Quotes of the Day:
"There are two ways to choke off free expression. We've already discussed one of them: clamp down on free speech and declare some topics off-limits. That strategy is straightforward enough. The other, more insidious way to limit free expression is to try to change the very language people use"
- Dennis Prager, author
How do you tell a Communist? Well, it’s someone who reads Marx and Lenin. And how do you tell an anti-Communist? It’s someone who understands Marx and Lenin."
- Ronald Reagan
“It is the individual only who is timeless. Societies, cultures, and civilizations―past and present―are often incomprehensible to outsiders, but the individual's hungers, anxieties, dreams, and preoccupations have remained unchanged through the millennia.”
- Eric Hoffer (1898-1983), moral philosopher
1. N. Korea's military staging wintertime drills, S. Korea says
2. Behind the Korean Peninsula “Arms Race”
3. N. Korean leader 3rd most searched politician online in 2021: data
4. S. Korea, China to hold high-level strategic talks this week
5. IFRC allocates $1.2 mln to help N. Korea fight against COVID-19
6. North Korea keeps mum on callouts of human rights violations
7. Taiwan protests Korea's canceled invitation to minister
8. The case for nuclear armament (South Korea)
9. Even With Omicron, North Korea Still Claims No Coronavirus Cases
10. Video messages from separated relatives still waiting to be delivered in North Korea
11. Joint Letter to South Korea's National Assembly Calling For the Immediate Passage of a Comprehensive Anti-Discrimination Law
12. Promised new homes don’t materialize for retired North Korean soldiers
13. Ten Years On: What to Make of Kim Jong-un’s Long March to Power?
14. The Obama Administration Discussed Sending Steve Kerr To North Korea To Meet With Kim Jong-un
15. First Two Episodes Of ‘Snowdrop’ Do Not Alleviate Viewer Concerns
1. N. Korea's military staging wintertime drills, S. Korea says
An indication of north Korean hostile policy? Why does no one call out the regime for its exercises that are offensive in nature?
A little history. The north conducts its annual winter training cycle from the end of November through March. Its usual intent is to bring its force to the highest state of readiness. Why is that? March is the optimal time to attack the South because the ground is still frozen and hard from the winter and the South has not yet planted and flooded the rice paddies. Why did we always conduct Team Spirit in March? To bring the ROK and US forces to the highest state of defensive readiness and to reinforce the peninsula with US forces (Team Spirit used to be the largest exercise in the free world until we unilaterally canceled the exercise - I participated in the last one in 1993.). After we canceled Team SPirit military leaders still recognized the requirement for readiness and deterrence in the mid-1990/s the exercise RSO&I was established, This later evolved into Key Resolve. For many years Foal Eagle was a rear area defense and special operations exercise conducted in the fall. It was moved to March and became a major field training exercise with Key Resolve the theater level command post computer simulation design to train the theater HQ and components (just as Ulchi Focus Lens and later Ulchi Freedom Guardian were designed to do at the end of August) after the summer personnel transitions to get all the new personnel up to speed on the defense plans for Korea.
It is amusing to me that all the pundits and north Korea apologists call for the end of ROK/US defensive exercises but they never call out the Kim family regime for its offensive exercises that are a demonstration of a real hostile policy in the north.
(LEAD) N. Korea's military staging wintertime drills, S. Korea says | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with remarks on submarine shipyard from 4th para)
SEOUL, Dec. 21 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's military is conducting a wintertime exercise, as South Korea and the United States are closely monitoring related moves, Seoul's defense authorities said Tuesday.
"We believe that wintertime drills by North Korea's military are under way," Col. Kim Jun-rak, the spokesperson of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), told reporters.
The North usually kicks off a regular military training in December, which continues through early spring often involving artillery firing drills.
Kim declined to comment on a report of a submarine shipyard located in the city of Sinpo on North Korea's east coast, where the country test-launched what it claimed to be a new type of submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in October.
"The intelligence authorities of South Korea and the United States have been closely cooperating and keeping close tabs on related movements," he said. "As of now, there is nothing to comment further."
38 North, a U.S. website monitoring North Korea, reported last week that the reclusive country has placed a Sinpo-class submarine at a dry dock of the shipyard, possibly for maintenance or repair.
colin@yna.co.kr
(END)
2. Behind the Korean Peninsula “Arms Race”
This Is the most troubling statement in this piece but I do not think it is accurate. I think the diplomats and military leaders in both governments have this sorted out. It may describe the pundits but not the officials.
The South does not feel it has total clarity about U.S. alliance commitments.
Conclusion:
Against this backdrop, there is little cause to believe that the current trajectory points toward a return to the 2017 “fire and fury” period, when the war of words between Trump and Kim gave the impression that conflict on the peninsula could be imminent. But risks remain to the regional order that has undergirded peninsular stability. The South does not feel it has total clarity about U.S. alliance commitments. The North is leery of its ever-deepening economic and political reliance on China. Worse, North Korea feels that it reaped no reward for its diplomatic outreach in 2018 and 2019. Though its next steps are always unpredictable, and the pandemic has only made them more so, Pyongyang will likely be tempted to take a different path if it fails to attract the international engagement it desires when it is ready to talk. That temptation will be greatest if the right wins the South Korean presidential election, with the Olympics in the rear-view mirror, and once the pandemic is under a measure of control. While there is no guarantee that the U.S. and the South will be able to forestall that outcome with a diplomatic surge at the right moment, both the Biden administration and the two contenders for South Korea’s presidency should be preparing to try.
16 DECEMBER 2021
Behind the Korean Peninsula “Arms Race”
North and South Korea have recently staged displays of military prowess, causing some to worry about an accelerating arms race. But both countries were playing politics. Any uptick in tensions is likely to come after the Beijing Olympics and South Korean elections in March 2022.
Senior Consultant, Korean Peninsula
Dest_Pyongyang
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In the autumn months, the two Koreas put on something of a military show for the world. As they flexed their muscles – testing missiles and displaying new capabilities – commentators speculated about an accelerating arms race and wondered whether the peninsula might be headed for a crisis moment after several quiet years. Since North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump exchanged taunts in 2017, including Trump’s famous threat to rain down “fire and fury” if Kim crossed his red lines, the peninsula has been relatively calm. But while the possibility of a sudden escalation in tensions can never be fully dismissed, particularly given North Korea’s penchant for wilfully unpredictable behaviour, the autumn’s activity does not necessarily augur a spike in near-term instability. It does, however, suggest that the two sides are positioning themselves for potentially consequential changes on the peninsula as South Korea’s 2022 national elections approach, Seoul and Washington jostle for operational control over their combined forces, and Pyongyang contemplates a new push to achieve its stymied strategic and economic objectives.
Much of the two sides’ showmanship took place in September and October. At first, the action was outdoors. North Korea conducted cruise missile tests on 11 and 12 September, a short-range ballistic missile test from a train three days later, and what the North claimed was a hypersonic missile test, of the Hwasong-8, late in the month. For its part, on 15 September, South Korea became the first non-nuclear state to test a submarine-launched ballistic missile. Then, in October, some events moved indoors, with back-to-back exhibitions in Pyongyang and Seoul showcasing some of both countries’ newest weaponry. North Korean state media reported on Self-Defence 2021, a celebration of new defence technology, which it hosted at the Three Revolutions Exhibition for several days beginning on 11 October. Shortly thereafter, from 19 to 24 October, South Korea held its International Aerospace and Defence Exhibition 2021 at Seoul Airport, a military base operated by its air force. At the same time, Seoul took a highly symbolic step, launching its first entirely indigenous rocket, the Korea Space Launch Vehicle-II, also known as Nuri-ho.
