Quotes of the Day:

"Both optimists and pessimists contribute to society. The optimist invents the aeroplane, the pessimist invents the parachute.” 

- George Bernard Shaw

“There is no belief, however foolish, that will not gather its faithful adherents, who will defend it to the death.” 

-Isaac Asimov

“A truly great library contains something in it to offend everyone.” 

-Anonymous

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 26 (Putin's War)

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (26.09.22) CDS comments on key events

3. Ex-CIA officer says Putin is 'completely cornered' and the chances of his using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine are increasing 'by the day'

4. Col. Owen Ray may lose Special Forces tab, lawyer doxxed prosecutor’s kids ahead of trial

5. Verdict reached in trial of former JBLM colonel accused of beating wife, causing standoff

6. Sweden and Denmark probe leaks in Nord Stream gas pipelines

7. Western leaders blame 'deliberate' sabotage after Nordsteam pipeline

8. Israel: Cyber War with Iran is Unparalleled

9. Stop Second-Guessing Joe Biden on Taiwan

10. Ukraine Can Win This War

11. China’s Mistakes Can Be America’s Gain

12. Philippines to shut 175 offshore gambling firms, deport 40,000 Chinese workers

13. ‘Huge problem:’ Iranian drones pose new threat to Ukraine

14. #Reviewing The Inheritance (The Inheritance: America’s Military After Two Decades of War. Mara E. Karlin)

15. New US nuclear sub made for China, Russia war

16. AUKUS and Cyber Capabilities: Alignment of Concepts, Definitions, Capabilities, Norms and Doctrine

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 26 (Putin's War)

Maps/graphics: https://www.

16..org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26

Key Takeaways

• The Kremlin is attempting to message its way out of the reality of major problems in the execution of its “partial mobilization,” but its narratives are unlikely to placate Russians who can perceive the real mistakes all around them.
• The Kremlin’s planned annexation of occupied Ukraine may take place before or shortly after October 1, the start of Russia’s normal fall conscription cycle, to enable the forced conscription of Ukrainian civilians to fight against Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces continued to make advances north of Lyman and on the eastern bank of the Oskil River.
• Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) as part of the southern counter-offensive interdiction campaign.
• Russian forces continued conducting offensive operations around Bakhmut and west of Donetsk City.
• Russian forces continued to use Iranian-made drones to strike Ukrainian forces and cities in southern Ukraine.
• The Kremlin may be considering formally closing its borders or more formally restricting the movement of fighting-age men within the country to better implement partial mobilization.
• Russian occupation authorities began to announce that the results of their sham annexation referenda, citing flagrantly falsified turnout numbers.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 26

Sep 26, 2022 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 26

Kateryna Stepanenko, Katherine Lawlor, George Barros, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 26, 11:25 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The Kremlin is attempting to message its way out of the reality of major problems in the execution of its “partial mobilization,” but its narratives are unlikely to placate Russians who can perceive the real mistakes all around them. The Kremlin is deflecting blame for the Russian government’s failure to abide by its own stated criteria for mobilization and exemptions onto the failing bureaucratic institutions responsible for the mobilization. The Kremlin is downplaying the widespread violations of the mobilization law as individual errors of local authorities, claiming to correct these errors as citizens call attention to them. The violations are clearly too common to be merely the result of individual errors, however, and Russian citizens can see them all too clearly. Unlike Russian failures in Ukraine, which the Kremlin has been able to minimize or deflect because its citizens cannot see them directly, violations of the mobilization decree are evident to many Russians. Word of these violations does not even require access to media or social media, because they are occurring in so many locations and victims’ families can spread their anguish by word of mouth.

Russian state media has begun acknowledging social media complaints of persistent problems with the mobilization process, largely pinning the blame on the supposedly unmotivated and careless employees of the military recruitment centers.[1] Russian propagandists and heads of federal subjects are actively discussing instances of wrongful mobilization of men older than the maximum mobilizable age, those who had never served, and those who have medical conditions, as well as poor treatment of mobilized individuals. Omsk Oblast Governor Alexander Burkov declaimed that the bureaucracy is the “enemy of patriotism” and blamed bureaucrats for focusing on meeting unstated quotas rather than correctly fulfilling Russian President Vladimir Putin’s partial mobilization order.[2] One state television host threatened to punish workers of military recruitment centers if they fail to abide by the limited reservist mobilization order.[3] The Kremlin’s media outlets and voices are increasingly sharing individual stories in which military recruitment centers released some men who were unfit for service following the involvement of local officials or with the help of Kremlin state media to suggest that errors are being corrected when called to the Kremlin’s attention.[4]

The Kremlin faces a daunting task in trying to calm the Russian people while still mobilizing enough men to keep fighting. The Kremlin’s current narrative aims to assuage its distraught and panicking population with the promise of fixing and punishing bureaucratic institutions for widespread “mistakes” in the mobilization campaign, but such messaging is unlikely to solve the Kremlin’s problems. Putin will have to fix (or convincingly appear to fix) the mobilization bureaucracy sprawling across 11 time zones while simultaneously getting it to meet the mobilization quotas he has set for it to support the war effort. These imperatives are likely mutually exclusive in a short period of time. The Kremlin also risks further undermining this critical bureaucratic institution during an important period by continuously blaming it for failures that are likely not entirely of its making. Some Russians are already directing their anger onto enlistment officials; a man who opposed mobilization shot the head of the Ust-Ilimsk military recruitment office in Irkutsk Oblast on September 26.[5]

The Kremlin’s efforts to calm the Russian population are struggling so far, as protests occurred in at least 35 settlements on September 25 and at least 10 settlements on September 26.[6] Russian police continue to suppress protests, notably detaining several hundred women in Yakutsk, Republic of Sakha.[7] Russian police also fired warning shots at anti-mobilization protestors in Endirei, a village of approximately 7,900 people in the Republic of Dagestan.[8] Russians set Russian military enlistment centers on fire in Uryupinsk, Volgograd Oblast and Ruzaevka, Mordovia Republic.[9] A detained student also attempted to set on fire a building that had a military registration and enlistment office sign in St. Petersburg even though the building itself was not a military enlistment office.[10] Some mobilized men harmed themselves to protest the mobilization, with one Russian man setting himself on fire in Ryazan Oblast.[11]

The Kremlin is executing a declared reserve partial mobilization as if it were partial conscription, exacerbating societal discontent. A normal selective mobilization of reserves would have the government call up reservists based on lists of those who have military experience (the primary prerequisite for membership in Russia’s less-than-formal reserve system) and are in the correct age bracket. The Kremlin, as well as nationalist Russian milbloggers, have repeatedly claimed that military enlistment centers throughout Russia are doing just that—using such preexisting lists of known reservists to mobilize eligible men.[12] A Russian milblogger cited a Russian Ministry of Defense source on September 26, however, who claimed that all Russian citizens are responsible for pre-emptively providing documentation of their ineligibility for mobilization to the military recruitment centers.[13] If they do not provide documentation, they risk being mobilized. That process is standard for conscription, but unorthodox for an alleged selective mobilization of reserves. The Kremlin has most likely set quotas for local officials to fill and emphasized meeting those quotas over abiding by the legal guidelines for mobilization eligibility, leading to the prioritization of numbers over adherence to the law and thus to the forced mobilization of men with no military experience or with other disqualifying health conditions.

Even a competently executed call up of Russia’s reserves would be unlikely to generate significant combat power in Ukraine in the near term. Financially motivated MoD reforms that reduced the term of conscripts’ service from two years to one in 2008 mean that those conscripted since 2008 were not trained to a level of competence that would make them useful force-multipliers for Russia’s current efforts without considerable additional training.[14] The MoD does not appear to have taken steps to render these new recruits useful, however. Russian reports from a Russian training center in Sergeyevsky claimed that newly mobilized men wandered around the center without training, equipment, or officers for four days.[15]

The Kremlin’s planned annexation of occupied Ukraine may take place before or shortly after October 1, the start of Russia’s normal fall conscription cycle, to enable the forced conscription of Ukrainian civilians to fight against Ukraine. If it does, the Kremlin will likely order the Russian Ministry of Defense to include Ukrainian civilians in occupied and newly annexed Ukrainian territory in the Russian conscription cycle, broadening the forced mobilization of Ukrainian civilians to fight against Ukraine. ISW has previously assessed that one motivation for Putin to order mobilization and annexation in concert with one another is to broaden the forced mobilization of Ukrainian civilians, but those civilians do not meet the legal criteria for the Kremlin’s current partial mobilization order—almost none of them in the mobilizable age categories are likely to have experience in the Russian military.[16] As “Russian” citizens under Russian law, however, all Ukrainian men between 18 and 27 years old in annexed territories would become eligible for conscription.[17] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 26 that the Russian Ministry of Defense will build a branch of the Nakhimov Naval School in occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, demonstrating the extent to which the Russian military intends to embed itself in occupied Ukrainian territory.[18]

Russian officials have already mobilized Ukrainian citizens to fight against Ukraine. The Russian-appointed occupation governor of Russian-annexed Sevastopol, Mikhail Razvozhaev, claimed on September 25 that Russian authorities mobilized around 2,000 men in occupied Crimea and Sevastopol as part of Putin’s partial mobilization.[19] As ISW has previously reported, Russian occupation authorities have previously forcibly mobilized Ukrainian civilians from all occupied Ukrainian oblasts in smaller numbers.[20]

Russian authorities have already set conditions to mobilize Ukrainian men in larger numbers after annexation is formalized. The Ukrainian advisor to the Kherson Oblast Military Administration, Serhiy Khlan, reported on September 25 that Russian occupation authorities are not allowing men under 35 years old to leave occupied Kherson.[21] The Ukrainian mayor of occupied Melitopol, Ivan Fedorov, reported on September 26 that the Kremlin instructed the Russian Melitopol occupation administration to form a volunteer battalion of 3,000 members by October 10.[22] The Ukrainian head of the Luhansk Oblast Military Administration, Serhiy Haidai, reported on September 26 that Russian occupiers in Svatove, Luhansk Oblast issued mobilization orders to all men in the area and that Russian authorities in annexed Luhansk will similarly mobilize all Ukrainian men.[23]

Unconfirmed reports suggest Ukrainian forces may have destroyed a Russian drone control and training center that directed drone attacks against Ukraine, possibly killing Iranian trainers. Ukrainian journalist Andriiy Tsapienko claimed that Ukrainian forces avenged Russian drone attacks on Odesa by striking the Russian facility in Chulakivka on the Kinburn Spit of Kherson Oblast on September 26 and claimed that the Ukrainian strikes killed four dozen Russians and two dozen Iranian trainers teaching Russian forces how to use Iranian-made drones like the Shahed-136.[24] Russian forces have used Iranian-made Shahed-136 munitions to strike targets in Odesa in recent days, as ISW has previously reported. ISW cannot independently confirm Tsapienko’s reporting, and Ukrainian government sources did not report an attack on a drone command center. Ukraine’s Southern Operations Command reported on September 26 that Ukrainian forces conducted a strike on at least one ammunition warehouse in the Kinburn Spit but did not mention a drone center.[25] Ukraine’s Odesa Military Administration Spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk also confirmed on September 26 that Ukrainian forces attacked unspecified targets in the Kinburn Spit.[26] The spit is the westernmost land the Russians still control in the Black Sea within 4 km of Ukrainian-controlled Ochakiv at its closest point, making it an excellent location for a drone command center from which Russia could direct attacks deep into unoccupied Ukraine.

Key Takeaways

• The Kremlin is attempting to message its way out of the reality of major problems in the execution of its “partial mobilization,” but its narratives are unlikely to placate Russians who can perceive the real mistakes all around them.
• The Kremlin’s planned annexation of occupied Ukraine may take place before or shortly after October 1, the start of Russia’s normal fall conscription cycle, to enable the forced conscription of Ukrainian civilians to fight against Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces continued to make advances north of Lyman and on the eastern bank of the Oskil River.
• Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) as part of the southern counter-offensive interdiction campaign.
• Russian forces continued conducting offensive operations around Bakhmut and west of Donetsk City.
• Russian forces continued to use Iranian-made drones to strike Ukrainian forces and cities in southern Ukraine.
• The Kremlin may be considering formally closing its borders or more formally restricting the movement of fighting-age men within the country to better implement partial mobilization.
• Russian occupation authorities began to announce that the results of their sham annexation referenda, citing flagrantly falsified turnout numbers.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Counter-offensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counter-offensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Vovchansk-Kupyansk-Izyum-Lyman Line)

The Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kharkiv and northern Donetsk Oblasts continued to make gains near Lyman on September 25 and September 26. Ukrainian forces likely captured Maliivka, Kharkiv Oblast, (25 km northwest of Lyman) on September 25.[27] Several Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces captured Shandryholove (12 km northwest of Lyman), Karpivka (20 km northwest of Lyman), and Nove (19 km north of Lyman), in Donetsk Oblast on September 26.[28] Some Russian reports claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks on Shandryholove, though ISW cannot confirm these reports at this time.[29] Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces expanded the Ukrainian bridgehead north of Drobysheve and seek to encircle Russian forces in Lyman from the northwest via Nove, Stavky and Kolodyazi.[30] A Russian milblogger reported that Ukrainian forces are shelling Lyman itself with artillery.[31]

Russia likely reinforced the Vovchansk-Kupyansk-Izyum-Lyman with elements of the 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA). Russian sources reported that unspecified elements of the Russian 20th CAA and “individual subunits of other formations” are conducting defense in Lyman and that elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (of the 20th CAA) are defending the Oskil River and Svatove, Luhansk Oblast, against Ukrainian attacks.[32] Previous Russian descriptions of the Russian forces defending Lyman mentioned BARS detachments from the Russian Special Combat Army Reserve and notably did not mention elements of the 20th Combined Arms Army. The current strength and composition of these 20th Combined Arms Army elements are unclear.

Russian sources claimed Ukrainian forces continue conducting attacks north of Kupyansk across the Oskil River. Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces began to advance from Horobivka and Dvorichna in the direction of Tavil'zhanka (18 km northeast of Kupyansk) on September 25 and managed to establish an unspecified foothold near railroad tracks near Tavil'zhanka.[33]

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)

Ukrainian military officials maintained operational silence about the progress of Ukraine’s southern counter-offensive on September 25 and September 26. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces are mining areas of potential Ukrainian advances, which indicates that Russian forces are likely prioritizing maintaining defensive positions rather than attempting to resume offensive operations in the south.[34]

Ukrainian forces maintained their interdiction campaign, targeting Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) and key positions. Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces continued to target bridges and emerging alternative crossings over the Dnipro River.[35] Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian positions in Kherson City and reportedly struck an unspecified Rosgvardia target within the city.[36] Ukrainian and Russian sources also reported that a Ukrainian strike on a hotel in Kherson City killed a Ukrainian collaborator, Oleksiy Zhuravko.[37] Ukrainian officials and social media reports noted that Ukrainian forces struck a military convoy, shot down an Su-25 attack aircraft, and destroyed an ammunition warehouse and command post in Beryslav Raion.[38] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command also reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed ammunition depots in Bezimenne, Ternovi Posy, Kalynivka, and on the Kinburn Spit.[39]

Ukrainian and Russian sources identified three areas of kinetic activity: south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border, near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, and east of Mykolaiv City. Ukrainian and Russian forces exchanged claims of unsuccessful reconnaissance in force attempts in the area of Arkhanhelske, south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border and along the Inhulets River.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff also noted that Russian forces struck Ukrainian positions in Potomkyne and in Osokorkivka, while the Russian Defense Ministry also claimed that it struck a Ukrainian command post in Vysokopillya and positions in Osokorkivka.[41] The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that it successfully targeted Ukrainian forces in Bezimenne (around 13km southeast of the bridgehead) and destroyed Ukrainian UAVs over Davydiv Brid on the T2207 highway.[42] Geolocated footage showed Ukrainian forces dropping explosives on Russian military equipment in Davydiv Brid, however.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are continuing to target Ukrainian positions east of Mykolaiv City.[44]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast on September 26. A Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner elements entered the northern part of Otradivka (10 km south of Bakhmut along the T0513 highway) from the east and cut off Ukrainian forces’ access to the southern part of Otradivka.[45] Wagner elements reportedly continued attacks north on the Bakhmut-Mayorsk highway and took up positions in southern Zaitseve (8 km southeast of Bakhmut).[46] Russian forces may be planning to encircle or envelop Ukrainian positions in eastern Zaitseve from newly acquired positions in the Donbas power substation. Geolocated footage posted on September 26 also shows Russian forces launching ground attacks against Ukrainian positions along the railroad by Bilohorivka.[47] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults on Spirne, Soledar, Pidhorodne, Bakhmut, Vyimka, Kurdyumivka, Novomykhailivka, Pervomaiske, and Mayorsk on September 26.[48] Ukrainian forces had reportedly repelled Russian ground assaults on Soledar, Vyimka, Kurdyumivka, Zaitseve, Novomykhailivka, Pervomaiske, and Pavlivka on September 25.[49] Russian forces also conducted routine shelling along the line of contact in the vicinity of Bakhmut, Kramatorsk, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City on September 25 and 26, according to the Ukrainian General Staff.[50]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued to use Iranian-made drones to strike Ukrainian forces and cities in southern Ukraine on September 25 and 26. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces conducted two successful Shahed-136 drone attacks on September 26 against military infrastructure facilities in Odesa Oblast resulting in a large-scale detonation of weapons and a fire.[51] Social media reports purported to show several other Shahed-136 drone attacks on September 25 and September 26 in Tairove, Vapniarka, Kotovske, Fontanka, Zatoka, and Bilenke in Odesa Oblast.[52] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces conducted Shahed-136 drone attacks on September 25 against the oblast administrative building in Odesa City, but Russian sources claimed striking Southern Operational Command Headquarters.[53] Ukrainian sources announced that Ukrainian air defenses shot down several Shahed-136 drones involved in potential attacks on September 25 and 26 in Odesa and Mykolaiv Oblasts.[54]

Russian forces continued shelling and missile attacks throughout the Southern Axis on September 25 and 26. Russian forces conducted anti-aircraft missile strikes against Ochakiv and Mykolaiv City according to Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command.[55] Mykolaiv Oblast officials also reported that Russian forces continued routine shelling of Mykolaiv Oblast on September 26.[56] Russian forces also conducted missile strikes against Marhanets, Musiivka, and Nikopol on September 26, and fired Grad MLRS and tube artillery at Marhanets and Chervonohryhorivska hromadas (territorial communities) on the night of September 24­­­–25.[57] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces launched missile strikes against Zaporizhia City.[58]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin may be considering formally closing its borders or more formally restricting the movement of fighting-age men within the country to better implement partial mobilization. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed on September 26 that there are no restrictions on Russian citizens’ movement due to mobilization orders.[59] However, Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on September 26 that border officials are telling Russian men who try to leave the country that they must provide a certificate from a military enlistment office declaring their ineligibility for partial mobilization.[60] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that “no decisions have been made for now” when asked about closing the Russian border or declaring martial law in some Russian regions.[61]

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on September 26 that the map of Russian servicemembers killed in Ukraine so far disproportionality draws from poor, majority-minority regions than from more developed, wealthier, and ethnically Russian majority regions.[62] The GUR predicted that the Kremlin intends to shift the focus of mobilization efforts away from ethnically non-Russian republics and regions toward more central regions of Russia.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Russian occupation authorities began to announce that the results of their sham annexation referenda are valid on September 26, a day before “voting” was scheduled to end, citing flagrantly falsified turnout numbers. Russian state media reported on September 26 that all the referenda in Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk are already valid because each allegedly reached over 50% participation.[63] Russian officials have yet to clarify whether their falsified participation numbers are supposed to reflect percentages of the pre-war population of the claimed oblasts or just of current residents of Russian-controlled parts of the oblasts. Kherson Occupation Administration Head Vladimir Saldo claimed on September 25 that the votes already cast are “enough for a positive [pro-Russia] outcome of the referendum” but that occupation authorities would keep polling stations open until September 27.”[64] Russian state media reported turnout of 86.89% in Donetsk, 83.61% in Luhansk, 63.58% in Kherson, and 66.43% in Zaporizhia on September 26.[65]

Turnout even in a free and fair referendum, rather than the Kremlin’s sham plebiscite, would almost certainly be much lower. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine displaced 12.8 million people, over 25% of Ukraine’s population, between February and May 2022, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.[66] Most of those displaced are from the south and east, where the sham referenda are taking place. And even in peacetime, Ukrainians do not turn out to vote at rates as high as what Russian occupation officials are reporting; the first round of Ukraine’s 2019 presidential election saw only a 62.8% turnout.[67] The Ukrainian head of Luhansk Oblast, Serhiy Haidai, reported on September 25 that Russian occupation authorities are releasing turnout percentages rather than numbers of votes because they do not know how many people remain in occupied parts of Ukraine.[68] Haidai noted that occupation authorities were reporting high turnouts for towns that the war has almost completely depopulated.

