Quotes of the Day:
"The most courageous act is still to think for yourself. Aloud."
- Coco Chanel
"For it is fixed principle with me, that whatever is done should be done well."
- George Washington
"Courage, hard work, self-mastery, and intelligent effort are all essential to successful life."
- Theodore Roosevelt
1. Hold Beijing Accountable for Aiding Kim Jong Un’s Crimes
2. Satellite imagery suggests ongoing operation of N. Korea's nuclear reactor: U.S. monitors
3. Yongbyon Nuclear Center: Insights from a Snow-covered Day
4. The Anti-Leaflet Law: Reevaluating Inter-Korean Appeasement
5. How South Korea’s Human Rights Lawyer President Sold Out Human Rights
6. Virulent Jew-hatred is regularly promoted by pro-North Korean groups
7. Why some North Korean defectors return to one of the world's most repressive regimes
8. South Korea prepares for another Covid-era national election.
9. U.S. names Korean-American as crypto enforcement leader
10. N.K. leader attends groundbreaking ceremony of greenhouse farm project
11. S. Korea reports more than 100,000 COVID-19 cases for 2nd day amid omicron spread
12. Reliance on atomic power
13. [Visual History of Korea] Staff Sgt. Reckless -- Korean warhorse celebrated on both sides of the Pacific Ocean
1. Hold Beijing Accountable for Aiding Kim Jong Un’s Crimes
Human rights is not only a moral imperative, it is a national security issue. We must take a human rights upfront approach.
Note the co-author is my good friend Greg Scarlatoiu, the Executive Director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (and I am on his board of directors, so excuse my bias). If I could make one recommendation to the Biden Administration it would be to nominate Greg as the next Ambassador for north Korean human rights. A fluent Korean speaker, one who lived through the tyranny of his native Romania to include the revolution in 1989, and one of the few Americans who has devoted decades to Korean studies and north Korean rights issues. There is no more qualified human rights expert than Greg.
Hold Beijing Accountable for Aiding Kim Jong Un’s Crimes
Foreign Policy · by Anthony Ruggiero, Greg Scarlatoiu · February 18, 2022
An expert's point of view on a current event.
China plays a crucial role in sustaining North Korea’s horrific human rights record.
By Anthony Ruggiero, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and Greg Scarlatoiu, the executive director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.
Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un take part in a welcoming ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Jan. 8, 2019. Xinhua/Shen Hong via Getty Images
The 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics were notable for the absence of Western politicians and officials, the result of a diplomatic boycott to protest China’s reprehensible treatment of Uyghurs, a Muslim minority group in its Xinjiang province. What the boycott ignores is that Beijing is complicit in North Korea’s horrific human rights abuses as well. Because the two countries’ abuses are inextricably linked, it is essential that U.S. North Korea policy focuses on China’s role in sustaining the crimes of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s family against the North Korean people.
For example, China is complicit in the fates of thousands of North Koreans who try to flee across the 882-mile border between the two countries each year. Escapees travel an arduous path and, in most instances, start their journey in China before eventually settling in a friendly country, such as South Korea or the United States. Yet Beijing is not a safe haven for defectors fleeing the brutal Kim regime. China does not grant North Koreans refugee status, treating them as economic migrants instead. If Chinese authorities discover them, they are forcibly deported back to North Korea.
China has also done little to crack down on the human traffickers who prey on North Koreans. These traffickers, as the U.S. State Department described last year, “lure, drug, detain, or kidnap some North Korean women upon their arrival” in China. Some are promised employment, but the State Department warned that women and girls are subjected “physical abuse and sexual exploitation by their traffickers, forced into commercial sex in brothels or through internet sex sites, or compelled to work as hostesses in nightclubs or karaoke bars.” North Korean women are also sold to Chinese men in forced marriages. If China repatriates the women to North Korea, they are subjected to harsh punishment, including separation from their children, forced abortions, or even death. Through satellite imagery and victim testimony, the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) confirmed that around 800 women forcibly repatriated by China were being held at Kyohwaso No. 12 in Jongo-ri, a correctional or reeducation center in northeast North Korea. (One of us, Greg Scarlatoiu, is the executive director of the HRNK.) Last year, the U.S. State Department also noted that “as many as 30,000 children born in China to North Korean women and Chinese men have not been registered upon birth, rendering them stateless and vulnerable to possible exploitation.”
The 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics were notable for the absence of Western politicians and officials, the result of a diplomatic boycott to protest China’s reprehensible treatment of Uyghurs, a Muslim minority group in its Xinjiang province. What the boycott ignores is that Beijing is complicit in North Korea’s horrific human rights abuses as well. Because the two countries’ abuses are inextricably linked, it is essential that U.S. North Korea policy focuses on China’s role in sustaining the crimes of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s family against the North Korean people.
For example, China is complicit in the fates of thousands of North Koreans who try to flee across the 882-mile border between the two countries each year. Escapees travel an arduous path and, in most instances, start their journey in China before eventually settling in a friendly country, such as South Korea or the United States. Yet Beijing is not a safe haven for defectors fleeing the brutal Kim regime. China does not grant North Koreans refugee status, treating them as economic migrants instead. If Chinese authorities discover them, they are forcibly deported back to North Korea.
China has also done little to crack down on the human traffickers who prey on North Koreans. These traffickers, as the U.S. State Department described last year, “lure, drug, detain, or kidnap some North Korean women upon their arrival” in China. Some are promised employment, but the State Department warned that women and girls are subjected “physical abuse and sexual exploitation by their traffickers, forced into commercial sex in brothels or through internet sex sites, or compelled to work as hostesses in nightclubs or karaoke bars.” North Korean women are also sold to Chinese men in forced marriages. If China repatriates the women to North Korea, they are subjected to harsh punishment, including separation from their children, forced abortions, or even death. Through satellite imagery and victim testimony, the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) confirmed that around 800 women forcibly repatriated by China were being held at Kyohwaso No. 12 in Jongo-ri, a correctional or reeducation center in northeast North Korea. (One of us, Greg Scarlatoiu, is the executive director of the HRNK.) Last year, the U.S. State Department also noted that “as many as 30,000 children born in China to North Korean women and Chinese men have not been registered upon birth, rendering them stateless and vulnerable to possible exploitation.”
In addition to punishing the escapees, the Kim regime often punishes those caught assisting other North Koreans attempting to escape by sending them to a kwanliso, one of the regime’s notorious political forced labor camps. A 2014 U.N. Commission of Inquiry concluded that these camps “resemble the horrors of camps that totalitarian States established during the twentieth century.” HRNK uses satellite imagery to monitor and assess the operations of the regime’s six such camps, which hold 80,000 to 120,000 prisoners. (American student Otto Warmbier was incarcerated at one of these camps and died shortly after his release.)
In close collaboration with the European Union, the United States must retake the high ground it once held at the United Nations.
Yet another way China is complicit in the Kim regime’s crimes is the use of North Korean forced labor. The regime sells North Koreans to work abroad—mainly in China—and takes most of their compensation. In 2017, the U.N. Security Council noted that the Kim regime uses the money for its prohibited nuclear and missile programs; the council mandated the return of all workers back to North Korea no later than Dec. 22, 2019.
In December 2021, the Biden administration sanctioned three Chinese companies and one Chinese individual for evading U.S. North Korea sanctions by facilitating millions of dollars in wire transfers to a North Korean government-run animation studio using North Korean workers in both China and North Korea itself. The Chinese Embassy in Washington denounced these and other human rights-related sanctions as a “serious interference in China’s internal affairs” and “severe violation of basic norms governing international relations.” The State Department reported last year that there were 20,000 to 80,000 North Koreans still working in China—a direct violation of the U.N. order.
The Biden administration’s North Korea policy is focused on nuclear negotiations with the Kim regime without preconditions, but U.S. President Joe Biden must also direct his attention to the plight of the North Korean people. He can start by appointing a special envoy for human rights in North Korea, as required by the 2004 North Korean Human Rights Act. That position has been vacant since the previous envoy departed more than five years ago. The envoy could be an advocate for the North Korean people and highlight Beijing’s role in covering up the Kim regime’s heinous crimes.
Congress unanimously reauthorized the North Korean Human Rights Act in 2018 and is expected to renew it by a similar bipartisan consensus this year. The law calls on the U.S. secretary of state to make it easier for North Koreans to receive protection as refugees. Since the law was first signed, only around 230 North Koreans have received asylum and resettled in the United States. The Biden administration must seek ways to better protect, aid, and resettle North Korean refugees. The House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee must conduct oversight of Biden’s North Korea policy and insist that addressing China’s role in North Korean human rights abuses play a central role.
