Quotes of the day:
“To be prepared against surprise is to be trained. To be prepared for surprise is to be educated.”
- James Carse
"First of all, my persuasion is what really breeds violence is political differences. But because religion serves as the soul of community, it gets drawn into the fracas and turns up the heat."
- Huston Smith
“For some of us, politics means fighting for our right to exist”
- Scott Westerfeld, Shatter City
1. N.K. propaganda outlet slams Yoon's approach toward Pyongyang
2. Moon, Yoon to hold first meeting Monday
3. N. Korea crosses red line
4. Yoon cites 'pragmatism,' 'people's interests' as key to setting state agendas
5. How to Strengthen South Korea-US Cooperation on Combatting Cyber-enabled Financial Crime
6. Will North Korea Soon Test a Nuclear Weapon?
7. Blue House Brawl: South Korea Spars Over Where Next President Will Live
8. Allies view N. Korea's ICBM launch as involving Hwasong-15, not new missile: sources
9. President-elect Yoon to send delegation to U.S. for policy consultation
10. N. Korea carrying out construction at Punggye-ri nuclear test site: sources
11. North's latest ICBM launch may be a Hwasong-15 in disguise
12. North Korea may be preparing for nuclear test soon – report
13. Pence says U.S. will remain committed to defense of South Korea
14. Get tougher with North
1. N.K. propaganda outlet slams Yoon's approach toward Pyongyang
If Kim did not like the Policies of Lee and Park, and now Yoon, why is it that he did not embrace Moon's policies?
There was no better time and combination of leaders than Moon and Trump and Kim looked a gift horse on the mouth.
Perhaps the problem is Kim and not Moon, Trump, Biden, or Yoon. Did anyone ever consider that?
N.K. propaganda outlet slams Yoon's approach toward Pyongyang | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, March 27 (Yonhap) -- A North Korean propaganda outlet on Sunday criticized South Korean President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol's policy stance on the Kim Jong-un regime as a move to revive "confrontational" approaches by former conservative administrations in Seoul.
The Tongil Voice claimed that Yoon is poised to follow the policy lines of two former presidents, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, who took tougher approaches than current liberal President Moon Jae-in.
"Yoon is struggling to resurrect the anti-republic confrontational policies that past conservative forces promoted," the outlet said in a piece titled, "A poisonous plant gives rise to a poisonous herb."
It also claimed that Yoon's policy is to use inter-Korean dialogue as a means only for the North's denuclearization, keep strong sanctions until the North's denuclearization and start cross-border cooperation only when the regime takes actual denuclearization steps like its declaration of nuclear arms.
During his presidential campaign, Yoon promoted his push for "peace through strength" by suggesting he would employ a preemptive strike in case of an imminent North Korean threat and deploy additional units of the U.S. THAAD anti-missile system to South Korea.
In a different story, the outlet took a swipe at the planned South Korea-U.S. summertime military training. It argued the South's military authorities are engaging in an anti-Pyongyang "confrontational commotion" following Yoon's election.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
2. Moon, Yoon to hold first meeting Monday
(LEAD) Moon, Yoon to hold first meeting Monday | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with details; ADD photo)
SEOUL, March 27 (Yonhap) -- President Moon Jae-in and President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol will hold their first meeting at Cheong Wa Dae this week, their aides said Sunday.
The two are set to hold a dinner meeting at the Sangchunje guest house on Monday, 19 days after Yoon was elected Moon's successor, Cheong Wa Dae spokesperson Park Kyung-mee and Yoon's spokesperson Kim Eun-hye said in separate press briefings.
Moon and Yoon will be accompanied by Presidential Chief of Staff Yoo Young-min and Yoon's top aide, Rep. Chang Je-won.
The decision on their meeting was finalized after Moon offered to meet Yoon at the "earliest possible" date, while Yoon expressed his hope to meet without any agenda and engage in "candid" dialogue, according to the briefings.
Their meeting comes amid controversies over some of Yoon's plans, including a push for the relocation of the presidential office to the defense ministry compound in Seoul's central district of Yongsan.
Their planned rendezvous comes 19 days after the presidential election, the farthest time past an election that a president and a president-elect in South Korea will have met.
In 1992, then President Roh Tae-woo met then President-elect Kim Young-sam 18 days after Kim's election.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
3. N. Korea crosses red line
This is the key point: Kim has to be made to understand that he cannot get what he wants or even what he needs by launching ICBMs (and certainly not by conducting nuclear tests).
Excerpts:
North Korea seems to have tried to make the most of the unstable international security situation following Russia's sweeping invasion of Ukraine. It is also seeking to build up its nuclear missile capabilities while the U.S. is absorbed by the war in Ukraine. Further, it is utilizing the power transition period in South Korea to advance its nuclear abilities in preparation for future negotiations with the U.S.
Yet, North Korea should realize that it cannot get what it wants by test-firing an ICBM. The Moon administration and Yoon's transition team should closely cooperate to tackle the growing security threat together.
N. Korea crosses red line
Steps needed to tackle growing security threat
North Korea has finally crossed the red line by test-firing a new inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) Thursday. Pyongyang said Friday it had successfully launched the Hwasong-17 ICBM the previous day on direct instructions from its leader, Kim Jong-un. Kim cited the need for North Korea "to be fully ready for long-standing confrontation with the U.S. imperialists," according to the North's official media, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). Kim made the remark during an on-site inspection of the missile test site.
KCNA quoted Kim as saying, "The new strategic weapon of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) will make the whole world clearly aware of the power of our strategic armed forces once again."
We express strong regret over the North's recent provocation, as it is a clear violation of Kim's moratorium on nuclear and ICBM missiles announced in April 2018.
President Moon Jae-in convened a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) and strongly condemned the North's test-firing. On Friday, South Korea's unification ministry called on the North to immediately cease such provocative acts that destabilize security on the Korean Peninsula and return to dialogue soon.
The North's move has also prompted the United States to impose new sanctions. The State Department said in a statement, "These measures are part of our ongoing efforts to impede the DPRK's ability to advance its missile program and they highlight the negative role Russia plays on the world stage as a proliferator to programs of concern."
