Quotes of the Day:
“While I believe the big powers—above all, the United States, China, and Russia—would refrain from any such large-scale attacks on each other short of a major war, the same cannot be said for North Korea or Iran if faced with a threat to the regime. Nor can any country expect restraint in the use of cyber threats by nonstate entities, such as terrorist groups, should they acquire the capability. While we worry about nuclear proliferation, in truth, cyber weapons are more likely to be used than nuclear weapons because they are potentially more damaging, much less risky for the attacker, and tougher to trace to the aggressor.”
— Exercise of Power: American Failures, Successes, and a New Path Forward in the Post-Cold War World by Robert Michael Gates
https://a.co/fQ6uXpk
"Freedom is the last, best hope of earth."
- Abraham Lincoln
"Luck enters into every contingency. You are a fool if you forget it -- and a greater fool if you count upon it."
- Phyllis Bottome
1. How to Prepare: North Korea Could Soon Test an ICBM or Nuclear Weapon
2. Understanding the incoming Yoon administration’s North Korea policy
3. South Korea sees imminent prospect of North ICBM test, newspaper reports
4. Gravitas: North Korea is upset with Pakistan: Here's Why
5. No new notification from N. Korea on Mt. Kumgang facilities: S. Korea
6. U.S. envoy calls on China to condemn N. Korea's missile tests
7. Yoon should prepare foreign policy change
8. Yoon reaches across the aisle in appointments
9. [Editorial] Sign of change: Yoon to relocate from Cheong Wa Dae, symbol of outsized power, to Seoul Govt. Complex
10. Opinion | Why It’s Never a Good Idea to Forget North Korea
11. A Lame-Duck Moon Can Fix South Korea’s Refugee Failings
12. Gov't Has Given up Trying to Control COVID
13. Rain Finally Douses East Coast Wildfires (South Korea)
1. How to Prepare: North Korea Could Soon Test an ICBM or Nuclear Weapon
My original proposed title: North Korean Miscalculation and Calling Kim Jong-un’s Bluff :-)
How to Prepare: North Korea Could Soon Test an ICBM or Nuclear Weapon
On March 10, 2022, the U.S. released a South Korea and Japan coordinated assessment of the last two North Korean missiles launches in February and March revealing that these were tests of components of a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system, with some reporting suggesting a full ICBM test is in the works. This may be a major inflection point for security on the Korean peninsula as well as North Korea’s ability to potentially attack the U.S. homeland. Despite Putin’s War raging in Ukraine, the U.S. and the international community must be prepared for the likely eventuality of at least an ICBM test if not also a possible nuclear test. To prepare courses of action policymakers and strategists must recognize and understand Kim Jong-un’s strategy.
Kim is facing severe domestic difficulties due to COVID mitigation measures, natural disasters, a failed economy due to poor central decision making by Kim Jong-un, and international sanctions. When faced with similar difficulties in the past, the regime has lashed out to “externalize” the threat and show the Korean people they must sacrifice to defend the regime from the hostile policies of the U.S. and South Korea. This could be one reason for the nine missile launches so far in 2022.
These two lines of effort are not divergent. They are mutually supporting and reinforcing –meaning they work in concert with each other – and are ultimately focused on ensuring the survival of the regime through peninsula domination. This has been ongoing over the past three decades. However, this time may be different. Although there are concerns about policy failure, the current situation may provide an opportunity to interrupt the cycle of provocations depending on decisions made by Kim Jong-un and the ROK/U.S. alliance.
Kim’s current actions may be based on his assessment of his relationship with former President Trump. Specifically, Trump touted his Korea policy as a success because his relationship with Kim caused him to implement a self-imposed moratorium on ICBM and nuclear tests after 2017. Despite some sixty missile and rocket launches from the failed Hanoi summit in 2019 until now, since there was not an ICBM or nuclear test Trump’s policy supposedly worked.
Kim may have assessed the U.S. political situation and determined that President Biden cannot afford a foreign policy challenge on the Korean peninsula. If he exerts enough pressure on the U.S. and the ROK he likely believes that at this point the ROK and U.S. will acquiesce and provide some form of sanctions relief in the hope that Kim Jong-un will allow negotiations to restart and not conduct any ICBM or nuclear tests.
It is possible that he has seriously miscalculated. The Biden administration policy not only relies on principled and practical diplomacy, strong alliances, and stern deterrence, but also the full implementation of all UN Security Council Resolutions. This last point should be interpreted to mean the Biden administration has no intention of providing sanctions relief until there is substantive and verifiable progress toward denuclearization. Despite the recommendations of pundits, there is no indication that the administration will provide any form of sanctions relief, and certainly not under duress.
Image of Hwasong-12 IRBM. Image Credit: KCNA.
If Kim does not achieve his objectives, he may consider that he must test an ICBM or a nuclear weapon. He may believe he has no other choice because he has set the conditions to do so and to not do so would be a sign of weakness. His failure to achieve sanctions relief since 2017 has put him under intense internal pressure from the elite and the military. Continued failure could lead to catastrophic consequences from internal threats.
However, if he does test, he must understand that he will suffer severe external consequences in the form of what might be called a strategic strangulation campaign. Although there continue to be sanctions designations by the U.S. such as the ones announced on March 11, 2022, there has been insufficient enforcement and international support for sanctions (namely China and Russia) and the regime has become very adept at sanctions evasions activities. It has also used its extensive global illicit activities to offset losses from sanctions. There needs to be aggressive implementation and enforcement of all sanctions and a trilateral campaign to finally cut off the regime from outside support which allows the regime to survive.
Pundits also argue that such a campaign will harm the Korean people living in the north. They are already suffering in the most horrible conditions due to Kim’s deliberate policy decisions to prioritize nuclear weapons, missiles, advanced military capabilities, and supporting the elite over the welfare of the Korean people. While the ROK and U.S. are very much concerned for the people, policy makers should also realize the people’s tremendous resilience and how through use of foreign currency, smuggling, and market activity they have adapted in the face of a brutal government to survive.
Pundits may argue that it would be better to provide sanctions relief now to prevent an ICBM or nuclear test in the near term, illustrating an inability to understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. Any form of appeasing the regime – and that is what sanctions relief must be called – will lead Kim to assess his political warfare strategy and blackmail diplomacy a success. Even though he might allow negotiations to take place he will double down on his strategy. The ROK/U.S. alliance, the region, and the international community will still be faced with a dangerous threat from Kim Jong-un who will continue to make demands.
What the U.S., the ROK, and Japan must do is inform Kim that any test of an ICBM or nuclear weapon will result in the execution of a comprehensive strategic strangulation campaign that will cause Kim Jong-un to personally suffer on a scale he has never experienced. This will include not only the necessary sanctions enforcement – full and aggressive enforcement to include secondary sanctions on China and Russia for their complicity in supporting the regime. There will be a trilateral information and influence activities effort that will penetrate the regime’s information defenses and spread the truth throughout the population, and this will support a human rights upfront approach. The U.S. will lead an international effort to reinvigorate the Proliferation Security Initiative to shut down the regime’s illicit arms sales in conflict regions around the world. A cyber campaign must be focused on cyber defense and offense to take down the regime’s cyber organizations operating globally. Finally, the ROK/U.S. alliance and the Japan/U.S. alliance will undertake a wide-ranging effort to improve military capabilities, demonstrating to the regime that despite it having the fourth largest army in the world it will be rapidly destroyed in any scenario the north attempts to initiate. This is not an exhaustive list of the actions that should be considered. These actions should be publicly presented so that Kim Jong-un, the elite, the military, and the Korean people understand the consequences.
North Korean Hwasong-16 ICBM. Image Credit: KCNA/North Korean State Media.
There is an off-ramp for Kim. The Biden Administration is completely sincere in offering to negotiate anywhere, anytime, and without pre-conditions. Kim can accept this offer and if he chooses to act as a responsible member of the international community and negotiate in good faith there can be a road ahead.
While ICBM and nuclear tests are serious actions the ROK/U.S. alliance cannot be intimidated by Kim’s threats. There is only one response to threats and that is by demonstrating strategic reassurance to allies and strategic resolve to defend national interests. There is only danger if the U.S. and alliance partners show weakness by trying to appease the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime. We want peace but as President Raegan said we can only have peace through strength.
David Maxwell, a 1945 Contributing Editor, is a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 20 years in Asia and specializes in North Korea and East Asia Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is the editor of Small Wars Journal and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
2. Understanding the incoming Yoon administration’s North Korea policy
I am not sure the Daily NK is the best venue for understanding President-elect Yoon's foreign policy.
