Quotes of the Day:
“The first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his capability, is by observing the people he has around him.”
- Machiavelli
Culture is not a piece of baggage that immigrants carry with them; it is not static but undergoes constant modification in a new environment.
- Sau-ling Cynthia Wong
"The most shocking fact about war is that its victims and its instruments are individual human beings, and that these individual beings are condemned by the monstrous conventions of politics to murder or be murdered in quarrels not their own."
- Aldous Huxley
1. U.S. threatens use of novel export control to damage Russia’s strategic industries if Moscow invades Ukraine
2. ‘China’s Media Warfare seeks global totalitarian thought control’
3. Only Putin Knows What Happens Next
4. Russia and China’s plans for a new world order
5. World braced as terrible trio Iran Russia and China forces in chilling threat to West
6. America’s Secret Government Crisis
7. How Middle Eastern conflicts are playing out on social media
8. U.S. carriers in South China Sea, Taiwan reports further Chinese incursion
9. Afghanistan’s Most Dangerous Threat
10. Putin’s Wager in Russia’s Standoff with the West
11. The Myth of Cyberwar and the Realities of Subversion
12. China’s Espionage Plans for the 2022 Winter Olympics: What Athletes Should Expect
13. Senior State Department Officials On Posture of U.S. Embassy Kyiv
14. Britain Pursues More Muscular Role in Standoff With Russia on Ukraine
15. US hits Chinese defense companies with sanctions
16. US turning the tide on Russian hackers
17. Oman Must Isolate, Not Embrace, the Houthis
18. Why Pakistan is happy to pay a heavy price this time for strategic depth in Afghanistan
19. Russia's Desert Storm: Putin's Plan to Use America's Military Playbook Against Ukraine?
20. Biden Weighs Deploying Thousands of Troops to Eastern Europe and Baltics
21. State Department Tells Families of U.S. Diplomats in Ukraine to Leave
22. Exclusive: Iran nuclear agreement unlikely without release of U.S. prisoners, negotiator says
23. Food shortages, medical negligence and online dissent: The growing cracks in China’s zero-covid campaign
24. Opinion | It’s Not Just About Ukraine. Putin Wants to Evict the U.S. From Europe.
25. Russia, the West, and the info war
26. The Big Lie’s lasting damage to American democracy
27. SAS on Ukraine standby to 'extract' UK officials if war breaks out
28. The Heart of Strategic Influence: Aristotle’s Contribution to Addressing DisInformation
1. U.S. threatens use of novel export control to damage Russia’s strategic industries if Moscow invades Ukraine
Excerpts:
The most important goal now is deterrence, officials and analysts said, and that means threatening the most severe sanctions — such as severing the largest Russian banks from the U.S. financial system, said Edward Fishman, adjunct fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Export controls wouldn’t have as immediate an effect, said Fishman, a former State Department official in the Obama administration.
But, he said, they are a good move.
“The United States has no interest in aiding Russia’s technological and industrial capacity,” he said, “so long as Putin is using it to bully neighbors and attack democracy.''
U.S. threatens use of novel export control to damage Russia’s strategic industries if Moscow invades Ukraine
By Ellen Nakashima and Jeanne Whalen
Today at 3:06 p.m. EST|Updated today at 9:45 p.m. EST
The Biden administration is threatening to use a novel export control to damage strategic Russian industries, from artificial intelligence and quantum computing to civilian aerospace, if Moscow invades Ukraine, administration officials say.
The administration may also decide to apply the control more broadly in a way that would potentially deprive Russian citizens of some smartphones, tablets and video game consoles, said the officials.
Such moves would expand the reach of U.S. sanctions beyond financial targets to the deployment of a weapon used only once before — to nearly cripple the Chinese tech giant Huawei.
The weapon, known as the foreign direct product rule, contributed to Huawei suffering its first-ever annual revenue drop, a stunning collapse of nearly 30 percent last year.
The attraction of using the foreign direct product rule derives from the fact that virtually anything electronic these days includes semiconductors, the tiny components on which all modern technology depends, from smartphones to jets to quantum computers — and that there is hardly a semiconductor on the planet that is not made with U.S. tools or designed with U.S. software. And the administration could try to force companies in other countries to stop exporting these types of goods to Russia through this rule.
“This is a slow strangulation by the U.S. government,” Dan Wang, a Shanghai-based technology analyst with research firm Gavekal Dragonomics, said of Huawei. The rule cut the firm’s supply of needed microchips, which were made outside the United States but with U.S. software or tools.
Now officials in Washington say they are working with European and Asian allies to craft a version of the rule that would aim to stop flows of crucial components to industries for which Russian President Vladimir Putin has high ambitions, such as civil aviation, maritime and high technology.
“The power of these export controls is we can degrade and atrophy the capacity of these sectors to become a key source of growth for the Russian economy,” said a senior Biden administration official, who, like others in this report, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations.
On Sunday, the State Department ordered the departure of all family members of U.S. Embassy personnel serving in Kyiv, citing the “threat of Russian military action.” The evacuation comes as the Biden administration weighs sending thousands of U.S. forces, as well as armaments, to the Baltic states and Poland to reinforce NATO, officials said. The officials stressed that no final decision has been taken on possible troop deployments, which were first reported by the New York Times. The United States is not planning to send any additional troops to Ukraine. There are about 200 military trainers in Ukraine. Most are Florida National Guard personnel.
The effort to use export controls could face head winds from American and European business interests that fear using export controls could lead to Russian retaliation in other spheres — and eventually cause foreign companies to seek to design U.S. technology out of their products. That’s because the extension of the rule beyond a single company like Huawei to an entire country or entire sectors of a country is unprecedented.
“It’s like a magic power — you can only use it so many times before it starts to degrade,” said Robert D. Atkinson, president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, a think tank. “Other countries will say, ‘Oh, man, the U.S. has total control over us. We’d better find alternatives.’”
Russia is vulnerable because it doesn’t produce consumer electronics or chips in large quantities, analysts say. In particular, it doesn’t make the highest-end semiconductors needed for advanced computing, an area dominated by Taiwan, South Korea, the United States, Europe and Japan.
Cutting off the country’s chip imports “would invariably hit the Russian leadership’s high-tech ambitions, whether in artificial intelligence or quantum computing,” said Will Hunt, an analyst with Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology.
The administration has not yet decided whether to restrict the export control to strategic sectors or extend it to everyday devices, officials said. Either way, said Paul Triolo, chief of technology policy at the Eurasia Group, “this would be weaponizing the U.S. semiconductor supply chain against an entire country.”
The pairing of financial sanctions with export controls would inflict pain immediately and over time. The impact of financial sanctions, which could apply to Russia’s largest banks as well as to civilian aerospace, maritime or emerging tech firms, would probably be felt first, experts say. Banking sanctions in particular probably would drive up Russian inflation and trigger a devaluation of the ruble, they say. Export controls, on the other hand, build over time as the cumulative effect of companies shutting off sales to Russia begins to hurt industrial production.
“If the objective is to impose severe and overwhelming costs on Russia’s economy, the combination of sanctions on major Russian banks and the export control would go a long way towards that, absolutely,” said Kevin Wolf, a former senior Commerce Department official who once headed the agency that implements export controls.
If the restrictions are applied broadly, they could also drive up prices for consumer electronics in Russia, analysts said.
The administration says it also may hit Russia with an export ban similar to those against Iran, Cuba, Syria and North Korea. Such a ban, experts say, probably would apply to basic electronics, aircraft parts, telecommunications items and software. But the United States exports relatively little in this area to Russia, so the measure would have limited effect unless other countries impose similar bans of their own.
Germany, which is Russia’s largest trading partner in Western Europe and is highly dependent on Russian energy, is in close” discussions with the United States on sanctions, said a German Embassy official, declining to comment further.
Targeted use of the foreign direct product rule could be a blow to Russia’s military, which relies on a type of chip called Elbrus that is designed in Russia but manufactured in Taiwan at a chip foundry called TSMC, according to Kostas Tigkos, an electronics expert at Janes Group, a U.K.-based provider of defense intelligence.
If the United States barred TSMC from supplying those chips to Russia, as it successfully barred TSMC from supplying Huawei, that would have a “devastating effect,” Tigkos said.
In a statement, TSMC said it “complies with all applicable laws and regulations” and that it has a “rigorous export control system in place … to ensure export control restrictions are followed.”
Analysts say that Western multinational firms probably would comply with the export controls. All U.S. chipmakers include clauses in their contracts requiring customers to abide by U.S. export rules. The United States also has a powerful stick to compel compliance: It could place any scofflaw companies on the Commerce Department Entity List, a blacklist of sorts that effectively bars U.S. firms from selling them their technology.
Russian government officials downplayed the potential impact.
The Russian state-owned defense and tech industry conglomerate Rostec said in a statement that while some foreign components are used in civilian products, Russia has begun to make many components on its own. “The possible imposition of additional sanctions will primarily hit the interests of American companies working for export,” Rostec said. “But we have managed and will manage again, albeit not immediately, but very quickly — we have proven this more than once.”
China could also provide an escape valve for Russia, analysts say.
The country is a big supplier of electronics to Russia. In 2020, it accounted for some 70 percent of Russia’s computer and smartphone imports, according to the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Three of the top five smartphone brands in Russia are Chinese, according to market-research firm International Data Corporation.
Liu Pengyu, spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, suggested that Beijing would not look kindly on extraterritorial control by the United States. “China is always opposed to any country’s unilateral sanctions and so-called long-arm jurisdiction on other countries based on domestic law,” he said in a statement.
Chinese manufacturers could choose to continue selling to Russia even if they use U.S. technology in their products, and it would be difficult, for instance, to monitor Chinese smartphone sales to Russia, IDC analyst Simon Baker said.
Experts, however, said there are ways to police noncompliance. The Commerce Department often gets tips from firms about rule-breaking competitors. Its investigators scan shipping data. They also get intelligence shared from other U.S. agencies.
If Chinese firms wound up supplying Russia in violation of the rule, that would leave Washington with a major diplomatic dilemma: whether to sanction them, even if they make ordinary — not military — goods.
After the Trump administration applied the foreign direct product rule to Huawei in August 2020, the company’s smartphone sales plummeted. Earlier in 2020, it led the world in such sales. Today, it’s fallen to 10th place, according to IDC.
The most important goal now is deterrence, officials and analysts said, and that means threatening the most severe sanctions — such as severing the largest Russian banks from the U.S. financial system, said Edward Fishman, adjunct fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Export controls wouldn’t have as immediate an effect, said Fishman, a former State Department official in the Obama administration.
But, he said, they are a good move.
“The United States has no interest in aiding Russia’s technological and industrial capacity,” he said, “so long as Putin is using it to bully neighbors and attack democracy.''
Isabelle Khurshudyan and Mary Ilyushina in Moscow contributed to this report.
2. ‘China’s Media Warfare seeks global totalitarian thought control’
A fascinating article and interview.
Excerpts:
At the military and diplomatic levels, while the world was distracted by Covid-19, Beijing ratcheted up its threats to take Taiwan by force as it massively increased its aviation incursions and other menacing military operations against Taipei. Media Warfare plays an important part of China’s intimidation strategy: Beijing uses its own propaganda to advertise the increased incursions as it conveys its threats and narratives via media coverage within Taiwan and globally.
Regarding military intimidation, one Media Warfare tactic China has employed is to get foreign publications to generate uncertainty and fear that Beijing may be pushed by “nationalist fever” of its citizens to invade Taiwan during this opportune time. This South China Morning Post headline is indicative: “Loud calls on social media urge Beijing to strike while world is busy with coronavirus crisis, but observers say the authorities do not want to be rushed.”
Beijing reinforced this political warfare gambit with a prominently highlighted Global Times article in May 2020 that asserted that, after three decades of Beijing espousing “peaceful re-unification,” the Chinese Communist Party policy no longer called for that reunification to be peaceful. To put a more blunt point to this “news”, Global Times then ominously threatened that military force remains a “final solution” for the worst-case scenario.
‘China’s Media Warfare seeks global totalitarian thought control’ - The Sunday Guardian Live
Cleo Paskal
Published : January 22, 2022, 8:51 pm | Updated : January 22, 2022, 8:51 PM
India and other countries would do well to study how China employs Media Warfare to try to undermine Taiwan’s democratic institutions, fracture national unity, demoralize the public and military, and create social instability in pursuit of its goal of annexing this sovereign country.
Alexandria, Va.: In this edition of “Indo-Pacific: Behind the Headlines”, we speak with Prof Kerry K. Gershaneck. Prof Gershaneck, author of the influential book, Political Warfare: Strategies for Combating China’s Plan to “Win without Fighting”, is a former US Marine officer with extensive national-level experience in strategic communications and counterintelligence.
He has been a Visiting Scholar (Taiwan Fellow) at the National Chengchi University in Taipei for more than three years and was the Distinguished Visiting Professor at Thailand’s Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy and the Royal Thai Naval Academy for six years. We talk to him about the findings in his new book, Media Warfare: Taiwan’s Battle for the Cognitive Domain.
Q: You’ve recently published a book about China’s Media Warfare against Taiwan. What is Media Warfare and how does China’s Media War against Taiwan affect India?
A: Media Warfare is central to China’s goal of achieving totalitarian thought control in its quest for global dominance. Media Warfare involves weaponizing all forms of media to shape public opinion in order to weaken its adversaries’ will to fight while ensuring strength of will and unity on the Chinese Communist Party’s side. To this end, Beijing leverages all instruments that inform and influence public opinion, such as social media, newspapers, radio, movies, television programs, books, video games, education systems, and global media networks.
China’s Media Warfare against Taiwan is expansive. It entails means such as co-opting individual journalists and media organizations, Social Media Warfare that effectively serves as online terrorism, military psychological warfare, election interference, subversion of the education system, purchase of key opinion leaders, and coercion of the business community. Beijing exploits media across these broad fronts to disseminate a wide array of propaganda, misinformation, covert disinformation, and fake news.
India and other democracies will benefit from this book because Taiwan is often the test bed for China’s general Political Warfare operations. Media Warfare is a central pillar of China’s Political Warfare. Consequently, the Media Warfare strategies, tactics, and techniques that China finds effective against Taiwan will eventually be used in other countries. India and other countries would do well to study how China employs Media Warfare to try to undermine Taiwan’s democratic institutions, fracture national unity, demoralize the public and military, and create social instability in pursuit of its goal of annexing this sovereign country.
Armed with this knowledge and the recommendations in the book, India and democracies worldwide can better detect, deter, counter, and defeat China’s potentially lethal Media Warfare.
Q: How has China employed Media Warfare regarding the Covid-19 pandemic?
A: As the Covid-19 pandemic began to engulf China and the world, Beijing’s global Political Warfare apparatus aggressively attempted to deflect blame for the virus from China. Beijing generated false stories assigning blame for the virus to the United States, and used its media apparatus to discredit, divide, and scare those who attempted to properly investigate the origins of the outbreak. Concurrently, Beijing used the virus to intensify military and diplomatic pressure against Taiwan and attempted to demoralize and panic its people.
Beijing attacked Taiwan on a number of levels. For example, it aimed its Media Warfare apparatus directly at the people of Taiwan, with a disinformation campaign designed to spread panic and undermine support for the Tsai administration’s response to the outbreak. Early on in the pandemic, Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau reported that the vast majority of “fake news” cases in Taiwan related to the pandemic originated from the Peoples Republic of China.
Of particular interest, social media outlets aligned with China tried to use Covid-19 for voter suppression in the national elections in early 2020. For example, the theme of many Facebook postings was “beware getting pneumonia on election day” and “voting is risky.” These “friendly reminders” contained false allegations of a high number of confirmed Covid-19 cases in Taiwan, with postings such as “Taiwan’s epidemic is out of control” designed to induce general panic and distrust.
At the military and diplomatic levels, while the world was distracted by Covid-19, Beijing ratcheted up its threats to take Taiwan by force as it massively increased its aviation incursions and other menacing military operations against Taipei. Media Warfare plays an important part of China’s intimidation strategy: Beijing uses its own propaganda to advertise the increased incursions as it conveys its threats and narratives via media coverage within Taiwan and globally.
Regarding military intimidation, one Media Warfare tactic China has employed is to get foreign publications to generate uncertainty and fear that Beijing may be pushed by “nationalist fever” of its citizens to invade Taiwan during this opportune time. This South China Morning Post headline is indicative: “Loud calls on social media urge Beijing to strike while world is busy with coronavirus crisis, but observers say the authorities do not want to be rushed.”
Beijing reinforced this political warfare gambit with a prominently highlighted Global Times article in May 2020 that asserted that, after three decades of Beijing espousing “peaceful re-unification,” the Chinese Communist Party policy no longer called for that reunification to be peaceful. To put a more blunt point to this “news”, Global Times then ominously threatened that military force remains a “final solution” for the worst-case scenario.
Q: How does China use Media Warfare to attack Taiwan’s education system, and those of other democracies?
A: China’s Media Warfare on Taiwan’s education system is, in many ways, similar to the way it attacks education systems in other countries. In addition to co-opting educators and school administrators, China targets Taiwan’s school books.
Books, including textbooks, are media. Through its United Front operations, China has co-opted pro-China “Pan Red” academics in Taiwan to revise public school textbooks to reflect the CCP’s narrative of history and current events. These narratives—such as “Taiwan is a province of China”, “Tibet, including Arunachal Pradesh, has always been a part of China”—are familiar CCP propaganda themes to your readers, who can easily see through the propaganda and dismiss it. However, children are particularly vulnerable to this type of Media Warfare indoctrination via authoritative school textbooks.
It is also important to note that many democracies have allowed the CCP to establish Chinese Student and Scholars Associations (CSSAs) and Confucius Institutes (CIS) and related programs. The US alone has roughly 265 CSSAs. These organizations are directed by the Chinese Communist Party, and often work closely with the Ministry of State Security and United Front organizations in Political Warfare operations. The CSSAs and CIs have censored films show on campuses as well as professors and texts critical of China. Even children’s books are targeted for censorship.
Another form of Media Warfare the CCP wages against education systems is to control the research published on China by manipulating China studies programs at key universities. Methods Beijing uses to achieve this include putting pressure on book publishers, printers, and booksellers, co-opting PhD academic advisors, and blackmailing and otherwise co-opting university officials. These pressures, along with other forms of intimidation have resulted in a well-documented pattern of self-censorship at American and Canadian universities and those of many other universities in Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia, South America. This constitutes a massive Media Warfare victory for the CCP.
China also employs a concept called Indoctri-tainment to indoctrinate students, through media such as movies, video games, and television programs.
Q: How has China used Social Media Warfare against Taiwan, and how might it do so against India and other democracies?
A: China views Social Media as both a threat from its adversaries and a weapon with which to wage media warfare against its adversaries. It censors Social Media quite heavily internally and, increasingly, globally to reduce the threats Beijing believes Social Media poses.
China’s Social Media Warfare arsenal includes Cyber Attacks, Artificial Intelligence, and a form of Online Terror and Intimidation that employs Trolls who provoke controversy or attack those targeted by the CCP, Sock Puppets which are social media accounts created under false personas that support China’s objectives, Bots that are automated (robot) accounts that amplify information China wants disseminated, Netizens, and the so-called 50-cent Army as well as the large organizations within the PLA.
Taiwan is a prime target for China’s Social Media Warfare. Ironically, Taiwan’s sophisticated technological environment facilitates Beijing’s attacks: Taiwan has one of the highest internet usage and smartphone penetration rates in the world, and one of the fastest Internet speeds in the Asia-Pacific region.
