Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Don’t join the book burners. Don’t think you are going to conceal faults by concealing the evidence that they ever existed. Don’t be afraid to go into your library and read every book.”

- Dwight D. Eisenhower

“Those who speak in the language of truth, in fact, or attacked as liars, traders, and purveyors of fake news.”

- Chris Hedges.

The mind's true work lies in the power to choose, reject, desire, repel, prepare, intend, and affirm. A corrupted mind is a barrier to the fulfillment of its own potential."

- Epictetus

1. If Kim Jong Un Travels to Russia is a New Arms Deal in the Works?

2. Time to Destroy North Korea’s Revenue Generation

3. Biden’s ‘Spirit of Camp David’ is a mere specter of alliance

4. Proposed Naval Drills Signal Closer Military Cooperation Among Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang

5. John Batchelor Show: #NorthKorea: Moscow romances Kim

6. Russia and China's Courtship of North Korea Is Disastrous for the US

7. How one activist helps North Koreans grow their own food – Ep. 303

8. Kim Jong Un's possible trip to Russia could be like his 2019 journey: 20 hours on his armored train

9. A Renewed Axis: Growing Military Cooperation Between North Korea and Russia - Beyond Parallel

10. North Korea publicly executes 9 people for running beef smuggling ring

11. N. Korea unveils new 'tactical nuclear attack submarine'

12. Great Event Heralding Arrival of New Era, Turning Point in Bolstering up Juche-based Naval Force Ceremony of Launching Newly-built Submarine Held with Splendor in Presence of Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un

13. S. Korea, U.S. to hold talks on extended deterrence next week

14. North Korea: Kim Jong Un reveals 'nuclear attack submarine'

15. Tipping Culture Comes to South Korea, and Backlash Is Fierce. ‘Wait, Is This America?’

16. After Camp David, bring S Korea into the Quad

17. N. Korea bolsters special police unit to guard against anti-state activities

18. [ANALYSIS] Concerns of Korea getting dragged into war in Taiwan are inflated

1. If Kim Jong Un Travels to Russia is a New Arms Deal in the Works?

All the experts on north Korea and Russia relations are coming out of the woodwork. But I subscribe to Dr. Bechtol's wise counsel and analysis. What he helps us to understand is that Russian support for North Korean military capabilities is not new. Where do we think most of the designs for north Korea's advanced missiles came from? It just seems news because of all the hyperventilating "concern" over a Putin-Kim meeting in Vladivostok. I think it is important to understand that a meeting may only be for show. They don't need a meeting to conclude new arrangements for support. In fact I think we should consider the "what if" they do not end up having a meeting. It would be wrong to assume that if a meeting does not take place that there would not be an implementation of new or expanded support relationships.

Conclusion:

What the North Koreans will most likely want from the Russians is thus more than just technical assistance. Pyongyang probably wants the assistance already coming in to increase in capabilities and largesse. In return, Russia will continue to get an unending supply of ground combat systems and ammo that are largely old in design, but still effective. We can also expect to see North Korea increasing the capabilities of such systems as ballistic missiles and long-range artillery and rockets. If this happens, it will be a significant deal for both governments.

If Kim Jong Un Travels to Russia is a New Arms Deal in the Works?

19fortyfive.com · by Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. · September 7, 2023

North Korea and Russia have made headlines in recent days with reports that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is likely to travel to Russia to meet with its president, Vladimir Putin.

The expected meeting would follow a recent visit to North Korea by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. During his trip, Shoigu toured North Korean arms factories. This has led many to opine that if Kim visits Russia, one of the key issues under discussion will be continued arms sales to the Russians for the prosecution of their war against Ukraine.

If Kim does in fact visit, several issues will likely feature in his talks with Putin. The North Korean economy is in dire straits. Decades of bad economic practices, combined with excessive spending on the military and on lavish lifestyles for the elite, have dragged down the economy. The effects of sanctions that impede at least some of Pyongyang’s illegal and illicit trade add to the difficulties. Thus, the two sides are likely to discuss economic issues, as well as other ways the pariah states can work together.

But the focus of much commentary on the reported meeting is Pyongyang’s sale of arms, particularly ammunition, to Russia. Moscow continues to struggle with supply chain issues as the war in Ukraine shows no sign of ending soon. Pyongyang will also likely want to get foodstuffs and resources (largely oil and natural gas) as part of any new deal.

Old Systems, Still Useful

Why is Russia looking to North Korea for arms, and what would these sales consist of? In the time since North Korea began supplying the Wagner Group, it appears many of its arms sales have consisted of ammunition, primarily for artillery platforms such as the 152mm system, and for multiple rocket launchers such as the 122mm and perhaps the 107mm systems. They may have provided various other small arms and ammunition to the Wagner Group, but specifics remain unconfirmed.

The systems and ammo the North Koreans have supplied are all old, 1960s-era Soviet weaponry. But the Russian army is a blunt instrument, not a force using precision weapons for the most part. That means these systems are very useful for Russian forces slogging it out on battlefields, particularly in Eastern Ukraine.

It is also important to note that the factories in North Korea that build the systems and produce the ammo were originally installed by the Soviets. These systems are thus fully compatible with the systems Russia is using today in Ukraine.

Finally, a prevailing line of commentary holds that while North Korea may have millions of shells and a lot of equipment in storage, many of these platforms are old, and they might perform poorly in combat. This is true, in part. North Korea does keep millions of shells in storage. But the North Koreans also have factories that actively produce new combat systems, and munitions factories that produce millions of shells annually. So to say these weapons and ammo might break down because of age is probably not accurate.

Since the Russian defense minister has already visited North Korea and toured its arms factories, and since it appears likely Kim will now make a rare trip to Russia, it seems the Russians will want to make deals to purchase even more systems and ammo. These could include a plethora of small arms, more artillery and rocket systems, and even tanks and armored personnel carriers that are patterned on Soviet design and based on very old technology.

The North Koreans never offer something for nothing, so what would they want in return?

What North Korea Wants

A common view is that North Korea will likely want technical assistance for its military in return for the purchase of its arms. This is also probably true in part. North Korea is also likely to demand badly needed resources such as oil and natural gas, as well as foodstuffs. But if this is the start of a long-term relationship, as seems to be the case, the North Koreans will want more. Why do I say that? Because the evidence leads me to assess that the Russians are already providing military technical assistance to North Korea.

In 2020, in a joint U.S. Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce North Korean Missile Procurement Advisory, the statement read, “On January 24, 2018, OFAC designated ten Korea Ryonbong General Corporation representatives based mainly in China and Russia, including one official identified as the vice consul of the North Korean consulate in Nakhodka, Russia, underscoring the key role that North Korean diplomats and foreign-posted North Korean procurement representatives play in sanctions evasion and ballistic missile-related procurement. North Korean officials accredited as diplomats to one country have also been detected attempting to acquire sensitive technology in neighboring countries.”

In February 2022, the State Department identified still more assistance from Russians to the North Koreans, stating that, “Between at least 2016 and 2021, O Yong Ho worked with Russian entity Parsek LLC and Russian national Roman Anatolyevich Alar, the director for development of Russian firm Parsek LLC, to procure multiple goods with ballistic missile applications, including Kevlar thread, aramid fiber, aviation oil, ball bearings, and precision milling machines controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Roman Anatolyevich Alar also provided O Yong Ho with instructions for creating solid rocket fuel mixtures.”

Further, does anyone really think that the North Koreans came up with their copy-cat of the Iskander missile, as well as their latest hypersonic missile technology, on their own? Those systems, and the designs and technical assistance for them, came from somewhere. Russian technical assistance or even proliferation to the North Koreans is not new.

What the North Koreans will most likely want from the Russians is thus more than just technical assistance. Pyongyang probably wants the assistance already coming in to increase in capabilities and largesse. In return, Russia will continue to get an unending supply of ground combat systems and ammo that are largely old in design, but still effective. We can also expect to see North Korea increasing the capabilities of such systems as ballistic missiles and long-range artillery and rockets. If this happens, it will be a significant deal for both governments.

About the Author and His Expertise

Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr. (Ph.D. Union Institute), is an award-winning professor of political science at Angelo State University and a retired Marine. The author of five books on North Korea, he is also the current President of the International Council on Korean Studies. He specializes in North Korean military and counter-proliferation issues. Bechtol is a 19FortyFive contributing editor.

19fortyfive.com · by Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. · September 7, 2023

2. Time to Destroy North Korea’s Revenue Generation

Yes, sanctions are important but not sufficient. They are only one part of what should be a holistic strategy to exert substantial pressure on the regime. Maximum Pressure 2.0: A plan for north Korea (2019), https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/12/3/maximum-pressure-2/ National Strategy for Countering North Korea (2023), https://nipp.org/information_series/robert-joseph-robert-collins-joseph-detrani-nicholas-eberstadt-olivia-enos-david-maxwell-and-greg-scarlatoiu-national-strategy-for-countering-north-korea-no-545-january-23-2023/

In addition to sanctions we need a human rights upfront approach and a sophisticated information campaign and execute a strategy that is designed to achieve an acceptable durable political arrangement on the Korean peninsula that will serve, sustain, protect, and advance US and JAROKUS interests in Northeast Asia. Such a political arrangement might be best described as a free and unified Korea.

While the focus is now on the Biden administration, I think a fair question is why did we not try to destroy north Korea's revenue generation during the Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations? The closest we came was during Bush 43 and Banco Delta Asia but we failed to sustain the pressure. No administration has really been aggressive and conducted sustained operations to conduct a strategic strangulation campaign and deny revenue to the regime. It is not as if we have not thought about it before: A Strategic Strangulation Campaign for North Korea: Is the International Community Ready for What May Come Next? (2016) https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/03/a-strategic-strangulation-campaign-for-north-korea-is-the-international-community-ready-for-what-may-come-next/. Of course we should consider the success of a strategic strangulation campiagn. Are we ready to deal with such "success" and what comes next?

Time to Destroy North Korea’s Revenue Generation

19fortyfive.com · by Anthony Ruggiero · September 7, 2023

North Korea will “pay a price for this in the international community.” That’s how National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan responded on Tuesday to news that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, who will travel to Russia this month to meet Vladimir Putin, may supply additional materiel for Moscow’s war in Ukraine. That would be an effective approach if Kim cared about his global standing. But the dear leader only responds to one thing: economic pressure that threatens his strategic priorities. And so far, the Biden administration has focused more on issuing strong rhetoric than on destroying North Korea’s revenue generation.

The Biden administration first revealed North Korea’s export of rockets and missiles to the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, in a flashy briefing in late January. National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby stood before imagery of railcars traveling in mid-November 2022 between Russia and North Korea and predicted that Wagner would “continue to receive North Korean weapons systems.” He promised consequences, and the administration designated Wagner as a significant Transnational Criminal Organization several days later.

But the administration’s North Korea policy has been largely muted. Washington condemned North Korea’s actions and shared the information on the weapons transfers with the UN Security Council’s panel of experts. Both actions reinforced their preferred path: humiliate Kim into changing course. Unfortunately for the administration, Kim has no shame.