Therefore, below this article is an unofficial translation of his foreign policy that I received from a Korean friend. Title: Yoon Suk Yeol's Foreign and Security Policy:
Confident Diplomacy and Strong National Security
That is going to be the talking point/bumper sticker: "Confident Diplomacy and Strong National Security"
There is a lot of detail in the draft outline below the article.
Understanding the incoming Yoon administration’s North Korea policy
South Korean President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol (Yonhap)
People Power Party candidate Yoon Suk-yeol has been elected as the 20th president of South Korea, defeating Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung by just 0.73% of the vote. Because Yoon has consistently pushed a hard-line policy against North Korea, inter-Korean tensions are likely to continue. However, some observers are looking forward to the new administration taking “principled and consistent” measures for denuclearization.
In summary, Yoon’s denuclearization policy is:
- Complete and verifiable North Korean denuclearization
- Putting forth a predictable roadmap for denuclearization
- Principled corresponding measures for substantive North Korean moves toward denuclearization
- Establishment of a tripartite liaison office between the two Koreas and the US
“Prior denuclearization”: Doomed to fail from the start?
Some observers criticize that a North Korea policy that prioritizes “prior denuclearization” — that is to say, demanding North Korea denuclearize before corresponding measures are taken — will not only escalate inter-Korean tensions, but also prevent the adoption of substantive measures. However, experts note that flexibly adopting corresponding measures regarding North Korea or offering inducements to North Korea prior to denuclearization does not necessarily bring North Korea to the negotiating table, either.
Oh Gyeong Seop, a researcher at South Korea’s Korea Institute for National Unification, told Daily NK in a telephone conversation that it was narrow minded to say insisting on denuclearization as a priority would prevent dialogue with North Korea. He said in the past, North Korea engaged in dialogue whenever it needed to, even when inter-Korean relations were tense.
In fact, even after the UN Security Council placed very tough sanctions on North Korea in 2017, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met with South Korean President Moon Jae-in in Panmunjom on Apr. 27 of the following year. Then he held his first summit meeting with US President Donald Trump on June 12.
With the second summit with Trump ending in failure in Hanoi in February 2019, Kim apparently lost face, but he still acceded to the US president’s proposal for a brief meeting in Panmunjom in July.
“We must view it as unavoidable if North Korea rejects dialogue, thus using dialogue itself as a tool to achieve its ends,” Oh said. He noted that a failure to make denuclearization a priority, or offering inducements beforehand, to bring North Korea to the negotiating table has the negative effect of losing a way to encourage North Korea to denuclearize.
The first step: North Korean denuclearization, not “Korean denuclearization”
Park Won Gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Seoul’s Ewha University, told Daily NK that for the US, North Korea must develop ICBMs or worse to cross a “red line,” but for South Korea, the red line has already been well and truly crossed. He said the Korean peace process cannot proceed without prioritizing denuclearization.
Park said policy makers must redefine “denuclearization” away from the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” as expressed in the joint statement following the first US-DPRK summit in Singapore. He said it is very important to clearly redefine the meaning and goals of denuclearization, even if this takes a long time.
North Korea claims “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” means not the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (DVID) of its nuclear program, but the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea and the removal of the US nuclear umbrella. Because of this, North Korea has openly pursued nuclear development employing this “double standard.”
Actively raising the long-ignored human rights issue
One of the hopes pinned on the incoming South Korean administration is that it will actively seek to improve North Korean human rights. Indeed, Yoon has pledged that South Korea will jointly sponsor UN resolutions criticizing North Korean human rights.
The Moon Jae In government, on the other hand, abstained from such resolutions.
To avoid provoking North Korea, the Moon government refused to participate in three consecutive joint statements by the international community condemning North Korean missile provocations. It also refused to sponsor UN resolutions condemning North Korean human rights for three straight years.
Oh said he expects the new South Korean administration will engage in principled, active responses to several matters regarding the North, including the nuclear issue, human rights, and humanitarian aid.
Strengthening US security cooperation, but choices remain
Meanwhile, President-elect Yoon has long said he will strengthen South Korean security based on the country’s alliance with the US in a time of renewed hegemonic competition with the Russian invasion of Ukraine and tensions between the US and China.
The South Korean government — which pursues security cooperation with the US and its allies while economically cooperating with China and Russia — now faces a choice between security and the economy.
Park said South Korea can no longer walk the tightrope of strategic ambiguity. He advised that Seoul make principled choices and pay the price of those choices, zero-sum game notwithstanding.
Some observers worry that if Seoul takes part in a US-centric security order, it could bring a “new Cold War” structure further into being by intensifying cooperation between anti-American nations such as North Korea, China, and Russia. However, experts say that North Korea, China and Russia face real difficulties in engaging in substantive military cooperation.
Oh said China and Russia could grow closer, but there are fundamental limits that prevent such cooperation from reaching the level of the US-ROK alliance. He said the bigger problem was potential economic retaliation, and that Seoul’s diplomatic task going forward is deciding how closely to cooperate with the US and Japan while defining its relationship with China.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Seulkee Jang is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about her articles to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
(Unofficial Draft Translation)
Yoon Suk Yeol's Foreign and Security Policy:
Confident Diplomacy and Strong National Security
NORMALIZATION OF INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS
1. Complete Denuclearization of North Korea
2. Normalize Inter-Korean Relations and Promote Coprosperity
3. Faithfully Implement a Unification Plan Based on a National Consensus
4. Establish the "North Korean Human Rights Foundation" at an Early Date
5. Completely Revamp the Settlement Support System for North Korean Defectors
DIPLOMACY FOR KOREA'S NATIONAL INTEREST
1. Rebuild the ROK-US Alliance and Strengthen the "Comprehensive Strategic Alliance"
2. Materialize "ROK-China Relations Based on Mutual Respect"
3. Usher in an ROK-Japan "Era of Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Joint Declaration 2.0"
4. Broaden Horizons for the Future of ROK-Russia Cooperation
5. Build a "Global Cooperation Network" Tailored to Each Region
6. Actively Conduct Diplomacy for Economic Security
7. Establish an Emerging Security Commission (ESC) Under the Prime Minister's Office and Strengthen the National Security System
8. Conduct Global Contribution Diplomacy Befitting National Dignity
9. Create an "Overseas Koreans Agency" (tentative)
10. Improve the Ability to Respond to Cybersecurity Threats
STRONG NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE
1. Build a Powerful Military Armed with Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Science and Technology
2. Bolster the ROK-US Alliance and Respond Firmly to North Korean Nuclear and Missile Threats
3. Fashion a Life in the Barracks Fit for Future Generations
4. Build Military Towns
5. A Country Where Soldiers Who Sacrificed for the Nation Are Respected
NORMALIZATION OF INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS
1. Complete Denuclearization of North Korea
A. Conclude a peace agreement among relevant parties and achieve sustainable peace and security when North Korea's complete and verifiable denuclearization has been attained.
B. Engage in principled and consistent denuclearization negotiations with North Korea.
1) Present a predictable roadmap for denuclearization and negotiate based on the principle of reciprocity.
2) Maintain international sanctions on North Korea until its complete denuclearization.
3) Economic assistance to North Korea is possible (e.g., by obtaining UN sanctions exemptions) even before North Korea's complete denuclearization if the North takes substantial steps toward denuclearization.
C. Play a central role in international cooperation on and bilateral and multilateral negotiations for the denuclearization of North Korea.
1) Make efforts to resume denuclearization negotiations within the framework of ROK-US cooperation (ROK: Republic of Korea).
2) Lead international cooperation for the implementation of UN Security Council sanctions resolutions.
D. Establish ROK, North Korean, and US liaison offices in Panmunjom (or Washington) and operate a regular trilateral dialogue channel.
2. Normalize Inter-Korean Relations and Promote Coprosperity
A. Defuse tensions through dialogue and attain common interests through the principle of reciprocity and pragmatism.
B. Promote economic cooperation and initiate an "inter-Korean joint economic development plan" in line with progress in North Korea's denuclearization.
C. Normalize abnormal inter-Korean relations from a predictable and principled position.
D. Turn inter-Korean alienation and confrontation into mutual openness, communication, and exchange.
1) Promote exchanges in the media and publication sectors and opening of broadcast communications, and expand cultural communication and people-to-people exchanges, including youth and students, through cultural exchange.
2) Promote "green detente" between South and North Korea (e.g., joint response to fine dust, natural disasters, and climate change, and cooperation on forestry, agriculture, and water resources).
