Quotes of the Day:
"The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against arbitrary government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when expediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of our government."
- Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black
"Practice becoming."
"Practice any art, music, singing, dancing, acting, drawing, painting, sculpting, poetry, fiction, essays, reportage, no matter how well or badly, not to get money and fame, but to experience becoming, to find out what's inside you, to make your soul grow."
- Kurt Vonnegut
“Some people insist that 'mediocre' is better than 'best.' They delight in clipping wings because they themselves can't fly. They despise brains because they have none.”
- Robert A. Heinlein, Have Space Suit—Will Travel
1. Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at the UN Security Council Stakeout on the Human Rights Situation in DPRK
2. Making much of human rights
3. Rights Group Tracks Kim Jong-un's Murders
4. U.S.-North relations unlikely to be impacted by Beijing Games: Lambert
5. Analysis: N.Korea after 10 years of Kim Jong Un - better armed but more isolated than ever
6. 2022 U.S. defense bill erases ban on reducing USFK troops
7. How Kim Jong-un Ran N.Korea's Economy into the Ground
8. A Declaration to End the Korean War: Why Now?
9. Undeterred by fruitless push in 2021, S. Korea seeks to revitalize peace process in coming year
10. Why South Korea Refused to Join the Olympic Boycott
11. Six UNSC members call for North's human rights issues to be addressed
12. North Korea continues to practice “politics of fear” as Kim Jong Un marks 10th year in power
13. Yanggang Province security agency ordered to “root out every last user of Chinese mobile phones”
14. Kim's first decade: 3 US meetings, 2 dead relatives, 1 nuclear arsenal
15. Escaping North Korea Under Kim Jong-Un – Analysis
16. Kim Jong-un presided over 10 years of brutal executions - OKN
17. North Korea in commemorative mood ahead of 10th anniversary of ex-leader's passing
18. Netflix boss reveals they knew ‘Squid Game’ would be big
1. Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at the UN Security Council Stakeout on the Human Rights Situation in DPRK
Let us sustain a human rights upfront approach.
We need to appoint an Ambassador for north Korean Human Rights.
Human Rights are not only a moral imperative but a national security issue as well.
We should never forget Kim Jong-un must deny the human rights of the people to remain in power. And who does KJU fear more: the US or the people? It is the people, armed with information, and they are an existential threat to the mafia like crime family cult AKA the Kim family regime.
Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at the UN Security Council Stakeout on the Human Rights Situation in DPRK
Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield
U.S. Representative to the United Nations
New York, New York
December 15, 2021
AS DELIVERED
Good morning. It’s afternoon, actually. Thank you for being here today. I’d like to make a statement on behalf of Estonia, France, Ireland, Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Last week we marked the 73rd anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As we celebrate and enjoy our inalienable rights, it is important we recognize those who are denied them by their government. The people of the DPRK are systematically denied their fundamental freedoms by one of the most repressive and totalitarian regimes in the world.
In the DPRK, the regime continues to hold more than 100,000 people in political prison camps, where they suffer abuses including torture, forced labor, summary executions, starvation, and sexual and gender-based violence. The rest of the population is ruled by fear and denied basic rights of free expression. These abuses have been exacerbated by the regime’s implementation of measures purposely in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The regime has implemented shoot-to-kill orders for anyone attempting to flee the country and has prevented humanitarian aid from getting to those who desperately need it.
The DPRK’s repression even extends beyond its borders. The regime has been implicated in international abductions and forced disappearances of Japanese citizens and other nationals, who are kept against their will in the DPRK. We urge the DPRK to resolve all issues related to these abductees, in particular their immediate return.
The DPRK’s human rights violations and abuses have been well documented. The UN Commission of Inquiry found that the DPRK commits crimes against humanity directed by the highest levels of the state.
The modern world has no place for such brutality. And it is time for the Council to address it. And while we are glad the Security Council discussed this important topic today, we believe it is worthy of a briefing in an open session. The regime’s egregious human rights violations, much like its unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs, are destabilizing to international peace and security, and must be prioritized within the Council.
Estonia, France, Ireland, Japan, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States urge all Security Council members to support an open briefing where we can discuss this dire human rights situation and its implications for peace and security, and focus on the actions the Security Council should take to help the countless individuals impacted by the regime. And we hope that tomorrow, when the General Assembly adopts its annual resolution on the human rights situation in DPRK, that UN membership will once again come together and universally condemn the DPRK’s violations. Thank you.
Now I want to say a few words just on my sole behalf.
Yesterday, I had the opportunity to speak with Joy, who is a survivor from the DPRK. After the regime took her father’s farm away, her family was desperately poor. They had to boil grass and steal unripe corn from their neighbors so they wouldn’t starve. She had, in her words, no dreams. She just wanted to survive. To avoid being married off as a teenager by her stepmother, Joy escaped the DPRK, only to be sold into sexual slavery in China because she was not recognized as a refugee. She then escaped again to South Korea, but had to leave her only child behind.
Her harrowing story brought tears to my eyes. And I was so moved by her strength, her courage, her perseverance, but, more importantly, her leadership. She reminded me that we need to recognize the human toll of the DPRK’s totalitarian regime. Because while it is hard to imagine, Joy considers herself one of the lucky ones. Thank you.
###
2. Making much of human rights
Don Kirk is saying the quiet part out loud.
Excerpts:
Ah, but here we get to the question of human rights inside North Korea ― or rather, more accurately, the absence of human rights up there. U.S. and United Nations sanctions are primarily in retaliation for the North's missile and nuclear tests and the refusal of dictator Kim Jong-un to stop making more of them, but they're also to protest the North's record of imprisonment, torture and killing of anyone remotely opposed to Kim dynasty rule.
Pathetically, a lot of people in both Korea and the U.S., salivating over an end-of-war agreement that they swear will truly open an era of North-South Korean good will, would rather forget about the North's egregious human rights record. Moon's people are all too aware of how North Korea responds to the mere mention of human rights. They scrupulously avoid the term while pleading with the Americans, please go along with what will no doubt be a craftily phrased statement to the effect that the Korean War is really and truly over.
As if that kind of pressure were not enough, pro-Northers in the U.S. are eager for the U.S. not only to support the end-of-war deal but also to stop supporting the South militarily. They're urging the U.S. Congress to pass a bill declaring the Korean War is over while echoing North Korea's demands for withdrawal of U.S. troops and an end to sanctions.
Making much of human rights
By Donald Kirk
Talk of "human rights" presents South Korea with a terrific headache. No way could President Moon Jae-in go along with U.S. President Joe Biden's decision not to send a bunch of bigwigs to consort with Chinese officialdom at the upcoming Beijing Winter Olympics. South Korea is too close to China on a number of levels to have joined the U.S. and its Anglo-Saxon soulmates, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada, in spurning China's big show.
The sad fact is "human rights" inspires as much controversy and debate as any other issue in diplomatic relations. Abuses are one big reason why Biden ordered the diplomatic boycott of the Games, and they're the reason, among others, for the latest U.S. sanctions against North Korea.
Luckily, of course, the U.S. is not boycotting the Games as such. That is, American athletes will be doing their thing as will Brits, Australians and Canadians. The millions glued to TV and mobile phone screens around the world will still get to see all those glittering and gleaming leaps and jumps, mad dashes and bruising collisions on snow and ice as at the last Winter Games in PyeongChang in 2018. The Games will not suffer for the absence of a few grinning, handshaking, happy-talking diplomats and bureaucrats whom no one ever heard of. No one in the vast viewing audience gives a damn about those boring faces in VIP boxes.
As for the decision of South Korea, America's ally from the Korean War, not to join the boycott, surely no offense was intended. What choice did President Moon have? China is not only the South's biggest trading partner but also the big brother of North Korea, with which he is striving mightily to get along.
Ah, but here we get to the question of human rights inside North Korea ― or rather, more accurately, the absence of human rights up there. U.S. and United Nations sanctions are primarily in retaliation for the North's missile and nuclear tests and the refusal of dictator Kim Jong-un to stop making more of them, but they're also to protest the North's record of imprisonment, torture and killing of anyone remotely opposed to Kim dynasty rule.
Pathetically, a lot of people in both Korea and the U.S., salivating over an end-of-war agreement that they swear will truly open an era of North-South Korean good will, would rather forget about the North's egregious human rights record. Moon's people are all too aware of how North Korea responds to the mere mention of human rights. They scrupulously avoid the term while pleading with the Americans, please go along with what will no doubt be a craftily phrased statement to the effect that the Korean War is really and truly over.
As if that kind of pressure were not enough, pro-Northers in the U.S. are eager for the U.S. not only to support the end-of-war deal but also to stop supporting the South militarily. They're urging the U.S. Congress to pass a bill declaring the Korean War is over while echoing North Korea's demands for withdrawal of U.S. troops and an end to sanctions.
One topic about which pro-Northers are most sensitive is that of human rights in North Korea. They blame U.S. policy and the current "state of war" for the suffering of North Koreans while avoiding questions about the North's vast gulag system in which millions have died and at least 100,000 are now held. A favorite tactic is whataboutism. Ask about abuses in North Korea, and they respond, what about all the abuses in the U.S., what about your police brutality, overcrowded prisons, inequality, poverty and all the rest?
South Korean diplomats and bureaucrats do not parry questions about North Korean abuses in such an off-putting way. Rather, they would like the skeptics to believe that honestly the end-of-war agreement will be an important step toward normalizing relations, after which the North will no longer threaten anyone with nukes and missiles and tens of thousands of troops poised above the Demilitarized Zone.
The inference is that North Korea, unthreatened by U.S. and South Korean warmongers, will downsize its huge military establishment and focus on domestic problems, after which those nasty stories with which we are familiar will go away. Above all, the South Koreans really want the Americans to stop making a ruckus about North Korean abuses for fear, horrors, Kim Jong-un will not go along with any agreement at all.
3. Rights Group Tracks Kim Jong-un's Murders
As an aside this is why we need a sophisticated and aggressive information and influence activities campaign.
Excerpts:
The TJWG warned that the flow of information is drying up. "The nearly complete closure of North Korea's border with China as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak since January 2020 has severely hampered the already limited flow of information in and out of the country and restricted the number of North Koreans reaching South Korea. This has made it difficult to find research participants to provide information on human rights violations that have occurred during the past two years," it added.