[T]hese parallel shows of strength can be viewed as part of a contest for military supremacy on the peninsula.
To some extent, these parallel shows of strength can be viewed as part of a contest for military supremacy on the peninsula. With Pyongyang continuing to develop its missile and nuclear capabilities, and Seoul demonstrating technological leaps of its own, both sides have reason to want to keep pace. But they were also driven by broader agendas.
For Seoul, displays of technological prowess have multiple audiences. On the economic side, South Korean companies generate considerable revenues from arms sales to overseas buyers in South East Asia, as well as Europe and, in a $700 million deal inked on 13 December, Australia. Regional customers have long looked to the South for competitively priced armoured vehicles and training aircraft. As for the strategic implications of showing off new armaments, it is a way of demonstrating to both domestic and international observers that South Korea’s political and defence establishments are working to develop military capabilities that will make the country less dependent on the United States. This is partly an outgrowth of the downturn in relations with Washington during the Trump administration, which pushed the South to pay much more for the U.S forces stationed there. Since President Joe Biden took office in January, the U.S.-South Korea alliance has been much more stable, as demonstrated in March by the painless conclusion of a new agreement on how to split the bill for the U.S. garrison. Nevertheless, South Korean policymakers know that polarised politics in the U.S. makes the latter less than perfectly reliable. In planning for the future, they must account for the possibility that U.S. voters will again elect a president who takes a Trump-like transactional approach to the alliance.
The South’s left-leaning Democratic Party, led by President Moon Jae-in, has still other reasons for wanting to show the U.S. its growing military prowess. Under current arrangements between the U.S. and South Korean militaries, the U.S. would take command of both U.S. and South Korean forces in the event of war with the North. Seoul has long, if fitfully, sought Washington’s agreement to transfer wartime operational control to South Korea, seeing this authority as a matter of national sovereignty. Moon and his party have made this issue a particular priority. If their efforts succeed, command of the South Korean military would rest with Seoul, even if shooting starts, for the first time since July 1950.
The Biden administration took a step toward allowing Seoul greater autonomy over its own defences in May, when the two sides quietly terminated limits first imposed on the range of South Korean missiles in 1979 as part of a deal that gave the South access to U.S. missile technology, but which had outlived their usefulness in the face of the North’s rapid missile development. Seeing this step as a sign of momentum, President Moon (who cannot seek another term in office) believes that his successor – to be elected when South Koreans go to the polls in March 2022 – will be positioned to conclude a deal for the transfer of operational control. On 2 December, when U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin visited South Korea for the annual U.S.-Republic of Korea Security Consultative Meeting, the Moon administration even broached the idea of accelerating an assessment of South Korean readiness for the transfer. (That assessment is presently planned for the summer of 2022.) Thus, by displaying new technological capabilities in September and October, Seoul was showing Washington that South Korea has not only the political will but also the technological capacity to defend itself, a key prerequisite for the transfer of authority.
North of the demilitarised zone, meanwhile, Pyongyang seems to be rebooting a familiar strategy by which it incrementally raises tensions with Seoul and Washington for diplomatic leverage. To the extent that it has begun stepping out beyond its practice of testing and perfecting weapons systems (North Korea laid out its top five priorities for the strategic weapons sector – including cruise missile development – at the 8th Korean Workers’ Party Congress in January), the North’s return to military posturing may be intended to begin the process of re-establishing the Korean situation’s prominence as a central international issue. It yielded this position during the North’s period of diplomatic engagement with the U.S. and the South starting in January 2018. Displays of warm personal relations between Trump and Kim – even described in the press as a “bromance” – cooled somewhat after their summit at Hanoi in February 2019 broke up without a breakthrough on Pyongyang’s twin aims of getting UN sanctions lifted and reducing what it sees as the U.S. threat on the peninsula. But, in the interim, Washington and Pyongyang have nevertheless each shelved, steered clear of or scaled back activities that the other finds especially provocative, including certain drills on the U.S. and South Korean side and nuclear tests and missile tests beyond a certain range on the North Korean side.
President Biden appears to hope that things stay this way. Since taking over, the Biden administration has indicated that North Korea is not a high priority in U.S. foreign policy. Against this backdrop, Pyongyang’s autumn spate of missile tests can probably best be seen as calibrated to put itself back on the diplomatic map without triggering a meaningful international response, by remaining below the level of provocation that would have prompted one. North Korea’s ballistic missile launches of 15 September can also be seen as a form of protest against Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Seoul around the same time.
The South does not feel it has total clarity about U.S. alliance commitments.
Whether or not Pyongyang turns up the temperature further will likely depend on developments in both Koreas. Looking to the South, on 10 October, the Democratic Party selected its candidate to succeed President Moon. The nominee, Lee Jae-myung, is mayor of a satellite city of Seoul. He declared back in August that, if elected, he would seek sanctions waivers for North Korea at the UN to allow the reopening of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, a joint North-South manufacturing zone just north of the shared border that has been shut down since February 2016. On 5 November, the conservative People Power Party also chose its presidential candidate: Yoon Seok-yeol. Unlike Lee, Yoon is inclined toward containment of North Korea and a renewed emphasis on its denuclearisation, which is likely to result in raised inter-Korean tensions. If elected, Yoon will almost surely pay lip service to political engagement with the North, promoting the notion of a principled engagement policy that conservative rhetoric asserts can push Pyongyang toward economic reform and opening. But he is unlikely to try to dismantle existing barriers to economic cooperation. For this reason, the North may be more inclined to give Lee some breathing space before escalating tensions significantly and less inclined to do the same for Yoon.
Moreover, the North is also facing constraints that limit its immediate options. A strict border regime designed to halt the spread of COVID-19 has denied entry to all people and most goods since the end of January 2020, thrusting North Korea into an economic malaise that will to some degree influence its ability to launch a provocation cycle. While the challenges of access to reliable data, exacerbated by a diminished foreign presence in Pyongyang, make it harder than ever to assess how long the downturn will last, it is clear that the near-term prognosis is not good. Equally, any serious escalation is unlikely to happen in the next few months, because China wants the 2022 Winter Olympics (beginning 4 February and ending 20 February) to go smoothly and will not welcome too much acting out by North Korea in the interim.
Against this backdrop, there is little cause to believe that the current trajectory points toward a return to the 2017 “fire and fury” period, when the war of words between Trump and Kim gave the impression that conflict on the peninsula could be imminent. But risks remain to the regional order that has undergirded peninsular stability. The South does not feel it has total clarity about U.S. alliance commitments. The North is leery of its ever-deepening economic and political reliance on China. Worse, North Korea feels that it reaped no reward for its diplomatic outreach in 2018 and 2019. Though its next steps are always unpredictable, and the pandemic has only made them more so, Pyongyang will likely be tempted to take a different path if it fails to attract the international engagement it desires when it is ready to talk. That temptation will be greatest if the right wins the South Korean presidential election, with the Olympics in the rear-view mirror, and once the pandemic is under a measure of control. While there is no guarantee that the U.S. and the South will be able to forestall that outcome with a diplomatic surge at the right moment, both the Biden administration and the two contenders for South Korea’s presidency should be preparing to try.
3. N. Korean leader 3rd most searched politician online in 2021: data
I am sure Kim Jong-un will want to figure out how to become number one.
N. Korean leader 3rd most searched politician online in 2021: data | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Dec. 21 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is the third most searched politician by internet users worldwide this year, data showed Tuesday.
Online searches for Kim totaled a monthly average of 1.9 million, behind U.S. President Joe Biden, who topped the list with 7 million searches, and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson with 2 million, according to German data analytics firm Statista.
Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel ranked fourth with 1.4 million searches.
The most searched keyword related to the North Korean leader this year was "weight loss," separate analysis by Google Trends found.