The Hwasong-17 ICBM, also called the "demon ICBM," was first shown to the public in Oct. 10, 2020, during a military parade ceremony to mark the 75th anniversary of the founding of the North's Workers' Party. As the world's longest ICBM, it can be equipped with multiple warheads and a payload of 1,700 kilograms, with a flying range of 13,000 to 15,000 kilometers, to reach even the U.S. mainland. With the test-firing of such an ICBM, tensions surrounding the Korean Peninsula will likely grow further and it could also lead to a confrontation between North Korea and the U.S.
The North's recent move will likely nudge South Korea and the U.S. to deploy strategic weapons such as fighter jets and submarines during the joint military exercises slated for next month. As President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol has vowed strong responses to the North's possible provocations, inter-Korean relations will continue to remain frozen.
North Korea seems to have tried to make the most of the unstable international security situation following Russia's sweeping invasion of Ukraine. It is also seeking to build up its nuclear missile capabilities while the U.S. is absorbed by the war in Ukraine. Further, it is utilizing the power transition period in South Korea to advance its nuclear abilities in preparation for future negotiations with the U.S.
Yet, North Korea should realize that it cannot get what it wants by test-firing an ICBM. The Moon administration and Yoon's transition team should closely cooperate to tackle the growing security threat together.
4. Yoon cites 'pragmatism,' 'people's interests' as key to setting state agendas
He sure seems to be on track to be the peoples' president.
Yoon cites 'pragmatism,' 'people's interests' as key to setting state agendas
Published : Mar 26, 2022 - 17:25 Updated : Mar 26, 2022 - 17:25
(Yonhap)
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol on Saturday cited "pragmatism" and "people's interests" as key elements his incoming government should keep in mind when deciding on state agendas.
Yoon made the remarks during a workshop of the presidential transition committee in Seoul and also highlighted the importance of economic development.
"We need to set the national tasks of priority as we smoothly take over the work from the incumbent government and launch a new one," Yoon said at the session. "The most important thing is pragmatism and the interests of our people."
"Economy is also very important, and the incoming government has the responsibility to further advance and update our industrial structure," he said.
Yoon also asked the committee to "create a good atmosphere" for government officials to debrief them on current issues "on a more equal footing."
Yoon's incoming government has been in discord with the current government of President Moon Jae-in, whose five-year term ends May 9, over issues that primarily involve personnel appointments.
A planned meeting between Moon and Yoon last week was called off at the last minute after the sides reportedly clashed over who would make the nominations and whether to pardon imprisoned former President Lee Myung-bak.
The two sides have also clashed over Yoon's plan to relocate the presidential office to the defense ministry compound.
Ahn Cheol-soo, chairman of the transition team, stressed the need for the new government to take the "road not taken."
"If we take the same road as the one taken by the previous government, the result will inevitably be the same," he said. "We have the responsibility to find a path that no previous governments have taken but that we must take for the sake of our people." (Yonhap)
5. How to Strengthen South Korea-US Cooperation on Combatting Cyber-enabled Financial Crime
Excerpt:
Cyber-enabled financial crime will likely continue to rise as the global economy and its consumers become more engaged with cryptocurrency and its growing digital industry. As the United States and South Korea contemplate ways to strengthen their own national defenses against ransomware and other illicit cyber activity, the two countries can work together to cover each other’s deficiencies and expand efforts to include more cyber and crypto-related collaboration within their alliance.
How to Strengthen South Korea-US Cooperation on Combatting Cyber-enabled Financial Crime
The U.S. and South Korea each possess unique strengths in combatting cyber-enabled financial crime, but their true joint potential is largely untapped.
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This is the first commentary of a three-part series based on key findings derived from a year-long research project investigating ways to enhance South Korea-U.S. cooperation on combating cyber-enabled financial crime. This project is conducted by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) with the generous support of the Korea Foundation.
Key logistical and structural differences between U.S. and South Korean intelligence and law enforcement agencies restrict enhanced coordination on crucial cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
Although Washington and Seoul have previously cooperated on cyber-enabled financial crime cases, these joint efforts are often only in response to ongoing incidents and not preventative in nature. This significantly reduces their ability to predict and prevent future crimes as information sharing often occurs already after the initial hack and/or illicit cyberactivity has succeeded.
In likely response to rising levels of cyber-enabled financial crime, Washington and Seoul included specific language on creating a joint cyber working group to combat the spread of ransomware and online sexual exploitation in a May 2021 summit between U.S. President Joe Biden and South Korean President Moon Jae-in. However, the document outlining the summit failed to include coordination on issues related to the misuse of cryptocurrency and other financial technology – despite cybercriminals using crypto as a major source of financing for their illicit activity.
Dating back to roughly 2017, North Korean operatives have continuously employed ransomware to extort cryptocurrency from their victims and South Korea-based child pornography websites also request payments in cryptocurrency to view their illicit content. Including joint research and investigations on the exploitation of cryptocurrency and new financial technology is crucial to strengthening both U.S. and South Korean national security.
The United States and South Korea each possess unique strengths in combating the rise of cyber-enabled financial crime, but their true joint potential is largely untapped. For the United States, the long reach of its economic sanctions and trade restrictions can stymie the transfer of financial assets and technology needed to conduct, develop, and improve cybercrime operations. For example, in 2021, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned several cryptocurrency exchanges and their operators for facilitating transactions related to ransomware attacks and the Commerce Department issued a new rule barring the export and resale of “cyber intrusion software” to China and Russia, two major trading partners of North Korea, without a proper license from the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security. These actions restrict targets from accessing the U.S. financial system, including transactions conducted in U.S. dollars, as well as their access to key technologies that can help facilitate the spread and use of malicious software.
While South Korea does not enjoy the same level of economic influence and global reach as the United States, Seoul does benefit from a greater overall understanding and exposure to cryptocurrency-related security risks. Compared to the United States, South Korean policymakers, law enforcement, and the general public possess a higher level of understanding around evolving financial technology, like cryptocurrency, and potential risks to national security. For almost a decade, North Korea has used ransomware and other malicious software to extract financial assets from the South Korean government, financial institutions, the private sector, and the average population. As such, South Korean policymakers and law enforcement have years of experience to responding to cyber-enabled financial crime. In contrast, the watershed moment for most average Americans on their awareness of ransomware happened in early May 2021 after the Colonial Pipelines hack.