Rights Group Tracks Kim Jong-un's Murders
December 16, 2021 12:07
An international human rights group has reconstructed the killings of the North Korean regime and how it tries to hide its crimes against humanity from the international community.
Based on satellite images and new testimony from defectors, the Seoul-based Transitional Justice Working Group on Wednesday published a report titled "Mapping Killings under Kim Jong-un: North Korea's Response to International Pressure" that meticulously reconstructs the North's executions, the sites where they take place and where the dead are buried.
/Courtesy of Transitional Justice Working Group
The report analyses where and how executions were carried out based on interviews with 683 defectors who arrived in South Korea over the past six years, while using satellite imagery to locate sites and applying Geographic Information Systems technology.
It shows how executions have shifted to sites where information is easier to control by banning mobile phone use citing 27 records of executions at sites that have been used since Kim came into power. Twenty-three were public executions by firing squad and two hangings.
One defector reported that in Pyongyang between 2012 and 2013, officials forced the family of the victims to sit in the front row and watch the entire process. One man fainted when he saw the body of his son burned.
In the northeastern city of Hamhung in 2012, executors had people stand in line so that they could see the face of a person whose head was crushed after a public execution. In Sariwon, North Hwanghae Province in 2014, the mouth of a person tied to a post was filled with pebbles before he was executed.
The most common charges cited for public executions include watching or distributing South Korean videos, drug crimes, prostitution, human trafficking, murder or attempted murder, and "obscene acts."
The regime bans mobile phones at execution sites to prevent information leaks and deployed radio devices and vehicles for surveillance and control. Executions typically "occurred in places such as Hyesan Airfield or in the surrounding hills/mountains and open spaces/fields away from the border and central area of the city."
Testimony suggests that public executions are declining but killings continue in secret. Students were "systematically mobilized" to attend public trials.
The TJWG warned that the flow of information is drying up. "The nearly complete closure of North Korea's border with China as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak since January 2020 has severely hampered the already limited flow of information in and out of the country and restricted the number of North Koreans reaching South Korea. This has made it difficult to find research participants to provide information on human rights violations that have occurred during the past two years," it added.
- Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com
4. U.S.-North relations unlikely to be impacted by Beijing Games: Lambert
Thursday
December 16, 2021
U.S.-North relations unlikely to be impacted by Beijing Games: Lambert
U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Japan and Korea Mark Lambert [U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT]
The United States is unlikely to try to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough with North Korea during the Beijing Winter Olympic Games, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Japan and Korea Mark Lambert said during an online seminar Wednesday.
The remarks are likely to dash hopes in Seoul that the upcoming Olympics could provide a venue for the United States to restart talks with North Korea, just as the 2018 Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, Gangwon paved the way for a flurry of high-profile summits between the North, South Korea and the United States.
Speaking at an online seminar hosted by the Los Angeles World Affairs Council & Town Hall (WAC), a non-profit organization that organizes speaker events and forums, Lambert called it “a moot question” to ask if the United States would try to talk to North Korea at the Beijing Games since North Korea’s athletes are barred from participating.
The International Olympic Committee suspended the North's National Olympic Committee for what the IOC described as a “unilateral decision” to not take part in the 2020 Summer Olympic Games, held in Tokyo in July and August, over concerns that North Korean athletes could contract Covid-19 and bring it home.
While the United States is participating in the Games, Washington will not be sending any government officials to the opening and closing ceremonies as part of a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Olympics over an alleged campaign of human rights abuses and ethnic cleansing in Xinjiang, China’s northwestern-most region where Uyghurs and other Muslim ethnic groups make up a majority of the population.
Lambert, however, stated the willingness of the United States to meet with North Korea at any time without preconditions, reflecting his country’s official position since U.S. President Joe Biden took office in January.
“We're committed to the framework that was laid out in Singapore,” he said, referring to former President Donald Trump’s Singapore summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in June 2018.
U.S.-North Korea dialogue stalled after the pair’s second summit in Hanoi in February 2019 ended without a deal.
Trump wanted the North to take measures beyond shuttering the Yongbyon nuclear complex, while the North demanded partial sanctions relief.
North Korea has since refused to engage in denuclearization negotiations with the United States, citing what it characterizes as U.S. hostility toward Pyongyang.
“We have no hostile intent to the DPRK, and even today we continue to make it clear to North Korea that we'll go anywhere at any time to talk about any aspect of a lasting peace and denuclearization on the peninsula,” Lambert said, using the acronym for the North’s official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
“Unfortunately, to date, we are not making any progress,” he acknowledged.
When asked about relations between South Korea and Japan, Lambert emphasized the need for the two U.S. allies to work closely together.
“Having our two closest allies in East Asia not cooperating as closely as they could make us less secure," he said, referring to the current chill in Seoul-Tokyo relations resulting from a series of retaliatory economic measures applied by Japan after a Korean court ordered Japanese firms to pay compensation to Korean forced laborers during Japan’s 1910-45 colonial rule of Korea.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
5. Analysis: N.Korea after 10 years of Kim Jong Un - better armed but more isolated than ever
A lot of retrospectives on the decade of KimJong-un.
Below this article is a short essay I wrote in december 2011 shortly after the death of Kim Jong-il.
Analysis: N.Korea after 10 years of Kim Jong Un - better armed but more isolated than ever
1/3
A shopkeeper walks past a set of TVs broadcasting a news report on summit between the U.S. and North Korea, in Seoul, South Korea, June 12, 2018. REUTERS/Kim Hong-Ji/File Photo
- Summary
- Nuclear weapons dominated Kim's first 10 years
- North Korea better armed, but now more isoalated
- Kim's challenge: balance nuclear arsenal with sanctions
- Kim needs to salvage economy, raise living standards
SEOUL, Dec 16 (Reuters) - Ten years after Kim Jong Un assumed power North Korea is better armed but deeply isolated and more dependent on China, despite actions by the young leader that raised - and dashed - hopes of economic transformation or international opening.
Kim’s pursuit of nuclear weapons defined his first 10 years in power, but analysts say the path has left him isolated and facing perhaps the greatest challenges yet.
Those weapons may stand in the way of political breakthroughs needed to improve a shattered economy and prevent millions from starving, as ongoing anti-pandemic lockdowns and sanctions that have left him over-reliant on China.
Kim embraced a different style than his idiosyncratic father, seeking to "normalise" North Korea by institutionalising and delegating more leadership; winning international respect through nuclear weapons and summits with foreign leaders; and displays of transparency and empathy toward improving the lives of everyday citizens.
At times that raised expectations of economic reform in the socialist state, or changes in its relationship with longstanding rivals such as the United States and South Korea.
But systemic change has failed to materialise as Kim continued many of his father's worst practices, from political prison camps and brutal executions to tight control over the economy and society.
"I think the experience of Kim's rule for ordinary North Koreans was a moment of hope in those early years followed by regression to the mean," said Christopher Green, a Korea specialist at Leiden University in the Netherlands.
Kim will have to make hard decisions over whether to trade any of his arsenal to win sanctions relief, or find other ways to boost the economy, such as through a distrustful but vital relationship with China or allowing more economic and social opening without losing political grip.
"(Sanctions) put an upper limit on what he can do with his economy but doesn’t mean he can’t get to a point that’s much more comfortable for people than where he is now," said Robert Carlin, a former CIA officer now with the Washington-based Stimson Center.
After the damage done by the pandemic, calls for controlled openness may again be heard from within the regime elite, but the challenges of turning the international situation in North Korea's favour are as big as ever, Green said.
"Without a big uptick in foreign capital, the cause of economic reform is almost certainly doomed," he added.
WEAPONS FOR SANCTIONS
Under Kim, North Korea conducted four of its six nuclear weapons' tests - including what appears to be its first hydrogen bomb - and developed a series of intercontinental ballistic missiles with the range to strike as far as the United States.
For Kim that arsenal is the "treasured sword" that will protect North Korea - and his rule - from outside threats, while making the country an equal with other nuclear powers.
But it also brought North Korea to the brink of war with the United States in 2017, and prompted even the country's partners in China and Russia to approve strict U.N. sanctions.
Kim's attempts to win sanctions relief and a breakthrough in relations with the United States led to historic and unprecedented summits with U.S. President Donald Trump, but talks have since stalled with Washington demanding Pyongyang surrender some of its weapons before any sanctions are eased.
Kim will likely continue to "play tough" in nuclear diplomacy because further nuclear weapons development will increase his political leverage and bargaining power both in negotiations and during stalemates, said Duyeon Kim, with the U.S.-based Center for a New American Security.
"We can expect to see him continue to shape his personal and his country’s image as normal, modern, and advanced across all sectors particularly nuclear and economic, and even foreign affairs when the pandemic subsides," she added.
After sending the China-North Korea relationship to a historical low by prioritising nuclear weapons and missiles development then harshly criticising Beijing for supporting sanctions, Kim managed to quickly repair ties, said Zhao Tong, a strategic security expert in Beijing.
China now accounts for the vast majority of North Korea's limited international trade, and the current governments in both countries share the goals of promoting socialist ideology and countering Western influence, Zhao said.
"Despite Kim’s preference of diversifying North Korea’s international partnerships, he is likely to continue relying heavily on support from China and a small number of other like-minded countries," he said.
TIGHTENING CONTROL
In his early years, Kim Jong Un experimented with economic reform in order to generate the surpluses he needed to run the patronage networks that sustain autocratic rule, said Green.
"But it appears the risks of and opposition to this became too great in time, and he dialled it back," he said.
A United Nations rights investigator has warned that vulnerable populations in North Korea risk starvation if the economic and food situation is not reversed.
The pandemic has seen the government further strengthen its grip on the economy, casting doubt on the future of the black markets and as well as official businesses that many North Koreans had come to rely on.
Kim's rule has seen the proliferation of new technologies such as cellphones in North Korea, but activists say he has simultaneously adopted a more high-tech approach to surveillance and oppressive political control as he seeks to outlaw and stamp out foreign influence and any hint of domestic protest.
Still, it's not too late for Kim to make good on promises to improve lives in North Korea if he embraces diplomacy, said Ramon Pacheco Pardo, a Korea expert at King's College London.
