Quotes of the Day:
“There never was a good war or a bad peace.”
-Benjamin Franklin
“If they want peace, nations should avoid the pin-pricks that precede cannon shots.”
-Napoleon Bonaparte
Americans:
Willing to cross a frozen river to kill you.
In your sleep.
On Christmas.
Totally not kidding
We‘e done it.
(George Washington crossed the Delaware on December 25, 1776)
-Internet Meme
1, Proactively countering North Korea’s advancing nuclear threat
2. More naughty than nice: In South Korea, motels, condoms and the pill are in hot demand for Christmas
3. How special pardon for ex-President Park may affect March election
4. Moon Settles for Video Summit with Xi
5. S.Korea, China agree to strengthen ‘substantial cooperation’ on economy, culture
6. Cooperative threat reduction in North Korea
7. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Growing Radicalization in People's Control
8. The unknown health of the Kim regime.
1. Proactively countering North Korea’s advancing nuclear threat
Implementation of operational countermeasures
- Reinvigorate US-South Korea training to deter and defeat the full range of North Korean aggression.
- Reinforce resilience of allied forces, including the ability to operate under attack from North Korean conventional and nuclear missiles.
[T]his report provide[s] a pragmatic and feasible roadmap to proactively counter the threats this continuing development would pose to US national security—rather than waiting for Pyongyang to initiate a new nuclear crisis when it feels its capabilities are sufficient.
Markus Garlauskas
Proactively countering North Korea’s advancing nuclear threat
December 23, 2021
By
FORWARD DEFENSE
REPORT RELEASE
As North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile arsenals grow larger and more sophisticated, the United States could soon be faced with a terrible choice when Pyongyang attempts to coerce Seoul—risk an intercontinental nuclear war or abandon a key ally. To avoid such as scenario, Scowcroft Center nonresident senior fellow and former National Intelligence Officer for North Korea Markus Garlauskas recommends that Washington adopt a new strategy to proactively counter North Korea’s nuclear threat by impeding its nuclear and missile programs, investing to stay ahead of its arsenal, and adjusting military operations on the Korean Peninsula.
The growing nuclear threat and its consequences
North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is improving in three key areas. First, its so-called standardized nuclear warhead designs improve the credibility of its nuclear threats. Second, continuing fissile materials production means that it can quantitatively expand its arsenal. Third, improvements in the number and sophistication of missiles and (especially mobile) launchers means that the United States is less able to find, fix, and destroy missiles, either preemptively or once launched. Pyongyang is likely to use all of these developments to gain coercive leverage and warfighting advantage over allied forces on the Peninsula, risking the “decoupling” of the alliance.
Key recommendations
To avoid potentially unacceptable aggression from the North or deterrence failure, Washington needs a new strategy including policy changes to limit the North’s arsenal growth, expanded investments to stay ahead of the threat, and operational countermeasures to be implemented by US and South Korean forces on the Peninsula.
Policy changes
- Negotiate with Pyongyang for a formal moratorium on missile flight testing, especially to prevent tests of long-range missiles with multiple reentry vehicles.
- Counter North Korea’s effort to undermine existing sanctions to constrain resources to the nuclear program, understanding that sanctions are unlikely to lead to either denuclearization or regime change.
Investments to stay ahead
- Improve theater-level counter-missile systems (i.e., those able to track and destroy mobile launchers and their supporting infrastructure, as well as detect and defend against missile launches).
- Calibrate National Missile Defense to stay ahead of the North Korean threat while making clear to Russia and China that US homeland missile defense is not directed at their nuclear weapons.
- Complete ongoing US nuclear modernization efforts, including of those capabilities relevant to nuclear counterforce operations.
Implementation of operational countermeasures
- Reinvigorate US-South Korea training to deter and defeat the full range of North Korean aggression.
- Reinforce resilience of allied forces, including the ability to operate under attack from North Korean conventional and nuclear missiles.