In June, the 37-year-old Kim appeared at a politburo session appearing to have lost a significant amount of weight, raising speculation about his health and sparking keen public interest.
South Korea's state intelligence agency told lawmakers in October that Kim has lost around 20 kilograms from a weight of about 140kg but appears to have no major health problem.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
4. S. Korea, China to hold high-level strategic talks this week
Excerpts:
Probably to be discussed as well is whether South Korea will send a government delegation to China on the occasion of the Beijing Winter Olympics slated to open in February. Seoul has stated that it has made no final decision on the sensitive matter despite the announcement of plans by Washington and some like-minded nations to boycott the games diplomatically.
Seoul officials said South Korea will consider an appropriate "role" as the host of the previous winter Olympic games in 2018.
"The governments of the two countries agree that high-ranking personnel exchanges are very important in the development of bilateral relations," a South Korean official told reporters on the customary condition of anonymity. "On top of this consensus, there will be an exchange of opinions (in the upcoming Strategic Dialogue) on the overall relationship between South Korea and China, including high-level exchanges."
S. Korea, China to hold high-level strategic talks this week | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Dec. 21 (Yonhap) -- South Korea said Tuesday it will hold high-level strategic talks with China via video links this week, the first bilateral session of its kind in more than four years.
Choi Jong-kun, first vice foreign minister, is scheduled to hold the 9th Strategic Dialogue with his Chinese counterpart, Le Yucheng, Thursday afternoon, according to Choi Young-sam, spokesman for Seoul's foreign ministry. They had the 8th Strategic Dialogue meeting in June 2017.
The two sides plan to have discussions on a wide range of issues, which include ways to develop their relations in a forward-looking way and strengthen cooperation on regional and global security issues. In 2022, Seoul and Beijing commemorate the 30th anniversary of forging diplomatic ties.
Probably to be discussed as well is whether South Korea will send a government delegation to China on the occasion of the Beijing Winter Olympics slated to open in February. Seoul has stated that it has made no final decision on the sensitive matter despite the announcement of plans by Washington and some like-minded nations to boycott the games diplomatically.
Seoul officials said South Korea will consider an appropriate "role" as the host of the previous winter Olympic games in 2018.
"The governments of the two countries agree that high-ranking personnel exchanges are very important in the development of bilateral relations," a South Korean official told reporters on the customary condition of anonymity. "On top of this consensus, there will be an exchange of opinions (in the upcoming Strategic Dialogue) on the overall relationship between South Korea and China, including high-level exchanges."
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
5. IFRC allocates $1.2 mln to help N. Korea fight against COVID-19
I wonder how much better off north Korea would be if it had accepted previous offers of vaccinations and other humanitarian aid to deal with COVID. Of course if there have been no outbreaks as the regime claims, I guess we should be trying to learn from the north (note sarcasm).
IFRC allocates $1.2 mln to help N. Korea fight against COVID-19 | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Dec. 21 (Yonhap) -- The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) has allocated 1.1 million Swiss francs (US$1.2 million) to help North Korea combat the COVID-19 pandemic from January last year to June next year, its interim financial report showed.
According to the COVID-19 Outbreak 20-Month Update, the organization had spent around 699,000 Swiss francs as of September, with the largest portion of 296,000 Swiss francs spent on health-related operations.
Another 157,000 Swiss francs was spent for the group's efforts to "influence others as leading strategic partners," while 91,000 Swiss francs, 68,000 Swiss francs and 61,500 Swiss francs was spent on disaster risk reduction, shelter, and water, sanitation and hygiene, respectively.
"The DPRK government has taken consistent pre-emptive and offensive measures since the outbreak of COVID-19, continuing to raise awareness of all people with campaign against the rapid spread of highly infectious new COVID-19 variants," the report said. DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
North Korea has imposed strict border controls since the outbreak of the pandemic, and claims to be coronavirus-free.
According to the World Health Organization's latest weekly report, North Korea said 739 people, including 151 with influenza-like illness or severe acute respiratory infections, underwent COVID-19 tests between Dec. 2-9, but all were found negative for the virus.
scaaet@yna.co.kr
(END)
6. North Korea keeps mum on callouts of human rights violations
Probably not for long.
We need to focus on human rights because we need to do the right thing, because it is the right thing to do (or something like that as Kant said)
Human rights are a national security issue as well as a moral imperative.Kim Jong-un must deny the human rights of the Korean people in the north in order to remain in power. Since the advent of COVID Kim has imposed draconian population and resources control measures over the people which further restrict what little human rights exist. The 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry said that the people need information and in particular information about how their human rights are being abused and that north Korea does not live up to the universal declaration of human rights.
Lastly, we should keep in mind that as we "attack" north Korea's nuclear and missile programs we actually contribute to reinforcing Kim's legitimacy. But when we work to educate and inform the Korean people (and the world) about the human right abuses and crimes against humanity being committed we undermine the legitimacy of the Kim family regime.
Tuesday
December 21, 2021
North Korea keeps mum on callouts of human rights violations
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un addresses the Eighth Conference of Military Educators of the Korean People's Army, held from Dec. 4 to 5 in Pyongyang. The photo was published in the Rodong Sinmun, the North Korean Workers' Party's paper. [NEWS1]
North Korea has kept quiet despite repeated callouts by the United States and the international community on its human rights violations.
Some experts in Korea think it may have to do with the timing of North Korea's year-end party meeting and leader Kim Jong-un’s New Year’s address.
All within this month, the Joe Biden administration imposed new sanctions on a few North Korean individuals for their human rights violations, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations called for an open meeting at the Security Council to discuss the regime’s human rights records, and the United Nations passed a resolution condemning the regime for its “gross” human rights violations that “may amount to crimes against humanity.”
Kim Song, the North Korean ambassador to the UN, protested the resolution before its passage, calling it an anti-North Korea policy and a collusion by the United States and the European Union.
But the usual rhetoric from the North Korean state media was visibly absent.
When the U.S. Donald Trump administration in December 2018 carried out sanctions against Choe Ryong-hae, then-leader of the Workers’ Party of Korea's organization and guidance department, and two other key aides of North Korean leader Kim for their human rights abuses, the regime published a statement the next day in its party’s paper, Rodong Sinmun, calling the sanctions “atrocious hostility against the spirit of the DPRK-U.S. summit in Singapore,” and Arirang Meari, another regime mouthpiece, called them “unacceptable political provocation.” DPRK is the acronym of North Korea's full name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Earlier this year when U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken called on the UN Human Rights Council to support resolutions “addressing issues of concern around the world, including ongoing human rights violations in Syria and North Korea,” the North Korean Foreign Ministry responded within a week with a statement condemning all countries “in the West” for using their human rights rhetoric to “try to rule the world by eliminating the countries that are offended by them.”
When the U.S. State Department issued a statement on April 28, on the occasion of North Korea Freedom Week, to “stand with the millions of North Koreans who continue to have their dignity and human rights violated by one of the most repressive and totalitarian states in the world,” the regime responded within four days, through a statement by its Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson.
“The fact that the United States blasphemed our supreme dignity this time is a clear signal that it is preparing for an all-out confrontation with us, and it gave a clear answer to how we should deal with the new U.S. [government] in the future,” the statement said.
The absence of such rhetoric from the regime this time around following several comments from the United States and the UN on its human rights records could be explained by the timing of the major events to take place in Pyongyang, according to some experts in Korea.
North Korea is to hold a party meeting near the end of this month, which will review the key policies of 2021 and decide on the ones for next year. Early next year, its leader Kim may deliver his regular New Year’s address, which usually contains the regime’s messages to the United States and South Korea. Kim skipped the address in both 2020 and 2021.