In close collaboration with the European Union, the United States must retake the high ground it once held at the United Nations by resuscitating the coalition of like-minded member states, including South Korea and Japan. The coalition was responsible for key human rights initiatives related to North Korea—including resolutions by the U.N. General Assembly and U.N. Human Rights Council—as well as for placing it on the Security Council’s agenda. Although diplomatic engagement with unsavory regimes continues to be a fundamental element of national power, Washington should also push for accountability for crimes against humanity committed against North Koreans and citizens of other countries—for example, by organizing support for the establishment of special tribunals.
The United States and like-minded nations must also press China to abide by the obligations it assumed under the two pillars of international refugee protection: the 1951 U.N. Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Washington and its partners should make clear that China needs to stop forcibly deporting North Korean refugees back to a place where they face a credible fear of persecution, including imprisonment under the harshest conditions, torture, and death.
At the Summit for Democracy last December, Biden proclaimed that “autocracies can never extinguish the ember of liberty that burns in the hearts of people around the world, in every portion of the world.” To fulfill that promise, he must redouble his efforts to free the North Korean people from the clutches of the Kim regime—and part of that road leads through China.
Anthony Ruggiero is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former senior director for counterproliferation and biodefense on the U.S. National Security Council during the Trump administration. Twitter: @NatSecAnthony
Greg Scarlatoiu is the executive director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.
2. Satellite imagery suggests ongoing operation of N. Korea's nuclear reactor: U.S. monitors
Excerpts:
The website said, while the uranium enrichment plant has shown no snowmelt on the roofs of the centrifuge halls, it does not mean that the centrifuges were not in operation, as the area is more tightly controlled to not let out enough heat to cause snow to melt.
In August last year, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said in its annual report the Yongbyon reactor appeared to be in operation since July.
North Korea has staged six nuclear tests with its last test being conducted in September 2017. Nuclear negotiations between the U.S. and the North have remained stalled since the 2019 Hanoi summit between the two nations ended without a deal.
Satellite imagery suggests ongoing operation of N. Korea's nuclear reactor: U.S. monitors | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Feb. 19 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's plutonium-producing nuclear reactor appears to be in operation, two U.S. monitoring websites have said, citing recent satellite imagery that observed snowmelt at the facility.
Beyond Parallel, a project of the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, reported Friday thermal infrared satellite imagery from Jan. 27 and Feb. 4 showed the discharge of warm water from the 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon nuclear complex, suggesting the reactor and its cooling system are in operation.
The North previously reprocessed spent fuel rods from the reactor to produce weapons-grade plutonium.
The reactor's cooling discharge pipe is "ice-free," and the temperature of the water being discharged from the reactor is "warmer than that of Kuryong River" that flows alongside the complex, the report said.
"Because of this temperature difference, the area where the water from the reactor discharges into the river has not iced over. In contrast, the deeper areas of the river remain frozen," it said.
The website, however, noted that the thermal analysis only helps suggest the reactor, the Radiochemistry Laboratory and the centrifuge plant are "occupied," rather than "operational" in a sense that certain significant activities are taking place.
"If (they) were operational, a much more rapid and generalized melting of snow than is observed in the current thermal and multispectral imagery is expected ... they would exhibit stronger thermal patterns," it said.
38 North, another monitoring website, on Thursday offered a similar analysis based on a Feb. 1 satellite imagery that detected snowmelt on the southern roof of the reactor building and nearby support buildings.
It also mentioned the continued warm water discharge has been observed since late December.
The website said, while the uranium enrichment plant has shown no snowmelt on the roofs of the centrifuge halls, it does not mean that the centrifuges were not in operation, as the area is more tightly controlled to not let out enough heat to cause snow to melt.
In August last year, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said in its annual report the Yongbyon reactor appeared to be in operation since July.
North Korea has staged six nuclear tests with its last test being conducted in September 2017. Nuclear negotiations between the U.S. and the North have remained stalled since the 2019 Hanoi summit between the two nations ended without a deal.
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
3. Yongbyon Nuclear Center: Insights from a Snow-covered Day
Yongbyon Nuclear Center: Insights from a Snow-covered Day
Recent commercial satellite imagery of a snow-covered Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center provides a unique snapshot of the complex and its activities. An overnight snowfall, which blanketed the center and surrounding countryside, and the subsequent snow melt provide key insights into present ongoing operations at the various facilities at Yongbyon.
Snow melt helps indicate that the 5 MWe Plutonium Production Reactor and the Uranium Enrichment Plant (UEP) continue to operate, as reported in recent months, and that there is ongoing activity throughout the Yongbyon complex.
The Frenemy of Snow
While it’s not unusual to see snow at Yongbyon during the winter, this particular snowfall is unique, as imagery from the day before was snow-free, and by the day after, most of the snow had melted away. This suggests the ground and air temperature were above freezing, thus causing the rapid melting. Moreover, the fact that the snow melt observed had occurred before any wind or afternoon sun could contribute meaningfully to its melting helps increase confidence that areas of snow melt indicate activity within those buildings with a greater degree of certainty.
North Koreans are known to live and often work in rather Spartan-like conditions, where buildings are often unheated or minimally heated. Therefore, when the snow on one rooftop melts away, but snow remains on the roofs of adjacent buildings, the melt is most likely the result of warming within—often from equipment in operation or the necessary heating for materials that need to be maintained within certain temperature parameters.
Unfortunately, snow melt can be misleading at times as well. Extreme cold can delay melting, as can a well-insulated roof, which keeps heat from escaping into the rafters. Strong winds can blow snow off roofs, making wind speed and direction also important to snow removal patterns. Portions of roofs that get direct sunlight during the day will also tend to melt faster than those more protected surfaces and those that fall into shadow. These caveats add uncertainty to the assessments.
The Reactor Area
The 5 MWe Reactor and associated buildings in the surrounding area show the most melting activity around the Yongbyon complex. Snow melt is evident on the southern roof of the reactor building and several nearby support buildings, suggesting reactor operations continue. Additionally, warm water discharge—a key indicator of reactor operations—has been observed since late last year and continues to date, as evidenced by the darkened area at the discharge point and the ice-free portion of the river.
At the Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR), while there have been no clear indicators that the reactor has started operations, there is snow melt on the turbine building that may be related to equipment installation and testing. This section of the building is closest to the substation located on the east side of the ELWR.
Figure 1. Overview of Reactor Area with snow melt visible.
Image Pleiades © CNES 2022, Distribution Airbus DS. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Uranium Enrichment Plant
At the UEP, there is no snow melt on the roofs of the centrifuge halls or new construction area. This does not mean the centrifuges are not spinning. The temperatures of the centrifuges, to accommodate this activity, are tightly controlled, making it unlikely to emit enough heat to cause snow to melt. Rather, there is snow melt on the buildings where the control room and stations for feeding and withdrawing UF6 are likely housed, suggesting enrichment activities are ongoing.
Figure 2. Overview of Uranium Enrichment Planet with snow melt visible.
Image Pleiades © CNES 2022, Distribution Airbus DS. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Radiochemical Laboratory (Reprocessing Plant)
There is minimal activity at the Radiochemical Plant, with only one small building associated with chemical processing, showing snow melt. All other building roofs remain snow covered, suggesting little apparent activity within.
Figure 3. Overview of the Radiochemical Laboratory with minor snow melt visible.
Image Pleiades © CNES 2022, Distribution Airbus DS. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Main Research and Administrative Headquarters Area
At the Main Research and Administrative Headquarters Area, there are two key facilities: the Institute of Radiochemistry and the Institute for Nuclear Electronics and Automatization. On February 1, the former showed snow melt along the ridge line of two the laboratory buildings, indicating activity is taking place therein.
While there is no snow melt at the Institute for Nuclear Electronics and Automatization, it does not necessarily mean the building is not in use. Rather, if there is activity taking place inside, it does not emit enough heat to cause snow to melt. Of note, this institute has some type of underground storage—likely for liquids—which appears as a raised earthen square at the east end of the facility. The square is dark in the image, absent of snow, suggesting its stored contents are warmer than the surrounding grounds.
Figure 4. Overview of the Main Research and Administrative Headquarters Area with minor snow melt visible.
Image Pleiades © CNES 2022, Distribution Airbus DS. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
50 MWe Reactor Complex
At the never-completed 50 MWe Reactor site, new construction began in early 2021 at the west end of the complex, but was apparently halted over the winter months. On February 1, the roofs of two of the administrative/engineering buildings were entirely devoid of snow. Another support building also showed signs of snow melt, although it is more difficult to discern due to its different roofing material. The nature of this activity and the purpose of the construction in this area is still unclear.
Figure 5. Overview of 50 MWe Reactor complex with snow melt visible.