“Ultimately, Kim’s time in power could be defined by his ability to raise the living standards of ordinary North Koreans once the pandemic is over," he said.
Reporting by Josh Smith; Editing by Michael Perry
“The Death of a Dictator: Danger, Opportunity or Best Timing Possible?”
Mon, 12/19/2011 - 1:56pm
When assessing the North Korean succession process the “Korean Hands” will remind us that Kim Jong-il had 21 years to consolidate power and eliminate all political opposition and that the longer that Kim Jong-il lived the greater the chances of a smooth succession from the North Korean perspective. Everything changed on December 17, 2011 at 8:30 in the morning aboard a train in north Korea when Kim Jong-il died of fatigue and overwork according to the Korean Central News Agency. The questions are many but can be boiled down to what next for the Kim Family Regime, the ROK, the US and Northeast Asia?
There are two scenarios that are likely to play out within North Korea. The first scenario depends on the strength and power of Jang Song-taek who, along with his wife and the late Kim Jong-il’s sister, is the de facto “regent” for the young Kim Jong-un. Has he been able to help Kim Jong-un establish sufficient legitimacy within the Regime and will they be able to consolidate power? It is very likely that if Kim has sufficient strength and control of the security apparatus there are very likely arrests and purges taking place even as we try to figure out what is happening.
The second scenario is that he has not been able to consolidate sufficient power and will be faced with internal threats from other senior members of the regime who are unwilling to allow a 27 year old four star general rule the party and the military. If there is a power struggle many scenarios can play out ranging from internal chaos, civil war, and “implosion” to an external “explosion” – e.g., spillover of the effects of chaos and civil war into China and the ROK or the worst case: the desperate execution of the regime’s campaign plan to reunify the peninsula as the only means left to ensure survival of the Kim Family Regime. Finally, regime collapse will occur when there is the loss of the ability of the regime to centrally govern and the loss of control and support of the military and security apparatus. We have seen cracks in the system like hairline cracks in a dam. The recently reported alleged defection of eight armed guards is but one indication of such cracks with water slowly dripping from through the regime’s dam - the question is are those cracks repairable or will they cause the dam to crumble and collapse; unleashing such a torrent on the peninsula that will make 1950-53 look like a minor skirmish in terms of scale of potential conflict and devastation.
Either scenario will ensure the continued suffering of 23 million north Korean people and the second scenario will expand the tragedy to the Republic of Korea and its 46 million citizens and significantly affect the other countries in Northeast Asia as well as have global effects.
This should be a wake-up call for the ROK, the US and the international community. For 61 years the international community has been reacting to the Kim Family Regime. While the ROK and US have conducted contingency planning for various scenarios in the north, the question that needs to be asked now is whether the ROK-US Alliance and the international community have sufficiently prepared for such contingencies? Since 1994 when it was assessed that we could accept the political risk of the Agreed Framework because we assumed that the regime would soon collapse, we have written plans but we have not laid the groundwork to actually prepare for collapse. Here are just two small examples of the preparation not conducted. We have not executed an aggressive influence campaign targeting the second tier military leadership and the population to prepare them for collapse. We have not aggressively targeted the external regime mechanisms around the world such as Department 39 – the lifeline of illicit activity that sustained the regime that if cut would cause the regime to strangle on its own incompetence. If collapse occurs plans may be executed without sufficient preparation.
Serious dangers have been laid out above. However, what is the likely outcome following the death of one of the world’s worst human rights violators and dictators?
Fortunately or unfortunately, depending on one’s perspective, the timing of Kim Jong-il’s death probably came at the most opportune time. With elections and a leadership transition in the ROK and US and China respectively, it is likely that there is going to be a major “strategic pause” on the Korean Peninsula.
Just from a US perspective, the Administration is not going to be able to make any effective overtures toward Kim Jong-un in an attempt to influence him. It will be interesting to see if agreements at the recent meetings in Beijing at which allegedly the US agreed to provide 240,000 tons of food aid and the north agreed it would return to the Six party talks, actually plays out (though there is precedence for agreements to be worked out during leadership transition as the Agreed Framework was completed after the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994). However, any action by the US Administration is likely to be exploited by the President’s political opponents. Even such a seemingly simple condolence statement is likely being hotly debated at the White House. If it is too conciliatory then it will be attacked as being too soft. If it is too strong then it will have no chance to have a positive influence effect on Kim Jong-un. The Administration is in a no win situation because even it makes a conciliatory statement the regime will interpret the attacks by the US political opposition as an indication of the real American position toward the north.
The ROK election season was not expected to have north Korea as a dominant issue. While the political opposition will attack the ruling party on Korean policy, both parties are more likely to focus on economic and social issues. Neither side will want to make the north the dominant issue.
The Chinese Communist Party also undergoes its leadership transition in 2012. More than any other country, save the ROK, it wants to maintain the status quo on the Korean Peninsula and does not want the distraction of the leadership transition in the north. It has its own internal complications with such events as protests in Wuken and other internal domestic political stability issues.
What the US, ROK, and China have in common is that they do not want collapse or war on the Peninsula. China in particular, will do what is necessary to assist the regime to maintain the status quo. We are likely to see food and fuel aid and protection from international political pressure on the regime to allow it to conduct its leadership transition in the hopes of preventing implosion or explosion.
This is going to lead to “peninsula paralysis” for the next two years at least. None of the major powers in the region want collapse or war so we are likely to see overt (China) and tacit (US) support to the north in order to ensure stability on the peninsula. While some will see the potential danger as outlined above there are others who will see this as an opportunity for regime change (beyond a Kim Family Regime transfer of power). However, it is unlikely that there has been sufficient preparation made to be able to orchestrate or at least influence such a change and the foundation has not been laid from a military, economic, diplomatic, and influence perspective to either effect change or deal with the potential fall-out. The bottom line is we are not prepared to exploit the current opportunity; however, the “peninsula paralysis” that we are about to experience may present the window of opportunity to conduct the necessary preparations to deal with the likely collapse of the regime because, as one Korea Hand recently opined, the regime cannot indefinitely defy the laws of economic and political gravity.
The real opportunity is not to exploit the current events to cause a regime change for which no one is prepared, but to exploit the opportunity over the next two or more years to conduct the effective preparations necessary to deal with regime collapse on terms that the ROK and US desire. Hasty and ill-advised calls for regime collapse are made only by those who do not understand the nature of the regime and the likely scenarios that will emanate from the final collapse of the Kim Family Regime. They are made by those who do not understand the preparation that is necessary to mitigate the fallout from regime collapse. At this time of potential crisis it is time to take a longer view to allow us to be proactive rather than reactive. The peninsula is likely to weather this storm for a period of time. But this should be the wake-up call that drives the ROK-US alliance to make the realistic preparations to deal with the only outcome on the Korean Peninsula that is necessary for both denuclearization and ultimate regional stability – the end of the Kim Family Regime and the solution to the lingering “Korea Question” that was supposed to be solved following the 1953 Armistice.
The opinions expressed in this paper are the author's alone
6. 2022 U.S. defense bill erases ban on reducing USFK troops
No one should get too worked up about this, especially my Korean friends. The legislation from 2018 through 2021 was for a specific purpose: to prevent the previous administration from making a significant withdrawal of US troops on the Korean peninsula. I think we can see from the information released about the Global Force Posture Review that there will not be a significant withdrawal of US troops.
Thursday
December 16, 2021
2022 U.S. defense bill erases ban on reducing USFK troops
A handout photo made available by the United States Forces Korea (USFK) shows Members of Team Osan preparing to receive their first round of Moderna vaccines at Osan Air Base on Dec. 29, 2020. [EPA/USFK]
The U.S. Congress passed its annual defense budget bill Wednesday with no ban on the reduction of U.S. Forces in Korea, a clause that had been included in the bill for the past four years.
Every year, the U.S. Congress passes the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to determine the funding for military activities under the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy.
The bill was passed by Congress on Wednesday to authorize a total of $777.7 billion in spending for the 2022 fiscal year, namely on strategic competition with China and Russia and on disruptive technologies like hypersonic weapons and artificial intelligence, amongst other U.S. defense priorities.
Missing this year, however, was a clause legally restricting the U.S. government from reducing the number of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) from its current level of around 28,500.
“It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense should recommit to and strengthen United States defense alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region so as to further the comparative advantage of the United States in strategic competition with the People’s Republic of China, including by […] reinforcing the United States alliance with the Republic of Korea and maintaining the presence of approximately 28,500 members of the United States Armed Forces deployed to the country,” reads the NDAA for 2022.
The NDAA bills passed for fiscal years from 2018 to 2021 all included a clause limiting the use of defense funds to reduce the U.S. forces in Korea.
“None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be used to reduce the total number of members of the Armed Forces serving on active duty who are deployed to South Korea below 28,500,” reads the clause included in the bill for 2021.
The clause was first included in the bill after former U.S. President Donald Trump spoke of pulling out the forces from Korea.
Some experts in Korea saw the omission as a possible U.S. defense strategy to not place any restrictions on the number of American troops in Korea, so as to use them flexibly in the Indo-Pacific region.
“Every year, when the NDAA is drafted, the U.S. Department of Defense comes to Congress to explain its direction. The core of the current defense policy is to contain China in the Indo-Pacific region,” said Park Won-gon, professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul.
“I think that in the process of drawing up a detailed plan for the Global Posture Review, which works on adjusting the deployment of U.S. forces around the world, the United States must have discussed how the USFK could be used to contain China,” Park said.
The bill also stipulates that until 2027, the secretary of defense needs to annually submit to the specified congressional committees a report on military and security developments involving China, including on China’s military presence and influence in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and the Indo-Pacific region, and what implications they may have on U.S. national security interests in the next 20 years.
Senate Armed Services Committee Chair Jack Reed speaks on the Senate floor prior to the final vote on the National Defense Authorization Act. [C-SPAN]
BY KIM SANG-JIN, ESTHER CHUNG [chung.juhee@joongang.co.kr]
7. How Kim Jong-un Ran N.Korea's Economy into the Ground
How Kim Jong-un Ran N.Korea's Economy into the Ground
December 16, 2021 12:56
In the decade since North Korean leader Kim Jong-un succeeded his father amid promises of modernization, North Korea has become poorer and more miserable than ever.