On a governmental level, Seoul began to monitor the growth of cryptocurrency and virtual assets starting around 2017 with several incremental legal actions leading to a government restriction on the use of anonymous accounts in cryptocurrency trading. A year later, South Korea passed a law requiring cryptocurrency exchanges to obtain a certificate from the Korea Internet & Security Agency to continue financial operations, leading to a 2021 legislation requiring all virtual asset service provides (VASPs) to register with the Korea Financial Intelligence Unit (KFIU) to operate in South Korea.
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In recent years, the United States has ramped up efforts to bring cryptocurrency and other financial technology under stricter financial regulations and legal guidelines. Most recently, Democratic Senator Elizabeth Warren and several colleagues announced a new bill entitled the “Digital Asset Sanctions Compliance Enhancement Act of 2022” to authorize the Treasury Department to sanction non-U.S.-based cryptocurrency exchanges engaging with sanctioned entities and persons. If codified into law, this bill would significantly increase U.S. capability to target illicit cyber-enabled financial activity abroad, such as cryptocurrency exchanges facilitating transactions linked to Russian, North Korean, and other sanctioned actors. Just weeks before, Biden signed an executive order outlining the first U.S. whole-of-government strategy to protect consumers, financial stability, national security, and address climate risks related to the further development of digital assets.
While there is great opportunity in enhancing cooperation between the United States and South Korea, several obstacles may delay rapid developments in the proposed South Korea-U.S. joint cyber working group.
First, new South Korean President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol vowed during his campaign to “deregulate the virtual asset industry” to allegedly promote further growth of the industry, while offering to raise the current crypto tax threshold from around $2,000 to roughly $40,000. Yoon also promised to establish a new government agency to monitor new areas of digital industry, such as cryptocurrency and non-fungible tokens (NFTs), and also allow local initial coin offerings (ICOs), the crypto equivalent to an initial public offering (IPO). This varies significantly from the current U.S. government approach, which recently named the first director of the National Cryptocurrency Enforcement Team to meet “the challenges posed by the criminal misuse of cryptocurrencies and digital assets” in close collaboration with the FBI’s new Virtual Asset Exploitation Unit. As Yoon will assume office in South Korea in May, the future level of executive support in curbing cryptocurrency-backed cybercrime remains unclear.
Second, there are major structural difference between U.S. and South Korean institutions addressing cyber-enabled financial crime that could limit enhanced coordination. In the U.S. context, typically the FBI and the Department of Justice collaborate on financial crime cases involving ransomware payments and online sexual exploitation, whereas South Korean agencies are typically siloed into tighter perimeters of engagement. For example, while the Korean National Policy Agency (KNPA) is the main domestic law enforcement agency dealing with financial crime, any illicit activity with a nexus to North Korea falls under the jurisdiction of the South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS). The KNPA and NIS are often described as South Korean counterparts to the U.S. FBI and CIA, but these key structural differences restrict potential information sharing and logistical operations addressing real-time hacks and illicit cyber activity. Understanding these structural differences is key in ensuring that a joint South Korea-U.S. cyber working group utilizes the appropriate government agencies, expertise, and resources to maximize collaborative efforts to combat cyber-enabled financial crime.
Cyber-enabled financial crime will likely continue to rise as the global economy and its consumers become more engaged with cryptocurrency and its growing digital industry. As the United States and South Korea contemplate ways to strengthen their own national defenses against ransomware and other illicit cyber activity, the two countries can work together to cover each other’s deficiencies and expand efforts to include more cyber and crypto-related collaboration within their alliance.
6. Will North Korea Soon Test a Nuclear Weapon?
Even though it would irritate China he is likely to do it. And he will probably be photographed with what will appear to be miniaturized nuclear warheads to make us believe he has developed the technology to one on an ICBM,
But Mr.Bandow wants to give Kim exactly what he wants - removal of US troops. He also gives hope to Kim by implying the US will not trade a US city for Seoul. (I certainly do not want to do that as well, I want to deter an attack on both- but Mr. Bandow's recommendations will likely cause one or both to happen.). Deterrence is destined to fall with recommendations ike Mr. Bandow's
Excerpts:
The latest North Korean missile test requires Washington to shift its DPRK policy from ideological antagonism to pragmatic engagement, rather like the Nixon administration did with China a half-century ago. The US isn’t going to denuclearize the North. Instead, Washington should promote a normal relationship like that with otherwise hostile states—diplomatic relations, arms control, cooperation when possible, containment when necessary. Regular communication is particularly important with potentially threatening adversaries, as Washington should have learned with the PRC in 1950. Today’s policy is outdated and counterproductive and will grow increasingly dangerous.
Given the South’s enormous advances, there is no need for Americans to defend let alone garrison the ROK. It is long past time for South Koreans to do whatever is necessary in their view to defend themselves. And that includes developing nuclear weapons. “Friendly” proliferation by the South may be second best, but maintaining “extended” nuclear deterrence for the South is worse. US policy is increasingly implausible and will be kaput once the North perfects its capacity to target America.
The US approach to the Koreas is a failure. In a world of crises, Washington cannot afford to keep pushing Northeast Asia into the background. It could soon become the next crisis du jour and force its way onto the Biden administration’s agenda.
Will North Korea Soon Test a Nuclear Weapon?
With its latest long-range missile test, North Korea is pushing back into the contest for the most dangerous international crisis. Last month, Russia leaped into the lead with its attack on Ukraine. Before that China and Taiwan looked like the world’s most dangerous potential military conflict.
President Donald Trump’s summitry with Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un defused a relationship highlighted in 2017 by “fire and fury” and the threat of US military strikes. However, détente lasted only a little more than a year, until the February 2019 failed Hanoi summit. Although the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea maintained its voluntary suspension of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and nuclear tests, it ended serious negotiations with the US and the Republic of Korea.