The PLA reportedly has approximately 300,000 soldiers serving with its Strategic Support Force, while more than 2 million Chinese and others are alleged to be members of the “50 Cent Army” that manipulates public opinion and attacks PRC critics and other targets. They spread disinformation, create and/or circulate negative propaganda about Taiwan and other adversaries, propagate fake news, and coerce targeted individuals such as entertainers.
In fact, the careers of entertainers and other key influentials are savagely destroyed by orchestrated online terror attacks if these influencers do not toe China’s line. The CCP is quite clear in what it expects: it has issued edicts ordering members of Taiwan’s showbiz industry to vow to stay “politically correct” in order to be allowed to perform in China. To support the CCP edicts and threats, its online terrorists rapidly deploy trolls, bots, and sock puppets and netizens to swarm targeted individuals and pages, increase share volume, and interfere with algorithms.
In addition, China and its agents “blacklist” popular YouTubers who criticize it, or who have not supported CCP-favoured candidates in Taiwanese elections. In addition, Beijing employs Internet celebrities and other key influentials (some from Taiwan) to wage infiltration campaigns against Taiwan on video platforms or attack certain targets through social media, such as WeChat.
- What is Indoctri-tainment?
A: Indoctri-tainment is a key form of Media Warfare, as it deceptively indoctrinates audiences under the guise of seemingly harmless entertainment. To this end, China employs such mediums as movies, soap operas, and video games to convey the CCP’s narratives.
For example, a recent blockbuster production out of China, The Battle of Changjin Reservoir, is a $200 million propaganda film that glorifies China’s 1950 attack against UN forces fighting in Korea to resist communist North Korean aggressors. The movie, which was financed largely by China’s military and other government entities, has both internal and external Media Warfare objectives. Internally, the film supports Xi Jinping’s efforts to hyper-nationalize the people of China in support of his expansionist agenda—in effect, to prepare them for war. Externally, one key objective is to convince audiences worldwide that China is willing to pay any price to achieve its national objectives, so it is pointless to resist China’s pre-ordained dominance.
Of greater concern, Beijing has co-opted much of the Western film industry. For example, by virtue of the scale of its domestic market, China ensures that Hollywood avoids offending the Chinese Communist Party in any manner. China’s “Enforcers” in Hollywood censor scripts—and intimidate studios and producers to self-censor—so that Hollywood portrays China in a strictly positive light. They quickly edit or outlaw movies that criticize China, even in minor ways, and punish those that fail to obey Beijing wishes.
Examples of how Hollywood has prostituted itself to the CCP’s Enforcers include the soon-to-be-released Top Gun: Maverick, which censored the flags of Japan and Taiwan from the star Tom Cruise’s flight jacket and the remake of Red Dawn (2012), which was digitally edited to make the forces invading America to be North Korean and not Chinese as originally filmed. Ironically, amidst increasing indications that Covid-19 originated in a Wuhan lab, the movie World War Z (2013) was censored by China’s Enforcers because the script mentioned that the zombie-producing-virus pandemic originated in China.
Q: What is the scope of China’s investment in Media Warfare?
A: Unfortunately, China does not publicly disclose its annual Political Warfare budget, so analysts must make best guesses regarding China’s malign influence investment. We do know from the evidence readily available that China invests massive time, effort, and funding into its Media Warfare operations. Here are some clues regarding the scope of investment:
First, it’s important to understand that China’s Media Warfare operations are directed from the highest levels of the Party-State apparatus. At the top of the hierarchy is Xi Jinping, who holds the senior-most Party-State leadership titles and is responsible for overall Media Warfare agenda-setting and ideological work. This is quite unlike democracies such as India and the US.
This senior-level Media Warfare oversight ensures that China’s propaganda platforms, such as People’s Daily, China Central Television (CCTV), China Global Television Network (CGTN), China Radio International (CRI), China Daily, Xinhua, and military organizations such as the PLA News Media Center and Strategic Support Force are funded quite well. Conservative estimates are that funding tops at least tens of billions of US dollars a year.
But this funding is only a fraction of Beijing’s investment in its Media Warfare, as indicated by the record $200 million cost of The Battle of Changjin Reservoir and the costs absorbed by supposedly private entities such as TikTok that provide apps that censor smart phones and computers searching for information that China does not like. Other costs mount up as well, such as the roughly $19 million that China Daily paid American newspapers such as The Washington Post and The New York Times for “advertising and printing costs” to carry its propaganda insert China Watch over a recent four-year period. Roughly 30 daily newspapers worldwide publish about 13 million copies of China Watch on a systematic basis.
Calculating the value of the millions of so-called netizens and the cyber army is quite impossible, but its equivalent value is likely worth billions more.
Further, China’s propaganda platforms are active globally, directly in disseminating the CCP’s propaganda but also indirectly by signing content sharing, partnership, and journalist training agreements with news organizations in Asia, Africa, South America, and Europe. For example, CCTV alone recently provided free video footage and television scripts to 1,700 foreign news organizations and media groups globally over the course of one year.
The outcome? Foreign news media organizations, looking for easy profits or perhaps simple personal payoffs, willingly post Xinhua or CCTV products as their own to their national audiences. Astonishingly, hundreds of millions of news consumers globally read, view, or listen to CCP propaganda on a daily basis, unaware that the CCP originated the report.
Further, journalists provided “training” in China for as long as a year are often co-opted there to serve China’s interests, through such means as bribery, persuasion, sexual enticement, or blackmail. These “journalists” become China’s agents of influence upon return to their countries, better able to convey China’s messages than, say, a Beijing-based propagandist who does not look and speak like a native of the journalist’s home country.
Q: How does the CCP wage Media Warfare to influence the Chinese diaspora outside of China?
A: The worldwide Chinese diaspora is a primary target audience of the CCP and of its United Front and Media Warfare operations. Under Chinese law, overseas Chinese must be loyal to communist China and not their adopted or home countries abroad.
To influence or control media within largely Chinese-speaking audiences, China has established at least five umbrella groups, to include the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese (ACFROC), the Chinese International Media Association (CIMA), the Global Chinese Media Cooperation Union (GCMCU), the International Chinese Media Union (ICMU), and the Overseas Chinese Media Cooperation Organization (OCMCO). These umbrella groups act as intermediaries that indoctrinate foreign media outlets and foster their connections with the PRC-CCP party-state.
Specifically, these organizations facilitate the indoctrination of foreign journalists, editors, researchers, and social media influencers. They also provide access to internet- and mobile-based dissemination platforms that upgrade user outlets’ audience reach, and provide free propaganda content and foreign policy statements favourable to Beijing. They cultivate relationships with key individuals in the foreign media hierarchy and invite them to the PRC to be honoured.
Prof Gershanek’s latest book
In addition, they coordinate the signing of “agreements” that formalize foreign media outlet relations with PRC-CCP propaganda and United Front entities. Member publications must often agree to an umbrella organization policy of “telling China’s story well”—which translates into agreeing to spread the CCP’s ideology and improve the CCP-PRC’s image abroad. Regarding Taiwan, members agree to “positively propagate the political, economic, and social situation on both sides of the Taiwan Strait”; this translates into providing the PRC’s narratives such as Taiwan is a “renegade province” that must be “re-united” with the PRC by any means necessary.
It is important to recognize that these umbrella groups do much more than just host foreign journalists to receive direction on propaganda themes and for training sessions and meetings. For example, CGMCU has opened a Global Editorial Office to (in its words) “streamline the organization and production of media content” in print media and new media (internet- and social media-based) publications. It also seeks to integrate overseas Chinese media globally, and it offers free access to foreign outlets that provide page space for its content. The platform is apparently fed by China’s propaganda platform data centres across the globe.
Q: What can democracies like India, Taiwan and the United States do to combat China’s Media Warfare?
A: Democracies must get serious about publicly identifying the Media Warfare threat and systematically confronting it if they want to survive as democracies. This includes the US, so India and other democracies cannot afford to wait until the US regains the capacity and will to fight this battle: they must act now!
A prudent first step is to develop a national strategy to counter general PRC political warfare, with appropriate organization, training, manpower, and funding.
A sound second step is to pass legislation that allows for aggressive prosecution of Media Warfare-related activities in order to diminish the offensive power of PRC news media and social media.
Related to legal prosecution, raise the cost of the PRC’s Media Warfare, both to the CCP organs and to those in our countries that engage in such malign influence or facilitate it. To this end, publicly expose covert and overt PRC political warfare operations on a routine basis.
Finally, democracies must encourage academic study and thesis development at government and public education institutions that focus on PRC Media Warfare and how to detect, deter, counter, and defeat the threat. Strong democracies, such as India and Taiwan, should establish regional centres focused on this study and on regional cooperation in combatting the threat.
3. Only Putin Knows What Happens Next
Excerpts:
The danger here is that the Kremlin, once military forces are on the move, could set in motion a chain of events that no one can predict or control. The only measures America and the West can take is to be prepared for Putin to throw the dice. This means ensuring a crisis team is already in place in Washington, making arrangements to keep the leaders of both U.S. political parties—despite the GOP’s pro-Russian tilt—in the loop. It also means confirming that communications with our allies are open and ready, and instructing U.S. and NATO militaries to remain alert for accidents or mistakes that could have catastrophic consequences.
Only Vladmir Putin knows why he has escalated tensions, and only Putin can make the choice to bring Europe back from the brink of a major war. The Americans and their allies need to recognize their limited ability to affect the Kremlin’s immediate calculations. Instead, Biden and NATO should prepare to get through this crisis controlling those things that are in their power, including planning ahead to use the considerable Western capacity to make Russia pay for a military adventure for years to come, if necessary.
Only Putin Knows What Happens Next
He alone can make the choice to bring Europe back from the brink of a major war.
By Tom Nichols
If Russian President Vladimir Putin isn’t about to invade Ukraine—or, more accurately, isn’t about to expand his previous invasion—he’s certainly making a good show of it.
If this isn’t the setup for a massive Russian invasion, it’s a damn good dress rehearsal.
Through all of this, the Biden administration has cycled through all the combinations of threats to deter the Russians from attacking. But the reality is this: Putin created this crisis, and only Putin can end it.
American options are limited for several reasons. Perhaps most important, no one really knows why Putin is doing this—or whether he really intends to do it at all. It is unlikely his own inner circle even has a good read on their boss. As Fyodor Lukyanov, a well-connected Russian foreign policy figure put it: “The expert opinion that I can authoritatively declare is: Who the heck knows?”
Despite all the Western myth-making about his cold cunning, Putin is emotional, volatile, and vain. His 2014 invasion, in which he seized Crimea and the eastern regions of Ukraine, was in response to the utter humiliation of seeing the Ukrainian president at the time, his ally Viktor Yanukovych, chased out of the country. When Putin moved in, no one knew when he would stop—and it is likely he didn’t either. The Russians gained real estate and inflicted pain on the Ukrainians, but without much of a plan for what to do next.
Putin’s impulsive move in 2014 was meant to assuage his ego and cover his appearance of weakness by stirring nationalism at home. But all of this was seven years ago, and now Russia is committed to a frozen conflict. To be sure, Putin has shown that he can take territory and sit on it, and force everyone else to get used to it. But sooner or later, even Russians—who in the main feel positively about their fellow Slavs in Ukraine—start asking if there’s a point to all this.
The point may well be deep in the dark recesses of Putin’s psyche. The Russian president has made no secret of his mourning for the old Soviet Union. (That wistfulness does not extend to socialism or communism; the world’s richest man might be an aging nostalgist but he’s not crazy.) And yet he has made it clear that he does not think Ukraine is a real country, but rather a renegade imperial possession that must be wrangled back into Kremlin control.
Putin’s emotional and visceral attachment to Ukraine is another reason why the West has limited sway in the situation that is now unfolding. American negotiators proceed from the assumption that they are discussing a political crisis among several countries; Putin, however, sees nothing but interference in a large and undifferentiated Russian domain. The Russians, even in Soviet times, were always in the grip of a paradox in which they saw themselves both as a great empire and a nation of dispossessed victims, and Putin is the prime example of Homo Sovieticus, a product of a system whose view of the world constantly wavered between paranoia and messianism.
This isn’t to say that Putin is irrational. Rather, he simply does not share a common frame of reference about the world with his opponents in the West. Americans might be right that Putin is on “the wrong side of history,” but they will not deter him from invading Ukraine by talking to him as if he’s failing a graduate seminar in international relations.
The Russian president also has practical and self-interested reasons to pursue an ongoing cycle of military confrontation with the West in general and with Ukraine in particular. Remember, most Kremlin policy is directly informed by the fact that Putin, in the end, sits atop a government that is in effect a mafia.
This matters because it is yet another aspect of Russian foreign policy that is beyond American control. If Americans were truly willing to go after the Russian elites who work below Putin, the United States might have leverage, but this would mean outing the locations of oligarchical wealth, the freezing of assets in places like London (which is practically a Russian bank vault these days), and as my Atlantic colleague David Frum has suggested, perhaps even uprooting children from elite Western schools and sending them home.
A warning, however, is in order. In the words of Jimmy Malone in The Untouchables, if you’re going to open the ball on these people, you must be prepared to go all the way. An escalation against Russian interests in America wouldn’t be a polite game of diplomatic and financial tit-for-tat. If the Western powers intend to pressure the Russian elites to dissuade Putin from war, then they’d better mean it. They must vow that violence in Ukraine will mean sleepless nights not only for Putin, but for everyone around him, including the underbosses who do not have Putin’s considerable political and financial resources to protect themselves and who thus will face real costs and personal losses.
More to the point, even if the West were more serious about a military defense of Ukraine, the United States is not going to plunge into World War III for a country that is not a member of the Atlantic Alliance, especially since there are clear divisions among the allies. Britain and other NATO states have stepped up and sent aid, but Germany has made it clear that it does not want to endanger its energy supplies from Russia. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has had to sack the head of his navy for publicly siding with Putin. This is not a formula for a united front against Russian aggression.
So what’s left? Nikolas Gvosdev, a longtime Russia watcher at the Naval War College, believes that unless the West has the will to inflict serious economic punishment on the Russian elites, the only path out is by a “diplomatic sleight of hand,” in which Washington publicly refuses to accept Russia’s unreasonable demands, but finds ways “to craft possible compromises and jury-rig solutions, between the United States and Russia, between Russia and Ukraine, and between the United States and its European allies.”
This could well be the outcome of the current crisis, if Putin is savvy enough to declare such negotiations the equivalent of victory over NATO and Ukraine. He has a compliant media at home and a population that is willing to believe him. He may hope that rattling Western nerves over the past few months will convince Kyiv that they have no friends in the world, and he can push other measures to destabilize the Ukrainian government in hopes of eventually replacing it with one more to his liking and finally closing the wound of 2014.
If Putin is bent on war, however, there is nothing we can do. The Russians might forego a full invasion (which over time would be immensely costly), but Putin could still try to use a sudden military escalation to create chaos and casualties, using a kind of Russian shock-and-awe to force a collapse of the Ukrainian government. Or he could move more forces into areas the Russians already occupy, as a means of strengthening the Kremlin’s hand in later negotiations.
The danger here is that the Kremlin, once military forces are on the move, could set in motion a chain of events that no one can predict or control. The only measures America and the West can take is to be prepared for Putin to throw the dice. This means ensuring a crisis team is already in place in Washington, making arrangements to keep the leaders of both U.S. political parties—despite the GOP’s pro-Russian tilt—in the loop. It also means confirming that communications with our allies are open and ready, and instructing U.S. and NATO militaries to remain alert for accidents or mistakes that could have catastrophic consequences.
Only Vladmir Putin knows why he has escalated tensions, and only Putin can make the choice to bring Europe back from the brink of a major war. The Americans and their allies need to recognize their limited ability to affect the Kremlin’s immediate calculations. Instead, Biden and NATO should prepare to get through this crisis controlling those things that are in their power, including planning ahead to use the considerable Western capacity to make Russia pay for a military adventure for years to come, if necessary.
4. Russia and China’s plans for a new world order
My thesis on China:
China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, and displace democratic institutions.
Russia and China’s plans for a new world order
For Moscow and Beijing, the Ukraine crisis is part of a struggle to reduce American power and make the world safe for autocrats
The western alliance has threatened the Kremlin with “massive” and “unprecedented” sanctions if Russia attacks Ukraine. But, as the Ukraine crisis reaches boiling point, western efforts to isolate and punish Russia are likely to be undermined by the support of China — Russia’s giant neighbour.
When Vladimir Putin travels to Beijing for the beginning of the Winter Olympics on February 4, the Russian president will meet the leader who has become his most important ally — Xi Jinping of China. In a phone call between Putin and Xi in December, the Chinese leader supported Russia’s demand that Ukraine must never join Nato.
A decade ago, such a relationship seemed unlikely: China and Russia were as much rivals as partners. But after a period when both countries have sparred persistently with the US, Xi’s support for Putin reflects a growing identity between the interests and world views of Moscow and Beijing. According to the Chinese media, Xi told Putin that “certain international forces are arbitrarily interfering in the internal affairs of China and Russia, under the guise of democracy and human rights”.
As Xi’s remarks to Putin made clear, the Russian and Chinese leaders are united by a belief that the US is plotting to undermine and overthrow their governments. In the heyday of communism, Russia and China supported revolutionary forces around the world. But today Moscow and Beijing have embraced the rhetoric of counter-revolution. When unrest broke out in Kazakhstan recently, Putin accused the US of attempting to sponsor a “colour revolution” — a term given to protest movements that seek to change the government — in a country that borders both Russia and China. Senior Chinese ministers echoed those remarks.
Washington’s hidden hand
As Russia and China see it, the uprising in Kazakhstan fitted a pattern. The Kremlin has long argued that the US was the hidden hand behind Ukraine’s Maidan uprising of 2013-14, in which a pro-Russian leader was overthrown. China also insists that foreign forces — for which, read the US — were behind the huge Hong Kong protests of 2019, which were eventually ended by a crackdown ordered from Beijing.
An estimated 100,000 Russian troops have amassed along Ukraine’s border © AP
Both Putin and Xi have also made it clear they believe that America’s ultimate goal is to overthrow the Russian and Chinese governments and that local pro-democracy forces are America’s Trojan horse.
In 1917, President Woodrow Wilson of the US talked of “making the world safe for democracy”. In 2022, Putin and Xi are determined to make the world safe for autocracy.
The ambitions of Russia and China, however, are far from being wholly defensive. Both Putin and Xi believe that their vulnerability to “colour revolutions” stems from fundamental flaws in the current world order — the combination of institutions, ideas and power structures that determines how global politics plays out. As a result, they share a determination to create a new world order that will better accommodate the interests of Russia and China — as defined by their current leaders.
Two features of the current world order that the Russians and the Chinese frequently object to are “unipolarity” and “universality”. Put more simply, they believe that the current arrangements give America too much power — and they are determined to change that.
“Unipolarity” means that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world was left with only one superpower — the US. Fyodor Lukyanov, a Russian foreign-policy thinker who is close to President Putin, believes that unipolarity “gave the United States the ability and possibility to do whatever it saw fit on the world stage”. He argues that the new age of American hegemony was ushered in by the Gulf war of 1991 — in which the US assembled a global coalition to drive Saddam Hussein’s Iraq out of Kuwait.
