow speeds, so one of the planners borrowed two infrared devices from the CIA that helped reveal rivers and other landmarks no longer visible on the radar.

In the final training phase, the air and ground forces practiced together. During these rehearsals they discovered that after three hours of sitting inside the cramped Huey, Blueboy raiders had trouble straightening their legs and moving on the ground, making the one-minute time frame for subduing the guards impossible. The Huey was replaced with a larger HH-3E Jolly Green Giant rescue helicopter. However, the HH-3E would be such a tight fit inside the prison walls that the pilots would have to make a controlled crash into the compound.

As training progressed, Manor, the Air Force general, and Simons, the Army colonel, raced around Southeast Asia with other planners to set up the launch bases. The raiders would use aircraft already in Southeast Asia. Rather than having those aircraft assemble at one location—which might give the enemy a clue that something was in the works—the crews would go to different bases. The planners carried a letter from the Air Force’s chief of staff, four-star Gen. John D. Ryan, telling other commanders to support them with no questions asked.

Manor and Simons also met with senior Navy officers, who agreed to launch aircraft from three carriers, the USS Oriskany, Hancock and Ranger, in the Gulf of Tonkin. To draw the attention of North Vietnam’s anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles away from Son Tay, the carriers would make a diversionary feint to Haiphong Harbor, about 60 miles from Hanoi.

Training was complete in early October. On Nov. 18, Nixon gave his final approval. The date was set for Nov. 21.

The two MC-130E Combat Talon crews had flown their aircraft from Eglin to Thailand the previous week. After the final go-ahead on Nov. 18, other raiders, who weren’t told where they were going, boarded a C-141 Starlifter troop transport plane at Eglin and 28 hours later landed in what the raiders surmised was Southeast Asia.

As the raiders’ aircraft waited for the final “go” signal for the raid, Typhoon Patsy threatened the Navy diversion. Rather than delay for five days, Manor moved the raid up to Nov. 20.

That evening, Gargus and the rest of his MC-130E crew, call sign Cherry 2, took off from Takhli at 10:25 p.m. and headed to their rendezvous point with the five A-1E Skyraiders. The A-1E pilots had a few anxious moments after takeoff when they encountered some clouds. Eventually they linked up with Cherry 2 for the trip to Son Tay.

About 11 p.m., Cherry 1, the Combat Talon that would lead the one HH-3E Jolly Green and five HH-53 Super Jolly helicopters, could not start one of its engines. Although the plane could take off on three engines, that would be very risky at night. Manor was monitoring the mission from a command center at South Vietnam’s Da Nang Air Base and was about to order Cherry 2 to lead the helicopters when Cherry 1’s engine finally started, according to Gargus. The plane took off about 23 minutes behind schedule.

The six helicopters that would conduct the rescue departed from Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base. Three—the one H-3E and two of the HH-53 copters—carried the assault force. The other three HH-53s were empty, a gunship and two for the returning POWs. The helicopters refueled over Laos and then joined with Cherry 1, which had made up for lost time. At about 1 a.m., Navy carriers began launching 59 fighter, attack and support planes. The pilots flew routes that seemed to indicate they were headed for targets around Hanoi. Several Air Force support aircraft were also airborne over the Gulf of Tonkin, providing radio relays and monitoring North Vietnamese radios and radars to ensure the raiders hadn’t been detected.

A little after 2 a.m., Air Force F-4 Phantom II fighter-bombers with air-to-air missiles arrived at a high altitude above Son Tay to defend against possible launches of MiG fighters aiming for the raiders. F-105 Thunderchief fighter-bombers also arrived to take out any threatening SAM sites.

The diversion worked. As the raiders approached Son Tay, North Vietnamese radars pointed east at the diversionary Navy attack and at the overhead F-4s and F-105s. Equipment on the Combat Talon showed enemy radars routinely scanning but failing to detect the inbound raiders.

At 2:16 a.m. after three hours of flying, the assault formation aircraft arrived at their planned break-off point 3½ miles from Son Tay. Cherry 1 broadcast a final heading for the helicopters bound for the prison camp and then flew ahead. Two of the empty HH-53 helicopters landed nearby, waiting for the POW pickup call.

AT 2:18 A.M., THE “EXECUTE” COMMAND CAME OVER THE RADIO: “ALPHA! ALPHA! ALPHA!”

Cherry 1 arrived over the prison compound and dropped four flares bright enough to light up the camp below as if it were daytime.

Air Force Maj. Frederic “Marty” Donahue turned his empty HH-53 gunship to fly across the camp between two guard towers. He ignored a warning light that signaled an emergency engine problem as his gunners sprayed the guard towers at 4,000 rounds per minute, collapsing the critical southwest tower. The gunners then strafed other buildings. Tracer bullets ignited a fire in a barracks. The compound was ready for Blueboy’s HH-3E.

As the helicopters carrying the ground force moved toward their landing spots, Cherry 2 dropped flares and other incendiary devices outside the prison to create diversions for enemy soldiers in the area. It then entered an orbit a few miles south to monitor and record the raiders’ radio transmissions. Cherry 1 dropped additional diversion devices and flew to an orbit in northern Laos.

The two pilots flying the HH-3E Jolly Green Giant nearly landed a few hundred yards south of the prison in a similar-looking compound that planners called a “secondary school.” The pilots realized their mistake at the last second and corrected back to the prison. Blueboy raiders armed with personal sidearms, CAR-15 commando carbines, shotguns, M79 grenade launchers and M60 machine guns crouched by the helicopter’s doors and windows. Some raiders lay flat on the open ramp.

The HH-3E’s controlled crash inside the prison compound was much more violent than expected. When the rotors hit the trees, the helicopter jerked violently to the right and tossed 1st Lt. George Petrie out the right front door—granting his wish to be the first raider on the ground. He had extra motivation: His cousin, Navy Lt. Cdr. James Hickerson, was a POW.

The crash didn’t slow anyone down. As severed tree limbs rained all around, raiders attacked what was left of the southwest guard tower and prepared to blow the exit hole. Blueboy’s leader, Capt. Richard “Dick” Meadows, shouted on a bullhorn: “We are Americans! We are here to rescue you!”

The raiders broke into some cells but found no POWs. They kept searching.

Greenleaf Platoon’s pilot mistakenly touched down in the secondary school. Raiders poured from the helicopter and headed toward their targets, but quickly realized something was wrong. Simons, traveling with Greenleaf, called for an extraction. In the four minutes it took the helicopter to return from its holding area, the Greenleaf men obliterated the school compound’s occupants, armed men who seemed much larger than average Vietnamese and were possibly Chinese advisers or trainers.

Redwine Platoon’s pilot realized Greenleaf had landed in the wrong spot and broadcasted the backup plan on the helicopter’s intercom before landing outside the wall of the prison. While still on the helicopter’s ramp, Buckler fired his M16 at a guard shooting at Redwine raiders as they dashed to take over some of Greenleaf’s duties as well as their own. With the reduced ground force unable to take out the bridge to the north, orbiting Skyraider pilots happily dropped cluster bombs on it instead. A Redwine group blew up a concrete pole in the helicopter return area, and the explosion knocked out power in parts of Son Tay.

In the midst of the commotion, Greenleaf Platoon arrived. The raiders had never practiced a late arrival. There was momentary confusion as newcomers joined the fight. Sydnor ordered the Redwine raiders to momentarily hold their positions while they sorted things out.

By then, Buckler had heard the words “negative items” over his radio. The crews circling above or waiting in helicopters heard them as well. “Items” was the code word for POWs.

Negative POWs? Simons couldn’t believe it. “Check again,” he demanded. Simons followed this by a string of expletives and, “I’m coming in.”

Simons checked the cells and found no one.

At 2:30 a.m., 11 minutes into the raid, Sydnor called for withdrawal. The two lead HH-53s flew back to pick up the raiders, who left a charge with a time delay on the HH-3E to destroy it.

Meanwhile the North Vietnamese realized they were under attack. Radar detection equipment on Cherry 2 lit up as a North Vietnamese radar for anti-aircraft artillery targeted the plane. The pilot flew north to a safer position. At 2:35 a.m., the North Vietnamese near Son Tay launched their first SAMs at the raiders.

At 2:45 a.m., 26 minutes after the crash into the courtyard, an HH-53 lifted off with the last of the ground force. There was a brief scare when a count came up short one raider.

After a few anxious moments and several recounts, they realized no one had been left behind. The raiders suffered only two casualties: one Green Beret shot in the leg, the only “enemy fire” casualty, and an HH-3E crew member with a broken ankle from the controlled crash.

As the raiders departed Son Tay, SAMs filled the sky, hitting two F-105 Thunderchiefs. One was able to refuel and limp back to Udorn. The pilot and electronic warfare officer in the other aircraft ejected over Laos at 3:17 a.m. and Cherry 2 located them. Two of the empty HH-53s refueled, waited for first light, and picked up the downed crewmen, who had spent three hours on the ground.

The dejected raiders returned to Udorn for debriefing. Manor and Simons flew to Washington for a press conference on Nov. 23. The men emphasized the bravery of the raiders and the difficulty of pinpointing POW camps, but some in the press focused on the apparent intelligence failure. Later evidence showed that intelligence indicated the POWs had been moved, but that information hadn’t been conveyed to the final decision-makers—who at that time were only two hours from mission launch. The tight secrecy to prevent leaks was likely a contributing factor, according to Gargus.

Yet the raid was far from a failure. Shocked at how easily the raiders had slipped in and out of their country, the North Vietnamese consolidated the POWs into the notorious “Hanoi Hilton” prison to make future rescue attempts more difficult.