Still, most policymakers expected Kim to use disruption and confrontation to gain attention from the Biden administration, which seemed inclined to follow its version of the Obama administration’s “strategic patience” amid many competing priorities domestic and foreign. However, Washington indicated its interest in reestablishing contact, which Pyongyang refused. The DPRK’s dismissal of South Korean entreaties was even more abrupt. President Moon Jae-in’s variant of the previous Sunshine Policy was dead.
More ominous is the future which Kim appears to contemplate. He declared the necessity of defending the North from an aggressive US, announced an extensive wish list of new weapons, including hypersonic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and multiple warheads, began to produce some of the promised hardware, and said it was time to drop the test suspension. In late January the regime first appeared to check some ICBM components but not at full range.
The latest launch was probably the Hwasong 17, the largest existing liquid fuel missile that was displayed at an earlier military parade. Said Kim: the DPRK military planned to develop the “formidable military and technical capabilities unperturbed by any military threat and blackmail and keep themselves fully ready for a long-standing confrontation with the U.S. imperialists.”
Although Kim has not declared his intention to stage a nuclear test, that would be the logical next step for Kim. There has been activity at the North’s old nuclear site. This year is especially important symbolically for the Kim dynasty: 10th anniversary of Kim Jong-un’s ascension, 80th birthday of father Kim Jong-il, and 110th birthday of grandfather Kim Il-sung. Warned my Cato Institute colleague Ted Galen Carpenter: “if the Biden administration’s ossified policy regarding bilateral relations doesn’t change, Kim’s restraint even on that issue is likely to expire soon.”
Although North Korea already has a nuclear deterrent, it primarily targets its neighbors, as well as American territories and possessions. That might not be adequate in a crunch, at least if the US president shared Trump’s view that a war “over there” in the Koreas wouldn’t matter much. However, even he would have to take seriously an ability to target cities on the American mainland.
So now what for Washington policy?
-The US and South Korea have no answer to the North’s increasing test regimen. Seoul convened an emergency National Security Council meeting and criticized the launch. Washington also denounced the test and imposed new sanctions. US Indo-Pacific Command urged Pyongyang to “refrain from further destabilizing acts.” The process has the look of Kabuki theater. The allies know they are playing a losing role. None of the foregoing actions will have any impact on the DPRK’s behavior. Kim almost certainly expected them and will pay no more attention to them this time than before.
-American policy toward Pyongyang has failed. Washington sought to isolate the People’s Republic of China for only 23 years. One consequence was Beijing’s intervention in the Korean War. Had the two capitals been in contact, it is possible that they would have restored the status quo ante diplomatically rather than through Chinese military intervention and two and a half years more of war. Keeping the North officially isolated for 74 years and counting has had no better results. The best that can be said for the last three decades of intermittent contact is that DPRK behavior has tended to moderate some during periods of engagement, even without any permanent result.
-Sanctions have become Washington’s standard response to almost every international controversy, especially driven by Congress, where close to 535 secretaries of state wannabes act as if economic penalties are a panacea. Alas, sanctions have consistently failed to force foreign governments to change policies that they view as vital to regime survival or national pride. Sanctions helped get Iran and North Korea to negotiate, but only so far. And the persistent demand for war by leading Republicans—both Presidents Clinton and Trump apparently seriously considered taking military action against the North—cut the opposite direction, convincing regimes on Uncle Sam’s naughty list that nukes are necessary for their survival.
-Although the Biden administration reiterated its commitment to diplomacy, it has no practical strategy. One US official commented that the DPRK must want to have that conversation. But it evidently doesn’t. Demanding CVID—complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization—is a dead end. Most Washington Korea analysts believe Pyongyang has no intention of giving up its nukes. The experiences of Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine all argue against doing so. Nuclear weapons also play an important domestic political role in the DPRK. The best hope for any progress likely is to shift to an arms control mode, seeking to limit the North’s arsenal. However, so far no administration wants to admit reality.
-The failure to do so may have moved Kim to adopt a new strategy: eschewing engagement while bolstering his military capabilities. The Rand Corporation and Asan Institute warned that North Korea could possess a couple hundred nukes by 2027. Once the North has multiple scores of nuclear weapons and a likely if not certain ability to target American cities, Kim will be in a very strong position to insist on recognition of the DPRK’s nuclear status and offer to cap his program in return for lifting sanctions, else he continues expanding his arsenal.
-Washington’s deteriorating relationship with the PRC has reduced America’s prospects for winning assistance from the only nation with practical leverage over the North. Beijing has never controlled its small, tenaciously independent neighbor except perhaps after intervening militarily in late 1950 to save the DPRK from military disaster. After that Pyongyang carefully balanced Russia and China. The latter paired its opposition to a North Korean nuke with its fear of a North Korean implosion. Although the Xi Jinping government was irritated enough with the North’s nuclear and missile activities to support and enforce increased UN sanctions after Kim took power, the Trump gambit caused Beijing to heal the Sino-North Korean breach. Today the PRC has little reason to aid the US.
-This deterioration has been matched by a near collapse in Sino-ROK relations. A plurality of South Koreans continued to name North Korea as their nation’s greatest threat, but an increasing number point to China. A majority figures that Beijing will pose the greatest threat within a decade. Moreover, one of President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol’s most important differences with outgoing President Moon is over relations with the PRC. Yoon promised to be tougher, including cooperating with the Quad, the US-Japan-Australia-India grouping that isn’t quite an alliance, but which is directed at China. So Xi is unlikely to offer Seoul a helping hand either.
-Allied inability to halt North Korea’s nuclear development appears to be radicalizing opinion in the South. For the last decade, a strong majority of the South Korean population has supported the development of a ROK nuclear deterrent, with the current number above 70 percent. Although most of the South’s political leaders remain opposed, they could shift as an ever-larger North Korean arsenal inevitably will bring America’s defense commitment and especially “nuclear umbrella” into question. What US president really is prepared to sacrifice multiple cities and millions of people to defend South Korea? Hopefully, none would do so since that would manifestly be against America’s interest.