Russian occupation officials are likely using door-to-door “polling” to identify potential future dissidents and partisans. Haidai reported on September 26 that Russian occupation officials are reading the ballots of voters and making note of those who vote against the Russian annexation of Luhansk.[69] Haidai reported that occupation authorities are circulating rumors that they are arresting those who vote no to deter additional dissenting votes.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://rutube.ru/video/ebc732c10a8628d7c825a8dafd065856/; https://rutu... ru/video/419bea0e66667bc5341466a18e93c36c/; https://rutube dot ru/video/9cc96ebb976b6b5559fb019cea5f7525/; https://rutube dot ru/video/132f11bb455991879badb5ed1e369588/; https://smotrim dot ru/video/2484208

[2] https://rutube dot ru/video/132f11bb455991879badb5ed1e369588/

[3] https://smotrim dot ru/video/2484208

[5] https://theinsdotru/en/news/255417; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/11897; ...(dot) io/feature/2022/09/26/v-irkutskoy-oblasti-mestnyy-zhitel-otkryl-strelbu-v-voenkomate-voenkom-nahoditsya-v-reanimatsii; https://t.me/readovkanews/42537

[6] https://ovd dot news/news/2022/09/24/spiski-zaderzhannyh-v-svyazi-s-akciyami-protiv-mobilizacii-24-sentyabrya-0; https://ovd dot news/news/2022/09/25/spiski-zaderzhannyh-v-svyazi-s-akciyami-protiv-mobilizacii-25-sentyabrya

[10] https://www(dot)fontanka.ru/2022/09/26/71684129/

[11] https://meduza(dot)io/news/2022/09/26/v-ryazani-muzhchina-podzheg-sebya-na-tsentralnom-avtovokzale-po-slovam-ochevidtsa-on-krichal-chto-ne-hochet-na-voynu-v-ukraine; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1574323058692816897

[27] https://mobile.twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1573926903534198787; https://t.me/volodymyrzolkin/4137; https://real-vin dot com/vsu-osvobodili-malievku-i-zahvatili-v-plen-treh-tankistov-vs-rf; https://mobile.twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1573693638877519873

[60] https://meduza dot io/news/2022/09/26/minoborony-rf-zayavilo-chto-mobilizatsiya-ne-predusmatrivaet-ogranicheniy-na-peredvizhenie-grazhdan-no-pogranichniki-uzhe-nachali-otkazyvat-rossiyanam-v-vyezde

[61] https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2022/09/26/kremlin-admits-call-up-errors-but-no-decision-to-close-border-a78891

[65] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/15876837

understandingwar.org

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (26.09.22) CDS comments on key events

CDS Daily brief (26.09.22) CDS comments on key events

Humanitarian aspect:

About 1.5 million Ukrainians, primarily women and children are currently in Russia and cannot return home. Their relatives cannot get in touch with them, Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Olga Stefanishyna said during an event on the sidelines of UNGA. Stefanishyna added that now more than ever, it is important to use all international human rights protection instruments and redouble efforts to prevent the forceful exploitation of Ukrainians.

On the evening of September 26, the Russian army attacked Kryvyi Rih, the head of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Valentyn Reznichenko reported. "The Russians hit the airport with an X-59 missile. Its infrastructure was destroyed," Reznichenko wrote. No people were injured during the attack.

On the night of September 26, Russian troops fired 130 shells at four communities in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, namely Nikopol, Marhanets, Chervonhrigoriv, and Myriv. As a result, civilian objects and power lines were damaged, leaving 3000 families without electricity.

On September 26, from 04:50, the enemy attacked Ochakiv, Mykolayiv Oblast. Head of Mykolayiv Oblast Military Administration Vitaliy Kim said there were no casualties. Around 01:00, the Russian forces shelled the village of Khrystoforivka; more than 15 houses and a school were damaged. Again, there were no victims, according to preliminary reports.

As a result of a kamikaze drone attack on a military target in Odesa, a large-scale fire and the detonation of ammunition took place. The evacuation of the civilian population was organized. There were no casualties. Odesa was again attacked in the evening.

As a result of the Russian shelling, 3 civilians were killed and 11 wounded in Donetsk Oblast on September 25.

On Monday, September 26, Russian forces shelled the center of Kramatorsk in Donetsk Oblast, Kramatorsk Mayor Oleksandr Honcharenko said. High-rise buildings and a square were damaged. 4 people were injured, and one person is in serious condition.

During September 25, the Russian forces shelled Kupyanskyi, Chuguyivskyi, Izyumskyi, Kharkivskyi, and Bohodukhivskyi districts of Kharkiv Oblast. According to the regional Center for Emergency Medical Assistance, 6 people were hospitalized during the day.

Around 2 p.m., the Russian forces launched a rocket attack on Pervomaisky, Kharkiv Oblast, two private houses were damaged, and 7 people, including a 15-year-old girl, were killed, Mayor of the city Mykola Baksheev reported.

In the village of Lyptsi, Kharkiv Oblast, the security service of Ukraine discovered a location where representatives of the so-called "people's militia of the LPR" and the Russian military kept and tortured local residents who refused to cooperate with the occupying authorities and then forcibly took them to Russia. Investigation to identify all victims and torturers continues.

On September 26, the electricity supply was restored in the recently liberated Balakliya, Kharkiv Oblast. Izyum is next to be connected to the power supply, Deputy Head of the Presidential Office Kyrylo Tymoshenko said. Administrative and banking services, local self-government, etc. will be able to work effectively.

According to EWL Group's survey of Ukrainian refugees in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Romania, most of those who fled the war to these countries plan to return to Ukraine. In particular, 58% of Ukrainians in Poland say they intend to return to Ukraine. Another 30% are going to stay in Poland for a longer period, and 12% want to move to other countries. In the Czech Republic, 56% of respondents say they intend to return to Ukraine. 24% intend to stay in the Czech Republic longer, and 20% plan to leave for another country. In Romania, the percentage of those who plan to return is 54%, 28% intend to stay in Romania for the time being, and another 18% intend to leave for another country, Evropeyska Pravda reported.

Occupied territories

According to Ivan Fedorov, the legally elected Ukrainian Mayor of temporarily occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhzhya Oblast, due to the catastrophically low turnout of "voters," members of the occupation "voting commissions" began making repeated door-to-door rounds. The small number of residents of the city, who opened their doors to impostors, are forced to vote for absent family members and neighbors as well as those who evacuated from the occupation.

The head of the Russian occupying administration in Zaporizhzhya Oblast said that once the sham referenda in the occupied territories are done, their residents will be drafted into the Russian army. He claimed it was going to be a "volunteer" battalion.

More than 2,000 former Ukrainian military servicemen from the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol were mobilized into the Russian Armed Forces, Rear Admiral Vyacheslav Rodionov, Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet for Military-Political Work, said.

Operational situation

It is the 215th day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to protect Donbas").

The enemy continues to concentrate its efforts on establishing full control over the territory of Donetsk Oblast, maintaining control over the captured territories, and disrupting the intensive actions of the Ukrainian troops in certain directions. It fires at the positions of the Ukrainian troops along the contact line, tries to recapture lost positions, and continuously conducts aerial

reconnaissance. It inflicts strikes on civilian infrastructure and peaceful residential buildings, violating the norms of international humanitarian law, the laws, and customs of war.

The threat of Russian air and missile strikes persists throughout the entire territory of Ukraine. Thus, the Russian military has launched 5 missile and 12 air strikes over the past day and carried out more than 83 MLRS attacks. The Russin forces employed 4 assault UAVs for strikes on civilian infrastructure targets.

More than 40 Ukrainian towns and villages were affected by the Russian fire, in particular, Kupyansk, Kramatorsk, Bakhmut, Krasnohorivka, Maryinka, Kamianka, Kurakhove, Pavlivka, Zaporizhzhya, Nikopol, Ochakiv, Mykolaiv, and Odesa, the village of Oleksandrivka located near the state border was shelled in Sumy Oblast.

The partial mobilization, announced by the Russian military-political leadership, is continuing in the Russian Federation. Rostov Oblast is closed for entry and exit. Persons who are not found at their residence are ordered via their relatives to appear within three days. Personnel arriving at assembly points in Belgorod Oblast are given a list of what they need to purchase at their own expense, in particular warm clothing.

The Russian authorities are carrying out similar measures in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. On September 24, the training of mobilized soldiers began in Sevastopol, based on the automobile battalion of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

In the city of Svatove, Luhansk Oblast, mobilization notices are handed out to persons who have reached the age of eighteen. Truck drivers are immediately sent to military units.

Aviation of the Ukrainian Defense Forces carried out 33 strikes. As a result, it was confirmed that 25 areas of the Russian manpower and military equipment concentration and 8 anti-aircraft missile systems positions were hit. In addition, Ukrainian Air Defense units destroyed one Su-25 aircraft, a Mi-8 helicopter, and 2 Russian UAVs.

Ukrainian Missile forces and artillery have inflicted fire damage on 6 enemy command and control points, 12 personnel and military equipment concentration areas, 2 air defense positions, 3 artillery positions, 6 ammunition depots, and 9 other important targets.

The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remain low. Kharkiv direction

• Zolochiv-Balakleya section: approximate length of combat line - 147 km, number of BTGs of the

RF Armed Forces - 10-12, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 13.3 km;

• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd, and 197th tank regiments, 245th motorized rifle regiment of the 47th tank division, 6th and 239th tank regiments, 228th motorized rifle regiment of the 90th tank division, 1st motorized rifle regiment, 1st tank regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 6th Combined Arms Army, 27th

separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Tank Army, 275th and 280th motorized rifle regiments, 11th tank regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division of the 11 Army Corps, 7th motorized rifle regiment of the 11th Army Corps, 80th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps, 2nd and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 1st Army Corps of so-called DPR, PMCs.

The Russian military fired tanks, mortars, and barrel artillery in the areas around Strilecha, Odnorobivka, Veterynarne, Hatyshche, Kam'yanka, Holubivka, and Senkove.

Kramatorsk direction

● Balakleya - Siversk section: approximate length of the combat line - 184 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17-20, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;

● 252nd and 752nd motorized rifle regiments of the 3rd motorized rifle division, 1st, 13th, and 12th tank regiments, 423rd motorized rifle regiment of the 4th tank division, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, 35th, 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 3rd and 14th separate SOF brigades, 2nd and 4th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Army Corps, 7th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Army Corps, PMCs.

The Russian forces shelled the Ukrainian Defense Forces with tanks, mortars, barrel and jet artillery in the areas of Novoselivka, Shchurovka, Siversk, Hryhorivka, Bilohorivka, Zakytne, Dibrova, Verkhnokamyanske, Vesele, Rozdolivka, Ozerne, and Spirne.

The Russian military attacked (with the forces of the 4th separated motorized rifle division of the 2nd Army Corps) in the direction of Verkhnokamyanske, Spirne. Still, units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled all attacks.

The Russian military is regrouping and moving part of its forces to new prepared defense lines: from Starobilsk (Luhansk Oblast) in the direction of Svatove and from Pankivka (Luhansk Oblast) in the direction of Starobilsk.

The enemy deployed a Buk-M2 anti-aircraft missile system in the Baranikyvka area (Luhansk Oblast) to cover the rear areas of troop concentration.

Donetsk direction

● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 235 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 17 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th tank regiment of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th, and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet," 336th separate marines brigade, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army

Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The Russian military fired at the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces near Soledar, Bakhmut, Bakhmutske, Odradivka, Zaitseve, Klishchivka, Vesela Dolyna, Yakovlivka, Mayorsk, Nelipovka, Vyimka, Bilohorivka, Avdiivka, Opytne, Pervomaiske, Novomykhailivka, and Paraskoviivka. They carried out airstrikes on the targets in Krasnohorivka (with a pair of Mi-8s), Maryinka (with a pair of Su-25s), and Kamianka (with a pair of Ka-52s).

Units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled Russian attacks in the areas of Soledar, Mayorsk, Bakhmut, Pidhorodne, Vyimka, Kurdyumivka, Zaitseve, Novomykhailivka, Pervomaiske, Kamianka, Pobyeda, and Pavlivka.

The Russian military carried out the following attacks:

•      the 7th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 2nd Army Corps – Striapivka, Soledar;

•      the 131st rifle battalion of the mobilization reserve – Zaitseve (lower), Mayorsk;

•      PMC "Wagner" - Pokrovske, Bakhmut; Klynove, Pidhorodnie;

•      the 9th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps in the directions of Verkhnotoretske, Kamianka;

•      the 71st motorized rifle regiment of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army of the Southern Military District - Luhansk, Pobyeda.

The Ukrainian Defense Forces repulsed all attacks.

The Russian military plans to strengthen the grouping of its troops in the Donetsk operational area. The transfer of the BTG of the 71st motorized rifle regiment (Kalinovska) of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army of the Southern Military District from the permanent dislocation to the Rostov Oblast (Taganrog district) is planned for September 25.

Zaporizhzhya direction

● Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 29th Combined Arms Army, 38th and 64th separate motorized rifle brigades, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37 separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 136th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps, 39th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 68th Army Corps, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, and 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The Russian military fired at the positions of the Ukrainian troops with tanks, mortars, and barrel and jet artillery. 18 towns and villages were hit in the areas under the shelling, including Yehorivka, Pavlivka, Zaliznychne, Novoandriivka, Hulyaipilske, Hulyaipole, Uspenivka, Novosilka, Vremivka, and Chervone.

The Russian military advanced in the direction of Yehorivka and Pavlivka (employing the forces of the 155th separate marines brigade of the Pacific Fleet). Still, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repulsed the attack.

The deployment of the command post of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th combined armed army of the Southern Military District on PJSC "Tokmak Forging and Stamping Plant" territory has been confirmed.

Kherson direction

● Vasylivka–Nova Zburyivka and Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line - 252 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 27, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.3 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 114th, 143rd, and 394th motorized rifle regiments, 218th tank regiment of the 127th motorized rifle division of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 57th and 60th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division, 51st and 137th parachute airborne regiments of the 106th parachute airborne division, 7th military base of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 16th and 346th separate SOF brigades.

There is no change in the operational situation. A precise hit [by Ukrainian Forces] on September 24 at the Russian equipment concentration area in the industrial zone of Kherson was confirmed. The Russian military lost up to 10 units of military equipment; personnel losses are being calculated.

On September 24, a group of representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, accompanied by guards and representatives of the Russian FSB, arrived in the Chulakivka district of Kherson Oblast. They inspect and coordinate the Iranian UAV launches by the Russian occupiers. According to preliminary data, the Iranian specialists settled in houses on Melnichenko street and Pershoho Travnya street.

The enemy moved 12 additional boats for towing ferries to Kherson Oblast to support the functioning of the temporary pontoon and pontoon-ferry crossings across the Dnipro River.

Kherson-Berislav bridgehead

● Velyka Lepetikha – Oleksandrivka section: approximate length of the battle line – 250 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces – 22, the average width of the combat area of one BTG –

11.8 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 108th Air assault regiment, 171st separate airborne assault brigade of the 7th Air assault division, 4th military base of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 429th motorized rifle regiment of the 19th motorized rifle division, 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments of the 20th motorized rifle division, 34th, and 205th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 224th, 237th and 239th Air assault regiments of the 76th Air assault division, 217th and 331 Air assault regiments of the 98th Air assault division, 126th separate coastal defense brigade, 127th separate ranger brigade, 11th separate airborne assault brigade, 10th separate SOF brigade, PMC.