Ironically, the consolidation at the Hanoi Hilton was the best thing that could have happened for the prisoners, short of rescue. Retired Col. Leon “Lee” Ellis, one of the Son Tay POWs, says that during the raid the POWs knew something was up.

In their new camp about 10 miles away, the power went off, probably from the raiders accidentally knocking out power to the surrounding area. The POWs then heard explosions from Son Tay, followed by the SAM launches.

Two days later, guards came into the cells “with fear in their eyes” and moved the prisoners to Hanoi. POWs previously in solitary confinement now roomed with dozens of men. Senior officers organized a POW wing with a military chain of command. The POWs taught each other classes, had evening speakers and surreptitiously held church services.

For their actions, all raiders were awarded medals—Silver Stars and above—but some feared they had made things worse for the POWs.

The raiders finally learned the truth after the POWs were released in February-April 1973. Many POWs wanted to meet the Son Tay raiders to thank them for the positive impact they had. Billionaire Texas businessman Ross Perot brought the raiders and the Son Tay POWs to a thank-you party in San Francisco. The two groups have had many reunions since.

In 1979 Simons led the rescue of two of Perot’s employees from an Iranian prison. The planning and execution of the Son Tay Raid became a blueprint for special operations forces, such as the 2003 rescue of Army Pvt. Jessica Lynch, captured during the Iraq War, and the 2011 Osama bin Laden raid. V

Eileen Bjorkman is a retired Air Force officer, freelance writer and author

of Unforgotten in the Gulf of Tonkin: A Story of the U.S. Military’s Commitment to Leave No One Behind. She lives in Edwards, California.

This article appeared in the December 2020 issue of Vietnam magazine. For more stories from Vietnam magazine, subscribe here:

13. Readout of Secretary of Defense Travel to Indonesia

Small world: General Andika Perkasa is a classmate of mine from the National War College.

Readout of Secretary of Defense Travel to Indonesia

Nov. 21, 2022 |

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3224271/readout-of-secretary-of-defense-travel-to-indonesia/

Pentagon Press Secretary Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder provided the following readout:

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III concluded his visit to Indonesia today, during which he met with Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto and Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces General Andika Perkasa.

Secretary Austin discussed with Indonesian counterparts a range of bilateral security initiatives that have formed the foundations of the U.S.-Indonesia defense relationship, including force modernization, professional military education, and cooperation in the maritime domain. The leaders agreed to expand bilateral military training and education, including through hosting new language training courses, expanding cooperation for emerging defense leaders, and enhancing combined exercises such as Garuda Shield, one of the Department’s largest multinational exercises in the Indo-Pacific region. 

Secretary Austin’s visit reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to partnering with Indonesia—a regional leader—to advance their shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

14. Notes from Central Taiwan: The unbearable lightness of being the ‘strategic ambiguity’ debate

Excerpts:

The other reason this “strategic ambiguity” debate looks like something constructed by the philosophers of Laputa is its disconnect from the reality of America’s stagnant naval power. It is pointless to talk about “strategic ambiguity” while China’s naval might mushrooms. Writers constantly mine the 20th century for historical analogies, but the US is a lot more like the Spain of Philip III than the Yankee juggernaut of Franklin Roosevelt.

We are on our fourth presidential administration in the last two decades, with China continuously signaling that it wants to displace us, and still there is no sense of urgency in Congress or the administration of US President Joe Biden about the Navy.

Indeed, next year the US navy plans to decommission 39 ships, including five older Ticonderoga class cruisers that boast a total of 610 vertical launch silos, according to recent media reports. There is nothing out there to replace that firepower.

By contrast, China’s navy commissioned 32 ships last year. By 2025, the most recent Congressional Research Service report calculates, it will have over 400 ships, and a fleet of land-based ballistic missiles developed specifically to kill ships. It will also have a panoply of aviation weaponry, including swarms of drones.

Developed in parallel to complement its formal navy, China also has an enormous “seaborne militia,” its fishing and coast guard vessels, seldom counted by anyone but Chinese planners.

China will likely remain behind the US in ship size and overall tonnage, as well as number of vertical launch silos, and in many capabilities. But not building a new navy and the necessary cargo ships and logistics infrastructure to match China and support a war in Asia?

Mon, Nov 21, 2022 page13

https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2022/11/21/2003789319

Notes from Central Taiwan: The unbearable lightness of being the ‘strategic ambiguity’ debate

‘Foreign Affairs’ magazine’s latest howler regurgitates tired tropes about ‘strategic ambiguity,’ features no Taiwan-based scholars and treats Taiwan as an object not a participant

• By Michael Turton / Contributing reporter
• 
  
•  
•  
• Over the years Foreign Affairs has offered innumerable light comedies on the subject of Taiwan. Who can forget Robert Ross’ immortal “Taiwan’s Fading Independence Movement” (March/April 2006), now fading into its second decade of silliness? Or Charles Glaser’s droll “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” (March/April 2011), which argued that Taiwan should be sold out to China to preserve the peace.
• Foreign Affairs also gave us Bruce Gilley’s argument for Finlandizing Taiwan: “Not So Dire Straits: How the Finlandization of Taiwan Benefits US Security” (Jan/Feb 2010), which Nat Bellochi, former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, dismissed as “an analysis that is so far removed from reality that it would be dismissed out of hand for its lack of understanding and its outright naivete.”
• Gilley would go on to earn global vilification by attempting to argue that European colonialism was a good thing in Third World Quarterly.
• 
  

China’s operational aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, in April 2018 sails during a drill at sea.

• Photo: AFP
• Hence, it was hardly surprising that Foreign Affairs hosted a piece in which a gaggle of people it called “experts” were invited to comment on whether the US should give up “strategic ambiguity” and declare what its red lines were in the Taiwan scenario.
• TAIWAN REPRESENTATION LACKING
• Where was Taiwan? You guessed it, dear reader: no Taiwan-based scholar was asked to comment on this topic of mortal interest to Taiwan. Indeed, arguably, not a single Taiwan expert save the redoubtable but US-based Jessica Drun and Tiffany Ma* were asked to comment.
• 
  

J15 fighter jets on China’s operational aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, in April 2018 during a drill at sea. During Xi Jinping’s decade-long rule China has built the world’s largest navy, revamped the world’s largest standing army and amassed a nuclear and ballistic arsenal to trouble any perceived foe.

• Photo: AFP
• What makes the “strategic ambiguity” debate so irrelevant? The debate treats Taiwan as an object and not a participant. People are still arguing, in the best 2005 style, that Taiwan could recklessly declare independence and trigger a war, so the US needs to deter that. Say what?
• In a masterful discussion of “strategic ambiguity” earlier this month, “Strategic Ambiguity Out of Balance: Updating an Outdated Taiwan Policy” (The Strategy Bridge, Nov. 9), US Naval War college professor Yvonne Chiu neatly dismissed such commentary: “To hold onto strategic ambiguity in order to deter Taiwanese declaration of independence posits a moral equivalence where there is none.”
• A couple of commenters argued that a clear declaration of US policy would enable Taiwan to a “free ride” on US defense. Quite the opposite: if Taiwan knows the US will come in it can make useful and complementary investments. Ambiguity serves only the pro-China side in Taiwan, who argue unceasingly that the US cannot be trusted to intervene, so why prepare to fight?
• OUTDATED ARGUMENTS
• The “deter Taiwan independence” and “free rider threat” claims are old arguments that simply signal the speaker remains in the 1990s when the strategic and political situation was simpler. That world was killed in the late 1980s when Chinese planners began envisioning a navy that could challenge the US.
• The Foreign Affairs piece was a brilliant demonstration of what I’ve been arguing for quite some time: the growing public debate on “strategic ambiguity” signals its irrelevance, not the need to change the policy. As several of the people who contributed noted, China assumes the US will respond if it invades. Why change anything?
• Irrelevant this debate may be, it remains indicative. Apparently no one in the Foreign Affairs editorial office possesses anything as exotic as a map, let alone basic geostrategic sense. Not a single scholar based in Japan or the Philippines, two nations that would be deeply affected by a cross-strait war, was brought in to comment.
• Yet, Foreign Affairs found space for the former Mexican Ambassador to China, now in a consultancy, along with someone from another China consultancy. The Big Establishment think tanks were there, a CATO scholar and some important names in the China field. Even Charles Glaser was asked. In fairness, he wrote: “I believe the United States should end its commitment to Taiwan” and his comment was among the more robust and interesting.
• Somehow there was room for a researcher from the Oslo Peace Institute whose research focus is China-Africa relations, and another random scholar who writes on China-Japan relations and rare earths. Scholars from Vietnam, Korea, Malaysia or Indonesia? Perish the thought.
• Gosh, if only I had thought to name my blog The View from Rare Earths, I could have been there too!
• Also cited in the Foreign Affairs piece were people from the Quincy Institute, which reproduces pro-Putin and pro-China fare, along with the Carnegie Institute for Peace, which has institutes in China. I noticed at least one name that received funding from a Chinese billionaire. Why do major media organs continue to source commentary from such individuals?
• CHINA’S NAVY
• The other reason this “strategic ambiguity” debate looks like something constructed by the philosophers of Laputa is its disconnect from the reality of America’s stagnant naval power. It is pointless to talk about “strategic ambiguity” while China’s naval might mushrooms. Writers constantly mine the 20th century for historical analogies, but the US is a lot more like the Spain of Philip III than the Yankee juggernaut of Franklin Roosevelt.
• We are on our fourth presidential administration in the last two decades, with China continuously signaling that it wants to displace us, and still there is no sense of urgency in Congress or the administration of US President Joe Biden about the Navy.
• Indeed, next year the US navy plans to decommission 39 ships, including five older Ticonderoga class cruisers that boast a total of 610 vertical launch silos, according to recent media reports. There is nothing out there to replace that firepower.
• By contrast, China’s navy commissioned 32 ships last year. By 2025, the most recent Congressional Research Service report calculates, it will have over 400 ships, and a fleet of land-based ballistic missiles developed specifically to kill ships. It will also have a panoply of aviation weaponry, including swarms of drones.
• Developed in parallel to complement its formal navy, China also has an enormous “seaborne militia,” its fishing and coast guard vessels, seldom counted by anyone but Chinese planners.
• China will likely remain behind the US in ship size and overall tonnage, as well as number of vertical launch silos, and in many capabilities. But not building a new navy and the necessary cargo ships and logistics infrastructure to match China and support a war in Asia?
• * The original version of this article didn't mention Tiffany Ma as being a Taiwan specialist. The Taipei Times regrets the error.
• That’s an unambiguous message.
• Notes from Central Taiwan is a column written by long-term resident Michael Turton, who provides incisive commentary informed by three decades of living in and writing about his adoptive country. The views expressed here are his own.
• 
  

