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Can you give a historical perspective on the previous interactions between Hamas and Israel?
A hard question because this is a long (and thus complex) history - I can't possibly do it justice in such a short space. I'll truncate to the last few years. Hamas seized power in Gaza following a (in some ways ongoing) civil war with the Palestinian Authority in 2007 and have ruled the Strip with an iron fist ever since. They are not the only militant group active there, however; while they exert some pressure on those other groups, they do not control them completely, and their own claim to legitimacy is premised in part on carrying the torch of resistance to Israel along fairly maximalist lines - they have to play further to the extreme lest other groups out-do them, and they must be seen to be relevant (thus the missile attacks from militant groups across Israel's northern border - a particularly heartless way of saying "We, too, are relevant"). To make an extremely complicated relationship digestible, I think I can only say that we can best understand Hamas and Israel as having essentially always been in a state of war with one another; the distinction is not that of war/peace, but rather one of intensity. Both Hamas and Israel have opportunistically attacked one another when the opportunity seemed opportune (both militarily and diplomatically). Somewhat cynically, this understanding has framed Israel's approach to "managing the conflict," and some have referred to Israel's periodic aerial attacks in Gaza as "mowing the grass" - essentially, a blunt message to Hamas to maintain quiet and not destabilize the situation. One thing we might keep in mind, here: both Hamas and Israel historically have and likely will continue to feel the need to retaliate to one another's actions, and each must appear to have "fired the last shot" in any given round of fighting. This allows each to claim that the fighting ended on their terms, and to thus represent that clash as a victory. No matter what comes in the next weeks, both sides will aim to frame the outcome as a victory for themselves. International war and diplomacy are much more complex than we tend to assume, and governments (or ruling factions) are not the monolithic, rationally-minded entities we sometimes imagine them to be; they are internally divided, complex, and responding to a range of motivations that range from the cynically rational to the ideological and to the emotional.
What caused Hamas to begin this attack/why now?
My first thought when I learned of the attack was "This has more to do with Saudi Arabia than al-Quds [Jerusalem]," despite the initial statements of Hamas spokespeople attesting to the latter. While tensions have indeed been steadily ramping up in Israel and the West Bank in particular over the last year (it has been a particularly deadly year, in fact), I think the catalyzing factor here is an imminent normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Compared to other countries that previously normalized relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia a bigger fish, the flagship of the Sunni world. Their normalization with Israel essentially signalled that some of the biggest regional power-players are ready to move on from the framework of conflict. I suspect Hamas was concerned they were going to be "left behind" in a future Middle Eastern thaw. These brutal attacks are, I think, their attempt to remind Israel and Saudi Arabia in particular and the world at large that they cannot be ignored or left behind. In part, this is because Hamas's own claims to legitimacy are predicated on a framework of conflict.
How is Hamas, a seemingly small organization, able to afford the weaponry for a conflict of this scale?
Very hard for us, as civilians, to say with any degree of confidence. Some of Hamas's rockets and weapons are manufactured in the Strip, while others are smuggled in, sometimes (but not always) from Iran. Remember, the last 22 years of "global war on terror" have created complex webs of international finance and smuggling that have enabled extremist groups to mobilize and muster resources to punch above their apparent weight. I think it is too simplifying to suggest that international aid money to the Gaza Strip is directly being appropriated by Hamas for military purposes, though in some cases this certainly happens. (Much of the international aid that reaches Gaza does not take the form of liquid cash). Similarly, I think it is deliberately oversimplifying and somewhat disingenuous to suggest that American dollars are being routed to Hamas directly by Iran. While money is fungible in theory, international agreements are more complex than most people realize, and tracking funding and sanctions-evasion is a key task of the US foreign policy apparatus. They're certainly not always completely successful in those efforts, but we must resist the urge of simplification.
[A brief addendum on the question of terror financing:
In spite of my remarks above, I do think it's likely the US will move to restrict or roll back recent agreements freeing up Iranian accounts. While it is not yet clear (at least to civilians) what role Iran may have played in the current fighting, enough public attention is fixating on Iran that there will almost certainly be a policy blowback from the United States. If money can be traced in a concrete way, that blowback will be very extensive.]
My sense is that this latest intensification of conflict has been many years in the making, and is capitalizing on military lessons learned from Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine, where new (often over-the-counter) technologies are being used in innovative ways for military purposes.