The Russian military shelled the positions of the Ukrainian troops with tanks, mortars, barrel and jet artillery in the areas of Ukrainka, Pravdyne, Oleksandrivka, Stepova Dolyna, Myrne, Novohryhorivka, Partyzanske, Shyroke, Kyselivka, Kobzartsi, Blahodativka, Bereznehuvate, Mala Seideminukha, Bila Krynytsia, Bilohirka, Sukhy Stavok, Kavkaz, Bezymenne, Odesa, Bilyaivka, Olhyne, Osokorivka, Vysokopillya, Ivanivka, Petrivka, Trudolyubivka, Novovoznesenske. They struck the headquarters of the "South" (Odesa) military command center with four "Shahed-136" UAVs (three hit the headquarters building, one was shot down by air defense. There are no losses on the Ukrainian side).

Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:

The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the sea and connect unrecognized Transnistria with the Russian Federation by land through the coast of the Black and Azov seas.

Currently, there are 15 enemy warships at sea providing reconnaissance and blocking shipping in the Azov-Black Sea water basin. Up to 28 Kalibr missiles on four carriers, namely two 1135.6 frigates and two Buyan-M missile corvettes, are ready for a salvo.

All 4 submarines of project 636.3 that are currently in the Black Sea are at the port of Novorossiysk.

Russian aviation continues to fly from the Crimean airfields of Belbek and Hvardiyske over the northwestern part of the Black Sea. Over the past day, 12 Su-27, Su-30, and Su-24 aircraft from Belbek and Saki airfields were involved.

No signs of the formation of amphibious groups for the landing of marine landings were detected.

The Russian forces continue to carry out intensive missile and artillery, and air strikes on the objects of the civil and military infrastructure of the seaports of Ukraine.

The Russian military continues to use "Shahid-136" kamikaze drones in the maritime zone of Ukraine. The launch site for the drones on the Kinburn spit has been identified. Kamikaze drones are launched from car trailers, up to 8-10 units from one trailer. On the morning of September 26, two Shahid-136 drones hit a military administrative building in downtown Odessa.

"Grain initiative": 4 ships with 88.17 thousand tons of agricultural products for the countries of Asia and Europe left the ports of "Odesa" and "Pivdenny."

MAINLAND, NEW FAITH, USICHEM left the berths of Odesa port. KATERIA departed from the "Pivdenny" port. Since the departure of the first ship with Ukrainian food, including today's ships,

4.9 million tons of agricultural products have been exported. A total of 222 ships left Ukrainian ports with agricultural products that were sent to the countries of Asia, Europe, and Africa.

Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 26.09

Personnel - almost 57,200 people (+500);

Tanks – 2,290 (+15);

Armored combat vehicles – 4,857 (+25);

Artillery systems – 1,369 (+1);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 330 (+2); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 172 (+1); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 3,711 (+10); Aircraft - 260 (+1);

Helicopters – 224 (+4);

UAV operational and tactical level - 970 (+4); Intercepted cruise missiles - 241 (0);

Boats / ships - 15 (0).

Ukraine, general news

Since the "Business Relocation" program launch in Ukraine, more than 745 enterprises have been relocated to safe territories, and more than 550 have started operations, Deputy Minister of Economy Tetyana Berezhna informed.

Kyiv does not plan to call up more people to the Armed Forces of Ukraine in response to mobilization in the Russian Federation since Ukraine has already created reserves "through the system of territorial defense," adviser to the office of the President of Ukraine Mykhailo Podolyak told the Tagesschau program of the German ARD TV channel.

International diplomatic aspect

The US commits $457.5 million in civilian security assistance to enhance the efforts of Ukrainian law enforcement and criminal justice agencies to improve their operational capacity and save lives. A portion of the new aid will support the Ukrainian government's efforts to document, investigate, and prosecute atrocities perpetrated by Russia's forces.

"We found a large mass burial with half a thousand people [in Izyum, previously reported] … They [Ukrainian law-enforcement agencies] found two more mass burials, large graves with hundreds of people. It is also about the small town of Izyum. There are two more mass burials in the small town," said President Zelensky. Ukraine's Security Service has found yet another torture chamber

in the liberated village of Lyptsi, where Russian troops and collaborators had been torturing Ukrainians during the occupation. So far, as many as 18 Russian torture chambers in Kharkiv Oblast have been discovered, with some 1,000 Russian servicemen involved in war crimes identified by the Ukrainian police.

"We must show that those who pick up a gun or load a missile do not benefit from impunity," emphasized Karim Khan, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. Forty-three states referred to the situation in Ukraine ICC. In September, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Denmark, Italy, Poland, France, Romania, Sweden, the US, and Germany filed declarations of joining the ICJ case concerning allegations of Russia committing genocide in Ukraine.

President Zelensky thanked the US for providing Ukraine with a national advanced surface-to-air missile system (NASAMS). However, it's unclear whether the first system has been delivered to Ukraine or Zelensky referred to the decision to send two systems within two months.

As a result of negotiations on a new spending bill, an agreement was reached to include about

$12 billion in new aid to Ukraine in response to a request from the Biden administration.

The UK has announced a package of sanctions in response to the Russian regime's illegal sham "referenda" in Ukraine. Sanctions target top Russian officials enforcing the illegal votes in four Ukrainian regions and a few oligarchs. Among those sanctioned are 55 board members and CEOs from entities that "continue to bankroll the Russian war machine," Gazprombank, Sberbank, and Sovcombank. "Sham referendums held at the barrel of a gun cannot be free or fair, and we will never recognize their results. They follow a clear pattern of violence, intimidation, torture, and forced deportations in the areas of Ukraine Russia has seized', stated the Foreign Secretary.

Russia, relevant news

Russia plans to carry out massive cyberattacks on critical infrastructure facilities in Ukraine; in particular, it intends to target the energy industry to amplify the effect of the earlier shelling campaign. It also plans to increase the number of DDoS attacks on institutions in Poland and the Baltic states, the press service of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine said.

In Makhachkala (the capital of Dagestan, Russian Federation), 101 people were detained for anti- mobilization actions, independent protest monitoring group OVD-Info said. The detentions that could be seen on video looked very harsh. According to estimates of the Russian BBC service, at least 301 servicemen from Dagestan died in the war with Ukraine. This exceeds the death toll among Moscow servicemen by more than 10 times, although the population of Moscow is about five times that of Dagestan.

A 25-year-old draftee shot the head of the draft commission in the city of Ust Ilimsk, Irkutsk Oblast, the Russian media reported. The official was wounded but is reported to have survived.

Nearly 17,000 Russian nationals crossed the border into Finland over the past weekend, up 80% from a week earlier, Reuters reported, citing the country's authorities.

About 3.5 thousand cars are waiting to pass at the Verkhny Lars checkpoint between Russia and North Ossetia (Georgia), the press service of the regional government head reported.

Dushanbe City Bank, one of the largest banks in Tajikistan, suspended the service of the Russian "Mir" payment system cards.

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3. Ex-CIA officer says Putin is 'completely cornered' and the chances of his using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine are increasing 'by the day'

Ex-CIA officer says Putin is 'completely cornered' and the chances of his using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine are increasing 'by the day'

Business Insider · by Jake Epstein

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.

Evgeniy Paulin, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP

• A former CIA officer said Vladimir Putin had been backed into a corner over his war in Ukraine.
• Robert Baer told CNN the Russian leader was unlikely to deescalate, given all his setbacks.
• Baer also said the chances that Putin might turn to tactical nuclear weapons were increasing.

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As military setbacks in Ukraine force Russian President Vladimir Putin into a corner, one former CIA officer argues that the chances he might turn to nuclear weapons are increasing.

"I think the chances of his de-escalating are close to zero," Robert Baer, a former CIA case officer, told CNN on Tuesday, adding that Putin "simply cannot give up so much ground and be seen to be losing and continue as leader of Russia."

"The chances of his using nuclear weapons — at least tactical nuclear weapons — is going up by the day," Baer added, referring to smaller nuclear weapons meant for use on the battlefield.

Ukrainian forces have recently retaken thousands of square miles of its territory previously under Russian occupation in counteroffensives along the war's eastern and southern fronts — a move that appears to have sparked a shift in Putin's approach to the seven-month conflict.

Last week, the Russian leader delivered a rare televised address in which he announced the partial military mobilization of his country's reservists, paving the way for more troops to deploy to Ukraine. Immediately after, Russians took to the streets and protested against the war. Many fled the country by any means necessary, fearing a call-up to fight.

The Kremlin on Monday acknowledged making mistakes when selecting draftees who would be sent to Ukraine and said it hoped mobilization would speed up once the issue is fixed.

But Baer told CNN that battlefield setbacks in Ukraine and domestic pressure in Russia wouldn't have any impact on the Russian president, who Baer argued was unlikely to withdraw troops and negotiate an end to the war.

Police officers detaining a protester during an unsanctioned anti-war protest in Moscow on Wednesday.

Photo by Contributor/Getty Images

"He's a strongman — he's portrayed himself that for the last 20 years — he doesn't give into dissent," Baer said. "He's cornered. He is completely cornered, and like a shark, he's got to move forward. He continues to bomb Ukrainian cities. He continues to grab people. He continues to hold onto ground, and I don't see him caving in at all."

During Putin's mobilization announcement, he also threatened to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, baselessly accused Western countries of provoking him with "nuclear blackmail," and said his remarks weren't a bluff. Russia has the world's largest nuclear arsenal, equipped with both tactical nuclear weapons as well as strategic nuclear weapons, which would be used against cities.

"Russians that I keep in touch within Russia are convinced he's going to go nuclear," Baer told CNN. "I don't know how well-connected they are, but this threat — it was a threat initially — but the more trouble he's in, the more likely he's going to use nuclear weapons."

Ned Price, the State Department spokesperson, told reporters on Monday that what he called Putin's "nuclear saber-rattling," among other things like mobilization, signaled "very clearly that he knows he is losing."

"He's on his back heels," Price said. "And he's making every attempt to intimidate those who would stand up to him. We — along with our allies and partners around the world — are not going to bow to intimidation."

Business Insider · by Jake Epstein

4. Col. Owen Ray may lose Special Forces tab, lawyer doxxed prosecutor’s kids ahead of trial

Col. Owen Ray may lose Special Forces tab, lawyer doxxed prosecutor’s kids ahead of trial

armytimes.com · by Davis Winkie · February 14, 2022

A retired Green Beret colonel could lose his Special Forces tab, as his civilian criminal case over kidnapping and domestic violence charges took a turn last week when the former officer’s defense attorney exposed the names, ages and an address for the prosecutor’s children, who are also victims of domestic violence, according to court documents.

Col. Owen Ray’s attorney also exposed the dates of birth and other identifying information for Ray’s own children, who are victims and witnesses in the ongoing case, through an “unintentional oversight,” the defense acknowledged in court filings.

Ray, a former 1st Special Forces Group commander, faces trial in Pierce County, Washington, on charges stemming from an hours-long armed police standoff in December 2020. During the standoff, Ray allegedly held his family hostage at gunpoint, put on his boots to stomp his wife’s face and chest in front of their children, and threatened to kill police and himself.

RELATED

Armed Green Beret colonel allegedly had two-hour standoff with police before surrendering

Ray is currently being held on two counts of felony harassment, one count of kidnapping, two counts of assault and one count of reckless endangerment.

The Army quietly allowed Ray, who last served as chief of staff of the Joint Base Lewis-McChord-based I Corps, to retire on Sept. 30 with an honorable discharge.

“Many people [in the special operations community] generally aren’t happy with the outcome” of Ray’s military discipline, explained a source directly familiar with the move to revoke Ray’s Special Forces tab and Green Beret. “The perception is that he got off scot free...whereas a [staff sergeant] in his position would have gotten fried.”

Special Forces officials “initiated tab revocation in recent weeks,” the source said. Ray has approximately two weeks to appeal the decision to Maj. Gen. Thomas Drew, the chief of Human Resources Command.

According to Army awards regulations, the commander of the Special Warfare Center and School can revoke the tab and beret if a soldier “has committed any act or engaged in any conduct inconsistent with the integrity, professionalism, and conduct of a SF Soldier.” The regulation isn’t clear on who initiates that action for a retiree, though.

According to the source, 1st Special Forces Command created an internal policy in 2021 to initiate tab revocation for domestic violence incidents, sexual assaults and gun crime.

Ray’s attorney did not immediately respond to a request for comment regarding the retired officer’s Special Forces tab.

A botched court filing

Ray’s attorney and former Pierce County prosecutor Jared Ausserer also had to revise and redact a recent, 256-page motion filed Jan. 26 asking the judge to disqualify one of the prosecutors on the case.

Ray’s defense team was attempting to disqualify Pierce County deputy prosecutor Coreen Schnepf because her conduct has been biased, according to the motion. The defense questioned her objectivity because Schnepf is a victim of domestic violence herself, according to a press kit on Ray’s website and the motion.

Ray faces more than two decades in prison if convicted of his alleged crimes — first degree kidnapping, two counts of second degree assault, two counts of felony harassment and reckless endangerment. According to court documents, Schnepf offered a plea deal to Ray that would give him roughly eight years in prison.

The former Green Beret’s defense team pointed at charges and sentences in other domestic violence cases and said the initial plea deal offered to Ray was unfair. Prosecutors called that assertion “disingenuous” in their Feb. 4 response because it left out subsequent negotiations.

JOINT BASE LEWIS-MCCHORD, Wash. – Col. Owen G. Ray, outgoing commander, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), (left), Maj. Gen. John W. Brennan Jr., 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) commanding general, (center), and 1st SFG (A) Commander Col. Ryan Ehrler stand at attention during the 1st SFG (A) change of command ceremony July 9, 2020, at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. (U.S. Army photo by Pfc. Gaozong Lee)

“This motion has nothing to do with…[Schnepf’s] conduct,” said Mary Robnett, Pierce County’s top prosecutor, in court filings. “The real issue here is Ray is unwilling to accept the statutory consequences of his conduct.”

Robnett also condemned Ausserer for “interject[ing] the names and ages of [Schnepf’s] children for no legitimate purpose.”

After Army Times asked a representative for Ausserer and Ray why the children’s information was listed in the public filings, the defense asked the judge to seal the motion to disqualify Schnepf pending redactions to the documents.

The defense attorney said in a Feb. 7 sworn statement that the failure to redact personal information from the motion’s supporting documents was an “unintentional oversight,” and Judge Stanley Rumbaugh granted the request to seal. But the redacted documents had been available to the public for 12 days before Ausserer filed that request.

“Any attachments I filed in that motion were...provided in response to a public records request,” Ausserer told Army Times in a Friday voicemail. “I took steps to...redact that information out as a courtesy to the prosecutor.”

In his memorandum included with the original motion, Ausserer said in his own words that the children of Ray and Schnepf “are similar in age and both of their sons are named [redacted by Army Times].”

A press kit available for download on Ray’s website also includes the children’s shared name. A new, redacted version of the motion, which Ausserer filed Feb. 8, removed the shared name.

Ray’s PR campaign

Despite the filing misstep, Ray’s public relations campaign has gained ground in recent months. A litigation communications firm, ANACHEL Communications, sent out a press release and fielded media inquiries on Ray’s behalf.

Ray wrote an article in November asserting that his breakdown and actions were “from the cumulative impact of untreated mental and physical health issues, operational and career stress across a career in SOF.”

The next month, according to public records, Ray’s team registered a sleek new website detailing his story and mental health resources that includes “testimonials” from former colleagues, though it’s not clear where the quotes originate.

One purported endorsement comes from former President Barack Obama, for whom Ray carried the “nuclear football” for more than two years.

Later in December, the editorial board of the Tacoma News-Tribune argued that “regardless of what you think of Ray or his alleged crimes, the issues he describes in his op-ed — including the need to address military mental health, reduce stigma and rethink warrior culture — demand our attention.”

Robnett, the Pierce County prosecutor, argued that the case should be settled at trial if Ray’s team isn’t satisfied with plea offers.

“[Ray] does not have the right to dictate what charges he faces,” she said in the state’s response. “But he does have the right to proceed to trial. This Court should deny his motion so the case may proceed to trial.”

Ray’s trial is tentatively scheduled to begin March 23.

About Davis Winkie

Davis Winkie is a senior reporter covering the Army, specializing in accountability reporting, personnel issues and military justice. He joined Military Times in 2020. Davis studied history at Vanderbilt University and UNC-Chapel Hill, writing a master's thesis about how the Cold War-era Defense Department influenced Hollywood's WWII movies.

5. Verdict reached in trial of former JBLM colonel accused of beating wife, causing standoff

Verdict reached in trial of former JBLM colonel accused of beating wife, causing standoff

Stars and Stripes · by Peter Talbot · September 27, 2022

Col. Owen Ray, 48, was found guilty of three of the seven charges leveled against him, including second-degree assault while armed with a firearm, felony harassment and reckless endangerment. (U.S. Army )

TACOMA, Washington (Tribune News Service) — A former Joint Base Lewis-McChord colonel has been found guilty by a Pierce County jury of assault and other charges for beating his wife and threatening to kill himself during a standoff with police in 2020.

Col. Owen Ray, 48, was found guilty of three of the seven charges leveled against him, including second-degree assault while armed with a firearm, felony harassment and reckless endangerment. He was found not guilty of the most serious charge, first-degree kidnapping, as well as two other counts of felony harassment. A second count of second-degree assault was dismissed.

Ray was taken into custody on a no-bail hold and was booked into Pierce County Jail. He had been out on $100,000 bail since January 2021. He is to be sentenced Oct 28. The maximum possible sentence he could receive is 10 years in prison.

Ray was formerly the chief of staff of I Corps at Joint Base Lewis-McChord. He was suspended shortly after the Dec. 27, 2020 standoff and was honorably discharged from the Army last year. According to court records, the defendant is a veteran of more than 25 years with combat experience from eight deployments to the Middle East and Asia. He also served as a military aide to President Barack Obama from 2011 to 2013.

The standoff occurred at Ray's home. According to charging documents and statements in Pierce County Superior Court, what would become an hours-long standoff where Ray threatened to kill any police who tried to arrest him started with an argument with his wife, Kristin, after he had been drinking.

Kidnapping charges alleged that Ray essentially held his wife hostage in front of their children after she called 911. According to court records, police arrived at the home shortly after midnight, and he allowed his wife and children to leave at about 12:30 a.m. The assault charge stemmed from allegations that Ray stomped on his wife's face and chest with his boots during the incident.

At the end of the two-week trial Thursday, the defendant's attorneys argued that Ray's actions were the result of years of untreated post-traumatic stress disorder, and that the only person he wanted to hurt that night was himself. Prosecutors said that while PTSD could have been a factor, it was Ray's own anger that led to him terrorizing his wife and children.