15. Scrap the Iran nuclear deal once and for all

Excerpts:

Thankfully, the Biden administration appears to be recognizing that a new strategy is needed to deal with the Iranian regime. On Oct. 31, U.S. special envoy Robert Malley stated that the United States is not going to “waste time” on further negotiations with Iran for the time being.

However, the proof is in the pudding. Will President Biden suspend negotiations for a while, or will the administration scrap the JCPOA and commit to developing viable alternatives?

Scrap the Iran nuclear deal once and for all

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3732305-scrap-the-iran-nuclear-deal-once-and-for-all/?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d

BY DAVID ALBRIGHT AND HENRIK F. RASMUSSEN, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS - 11/16/22 7:30 AM ET

Rapper Toomaj Salehi, actress Nazanin Boniadi, and the daily witness of thousands of like-minded Iranians rising up for freedom and dignity have made it clear that now is not the time to revive a nuclear deal that would entrench and legitimize Iran’s current regime.

The killing of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini by security forces in September laid bare the oppressiveness and brutality of Iran’s rulers, especially toward women. The regime’s willingness to kill protestors astounds, as an increasing number of teenage girls are killed for little more than voicing their opinions of how they want to dress. The United States and the European Union have responded to these human rights abuses with stronger sanctions. European decision-makers soon may follow America’s lead in classifying the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization. This is the exact opposite of what Iran would demand in exchange for a revival of the 2015 nuclear deal, the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Then there are the Iranian drones in Ukraine, killing civilians and destroying critical energy production infrastructure, guaranteeing a brutal winter for many Ukrainians. The supply of drones violates the United Nations’ missile embargo on Iran, a central tenet of the JCPOA and its establishing mandate, UN Security Council resolution 2231. That violation will grow even more menacing if Iran delivers advanced ballistic missiles to Russia, which could well happen in the very near future.

Instead of negotiating with Iran, America and its allies must now take urgent steps to stop the regime’s human rights abuses, block its support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and prevent it from building nuclear weapons.  

First, the European parties to the JCPOA, with U.S. support, should move ahead with snapping back sanctions against Iran under the JCPOA. Once this process is completed, the world will revert to the 2015 status quo with more effective sanctions, a reinstated UN arms embargo, and an ongoing UN missile embargo. After a snapback, the U.S and the EU should rapidly intensify and better enforce U.S., British, and European Union sanctions on Iran for all its nefarious activities.  

Second, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be empowered to investigate and monitor Iran’s nuclear program more fully. Today, Iran can produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon in less than two weeks, and the IAEA has demonstrated Iran’s violations of its commitment to fully declare its nuclear activities and maintain a purely peaceful nuclear program. Iran is steadfast in not cooperating with the inspectors, which suggests the regime is protecting a secret nuclear weapons program and waiting for the right time to build nuclear weapons. As a first step, Iran’s noncooperation and violations of its safeguards agreement should lead to an IAEA Board of Governors’ referral to the UN Security Council, further isolating Iran.

Third, the West must develop a credible strategy of deterrence by denial, including robust missile defense capabilities. These capabilities are woefully inadequate to confront Iran’s drone and missile fleets, whether in Ukraine, the eastern flank of NATO, or the Persian Gulf region.

Fourth, the Western powers should get serious about offensive military options to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities if Iran moves to divert nuclear material, kicks out the inspectors, withdraws from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or moves to build nuclear weapons.

Thankfully, the Biden administration appears to be recognizing that a new strategy is needed to deal with the Iranian regime. On Oct. 31, U.S. special envoy Robert Malley stated that the United States is not going to “waste time” on further negotiations with Iran for the time being.

However, the proof is in the pudding. Will President Biden suspend negotiations for a while, or will the administration scrap the JCPOA and commit to developing viable alternatives?

Democrats interrupt history to make their own

Biden reaches for his pen — and undermines separation of powers

For too long, the United States and Europe have given the Iranian regime a free pass on human rights violations and regional meddling in the name of keeping Iran from building a nuclear weapon. But this approach has only strengthened the regime while failing to halt its development of advanced nuclear capabilities, putting Iran dangerously close to becoming a latent nuclear power, if not an open one.

Vladimir Putin reminds the world every day about the dangers of nuclear weapons in the hands of irresponsible and immoral regimes. The West must draw a firm line in the sand and get serious about preventing Putin’s Iranian henchmen from ever possessing nuclear weapons.

David Albright is the president of the Institute for Science and International Security and Henrik Rasmussen is the Institute’s executive director. Follow on Twitter @TheGoodISIS.

16. China Trying to ‘Air Brush’ Over Wolf Warrior Damage, US Ambassador Emanuel Says

Excerpts:

Emanuel said caution was needed when it comes to Beijing, especially its access to critical technologies such as semiconductors. He argued that China benefited from the old model of globalization where companies optimized their operations for low costs.

A new model is emerging that will benefit stable democracies like the US and Japan, he said, because they offer corporations a “predictability premium.”

“In a post-Covid, post-Chinese coercion and post-Russian war in Ukraine era, we are in the early stages of significant economic restructuring and transformation so that like-minded countries are never again vulnerable to those who want to upend the global economy or rules that hold it together,” he said in prepared remarks.

China Trying to ‘Air Brush’ Over Wolf Warrior Damage, US Ambassador Emanuel Says

• Rahm Emanuel says caution is needed with China and chips
• Xi held series of summits with US and partners to steady ties

ByJon Herskovitz and Peter Elstrom

November 20, 2022 at 11:42 PM EST

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-21/china-trying-to-air-brush-over-wolf-warrior-damage-us-ambassador-emanuel-says?sref=hhjZtX76

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s summits with the US and its partners were likely an attempt to paper over the harm it has caused with numerous countries in recent years, a top US envoy said.

“President Xi took note of the damage that the wolf warrior and economic coercion has done to China,” US Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel told reporters Monday, referring to the pugnacious, nationalistic approach that some of Beijing’s diplomats have used.

“It’s an attempt to air brush those out of people’s memory,” he said.

Xi Jinping at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Bangkok on Nov. 19.Photographer: Andre Malerba/Bloomberg

Xi tried to thaw the diplomatic chill during summits in Asia in recent days that included meetings with US President Joe Biden, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, and the leaders of several other major democracies that have had diplomatic and trade disputes with Beijing. 

The outreach came as the US pressured security partners including South Korea, the Netherlands, Taiwan and Japan to comply with sweeping curbs on the sale of advanced semiconductors to China. The Biden administration’s policy is aimed at preventing China’s advance in a range of cutting-edge technologies that could threaten America’s status as the world’s pre-eminent power.

“When China tries to dominate something, it’s not just a sector. It’s you,” Emanuel said in the address to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan. “They’ve said it and they’ve done it time and again, and the president is saying those days are over.” 

Why China’s Diplomats Snarl at ‘Wolf Warrior’ Label: QuickTake

China has largely eschewed the “wolf warrior” label but some of its diplomats have become known for blasting leading democracies when they criticized Beijing for its record on human rights and aggressive military actions in the region. They’ve also resorted to peddling conspiracy theories at times, suggesting that the coronavirus may have originated at US military facilities.

Biden and Xi held their first in-person summit last week in Bali in a meeting that lasted about three hours and helped ease tensions. The US said the two sides would resume cooperation on climate change and food security issues, and that Biden and Xi jointly chastised the Kremlin for loose talk of nuclear war over Ukraine.

• READ MORE:Biden, Xi Take Biggest Step in Years to Avoid US-China Clash 
• China, Japan Leaders Open Door to Mend Ties in First Meeting 
• Xi Seeks High-Tech Cooperation in Summit With South Korea’s Yoon

Rahm EmanuelPhotographer: Shoko Takayasu/Bloomberg

Emanuel said caution was needed when it comes to Beijing, especially its access to critical technologies such as semiconductors. He argued that China benefited from the old model of globalization where companies optimized their operations for low costs.

A new model is emerging that will benefit stable democracies like the US and Japan, he said, because they offer corporations a “predictability premium.”

“In a post-Covid, post-Chinese coercion and post-Russian war in Ukraine era, we are in the early stages of significant economic restructuring and transformation so that like-minded countries are never again vulnerable to those who want to upend the global economy or rules that hold it together,” he said in prepared remarks.