Returning to Pyongyang from a posh boarding school in Switzerland to be groomed as the next leader, Kim ascended to North Korea's throne on Dec. 19, 2011, just two days after Kim Jong-il died of a massive heart attack.
Amid brutal purges as he tried to cement his power, Kim Jon-un came to see the completion of North Korea's nuclear weapons program as his greatest task. Blatantly ignoring warnings from the international community, he conducted four nuclear tests and 60 missile tests in violation of UN resolutions.
Kim was almost always present at the North's launched intercontinental ballistic missiles, but North Korea paid a heavy price for the provocations. After years of sanctions and a total border lockdown as Kim trembles before the coronavirus pandemic, North Korea is suffering its worst economic hardship since it was founded in 1948.
Most foreign diplomats have left, attesting to the severity of the economic hardships the North is experiencing. Kim was forced to confess that his economic goals had failed "in almost all areas to a great extent."
According to statistics from the Bank of Korea, North Korea's average annual economic growth tumbled from 3.86 percent during Kim Jong-il's rule to 0.84 percent under Kim Jong-un. The North's trade shriveled from US$6.3 billion when Kim Jong-un took into power to a mere $860 million last year, the level of the early 1970s.
The main reason is the border lockdown, but economists say intense sanctions had already depleted the paltry economic momentum the North had. The statistics back up this view. North Korea's gross national income shrank every year since 2017 with the exception of 2019.
After conducting its fourth nuclear test on Jan. 6, 2016, North Korea's provocations continued with the test launch of the Hwasong-15 ICMB on Nov. 29, 2017, prompting the UN to adopt six sanctions starring in March of 2016. Starting with a ban on shipments of coal, North Korea's top export, the sanctions eventually blocked exports of even agricultural goods and textiles.
North Korea's refined oil imports were also severely limited, causing its economy to suffocate.
North Korea's trade volume fell even more markedly from $5.55 billion in 2017 to $2.84 billion in 2018. After rising temporarily to $3.25 billion in 2019, trade plummeted to $860 million last year. In the first 10 months of this year, trade with China, its main patron, shriveled to $227 million, just a third of last year's amount, and is not expected to rise above $300 million by the end of this year.
Yoo Sung-ok, a former head of the Institute for National Security Strategy, said, "Kim Jong-un's decade of rule can be summed up as inflicting international isolation and economic ruin on his own country and blighting the lives of its citizens."
Kim mobilized all of his country's resources to develop nuclear weapons, sharply escalating tensions, only to extend an olive branch in early 2018, agreeing to summits with South Korea and the U.S. It was a calculated strategy of eliciting rewards after acquiring nuclear weapons. But that plan was eventually rejected even by former U.S. President Donald Trump, who at one time claimed he "fell in love" with Kim but walked away from talks in Hanoi in February 2019.
Early this year, Joe Biden, who is familiar with North Korea's tactics from his time as Barack Obama's vice president, became the leader of the U.S., while President Moon Jae-in, who has been devoted to engaging the North throughout his term, is a lame duck as he leaves office in May next year. As long as Biden's strategy on the North remains unchanged and Kim refuses to bend, the isolated country's economic woes can only get worse.
- Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com
8. A Declaration to End the Korean War: Why Now?
Our criticism about the threat to the alliance is not hyperbolic. it is based on an understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regimes and the pro-north Korean factions in the ROK and US who blame the security situation on the Korean peninsula on the US presence on the peninsula and criticism the so-called US hostile policy without acknowledging the regimes actual hostile policy to dominate the Korean peninsula as well as the threat somde north Korea nuclear weapons and long range missiles, proliferation of weapons and training in conflict zone, global illicit activities, cyber attacks, overseas slave labor and human rights abuses and crimes agains
Excerpts:
Some American commentators have resorted to a genre of hyperbolic criticism, implying that somehow such a declaration would precipitate a series of events that could lead to the end of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, but this appears premature. While legitimate questions about the alliance’s future could be raised in the context of a peace treaty, a declaration does not create similar problems.
Meanwhile, North Korea’s views on such a declaration are, unsurprisingly, are in the realist vein. North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Ri Thae-song, in September, noted that there was no guarantee that a “mere declaration of the termination of the war would lead to the withdrawal of the hostile policy toward the DPRK.” Kim Jong Un’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, reiterated this message later that month.
The “hostile policy” refers to an ambiguous, but expansive, set of U.S. military and other measures toward North Korea that Pyongyang has long deemed unacceptable. In essence, for North Korea, this is not purely an inter-Korean conversation, but one that must include consultations with the United States.
A Declaration to End the Korean War: Why Now?
South Korean President Moon Jae-in has announced that the United States, China, and North Korea have reached an agreement “in principle” on declaring an end to the Korean War. With the war having ended with a 1953 armistice, the two Koreas remain in a technical state of war, even though full-scale hostilities haven’t resumed since then.
Moon, who leaves office next May, has been keen to “institutionalize” progress in the area of inter-Korean peace since 2019. In 2007, when he served as chief of staff to former South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, Moon saw firsthand the risks of inter-Korean rapprochement becoming subject to domestic political swings in South Korea.
Roh’s 2007 summit with Kim Jong Il, current North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s father, didn’t result in any long-term recalibration of the relationship between the two sides. Moon, recalling these lessons, has been keen to leave his mark for the long-haul on the inter-Korean equation; with the pandemic and international sanctions limiting more meaningful forms of economic rapprochement, the idea of an end of war declaration has found itself at the top of the agenda in the final months of his term.
What exactly an end of war declaration would say or do is the subject of considerable debate. Most importantly, an end of war is not the same thing as a legally binding peace treaty that would replace the so-called “armistice regime” that the Peninsula has endured since 1953 with a new “peace regime.”
This “peace regime” has been a longstanding South and North Korean aspiration; most recently, the Koreas articulated their intent to move toward this goal in the summit diplomacy of 2018. The U.S.-North Korea summit meeting between former President Donald J. Trump and Kim Jong Un in Singapore also included a pledge by both countries “to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.”
South Korea has been consulting for some months now with the Biden administration on the end of war declaration. The administration, understanding the Moon government’s high degree of emphasis on this outcome, has gone along, despite its misgivings. But the United States has had reservations about the utility of such a declaration.
While a declaration to end the Korean War would doubtless create the appearance of change, it’s unclear the extent to which this would be a truly costly signal by the United States and South Korea to fundamentally change the security situation on the Peninsula.
Some American commentators have resorted to a genre of hyperbolic criticism, implying that somehow such a declaration would precipitate a series of events that could lead to the end of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, but this appears premature. While legitimate questions about the alliance’s future could be raised in the context of a peace treaty, a declaration does not create similar problems.
Meanwhile, North Korea’s views on such a declaration are, unsurprisingly, are in the realist vein. North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Ri Thae-song, in September, noted that there was no guarantee that a “mere declaration of the termination of the war would lead to the withdrawal of the hostile policy toward the DPRK.” Kim Jong Un’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, reiterated this message later that month.
The “hostile policy” refers to an ambiguous, but expansive, set of U.S. military and other measures toward North Korea that Pyongyang has long deemed unacceptable. In essence, for North Korea, this is not purely an inter-Korean conversation, but one that must include consultations with the United States.
But, in general, North Korea has long supported such a step “in principle.” All of this raises questions about what exactly an end of war declaration might change. Both the perceived upsides and downsides of a declaration are modest; it would neither usher in the long-sought “peace regime” or meaningful enhance stability on the Peninsula. It would also not end the alliance or address perceived North Korean concerns about the U.S. “hostile policy.” Finally, the declaration is unlikely to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table with the United States.
For Washington, the notion of employing such a declaration—an irreversible measure, since it wouldn’t be credible for the United States or South Korea to un-declare the end of war—in the absence of a broader process of denuclearization talks with North Korea is uncomfortable. In this sense, the United States may share North Korea’s view that a declaration may be “premature.”
It’s difficult to escape the conclusion that the primary value of such a declaration concerns Moon’s own legacy as a transformative figure in the inter-Korean relationship. Moon has no shortage of accomplishments in this era. Even while the benefits of a declaration appear diffuse, Moon should take pride in the September 2018 inter-Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement, which did have practical on-the-ground effects (despite subsequent North Korean violations).
When South Korean voters head to the polls next March, these issues are unlikely to guide their decisions. Moon’s successor, be it the progressive Lee Jae-myung or conservative Yoon Seok-youl, will chart their own course on inter-Korean affairs. While Lee can be expected to pick up much of Moon’s approach, Yoon has already charted a divergent course, for which he’s received criticism from Moon’s Democratic Party.
As a parting gesture from Moon toward North Korea, the end of war declaration could largely prove to be harmless. But Seoul and Washington will inevitably find themselves back at the negotiating table with Pyongyang in the coming years—perhaps after Kim has made sufficient progress in weapons development in the course of the 8th Party Congress military modernization agenda.
When that happens, it may be beneficial to retain the option to move forward with an end of war declaration as a starting point for confidence-building with North Korea.
Ankit Panda is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. An expert on the Asia-Pacific region, his research interests range from nuclear strategy, arms control, missile defense, nonproliferation, emerging technologies, and U.S. extended deterrence. He is the author of Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and Deterrence in North Korea (Hurst Publishers/Oxford University Press, 2020).
A widely published writer, Panda’s work has appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the Diplomat, the Atlantic, the New Republic, the South China Morning Post, War on the Rocks, Politico, and the National Interest. Panda has also published in scholarly journals, including Survival, the Washington Quarterly, and India Review, and has contributed to the IISS Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment and Strategic Survey. He is editor-at-large at the Diplomat, where he hosts the Asia Geopolitics podcast, and a contributing editor at War on the Rocks.
9. Undeterred by fruitless push in 2021, S. Korea seeks to revitalize peace process in coming year
Peace at any cost, the Moon administration mantra.
Unfortunately the "conciliatory gesture" that most advocate is sanctions relief which is a concession that will confirm to KimJong -un the success of his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strgegies. rather than influence him to come to the table and negotiate in good fath as a responsible member of the international community, he will double down on his strategies in support of his hostile policy which remains to achieve the domination of the Korean peninsula.