"He's not up there to say goodbye to his kids," deputy prosecutor Loren Halstrom told jurors during rebuttal argument. "He's not up there to explain why he's going away, he's up there because he wanted control. He wanted the power, and he had that power. He had the gun. He knows the power, the danger, the terror of having a gun."

___

(c)2022 The News Tribune (Tacoma, Wash.)

Visit The News Tribune (Tacoma, Wash.) at www.TheNewsTribune.com

Distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC.

Stars and Stripes · by Peter Talbot · September 27, 2022

6. Sweden and Denmark probe leaks in Nord Stream gas pipelines

Sabotage?

Sweden and Denmark probe leaks in Nord Stream gas pipelines

Berlin says Russia’s involvement cannot be excluded after damage to gas pipelines at centre of Europe’s energy crisis

Financial Times · by Richard Milne · September 27, 2022

Sweden and Denmark are investigating leaks in both of the Nord Stream gas pipelines that have been at the centre of the energy crisis between Russia and Europe.

Sweden’s maritime administration on Tuesday reported two leaks in Nord Stream 1’s pipelines close to the Danish island of Bornholm in the Baltic Sea, and warned ships to avoid the area. That report came hours after Denmark’s energy agency said there was a separate leak on the now defunct Nord Stream 2 pipeline, also close to Bornholm.

The leaks in both pipelines will not affect gas supply. Russia halted supplies through Nord Stream 1 this month, intensifying Europe’s energy crisis as countries rush to replace that gas from other sources before the winter.

Nord Stream, the pipelines’ Swiss-based operator that is majority owned by Gazprom, said the incidents were “unprecedented”, adding that it was carrying out an investigation into the leaks.

“Incidents on three strings of two pipelines is certainly not something that happens every day. As this is on the seabed it will take time to investigate. It’s speculative to talk about the damage or the repair duration at this point,” Nord Stream said. “Generally speaking a methane gas is not poisonous — it dissolves in the water. But the coastguards have brought in restrictions.”

Analysts suggested that, while authorities were being cautious, they would almost certainly suspect foul play.

“Given both pipelines were still pressured and have the capacity to pipe around 165mn cubic metres a day of methane-heavy fossil gas, leaks of this size pose potentially severe safety and environmental risks,” said Henning Gloystein, at Eurasia Group.

“Pipelines of this size are designed to avert accidental damage,” Gloystein added, pointing out that the lines consist of concrete-coated thick steel pipes that lie on the seabed.

Swedish and Danish authorities warned ships to keep clear of the region as they also investigate the possible causes of the leaks. The Swedish maritime administration also cautioned that aircraft should keep a “safety altitude” of 1,000 metres in the area.

A new gas pipeline link between Norway — now Europe’s biggest supplier of gas — and Poland is due to open on Tuesday.

German authorities cancelled the approval process for Nord Stream 2 just days before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February, but the pipeline had been filled with gas in anticipation of its start-up. The pipeline had been completed but was awaiting certification.

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European politicians accused Russia of “weaponising” energy supplies as it cut flows through Nord Stream 1, before finally saying in early September it would keep it switched off after maintenance until the EU lifted sanctions against it.

That move rippled through European energy markets, causing Nordic ministers to warn of a potential Lehman Brothers moment while offering billions of euros in liquidity support to utilities. Germany also nationalised Uniper, its largest importer of gas, which struggled to replace its Russian supplies.

Ukraine has long opposed both of the Nord Stream pipelines, arguing they were designed to weaken its position as one of the main conduits for Russian gas into Europe. Russian gas has continued to flow through Ukraine even after Moscow launched its invasion.

Energy analysts said it was not clear who would stand to benefit from the leaks at a time when neither line was operational.

“To see a number of leaks happening in quick succession will clearly raise questions over how this could be a coincidence,” said Tom Marzec-Manser, at ICIS. “But the leak on Nord Stream 2 is very close to the new Baltic Pipe that will bring Norwegian gas to Poland for the first time when it opens this week, so there’s some heavy symbolism. For EU gas imports it’s a new dawn for Norway and twilight for Russia.”

James Huckstepp, at S&P Global Platts, said the price reaction was limited but cautioned it could still stoke uncertainty in the market.

“The probability of Nord Stream 1 coming back before the end of the year has essentially dropped from 1 per cent to 0 per cent,” Huckstepp said. “But there remain concerns about the remaining gas flows through Ukraine and whether they could see reductions later this year.”

Financial Times · by Richard Milne · September 27, 2022

7. Western leaders blame 'deliberate' sabotage after Nordsteam pipeline

Some do think this is sabotage.

Western leaders blame 'deliberate' sabotage after Nordsteam pipeline

Did Putin’s frogmen blow up Europe’s gas supplies? Western leaders blame ‘deliberate’ sabotage after Nordsteam pipe from Russia ruptured off Sweden causing 3000ft-wide bubbles and sending prices spiking

• Three leaks were reported in Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines near Danish island last night and this morning
• Pipelines are leaking gas into the Baltic Sea, with one area more than 3,000ft wide churning with bubbles
•  Danish PM Mette Frederiksen has said her government believes the leaks were caused by 'deliberate actions'
• Ukraine also pointed the finger at Moscow, describing the incident as a 'terrorist attack and act of aggression'
• Latvian Defence Minister has called on Nato and EU's member states to jointly investigate the pipeline blasts

By DAVID AVERRE and JAMIE PHILLIPS FOR MAILONLINE

PUBLISHED: 10:15 BST, 27 September 2022 | UPDATED: 21:26 BST, 27 September 2022

Daily Mail · by David Averre · September 27, 2022

Western leaders have blamed ‘deliberate’ sabotage after the Nordsteam pipe from Russia suffered 'unprecedented' damage off Sweden - causing 3000ft-wide bubbles in the Baltic Sea and causing prices to spike.

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has said her government believes the leaks were caused by 'deliberate actions', adding that the gas supply pipeline will be out of action for around a week.

She said this evening: 'It is now the clear assessment by authorities that these are deliberate actions. It was not an accident. There is no information yet to indicate who may be behind this action.'

Her Energy Minister Dan Jorgensen also said the size of the holes in the pipelines indicate that the leaks could not have been caused by an accident such as getting hit by an anchor. The damaged pipelines are at a depth of 70-90 meters below sea level, he added.

The remarks were backed by Sweden's PM Magdalena Andersson, who has said informations suggests the blasts were likely sabotage.

She said her government was in close contact with partners such as Nato and neighbours such as Denmark and Germany concerning the developments.

Ms Andersson continued: 'We have Swedish intelligence, but we have also received information in our contacts with Denmark, and based on this concluded that this is probably a deliberate act. It is probably a matter of sabotage.

'It is not a matter of an attack on Swedish or Danish territory. But that said, the government is taking what happened very seriously, not the least in light of the current security situation on our close proximity.'

Investigations are ongoing into major leaks in Russian pipelines that are now spewing gas into the Baltic Sea near Sweden and Denmark, including assessing evidence of possible sabotage.

It comes after Kyiv's presidential advisor Mikhaylo Podolyak said on Twitter: 'The large-scale gas leak is nothing more than a terrorist attack planned by Russia and an act of aggression towards the EU.'

Podolyak accused Russia of seeking to 'destabilise the economic situation in Europe and cause pre-winter panic'.

Latvian Defence Minister Artis Pabriks also today called on Nato and the EU's member states to jointly investigate the Nord Stream blasts.

Shocking footage released earlier today by the Danish military from a flyover of the affected region showed huge swathes of the sea near the Danish island of Bornholm churning as the gas bubbled to the surface.

A military statement claimed that the largest leak 'is spreading bubbles a good kilometre (3,280ft) in diameter. The smallest is creating a circle about 200 metres (656 feet) in diameter', while the head of Denmark's Energy Agency said it could take up to a week for gas to stop draining into the sea.

'The sea surface is full of methane, which means there is an increased risk of explosions in the area,' Kristoffer Bottzauw said, adding that ships could lose buoyancy if the entered the affected region.

Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said it would be 'in no-one's interest' if attacks or acts of sabotage caused the leaks detected in the Nord Stream gas pipelines amid an energy standoff between Europe and Russia over gas supplies.

Speaking alongside India's Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, he added: 'There are initial reports indicating that this may be the result of an attack or some kind of sabotage, but these are initial reports and we haven't confirmed that yet. But if it is confirmed, that's clearly in no one's interest.'

The White House said the US was ready to provide support to European partners conducting an investigation.

Blinken added that his understanding was leaks would not have a significant impact on Europe's energy resilience, and reiterated that Washington was working to address energy security for Europe in the short- and long-term.

European gas prices rose on the news of the leaks, with the benchmark October Dutch price up almost 10 per cent on Tuesday. Prices are still below this year's stratospheric peaks, but remain more than 200 per cent higher than in early September 2021.

A huge swathe of Baltic sea is pictured from this helicopter flyover showing bubbles breaking the surface amid a gas leak

A satellite image released by Planet Labs PBC showing the gas leak at the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline off the Danish Baltic island of Bornholm, south of Dueodde, in the Baltic sea

Poland's Prime Minister said he believed the pipelines had been sabotaged at an opening of a new pipeline between Norway and his nation today (Baltic Sea is pictured as gas escapes from undersea pipes)

A large disturbance in the sea can be observed off the coast of the Danish island of Bornholm Tuesday, Sept. 27, 2022 following a series of unusual leaks on two natural gas pipelines running from Russia under the Baltic Sea to Germany

Shocking footage released earlier today by the Danish military from a flyover of the affected region showed huge swathes of the Baltic Sea near the Danish controlled Bornholm island churning as the gas bubbled to the surface

A reading from a German Centre for Georesearch seismograph on the Danish island of Bornholm shows two spikes, at 0003 and 1700 GMT, followed by a lower-level 'hissing' on the day when the Nord Stream 1 and 2 Baltic gas pipelines sprang leaks one after the other

The unsettling incident comes as Sweden's National Seismology Centre (SNSN) announced that their equipment registered powerful undersea blasts in the region yesterday. It said one explosion was equivalent to a magnitude-2.3 earthquake.

The Nord Stream pipelines have been flashpoints in an escalating energy war between Europe and Moscow amid Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine that has pummelled major Western economies and sent gas prices soaring.

The cause of the leaks has not yet been confirmed, however, and the European Commission said it was too early to speculate on the potential causes.

Meanwhile, Norway said it will strengthen security at its oil and gas installations in the wake of the gas leaks amid reports of drones buzzing its rigs. Newspaper Stavanger Aftenblad reported last week that unidentified drones had been observed at least at six Equinor installations, including at its giant oilfield Johan Sverdrup.

Last Tuesday, a drone was observed some 50 meters away from Equinor's Heidrun platform in the North Sea, breaching the 500-metre security perimeter, the newspaper reported.

'There is no doubt that these were explosions,' SNSN seismologist Bjorn Lund told broadcaster SVT, suggesting the pipelines were likely sabotaged.

'With energy releases this big there isn't much else than a blast that could cause it,' another seismologist added. 'You can see that they are quite sudden. It is a very sudden energy release. It's not a slow collapse of something.'

Poland's Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said: 'We faced an act of sabotage, we don't know all the details of what happened, but we see clearly that it's an act of sabotage, related to the next step of escalation of the situation in Ukraine.'

And Denmark's Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen stopped short of claiming sabotage but said she doubted the leaks were happenstance.

'We are talking about three leaks with some distance between them, and that's why it is hard to imagine that it is a coincidence,' she said.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov meanwhile told reporters this morning 'no option can be ruled out right now' regarding the damage.

'This is a very concerning news. Indeed, we are talking about some damage of an unclear nature to the pipeline in Denmark's economic zone,' Peskov said.

'This is an issue related to the energy security of the entire continent.'

Anders Puck Nielsen, a researcher with the Centre for Maritime Operations at the Royal Danish Defence College, said the timing of the leaks was 'conspicuous' given that a new pipeline carrying gas from Norway to Poland was opened today.

'The arrow points in the direction of Russia,' he said. 'No one in the West is interested in having any kind of instability in the energy market.'

The extent of the damage means the Nord Stream pipelines are unlikely to carry any gas to Europe this winter even if there was political will to bring them online, analysts at the Eurasia Group said.

'Depending on the scale of the damage, the leaks could even mean a permanent closure of both lines,' Henning Gloystein and Jason Bush wrote.

They noted that undersea pipelines are designed so they can not be damaged accidentally and leaks are rare.

Mr Puck Nielsen said of possible sabotage that 'technically speaking, this is not difficult. It just requires a boat. It requires some divers that know how to handle explosive devices'.

'But I think if we look at who would actually benefit from disturbances, more chaos on the gas market in Europe, I think there's basically only one actor right now that actually benefits from more uncertainty, and that is Russia,' he added.

A handout photo taken from a Danish F-16 jet on 27 September 2022 and made available by the Danish Defence Command shows a gas leak of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline off Bornholm, Denmark, Baltic Sea

A huge churn can be seen at the centre of this large expanse of methane bubbling to the surface of the Baltic Sea

A Danish military statement claimed that the largest leak 'is spreading bubbles a good kilometre (3,280ft) in diameter. The smallest is creating a circle about 200 metres (656 feet) in diameter'

Two leaks in the Nord Stream 1 pipeline were reported by Sweden's Maritime Authority last night, shortly after a leak on the nearby Nord Stream 2 pipeline was discovered that prompted Denmark to restrict shipping in the area.

Of the two pipelines hit by leaks, Nord Stream 2 has never operated, while Nord Stream 1 carried gas to Germany until late August when Russian energy giant Gazprom cut off the supply, claiming there was a need for urgent maintenance work.

Gazprom's explanation of technical problems have been rejected by German officials as a cover for a political power play to raise prices and spread uncertainty.

The fresh incidents will hinder any effort to start or restart either pipeline for commercial operations, and triggered an investigation with Swedish and Danish energy agencies.

The head of Denmark's energy agency warned such leaks 'happen extremely rarely', lending further credence to speculations of sabotage given that three separate leaks sprung up across two different pipelines.

Denmark's energy minister Dan Jorgensen said this morning: 'Yesterday, a leak was detected on one of the two gas pipelines between Russia and Denmark - Nord Stream 2. The pipeline is not in operation, but contains natural gas, which is now leaking.

'Authorities have now been informed that there have been 2 more leaks on Nord Stream 1, which is also not in operation but contains gas,' he added.

The leaks were located northeast of the Danish island Bornholm, a Swedish Maritime authority spokesperson said.

Gazprom, who owns the majority stake in Nord Stream AG which owns and operates the pipelines, declined to comment.

Nord Stream AG however released a statement warning that the pipelines had suffered 'unprecedented damage' in one day.

'The destruction that occurred on the same day simultaneously on three strings of the offshore gas pipelines of the Nord Stream system is unprecedented,' it said.

One European governmental source, when asked if there was specific intelligence indicating sabotage, said: 'Not specific yet, but it seems this pressure failure can only happen when a pipe is completely cut. Which pretty much says it all.'

Nord Stream 1 has not been supplying gas to Europe since late August after Moscow announced the pipeline would be closed for three days for maintenance.

The pipeline was never opened again after the G7 group of advanced economic nations in early September agreed an price cap on Russian oil and moved to bar insurance for tankers or shipping companies helping Moscow to sell supplies above the cap.

The new Nord Stream 2 pipeline was completed earlier this year but had not entered commercial operations.

The plan to supply gas via the pipeline was scrapped by Germany days before Russia sent troops into Ukraine in February.

European politicians say Moscow's decision to close the pipeline was simply a pretext to slash supply and hasten a European energy crisis.

The head of Denmark's energy agency warned such leaks 'happen extremely rarely', lending further credence to speculations of sabotage given that three separate leaks sprung up across two different pipelines

Putin has kept the Nord Stream 1 pipeline closed since August after the G7 group of advanced economic nations in early September agreed an price cap on Russian oil and moved to bar insurance for tankers or shipping companies helping Moscow to sell supplies above the cap

A painting showing the Nord Stream pipelines is displayed on a container near the Nord Stream 1 Baltic Sea pipeline in Lubmin, Germany, July 20, 2022

Morning light falls on the landfall facility of the Nord Stream 1 Baltic Sea pipeline and the transfer station of the OPAL gas pipeline, the Baltic Sea Pipeline Link, in Lubmin, Germany, July 21, 2022

Danish authorities have asked that the country's level of preparedness for the power and gas sector be raised after the leaks.

The raised level would mean that companies in the power and gas sector have to implement measures to increase safety at for example plants, buildings and installations.

Ships can lose buoyancy if they enter the area affected by the leaks, and there may be a risk of an ignition over the water and in the air, the Danish energy agency warned.

It said the gas leak would only affect the environment locally, which means that only the area where the gas plume in the water column is located would be affected.

A spokesperson from Energinet, Denmark's national electricity and natural gas operator, confirmed that precautionary measures would include increased surveillance of pipelines and and security measures, but declined to give specifics.

(From L to R) Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and Polish President Andrzej Duda shake hands after turning a valve to symbolically open the new Baltic Pipe natural gas pipeline on September 27, 2022

A view of the installation of the gas compressor station 'Goleniow', before the ceremonial opening of the 'Baltic Pipe' gas pipeline on the premises of the gas compressor station in the vicinity of Budno near Goleniow, Poland, 27 September 2022

Meanwhile, a new subsea pipeline delivering Norwegian gas to Poland and neighbouring countries with an annual capacity of 10 billion cubic metres per day was inaugurated today.

The Baltic Pipe is seen as a key element in the diversification away from Russian energy sources for Poland and other European and Nordic nations, and was completed ahead of schedule in light of the impending energy crisis.

The European Commissioner for Energy Kadri Simson said: 'The Baltic Pipe is a key project for the security of supply of the region and the result of an EU policy drive to diversify sources of gas. The pipeline will play a valuable role in mitigating the current energy crisis.'

At a ceremony in western Poland, Norwegian Energy Minister Terje Aasland said the project was 'a milestone on the important path towards European independence from Russian energy.'

And Polish President Andrzej Duda called the new pipeline 'a Polish dream', which Prime Minister Morawiecki said showed that 'the era of Russian gas dominance is ending'.

MailOnline has contacted representatives of the Baltic Pipe project for comment.