17. The World Cup Spotlights Qatar’s Abuses

The World Cup Spotlights Qatar’s Abuses

fdd.org · November 18, 2022

Latest Developments

With the World Cup kicking off this Sunday, Qatar hopes to improve its image by hosting the planet’s largest sporting event. However, the added attention generated by the tournament is raising concerns over Doha’s corruption, abuse of foreign workers, and poor treatment of the LGBT community.

Expert Analysis

“Using the glitz and glamor of sporting events to distract from human rights abuses is a standard move from the autocrat’s playbook. Hosting the World Cup is Doha’s largest soft power maneuver, which aims to present a positive image of the country on an international stage. None of this will erase Qatar’s corrupt practices, abuse of foreign workers, and persecution of the LGBT community.” – David May, FDD Research Manager

Bribery and Corruption

In 2010, soccer’s governing body, FIFA, selected Qatar to host this year’s games. Qatar allegedly bribed at least three African members of the FIFA Congress to win the hosting rights. Leaked documents show that three weeks before FIFA selected the Gulf country, Doha offered the soccer body $400 million. Qatar reportedly offered FIFA another $480 million three years later. U.S. court documents support allegations of Qatari bribery.

Sportswashing

In recent years, several other autocratic countries have used international sporting events to rehabilitate their public image. Like Doha, Moscow employed bribery to secure the World Cup it hosted in 2018. Russia also hosted the 2014 Winter Olympics. Earlier this year, China hosted the Winter Olympics, which activists have pejoratively termed the “#GenocideGames” because of Beijing’s imprisonment of over 1 million ethnic minority Uyghurs.

Qatar’s Abuse of Foreign Workers

Foreigners, including 1 million construction workers, comprise approximately 91 percent of Qatar’s workforce. The Guardian found that over 6,500 migrant workers from five countries have died in the Gulf country since FIFA announced Qatar as the host of the 2022 games.

Beyond poor working conditions, laborers face an exploitative sponsorship system that gives employers far-reaching control over their employees. After paying a large sum to work in Qatar, impoverished workers are subject to deportation if they do not meet their employers’ demands. Though Qatar has made legal reforms in recent years, little has changed on the ground.

Qatar’s Repression of the LGBT Community

Individuals engaging in homosexual activity in Qatar could face a seven-year prison sentence. While Qatar assured FIFA it would allow fans to display rainbow flags in solidarity with the LGBT community, a senior Qatari official overseeing the tournament’s security recently claimed that if his personnel seize rainbow flags, it is for the fans’ own protection. Meanwhile, several World Cup captains intend to wear rainbow armbands to draw attention to Qatar’s anti-gay repression.

Related Analysis

“The World Cup Won’t Clean Up Qatar’s Image,” by David May

“World Cup 2022: What’s In It For Qatar?” by Hussain Abdul-Hussain

fdd.org · November 18, 2022

18.  IAEA Board Votes to Censure Iran, but Accountability Requires a Snapback of UN Sanctions

Excerpts:

At the UNSC, world powers need not worry about a Russian or Chinese veto of a new Iran resolution. As remaining parties to the JCPOA, the United Kingdom, France, or Germany could trigger the reimposition of all prior UNSC resolutions and sanctions by initiating the deal’s so-called “snapback mechanism.”

The IAEA board has been remiss in its duty to uphold the NPT’s integrity and should immediately correct this failure. Even without a board referral, one of the European parties to the JCPOA can still initiate a snapback and restore UN sanctions, whose purpose was to hold Iran responsible for precisely the kinds of violations it is now committing.

IAEA Board Votes to Censure Iran, but Accountability Requires a Snapback of UN Sanctions

Andrea Stricker

Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program Deputy Director and Research Fellow

fdd.org · November 18, 2022

On Thursday, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Board of Governors voted to censure Iran for prolonged non-compliance with Tehran’s obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Despite this step toward accountability, the board failed to warn Iran that, absent immediate compliance, the board will refer the matter to the UN Security Council (UNSC).

Responsible for the oversight of nuclear safeguards issues, the IAEA board consists of 35 member states elected by their peers. The board passed its censure of Iran by a vote of 26 states in favor, five abstentions, and two against — namely, Russia and China. Two additional states did not vote.

The resolution marks the second IAEA censure of Iran this year, the first occurring in June. Previously, the board had not censured Iran since June 2020 despite Tehran’s ongoing non-compliance with an IAEA investigation into undeclared nuclear material the agency detected at three Iranian sites in 2019 and 2020. As an NPT state party, Iran must implement IAEA safeguards that require Tehran to disclose to the agency where it produces and stores nuclear material.

In 2018, the Israeli Mossad uncovered and exfiltrated a trove of Iranian files that pointed to previously unknown, undisclosed nuclear weapons production plans, sites, and activities. The information in those files spurred the currently ongoing IAEA investigation that uncovered the undeclared nuclear material.

Last week, the IAEA recounted that due to Iran’s prolonged refusal to provide answers to its questions, the agency had made no further progress in its investigation. It reported, “the Agency is not in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.”

While the board’s new resolution “decides” that Iran must “fulfill its legal obligations” pursuant to the NPT, the board has resisted a referral of Iran to the UNSC despite three years of continuous obstruction.

For most of that time, world powers have sidelined the matter of holding Iran accountable in favor of negotiations aimed at restoring the 2015 nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Those talks have been stalled since September as a result of Tehran’s intransigence toward reviving the accord.

The IAEA board must make up for lost time on remediating Tehran’s NPT safeguards violations. Thursday’s resolution notes that, if appropriate, the body could hold a special Iran meeting prior to its next scheduled meeting in March 2023. Failing Iran’s immediate compliance, the board should schedule this meeting and vote to refer Iran to the UNSC. There is no reason to wait an additional four months before acting.

At the UNSC, world powers need not worry about a Russian or Chinese veto of a new Iran resolution. As remaining parties to the JCPOA, the United Kingdom, France, or Germany could trigger the reimposition of all prior UNSC resolutions and sanctions by initiating the deal’s so-called “snapback mechanism.”

The IAEA board has been remiss in its duty to uphold the NPT’s integrity and should immediately correct this failure. Even without a board referral, one of the European parties to the JCPOA can still initiate a snapback and restore UN sanctions, whose purpose was to hold Iran responsible for precisely the kinds of violations it is now committing.

Andrea Stricker is a research fellow and deputy director of the Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). She also contributes to FDD’s Iran Program, International Organizations Program, and Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP). For more analysis from Andrea, the Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program, the Iran Program, the International Organizations Program, and CMPP, please subscribe HERE. Follow Andrea on Twitter @StrickerNonpro. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_Iran and @FDD_CMPP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

fdd.org · November 18, 2022

19.  Four ways to begin fixing the Army recruiting crisis

I can see some Gen Z people saying, "Okay Boomer" to this one.

But the SFAB proposal should certainly stir some debate.

Excerpts:

First, the Army must put its best and brightest into Recruiting Command.

Recent operational force structure changes, such as the creation of the Security Forces Assistance Brigades, or SFABs, continue to siphon off mid-grade officer and NCO talent, the heart of the recruiting force. The Army should repurpose three of the new SFABs from overseas duty supporting combatant commands and send these talented leaders into the recruiting trenches, not to augment existing recruiting brigades but to act as smaller “surge” recruiting brigades of their own.

For any sales team, marketing is crucial. But, by being a large, centrally planned, and bureaucratic organization, the Army is managed from the top down, with the secretary of the Army’s staff calling the shots at the top. This is a failed approach when it comes to recruiting.

Finally, the Army needs to clearly articulate what it means by quality and why it believes most Americans are not qualified for recruitment into the Armed Forces.

The basic question is: will the Army continue to just blame “the economy” and “everyone else” for its recruiting plight or is it ready to make truly fundamental changes? The answer to that question should be the latter. The Army should also be putting together a legislative package for Congress that addresses any barriers to implementing these reforms.

It’s time that the Army get more introspective and start looking at ways it can accelerate change to fix its recruiting crisis. The above reforms are a good start.

Four ways to begin fixing the Army recruiting crisis

By John Ferrari and John Kem

armytimes.com · by John Ferrari · November 18, 2022

Calling the Army recruiting shortfall a crisis is like saying that the Titanic had a “small” problem in its crossing of the Atlantic. The Army’s shortfalls, at least six years in the making, are an existential threat to the Army and, by extension, a major threat to our national security.

Right now, Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea are cooperating in a manner that increases regional instability and could open up a multi-front mix of hostilities up to and including war, at the time and place of their choosing. And, this all comes at a time when our Army is shrinking precipitously.

The three service secretaries recently penned in a Wall Street Journal piece the ways in which the American public can assist them in manning the force. What has been missing from the discussions is what the Army can do to help itself, since recruiting is bar none, the first essential task that the Army must perform.

Without new recruits, there is no Army. Yet time and again, the Army takes its proverbial “eye-off-the-ball” and feigns surprise when the “crisis” emerges, even blaming the national press. Instead, the Army must look internally and take the following four actions to demonstrate its seriousness to fix this problem.

First, the Army must put its best and brightest into Recruiting Command. Today, it is an open secret in the Army that the path to promotion lies in any assignment other than recruiting. We send our best and brightest young and mid-career leaders from tactical unit to tactical unit to training center staff rotations multiple times in succession but rarely to recruiting units.

RELATED

Consider bringing prospective recruits to transition counseling

The military must get out of its bubble, be willing to perceive itself as the public perceives the military and be willing and ready to tackle the “elephants in the room..

By Ronald R. Medina, Jr.