Image Pleiades © CNES 2022, Distribution Airbus DS. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
4. The Anti-Leaflet Law: Reevaluating Inter-Korean Appeasement
Excerpts:
History clearly suggests that appeasement is not an effective strategy for improving inter-Korean relations and fostering regional and international peace. It is thus important to consider the context in which the Anti-Leaflet Law was passed and promoted, as well as the contexts in which past concessions have been made. One factor often plays a major role in these cases: domestic and international pressure for progress toward peace on the Korean Peninsula. President Moon Jae-in came into office due, at least in part, to his promise to bring about tangible improvements in inter-Korean relations.[20] As his term comes to an end, he has become increasingly more willing to appease North Korea in exchange for symbolic gestures of peace in the short term.[21] Past administrations, faced with similar pressures by both their constituents and the international community, were also more willing to make concessions for short-term peace at the expense of South Korea’s long-term credibility.[22]
Ultimately, however, consequential foreign policy decisions should not be made based on short-term political goals. Based on the prior history of inter-Korean relations and negotiations surrounding North Korea’s nuclear program, it is clear that the Anti-Leaflet Law will not produce any meaningful change in North Korea’s willingness to pursue peaceful reunification, denuclearize, or improve its human rights record. Instead, this amendment will only further empower the Kim regime to continue suppressing the freedom of information and damage the credibility of South Korean democracy. Going forward, South Korean policymakers should take a tougher stance on North Korea. While the Kim regime should not be provoked unnecessarily, policymakers must avoid making concessions that produce no meaningful long-term results, nor should they continue to bow down to North Korean pressure for the sake of their political image. As these patterns of appeasement continue into the 21st century, North Korea’s bargaining power only grows stronger—at the expense of that of South Korea.
The Anti-Leaflet Law: Reevaluating Inter-Korean Appeasement
2/17/2022
By Claire McCrea, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Raymond Ha, HRNK Director of Operations and Research
February 17, 2022
On December 13, 2020, South Korea’s National Assembly sparked international controversy by amending the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act, prohibiting activists from sending balloons into North Korea containing anti-regime leaflets or USB drives.[1] Activists both inside and outside of South Korea have decried this amendment, known colloquially as the “Anti-Leaflet Law,” for restricting the civil liberties of NGOs and citizen activists and stifling the flow of outside information into North Korea.[2] The South Korean government has defended the amendment by stating that anti-Kim regime leaflets unnecessarily provoke North Korea, and that this prohibition will “contribute to the improvement of inter-Korean relations and promotion of peace on the Korean Peninsula.”[3]
Conflict over cross-border leaflet campaigns is not new in South Korea. Leaflets were first dropped on North Korean territory during the Korean War by UN forces to counter communist propaganda, spreading information about the world outside North Korea and encouraging defection to the South.[4] Government-led leaflet campaigns continued for decades until they were officially halted by the Kim Dae-jung administration to meet one of Kim Jong-il’s preconditions for the Inter-Korean Summit on June 15, 2000.[5] Similar concessions would be made over the next twenty years: Roh Moo-hyun’s decision to end all inter-Korean border propaganda activities in 2004, Moon Jae-in’s agreement with Kim Jong-un in 2018 to end the dissemination of leaflets along the Military Demarcation Line, and finally, the South Korean National Assembly’s 2020 amendment banning civilians from launching leaflets across the border.[6] In all four cases, the South Korean government leveraged bans on cross-border information dissemination in an attempt to draw North Korea to the bargaining table and ease inter-Korean tensions.
Despite the government’s belief that banning leaflets will improve inter-Korean relations, many activists and NGOs (such as Fighters for a Free North Korea, one of 289 organizations under investigation by the Ministry of Unification as of December 2020)[7] are concerned about the adverse effects this law will have on the human rights situation in North Korea as well the credibility of democracy in South Korea.[8] Despite these criticisms, the South Korean government has maintained its stance that certain concessions are necessary in the long term to achieve peaceful inter-Korean relations.[9] Thus, an important question presents itself: is the appeasement of North Korean demands a valid and effective means of fostering peace and security on the Korean Peninsula?
The history of inter-Korean relations is a story of alternating hostility and detente. As hostilities increase, the South Korean government is often the first party to offer concessions to ease tensions.[10] When North Korea decides it is satisfied with these concessions and adopts a less hostile posture, relations typically improve for a limited period.[11] This short-term detente often ends when the North Korean regime reneges on a negotiated promise or finds fault in South Korean policy.[12]
For example, in 1992, there was a phase of detente after the signing of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (JDD), which was to be carried out through the Joint Nuclear Control Commission.[13] However, throughout the course of two years and more than thirteen missions, any possible advancement toward denuclearization was prevented by North Korea’s refusal to meet the JDD’s requirement for arms inspections.[14] South Korea continuously offered incentives and concessions in exchange for North Korea’s meeting these basic requirements: the cancelation of U.S.-ROK joint military exercises, accepting North Korea as part of the international community, ending diplomatic confrontation, and more.[15] Despite these attempts, North Korea refused to allow nuclear inspections and in 1993 announced its intention to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[16] Instead of holding the Kim regime accountable, South Korea offered to help the DPRK build light reactors as an incentive for staying in the NPT.[17] In 1994, the U.S. and the DPRK signed the Agreed Framework, and the regime was rewarded for this effort despite not following through with any of its stipulations in the long term.[18] By 2003, the Agreed Framework had collapsed and North Korea had left the NPT, rendering all of South Korea and the United States’ concessions fruitless.[19]
History clearly suggests that appeasement is not an effective strategy for improving inter-Korean relations and fostering regional and international peace. It is thus important to consider the context in which the Anti-Leaflet Law was passed and promoted, as well as the contexts in which past concessions have been made. One factor often plays a major role in these cases: domestic and international pressure for progress toward peace on the Korean Peninsula. President Moon Jae-in came into office due, at least in part, to his promise to bring about tangible improvements in inter-Korean relations.[20] As his term comes to an end, he has become increasingly more willing to appease North Korea in exchange for symbolic gestures of peace in the short term.[21] Past administrations, faced with similar pressures by both their constituents and the international community, were also more willing to make concessions for short-term peace at the expense of South Korea’s long-term credibility.[22]
Ultimately, however, consequential foreign policy decisions should not be made based on short-term political goals. Based on the prior history of inter-Korean relations and negotiations surrounding North Korea’s nuclear program, it is clear that the Anti-Leaflet Law will not produce any meaningful change in North Korea’s willingness to pursue peaceful reunification, denuclearize, or improve its human rights record. Instead, this amendment will only further empower the Kim regime to continue suppressing the freedom of information and damage the credibility of South Korean democracy. Going forward, South Korean policymakers should take a tougher stance on North Korea. While the Kim regime should not be provoked unnecessarily, policymakers must avoid making concessions that produce no meaningful long-term results, nor should they continue to bow down to North Korean pressure for the sake of their political image. As these patterns of appeasement continue into the 21st century, North Korea’s bargaining power only grows stronger—at the expense of that of South Korea.
Claire McCrea is a first-year student at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), pursuing an M.A. in International Relations. Her concentrations include human rights, the Korean Peninsula, and nuclear nonproliferation.
[1] This article was originally submitted as an academic assignment at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in October 2021 and is published here with the instructor’s permission. It has been lightly edited and updated to reflect current events since the assignment was submitted.
[4] “Psychological Warfare in Korea,” Public Opinion Quarterly 15, no. 1 (Spring 1951): 65–75.
[5] Tae, “Anti-Leaflet Law in South Korea.”
[7] Editor’s Note: In January 2022, South Korean prosecutors indicted Park Sang-hak, the Chairman of Fighters for a Free North Korea, for an attempted violation of the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act. On February 15, 2022, Park’s lawyers requested the Act to be referred to South Korea’s Constitutional Court for constitutional review. See Huh Jin-moo, “Prosecutors Indict Park Sang-hak, Chairman of Fighters for a Free North Korea, for Launching Leaflets to North Korea” [in Korean], The Kyunghyang Shinmun, January 28, 2022. https://www.khan.co.kr/national/court-law/article/202201281626001?www; and Ryu Jae-min, “Park Sang-hak Requests Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act to be Referred to Constitutional Court” [in Korean], The Chosun Ilbo, February 15, 2022.
[8] Enos, “Anti-Leaflet Law Poses Threat.”
[10] Park Kyung-Ae and Sung-Chull Lee, “Changes and Prospects in Inter-Korean Relations,” Asian Survey 32, no. 5 (1992): 429–47.
[11] Park and Lee, “Changes and Prospects in Inter-Korean Relations.”