“Ahead of the year-end party meeting, North Korea appears to be making a last-minute review on whether to go into confrontation mode with the Biden administration or whether to open up the possibility of negotiations,” said Hong Min, researcher of North Korean affairs at Korea Institute for National Unification, a Seoul-based think tank, in speaking with the JoongAng Ilbo on Tuesday. “Pyongyang could be thinking that if it responds to the United States on its every action, the scope of its own future movements could be further reduced. That might be why they are keeping silent at the moment, which is at the moment drawing more attention [from the international community] on what its key external messages will be.”
BY PARK HYUN-JU, ESTHER CHUNG [chung.juhee@joongang.co.kr]
7. Taiwan protests Korea's canceled invitation to minister
I wish we would all stop kowtowing to the PRC.
Tuesday
December 21, 2021
Taiwan protests Korea's canceled invitation to minister
Digital Minister of Taiwan Tang Feng speaks at an event on Dec. 2. [TWITTER ACCOUNT OF TANG FENG]
The Taiwan Foreign Ministry on Monday protested Korea’s decision last week to cancel its invitation to Digital Minister of Taiwan Tang Feng to speak at a forum on the fourth industrial revolution.
"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has summoned the acting representative of the ROK [Republic of Korea] Representative Office in Taipei to express strong dissatisfaction with the disrespectful behavior of the ROK," the Taiwanese ministry said in its statement on Monday. "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country and has the right to conduct exchanges and deepen exchanges with other countries in the world."
Minister Tang, who also goes by Audrey Tang, was scheduled to speak at the Global Policy Conference on the 4th Industrial Revolution hosted by Korea’s presidential committee on the fourth industrial revolution last Thursday.
According to the Taiwanese Foreign Ministry, Minister Tang was informed of the cancellation “early in the morning” the day of the conference.
“Ambassador Tang Dianwen of the [Taipei Mission] in the ROK has also simultaneously expressed to the ROK the solemn protest of the Taiwan authorities,” the statement said.
Korea’s reason for the abrupt cancellation was “various aspects of cross-Strait issues,” according to a report by the Central News Agency in Taiwan on Monday. The agency quoted the Taiwanese ministry’s spokesperson Joanne Ou, who cited an email sent to Tang’s office from the conference organizers.
"Cross-strait issues" refers to Taiwan-China relations. The last time the Taiwan Strait was mentioned in the U.S.-Korea joint statement following the summit in May, the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s spokesman told the two countries to “refrain from playing with fire.”
When asked about Tang's cancellation and Taiwan’s protest, the Korean Foreign Ministry said on Tuesday that there is no change in the government's position in that it "will continuously promote informal and substantive exchanges with Taiwan."
“I understand that the issue of Taiwan's participation in the policy conference was decided after a comprehensive review of the circumstances,” Choi Young-sam, spokesperson of the ministry, said in a regular press briefing at the ministry headquarters in Seoul on Tuesday. “In this regard, the basic position of the Korean government to continuously promote informal and substantive exchanges with Taiwan has not changed.”
Minister Tang was formerly a software programmer and became the first transgender official to assume a minister-level position in Taiwan in October 2016.
Tang was also a speaker at the Joe Biden administration’s virtual Summit on Democracy, which was denounced by the Chinese Foreign Ministry as an attempt by the United States to “draw lines of ideological prejudice, instrumentalize and weaponize democracy.”
The Taiwan Foreign Ministry's statement on Monday protesting Korea’s decision last week to cancel its invitation to Digital Minister of Taiwan Tang Feng to speak at a forum on the fourth industrial revolution. [SCREEN CAPTURE]
BY ESTHER CHUNG [chung.juhee@joongang.co.kr]
8. The case for nuclear armament (South Korea)
I think it would be a strategic mistake by South Korea to develop indgenous nuclear weapons. They would not deter north Korea even without US extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella. On the other hand they would also have the effect of legitimizing the north's argument that they need them for deterrence.
But the real issue is trust of the US and the no first use issue. We need a stronger information and influence campaign against the north and our adversaries and a public diplomacy campaign with our friends, partners, andallies to ensure we demonstrate sufficient strategic reassurance and strategic resolve.
Tuesday
December 21, 2021
The case for nuclear armament
Nam Jeong-ho
The author is a columnist of the JoongAng Ilbo.
As North Korea denuclearization has hit a snag, nearly 70 percent of the South Korean public want their country to have nuclear weapons. What about overseas perspective?
In the autumn of 2016, then U.S. President Barack Obama seriously considered declaring the principle of “No First Use” (NFU) of nuclear weapons. According to the policy, the United States will use nuclear weapons only to defend the country and its allies from nuclear attacks or only to retaliate nuclear attacks against them. Even if an enemy state attacks the United States or its allies — and if it used conventional weapons — the United States will not counter the attack with nuclear weapons, according to the principle.
Most of his foreign affairs and security aides tried to dissuade Obama. They said U.S. allies won’t trust U.S. nuclear umbrella under the NFU policy. In particular, then U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter argued that South Korea and Japan will develop their own nuclear programs. As oppositions grew, Obama gave up on the NFU policy.
That principle, after five years, was revived. President Joe Biden, who served as the vice president of the Obama administration, started pushing it again after he took office this year. The Nuclear Posture Review, scheduled to be issued next month, will likely include the NFU policy.
It is noteworthy that many experts in the United States are now expecting a nuclear-armed South Korea amid the current situation. According to a survey by the Foreign Affairs magazine, published on Dec. 12, seven out of 50 experts responded that Korea will likely be acquiring nuclear weapons in 10 years. Korea was ranked third after Iran and Japan.
Furthermore, some argued that the United States should encourage a nuclear-armed South Korea. In a joint contribution to the Washington Post in early October, Professors Jennifer Lind and Daryl G. Press of Dartmouth College, urged the United States to support the South’s acquiring of nuclear weapons in the context of China’s rise and the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear programs.
Michael Green, top left, senior vice president for Asia and Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University, speaks at the first session of the virtual JoongAng Ilbo-CSIS Forum on Dec. 14 at a JTBC studio in Ilsan, Gyeonggi. [KIM SEONG-RYONG]
Why do many U.S. experts, including Carter, discuss a possibility of a nuclear-armed South Korea? It indicates that South Korea will end up acquiring nuclear weapons in response to the NFU policy amid the stalled denuclearization of North Korea. After the NFU policy is established, a U.S. pledge to offer nuclear umbrella to its allies will inevitably be shaken. Therefore, U.S. allies, including Britain, France, Japan and Australia fiercely lobbied to stop the NFU policy.
But there was no sign that the Moon Jae-in administration was part of the campaign, although threats to South Korea will actually be the greatest.
Michael Green, senior vice president for Asia and Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University, said South Korea is using 90 percent of its diplomatic energy to persuade the Biden administration although it is skeptical about the end of war declaration. Seoul, instead, must put efforts to reinforce nuclear deterrence, he said in a recent op-ed piece to the JoongAng Ilbo and the Korea JoongAng Daily.
Although experts overseas talk about a possibility of a nuclear-armed South Korea, it is regretful that there was no discussion domestically. The Moon administration, obsessed with inter-Korean exchanges, will unlikely bring up the issue first. But presidential candidates, who are promising to work for Korea’s future, must address this issue.
Korea is barred from acquiring nuclear weapons under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). But Article 10 of the NPT said, “Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” North Korea’s nuclear threats amount to an “extraordinary event,” according to experts.
There is an old saying — “The mantis stalks the cicada, unaware of the oriole behind” — indicating that you neglect a greater danger to pursue a small gain. If the Biden administration declares the NFU policy, we will face a far greater danger. But the Moon administration does not care. It must stop being obsessed with a hopeless end-of-war declaration and try to come up with a substantial resolution, whether it means building nuclear weapons or allowing the deployment of U.S. nuclear missiles.