Recent operational force structure changes, such as the creation of the Security Forces Assistance Brigades, or SFABs, continue to siphon off mid-grade officer and NCO talent, the heart of the recruiting force. The Army should repurpose three of the new SFABs from overseas duty supporting combatant commands and send these talented leaders into the recruiting trenches, not to augment existing recruiting brigades but to act as smaller “surge” recruiting brigades of their own.

In 2009, the Army piloted commercial sales software to help its recruiting force. In 2018, nearly a decade later, the Army began an effort to replace its information system supporting recruiters with a commercially based system but one that had to be customized for the Army. It is now nearly 2023 and the Army still does not have a fully deployed, tablet-based, sales software system to give its recruiters cutting edge digital recruiting tools. If the Army is serious about fixing recruiting, it will embark on a crash agile implementation of new sales software rather than using its decades long, failed waterfall approach. This will require the Army to adopt, rather than adapt to current commercial software systems.

For any sales team, marketing is crucial. But, by being a large, centrally planned, and bureaucratic organization, the Army is managed from the top down, with the secretary of the Army’s staff calling the shots at the top. This is a failed approach when it comes to recruiting. Instead of more bureaucracy and vertical control, the Army should immediately decentralize large parts of its marketing dollars to the regional and local recruiting leaders. That would provide regional-local analysis and influence to drive more tailored approaches to recruiting, facilitating better outcomes.

Finally, the Army needs to clearly articulate what it means by quality and why it believes most Americans are not qualified for recruitment into the Armed Forces. Over the past several decades, it is entirely possible that during a period of downsizing the force from 780,000 in the mid-1980s to about 480,000 today, the Army tightened its quality standards so much that they inadvertently created this crisis themselves.

We aren’t arguing for low standards. The Army needs to clearly articulate the quality of recruits during the Reagan buildup, the Army that fought in Desert Storm, and the force of the early 2000s, and then put the standards that applied to each side by side with today’s standards. What the Army may find is that it has, over time, in effect priced itself out of the market with slow ratchet turns on quality standards.

In the aggregate, schools may be less effective than 20-30 years ago and on average 18- to 21-year-olds may be heavier. Repeatedly talking down at the 83% that currently don’t meet the standards — “we can’t get there because you aren’t good enough” — is probably not the best way to inspire affinity for the Army and military service. Instead, the Army needs to be a powerful draw for them to raise their game. They should start by saying that anyone committed can work physically and mentally to join. The Army should emphasize the meaningful, life-changing experiences that the Army offers and better leverage the millions who have served.

Lastly, we need to recreate much of the infrastructure that Gen. Max Thurman and others put into place during the 1970s and 1980s. These included scores of behavioral scientists, economists, and think tankers who studied the trends in labor economics affecting the Army.

The Army started a Future Soldier Preparatory Course pilot program at Fort Jackson, S.C. to help America’s youth overcome academic and physical fitness barriers to service so they can earn the opportunity to join the Army. (Nathan Clinebelle/Army)

Finally, we now know that COVID reduced educational outcomes across America. Pass rates on the military’s test of academic quality, the ASVAB, have seen a similar drop in outcomes. The Army may need to make a temporary adjustment to the ASVAB to account for this national drop in educational performance.

The ASVAB is normed every 15 to 20 years, with the last one done in 2004. This is not lowering the bar to enter the military — as the innate intelligence of these potential recruits remains unchanged, but the pandemic has resulted in a one-time loss in achievement that has to be compensated for. The Army is currently running a pilot 90-day prep program and has found that helping new recruits to “take the test” increased their scores. This may indicate that success on the aptitude test hinges less on ability and more on experience in taking standardized tests.

Everyone in the business of recruiting and manning the military must read Bernie Rostker’s 2006 book, “I Want You!” The book shows that we’ve have been here before, and in the past we managed to turn ourselves around. However, we can’t just assume that throwing more people at the problem or some ‘additional emphasis’ like bringing back hometown recruiter type programs will make a real difference this time.

The basic question is: will the Army continue to just blame “the economy” and “everyone else” for its recruiting plight or is it ready to make truly fundamental changes? The answer to that question should be the latter. The Army should also be putting together a legislative package for Congress that addresses any barriers to implementing these reforms.

It’s time that the Army get more introspective and start looking at ways it can accelerate change to fix its recruiting crisis. The above reforms are a good start.

Retired Army Maj. Gen. John Ferrari is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, or AEI, and is the former director of program analysis and evaluation for the Army.

Retired Army Maj. Gen. John Kem is a consultant and a former Commandant of the Army War College.

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20. Meet Xi and Putin’s Hired Gun Inside the UN

Conclusion:

With the war in Ukraine still raging, North Korea launching a record number of ballistic missiles, mass demonstrations convulsing the streets in Iran, and rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait, it is hard to see the Biden administration prioritizing reforms at the Human Rights Council. Then again, world events are unlikely ever to slow down enough to make rewiring the UN human rights body seem like the top issue on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. At some point, if the administration is serious about reform via engagement, it will have to launch a much more ambitious campaign, with the president and secretary of state becoming personally involved. Otherwise, its engagement will only serve to shore up the credibility of a failing institution.

Meet Xi and Putin’s Hired Gun Inside the UN​

If your dictatorship is facing U.S. or EU sanctions, you can count on Alena Douhan to announce that Western governments are the real human rights violators.​

The National Interest · by David Adesnik · November 18, 2022

If your dictatorship is facing U.S. or EU sanctions—especially human rights sanctions—you can count on Alena Douhan to pay your country a visit, hold a press conference, and announce that Western governments are the real human rights violators. This month she was in Damascus. Previous trips have taken her to Tehran, Caracas, Harare, and Doha. But this is precisely what one should expect from a UN office funded by Moscow and Beijing.

Douhan is a professor of international law and director of the Peace Research Center at the Belarusian State University. Since March 2020, she has served as the UN Special Rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures, the technical way of saying sanctions imposed without the approval of the UN Security Council. She is one of fifty-five special rapporteurs, independent experts, and working groups the UN Human Rights Council has appointed to cover portfolios ranging from freedom of expression to human trafficking, privacy rights, and climate change.

In Damascus on November 10, Douhan thanked the government of Bashar al-Assad for its cooperation and listed the twenty-one cabinet ministers with whom she met to learn about the impact that U.S. and EU sanctions have on Syria. Douhan said she also met with a wide array of representatives from Syrian civil society, although she did not mention any by name. Despite the ongoing chaos in Syria, the Assad regime maintains a tight grip on non-governmental organizations, often via the Syria Trust for Development, run by First Lady Asma al-Assad. Douhan reported she held meetings in Damascus and Homs. If she did not venture further afield, to areas outside of the regime’s control, odds are she met with the regime’s hand-picked civil society representatives.

Douhan’s unusual view of the Syrian economy is that it began to recover in 2018 from the country’s ruinous war, “but the intensification of unilateral sanctions … eliminated all remaining avenues for economic recovery.” She singled out the sanctions Washington imposed pursuant to the Caesar Act as a cause of the subsequent downturn, during which the lira has lost 90 percent of its value and inflation hit triple digits. In contrast, Assad himself said the true cause of the economic crisis was the implosion of the Lebanese financial system in 2019, which locked up as much as $42 billion of Syrian deposits in Beirut’s insolvent banks. “The crisis began before the Caesar Act and years after long-imposed Western sanctions,” Assad observed, “It’s the money (in Lebanese banks) that has been lost.”

Neither probity nor candor is among Assad’s virtues, but his chronology is correct. Caesar sanctions did not go into effect until June 2020, whereas the lira began tumbling eight months earlier, only weeks after Lebanese banks shut their doors.

Many of the UN’s special rapporteurs rely on voluntary contributions from member states to supplement their budgets. Last year, Douhan’s office received $200,000 from China, $150,000 from Russia, and $25,000 from Qatar, according to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ annual report. In 2020, the year Douhan took office, Beijing gave $160,000 and Moscow $115,000. This represented an unusual and sudden increase—Russia had consistently given $50,000 in the years prior to Douhan’s appointment, while China had not donated. Now, her office receives more voluntary funding than the offices of all but one of the other rapporteurs.

Beijing’s investment appears to be paying off. In September 2021, the Chinese mission in Geneva hosted an online event entitled “Xinjiang is a Beautiful Land,” where officials from the region spoke about their efforts to promote education and economic growth. The first foreign speaker at the event was Douhan, who lamented the negative humanitarian impact of unilateral sanctions while uttering not a word about human rights violations in Xinjiang. Douhan contended that “99 percent” of the unilateral sanctions amount to violations of international law, an estimate she reiterated this year on Chinese state television.

UN Watch, an NGO that monitors anti-Semitism and the problematic influence of dictatorships at the UN, called on Douhan to return the $200,000 from Beijing. Its executive director, Hillel Neuer, said Douhan is “in breach of the UN’s most fundamental ethical principles.”

To date, the Human Rights Council has never ousted one of its rapporteurs. It has the power to do so by majority vote, yet even after Russia’s expulsion from the council in October, authoritarian governments remain well-represented. Their ranks include China, Cuba, Eritrea, Gabon, Kazakhstan, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela. Last month, in one of the most visible setbacks for democratic nations on the council, it voted nineteen to seventeen, with eleven abstentions against holding a debate about human rights in Xinjiang.

This situation is likely to endure for as long as the General Assembly votes by secret ballot to elect the members of the council. Spared an open vote, no government must admit that it voted for China, Cuba, or another dictatorship. Last month, Sudan won a three-year term on the council with votes from 157 out of 193 UN member states. Vietnam claimed a seat with 145 votes, edging out South Korea with 123. Venezuela only received 88 votes in its re-election bid, an indication that the system does reject some of the worst candidates (as it did Saudi Arabia two years ago).