[T]his report provide[s] a pragmatic and feasible roadmap to proactively counter the threats this continuing development would pose to US national security—rather than waiting for Pyongyang to initiate a new nuclear crisis when it feels its capabilities are sufficient.
Markus Garlauskas
About the author
Fellow
Markus Garlauskas
Nonresident Senior Fellow
Asia Security Initiative
Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Indo-Pacific
Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes the debate around the greatest military challenges facing the United States and its allies, and creates forward-looking assessments of the trends, technologies, and concepts that will define the future of warfare.
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2. More naughty than nice: In South Korea, motels, condoms and the pill are in hot demand for Christmas
A different Christmas tradition.
More naughty than nice: In South Korea, motels, condoms and the pill are in hot demand for Christmas
Reporting from Seoul —
It’s Christmastime in Seoul — the city decked out in festive lights, storefronts adorned with red and white decorations and the steady clang of Salvation Army bells echoing through subway stops.
Here, though, it’s not the latest popular toys that fly off the shelves this time of year. In hot demand instead are birth control pills, condoms and Christmas-themed lingerie.
A reservation at one of Seoul’s many rent-by-the-hour motels on Christmas Day? Many book up weeks earlier, even at prices that can be double or more the normal rate.
Christmas, first brought to this nation by American missionaries in the late 19th century and designated a public holiday under U.S. military rule in the 1940s, has since evolved into a very different kind of celebration than the one across the Pacific.
Volunteer Santa Clauses throw their hats in the air during a Christmas charity event in Seoul in 2015.
(Lee Jin-man / Associated Press)
Even though South Korea is about 30% Christian, Christmas is widely celebrated as a secular lover’s holiday not unlike Valentine’s Day, especially among the younger generation.
And because it’s customary for most unmarried young adults to live with their parents, Christmas has become a cherished occasion for couples to seek some privacy. So much so that a few years ago, the convenience store chain 7-Eleven Korea said that it sold more condoms on Christmas Day than any other day of the year, more than 2½ times as many as an average day.
“It’s just expected that you spend it with a lover,” said 24-year-old college student Jamie Park. “Society and social media ads reinforce that.”
His girlfriend, Lucy Kim, 27, chimed in: “They say if you don’t have a lover to spend it with, it’s a lonely and miserable holiday.”
Park and Kim, newly dating as of about a month ago, stood on a frigid Seoul street corner giggling and feeding each other spoonfuls of ice cream, near a stream decorated with holiday lights. They were planning to go to a concert on Tuesday for their first Christmas together.
The two hadn’t yet settled on plans beyond the concert, but Park said several of his friends were complaining about the difficulty of booking a motel for Christmas night. One resourceful friend had booked a room a month ago.
How Christmas in Korea came to be more naughty than nice is a tale of the unlikely confluence of American cultural influence, military rule and young Koreans eager to party.
After initially being celebrated as a religion holiday here by a small number of Christians in the early part of the 20th century, Christmas gained popularity in the years after the Korean War truce in 1953. During those years, the typically strictly enforced nighttime curfew was lifted on Christmas Day by the U.S. forces controlling Seoul.
American-style dance halls were springing up around the same time, and while police usually cracked down on them as morally objectionable, they were given a pass on Christmas, according to Kang Jun-man, a communications professor at Chonbuk University who surveyed accounts in Korean newspapers about Christmas celebrations.
The holiday never took hold as a family celebration because most families already gather during two Korean holidays — Lunar New Year and the mid-autumn harvest festival.
By the 1960s, Christmas in Korea had became established as an occasion for cavorting for the young. In 1964, the Walkerhill Hotel held a massive Christmas Eve dance party that sold out despite steep ticket prices, and all of its 450 rooms were booked, according to a news article from the time.
A Korean-language editorial published on Dec. 24, 1965, decried that Christmas Eve had become “a night without rationality” and questioned: “Who made these youngsters roam the streets late at night and spend the night with obscene gestures?”
“The customs of the night have long been repressed by curfew,” the Joongang Ilbo editorial said, according to Kang. “And because of the freedom of the night, curfew-free Christmas Eve could never just be holy.”