Kim’s political prison camps and other human rights abuses are crimes against humanity and the world has let him escape without any punishment. Kim is not going to be shamed by American officials standing behind a podium in the White House briefing room.

The administration squandered eight months since the initial briefing on Russia-North Korea cooperation by relying solely on rhetoric and shunning impactful sanctions. Of course, the administration would object to that characterization, and Sullivan tried to defend the Biden team’s policy. He explained that the administration in mid-August imposed “targeted sanctions to try to disrupt any effort to use North Korea as a conduit or as a source for weapons going to Russia.” But a closer look at those sanctions reveals the administration’s misguided approach.

According to the U.S. Treasury Department, the sanctions targeted three companies linked to a “sanctions evasion network attempting to support” North Korea-Russia arms deals. These companies were owned or controlled by Ashot Mkrtychev, a Slovakian national whom Treasury designated on March 30. Treasury explained that between the end of 2022 and early 2023 Mkrtychev worked as an intermediary between Russian and North Korean officials for the transfer of “over two dozen kinds of weapons and munitions for Russia in exchange for materials ranging from commercial aircraft, raw materials, and commodities to be sent to the DPRK.”

It is possible that Mkrtychev was an entrepreneur and found an opportunity to make a quick profit facilitating Russia-North Korea arms deals. More likely is that Putin and Kim are so dismissive of the Biden administration’s response that they decided to cut out the middleman and just work directly with each other. That could explain why Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s defense minister, visited North Korea and toured a weapons expo, providing an opening for the forthcoming leader-level summit.

The administration’s sanctions misfire illuminates a larger problem: The administration has largely shunned using meaningful sanctions to counter Pyongyang’s weapons advances. Sanctions have atrophied since 2018, when former President Donald Trump pursued summit-level diplomacy with Kim. But Biden has continued this dangerous policy and has not implemented congressionally mandated sanctions that passed by overwhelming bipartisan majorities.

There is a better path. Kim has four strategic priorities: nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, North Korean elites, and the military. He likely judges every action, including aid to Russia and bolstering his relationships with Putin and China’s Xi Jinping, against how they help him advance these priorities.

That provides an opportunity for the administration to impact the North Korea-Russia relationship by destroying Kim’s revenue generation. If Kim does not have the money to buy luxury goods for his elites, or build nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles for the military, he could see his grip on power slip.

The administration should begin by targeting every sanctions evader aiding North Korea wherever located, including in China and Russia. Pyongyang relies on both countries for importing materials and financing its transactions abroad, since North Korea’s financial system is largely cut off from international finance. Washington should remember that Kim is building additional nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles. President Biden needs to prioritize this threat by targeting Chinese banks, companies, and individuals.

The Biden team believes it can shame North Korea into being a responsible actor. But Kim cares not about international prestige but about survival, and right now Putin and Xi are offering better terms. Biden can change that calculus by devastating Kim’s economy. And in so doing, Biden would ultimately help Ukraine’s war effort.

About the Author and His Expertise

Anthony Ruggiero is a senior fellow and senior director of the Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He previously served as the National Security Council’s director for North Korea (2018-2019) and senior director for counterproliferation and biodefense (2019-2021) in the Trump administration. Follow him on X: @NatSecAnthony.

19fortyfive.com · by Anthony Ruggiero · September 7, 2023

3. Biden’s ‘Spirit of Camp David’ is a mere specter of alliance

I could not disagree more strongly with Donald Kirk. I think he is wrong.

That said, I applaud this article and the example it sets for the Fourth Estate doing its job holding the political leaders and policy makers to account. Policy makers of JAROKUS (Japan-ROK - US) need to respond to this critique. He is right to do this because most of us have been very public and vocal in our support for the Summit outcome and we need critics like Donald Kirk to press for details and hold leaders and policy makers' to account and force them to answer the tough questions with details to instil confidence among the publics that these agreements will improve and enhance mutual security and mutual prosperity for all three nations.

I think Mr. Kirk has long been a keen observer of foreign policy, foreign affairs, and national security and has the legitimacy and credibility to make this critique. However, from a policy maker position and more specifically my own experience as a military planner, the Camp David Principles, The Spirit of Camp David, and theFact Sheet constitute strategic guidance for those who work on these issues in the governments and militaries of the three nations. But while Mr. Kirk challenges the substance as mere fluff I do not think he appreciates who much work, coordination, and negotiation goes into every word, every sentence, and every paragraph of these documents.

I subscribe to President Eisenhower's adage: "Plans are nothing. Planning is everything." In this case it could be that "the statements themselves are nothing, all the work that has gone into developing them and reaching agreement and then implementing them is everything." This means that the real substance lies within the bureaucracy of the three nations where these agreements will be brought to life and actually implemented. As one example (and Mr. Kirk references this), the militaries are already planning trilateral exercises. What most do not know is that exercises are usually planned five years in advance. As we speak, the action officers from the three countries are planning exercises for the next five years. Next year they will begin planning for the sixth year out and the year after that the 7th year. This is one way the Summit agreements become institutionalized. Yes there was an agreement for the 3 leaders to meet annually but what is not spelled out in the documents are the myriad institutional meetings that already exist and are being adapted to meet the strategic guidance and then new meetings that will be implemented. For example, some number of 2+2 meetings will likely transition to 3+3 meetings. We are not going to see all these details in the agreement among the two Presidents and Prime Minister. But we should have confidence that our diplomats and military professionals are already implementing the strategic guidance. I have just touched the tip of the huge policy making and military planning iceberg. Spokespeople from all three countries should provide additional details to inform the press and thus the public on the depth and breadth of the coordinating and planning that is and will continue to take place to implement the strategic guidance of the three nations.

Biden’s ‘Spirit of Camp David’ is a mere specter of alliance

BY DONALD KIRK, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 09/07/23 1:00 PM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4189938-bidens-spirit-of-camp-david-is-a-mere-specter-of-alliance/

South Korea’s President Yoon Suk Yeol, left, President Joe Biden and Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, right, meet Friday, Aug. 18, 2023, at Camp David, the presidential retreat, near Thurmont, Md. (AP Photo/Andrew Harnik)

“The spirit of Camp David” may be the most enduring dividend of the trilateral summit held last month in the low-lying mountains northwest of Washington. There was no doubt of the goodwill among the leaders of the U.S., South Korea and Japan as they formed what appeared to the Chinese as an alliance to contain China, from the Korean peninsula to the Taiwan Straits to the South China Sea, around the southern rim of Asia, across the Indian subcontinent to the Middle East.

A closer look at the documents that emerged from the one-day gathering, hosted by President Joe Biden, reveals that he, South Korea’s President Yoon Suk-yeol and Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida actually failed to reach hard-and-fast agreements on anything aside from their pledge to meet again.

Probably the most significant of the two documents they signed was “The Spirit of Camp David,” in which they vowed “to expand our cooperation bilaterally and raise our shared ambition to a new horizon, across domains and across the Indo-Pacific and beyond.”

They would, they said, “strengthen our economies, provide resilience and prosperity, support the free and open international order based on the rule of law, and bolster regional and global peace and security, especially as current and incoming members of the United Nations Security Council.” More practically, they would “enhance strategic coordination between the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliances and bring our trilateral security cooperation to new heights.”

The statement of “principles” to which they agreed was couched in similarly lofty language. The three declared they “strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion” and would “advance a free and open Indo-Pacific based on a respect for international law, shared norms, and common values.” And, yes, they would “promote and enhance peace and stability throughout the region.”

No doubt expressions of goodwill and cooperation are important. But the problem with all the fine verbiage is that it contains no firm guarantees and no commitments, other than a desire to meet regularly and review what’s happening and what to do about it, if anything.

A firm stand on the need for “complete denuclearization” of North Korea adds nothing to all that we’ve been hearing for years about CVID: complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization. No, they did not use that familiar acronym. Instead, they “remained committed to dialogue with the DPRK with no preconditions” — a meaningless repetition of previous statements to which we may be sure Kim Jong Un won’t respond.

The three leaders put on an appearance of coming down to more meaningful understandings as outlined by the White House in a “fact sheet” accompanying the statements on spirit and principles, but here too the wording reveals the lack of a binding commitment.

They would, said the fact sheet, meet at least once a year to “build on the momentum” of the Camp David summit, but whether they would convene one-on-one or all three together wasn’t clear. They would, to be sure, engage in “trilateral exercises, which will constitute an unprecedented level of trilateral defense cooperation,” said the fact sheet, and “they would “exchange real-time missile warning data that would improve the detection and assessment of DPRK missile launches.” Also, they would “strengthen our data sharing.”

Again, the devil was in the details — or, rather, the lack of details. What was the exact nature of the agreement under which Biden, Yoon and Kishida had come to terms? Had they signed a specific deal for trilateral exercises? The wording suggested they were talking in terms of aspirations rather than firm promises. Depending on the level of threats from North Korea and China, they would meet again, at which time they would repeat whatever they had said at Camp David.

More substantively, the three did agree to set up a “trilateral working group on DPRK cyber activities,” hoping to “counter DPRK illicit revenue generation and malicious cyber activities.” They would “focus on sharing intelligence” and “coordinating responses to the DPRK’s cryptocurrency use, theft and laundering” — areas in which North Korean cyber experts have scored notable successes. North Korea’s Lazarus Group is believed responsible for hacking into Sony Pictures in 2014, demanding that Sony not release “The Interview,” a mordant satire on Kim Jong Un. Two years later, Lazarus broke into the Bangladesh Central Bank, getting away with millions of dollars.

The American, Korean and Japanese leaders did not, however, need to meet at Camp David to reach a deal for fighting cybercrime. Other countries should be equally interested. The point of the trilateral summit was to form what might be seen as a serious, viable alliance. They did not say a word about joining forces in the event of a war, the overwhelming reason being defense against North Korean threats supported by Chinese expansionism.

Incredibly, there was no agreement at Camp David on what may be the most pressing concern: the use of nuclear weapons to combat North Korean nuclear threats. None of the statements said a word about the need for nuclear weapons for defense against North Korea, China or Russia. Yes, the U.S. remains responsible for providing a “nuclear umbrella” covering both Korea and Japan, but would it not have been a good idea to have mentioned this crucial aspect of regional defense?

Instead, Biden, Yoon and Kishida papered over this omission with a self-righteous reaffirmation “that achieving a world without nuclear weapons is a common goal for the international community, and we continue to make every effort to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again.”

Those were empty words. They did not have to hold a summit to agree on the evils of nuclear weapons and the need to work on banning them. Neither South Korea nor Japan are about to go nuclear. They may have all the skills and resources to fabricate their own nukes, but they are not about to join the global nuclear club. Biden, Yoon and Kishida might have reaffirmed that much but preferred to ignore the topic totally.

The nuclear issue was too sensitive, too divisive and too controversial to raise in a trilateral conversation. The U.S., however, sought to reassure South Korea and Japan of the American commitment on nuclear defense by having a nuclear submarine, capable of firing warheads, dock at the port of Busan.