Whereas the Trump administration walked out of the Human Rights Council after concluding it was a lost cause, the Biden administration brought America back in. The “best way to improve the Council, so it can achieve its potential, is through robust and principled U.S. leadership,” said Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

The Xinjiang resolution did not fail for lack of effort on the administration’s part. A senior official told the Washington Post a week ahead of the vote, “We are going to engage on a full-court press.” The official added that winning the showdown with China was very much “achievable.”

With the war in Ukraine still raging, North Korea launching a record number of ballistic missiles, mass demonstrations convulsing the streets in Iran, and rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait, it is hard to see the Biden administration prioritizing reforms at the Human Rights Council. Then again, world events are unlikely ever to slow down enough to make rewiring the UN human rights body seem like the top issue on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. At some point, if the administration is serious about reform via engagement, it will have to launch a much more ambitious campaign, with the president and secretary of state becoming personally involved. Otherwise, its engagement will only serve to shore up the credibility of a failing institution.

David Adesnik is a senior fellow and director of research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Image: Reuters.

The National Interest · by David Adesnik · November 18, 2022

21. Israel must reclaim its Arab citizens - opinion

Conclusion:

Ultimately, the shape of the new government is in the hands of Benjamin Netanyahu. He has a duty to form this government in accordance with the wishes of the Israeli electorate, which includes Israelis of Arab descent. He should acknowledge the inadvertent role they played in bringing Israel to this point and he should work to ensure greater integration, with US assistance.

Israel must reclaim its Arab citizens - opinion​

Israeli-Arabs, who undeniably enjoy greater rights and freedoms in Israel than in any of the surrounding states, are drifting away from their Israeli identity.

By MARK DUBOWITZ, JONATHAN SCHANZER Published: NOVEMBER 18, 2022 14:05​

Jerusalem Post

The rise of right-leaning candidates in Israel’s November 1 election has been derided by a gaggle of breathless commentators, notably The New York Times’ Thomas Friedman, lamenting the end of Israel as we once knew it. First, it should be noted that such prognostications are wildly premature; Israel’s government has yet to be formed. Moreover, it’s worth noting what these observers have until now ignored: the elections were heavily influenced by the 11-day war in May 2021, also known as Operation Guardian of the Walls.

Amid heavy rocket fire by the Iran-backed terrorist group Hamas, significant numbers of Arab-Israeli citizens staged a series of riots, attacking Israeli homes, schools, synagogues and hospitals. A little more than a year later, with troubling questions still lingering about coexistence, votes gravitated to the pugilistic law-and-order campaign of the Religious Zionist bloc led by Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir.

The growing popularity of the Israeli Right is also informed by a lesser-analyzed trend that cannot be ignored. Israeli-Arabs, who undeniably enjoy greater rights and freedoms in Israel than in any of the surrounding states, are drifting away from their Israeli identity. They increasingly identify as Palestinians. This explains why some turned out during the May 2021 conflict, even hoisting Palestinian flags in mixed cities. During the recent election, even as other Arabs in the region cannot vote, a surprising number of them declined to cast ballots.

Arabs make up 21% percent of Israel’s population – a Muslim minority larger than in any other Western nation. As recently as 2020, only 7% of Israeli Arabs described identified as Palestinian. And Israel’s internal security service, the Shin Bet, has regularly downplayed the threat to Israel from this community. Indeed, while the coexistence is far from perfect, the ability to live together in relative harmony has been a point of pride for both Jews and Arabs in Israel.

All of this may be changing, thanks to recent efforts mounted by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The clerical regime has stood up a nerve center to coordinate the activities of violent groups that seek Israel’s destruction. Cells of Arab-Israelis may be among them. Moreover, Iran has activated the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah to smuggle guns to Arabs in Israel. The goal is to arm the population to battle Israel. One inadvertent result appears to be an uptick in homicide among Arab Israelis.

Arab Israelis and Israeli left wing activist students, attend a rally marking the Nakba anniversary at the Tel Aviv University on May 15, 2022 (credit: TOMER NEUBERG/FLASH90)

AT THE same time, the Palestinian Authority and Hamas have launched an effort to draw the Israeli Arabs closer. Both actors, to varying degrees, harbor irredentist designs on Israeli territory. They see their Arab brethren within as key to their success. To this end, they insinuate that only Jews are full citizens and that the path to equality (if not dominance) is to join the cause of Palestinian liberation.

Fortunately, Israel is far from labeling a fifth of Israelis as a fifth column. But the new government must ensure that Israel never goes down that path. It must make greater efforts to integrate Israeli Arabs.

It begins with terminology. News outlets, like The Washington Post, now refer to Israeli Arabs as Palestinians. The Israeli government must not let this stand. Nor should Washington. Not if the goal is to foster coexistence. For that matter, not if the goal is to convey the truth. If Arab Israelis serve in the military, enjoy health and education benefits, and serve in the Knesset, they are clearly not Palestinians.

While the US can reinforce this, it begins with Israeli officials. Differentiating rhetorically among citizens on the basis of ethnicity is harmful. In government discourse, Israeli Arabs should referred to simply as “Israelis,” with exceptions of unavoidable sectarian relevance, such as religious holidays, school curricula, and language.

Beyond this, Israel must develop alternatives to military conscription for this important Israeli population. In recent years, such a thing was unthinkable. However, the new government will feature prominent Jewish figures who never served in uniform. Granting exemption to Israeli Arabs should no longer be resented. One viable alternative, and one that is already mainstreamed in Israel, is national service. Satisfactory fulfillment of such service should guarantee full legitimation in return.

Ironically, a right-wing government could be an ideal candidate to push for such change. Few, if any would accuse the next government of being soft on security. Indeed, Ben-Gvir has pledged to tackle crime in the Arab sector if he is tapped to handle the internal security portfolio. He sees the blight of gun violence among Israeli Arabs bleeds across to threaten Israeli Jews. If he succeeds in curbing the violence, he could persuade Israel’s Arab citizens that the government, even if containing hardliners, is theirs, no less. And it will distinguish them from Palestinians in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip – kindred people, perhaps, but with a different national destiny.

Ultimately, the shape of the new government is in the hands of Benjamin Netanyahu. He has a duty to form this government in accordance with the wishes of the Israeli electorate, which includes Israelis of Arab descent. He should acknowledge the inadvertent role they played in bringing Israel to this point and he should work to ensure greater integration, with US assistance.

Mark Dubowitz is the CEO of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Jonathan Schanzer is senior vice president for research. Follow them on Twitter @MDubowitz and @JSchanzer.

Jerusalem Post

22. The Strategic Backdrop of Qatar ’22: Unpacking the Geopolitical, Security, and Other Issues Surrounding the World Cup

Conclusion:

With so much controversy surrounding the World Cup, it will be compelling to see how the multitude of issues unfold. Will Qatar welcome the world and allow traveling supporters the freedom to enjoy the event in the way they choose, or should supporters be expected to adapt to the nation’s laws and customs? Will players and supporters protest the event in an attempt to make their voices heard? How will the sport referred to as “the beautiful game” influence—and be influenced by— the complex network of political and security issues that form the landscape on which the World Cup is playing out?

The Strategic Backdrop of Qatar ’22: Unpacking the Geopolitical, Security, and Other Issues Surrounding the World Cup - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu · by Grant Barge · November 21, 2022

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Hey strategists, policymakers, and geopolitical analysts—not a soccer fan? Here’s why you should be paying attention to the FIFA World Cup, anyway. With Thanksgiving right around the corner, millions of Americans will gather for food, family, and football. For much of the rest of the world, though, attention will be on the other football, with an expected five billion viewers tuning in worldwide. For the first time in its nearly one-hundred-year history, the world’s largest and most watched sporting event kicked off this week on the Arabian Peninsula when the tiny country of Qatar launched the opening ceremonies for the 2022 FIFA World Cup. And even if you have little interest in the action unfolding inside the eight stadiums that will host the matches, the tournament is taking place against a backdrop of geopolitical and strategic issues that you should be watching.

Providing Security to Qatar

One reason this global soccer spectacle is significant to the United States is that Qatar is currently home to the forward headquarters of both the US Central Command and Special Operations Command–Central, with over ten thousand military personnel at al-Udeid Air Base on the outskirts of its capital city of Doha. In October of this year, Qatar’s Ministry of Defense signed a memorandum of agreement for the United States to provide security support during the tournament.

There has been interagency collaboration in recent months with the US Department of Homeland Security signing an agreement with Qatar to also assist with security. According to a joint statement, the department would help “identify air passengers linked to terrorism and trafficking” and would assist in “detecting watchlisted travelers and monitoring potential security risks at Hamad International Airport.” The agreement also includes help in countering threats from unmanned aircraft systems and commits the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to providing resources on infrastructure security. With so many viewers, an event of this magnitude offers an attractive target to extremist groups seeking to send a message. The United States will play a big part in providing the necessary support for a safe, secure World Cup.

Geopolitical Issues

The United States men’s national team qualified for the Qatari World Cup by earning one of the three automatic berths allotted to CONCACAF—the qualifying region encompassing North America, Central America, and the Caribbean. The team is now set to compete in an explosive four-team group at the tournament with England, Wales, and Iran. With protests and civil unrest raging across the country and Tehran’s alleged support to Russia in Ukraine, the eyes of the world are on Iran. Earlier this month, the Ukrainian Association of Football (UA) filed a formal complaint to FIFA, the sport’s global governing body. Based on “systematic human rights violations in Iran, which may violate the principles and norms of the FIFA Statutes” and “the possible involvement of Iran in the military aggression of Russia against Ukraine,” the complaint called for Iran’s national team to be excluded from the World Cup. Despite the formal complaint, FIFA ruled that Iran will remain in the competition.