9. Even With Omicron, North Korea Still Claims No Coronavirus Cases
A lot to be said for totalitarian authoritarian regimes. If you cannot control the pandemic at least you can control the narrative.
Even With Omicron, North Korea Still Claims No Coronavirus Cases
North Korea has not reported any positive tests to World Health Organization but state media has been reporting about the spread of the Omicron variant.
Throughout the entire coronavirus pandemic, North Korea has continued to insist that has had no cases of the deadly virus. This was the case through the original emergence of the virus, through various earlier variants, and now the arrival of Omicron.
Sure, no one in the public health or diplomatic worlds believes the regime in these claims, but they have continued to make them despite the country’s close proximity to the pandemic’s initial epicenter of China.
According to NK News, North Korea has told the World Health Organization (WHO) that it had tested an additional 1,464 people in the last two weeks. According to WHO, North Korea has tested 48,449 people to date.
NK News did note that while North Korea has not reported any positive tests to WHO, state media has been reporting about the spread of the Omicron variant. Korean Central TV, like many other media outlets in the world, has been reporting that the initial two vaccines are not enough to prevent some transmission of the Omicron variant.
Back in November, a UN panel passed a resolution criticizing North Korea for its human rights abuses.
“The urgency and importance of the issue of international abductions, which involves a serious violation of human rights, and of the immediate return of all abductees,” said the resolution, which was backed by Japan and the European Union. The General Assembly, according to Kyodo, is likely to pass the resolution later this month.
Also mentioned in the resolution is “grave concern at the long years of severe suffering experienced by abductees and their families, and the lack of any concrete or positive action,” as well as a denunciation of North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.
“We will never tolerate any attempts that violate the sovereignty of our state and we will continue to resolutely counter to the end the ever-worsening moves of the hostile forces against us,” the North Korean foreign ministry said in a statement issued by the Korean Central News Agency.
Kim caused a stir earlier this year when he appeared in public having lost a large amount of weight, leading to speculation either that he had gotten healthier, or that he was perhaps ill. South Korean intelligence has reportedly concluded that the North Korean leader is not facing any particular health problem, nor is there any truth to rumors that the Kim appearing in public is a double, ABC News reported back in October.
Stephen Silver, a technology writer for the National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.
Image: Reuters
10. Video messages from separated relatives still waiting to be delivered in North Korea
Another example of the regime's human rights abuses.
Video messages from separated relatives still waiting to be delivered in North Korea
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Ribbons tied to a fence offer wishes for the reunification of South and North Korea, near the DMZ at Imjingak Park in Paju, South Korea. More than 47,000 South Korean family members remain on a Red Cross list to join family reunions. File photo by Thomas Maresca/UPI | License Photo
SEOUL, Dec. 21 (UPI) -- More than 24,000 video messages have been recorded by separated families hoping to reach relatives in North Korea since 2005 -- but almost none have been delivered, South Korea's Unification Ministry said on Tuesday.
The video letters were created in conjunction with the Red Cross, with more than 1,000 new ones added this year, the ministry said in a statement. But North Korea has shown little interest in receiving them -- just 40 video messages have ever been exchanged between North and South, according to the Red Cross.
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Seoul has long pushed to hold reunions for family members separated by the 1950-53 Korean War, but face-to-face meetings have only been held sporadically since 2000, with the last one taking place in August 2018 during a period of diplomatic engagement.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in agreed to the exchange of video messages as "a matter of priority" during their summit in Pyongyang in September 2018, but relations have soured since then.
A man looks through binoculars across the Imjin River to North Korea over the Freedom Bridge that crosses the North Korea-South Korea border. File Photo by Thomas Maresca/UPI
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Time is not on the side of the family members who are still hoping to connect with their long-lost relatives. More than 82% of those who signed up with the Red Cross to participate in family reunions are over 80 years old, with a full 40% over 90.
Of the 133,000 people on the Red Cross list, only about 47,000 are still alive, according to data from the Unification Ministry, with more than 10 people dying per day on average.
The video letters, thousands of which can be viewed on a ministry website, are generally around 10 minutes long and contain basic information about the separated family member, memories of his or her hometown and a message to relatives in North Korea.
Unification Minister Lee In-young said last month that Seoul is hoping to resume family reunions for the upcoming Lunar New Year, which falls on Feb. 1, but Pyongyang has not responded to any efforts to reach out.
The South Korean government has also been compiling DNA information of separated family members to allow future generations to identify relatives in North Korea, with more than 25,000 people taking part so far, the ministry said.
"The production of video messages and DNA testing projects are the best measures considering the reality of North-South relations," a ministry official said, according to news agency Yonhap.
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"We have enough time to prepare for video reunions if North Korea responds to our calls this month as the two Koreas have an experience of holding such video-linked reunions in the past," the official said.
Information for separated family members about their relatives in North Korea remains scarce. In a survey conducted earlier this month by the Unification Ministry, more than 82% of respondents said they didn't know whether or not their relatives in the North were still alive.
11. Joint Letter to South Korea's National Assembly Calling For the Immediate Passage of a Comprehensive Anti-Discrimination Law
Joint Letter to South Korea's National Assembly Calling For the Immediate Passage of a Comprehensive Anti-Discrimination Law
December 20, 2021
National Assembly of the Republic of Korea
1 Uisadang-daero, Yeongdeungpo-gu, Seoul 07233
Republic of Korea
Re: Protect marginalized groups in South Korea
Dear members of the Legislation and Judiciary Committee and other members of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea:
On behalf of the 30 signatory organizations to this letter, we are writing to urge you to immediately pass a comprehensive antidiscrimination law in the Republic of Korea (South Korea), which would meaningfully address pervasive discrimination against marginalized groups in the country.
Over the past 15 years, United Nations mechanisms have repeatedly expressed concern about discrimination in South Korea. The UN Human Rights Committee, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, and Committee on the Rights of the Child have all specifically urged the government to adopt comprehensive antidiscrimination legislation.
States have also urged South Korea to adopt comprehensive antidiscrimination legislation throughout the three cycles of its Universal Periodic Review, which South Korea accepted several times in 2008, 2013, and 2018.While patchwork protections exist for some marginalized groups, a comprehensive bill would make them more cohesive and effective, and would cover other groups as well. Recent proposals would prohibit discrimination based on “gender, disability, medical history, age, origin, ethnicity, race, skin color, physical condition, marital status, sexual orientation, and gender identity.”
Explicit protections are urgently needed, as existing frameworks are failing to prevent discrimination and provide redress.South Korea lags globally in protecting the rights of women and girls. Traditional patriarchal values remain deeply embedded in society and help drive deep gender inequity. In the 2021 World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap ranking, South Korea ranked 102 out of 156 countries, with an especially large gender gap on economic participation and opportunity, where it ranked 123.
The country ranked 134—among the worst in the world—on the percentage of legislators, senior officials, and managers who are women, with 16 percent of these roles filled by women. Less than 3 percent of board members at South Korea’s top 200 listed companies and less than 4 percent of top executives are women. South Korean women do more than four times as much unpaid work as men and face a 33 percent gender pay gap. Gender-based violence is unfortunately- widespread, as well as digital sex crimes. In 2019, the Korea Women’s Hotline estimated that a woman was murdered every 1.8 days. In a 2017 survey of 2,000 South Korean men by the Korean Institute of Criminology, nearly 80 percent of respondents reported they had committed violence against an intimate partner.Discrimination against older people in South Korea is pervasive.