At Camp David, the leaders chose to stick to generalities. They may have shown their desire to cooperate on defense but avoided saying what they would do should war again engulf the region.

Donald Kirk has been a journalist for more than 60 years, focusing much of his career on conflict in Asia and the Middle East, including as a correspondent for the Washington Star and Chicago Tribune. He is currently a freelance correspondent covering North and South Korea, and is the author of several books about Asian affairs.

TAGS CAMP DAVID CHINA DENUCLEARIZATION FUMIO KISHIDA JAPAN JOE BIDEN KIM JON UN NORTH KOREA SOUTH KOREA UNITED STATES YOON SUK-YEOL

4. Proposed Naval Drills Signal Closer Military Cooperation Among Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang

Proposed Naval Drills Signal Closer Military Cooperation Among Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang

September 07, 2023 8:02 PM

Christy Lee

voanews.com · September 7, 2023

washington —

South Korean officials say North Korea has likely been invited to join Russia and China for the first time in trilateral naval exercises that experts see as a response to the newly cemented strategic cooperation among South Korea, Japan and the United States.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu is believed to have proposed the joint naval drills during a visit to Pyongyang in July, according to South Korean lawmaker Yoo Sang-bum. Yoo said National Intelligence Service Director Kim Kyou-hyun briefed about the proposal at a closed-door meeting on Monday.

#NorthKorea: Moscow romances Kim. David Maxwell, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation, on these:

https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/30/europe/russia-north-korea-advancing-arms-deal-intl/index.html

Photo:

1894 Moscow

No known restrictions on publication.

@Batchelorshow

6. Russia and China's Courtship of North Korea Is Disastrous for the US

It is wise to be wary of the axis of authoritarians. But I think we have to temper our concerns somewhat. Or at least seek the weaknesses and vulnerability and exploit them.

The axis of authoritarians (*China-Russia-north Korea) will never create a security arrangement that will come close to matching (JAROKUS) (as well as all the other security arrangements of like minded democracies (Quad, AUKUS, NATO+AP4, JAROPUS (Japan, Republic of Philippines-US))). This is because the likeminded democracies' security arrangements are built on a foundation of trust and the rules based international order. Of course there are disagreements and sometimes conflicting interests but the arrangements work because the members trust each other to act in their own best interests and for the majority of issues those interests sufficiently align.

China, Russia, and north Korea have no such level of trust among themselves. China and Russia have both benefited from north Korea creating dilemmas for the US and its allies. China and Russia have tolerated north Korean activities because for the most part regime activities go against the US. However, north Korea has never really done their bidding. Most importantly it is in the Kim family regime's DNA to be able to play both China and Russia against each other. This goes back to Kim Il Sung manipulating Maor and Satilin before and during the Korean War. Furthermore, all three countries are facing increasing economic difficulties. Although China has the second largest economy in the world it appears to be faltering. And for all intents and purposes north Korea is a failed state that survives through political warfare, blackmail diplomacy, and global illicit activities that live up to its description as a mafia-like crime family cult. And Putin's war is draining manpower, equipment, resources, and money from Russia.

While the axis of authoritarians can unite to cause problems for like minded democracies they cannot be successful over time due to their inherent contradictions of their systems and their relationships.

But what is most dangerous of course is the fact that all three countries have nuclear weapons. That obviously is the dangerous wild card. Which country might use them first?

I do like the authors' proposal here. They are right, we have much work to do. We can do so much more, especially in terms of effective use of information to undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the axis as well as each individual nation both internally and externally. There is great potential for internal unrest in all three countries which could threaten regime leadership and focus resources and actions internally to remain in power. We could use information to create internal threats through resistance.

Excerpts:

The U.S. must make sure that when a new crisis or war comes, it is met by the full force of Japanese, South Korean, U.S. and Taiwanese capabilities. For example, creating a Pacific version of the “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing network should be stood up immediately between the U.S., Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines.

There is much work to be done. The U.S. is not there yet, and time is short.

Russia and China's Courtship of North Korea Is Disastrous for the US

Published 09/07/23 08:30 AM ET

Capt. (Ret.) James E. Fanell and Bradley A. Thayer

themessenger.com · September 7, 2023

Recent visits by North Korean officials to Russia, by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to Pyongyang, and the anticipated visit of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to Vladivostok in Russia for the Eastern Economic Forum are significant and worrisome. It’s expected that Kim and Vladimir Putin will discuss the sale of North Korean weapons to Russia in support of its war in Ukraine — likely, artillery shells and anti-tank weaponry. In return, Russia is expected to provide a curious mix of satellite technology, nuclear submarines and food aid.

No doubt, the two leaders also will discuss Russian arms transfers to North Korea in the future. Russia is also moving to hold joint naval exercises with China and North Korea in the Pacific.

The importance of all these meetings, of course, is that they could sustain Russia’s war in Ukraine. That is disastrous enough. However, the meetings take on even more significance because the secret discussions likely are focusing on greater military cooperation and mutual support in Asia.

The Kim-Putin meeting is only part of the story. There is a third party involved, one that is the dominant actor: Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s fingerprints are all over the meetings between North Korea and Russia. China seeks to support Russia’s war, and to employ both North Korea and Russia to serve its own strategic objectives.

For China, the benefits are, first, that the war has become a major crisis in Europe, which occupies the attention of most Western political leaders, the intelligence community, and Western militaries. Second, the war ensures that Western conventional arms flow to Kyiv, draining stockpiles at a rapid pace. The U.S. is a long way away from ensuring that Ukraine’s prodigious armament needs can be met while simultaneously meeting the requirements of partners like Taiwan and U.S. allies — and while keeping the U.S. arsenal full. Third, the war ensures Putin’s dependence on Xi and demonstrates to global audiences that Putin is subordinate to Xi. Russia needs China far more than the reverse. Certainly, Xi must be privately asking, “What is Russia good for?” and a part of the answer may be to demonstrate China’s superiority and to serve as a diplomatic and military factotum.

North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un is greeted by Russian President Vladimir Putin on April 25, 2019, in Vladivostok, Russia. The two may meet again soon to discuss weapons for Russia's war in Ukraine.Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images

Fourth, and most importantly, the North Korea-Russia meetings very likely will involve a discussion of how North Korea could assist China and Russia in distracting the U.S. and its allies at a crucial time — that is, before China invades Taiwan or moves against Japan or the Philippines. A crisis on the Korean peninsula would further stretch the U.S. It would draw major attention from the U.S., Japan and South Korea, involving the intelligence community and military resources.

After a period of North Korean military activity — such as a mobilization at the South Korean border or a surge of missile firings toward Japan — China could mobilize its People’s Liberation Army with the potential that U.S. intelligence community warnings would be missed or dismissed.

North Korea need not go to war with South Korea. A significant crisis would divert America’s attention and thus achieve China’s strategic objectives. A diversion of this kind, when combined with the Ukraine war, means the U.S. would have to confront a Korean crisis before a potential Chinese attack on Taiwan. Xi’s goal would be to present the U.S. intelligence community with a multi-front war problem before moving its army and navy against the third front: Taiwan and/or the Philippines. An additional aspect of the South Korea-Taiwan nexus would be the destruction of semiconductor chips by Taiwanese producers in the course of a conflict with China. When coupled with reported sabotage of chip production at Samsung, the U.S. and its allies would be placed in a profound and lasting economic and security crisis.

The Biden administration must anticipate the flowering of the North Korea-China-Russia axis will complicate America’s strategic position in the immediate future. Anticipating the North Korean wild card is a challenging task, but the recent developments compel an immediate U.S. and allied response to ensure that the West is prepared.

The U.S. must make sure that when a new crisis or war comes, it is met by the full force of Japanese, South Korean, U.S. and Taiwanese capabilities. For example, creating a Pacific version of the “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing network should be stood up immediately between the U.S., Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines.

There is much work to be done. The U.S. is not there yet, and time is short.

Capt. (Ret.) James Fanell is a government fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and a former director of intelligence and information operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Bradley A. Thayer is director of China policy at the Center for Security Policy and the co-author with Lianchao Han of “Understanding the China Threat.”

themessenger.com · September 7, 2023

7. How one activist helps North Koreans grow their own food – Ep. 303

Take 62 minutes and listen to Tim Peters, a great humanitarian who does more for the Korean people in the north than the entire international community.

How one activist helps North Koreans grow their own food – Ep. 303

https://www.nknews.org/category/north-korea-news-podcast/latest/how-one-activist-helps-north-koreans-grow-their-own-food-ep-303/932524/?utm

Tim Peters of Helping Hands Korea talks about sending seeds to the DPRK and supporting North Koreans escapees

00:17

62:25

23 Aug 2023 Last updated at 18:39

Kim Jong Un's possible trip to Russia could be like his 2019 journey: 20 hours on his armored train

AP · September 6, 2023

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — Reports that Kim Jong Un may travel to Russia soon have drawn attention to the traditional method of travel for North Korean leaders: luxury, armored trains that have long been a part of the dynasty’s lore and are symbols of its deep isolation.

In what would be his first foreign travel since the start of the pandemic, Kim may visit Russia this month for a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, a U.S. official has said, possibly to discuss North Korean arms sales to refill Russian reserves drained by its war on Ukraine.

According to U.S. reports, the two leaders could meet in the eastern city of Vladivostok, the site of their first get-together in April 2019, when Kim took his green-and-yellow train. Putin is expected in the city for the annual Eastern Economic Forum that runs from Sunday to Wednesday.

The reports come at a time when the leaders’ interests are aligning in the face of their deepening, separate confrontations with the United States.

Whether Kim could again make the rattling 20-hour journey by rail is a focus of media attention, as is the reportedly luxurious train, which stands in sharp contrast to the grinding poverty of daily life for most North Koreans.

Kim’s famously flight-averse father, Kim Jong Il, made about a dozen trips abroad during his 17-year rule, almost all to China and all by train. North Korea’s state media said that the elder Kim died of a heart attack during a train trip in 2011.

According to an account published in 2002 by Konstantin Pulikovsky, a Russian official who accompanied Kim Jong ll on a three-week trip to Moscow, the train carried cases of expensive French wine and passengers could feast on fresh lobster and pork barbeque.

FILE - Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un shake hands during their meeting in Vladivostok, Russia, on April 25, 2019. (Yuri Kadobnov/Pool Photo via AP, File)

The train’s most important feature, however, is security. According to South Korean media reports, North Korea has 90 special carriages in total and operates three trains in tandem when a leader is traveling — an advance train to check the rails, the train with the leader and his immediate entourage, and a third behind for everyone else. High-tech communication equipment and flat-screen TVs are installed so a leader can give orders and receive briefings.

In a sign of the trains’ symbolic importance, a life-size mock-up of one of the carriages is on permanent display at a mausoleum on the outskirts of Pyongyang where the embalmed bodies of Kim Jong Il and his state-founding father, Kim Il Sung, lie in state.

Kim, who is 39, has used his family’s armored train for previous meetings with Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and then-U.S. President Donald Trump in 2018 and 2019.