Could Israel’s lack of prior awareness to the attack be an international intelligence failure?
Certainly it seems to indicate an Israeli intelligence failure, and I suspect that, in the aftermath of this conflict (whenever that may be, hopefully quickly), we will see a major public reckoning in Israel similar to that which took place in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. It is worth noting that Israeli governing coalitions have rarely survived military conflicts once the conduct of those conflicts is assessed in the aftermath. Whether this is an "international" intelligence failure is a harder question to answer. I think we can reliably assume that if the US, for example, had intelligence foreknowledge of such an attack that they would have shared it with Israeli authorities. Some Egyptian spokesmen have claimed that they alerted Israel, in non-specific terms, to an impending attack. It is too early for us to assess the veracity of that claim, despite Netanyahu's denial of it. It would certainly be damning in the public eye if such intelligence were overlooked, however, we must remember that all intelligence looks clearer with the benefit of hindsight, and much intelligence is vague. Regardless, however, Hamas's operational secrecy in this case is somewhat remarkable, as much a "success" (if such a term can be used to describe terror attacks) as the acts of violence themselves.
How do you see this getting resolved?
Painfully. While Israeli leaders have promised to redraw the map of the Middle East, their actions suggest greater caution than their words; they are aware that a ground operation will lead to dramatically higher casualties both for Israeli troops, likely for Israeli civilians (it will catalyze additional acts of terror), and for Palestinian civilians. They are also aware of the "negative optics" of a ground invasion and how that will impact international perceptions of the fighting; Israeli leaders will pause before they risk the international sympathy they currently are experiencing. One thing that caught my attention on the first horrific day of violence was a statement by a Hamas spokesperson that suggested that Hamas felt ready for an Israeli ground invasion; I happen to believe this claim, and part of me is worried that Hamas is baiting a ground invasion, where dense urban fighting will reward their irregular tactics in the same ways that made US military operations so difficult in Iraq and Afghanistan. I have the bad feeling Hamas may have more surprises up their sleeve. If a group operation happens, I expect several very bloody weeks or months of fighting. I do not anticipate an Israeli reoccupation of the Gaza Strip, as such an occupation would prove immensely costly in both casualties (on all sides), international support, and economic burden (the cost of keeping large numbers of IDF reservists mobilized); Israel needs short wars only. An attempt to systematically displace the civilian population from the Strip is, I think, also unlikely for the same reasons - considerations of international law aside. I would be surprised to see this fighting broaden into a larger regional conflict (in part but not only due to the recent mobilization of US military forces in the region and the deterrent posture the US has adopted militarily and diplomatically). I do, however, think we will continue to see localized acts of violence and terror carried out by extremist groups on Israel's other borders or in other countries until this sequence of fighting concludes. I do not think that the eradication of Hamas is a realistic outcome of this conflict, however desirable the destruction of such a terror organization might be.
The real wildcard here, however, is the hostage situation, which complicates any potential military operation - particularly because of the presence of hostages from other countries. Israel will not want to appear fully or partially responsible if any hostages (domestic or international) are killed directly or indirectly as a result of Israeli military actions. I must admit that, horrifically, I am not optimistic regarding the fate of the hostages.
Are there any news sites in specific you recommend for the students to look at for the most accurate information?
I find the best practice is to solicit news on the Middle East from a range of different sources with different perspectives. If you have one news outlet you typically favor, start following one or two more as well to get a different perspective, one that will shed more nuance. I also find it helpful to use news outlets that are a little more distanced from the events being covered - like those in other countries (Le Monde, the French paper, has English-language reporting). Typically, I would say Reuters and the Associated Press tend to be fairly impartial, focused on reporting rather than editorializing, but one can't make blanket statements. I would caution all of us, however, with the same message we heard recently in school: follow the conflict in moderation. War has rightly been called "hell." Take care not to brutalize your soul and your mind and your outlook. We do not need to personally know or witness every horror to know that horrors have transpired.
Addendum: I would look to university-sponsored public and international affairs programs that are already offering analyses. I just read that Princeton's program is already doing exactly this, though I have not yet engaged with it directly. Turn to scholarly experts (rather than arm-chair "experts" with a microphone) for nuanced analyses that better reflect the realities and implications.
Interview by Dr. Isaacson and Jacob Zucker ('25)
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