The Gulf war was followed by a succession of US-led military interventions around the world — including in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. Nato’s bombing of Belgrade, Serbia’s capital, in 1999, has long formed part of Russia’s argument that Nato is not a purely defensive alliance. The fact that Nato bombs also struck the Chinese embassy in Belgrade has not been forgotten in Beijing.
China insists that foreign forces — ie the US — were behind the Hong Kong protests of 2019 eventually suppressed by Beijing © Isacc Lawrence/AFP via Getty Images
When unrest broke out in Kazakhstan recently, Putin accused the US of attempting to sponsor a revolution © STR/EPA/Shutterstock
After the 9/11 terror attacks on New York and Washington, Nato invoked Article 5 — its mutual-defence clause — and invaded Afghanistan. Once again, according to Lukyanov, America had demonstrated its willingness and ability to “forcefully transform the world”.
But America’s defeat in Afghanistan, symbolised by the chaotic withdrawal from Kabul in the summer of 2021, has given the Russians hope that the US-led world order is crumbling. Lukyanov argues that the fall of Kabul to the Taliban was “no less historical and symbolic than the fall of the Berlin Wall”.
Influential Chinese academics are thinking along similar lines. Yan Xuetong, dean of the school of international relations at Tsinghua University in Beijing (Xi’s alma mater), writes that “China believes that its rise to great-power status entitles it to a new role in world affairs — one that cannot be reconciled with unquestioned US dominance.”
Like Lukyanov, Yan believes that “the US-led world order is fading away . . . In its place will come a multipolar order”. President Xi himself has put it even more succinctly with his often repeated claim that “the east is rising and the west is declining”.
For Russia and China, the making of a new world order is not simply a matter of raw power. It is also a battle of ideas. While the western liberal tradition promotes the idea of universal human rights, Russian and Chinese thinkers make the argument that different cultural traditions and “civilisations” should be allowed to develop in different ways.
Vladislav Surkov, once an influential adviser to Putin, has decried Russia’s “repeated fruitless efforts to become a part of western civilisation”. Instead, according to Surkov, Russia should embrace the idea that it has “absorbed both east and west” and has a “hybrid mentality”. In a similar vein, pro-government thinkers in Beijing argue that a fusion of Confucianism and communism means that China will always be a country that stresses collective rather than individual rights. They claim that China’s success in containing Covid-19 reflects the superiority of the Chinese emphasis on collective action and group rights.
Fyodor Lukyanov, right, a foreign-policy thinker close to Putin, believes the collapse of the USSR gave the US permission to do what it liked on the world stage © Mikhail Klimentyev/TASS
Beijing and Moscow argue that the current world order is characterised by an American attempt to impose western ideas about democracy and human rights on other countries, if necessary through military intervention. The new world order that Russia and China are demanding would instead be based on distinct spheres of influence. The US would accept Russian and Chinese domination of their neighbourhoods and would abandon its support for democracy or the colour revolutions that might threaten the Putin or Xi regimes.
The crisis over Ukraine is a struggle over the future world order because it turns on precisely these issues. For Putin, Ukraine is culturally and politically part of Russia’s sphere of influence. Russia’s security needs should give it the right to veto any Ukrainian desire to join Nato, the western alliance. Moscow also demands to act as the protector of Russian speakers. For the US, these demands violate some basic principles of the current world order — in particular, the right of an independent country to define its own foreign policy and strategic choices.
The Ukraine crisis is also about “world order” because it has clear global implications. The US knows that if Russia attacks Ukraine and establishes its own “sphere of influence”, a precedent will be set for China. During the Xi era, China has built military bases all over contested areas of the South China Sea. Beijing’s threats to invade Taiwan — a self-governing democratic island that China regards as a rebel province — have also become more overt and frequent. If Putin succeeds in invading Ukraine, the temptation for Xi to attack Taiwan will rise, as will the domestic pressure on the Chinese leader from excitable nationalists, sensing the end of the American era.
Russia and China clearly have similar complaints about the current world order. There are also some important differences between the approaches of Moscow and Beijing. Russia is currently more willing to take military risks than China. But its ultimate goals may be more limited. For the Russians, the use of military force in Syria, Ukraine and elsewhere is a way of repudiating the claim made by former US president Barack Obama that Russia is now no more than a regional power. Dmitri Trenin of the Carnegie Center in Moscow argues that, “For the country’s leaders, Russia is nothing if it is not a great power.”
But while Russia aspires to be one of the world’s great powers, China seems to be contemplating displacing the US as the world’s pre-eminent power. Elizabeth Economy, author of a new book called The World According to China, argues that Beijing is aiming for a “radically transformed international order” in which the US is in essence pushed out of the Pacific and becomes merely an Atlantic power. Since the Indo-Pacific is now the core of the global economy, that would essentially leave China as “number one”. Rush Doshi, a China scholar working in the White House, makes a similar argument in his book, The Long Game. Citing various Chinese sources, Doshi makes the case that China is now clearly aiming for American-style global hegemony.
The 9/11 terror attacks led to Nato invoking Article 5 and invading Afghanistan, showing US willingness to ‘forcefully transform the world’ © Jose Jimenez/Primera Hora/Getty Images
US forces battle the Taliban in 2001. America’s final defeat in Afghanistan last year has given Moscow hope the US-led world order is crumbling © Oleg Nikishin/Getty Images
A bid for global supremacy
The difference in the scale of the ambitions of China and Russia reflects the difference in their economic potential. Russia’s economy is now roughly the size of Italy’s. Moscow simply does not have the wealth to sustain a bid for global supremacy. By contrast, China is now, by some measures, the world’s largest economy. It is also the world’s largest manufacturer and exporter. Its population of 1.4bn people is roughly ten times that of Russia. As a result, it is realistic for China to aspire to be the most powerful country in the world.
But while the differences in the economic potential of Russia and China makes Xi ultimately more ambitious than Putin, in the short term it also makes him more cautious. There is something of a gambler’s desperation in Putin’s willingness to use military force to try to change the balance of power in Europe. Trenin argues that, having seen Nato expand into much of what was once the Soviet bloc, Putin sees Ukraine as his “last stand”.
In Beijing, by contrast, there is a strong feeling that time and history are on China’s side. The Chinese also have many economic instruments for expanding their influence that are simply not available to the Russians. A signature project of the Xi years is the Belt and Road Initiative, a vast international programme of Chinese-funded infrastructure that stretches into Central Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas.
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As America has become more protectionist, China has also used its trading power to expand its global influence. This month has seen the launch of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a vast new free-trade area in the Asia-Pacific that includes China and several American strategic allies, such as Japan and Australia — which the US is not taking part in. Granting or withholding access to the Chinese market gives Beijing a tool of influence that is simply not available to Moscow.
But will gradualism work? Or do Russia and China need some kind of dramatic moment to create the new world order that they seek?
History suggests that new governing systems for the world generally emerge after some kind of seismic political event, such as a major war.
Much of the security and institutional architecture of the current world order emerged as the second world war was closing or in its aftermath, when the UN, the World Bank and the IMF were set up and their headquarters were situated in the US. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Gatt) came into force in 1948. Nato was created in 1949. The US-Japan Security Treaty was signed in 1951. The European Coal and Steel Community, the forerunner of the EU, was also founded in 1951. After the end of the cold war, rival Soviet-backed institutions such as the Warsaw Pact collapsed and Nato and the EU expanded up to the borders of Russia. China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, the successor to the Gatt.
The question now is whether Russia and China’s ambitions for a “new world order” will also need a war to come to fruition. A direct conflict with the US is simply too dangerous in the nuclear era and will not happen unless all sides miscalculate badly (which is always possible).
Iranian, Russia and Chinese warships on a military drill in the Indian Ocean last year. Will Russia and China’s ambitions for a ‘new world order’ need a war to come to fruition? © Iranian Army office/AFP/Getty Images
Russia and China may, however, feel that they will be able to achieve their ambitions through proxy wars. An unopposed Russian victory in Ukraine might signal that a new security order was emerging in Europe, involving a de facto Russian “sphere of influence”. A successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be widely read as a sign that the era of American dominance of the Pacific was over. At that point, many countries in the region that currently look to the US for their security, such as Japan and South Korea, might choose to accommodate themselves to a new China-dominated order.
Alternatively, a new world order might emerge through tacit acquiescence from Washington. That outcome does not seem likely with the Biden administration in power, unless there are some dramatic last-minute concessions from the US over Ukraine. But Donald Trump could return to the White House in 2024. At least rhetorically, he seems sympathetic to aspects of the Russian-Chinese world view.
The former US president sometimes denigrated Nato and suggested that America’s allies in Asia were free-riders. His “America First” philosophy eschewed traditional language about an American mission to support freedom around the world. At times, Trump was also frank in expressing admiration for both Xi and Putin. And, as a self-proclaimed dealmaker, Trump is sympathetic to ideas of spheres of influence.
The ever closer Chinese-Russian alliance will ensure the threat to the US-led world order will not disappear any time soon © Greg Baker/AFP/Getty Images
Yet Russia and China do not seem inclined to sit back and wait for Trump to return to the White House. They know that even Trump’s Republican party includes many hawks, intent on confrontation with both Russia and China. In any case, a great deal can happen between now and the next presidential election in November 2024.
Russia’s impatience is clear from Putin’s willingness to force a crisis over Ukraine. The prospects for a new world order that is more congenial to Russia may depend on whether his Ukrainian gamble works. But even if Putin fails to achieve his goals in Ukraine, the threat to the US-led world order will not disappear. A rising China, led by an ambitious President Xi, will make sure of that.
5. World braced as terrible trio Iran Russia and China forces in chilling threat to West
Why do they always leave out north Korea? It could be a spoiler in strategic competition, note only for the US but for China and Russia as well.
World braced as terrible trio Iran Russia and China forces in chilling threat to West
CHINA, Russia and Iran will hold joint naval drills on Friday, a public relations official from Iran's armed forces told semi-official ISNA news agency on Thursday.
Express · by Pip Cook · January 20, 2022
Liz Truss: Iran's last chance to agree to the JCPOA terms
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The “2022 Marine Security Belt” exercise will take place in the north of the Indian Ocean and is the third joint naval drill between the three countries since 2019, according to Mostafa Tajoldin speaking to Reuters. Naval forces from the three powers are due to take part in a range of drills, which reportedly involve tactical exercises such as rescuing a burning vessel, releasing a hijacked vessel and shooting air targets at night.
"The purpose of this drill is to strengthen security and its foundations in the region, and to expand multilateral cooperation between the three countries to jointly support world peace, maritime security and create a maritime community with a common future," the Iranian official told ISNA.
The three countries have been moving closer together since Iran’s new hardline president Ebrahim Raisi took office last August. President Raisi has pursued a “look east” policy to strengthen ties with China and Russia in the face of increasing political and economic pressure from the United States and other western countries.
Iran’s leader met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin on Wednesday in a bid to forge “sustainable and comprehensive relations”, according to Iran state media.
President Raisi earlier described the trip as a potential “turning point” in relations with “our friend” Russia. “We have common interests which can help strengthen security in the region and prevent unilateralism [by the US],” he said.
President Putin has previously boasted of a possible military alliance between Moscow, Beijing and Tehran, sparking concern within western countries of a potentially dangerous power alliance.
Speaking to Express.co.uk last year, Chair of the Defence Select Committee Tobias Ellwood said stronger relations between Beijing and Moscow should come as no surprise, and Tehran’s entry into the group could form a “devastating trio”.
Iran has been strengthening military and trade ties with China and Russia in recent years. (Image: GETTY)
Military vessels from China and Russia took part in a joint naval exercise last October. (Image: PA)
Mr Ellwood said: “Russia and China are not natural allies, but it’s because they have a common enemy now. Their troops are now exercising together so they are learning each other’s protocols and communicate with each other.
“I think what will happen is Russia will want to remain valued – its economy is the size of Italy and it is suffering because of its military budget. The only way it can sustain this is by somehow, over the next few decades, sliding in behind China.”
In another show of strengthening ties between the three countries, Iran joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in September, a central Asian security body led by China and Russia. Tehran used its entry into the group to call on its fellow members, which include nine countries such as India and Pakistan, to help it avert western sanctions.
Russia and China are parties to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal between Iran and other world powers including the United Kingdom and United States under which Tehran agreed to curb its nuclear programme in return for the lifting of sanctions.
The United States abandoned the deal under former president Donald Trump, who pulled out in 2018 and slapped unilateral financial sanctions on the country which have crippled its economy.
Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin met via video link in December 2021. (Image: PA)
Iran has carried out a number of military launches during military exercises in recent months. (Image: PA)
Negotiations to revive the deal resumed last year after President Joe Biden took office in January and brought US negotiators back to the table. However, as six months of talks in Vienna prepare to wrap up in less than two weeks, no agreement has been reached over how to check Iran’s nuclear programme which has expanded rapidly since Mr Trump ripped up the deal.
Under the accord, Iran’s nuclear programme is being watched by a group of world powers known as the P5+1, which includes the UK, France, China, Russia, Germany and the US. Iran has been enriching uranium that can be used for nuclear weapons, which is a key concern within the international community.
The UK met with Iranian officials at the talks in Vienna in December to try to resurrect the deal that would require Iran to stop enriching uranium and allow international inspectors on the ground to assess the progress of its nuclear programme.
President Raisi vehemently opposes the western sanctions, which he has compared to terrorism. In a speech to SCO members, he said: “Nothing can stop Iran's peaceful nuclear activities that are within the framework of international regulations. Diplomacy is only effective when all parties adhere to it. Threats and pressure tie diplomacy’s hands and render it ineffective.”
Iran, Russia and China signed a nuclear “consensus” in November last year while talks between Iran and the US to revive the 2015 deal floundered, in a clear show of unity against western powers.
Iran's rapidly expanding nuclear programme has caused international concern. (Image: EXPRESS)
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Russia has said it supports Tehran’s call for the scrapping of all sanctions that violate the 2015 deal and a guarantee against future US withdrawal.
Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amirabdollahian also visited Beijing last week for the first time since President Raisi took office.
China has been Iran’s top trading partner since 2014 and the biggest buyer of Tehran’s crude oil exports, providing a vital lifeline for the country’s economic growth and survival in recent years.
Mr Amirabdollahian and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi met to launch a $400 billion deal forged between the two countries in 2020. The 25-year security and economic cooperation agreement will see China invest in sectors across Iran’s economy, spanning finance to infrastructure, and closer military ties between the two powers.
China has consistently opposed US sanctions against Beijing. Speaking after the visit, Mr Wang said: “China firmly opposes illegal unilateral sanctions against Iran, political manipulation on human rights and other issues, and gross interference in the internal affairs of Iran and other regional countries.”
Trade between Iran and Russia has also risen in recent months, with some politicians in Iran suggesting a long-term agreement could be reached between the two countries similar to the deal recently brokered with China.
Express · by Pip Cook · January 20, 2022
6. America’s Secret Government Crisis
America’s Secret Government Crisis
Jefferson’s vision of an informed citizenry holding its government accountable will only be realized when government secrecy becomes the exception, not the rule.
JANUARY 20, 2022 • COMMENTARY
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America’s founding generation believed that an informed citizenry was vital to the survival of the Republic. Writing to theologian and philosopher Richard Price on January 8, 1789, Thomas Jefferson observed with satisfaction how his countrymen had come to largely embrace the new constitutional form of government just recently adopted.
“A sense of this necessity, and a submission to it,” Jefferson told Price, “is to me a new and consolatory proof that wherever the people are well informed they can be trusted with their own government; that whenever things get so far wrong as to attract their notice, they may be relied on to set them to rights.”
But what if that same government takes deliberate, calculated steps to try to ensure that the public is not well informed about the government’s own actions, especially those carried out under a legal cloak of secrecy?
Over 200 years after Jefferson’s missive to Price, the United States now has a sprawling national security bureaucracy that has created tens of millions of classified documents. In 2017 alone (the last year for which figures are available), federal employees created some 50 million classified records. Estimated cost to you, the taxpayer? Around $18 billion.
Jefferson’s vision of an informed citizenry holding its government accountable will only be realized when government secrecy becomes the exception, not the rule.
What’s worse is that many of the classified records created since World War I (when the U.S. government classification system essentially began) – tens of millions of pages – remain classified to this day, out of the reach of the public, historians, journalists and others interested in understanding the totality of America’s history. Here are some examples, based on just the last six years of my own research at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and from using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
Martin Luther King, Jr.: According to National Archives locator documents I examined, at least 17,000 pages of material on King remain classified to this day, over 50 years after his murder by James Earl Ray.
Frank Wilkinson: Founder of the National Committee to Abolish the House Un‐American Activities Committee, Wilkinson’s file is over 130,000 pages and would take years to review and release, according to an August 2019 email exchange I had with a NARA archivist.
TALON/CIFA programs: The Department of Defense’s Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) and the Threat and Local Observation Notice (TALON) report program were major sources of controversy during George W. Bush’s presidency, as they targeted domestic dissidents opposed to the Iraq War. According to the G.W. Bush Presidential Library, there are potentially over 60,000 pages of relevant records on CIFA and TALON that, per January 2022 letters to me from NARA officials, will take anywhere from 12 to 20 years to process and release.
Operation VULGAR BETRAYAL: A massive and illegitimately predicated FBI counterterrorism investigation of Arab and Muslim Americans dating from the mid‐1990s through the early 2000s, which a November 23, 2021 FBI letter to author revealed that the Bureau has at least 1,290,010 pages of records potentially responsive” to the Cato Institute’s FOIA request.
Since the Bureau will never release more than 500 pages per month to a FOIA requester, absent the rare order from a federal judge, it would take 215 years for Cato to receive all the records.
Existing federal agency and department records review and release polices practically ensure that requesters will be either very old or long dead before the mountain of previously secret government records they seek see the light of day. And while federal courts could compel agencies and departments to produce the records at a far faster rate, they rarely do. The effect is to keep the public in the dark about lots of potentially dirty deeds done in secret, in their name, at taxpayer expense.
The late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D‑NY), who co‐chaired the Clinton‐era Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, wrote in his 1998 book Secrecy (pp. 216–217) that “Eighty years from the onset of secrecy as an instrument of national policy, now is the time for a measure of definition and restraint.”
We are now over 100 years into the American Age of Secrecy, with even fewer restraints on the federal government’s ability to keep its citizens in the dark about what it is doing secretly in the name of national security. The commission Moynihan led proposed legislation to address the problem, but in the author’s view it still left entirely too much discretion to executive branch officials about what, why, and for how long a given document could be classified.
It’s important to remember that the Constitution only mentions secrecy once, and not in connection with the executive branch but Congress – Article I, Section 5. Congress was the original arbiter of what should or should not be kept from the public, and if America’s governmental secrecy sickness is to be cured, it must reclaim that leading role.
Any secrecy reduction legislation must do, at a minimum, several key things.
First, it should be a felony to classify a document to conceal waste, fraud, abuse, negligence, mismanagement, criminal conduct, or anything deemed “embarrassing” to the executive branch entity.
Second, in no case should a record remain classified unless it deals with current or projected military operations; cryptologic systems in active use by the United States or a foreign power; an active, ongoing, and legitimately predicated criminal investigation; the need to protect a current, confidential human source; or maters dealing with an ongoing treaty negotiation process.
Third, it should repeal existing, sweeping agency‐ or department specific legal carve outs that allow those governmental entities to withhold entire bodies of information.
Fourth, the Government Accountability Office should be given the mandate and the resources to monitor, on an annual basis, executive branch compliance with the statute.