Excerpts:
Washington also unveiled a "calibrated, practical" approach to the North. It has since put out diplomatic feelers to the North and stressed it is ready to engage in dialogue "anywhere, anytime without preconditions."
But its repeated, if not perfunctory, mention that the "ball is in the North's court" raised doubts over whether the U.S. is willing to make a more active conciliatory gesture to the North.
Dialogue overtures by Seoul and Washington have fallen largely on deaf ears as Pyongyang has been preoccupied with warding off COVID-19 and weathering economic woes stemming from pandemic-driven border controls and global sanctions.
(Yearender) Undeterred by fruitless push in 2021, S. Korea seeks to revitalize peace process in coming year | Yonhap News Agency
By Song Sang-ho
SEOUL, Dec. 16 (Yonhap) -- After a pandemic-plagued year that saw North Korea grow even more insular, South Korea appears set to charge ahead with its bumpy drive for peace in 2022, an undertaking still beset by mutual distrust and geopolitical tensions as well as laden with uncertainty.
The South's peace initiative has borne little fruit this year, as the North has focused on an antivirus campaign and stuck to its "self-reliance" credo while raising the stakes for the resumption of dialogue with sporadic saber-rattling, analysts said.
Seoul's policy coordination with the Joe Biden administration launched in January got off to a smooth start, at least seemingly, as the allies publicly reaffirmed a commitment to a "fully coordinated" strategy on the North. But a bitter Sino-U.S. rivalry has dimmed the prospects of great-power cooperation on the North's nuclear conundrum.
Ahead of the new year, uncertainties continue to loom, as the Biden administration's diplomatic boycott of the upcoming Beijing Olympics heightened geopolitical risks, with its recent imposition of new sanctions on the North for human rights abuses feared to dampen the mood for dialogue.
With less than five months left in its term, the Moon Jae-in administration remains unperturbed by the cloudy prospects, doubling down on its proposal to declare a formal end to the 1950-53 Korean War, which it calls a catalyst to reengage with the North.
"On top of signifying the end of the unstable armistice regime that has continued for nearly 70 years, (the declaration) can serve as momentum to restart talks between the South, North and the U.S.," President Moon said at a press conference with his Australian counterpart, Scott Morrison, after their summit in Canberra on Monday.
"Our government will try till the end to enable a dialogue-based approach," he added, stressing the U.S., China and the North have agreed "in principle" to declare the end of war.
It is a widespread view that Seoul hopes to use the Beijing Olympics to jump-start dialogue with Pyongyang and possibly make the end-of-war declaration a reality. But the U.S.' diplomatic boycott of the Games could spell trouble, observers said. Seoul has said it is not considering joining the U.S. move.
At the start of this year, Seoul's diplomacy focused on ensuring the newly launched Biden administration would build on earlier peace agreements with Pyongyang, including the 2018 Singapore summit accord reached between former U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.
The diplomatic endeavors paid off.
The Biden team has stated that it inherits the Singapore accord under which Kim committed to work toward the "complete denuclearization" of the peninsula while both sides agreed to work together to build new relations and foster a lasting peace regime on the peninsula.
Washington also unveiled a "calibrated, practical" approach to the North. It has since put out diplomatic feelers to the North and stressed it is ready to engage in dialogue "anywhere, anytime without preconditions."
But its repeated, if not perfunctory, mention that the "ball is in the North's court" raised doubts over whether the U.S. is willing to make a more active conciliatory gesture to the North.
Dialogue overtures by Seoul and Washington have fallen largely on deaf ears as Pyongyang has been preoccupied with warding off COVID-19 and weathering economic woes stemming from pandemic-driven border controls and global sanctions.
But the North's attention could pivot toward the South where major parties are quickening preparations for the March 9 presidential poll that could determine the future course of Seoul's policy toward the reclusive state.
Ruling Democratic Party presidential nominee Lee Jae-myung seeks a North Korea policy anchored in what he calls "realism and pragmatism" and will "confidently" respond should the North flout inter-Korean deals or behave wrongly, an aide to him said during a webinar last week.
Yoon Suk-yeol, the nominee for the conservative main opposition People Power Party, focuses on stronger deterrence against the North's nuclear threats and stresses the need to keep economic sanctions until the North takes substantive steps toward its denuclearization, an aide to Yoon said in the same webinar.
Over the past year, the North's weapons tests have complicated the South's push for peace. They include the launches of a hypersonic missile in September and a new submarine-launched ballistic missile the following month.
A silver lining is that the North has not conducted any strategic provocations like an intercontinental ballistic missile test. The restoration of inter-Korean communication lines in July after more than a year of suspension raised hopes for a thaw in cross-border relations.
But the lines came to a halt again in August amid the North's protest over a regular summertime South Korea-U.S. military exercise -- in a sign of the fragility of cross-border channels. The lines were back up and running again in October.
As Washington showed no signs of budging on its call for sanctions relief, Pyongyang has been seen as upping the ante this year.
In addition to its demand for ending what it calls "hostile policy," the North started to call on the South and the U.S. to withdraw "double-dealing" standards -- a reference to the allies casting its missile and other military activities as "provocations" while justifying their own as "deterrence" against the North.
"By and large, over the past year, the North's position appears to have hardened, which could lead to a crucial decision like a long-range missile test later," Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korea studies at Ewha Womans University, said.
Seeking to revive the stalled peace crusade, Seoul and Washington have been exploring various inducements for dialogue, including humanitarian aid and the end-of-war declaration.
The North Korean issue, nonetheless, could be nudged onto the back burner of the U.S.' foreign policy list as Washington is grappling with other major challenges, including the nuclear talks with Iran and Russia's military buildup near its border with Ukraine, analysts noted.
The future trajectory of the Sino-U.S. relationship is expected to be a focus of Seoul's policy attention, as it could affect its efforts to promote the unity of purpose between the major powers to entrench peace on the peninsula.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
10. Why South Korea Refused to Join the Olympic Boycott
Excerpt:
Moon’s decision not to boycott puts him on the wrong side of Korean public opinion. According to a poll conducted by Korea Society Opinion Institute, 50.9 percent of Korean adults believed Korea should join the boycott, while 33.1 percent did not. Support for a boycott is highest among supporters of the opposition People Power Party, at 72.1 percent, while only 36.9 percent of Moon’s own Democratic Party voters support a boycott.
Why South Korea Refused to Join the Olympic Boycott
Korea has lots of interests to balance vis-a-vis China and North Korea, but Moon’s decision not to boycott puts him on the wrong side of Korean public opinion.
South Korean president Moon Jae-in’s decision not to join other American allies in a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Olympics came as no surprise.
Moon has been courting China’s support of his proposed declaration of peace with North Korea, which he hopes to finalize in the next five months before he leaves office. He had hoped to use the Olympics as a venue for the relevant countries to meet and build support for the declaration. That will not be a possibility now, without U.S. officials present. North Korea had already been banned by the Olympic Committee as punishment for its refusal to take part in the Tokyo Olympics.
But Moon still finds benefits in having his country take part fully.
“We have not been asked by the U.S., or any other country regarding a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Olympics, and the South Korean government is not considering one either,” Moon said.
He also singled out China’s importance to Korea’s economy: “Relations with China are very important on the economic front. Another factor is that South Korea requires China’s constructive efforts for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and for North Korea’s denuclearization.”
Even if the Olympic Games cannot serve Moon’s original goal of building momentum for the peace declaration—much as the 2018 Pyeongchang Games did for the series of South-North meetings that followed—sending South Korean representatives helps maintain China’s active engagement.
“I don’t think South Korea is likely to boycott because of the possibility that China holds the option to pull support on the peace agreement,” Daniel Rice, a senior editor at Foreign Brief, told me before the decision was announced. He did say that a peace declaration would be in China’s strategic interests in any case. “If they can pressure off of Kim and lower the risk of any radical action, it’s a win.”
China has previously used informal sanctions to punish countries for going against China’s interests. In 2016, China limited flights to Korea and waged a regulatory war against South Korean retail group Lotte’s operations in China in response to Korea’s plan to place the THAAD missile defense system on Korean territory. Moon made an agreement with China to limit future placements of American missile defense systems upon his 2017 inauguration and ended most of the sanctions.
Liu Xiaoming, China’s Special Representative on Korean Peninsula Affairs, tweeted that the countries that boycott the Olympics will “pay a price for their erroneous moves.” The Chinese state-run Global Times news outlet published a long article criticizing the U.S. for boycotting, which cited a Seoul Sinmun editorial against the boycott.
The Seoul Sinmun editorial, published December 7, said, “Although the Biden administration values alliances, the harsh reality is that South Korea’s national interests cannot be 100 percent aligned with the United States.”
“It is not desirable for us to have Northeast Asia to be drawn into the frame of a new cold war and be forced to pick a side due to the American decision,” the article continued.
South Korea has resisted U.S. pressure to take harder stances against China on a number of issues. They have refused to join the “Clean Network” and ban Huawei from their telecom networks. In 2021, China was Korea’s number one trade partner for both exports and imports, accounting for over twenty percent of each, Korean government data shows. The United States is Korea’s second-leading trade partner, accounting for fifteen percent of Korea’s export value.
Moon’s decision not to boycott puts him on the wrong side of Korean public opinion. According to a poll conducted by Korea Society Opinion Institute, 50.9 percent of Korean adults believed Korea should join the boycott, while 33.1 percent did not. Support for a boycott is highest among supporters of the opposition People Power Party, at 72.1 percent, while only 36.9 percent of Moon’s own Democratic Party voters support a boycott.
Mitchell Blatt is a former editorial assistant at the National Interest. He is based in Korea where he covers foreign policy, Korean politics, elections, and culture. He has been published in USA Today, The South China Morning Post, The Daily Beast, The Korea Times, and Silkwinds magazine, among other outlets. Follow him on Facebook at @MitchBlattWriter.