E. Provide humanitarian aid even before denuclearization in consideration of the North Korean domestic situation.
1) Examples include emergency disaster relief, nutrition support for infants and pregnant women, health care support.
F. Resolve humanitarian issues caused by division.
1) Resolve the issues of prisoners of war (POWs), abductees, and separated families; work toward the repatriation of detainees; and protect North Korean defectors and support their successful settlement.
G. Promote the improvement of human rights in North Korea.
1) Faithfully enforce the "North Korean Human Rights Act."
2) Carry out solidarity activities at home and abroad, for example by taking part in "UN resolutions on the human rights situation in North Korea" as a cosponsor.
3. Faithfully Implement a Unification Plan Based on a National Consensus
A. Lay a foundation for a liberal democratic unification and expand public participation.
1) Promote a unification policy that respects the spirit of the constitution.
2) Open channels to strengthen communication with people from all walks of life and actively engage in dialogue.
3) Expand young people's participation and promote education about a liberal democratic unification using the metaverse.
B. Inherit and develop the National Community Unification Plan.
1) First, establish peace and achieve a gradual cultural and economic unification; then work toward a political unification.
2) Expand mutual openness and communication between the two Koreas.
3) Build a greater and more prosperous unified Korea where individual freedom, human rights, and welfare are guaranteed.
4. Establish the "North Korean Human Rights Foundation" at an Early Date
A. Establish the North Korean Human Rights Foundation as soon as possible pursuant to the "North Korean Human Rights Act" passed in the National Assembly in 2016, and enable the Foundation to satisfactorily perform its functions as stipulated in the law.
1) Investigate and research the state of human rights in North Korea to promote North Korean human rights.
2) Develop policy alternatives for an inter-Korean human rights dialogue and make recommendations to the government.
3) Research and assess humanitarian aid needs in North Korea.
4) Provide support to relevant civil society groups.
B. Realize universal values of mankind by strengthening international cooperation to improve human rights in North Korea.
5. Completely Revamp the Settlement Support System for North Korean Defectors
A. Create a system for providing intensive support in the early stages of settlement.
1) Significantly expand the scope of support to defectors such as by helping them find employment and start a business, or by giving them more farming training opportunities.
B. Build an integrated management system for families in crisis.
1) Expand the social safety net by developing and reinforcing a support system for defector families in crisis.
C. Increase support for post-traumatic stress disorder treatment.
1) Mitigate difficulties from social and cultural differences in the process of settlement.
D. Legislate a legal protection and management system.
1) Enhance the effectiveness of legal counseling programs offered by ministries concerned, whose basis is grounded in the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act.
DIPLOMACY FOR KOREA'S NATIONAL INTEREST
1. Rebuild the ROK-US Alliance and Strengthen the "Comprehensive Strategic Alliance"
A. Rebuild the weakened combined defense posture and bolster ROK-US extended deterrence against North Korean nuclear weapons.
1) Build a strong deterrent against the North Korean nuclear threat and maximize the effect of extended deterrence by conducting joint exercises based on the needs and decisions of the alliance itself.
B. Strengthen the ROK-US "comprehensive strategic alliance."
1) Lay a foundation for broadening our national interests and global role by restoring trust between the two allies.
2) Jointly map out a vision for the future of the Asia-Pacific and global order based on liberal democratic values.
3) Expand and deepen collaboration across new frontier areas like emerging technologies, global supply chains, space, cybersecurity, and nuclear reactors.
C. Pursue open cooperation among countries concerned in the region.
1) Take a phased approach to the Quad (the quadrilateral consultative mechanism among the US, Japan, Australia, and India) of seeking formal membership in the future while in the meantime taking part in the Quad's vaccine, climate change, and emerging technology working groups and broadening our functional cooperation in these areas.
2. Materialize "ROK-China Relations Based on Mutual Respect"
A. Conduct diplomacy vis-à-vis China based on respect and cooperation.
1) Carry out exchange visits between the leaders of the ROK and China.
2) Expand and deepen ROK-China cooperation centered on the economy, public health, climate change, fine dust, and cultural exchange.
B. Effectively manage outstanding issues, including the North Korean nuclear conundrum, as well as potential causes of conflict by faithfully and substantially operating existing cooperative mechanisms between the ROK and China. These include:
1) A regular high-level strategic dialogue between the director of the ROK Office of National Security and the Chinese State Councilor for foreign affairs.
2) Annual exchange visits by the foreign ministers and a biannual strategic dialogue between the vice foreign ministers.
3) Faithful implementation of the 2+2 foreign and defense vice ministers' strategic dialogue.
C. Install an ROK-China high-level hotline to respond rapidly and effectively to emergencies.
3. Usher in an ROK-Japan "Era of Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Joint Declaration 2.0"
A. Build a future-oriented ROK-Japan cooperative relationship based on a correct understanding of history.
1) Constructively reengineer the innate spirit and objectives of the "Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Joint Declaration,"* a comprehensive blueprint for the future of ROK-Japan relations.
* The Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Joint Declaration: also known as the 1998 "ROK-Japan Joint Declaration: A New ROK-Japan Partnership Towards the 21st Century."
B. Work out sweeping solutions to all pending problems by restoring shuttle diplomacy between the ROK and Japanese leaders and operating high-level communication channels.
1) Present a blueprint for an "Era of Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Joint Declaration 2.0" as soon as conditions mature for future-oriented cooperation between the ROK and Japan.
C. Maintain a confident stance on issues pertaining to history and sovereignty.
D. Increase open exchanges between the people of the two countries with a focus on future generations.
4. Broaden Horizons for the Future of ROK-Russia Cooperation
A. Revitalize bilateral cooperation by breathing life back into and restoring momentum to ROK-Russia relations.
1) Improve prospects for future cooperation on the Korean Peninsula by starting with projects that are feasible for both countries.
2) Expand interchanges of youth and exchanges in culture and humanities.
B. Identify mutually beneficial projects for broadening investment and trade by operating a high-level consultative mechanism.
C. Grow and support new areas of cooperation such as medical care and tourism.
D. Restore and rejuvenate information and policy cooperation between the ROK and Russia on North Korean issues.
5. Build a "Global Cooperation Network" Tailored to Each Region
A. Promote an ROK-ASEAN "win-win solidarity initiative" and broaden diplomatic horizons to India and Oceania (ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations).
1) Promote an "ABCD" strategy* for ROK-ASEAN relations:
2) Build a pan-East Asian community by establishing an effective response system in the region against the spread of new infectious diseases and leading the expansion of digital infrastructure in line with advancements in information and communication technology (ICT).
* ABCD strategy:
a) Advance human capital
b) Build health security
c) Connect cultures
d) Digitize Asian infrastructure
B. Build a "values diplomacy partnership" with European nations to establish international norms and promote human rights.
1) Significantly expand cooperation in emerging industries, climate change response, and fields of advanced science and technology.
C. Promote bespoke cooperation programs for each region and country in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia.
1) Secure resource and energy supply chains, expand trade and consumption markets, and identify new areas for development.
6. Actively Conduct Diplomacy for Economic Security
A. Establish cooperative mechanisms with the US, Japan, and European nations, which have the leading edge in proprietary technology.
1) Use our core manufacturing technologies (e.g., semiconductors and batteries) as leverage for economic security diplomacy.
2) Pursue 2+2 economic and security meetings with the US and, on the premise that ROK-Japan relations improve, 2+2+2 ROK-US-Japan economic and security meetings (foreign and economic ministers).
B. Facilitate discussions on the supply and demand of strategic materials by utilizing the high-level strategic dialogue, foreign ministers' talks, and vice minister-level strategic dialogue with China.
C. Actively take part in the Quad's vaccine, climate change, and emerging technology working groups and use them as a stepping-stone for building an ROK-Quad network.
D. Support our companies so that they can have the leading edge in areas like global supply chains and digital trade through key regional trade pacts (e.g., the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework), the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and so forth.
E. Actively hold "economic strategic dialogues" between state leaders.
1) Promote trade, investment, and the expansion of infrastructure business and operate a high-level special envoy system with key economic partners.
7. Establish an Emerging Security Commission (ESC) Under the Prime Minister's Office and Strengthen the National Security System
A. Establish a mechanism for effectively responding to various emerging security challenges through integrative thinking.
B. Establish under the Prime Minister's Office an "Emerging Security Commission (ESC)," cochaired by the Minister of the Office for Government Policy Coordination and a private expert and consisting of emerging security experts. Authorize the ESC to coordinate responses to emerging security threats among the different ministries and provide them with support.