Finally, the new law should apply to the operations of House and Senate committees, many of which deal with classified issues on a daily basis.
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, neither the House or Senate Intelligence Committees had sent a single one of their records to NARA for review and release, according to NARA officials with whom I spoke. If the American people are ever to know whether or not Congress is doing a proper job of preventing executive branch overreach on secrecy, it should open its own records for public inspection.
Jefferson’s vision of an informed citizenry holding its government accountable will only be realized when government secrecy becomes the exception, not the rule.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Senior Fellow, Cato Institute
7. How Middle Eastern conflicts are playing out on social media
Excerpts:
Democratic governments, social media companies, and civil society organizations all can help combat these campaigns. Much of the relevant technical expertise and knowledge of ongoing operations are in the private sector, and governments must be able to draw on and coordinate with experts there. The United States and other democratic governments must improve their technical capacity and, with it, their ability to detect these campaigns.
Social media companies, for their parts, must improve their ability to protect the accounts and user experiences of dissidents, particularly those not operating in an English-language environment, as well as ordinary users who might be fooled by false information. These companies must increase the people and resources they devote to the region to combat false information and actors who violate their terms of service. They must also be more open with data so independent researchers can better monitor potentially dangerous activity.
How Middle Eastern conflicts are playing out on social media
The Middle East has always been rife with enmity and rivalry, and its regimes have long taken advantage of the region’s many linguistic, religious, and cultural connections to shape the overall political environment. Regimes that do not control the information space risk being destroyed by it.
The Middle East is far from alone. Virtually every authoritarian regime barrages its own population with propaganda, ranging from state-controlled television to social media campaigns on a wide range of platforms. The Middle East, however, may be especially prone to foreign influence operations. In addition to intense regional rivalries, the lack of free media in many countries and the distrust of government and institutions make the region particularly vulnerable.
This tendency is reinforced by actual conspiracies, including the 1953 coup that toppled Mossadegh, the false pretext of the Suez Crisis, and myriad attempts by regional governments to weaken and overthrow one another. In addition, shared religious, historical, and linguistic ties, embodied in concepts such as pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism, both create transnational bonds and foster vulnerabilities. It is easy for ideas to cross borders, and in so doing they can inspire, frighten, or subvert.
Social media campaigns are now a regular tool of Middle Eastern governments, and they are used as well by governments like Russia seeking to influence the Middle East. The confrontation between Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE (the so-called “Quartet”) and Qatar, for example, began in 2017 in part due to social media exploitation involving hacked email accounts and associated disinformation. It escalated into a massive social media skirmish between the two sides around the broader Muslim world that endures to this day. This campaign later encompassed an effort to discredit Qatar’s ally, Turkey, and included actors in the civil wars in Libya and Yemen, as well. Iran, for its part, created a network of fake websites and online personas, an operation that The Citizen Lab labeled “Endless Mayfly,” to spread false information about Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States. On a more individual level, Saudi Arabia targeted dissidents such as Jamal Khashoggi, trying to make his online life a living hell — “the equivalent of sustained gunfire online,” as one of his friends put it.
Why social media is so useful for Middle Eastern governments
Social media offers governments several advantages in their information operations. Perhaps most important, social media campaigns are relatively cheap and have low barriers to entry. As so many Middle Easterners use social media, manipulating these platforms is an inexpensive way for regimes to influence large audiences. What’s more, social media companies’ guardrails are weaker outside an English-language environment, as they may focus more on profitability and innovation before security and information quality.
Volume also matters. Rumors and conspiracies are more likely to be believed if people are repeatedly exposed to them, and the constant pushing of conspiracies on multiple platforms can make the outlandish seem believable.
Social media campaigns also grant a degree of deniability. Some states clandestinely fund private firms, encourage their citizens to act on their own, or simply tolerate activities such as hacking and harassment, making it hard to find a smoking gun that ties the government to a specific action.
Social media sources are often more trusted than traditional media. Family and friends pass on news and other information via Facebook and other platforms, implicitly endorsing it, and they are more trusted sources than the media and government. When governments can tap into these personal networks, their messages are far more likely to be believed and supported.
Finally, social media also offers an excellent mix of differentiation and reach. Huge platforms like Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram are great ways to reach elite Saudis focused on politics as well as more ordinary Saudis who might use these platforms for sports, work, and entertainment. At the same time, through microtargeting the regimes can focus more specialized messages on different constituencies, again at relatively low cost. Political microtargeting is under-regulated, especially for non-English-speaking users.
How disinformation campaigns play out on Middle Eastern social media
These campaigns and the states behind them use a number of tools to increase the influence of their social media efforts. These include creating fake news sites, modifying the content of legitimate sites, creating fake personas who masquerade as journalists or opposition figures, “typosquatting” by taking advantage of common mistakes (such as “thejerusalempost[dot]org” (the real site is “jpost.com”), and many other methods. In addition, they may simply create a virtual loudspeaker, using bots and human armies to retweet, “like,” and drown out critics, while boosting pro-regime content.
At times they have directed their troll armies at internal critics, such as the late Khashoggi or critics of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey. Such constant harassment makes online life miserable for these individuals, wearing them down through constant abuse. It also deters ordinary people from following them, as they seek to avoid the cesspool of recrimination and abuse associated with the critics’ accounts.
Another method is to hack or otherwise gain access to a rival’s private information and then selectively publicize it. In June 2017, days before a public and enduring split between Qatar and the Quartet began, a group called “GlobalLeaks” sent out copies of emails and other hacked documents of the UAE ambassador to the United States to various U.S. media outlets.
At times, the goal (or at least the outcome) is that citizens do not know what to believe and so dismiss all news sources or otherwise lose faith in traditional institutions. Facebook notes that some actors “engaged in what we call ‘perception hacking.’ That is, rather than running actual on-platform campaigns or compromising election systems, they are attempting to garner influence by fostering the perception that they are everywhere, playing on people’s far of widespread deception itself.” Making all this worse, a host of authentic accounts from political leaders, clerics, and others spread hateful or false ideas, often with little interference from social media companies despite the violation of their terms of service.
The capabilities and means of state actors to spread disinformation vary considerably. Many employ outside firms to run at least part of their effort. Saudi Arabia created a “troll farm,” identifying messages to amplify and paying workers to identify voices on Twitter that need to be silenced. Workers at the farm received daily lists of people to threaten and insult, pro-government messages to augment, and other instructions.
What is the impact of these disinformation campaigns?
Judging the impact of these campaigns is difficult. The Quartet was determined to escalate pressure on Qatar, and the social media campaign was the result, not the cause, of this standoff. Although Iran was able to get its propaganda published and retweeted — The Citizen Lab estimates that Iran generated 21,685 clicks on its Endless Mayfly content — how much it changed minds, and who those minds were, is not clear.
Fortunately, Middle Eastern regimes are not at the level of Russia when it comes to disinformation. Iran, with its anti-American propaganda, often is “hasty in execution” when it comes to operations, according to disinformation expert Clint Watts. And while Saudi Arabia did indeed make Khashoggi’s online life a living hell, this did not deter him, leading the regime to turn to the more time-honored tactic of assassination. Researchers Jennifer Pan and Alexandra Siegel found that the Saudi regime’s imprisonment of dissenters and other repression did deter critics, but it also led to an increase in attention to their cause and more online dissent from their followers.
How to push back against online disinformation
Democratic governments, social media companies, and civil society organizations all can help combat these campaigns. Much of the relevant technical expertise and knowledge of ongoing operations are in the private sector, and governments must be able to draw on and coordinate with experts there. The United States and other democratic governments must improve their technical capacity and, with it, their ability to detect these campaigns.
Social media companies, for their parts, must improve their ability to protect the accounts and user experiences of dissidents, particularly those not operating in an English-language environment, as well as ordinary users who might be fooled by false information. These companies must increase the people and resources they devote to the region to combat false information and actors who violate their terms of service. They must also be more open with data so independent researchers can better monitor potentially dangerous activity.
8. U.S. carriers in South China Sea, Taiwan reports further Chinese incursion
U.S. carriers in South China Sea, Taiwan reports further Chinese incursion
U.S. Navy aircraft carrier, USS Carl Vinson, docks at a port in Danang, Vietnam March 5, 2018. REUTERS/Kham/File Photo
TAIPEI, Jan 24 (Reuters) - Two U.S. aircraft carrier groups have entered the disputed South China Sea for training, the Department of Defense said on Monday as Taiwan reported a new Chinese air force incursion at the top of the waterway including a fearsome new electronic warfare jet.
The South China Sea and self-governing Taiwan are two of China's most sensitive territorial issues and both are frequent areas of tension between the United States and China.
U.S. Navy ships routinely sail close to Chinese-occupied islands in the South China Sea to challenge Chinese sovereignty claims, as well as through the Taiwan Strait, to Beijing's anger.
The U.S. Department of Defense said the two U.S. Navy Carrier Strike Groups, led by their flagships USS Carl Vinson and USS Abraham Lincoln, had begun operations in the South China Sea on Sunday.
The carrier groups will carry out exercises including anti-submarine warfare operations, air warfare operations and maritime interdiction operations to strengthen combat readiness, it said in a statement.
The training will be conducted in accordance with international law in international waters, the Department of Defense added, without giving details.
"Operations like these allow us to improve our combat credible capability, reassure our allies and partners, and demonstrate our resolve as a Navy to ensure regional stability and counter malign influence," it quoted Rear Admiral J.T. Anderson, commander of the strike group led by the USS Abraham Lincoln, as saying.
Both carrier groups were reported on Sunday by the U.S. Navy to have been exercising with Japan's navy in the Philippine Sea, an area that includes waters to the east of Taiwan.
The news of the U.S. operations coincides with Taiwan reporting the latest mass incursion by China's air force into its air defence identification zone - 39 aircraft - in an area close to the Taiwan-controlled Pratas Islands in the northern reaches of the South China Sea.
Taiwan on Monday reported a further 13 Chinese aircraft in the zone, with one, an anti-submarine Y-8, flying through the Bashi Channel which separates Taiwan from the Philippines and connects the Pacific to the South China Sea, according to a map provided by Taiwan's Defence Ministry.
The ministry added that two Chinese J-16Ds took part in the mission, though kept close to China's coast, a new electronic attack version of the J-16 fighter designed to target anti-aircraft defences of the sort Taiwan would rely on to fend off an attack.
China has yet to comment, but has previously said such missions are aimed at protecting its sovereignty and to prevent external interference in its sovereignty claims over democratically-governed Taiwan.
Security sources have previously told Reuters that China's flights into Taiwan's defence zone are also likely a response to foreign military activity, especially by U.S. forces, near the island, to warn that Beijing is watching and has the capability to handle any Taiwan contingencies.
Taiwan calls China's repeated nearby military activities "grey zone" warfare, designed to both wear out Taiwan's forces by making them repeatedly scramble, and also to test Taiwan's responses.
The South China Sea, crossed by vital shipping lanes and also containing gas fields and rich fishing grounds, is also claimed by Taiwan, while Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines claim parts.
Reporting by Ben Blanchard; Editing by Nick Macfie
9. Afghanistan’s Most Dangerous Threat
Conclusion:
This is a pivotal moment. If the United States is able to limit and contain the power of the Haqqanis in the new Taliban state, it would go a long way toward preventing Afghanistan from becoming a breeding ground for terrorism. When designed properly, such an approach could also buttress more moderate—non-Haqqani—factions of the Taliban constellation, which may include, for example, some of the leaders with whom Washington negotiated in 2020. But the United States will need international partners for any such strategy to be successful. Even in minimal form, a multilateral approach among the United States, Russia, China, and other nations toward the Haqqani threat in Afghanistan would do much to limit the expansion of ISIS-Khorasan and al Qaeda into the broader region and potentially stave off a devastating wave of destabilization from the new global terror threat.
Afghanistan’s Most Dangerous Threat
Why America Can’t Take on the Haqqani Network Alone
In recent weeks, world leaders have pledged billions of dollars in aid to address the humanitarian emergency in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. In addition to alleviating the suffering of the Afghan people, such assistance will serve crucial strategic goals, as a bulwark against cross-border destabilization, terrorism, drug trafficking, weapons proliferation, and large-scale displacement. Amid these efforts, however, another Afghan crisis has received comparatively little attention: the resurgence of international terrorism.
The source of this peril is the Haqqani network, the little-understood but most powerful faction of the Taliban government that maintains ties to al Qaeda and to some elements of the Islamic State Khorosan (also known as ISIS-K). Recent terrorist activity claimed by ISIS-K, for example—including attacks against Kabul University, a maternity ward, and a girls’ school—has been linked to the Haqqanis. Moreover, the network has a seat at the table at the highest levels of the Taliban government. The group’s leader, Sirajuddin Haqqani, is head of the powerful Interior Ministry, with de facto control of the nation’s domestic security and intelligence operations, as well as of such civilian functions as control of passports and identity cards for Afghans seeking to travel abroad. And other members of the Haqqani clan hold key positions in the Taliban government, including the Ministries of Education, Refugees and Repatriation, and Agriculture, giving the group unrivaled influence in Afghanistan.
Yet until now, world leaders have failed to develop a coherent strategy to contain the Haqqani network. Partly this owes to the competing interests of surrounding states in the region, including Pakistan and Iran, which have historically seen the Haqqanis as a strategic asset. Meanwhile, rivalry between the United States, China, and Russia has seemed to preclude closer security cooperation in Afghanistan. At the same time, poor knowledge of the network’s multistate terrorist affiliations has led to an erroneous tendency to label the group as a domestic security problem rather than an international terrorist syndicate that has frequently targeted U.S. interests.
At a moment when new aid money may soon be reaching Afghanistan, this neglect is particularly dangerous. Without a coordinated plan to keep funds from flowing to the Haqqanis, any aid that is provided to the new Afghan government could risk strengthening terrorists and could lead to a dangerous new competition between the Taliban and ISIS. Only by addressing the Haqqani problem head-on will the United States and other major powers be able to prevent Afghanistan from becoming once again the world’s largest terrorist sanctuary.
From the Taliban to al Qaeda
Though they have maintained a far lower profile than al Qaeda and ISIS, the Haqqanis have proved remarkably resourceful and resilient. Founded in the early 1970s by Jalaluddin Haqqani, the father of Sirajuddin Haqqani, the syndicate began as a relatively small, tribal jihadist group based in Afghanistan and Pakistan but has used a series of strategic alliances to steadily accrue power and influence. The network now works with nearly every designated foreign terrorist organization operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, manpower that would cease to exist if not for Sirajuddin’s protection and patronage.
Beginning in the 1990s, the Haqqani network became a semiautonomous entity within the Afghan Taliban, and since 2015 Sirajuddin Haqqani has cultivated a position as deputy emir of the Taliban, designing and executing policy in strategic areas. As shown by Jeff Dressler, a former research analyst for the Institute for the Study of War, the Haqqani network has strengthened its decades-long infiltration campaign in northern areas that the Taliban struggled to capture in the mid-1990s by assassinating local power brokers it views as rivals and by fostering relationships with key foreign fighters.
At the same time, the Haqqanis have cultivated a long-standing relationship with al Qaeda. In the mid-1990s, the mujahideen fighter Yunus Khalis, who was a patron of the Haqqanis, served as a host and enabler to Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. And beginning in 2008, the since deceased al Qaeda leader Abdul Rauf Zakir became a right-hand man to Sirajuddin Haqqani as they worked to increase both groups’ influence in northern Afghanistan. According to General John R. Allen, the former commander of the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan and the U.S. special envoy spearheading the fight against ISIS, few other jihadist groups “sending their rank and file to places like Syria have the close relations with al Qaeda, media savvy, military capability, and technical expertise for suicide attacks like the Haqqani network.”
There are haunting similarities with the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
In addition to their astute alliances with the Taliban and al Qaeda, the Haqqanis have long received crucial backing from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI. For years, the ISI has viewed a pro-New Delhi regime taking hold in Kabul as an existential threat and sought to use militant groups in Afghanistan to maintain what it refers to as “strategic depth”—a euphemism for a pro-Pakistan regime in the Afghan capital. In recent years, the ISI has come to view the network’s unique cohesion and reach as offering Pakistan a reliable agent to shape its long-term vision of a “post-NATO” Afghanistan. At the same time, the Haqqanis have also been able to rely on informal backing from other powers seeking to counterbalance the interests of the United States and its allies. At various times in the past, the network has gained tacit support from Gulf states, and more recently from China, Iran, and Russia, which in different ways viewed it as a proxy hedge against the U.S.- and Indian-backed Afghan government before the NATO withdrawal.
Nor are the Haqqanis’ ambitions limited to the Taliban-ruled state. If left unchecked, Sirajuddin will continue to protect his al Qaeda partners from Western countermeasures, whether military, economic, or political, as he seeks to build on his father’s legacy and establish Afghanistan as a beacon for international jihad. In a rare interview in 2010, Sirajuddin Haqqani made clear that he aspires to a caliphate that unites the Islamic world, as he lauded the victories and sacrifices of jihadist fighters in regions ranging from Afghanistan to Iraq to as far afield as Somalia and Algeria. According to Western officials, he has already begun to focus on Tajikistan, Kashmir, Syria, and Yemen.
By failing to consider these larger ambitions, the United States risks allowing the Haqqanis to create a new wave of regional instability and international terrorism. In a recent interview, Lieutenant General Michael K. Nagata, who commanded U.S. special operations forces in the Middle East and South Asia from 2013 to 2015, described the Haqqanis as consistently underestimated. Referring to the group’s expanding, multiregional influence, he said, “there are haunting similarities in the risks that flow from America’s Afghanistan withdrawal in 2021” and the "failure of the United States to anticipate or recognize the gathering strength of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq after we withdrew in 2011.”
The ISIS Connection
The Haqqanis have directly targeted the United States and its allies on multiple occasions. In 2009, the network facilitated the al Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban attack on the U.S. base in Khost Province that killed seven CIA operatives. In 2011, the network attacked the U.S. embassy and NATO headquarters in Kabul; and in 2013, it attacked the U.S. consulate in Herat Province, along the border of Iran. In recent years, the Haqqani network has held captive more Americans than any other terrorist organization in the world. These have included U.S. Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, the New York Times reporter David Rohde, and the American Canadian Coleman-Boyle family. Sirajuddin is still holding at least one American captive, former U.S. Navy diver Mark Frerichs.
The Haqqanis’ record of hostage taking of Westerners—often in alliance with al Qaeda—has been particularly troubling. If history is any guide, the network will continue to use hostages for political leverage, seeking to force the United States to compromise, for example, on such issues as financial sanctions, travel restrictions, prisoner exchanges, and drone strikes. This prisoner-for-concession tactic strongly suggests that until Americans are repatriated, the Haqqani network will aim to confront the West with a no-win decision: either refrain from ordering lethal strikes or manned counterterrorist operations or continue current policies and risk American lives and additional political fallout at home.
Through 20 years of U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan, the Haqqani network has also proved remarkably adaptive. Instead of trying to construct parallel government institutions, as the Taliban did in southern Afghanistan, the Haqqanis increased their reach by infiltrating existing Western-backed military and political structures. Western intelligence officials say the network placed itself in an ideal position to seize money meant for legitimate institutions, avoid blacklists, confiscate Western security resources, and request the release of detainees. Using links to officials in the Afghan government, the group was often able to evade U.S. scrutiny even as it used local governance and development programs funded by Washington for its own destabilizing ends.