But he does sometimes fly, unlike his father. Schooled for several years in Switzerland, Kim Jong Un is believed to have traveled by air often as a teenager.

When he jetted off to the northeastern Chinese city of Dalian in 2018 to meet with Xi, it was the first time a North Korean leader had publicly gone abroad by air since Kim Il Sung’s flight to the Soviet Union in 1986.

Kim’s official plane is a remodeled version of the Soviet-made IL-62. North Korea calls it “Chammae-1,” named after the goshawk, North Korea’s national bird. South Korean media say the plane can carry about 200 people and its maximum range is about 9,200 kilometers (5,700 miles) but it has reportedly never flown that far.

Putin, for his part, now prefers to avoid airplanes and also travels on a special armored train since his decision to invade Ukraine in early 2022, according to Gleb Karakulov, a defector from Putin’s secretive elite security service.

Kim’s earlier meeting with Putin required a daylong trip that began at the North Korean capital of Pyongyang and chugged over the country’s aging railways along the eastern coast before crossing a river that serves as the border with Russia.

Some analysts are skeptical that another meeting would occur on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum because Kim and his predecessors have preferred stand-alone summitry when making rare trips abroad

In all, Kim went to China four times from 2018 to 2019 to meet Xi — two of them by train and two on his jet. In June 2018, he borrowed a Chinese plane to meet Trump in Singapore, reportedly because his jet was deemed unsafe. For another meeting with Trump in Hanoi, Vietnam, Kim took his train on the two-and-half day trip.

Since closing his country’s borders in early 2020 to guard against the COVID-19 pandemic, Kim hasn’t met any foreign leader.

Kim’s possible second trip to Russia could signal a restart of a summit-driven diplomacy and may be followed by a trip to China for a meeting with Xi, said Yang Moo-jin, president of the University of North Korean Studies in South Korea.

AP · September 6, 2023

9. A Renewed Axis: Growing Military Cooperation Between North Korea and Russia - Beyond Parallel

Limited options? Human rights up front, information campaign, and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea provide the foundation for a strategy.

Excerpts:

Limited Options

There are limits to what the U.S. can do in response to the new Russia-DPRK axis. But there are some policy options that Washington could consider. First, the United States can push the envelope in terms of the deliverables from the Camp David trilateral summit in August such as multi-domain trilateral exercises and enhanced information sharing. The United States can also expand missile warning sharing data arrangements with the ROK and Japan. Second, to counter and deter further ICBM launches by North Korea, Washington could declare that the US and its allies will not rule out neutralizing missiles in flight (particularly if they are not on a lofted trajectory) or on the launchpad. Third, Washington should list Russian entities and individual involved in any DPRK arms deals and seek similar sanctions from like-minded parties. Fourth, it should warn Beijing about neither participating nor condoning the Russia-DPRK axis. Fifth, it should continue to draw attention to Russia-DPRK cooperation at upcoming forums like UN General Assembly, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations this fall by downgrading intelligence for public consumption as part of the DNI transparency program.

A Renewed Axis: Growing Military Cooperation Between North Korea and Russia - Beyond Parallel

September 6, 2023, by Victor Cha and Ellen Kim

beyondparallel.csis.org · by Victor Cha · September 6, 2023

Key Findings

The White House’s acknowledgement this week of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s possible trip later this month to meet Russian president Vladimir Putin is only the latest evidence of a growing military alignment between North Korea and Russia.
Russia-North Korea cooperation may extend beyond conventional arms deals and food/energy assistance, possibly to advanced technology for satellites, nuclear-power submarines, and ballistic missiles.
A Russia-North Korea axis complicates the security picture both in Ukraine and on the Korean peninsula.
Even technical support by the Russian military to advance or modernize North Korea’s conventional forces could embolden Kim to adopt more coercive, even lethal use of force.
The United States and its allies have limited policy options in addressing this new challenge.

The White House’s acknowledgement of intelligence indicating a possible meeting between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok on September 10-13 to advance ongoing arms negotiations is only the latest evidence of a growing military alignment between the two countries.

Last week, the National Security Council announced that the two leaders had exchanged letters pledging to increase their bilateral cooperation and that the two countries were actively advancing negotiations to assist Russia’s war in Ukraine. U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, joined by her counterparts from Japan, South Korea and the United Kingdom, condemned such negotiations as a violation of UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea (UNSC 1874 and 2270).

In January 2023, the White House released satellite imagery of arms transfers from North Korea to the Wagner paramilitary group taking place at the Tumangang–Khasan railroad crossing on November 18 and 19 of last year. This was followed by the Treasury Department’s announcement of new sanctions in mid-August against three entities allegedly connected to arms deals between North Korea and Russia.

If Kim and Putin agree to enhance their military and strategic cooperation, including joint naval exercises with China (Russia allegedly proposed during its Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s visit to North Korea) and potential reactivation of the former Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, this will add a new dimension to traditional challenges presented by both foes to U.S. security both at home and abroad.

Transactional ties

Historically, North Korea’s interest in the Soviet Union/Russia was largely derivative of its policies toward China, using cooperation with Moscow as leverage in eliciting more assistance from China, or in lieu of Beijing’s assistance during certain periods in Chinese history (e.g., Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution). During the Sino-Soviet split, for example, North Korea played Moscow off Beijing, as Soviet leaders sought to pull the North’s allegiance away from China. North Korea also experiences acute abandonment anxieties when Moscow draws closer to Seoul or when U.S.-Russian or U.S.-China relations are stable. Russia-South Korean normalization in 1990, for example, realized the ultimate abandonment fear for the late North Korean leader Kim Jong-il as Moscow stopped providing energy assistance at discounted prices to Pyongyang. Russian interest in North Korea is equally transactional, but at the same time relatively consistent over the centuries.

Moscow has interest in warm water ports on the Korean peninsula for its Pacific Fleet and in energy and transport infrastructure projects that connect Northeast Asia to Siberia and the Eurasian land mass through the Korean peninsula.

Arms deals to support Putin’s war in Ukraine

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the precipitous downturn in U.S.-Russian relations even before the war is the permissive condition for a tightening of relations between Putin and Kim. Russia’s arms negotiations with North Korea reflects its growing international isolation and the deplorable state of its military industrial complex that cannot meet the needs of its own armed forces. Under heavy international sanctions, North Korea also needs food and energy assistance from Russia. Each side also views opportunities in the current context that complicates the security picture for the United States and its allies. The record of quiet but substantive expanding cooperation is clear.

For example, during the emergency special session of the UN General Assembly in response to the invasion in early March 2022, North Korea expressly defended Russia’s war in Ukraine and joined Russia, Belarus, Eritrea and Syria to veto the UN resolution that condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Four months later in July, North Korea recognized the independence of the two Russian-occupied states— Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s of Republic (LPR)—in eastern Ukraine and announced its plan to send workers to Donetsk after the country reopens the border. Russia also took actions in support of DPRK leveraging its position in the Security Council to block all UN-mandated punitive action in response to DPRK ballistic missile tests in 2022 and 2023. Russia joined North Korea in condemning military exercises by the U.S., the ROK, and Japan, calling them “provocative” and attesting that “Russia stands in the same trench with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s visit to North Korea in July 25-27, 2023, the first by a Russian Defense Minister since 1991, reflects a significant uptick in bilateral cooperation. Shoigu was the highest-ranking foreign official to attend North Korea’s “Victory Day” celebrations to mark the 70th anniversary of the Korean war armistice in spite of the COVID lockdown in North Korea. And North Korean leader Kim Jong-un provided unusually visible VIP treatment to Shoigu, including a one-on-one meeting and a personal tour of the military exhibition, announcing to state-run media that he would expand military cooperation with Moscow. In his letter to Kim, Putin vowed to increase political, economic, and security ties with North Korea and said that North Korea’s “firm support to the special military operation against Ukraine and its solidarity with Russia on key international issues highlight [their] common interests and determination to counter the policy of the Western group.”

Shoigu’s visit, moreover, came on the heels of growing activities in railway traffic across the Russo-North Korean border. CSIS Beyond Parallel exclusive satellite imagery analysis observed an increase in the number of iron ore, petroleum and food railcars at the Tumangang–Khasan railroad crossing between late November and mid-December 2022 (see Graph 1) shortly after the DPRK arms transfer to the Wagner Group in mid November (see images 1 and 2 below).

Graph 1: Number of box cars observed at Khasan and Tumangang in late 2022 after Wagner arms transfer. Ore cars were observed at Khasan, and oil/petroleum tank cars were seen at Tumangang. (Source: Beyond Parallel)

Possible missile cooperation

The extent of this growing alignment likely extends beyond one-off arms-for-food and energy deals to more robust missile cooperation that may help to explain the latest developments in DPRK ICBM capabilities. There are a number of reasons to suspect, using only open-source materials, that claims of such cooperation are more than speculative.

First, there is a long history of bilateral missile cooperation dating back to as early as the 1960s when the Soviet Union provided the V-75 Dvina (SA-2a Guideline) surface-to-air missile to North Korea, which eventually became the latter’s first missile system. The Soviet also transferred other types of missiles, such as S-2 Sopka (SSC-2b SAMLET) coastal-defense cruise missile and P-20 (SS-N-2 STYX) anti-ship missile and also gave technical training to North Korea on assembly and maintenance.

Second, North Korea’s ballistic missile and submarine launched ballistic missile programs have benefited significantly from Soviet technology. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, North Korea recruited many Russian scientists and engineers who helped advance the program. Some experts contend that development of missile systems like the Hwasong-12 IRBM and Hwasong-14 ICBM is based on a modified North Korean version of the Soviet RD-250 engine.

Third, it is challenging in the least to explain recent significant improvements in DPRK ICBM technology based solely on the North’s capabilities. Some experts contend that the successful launches of the Hwasong-18 ICBM on April 13 and July 12, 2023 show a striking resemblance to the Russian Topol-M, providing DPRK with solid propellant ICBMs with countermeasure deployment canisters. Although there has been debate over this assessment, these are capabilities that are hard to fathom the North Koreans’ demonstrating or deploying, certainly over such a short period of time, without outside help.

Finally, it is not by coincidence that a week after Shoigu’s visit to DPRK, Kim Jong-un visited major munitions factories, where he expressed satisfaction with the country’s capacity for the serial production of large-caliber artillery rockets and announced a drive to mass produce other capabilities such as engines for strategic cruise missiles and armed unmanned aerial vehicles.

The implications of the growing military alignment between North Korea and Russia for the U.S. are clear. The tactical advantage that each foe gains in expanding cooperation complicates U.S. efforts in the war in Ukraine. It is noteworthy in this regard that U.S. officials in condemning DPRK munitions transfers to Russia no longer downplay the supplies as trivial. It also complicates U.S. efforts at shoring up extended deterrence on the Korean peninsula with its South Korean ally as North Korea demonstrates increasingly more capable and potentially survivable ICBMs. In this regard, Putin may be trying to demonstrate that actions taken in Europe by the U.S. will have consequences not just in that theater but also in the Indo-Pacific detrimental to U.S. interests.