[15] Park and Lee, “Changes and Prospects in Inter-Korean Relations.”
[16] “Joint Declaration of South and North Korea,” Nuclear Threat Initiative.
[22] Park and Lee, “Changes and Prospects in Inter-Korean Relations.”
5. How South Korea’s Human Rights Lawyer President Sold Out Human Rights
Conclusion:
As Moon Jae-in wraps up his time in office before the March presidential election, he continues to push for “peace on the Peninsula” whilst undermining the human rights of the most vulnerable Koreans.
Upon his election victory in 2017, Moon was asked to share one thing he could never forgive. “A person in power and of capacity…that neglects the plight of the weak,” was his answer.
Five years later, can Moon forgive himself?
How South Korea’s Human Rights Lawyer President Sold Out Human Rights - Rabbit Hole
How South Korea’s Human Rights Lawyer President Sold Out Human Rights
Staff Writer
26/1/2022
Raising a hand to the cheering crowd, South Korean President Moon Jae-in joined North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un at the massive May Day Stadium at the Arirang Mass Games, a gymnastic and artistic festival held annually in Pyongyang. Swirling in kaleidoscopes of color, tens of thousands of performers welcomed the president from the South. As Moon spoke to them, the crowd gave him a standing ovation. It was September 2018, just months after his first meeting with Kim at the Demilitarized Zone and the US-North Korea summit in Singapore. Praised by the media as another historic breakthrough, Moon’s engagement policy was seen as a success, and there was even talk of a Nobel Peace Prize.
North Korean defector Doohyun Kim saw the footage in a different light. Beneath the garish lights and decor, the perfectly synchronized movements, and the rows of wide, identical smiles, he could almost smell the blood, sweat, and tears the 150,000 North Koreans in the stadium must have shed to rehearse the performance.
“These rehearsals can take around 12 hours without stop,” he said. “There’s no time to rest or sit down even for five minutes. You cannot breathe because of the smell of pee. People don’t have time to go to the restroom. So they pee where they are, anywhere. But South Korean politicians went to the event and praised the Games without thinking about the human rights violations of thousands that took place.”
Such concerns surrounding the Arirang Games, particularly regarding child abuse, have been well-documented and raised by international observers and the media, something Moon must know better than anyone. “He was a human rights lawyer. But he didn’t talk about it,” said Doohyun, who is working as a social media associate for the Committee on Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). “He did nothing about human rights. I am so disappointed.”
Child performers at Arirang Mass Games in Pyongyang in 2012 (Picture Credit: Jen Morgan)
Before entering politics in 2002 as a top aide to the late former President Roh Moo-hyun, Moon worked at a legal practice in Busan, defending pro-democracy and labor rights activists in the South. He’d turned down tempting offers of high-flying corporate positions to stand up for the people, according to his 2011 autobiography. His ultimate dream was to reprise his role as human rights lawyer, offering pro-bono legal services in a unified Korea.
When Moon became president in 2017, following the historic impeachment of Park Geun-hye over a power-abuse and bribery scandal, there were hopes that he would herald a new chapter of democracy. As he vowed to represent all South Koreans and build an inclusive nation, Moon’s campaign pledges also reached across the border. He urged engagement with Pyongyang, and was the only presidential candidate promising to strive to advance human rights in North Korea.
He’ll be breaking that promise in a couple weeks’ time when he leaves the Blue House. His tireless bid for engagement with Pyongyang has emphasized inter-Korean peace and cooperation, and denuclearisation talks with Washington. However, the former human rights lawyer has, ironically, been largely silent on North Korea’s human rights violations. Instead, Moon has spent his tenure gushing over Kim Jong-un, one of the world’s worst dictators. In a 2018 BBC interview, Moon enthused about Kim’s “respect for his elders that exemplified his humble leadership” – a peculiar way to describe an autocrat known to have executed his own uncle and assassinated his older half-brother and whose cult of personality brainwashes his people into believing he’s a god. When asked by the BBC journalist whether he, as a former human rights lawyer, was comfortable shaking the hand of the dictator, he dodged the question. He paused briefly before saying that pressure on the North would not be effective. Cooperation between the two Koreas, and between the North and the international community would be more realistic in advancing human rights, he said.
Trump, Kim, and Moon in the Demilitarized Zone in June 2019
Keen to make progress on inter-Korean projects that would build his political legacy as the peace negotiator, Moon continued to tread carefully, sweeping the issue of human rights under the carpet. Almost everything else, from cooperation on forests and building railroads to holding cultural concerts and forming joint Olympic teams were extensively discussed. The civil rights, safety, and well-being of North Koreans didn’t get a mention during the three rounds of summits held between the Korean leaders, and the subsequent ministerial and working-level talks between government officials.
Human Rights Watch (HRW) Deputy Director Phil Robertson described this as a “very, very shortsighted approach” that did “disservice to the North Korean people.” Already one of the most oppressed people in the world, subject to arbitrary imprisonment, torture, and forced labor tantamount to slavery, North Koreans have seen their human rights situation worsen over the past decade of Kim’s rule. HRW’s recent reports shows North Koreans are now suffering even worse human rights abuses than ever before as Kim’s regime has used COVID-19 restrictions to further oppress the population. In recent months, Pyongyang has doubled down on measures to curb the spread of information and “anti-socialist” culture. It has cracked-down on those caught consuming foreign media; under a new law, those found speaking or singing in the “South Korean style” could serve up to two years of hard labor.
UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea reporting its findings in March 2014. It found evidence of gross, widespread, and systemic human rights violations. (Picture Credit: U.S. Mission Geneva/ Eric Bridiers)
Moon probably avoided mentioning human rights out of fear that doing so would push the North away, but, if so, he seriously misunderstood the situation. He should have just “let them walk away,” Robertson said. “They’ll be back. They have things that they want as well. The fundamental failure of the Moon Jae-in approach is that he thought if they only talked about the things that the North Korean regime wants, then they would agree, and he [Moon] would get his legacy as the great peace builder of the Korean Peninsula. In fact, he got nothing and also he’s been treated with contempt by the leaders in Pyongyang.”
Moon should have just “let them walk away. They’ll be back. They have things that they want as well.”
Greg Scarlatoiu, executive director of HRNK (the Committee on Human Rights in North Korea), a US-based NGO dedicated to promoting human rights in North Korea, said that while he understands the political sensitivities, he would like to see Seoul “show more leadership on human rights…and work in accordance with other like-minded countries in the international community.”
One such measure includes the appointment of a special envoy on North Korean human rights. Under the North Korea Human Rights Act of 2016, which created official government channels to monitor, investigate, and advance human rights in the North, the Moon administration should have appointed someone to the position by now, but the position has been vacant for the last five years. That same law also provided for the creation of a new human rights foundation to support NGOs and activities to help promote the rights of North Koreans. However, the foundation has yet to be launched and, according to Amanda Mortwed Oh, director of international advocacy and development at HRNK, the government has reduced its support for civic groups and defectors’ organizations in the South which assist escapees from the North. This is likely one of the reasons why the number of defectors to the South has dropped from 1,416 in 2016 to 63 in 2021, the lowest it’s ever been.
Unfortunately, the Moon administration’s shortcomings on human rights have gone beyond simple neglect – oftentimes, it has even actively worked to obstruct the work of these human rights organizations.
In 2003, Yoon Yeo-sang, a well-respected human rights activist, established the nonpartisan NKDB (the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights). For the past 14 years, the NKDB had a contract with the Ministry of Unification (the South Korean ministry tasked with promoting a prospective democratic unification of the two Koreas, as well as supporting North Korean defectors) granting it exclusive access to defectors. This has enabled it to issue white papers annually without fail detailing the human rights situation in North Korea. With over 130,000 records in its database, the NKDB has played a vital role in keeping tabs on the status of human rights in the North, pursuing justice for violations, and providing support for victims. But last year, the organization said in a press release that it could not publish a white paper for 2021, as the Moon administration had terminated their contract and revoked access to the defectors.
Robertson said that Moon should have worked to “extend the civil liberties of the South” and push for an open discussion. Instead, he’s done the exact opposite – Moon’s administration has curtailed human rights in the South to appease the dictatorship in the North.
Moon’s administration has curtailed human rights in the South to appease the dictatorship in the North.
Two years ago, Chanyang Ju, a North Korean defector, was busy crafting what she calls “manna missiles,” aimed at her native North Korea.
“It was all very scientific,” she said. “We timed the balloons to explode and release the flyers over Pyongyang. About a million of leaflets flurrying through the air. It was executed beautifully. Any Pyongyang citizen would have been able to just pick one off the street. That’s how many were sent.”