1) Bring to fruition a "small Blue House" and a "responsible prime minister system" by creating a bifurcated national security response system where the Office of National Security in the Blue House continues to take the lead in traditional security issues, such as North Korean nuclear and military threats, while the Prime Minister's Office takes charge of emerging security issues.
8. Conduct Global Contribution Diplomacy Befitting National Dignity
A. Take the lead in building an open and inclusive international order by expanding leadership in multilateral diplomacy.
1) Contribute to the peace and stability of the international community and materialize universal values such as liberal democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council from 2024 to 2025.
B. Reinforce global climate change diplomacy to attain the dual goal of preserving the global ecosystem and revitalizing the green economy.
1) Expand cooperation with the international community to attain the goal of reaching carbon neutrality by 2050.
C. Elevate national dignity and help meet the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by providing official development assistance (ODA) in advanced nations' style commensurate with our economic status.
D. Demonstrate leadership in promoting "human security," which places importance on people, in the areas of public health security, food security, terrorism, and UN peacekeeping operations.
9. Create an "Overseas Koreans Agency" (tentative)
A. Establish an "Overseas Koreans Agency" (tentative) and subsume the existing Overseas Koreas Foundation under it.
B. Join hands with the World Korean Business Convention, World Federation of Overseas Korean Traders Associations (World-OKTA) networks, and prominent overseas Koreans' businesses to support Korea's small- and medium-sized enterprises' and young people's advance into overseas markets.
C. Implement practical policies to enhance the rights and interests of Koreans abroad.
1) Formulate measures to increase participation in absentee voting by Koreans abroad.
2) Expand support for Korean language, history, and culture education for overseas Koreans and strengthen the Korean people's networks by region, field, and generation.
3) Assist overseas Koreans with employment or investment in Korean high-tech emerging industries and streamline relevant institutions to that end.
4) Strengthen overseas Korean adoptees' sense of connection to Korea.
10. Improve the Ability to Respond to Cybersecurity Threats
A. Build a unified national cyber response system.
1) Establish a national cybersecurity response system, strengthen the integrated private-public-military response system, and give shape to a basic cybersecurity plan and its modus operandi.
2) Enact a "Basic Cybersecurity Act" and revise the "Integrated Defense Act."
B. Train cybersecurity talents.
1) Train practical job-oriented talents who can actually defend against illegal cyberattacks.
2) Ensure that the government actively supports cyber training by increasing regular programs (universities and graduate schools) and special programs (colleges specializing in information protection and convergence security programs at graduate schools) by region across the country, and by establishing information protection training centers by region.
C. Build a cybersecurity ecosystem for advancing cybersecurity technology and supporting businesses.
D. Actively take part in global cyber cooperation networks.
1) Join the "Budapest Convention on Cybercrime" to minimize damage from cybercrime.
2) Actively take part in the US-led Counter Ransomware Initiative (CRI) to respond to the risk of ransomware.
3) Increase cybersecurity information-sharing with allies and friends and strengthen international cyber cooperation such as training and secondment programs and joint cyber training.
E. Promote the rapid deployment of weapons and support systems in the cyber field.
STRONG NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE
Bolster the ROK-US Alliance and Respond Firmly to North Korean Nuclear and Missile Threats
A. Strengthen the execution of ROK-US extended deterrence (nuclear umbrella).
1) Actually operate the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) attended by high-level foreign and defense officials (2+2) from the ROK and the US.
2) Deploy strategic assets (e.g., strategic bombers, aircraft carriers, and nuclear-powered submarines) and reinforce regular exercises.
B. Restore broken trust and rebuild the ROK-US combined defense posture.
1) Ensure that the ROK and the US normally conduct theater-level command post exercises (CPX) and field training exercises (FTX).
2) Normalize terminal high altitude area defense (THAAD) units by completing environmental impact assessments and making sure that mission performance conditions are met.
C. Bolster the ROK-US AI and Science and Technology Alliance
1) Strengthen cooperation on research and development and core technologies by establishing an ROK-US Military Science and Technology Center.
D. Restore the Korean three-axis system and dramatically strengthen the ability to respond to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.
1) Secure the ROK's right of self-defense through the Kill Chain system.
* Attain powerful preemptive strike capabilities such as high-powered, ultraprecise, and hypersonic strike capabilities.
2) Strengthen the Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD).
* Build a multilayered missile defense system by deploying additional THAAD units and fielding SM-3s at an early date.
* Develop new interception weapons such as lasers.
3) Reinforce Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) capabilities.
* Punish with a high-powered, ultraprecise strike system and ROK-US strategic assets.
* Deter North Korean provocations by building overwhelming punitive capabilities.
E. Early deployment of a Korea Iron Dome (move up from 2030 to 2026).
1) Deploy in the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area and densely populated areas in the shortest amount of time and build a dome-style defense network.
2) Integrate with the KAMD and reinforce the multilayered defense network.
F. Build our own intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
1) Operate military reconnaissance satellites at an early date and increase them, and obtain the ability to monitor key targets at all times.
2) Provide timely information support for response to North Korea's nuclear, missile, and long-range artillery threats.
3. South Korea sees imminent prospect of North ICBM test, newspaper reports
Perhaps they will not launch one just to say we got it wrong.
South Korea sees imminent prospect of North ICBM test, newspaper reports
SEOUL, March 14 (Reuters) - The South Korean government believes North Korea could test an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) as soon as this week, domestic media said, citing unidentified sources.
Tension on the Korean peninsula has been rising amid growing signs that Pyongyang could soon follow through on its threats to restart such tests, breaking a self-imposed 2017 moratorium. read more
The office of outgoing President Moon Jae-in has told president-elect Yoon Suk-yeol a test launch was imminent and that it would not be a surprise if it took place on Monday, the Chosun Ilbo newspaper said.
Yonhap news agency said separately that both South Korea and the United States had detected signs of an upcoming test.
The comment was made as Moon's national security adviser, Suh Hoon, briefed Yoon on Saturday about foreign policy and security issues, the report said, citing an unnamed official at the president-elect's office.
"It is so imminent that it would be no surprise if they fire it on Monday," it quoted Suh as saying. "We are taking the situation seriously."
A spokesperson for Moon's office said Suh had briefed Yoon on North Korea's recent movements, including recent missile launches, and the Ukraine crisis, among other issues, but declined to comment on the Chosun Ilbo report.
Yoon spokesperson Kim Eun-hye told reporters that there could be additional briefings for the president-elect but did not confirm details of security issues.
At a meeting with senior aides, Moon called for Pyongyang to stop escalating tensions and seek diplomacy, and vowed to keep up a solid security posture.
Seoul's Unification Ministry handling inter-Korean affairs also urged the North to immediately halt actions that "run counter to peace and stability" on the peninsula.
On Friday, the United States and South Korea said in a rare joint announcement that the North had used its largest-ever ICBM in two recent launches, in the guise of satellite launch preparations. read more
The missile system, the Hwasong-17, was unveiled at a military parade in Pyongyang in 2020 and reappeared at a defence exhibition in October 2021. read more
The Dong-A Ilbo newspaper also reported on Monday, citing unnamed government sources, that a transporter-erector-launcher used to fire road-mobile missiles such as the Hwasong-17 had been spotted around the Pyongyang airport, where the two recent tests were held.
Yoon, who was elected president last week, had signalled a tougher line against Pyongyang.
While staying open to restarting stalled denuclearisation talks, he has said pre-emptive strikes might be needed to counter an imminent North Korean missile attack, and vowed to buy additional U.S. THAAD missile interceptors. read more
Before the election, Yoon also warned of "even stronger pressure from the international community if North Korea fires an ICBM under colour of a satellite launch".
He declined to make additional comment on Sunday.
Reporting by Hyonhee Shin; Editing by Gerry Doyle and Clarence Fernandez
4. Gravitas: North Korea is upset with Pakistan: Here's Why
I have seen no other reporting on this. What is anyone doing with liquor in Pakistan anyway? Doesn't that break some religious law? :-) But this is just one more indication of the regime's global illicit activities.
You would think Pakistan would turn a blind on eye on this given all the cooperation on missile technology and nuclear planning (AQ Kahn network). I wonder how this will affect future business dealings.
4 minute video in English is at the link below.
Gravitas: North Korea is upset with Pakistan: Here's Why
North Korea is upset with Pakistan. On March 7, the Pakistani police raided the North Korean Embassy. It was looking for a huge stash of illegal liquor but did not find any. Pyongyang now wants Pak to punish the cops. Palki Sharma gets you a report.