Putin squirms in his seat as Belarus dictator Lukashenko rants about men 'running away' from mobilisation in Russia as huge traffic jams on Georgia border are captured in images from SPACE

By WILL STEWART and DAVID AVERRE for MAILONLINE

This is the moment an uncomfortable-looking Vladimir Putin squirmed in his seat as he was forced to endure a bizarre lecture on people fleeing his rule from fellow autocrat Alexander Lukashenko.

The Belarusian president - who needed Putin's help to crush a pro-Western democratic movement in his country in 2020 - assured the Kremlin leader he would win his war in Ukraine, despite the growing unrest over his decision to mobilise 300,000 new troops.

The Kremlin chief looked hunched and uncomfortable, saying little during the meeting in Sochi as Russians continue to protest his mobilisation edict or flee abroad to avoid being drafted.

'Our course is right, our cause is right,' Lukashenko told Putin, bringing a rare smile to the Russian warmonger's lips.

'We will win. We have no other choice. We, as Slavs, would not tolerate humiliation,' Lukashenko told him.

The Belarusian leaders bombastic speech belied the situation on the ground though.

The call for mobilisation has proved wildly unpopular, with hundreds of thousands of Russian men having already fled the country to avoid the call up.

Outbound flights from Russia are completely sold out, and traffic jams leading to Russia's borders are so big they can be seen from space.

Anti-war protests have erupted across the country, and Russian media reported an increasing number of arson attacks on military enlistment offices. Yesterday, an enlistment officer was shot at almost point blank range by a man who refused to be drafted.

Alexander Lukashenko (R) shakes hands with Vladimir Putin at a meeting in Sochi, Russia

Belarusian president Lukashenko (L) - who needed Putin's help to crush a pro-Western democratic movement in his country in 2020 - assured the Kremlin leader he would win his war in Ukraine

A satellite image shows trucks and cars waiting in a traffic jam near Russia's border with Georgia as Russians desperately try to flee the country, September 25, 2022

The call for mobilisation has proved wildly unpopular, with hundreds of thousands of Russian men having already fled the country to avoid the call up. Pictured: A satellite image of traffic jams near Russia's border with Georgia

A satellite image shows traffic at the Khyagt border post on Russia's border with Mongolia, September 23, 2022

Queues of traffic have been growing on Russia's borders with neighbouring countries. This satellite image shows traffic at the Khyagt border post on Russia's border with Mongolia on September 23

A group of Russian men walk with their bicycles after crossing the border at Verkhny Lars between Georgia and Russia in Georgia, Tuesday, Sept. 27, 2022. Long lines of vehicles have formed at a border crossing between Russia's North Ossetia region and Georgia after Moscow announced a partial military mobilisation

A group of Russians walk after crossing the border at Verkhny Lars between Georgia and Russia in Georgia, Tuesday, Sept. 27, 2022

Lukashenko continued monologuing in Sochi yesterday, spouting rhetorical questions as Putin sat silently, squirming uncomfortably beside him.

'Let's say 30,000 or 50,000 [people] run away. If they were to stay, would they be our people?' the Belarusian president said.

'Let them run away. I don't know what you think about it, but I wasn't worried too much in 2020 when people left [Belarus after protests over his vote-rigging].

'They [later] ask to let them in. So these ones will also come back.

'But there's a decision needed: what to do with them? Let them come back or stay there?'

While Lukashenko and Putin shared a chat in Sochi yesterday, a young conscript shot a Russian military officer at close range at an enlistment office in an unusually bold attack reflecting resistance to mobilisation efforts.

The shooting came after scattered arson attacks on enlistment offices and protests in Russian cities against the military call up that have resulted in at least 2,000 arrests.

In the attack in the Siberian city of Ust-Ilimsk, 25-year-old resident Ruslan Zinin walked into the enlistment office saying 'no one will go to fight' and 'we will all go home now,' according to local media.

A witness quoted by a local news site said Zinin was in a roomful of people called up to fight and troops from his region were heading to military bases on Tuesday.

Footage of the incident showed how Zinin strode into the office and blasted the official before being arrested and forced to testify to the crime on camera, which he did willingly.

Authorities said the military commandant was in intensive care.

Protests also flared up in Dagestan, one of Russia's poorer regions in the North Caucasus.

This is the moment gunman Ruslan Zinin, 25 walked into a Russian enlistment office in Ust-Ilimsk and shot military commissar Alexander Eliseev

A man casts his ballot into a mobile ballot box as members of an electoral commission visit patients of a hospital during a referendum on the joining of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) to Russia, in Donetsk, Ukraine September 27, 2022

A group of Russians walk after crossing the border at Verkhny Lars between Georgia and Russia in Georgia, Tuesday, Sept. 27, 2022

Protests have also erupted across Russia in fury at Putin's decision to begin conscription, with some 2,000 people arrested so far

Local media reported that 'several hundred' demonstrators took to the streets Tuesday in its capital, Makhachkala.

Videos circulated online showing dozens of protesters tussling with the police sent to disperse them.

Demonstrations also continued in another of Russia's North Caucasus republics, Kabardino-Balkaria, where videos on social media showed a local official attempting to address a crowd of women who banded together to chant 'No to war!'

Concerns are growing that Russia may seek to escalate the conflict - including potentially using nuclear weapons - once it completes what Ukraine and the West see as illegal referendums in occupied parts of Ukraine.

The voting, in which residents are asked whether they want their regions to become part of Russia, began last week and ends Tuesday, under conditions that are anything but free or fair.

Tens of thousands of residents had already fled the regions amid months of fighting, and images shared by those who remained showed armed Russian troops going door-to-door to pressure Ukrainians into voting.

'Every night and day there is inevitable shelling in the Donbas, under the roar of which people are forced to vote for Russian ''peace'',' Donetsk regional governor Pavlo Kirilenko said Monday.

Russia is widely expected to declare the results in its favour, a step that could see Moscow annex the four regions and then defend them as its own territory.

Daily Mail · by David Averre · September 27, 2022

8. Israel: Cyber War with Iran is Unparalleled

Excerpts:

Siboni warned that the threat is that cyber-attacks against Israel will be able to strike the domestic front, adding that Iran is rapidly and subtly close to "bridging the gap" in cyber technology with Israel.

"We should not be naive," said the commander of the cyber unit.

The Iranian axis is constantly looking for loopholes in the armor of the Israeli army and the cyber field.

He warned that in the coming wars, cyber capabilities would be more critical than in previous wars, asserting Israel's readiness to repel and respond more than ever.

Israel: Cyber War with Iran is Unparalleled

english.aawsat.com · by Tel Aviv - Asharq Al-Awsat

Israeli defense and cyber intelligence unit commanders announced that the conflict with Iran has no parallel in the cyber-realm.

They explained that since its outbreak in 2013, this war has become increasingly complex, noting that Israel is the strongest party, but the enemy must never be underestimated.

Colonel Uri Stav, deputy head of the 8200's offensive unit, and Colonel Omer Grossman, Vice President of the same brigade for defense affairs, said Iran's offensive capabilities are also improving.

Iran is also activating several of its arms and militias, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, and it mobilizes support in this field for the Islamic Jihad and Hamas organizations in Palestine.

Stav said: "One of the challenges is that Iran supports organizations that are on our borders but are physically distant from us. When it comes to cyberwarfare, distance doesn't exist."

He explained that Iran managed to sabotage the water system in Israel, disrupting it for several hours, and even tried to poison the water, but Israel responded to the attack.

But Stav adds that the level of its performance is still very far from the Israeli level.

For his part, Grossman admitted that the enemy must never be underestimated, as a rule.

"But I can say with full confidence that the abilities on our side are infinitely higher. This is not the same league at all, not even the same sport. To date, there has been no functional damage to our systems due to attacks by Iran."

The threat, he estimates, will increase in the coming years.

Unit 8200, which was initially made of five people, including a secretary and a driver, has become the most significant military brigade and includes among its ranks soldiers and officers more employees and agents in the Mossad and the Shin Bet combined.

It cooperates with its US counterpart, the "National Security Agency" (NSA).

The two cyber units in the Israeli army were established as an emergency cell 11 years ago and detected in 2014, the first Iranian major cyber war attack during the "Protective Edge" war on Gaza.

The Iranian-backed attack, executed by the "Syrian Electronic Army" at the time, managed to hack the Twitter account of the Israeli army's English spokesperson.

The hackers warned of a possible nuclear leakage in the region after two missiles hit the Dimona nuclear reactor, but Israel repaired the damage within a few minutes.

Some reports were published about this cyber war but did not receive the importance they deserved at that time. However, experts have conducted several types of research on the subject.

Director of the cybersecurity program at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, Colonel Gabi Siboni, said there is an excellent possibility that this Iranian cyber advance in the Protective Edge would mark the beginning of cyber warfare, which will replace classic terrorism as a central tool in Iran war with Israel.

Siboni warned that the threat is that cyber-attacks against Israel will be able to strike the domestic front, adding that Iran is rapidly and subtly close to "bridging the gap" in cyber technology with Israel.

"We should not be naive," said the commander of the cyber unit.

The Iranian axis is constantly looking for loopholes in the armor of the Israeli army and the cyber field.

He warned that in the coming wars, cyber capabilities would be more critical than in previous wars, asserting Israel's readiness to repel and respond more than ever.

english.aawsat.com · by Tel Aviv - Asharq Al-Awsat

9. Stop Second-Guessing Joe Biden on Taiwan

Is he correct? What do the China hands say?

Stop Second-Guessing Joe Biden on Taiwan

It’s time to take the president’s judgment seriously and give him credit for correctly assessing the connection between U.S. interests and the growing tensions across the Taiwan Strait.

The National Interest · by Dean P. Chen · September 25, 2022

Sen. Bob Menendez (D-NJ), the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) are the key sponsors of the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 (TPA). Introduced in June 2022, this bipartisan bill was advanced by the committee on September 14 in a vote of seventeen to five. Menendez boasts that the legislation is the “most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. policy toward Taiwan since the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.”

After tweaks and revisions made to address the apprehensions expressed by some Biden administration officials and more cautious senators, the bill would authorize $6.5 billion in security assistance for Taiwan, strengthen American support for Taiwan’s democratic government and its participation in international organizations and trade institutions, prepare concrete measures to sanction Beijing in the event of an invasion, create a Taiwan fellowship program, and accord Taiwan treatment equivalent to a “major non-NATO ally.” The legislation also calls for the secretary of state to permit Taiwanese officials to display symbols of Taiwanese sovereignty, including Republic of China (Taiwan) flags and the emblems and insignia of military units. The more sensitive sections, nonetheless, were amended so that Congress would only suggest that the secretary of state should renegotiate the renaming of Taiwan’s de facto embassy in Washington from the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office to the Taiwan Representative Office. It also scrapped a provision of the bill that would have required a Senate confirmation of the director of the American Institute in Taiwan, the unofficial U.S. embassy in Taipei, which would formalize the position to an ambassadorship.

Those with reservations suggested that the TPA would compromise U.S. strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan and worsen Washington-Beijing relations, which have been in a downward spiral since 2018. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, for instance, sought to persuade lawmakers to change provisions seen as provocative to Beijing, especially after House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s recent visit to Taipei, which led Beijing to wage a series of dangerous naval blockading, aerial, and missile exercises in close proximity to the self-governed island. “There are elements of that legislation with respect to how we can strengthen our security assistance for Taiwan that are quite effective and robust that will improve Taiwan security,” Sullivan stressed in an interview on Bloomberg Television. “There are other elements that give us some concern.”

The worries, however, are misplaced given the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) heightened attempts to unilaterally upset the Taiwan Strait status quo. The TPA, if it comes to fruition, would significantly enhance America’s support for Taiwan and confront Chinese autocracy and bellicosity. As Chinese president Xi Jinping continues to coerce Taiwan, even using Pelosi’s August visit as a pretext to escalate military maneuvers, Washington’s Taiwan Strait policy must become clearer in words and deeds to more effectively deter the PRC. The bill serves that function without altering Washington’s longstanding policy approach. It states: “Nothing in this Act may be construed to restore diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) or alter the U.S. government position with respect to the international status of Taiwan.” More importantly, the TPA signals to Beijing that the United States’ One China policy is contingent on whether the PRC abides by peaceful and nonviolent means to resolve cross-strait differences.

The U.S. president, as the nation’s foremost decisionmaker on foreign affairs, has the prerogative to deliberate and decide how exactly to implement the TPA in line with America’s national interests. The chief executive could choose not to execute the law if Beijing ultimately mollified its behaviors. However, having this legal document institutionalized as yet another pillar of Washington’s Taiwan Strait infrastructure would enhance the White House's flexibility and latitude in responding to a Taiwan crisis and, in turn, offer more reasons for the Chinese government to pause before any military action.

Furthermore, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, the State Department affirmed in May that “the United States makes available defense articles and services as necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability—and maintains our capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of Taiwan.” The TPA merely seeks to amplify, rather than undercut, that capacity.

Biden has indeed captured this sentiment better than his circumspect aids. In a 60 Minutes interview aired on CBS on September 18, Biden said, “We agree with what we signed onto a long time ago. … And that there’s one China policy.” Asked whether U.S. forces would defend the island democracy, Biden answered unequivocally: “Yes, if in fact there was an unprecedented attack.” The CBS host probed further: “U.S. forces, U.S. men and women would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion?” Biden’s response was a plain “yes.” Like the previous three occasions when Biden has said that Washington would intervene militarily and help Taiwan resist a Chinese assault, White House officials said that U.S. policy on Taiwan has not changed, explaining that the president was merely responding to a “hypothetical question.” Such repeated walk-backs are counterproductive, perplexing, and unnecessarily contravene the president’s handling of diplomacy.

The president, to be sure, never abandoned the One China policy or strategic ambiguity. At the seventy-seventh session of the UN General Assembly, Biden said, “We remain committed to our One China policy, which has helped prevent conflict for four decades. And we continue to oppose unilateral changes in the status quo by either side.” Yet he was also trying to convey greater clarity to the Chinese Communist Party about what would happen if it decided to mount an offensive against Taiwan. According to U.S. military assessments, Beijing is preparing to have the capabilities to do so by 2027 (though Russia’s setbacks in its feckless invasion of Ukraine may have discouraged Xi). Biden hinted at possibly condoning, at least tacitly, Taiwan’s right to self-determination: “Taiwan makes their own judgments about their independence. We are not encouraging their being independent. [That’s] their decision.” That wasn’t an off-the-cuff remark. In fact, the president made the same point last November. It’s time to take the president’s executive judgment on Taiwan seriously and give him credit for correctly assessing the connection between U.S. interests and the growing tensions across the Taiwan Strait. To quell second-guessing, Kurt Campbell, the White House’s Indo-Pacific coordinator, finally set the record straight: “The president’s remarks speak for themselves.”

Dean P. Chen, Ph.D. (Associate Professor of Political Science, Ramapo College of New Jersey) is the author of US Taiwan Strait Policy: The Origins of Strategic Ambiguity (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012) and US-China Rivalry and Taiwan’s Mainland Policy: Security, Nationalism, and the 1992 Consensus (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). His new book, US-China-Taiwan in the Age of Trump and Biden: Towards a Nationalist Strategy (Routledge, 2022) informs some of the observations outlined in this article. Email: [email protected].

Image: Reuters.

The National Interest · by Dean P. Chen · September 25, 2022

10. Ukraine Can Win This War

Conclusion:

If the West continues its level of aid and support, while Ukraine continues to build military capability and execute a superior war plan, the path to victory is clear. Under those conditions, it's only a matter of when—not if—Ukraine will win this war.

Ukraine Can Win This War

The experts said Ukraine was was ill-prepared, ill-equipped, and Russia’s military was simply too powerful. They were wrong.

Liam Collins and John Spencer

commonsense.news · by Liam Collins

Ukrainian soldiers ride in an armored tank in the town of Izium, recently liberated by Ukrainian Armed Forces, in the Kharkiv region. (Oleksii Chumachenko/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images)

When Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the conventional wisdom among military experts was that it would all be over for Ukraine in a matter of weeks. Here was Russia, one of the world’s ostensible superpowers, its military five times the size of Ukraine’s, and with nuclear weapons to boot. At the start of the conflict, Russia maintained an advantage of nearly ten-to-one in defense spending and weapons systems. Ukraine, they said, was ill-prepared, ill-equipped, and Russia’s military was simply too powerful.

It hasn’t turned out that way.

Since Ukraine’s counteroffensive began nearly three weeks ago, the country has reclaimed more than 3,400 square miles. By contrast, Russia’s offensive in the east gained only 2,000 square miles in the past five months. Ukraine continues its advance via a successful offensive in the Kharkiv region (in which they launched a massive surprise counterattack to overwhelm unprepared and unmotivated Russian forces) and through its ongoing success in the Kherson region (where Ukrainian forces have basically encircled and cut off up to 20,000 Russians).

Then there is the panic in Moscow. Days ago, Putin announced the mobilization of 300,000 Russian reservists while also threatening nuclear war. The draft—Russia’s first since World War II—will force thousands of Russians who had previously served to report for duty, receive two weeks of refresher training, and immediately deploy into Ukraine. Russian conscripts' time of service has been extended indefinitely, meaning they will not be able to leave the fighting when their time is up. It’s hard to conceive of how much lower the morale of Russian troops can get.

All of this indicates that Putin is deeply concerned about Ukraine’s ability to win this war. He is right to be.

It has now been seven months since the war began, and signs from Ukraine and Russia indicate quite the opposite outcome that most experts predicted. So, how did all this happen?

Success in warfighting is a function of much more than the size of a nation’s military. It is also a function of strategy, allyship, doctrine, culture, and the will to fight, among many other factors. And Ukraine—not Russia—holds the advantage in every category except for military size.

Let’s take each in turn.

Strategy

Since Ukraine’s victory in preventing Russia from decapitating the capital city of Kyiv in April 2022, Russia’s strategy in eastern Ukraine can best be described as a war of attrition. Russia massed its combat power and conducted large artillery barrages. These battles were temporarily effective, as Russia was able to make incremental gains in the Donbas. But it came at great cost: Russia expended massive amounts of ammunition and soldiers to make those small gains.

By August, the Pentagon estimated that as many as 80,000 Russian soldiers had been killed or wounded. They lost thousands of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces, and have expended or lost tons of ammunition and supplies. They also lost at least a dozen generals and countless lower-level leaders. It will take Russia decades to train, educate, and ultimately replace these people. For Russia’s officer-centric military, these losses are particularly devastating as it greatly impacts their ability to mobilize a coherent fighting formation on the battlefield today. Military analysts were also surprised at the health and order of Russian equipment and positions—many resembled homeless encampments more than military outposts.