Research by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) found that over 40 percent of older people in South Korea live in relative poverty, the highest rate among OECD countries. In a 2018 survey of 1000 older people by the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, 59 percent of respondents said they had difficulty finding jobs because of age restrictions, while 44 percent said they had experienced ageism in their workplaces. A 2020 report by the Korea Elder Protection Agency of the Ministry of Health and Welfare said the cases of abuse against older people increased from 2,674 in 2009 to 6,259 in 2020.Discrimination against people with disabilities is widespread. Children with disabilities, for example, can face significant difficulties obtaining an education.
Discrimination based on race, origin, and ethnicity has also been a pervasive concern in South Korea. A 2020 survey from the National Human Rights Commission of Korea found that nearly 70 percent of foreign residents had experienced racial discrimination, with nearly 40 percent facing workplace discrimination and nearly 30 percent being refused a job.
North Koreans living in South Korea also face discrimination in accessing education, accommodation, and employment opportunities.Discrimination based on origin is also evident in the education law itself.
All Korean citizen children have a right to nine years of compulsory education, consisting of six years of elementary education and three of secondary education. Although migrant children may have the right to attend school, they do not benefit from compulsory education. Under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, however, all children, regardless of national origin, have a right to free and compulsory primary education, and access to all other education, including further compulsory education, on a non-discriminatory basis.South Korea has not adopted protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, leaving gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people at particular risk. LGBT people are highly vulnerable to being fired, evicted, or subjected to other forms of harassment. LGBT children experience severe isolation and mistreatment in schools.
In recent years, LGBT parades and festivals have been targeted with intimidation and violence, and anti-LGBT sentiment surged last year in the wake of a Covid-19 outbreak.Lawmakers in South Korea have introduced comprehensive antidiscrimination legislation 11 times since 2007, but these bills have not been a priority for lawmakers despite wide support by majority of South Koreans. In 2020, 89 percent of those surveyed by the National Human Rights Commission of Korea supported the enactment of an antidiscrimination law.
In 2021, 100,000 citizens petitioned the National Assembly to enact an antidiscrimination law, and the Legislation and Judiciary Committee was obligated to review that petition by November 10, 2021. However, on November 10, the Legislation and Judiciary Committee announced it extended the review period until the end of the parliamentary sitting on May 29, 2024.On November 25, President Moon Jae-in called for South Korea to align its standards to international law and protect human rights of all marginalized groups.
We are aware the regular legislative session of the National Assembly ended on December 10, but the National Assembly will hold an extra temporary session from December 13, 2021, to January 10, 2022. You have a crucial opportunity to support President Moon’s call, and respond to recommendations from within South Korea and from the international community to pass a law that would preemptively protect all marginalized minorities from discrimination as well as create systems to protect them if victimized.We strongly urge you to pass comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation within this legislative session to support these long-overdue protections to safeguard the rights of all South Koreans and bring South Korea in line with its human rights obligations.
Sincerely yours,
Advocacy for Principled Action in Government
African Observatory for Public Freedoms and Fundamental Rights
Amnesty International Korea
Cadal
CIVICUS
Equinox Initiative for Racial Justice
European Network Against Racism
FIDH - International Federation for Human Rights.
Forum Asia
Hall & Prior Health and Aged Care Group
Han Voice
HelpAge International
Human Rights Watch
Human Rights Without Frontiers
ILGA Asia
Imagine Africa Institute
International Coalition to Stop Crimes against Humanity in North Korea
International Federation on Ageing
International Longevity Centre Canada
International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism
International Network for the Prevention of Elder Abuse
Minority Rights Group International
Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights
Open North Korea
Organization for Identity and Cultural Development
Oyu Tolgoi Watch
Rivers without Boundaries Coalition
Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
Transitional Justice Working Group
Unification Academy
UN Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/KOR/CO/4, December 3, 2015, paras. 12-13; UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/KOR/CO/3, December 17, 2009, para. 9; UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/KOR/CO/4, October 19, 2017, paras. 22-23; UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc. CERD/C/KOR/CO/14, August 17, 2007, paras. 10-11, 13; UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc. CERD/C/KOR/CO/15-16, October 23, 2012, paras. 6-7; UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc. CERD/C/KOR/CO/17-19, January 10, 2019, paras. 5-6; UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/KOR/CO/7, August 1, 2011, paras. 14-15; UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/KOR/CO/8, March 14, 2018, paras. 12-13; UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/KOR/CO/3-4, February 2, 2012, paras. 28-29; UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/KOR/CO/5-6, October 24, 2019, paras. 16-17.
Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/37/11, December 27, 2017; HRC, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/10, December 12, 2012; HRC, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/40, May 29, 2008; HRC, UN Doc. A/HRC/37.11/Add.1, February 28, 2018; HRC, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/10/Add.1, January 16, 2013; HRC, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/40/Add.1, August 25, 2008.
“Hecklers Outnumber Gay-Festival-Goers in South Korea,” Economist, September 7, 2019, https://www.economist.com/asia/2019/09/05/hecklers-outnumber-gay-festival-goers-in-south-korea (accessed December 13, 2021); Shin Ji-hye, “Debate on Anti-Discrimination Law Gains Momentum,” Korea Herald, June 20, 2021, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210620000168 (accessed December 13, 2021).
Ibid., p. 209.
Song Chae Kyung-wha, “Female Board Members Comprise Only 2.7% of Executive Directors at Top 200 S. Korean Companies,” Hankyoreh, March 15, 2020, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_business/932611.html (accessed October 20, 2021); Gyung-hwa Song, “S. Korean Women Comprise 3.6% of Top Corporate Executives,” Hankyoreh, October 30, 2019, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_business/915170.html (accessed October 20, 2021).
Global Gender Gap Report 2021, p. 241.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Pensions at a Glance 2019, https://read.oecd.org/10.1787/b6d3dcfc-en?format=pdf (accessed October 18, 2021), p. 186.
Ibid., arts. 1 & 6.
Human Rights Watch, “I Thought of Myself as Defective”: Neglecting the Rights of LGBT Youth in South Korean Schools, September 14, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/09/14/i-thought-myself-defective/neglecting-rights-lgbt-youth-south-korean-schools
Yoon So-yeon, “Calls for Anti-discrimination Law Grow, but so Does Opposition,” JoongAng Daily, July 11, 2021, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2021/07/11/culture/features/antidiscrimination-equality-law-discrimination/20210711173307144.html (accessed October 20, 2021); Human Rights Watch, Joint Statement National Assembly of South Korea act swiftly to enact anti-discrimination legislation, November 11, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/11/national-assembly-south-korea-should-act-swiftly-enact-anti-discrimination.
12. Promised new homes don’t materialize for retired North Korean soldiers
"I used to feel sorry for myself because I had no shoes until I met a man who had no feet." Someone always has it worse and the retired nKPA probably have it worst of all.
Promised new homes don’t materialize for retired North Korean soldiers
Housing shortages means ex-military officers must crash in basements, spare rooms after 30 years of service.
Newly retired military officers in North Korea are complaining to authorities about a serious lack of housing, with many of them forced to stay with relatives in utility rooms and basements after decades of service to the country, sources told RFA.
The military officers, who joined up in the late 1980s and early 1990s, were promised that the hardships they would experience in the line of duty would be worth it, because they would be well taken care of after completing their service.
But many have been waiting around for years for the government to provide them with homes. Some are beginning to think that it won’t happen at all.
“As winter begins, dissatisfaction with the authorities is rising among the retired officers. Their housing problems have not been resolved even after they’ve waited several years,” a local government employee from the port city of Hamhung on the east coast told RFA Dec. 15.
“At the end of last month, several recently discharged military officers visited the Hamhung Municipal People’s Committee and protested the lack of housing support,” said the source, who requested anonymity for security reasons.