The latest North Korean missile test requires Washington to shift its DPRK policy from ideological antagonism to pragmatic engagement, rather like the Nixon administration did with China a half-century ago. The US isn’t going to denuclearize the North. Instead, Washington should promote a normal relationship like that with otherwise hostile states—diplomatic relations, arms control, cooperation when possible, containment when necessary. Regular communication is particularly important with potentially threatening adversaries, as Washington should have learned with the PRC in 1950. Today’s policy is outdated and counterproductive and will grow increasingly dangerous.
Given the South’s enormous advances, there is no need for Americans to defend let alone garrison the ROK. It is long past time for South Koreans to do whatever is necessary in their view to defend themselves. And that includes developing nuclear weapons. “Friendly” proliferation by the South may be second best, but maintaining “extended” nuclear deterrence for the South is worse. US policy is increasingly implausible and will be kaput once the North perfects its capacity to target America.
The US approach to the Koreas is a failure. In a world of crises, Washington cannot afford to keep pushing Northeast Asia into the background. It could soon become the next crisis du jour and force its way onto the Biden administration’s agenda.
A 1945 Contributing Editor, Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties. He worked as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry. He writes regularly for leading publications such as Fortune magazine, National Interest, the Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Times. Bandow speaks frequently at academic conferences, on college campuses, and to business groups. Bandow has been a regular commentator on ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC. He holds a JD from Stanford University.
7. Blue House Brawl: South Korea Spars Over Where Next President Will Live
Perhaps there will be a brawl but I do not doubt that President-elect Yoon will make this move. I bet he will never ever set foot in the Blue House as a president.
Some will ask why is the Moon administrator only now concerned with the threat from north Korea?
Blue House Brawl: South Korea Spars Over Where Next President Will Live
President-elect wants to abandon the official residence, while country’s outgoing leader balks over potential military risks of leaving
WSJ · by Timothy W. Martin
It has now become a political chess piece in a tussle between outgoing and incoming presidential administrations that is disrupting a transfer of power inside a key U.S. ally and the world’s 10th largest economy.
“It’s almost like children fighting over something stupid,” said Gi-Wook Shin, a Korea expert at Stanford University. “I am afraid that there will be no honeymoon with the new administration, and both ruling and opposition parties will continue to fight over every single major issue.”
The stakes for a smooth transition are high after North Korea conducted its first full-range intercontinental ballistic missile test in more than four years, prompting South Korea to test-fire land, air and sea missiles of its own in a show of force.
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol, a conservative who won by a razor-thin margin earlier this month, wants to turn the presidential compound, located at the foot of a mountain in northern Seoul, into a public attraction and relocate to the country’s Defense Ministry a few miles away, near the center of the city.
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol, who will take office in May, wants to move the presidential compound to the Defense Ministry.
Photo: Press Pool
The 62-acre Blue House compound is more than three times the size of the White House grounds. Mr. Yoon contends that it symbolizes an emperor’s palace—encased by forestry, distanced from staff and isolated from society.
Outgoing President Moon Jae-in, of the left-leaning Democratic Party, begs to differ, saying a swift relocation could compromise national security by uprooting military officials and leaving a secure compound at the Blue House. Mr. Moon’s administration has refused to release the roughly $40 million in funds needed to switch locales.
The showdown illustrates how even customary handoffs of power have become a political prize fight in South Korea. It follows a presidential race filled with mudslinging that South Koreans dubbed the “most off-putting election.” Mr. Yoon takes office May 10.
Nearly three-fifths of South Koreans oppose moving the Blue House, with just one-third backing the relocation plan, according to a recent poll. More than 477,000 South Koreans have signed an online petition that argues that moving the Blue House is a waste of taxpayer money and represents a forced relocation executed only for Mr. Yoon’s satisfaction.
The rifts are extending beyond the presidential palace. The Kim Jong Un regime’s test-fire of artillery on March 20 violated an inter-Korean accord to tone down military hostilities, Mr. Yoon said; the Moon administration disagreed. The two sides issued conflicting reports over whether Mr. Yoon had been consulted for the appointment of the country’s top central-banking official. A planned meeting between Messrs. Moon and Yoon after the election has been delayed.
Mr. Yoon, a 61-year-old former prosecutor and political neophyte, crafted himself as a decisive leader and made abandoning the Blue House a prominent campaign promise. There is zero chance he will move into the presidential palace, his spokeswoman said recently, adding that he would work from his temporary offices after May 10 if the new facilities aren’t ready.
The proposed relocation could require hundreds of South Korean Defense Ministry officials to move to an adjacent building currently housing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose own personnel would be rotated out in phases. The move would take at least four weeks, according to Seoul’s military. Mr. Yoon has said he could build a smaller residence inside the Defense Ministry compound or use one of the nearby, off-site venues assigned to senior military officials.
Chun In-bum, a retired three-star South Korean army general, said the displacement of military personnel brings the potential to cause some logistical gaps. Even minor details, such as where officials would take their meals during training exercises, need to be reconfigured, never mind the task of safeguarding an area surrounded by high-rise buildings with direct views on the key facilities, he added.
“In a perfect world, we would build the facility first, then move in,” Gen. Chun said.
South Korean President Moon Jae-in met with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin at the Blue House last year.
Photo: Press Pool
The Blue House, or Cheongwadae in Korean, is a compound built on what had been royal gardens during the centurieslong Joseon Dynasty. The site was used by the Japanese during its colonial rule from 1910 to 1945.
South Korea’s earliest leaders, who had placed the country under dictatorial rule, kept the presidential compound under tight security and off-limits to civilians—especially after a team of North Korean commandos came close to reaching the Blue House in a foiled 1968 assassination attempt of the country’s leader at the time.
After South Korea was democratized in the late 1980s, a series of presidents pledged to open the Blue House to the public. That includes Mr. Moon, who before taking office in 2017, pledged to vacate the presidential palace much as Mr. Yoon is promising now. “I will stop by the market after leaving work so I can talk candidly with citizens,” Mr. Moon said in a national address after being sworn into office.
The efforts later fizzled out, as alternative venues didn’t have the necessary facilities, such as a helicopter pad or a reception hall to host overseas dignitaries. Re-creating security measures in a new building, from underground bunkers to secure communications, was another complicating factor.