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5. No new notification from N. Korea on Mt. Kumgang facilities: S. Korea
No surprise.
No new notification from N. Korea on Mt. Kumgang facilities: S. Korea | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, March 14 (Yonhap) -- South Korea said Monday it has not received any additional notification from North Korea on the fate of South Korean-built facilities at its Mount Kumgang resort despite reports of indications that Pyongyang has started work to remove them.
Signs of the North dismantling some of the resort's facilities along the North's east coast have been spotted amid intensifying tensions on the peninsula attributable to the secretive regime's saber-rattling, according to an informed source.
In October 2019, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un ordered authorities to remove them. Months later, Pyongyang informed Seoul of its decision to postpone the removal work apparently as part of efforts to prevent the spread of COVID-19.
Lee Jong-joo, spokesperson for the South's Ministry of Unification, told a press briefing that the government has not been given any additional notification by the North regarding the issue.
"There shouldn't be unilateral measures by the North that infringe upon our companies' property rights and all (relevant) issues should be resolved through consultations between the South and the North," she said.
Launched in 1998, the Mount Kumgang tour project was once regarded as a key symbol of inter-Korean reconciliation and economic cooperation. It was suspended in 2008 after a South Korean tourist had been shot dead by a North Korean guard near the resort for allegedly intruding into an off-limits area.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
6. U.S. envoy calls on China to condemn N. Korea's missile tests
Perhaps China has its hands full with Russia and Ukraine.
U.S. envoy calls on China to condemn N. Korea's missile tests | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, March 13 (Yonhap) -- U.S. special envoy for North Korea Sung Kim has called on China to condemn North Korea's continued missile launches, the state department said Sunday.
Kim also called on China to help bring North Korea back to dialogue in a phone conversation with his Chinese counterpart, Liu Xiaoming, according to department spokesperson Ned Price.
The call was made Thursday, the same day the United States made a rare revelation of its intelligence that North Korea's recent missile tests on Feb. 27 and March 5 (Seoul time) had involved a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system.
"Special Representative Kim strongly condemned the launches, which violated multiple UN Security Council resolutions and present a serious threat to international peace and security," Price said of the call in a press release.
"He expressed concern that these launches demonstrate the DPRK's determination to advance its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs and continue an increasingly escalatory path," he added.
The U.S. says the North's latest missile tests involving a new ICBM system did not demonstrate the range or capability of an ICBM but that the North may soon conduct an ICBM test "at full range," lifting its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile testing, which has been in place since late 2017.
Earlier reports have also said the North appears to be repairing its Punggye-ri nuclear test site, which it purportedly demolished in 2018.
Kim emphasized both the U.S. and China shared an interest in ensuring regional stability, calling on Beijing to join Washington in "publicly condemning the DPRK's missile launches," Price said.
The U.S. has at least thrice failed to impose additional U.N. Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on North Korea for its provocative missile tests, each time partly because of objections from China, North Korea's closest ally and a veto-power wielding permanent member of the UNSC.
North Korea has staged nine rounds of missile launches since the start of the year, including seven in January, which marked the largest number of missile tests it conducted in a month.
"Special Representative Kim also encouraged the PRC to urge the DPRK to cease its destabilizing activity and return to dialogue," the department spokesperson said of the Kim-Liu call.
"Special Representative Kim reiterated that the United States remains open to diplomacy with the DPRK to make progress toward our shared goal of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
7. Yoon should prepare foreign policy change
Excerpt:
Yoon will take over the responsibilities as president during hard times. Strategic competition between the U.S. and China mounts while Russia triggers a war, creating severance and division. South Korea’s geopolitical position, with nuclear-armed North Korea next to its borders, is more challenging than ever. We need to come up with a strong foreign policy that serves our national interests during these hard times. Such efforts should start with finding and deploying a competent foreign policy advisor that knows how to tone down and refine Yoon’s political rhetoric during the presidential campaign and effectively communicating his messages.
Yoon should prepare foreign policy change
Posted March. 14, 2022 07:49,
Updated March. 14, 2022 07:49
Yoon should prepare foreign policy change. March. 14, 2022 07:49. .
President-elect Yoon Seok-youl was briefed by Seo Hoon, head of National Security at Cheong Wa Dae, on recent trends of North Korea and major foreign affairs events including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The briefing also includes up-to-date reports on North Korea’s preparations to fire ICBM, resume nuclear facilities operations and removing South Korean facilities installed at Mount Kumgang. “We are unable to issue a definite position at this point,” said Kim Eun-hye, the spokesperson for Yoon. “We hope that North Korea will come forth to the negotiation table to achieve full denuclearization.”
Yoon’s cautious approach in dealing with foreign affairs and national security issues is noticeable. He had heavily criticized the incumbent government’s foreign policies during his presidential campaign and promised to bring major changes. His prudent behavior reflects his determination to understand current security challenges and refine foreign policy approach. It would not serve national interests to expose discord in policy before Yoon officially takes office.
Yoon’s foreign policy would be significantly different from the Moon Jae-in administration’s. First, there will be inevitable changes to the current foreign policy of prioritizing dialogue in dealing with North Korea as Yoon has advocated for the principle of reciprocity in North Korea policy. As it has always done in the past during government change, the North is coming up with provocations to take a strong approach. Yoon’s new foreign policy is expected to shift to include adjacent four major countries (the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia) to pressure North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons.
Yoon had repeatedly said that President’s Moon’s foreign policy of weighing in on foreign ties with China and North Korea has undermined South Korea-U.S. alliance. Thus, foreign policy priorities will also shift to strengthen U.S. alliance and cooperation with the U.S. and Japan. Such change, however, may lead to friction with China. Moreover, Yoon’s promise to additionally assign THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) is likely to be highly debated. Against this backdrop, Yoon’s foreign policy requires refined tuning to position South Korea to promote good relationship with China while reinforcing ties with the U.S. and Japan.
Yoon will take over the responsibilities as president during hard times. Strategic competition between the U.S. and China mounts while Russia triggers a war, creating severance and division. South Korea’s geopolitical position, with nuclear-armed North Korea next to its borders, is more challenging than ever. We need to come up with a strong foreign policy that serves our national interests during these hard times. Such efforts should start with finding and deploying a competent foreign policy advisor that knows how to tone down and refine Yoon’s political rhetoric during the presidential campaign and effectively communicating his messages.
8. Yoon reaches across the aisle in appointments
Can he achieve some semblance of political unity or realistically cooperation?
Monday
March 14, 2022
Yoon reaches across the aisle in appointments
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol, right, holds his first teatime meeting with his presidential transition committee leaders including chairman Ahn Cheol-soo, left, at his office in Tongui-dong in Jongno District, central Seoul, Monday morning. [NEWS1]
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol's transition committee is including veteran politicians with liberal roots.
On Monday, Yoon named Kim Han-gil, former head of the liberal Democratic Party (DP), to lead the presidential transition team's committee on national unity, and Kim Byong-joon, a senior policy secretary and deputy prime minister for education in the Roh Moo-hyun administration, to lead a special committee on balanced regional development.
"Kim Han-gil is a person who can achieve national unity, bringing together generations and social classes," Yoon said.
Kim Byong-joon, he added, "is expected to draw the big picture for balanced regional growth based on his long experience and expertise in decentralization."
Kim Byong-joon was the first chairman of Yoon's presidential campaign committee, while Kim Han-gil briefly headed the campaign's New Era Preparation Committee. They were both sidelined after an overhaul of Yoon's campaign in early February but maintained close relations with Yoon and reportedly offered advice at major turning points.
Both politicians served under liberal administrations previously, although Kim Byong-joon, a professor emeritus of Kookmin University, was also a former interim head of the Liberty Korea Party, a predecessor of the conservative People Power Party (PPP). Kim Han-gil served as culture minister in the Kim Dae-jung administration.
Yoon said on regional development, "It is necessary to ensure that people do not suffer fewer opportunities because of where they live."
On Sunday, Yoon appointed Ahn Cheol-soo, head of the People's Party, chairman of his transition committee; PPP Rep. Kwon Young-se, his election campaign chief, as vice chairman; and former Jeju Gov. Won Hee-ryong, a PPP campaign policy chief, as its planning chair.
Ahn, a medical doctor and entrepreneur-turned-politician, doubles as head of the transition's special committee on Covid-19 pandemic response. He formed an electoral alliance with Yoon six days ahead of the March 9 election, supporting the PPP candidate in exchange for a role in the new government.