Ukraine had a very different strategy.

Over the past several months, Ukraine—being a much smaller military—wisely decided to surrender some territory in the East, pulling back to more defensible positions so that it could maintain the necessary combat power to fight another day. That day came on August 29, when Ukraine launched its massive counteroffensive. This offensive has been successful because Ukraine has a superior military by every measure other than quantity. As the war has progressed, Ukraine has also been able to replace worn down arms and ammunition, while at the same time acquiring new ones thanks to its relationship with the U.S. and other key allies.

Allyship

Western aid has been critical to Ukraine’s successful counteroffensive. They’ve been able to strike Russian ammunition depots, command and control centers, and supply lines thanks to weapons provided by the U.S., the U.K., Poland, and others. These weapons include HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems), counter artillery and missile radars, HARM (high-speed anti-radiation missiles) air-to-surface missiles, and other superior long-range weapons.

Western aid has not just been about weapons. It has also included battlefield intelligence, planning assistance, and training for thousands of Ukrainian soldiers outside of the country. The Ukrainians have put that aid and know-how to work to immediate effect on the battlefield.

NATO Doctrine

Just as critical to Ukraine’s success was the decision nearly eight years ago to have a professional force designed and trained so it could defend itself from Russian aggression. In 2016, Ukraine committed itself to building a modern military capable of meeting NATO standards. With the help of hundreds of Western trainers and advisers, Ukraine built an army that could execute maneuver warfare involving large-scale combined arms operations by the start of the most recent invasion. One of us was among them, and we were deeply impressed by their commitment to make such difficult reforms.

While Ukraine was adopting a NATO force and doctrine, Russia doubled down on their Soviet-era approach—a doctrine that relies on officer-centric orders and rigid, artillery-dependent formations. As Ukraine built a smaller, more nimble military, Russia continued to adhere to the outdated idea of amassing firepower and armor to overwhelm a stationary force.

Culture

In 2014, Ukraine’s military culture was much like Russia’s today: a highly centralized command structure where all decisions flow to the top. Risk-taking and battlefield initiative were not part of its military culture. But Ukraine learned through its experience in the Donbas in 2014—when Russia overwhelmed defending Ukrainian forces to take control of most of eastern Ukraine—that initiative was required when initial battlefield orders no longer fit the changing situation. Now, when the unexpected happens on the battlefield, lieutenants and captains are free to act immediately rather than having to seek permission and receive it after it is too late.

The second important component for Ukraine’s success is a national culture of military volunteerism. Russia’s active military may have been five times that of Ukraine at the start of the conflict, but few anticipated how significant a role volunteers would play in the defense of Kyiv. Tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens who were civilians on February 23—the day before Russia invaded—went to recruiting stations on February 24, or simply used their own arms to support the war effort. The Territorial Defense Force now numbers in the hundreds of thousands, and these volunteers have allowed Ukraine to commit most of its active duty military to the current counteroffensive.

Will to Fight

When the U.S. offered to evacuate him at the start of the conflict, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is famous for responding, “I need ammunition, not a ride.” The sentiment is common to many Ukrainians. Despite facing what was ranked as the second most powerful military in the world, ordinary Ukrainian men and women have demonstrated a strong will to fight for their country.

There is no greater test of a soldier or a people than war. The story of the Ukrainian people’s heroism is too rich to truncate here, but we are thinking of how thousands of civilians took up arms in February and March 2022, blocked streets, destroyed convoys, blew up bridges, and flooded rivers to prevent the fall of Ukraine’s capital. Or how just a few thousand men and women fought and held down 20,000 Russians for over 80 days in the city of Mariupol, ultimately withdrawing into their own version of an Alamo in the underground tunnels of a steel plant.

The most important difference between a Ukrainian soldier and a Russian one is their determination. Ukrainians prove every day that they are fighting for their freedom, families, and nation. By contrast, Russian soldiers have demonstrated their lack of motivation by refusing to fight, abandoning their positions when in danger, and attacking their leaders.

Despite Ukraine’s recent success, it’s important to remember that wars ebb and flow, and this war has been no different. Ukraine may be able to retake Kherson, but its current counteroffensive is not going to expel Russian forces everywhere. Ukraine’s military will eventually exhaust its capacity to continue this massive counterattack, and the larger Russian military will regroup and establish more effective defensive positions.

Nonetheless, the success of this counteroffensive provides a roadmap for Ukrainian forces: holding where they need to, slowly retreating where they must, and quickly counterattacking when the conditions are right. The ongoing offensive has demonstrated that Ukraine has a superior military that can overwhelm and defeat Russian forces, at scale, when they can achieve more favorable conditions. It has also provided a window into Russia’s military status: Russia cannot sustain their losses in this war.

If the West continues its level of aid and support, while Ukraine continues to build military capability and execute a superior war plan, the path to victory is clear. Under those conditions, it's only a matter of when—not if—Ukraine will win this war.

About the authors:

Liam Collins is the executive director of the Madison Policy Forum. He served as a defense advisor to Ukraine from 2016-2018 and is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel with deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, the Horn of Africa, and South America. He is co-author of the forthcoming book Understanding Urban Warfare.

John Spencer is the chair of urban warfare studies at the Madison Policy Forum. He served 25 years as a U.S. Army infantryman, which included two combat tours in Iraq. He is the author of the book Connected Soldiers: Life, Leadership, and Social Connection in Modern War and co-author, with Liam Collins, of Understanding Urban Warfare.

If you appreciated this piece and the work that we do every day at Common Sense, please subscribe:

commonsense.news · by Liam Collins

11. China’s Mistakes Can Be America’s Gain

Excerpts:

The evidence of rising discontent with Xi’s government is anecdotal, of course. In an environment without free speech and a free press, what the Chinese public really thinks about Xi Jinping is impossible to gauge. But the willingness of ordinary citizens to risk reprisals for their displays of defiance—in Zhengzhou unidentified thugs assaulted protesters with the apparent complicity of local authorities—is a measure of how frustrated people are with the current state of China.

None of these diplomatic, economic, or social problems appear likely to derail Xi’s quest for a third term. They may, however, make his rule unpredictable. The more China’s fortunes fade, the more of a threat Xi may become—not unlike his friend Putin. Xi has shifted toward nationalism to legitimize his hold on power. Hence Beijing’s heightened rhetoric on issues such as Taiwan, and the relentless anti-American propaganda from its foreign ministry and state media. Xi needs enemies abroad to deflect public disaffection with his failures at home.

For Washington, Xi’s continued rule presents both dangers and opportunities. The correct strategy will be to ensure that tensions do not escalate into conflict, while capitalizing on Xi’s missteps to bolster American power. This approach involves a delicate balance, one fraught with the possibility of war. But if Washington manages the situation well, the U.S. could reap the benefits of Xi’s rule and make China bear the costs.

China’s Mistakes Can Be America’s Gain

The United States does not need to take Xi Jinping’s attempt to project power at face value.

By Michael Schuman

The Atlantic · by Michael Schuman · September 26, 2022

Xi Jinping should be enjoying his final days in charge of China. For decades now, the Chinese Communist Party has regularly replaced its senior leadership—a system crucial to the nation’s success—and after 10 years in power, Xi would be due to step aside and allow a new team to guide the country’s future. But when the country’s top cadres meet in Beijing on October 16 for the 20th Party Congress, Xi is widely expected to break precedent and extend his rule for at least another five years.

Although this departure from custom has been mooted for years, the news might send a renewed chill down the spine of some in Washington, D.C. Xi has transformed China from the U.S.’s potential partner to its chief strategic adversary. The Chinese leader appears determined to capitalize on his country’s recently acquired wealth to challenge America’s economic primacy, technological advantage, and military dominance, and even its assumptions about the global order that forms the foundation of American power. Five more years of Xi almost certainly means five more years of superpower competition, even confrontation.

That is the conventional wisdom. But maybe Washington should be grateful Xi is sticking around. China’s leader definitely intends to roll back American global influence, but he may not be doing a good job of preparing his own country to attain that goal. The actual results of his policies suggest that he is weakening, not strengthening, China as a competitor to the United States. The longer Xi remains at China’s helm, the less competitive the country may become.

Lost amid the hype about China’s ascent is just how poorly the country has performed under Xi’s stewardship in nearly every aspect of policy. The economy has slowed dramatically. The leadership has given up on meeting its once-sacrosanct growth target. Xi’s aggressive foreign policy has alienated most of the world’s major powers and terrified China’s neighbors in Asia. Many of Xi’s high-profile government initiatives are marred by waste and mismanagement. China’s rise, which Xi has called inevitable, is less, not more, certain because of his rule.

That alternative narrative has serious implications for American foreign and domestic policy. In response to Xi’s belligerence, policy makers in Washington feel compelled to contest China on every front: diplomatic, economic, technological, military, and ideological. That was the thinking behind the recently signed CHIPS bill, which is designed to ensure America’s continued mastery of the semiconductor industry against China’s high-tech ambitions. The same strategy guided President Joe Biden’s 2021 Build Back Better World, an infrastructure-building program intended to compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and vie for influence in the developing world. These policies were based on the premise that China’s capabilities are keeping pace with Xi’s ambitions. The evidence now suggests that Xi’s aims are outstripping the country’s capacity to sustain them.

Read: No more ‘strategic ambiguity’ on Taiwan

The timing of Xi’s overreach is fortunate for Washington. Amid the partisan rancor and social disorder that has preoccupied the United States in the past five years, American global power has probably been more vulnerable than at any time since World War II. Xi could have taken advantage of that disarray to expand Chinese influence at America’s expense. Instead, his actions have had the effect not only of keeping the U.S. in the game but also, in certain respects, of enhancing its global standing. The worldwide American network of alliances, which had come under severe strain, is arguably stronger now than it has been in years—in part due to Xi’s policies.

Xi’s China remains a threat as the only country with both the intent and the resources to undermine the U.S.-led global order. Yet the failings of Xi’s agenda show that the widely held assumption that China’s rise is as unstoppable as American decline is simplistic. Xi wants to be written into the history books as the man who overturned Pax Americana. Instead, he could end up being the one who preserves it.

When Xi Jinping claimed power in 2012, most China experts anticipated that he would follow the immensely successful path laid by the “paramount leader” Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s—based on liberalizing economic reforms, integration with the global economy, and a partnership with the United States. Xi had previously served as an official in some of China’s most economically vibrant regions, so he had long experience with Deng’s central principle of “reform and opening up.” Shortly before Xi became the country’s new leader, he had had extensive interactions with then Vice President Joe Biden, which left the impression that Xi valued China’s fruitful relationship with Washington.

As his rule has unfolded, however, those early assumptions have proved to be wrong. Highly ideological, fiercely nationalist, and obsessed with political control, Xi has deviated sharply from his predecessors’ policies. In so doing, he has altered China’s course in profound and unpredictable ways.

Most dramatically of all, Xi has entirely revised China’s foreign policy. He apparently believes that China’s moment to assume the status of the world’s most powerful country has arrived. Rather than treating Washington as a partner, Xi considers the U.S. to be China’s most dangerous adversary. Instead of immersing China in the American-led global order, Xi is promoting his own vision of a Sinocentric alternative, one that is friendlier to authoritarian regimes. Notably, the Chinese leader has forged a new friendship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who Xi seems to believe can be an ally in his quest to roll back American power.

Yet the more openly hostile China has become to the current international system, the stronger U.S. alliances have grown. Xi’s agenda has persuaded the world’s democracies to tighten their ties to the United States and to one another in order to counter the threat he presents.

Initially, European leaders were uncomfortable with Washington’s tougher line on China, insisting on their “strategic autonomy.” This divergence sowed some dissension within the Atlantic alliance. However, Xi’s support for Putin amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has gone a long way toward healing that rift. At a virtual summit in April, ostensibly meant to bolster cooperation between China and Europe, the leaders of the European Union criticized Xi’s pro-Russia stance, warning him against aiding Putin’s war effort.

Then, in June, the leaders of Washington’s four main partners in the Pacific—Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand—participated in a NATO summit for the first time to discuss the Chinese threat. This was a sign that a more coordinated or fully united alliance that brought together the democratic powers in Europe and Asia might be possible. In addition, India—usually wary of entangling itself in superpower competition—has become more active in the Quad (a security partnership that also includes Australia, Japan, and the U.S.). This suggests that India sees the group as a potential bulwark against Beijing, which has alarmed Indian leaders by pressing territorial claims along the two countries’ disputed border.

Read: Zero COVID has outlived its usefulness. Here’s why China is still enforcing it.

Xi seems not to care about these effects of his actions. In mid-September, on his first international diplomatic trip since the start of the coronavirus pandemic, Xi chose to meet Putin, thumbing his nose at the United States and its European allies. He has also pressed ahead with his undiplomatic diplomacy, which has at times descended into threats and demands delivered by his appointees. In a July meeting with his Australian counterpart, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi blamed the two countries’ strained relations on Canberra’s “irresponsible words and deeds.” He went on to say that they could be improved—if Australia avoided “being controlled by any third party”—that is, the U.S.—according to an official Chinese summary of the conversation.

Shortly after that, China’s foreign ministry directly threatened the U.S. that it would “pay the price” for House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, which Beijing perceived as a violation of its sovereignty. (The government in Beijing considers Taiwan part of China.) A few days later, a senior Chinese official warned the Israeli ambassador to Beijing not to allow the U.S. to influence Israel’s approach to China, with a tactless claim that the Jews and the Chinese share a common grievance as victims of the West.

As a consequence of all this, China’s image has deteriorated sharply around the world, according to a recent survey of 19 countries, mostly major democracies, by the Pew Research Center. Xi himself fares poorly, too, with respondents in many countries expressing little or no confidence that the Chinese leader will “do the right thing” in international affairs.

China is perceived somewhat more favorably in parts of the developing world, and Beijing’s foreign policy has become increasingly focused on winning support in what’s called the “Global South.” But even there, Xi blunders. China, for instance, failed to corral the small nations of the South Pacific into a security and economic pact, in part because of Beijing’s arrogance. Henry Puna, the secretary general of the Pacific Islands Forum, a regional policy organization, said in a July briefing that local leaders had rejected the initiative because Chinese officials had presented them with fully drafted documents for the pact without consultation. “If anybody knows what we want and what we need and what our priorities are, it’s not other people—it’s us,” he said.

Xi isn’t doing much better at home, particularly with China’s economy. Growth has slowed significantly on his watch. In 2012, at the start of his tenure, the economy grew 7.8 percent, but this year the International Monetary Fund forecasts a meager 3.3 percent expansion. A reduction in the rate of growth was probably inevitable as the economy developed, but Xi’s policies have likely made matters worse.

The key to China’s decades-long economic boom was the withdrawal of state intervention in the economy and its opening to overseas trade and investment, which allowed private enterprise to thrive. To some extent, Xi has reversed that—enough to undercut some of the most vibrant sectors of the economy and divert capital and talent into wasteful endeavors, such as a slate of state-led industrial programs.

The most obvious sign of that shift is the extensive new regulatory burden imposed on private companies. Some of it is well intentioned—ensuring that food-delivery workers get better treatment, for instance—but all of it has been introduced haphazardly and has curtailed the expansion of some of the country’s most important companies. The once-flourishing private-education industry, which offered after-school classes for college-hungry kids, has suffered layoffs and heavy financial losses after an edict forbidding these businesses from making money out of teaching core-curriculum subjects to most students. One prominent technology firm, the ride-hailing app Didi Chuxing, has suffered so much harassment from a cybersecurity investigation and restrictions on its operations that its share price has plunged by more than 80 percent since its initial public offering a year ago.

Read: When Biden went to China

Instead of propelling fresh economic growth, the tech sector as a whole has been downsizing and laying off employees. That has made jobs harder to find for recent college graduates: In July, youth unemployment reached an all-time high of nearly 20 percent (though it improved slightly in August).

Xi’s motivations appear part ideological, part purely political. He seems to fear that Big Business, and especially the tech sector, could amass sufficient influence and wealth to pose a challenge to Communist rule. Party officials have said plainly that they want greater control over the management of private enterprises, and Xi himself has spoken of the “need to prevent the disorderly expansion and unchecked growth of capital.” Xi prefers instead state-led endeavors that he can more easily superintend. The government has provided lavish investments, subsidies, and tax breaks to support industries that Xi’s bureaucrats favor in sectors they want China to dominate, including electric vehicles, semiconductors, and artificial intelligence.

Although these industrial programs are in too early a phase to pass final judgment on, and there are a few signs of progress, the results so far are generally not encouraging. One observer, Scott Kennedy, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, noted in a recent essay that in spite of huge government support, “there is almost no sector where China is the dominant technology leader.”

One of the most high profile of these state-driven missions—to develop a semiconductor industry advanced enough to make the country self-reliant—has been plagued by corruption. To date, it has made only glacial progress in catching up to industry leaders in the U.S., and has not come close to reducing the Chinese economy’s dependence on foreign-made chips.

Xi’s apparent distrust of free-market reforms has also exacerbated the economy’s most dangerous weakness: its broken growth model. Chinese policy makers and economists worldwide have long warned that China’s growth is too dependent on investment, which is often debt driven and excessive—squandering resources on unnecessary apartments, factories, and infrastructure. Xi continued the practice of pumping credit into the economy whenever it slowed below the party’s preferred target, and he’s suffering for it today. Debt has risen steeply during Xi’s tenure, from less than double national output in 2012 to almost triple today.

The consequences are emerging in the bloated but vital property sector. A government attempt to rein in highly indebted developers led to a crisis last year at one of the industry’s giants, Evergrande, and the sector’s troubles have deepened. With developers defaulting, property sales falling, real-estate prices sinking, and new construction slumping, the instability of the sector represents a risk to the nation’s banks, which are deep in property-related lending, as well as to the wealth of the country’s middle class. In a remarkable indication of diminished public confidence, families across the country recently engaged in a “mortgage strike”—suspending payments on unfinished apartments out of concern that cash-strapped builders will never complete them.