For Western officials, addressing the Haqqani issue has been made more complicated by pressure to deal with ISIS-K. Many officials and analysts view ISIS-K as a common enemy of both the United States and the Taliban—and, by extension, of the Haqqani network. And since ISIS-K is viewed as the primary international terrorist threat in Afghanistan, they argue that it is necessary to provide foreign aid to the new Taliban-controlled government to effectively counter ISIS-K.
This is deeply flawed logic. To understand the Haqqani network’s true relationship to ISIS-K requires moving beyond the notion of a simple divide between the groups. In Afghanistan, there are really two ISIS-Ks: Islamic State Khorasan and Islamic State Kabul. The former is affiliated with and directed by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and is primarily composed of former Pakistani Taliban. The latter is a distinct entity, primarily composed of former al Qaeda members and led by Shahab al-Muhajir, an alumnus of the Haqqani network. Also a previous leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Abdul Hasib Logari, was an alumnus of the Haqqani network.
Both ISIS-Ks are extremely dangerous, but until the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces, Sirajuddin Haqqani and his confederates have made a show of opposing ISIS-Khorasan, while surreptitiously supporting the activities of ISIS-Kabul. As reported by the United Nations Security Council Monitoring Team, based on member states’ statements, ISIS-Khorasan has often “lacked the capability to launch complex attacks in Kabul on its own,” but it often claims responsibility for operations that were likely carried out by the Haqqanis. Such attacks belie the Taliban’s feigned moderation and point to the danger of sending select types of foreign assistance to Afghanistan that could end up in the control of the network.
The Enemy of My Enemy
Bringing together an international front against the Haqqanis will be a formidable task, but the United States and its direct allies are not the only players in the region that have reason to be concerned about the group. Despite vast differences with the United States on most issues, China and Russia have a shared interest in not having Afghanistan become a lawless sanctuary for international terrorism. In previous years, China tacitly endorsed Pakistan’s use of clandestine terrorist proxies in Afghanistan because it was happy to delegate the job of containing India to Pakistan. But Beijing is increasingly worried about the prospect of jihadist activity in the Xinjiang region, which sits close to Afghanistan.
For its part, although the Russian government has long viewed terrorist groups as proxies to help oust U.S. forces from the region, it has become wary of the potential for blowback, as exemplified by the terrorist attack carried out by al Qaeda in 2017 in St. Petersburg. Moscow also fears that insecurity in northern Afghanistan, strategic pockets of which have been under the influence of the Haqqanis and al Qaeda since at least 2008, could spread to its allies in central Asia. Iran, too, has good reasons to curtail its previous support for the Haqqanis. Tehran worries, not unreasonably, that an al Qaeda–backed Afghan government could trigger a refugee crisis, sending more waves of Afghans into Iran and empowering an extremist Sunni resurgence on its eastern border.
In recent years, the Haqqanis have held more U.S. hostages than any other terrorist group.
Bringing together these widely disparate regional and world powers against the Haqqanis, however, will require intensive diplomacy. Washington should appoint a senior envoy charged with holding the Taliban to their obligations under the 2020 peace deal with the United States and pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999), to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a refuge for international terrorists. The Taliban’s political leadership could theoretically reform itself to gain international acceptance and aid, but it cannot or will not overrule Sirajuddin Haqqani where he has staked out an opposing view. As a crucial and achievable first step, the U.S. envoy should seek to convince China, Russia, and other regional powers to jointly insist that any new foreign aid to Afghanistan be contingent on the Haqqanis ensuring Afghanistan will not again export terrorism. Specifically, new multilateral sanctions must be designed to target the Haqqanis’ relationships with al Qaeda and IS-Kabul, and provisions must be put in place to ensure that the Taliban government commits to using aid solely to alleviate the humanitarian crisis.
U.S. policymakers must also craft a new approach toward Pakistan. Until now, the United States has generally been reluctant to force Pakistan to crack down on the Haqqanis within its borders, out of concern over the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. But that view may be changing. In a recent interview for this research, General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, suggested that the U.S. needs to take a more robust stand against Pakistan’s support for the terrorist syndicate. “We cannot allow our concerns for instability in a nuclear armed Pakistan to impede effective action against Haqqani,” General Dunford said.
To address the Haqqani problem, Washington would likely have to reveal publicly the extent to which officials at the highest levels of the Pakistan military and the ISI support terror organizations. Such moves against an ostensible ally would be unusual and would require advanced multilateral measures and innovative statecraft to protect intelligence sources and methods. But neither Washington’s nor Beijing’s practice of delegating its counterterrorism efforts to Islamabad has worked. Pakistan must account for its support of terrorists and face incentives to act more like an ally that would benefit from increased stability in South Asia and beyond.
This is a pivotal moment. If the United States is able to limit and contain the power of the Haqqanis in the new Taliban state, it would go a long way toward preventing Afghanistan from becoming a breeding ground for terrorism. When designed properly, such an approach could also buttress more moderate—non-Haqqani—factions of the Taliban constellation, which may include, for example, some of the leaders with whom Washington negotiated in 2020. But the United States will need international partners for any such strategy to be successful. Even in minimal form, a multilateral approach among the United States, Russia, China, and other nations toward the Haqqani threat in Afghanistan would do much to limit the expansion of ISIS-Khorasan and al Qaeda into the broader region and potentially stave off a devastating wave of destabilization from the new global terror threat.
- MELISSA SKORKA is a Senior Fellow at the University of Oxford’s Changing Character of War Centre.
10. Putin’s Wager in Russia’s Standoff with the West
Conclusion:
This crisis reveals a problem in U.S. strategy. European security remains much more unsettled than it appears. The most militarily powerful state on the continent does not see itself as a stakeholder in Europe’s security architecture. There’s little evidence that without the United States, European powers can deter Moscow or lead their way out of a major crisis. The European Union is nonexistent in the conversation, begging for relevance. Yet the United States is materially constrained, seeking to focus on the Indo-Pacific and redress a deteriorating military balance vis-à-vis China. Washington’s dream of making the Russia relationship more predictable via a narrow strategic stability agenda appears to be dissipating. The United States will have to manage China and Russia, at the same time, for the foreseeable future. For U.S. strategy, it was never going to be China only, but it will prove exceedingly difficult to make it China mostly — not as long as Russia gets a vote.
Putin’s Wager in Russia’s Standoff with the West - War on the Rocks
A large war in Europe is likely in the coming weeks. The current security architecture of the continent, the future of NATO, and America’s role in shaping security outcomes there are all at stake. Beyond Europe, this conflict would have profound implications for U.S. defense strategy, and may upset America’s best-laid plans to focus on the eroding military balance with China. Ukraine, whose fate hangs in the balance, may be at the center of the crisis, but Moscow has a greater goal in mind: the revision of Europe’s security order. The Russian armed forces have conducted a substantial buildup around Ukraine, with Moscow threatening unilateral military measures if it is not able to achieve its goals at the negotiating table. President Vladimir Putin has been coy, but the threat is use of force on a large scale against Ukraine, including the possibility of regime change. Even if force does not get Moscow any closer to the wide-reaching concessions that it seeks from the West, Russia’s leadership likely judges that it will secure its influence in the country, deny Ukraine any hope of getting into NATO, and end NATO’s defense cooperation with Ukraine.
The unfolding events of the past year and the crescendo of the current crisis have been widely interpreted as a classic case of coercive diplomacy: threats, signals, and demands backed by a show of capability and resolve. However, it is more likely that Moscow was leaning towards a military solution. Russia’s diplomatic overture offered few prospects for success at the negotiating table. There is an eerie calm as Russian forces continue to position equipment and units around Ukraine. At this stage, Russia’s military retains operational surprise and could launch an assault on short notice. There will not be further strategic warning ahead of an offensive.
Prediction is always a fraught business, but it seems plausible that Russian forces would seize Ukraine’s eastern regions, as well as the southern port city of Odessa, and encircle Kyiv. The Russian goal would be regime change, perhaps via constitutional reform, and a settlement that would secure Russian influence over Ukraine. From a position of leverage, Russia would try to attain a U.S. commitment to give it a free hand in this part of eastern Europe. With Belarus firmly in Russia’s orbit, Moscow is eyeing using force to change Ukraine’s strategic orientation in an effort to create its own cordon against Western influence. An expanded invasion of Ukraine may not herald a prolonged occupation, but Russia appears prepared for that contingency. Russian force posture can enable a range of choices, but it is difficult to see how Moscow accomplishes any lasting political gains without having to resort to maximalist options.
How to Interpret Russian Demands
This crisis is not about NATO or Ukraine, but about NATO and Ukraine. Russia wants Washington to agree to a revised European order in which Russia has a veto over security arrangements and in decisions over security outcomes. By closing NATO’s open door, and halting defense cooperation with non-members, Washington would be acknowledging that Moscow’s security considerations supersede the right of its neighbors to choose their strategic orientation, and that security in Europe must be negotiated with Moscow.
Yet Russian demands for legally binding guarantees raise questions. On the one hand, Putin has railed against successive rounds of NATO expansion, encroaching military infrastructure, military exercises, and defense cooperation with countries like Ukraine. But he has also said that he does not believe in U.S. security assurances, and according to him Washington easily withdraws from treaties with or without explanation. So, why pursue such agreements with urgency when he believes that Washington may just bin them one day anyway?
There is also the nagging problem that no U.S. Congress, or any legislature in Europe, is likely to ratify a legally binding agreement with Russia based on such demands. Perhaps Moscow still assesses that the United States and its European allies might sign politically binding agreements that fall short of a treaty. While not legally binding, such agreements would hold strategic implications for European countries that are not NATO members. Those states would find their room for maneuver shrinking and would seek to hedge or to pursue a foreign policy that includes balancing relations between Europe and Russia.
Russia’s demands for a halt to NATO expansion, a rollback of defense cooperation with non-NATO members, and a return to force posture prior to 1997 (essentially a “go back to Germany” clause) seem to have little relationship to the deadlock over Minsk II implementation. These demands won’t secure a say over Ukraine’s domestic policy, or even get Russia out of the current sanctions regime. Furthermore, why didn’t Moscow make any of these demands during the spring buildup? The timing was no less auspicious. Why wait until the end of 2021 to come up with rushed proposals and demand rapid progress?
The diplomatic effort appears improvised, while the central demands were obvious non-starters for the West. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, often the last to know what is happening, was unsurprisingly surprised to find out it that was supposed to be coming up with these draft treaties in late December. Moscow has not only been asking for things that it knows it cannot attain, but it has been doing so in a manner that will ensure that it cannot attain them. Serious negotiations are usually done behind closed doors. By publicizing its demands and refusing to unbundle them in ways that might achieve compromise, Russia has made its diplomatic effort appear more performative than genuine.
Perhaps Moscow is just fishing for what it can get, but the political demands do not align with the military side of the equation. Settling for minor modifications to the already existing strategic stability agenda would appear to be a political retreat after releasing such ostentatious demands. Persistent references to internal time constraints, demanding “answers urgently,” suggest that Putin has been leaning towards using force all along. At Geneva, it became clear that Moscow views U.S. counteroffers for an expanded strategic stability agenda with much lower significance than its irreconcilable demands.
A dramatic expansion of the war is now the most probable outcome. In the spring the Russian leadership issued red lines, but if they really were interested in deterring an expansion of U.S. defense cooperation then such a demand would have been made at the June presidential summit, and they would have given the effort a bit longer than a few months to produce results.
Putin may see diplomacy as a last-ditch effort to avert war, but Russia’s posture suggests that he is leaning towards a unilateral solution. While some commentators may view this as a bluff, it hard to see how Putin imagined bluffing his way to a wholesale revision of Europe’s security architecture.
Why Now?
There are two overlapping issues: The first is Ukraine, where Russia desires to have a firm say over its foreign policy as well as aspects of its internal governance. The second is to block further NATO expansion and to roll back Ukrainian defense cooperation with NATO members. Moscow perceives its strategy in Ukraine as having generally failed, with diplomacy over the Minsk ceasefire agreement at a deadlock, while Ukraine is increasingly treated as a de facto NATO member. In statements, essays, and articles, Russian leaders have made clear over the course of 2021 that they believe that Ukraine and its territory are being used as an instrument against Russia by the United States, and if they cannot compel a policy reversal, they will seek military solutions. As Putin said in December, “if our Western colleagues continue their obviously aggressive line, we will take appropriate military-technical reciprocal measures and will have a tough response to their unfriendly steps.” What is remarkable about this crisis is how well it has been signposted over the course of 2021, with Russian political statements and military activity in close alignment.
Although the crisis has structural roots in the post-Cold War settlement, the proximate cause of this standoff is a series of political turns in 2020 and early 2021. After initially being open to dialogue, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s administration took a hard turn away from pursuing compromises with Moscow. Zelensky arrested Putin’s ally Viktor Medvedchuk and banned three pro-Russian television channels in the country. Putin has also railed against a discriminatory language law passed in 2019, which has just entered into force. Not only has Ukraine continued on a westward trajectory, but Zelensky has also chosen to take a hard line, and has begun to actively eliminate Russian influence in Ukraine. This turnabout dashed any hopes that Russia had of achieving a desirable political settlement and removed a path for Russia to get out from under Western sanctions. Russian officials have publicly made clear that they see no further point to negotiating with Zelensky, viewing his administration as a marionette of the United States, and have instead approached his patron — Washington.
European capitals and Washington have backed Ukraine’s position. Moscow is thus faced with a choice between accepting that Ukraine is slipping away, or escalation. Moscow judges that it has to act in order to prevent a fixed reorientation of the country and the destruction of the key pillars of its influence. Among Putin’s grievances is the belief that Ukraine will become a platform for U.S. power projection along Russia’s southwestern flank and he cannot tolerate this prospect (recalling Moscow’s fears that led it to invade Afghanistan). Last fall he remarked “what if tomorrow there are missiles near Kharkov — what should we do then? We do not go there with our missiles — but missiles are being brought to our doorstep. Of course, we have a problem here.” Whether genuine, or instrumental, Russia’s leadership have often used this threat to link Ukraine to broader grievances on European security.
Washington’s effort to launch a strategic stability dialogue has also played a role. The Biden administration sought predictability in the relationship, perhaps so it could focus on China and pressing domestic concerns. The administration was right to launch this initiative and see if Moscow was willing to engage, but as Oscar Wilde quipped, “There are only two tragedies in life: one is not getting what one wants, and the other is getting it.” Moscow has now made clear what the price of predictability in relations is, and it is clearly one that the United States is unwilling to pay. Given that Washington has signaled that it sees Europe as a secondary theater, the price Russia would ask was inevitably going to be high.
Russia’s elite may believe that they are in a good position to conduct a military operation and weather the storm of Western economic punishment. Having stabilized the Russian economy, established a war chest of reserves (over $620 billion), and tightened the screws on its opposition, the regime is more confident economically and politically. Moscow has greater leverage over Europe due to surging gas prices and energy supply shortages. Putin might also judge that the Biden administration is reticent about enacting the most severe financial sanctions in its arsenal because these would cause ripples in the global financial system, a rise in U.S. gasoline prices, not to mention the impact on energy prices in Europe.
It also merits considering that Russian assumptions may be colored by war optimism. Moscow might believe that much of the Ukrainian public quietly holds pro-Russian attitudes and Russian forces might be greeted as liberators. Russian elites see Ukraine as a manipulable oligarchy with corrupt elites. Such assumptions and narratives run deep in Putin’s statements and writings. The Russian elite is deeply chauvinistic and has little regard for Ukrainian military capabilities. Moscow may judge the use of force to be preferable relative to the mounting costs of inaction, and the potential risks of having to use force later. Leaders talk themselves into war, imagining that the situation is imposed upon them and rationalizing that a conflict is inevitable so it is better to fight now than later. Russia would not be the first country to invade another, misjudging the socio-political dynamics, and the costs of occupation.
Can Putin Back Down?
The United States and its allies have made clear that while they are willing to discuss an expanded strategic stability agenda, they will not shut NATO’s open door, constrain military cooperation with non-member states, remove military forces and infrastructure from the territory of NATO members who have joined since 1997, or compel Ukraine to accept a form of neutrality. While a discussion on future missile placement, mutual reductions in military activity, and other measures might count as a diplomatic success for Moscow, it is unlikely that this is enough to satisfy Putin. If it were, why has he not pocketed the deal already?
After the meeting in Geneva, the United States was unable to determine if the Russian diplomatic effort was genuine or cover for a planned military operation. The head of Russia’s delegation, Sergey Ryabkov, didn’t appear to know either.
It is doubtful that the Russian leadership can back down without external and internal audience costs. Over the past month, the West has also been arming Ukraine in anticipation of a Russian attack, hardly a policy success for Moscow. If Putin backs down with nothing, the domestic and international perception will be that he was either bluffing or, even worse, was successfully deterred. Putin will end up with the worst of both worlds, seen as simultaneously aggressive and resistible. Also, while an authoritarian state may care less about domestic audience perceptions, the elites, or the so-called “selectorate,” are another matter. Authoritarian leaders like Putin can find their ability to manage political coalitions diminished if elites perceive them as reckless, incompetent, and increasingly unfit to rule. Putin certainly has options, but this is not a contest in which he can afford to back down cost-free.
A More Dangerous Mobilization
While the military deployment may appear overly visible, lacking in initiative or surprise, in fact the opposite is true. Russia is indeed assembling this force in a manner designed to conceal its operational aims. To some extent it retains surprise and initiative. The Russian military is deploying a large force slowly, and deliberately, with equipment that can be parked in the field for months. Troops can be quickly sent to these encampments, fall in on equipment, and begin dispersing. This conceals the final disposition of forces, and the timing and scope of an operation. With large numbers of Russian forces having arrived in Belarus, and more on the way, a large-scale military operation in the coming weeks seems probable.
Ukraine finds itself in a mobilization trap. Kyiv might be reluctant to conduct large force shifts — if Moscow is spoiling for a fight, then a mobilization order could be used as a pretext by the Russian leadership, claiming that Ukraine intends to retake the Donbas by force. It is also expensive and economically disruptive. Yet on the brink of all-out war, the calm among Ukrainian elites is jarring. Rumors swirl that Zelensky thinks that this is a bluff, and even believes that the United States is exaggerating the threat intentionally to force him into concessions. Ukraine’s leadership appears to be more worried about the impact that this threat has on the economy and public sentiments, than about preparing the nation for the war.
Since 2014, the Russian military has shifted formations to Ukraine’s borders, resulting in roughly 55,000 to 60,000 ground troops permanently stationed in the region (a 250 to 300-kilometer range). The forces normally stationed on Ukraine’s border can generate about 25 to 30 battalion tactical groups and the forces that have been mobilized in recent months to join them represent another 35 to 40 battalion tactical groups. Recently arrived forces from the Eastern Military District might bring this figure to a total of 65 to 70. A battalion tactical group is a task-organized combined-arms maneuver formation, averaging 800 personnel per unit (though it can be as small as 600 and as large as 1,000). It is essentially a battalion plus enablers such as artillery, logistics, and air defense. These formations are an imprecise but useful unit of measurement when talking about Russian offensive maneuver potential.
Total estimated end strength is therefore already north of 90,000 personnel. These figures do not include airpower, naval units, or additional logistical components that are likely to support this force. Russian-led forces in Ukraine’s Donbas region might account for another 15,000 troops, but they have considerably lower combat effectiveness than Russian regulars.