The transition committee has seven subcommittees on planning and adjustment; foreign policy and national security; legal, political and administrative affairs; the economy; science, technology and education; and culture, society and welfare.
Yoon expects to appoint 24 committee members within the week and the transition team is expected not exceed a total of 200 people. The team will help him transition into his new office on May 10.
Yoon went to work for the first time at his transition office in Tongui-dong in Jongno District, central Seoul, Monday morning.
He held a teatime meeting with the three new transitions committee leaders and said, "State affairs are ultimately for the unity of the people."
Yoon said in the meeting he will abolish the position of presidential senior secretary for civil affairs in keeping with a campaign pledge, describing that Blue House office as one that has often been used to conduct secret probes into political opponents and ordinary people.
According to the president-elect's spokesperson Kim Eun-hye, Yoon said, "In the past, it was not uncommon for the office of the senior secretary for civil affairs to control political opponents under the guise of lawfulness."
Yoon vowed to eradicate the post which has "conducted secretive investigations on ordinary people, robbing them of their right to privacy in the guise of verifying public opinion."
Former Justice Minister Cho Kuk served as the first senior presidential secretary for civil affairs in the Moon Jae-in administration. As Moon's prosecutor general, Yoon initiated a probe into allegations that Cho and his wife fabricated academic credentials for their daughter to successfully apply to university and medical school.
Yoon plans to bring back a special inspector position tasked with preventing corruption involving top officials and presidential relatives that has been left vacant by the current administration. The special inspector post was introduced in 2014 under the Park Geun-hye administration.
"It is the president-elect's consistent belief that laws and principles must be applied to everyone without exception," said Kim.
She added that Yoon's vows reflect his view that "the president, who has been delegated power by the people, should focus solely on national security and people's livelihood in accordance with the powers stipulated by the Constitution and the law."
After his meeting with Yoon, Ahn in his first press conference as chairman of the presidential transition committee Monday afternoon at the National Assembly revealed major tasks that will serve as the blueprint for the president-elect's policies.
He said the five tasks are a restoration of justice, rule of law and democracy; creating a foundation for future livelihoods and jobs; balanced regional development; Korea's sustainability; and national unity.
"Above all, we will seriously recognize the needs of the times and the will of the people in accordance to global trends and will discover and create essential government tasks," said Ahn.
He stressed the transition committee will uphold the principles of humility, communication and responsibility.
Ahn later named PPP Rep. Choo Kyung-ho, People’s Party Rep. Lee Tae-kyu and Choi Jong-hag, a professor at Seoul National University, as members of the subcommittee for planning and coordination.
On Monday afternoon, Yoon also visited a traditional market in central Seoul to meet small merchants struggling because of the Covid-19 pandemic. It was his first public outreach since last week's election.
Speaking to merchants at Namdaemun Market, Yoon said he will keep his campaign pledges on pandemic recovery relief and sought feedback on the difficulties faced by small businesses.
"This is a place that is the basis of people's livelihood and the economy, and if you have difficulties, the whole country will suffer," he said. "The middle class is the foothold for a stable national economy and society and a country without worries."
In a visit to the market in November, Yoon pledged a 100 trillion-won ($80.7 billion) Covid-19 relief plan.
President Moon in a meeting with senior aides said Monday, following the March 9 election, "Above all, now is the time for unity. The most urgent task is to deal with, heal and unify the divided public sentiment clearly evident through the election process and results."
He stressed his administration will cooperate with Yoon to help the next government get started.
BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]
9. [Editorial] Sign of change: Yoon to relocate from Cheong Wa Dae, symbol of outsized power, to Seoul Govt. Complex
I think Yoon has to make this happen.
[Editorial] Sign of change
Yoon to relocate from Cheong Wa Dae, symbol of outsized power, to Seoul Govt. Complex
Published : Mar 14, 2022 - 05:30 Updated : Mar 14, 2022 - 05:30
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol is expected to push for the relocation of the presidential office from Cheong Wa Dae to the Seoul Government Complex in Gwanghwamun Square.
Yoon plans to use the current prime minister’s office at the complex as his main working space and set aside four to five floors for his secretariats, security and other presidential officials.
Yoon is also expected to move the presidential residence outside of Cheong Wa Dae to a nearby venue so that the current facilities can be open to citizens. A special committee is to be set up so that it can implement Yoon’s election pledge as his first high-profile project as president.
The relocation of the all-powerful presidential office is part of Yoon’s government reforms, which includes a smaller office, an overhaul of presidential committees and introduction of a new system in which government officials and global talents can work together.
It is not the first time that Cheong Wa Dae was targeted as a venue to be reformed. In past presidential elections, similar proposals were made but not implemented. Outgoing President Moon Jae-in also pledged to relocate the presidential office to the government complex in Gwanghwamun in April 2017, slamming former President Park Geun-hye’s lack of communication. But in January 2019, Moon broke his own promise to become a “Gwanghwamun president” by scrapping the relocation plan.
As for the sudden change, the Moon administration cited the difficulty in securing a new working space that is big enough to accommodate all the presidential staff as well as potential problems with security. But the relocation itself comes down to the president’s will. Moon’s failure to push for a relocation reflects that after spending two years at Cheong Wa Dae, he simply found it too convenient and cozy to move out.
Why is it so hard for Korean presidents to give up on the current Cheong Wa Dae location?
Cheong Wa Dae is located right behind Gyeongbokgung, the main royal palace of the Joseon era in central Seoul. It is within viewing distance of the Seoul Government Complex, but the psychological distance has long been far and wide.
Cheong Wa Dae, otherwise known as the Blue House, is a deeply secluded complex of multiple buildings used as the president’s executive office, official residence and secretariat’s office.
For all its grandeur, Cheong Wa Dae is fraught with inefficiency, secrecy and structural issues. At the heart of the problem is that the presidential executive office is about 500 meters away from the secretariat office. Due to the distance, presidential aides were required to walk for about 10 minutes to brief the president on state affairs. As a result, aides often had to make phone calls or write up reports to communicate with the president.
As for urgent issues, aides were said to use a bicycle or car within the compound to deliver messages to the president without delay.
For a president, the main structure of Cheong Wa Dae occupies 8,476 square meters in a traditional Korean architectural style that is widely viewed as grandiose and authoritative. The distance between the president’s desk and the door is so wide -- about 15 meters -- that a minister, after finishing his briefing, once slipped and fell while stepping back toward the door.
Yoon criticized Cheong Wa Dae as a symbol of “imperial” presidential power and a blockade to political reforms. It is hoped that Yoon will start his five-year term at the government complex. It will finally send Cheong Wa Dae down in history as a symbol of emperor-like presidency, one which lasted for about 60 years and was riddled with broken promises.
10. Opinion | Why It’s Never a Good Idea to Forget North Korea
From Jean Lee who has probably spent more time in Pyongyang than any American.
Key points: Kim wants to be paid to not test his weapons. Must address Kim's cyber threat. The regime wants to divide and conquer. Do not neglect Kim (he does not like to be neglected!) But do not panic at every provocation.
Excerpts:
It may seem as if Mr. Kim doesn’t want to talk. But my experience tells me otherwise: The tests are intended to compel the United States to engage and ultimately to pay to keep him from using those weapons.
He’s just not in any hurry. Since he’s playing the long game, the United States must do the same if it wants to successfully confront Mr. Kim’s nuclear ambitions. That includes maintaining consistent, measured messaging — acknowledging the urgency around North Korea’s nuclear ambitions without handing Pyongyang ammunition by panicking at every provocation. Since North Korea likes to divide and conquer, Washington must find common ground with all of its neighbors — including China — to establish a united front around the shared concern over nuclear proliferation.
And Washington must work harder to address the expanding cyberthreat as part of its strategy to stop money from flowing into Pyongyang’s nuclear program. Seoul and Washington took a promising step at a summit last year where they pledged to collaborate on cyber issues.
We may have overlooked North Korea while Mr. Kim was quiet. The latest spate of tests should serve as an alert: It never pays to forget about North Korea.
Opinion | Why It’s Never a Good Idea to Forget North Korea
Guest Essay
Why It’s Never a Good Idea to Forget North Korea
March 14, 2022, 1:00 a.m. ET
Credit...Illustration by The New York Times; Photographs by BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI and JUNG YEON-JE via Getty
By
Ms. Lee made dozens of reporting trips to North Korea from 2008 to 2017. She is a co-host of the “Lazarus Heist” podcast from the BBC World Service and a senior fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington.