In the 1998 World Cup in France, nineteen years after the revolution that ousted the pro-American shah, the United States and Iran played what has been described as “the most politically charged game in World Cup history.” Prior to the match, Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, ordered the Iranian team to not shake hands with the Americans in the traditional prematch ritual. Iran won 2-1, eliminating the United States from the tournament and causing massive celebrations across the country. “People were dancing in the streets of Tehran, openly drinking alcohol and the women took off their head scarves,” one account described. “The Revolutionary Guard didn’t do anything about it because they were also so happy. They were football fans first and Revolutionary Guards second.” It is interesting to note that Iran’s current unrest was triggered by an instance of the state’s crackdown on the identical thing that was apparently allowed in the jubilation following a soccer match twenty-four years ago: the death of Mahsa Amini after she was detained by the country’s morality police for not fully complying with Iran’s veiling laws sparked waves of protests and violence. The United States plays Iran on November 29 for the first time since France ’98. How will the regime respond if similar celebrations ensue if Iran is to win?

Clash of Cultures

Qatar, a Muslim nation with laws, customs, and practices rooted in Islam, promises to welcome fans “without discrimination.” In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in September, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani said that traveling supporters will be safe and that it is “our duty is to overcome obstacles, extend a hand of friendship, build bridges of understanding and celebrate our common humanity.” However, Qatar’s actions in recent weeks say otherwise with concerns over its response to issues such as homosexuality, censorship, and alcohol.

Homosexuality is illegal in Qatar and various human rights organizations reported that, as recently as September, at least six LGBTQ+ people have been arrested and abused while in custody. Even more troubling is that former Qatari national team player and current World Cup ambassador Khalid Salman said in a recent pretournament interview that homosexuality is “damage to the mind.” In response, the players competing in the tournament launched the One Love campaign aimed at promoting inclusion and equality at this year’s World Cup and beyond. The captains of nine European nations will wear rainbow armbands to share their message of inclusion to a worldwide viewing audience. The United States chose not to wear the armband during the matches but will display the One Love crest at their training camp for the duration of the tournament.

Another controversial topic has been the sale of alcohol, something Qatar only permits at designated locations in support of tourism but not allowed in Muslim laws. Qatar, FIFA, and Budweiser, who paid $75 million to sponsor the tournament and for sales rights at the tournament’s matches, have been in negotiations. Two days prior to kicking off the tournament, Qatar announced that there will be no alcohol sold in and around the stadiums—revenue lost for Budweiser and disappointment for the traveling supporters. Upon receipt of the announcement, Budweiser tweeted on November 18, “Well, this is awkward. . . .” Qatar conceded that the state will allow the sale of alcohol in designated “fan zones” across the country but want to ensure “that the stadiums and surrounding areas provide an enjoyable, respectful and pleasant experience for all fans.”

Human Rights Violations

Russia spent $11 billion when it hosted the World Cup in 2018. Qatar has reportedly spent $229 billion—building stadiums and launching infrastructure projects such as transit lines, hospitals, and shopping malls. The primary goal of hosting the tournament is to showcase Qatar to the world and make it a desirable location for future travel and investment. The pace of this rapid development comes at a significant cost: the cost of human life.

The Qatari government stated that over thirty thousand foreign workers, mostly from Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and the Philippines, have worked on construction projects since 2010, when FIFA awarded this year’s World Cup to Qatar. Various human rights groups have accused Qatar of forcing these migrant workers to live in poor accommodations, pay large recruitment fees, and have their wages withheld and passports confiscated. Over the years rights groups have also accused FIFA of indifference to the matter and criticized the organization’s unwillingness to stop a tournament being “built on human rights abuses.”

As of February 2021, a staggering 6,500 migrant workers have died since 2010. The Qatari government claims those numbers are wildly exaggerated and that its accident reports from 2014 to 2020 showed only three “work-related” deaths, and another thirty-four from natural causes. The One Love campaign, in addition to promoting inclusion, is also undertaking its activities in recognition of the migrant workers lost to the World Cup and for the equal and fair treatment of all human beings.

In his pre–World Cup press conference from Doha on Saturday, FIFA president Gianni Infantino (a European) gave an explosive one-hour monologue lashing out at what he described as “hypocrisy” and “racism” from countries criticizing and Qatar on morality grounds. “What we Europeans have been doing for 3,000 years around the world, we should be apologizing for the next 3,000 years before starting to give moral lessons to people,” he insisted. European companies, he continued, had done nothing to address the rights of migrant workers because it would jeopardize the vast profits they earn in Qatar. His comments will do little to tamp down criticism of Qatar on the issue of human rights—an issue that will remain heavy in the air throughout the entire tournament and beyond.

With so much controversy surrounding the World Cup, it will be compelling to see how the multitude of issues unfold. Will Qatar welcome the world and allow traveling supporters the freedom to enjoy the event in the way they choose, or should supporters be expected to adapt to the nation’s laws and customs? Will players and supporters protest the event in an attempt to make their voices heard? How will the sport referred to as “the beautiful game” influence—and be influenced by— the complex network of political and security issues that form the landscape on which the World Cup is playing out?

Maj. Grant Barge is a civil affairs officer and strategic studies instructor at West Point. He is a United States Soccer Federation–licensed coach and is a team culture and leadership advisor at the professional and collegiate level.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Md Shaifuzzaman Ayon

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mwi.usma.edu · by Grant Barge · November 21, 2022

23. Special Operations News Update - Nov 21, 2022 | SOF News

Special Operations News Update - Nov 21, 2022 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · November 21, 2022

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo: Army paratroopers descent to the Malemute Drop Zone at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska. Photo by Alejandro Pena, USAF, November 4, 2022.

Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).

SOF News

Failing BUD/S – What’s Next? Over several past decades tens of thousands of Navy sailors have entered Navy special operations training. More than two out of three Sailors who enter the NSW pipeline will be disqualified. The reasons vary from a medical issue, the inability to meet the mental or physical standards, or a “drop on request” by the Sailor. So what’s next for these Sailors? The Phoenix Division, a part of the the NSWC, is responsible for preparing and assisting these Sailors to find a new rating in the Navy for a successful transition to a new career. Read more in “Naval Special Warfare Strengthens Program for Former Candidates”, Navy.mil, November 16, 2022.

SOF Selection and Older Men. There are many potential candidates that ponder attending the Special Forces Selection and Assessment (SFAS) course. Some as old as 40 years. While it certainly is possible for an older candidate to pass; there are some realities to take into account. The pace of training, lack of sleep, and lack of recovery time are designed to put a maximum amount of stress on candidates. Someone enter the training pipeline at age 38, starting with SFAS; won’t leave the training pipeline until age 40. Realistically, his days on an SF team are limited. So . . . . “Can Older Candidates Make it Through Special Operations Selection?”, SANDBOXX, November 16, 2022.

Navy SEAL Sentence Set Aside. An appeals court has ordered that Navy SEAL Tony DeDolph will get a new sentencing hearing. “Navy SEAL convicted for death of Green Beret Logan Melgar has 10-year sentence set aside”, Task & Purpose, November 17, 2022.

3rd ASOS and SWMS Conduct Arctic Training. Airmen from the 3rd Air Support Operations Squadron participated in an Arctic Familiarization field exercise in Alaska. They were assisted by Special Warfare Mission Support (SWMS) personnel. “3rd ASOPS Conducts First-ever Arctic Familiarization Field Exercise”, Pacom.mil, November 18, 2022.

Defense Strategies Institute presents SOF & Worldwide Operations, December 7-8, 2022, Tampa, Florida. The 11th Annual SOF & Worldwide Symposium will convene senior level leaders and decision makers from across the Special Operations Community, regional combatant commands, Department of State, intelligence community, academia, and industry.

Military Dive Vests Under Scrutiny. A new programmable dive vest is being tested by the Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). The action is prompted by the death of a Green Beret who drowned during a one mile swim at Fort Campbell, Kentucky while preparing for combat dive school in fall 2021. The new dive vests will automatically inflate using CO2 cartridges when a diver sinks below a set depth. “Drowning death spotlights problem with older military dive vests”, Air Force Times, November 14, 2022.

Navy SEALs and Ethics. Scandals have plagued the Navy SEALs over the past few decades and this problem continues to occupy the time of the Naval Special Warfare leadership. “The Ethics of the Navy SEALs”, The Ruck, November 17, 2022.

AFSOC Cdr Has a New Job. Lt. Gen. James Slife, currently the head of Air Force Special Operations Command, will soon be joining the Air Staff as the Air Force’s next deputy chief of staff for operations. (Air and Space Forces, Nov 16, 2022.

Military Diving – A Complex Mission. Divers of the various military units have a tough job – operating in one of the most demanding operational environments on earth. Avon Protection is a firm that is providing dive equipment to military divers so that they can extend their mission envelope – operating deeper and for longer periods of time. “Going deep into the world of military diving“, Naval Technology, November 14, 2022.

International SOF

Exploitation of Afghan Commandos. Daniel Elkins, a special operations veteran and founder of the Special Operations Association of America, writes about the need to resume the evacuation of our Afghan allies from Afghanistan. Afghan Commandos were the last to stop fighting in the final days of August 2021. These brave soldiers have fled to Iran where they have no job, no place to live, and no legal status. Iran and Russia are recruiting these desperate Afghans to fight in Ukraine for Russia. Read more in “Afghan Commandos are being exploited by Russia, Iran”, Washington Times, November 14, 2022.