The perception that South Korea’s leader holds unchecked power—formed when the country was a military dictatorship—has lingered for many South Koreans, and the Blue House has symbolized that, said Kim Dong-no, a sociology professor at Yonsei University in Seoul.
For instance, the online petition system, which Mr. Moon created early in his tenure, is designed so that any submission that surpasses 200,000 signatures triggers a Blue House response. But many petitions address topics that fall well outside the president’s power, such as impeaching judges, Mr. Kim said.
“That just shows how Korean people think,” he said. “They believe the president can do anything in Korea.”
WSJ · by Timothy W. Martin
8. Allies view N. Korea's ICBM launch as involving Hwasong-15, not new missile: sources
Interesting assessment. BUt an ICBM that can range the entire US is an ICBM that can range the entire US.
Allies view N. Korea's ICBM launch as involving Hwasong-15, not new missile: sources | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, March 27 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States regard North Korea as having disguised its launch of an existing intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) last week as that of a new larger one, informed sources said Sunday.
The allies believe that the North again tested a Hwasong-15 ICBM on Thursday, the same type it fired in late 2017, according to the sources. The North has publicly claimed success in the launch of a Hwasong-17 missile.
Their intelligence analysis suggested that like the Hwasong-15, the ICBM in question had two engine nozzles, whereas the Hwasong-17 has four nozzles. The engine combustion time of the first-stage rocket was also similar to that of the Hwasong-15.
The analysis was based on data from the allies' intelligence assets, including from a satellite equipped with infrared thermal sensors.
The South Korean military said that in the latest test, the ICBM -- fired at a lofted angle -- traveled some 1,080 km at an apogee of over 6,200 km.
It represented progress given that the Hwasong-15 missile flew some 960 km at a top altitude of around 4,500 km in the 2017 launch.
But the military authorities here downplayed the projectile fired last week as an apparent Hwasong-15 missile with a lighter warhead designed to appear to have flown like the longer-range Hwasong-17.
Questions over the North's claim about its latest ICBM launch emerged as the North's photo of the latest launch showed the missile shot up in a clear blue sky in Pyongyang though it was cloudy in the North Korean capital at the time of the launch.
Observers said the North might have used a photo of an earlier ICBM test in its state media report on the purported Hwasong-17 launch.
(END)
9. President-elect Yoon to send delegation to U.S. for policy consultation
President-elect Yoon to send delegation to U.S. for policy consultation | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, March 27 (Yonhap) -- South Korean President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol plans to dispatch a delegation to the United States within the coming weeks for policy consultations on the bilateral alliance, North Korea and other issues of mutual concern, his spokesperson said Sunday.
Led by Rep. Park Jin of Yoon's People Power Party, the delegation will visit Washington before the launch of the new administration in Seoul on May 10, according to Yoon's spokesperson, Kim Eun-hye. It will consist of about five experts on relations between South Korea and the U.S.
"(Yoon) has decided to send the delegation for comprehensive, practical consultations on key pending issues with the U.S. side," Kim said in a press statement.
The delegation will head to the U.S. "at an early date" for meetings with key officials at the U.S. government, Congress and think tanks.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
10. N. Korea carrying out construction at Punggye-ri nuclear test site: sources
I wonder what one more test will do to the test site. I wonder if all the recent earthquakes in the area have been a result of the 6 previous nuclear tests and have somehow altered the geology of the area.
And of course if they test a =nother nuclear device we should finally consider the real strategic strangulation campaign. A test must ensure that Kim will never receive concessions/sanctions relief.
N. Korea carrying out construction at Punggye-ri nuclear test site: sources | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, March 27 (Yonhap) -- North Korea seems to be working on making a "shortcut" to a tunnel at its nuclear test site in Punggye-ri, apparently aimed at making speedy preparations for a seventh underground nuclear experiment, according to government sources in South Korea on Sunday.
If carried out, it would be the secretive nation's first known nuclear test in 4 1/2 years.
South Korea's military and intelligence authorities have detected signs of the country focusing on restoring Tunnel 3 in the mountainous northeastern area, they said.
"(The North) abruptly stopped its initial construction work to restore the entrance to Tunnel 3, and it is digging up the side (of the tunnel)," a source said, requesting anonymity. "In this way, it seems like it will be possible to restore (the facilities) in a month."
Concerns have grown over the odds that the Kim Jong-un regime will push for another nuclear test since it test-fired a long-range missile last week, putting a formal end to its self-imposed moratorium on major strategic provocations.
Experts say the North may test a small tactical nuclear weapon that can be loaded on ballistic missiles around the key national holiday on April 25 to commemorate the founding of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army (KPRA).
There are reportedly four tunnels in the Punggye-ri zone, which was formally shut down in 2018, with demolition work carried out in front of a small group of invited foreign journalists.
Some observers said it would be difficult to immediately restore Tunnels 1 and 2, where the North carried out its previous nuclear tests, while Tunnels 3 and 4 could be usable after restoration work.
lcd@yna.co.kr
(END)
11. North's latest ICBM launch may be a Hwasong-15 in disguise
All warfare is based on deception. Even (and especially) political warfare.
Sunday
March 27, 2022
North's latest ICBM launch may be a Hwasong-15 in disguise
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, center, walks forward in what appears to be a staged photo-op released by the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on the occasion of the test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile on Thursday. Kim is flanked on his right by Jang Chang-ha, chief of the North's National Academy of Defense Science, and Kim Jong-sik, chief of the Workers' Party Military Industry Department on his left. [YONHAP]
U.S. and South Korean intelligence believe the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launched by North Korea on Thursday was actually a Hwasong-15 missile disguised to look like the newer, larger Hwasong-17, according to South Korean military sources.
Speaking to the JoongAng Ilbo on condition of anonymity on Sunday, a military official said that the allies were “closely analyzing” the missile fired by the North on Friday, but added that they “placed more weight on the possibility that it was a Hwasong-15 missile,” not a Hwasong-17 missile as claimed by the North’s state media.
According to the official, U.S. and South Korean analysis of the missile in question revealed it had two engine nozzles, like the Hwasong-15 that was test-fired in 2017, instead of the Hwasong-17, which has four nozzles. The engine combustion time of the first-stage rocket was also similar to that of the Hwasong-15.