Most of the retired officers are living wherever they can, with friends, acquaintances or even in factory dormitories, according to the source.
Home construction has been put on hold due to a suspension of trade with China to stem the spread of the coronavirus. Chinese construction materials have not been available for almost two years in North Korea.
The central government has been funneling resources and electricity to the capital Pyongyang so that it can complete an ambitious national plan to construct 50,000 homes by 2025, including 10,000 by the end of this year.
But this has taken even more attention away from the provinces, the source said.
“Housing construction has been so sluggish here that receiving a state provided house is akin to picking the stars out of the sky,” the source said. “Still, the discharged officers visit the Urban Management Department of the People’s Committee every day to complain.”
Ex-soldiers, especially officers, are supposed to receive benefits like new homes in return for their 30 years of service, but Hamhung officials have been unable to comply, the source said.
“The housing problem for veterans is likely to be similar in other regions of the country, beyond just Hamhung,” the source said.
“It’s a difficult time for everyone to live these days, but the transition from military life is even more difficult. Veterans are accustomed to receiving monthly food rations while in the military. … They have to live their lives to the best of their ability where there are no rations at all,” said the source.
For many, the hard military life was better than their retirement, according to the source.
“They are tired of waiting for their house to be assigned. They are suffering from hardships they never experienced while in uniform,” the source said. “They are not hiding their dissatisfaction, saying, ‘Is this our reward for more than 30 years of hard work in service of the party and the country?’”
A resident of the city of Hyesan, on the border with China in Ryanggang province, told RFA that an uncle has been living with the family for three years while waiting for his own house from the government.
“My uncle visits the People’s Committee every week to find out when he will get his house, but he comes back discouraged because there is no prospect that the problem will be resolved,” said the second source, who requested anonymity to speak freely.
“At least the veterans with parents and relatives can live with them, but most veterans have been assigned to places where there was nobody to support them, so now they live in basements of apartments or in storage rooms,” the second source said.
The economy has transformed radically since the time that the retired officers joined the military. Back then, the Soviet Union was still in existence, providing aid to Pyongyang that kept the economy stable. People could live off their government salaries.
Now government salaries are nowhere near enough to live on, and a nascent market economy has emerged. Most people earn their living doing secondary jobs, usually by running a family business.
“Veterans have no experience doing business in the market, so it is more difficult for them to live,” the second source said. “This is emerging as a real social problem, so urban youth who see these veterans suffering from housing shortages and hardships do not hope to become military officers, and women do not want to marry soldiers.”
Translated by Claire Lee. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
13. Ten Years On: What to Make of Kim Jong-un’s Long March to Power?
The longest running "correct" intelligence assessment that dates back to the beginning of the Kim Jong-il era: in the next 10 years north Korea will attack the South, collapse, or continue to muddle through.
Excerpts:
On December 17, 2011, Kim Jong-un looked impossibly young and out of place in an old man’s government and system. Today he is firmly in control even if he still looks vaguely out of place. However, with the COVID-19 pandemic still raging and allied concern growing as his nuclear and missile capabilities continue to expand, the next decade could be even less stable and more dangerous than his first.
North Korea is likely to be in tact when the next decade concludes, but uncertainties will steadily grow. No matter how strong Kim might appear to be, the North Korean system will increasingly clash with the interests and wishes of the Korean people. It will eventually disappear, and the collapse could be ugly.
Ten Years On: What to Make of Kim Jong-un’s Long March to Power?
A decade ago Dear Leader Kim Jong-il died at age seventy. Although the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) had survived many challenges in its sixty-three years of existence, its future was far from assured.
Kim’s twenty-seven-year-old son, Kim Jong-un, was the presumed Great Successor, but the odds that he would end up in control appeared long. The DPRK spent most of its existence isolated with few friends and only a couple reluctant allies, most notably the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which of late had warmed significantly to South Korea.
The North’s conventional military superiority had waned as the Republic of Korea’s development had waxed. Yet Pyongyang’s aggressive drive for nuclear weapons put it at odds with China as well as the United States. The 1983 attempted assassination of the Republic of Korea (ROK) president with a bombing in Rangoon, Burma wrecked the North’s reputation among nonaligned third-world states, relationships which founder Kim Il-sung had made a priority.
Ahead of South Korea economically in its early years, the DPRK had fallen behind in the 1960s and the gap had continued to expand. A devastating famine in the mid-to-late 1990s killed hundreds of thousands and as many as two million people. Having reneged on foreign debts, Pyongyang had no international credit. As defections rose and technologies seeped into the North, North Koreans increasingly realized that they were living in something other than paradise.
Today, however, Kim remains in charge. His country continues to look stable. And while the DPRK’s future remains fraught with challenges, there is no reason to presume an early collapse either of the Kim dynasty or North Korea.
Kim has had an enormous impact on his country. He has both facilitated great change and cemented conventional wisdom. The combination makes a challenging mix.
The dynasty still reigns supreme. Kim Il-sung took years moving Kim Jong-il up the leadership ladder, ensuring that Kim fils would ascend to the communist throne. Kim Jong-il had far less time to train Kim Jong-un, since the former didn’t begin until recovering from his stroke of August 2008. Only a few years of paternal assistance seemed too little time to ready Kim Jong-un for combat in one of the most dangerous political snake pits on earth. Many observers bet on his “mentors” ending up in charge, either individually or collectively amid an extended power struggle. Instead, his supposed guides successively disappeared. Vice Marshal Ri Yong-ho was dumped a few months after Kim’s ascension at a special politburo meeting, never to be heard from again. The following year Uncle Jang Song-thaek fell, with a stage-managed arrest followed by a well-publicized execution. Of the seven officials who accompanied Kim alongside his father’s coffin, within five years two were purged, one disappeared, one was demoted, one was retired, and two were promoted. Hundreds of senior party members were executed in the early years, establishing Kim’s brutal authority.
Kim successfully transformed his international image from gruesome murderer—using antiaircraft guns, a banned nerve agent, and more to execute when seeking to make a point—to practiced king of summitry. He met Chinese president Xi Jinping five times, South Korean president Moon Jae-in three times, Donald Trump two times (plus a quick meet & greet at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)), and Russian president Vladimir Putin one time. South Korean diplomats privately commented on Kim’s skill and charm.
Planned or not, Kim used the prospect of détente with America to restore the bilateral Sino-North Korean relationship. Historically, relations between Pyongyang and Beijing were never good, despite, or, perhaps, because of the PRC’s military rescue operation during the Korean War. China also was unhappy with its reckless, destabilizing neighbor. Kim Il-sung ruthlessly balanced between Beijing and Moscow, and difficult political differences emerged, including Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution and Kim’s personality cult. Before 2018, Xi Jinping had frozen out Kim Jong-un, refusing to meet, despite holding several summits with South Korean president Park Geun-hye. However, the impending Trump-Kim meet-up forced Beijing to act, lest it get sidelined by a U.S.-DPRK deal. Today the PRC plays a major role in keeping North Korea afloat economically.
Kim has permanently changed DPRK relations with America. Although Korea specialists widely panned Donald Trump’s summitry, President Joe Biden affirmed that he, too, was willing to meet with Kim, though with more conditions. A policy of strict isolation having been abandoned, future contact is likely to be more personal as well.
With four nuclear and a hundred conventional missile tests, the latest ruling Kim brought his father’s and grandfather’s nuclear and missile plans to fruition. Although the size of the North’s arsenal, and Pyongyang’s ability to target the American homeland, remain uncertain, there is little doubt that the DPRK is a genuine nuclear power. And it could become a significant one in the not-too-distant future. The Rand Corporation and Asan Institute warned: “by 2027, North Korea could have 200 nuclear weapons and several dozen intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and hundreds of theater missiles for delivering the nuclear weapons. The ROK and the United States are not prepared, and do not plan to be prepared, to deal with the coercive and warfighting leverage that these weapons would give North Korea.”