Information about the outside world was what led Ju and her family to plan their own escape from North Korea. Determined to lead others into freedom, she’s taken up graduate studies in communications and joined an NGO that aims to spread vital information to the highly-censored North. The leaflets carried information about South Korea’s economic development over the decades, and decried the abuses made by the Kim Dynasty. They were dropped along with supply kits, US dollar bills (which are reportedly in wide use due to the low value of the North Korean won), and packets of rice. It was “our own kind of missile,” Ju said, feeding the people with the truth.
Chanyang Ju speaking of her experiences in North Korea at the Asia Liberty Forum in 2014
Such truth bombshells were not received well by the Kims. When a group led by another defector, Park Sang-hak, sent over millions of leaflets last year, North Korea’s state-run media quoted a furious Kim Yo-jong, the powerful younger sister of the regime leader, who slammed Seoul for its inability to prevent the “human trash” from sending the leaflets.
Seoul once again bowed to pressure. The police commissioner ordered a “thorough” crackdown on these activities. The Moon administration revised the Inter-Korean Relations Development Act in 2020 to prosecute people in South Korea for sending anti-North materials across the border – anyone caught trying to do so can face up to three years in prison or a fine of 30 million won (roughly $27,400). Alarmed by these developments, international observers, including the UN’s Special Rapporteur on North Korean Human Rights, have expressed concern and urged Seoul to rescind the law, but to no avail.
Since the law came into force, Ju has not been able to launch any more balloons. In fact, Ju said even getting near the border with North Korea would be difficult. “When we drive anywhere remotely near Paju (a city in South Korea near its border with the North), cars emerge out of nowhere and start tailing us,” she said.
The situation is full of tragic irony. Not only does Moon’s government refuse to criticize Kim’s crackdown on human rights in the North, in order to placate him, he’s started his own crackdown on human rights in the South.
Kim and Moon at the inter-Korean summit in April 2018 (Picture Credit: Cheongwadae / Blue House)
Discouraging defectors from speaking out is particularly concerning, said Robert R. King, former special envoy for North Korean human rights issues at the US State Department, as they are “among the most critical of the Kim regime and the most credible when they speak out.”
Worst of all was the Moon administration’s forced repatriation of two North Korean defectors who were accused of murder in 2019. It was a “death sentence,” according to Scarlatoiu, who said the move sent a signal to other North Korean escapees that South Korea “no longer provides a safe haven for them.”
“I cried and cried for days when I heard about the repatriation because we all knew what would happen to them,” said Ju. “I was scared, angry, and I shouted and called for change. But the situation hasn’t improved, and the freedom we’ve found in the South is slipping through our fingers.”
Kim and Moon at the inter-Korean summit in April 2018 (Picture Credit: Cheongwadae / Blue House)
As Moon Jae-in wraps up his time in office before the March presidential election, he continues to push for “peace on the Peninsula” whilst undermining the human rights of the most vulnerable Koreans.
Upon his election victory in 2017, Moon was asked to share one thing he could never forgive. “A person in power and of capacity…that neglects the plight of the weak,” was his answer.
Five years later, can Moon forgive himself?
6. Virulent Jew-hatred is regularly promoted by pro-North Korean groups
A subject that we do not see addressed among the Korea watcher community. Lawrence Peck has done a tremendous amount of research on north Korean subversive activities and influence operations in South Korea and the US.
Virulent Jew-hatred is regularly promoted by pro-North Korean groups
Most reporters and editors of Jewish-themed media outlets, as well as leaders of pro-Israel and Jewish organizations, even those specifically dedicated to opposing anti-Semitism, are not aware of the issue.
(February 17, 2022 / JNS) One would expect that pro-North Korean groups and activists in the United States take stridently anti-Israel positions in their statements and on their websites and social media, and actively participate in anti-Israel events and campaigns. These groups have engaged in anti-Zionist rhetoric and activism for years, unnoticed by virtually all pro-Israel organizations and media. Such stances are attributable to their opposition to Israel and provision of weapons, training and political support to anti-Israel terrorist groups and state sponsors of terrorism, from Hamas and Hezbollah to Iran and Syria. This anti-Zionism is also motivated by the far-left extremism of pro-North forces. What is truly scandalous, however, is the virulent Jew-hatred regularly disseminated by pro-North groups/activists in America, and how Jewish organizations and media have, with only a few minor exceptions, almost entirely failed to take notice of or publicly condemn the purveyors of this vicious, overt anti-Semitism.
The pro-North movement in America consists of two components. There are fanatically and openly pro-North groups/activists that operate mostly in the Korean language and primarily target the Korean-American community. There are also pro-North “front” groups that publicly deny they are pro-North, and in order to appeal to a broader range of supporters, deceptively attempt to portray themselves as mere advocates for “peace” on the Korean peninsula. Rank-and-file members of front groups may be “fellow travelers” or “useful idiot” types, but their leaders are usually just as pro-North as those of openly pro-North groups.
Some fronts almost exclusively target the Korean-American community, while others primarily focus their efforts on the broader public, although with particular emphasis on influencing media and lobbying Congress. Whereas openly pro-North groups/activists, writing and speaking in Korean, are not shy about expressing rabid hatred for Jews and Judaism, pro-North front groups and their leaders usually try to be somewhat more circumspect, at least in public, to avoid being branded as bigots and alienating potential supporters. The fronts therefore mostly engage in anti-Israel activities and rhetoric, although their members occasionally make the short transition to outright anti-Semitism.
Nevertheless, fronts and openly pro-North groups/activists closely collaborate with one another, which increasingly blur the distinction between the two types of groups. In any event, they share the same goals, even if their respective tactics, methods of operation and primary target audiences differ. It is perhaps because the openly anti-Semitic rhetoric of the more fanatically pro-North groups/activists is mostly in the Korean language that Jewish organizations and media have not paid attention to it or denounced it in any significant way.
Although the anti-Zionism of the pro-North movement is typically expressed in the form of official statements and participation in various events and campaigns, as well as close and frequent collaboration with Marxist-Leninist and radical Palestinian groups/activists, the worst of the explicit Jew-hatred is featured in official statements and regular columns on the websites of, and to a lesser extent in lectures by, the leaders and active members of organizations and websites such as the openly and fanatically pro-North “Korean American National Coordinating Council (KANCC)” and “Minjok Tongshin.”
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It is disturbing that despite the anti-Semitism and other racist content promoted by these groups, some of their leaders and members have been meeting with and receiving respectful receptions from members of Congress who would not normally welcome extremist fanatics from anti-Semitic groups. These and other pro-North groups have essentially been lobbying Congress on behalf of North Korea, supporting measures that the North favors and opposing legislation it disfavors. Leftist academics, former government officials and religious leaders have attended and actively participated in meetings and other events of such openly bigoted, anti-Semitic groups.
Journalists, particularly some correspondents in South Korea, have through bias or lack of due diligence in reporting downplayed or failed to note in references to groups such as “KANCC” and “Minjok Tongshin” the Jew-hatred promoted by them. In addition, these groups and their leaders have been close to the North’s Mission to the United Nations in New York and to intelligence agents who have in recent years been stationed there from the North’s “United Front Department,” whose operatives are tasked with establishing and guiding pro-North organizations in the United States.
In order to emphasize the seriousness of this problem, and alert Jewish organizations and media to the appalling nature of the vilification of Jews and Judaism involved, in the hope that they will finally take notice of and condemn it, it is unfortunately necessary to disclose the disgusting rhetoric published by pro-North groups/activists here.
Such examples are only a small representative sampling of the Jew-hatred and anti-Israel vituperation featured on websites and social media of pro-North groups and activists in the United States. One would hope that they would be enough to convince Jewish organizations and media to take notice of this problem, and motivate them to strongly and publicly condemn those responsible for it.
The fact that much of this anti-Semitism appears in the Korean language is no excuse to ignore it. Some politically active Korean Americans are aware and ashamed of this dissemination of hatred by the small minority of pro-North fanatics in their midst. Human-rights activists from the North Korea Freedom Coalition who are focused on the North’s crimes against humanity are also aware of and condemn it. Unfortunately, however, most reporters and editors of Jewish-themed media outlets, as well as most leaders of pro-Israel and Jewish organizations, even those specifically dedicated to opposing anti-Semitism, are not aware of the issue. Now is the time for the Jewish community to study up on the issue and to speak out.
Lawrence Peck is an adviser to the North Korea Freedom Coalition. For nearly six years, he lived and worked in South Korea as a consultant for major Korean conglomerates. Pro-North Korean groups and activists in the U.S. have complained that his research on and exposure of them poses a threat to their movement.
7. Why some North Korean defectors return to one of the world's most repressive regimes
Human nature. Don't we all want to go home?