The analysis was based on data from the allies’ intelligence assets, including from a U.S. military reconnaissance satellite equipped with infrared thermal sensors.
South Korean military intelligence also believe that the video released Friday by the North of the purported Hwasong-17 launch was actually earlier footage edited and cobbled together from previous tests of the Hwasong-17-type missiles.
Military authorities explained that while the missile fired Thursday, which traveled 1,080 kilometers (miles) and reached an apogee of over 6,200 kilometers, flew farther than the Hwasong-15 missile that flew some 960 kilometers and topped out at 4,500 kilometers in the 2017 launch, it could also have been capped with a lighter warhead to fly like the longer-range Hwasong-17.
This explanation did not, however, mesh with the conclusion by outside observers and Seoul’s own spy agency, which suspects that the test involved a Hwasong-17 missile.
In an interview with Voice of America (VOA) released Saturday, former U.S. State Department Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Vann Van Diepen said that the data on Thursday’s missile released by Seoul and Tokyo showed it had a trajectory closed to the Hwasong-17 than the Hwasong-15.
Another South Korean defense official who spoke to the JoongAng Ilbo on condition of anonymity said that the country’s military should “reconsider the South Korean missile defense system (KAMD) from the ground up in light of North Korea’s increasingly diverse and advanced missile capabilities” and that the the military “should not evaluate North Korea's threats but demonstrate its ability to assuage public anxiety.”
Concerns are also growing that the North’s latest ICBM launch could be a precursor to a nuclear test by the recalcitrant regime as its self-imposed moratorium on provocative nuclear and longer-range missile tests, which came into effect in late 2017, appears effectively scrapped.
Pyongyang has carried out six known nuclear tests since 2006, with the last test being conducted at the Punggye-ri testing site in North Hamgyong Province in September 2017.
Although the North staged the demolition of Punggye-ri before world media in 2018, blowing up tunnels at the underground testing site with a pledge to halt all nuclear tests, satellite imagery in recent months shows that the regime could be working to repair the test site.
According to unnamed South Korean military and intelligence sources, the North is focusing on restoring one of the tunnels leading into the mountainous underground site.
“(The North) abruptly stopped its initial construction work to restore the entrance to Tunnel 3, and it is digging up the side (of the tunnel),” the source said. “In this way, it seems like it will be possible to restore (the facilities) in a month.”
Meanwhile, the United States on Friday called for stronger action from the United Nations Security Council at a rare public meeting of the body in response to the North’s latest ICBM test.
“The Security Council must speak publicly and with one voice to condemn the DPRK's unlawful actions and encourage the DPRK to return to the negotiating table,” US Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield said during the council meeting, which was broadcast live, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Russia swiftly opposed the U.S. call for enhanced sanctions on North Korea, saying it will create “unacceptable socio-economic and humanitarian problems” for the people of North Korea.
Thomas-Greenfield, however, criticized the Security Council for its silence while the North “has escalated its provocations with impunity,” adding that “remaining silent in the hope that the DPRK would similarly show restraint is a failed strategy.”
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
12. North Korea may be preparing for nuclear test soon – report
Excerpt:
“One possibility is that North Korea plans to bring the test site back to a state of readiness to resume nuclear explosive testing,” the report said. “How long it would take North Korea to resume explosive testing at the site depends on the extent of the damage to the tunnels themselves, something we do not know with confidence.”
North Korea may be preparing for nuclear test soon – report
‘Shortcut’ tunnel at Punggye-ri nuclear testing centre could see it operational within a month, sources tell South Korean news agency
Guardian staff
Sun 27 Mar 2022 00.01 EDT
North Korea may be making rapid preparations to carry out a nuclear weapons test for the first time in more than four years, according to a South Korean media report.
The Yonhap news agency, quoting government sources, said North Korea appeared to be digging a “shortcut” to Tunnel 3 at its previously closed nuclear test site in Punggye-ri.
Analysts at the Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies (CNS) had said at the beginning of March that satellite images showed signs of rebuilding at the site, but that getting it back up and running could take months or years. Now, Kim Jong-un’s regime may have changed tack.
“[The North] abruptly stopped its initial construction work to restore the entrance to Tunnel 3, and it is digging up the side [of the tunnel],” Yonhap quoted a source as saying. “In this way, it seems like it will be possible to restore [the facilities] in a month.”
Punggye-ri is North Korea’s only known nuclear test site. It conducted six nuclear weapons tests in tunnels at the site from 2006 to 2017. North Korea’s last and largest nuclear test appeared to trigger geological instability that caused multiple small earthquakes, but analysts and US intelligence officials have said the site could probably be used again.
The missile, dubbed the Hwasong-17, was the largest liquid-fuelled missile ever launched from a road-mobile launcher, analysts said. It was the first time since 2017 that North Korea had tested an ICBM and represented a significant step in Pyongyang’s development of weapons that might be able to strike targets in the US.
Kim ordered the test because of the “daily escalating military tension in and around the Korean peninsula” and the “inevitability of the longstanding confrontation with the US imperialists accompanied by the danger of a nuclear war”, the state-run KCNA news agency said at the time.
North Korea tested a record number of missiles in January and also appears to be preparing to launch a spy satellite.
Images captured by satellite early in March showed very early signs of activity at the Punggye-ri site, including construction and repairs, specialists at the California-based CNS said in a report.
“One possibility is that North Korea plans to bring the test site back to a state of readiness to resume nuclear explosive testing,” the report said. “How long it would take North Korea to resume explosive testing at the site depends on the extent of the damage to the tunnels themselves, something we do not know with confidence.”
Punggye-ri has been closed since North Korea’s self-imposed moratorium on nuclear weapons tests in 2018. With denuclearisation talks stalled, however, Kim has said he no longer feels bound by that moratorium.
In 2018 North Korea removed all observation facilities, research buildings and security posts beforing blowing up the tunnel entrances. A small contingent of foreign media observed the demolition, but North Korea refused to allow international inspectors, leading to speculation the facilities could be restored.
13. Pence says U.S. will remain committed to defense of South Korea
Working on his foreign policy chops for 2024?