French SOF and Burkina Faso. There have been protests against the French military presence in the West Africa nation and the possibility of a French withdrawal is looming. France’s Sabre unit has played a key role in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel. “France Not Ruling Out Pulling Special Forces From Burkina”, Barron’s, November 20, 2022.

CIA’s Zero Units, Afghanistan Withdrawal, and Kabul NEO. Many of the personnel in the counter terrorism pursuit units established by the Central Intelligence Agency within the framework of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) benefited from an arrangement between the CIA and the Taliban. The personnel were allowed to transit through Taliban-held territory in the final days of August 2021. They would provide security for the Kabul NEO at the airport and then board flights to ‘lily pads’ in the Middle East for final relocation to the United States. The evacuation of the CIA’s Afghan proxies is a riveting story about the non-combatant evacuation operation of August 2021. “Ground Zero”, by Fahim Abed, The Intercept, November 20, 2022.

USSF and Mauritanian SOF Complete JCET. Members of the Mauritanian Special Forces recently completed training during a Joint Combined Exchange Training event. “Closing Ceremony of the JCET Training”, U.S. Embassy in Mauritania, November 2022.

SOF Care Coalition. The United States Special Operations Command Warrior Care Program was established in 2005. It assists SOF service members who are wounded, ill, or service injured to transition to a life outside of uniform. Read the success story of a Green Beret who made a successful military to civilian transition with the help of the Care Coalition. “Fellowship helps veteran transition to civilian work”, Florida International University (FIU News), November 9, 2022.

13th Parachute Dragoon Regiment. One of the oldest and prestigious reconnaissance units of the French military has a history that goes back to 1676. The 13e RDP operates as an airborne reconnaissance unit and is part of the French Army Special Forces Brigade. The regiment has seen a lot of action in Africa but also has a role on the European continent. “13th Parachute Dragoon Regiment”, Grey Dynamics, November 13, 2022.

SOF History

Operation Ivory Coast. On November 21, 1970, 56 Special Forces soldiers were inserted by helicopter at the Son Tay prisoner-of-war camp located just 23 miles west of Hanoi, North Vietnam. They were to rescue over 60 U.S. prisoners thought to be at the POW camp. Unfortunately, they had been moved prior to the Son Tay raid taking place. It did result in raising the morale of the POWs.

Delta Force Established. On November 19, 1977, over four decades ago, the country’s premier counter-terrorism unit was formed up. Wikipedia.

Ukraine Conflict

Ukrainian Commandos Strike Into Russia. According to one news report Ukrainian SOF infiltrated a northern Russian airbase and damaged three Ka-52 “Alligator” attack helicopters with rigged explosives. The Veretye air base is located more than 500 kilometers from Ukraine. “Ukrainian commandos infiltrated deep inside Russia to destroy Russian attack aircraft”, We Are the Mighty, November 14, 2022.

If HIMARS Can’t Reach You, a Partisan Will. The withdrawal of Russian military forces (probably about 25,000) from the large city on the west bank of the Dnieper River in mid-November was likely due, in part, to the activities or ‘partisans’ who were in touch with Ukrainian intelligence and special operations personnel. Read more in “Stealthy Kherson resistance fighters undermined Russian occupying forces”, The Washington Post, November 18, 2022. (subscription).

Russian Helicopter Losses. Many of the best Russian Ka-53 attack helicopter crews were lost in the beginning stages of the Ukraine-Russian war. The chopper was specifically designed to support Russian special operations forces at night. The crews were shot down while conducted deep hunter-killer strikes behind Ukrainian lines. The Russian tactics have changed, with a lot less deep penetrations strikes taking place; but the losses continue. “How the Ukrainians Wrecked the Russians Best Helicopter Regiments”, Forbes.com, November 11, 2022.

Engaging with Russia After Ukraine. Pavel K. Baev outlines the trajectory of the forthcoming defeat of Russia in Ukraine will present challenges and risks. The successful Ukrainian offense in Kharkiv and the capture of Kherson underscores how badly the Russians are doing on the battlefield. There is the possibility that Putin is removed from power; and if this happens, the West needs to be prepared for it and have a plan for going forward. While deterrence will be an important aspect of the ‘new relationship’ with the ‘new leadership’; a multi-layered meaningful engagement will be necessary as well. “Time for the West to think about how to engage with defeated Russia”, Brookings Institute, November 15, 2022.

National Security and Commentary

SOF, ASD SO/LIC, and GPC. U.S. special operations forces are getting lost in the transition to great power competition (or are we calling it strategic competition now?). ASD SO/LIC Christopher Maier says that the defense establishment equates SOF to counter-terrorism; however, SOF has its roots in GPC back ‘in the day’ – prior to 9/11. “Special Operators Lack Seat at the Table in Post-Counterterror Pentagon, SOF Leaders Say”, Defense One, November 18, 2022.

Deactivation of CAA Squadron. In October 2022 the 6th Special Operations Squadron (6SOS) was inactivated. Its highly trained and experienced personnel either retired or moved on to other assignments. These Combat Aviation Advisors had technical, cultural, and language skills that enabled them to work in foreign countries and advise, assist, and train pilots in the operation of their aircraft. That capability has now gone away. Forrest L. Marion argues that the U.S. Air Force needs to reverse course with its combat aviation advisors and restore a language and culture-based capability. “Air Force ‘Diversity’ of Languages: A Strategic Concern”, The Roanoke Star, November 16, 2022.

SOF, Global Threats, and an ‘Inflection Point’. U.S. special operations forces will need to adapt to the current threat environment – moving away (a bit) from the counterterrorism mission. The strategic threats of Russia and China are now center stage. USSOCOM is rebalancing its resources for great power competition. “Special Operations Forces at ‘Inflection Point’ as Global Threats Evolve”, by Josh Luckenbaugh, National Defense Magazine, November 18, 2022.

Rep. Waltz and a “Woke Military”. The Heritage Foundation is establishing a think-tank panel to combat wokeness in the military and examine ways to turn around its recruiting crisis. Representative Mike Waltz (R-FL), a U.S. Army Green Beret in the National Guard, will chair the panel. (Breitbart, Nov 18, 2022).

Africa

Germany Ending UN Africa Mission. It is expected that one more European nation will be reducing its peacekeeping role in Africa. The Germans will be ending their involvement in the MINUSMA mission. It has participated in the missions since 2013, with a presence of up to 1,400 personnel. The Mali authorities have been restricting the military activities of Germany while cozying up to Russia and the Wagner Group. “Germany to Pull Troops From Mali by End 2023”, The Defense Post, November 17, 2022.

Sahel Region Terrorism. The Accra Initiative of seven West African countries is met for two days in the Ghanaian capital this past week to discuss ways of preventing the spread of terrorism in the Sahel region and beyond. The Islamist militants have been spreading their activities from Niger to Burkina Faso and Mali to West Africa’s coastal states. The program promotes intelligence sharing, cross border operations, and training of intelligence and security personnel. “West African Countries Meet Over Spillover of Terrorism From Sahel Region”, by Kent Mensah, Voice of America, November 17, 2022.

New Strategy Needed for Somalia. Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, a visiting professor at the African Leadership Centre, King’s College London, provides a pessimistic overview of the security situation in Somalia. “Al-Shabaab in Somalia has resisted military force: now is the time for a new strategy”, The Conversation, November 20, 2022.

COIN in Africa – Still Needed. Natasha Louis argues that terrorism is on the increase in African and the U.S. needs to continue its engagement in counterinsurgency efforts to stop it. Reducing COIN operations significantly weakens the ability of the U.S. to have influence in unstable regions around the world; especially Africa. Unfortunately, the U.S. may not learn from its past mistakes in earlier conflicts. “America Can’t Turn Away from Counterinsurgency in Africa”, National Interest, November 19, 2022.

Upcoming Events

November 17-18, 2022

33rd Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium

NDIA

December 7-8, 2022

SOF & Worldwide Operations

Defense Strategies Institute (DSI)

Old Salt Coffee is a corporate sponsor of SOF News. The company offers a wide range of coffee flavors to include Green Eyes Coffee, a tribute to those Navy special operations personnel who operate in the night.

Podcasts, Videos, Books, and Movies

Podcast – Matt Bracken – Freedomista. The former Navy SEAL discusses current events and viable options for the current generation of warriors. The Pinelander Podcast, November 18, 2022, one hour.

https://pinelander.podbean.com/e/episode-050-matt-bracken-november-18-2022/

TV Series Review – Rogue Heroes. A new series to be premiering on Epix features a cast that replicates on screen the origin of Britain’s elite Special Air Service (SAS). The series is an adaptation of the book SAS: Rogue Heroes. The unit was created in 1941 during World War II in the deserts of North Africa. “Shot in Morocco, Rogue Heroes offers thrilling war adventure in the desert”, The Arab Weekly, November 17, 2022.

Retrograde. The release of the movie documentary Retrograde has sparked numerous positive reviews. When it comes to your area it is worth watching. The documentary was filmed during the final 9 months of the war in Afghanistan – and follows a Special Forces detachment of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne). “Fort Carson Green Berets featured in new documentary”, KOAA.com, November 19, 2022.

Information Warfare Reading List. The Navy’s Information Dominance Reading List has been published. DODReads, November 2, 2022.

https://www.dodreads.com/information-warfare-reading-list/

sof.news · by SOF News · November 21, 2022

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com