Why some North Korean defectors return to one of the world's most repressive regimes
CNN · by Yoonjung Seo and Julia Hollingsworth, CNN
Seoul, South Korea (CNN)He risked his life fleeing from one of the world's most repressive regimes, traversing a militarized stretch protected by barbed wire fences. Then a year later, he went back -- the way he came.
More than one month since the man crossed the demilitarized zone from South to North Korea, much of his life in both countries remains a mystery -- as do his reasons for returning to the isolated nation ruled by Kim Jong Un.
South Korean media reported that the defector -- who hasn't been officially named, although fellow defectors say he was called Kim Woo-jeong in South Korea -- was a former gymnast who largely kept to himself. According to South Korean police, he was a construction worker in his 30s who earned money by doing manual labor.
The man's case is rare -- while more than 10,000 North Korean defectors have arrived in South Korea in the past decade, just 30 have returned home, where they face the prospect of being put into forced labor camps, according to official South Korean data.
But defectors and advocates say even if the man's rationale for leaving South Korea is unclear, the fact that some North Korean defectors are willing to return to one of the world's most politically isolated countries only highlights how challenging life can be in the South for North Koreans.
Read More
Why people defect
Over subsequent decades, South Korea has modernized, becoming one of the world's richest and most technologically developed countries. Meanwhile, North Korea has become increasingly isolated, with citizens subject to widespread poverty and limited basic freedoms.
So it isn't hard to see why people may want to escape.
Since 1998, more than 33,000 people have defected from North Korea to South Korea, according to South Korea's Unification Ministry. However, numbers have dwindled in recent years after Kim imposed even tougher border controls to prevent Covid inflows.
On very rare occasions, defectors -- like the former gymnast -- manage to escape through the heavily guarded demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea. The vast majority, like defector Kang Chun-hyuk, flee over North Korea's lengthy border with China.
Kang's family made the trip in 1998 when he was 12 years old, before finally making it to South Korea a few years later.
People gather before the statues of late North Korean leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il in 2021 to mark the 10th anniversary of Kim Jong Il's death.
In North Korea, Kang remembers barely having enough food to survive.
Sometimes, his family would make a single portion of dry noodles into a meal that would feed him and his parents for a week.
"It wasn't worth going to school, so me and my classmates stole food like corn or potatoes," he said.
According to a survey of 3,000 people released this year by the North Korean Refugees Foundation, food shortages are one of the most common motivations for defection, with nearly 22% saying that was why they had defected. The most common reason given -- at 23% -- was that people didn't like being controlled or monitored by the North Korean regime.
Once they arrive in South Korea, there are measures in place to support them. Defectors undergo a compulsory, 12-week education session to help them adjust to life in their new home. They're given financial support and accommodation, and access to health care and employment services.
But even so, life for defectors is often a struggle.
Finding work and fitting in
Before Kang Na-ra -- no relation to Kang Chun-hyuk -- defected in 2014 as a teenager, she thought her life in South Korea would mirror the K-dramas she watched in secret in the city of Chongjin.
But South Korea was a far cry from the romantic world she'd seen on screen.
Kang Na-ra's mother defected before her -- she does not want to say why -- but their life together in South Korea was not what she'd hoped.
The North Korean border county of Kaepoong from a South Korean observatory at the southern boundary of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) dividing the two Koreas.
Her mother worked long hours and was often away from home dancing in a North Korean defectors performing group to make ends meet. Although Kang Na-ra spoke the same language, she was lonely and had few friends in South Korea.
Another defector, who asked not to be named or further identified for fear of repercussions for his family remaining in North Korea, said he also struggled with culture shock when he defected a few years ago -- even bright and colorful signs and the abundance of English words used in language in South Korea made him feel uncomfortable.
"You don't see things like that in North Korea," said the defector. "I didn't like many things in South Korea at first."
He also said many defectors found it difficult to get a job.
Statistics for 2020 released last year by South Korea's Unification Ministry found defectors had a higher unemployment rate than the general population, with 9.4% of defectors unemployed, compared with 4% of the general population in December 2020.
"Getting a good job is important, but even South Koreans who are raised and educated here find it difficult to get a decent job," he said. "You can imagine how hard it can be for North Korean defectors."
Mom and son defect from N. Korea, starve to death in S. Korea 02:11
Kang Chun-hyuk's family was given a flat by the government when they made it to South Korea in 2001 after three years in China. But his thick North Korean accent made it hard for him to fit in at school and he dropped out. He worked in manual labor until he was 25 years old, unsure if he would be able to ever do anything else.
For others, the struggle to adjust and find work can have deadly consequences. In 2019, North Korean defector Han Sang-ok was found dead in her apartment with her 6-year-old son after she failed to pay her bills for months.
A water meter inspector noticed a foul smell coming from the apartment and called the police, who found two heavily decomposed bodies and an empty fridge, leading the police officer to note starvation as the suspected cause of death.
Separation pains
But not all defectors have dreams of a bright life in South Korea.
Kim Ryon-hui is a rare case of a defector who arrived almost by accident.
The 54-year-old, who lived a relatively upscale life in North Korea, went to China in 2011 to visit relatives and seek medical care for liver disease. But when she arrived, she found Chinese doctors wanted payment upfront.
Kim Ryon-hui desperately wants to get back to North Korea.
Kim said a broker told her Chinese people often went to South Korea to earn money. So, she signed up for a journey to South Korea and left her North Korean passport with the broker group -- not realizing that meant she would never be able to return home.
Kim feels hostility from South Koreans, especially when North Korea's leader fires missiles. She told CNN she struggled to adapt to a capitalist society governed by market pressures and to understand what she sees as a dog-eat-dog world.
"It's like we're oil and South Korea is water, so we can't mix," she said.
That's a common sentiment for defectors. According to the North Korean Refugees Foundation survey, while most people are happy in South Korea because they can live a free life and earn relative to how much they work, many are unhappy with the level of intense competition.
But the hardest part for Kim is the separation from her family. South Korean law prevents any communication with people in North Korea and South Koreans cannot travel there. Unless Kim sneaks back into North Korea, or the two Koreas reach a peace agreement, she has little chance of seeing her family again.
Kim last saw her daughter when she was 17 -- now her daughter is 28. Kim is only able to communicate with her family through journalists who take letters and gifts for her to North Korea, but that hasn't been possible since North Korea closed its borders due to the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020.
"It's scary to be alone," she said. "When I see lights on in other apartments in the evening, I imagine families having dinner together. That's the saddest and loneliest feeling."
Why defectors return
Despite the difficulties of being in South Korea, the vast majority stay put. For most, that's because the benefits of staying in South Korea are far greater than the risks they face if they return.
Seo Jae-pyeong, the director of the Association of the North Korean Defectors, defected in 2001. In the 20 years he's lived in South Korea, he's only known one defector personally who returned to North Korea.
She was a doctor with a family back in North Korea who didn't realize her brother was bringing her to South Korea, he said.
"She didn't have a reason to defect and she couldn't get used to life in South Korea," Seo said.
Anti-North Korea activists and refugees from North Korea attend a protest against a summit between US President Donald Trump and North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un, in Seoul on February 26, 2019.
He questioned how many of the 30 defectors who returned to North Korea had left of their own free will. He said some may have been blackmailed or kidnapped near the border between China and North Korea.
Others might have had major financial difficulties that left them with few other choices.
Lee Na-kyung, a defector activist for single parents and people with disabilities from the North, said by the time many defectors arrive in South Korea they already have major debts to brokers who helped them cross the border.
Some defectors pay their government settlement money to the brokers, and then sink further into debt as they struggle to find work, according to Lee, who defected from North Korea in 2005 after her husband was framed for a crime she says he didn't commit.
For some, the hardship of life in South Korea doesn't meet their expectations. She knows of one man who was a high-ranking military officer in North Korea who could only find work in a junkyard in South Korea. "He said that he would rather die at home instead of dying as a junkman," she said.
What next?
A month after the gymnast Kim crossed back into North Korea, it's unclear whether he is still alive.
Although the South Korean military spotted him on surveillance footage crossing the barbed wires into the demilitarized zone, they failed to stop him, the South Korean military's Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Won In-choul said in a briefing in January.
He was seen four times on security camera on the south side of the border, and once after he crossed the Military Demarcation Line.
At one point, soldiers mistook him for a defector coming from the North. At another point, they went to find him. Later, they found no trace of him except a feather caught on a wire that they suspected had come from his puffer jacket.
There were "no unusual movements" of the North Korean military over the incident, South Korea's Defense Ministry spokesman Boo Seung-chan said last month at another briefing.