Image: Reuters
11. Six UNSC members call for North's human rights issues to be addressed
But why not all 15 members? (Or at least 13 less China and Russia)
Thursday
December 16, 2021
Six UNSC members call for North's human rights issues to be addressed
A file photo of a UN Security Council meeting [UN/ESKINDER DEBEBE]
The UN Security Council (UNSC) should address the human rights issues of North Korea in an open session, said U.S. Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield to the United Nations, with representatives of Britain, Estonia, France, Ireland, Japan and Norway in a joint statement following their closed-door meeting Wednesday.
"The people of the DPRK are systematically denied their fundamental freedoms by one of the most repressive and totalitarian regimes in the world," said the statement, using the acronym for the full name of North Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. "The modern world has no place for such brutality. And it is time for the Council to address it. While we are glad the Security Council discussed this important topic today, we believe it is worthy of a briefing in an open session."
North Korea's human rights issues have been discussed at the UNSC since 2014, when a critical report was issued by the UN Human Rights Council on the situation, however there has been pushback from some members on whether the council is the right venue to discuss such matter.
From 2014 to 2017, the council held open meetings on the topic, but from the following year they have been held behind closed doors.
"The regime's egregious human rights violations, much like its unlawful WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and ballistic missile programs, are destabilizing to international peace and security, and must be prioritized within the Council," read the statement.
"Estonia, France, Ireland, Japan, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States urge all Security Council members to support an open briefing next year where we can discuss this dire human rights situation and its implications for peace and security, and focus on the actions the Security Council should take to help the countless individuals impacted by the regime."
All of the parties in support of the joint statement are members of the security council, except Japan.
The statement also called out on the North Korean abduction of Japanese nationals, a thorny issue between the two countries for years.
"The regime has been implicated in international abductions and forced disappearances of Japanese citizens and other nationals, who are kept against their will in the DPRK," said the statement. "We urge the DPRK to resolve all issues related to these abductees, in particular their immediate return."
A public meeting can be held at the UNSC, when at least nine members of its current 15 support the session. In addition to the participants of the joint statement, the council will need the support of three more members. It remains to be seen if South Korea will join.
South Korea's former ambassador to the UN, Oh Joon, welcomed the joint statement.
"The UN Security Council has the authority to refer the North Korean human rights issue to the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a crime against humanity, and the North Korean human rights resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly every year also recommends it," he said in a phone call with the JoongAng Ilbo on Thursday. "It is desirable that the Security Council hold an open meeting to send a more active message on human rights in North Korea."
The call to host an open session at the council to address the North Korean human rights issues comes after the United States imposed fresh sanctions on the North last week.
The U.S. Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 15 individuals and 10 entities in several countries around the globe including North Korea, Myanmar and Bangladesh, issuing financial sanctions and visa bans "for their connection to human rights abuse and repression."
This marked the first new sanctions on North Korea over human rights issues since the launch of the Joe Biden administration and coincided with International Human Rights Day.
The UN General Assembly was scheduled to vote on a resolution on the situation of human rights in North Korea in New York on Thursday.
BY PARK HYUN-JU, ESTHER CHUNG [chung.juhee@joongang.co.kr]
12. North Korea continues to practice “politics of fear” as Kim Jong Un marks 10th year in power
The essence of rule by law is rule by fear. It is the only way someone like Kim Jong-un can remain in power.
And we should remember when we talk about survival of the Kim family regime we are not talking merely about survival. We are talking about remaining in complete power.
North Korea continues to practice “politics of fear” as Kim Jong Un marks 10th year in power
In particular, North Korea is evaluating the skill and loyalty of cadres based on how they execute and achieve policy regarding COVID-19 quarantine efforts
By Ha Yoon Ah - 2021.12.16 2:55pm
North Korean authorities continue to practice “politics of fear” even as Kim Jong Un marks the 10th year of his rule. In particular, authorities are using punishments and personnel transfers to keep cadres even more inline amid the protracted COVID-19 pandemic.
Having long strengthened his base of power through the politics of fear, sacking or even executing high-ranking cadres, Kim has ruled by generating internal tension this year, too, mercilessly replacing top-ranking party, government and military cadres at the apex of power.
In fact, Ri Pyong Chol — who had risen as a central figure with a place on the Presidium of the Politburo of the ruling party’s Central Committee, a key body — lost his position in June due to a “grave case” pertaining to the state’s emergency quarantine efforts.
Officials of all ranks at the Central Emergency Anti-epidemic Headquarters were replaced en masse for lackadaisical handling of quarantine problems or lazy statements and actions. Even to the present day, guidance officers at the very bottom of the administrative totem pole are reportedly being replaced.
Because of this, cadres are apparently telling one another that “they’ve no luck this year, perhaps because it’s been eight years since the execution of Jang Song Thaek.” The source says cadres are complaining that they fear “icy gusts” are coming their way, invoking the death of Jang — which opened the chapter on the “politics of fear” — and the superstition against the number eight, which is considered inauspicious.
Former Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission Jang Song Taek was arrested and put on trial before being executed for being a “counter-revolutionary.” / Image: KCTV screen capture
With its harsh punishments of cadres, North Korea apparently intends to reestablish lax internal discipline while producing results in COVID-19 quarantine efforts and economic construction, two major current tasks.
Along the same lines, Kim replaced Department of Economic Affairs head Kim Tu Il just a month after appointing him to the post with its crushing duties in the first year of the state’s new five-year economic development plan, punished a series of high-ranking military officials (Ri Pyong Chol, Kim Jong Gwan) for the “grave case” in quarantine efforts, and sacked the head of the Science and Education Department, Choe Sang Gon, who had general oversight over the public health sector.
Kim’s “Cadre Revolution”: Lighting a fire under cadres with ideological efforts
South Korea’s Ministry of Unification recently published its 2021 directory of North Korean government institutions and 2021 report on major North Korean figures. About personnel trends in North Korea over the last year, a Ministry of Unification official said the authorities are focusing more on working-level ability and professionalism, but they are also using transfers as a means to reward or punish officials.
North Korea has long selected people based on professionalism by sector, and a generational change is underway as well. Also characteristic is its use of personnel changes to execute party decisions and orders.
In late June, the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee convened an enlarged meeting “to roundly deal with some leading officials’ dereliction of duty in implementing the major policy tasks of the Party and the state, and to provide a fresh turning point in the personnel administration within the Party.”
According to a Rodong Sinmun report, Kim — presiding over the meeting — said “now is the time to bring about a revolution in personnel administration before solving the acute economic problems,” and that “the revolution in cadre management which has always been regarded as of priority importance by our Party in the whole course of its development, is an important Party-wide task that has to be further intensified and strengthened on a priority basis to suit the current situation of our revolution.”
Subsequently, North Korea has been carrying out an ideological campaign. A July 10 opinion piece in the Rodong Sinmun said the “cadre revolution” is a fundamental means to achieve actual transformation and substantive progress in socialist construction, while an Aug. 2 editorial on the front page of the newspaper called on “all party organizations” to follow the Central Committee’s will to bring about a “cadre revolution” by strengthening guidance over officials and encouraging them to show complete dedication to the people, taking ownership over the people’s well-being.
Achieving party policy linked to skill, loyalty; cadres feel compelled to make fake reports
North Korea has continuously demanded that cadres improve irresponsible work attitudes and correct lax efforts, berating them to fulfill tasks with loyalty to the party and skill. North Korea might intend to produce exceptional results by keeping cadres in line through competency-based appointments, but in reality, there are lots of ill side effects.
A Daily NK source in North Korea said the authorities keep assigning unrealistic plans and tasks out of touch with current circumstances, with imports and exports frozen due to COVID-19. Officials believe they must unconditionally achieve these targets if they are to keep their jobs, so have little choice but to fake the statistics and issue false reports.
Above all else, North Korea is evaluating the skill and loyalty of cadres based on how they execute and achieve policy regarding COVID-19 quarantine efforts, the authorities’ top priority.
Disease control officials in Pyongyang spraying buses with disinfectant. / Image: Rodong Sinmun
The source said cadres were avoiding being chosen to become quarantine guidance officers. He said they get sacked for dereliction of duty if they fail to properly respond to conditions on the ground, make false reports or present the same quarantine plan each quarter. If they are lucky, they are punished and become laborers. If not, they get exiled to the mountains or sent to political prison camps.
Since Kim mentioned the “cadre revolution,” cadres in the party, administration, military, legal bodies and specialized institutions have been taking typing and basic computer competency tests. Older cadres who fail these tests are reportedly admonished that they are “unqualified to guide modernization” and sacked.
The source said older cadres say they are struggling to keep up with younger teachers. Young cadres in their 40s and 50s, meanwhile, take delight in watching old, placekeeping cadres fall, but they already dejectedly realize that what happened to their older colleagues will happen to them.
Ha Yoon Ah is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about her articles to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
13. Yanggang Province security agency ordered to “root out every last user of Chinese mobile phones”
Information and communications tools are a threat to the regime.
Yanggang Province security agency ordered to “root out every last user of Chinese mobile phones”
Security agents are even running ops by using confiscated mobile phones to continue WeChat conversations
By Lee Chae Un - 2021.12.16 2:35pm
North Korean security authorities are charging anyone caught using the Chinese messaging app WeChat in the Sino-Korean border region as spies, regardless of why they were using the app.
According to a Daily NK source in Yanggang Province on Wednesday, the provincial branch of the Ministry of State Security received an order early this month to “root out every last user of Chinese-made mobile phones.”
The order included instructions to “unconditionally” level espionage charges on suspects if they have installed WeChat on their phones. This suggests the authorities intend to thoroughly stop the use of WeChat, which they believe people have long used to communicate with the outside world.
The authorities are also ferreting out whoever the suspects have been chatting with. That is, security agents are running ops by using confiscated mobile phones to continue WeChat conversations.
In fact, a remittance “broker” in Hyesan — a woman in her 40s identified by her family name of Choe — was arrested on Dec. 3 as she attempted to hand money to a Ministry of State Security operative.
In this undated file photo, a North Korean merchant is seen using a cell phone at a local market. / Image: Daily NK
Ministry agents then began sending messages to Choe’s WeChat contacts, posing as a remittance broker. As they exchanged messages, the agents hoped to confirm whether Choe just moved money or whether she also leaked domestic information overseas.
The source said they located the people who left text or voice messages that they received money and confiscated their cash. This means they are using a dragnet to sweep up accomplices.