All in all, Russia may be the biggest enabler of North Korea today, even more so than China. The latter has not been supportive of the denuclearization agenda and has not helped to bring Pyongyang back to the negotiating table, given the state of U.S.-China relations. But Beijing reportedly has been opposed to North Korea conducting a seventh nuclear test. This stands in contrast to potential arms and missile deals with DPRK being negotiated by Moscow, which could transfer sensitive military technology that could accelerate North Korea’s military satellite, nuclear submarine, and ICBM programs. Any Russian technical support that could help advance or modernize the Korean People’s Army’s conventional forces are also an area of concern. According to the recent National Intelligence Estimate declassified by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Kim Jong-un could fully leverage his growing WMD capabilities to employ nuclear coercion strategies using conventional capabilities, even potentially the lethal use of force.

Limited Options

There are limits to what the U.S. can do in response to the new Russia-DPRK axis. But there are some policy options that Washington could consider. First, the United States can push the envelope in terms of the deliverables from the Camp David trilateral summit in August such as multi-domain trilateral exercises and enhanced information sharing. The United States can also expand missile warning sharing data arrangements with the ROK and Japan. Second, to counter and deter further ICBM launches by North Korea, Washington could declare that the US and its allies will not rule out neutralizing missiles in flight (particularly if they are not on a lofted trajectory) or on the launchpad. Third, Washington should list Russian entities and individual involved in any DPRK arms deals and seek similar sanctions from like-minded parties. Fourth, it should warn Beijing about neither participating nor condoning the Russia-DPRK axis. Fifth, it should continue to draw attention to Russia-DPRK cooperation at upcoming forums like UN General Assembly, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations this fall by downgrading intelligence for public consumption as part of the DNI transparency program.

Victor Cha is senior vice president for Asia and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Ellen Kim is deputy director and senior fellow at the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Headline image: Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images

beyondparallel.csis.org · by Victor Cha · September 6, 2023

10. North Korea publicly executes 9 people for running beef smuggling ring

An audience of 25,0000 for an execution? This is an indicator of Kim's fear of internal threats.

North Korea publicly executes 9 people for running beef smuggling ring

Authorities forced 25,000 residents to gather at the airport to watch them being shot by firing squad.

By Kim Jieun for RFA Korean

2023.09.05

rfa.org

A crowd of 25,000 people were forced to gather at the airport in Hyesan, North Korea, and made to watch the day’s spectacle: nine people executed by firing squad.

Their crime? Beef smuggling. The nine people operated an illegal beef distribution ring that bought and sold about 2,100 government-owned cows, slaughtered them, and distributed the meat to markets and businesses, including a restaurant in the capital Pyongyang, residents told Radio Free Asia.

“There were enough people witnessing the shooting scene to fill the whole mountain range,” a resident of Hyesan’s surrounding Ryanggang province told RFA Korean Aug. 30 on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

Prior to the execution, army representatives conducted an hour-long special military tribunal and disclosed details about each person’s crime, he said.

“After [that], the seven men and two women who were tied to wooden stakes were executed by military marksmen,” he said. “They were shot to death for killing and selling more than 2,100 state-owned cows from 2017 to February this year.”

The ring included the head of the Ryanggang province veterinary quarantine station, a salesperson at the provincial commercial management office, a farm official, a restaurant manager in Pyongyang, and a young college student who, while serving in the military, had manned a security checkpoint on the road into Pyongyang.

The crowd was surrounded by police, soldiers, and other security personnel and made to stay for the duration of the event, the resident said.

The execution caused another resident to have nightmares, she told RFA the next day.

“I kept thinking of the horrific scene of yesterday’s shooting, so I couldn’t sleep all night and trembled with fear,” she said.

Resurgence

Public executions are believed to have seen a resurgence in North Korea under the rule of Kim Jong Un, after a brief respite in the 2000s when the country was trying to soften its international image in the final years of his father Kim Jong Il’s rule.

Though there are no official statistics on public executions from the North Korean government, a 2021 report by the Seoul-based Transnational Justice Working Group interviewed more than 600 North Koreans who escaped to the South and determined that at least 27 public executions occurred between 2011, the year the younger Kim took power, and 2018.

RFA reported several more public executions since the period covered in the report.

Whenever there is a public execution, the government usually requires every able-bodied person in the surrounding area to attend.

Last Wednesday was no different, as factories, farms, and marketplaces in Hyesan were closed down, and “everyone between the ages of 17 and 60 who can walk,” were ordered to participate, the resident said.

Ruling by fear

During the tribunal before the execution, officials told the crowd that the ring was discovered in February when the soldiers who manned the security checkpoint into Pyongyang were discharged and new soldiers replaced them, the second resident said.

The smugglers had attempted to enter Pyongyang as usual and were caught by the new soldiers.

“In the judgment [against the ring], it was written that ‘cows are necessary for plowing fields and farming, but the culprits, by slaughtering them, hindered the country’s grain production and disrupted society,’” she said.

In a country plagued by chronic food shortages, authorities consider this to be a very serious crime, the second resident said.

“Prior to the public execution, the Special Military Tribunal of the Korean People’s Army said, ‘these criminals are treacherous, so there is no place to bury them in our country, whether in the sky or in the ground, and even extermination of three generations is not enough.’”

Translated by Claire Shinyoung Oh Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.

rfa.org

11. N. Korea unveils new 'tactical nuclear attack submarine'

To my untrained eye the KCNA photo at the link does not look authentic. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230908000653325?utm.

(3rd LD) N. Korea unveils new 'tactical nuclear attack submarine' | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · September 8, 2023

(ATTN: ADDS remarks by South Korean military official in paras 13-16)

By Yi Wonju

SEOUL, Sept. 8 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has launched a newly built "tactical nuclear attack submarine" capable of carrying out an underwater nuclear attack, with leader Kim Jong-un vowing to "further strengthen the state nuclear deterrence," the North's state media said Friday.

The launching ceremony for the submarine, held Wednesday, was attended by the North Korean leader ahead of the country's 75th founding anniversary, which falls on Saturday, according to the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

"The submarine-launching ceremony heralded the beginning of a new chapter for bolstering up the naval force of the DPRK and made clearer the steadfast will of the WPK and the government of the DPRK to further strengthen the state nuclear deterrence both in quality and quantity and by leaps and bounds for regional and global peace and security," the KCNA said, referring to the ruling Workers' Party (WPK).

DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

This photo, provided by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Sept. 8, 2023, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (2nd from L) attending a ceremony on Sept. 6 to launch a newly built "tactical nuclear attack submarine." (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

This photo, provided by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Sept. 8, 2023, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at a ceremony on Sept. 6 to celebrate the launch of a newly built "tactical nuclear attack submarine." (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Named the Hero Kim Kun Ok, the tactical nuclear attack submarine No. 841 -- the first of its kind -- will "perform its combat mission as one of the core underwater offensive means of the naval force" of the North.

"The fact that the nuclear attack submarine, considered a symbol of invasion against our republic for decades, now symbolizes our power that terrifies the shameless enemies and that it is a new attack submarine of our own style unseen by the world, is truly something welcomed by all our people," Kim said during his speech, hinting that the latest move was aimed at countering U.S. nuclear-powered submarines.

Calling it an "urgent task of the times" to arm the navy with nuclear weapons, Kim urged the swift transfer of "underwater and surface vessels equipped with tactical nuclear weapons" to the Navy.

He also announced the country's plans to build more submarines, including a nuclear-powered submarine.

"Today's launching ceremony will shoulder no less burden for our enemies than building a nuclear-powered submarine," Kim said.

He then stressed that the rapid development of the naval force is the "top priority" for national defense, given the geopolitical situation, as well as "recent aggressive attempts by the enemies."

Initial photos released by the KCNA suggest the latest submarine is equipped with ten missile tubes that can likely fire submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), though the reclusive North has not provided any details. A military source said the North appears to have modified a Romeo-class submarine, which is not capable of carrying an SLBM launcher.

The submarine is also presumed to be capable of launching the "Haeil," the North's first-ever nuclear-armed unmanned underwater vehicle unveiled last March.

This photo, provided by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Sept. 8, 2023, shows a newly built "tactical nuclear attack submarine" being launched on Sept. 6. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

An official in South Korea's military, however, raised questions about the capabilities of the North's new submarine.

"An analysis of the external features of the North Korean submarine so far shows that parts of it have been enlarged to carry a missile," an official at the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) told reporters.

"But it is assessed that (the submarine) is not in the form of being capable of normal operation," the official said, adding the military is looking into signs of the North's possible exaggeration.

The JCS official said the military has been tracking the North's building of the submarine in close coordination with the United States, adding Seoul and Washington will closely monitor additional activities and maintain a firm readiness posture based on the ability to overwhelmingly respond to provocations.

The ceremony comes as North Korea has been bolstering its military cooperation with Russia and China in the wake of growing trilateral security cooperation among Seoul, Washington and Tokyo. It also comes amid reports Kim may travel to Vladivostok, Russia, next week to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin and discuss a possible arms deal.

Seoul's spy agency earlier said Russia had proposed conducting three-way naval exercises with North Korea and China in late July.

This photo, provided by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Sept. 8, 2023, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un delivering a speech during a ceremony on Sept. 6 to celebrate the launch of a newly built "tactical nuclear attack submarine." (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · September 8, 2023

"Korean-style tactical nuclear attack submarine"

So is this just description verbiage from the Propaganda and Agitation department? Why the use of tactical? IS that to focus the threat locally in the region (Northeast Asia). Is it tactical and attack submarine in that it iss purpose is to attack other submarines or warships or commercial shipping (perhaps trying to use similar US terminology) or are they using "attack" for the purpose of attacking targets in the region with tactical nuclear weapons? Or the Propaganda And Agitation Department just giving us their usual word salad.

Great Event Heralding Arrival of New Era, Turning Point in Bolstering up Juche-based Naval Force Ceremony of Launching Newly-built Submarine Held with Splendor in Presence of Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un

https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1694124676-336895087/great-event-heralding-arrival-of-new-era-turning-point-in-bolstering-up-juche-based-naval-force-ceremony-of-launching-newly-built-submarine-held-with-splendor-in-presence-of-respected-comrade-kim-jon/

Date: 08/09/2023 | Source: KCNA.kp (En) | Read original version at source

Pyongyang, September 8 (KCNA) -- A new powerful entity has emerged to demonstrate the rapid development of the Juche-based naval force all over the world in the glorious journey of ushering in a new era of a great prosperous and powerful country with the world-renowned tremendous national defence capabilities, unprecedented in the nation-building history of the DPRK, under the outstanding leadership of the ever-victorious Workers' Party of Korea (WPK).

The heroic munitions industrial workers, scientists and technicians, boundlessly loyal to the revolutionary cause of the WPK, built a Korean-style tactical nuclear attack submarine and presented it as a gift to the motherland celebrating its 75th founding anniversary.

The submarine-launching ceremony heralded the beginning of a new chapter for bolstering up the naval force of the DPRK and made clearer the steadfast will of the WPK and the government of the DPRK to further strengthen the state nuclear deterrence both in quality and quantity and by leaps and bounds for regional and global peace and security.