And while North Korean state media has crowed about past defectors returning home, there has been no mention of last month's defector in state news publications.
For those in South Korea, it's a reminder that the country's policies to help defectors could still be improved. Last week, the South Korean government announced it was launching a new team to improve the safety of defectors, noting that despite its current efforts, some defectors were still "experiencing difficulties settling into our society."
But defector advocates were dubious about how effective those new steps would be, pointing out that support measures are in place -- they just don't work.
Kang Na-ra on her YouTube channel.
Even defectors who appear to have successfully made their transition sometimes struggle with the pull back to North Korea.
Two years after she defected, Kang Na-ra told her mother she wanted to go back. But she didn't want to risk her life after going through so much to get to South Korea.
Now Kang, 25, is a television personality and YouTuber with more than 300,000 subscribers who watch her clips about life in North Korea. Her income is unstable, but at least she's enjoying life.
"Still today, I wonder if I made the right decision," she said. "Life here is tough."
Saeeun Park and Seoyeon Youn contributed to this story from Seoul, South Korea.
CNN · by Yoonjung Seo and Julia Hollingsworth, CNN
8. South Korea prepares for another Covid-era national election.
South Korea prepares for another Covid-era national election.
Waiting in line to be tested for the coronavirus in Seoul on Friday.
By
SEOUL — South Korea, which is experiencing its largest Covid-19 wave yet, will set aside a 90-minute window just for voters with the coronavirus to cast their ballots at polling stations next month.
The recent surge in coronavirus cases had raised questions about how the country’s tight presidential election would be held. Lawmakers agreed this week to reserve 6 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. on March 9, Election Day, for voters with Covid. The rest of the electorate will vote from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m.
“Protecting everyone’s right to vote is paramount,” Dr. Jung Jae-hun, a professor who is a Covid-19 policy adviser to the prime minister, said in an interview. “It’s entirely possible to do so while preventing outbreaks.”
The National Election Commission reported on Thursday that interest in voting in the upcoming election was at its highest since 2012, demonstrating that the surge in coronavirus infections might not dampen turnout.
Lee Jae-myung of the ruling Democratic Party and Yoon Suk-yeol of the opposition People Power Party are neck and neck.
About 44 million eligible voters reside in South Korea, according to the election commission. But at the rate that infections are going, as many as one million might have Covid by Election Day, according to Dr. Jung, who is also a professor of preventive medicine at Gachon University near Seoul.
The government’s health protocols require people with Covid to remain in isolation at home. The special time window on Election Day would allow them to leave for the purposes of casting their ballot.
Source: Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University. The daily average is calculated with data that was reported in the last seven days.
Some legal experts and officials said the government should provide more ways for people with the coronavirus to vote. Young-Soo Chang, a professor of law at Korea University, said the government should have allotted two time slots instead of one.
9. U.S. names Korean-American as crypto enforcement leader
U.S. names Korean-American as crypto enforcement leader
Posted February. 19, 2022 07:26,
Updated February. 19, 2022 07:26
U.S. names Korean-American as crypto enforcement leader. February. 19, 2022 07:26. abro@donga.com.
The U.S. Department of Justice said on Thursday (local time) that it named Korea-American prosecutor Choi Eun Young as the first director of the department’s National Cryptocurrency Enforcement Team (NCET). The NCET has been newly established to respond to crimes using digital assets, such as virtual currency, and will consist of prosecutors and attorneys with experience in cybercrime and money laundering investigation as well as cryptocurrency.
“She will assume her duties full-time effective today,” said the Department of Justice. “Eun Young is an accomplished leader on cyber and cryptocurrency issues, and I am pleased that she will continue her service as the NCET’s inaugural Director, spearheading the department’s efforts in this area.”
After graduating from Harvard Law School, Prosecutor Choi began her career as an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York (SDNY) from 2012, building her career in cybercrime investigation. The SDNY, which is in charge of crime investigations in the Manhattan area in New York, is considered one of the most influential prosecutors’ offices in the U.S. Choi led the prosecution of the 2014 hack against JPMorgan, where a Russian hacker stole information about more than 80 million customers and racked up about 120 billion won in profits.
“The NCET will play a pivotal role in ensuring that as the technology surrounding digital assets grows and evolves, the department in turn accelerates and expands its efforts to combat their illicit abuse by criminals of all kinds,” Choi said. “I am excited to lead the NCET’s incredible and talented team of attorneys.”
According to Reuters, an American couple has been charged for allegedly laundering bitcoins valued at $4.5 billion that was stolen from the hack of a Hong Kong virtual asset exchange. Crimes involving cryptocurrency are becoming bolder. The U.S. Department of Justice sized roughly $3.6 billion in cryptocurrency from the couple, the biggest seizure in the department’s history.
After Colonial Pipeline, the largest pipeline system for refined oil products in the U.S., and JBS SA, the largest meat processing company in the world, were hacked last year by Russia-based group of cybercriminals, the Joe Biden administration ordered a detailed investigation into the overall cyber industry to strengthen the country’s cybersecurity defenses.
Recently, concerns are being raised about North Korea’s hacking attempts aimed at virtual cryptocurrency exchanges. According to the 2022 Cryptocurrency Crime Report released by Chainalysis, a blockchain analysis company, North Korea hacked a cryptocurrency exchange in August last year, stealing $91 million worth of virtual currency.
10. N.K. leader attends groundbreaking ceremony of greenhouse farm project
N.K. leader attends groundbreaking ceremony of greenhouse farm project | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Feb. 19 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has attended the groundbreaking ceremony for a greenhouse farm in the country's east and stressed the importance of modernizing agriculture for rural development, the state media reported Saturday.
Kim dug the first shovel of earth marking the start of the construction of Ryonpho Greenhouse Farm in the Hamju County in the eastern province of South Hamgyong on Friday, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
The construction is scheduled to be completed by Oct. 10, the anniversary of the communist party's founding.
In his speech, Kim mentioned the significance of the modern greenhouse farm, which will contribute to education of advanced agricultural technology and serve as a new base for rural civilization, the report said.
Kim also encouraged soldiers who have been sent to participate in the construction.
In footage aired by the North's state TV station, Kim was seen waving to the crowd while standing through a sunroof in what appeared to be a luxury imported sports utility vehicle.
Kim's visit appears aimed at reinforcing his drive for rural development, a major task he set forth during a key plenary meeting of the ruling Workers' Party held in December amid chronic food shortages and other economic hardships.
Also attending Friday's event were Jo Yong-won, a senior member of the ruling party and other military officials, the KCNA said.
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
11. S. Korea reports more than 100,000 COVID-19 cases for 2nd day amid omicron spread
(3rd LD) S. Korea reports more than 100,000 COVID-19 cases for 2nd day amid omicron spread | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with latest figures in 5th para)
SEOUL, Feb. 19 (Yonhap) -- South Korea reported more than 100,000 new COVID-19 cases for the second day in a row on Saturday amid the rapid spread of the highly transmissible omicron variant.
The new daily infections came to 102,211, including 102,072 local infections, raising the total caseload to 1,858,009 the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA) said.
The death toll from COVID-19 reached 7,354, up 71 from Friday. The fatality rate was 0.4 percent, the KDCA said.
The number of critically ill COVID-19 patients came to 408, up 23 from a day earlier.
As of 9 p.m. Saturday, the country had added 100,512 new COVID-19 cases, up 3,661 from the same time the previous day, according to health authorities and city governments. Daily cases are counted until midnight and announced the following morning.
South Korea has seen caseloads spike in recent weeks as the omicron variant raged across the country, with the daily counts nearly doubling in just a week after surpassing 50,000 for the first time on Feb. 10.
The daily infections exceeded 100,000 for the first time on Friday.
Health authorities forecast that the omicron wave will likely start to peak between the end of this month and early March, with the daily caseload expected to reach 130,000-180,000.
Despite the virus surge, the government on Friday decided to ease the business hour curfews for cafes and restaurants by one hour to 10 p.m., for the next three weeks, a move unwelcomed by some experts amid concerns over a further virus uptick.
The decision came amid a strong backlash from small merchants and self-employed people who have complained that prolonged antivirus measures are dragging down sales.
The cap on private gatherings will stay unchanged at six people.
The partially relaxed antivirus curbs will be in place until March 13.
As of Saturday, 30.31 million people, or 59.1 percent of the country's 52 million population, had received booster shots. The number of fully vaccinated people came to 44.29 million, accounting for 86.3 percent, the KDCA said.
Of the locally transmitted cases reported Saturday, Seoul registered 23,135 new cases and the surrounding Gyeonggi Province and the western port city of Incheon added 30,641 and 7,816 cases, respectively. Cases from overseas rose 139 to 28,003.