Tourists take a selfie in front of an 8-meter-tall installation by South Korean pop artist Im Ji-bin, which was set up ahead of Christmas in lieu of a tree in downtown Seoul.
(Yonhap /EPA-EFE/REX)
There are, of course, Christians appalled by the way the holiday is celebrated in Korea.
The website GodPeople.com, an online Christian store and website, has been running an annual campaign since 2001 to “recover the true meaning of Christmas.”
“Nonbelievers think of it as a festival, an occasion to celebrate with family, friends and lovers,” said general manager Kim Hee-dong, who conceived of the campaign. “It was regrettable that the true meaning of Jesus’ birth was lost.”
But if Dr. Cho Byung-goo’s gynecology practice in the popular Hongdae area of Seoul is any indication, Christmas very much remains a lovers’ occasion. Each Dec. 26, Cho is invariably busy with several patients seeking emergency morning-after contraception.
“We don’t consider it a family holiday, so many of us end up spending it with lovers,” said Cho, a board member of the Korean Assn. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, which has used the Christmas season as an opportunity to increase awareness of birth control.
“People get excited on Christmas Eve,” he said. “There are new encounters and opportunities to meet people.”
3. How special pardon for ex-President Park may affect March election
Yes, it will be interesting to see what kind of effect this does have, if any.
How special pardon for ex-President Park may affect March election
Opposition parties call Moon’s decision a political move aimed at creating divide, while ruling party concerned of disappointed supporters
Published : Dec 24, 2021 - 17:42 Updated : Dec 24, 2021 - 17:44
A placard, which reads “President Park Geun-hye Acquittal and Discharge,” is installed by Our Republican Party, a far-right political party in Seoul, on Friday. (Yonhap)
With just 75 days before the presidential election, the government’s decision to grant special pardon to former President Park Geun-hye on Friday has risen as a factor that may sway the results of the election.
While the main opposition People Power Party welcomed the pardon of their former leader, key party members criticized President Moon Jae-in for making a “political move” to create a divide in the conservative bloc, ahead of the presidential election slated for March.
The ruling Democratic Party of Korea appears to be concerned that Moon’s decision to grant pardon to his predecessor, who was taken down for power abuse and corruption, would disappoint its supporters.
For the People Power Party, which has chosen former Prosecutor General Yoon Suk-yeol as its flagbearer for the presidential election in March, Park’s stance toward the candidate would be a critical factor that would either pull together support or divide the party.
For one, Yoon was the lead prosecutor investigating the massive corruption scandal which ultimately brought down Park and eventually landed her in prison in 2017, after she was impeached in the year before.
In 2013, Yoon had also conducted investigations into allegations that the National Intelligence Service, the country’s spy agency, sought to influence public opinion to run in favor of Park ahead of the December 2012 presidential election.
Raising ire of the Park administration, Yoon was demoted after revealing that he also received outside pressure to water down the probe.
With the series of events between Yoon and Park in the backdrop, Park’s pardon may be able to influence the opinions of supporters for the conservative party who could seek to fix the blame on Yoon for Park’s fall.
After the announcement, Yoon said he welcomes the special pardon for Park, and also wished for her fast recovery in health.
Yoon also said it was not his decision to turn down Park’s request for suspension of execution, which was made twice in 2019, as she cited poor health conditions.
Yoon was the chief of the Seoul Central District Prosecutors Office, and then prosecutor general when a prosecution panel reviewed Park’s requests.
At the same time, the president’s decision may also come as a burden for the ruling Democratic Party which came into power from the fall of the Park administration.
Moon garnered a landslide victory in the 2017 presidential election following the impeachment of Park, who came in at the center of the massive corruption scandal that brought tens of thousands of people to the streets.
The liberal bloc had also gained great support then, making pledges that their administration would be completely different from the corrupt government under Park.
Lee Jae-myung, the ruling party’s presidential candidate said he “respects” Moon’s decision. Just a couple of days ago, Lee had opposed granting special pardons for former presidents of the conservative blocs, saying it is “too early,” and that the former leaders should make sincere apologies for their wrongdoings.