The ceremony was splendidly held on Sept. 6 in the presence of Kim Jong Un , general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with attendance of leading officials of the Party, government and military, including Marshal Ri Pyong Chol, Marshal Pak Jong Chon, Premier of the Cabinet Kim Tok Hun and Admiral Kim Myong Sik, amid the great joy and excitement of commanding officers and seamen of the East Sea Fleet of the Navy and all the workers, scientists and technicians of the Pongdae Dockyard.

The venue of the ceremony was full of deep gratitude and reverence for the WPK, the great motherly Party, which has realized the long-cherished desire of the nation by leading the great development of the self-reliant defence industry, the revolutionary industry, to further strengthen the nuclear force representing the national prestige and honor and the absolute might of the Republic and consolidate the irreversible status of the country.

When the respected Comrade Kim Jong Un arrived at the submarine-launching venue, all the participants broke into enthusiastic cheers as a token of their admiration for the iron-willed brilliant commander and outstanding leader of the people who is paving a broad avenue toward great victory and prosperity with his world-famous matchless pluck and courage, ardent love and trust in the people, and tireless dedication to the building of a prosperous country with powerful army.

Amid the solemn playing of the national anthem of the DPRK, the guards of honor of the Navy of the Korean People's Army (KPA) slowly hoisted the national flag associated with the noble soul of the service personnel of the Navy who have fought to defend the vast sea of the country for more than 70 years, and symbolic of the eternal dignity and invincibility of the DPRK.

Then, Marshal Ri Pyong Chol conveyed the order of the Central Military Commission of the WPK on the transfer of the tactical nuclear attack submarine to the Navy of the KPA.

According to the order of the Central Military Commission of the WPK, the tactical nuclear attack submarine No. 841, the first of its kind, was transferred to the relevant submarine squadron under the East Sea Fleet of the KPA Navy and named the "Hero Kim Kun Ok".

Kim Jong Un conferred the transfer certificate on the commander of the submarine squadron under the East Sea Fleet of the Navy.

He made a meaningful speech congratulating the launching ceremony.

Saying that the submarine No. 841 " Hero Kim Kun Ok" to be launched today will perform its combat mission as one of core underwater offensive means of the naval force of the DPRK, he highly praised it as the first entity, produced by the noble ideal and peerless creation struggle of the WPK and its revolutionary industrial workers, in the great cause of building an advanced maritime power.

He noted that the Party Central Committee decided to make greater leaps forward in the shipbuilding industry of the country in order to substantially guarantee a new heyday of bolstering up the naval force. There is no room to step back in the drive for the expansion of the naval vessel-building industry as it is the top priority task to be fulfilled without fail, he said, clarifying the strategic and tactical plan to continuously enhance the modernity of underwater and surface forces and push forward with the nuclear weaponization of the Navy in the future, too.

When Kim Jong Un finished his congratulatory speech, all the participants broke into cheers of "Hurrah!" to express their ardent loyalty.

The scientists, technicians and workers of the Pongdae Submarine Factory extended deep thanks to Kim Jong Un who is ushering in a heyday of bolstering up the naval force, clearly indicating the orientation of the development of the Korean-style submarine industry and the way for developing new-type submarine.

Kim Jong Un had a photo session with senior officials of the Party and the government, leading commanding officers of the Navy and senior officials of the submarine factory in commemoration of the launch.

Marshal Ri Pyong Chol ordered the launching of the submarine after being informed by the manager of the factory that it was ready to be launched.

When the signal was given, the newly built submarine was launched amid the shower of confetti and release of balloons, reflecting the excitement and joy of all the participants witnessing the historical moment of epochal significance in bolstering up the naval force.

Kim Jong Un repeatedly praised the workers in the munitions industry, saying that thanks to the inexhaustible strength and enthusiasm resulting from the loyalty and patriotism displayed by them upholding the revolutionary defence-building policy with pure conscience, sense of obligation and devoted implementation, it was possible to demonstrate the might of the country once again ahead of the 75th founding anniversary of the Republic. He expressed belief that the officials and workers of the factory would continue to add glory to their great honor as the genuine patriots contributing to the development of the naval vessel-building industry in the new century and the front-line fighters defending the arsenal for the defence of the territorial waters.

On September 7, he inspected the tactical nuclear submarine "Hero Kim Kun Ok" preparing for a shakedown cruise.

A ceremony was hosted by the East Sea Fleet of the KPA Navy, to which the tactical nuclear attack submarine was assigned, to greet the Supreme Commander of the DPRK armed forces at the dock.

Kim Jong Un reviewed the honor colours of the East Sea Fleet of the KPA Navy and the guards of honor.

He was greeted by Admiral Kim Myong Sik, commander of the KPA Navy, Vice-Admiral Kim Chang Guk, political commissar of the KPA Navy, commanding officers of the East and West Sea Fleets of the KPA Navy and military and political officers of submarine squadrons.

He entered the tactical nuclear attack submarine to acquaint himself with its weapon system and underwater operation capability.

Saying that to arm the navy with nuclear weapons arises as an urgent task of the times and a crucial requirement for building the revolutionary armed forces, the fulfillment of which brooks no further delay, he stressed the need to enable the Navy to successfully carry out its strategic duty by hastening the transfer of underwater and surface vessels equipped with tactical nuclear weapons to the Navy.

He expressed expectation and belief that the officers and sailors of the submarine would become the model of the navy and the example to the whole army not only in the politico-ideological, spiritual and moral readiness but also in rounding off the preparations for a revolutionary war and continue to create new myth of the heroic navy in the van by firmly carrying forward the great sailor spirit of the preceding generations as befitting the ones of the submarine named after Hero Kim Kun Ok, the hero commanding officer of the first generation of the naval force of the Republic,.

He had a photo taken with all the sailors of the submarine with the submarine "Hero Kim Kun Ok" in the background.

All the commanding officers and sailors of the submarine "Hero Kim Kun Ok" made a firm pledge to demonstrate their bravery as death-defying seamen and strong fist of the navy, regarding as lifeblood of their destiny the boundless love and trust by the great brilliant commander who provided them with an invincible treasured sword capable of defeating any formidable enemy, prayed for their safe navigation and feats and indicated the ever-victorious route aboard the submarine.

The ceremony of launching a tactical nuclear attack submarine, held just before the 75th founding anniversary of the DPRK, will be etched in the history of the country as a historic event worthy of special note in the history of bolstering up the Juche-based naval force and the history of building the state nuclear force in the great era of Kim Jong Un , and as a significant occasion that solemnly declared the start of the advance toward the attainment of the grandiose goal for turning the country into an advanced maritime power. -0-

www.kcna.kp (Juche112.9.8.)

13.S. Korea, U.S. to hold talks on extended deterrence next week

S. Korea, U.S. to hold talks on extended deterrence next week | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · September 8, 2023

SEOUL, Sept. 8 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States plan to hold high-level talks on extended deterrence next week to discuss ways to better deal with evolving North Korean threats, according to Seoul's foreign and defense ministries Friday.

The fourth meeting of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG), a gathering of the two countries' vice ministerial defense and diplomatic officials, is scheduled to take place in Seoul on Sept. 15, they said.

Seoul's vice foreign and defense ministers, Chang Ho-jin and Shin Beom-chul, respectively, will lead the South Korean side, while the U.S. side will be headed by Bonnie Jenkins, under secretary of state for arms control and international security, and Sasha Baker, deputy undersecretary of defense for policy.

This file photo from Sept. 16, 2022, shows South Korea's vice defense minister and then vice foreign minister, Shin Beom-chul (R) and Cho Hyun-dong (2nd from R), respectively, as well as Colin Kahl (L), then U.S. undersecretary of defense for policy, and Bonnie Jenkins, U.S. under secretary of state for arms control and international security, at a session of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group in Washington, D.C. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

According to the ministries, the two sides plan to have comprehensive and in-depth discussions on policies and strategic cooperation to enhance their deterrence capabilities in the face of North Korea's increasingly advanced and overt nuclear and missile threats.

Extended deterrence refers to the U.S. commitment to use all its defense capabilities, including nuclear, to help defend its allies. The two sides held their first EDSCG meeting in 2017.

After the second meeting in 2018, the EDSCG was suspended due to the then liberal Moon Jae-in administration's push for an initiative to promote inter-Korean rapprochement and cooperation.

The reactivation of the EDSCG came after South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and his U.S. counterpart, Joe Biden, agreed on it during their summit in May of last year as part of joint efforts to address Pyongyang's growing nuclear and missile threats.

odissy@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · September 8, 2023

14. North Korea: Kim Jong Un reveals 'nuclear attack submarine'

North Korea: Kim Jong Un reveals 'nuclear attack submarine'

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-66747891

Published
1 hour ago

IMAGE SOURCE,REUTERS

Image caption,

Experts have cast doubts over whether the submarine can fire nuclear weapons

By Jean Mackenzie & Kathryn Armstrong

BBC News, in Seoul and London

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has held a ceremony to reveal a new submarine, which Pyongyang claims can launch nuclear weapons.

State media said the submarine strengthened the country's nuclear deterrent by "leaps and bounds".

It has been named Hero Kim Kun Ok after a North Korean naval officer and historical figure.

A nuclear-attack submarine has long been on the list of weapons North Korea wants to build.

In photographs released by state media, Mr Kim is seen standing in a shipyard, surrounded by naval officers, and overshadowed by an enormous black submarine.

He is quoted as saying that the sub will be one of the navy's main means of "underwater offensive."

IMAGE SOURCE,REUTERS

But there is some scepticism about how effective it will be.

Analysts believe it is a Soviet-era Romeo-class sub - the same that Mr Kim inspected in 2019 - but has been modified to carry nuclear weapons.

"As a platform, it will have some fundamental limitations and vulnerabilities," said Joseph Dempsey, a researcher at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

These include being noisy, slow and having limited range, according to Vann Van Diepen, a former US government weapons expert, who spoke to Reuters news agency.

What missiles has North Korea been testing?

We don't know if this submarine is operational. The North Koreans have yet to demonstrate it can successfully fire nuclear-capable missiles.

It is thought the vessel has been designed to carry shorter-range submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM), which are capable of striking regional targets.

South Korea has condemned the launch and questioned the sub's capabilities, saying the North may have exaggerated them.

Japan has also expressed unease. Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirokazu Matsuno said North Korea's military activity is "posing graver and more imminent threat to our country's security than before", according to Reuters.

IMAGE SOURCE,REUTERS

Mr Kim's regime has been working to develop this submarine for many years, and it is seen as a crucial part of his nuclear weapons programme.

Submarines are difficult to locate under water, meaning having one could allow Pyongyang to strike its enemies from the sea.

At the same time, North Korea has continued regular tests of ballistic and cruise missiles this year, following a significant increase in tests carried out in 2022.

The revelation of the submarine comes days ahead of the 75th anniversary of the North's founding. State media have said a Chinese delegation will be sent to participate in the celebrations.

It also follows reports that Mr Kim plans to travel to Russia this month to meet President Vladimir Putin.