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
12. Reliance on atomic power
I hope the next president eliminates the nuclear phaseout policy.
Reliance on atomic power
Higher plant utilization rate contradicts nuclear phaseout policy
Korea's nuclear power plant utilization rate has jumped by more than 33 percentage points compared to four years ago. According to Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power on Tuesday, the nation's utilization rate of atomic power stations stood at 89.4 percent last month, far higher than the 56.2 percent in January 2018. That shows how the Moon Jae-in administration's nuclear phaseout policy has increased the country's reliance on atomic energy instead of decreasing it.
According to Korea Electric Power Corp. statistics, the share of nuclear power in Korea's total electricity generation also rose to 29 percent last year from 25.8 percent in 2018. This increase resulted from the government's switch to advance the operations of overhauled nuclear power plants, due to rising fuel prices amid the global energy shock last summer. More fundamentally, however, it reveals the problems with the government's policy to replace nuclear power with renewable energies, such as solar and wind power.
The government has poured 24 trillion won ($20 billion) into expanding the generation capacity of solar and wind power plants. However, the shares of these renewables have not grown much, as they have failed to get over the limitation of intermittency. A case in point is the Saemangeum Photovoltaic Power Generation Complex along the southwestern coast, where solar panels have been covered with bird droppings. The trouble began when the government chose a habitat for migratory birds as an alternative site to hillside areas after learning that inclined terrain was prone to landslides. Some officials even made a "brilliant" proposal to fly hawk-shaped kites to chase away the migratory birds.
These solar power generation facilities occupy too much open land, a critical disadvantage to installing them in rural areas in a small, mountainous country like Korea. That may be one reason why Japan recently tightened regulations on solar stations, faced with various side effects, including rural deforestation and landslides. Whoever takes power after the March 9 election, the next government should break away from the nuclear phaseout policy. Of course, the nation needs to promote renewable energy. However, it should not adhere to a one-sided policy but pursue a more realistic energy mix by including nuclear power.
13. [Visual History of Korea] Staff Sgt. Reckless -- Korean warhorse celebrated on both sides of the Pacific Ocean
[Visual History of Korea] Staff Sgt. Reckless -- Korean warhorse celebrated on both sides of the Pacific Ocean
Published : Feb 19, 2022 - 16:01 Updated : Feb 19, 2022 - 16:01
A statue of Staff Sgt. Reckless, a Korean warhorse, is seen at the Semper Fidelis Memorial Park at the National Museum of the Marine Corps in Triangle, Virginia. Photo @Hyungwon Kang
The United States Marine Corps motto “Semper Fidelis,” which means “Always Faithful” does not leave anyone behind on the battlefield.
After fighting in the Korean War, also known as “the Forgotten War,” a Korean warhorse named Reckless was not left behind by the US Marines. When the US 5th Marine Regiment returned to California in 1954 following the July 27, 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement, the horse came with them.
Standing 1.32 meters tall at the withers, Reckless was originally a racehorse named Achimhae, which means flame of the morning.
The Korean sorrel mare breed is better known today as the Hallama breed, a mixed horse between a Korean native Jeju horse and a thoroughbred horse which was introduced to Korea during the Japanese colonial period.
“Achimhae was a race horse that ran at the Seoul Ttukseom Racecourse, and she looks similar in height and weight to a Hallama from Jeju-do. Hallama is a cross between a Jeju mare and a thoroughbred horse. It was bred in Jeju-do during the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945), the liberation period (1945-1950) and through the Korean War (1950-1953),” said Jang Deok-jee, a veterinarian and Jeju horse researcher.
A statue of Staff Sgt. Reckless welcomes visitors at the Yeoncheon Gorangpo District Historical Park in Gyeonggi Province, Korea. Photo @Hyungwon Kang
“Achimhae’s red coat is called ‘jeokda’ in the Jeju dialect. The white marking on her head is called ‘ganjeon,‘ which means flowing stars,“ said Jang, a foremost authority on native Jeju horses.
A Hallama is typically a bit taller than the native Jejuma, which stands from about 1.22 meters at the withers. For reference, an average thoroughbred’s height at the withers is around 1.63 meters.
According to US military historians, Reckless was more than just a working animal in the Korean War. She earned her way to becoming a member of the US Marine Corps with her valor serving in actual battles.
The Korean War, which began on June 25, 1950, can be divided into two parts for the American troops as the war went on.
The Incheon landing of the United Nations forces in September 1950 resulted in a decisive victory and strategic reversal in favor of UN forces.
The brass halter tag worn by Reckless is on display at the National Museum of the Marine Corps in Triangle, Virginia. Photo @Hyungwon Kang
But the sudden and unexpected entry of Chinese Communist Forces on Oct. 19, 1950 dragged the war into an unending “dreary cycle of grinding combat, devoid of operational finesse or popular appeal,” according to documents at the National Museum of the Marine Corps in Triangle, Virginia.
While armistice talks between military commanders from the US, representing the UN Command, the Korean People’s Army and China’s People‘s Volunteer Army were going on, soldiers on both sides were digging in for ongoing skirmishes.
The US Marines had deployed a superior weapon for the ground fight with a 75 mm anti-tank artillery weapon that was powerful enough to knock down enemy huts with a single shot, but required four men to carry.
The 75 mm artillery shells weighed a hefty 10.8 kilograms each. The Marines in charge of carrying the heavy ammunition from the ammunition supply point located 900 meters away were getting exhausted and at danger of becoming enemy targets. They needed a pack horse.
Lt. Eric Pedersen was the leader of the recoilless rifle platoon in the 5th Marine Regiment, whose crew was called the Reckless Riflemen, in reference to the powerful blowback of the 75 mm anti-tank artillery weapon.
Reckless was a sorrel mare, better known today as a Hallama, a cross between a Korean native Jeju-do mare and a thoroughbred horse. Photo @Hyungwon Kang
Pedersen was looking to help his Marines carry heavy artillery shells to the firing positions over the rugged mountainous terrain near Yeoncheon County in Gyeonggi Province, where UN forces were holding back Chinese troops from advancing toward Seoul.
Pedersen went to the Seoul Ttukseom Racetrack and bought a Korean sorrel mare -- Achimhae -- for $250 from a boy who needed money to get a prosthetic limb for his sister, who had lost her leg in a landmine explosion.
Achimhae was a hit with the Marines, and was given the nickname Reckless, after Pedersen’s platoon.
They trained Reckless to carry 75 mm ammunition and supplies to frontline firing positions. She was a quick learner and often completed her mission without a handler. The Korean mare became Pvt. Reckless.
In March 1953, the US Marines were engaged in a particularly tough fight known as the Battle for Outpost Vegas in Yeoncheon, about 55 kilometers north of Seoul.
A PDSA Dickin bronze medal awarded to Reckless is on display at the National Museum of the Marine Corps in Triangle, Virginia. Photo @Hyungwon Kang
The Americans called the Yeoncheon battle the Nevada Complex, with three hills forming a defense against advancing Chinese troops. The Yeoncheon battle was one of the fiercest fights that held back the enemy for the US Marines.
During a day of that engagement, Reckless made 51 trips from the ammunition supply point to the frontline positions, most of them on her own. She carried over 300 rounds, more than 4082 kilograms, across 50 kilometers of rice paddies and steep mountain trails to her fellow Marines. After offloading her supplies, she carried the wounded back to the aid station. Reckless was wounded twice, but never faltered.
“Reckless was cited for bravery and I had the pleasure of promoting her to the rank of sergeant. In my career I have seen many animals that have been adopted by the Marines, but never in all my experience have I seen one which won the hearts of so many as did this lovely little lady known as Reckless.” Lt. Gen. Randolph McC. Pate, assistant commander of the Marine Corps, is quoted as saying in the 1955 book “Reckless Pride Of The Marines” by Andrew Geer.
Reckless is celebrated both in the US and in Korea.
A statue of Achimhae welcomes guests at the Yeoncheon Gorangpo District Historical Park in Gyeonggi Province.
A statue of Staff Sergeant Reckless, the Korean warhorse, is on prominent display at the Semper Fidelis Memorial Park at the National Museum of the Marine Corps in Triangle, Virginia.
Under the statue of Staff Sergeant Reckless, her list of military decorations are documented: Two Purple Hearts, the Marine Corps Good Conduct Medal, the Presidential Unit Citation with a bronze star, a Navy Unit Commendation, the National Defense Service Medal, the United Nations Korea Medal, a Korean Service Medal with 3 stars, and the Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation.
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Korean American photojournalist and columnist Hyungwon Kang is currently documenting Korean history and culture in images and words for future generations. -- Ed.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