Xi is adding to these woes with his strict pandemic controls. Undoubtedly, the biggest achievement of Xi’s tenure was limiting COVID-19’s hold in China and averting the scale of public-health crisis that so many other countries have suffered. But Xi’s mandate that COVID cases must be kept at or near zero has become an intolerable burden on the nation. Recurring closures of major cities and industrial zones have stifled travel, output, and commerce. Hardest hit have been the smallest businesses, those neighborhood restaurants, salons, and corner shops that provide crucial urban employment.

Amid the strain of quarantines and joblessness, domestic discontent has reached an unusually high level. The government faced widespread resistance in imposing its two-month COVID shutdown of Shanghai earlier this year. Residents confined to their homes banged pots and pans and screamed out of their windows to protest the harsh restrictions. In Beijing, where residents must still present a recent negative COVID test in order to ride the subway or eat in a restaurant, testing stations have become targets for vandalism, in some cases defaced with graffiti reading “Give me liberty or give me death.”

The sources of public dissatisfaction are not limited to the lockdowns. In July, hundreds of protesters from all over the country massed in the central city of Zhengzhou after their bank deposits were frozen thanks to a local financial scandal.

Jeffrey Goldberg: A Russian defeat in Ukraine could save Taiwan

The angry mood seems to have overwhelmed efforts to censor criticism on Chinese social media. “People are not happy!” proclaimed one recent post on Weibo, China’s version of Twitter. “Your government positions are secure but people at the bottom are having a hard time surviving.”

The evidence of rising discontent with Xi’s government is anecdotal, of course. In an environment without free speech and a free press, what the Chinese public really thinks about Xi Jinping is impossible to gauge. But the willingness of ordinary citizens to risk reprisals for their displays of defiance—in Zhengzhou unidentified thugs assaulted protesters with the apparent complicity of local authorities—is a measure of how frustrated people are with the current state of China.

None of these diplomatic, economic, or social problems appear likely to derail Xi’s quest for a third term. They may, however, make his rule unpredictable. The more China’s fortunes fade, the more of a threat Xi may become—not unlike his friend Putin. Xi has shifted toward nationalism to legitimize his hold on power. Hence Beijing’s heightened rhetoric on issues such as Taiwan, and the relentless anti-American propaganda from its foreign ministry and state media. Xi needs enemies abroad to deflect public disaffection with his failures at home.

For Washington, Xi’s continued rule presents both dangers and opportunities. The correct strategy will be to ensure that tensions do not escalate into conflict, while capitalizing on Xi’s missteps to bolster American power. This approach involves a delicate balance, one fraught with the possibility of war. But if Washington manages the situation well, the U.S. could reap the benefits of Xi’s rule and make China bear the costs.

The Atlantic · by Michael Schuman · September 26, 2022

12. Philippines to shut 175 offshore gambling firms, deport 40,000 Chinese workers

Excerpts:

Real estate consultancy Leechiu Property Consultants estimates that a complete exit of the POGO industry would leave vacant 1.05 million square metres (259 acres) of office space - a third of the size of New York's Central Park - and 8.9 billion pesos (US$151 million) in foregone annual rent.

The sector employs 201,000 Chinese and 111,000 Filipinos, according to Leechiu's data, which estimates POGOs deliver 190 billion pesos (US$3.22 billion) to the economy each year, a boon to the property and retail sectors.

Philippines to shut 175 offshore gambling firms, deport 40,000 Chinese workers

channelnewsasia.com

A casino dealer collects chips at a roulette table in Pasay city, Metro Manila, Philippines on Mar 27, 2015. (Photo: Reuters/Erik De Castro)

26 Sep 2022 09:57PM (Updated: 26 Sep 2022 10:28PM)

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MANILA: The Philippines will stop operations of 175 offshore gambling firms and deport about 40,000 Chinese workers, a justice ministry official said on Monday (Sep 26), part of a crackdown on the notoriously opaque online gaming industry.

The sector emerged in the Philippines in 2016 and grew exponentially, as operators capitalised on the country's liberal gaming laws to target customers in China, where gambling is banned.

At their peak, Philippine offshore gambling operators, or POGOs, employed more than 300,000 Chinese workers, but the pandemic and higher taxes have forced many to operate elsewhere.

"The crackdown was triggered by reports of murder, kidnapping and other crimes committed by Chinese nationals against fellow Chinese nationals," justice ministry spokesperson Jose Dominic Clavano said.

The POGOs targeted for closure had licenses that either expired or were revoked, for violations like non-payment of government fees, Clavano said, adding the deportation of the Chinese workers would start next month.

The government generated 7.2 billion pesos (US$122.21 million) in 2020 and 3.9 billion last year in POGO fees alone, according to the finance ministry. Economists estimate considerably larger amounts are being spent on taxes, workers' spending and office rental.

China's embassy in Manila in a statement said Beijing supports the deportation and crackdown on POGO-related crimes, adding the government "firmly opposes and takes tough measures to combat gambling".

The Philippines regulator, which recently said there were 30 licensed POGO firms versus 60 before the pandemic, did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Real estate consultancy Leechiu Property Consultants estimates that a complete exit of the POGO industry would leave vacant 1.05 million square metres (259 acres) of office space - a third of the size of New York's Central Park - and 8.9 billion pesos (US$151 million) in foregone annual rent.

The sector employs 201,000 Chinese and 111,000 Filipinos, according to Leechiu's data, which estimates POGOs deliver 190 billion pesos (US$3.22 billion) to the economy each year, a boon to the property and retail sectors.

Source: Reuters/st

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channelnewsasia.com

13. ‘Huge problem:’ Iranian drones pose new threat to Ukraine

‘Huge problem:’ Iranian drones pose new threat to Ukraine

Politico

By LARA SELIGMAN

09/26/2022 10:05 AM EDT

Recent attacks are prompting renewed calls for the U.S. to send more advanced weaponry.

A triangle-shaped suicide drone approaches the target during a drill in Iran. | Imamedia via AP

09/26/2022 10:05 AM EDT

It was a little over a week ago that Iranian drones first began appearing in the skies over Ukraine.

Andriana Arekhta, a junior sergeant with the Ukrainian Armed Forces, said the drones flew from Crimea to attack her special forces unit fighting near the southern city of Kherson. The drones evaded the soldiers’ defenses and dropped bombs on their position, destroying two tanks with their crews inside.

“It’s very difficult to see these drones on radars,” said Arekhta, who traveled to Washington, D.C., last week as part of a delegation of female Ukrainian soldiers. “It’s a huge problem.”

Over the past week, Russia has deployed Shahed and Mohajer combat drones imported from Iran in greater numbers across Ukraine, with devastating results. Some hit combat positions, smashing tanks and armored vehicles, while others struck civilian infrastructure, including in the port city of Odesa.

In his nightly address on Friday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said his country’s anti-aircraft forces had shot down more than a dozen drones in the eastern Dnipropetrovsk region and Odesa. The Ukrainian Air Force identified them as Shahed-136 kamikaze drones and Mohajer-6 drones that carry munitions and can also be used for reconnaissance.

But in interviews, a Ukrainian activist and three soldiers said the Iranian drones pose a major threat to both fighters and civilians. Their arrival on the battlefield makes the need for the West to send additional modern weaponry even more urgent, as Kyiv tries to seize on recent gains to retake as much territory as possible before winter sets in, they said.

The Iranian drones appear to be a potential game-changer for the Russians. They are relatively small and fly at low altitude, evading Ukrainian radars. Arekhta said she could shoot them down with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, but only during the day because the U.S.-provided weapons do not come with a night-vision system.

Ukraine needs modern air defenses, such as the Counter-Rocket, Artillery and Mortar systems the U.S. used in Afghanistan, and 360-degree radar to counter the new threat, the visiting group said.

“I need to be in position against Russian helicopters on one side and Iranian drones came from another side,” Arekhta said. “It’s very hard to close the huge area with Stingers, with other weapons that can hit these drones.”

Arekhta uses the Switchblade 300 drones provided by Washington, but they are essentially commercial systems that are not powerful enough to work against armored vehicles and artillery, she said. Ukraine needs the upgraded Switchblade 600 drones, a loitering munition she described as “a flying Javelin.”

Washington has contracted with manufacturer AeroVironment to send the 600 version, but they likely won’t arrive for many months.

Ukrainian forces are now fighting the Russians on two fronts: advancing east from the Oskil River into the contested Donbas region, and south from Kherson. After an initial breakthrough at the beginning of the month during which Kyiv recaptured much of the Russian-occupied Kharkiv region, gains have slowed significantly. Ukrainian soldiers are now pushing into the entrenched Donbas, where the two sides have been essentially deadlocked since 2014.

In the Donetsk oblast, the battle is now more difficult because Russian forces are fighting from trenches and shelters built years ago, said Ivanna Chobaniuk, a medic who was serving near Kharkiv before she traveled to D.C. last week.

In the northeast, Ukrainian soldiers are trying to retake ground using Toyotas and other civilian cars — which are particularly vulnerable to drone attack — because their old armored vehicles were destroyed, Chobaniuk said.

The old Soviet-era tanks Kyiv operates have a myriad of problems, Arekhta said. The soldiers frequently get error messages when using the aiming system and there is no fire protection system, forcing them to use a small fire extinguisher on the outside of the tank if they are hit. The tanks don’t connect to the soldiers’ Western-provided radios, so Arekhta has to use her cell phone to communicate. In the winter, “Soviet tank doesn’t work at all,” she said.

Kyiv needs modern tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles and Humvees to help Ukraine’s forces advance in the face of heavy Russian artillery, the soldiers said.

“It is now when we have momentum,” said Daria Kaleniuk, the head of the Ukrainian nonprofit the Anti-Corruption Action Center. “We keep counterattacking and counterattacking in Toyotas, in civilian cars — it is very inconvenient, especially if Iranian drones are flying over.”

Kyiv is trying to recapture as much ground as possible before winter sets in, the soldiers said. But now they have a new problem: in response to their counteroffensive, Vladimir Putin has mobilized 300,000 reservists to fight in Ukraine.

While there are questions about the quality of the soldiers Putin has called up, Russia will use the colder months, when fighting typically slows, to train and equip them, the Ukrainian soldiers said.

“If we give them that time, in spring there will be an epic battle — another epic battle,” said Daria Zubenko, a senior sergeant who has served as a paramedic and sniper.

Ukraine could use the winter to train its forces on more advanced weapons that the West has not yet greenlighted — for instance, modern battle tanks and fighter jets, Kaleniuk said. The Ukrainian Armed Forces two weeks ago submitted an official letter of request asking for either used or new fighter jets, and its air force has identified a few dozen pilots who speak English and are prepared to begin training immediately, she said.

But modern tanks and jets may be little more than a pipe dream, at least for now. Although Pentagon officials have left the door open to sending Kyiv the U.S.-made F-16 fighter jet, top generals said the planes wouldn’t arrive for years after any political decision was made to donate them.

“I’m really fed up of losing my friends,” Arekhta said. “Sometimes I just say ‘happy birthday’ on social media, on Facebook, and the answer is: ‘he is dead.’ ”

POLITICO

Politico

14. #Reviewing The Inheritance (The Inheritance: America’s Military After Two Decades of War. Mara E. Karlin)

Note that Dr. Karlin is the current Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Secretary of Defense's Strategy & Force Development

#Reviewing The Inheritance

thestrategybridge.org · September 27, 2022

The Inheritance: America’s Military After Two Decades of War. Mara E. Karlin. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2022.

Mara E. Karlin’s new book, The Inheritance: America’s Military After Two Decades of War, is a sobering yet necessary read. In looking at the effects of the post-9/11 wars on the U.S. military, she asks—and proposes answers to—two questions. First, “[h]ow did the most capable military in U.S. history—indeed in the history of the world—fight to, at best, a draw in its longest contemporary conflict?” And second, “why has this not been the subject of greater reflection and debate.”[1]

Karlin largely blames the dreadful state of civil-military relations in the United States, of which the military is part. Her answer to the latter question is that clear-eyed self-reflection is tremendously difficult, both for individuals and for institutions. Nevertheless, she argues, the U.S. military needs to engage in critical analysis of its own mistakes rather than passing all blame to civilians. Failure to do so, she claims, “neuters the history of what has transpired,” breeds “inconclusiveness,” and “could be ruinous” to preparedness for future conflicts.[2]

According to Karlin, civilian leaders have either inappropriately deferred to military leaders or asked of them the impossible.

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The book’s thematic organization is complex. Karlin first draws on Karl von Clausewitz’s “social trinity”—the military, the people and the government[3]—to frame three crises that she sees as the military’s most consequential and lasting inheritance from the last two decades of war.[4] First, the military, both as an institution and as an assembly of individuals, faces a crisis of confidence. The best trained, best equipped armed force in the world seemingly could not win a decisive victory. The resultant cognitive dissonance has left personnel at every level scrambling for explanations that often take the form of seeking someone else to blame. Second, the American public faces a crisis of caring, as a multigenerational war has barely registered in most people’s lives. Americans have largely abdicated their civic responsibility to act as a check on military and civilian leaders. Instead, many have uncritically venerated military institutions as intrinsically blameless. Such civic abdication of responsibility has been compounded by the fact that, third, the government faces a crisis of meaningful civilian control. According to Karlin, civilian leaders have either inappropriately deferred to military leaders or asked of them the impossible.

Although each of these three crises receives its own chapter, they are interrelated and they exacerbate each other. On this subject, it is worth quoting Karlin at length:

The crisis of confidence and the crisis of caring both interact with and shape the crisis of meaningful civilian control. The first has meant that civilian leaders have repeatedly sent the military to deal with problems it could not reasonably solve on its own. The second, in which the public elevated an increasingly alien military over other forms of public service while largely abdicating its own civil duty, has made the military feel increasingly isolated but means it hasn’t had to face the costs of strategy failures abroad. Aggravating each of these legacies of war—harming the military’s inability to understand its purpose and inhibiting the public’s ability to shape what is being done in its name—impedes civilian control of the military.[5]

In other words, a legacy of the post-9/11 wars is a jumbled system in which the public trusts the military too much, the military does not trust the public or the civilian government enough, and the civilian government has been too dysfunctional—under Republican and Democratic administrations, alike—to exert proper control.

After framing the problem, Karlin devotes five chapters to the growth and effects of these crises on the U.S. military. To do this, she looks through five lenses: how the military goes to war, how it wages war, who serves, who leads, and the military’s preparedness for future conflicts.[6] Taken together, these five chapters bring the ad hoc nature of the post-9/11 wars into focus. Information was not shared freely between senior civilian and military officials during the planning phases. Congress initially wrote a blank check, allowing leaders to buy “prime rib on the credit card,” and then opened and closed the funding spigot seemingly randomly throughout the conflicts.[7]

On a more individual level, Karlin is full of praise for servicemembers of all ranks and at all echelons, but she points out the weaknesses in the systems of who serves and how accountability in leadership is assessed.

Each of the military service branches struggled to balance the practical needs of the conflicts at hand, maintain force readiness for future conflicts, and navigate the reality of a detached public. Tactical responsibility was shifted disproportionately to U.S. special operations forces and drone strikes without properly accounting for the strategic (or personal) consequences of relying on these types of warfare. Army and Marine leadership surrendered to a “growing aversion…to taking operational risks” for fear of incurring unacceptable casualty rates.[8] The Air Force, thanks to delayed modernization and “in lieu of” assignments that put airmen into joint forces ground positions, “came out of this war hollow” while the Navy faced an identity crisis sparked by conflicts fought primarily on land and in the air.[9] None of the branches, argues Karlin, emerged from two decades of war in a better position than where it started.

On a more individual level, Karlin is full of praise for servicemembers of all ranks and at all echelons, but she points out the weaknesses in the systems of who serves and how accountability in leadership is assessed. Military service, as scholars have pointed out for years, is not evenly distributed and has only become more stratified over the decades.[10] Because military service has become a “family business,” where service runs in families, there are three points of danger—the well could run dry, a homogenous force is a less adaptable force, and uneven distribution of service only deepens the crisis of caring.[11] Meanwhile, military leaders are part of the U.S.’s sprawling, increasingly politicized, civil-military bureaucracies. They are therefore enmeshed in a culture of “micromanagement, politicization, and ethics,” that has further left them mired in “accountability soup,” whereby collective responsibility barely exists.[12] In the words of one of Karlin’s interview subjects:

Everyone can look at [the failures of the post-9/11 wars] and it’s a Rorschach test. The Army can say we won the operational piece, but we were let down by policymakers…the Marines, too. The Air Force can say we delivered precision airpower and tore apart our force. Civilians can say we tried. The Administrations can say we’ve been eating different types of shit sandwiches and every time we try to pull out, the military says no. It’s like a weird and bad Thanksgiving dinner happens in a family and everyone in that family has a different perspective about what was the original sin…Everyone’s got their own different opinion about where it started and who is to blame.[13]

The picture is not pretty.

One of the book’s major strengths is its source base. Karlin integrates a wealth of recent scholarship and makes excellent use of other available sources, including the satirical website Duffle Blog. But most importantly, she conducted almost 100 interviews with current or recently retired generals, flag officers, and civilian officials from the Department of Defense. Although they have been anonymized in the text, their candid observations and recollections provide the meat of the book. Interview subjects very clearly said the quiet parts out loud.

Clear-eyed assessment at every level of every phase of the post-9/11 conflicts is necessary to truly move forward into the future.

The book’s argument is dense. I am not sure its organizational structure does it any favors. There is some repetition, and some of the “lenses” are more clearly developed than others. Nevertheless, this book needed to be written, especially by someone with as much experience as Karlin. Recent history shows that the military has a habit of forgetting conflicts that were less than successful or at least of only remembering the lessons it chooses to.[14] But such an approach does no one any good. Clear-eyed assessment at every level of every phase of the post-9/11 conflicts is necessary to truly move forward into the future. And, as Karlin points out, this includes acknowledgement on the part of the military half of the civ-mil equation that it made mistakes too.

Overall, this book is a plea for better communication between and among multiple parties—individual service branches, the Joint Chiefs, the offices of the Department of Defense, Congress, executive offices, and the American public. Dialogue, Karlin writes, can help those who waged the post-9/11 wars process their experiences; reestablish civilian authority to “baseline” the interactions between diplomacy, domestic politics, and military force; and give the military an opportunity to honestly debrief how the wars shaped “its conception of warfare.”[15] The purposes of foreign policy and of national security are too important to do anything less.