The force gathered from other Russian regions largely consists of prepositioned equipment, but it is already sufficient for a military operation. There are indications that Russia has begun sending personnel. The current force is largely within the self-deployment range, which means they can move to the border in a matter of days once personnel arrive. Russia retains considerable force-generation potential and can surge units to the area on relatively short notice. Publicly available estimates suggest Moscow might gather a force of 90 to 100 battalion tactical groups, together with reserves, and auxiliary forces for a total of 150,000 to 175,000 troops. The Russian military is not yet in position for such a largescale operation, but it could have the requisite forces and elements placed in the coming weeks.
What are Russia’s Options?
A Russian military campaign could range from standoff strikes to a largescale invasion of Ukraine’s eastern regions, the encirclement of Kyiv, and the taking of Odessa along the coast. The question is not what Russia can do militarily in Ukraine, since the answer is almost anything, but what kind of operation might attain lasting political gains. Consequently, most scenarios seem illogical and politically counterproductive.
Given the stakes, and likely costs, any Russian military operation would have to attain political gains that give Moscow the ability to enforce implementation. In short, just hurting Ukraine is not enough to achieve anything that Russia wants. While some believe that Russia intends to compel Ukraine into a new Minsk-like agreement, the reality is that nobody in Moscow thinks that a Ukrainian government can be made to implement any document they sign. Such a settlement would be political suicide for the Zelensky administration, or any other. Russia has no way to enforce compliance with its preferences once the operation is over. This is, at least, the lesson that Moscow seems to have taken from Minsk I and Minsk II. Why would Minsk III prove any different? Russia has not struggled in getting Ukraine to sign deals at gunpoint, but all of these have resulted in Ukraine’s continued westward march and a decline of Russian influence in the country. It’s not clear how Moscow achieves its goals without conducting regime change, or a partitioning of the state, and committing to some form of occupation to retain leverage.
Those who think that Russia might simply conduct an airstrike campaign have an even bigger problem in explaining what possible political aims Moscow could attain via this type of operation. Most likely, the initial war effort will involve the use of artillery, precision fires, and airpower. Then ground forces would conduct a multi-axis attack from Belarus, Russia, the Donbas, and Crimea. A ground operation would entail the occupation of Ukrainian territory for some time to secure lines of communication and critical infrastructure, which requires follow-on forces and potentially reserves. The Russian military has been developing a sizable reserve and conducting partial callups to test it.
Russia could leverage the offer of an eventual withdrawal from Ukraine in exchange for a deal, figuring that the United States might prefer a broken Ukraine to a hard redrawing of the map of Europe. But this arrangement would undoubtedly combine current demands made to NATO with sovereignty impositions on Ukraine, including federalization to increase regional autonomy, and a rollback of defense ties with NATO members along with promises that NATO will never admit Ukraine. It is possible that Putin believes he can get such a deal, to be enforced externally by the United States, but only if he holds the bulk of Ukraine’s territory in his hands.
The increasingly likely scenario is that Moscow intends to install a pro-Russian government backed by its forces, which aligns with recently released claims by the United Kingdom. Alternatively, Russia may consider a partitioning of Ukraine. This would not be a total occupation of the country, but would include most of the country sans the Western regions. It would be terribly risky, and costly, but it would make Putin the Russian leader who restored much of historical Russia, and established a new buffer against NATO. A de facto occupation of most of Ukraine may be the only way that Russia can impose its will on the country if it cannot install a pro-Russian government. In launching an offensive, one of Moscow’s riskiest decisions will be whether to stay largely east, or to venture west of the Dnieper river.
Whether Russia intends to partition Ukraine or not, war is highly contingent. Russian forces may end up controlling large parts of Ukraine for a prolonged period either way. Indeed, this is how Russia originally ended up with the Donbas in the first place, having never sought to hold it indefinitely. Similarly, the Russian operation to seize Crimea shows little evidence that annexation was a premediated outcome. Consequently, once an operation is launched, beyond the initial move it is difficult to predict how it might end.
Why not something lesser in scope? A smaller campaign, perhaps seizing the rest of the Donbas, would have high costs and risks. What does this gain Moscow in Ukraine, or in terms of revising its position in Europe? If anything, it worsens Russia’s current predicament. Russian leaders have acknowledged that their strategy of trying to leverage the Donbas has failed to deliver and are unlikely to double down or repeat something that they concede won’t work. The logic of a Russian military operation suggests that the best way in which Moscow could attain lasting political gains is to use force on a large scale and commit to an occupation for some period of time.
The Unfinished Business of Europe
If Putin’s aim is to see what he can get, then he may well take the low-hanging fruit of an expanded strategic stability agenda, pocket the win, and close out this gambit. Europeans would breathe a sigh of relief and U.S.-Russian relations would stagger on until the next crisis. This looks terribly unlikely. Alternatively, if Russia uses force on a large scale, Washington would have to make major shifts in force posture, reinforce deterrence on NATO’s flank, and reinvest in its ability to defend European allies, likely to the detriment of its aim to focus on the Indo-Pacific. The ensuing cycle of sanctions, diplomatic expulsions, and various forms of retaliation might escalate to the use of larger-scale economic and political instruments.
If Ukraine is unfinished business for Russia’s leader, then European security should be unfinished business for the United States. This is a defining moment. Russia may be able to temporarily set the agenda, but it has thus far not shown itself strong enough to make the United States and its allies in Europe restructure the current order to accommodate Russian preferences. There are fundamental disagreements in outlooks on international relations and which principles should govern them. Despite periods of cooperation, Moscow has long interpreted this as an order of exclusion, created and expanded during a time of Russian weakness. This not just a phenomenon under Putin. Missed opportunities, choices made and not made, cast a long shadow over European security.
This crisis reveals a problem in U.S. strategy. European security remains much more unsettled than it appears. The most militarily powerful state on the continent does not see itself as a stakeholder in Europe’s security architecture. There’s little evidence that without the United States, European powers can deter Moscow or lead their way out of a major crisis. The European Union is nonexistent in the conversation, begging for relevance. Yet the United States is materially constrained, seeking to focus on the Indo-Pacific and redress a deteriorating military balance vis-à-vis China. Washington’s dream of making the Russia relationship more predictable via a narrow strategic stability agenda appears to be dissipating. The United States will have to manage China and Russia, at the same time, for the foreseeable future. For U.S. strategy, it was never going to be China only, but it will prove exceedingly difficult to make it China mostly — not as long as Russia gets a vote.
Michael Kofman (@KofmanMichael) is director of the Russia Studies Program at CNA and a fellow at the Wilson Center, Kennan Institute.
11. The Myth of Cyberwar and the Realities of Subversion
Excerpt:
In most circumstances, then, the subversive trilemma significantly limits the value of cyber operations. Their track record in Ukraine confirms this assessment. Of course, actors may occasionally get lucky and manage to achieve strategic goals despite taking exceptional risks. Yet such rare scenarios should not dominate threat assessments and strategy development. In theory, it is possible to juggle three balls while sprinting one hundred meters at competitive pace without dropping a single ball. In practice, few—if any—will be able to achieve this feat.
The Myth of Cyberwar and the Realities of Subversion - Modern War Institute
The prospect of cyberwarfare continues to haunt defense planners, policymakers, and the public. Earlier visions of cyberwar, in which opponents hurled cyber weapons and logic bombs at each other at the speed of light, have mostly subsided. Yet fears of a strategic cyberattack causing a “cyber Pearl Harbor” remain acute. And even if cyberattacks remain below the intensity of armed conflict, many argue that their unrivaled effectiveness expands the value of “hybrid warfare,” opening a new space for strategic competition. Cyber operations, in this view, will allow states to shift the balance of power and attain strategic gains in ways that were previously impossible without going to war. In other words, by staying in the gray zone states can get more for less.
If true, this development would herald no less than a revolution in strategic competition. The reality is more prosaic. In a recent article in International Security, I show that current expectations about the strategic potential of cyber operations focus on the promise of technology, while neglecting key operational challenges. As has often been the case with new and ostensibly revolutionary military technologies, the way actors use them at the operational level determines their strategic utility. And a closer look at the operational challenges in cyber conflict— including Russia’s five major disruptive cyber operations in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict—suggests that its strategic value will be modest.
Cyber operations are not novel instruments of power, but instruments of subversion. Like all such instruments, cyber operations hold great strategic promise but falter all too often in practice. The reason is an operational trilemma between speed, intensity, and control: cyber operations cannot have all three properties at once. In theory, cyber operations offer rapid and stealthy options to sow mass disruption capable of shifting the balance of power. In practice, however, they tend to be too slow, weak, and volatile to deliver on that promise.
Subversion and its Promise
Subversion’s Pitfalls: An Operational Trilemma
But the same characteristics that enable this strategic promise also often prevent its fulfillment. Subversion promises low risks and low costs because of its secrecy and its exploitation of adversary systems. These operational characteristics are not a given, however, but require significant efforts to achieve and maintain. Secrecy requires stealth and adaptation. Exploitation requires reconnaissance of systems, identification of vulnerabilities, and development of means of manipulation—all under the constraints of secrecy. These challenges limit operational speed, intensity of effects, and control. Moreover, increasing one variable tends to create corresponding losses across the remaining ones.
First, speed is constrained because reconnaissance, identification of vulnerabilities, and development of exploitation techniques all take time. Since an increase in speed means less time to develop and refine exploitation techniques, it correspondingly tends to reduce the intensity of effects and the degree of control over an operation.
The second variable in the trilemma, intensity of effects, is constrained by adversary systems and the need for secrecy. The properties of the target system determine the maximum intensity of effects—for example, if economic disruption is the aim, the target system must in some way affect the relevant economic processes. Even if the target system is capable of such an effect, however, the process of manipulation must stay hidden until the effect is produced. Otherwise, the victim can neutralize it—typically, by arresting the spy involved.
Finally, subversive actors never fully control a target system, and usually have only incomplete knowledge about its design and functioning. Because of this limited control, manipulation may fail to produce the intended effect or lead to unintended consequences. This trilemma means that subversion is typically too slow, too weak, and too volatile to provide strategic value.
The Subversive Nature of Cyber Operations
Hacking targets two types of vulnerabilities. First, it can target flaws in the design of the technology itself, such as software code, to make systems behave in ways neither their designers nor users intended or expected. Usually, this means granting access and control to the hacker. But it can also exploit flaws in hardware design.
The second type of vulnerability targets users and security practices. Phishing emails offer a classic example, leveraging weaknesses in human psychology to trick users into installing malware or revealing access credentials. Regardless of the vulnerability exploited, cyber operations then use the targeted system to inflict damage upon an adversary. As in the case of traditional subversion, hackers turn these systems into instruments of the sponsor’s interests. In a second parallel, hackers also proceed stealthily, establishing access to, and assuming control over, targets without alerting the victim to their presence.
Hacking can achieve similarly diverse effects as traditional subversion, ranging from influencing public opinion to disrupting the economy to the sabotage of critical infrastructure. In modern societies a growing portion of social, economic, and physical processes are computerized. This computerization produces vast efficiency gains, but it also creates new liabilities. Current expectations about the strategic potential of cyber operations are correct in identifying this promise.
The Subversive Trilemma and the Strategic Limitations of Cyber Operations
Yet the exploitation required to fulfill this promise involves the same operational challenges as in the case of traditional subversion, and therefore produces the same trilemma. As a result, in practice cyber operations offer similarly limited strategic value.
Contrary to prevailing expectations, cyber operations face key constraints when it comes to speed. Hacking requires reconnaissance, identifying suitable vulnerabilities, and developing the means to exploit them, such as computer viruses. All of this takes time. If operational speed is required, there is less time for reconnaissance and development which means that the tools and techniques deployed are less likely to achieve large effects and significant control over the target system. And hacking, like traditional subversion, also requires stealth. Upon discovery, victims can delete malware and patch vulnerabilities, so hackers must proceed with caution—constraining the intensity of effects that can be produced.
Conversely, increasing the intensity of an operation tends to slow down speed and decrease control. The greater the desired scale of impact, the more reconnaissance and development time will be required to achieve a corresponding degree of control over a target system capable of producing the desired effect. The more capable the system, the more likely it is to be well protected, raising the risk of discovery. With the increase in scale, the likelihood that something goes wrong also tends to increase—unless one invests even more time in reconnaissance and development.
Finally, as in the case of traditional subversion, control in cyber is also limited. Access to target systems usually remains incomplete, and some parts of these systems remain unfamiliar. Even those parts that hackers have access to may behave differently than expected in response to manipulation. The same fallibility that produces logical flaws that enable exploitation may also apply to the hackers themselves. For example, in the 2016 sabotage operation against Ukraine’s power grid, the infamous Sandworm hacking group had developed a program that was capable of physically damaging power circuits by overloading them. Yet the hackers had missed something: the industrial control systems they targeted reversed IP addresses. As a result, the malicious commands went nowhere, the capability failed to produce any effects, and the victims neutralized the outage in little more than an hour.
In sum, the trilemma predicts that an increase in one of speed, intensity, or control will tend to produce a decrease in the other two. And increasing two variables at once tends to produce corresponding “double losses” in the remaining variable. For example, high-speed and high-intensity operations will entail an extremely high risk of losing control.
The Strategic Value of Cyber Operations: Expectations versus Evidence
This subversive trilemma defangs cyber operations in most circumstances. Contrary to expectations, cyber operations cannot be fast, intense, and anonymous—or at least not all at once. In practice, cyber operations are usually too slow, too weak, or too volatile to contribute to strategic goals.
My research into the use of cyber operations in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict—a paradigmatic example of cyber-enabled gray-zone conflict—confirms these conclusions. In contrast to expectations about the integral role of cyber operations in hybrid warfare, cyber operations have been mostly irrelevant to the military dimension of the conflict. And Russia’s five major disruptive cyber operations against Ukraine failed to produce strategic value—in large part because of the operational constraints laid out above. Even the one operation that produced strategically significant effects, the 2017 NotPetya operation that disrupted businesses across much of the world, ultimately supports this theory: the reason for its wide spread was a loss of control. The hackers had no way to control the malware’s spread, and thus no control over the scale of its disruption—which, based on forensic evidence, spread far wider than intended. The operation had a measurable strategic impact since it reduced Ukraine’s GDP, but its uncontrolled spread also produced additional costs as several Western countries levied sanctions against Russia in response, reducing the attack’s net strategic benefit.
This last point highlights an important distinction between strategic impact and value. Cyber operations can produce significant impacts by spreading widely, but their uncontrolled spread limits their strategic value. And because of the trilemma, the greater the scale of effects, the greater the risk of losing control tends to become.
In most circumstances, then, the subversive trilemma significantly limits the value of cyber operations. Their track record in Ukraine confirms this assessment. Of course, actors may occasionally get lucky and manage to achieve strategic goals despite taking exceptional risks. Yet such rare scenarios should not dominate threat assessments and strategy development. In theory, it is possible to juggle three balls while sprinting one hundred meters at competitive pace without dropping a single ball. In practice, few—if any—will be able to achieve this feat.
Lennart Maschmeyer is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich. You can follow him on Twitter @LenMaschmeyer.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
12. China’s Espionage Plans for the 2022 Winter Olympics: What Athletes Should Expect
What to expect: All your electronic devices will be penetrated. Your personally identifiable information will be compromised. At some time in the future you will be targeted based on the exploitation of the information collected during the Olympics (more likely if you are in some kind of a sensitive position).
China’s Espionage Plans for the 2022 Winter Olympics: What Athletes Should Expect
Yes, China is going to spy on the Olympic athletes. Its mandatory app is just the tip of the iceberg.
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As the world prepares for the Winter Olympics in Beijing, the athletes will have to contend with more than just competing in their chosen sport. The Chinese government will implement extensive surveillance efforts to ensure the safety of all involved, to control the spread of COVID-19, and to serve China’s political interests. It is the latter reason that is of particular concern.
China’s national image before the world is of the utmost importance to the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Why would China feel threatened by professional athletes? Of what possible interest would the personal lives, actions, and opinions of the world’s athletes be to China’s powerful regime? After all, these athletes have not spent their lives in self-sacrifice and arduous training just to spy on China. They will not have access to any Chinese government facilities, senior officials, or state secrets. Why then would China spy on them? The answer is to protect China’s image.
Saving face is a particular paranoia for the CCP; it is what maintains China’s dictatorship. Protecting the CCP’s image has driven Chinese leaders to create the world’s most advanced and pervasive censorship capability, effectively becoming the first digital authoritarian nation. China restricts all information that is released to or by its citizens and is known to coerce or lash out at any foreign government, business, or public figure that criticizes China or its rulers. Athletes are no exception.
First, the athletes must be aware that the information they provide on their visa applications has been used to create files and open-source collection efforts on them. That research effort identifies and places athletes into at least two categories: First, those who have espoused public views that the CCP deems threatening, such as issues relating to democracy, freedom, human rights, Uyghurs, Tibet, minorities, Hong Kong, women’s rights, homosexuality, and/or transgender issues. And second, those that have made public statements in support of China (what the CCP would call “friends of China”). The first group can threaten China’s image by making public statements at the Winter Olympics, while the second group can be exploited to represent China in a positive light.
Regardless of category, however, athletes can expect to have their cellphone signals intercepted upon arrival in Beijing. Cellphone towers will record everything from the metadata to actual content of messages. The information gathered from the interceptions will be relayed to China’s Ministry of Public Security. There are several national security laws that require companies to provide all communications and associated information to the state’s intelligence and security services upon request. There are also reports from China on criminal organizations using fake cellphone towers to collect personal information on individuals and using the information for a variety of fraud schemes.
Beijing requires all athletes to install a smartphone app called MY2022 to report health and travel data while in China. The University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab reported the app as having significant encryption and security flaws and a censorship list (albeit currently inactive) of 2,442 “illegal words.” The security flaws are by design, allowing authorities to access phones. Such subtle approaches are common among intelligence services.
Once at the Olympic Village, the athletes will be greeted by numerous physical and information security measures. The extensive security measures will be openly advertised as necessary to protect the athletes from COVID-19 – China does not want to put the health of the athletes at risk, as this would embarrass China’s leaders before the world. Therefore, athletes will have limited access to places and people. This practice is standard for large-scale events.
Beijing has promised to provide Olympians internet access at official venues sites and hotels that will allow them to bypass the Great Firewall and access websites banned in China (everything from Facebook and Twitter to Gmail and YouTube, as well as many foreign news sites). That access will most certainly be monitored. Participating companies providing communications and network support, such as Huawei Technologies Co. and Iflytek Co., work closely with China’s Ministry of Public Security. Both are on U.S. export denial lists and Huawei has been accused in U.S. civil and criminal courts of commercial espionage. Several other onsite IT service providers have been banned by foreign countries for their collection of personal data.
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All laptop communications will be monitored and provided, in near real time, to China’s security services. Chinese law requires the use of government-approved VPN (Virtual Private Network) providers for internet access. Use of non-approved VPN providers could result in criminal charges against the individual.
Cellphone tracking, onsite video surveillance systems, and facial recognition technology will be used to track the movement of each athlete. China has the most sophisticated facial recognition and associated artificial intelligence in the world, thanks in part to collaborations with U.S. universities and businesses.
Personal behavior will also be watched and catalogued by the Chinese government. Olympic athletes are known for their after-hours celebratory partying. As one would expect, young adults mostly in their 20s, in outstanding physical condition, coming off the most stressful and probably significant event in their lives, are likely to let off a little steam. In fact, during the Tokyo Summer Olympics, the Japanese government built bed frames out of hard cardboard to cut down on any “jumping on the bed” celebrations.