The presidential office rejected claims that Moon’s decision to grant amnesty to Park is politically aimed.
“We don’t know which side (of the political parties) would benefit (from Park’s pardon). But I am sure the government did not consider the presidential election,” an official from the presidential office said.
“If the government were to consider the political implications, wouldn’t there have been better times to do it?” the official said, adding that the president did ask the ruling party in making Friday’s decision.
The official also said the exclusion of Lee Myung-bak in the special pardon list is because “the cases (of Park and Lee) are different.”
Park, who served as the president from 2013-17, is currently serving a 22-year prison term for charges including abuse of power and bribery. Her predecessor Lee is serving a 17-year sentence for similar charges.
According to a Gallup Korea poll last month, 44 percent of respondents agreed to granting amnesty to the two former presidents, while 48 percent opposed it.
4. Moon Settles for Video Summit with Xi
Moon Settles for Video Summit with Xi
President Moon Jae-in's has buried his hopes of a visit from his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping and settled for a Zoom call.
The Foreign Ministry here on Thursday said Korea and China are "in talks" to arrange a video summit between the two leaders. That scotches Moon's hopes of magically turning his party's fortunes around with a visit to from Xi before Moon leaves office in March.
"Close negotiations are taking place between Korea and China over a summit," Vice Foreign Minister Yeo Seung-bae told reporters. He added the two countries "share the view that smooth communication at various levels is very important to the development of bilateral relations."
National security adviser Suh Hoon and Chinese Communist Party foreign policy chief Yang Jiechi already discussed the video summit when they met in Tianjin early this month. It is expected in January before the Beijing Winter Olympics begin.
The U.S. is leaning on its allies to join its diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Games, but Korea has already said it will not join the campaign.
5. S.Korea, China agree to strengthen ‘substantial cooperation’ on economy, culture
Excerpt:
Thursday’s strategic dialogue also came after a series of high-level meetings between Seoul and Beijing, an apparent move to mend bilateral relations mainly strained by the development of the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile battery.
S.Korea, China agree to strengthen ‘substantial cooperation’ on economy, culture
Resumption of strategic dialogue comes amid discussion on Xi-Moon summit
Published : Dec 24, 2021 - 14:44 Updated : Dec 24, 2021 - 17:00
South Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choi Jong-kun and his Chinese counterpart Le Yucheng hold the virtual session of the ninth Strategic Dialogue on Dec. 23.
South Korea and China pledged to strengthen “substantial cooperation” in the fields of economy and culture and agreed on the importance of leader-to-leader and high-level exchanges at a strategic dialogue in more than four years.
South Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choi Jong-kun and his Chinese counterpart, Le Yucheng, held the virtual session of the ninth Strategic Dialogue on Thursday, the first of its kind since June 2017.
The resumption of the meeting came at a critical time when South Korea and China are in close consultation on the Moon-Xi summit.
The timing is also noteworthy given that Seoul has not yet made an official announcement on whether to join the US-led diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics, which the country still views as an opportunity to make progress on its peace initiative.
At the strategic dialogue, both sides had an “in-depth discussion” on areas of mutual interest, including bilateral relations, Korean Peninsula affairs and regional and international circumstances, South Korea’s Foreign Ministry said.
Seoul and Beijing particularly “agreed to strengthen performance-oriented substantial cooperation” in the multifaceted fields of economy, culture, and environment, with the goal of revitalizing cultural exchanges, ensuring the security of a raw material supply chain, and addressing climate change.
During the high-level talks, Choi emphasized the necessity of continuing to expand substantial cooperation and exchanges in each field to develop bilateral relations “in a stable manner,” the Foreign Ministry said.
Both sides also “shared the view on the significance of leader-to-leader and high-level exchanges in improving bilateral relations and agreed to continue strategic communication in various ways including face-to-face and virtual format” despite the COVID-19 challenges.