Sunday
March 27, 2022
Pence says U.S. will remain committed to defense of South Korea
Former U.S. Vice President Mike Pence speaks at a special guest lecture titled "Current International Affairs and the Strong U.S.-R.O.K. Alliance" at the Westin Chosun Hotel in Jung District, Seoul on Friday. [NEWS1]
Former U.S. Vice President Mike Pence said that the United States would remain committed to the defense of South Korea in the face of what he described as "provocations" by nuclear-armed North Korea in a speech in Seoul on Friday that tied the two countries' security alliance to broader U.S. support for "freedom-loving countries" under threat worldwide.
Speaking at a special guest lecture on the theme of "Current International Affairs and the Strong U.S.-R.O.K. Alliance" at the Westin Chosun Hotel in Jung District, Seoul on Friday, the former vice president said that the alliance between South Korea and the United States would stand against North Korea’s renewed testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and that there would be no loosening of U.S. military commitment to South Korea’s defense.
The lecture was hosted by Island Resort The Heaven and co-sponsored by the Korea Peace Foundation, led by Hong Seok-hyun, chairman of JoongAng Holdings, and the Far East Broadcasting Corporation.
Condemning North Korea’s latest ICBM test in the “strongest possible terms,” Pence commended outgoing South Korean President Moon Jae-in and current U.S. President Joe Biden for “working to strengthen our commitment to our common defense,” while also expressing his confidence that “the bonds of friendship and partnership will grow even stronger” under the incoming administration of President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol.
Even as the trajectory of North’s latest ICBM launch seemed to suggest that the recalcitrant regime now possesses a missile capable of reaching the continental United States, the former vice president warned North Korean leader Kim Jong-un that the U.S. would not “tire” of its treaty promise to defend South Korea.
Pence also echoed Yoon’s campaign message that South Korea should seek to deter North Korean aggression with a posture of “peace through strength,” using the phrase to describe the U.S. position not only in the Asia-Pacific region, but also in Europe.
Repeatedly invoking the terms “the free world” and “freedom-loving nations” to refer to the United States and its allies, the former vice president urged such countries to stand firm against attempts to “trample the liberty or the boundaries of our friends and allies” and send an “unambiguous message that aggression will not be tolerated.”
Speaking in stark, almost biblical terms, Pence warned that “weakness arouses evil” and raised the specter that “countries like China and North Korea,” which he described as “watching very closely to determine whether the free world will stand together” in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, could perceive inaction from the United States and its allies as an opening to threaten South Korea and Taiwan, a self-governing island that mainland China claims is a renegade province.
The former vice president’s speech drew a large gathering of dignitaries from across the upper echelons of South Korean politics, business and religious communities. Attendees included Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong; former prime ministers Chung Un-chan and Kim Hwang-sik; former Foreign Minister Yoo Myung-hwan; Democratic Party lawmaker Kim Jin-pyo; former People Power Party (PPP) lawmaker Na Kyung-won; current PPP lawmaker Park Jin; and former Bareunmirae Party leader Sohn Hak-kyu.
Also in attendance were Chung Mong-joon, chairman of the Asan Foundation; Shin Sung-chul, former president of KAIST; Lee Bae-yong, former president of Ewha Womans University; Noh Seung-sook, former chairman of the Kukmin Ilbo; Kim Jin-oh, president of the Christian Broadcasting Corporation; and Lee Ha-kyung, editor-in-chief of the JoongAng Ilbo.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
14. Get tougher with North
Sanctions are not enough. Important, but not sufficient. Sanctions are not a strategy. We need a broader strategy built around information and influence. We have never executed a comprehensive and aggressive influence campaign despite Kim being deathly afraid of information.
Get tougher with North
Pyongyang should face more sanctions for ICBM launch
The U.N. Security Council failed to take any action Friday against North Korea for test-firing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) last week. China and Russia were held accountable for the failure as they were against the council's adoption of any statement condemning the North's provocation.
It is regrettable that the UNSC could not afford to issue at least a press statement on the matter. The objection by the council's two permanent members with veto-wielding power has made the world body remain silent on the North's blatant violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions against its nuclear tests and ICBM launches.
The council's inaction came despite efforts by South Korea, the U.S. and other countries to prevent Pyongyang from making further provocations. This is raising concerns that China, Russia and North Korea are moving toward strengthening their three-way alliance against the U.S., Japan and South Korea amid an emerging new Cold War. Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the Sino-U.S. rivalry have been reshaping the international order to the detriment of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
It is hard to understand why Beijing and Moscow are trying to defend Pyongyang despite the North's unlawful actions. They should join international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction just as they did in 2017 when the North launched an ICBM and conducted its sixth nuclear test. Otherwise, they should get the blame for giving the Kim Jong-un regime carte blanche to increase its military threats not only in East Asia, but also around the world.
No country can overlook Kim's scrapping of his self-imposed moratorium on long-range missile launches and nuclear tests which had been in place since April 2018. On Thursday, the North test-fired the Hwasong-17 ICBM which it said flew 1,090 kilometers at a top altitude of 6,249 kilometers for 67 minutes. The latest launch followed 11 rounds of ballistic missile tests, including the firing of a hypersonic missile, this year.
More worrisome is that Pyongyang might continue its missile launches as well as resume its nuclear tests amid the Ukraine crisis and South Korea's power transition period. There are reports that the North is reconstructing the Punggyeri nuclear test site that it demolished in 2018. Against this backdrop, Seoul needs to engage in more active diplomacy to make Pyongyang pay the price for its military buildup.
The U.S. is seeking to impose additional UNSC sanctions on the North. It is expected to push for a cut in the cap on North Korea's imports of crude oil and refined oil which is currently set at 4 million barrels and 500,000 barrels, respectively, per year. However such a reduction seems unfeasible because China and Russia are sure to oppose it.
The outgoing Moon Jae-in government and the incoming Yoon Suk-yeol administration should exhaust every effort to stop the North from making further provocations. President-elect Yoon needs to hold a summit with U.S. President Joe Biden soon after he is inaugurated on May 10, in order to strengthen the Seoul-Washington security alliance and prod Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program and the development of ICBMs.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