Kim has taken his country full circle, first toward greater economic reform and contact with South Korea, then to almost complete international isolation, highlighted by a sustained attempt to increase state economic control and eradicate South Korean cultural influences. Kim hosted a K-pop concert in 2018. Three years later, he is waging ideological war on K-pop and other outside influences. Teens are being jailed for listening to or singing South Korean songs. Some analysts predict that as COVID eases he will open up again, while others fear he has joined his father and grandfather in deciding that he must sacrifice economic growth to maintain political control.
Kim retains the opportunity to move in almost any direction once the pandemic ebbs. Isolation is one option: His country is more powerful militarily, has a better relationship with the PRC, and recently has come close to hermetically sealing its border. Also possible is opening commercially to the West, since under Kim the DPRK has greater experience with domestic markets and foreign investment than under his predecessors and China long has urged this strategy. Pyongyang could reopen political talks with the United States. Previously under discussion were issuing a peace declaration, opening liaison offices, searching for additional combat remains from the war, and pursuing denuclearization. With this course, Pyongyang and Washington could set up arms control negotiations by labelling denuclearization talks.
Who might follow Kim Jong-un remains a mystery. When Kim was ostentatiously heavy and unhealthy, the appointment of a de facto party deputy earlier this year might have reflected regime concern over his longevity. Since then Kim has dropped substantial weight, but the question of succession remains. Observers usually focus on other members of the sacred bloodline, though how much difference that would make in practice is unclear, since there appears to be less popular illusion about the leadership today than in the past. His children remain pre-teens and are unlikely to be possible political factors for another couple decades, assuming he retains control. His sister, Kim Yo-Jong, has his trust and a high public profile, but no obvious source of independent authority should he die. Moreover, the only women to exercise political power in the North have done so indirectly, as spouses or sisters, not on their own. Other close male relatives include an older brother, half-uncle, and two half-nephews, none of whom could easily claim the throne. Without an obvious successor in place who enjoys strong political support, the next transition could be much more difficult.
On December 17, 2011, Kim Jong-un looked impossibly young and out of place in an old man’s government and system. Today he is firmly in control even if he still looks vaguely out of place. However, with the COVID-19 pandemic still raging and allied concern growing as his nuclear and missile capabilities continue to expand, the next decade could be even less stable and more dangerous than his first.
North Korea is likely to be in tact when the next decade concludes, but uncertainties will steadily grow. No matter how strong Kim might appear to be, the North Korean system will increasingly clash with the interests and wishes of the Korean people. It will eventually disappear, and the collapse could be ugly.
Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of several books, including Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World and co-author of The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations with North and South Korea.
Image: Reuters
14. The Obama Administration Discussed Sending Steve Kerr To North Korea To Meet With Kim Jong-un
Hmmm..... I was not aware of this. I am going to have to ask Marcus Noland about this at our next board meeting since he is cited in the article.
A desire for a modern era "ping pong diplomacy" with basketball?
The Obama Administration Discussed Sending Steve Kerr To North Korea To Meet With Kim Jong-un
Steve Kerr almost found himself in North Korea playing basketball against Kim Jong-un.
Kerr played point guard on multiple Bulls championship teams.
“We have to work with what we’ve got. If this guy is really as big of a Chicago Bulls fan as we hear, let’s work with that, because we have nothing else to go on,” advisor Marcu Noland told President Barack Obama at the time about potentially sending Kerr, who was a TNT analyst in 2012, according to The Athletic.
The plan was to send Kerr with two advisors to Pyongyang to play some hoops with the young dictator so they could get a better read of the situation in North Korea, but the plan never happened.
In an unrelated situation, Bulls legend Scottie Pippen did go over to North Korea on multiple occasions and is a good friend with the brutal tyrant.
An advisor to President Obama once proposed a radical plan to jumpstart diplomatic relations with North Korea: send Steve Kerr to Pyongyang to play a game of H-O-R-S-E with new Supreme Leader, and lifelong Bulls fan, Kim Jong-un.
As scary as people might think it is to visit North Korea, if you’re going as a former NBA star and at the time an analyst, the North Koreans wouldn’t dare touch you.
Add in the fact the man running the country loves the Bulls, and Kerr would have been treated like royalty, which is probably why the plan was pitched in the first place.
If I was offered the chance to go to North Korea as a representative of the USA, I would do it in a heartbeat. Think about how few Americans go to the closed off communist dictatorship and think of how fewer have ever met Kim Jong-un.
The list of Americans who have met the mysterious and brutal leader is very small.
We’ll never know what could have been, but at least we always have Kim Jong-un’s friendship with Dennis Rodman to fall back on!
15. First Two Episodes Of ‘Snowdrop’ Do Not Alleviate Viewer Concerns
I have not yet seen this but now I really want to since I was stationed in Korea during the period that this takes place.
Dec 20, 2021,10:19am EST|1,338 views
First Two Episodes Of ‘Snowdrop’ Do Not Alleviate Viewer Concerns
I'm a journalist fascinated by Korean drama and film.
Jung Hae-in and Blackpink's Jisoo star in 'Snowdrop.' JTBC
The controversy surrounding the JTBC drama Snowdrop did not dissipate after the first two episodes were aired on Dec. 18 and 19. Concerns about the plot and characters were first expressed in March of 2021 when descriptions of the drama were leaked.
The drama, starring Jung Hae-in and BlackPink’s Jisoo, tells the story of a North Korean spy and a university student. Jisoo’s character hides the spy when he stumbles into her room, thinking that he is a pro-democracy activist.
The controversy concerns the fictional contention that a North Korean spy was potentially involved in or even associated with Korea’s pro-democracy movement. Many of those who protested Chun Doo-hwan’s regime in the 1980s were falsely accused of being North Korean spies. Pro-democracy protesters were imprisoned, tortured and killed in an attempt by the government to suppress political dissidents. Chun was a South Korean politician and army general who served as the fifth president of South Korea from 1980 to 1988. His expansion of martial law resulted in the death of at least 200 pro-democracy activists.
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According to the Korea Times, an online petition was posted on Dec. 19 to ask that the show be cancelled.
“Many activists were tortured and died after being falsely accused of being North Korean spies,” said the petition. “I believe that the content of the drama defames the value and reputation of the democratization movement.”
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The petition currently has more than 200,000 signatures. Some viewers have expressed concerns that since Snowdrop was going to be aired internationally on Disney+, that foreign viewers would be influenced by an inaccurate description of Korean history.
At a Dec. 17 press conference, director Jo Hyun-tak said that the story is about individuals and not about politics or ideology.
He tried to reassure viewers that although the series was set in 1987, everything in the story was fictional, except for the fact that it was set during the military regime. Information leaked about the plot, he said, should not be perceived as representing the entire series.
However, reactions to the first episodes prompted renewed concern by viewers and more people signed the petition. According to the Korea Herald, several advertisers have since requested that their products be removed from the show or the placement minimized.
Earlier in 2021, another Korean drama, Joseon Exorcist, was canceled because viewers complained about historical inaccuracies.
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I am a journalist fascinated by Korean drama and film. Since 2013, my stories on Korean media and culture have been published in the Los Angeles Review of Books, Kultscene, Macg Productions, The Independent, Bust, Hello Giggles and Mental Floss. For three years I worked as a writer and editor at KPopStarz, a popular K-pop and kdrama news site and appeared on three KCON panels discussing drama trends. Some of my drama blogs appear on the That Only Happens In Kdramas FB page. Read Less
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David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