There are concerns that in return, North Korea may seek advanced weapons technology from Moscow.

IMAGE SOURCE,REUTERS

Image caption,

Kim acknowledging the applause at the ceremony

15. Tipping Culture Comes to South Korea, and Backlash Is Fierce. ‘Wait, Is This America?’

Interesting cultural differences. I wish Korean soft power would spread their kind of culture in this area rather than vice versa.

Tipping Culture Comes to South Korea, and Backlash Is Fierce. ‘Wait, Is This America?’

A nation where people don’t usually tip grapples with gratuities

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/tipping-backlash-businesses-korea-e8a1ccf7

By Jiyoung Sohn

Sept. 7, 2023 9:01 pm ET

SEOUL—South Koreans adore U.S.-style cheeseburgers, bridal showers and sitcoms. But they have little affection for another American custom—tipping.

Like many people outside the Americas, South Koreans don’t customarily tip. The status quo faced an abrupt challenge recently, when the country’s version of

Uber added an option to give certain drivers an extra 75 cents to $1.50 per ride for higher-tier taxi selections.The backlash came swiftly, and many South Koreans couldn’t resist giving their 2 cents on the matter.

“For now, it begins as a favor,” one viral online post read, “but later it will come back as pressure.” Others engaged in a quasi-witch hunt—at times based on rumors—to find and shame any business asking for gratuities or displaying a tip jar.

“Wait, Is This America?” gasped one recent news headline.

Sohn Eun-ji, a 34-year-old who works in finance, can’t recall ever tipping in South Korea except for charitable donations. She would probably shun businesses that actively ask for extra. “Tipping hasn’t ever been a thing here,” she says, “and shouldn’t start now.”

South Korea has remained a tipless land with few exceptions, such as golf-course caddies and servers at fancy barbecue or seafood restaurants. Local laws require restaurants and other businesses to list their all-inclusive final price. Delivery drivers, who usually get paid by delivery apps, don’t expect an additional tip, rain or shine. Tossing a few bucks to most service workers—let alone locksmiths or medical personnel—would draw puzzled looks.

The U.S. is “most definitely an outlier on tipping,” says Sean Jung, a hospitality administration professor at Boston University, because doing so is expected and extends beyond restaurants.

South Korea is mired in a national conversation about tipping. PHOTO: JUNG YEON-JE/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Tipping is such a no-go across South Korea that even restaurant owners find the U.S.-style version of it off-putting. Nam Soog-ja runs a high-end Japanese restaurant in Seoul serving tuna sashimi. The venue is filled with private dining rooms where patrons, in a showy offering in front of fellow attendees, often hand servers 10,000 won, or about $8, at the start of the set-course meals.

The tip might ensure more attentive service, less time between courses or even an extra serving. Even so, Nam thinks that it would be wrong for her customers to feel obligated to pay a gratuity. “That’d make us uncomfortable,” she says.

Bar owner Kim Myung-kyu worries normalizing tips would drive down sales, since eating a lot would mean tipping a lot. “It doesn’t seem like it would be pleasant to a consumer,” he says. A tip jar? “Not a chance.”

South Korea hit a national tipping point on tipping last month. Kakao Mobility, the country’s largest taxi-hailing operator, had begun a pilot program offering a “thank you tip” of $1.50 or less as a way to motivate drivers to provide better service. Only riders using a higher-tiered service and leaving a five-star review at the end receive the tip prompt, says a company spokeswoman. She adds the feature’s fate has yet to be decided.

More than seven out of 10 South Koreans oppose taxi-tipping features, according to a recent poll by Seoul-based firm Opensurvey. Just one-sixth of respondents supported it.

Lee Dong-wook, shown with his son at Jeju Island, is pro-tipping by South Korean standards. PHOTO: LEE DONG-WOO

Public skepticism inspired news segments about the tipping slippery slope afflicting the U.S. Against dramatic background music befitting an election night, a news broadcaster appeared with her shirt sleeves rolled up. She held a pen and her notes and explained how “tipflation” had spread across America and how consumers were now being asked to pay extra even at self-checkout stations.

“Naturally, people are wondering why in the world is tipping culture coming here,” the broadcaster said.

As the nation looked inward, locals started probing and trading hot tips about places that may or may not have embraced tipping.

A burger place in Seoul offers a $1 “tip” menu item for online delivery orders. A coffee shop was rumored to have a U.S.-esque payment tablet that swivels toward customers with prompts for adding 5%, 10% or 15% tips, though online sleuths failed to confirm the actual location. One restaurant won praise for ditching tips for “compliment cards,” which then get factored into an employee’s compensation.

Until recently, one of South Korea’s most popular eateries had set out a glass tip jar next to the cash register. “Tips! if you liked London bagel Museum,” a Post-it note read—written in English.

Critics bombarded the company’s social-media pages and the tip jar disappeared within days. The owner told local media it was always voluntary and more of a decoration to give the shop an “exotic vibe,” as if visitors had traveled overseas.

On a recent afternoon, An Soo-jin, a 29-year-old office worker made a visit to the London Bagel Museum. She had seen news of the tip-jar backlash online. No matter, An says: “I wouldn’t have tipped anyway.”

Visiting her younger sister recently in Seoul, Stephanie Varela, 28, a sales associate from San Antonio, thought nothing of leaving a tablet-prompted tip of 15% for a coffee she bought at South Korea’s international airport. She later spotted a tip jar at a cafe in Seoul, though didn’t have enough cash on hand and had to skip. “Tipping comes so naturally to me,” she says.

Valeria Varela, left, with her sister Stephanie Varela at the Changgyeonggung Palace in Seoul PHOTO: STEPHANIE VARELA

That is no longer the case for her sister Valeria Varela, a 24-year-old teacher, who moved to Korea two years ago. Back then, she didn’t recall seeing any places soliciting tips. Now she sees them more often. “I think, ‘Wow, that’s strange that they’re adding tipping now,’ ” she says.

By South Korean standards, Lee Dong-wook is pro-tipping. The 41-year-old has shelled out as much as $40 for a tip at a restaurant serving premium Korean beef. Given the relatively low wages of most food-industry workers and taxi drivers, Lee, a photonics-technology researcher, would be fine if tipping became a cultural norm for that kind of work.

He draws the line pretty much everywhere else. “Why would anyone need to tip, when there isn’t any real form of serving involved?” he says.

Write to Jiyoung Sohn at jiyoung.sohn@wsj.com

16. After Camp David, bring S Korea into the Quad

Excerpts:

The tenor of Japan-ROK ties habitually fluctuate, but the Quad could bring structural support to the relationship. With the Spirit of Camp David, leaders in Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul took advantage of the current upswing in trilateral ties to proclaim their shared ambitions and collective purpose.

Adding the Quad’s comprehensive lines of effort to those objectives would enhance the trilateral’s scope and further cement its future. The Quad will not always be closed to new members, and in the meantime it ought to pursue relationships with like-minded partners that would support its goals.

Incorporating South Korea—even initially at the observer level—would lead to a more capable Quad, a more stable trilateral relationship, and ultimately, a more prosperous Indo-Pacific.

After Camp David, bring S Korea into the Quad

South Korea’s entry into strategic grouping would not only be a force multiplier but also a boon for US-Japan-ROK trilateral relations

asiatimes.com · by Joshua Fitt · September 8, 2023

On a warm August afternoon in Virginia, beneath a lush canopy of ash trees, President Joe Biden, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, and President Yoon Suk Yeol convened to show the world that their response to adversity is unity.

In contrast to the gridlock that has characterized the nadir in Japan-ROK relations since 2018, the Spirit of Camp David charts a course for the US-Japan-ROK trilateral relationship predicated on steadfast alignment in the face of unprecedented threats.

Among the summit’s initiatives is a plan to regularize trilateral ballistic missile defense and anti-submarine warfare exercises—a response to North Korea’s record-breaking tempo of provocative missile tests over the past year and a stark reminder of the stakes underpinning the trilateral relationship.

Considering the backdrop of a deteriorating security environment in the Indo-Pacific, this turning point is vital to the sustainability of the regional order. However, while the latest round of Japan-ROK rapprochement is promising, it remains fragile, and therefore the progress of the US-Japan-ROK trilateral could unravel, like after similar past breakthroughs.

Still, by articulating a common vision and actionable agenda, the United States, Japan, and South Korea are undeniably closer to escaping the well-trod cycle of previous decades.

To continue making progress toward a relationship that will survive the next resurgence in Japan-ROK bilateral tensions, additional efforts must both increase the political costs of regression and demonstrate to domestic populations that these relationships can be sources of strength and catalysts for prosperity.

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, US President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on a stroll during recent Camp David Summit. Image: Twitter / Screengrab

Fortunately, a complementary agenda with initiatives on preserving a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific already exists in the form of the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States).

South Korean integration into the Quad’s activities would provide a channel through which Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul can work together on concrete lines of effort, thereby reinforcing their relationship against bilateral turbulence.

Amid the increased volatility in the region, the resurrection of the Quad stands out as a momentous victory for stability. In a few short years, the Quad has emerged as a focal point of multilateral collaboration in the Indo-Pacific and a central pillar of the Biden administration’s regional strategy.

The Quad is a major force for good in the region: its promise is rooted in an ambitious agenda that aims to meet the needs of the Indo-Pacific through leveraging the comparative advantages of its members as liberal democracies.

That agenda has grown from the Quad’s origins in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the mid-2000s to its current state with working groups tackling a slate of issues, including cyber security, climate change, infrastructure, and critical and emerging technology.

While South Korea may not officially join the Quad in the near future, that should not preclude its involvement. During the Quad’s revitalization in 2020 and 2021, Japan-ROK tensions and former President Moon Jae-in’s indisposition toward the group understandably made South Korea’s participation a nonstarter.

Now that relations have improved and Yoon has expressed interest in certain working groups, the situation has changed. Nonetheless, the Quad countries have signaled their grouping will not expand its membership as it is still gaining momentum and defining its purpose.

However, after two years of building the lines of effort of its various working groups since its first leader-level summit, the Quad should soon begin to consider opportunities for partnerships and consultations on certain initiatives with highly capable like-minded countries such as South Korea.

To start, the Quad could invite Seoul to send observers to working group meetings. South Korea already engages bilaterally with Quad countries on many of the issues in the Quad’s portfolio.

Seoul’s financial resources, technical know-how, and positive reputation in the region would empower the Quad to scale up its activities and build a more compelling agenda, particularly in areas such as critical and emerging technology, where South Korea is already a world leader.

From Seoul’s perspective, the Quad is an opportunity to act on its Indo-Pacific foreign policy ambitions of increasing South Korea’s presence outside the Korean Peninsula, thereby transforming into a “global pivotal state.”

Considering South Korea’s position as a strong US ally, leading Indo-Pacific democracy, and technological powerhouse, South Korean involvement in the Quad would not only be a force multiplier for the grouping, but also a boon for the US-Japan-ROK trilateral relationship.