Amy J. Rutenberg, Associate Professor of History, Iowa State University and author of Rough Draft: Cold War Military Manpower Policy and the Origins of Vietnam-Era Draft Resistance. She is currently working on a book on peace activism and military service.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of the The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: Untitled, Mililani, Hawaii 2020 ( Thomas Ashlock).

Notes:

[1] Mara E. Karlin, The Inheritance: America’s Military After Two Decades of War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2022), xiv-xv.

[2] Karlin, 2, 6.

[4] Karlin, 4.

[5] Karlin, 50.

[6] Karlin, 3.

[7] Karlin, 88.

[8] Karlin, 116.

[9] Karlin, 123, 124.

[10] Worries about the makeup of the all-volunteer force have ranged from Thomas S. Gates, Jr., The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Force ((Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1970) to the very recent textbook, Katherine Carroll and William B. Hickman, eds.,Understanding the U.S. Military (London: Routledge, 2022).

[11] Karlin, 144.

[12] Karlin, 162.

[13] Karlin, 162=163.

[14] See, for example, David Fitzgerald, Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013).

[15] Karlin, 217-218.

thestrategybridge.org · September 27, 2022

15. New US nuclear sub made for China, Russia war

Of course. Who else would it be made for?

New US nuclear sub made for China, Russia war

SSN(X) design aims to fix flaws in Virginia class predecessor and marks a return to Cold War operational doctrine

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · September 27, 2022

The US is designing its SSN(X) next-generation nuclear attack submarine in a significant shift from procuring Virginia class SSNs to a new class by the 2030s. The program addresses maintenance woes in its current nuclear attack submarine fleet and reorients US undersea warfare capabilities to great power competition from China and Russia.

The designation “SSN(X)” means that the exact design of the nuclear attack submarine class has not yet been determined, according to an August 2022 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report.

Although the Virginia class is built with incremental improvements called “blocks,” a new design that solves maintenance problems and includes game-changing technologies may represent the development of a new class altogether.

The CRS report states that the US Navy estimates the SSN(X)’s price tag at US$5.8 billion per boat, significantly higher than the $3.6 billion for a VPM-equipped Virginia class boat.

At the Society of Naval Engineers’ annual Fleet Maintenance and Modernization Symposium held this month, Rear Admiral Jonathan Rucker stated that the US currently has 50 SSNs, but 18 are under maintenance and unavailable to operational commanders, as reported in Defense News.

Rucker said that the current number of SSNs in maintenance is too high and that sub maintenance is facing challenges in planning availabilities, work execution and keeping enough spares and materials for repairs on hand.

At the same conference, Rear Admiral Scott Brown said that the US Navy did not make sufficient investments in repair and maintenance capabilities when designing and acquiring the Virginia class SSN, resulting in the cannibalization of other boats to maintain operational numbers and delays waiting for parts and components that are often unavailable.

Rucker emphasized that such shortfalls should not happen with the SSN(X). He stated that from over a million parts in the Virginia SSN, only 0.1%, or 32 parts, were found not to perform as intended from a life expectancy perspective. He also mentioned that those 32 parts were redesigned, or had their maintenance cycle changed, insinuating those improved parts could possibly be used in the SSN(X).

He stated that the SSN(X) design emphasizes four top requirements: speed, stealth, payloads and operational availability. Rucker and Brown’s statements echo the August 2022 CRS report highlighting the industrial base and maintenance woes plaguing the US Virginia class SSN fleet.

America’s shipyards are being asked to produce more Virginia-class submarines per year. Credit: US Navy photo.

The report notes concern about the US’ limited industrial base to construct two Virginia class SSNs with the multi-mission Virginia Payload Module (VPM) and one Columbia class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) annually from the mid-2020s to mid-2030s.

Despite those limitations, there may be plans to increase US submarine production to three Virginia class boats and one Columbia class boat per year, which has been dubbed the “3+1 program.”

In December 2021, US President Joe Biden signed three determinations of the Defense Production Act (DPA) to strengthen the US submarine industrial base to increase the production of Virginia class subs.

However, the CRS report asks several difficult questions – most without answers – about the US’ submarine construction industrial base. First, it asks whether the US Navy, submarine shipyards and submarine supplier firms have agreed on the US industrial base capacity to handle building the Virginia and Columbia class subs.

Second, it asks whether those organizations have taken steps to increase the industrial base capacity to match desired submarine procurement rates. Third, the report asks about the specific effects of the three presidential DPA determinations on US submarine-building capacity.

The CRS report also points to other issues within the Virginia class fleet such as cannibalization between boats, noting that some components have worn out earlier than their 33-year designed lifespan, with flaws in contractor quality and out-of-spec parts contributing to accelerated wear.

The report notes that most cannibalized parts were electrical components, among other classified parts. It also says that cannibalization brings a slew of disadvantages, such as increased workload and risks of parts being damaged during the process.

Other issues raised in the CRS report included substandard steel, problems with hull coating and defective parts.

With all these problems, US Navy SSNs have had delayed deployments due to capacity-related backlogs at US Naval shipyards, notes a separate July 22 CRS report. That report asks critical questions about the US Navy’s required number of SSNs given its 355-ship goal in 2016 while pointing to the operational implications of the US’ shrinking SSN fleet, which is projected to decline to 46 boats by 2028 and stay below 60 until 2045.

The US built the Virginia class SSN in the 2000s as a less-expensive alternative to the Seawolf class, which was built between 1989 and 2005, with the latter class being the most expensive US attack sub ever built at $5 billion per boat in 2018 dollar values.

The Seawolf class was designed as the successor to the 1970s Los Angeles class, which is currently still in service. The US built the subs to operate in deep-water environments to hunt then-Soviet nuclear-powered subs such as the Typhoon-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile subs (SSBN) and Akula-class SSNs.

However, the US built only three out of 29 planned boats due to the end of the Cold War.

A Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarine moors to the pier at Naval Base Guam. Photo: U.S. Navy / Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kelsey J. Hockenberger

In contrast, the VPM-equipped Virginia class costs $3.6 billion per boat while featuring technologies found in the Seawolf class.

While the Virginia class can perform the same missions as the Seawolf class, it is optimized for a post-Cold War threat environment characterized by covert insertion and delivery of special operations forces (SOF), covert cruise missile strikes on land targets and covert offensive and defensive mine warfare.

However, renewed great power competition between the US, China and Russia may have prompted a shift in US submarine design philosophy, with a new emphasis on anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare.

Notably, China’s rapidly advancing anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities and improving nuclear and conventional subs pose a significant challenge to US undersea dominance in the Pacific. Russia’s nuclear subs are also a serious challenge to US dominance in the Pacific and Arctic. When operating close to US shores, Chinese and Russian subs pose a significant threat to the US homeland.

Apart from simplifying logistics and maintaining fleet numbers as a rationale for the SSN(X), the US Navy may have reached its stealth capability limit with a purely mechanical system, a limitation that may be driving the SSN(X)’s development.

In a 2016 article for The National Interest, Dave Majumdar notes that a next-generation sub would have to dispense with moving parts to improve stealth drastically, as rotating machinery and propulsors moving through water excite the stern and other parts, generating noise.

In addition, Majumdar notes that a permanent magnet motor for the upcoming Columbia class may also be installed in the SSN(X), presenting a big technological leap from the Virginia class.

Critically, the increasing stealth of Chinese and Russian subs may be the driving factor to improve the stealth of the Virginia class. However, current mechanical propulsion technologies may already have reached their limit.

In a September 2020 article for The National Interest, Caleb Larson mentions that China’s Shang class SSNs may already be as quiet as their US counterparts. He notes improvements in reactor design and anti-echoic tiles may have reduced the Shang class’s noise level to that of upgraded Los Angeles SSNs.

Similarly, Russia has been steadily improving the capability of its subs, despite the relative deterioration of its military in other areas. In technology terms, the Yasen SSGNs represent a significant development in acoustic signature reduction and weapons integration, which are on par with some Western counterparts, notes Arnaud Sobrero in a February 2021 article for The Diplomat.

Sobrero also mentions that Russia’s Borei SSBNs are more modern than the aging US Ohio class SSBNs. Russia commissioned its Belgorod special mission submarine this July.

Asia Times has reported on this development, noting that the Belgorod is the designated carrier of the Poseidon nuclear-armed underwater drone and the highly-classified Losharik saboteur sub.

Russia’s Belgorod submarine is designed to fight in a nuclear conflict. Image: Creative Commons

Asia Times has also reported on Russia’s planned successor to the Borei class, the Arcturus, which is optimized for Arctic operations and features stealth improvements such as a shaftless power plant and pump jet propulsion.

Given these threats, the US Navy envisions the SSN(X) will be an “apex predator” combining the high speed and payload of the Seawolf class, stealth and sensors of the Virginia class and availability and service life of the Columbia class.

The CRS report says the SSN(X) will be designed to counter the growing threat posed by near-peer adversary competition for undersea supremacy, noting it aims to outclass competitors in terms of speed, payload, stealth and operational availability.

The SSN(X) will also be capable of full-spectrum undersea warfare and coordinate with a larger contingent of off-hull vehicles, sensors and friendly forces while improving multi-mission capability and sustained combat presence in denied waters.

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · September 27, 2022

16. AUKUS and Cyber Capabilities: Alignment of Concepts, Definitions, Capabilities, Norms and Doctrine

Conclusion:

To take the greatest advantage of these pooled resources and efforts, however, a deep level of communication and collaboration is needed. Genuine exchanges of ideas, tools, and talent is needed. The best and brightest in the militaries, governments, and academia of each of the AUKUS partners need to come together to respond to the joint challenges these countries face. In relation to cyber capabilities, this would help the AUKUS partners achieve great things.

AUKUS and Cyber Capabilities: Alignment of Concepts, Definitions, Capabilities, Norms and Doctrine - Security & Defence PLuS Alliance

securityanddefenceplus.plusalliance.org · by Sally Burt

As strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific intensifies, it challenges previously held assumptions about how to establish and maintain security in the region and between global powers. The challenge to the status quo being posed by China and Russia is increasingly being countered by partnerships and small groupings of like-minded states. Among these groupings, the most recent to form is the AUKUS collaboration.

The September 2021 announcement of the AUKUS relationship between the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia was focused on the deal made between these governments to share nuclear submarine technology with Australia. Since that announcement, it has been made clear that these governments see great potential for the sharing of a broader range of technology and capabilities. A further joint statement from the three leaders made in April 2022 explicitly articulated the intention for collaboration in the fields of artificial intelligence, hypersonics, underwater technologies, and cyber capabilities. Little detail of how the relationship will lead to this greater collaboration has yet been made public.

In the area of cyber capabilities, for warfighting and other national security purposes, there is huge potential for the partners to benefit from collaboration and cooperation. China and Russia continue to express their commitment to growing their cyber power as a strategy to combat the United States’ global dominance through traditional military power. There is a need, therefore, for a focused effort by like-minded states to prevent the development of that capability and to develop counter-capabilities. Rapid innovation and research and development is needed to stay ahead in the competition for dominance in cyberspace. AUKUS provides an avenue to achieve this.

By pooling resources, including human capital, research facilities and institutions, as well as finance and expenditure, economies of scale can be derived and duplication of effort can be minimised in the development of new cyber technologies. Each AUKUS partner has different strengths and areas of focus for their work on weapons technology and cyber capabilities; sharing access to information and technologies between AUKUS members will allow a greater focus on these areas of strength and will avoid dilution of limited research investment and resources.

The number one imperative outlined in the Command Vision for U.S. Cyber Command 2018 is to develop cyber capabilities more quickly and effectively than America’s adversaries. There is a need to not only innovate but also operationalise the technology to keep ahead of the strategic competition. The United Kingdom shares this vision. The Ministry for Defence Joint Doctrine Note 1/18 on Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities states that there is need to regain the initiative from China and Russia through quickly developing technology and capabilities in cyberspace. Australia’s 2020 Force Structure Plan for the Australian Defence Force also outlines the need for improved cyber capabilities, particularly offensive capabilities.

Developing credible offensive cyber capabilities is essential to providing an effective deterrent to authoritarian states trying to impose themselves on the region and broader international community. Both Russia and China have demonstrated their intent to utilise cyber capabilities to destabilise the liberal democratic world order. To respond to this challenge, states that seek to maintain and restabilise the status quo in the international system need to be able to work together, not just in a broad diplomatic sense but also in terms of presenting a united military and cyber counterthreat.

The greater the level of interoperability between the militaries of each of the AUKUS partners, with their own strengths in different technologies and weapons platforms, the more credible and formidable the cyber threat that adversaries will face. The deterrence value of this interoperability is a crucial force multiplier in the face of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership.

Interoperability also allows for the burden and cost of defending the region to be more evenly distributed among alliance partners for the benefit of all. This is one of the key drivers for sharing information and technology between the partners.

Collaboration is also needed to develop norms for the use of new cyber weapons and the regulatory regimes around their use. This will build the credibility of the threat and deterrence posed by the AUKUS partners’ cyber capabilities. In the past, allies have misinterpreted their partners’ willingness to use certain weapons technology (particularly nuclear) and this has led to the undermining of deterrence and coercion activities. Lessons need to be learned from history. A clear understanding between the AUKUS partners needs to be developed to ensure misinterpretations or premature or unrealistic threats are not made.

If the militaries are to develop a much deeper collaboration in cyberspace, as well as more generally, there needs to be a united front presented about when and how different offensive cyber capabilities will be used in order to deter adversarial actions. Signalling is key to coercion and deterrence, and without this clear understanding of the parameters for use of the technology, effective deterrence strategy is unlikely to succeed.

There is a public perception that offensive cyber operations are unethical or at least divergent from currently developing norms in cyberspace and long-established norms of more generalised behaviour by Western states in conflict; however, there is also a case to be made that modern warfare is conducted using activities short of war based on coercion, deterrence, espionage, and political influence. Without the ability to counter these types of activities through offensive cyber operations, states will be at a severe disadvantage as this disruption to international politics and warfighting occurs.

Having offensive capabilities does not mean states will be free to use these weapons or tactics in an unrestricted way. It will be important to (quickly) develop the doctrine, norms, and regulations to govern their use. These two goals can and should be pursued together, and AUKUS has the potential to develop both the technology and negotiated agreements for its use more quickly.

Norm development will also lead to greater support from non-AUKUS member states for the use of these weapons to defend the status quo. It is also a bridge between the development of new technologies and weapons and their ability to be used by armed forces. As confidence is built around how and when different capabilities can and will be used, and the legal and norm structure guiding those decisions, more states are likely to support these new developments and the armed services will be more confident in using them.

All the partners would gain from a well-functioning collaboration on cyber technology, but among the many challenges is the need to develop a common understanding of the concepts of cyber warfare and information warfare and how they work together. Currently, the three partners use the terms quite differently in different settings. Without addressing this issue and creating a commonly understood definition of these concepts, progress cannot be made toward the ultimate goal of interoperability. Bringing together the research communities, militaries, and government officials from the three states with the aim of resolving these definitional issues will be crucial to AUKUS achieving its potential.

Along with the differences in priorities for the use of cyber technologies and offensive capabilities, doctrine also needs to be considered. The development of effective and aligned warfighting doctrine to guide cyber activities relies on mutually recognised definitions and shared priorities remaining the focus of each state’s military. This doctrine will also help guide technological research priorities.

It is important that the defence directions of each state do not hijack the agenda and pull partners in different directions. Conservation of effort to achieve the highest level of innovation should be the focus, not infighting over budget allocations and inter-service rivalries. There is a danger that without a clearly established and understood framework for the structure of interaction between the three AUKUS members, rivalries and political motives within the governments and services of the individual states could detract from the overall goal of collaboration.

This is not to suggest that each state needs to have exactly the same structure guiding which officials are responsible for elements of the AUKUS collaboration. There is, however, a need to ensure that all three states are on the same page when it comes to the priorities of and commitment to the AUKUS mission. The structure needs to remove, or at least restrict to the greatest extent possible, the ability for motives other than achieving the states’ shared aims.

A level of realism is also needed, as states will have their own interests aside from those shared with their AUKUS partners. A balance must be stuck between the requirement for sovereign cyber capabilities and control and the need to collaborate to serve shared interests.

One of the goals outlined in Australia’s 2020 Defence Strategic Update is to develop greater self-reliance and a more capable defence industry so that there is sovereign control over essential technologies. A key purpose of this objective is to prevent the disruption of supply chains for essential goods spanning across borders. The AUKUS partners should note that each state will have a similar imperative and that this need not negate the effectiveness of sharing technologies and capabilities. With the right approach and attitude, the seemingly disparate interests of maintaining sovereign strength and sharing capabilities can be achieved together.

Connected to the united front idea is the need to ensure that members of other diplomatic groupings in the Indo-Pacific, such as Five Eyes, are not alienated by AUKUS. The original announcement of the submarine deal between AUKUS members led to the alienation and provocation of France. Some states within the Indo-Pacific region are also unconvinced of the utility of AUKUS, and others are worried about the provocation of conflict that may result from an AUKUS-inspired arms race. This concern may deepen and suspicion may grow with the sharing of technologies that are less likely to be trumpeted by the leaders at press conferences, such as offensive cyber capabilities.

The nature and purpose of AUKUS also needs buy-in from other like-minded states and allies. AUKUS could play an incredibly useful, complementary role to the myriad other relationships that exist between regional players, but the fact that this is the intention of the collaboration needs to be made clear, and quality diplomacy is needed to ensure this remains the case. Solidarity between those states seeking to thwart the revisionist powers is key to both deterring would-be adversarial states and preventing adversaries from exploiting points of division between the partners for their own interests.

As can be seen in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, when this collaboration and commitment to shared interests and goals is maintained with a tight focus, the challenges posed by adversarial states can be negated. Given the right tools, attention, and investment, AUKUS has the potential to be an avenue to present a formidable, united front.

To take the greatest advantage of these pooled resources and efforts, however, a deep level of communication and collaboration is needed. Genuine exchanges of ideas, tools, and talent is needed. The best and brightest in the militaries, governments, and academia of each of the AUKUS partners need to come together to respond to the joint challenges these countries face. In relation to cyber capabilities, this would help the AUKUS partners achieve great things.

About the Author

Sally Burt

Dr. Sally Burt is Lecturer in Cyber Security at UNSW, Canberra. She has a PhD from the Australian National University and is a specialist in US foreign policy, Sino-US relations, Cyber Strategy and Information Warfare. Sally has published books, journal articles, reports, and has presented internationally to conferences and summits.

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