The strategic dialogue was held after a yearslong freeze in Seoul-Beijing relations that had rapidly began to thaw ahead of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics.
The Foreign Ministry said both sides discussed the upcoming Olympics and ways to cooperate in reinvigorating the Moon Jae-in government’s peace process including an end-of-war declaration.
“Both sides agreed that the stable management of situations on the Korean Peninsula is important and reaffirmed the shared goal of achieving complete denuclearization and establishing permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula,” the ministry said.
Seoul and Beijing also agreed to “develop their strategic cooperative partnership into more mature and future-oriented relations” on the occasion of marking the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations next year.
In a policy road map for 2022, the Foreign Ministry on Thursday reiterated its plan to further enhance South Korea-China relations, while reinforcing its efforts to manage pending issues and prevent conflicts.
Yeo Seung-bae, deputy minister for political affairs at the Foreign Ministry, confirmed that Seoul and Beijing have continued “close communication” on the Moon-Xi summit.
A senior South Korean government official, who wished to remain anonymous, also suggested South Korea would take the upcoming Beijing Winter Olympics as an opportunity to drive momentum for the peace process.
Seoul expects that the Beijing Olympics will serve as an “important turning point to improve inter-Korean relations and an opportunity to contribute to peace in Northeast Asia and in the world,” according to the official.
The official said the Moon Jae-in government would keep an eye on the outcome of consultations between China, North Korea and the International Olympic Committee and seek ways to enhance its role as a country that has hosted the Olympics.
Thursday’s strategic dialogue also came after a series of high-level meetings between Seoul and Beijing, an apparent move to mend bilateral relations mainly strained by the development of the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile battery.
Top Chinese Communist Party diplomat Yang Jiechi visited Busan this August in around two years after an unofficial visit to South Korea in July 2018. In November, South Korea’s Ambassador to China Jang Ha-sung had his first one-on-one meeting with Yang since his appointment in April 2019.
South Korea’s national security adviser Suh Hoon visited Tianjin in China earlier this month. During the visit, Suh and Yang discussed a wide range of issues including an end-of-war declaration, supply chain issues, cultural exchanges, and the Moon-Xi summit.
6. Cooperative threat reduction in North Korea
I would take some exception to two points from my friend Dr. Jina Kim. I would add to her point and say that cooperative threat reduction must take place before there is an end of war declaration and eventual peace regime/peace treaty. The north's offensive threat must be reduced.
In regard to CTR and Ukraine, I think we should keep in mind that Kim has assessed what has happened (and is happening in Ukraine). Both the US and Russia made security guarantees in return for Ukraine turning over nuclear weapons and in Kim's view neither country has lived up to them, Why should he trust security guarantees from any country? It is likely that in Kim's calculus this was viewed as a strategic mistake and that if Ukraine had not given up its nuclear weapons it would not be facing the threats it is today. I am sure this influences his thinking on why he should not ever give up his nuclear weapons. They are key to survival and so smooch more.
Cooperative threat reduction in North Korea
By Jina Kim
The prospect of denuclearization negotiations starting again between North Korea and the United States is difficult to predict, but if they begin, the U.S. will focus on the comprehensive dismantling of North Korea's nuclear and biochemical weapons and missile programs.
Since the early 1990s, the U.S. has helped eliminate weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the former Soviet states through the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which aimed at not only dismantling strategic assets, but also providing transport, storage and safeguards for the eventual disposal of related equipment and facilities. After 9/11, the focus has been on preventing terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear and radioactive materials, so the program has been extended to other countries.
The CTR program was able to contribute to achieving threat reduction in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, because these countries lacked the financial and technical means to maintain nuclear weapons independently, and the value of achieving security guarantees and economic support in exchange for nuclear disarmament was high.
Arguably, North Korea is different from these countries in terms of its capabilities, intentions and security environment. However, it is worth noting that, in the process of pursuing the goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, the CTR program could be a useful tool to speed up threat reduction in North Korea.