You could be forgiven for forgetting about North Korea, which went quiet for a stretch, locked in self-imposed isolation for two years during the pandemic while U.S. attention diverted to other crises (like the perilous fate of Ukraine).
If it seems as if North Korea wants us to sit up and pay attention — Don’t forget, we’re still building missiles and nuclear weapons! — that’s certainly one of its objectives.
But these tests are about a lot more. This is a big year for North Korea. Mr. Kim is marking his 10th year in power. It’s also the 80th anniversary of his father’s birth and, on April 15, the 110th anniversary of his grandfather’s. The tests are to ensure that Kim Jong-un has fancy new hardware to show off to his people in a landmark year and, in the longer term, to gain more leverage in future nuclear negotiations.
Celebrations around this trifecta of milestones are all about glorifying the Kim family’s rule and legitimizing the reign of the young man who inherited power over this anachronistic, impoverished nation a decade ago. Weapons are central to that — and to Mr. Kim’s foreign-policy strategy.
When I landed in Pyongyang in January 2012, Kim Jong-il had just died, catapulting his youngest son, then in his 20s, to power. Snow blanketed the capital and icicles tinged the funeral wreaths lined up beneath the portrait of Kim Jong-il at the city’s main square. I was one of the first foreigners welcomed into Kim Jong-un’s North Korea, there to open the first full U.S. news bureau in Pyongyang (for The Associated Press). None of us, not even the North Koreans, had any idea what kind of leader he would be.
It was a strange, hastened mourning period. Behind their solemn masks, the North Koreans were antsy for change after 17 years of stifling military rule under his father. Their hopes for a different life under Mr. Kim — trumpeted as modern and technologically savvy — were palpable in those early months. I picked up on it in conversations with North Koreans behind closed doors.
The rest of the world, however, saw only a comic figure in Mr. Kim — a boy king with a goofy haircut. (Cue the movie “The Interview.”)
There’s nothing funny about him now. In his first 10 years, this 30-something millennial has tested four nuclear devices and more than 130 missiles — including an intercontinental ballistic missile that might be capable of reaching the White House. (His father tested 16 missiles during his 17 years in power.)
And he’s just getting started. If all goes well, Mr. Kim will rule for decades to come. We should brace ourselves.
An image of a North Korean missile launch in January was shown on TV at a railway station in South Korea.Credit...Ahn Young-joon/Associated Press
Weapons and warfare have always been part of the Kim family formula. But Kim Jong-un has bigger sights than those of his father and grandfather. He calls North Korea’s nuclear capability a “treasured sword” — key to protecting his family’s rule and ensuring his country’s very existence.
For years, I had a front-row seat to the cult of personality created around him. I watched as North Koreans attended study sessions introducing him as a modern incarnation of his illustrious grandfather, the heir who would bring the economy into the 21st century.
Today Mr. Kim is using technology not only to modernize his analog nation but also to win the loyalty of millennials, his future power base, by enticing them with smartphones and tablets. He’s weaponizing the cybersphere to help build the weapons essential to his strategy of dazzling his people — who continue to go without food, medicine and heat as the leadership funnels the country’s limited resources into nuclear weapons — while terrorizing his foes.
The United Nations has tried for decades to use sanctions to stop the flow of money into North Korea’s weapons program. To get around them and spirit hard currency back to the country, the Kims have long relied on illicit moneymaking schemes.
Tests for that very nuclear program are what got President Donald Trump’s attention in 2017, setting off a volley of threats between the two men. Mr. Kim carried on testing — firing three intercontinental ballistic missiles and claiming to detonate a thermonuclear bomb — before turning to diplomacy in 2018 to negotiate a payoff in exchange for the promise of a nuclear accord.
Mr. Trump took the bait, seeing it as an opportunity for a foreign-policy victory. Historic summits and an unlikely bromance followed — but not a nuclear deal. So after Mr. Trump lost re-election in 2020, Mr. Kim retreated to focus on repairing his standing at home and to reassess his nuclear strategy.
That’s why he’s now returning to the family playbook of poking the bear to give himself a pretext to perfect his weapons.
Here’s how it works: North Korea tests ballistic missiles. The United States pushes the U.N. Security Council to condemn or impose sanctions on Pyongyang for carrying out banned activity. North Korea accuses Washington of hostility and claims it needs weapons for self-defense. Then North Korea carries out more tests, which help its scientists refine their ballistic missile technology.
Yet we’re not seeing the “fire and fury” from Washington that we saw under Mr. Trump. Part of that is a matter of priorities: The Biden administration is focused on Russia and Ukraine, as well as on China’s global ambitions.
But it’s also a show of restraint. Washington is refusing to take the bait from Pyongyang and be drawn into tensions that could raise the specter of war on the Korean Peninsula. Instead, the Biden administration continues to stress that it’s open to talks “with no preconditions.”
Mr. Kim has so far rebuffed the administration’s overtures. That should worry us, since his arsenal is growing.
Already, some in South Korea — which just elected a conservative who is hawkish on North Korea as its new president — are clamoring for their country’s own nuclear weapons, raising the prospect of a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia. In Japan, the testing has spurred calls to bolster defense and consider stronger strike capability.
It may seem as if Mr. Kim doesn’t want to talk. But my experience tells me otherwise: The tests are intended to compel the United States to engage and ultimately to pay to keep him from using those weapons.
He’s just not in any hurry. Since he’s playing the long game, the United States must do the same if it wants to successfully confront Mr. Kim’s nuclear ambitions. That includes maintaining consistent, measured messaging — acknowledging the urgency around North Korea’s nuclear ambitions without handing Pyongyang ammunition by panicking at every provocation. Since North Korea likes to divide and conquer, Washington must find common ground with all of its neighbors — including China — to establish a united front around the shared concern over nuclear proliferation.
And Washington must work harder to address the expanding cyberthreat as part of its strategy to stop money from flowing into Pyongyang’s nuclear program. Seoul and Washington took a promising step at a summit last year where they pledged to collaborate on cyber issues.
We may have overlooked North Korea while Mr. Kim was quiet. The latest spate of tests should serve as an alert: It never pays to forget about North Korea.
Jean H. Lee (@newsjean) opened The Associated Press’s Pyongyang bureau in 2012 and made dozens of reporting trips to North Korea from 2008 to 2017. She is a co-host of the “Lazarus Heist” podcast from the BBC World Service and a senior fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington.
11. A Lame-Duck Moon Can Fix South Korea’s Refugee Failings
The issue of Chinese Chritians in South Korea goes largely unnoticed.
Excerpt:
The incoming government of Yoon Suk-yeol should intervene, or else Moon should handle the issue before leaving office. South Korea’s asylum process is notoriously tough. However, the Chinese government’s rising onslaught against religious freedom leaves no doubt that the Mayflower’s members will suffer greatly if forced back to China. Moon has been thwarted in his desire to achieve peace with North Korea before leaving office. Taking a stand for human rights and against China would be a worthy substitute legacy as his term ends.
A Lame-Duck Moon Can Fix South Korea’s Refugee Failings
An expert's point of view on a current event.
Persecuted Chinese Christians deserve asylum from Seoul.
A pastor speaks during a online Christmas service from the Yoido Full Gospel Church on December 25, 2020 in Seoul, South Korea. Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images
South Korea has chosen a new president after a narrow and highly contentious election. The ideological and generational divide in the country may be even greater than in the United States. Yet one of the most striking features of Korean politics is a hostility to refugees—even on the left.
Seoul has been denying asylum to Chinese Christians, who face certain persecution if forced to return to China. It was a particularly bizarre stance for outgoing President Moon Jae-in’s government to take, given the significant number of Christians in South Korea. Indeed, Christian churches and organizations have actively aided North Korean refugees escaping through China.
A decade ago, religious persecution was easing in China, which had dropped down the World Watch List, an annual ranking of the 50 countries where Christians face the most persecution. However, China began a rapid rise in 2019 and now ranks at 17, up from 43 just four years ago. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has greatly intensified persecution against all faiths, including Buddhism and Daoism. The existing religious institutions have been brought under the aegis of the United Front, the arm of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) charged with maintaining control over religious society. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, in its report on conditions in China in 2020, cited the “unprecedented use of advanced surveillance technologies to monitor and track religious minorities.”
South Korea has chosen a new president after a narrow and highly contentious election. The ideological and generational divide in the country may be even greater than in the United States. Yet one of the most striking features of Korean politics is a hostility to refugees—even on the left.