In particular, they are reportedly confirming the identities of chat partners. In Hyesan, the city branch of the Ministry of State Security now has a list of dozens of defectors who reside in South Korea.
Thus, if you get busted for using a Chinese-made mobile phone with WeChat, both you and your connections will likely get hurt.
The source said the authorities have recently been employing more diverse means of ferreting out users of Chinese-made mobile phones and their accomplices. This has locals on edge, he said.
14. Kim's first decade: 3 US meetings, 2 dead relatives, 1 nuclear arsenal
Excerpts:
With just one meeting, the chubby young leader charmed the American businessman and reality TV host -- some 40 years his senior.
Trump boasted of forming a "special bond", even "love", with someone he had once mocked as "little rocket man".
The same year, Kim chatted in the woods with the Moon and had several meetings with Xi Jinping of China -- North Korea's primary backer.
"The effect was tantalising," said Sung-yoon Lee, professor of Korean Studies at Tufts University.
"The cruel, funny-looking dictator had transformed himself into a reform-minded, peace-prone, responsible steward of nukes and gulags perhaps amenable to denuclearisation."
The amicable mood was short-lived: a second Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi collapsed over sanctions relief and what Pyongyang would be willing to give up in return.
Trump quickly flew out of the Vietnamese capital and Kim took a 60-hour train ride back home empty-handed.
A follow-up meeting in the Demilitarized Zone that divides the Korean peninsula did nothing to break the deadlock.
Kim's first decade: 3 US meetings, 2 dead relatives, 1 nuclear arsenal
© Handout Unlike most of his counterparts, with no concerns over elections or term limits and age on his side, Kim Jong Un can expect to remain in office for decades
After 10 years in power, North Korea's once youthful Kim Jong Un is now one of the world's more experienced leaders, and will look to defy the West for decades to come with his nuclear arsenal, analysts say.
Unlike most of his counterparts, with no concerns over elections or term limits and age on his side -- he is only in his late 30s -- Kim can expect to remain in office for decades, as long as his health holds up.
© SAUL LOEB The arc of his first 10 years points to the trajectory to come, analysts say, from isolation to nuclear development to sharing the diplomatic stage with the world's most powerful leaders
It is a far different perspective to a democratic politician worrying about headlines every day, and Kim already has more experience in power than most heads of state he will deal with in the future.
The arc of his first 10 years points to the trajectory to come, analysts say, from isolation to nuclear development to sharing the diplomatic stage with the world's most powerful leaders.
"North Korea will maintain its confrontational status with the United States and harass it by tactically challenging it while making sure it doesn't cross the line to completely derail its relations," Kim Jin-ha, researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, told AFP.
© ED JONES While North Korea has acquired bombs and missiles, its state-led economy has been mismanaged for decades, even before sanctions
For more than six years after inheriting power when his father and predecessor Kim Jong Il died on December 17, 2011, Kim did not leave his isolated country or meet any foreign heads of state.
© STR Analysts say Kim Jong Un will look to defy the West for decades to come with his nuclear arsenal
Initially seen by some as a figurehead for North Korea's generals and Workers' Party bureaucrats, he brutally established his authority, executing his uncle by marriage Jang Song Thaek for treason.
He was also accused of the assassination at Kuala Lumpur airport of his elder half-brother Kim Jong Nam with a nerve agent.
At the same time, Kim oversaw rapid progress in North Korea's banned weapons programmes.
He conducted four of its six nuclear tests and the 2017 launches of ballistic missiles that can reach the whole of the US mainland, defying increasingly severe UN Security Council sanctions along the way.
For months, he traded fiery rhetoric with then US president Donald Trump, raising fears of an armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula.
Then he declared the country's nuclear arsenal "complete" and came knocking on the door of the outside world.
- 'Fortuitous alignment' -
With the assistance of dovish South Korean President Moon Jae-in, in 2018 Kim became the first North Korean leader ever to meet a sitting US president at a headline-grabbing Singapore summit.
Soo Kim, an analyst at the RAND Corporation, said Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal was largely what made the encounter possible.
"North Korea's development of its weapons programme, the credibility of the nuclear and missile threat, and the fortuitous alignment of leadership -- Trump, Moon, and Kim -- helped prime the conditions," she said.
With just one meeting, the chubby young leader charmed the American businessman and reality TV host -- some 40 years his senior.
Trump boasted of forming a "special bond", even "love", with someone he had once mocked as "little rocket man".
The same year, Kim chatted in the woods with the Moon and had several meetings with Xi Jinping of China -- North Korea's primary backer.
"The effect was tantalising," said Sung-yoon Lee, professor of Korean Studies at Tufts University.
"The cruel, funny-looking dictator had transformed himself into a reform-minded, peace-prone, responsible steward of nukes and gulags perhaps amenable to denuclearisation."
The amicable mood was short-lived: a second Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi collapsed over sanctions relief and what Pyongyang would be willing to give up in return.
Trump quickly flew out of the Vietnamese capital and Kim took a 60-hour train ride back home empty-handed.
A follow-up meeting in the Demilitarized Zone that divides the Korean peninsula did nothing to break the deadlock.
- 'Common adversary' -
North Korea's dynastic regime and the ruling Workers' Party base their claim to a right to rule on nationalism, from asserting responsibility for the end of Japanese colonialism after World War II, to "winning" the 1950-53 Korean War, to defying the United States ever since.
Officials and analysts say Kim never intended to fully give up his nuclear arsenal, which North Korea has pursued for decades at vast cost in resources and isolation, and is still developing further.
"He can't feed the people, but he's able to maintain his regime's political survivability" with his weapons, said Soo Kim of RAND Corporation. "And this is more important to Kim."
And with the United States set for long-term tensions with China, Kim will have an opportunity to follow the example of his grandfather Kim Il Sung.
North Korea's founder adeptly exploited Cold War tensions between Moscow and Beijing to play one Communist state off against another.
The ties between Pyongyang and Beijing -- forged in the Korean War when their forces fought South Korea and a US-led UN coalition to a standstill -- were "a love-hate relationship between two 'frenemies'", said Professor Lee of Tufts University.
"Neither adores the other, but recognises that the other is its closest ally in terms of strategy, ideology, history, and in taming the US, the common adversary."
- 'Considerable success' -
Kim has only to look across the border to China to see how increasing prosperity over many years can bolster the popularity of a one-party state.
But -- to Beijing's frustration -- while North Korea has acquired bombs and missiles, its state-led economy has been mismanaged for decades, even before sanctions, and its people suffer chronic food shortages.
With a vulnerable health system, last year it closed its borders after the coronavirus emerged in neighbouring China.
The self-imposed blockade remains in place, and while Pyongyang insists it has yet to see any cases of the disease -- analysts doubt the claim -- Kim has admitted resulting hardships and warned his people to prepare for the "worst-ever situation".
"Economically, North Korea is at the very bottom in the international order," said Park Won-gon, professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul.
"But with its nuclear arsenal, it is able to exercise its influence between two world powers, the United States and China," he added.
"I'd call that a considerable success on Pyongyang's part."
sh/slb/qan
15. Escaping North Korea Under Kim Jong-Un – Analysis
Excerpts:
Life satisfaction levels among North Korean migrants in South Korea are moderately high. Male defectors identify South Korea’s competitive society as a main source of unhappiness, while women attribute life dissatisfaction to family separation. One in five North Koreans have experienced discrimination in South Korea. Teenagers commonly point to their low-income status, while older North Koreans attribute this to incompatible skillsets compared to their South Korean peers.
Some North Koreans prefer to undertake onward migration to Western countries. According to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the top destination countries for North Korean asylum applications in the past 10 years were Canada, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Russia and the Netherlands. Despite their strong human rights campaigns against North Korea, the United States has not accepted many North Korean refugees.
Migration in contexts like these elsewhere around the world is characterised by natural selection for survival. North Koreans are not unique in this respect. Humans have always tried to move to new locations where more freedom, safety and a higher quality of life are available. Families and social networks play key roles in facilitating and reality the choice for mobility. States have likewise always sought to control people’s inbound and outbound movements, especially in times of crisis.
For ordinary North Koreans life proceeds from crisis to crisis, rooted in patterns that stem back to the Korean War. As North Korea tightens border restrictions to prioritise regime survival — a strategy compounded by pervasive restrictions in neighbouring countries due to COVID-19 — most of its citizens simply seeking to survive will continue to face an uphill battle.
Escaping North Korea Under Kim Jong-Un – Analysis
By Jay Song*
As of September 2021, data from the South Korean Ministry of Reunification suggest that 33,800 North Korean defectors currently live in South Korea. This number has soared over the past two decades — before 1998, they numbered under 200.
Following the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the devastating famine in North Korea in the mid-1990s, the turn of the century saw an influx of North Korean arrivals into South Korea rise each year, reaching its peak in 2009 at 2914. Since Kim Jong-un took power in 2012, the flow has largely stagnated and decreased, with COVID-19 reaching an all-time low.
Following Kim’s succession, annual arrivals have not exceeded 1600. In 2020, with increased border restrictions due to COVID-19, only 229 entrants were recorded. A number of factors explain this. The first is strengthened border control between North Korea and China. In the 1990s and 2000s, there were few barbed wire barricades across the exit route of choice, the Tuman river separating both countries. But under Kim’s regime, both China and North Korea have heightened border security with more fences and checkpoints.
Increased social surveillance practices in China have also amplified the challenges facing defectors once they enter. In 2012, with China amending border laws affecting North Korean defectors, efforts to locate them have increased. Without official identification, it is extremely difficult to move around China without attracting suspicion. The adoption of AI-driven face recognition CCTV systems and other systems of social control have further restricted the mobility of defectors hoping to avoid detection. If they are caught and repatriated, there are detrimental consequences, individually and for their families.
Gender disparity across the North Korean migrants in South Korea is another clear dimension. From 2002, women have comprised 75 to 85 per cent of defectors in South Korea. This is a product of social norms in North Korean society. While all men in North Korea must complete at least 10 years of military service, women with middle or high school education are enlisted only between the ages of 17 and 22. Women are relatively more mobile and are more commonly involved in entrepreneurial and informal trading activities across the Chinese border. This likewise exposes women and children to increased risks of human trafficking, and many were sold as wives or cheap domestic labour during the famine and post-famine periods.