Discussions about cooperative threat reduction in North Korea were raised during the Six-Party Talks, and the U.S. Congress reviewed supporting comprehensive activities including not only verified dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program but also job creation for nuclear scientists and engineers. South Korea needs to examine in advance the scope, requirements and implementation plan for comprehensive threat reduction in North Korea for the following reasons.
First, if North Korea returns to the international non-proliferation regime, preventing the proliferation of WMD and missiles naturally becomes an obligation for the country to fulfill. Since the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 on April 28, 2004, it has become the responsibility of all U.N. member states to strengthen their domestic systems to prevent the proliferation of WMDs.
The U.S. has ensured that beneficiaries of the CTR program are incorporated into the nuclear, biological, chemical and conventional weapons control regime to comply with their international obligations.
Because of North Korea's track record of halting denuclearization measures, the international community is seeking concrete, irreversible means to resolve proliferation concerns. Therefore, institutional support for North Korea to continue to fulfill its obligations under the international non-proliferation regime will help manage WMD proliferation concerns.
Second, the CTR program can provide incentives for North Korea to be cooperative in denuclearization efforts. The CTR program supports the entire process including the transport, storage, disposal and conversion of WMD-related materials. This process includes activities that provide infrastructure, such as railways and roads, if necessary for WMD dismantlement activities, which will be positively considered in North Korea's decision to denuclearize.
The U.S. spent more than $400 million in cooperative threat reduction programs to transport nuclear warheads deployed in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan safely to Russia's central storage facilities, repair roads and bridges, and supply vehicles. It also helped Russia convert facilities used to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons into civilian nuclear power plants to provide heating for local communities.
In particular, the biosecurity and safety activities of the CTR program will be an attractive proposition for North Korea to address its long-standing health security issues. After the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014, the U.S. converted overseas biological weapons-related infrastructure to civilian use and has supported the strengthening of regional capabilities for the rapid detection, diagnosis and reporting of especially dangerous pathogens.
Third, the CTR program can also contribute to building trust necessary for the implementation of denuclearization. As the scope of the CTR program is broad, agencies at various levels will be in contact with their counterparts in North Korea to keep consultations. Therefore, from the beginning of the program, opportunities for both sides to share interests and increase procedural transparency will be expanded.
Above all, the Threat Reduction Engagement Program can help North Korea's WMD program workers participate in peaceful research activities, integrate them into the international community and increase accountability, by introducing a system that meets international standards. Establishing a cooperative relationship will be even more important, in that North Korean scientists and engineers can participate in the exchange of information related to nuclear weapons safety and security.
Fourth, the CTR program will provide opportunities for multiple actors to participate as donors. In recent years, the member states of the Global Partnership, along with international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and World Health Organization (WHO), participated in supporting chemical weapons destruction, cooperative biological engagement, proliferation prevention and global nuclear security.
Multilateral guarantees of the CTR program can reduce the risk of parties failing to comply with the denuclearization agreement. Securing the necessary financial resources for North Korea's denuclearization activities will contribute to accelerating the disarmament process and maintaining the sustainability of the program.
Taking these benefits into consideration, South Korea and the U.S. should develop a long-term cooperative threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance strategy, to be implemented when denuclearization talks with North Korea begin.
Dr. Jina Kim is a professor in the Division of Language and Diplomacy at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. She is on multiple advisory boards for the National Security Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Unification, and Peaceful Unification Advisory Council. This article is published in cooperation with the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN) (www.apln.network).
7. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Growing Radicalization in People's Control
More op on the evil nature of the Kim family regime and what it is doing to the Korean people.
＜Inside N. Korea＞ Growing Radicalization in People's Control (2). The Revival of the Fear of "Word Hunting": One Word of Complaint or Dissent Leads to Arrests and Expulsions.