Seoul has been denying asylum to Chinese Christians, who face certain persecution if forced to return to China. It was a particularly bizarre stance for outgoing President Moon Jae-in’s government to take, given the significant number of Christians in South Korea. Indeed, Christian churches and organizations have actively aided North Korean refugees escaping through China.
A decade ago, religious persecution was easing in China, which had dropped down the World Watch List, an annual ranking of the 50 countries where Christians face the most persecution. However, China began a rapid rise in 2019 and now ranks at 17, up from 43 just four years ago. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has greatly intensified persecution against all faiths, including Buddhism and Daoism. The existing religious institutions have been brought under the aegis of the United Front, the arm of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) charged with maintaining control over religious society. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, in its report on conditions in China in 2020, cited the “unprecedented use of advanced surveillance technologies to monitor and track religious minorities.”
The situation continued to worsen last year. As World Watch Research, the analytics unit of the Christian watchdog Open Doors that publishes the World Watch List, recently reported.
“The policy of ‘Sinicizing’ the church is implemented across the country as the Communist Party is relying strongly on Chinese cultural identity to stay in control, limiting whatever could threaten its hold on power. New restrictions on Internet, social media, NGOs and the 2018 regulations on religion (with its extension in 2020 and 2021) are or are going to be strictly applied and all seriously limit freedom. Likewise, already existing laws are being implemented more strictly. … The old truth that churches would only be perceived as being a threat if they became too large, too political or by inviting foreign guests, has become an unreliable guideline today. Many churches are being monitored and closed down, no matter whether they are independent or belong to the [government-monitored] Three-Self Patriotic Movement.”
House churches—independent congregations that often meet in a commercial space—suffer especially harshly since they operate outside of the state’s purview and sometimes even knowledge. Pan Yongguang established the Shenzhen Holy Reformed Church a decade ago. Having received assistance from a church in the United States, Pan received special scrutiny. As Bob Fu and Arielle Del Turco wrote last October: “By 2014, authorities were interrogating him at least twice a week and trying to persuade him to join the Chinese Communist Party-approved Three-Self Patriotic Movement.” The government later stopped him from traveling overseas to attend theology classes. The CCP also forced the church’s landlord to shut down the elementary school it had been running, frustrating parents who sought to protect their children from the government’s increasingly overt indoctrination efforts.
Pan explained the rationale for leaving China: “Our church would educate our children about our religious beliefs, and the police would come along and force them to enroll in school so they could be brainwashed.” Moreover, “They didn’t want us to teach our children the Bible, and children are banned from attending church. This went against our faith and our consciences.” Chen Jingjing, a member of the church and former factory worker, observed: “All day, from morning to night, it’s all Xi Jinping—more and more, it stands in opposition to faith.” In late 2019, church members voted to flee en masse, flying to South Korea’s Jeju Island as tourists.
Life in South Korea has been difficult for church members, who now use the name Mayflower Church. They don’t speak Korean and have had difficulty finding work. Some have come to question their decision. However, Pan argued, “There’s no way back for us.”
Although Pan and his about 60 congregants are not political and posed no threat to the Chinese state, their decision embarrassed the Xi regime. So in Jeju, Chinese consulate staff have repeatedly called church members. Moreover, the human rights group CSW reported, “several church members, including Pastor Pan, have received threatening phone calls from unknown persons while in Jeju.” Worse has been the fate of church members still in China, who “have been placed under surveillance and interrogated by police, while at least one person who was denied entry to Jeju has been placed under ‘Residential Surveillance’ and is not permitted to leave her home.”
It is not hard to envision the reception Mayflower refugees will face if forcibly repatriated to China. In 2018, Pan joined his friend Wang Yi, who pastored an unregistered 500-member home church, and 456 other house church pastors in signing a statement protesting rising persecution. Later that year, the authorities detained Wang and some 100 members after raiding a Sunday evening service. In 2019, he was tried and sentenced to nine years in prison for “subversion of state power.”
Wang’s arrest spurred Pan to seek religious freedom elsewhere. Now Pan faces similar charges in China. He explained: “I have been charged with subversion of state power, colluding with anti-China foreign forces, and human trafficking.” The latter is “because I took these believers out of China, so now I’m suspected of trafficking or smuggling them.”
The theologian Apollos Bell and China Partnership blog editor E.F. Gregory noted that “the charge of subversion of state power [is] a catchall charge that is often used against political activists. The trafficking charge is due to Pan’s leadership of his church as they crossed national borders to seek refuge overseas. Life will likely also be difficult for the other members of his church, who in all likelihood would also face interrogation, surveillance, harassment, and, in some cases, imprisonment.”
Unfortunately, last June the Moon government denied the church members’ request for asylum. The government presumably failed to recognize a danger to the refugees’ lives or health but refused to publicly specify the reason for its decision. Several appeals followed. In late January, the Gwangju High Court rejected their final asylum appeal. They now face imminent deportation. Unless another country steps in, most likely the United States, they could be sent back to China.
The incoming government of Yoon Suk-yeol should intervene, or else Moon should handle the issue before leaving office. South Korea’s asylum process is notoriously tough. However, the Chinese government’s rising onslaught against religious freedom leaves no doubt that the Mayflower’s members will suffer greatly if forced back to China. Moon has been thwarted in his desire to achieve peace with North Korea before leaving office. Taking a stand for human rights and against China would be a worthy substitute legacy as his term ends.
Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of several books, including Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World.
12. Gov't Has Given up Trying to Control COVID
Seems like the whole world except for China has given up.
Gov't Has Given up Trying to Control COVID
Global coronavirus infections reached 1.81 million cases last Friday and Korea accounted for a staggering 21 percent of them while the cumulative number of COVID-19 deaths in Korea surpassed 10,000. President Moon Jae-in at one point early in the pandemic described Korea as a "model country" in containing infections, but since then the tide has turned. The government continues to tell people not to worry too much and says there are still enough hospital beds, but frontline medical workers say many critically ill COVID-19 patients are unable to find hospital beds.
At this rate, there is no telling how high the number of daily infection cases will rise. Prime Minister Kim Boo-kyum said last Friday average infections will peak at 370,000, but they reached 380,000 the same day. In January Kim said the number of infections will peak at 300,000 and last month that they will peak at 250,000. He seems to be pulling the numbers out of a hat, and the government is easing lockdown based on these inaccurate projections. Already, it has scrapped mandatory testing and tracing of infected people and allowed bars and restaurants to stay open until 11 p.m. The government has virtually given up on quarantine and other responses.
It should at least warn people to be more careful. But government officials are behaving in the exact opposite way, telling the public that the Omicron variant is milder than other viruses or that infections will "peak soon." But over the past month, the number of COVID deaths has surged seven times, and other medical experts warn that daily infections could surpass 400,000 and the number of deaths could rise above 300.
Starting Monday, the government allowed people who test positive on rapid antigen tests to be eligible for treatment. But around five percent of results are said to be false positives, which means thousands of people every day could be wrongly diagnosed, receiving medication at the expense of taxpayers and being hospitalized along with COVID patients. The government seems to have simply given up.
13. Rain Finally Douses East Coast Wildfires (South Korea)
We should be thankful for Mother Nature. She giveth and she taketh away.
Rain Finally Douses East Coast Wildfires
March 14, 2022 10:37
Rain finally put out wildfires that had been raging on the east coast for 10 days on Sunday morning, the longest conflagration in Korea's history.
The damage was also the worst on record in Donghae and Gangneung in Gangwon Province, where forest fires were extinguished on March 8, as well as Uljin and Samcheok.
The wildfires started in a forest in Uljin, North Gyeongsang Province at 11:17 a.m. on March 4. Flames spread rapidly on strong winds to Samcheok in Gangwon Province.
Forest authorities had difficulties putting out fires due to dry weather, strong winds and thick smoke. In some areas, firefighters were hampered by rough terrain as thick smoke blocked the vision of helicopter pilots. But finally 16 mm of rain fell in the Uljin area on Sunday, helping put out the main fire.
Trees are burnt to ashes on a mountain in Uljin, North Gyeongsang Province on Sunday. /News1
The previous longest wildfires ravaged forests for almost eight days in Goseong, Gangwon Province in April 2000.
According to the government, 24,940 hectares of forest were been destroyed by the flames, equivalent to 41 percent of the entire Seoul metropolitan area. They destroyed 908 buildings, including 388 homes, and displaced 438 people. Fortunately, there were no casualties.
It will take more time to completely snuff out all smaller fires as the areas are too vast and embers could still be hidden in the ashes. Forest authorities have yet to determine what caused the blaze in the first place.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