Changes in South Korean entry requirements for verifying the identity of self-claimed North Korean refugees is another challenge. These changes are attributed to fears of North Korean espionage and the propensity of Korean-Chinese to enter South Korea falsely claiming defector status to receive government subsidies and more favourable work and residence rights than those of other foreign migrants. The South Korean government also changed the scale and nature of various subsidy schemes for North Korean defectors. Instead of outright cash payments, it now provides incentives that are tied to education, training and employment for long-term settlement and capacity building.
Fees for brokering services to cross borders via land, sea or air have also increased dramatically. In the 2000s, fees per person were around US$3–4000. Now they have skyrocketed to US$20,000. The air route has become largely inaccessible as faking Chinese passports is almost impossible. This has significantly restricted the number of individuals who can afford to leave.
Despite the barriers, North Koreans still have significant motivation for defecting. According to the 2020 survey by the Hana Foundation, the biggest driver for leaving North Korea was the food shortage, followed by political repression, a better environment for families, family reunion, economic opportunities, secondary family migration, personal security and recommendation from others. Family-related motivations have become a dominant pull factor for North Korean migration to South Korea under Kim.
Life satisfaction levels among North Korean migrants in South Korea are moderately high. Male defectors identify South Korea’s competitive society as a main source of unhappiness, while women attribute life dissatisfaction to family separation. One in five North Koreans have experienced discrimination in South Korea. Teenagers commonly point to their low-income status, while older North Koreans attribute this to incompatible skillsets compared to their South Korean peers.
Some North Koreans prefer to undertake onward migration to Western countries. According to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the top destination countries for North Korean asylum applications in the past 10 years were Canada, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Russia and the Netherlands. Despite their strong human rights campaigns against North Korea, the United States has not accepted many North Korean refugees.
Migration in contexts like these elsewhere around the world is characterised by natural selection for survival. North Koreans are not unique in this respect. Humans have always tried to move to new locations where more freedom, safety and a higher quality of life are available. Families and social networks play key roles in facilitating and reality the choice for mobility. States have likewise always sought to control people’s inbound and outbound movements, especially in times of crisis.
For ordinary North Koreans life proceeds from crisis to crisis, rooted in patterns that stem back to the Korean War. As North Korea tightens border restrictions to prioritise regime survival — a strategy compounded by pervasive restrictions in neighbouring countries due to COVID-19 — most of its citizens simply seeking to survive will continue to face an uphill battle.
*About the author: Jay Song is Korea Foundation Senior Lecturer in Korean Studies at the Asia Institute in the University of Melbourne. This work is funded by the Academy of Korean Studies.
16. Kim Jong-un presided over 10 years of brutal executions - OKN
Kim Jong-un presided over 10 years of brutal executions - OKN
December 16, 2021
Report finds North Korean leader killed hundreds
December 17 marks the 10th year since North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il died and his son Kim Jong-un came to power. Over the past 10 years, the Kim Jong-un regime has continued the public executions of its people just like his father did. However, the latest report by a South Korean human rights group showed that Kim Jong-un’s execution style is different from his father’s. The son seems to be more concerned about leaks of inside information and international monitoring, so he is executing people in isolated areas, or regions far away from the border with China.
The Seoul-based Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG) released the report “Mapping Killings under Kim Jong-un: North Korea’s Response to International Pressure” on December 15. The report is based on six years of research. The group analyzed satellite imagery and interviewed 683 defectors to examine “how state killing practices have shifted in North Korea under the young leader.” The project documented 442 testimonies on state-sanctioned killings and 30 testimonies on body disposal sites, including burial and cremation sites.
The report said, “North Korea, in response to international criticism, has changed its killing practices, clamping down on potential information leaks by selecting execution sites that are easier to control.”
The TJWG has identified differences in the patterns of public executions during the Kim Jong-un era by focusing on the city of Hyesan, which is on the border with China and is more exposed to the outside world due to its geographical location.
The key difference is that the Kim Jong-un regime carried out most of its public executions in isolated and inconspicuous places a long way from the border and central area of the city. The sites for public executions include Hyesan Airfield and nearby hills, mountains, open terrain and fields.
The testimonies of North Korean defectors also suggested that public executions have not been staged in the center of Hyesan or places near the border with China during the Kim Jong-un era, unlike the previous period. Also noteworthy was that the number of locations mainly used for public executions in Hyesan decreased under Kim Jong-un’s rule.
The testimonies of North Korean defectors also suggested that the number of public executions decreased while Pyongyang has continued to secretly kill people at indoor locations, possibly to avoid international monitoring systems.
“Documenting secret or ‘indoor’ killings is our next step,” said Hubert Younghwan Lee, Executive Director of TJWG. “There are increasing numbers of news reports quoting clandestine information sources inside North Korea about this type of killing over the last five to six years. To track ‘indoor’ killings we will strengthen our cooperation with news platforms that have contacts on the ground through cross-border telecommunication.”
The TJWG documented 27 testimonies of state-sanctioned killing sites, of which 23 were public execution. Of the 23 executions, 21 were by firing squad and 2 were by hanging. The group also identified the reason for the executions under the Kim Jong-un regime.
“The most commonly cited offenses announced at public executions included (in descending order of frequency): watching or distributing South Korean videos (7 instances), drug-related crimes (5), prostitution (5), human trafficking (4), murder or attempted murder (3), and ‘obscene acts’ (3).”
The report introduced one witness at a public execution in Hamheung, North Hamgyong province, in 2012.
“Even when there was fluid leaking from the condemned person’s brain, people were made to stand in line and look at the executed person in the face as a warning message,” the witness testified.
Meanwhile, the Chosun Ilbo newspaper also ran special reports analyzing 10 years of North Korea under Kim Jong-un’s rule, including his persecution style. According to the Institute for National Security Strategy, a de facto think tank of South Korea’s National Intelligence Service, at least 140 senior officials were executed from the beginning of Kim Jong-un’s term through the end of 2016. According to the think tank’s data, around 30 people were executed in 2013 and around 40 people were killed in 2014. Most of the figures were close allies of Jang Song-thaek, Kim Jong-un’s uncle and the second most powerful man before he was executed by anti-aircraft guns by his nephew in 2013.
Kim Jong-un’s politics of fear hit its peak in 2015. He executed at least 60 people in that year. Reasons for execution were random and absurd, such as falling asleep, poor body posture, or clapping without enthusiasm.
Publicly available reports by the intelligence agency on North Korea’s persecution dropped significantly under the Moon Jae-in administration. A source told the Chosun Ilbo newspaper that “Kim Jong-un’s politics of fear remain the same, but the current South Korean administration is very passive about releasing information that can be sensitive to North Korea.” The source added, “internal data suggests that around 700 people were executed during the 10 years of Kim Jong-un’s rule.”
The Moon administration appears to have taken a policy of silence on these executions as it focuses on its last-ditch attempt to end the Korean War and improve relations with Pyongyang.
17. North Korea in commemorative mood ahead of 10th anniversary of ex-leader's passing
It is all about venerating and idealizing the Kim family regime. It is what you do when you attempt to create "god-like" figures.
North Korea in commemorative mood ahead of 10th anniversary of ex-leader's passing
This file photo taken on June 18, 2019, shows commuters riding a bus past portraits of late North Korean leaders Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, on Kim Il-sung Square in Pyongyang. AFP-Yonhap
North Korea is holding a series of events memorializing late leader Kim Jong-il ahead of the 10th anniversary of his passing this week, Pyongyang's state media said Thursday.
Kim, the father of current leader Kim Jong-un, died on Dec. 17, 2011, after having ruled the reclusive regime since the death of his father and national founder, Kim Il-sung, in 1994.
In Pyongyang, young workers and students held a meeting to remember the late leader, and an art exhibition opened with works depicting his life, according to the North's official Korean Central News Agency.
In an editorial, the North's main newspaper, the Rodong Sinmun, said the past decade has been a "history of learning and following Kim Jong-il's faith, determination and courage for a revolution."
The state media also said international organizations sent flower baskets to mark the anniversary.
Eyes are on whether North Korea will hold a massive public event for the upcoming anniversary, as Pyongyang usually marks every fifth and 10th anniversary with larger events.
The North held a large-scale gathering in Pyongyang to commemorate Kim Jong-il's death on the first, second, third and fifth anniversaries.
Last year, Kim paid tribute at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, where the body of the late leader lies in state, to mark the ninth anniversary of his death. (Yonhap)
18. Netflix boss reveals they knew ‘Squid Game’ would be big
Netflix boss reveals they knew ‘Squid Game’ would be big
When Squid Game was first released back in September, only the executives of Netflix had any idea of how popular the survival series would become. They knew it would be a massive hit of course, but were completely oblivious to what would become of Squid Game’s success – particularly outside of Asia.
Netflix boss Bela Bajaria said that they knew Squid Game would become a hit show before it was released in an interview with Variety. Unbeknownst to Netflix, Squid Game would become one of their biggest TV shows and capture a staggering 2.1 billion hours of streaming.
“We knew it would be a big regional hit,” Bajaria told Variety. “Our team in Korea always said this would be a big tentpole for us. [They knew] it would do very well in Korea and all through Asia.”
She also mentioned that Netflix did not expect the level of success that would eventually become reality. “We couldn’t imagine or anticipate this because it’s never happened before. It’s so hard to imagine something to this kind of scale,” the Netflix boss added.
The hit show, which was initially meant to be a film, had its script finished in 2009 and struggled to find funding until Netflix took interest in the Korean show nearly ten years later. When talking about the goals for Squid Game, creator Hwang Dong-hyuk told The Guardian, “When I was working on the project, the goal was to rank No 1 on the Netflix US chart for at least a day. But it ended up being much more successful, the most-watched show on Netflix ever. It’s very surprising. It shows that the global audience is resonating with the message I wanted to reflect.”
Squid Game has since won a nice selection of awards, including a Gotham Award, People’s Choice Award, and even nominations for the 79th Golden Globe Awards. The show easily secured wins for best breakthrough series, binge-worthy show of the year, and best score and will most likely get the green light for their other nominations.
Comments
comments
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