(Photo) A soldier inspecting residents as they enter a Pyongyang subway station. People who are deemed to be dressed too “shabbily” are not allowed to enter. Photographed in June 2011 in the Daesung District of Pyongyang by Koo Kwang-ho (ASIAPRESS)
In North Korea, there are strong indications of the revival of "word hunting" known as "Mal-Pandong". "Mal" means "word", and "Pandong" means "reaction. In addition to criticism and ridicule of the supreme leader and the Kim family, there have been several cases in which people have been prosecuted simply for expressing dissatisfaction with the difficult living conditions and crackdowns or for speaking out against officials and policies, which has made residents nervous (Kang Ji-won / ISHIMARU Jiro).
"We're finally being punished with 'Mal-Pandong.' People who openly complained or criticized the authorities' crackdown or the difficult living conditions, envied foreign countries or spread falsehoods are being dragged away without mercy. The old people around me even say that 'the world is heading in the opposite direction again.'"
Our reporting partner, who lives in North Hamkyung Province, reported this in early December.
◆ What is "Mal-Pandong" = word hunting?
"Mal-Pandong" was a standard control method in North Korea until the early 1990s. It included criticism and ridicule against Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, praise of South Korea, as well as criticism of socialism, dissemination of outside information, opposition to policies, and complaints about the difficult living conditions.
However, as the economy collapsed and the food rationing system was paralyzed, not only the ordinary people but also the cadres, security personnel (secret police), and police officers who were in charge of policing the situation could not make ends meet, and the "word hunt" faded away.
Since then, it has been rare for ordinary people to be strongly punished for their words, except in cases of criticism of the supreme leader, praise of South Korea, or other issues that affect the very foundations of the regime, and the punishment has been limited to caution and guidance.
◆ Complaints and protests erupted due to the impoverished.
Economic conditions have deteriorated dramatically since the Kim Jong-un regime implemented extreme coronavirus quarantine measures starting in 2020. While the residents were struggling to make ends meet, the authorities prioritized maintaining order and instead strongly regulated individual economic activities, cracking down on workplace departures, unauthorized business activities, and the use of foreign currency. As a result, dissatisfaction among people has grown.
"Until last year, it was common to hear old ladies doing business in the vicinity of the market cursing the officials in response to the crackdown, and residents criticizing the officials, saying that 'we can't afford to eat because the officials are bad' and that 'no measures are being taken.' In many cases, when officials confiscated the goods of vendors in the alleys, the people around the protesters would join in and attack them."
This is how my reporting partner described it. However, it is said that such phenomena are rarely seen anymore.
◆ Declaration of systematic "Mal-Pandong" exposure
"Since there were a lot of blatant criticisms of the policy, the ''word hunt'' started in September. There is even a rumour that people will be sent to prison camps depending on what they say."
According to several reporting partners, at a meeting of women's organizations under the Labor Party, labour organizations, youth leagues, and workplaces held in early December, the intensification of the "Mal-Pandong" crackdown was announced as follows:
● No condemnation of the policy will be tolerated.
● No tolerance will be given to those who speak unverified information or spread falsehoods.
● Instruct the people, especially the elderly and students, not to say strange things outside.
◆ Expelled for just saying, "I want to go to South Korea."
However, our reporting partner was shocked by a recent incident.
"In the neighbourhood of 〇〇dong, in front of a group of acquaintances gathered at a house, a person said, 'It's tough to live here, I want to go to South Korea,' which was tipped off and he was later taken to the security department. He was interrogated for a few days and will probably be expelled."
※ Although expulsion is not a crime, it forces people to move from cities to rural areas or remote mountainous regions.
Needless to say, The authorities are anxious to suppress the residents' grievances, whose lives are becoming increasingly difficult.
※ ASIAPRESS contacts its reporting partners in North Korea through smuggled Chinese mobile phones.
8. The unknown health of the Kim regime.
My recent interview with John Batchlor and Gordon Chang.
The unknown health of the Kim regime. David Maxwell @FDD @GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill
Dec 22, 8:30 PM
Embed
Photo: A high DPRK official, Ri Yong-gil, at his most mirthful.
The unknown health of the Kim regime. David Maxwell @FDD @GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill
David Maxwell, @FDD Foundation for Defense of Democracies