Incorporating South Korea into the region’s most promising democratic coalition would provide critical opportunities to rebuild the connective tissue of the US-Japan-ROK trilateral relationship that has atrophied over the past several years.

Through the Quad, Japanese and South Korean officials would have more opportunities to interact, exchange views and build personal ties in a constructive multilateral environment. Acting in concert upon their shared strategic interests would lay the foundation for a more cooperative bilateral partnership by increasing trust and fostering mutual understanding.

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force conducts Malabar 21 – an inter-nation exercise with the Indian Navy, US Navy and Royal Australian Navy – to improve tactical skills and further strengthen the Quad navies. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP / EyePress News

The tenor of Japan-ROK ties habitually fluctuate, but the Quad could bring structural support to the relationship. With the Spirit of Camp David, leaders in Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul took advantage of the current upswing in trilateral ties to proclaim their shared ambitions and collective purpose.

Adding the Quad’s comprehensive lines of effort to those objectives would enhance the trilateral’s scope and further cement its future. The Quad will not always be closed to new members, and in the meantime it ought to pursue relationships with like-minded partners that would support its goals.

Incorporating South Korea—even initially at the observer level—would lead to a more capable Quad, a more stable trilateral relationship, and ultimately, a more prosperous Indo-Pacific.

Joshua Fitt (jfitt@cnas.org) is an Associate Fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security.

This PacNet was developed as a part of the United States-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Next-Generation Leaders Dialogue to encourage creative thinking about how this vital partnership can be fostered. For the previous entries please click here, here, here, and here.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

asiatimes.com · by Joshua Fitt · September 8, 2023

17. N. Korea bolsters special police unit to guard against anti-state activities

The regime must live by the three C's: control, control, control.

We need to be observing for indicators of instability.

N. Korea bolsters special police unit to guard against anti-state activities

https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korea-bolsters-special-police-unit-guard-against-anti-state-activities/

“Their chief mission is deployment in operations to ensure the safety of the revolutionary leadership and protect the socialist system in times of war,” a source told Daily NK

By Seulkee Jang - 2023.09.08 10:00am

An armed mobile unit attached to the Ministry of Social Security made an appearance at the July 27 parade celebrating North Korea's victory in the Korean War. (YouTube video capture)

In the early months of this year, North Korea expanded the troop strength of an armed mobile unit attached to the Ministry of Social Security as part of intensifying efforts to guard against potential anti-state activities by the general public.

Speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons, a Daily NK source in North Korea said Tuesday that North Korean authorities completed work to bolster the manpower and weaponry of the Ministry of Social Security’s armed mobile unit in the first half of the year.

The ministry’s armed mobile unit has regular companies in each province, city and county. Some 80 to 120 personnel serve in each of the unit’s regular companies.

In addition to these regular companies, mixed tactical units with snipers and other specialized personnel are also attached to the unit.

Following recent changes in the organization of the ministry’s armed mobile unit, these mixed tactical units now operate helicopters, the source said.

Daily NK reported in June 2021 that North Korean authorities ordered the creation of helicopter units under the Ministry of Social Security in March 2021.

The order has led at least one Ministry of Social Security helicopter to be deployed to each region of North Korea.

At the time, the ministry ordered the new units to protect people’s lives during a disaster, putting down schemes and demonstrations by “impure elements” in times of emergency, participating in joint-operations with the military, and protecting “the leadership of the revolution” during periods the country is on wartime alert.

North Korea’s recent efforts to bolster the troop strength of the Ministry of Social Security’s armed mobile unit is being promoted as part of efforts to protect lives and property during disasters; however, in reality, the authorities are more worried about suppressing anti-state behavior by “impure elements.”

“Their chief mission is deployment in operations to ensure the safety of the revolutionary leadership and protect the socialist system in times of war,” the source told Daily NK.

The armed mobile unit is currently armed with live ammunition, handguns, automatic rifles, sniper rifles, machine guns, gas guns, blanks and shields.

Growing concern about internal rebellions?

Recent efforts to reinforce the troop strength of the Ministry of Social Security’s armed unit — along with the expansion of its duties beyond its original role of maintaining order to putting down demonstrations and “schemes” by “impure elements,” joint operations with the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and protecting the leadership — suggests that the North Korean leadership has growing concerns about internal rebellions.

The appointments of former KPA generals to the Ministry of Social Security since Kim Jong Un came to power in 2012 also suggests that the regime is focused on further militarizing the Ministry of Social Security’s forces.

For example, Ri Thae Sop, the current head of the Ministry of Social Security, used to be the head of the KPA’s General Staff Department.

Meanwhile, a column of armed officers with the Ministry of Social Security’s armed mobile unit appeared at the military parade for “Victory Day” celebrating the end of the Korean War on July 27.

When the military unit appeared on screen, Korea Central TV described them as “a file of soldiers with the iron will of a guardian who will mercilessly strike the evil plots of all the class enemies looking to harm the socialist system and one-hearted solidarity, which are more precious than even our own lives, with the red sword of the revolution.”

These remarks were more or less an open admission that the regime is enhancing the strength of the armed mobile unit to suppress anyone involved in anti-state activities.

Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Daily NK works with a network of sources who live inside North Korea, China and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous due to security concerns. More information about Daily NK’s reporting partner network and information gathering activities can be found on our FAQ page here.

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

18. [ANALYSIS] Concerns of Korea getting dragged into war in Taiwan are inflated

Yes and no. If there is a conflict in Taiwan, job one for the ROK and US forces in Korea is to continue to deter a north Korean attack. But if there is a war in Taiwan it will have global effects and South Korea will be unable to avoid those effects. The only way to mitigate those effects (they cannot be prevented) is through strong alliances and that is what President Yoon's efforts have focused on, correctly in my opinion.

[ANALYSIS] Concerns of Korea getting dragged into war in Taiwan are inflated

The Korea Times · September 8, 2023

Chinese military helicopters fly past Pingtan Island, one of Beijing's closest points from Taiwan, in Fujian province, ahead of massive military drills off Taiwan, in this Aug. 4, 2022 file photo. Experts recently told The Korea Times that a Seoul-Washington-Tokyo security deal signed at Camp David last month would not expose South Korea to a greater Taiwan war risk. AFP-Yonhap

Trilateral security pact does not make Seoul's involvement more likely, experts say

By Jung Min-ho

After a new Seoul-Washington-Tokyo security pact was sealed last month to reinforce cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, critics in South Korea claimed that the deal could expose their country to a greater risk of being drawn into a potential war over Taiwan ― a volatile superpower flashpoint.

At a recent meeting with officials of the opposition Democratic Party of Korea, Kim Do-gyun, former commander of the Capital Defense Command, said, with their stated commitment to unity, South Korea is now more likely to be embroiled in issues of potential armed conflict.

"It is very likely that the move, packaged as the trilateral security partnership against North Korean threats, aims largely at strengthening containment against China," he said.

Such views are shared by more than just a handful of politicians.

A poll released Wednesday shows that 44.8 percent of respondents said they believe the three-way deal would not be helpful for the security of their country.

That, however, is a weak argument, according to security and foreign relations experts. They said, with the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States already in place, South Korea would have to respond militarily regardless of the trilateral pact should US forces clash with those of China over Taiwan, a self-ruled island Beijing claims as its territory. Considering other risk factors before and after the possible outbreak of violence in that area, South Korea is safer, not less so, with the pact, they added.

"Please consider that the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty is a mutual defense treaty. My reading of that treaty says that even if the ROK (South Korea) decides not to send forces to assist Taiwan in a conflict, as soon as China attacks any U.S. military base in the Pacific, the ROK would have a responsibility to support the U.S.," said Bruce Bennett, a senior defense analyst at the Rand Corporation, a U.S. think tank.

The treaty states that in such cases, either party "would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

"Now some in the ROK may perceive that this is a weak requirement that the ROK might evade, but think how the American people would react if China attacks the U.S. Kadena Air Base in Japan and the ROK fails to support the United States after decades of U.S. support," Bennett said.

"It is of course the ROK choice whether or not to send forces to defend Taiwan, but a ROK failure to defend U.S. forces and civilians after a Chinese attack on U.S. facilities or the United States would, to me, imply a ROK abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty, and the Trilateral Summit has no effect on this bilateral ROK responsibility."

The addition of Japan to the already existing South Korea-U.S. security system would not hurt the core of that partnership, according to Sean King, senior vice president at Park Strategies, a New York-based advisory firm.

"Nothing discussed or signed at Camp David makes any potential South Korean wartime involvement more or less likely," he said. "President (Joe) Biden again reaffirmed America's extended deterrence commitment to South Korea at Camp David which is only good for the U.S.-ROK alliance long-term."

Asked about the prospect of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, experts said they think it is highly unlikely, given the stability brought about and supported by international security principles in the region, including the South Korea-U.S.-Japan pact.

"I think it is unlikely now. I think mutual deterrence is stable," said Daniel Pinkston, an East Asia expert at Troy University in South Korea.

"I think the trilateral statement is aimed at deterring Beijing from using force to resolve the Taiwan issue. So, this turns on what people believe about the credibility of that deterrent signal. I tend to view it as credible, so, I think the risk of conflict is lower than if the U.S. were to abandon its security commitments in the region and if trilateral security cooperation were absent."

President Yoon Suk Yeol, left, walks alongside U.S. President Joe Biden, center, and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida ahead of their trilateral summit at Camp David near Thurmont, Md., Aug. 18 (local time). Yonhap'

Japan's help is critical against North Korea'

For South Korea, one of the most important gains from the Camp David deal was a renewed, stronger partnership with Japan, which Bennett thinks will be essential if Pyongyang decides to invade South Korea ― a possibility that is, in his view, "at least as likely as a Chinese attack on Taiwan."

"I think it is being misunderstood because the ROK people don't understand that the United States cannot rapidly send a major military force to defend the ROK without substantial Japanese assistance," he said.

"And now that the ROK has reduced its Army from 560,000 active duty personnel to 360,000 over the last 20 years (and that number continues to fall), a rapid U.S. deployment is absolutely required."

There are many forms of military coordination where Japanese help could be critical against North Korea. In a hypothetical conflict, the North is expected to send many submarines and other naval combatants out into the East Sea.

"Even a few of those leaking south could force the closure or limited use of key ports in the ROK until the threat is eliminated (think of the insurance liability of the shipping companies alone). Japanese naval help will significantly reduce the damage that North Korea could do," Bennett said.

Japan's anti-missile system could also help by reducing the number of North Korean ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones that could effectively strike South Korea.

"Given that the North would arm at least some of these delivery means with nuclear weapons, the damage to the ROK could be significantly reduced with Japanese coordination," Bennett said.

It is true that the trilateral pact demands South Korea assume greater responsibilities in the regional security, experts said. But it is ultimately in its national interest as it depends on the stability and peace in where it belongs, they added.

"It is designed to make our collective defenses stronger," Bennett said. "No surprise that both China and North Korea strongly objected to the Trilateral Summit: They both want to be able to coerce the U.S., ROK and Japan and the Trilateral Summit undermines their ability to do so."

The Korea Times · September 8, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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