Going beyond this, China will closely monitor the personal behavior of athletes, to include their conversations. For decades, China’s Ministries of State and Public Security have maintained electronic listening devices in hotels frequented by foreigners. It is likely that those security services will do the same at the Olympic Village if deemed necessary. That information may be immediately used or just held for future opportunities.
Politics on the pedestal will be very closely monitored. This is a huge concern for Beijing. In recent years, several athletes have chosen to use their moment on the winner’s pedestal to highlight a political or social issue. The Chinese government will be on watch for such actions. Any public display or statement on any issue that is perceived as offensive will be restricted on Chinese broadcasts, and likely to the global audience as well.
Many of the world’s governments are advising their athletes to take precautions while at the Olympics. Such measures include using new laptops, cellphones, and email addresses, and never accessing any online account with your regular password, which will result in the account being compromised. Devices taken to Beijing should not be used (or at least be thoroughly cleaned) upon return.
Rocked by cheating scandals, international politics, pandemics, and a loss of viewership, the Olympic Games continues to struggle in an ever more cynical and disillusioned world. The great dream of uniting the world through sports is on life support. By being prepared, aware, and protecting themselves in China, the athletes of the world can work to keep that great dream alive and avoid becoming pawns in the game between nations.
13. Senior State Department Officials On Posture of U.S. Embassy Kyiv
A Sunday night State Department briefing.
Senior State Department Officials On Posture of U.S. Embassy Kyiv - United States Department of State
MODERATOR: Thank you very much, and thanks to everyone for joining this call, especially on a Sunday evening on such short notice.
As a reminder at the top, the briefing today is on background. We have joining us this evening two senior State Department officials who will discuss the recent decision regarding the authorized of ordered departure at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine. To reiterate, the contents of this briefing are on background, and they are embargoed until the end of this call. For your awareness only but not for reporting, we have two senior State Department officials on the line. We have with us [Senior State Department Official One]. We also have [Senior State Department Official Two]. Again, in your reporting, you can refer to our briefers as senior State Department officials.
We will first hear from our briefers this evening, and then we will look forward to taking your questions. So with that, I will turn it over to our first senior State Department official. Please go ahead.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Well, good evening, everyone, and thanks so much for joining us today. I’m glad that my consular colleague is here to speak to the important changes we’ve just made to our Travel Advisory for Ukraine with updated advice for U.S. citizens.
Before I turn it over to her, I would like to underscore three key principles. First, as you know, we’ve authorized the departure of some U.S. Government employees, while we have ordered the departure of all family members of U.S. Government employees at our embassy in Kyiv. The State Department has also elevated our Travel Advisory for Ukraine to Level Four – Do Not Travel due to the increased threat of Russian military action. I would note that the Travel Advisory was already at Level Four – Do Not Travel due to COVID-19. These decisions were made out of an abundance of caution due to continued Russian efforts to destabilize the country and undermine the security of Ukrainian citizens and others visiting or residing in Ukraine. We have no higher priority than the safety and security of U.S. citizens, and this includes our U.S. Government personnel and their dependents, and the security of our facilities overseas.
Why did we make this decision now? Do we believe a Russian invasion is imminent? As President Biden has said, military action by Russia could come at any time. The United States Government will not be in a position to evacuate U.S. citizens in such a contingency, so U.S. citizens currently present in Ukraine should plan accordingly, including by availing themselves of commercial options should they choose to leave the country.
We continue to pursue the path of diplomacy. But if Russia chooses further escalation, then the security conditions, particularly along Ukraine’s borders in Russia-occupied Crimea and in Russia-controlled eastern Ukraine are unpredictable and can deteriorate with little notice. We are taking this action now because of Russia’s aggressive actions towards Ukraine. It is Russia that has amassed upwards of 100,000 troops on Ukraine’s borders. It is Russia that is conducting disinformation operations and fomenting unrest. As to President Putin’s intentions, we don’t know if he has yet made up his mind to invade, but he is building the military capacity along Ukraine’s borders to have that option ready at any time.
Second, let me be clear: these are prudent precautions taken for the sake of the safety of U.S. citizens and government personnel, and they in no way undermine our support for or our commitment to Ukraine. The United States commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is unwavering. The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv continues to operate, and the Chargé d’Affaires, Kristina Kvien, remains in Ukraine.
In addition to our diplomatic coordination, we are assisting Ukraine with new lethal defensive security assistance, including ammunition for the frontline defenders of Ukraine. The first of several shipments for Ukrainian armed forces, totaling $200 million, arrived in Kyiv on January 22nd, yesterday, and more will arrive in weeks to come. With this new authorization, the United States has committed more than $650 million of security assistance to Ukraine in the past year and more than $2.7 billion in total U.S. security assistance to Ukraine since 2014. As President Biden told President Putin, should Russia further invade Ukraine, the consequences will be severe, and the United States will provide additional defensive material to Ukraine above and beyond that already provided.
Finally, in regard to Russia, we have been consistent in our message. There are two paths, dialogue and diplomacy or escalation and massive consequences. Over the past weeks, you’ve seen us make intense and sustained efforts to pursue diplomacy. But while we continue to pursue peace, we must be clear-eyed about the reality if Russia chooses escalation: it will face massive consequences.
So at this time of escalated tension, we urge President Putin to take steps to de-escalate this crisis so the United States and Russia can pursue a relationship that is not based on hostility or conflict. And with that, I’ll turn it over to [Senior State Department Official Two]. Thank you.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Thank you very much. Good evening, everybody, and I’m very glad you could join. I represent the Bureau of Consular Affairs today to reiterate our message to U.S. citizens currently in Ukraine.
As my colleague stated, the State Department has elevated our Travel Advisory for Ukraine to Level Four – Do Not Travel due to the increased threat of Russian military action. The Travel Advisory was already at Level Four – Do Not Travel due to COVID concerns.
Our recommendation to U.S. citizens currently in Ukraine is that they should consider departing now using commercial or privately available transportation options.
To be clear, President Biden has said military action by Russia could come at any time. The United States Government will not be in a position to evacuate U.S. citizens in such a contingency. So U.S. citizens currently present in Ukraine should plan accordingly, including by availing themselves of commercial options should they choose to leave the country.
We always encourage U.S. citizens to read the entire Travel Advisory themselves, but I would like to reiterate a few key points and ask you to help us share them.
This elevation of the Travel Advisory level comes as there are reports Russia is planning significant military action against Ukraine. We want U.S. citizens in Ukraine to know that the security conditions, particularly along Ukraine’s borders, in Russia-occupied Crimea, and in Russia-controlled eastern Ukraine, are unpredictable and can deteriorate with little notice.
We want U.S. citizens in Ukraine to be aware, for their planning purposes, that Russian military action anywhere in Ukraine would severely impact the U.S. Embassy’s ability to provide consular services, including assistance to U.S. citizens in departing Ukraine.
Our Travel Advisory update asks all U.S. citizens in Ukraine to complete an online form so that we may better communicate with them. This is especially important if they plan to remain in Ukraine. That form is available on travel.state.gov and on the website of the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv.
And as always, we urge U.S. citizens to register with our Smart Traveler Enrollment Program, STEP.state.gov, so they can receive important messages about Ukraine, including timely Alerts and updates to Travel Advisories.
Again, we recommend that U.S. citizens in Ukraine: one, consider departing now using commercial or other privately available transportation options; two, use the online form in our updated Travel Advisory to tell us their plans, so that we can best conduct our ongoing contingency planning; and three, register in STEP to ensure you receive alerts and guidance from the State Department.
With that, I turn it back to our Moderator. Thank you.
MODERATOR: Thank you both. Operator, if you wouldn’t mind repeating the instructions to pose a question, please.
OPERATOR: Thank you. If you have not already done so, you need to press 1 then 0 on your telephone keypad to place yourself in queue for questions. To remove yourself at any time, you may repeat the 1 then 0 command. Please stand by for the first question.
MODERATOR: We’ll go to the line of Matt Lee, please.
OPERATOR: And your line is open.
QUESTION: Yeah? Can you hear me?
MODERATOR: We have you.
OPERATOR: Yep.
QUESTION: Yes? Okay, cool. Thanks. Look, I know, and I don’t want to get into this – we spar over this all the time. Do you have any idea how many Americans are registered under the STEP program in Ukraine? I know that you do, and so I want to stop you from saying oh, well, it changes all the time. How many are registered right now? Thank you.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: I can take that. Look, you’ve probably even sparred with me, but I’m going to have to tell you what we generally tell everybody. U.S. citizens —
QUESTION: Yeah, but —
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: I’m sorry, if I can continue. U.S. citizens aren’t required to register with us, and so it’s not a number that we are able to share because we don’t have a solid number, and it’s not helpful to share estimated numbers with you. So unfortunately, I’m not going to be able to give you a solid number.
MODERATOR: We’ll go to the line of Halley Toosi, please.
OPERATOR: One moment, please. Your line is open.
QUESTION: Hi. Guys, can you just please clarify, like, exactly what this order is? Like, you’re ordering the relatives of all of the diplomats to leave, but you’re giving, like, the option to some or all of the diplomats themselves to leave? Like, it’s written in this really confusing way, and I’d be really grateful if you could clarify what it actually means. Thank you.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I’m happy to jump in, and then my colleague may want to jump in as well. So what the U.S. Department of State is doing is authorizing the voluntary departure – so that means authorized departure – authorizing the voluntary departure of non-emergency U.S. Government employees. At the same time, the department has ordered the departure of family members of U.S. Government employees at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv.
So authorized departure gives these employees the option to depart if they wish. Departure is not required. Family members, however, are required to depart the country, and the U.S. Embassy’s authorized and ordered departure status will be reviewed in no later than 30 days. So I hope that’s helpful, and I don’t know if my colleague wants to add something.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Yeah, and I’ll – thank you. Yeah, I’ll just jump in and say that under the no-double-standard policy, we are in turn advising U.S. citizens of what we are authorizing and ordering our official personnel to do, so that they have the same information that our official staff does. Thanks.
MODERATOR: We’ll go to the line of Kylie Atwood, please.
QUESTION: Hi, everyone. Thanks for doing this. I know there’s been a lot swirling about this over the weekend, so we appreciate it. Quick question, I am wondering – I understand that you guys are doing this out of an abundance of caution. But how do we explain why this abundance of caution action was taken now versus taken yesterday or the day before or the day before that? Is there anything that has changed to add additional threat to U.S. Government personnel in Ukraine over the last 24 hours or so that triggered this? Thank you.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Well, thanks a lot for that question. As President Biden has said, military action by Russia could come at any time. We are continuing to pursue the path of diplomacy, but if Russia chooses further escalation, then the security conditions, particularly along Ukraine’s borders in Russia-occupied Crimea, in Russia-controlled eastern Ukraine, are predictable and can deteriorate with little notice. So we are taking this action now because of Russia’s aggressive actions towards Ukraine. As you know, it’s Russia that has amassed upwards of 100,000 troops on Ukraine’s borders, and we continue to see that troop buildup. It is Russia that is conducting the disinformation operations and fomenting unrest.
Now, we still don’t know what President Putin’s intentions are. We don’t know if he’s made up his mind to invade. But we so clearly see his building the military capacity along Ukraine’s borders to have that option ready at any time, and that’s the backdrop for these decisions that were made today. Thanks.
MODERATOR: We’ll go to the line of John Hudson.
QUESTION: Thanks. I wanted to ask: How much are U.S. officials mindful of the evacuation in Afghanistan, how that played out, when they are – when they came upon this decision to go to this phase now? And I’m wondering how much of a concern there was in creating a panic in Kyiv that residents of Kyiv are unsafe at the moment.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Well, I can say for my part, this is very much a decision that is focused on the situation in Ukraine and what is best for Embassy Kyiv and American citizens in Ukraine. Your question about how this perhaps will be interpreted by Ukrainians or how it will play out there – I just want to be clear that these are prudent precautions that in no way undermine our support for or commitment to Ukraine. And we continue to avow our commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and I reviewed in my opening comments the assistance, the ongoing assistance, we’re giving to Ukraine. I can say that the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv is going to continue to operate in an uninterrupted way to support Ukraine at this critical moment. Thanks.
MODERATOR: Michael Gordon, please.
QUESTION: Can you please, just some nitty gritty questions? How many personnel are in the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv? How many family members are there who you are ordering to depart? Are they all going by commercial? Is that how they’re leaving? Could you please provide just some – and how many American citizens do you guesstimate are in Ukraine at this time? I understand you don’t know for sure if they don’t register, but what’s your estimate? Can you give us some of these numbers?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Well, now it’s my turn to disappoint you as well. So we’re not providing those kinds of public details regarding our plans. All of these actions are taken as part of ongoing efforts to ensure the safe and secure operations of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Ukraine, and we’ll be continuing to work with our Ukrainian partners to pursue our national security interests while we are simultaneously prioritizing the safety of staff. So we are going to be continuing to take these sorts of prudent precautions. But happy to turn it over to my colleague in case she’s like to add more to that.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Yeah, and I will just say again we just don’t guesstimate. And because we don’t have solid numbers, we have estimates, I’m just not going to be able to share that with you. Unfortunately, U.S. citizens do not always register in STEP, and a lot of U.S. citizens are dual nationals and they enter Ukraine on their Ukrainian passports so we wouldn’t have data from the host country officials either. So I don’t have a number for you. Thanks.
MODERATOR: Barbara Usher, please.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) Kylie’s question. I take it that nothing has actually changed in the security situation from yesterday to today in terms of why you’re taking this – making this decision now.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Yes, that is based on the answer I gave about why now, is there something that’s happened imminently. And it is the totality of the situation that we’ve been watching and the decision that based on this military buildup, based on how we see these developments, we felt this was the right moment to take this step with regard to the embassy in Kyiv and to give the same message to American citizens in Ukraine. Thank you.
MODERATOR: We’ll go to Joel Gehrke.
QUESTION: Hi, thanks for doing this. I wondered, shifting focus just a little bit, if you’re – as we’re talking about potential threats in Kyiv, how do you think about the role of Belarus in a contingency that would threaten Kyiv, and do you – just given how close the capital is to the Belarusian border? And do you have options for how to prevent a threat from that corridor that you don’t have for preventing a threat from the Russians directly from Russia? In other words, do you have more options for stopping Belarus from doing things that you – that you wouldn’t be able to have without – without taking a really great risk with Russia?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: So I would say that we’ve been watching this situation around Ukraine with great care for some months now, and the concern has been that there are multiple – if Russia chooses to engage in further military aggression, it has the opportunity to launch that attack from different directions based on where it can launch those incursions against Ukraine.
So we are continuing to watch with care what’s happening in Belarus. We have, of course, noted with concern the so-called exercises that Russia says it will be doing in Belarus. And this is part of that larger picture that we will watch with care as it unfolds. And we are continuing to speak quite publicly about our concerns about Russia’s military buildup, whether it’s on Russia’s border with Ukraine or whether it’s in Belarus. Thank you.
MODERATOR: Andrea Mitchell, please.
QUESTION: Thank you. I joined late, so stop me if you’ve asked – if this has been asked, but how much if any of this has to do with the political instability in Ukraine and the British report which may or may not be closely connected to the sanctioning that you all announced this week of the four Ukrainians, including two sitting members of parliament?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: We’ve been clear that we’re very concerned about attempts to destabilize Ukraine internally. And you mentioned the reports from the UK that we heard about yesterday, and I’m not going to comment on specific intelligence reports.
What I can tell you is this: We have been concerned and have been warning about exactly those kinds of tactics for weeks. And as you know, we’ve talked about that publicly, that Russia could try, might try, in some way to topple and replace the Ukrainian Government. You will have noted that just a few days ago we sanctioned four Russian agents in Ukraine who were engaged in destabilizing activities, and this is very much part of the Russian playbook that we have seen in the past as well.
So I think it’s important for people around the world, whether it’s Europe, the U.S., or beyond, that they understand the kinds of things that Russia could be preparing to do in Ukraine. And of course, we talked about a false flag operation recently, and we do think it’s possible that they could create a false pretext for going in. So I think it’s important that all of us be aware that this is something that’s been in the Russian playbook and it’s something we should be keeping a very close eye on. Thanks.
MODERATOR: We have time for a final question or two. We’ll go to David Shepardson.
QUESTION: Thank you for doing this call. Just to follow up on some of the other questions, again, I know you can’t provide us with a concrete estimate of all American citizens in Ukraine. But based on the registration data, you can at least give us a sense of the minimum number of Americans. Can you tell us if it’s hundreds or thousands or give us kind of any sense of the minimum number? And do you have sort of specific evacuation plans in the event that the Russians do invade and you have to get the remaining embassy personnel out of the embassy?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: So I’ll take another stab at this. We do not provide numbers of U.S. citizens living in or traveling to a particular country. U.S. citizens are not required to register their travel to a foreign country with us, and we do not maintain comprehensive lists of U.S. citizens residing overseas. Our embassies overseas compile estimates of U.S. citizens in their countries for contingency planning purposes, but these estimates can vary and are constantly changing. So we do not want to provide figures that cannot be considered authoritative. So let me leave it there unless my colleague wants to jump in.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Yeah, no, you said it perfectly. And I just want to say – just take an opportunity, too – I’m not sure if the question was about official personnel evacuation or private Americans. But again, I just want to say given that the President has said military action by Russia could come at any time, the U.S. Government will not be in a position to evacuate U.S. citizens. So U.S. citizens currently present in Ukraine should plan accordingly, including by availing themselves of commercial options should they choose to leave the country, and commercial options are available now. Thanks.
MODERATOR: We’ll conclude with the line of Josh Wingrove, please.
QUESTION: Thank you very much. Can we just circle back to the clarity – you talked about authorizing voluntary departure of non-emergency U.S. Government employees. Now, are there those – are there those employees anywhere other than Kyiv? In other words, does that capture a broader group than the second group, which is departure of family members for workers at the embassy in Kyiv? And more broadly, these measures are obviously focused at the embassy, but you’re talking about, in particular, instability along the eastern flank. But of course, Kyiv isn’t in the regions you’re talking about. So forgive me for circling back to the Belarus question: Is it the U.S. position that the threat to Kyiv in particular is rising? Thank you.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I want to go back to the quote from President Biden about Russia could engage in fuller military aggressive against Ukraine at any time. And Russia has a very large and very strong military army, and we certainly want to be prepared for any of those contingencies. So when we’re talking about authorizing the voluntary departure of non-emergency U.S. Government employees, we are talking about U.S. Government employees, and that’s through the embassy in Kyiv. And then we’re ordering the departure of family members of those U.S. Government employees.
So it isn’t – it is the holistic view of the buildup we have been seeing over months now and the concern that we’re now at a point where President Putin could make a decision at any time to launch an invasion. I also want to be clear that we’re not saying we know that will happen. None of us know what President Putin will decide. And at the same time that we’re doing this prudent planning and taking these measures, we are still very engaged on a diplomatic path. As you saw, Secretary Blinken spent last week in Ukraine and then in Germany, and then he met with his Russian counterpart, Foreign Minister Lavrov, in Geneva. So the diplomacy path is also something that we’re putting a great deal of focus on.
So we have this dual approach of trying to deter Russia from engaging in military action and making clear what the massive consequences of such military aggression could be, while at the same time we’re continuing to pursue this path of diplomacy. So I just want to make sure everyone keeps that holistic frame as they take on board the news of the day.
And again, if my colleague wants to jump in, please do.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: I think that was absolutely right. Thanks.
MODERATOR: I want to thank both of our speakers. I want to thank everyone for joining this evening. Just a reminder this call was on background. You can attribute what you heard to senior State Department officials. And with that, the call is concluded and the embargo is lifted. I hope everyone has a good night.
14. Britain Pursues More Muscular Role in Standoff With Russia on Ukraine
Excerpts:
And yet Britain’s moves also bear the imprint of a country eager to set itself apart, two years after it left the European Union. When Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken landed in Kyiv last week for talks about Russian troops massing on Ukraine’s border, his plane taxied past a Royal Air Force C-17 cargo plane that had just finished unloading antitank weapons for the Ukrainian military.
“The U.K. is differentiating itself from Germany and France, and to some extent, even the U.S.,” said Malcolm Chalmers, the deputy director general of the Royal United Services Institute, a think tank in London. “That comes out of Brexit, and the sense that we have to define ourselves as an independent middle power.”
The theatrical timing and cloak-and-dagger nature of the intelligence disclosure, which came in the midst of a roiling political scandal at home, raised a more cynical question: whether some in the British government were simply eager to deflect attention from the problems that threaten to topple Prime Minister Boris Johnson.
Either way, Britain is moving on multiple fronts. It is preparing legislation that would enable it to impose sanctions if Mr. Putin carries out an invasion. It dispatched senior ministers to other NATO countries menaced by Russia. And it has begun engaging directly with Moscow, with reports that its foreign and defense secretaries plan to meet their Russian counterparts in the coming weeks.
Britain Pursues More Muscular Role in Standoff With Russia on Ukraine
With a late-night announcement about Russian meddling in Ukraine, the U.K. signaled its aim to be a player in Europe’s security crisis — even as scandals besiege Prime Minister Boris Johnson.
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A convoy of Russian armored vehicles on the move in Crimea on Tuesday. Britain is adopting a harder line against Russia amid fears of a possible invasion of Ukraine.Credit...Associated Press
By
Jan. 23, 2022
LONDON — Britain seized the world’s attention on Saturday by accusing President Vladimir V. Putin of plotting to install a pro-Russian leader in Ukraine, a dramatic late-night announcement that instantly thrust it on to the front lines of the most dangerous security crisis in Europe in decades.
British officials say its release of sensitive intelligence was calculated to foil a potential plot and to send a message to Mr. Putin. They cast it as part of a concerted strategy to be a muscular player in Europe’s showdown with Russia — a role it has played since Winston Churchill warned of an “Iron Curtain” after World War II.
And yet Britain’s moves also bear the imprint of a country eager to set itself apart, two years after it left the European Union. When Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken landed in Kyiv last week for talks about Russian troops massing on Ukraine’s border, his plane taxied past a Royal Air Force C-17 cargo plane that had just finished unloading antitank weapons for the Ukrainian military.
“The U.K. is differentiating itself from Germany and France, and to some extent, even the U.S.,” said Malcolm Chalmers, the deputy director general of the Royal United Services Institute, a think tank in London. “That comes out of Brexit, and the sense that we have to define ourselves as an independent middle power.”
The theatrical timing and cloak-and-dagger nature of the intelligence disclosure, which came in the midst of a roiling political scandal at home, raised a more cynical question: whether some in the British government were simply eager to deflect attention from the problems that threaten to topple Prime Minister Boris Johnson.
Either way, Britain is moving on multiple fronts. It is preparing legislation that would enable it to impose sanctions if Mr. Putin carries out an invasion. It dispatched senior ministers to other NATO countries menaced by Russia. And it has begun engaging directly with Moscow, with reports that its foreign and defense secretaries plan to meet their Russian counterparts in the coming weeks.
Britain’s hard-edge approach was crystallized in a punchy essay by the defense secretary, Ben Wallace. Writing in The Times of London, Mr. Wallace rejected Mr. Putin’s claims of encirclement by NATO and accused the Russian leader of crude “ethnonationalism,” based on what he called the bogus claim that Russians and Ukrainians are one people. The essay made waves in Washington and in European capitals.
Ukrainian service members unloading anti-tank weapons supplied by Britain at the Boryspil International Airport near Kyiv on Tuesday.Credit...Ukrainian Defence Ministry/Via Reuters
“Whether Britain is in the E.U. or out of the E.U., it is always going to push back on Russian bad behavior,” Karen Pierce, the British ambassador to the United States, said in an interview. “Where the Russians are concerned, you’ll always find the U.K. at the forward end of the spectrum.”
But Mr. Wallace is not the leader of Britain’s government — Mr. Johnson is. And the prime minister is caught up in an increasingly desperate campaign to save his job amid a scandal over Downing Street parties that violated coronavirus restrictions. Not only has this political circus crowded out public debate over the British role in Ukraine, but it has also stoked suspicion that Mr. Johnson would welcome a distraction from the flood of pesky questions about garden parties.
Even Saturday’s announcement about a possible coup in Ukraine appeared timed to grab headlines in the Sunday morning papers and airtime on the news shows. Britain rarely declassifies intelligence in this manner, unlike the United States, though it has done so before on issues involving Russia.
“There is no distraction as enticing as war,” wrote Simon Jenkins, a columnist for The Guardian, adding that the only thing more dangerous than a populist leader in trouble was two populists in trouble — in this case, he asserted, Mr. Putin and Mr. Johnson.
Some Conservative lawmakers warn that Britain cannot afford a messy leadership battle at a time like this. Tough talk about Russia also appeals to the Tory right, and critics say some ambitious officials are taking advantage of the tensions.
During a visit to British troops in Estonia in November, the foreign secretary, Liz Truss, posed in military gear atop a tank. Commentators said she looked like she was channeling Margaret Thatcher, which may not be a bad strategy for someone rumored as a potential replacement for Mr. Johnson.
At the same time, there are ample historical and strategic reasons for Britain to take a hard line with Russia. British officials have been furious with the Kremlin since the poisoning of a former Russian intelligence agent and his daughter in Salisbury, England, with a nerve agent in 2018, an operation that Britain blamed on Russia’s military intelligence and that led the British to expel about 150 diplomats.
Preoccupied by his political woes, Prime Minister Boris Johnson, right, has largely ceded the stage on Russia and Ukraine to Britain’s defense secretary, Ben Wallace.Credit...Pool photo by John Sibley
The Russians have returned Britain’s antipathy, viewing it as the leading edge of American efforts to curb its ambitions and dismissing criticism from British officials as moral posturing, given their country’s imperial past. Britain has done little to stop Russian billionaires from using London as a haven, where they buy up Mayfair real estate and influence in the House of Lords.
While Mr. Johnson has not been as full-throated as his defense secretary, he said on Thursday that “any kind of incursion” by Russia “would be a disaster — not just for Ukraine but for Russia, a disaster for the world.”
The prime minister, preoccupied by his political woes, has largely ceded the stage on Ukraine policy to Mr. Wallace, a British Army veteran who was security minister at the time of the Salisbury attacks. In June, Mr. Wallace deployed a Navy destroyer, H.M.S. Defender, to sail close to the coast of Russian-occupied Crimea in the Black Sea. Russian planes buzzed the ship in protest.
Understand the Escalating Tensions Over Ukraine
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Ominous warnings. Russia called the strike a destabilizing act that violated the cease-fire agreement, raising fears of a new intervention in Ukraine that could draw the United States and Europe into a new phase of the conflict.
The Kremlin’s position. President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, who has increasingly portrayed NATO’s eastward expansion as an existential threat to his country, said that Moscow’s military buildup was a response to Ukraine’s deepening partnership with the alliance.
Britain’s action, analysts said, was deliberately aggressive, reflecting a frustration among military officials that its policy has been too reactive to Russia’s serial provocations. These go beyond the Salisbury attack to accusations that Moscow meddles in British elections and has corrupted its politics with dirty money.
Ambassador Pierce pointed out that Britain conducted an independent foreign policy even when it was a member of the European Union. It did, however, take part in E.U.-wide sanctions when it was part of the bloc, something it will no longer do after Brexit. Officials said that was why the government needed to draft new legislation to target Russian individuals and its financial services sector.
Beyond that, analysts said Britain’s determination to be assertive also reflected its post-Brexit identity. Kim Darroch, who was national security adviser under Prime Minister David Cameron, said Britain once refused to supply weapons to Ukraine because it feared they could end up in the wrong hands. Now, those concerns are outweighed by the advantages of acting independently.
Members of the Ukrainian military on the front line in the Luhansk area of eastern Ukraine.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times
“I suspect this is part of showing we’re not bound up with the European Union, which is led by the far more equivocal German view on Russia,” said Mr. Darroch, who later served as ambassador to the United States.
Germany’s equivocation helps explains why the R.A.F. planes carrying the antitank weapons to Ukraine flew a circuitous route across Denmark, avoiding German airspace. A senior British official said that reflected Britain’s close consultations with Denmark and Sweden, and that London did not ask the Germans for permission because it would have delayed a mission that depended on speed.
“The most interesting thing is what it says about how frayed the U.K.-German relationship is,” said Jeremy Shapiro, research director at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “The disunity was on display for everyone who could track the planes.”
Ms. Truss also skipped a meeting in Berlin with Mr. Blinken and her counterparts from Germany and France to discuss Ukraine, sending her deputy. Instead, she traveled to Australia, where she and Mr. Wallace met with officials to discuss a new submarine alliance with Australia, Britain and the United States.
That seemed an odd choice in the midst of a mushrooming European crisis. But it underscored Britain’s commitment to Asia, another cornerstone of Britain’s post-Brexit foreign policy. It also, analysts said, helped Britain avoid the perception of being unduly subservient to the United States.
“They have to work carefully not to be seen as a poodle,” Mr. Shapiro said. “They want to show that they are an extra-regional player.”
Michael Schwirtz and Michael Crowley contributed reporting from Kyiv, Ukraine, and Anton Troianovski from Moscow.
15. US hits Chinese defense companies with sanctions
US hits Chinese defense companies with sanctions
BEIJING — China on Friday criticized Washington for imposing sanctions on Chinese companies the U.S. says exported missile technology, and accused the United States of hypocrisy for selling nuclear-capable cruise missiles.
The United States announced penalties on three companies it said were engaged in unspecified “missile technology proliferation activities.” It said they were barred from U.S. markets and from obtaining technology that can be used to make weapons.
The penalties apply to China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp. First Academy; China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp. Fourth Academy; and Poly Technologies Inc. and their subsidiaries.
“This is a typical hegemonic action. China strongly deplores and firmly opposes it,” said Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian. “China urges the United States to immediately correct its mistakes, revoke the relevant sanctions and stop suppressing Chinese enterprises and smearing China.”
China accounted for about 5% of global weapons exports in 2016-2020, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The United States was the top global exporter, accounting for 37% of the total in 2016-2020.
Cruise missiles and long-range ballistic missiles are regarded as among China’s strengths in weapons technology.
Zhao defended Beijing’s controls on weapons exports. He said China opposes proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and strictly controls exports of missiles.
“Normal cooperation between China and relevant countries doesn’t violate any international law and doesn’t involve proliferation” of weapons of mass destruction, Zhao said.
Zhao pointed to U.S. plans to sell Australia’s government Tomahawk cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
“The United States has overtly pursued double standards,” Zhao said.
16. US turning the tide on Russian hackers
Excerpts:
The US has hit back at the gangs extorting money via hacks. \
Similarly, after cyber gang BlackMatter carried out a ransomware
attack on an Iowa farm cooperative in September, the gang
claimed that the cooperative did not count as critical infrastructure. The gang’s claim refers to cyberattack targets that would prompt a national response from the US government.
Despite this ambiguity, the administration has unleashed the military to frustrate the efforts of ransomware groups, while law enforcement agencies have gone after their leaders and their money, and organizations in the US have shored up their information systems defenses.
Though government-controlled hackers might persist, and criminal groups might disappear, rebuild and rebrand, in my view the high costs imposed by the Biden administration could hinder their success.
US turning the tide on Russian hackers
Biden administration has taken a different tack on Russian cyberattacks, not least by calling Putin on the carpet
The move marks a dramatic shift in Russia’s response to criminal cyberattacks launched against US targets from within Russia and comes at a time of heightened tensions between the two countries.
US policy and actions in response to cyberattacks connected to Russia have changed distinctly since the Biden administration took office.
President Joe Biden has openly confronted Russian President Vladimir Putin on his responsibility regarding international cyberattacks, and the Biden administration has taken unprecedented steps to impose costs on Russian cybercriminals and frustrate their efforts.
Upon taking office, Biden immediately faced difficult challenges from Russian intelligence operatives and criminals in headline-grabbing cyberattacks on private companies and critical infrastructure.
As a scholar of Russian cyber operations, I see that the administration has made significant progress in responding to Russian cyber aggression, but I also have clear expectations about what national cyber defense can and can’t do.
Software supply chain compromise
The SolarWinds hack carried out in 2020 was a successful attack on the global software supply chain. The hackers used the access they gained to thousands of computers to spy on nine US federal agencies and about 100 private-sector companies.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has heard directly from President Biden on the subject. Photo: AFP / Mikhail Klimentyev / Sputnik
On February 4, 2021, Biden addressed Putin in a statement delivered at the State Department. Biden said that the days of the US rolling over in the face of Russian cyberattacks and interference in US elections “are over.”
Nevertheless, the US Treasury Department issued sanctions against the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, the SVR, on April 15, 2021.
By masquerading as the US Agency for International Development, they sent authentic-looking emails with links to more than 150 organizations, which, when clicked, inserted a malicious file that allowed computer access.
Ransomware attacks
It is likely that Russian intelligence services and law enforcement have a tacit understanding with cybercriminals and can shut down their resources.
The people behind the attacks are shadowy figures. Photo: iStock
Though not counting on Putin to exert influence, the White House formed a ransomware task force to go on the offense against the gangs. The first step was using a counterterrorism program to offer rewards of up to $10 million for information on hackers behind state-sanctioned breaches of critical infrastructure.
In close collaboration with international partners, the Justice Department announced the arrest of a Ukrainian national in Poland, charged with the REvil ransomware attack against Kaseya, an information technology software supplier.
The Justice Department also seized $6.1 million in cryptocurrency from another REvil operator. Romanian authorities arrested two others involved in REvil attacks.
Treasury Department sanctions blocked all of their property in the US and prohibited US citizens from conducting transactions with them.
Additionally, the top US cyberwarrior, General Paul Nakasone, acknowledged for the first time in public that the US military had taken offensive action against ransomware groups.
Limits of US responses
US officials considered the operation to be routine spying. The reality that international law does not prohibit espionage per se prevents US responses that could serve as strong deterrents.
The US has hit back at the gangs extorting money via hacks. Photo: AFP
Similarly, after cyber gang BlackMatter carried out a ransomware attack on an Iowa farm cooperative in September, the gang claimed that the cooperative did not count as critical infrastructure. The gang’s claim refers to cyberattack targets that would prompt a national response from the US government.
Despite this ambiguity, the administration has unleashed the military to frustrate the efforts of ransomware groups, while law enforcement agencies have gone after their leaders and their money, and organizations in the US have shored up their information systems defenses.
Though government-controlled hackers might persist, and criminal groups might disappear, rebuild and rebrand, in my view the high costs imposed by the Biden administration could hinder their success.
17. Oman Must Isolate, Not Embrace, the Houthis
Oman Must Isolate, Not Embrace, the Houthis
The Switzerland of the Middle East can still serve as a center for regional diplomacy. But even Switzerland does not offer safe haven to terrorists.
On January 17, the Houthi terrorist group launched a drone and missile strike from its base in Yemen against Abu Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates. Kamikaze drones hit the international airport and a nearby fuel depot, sparking a large fire. The attack killed two Indian citizens and a Pakistani, and injured several other workers.
The Biden administration last year delisted the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization citing questionable concerns that the designation could hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid. Calls to re-designate the group are fully justified. The Biden administration should go a step further, however, and demand that Oman dismantle the Houthi regional headquarters that currently operates with Washington’s blessing inside its borders. The office is home to senior Houthi leaders who have blood on their hands.
Oman views itself as the Switzerland of the Middle East. The country cites its neutrality and commitment to diplomacy as justification for hosting the Houthi headquarters. However, the Houthis have exploited their presence in Oman not only to legitimize their operations and to access the international financial system, but also to smuggle weapons into Yemen. In 2016, Iran reportedly smuggled anti-ship missiles, surface-to-surface short-range missiles, small arms, explosives, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Yemen, some of which apparently passed through Oman. In March 2017, Conflict Armament Research, a nongovernmental group, reported that the Houthis had smuggled UAVs used in Yemen through Oman. The following year, the United Nations reported that Oman was the “most likely” route through which Burkan-2H missiles reached Yemen.
Subsequent U.S. pressure led the Omanis to crack down on some illicit activity. However, for Saudi Arabia and other regional countries, Oman’s indulgence of the Houthis remains problematic. Rather than engaging in diplomacy, the ostensible justification for the Houthi presence in Oman, the Houthis continue to wage a campaign of regional terrorism. The number of Houthi terrorist attacks has spiked in the last year. In just the last two months, the Houthis have hijacked an Emirati-flagged ship off the Yemeni coast; overrun the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a, taking several Yemenis staff members hostage; and have taken two United Nations workers hostage.
The Omanis might once have justified their relationship with Mohammed Abdulsalam, the Houthi’s chief negotiator and a resident of Oman, in an effort to resolve the Yemeni civil war. However, the Houthi strikes on civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and now the United Arab Emirates put an end to that pretense. That Abdulsalam was in Tehran at the time of the attack suggests a level of coordination. To put it mildly, that is not a good look for Oman.
The ruling elite in Muscat may say that the Houthis are indigenous freedom fighters. While this was once a subject of debate, the Houthis have themselves helped to settle it. The group openly identifies as part of an “Axis of Resistance,” the Iran-led alliance that includes Lebanese Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas, Iraqi militias, and Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Ali Shirazi, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative to Qods Force, stated in January 2015, “The Houthis are a version of Hezbollah, and this group will use the stage for confronting the enemies of Islam.” It should come as no surprise that the missile, drone, and guidance technology used in the Abu Dhabi attack were made in Iran.
Sultan Qaboos, the late ruler of Oman, prided himself on moderation and mediation. During the first years of his rule, he faced a communist insurgency that he put down with Iranian assistance. Omani officials often cite Iran’s assistance during that Dhofar Rebellion to justify their cordial relationship with Iran today. But that was a different Iran, led by the secular Pahlavis. Today, Iran is a terrorist-supporting theocracy. The alliances of a bygone era in no way justify Oman’s support for a terrorist group that operates with impunity on its soil.
Qaboos died in 2020, paving the way for his successor Haitham, who is a careful pragmatist. It is unlikely that Haitham would expel the Houthis without direct coordination with the United States. Washington must now put a process in motion. It begins with a simple bureaucratic measure: the State Department must add the Houthis back onto its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. It serves as a recognition that the State Department’s 2021 decision to delist the group neither furthered a diplomatic solution nor facilitated provision of humanitarian assistance to Yemen. It would further mark the beginning of an international effort to isolate the Houthi leadership.
Of course, that effort should primarily include measures to isolate the Houthis’ patrons in Iran. But it must include pressure on Muscat to dismantle the Houthi headquarters. The Switzerland of the Middle East can still serve as a center for regional diplomacy. But even Switzerland does not offer safe haven to terrorists.
Jonathan Schanzer is senior vice president for research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
Image: Reuters.
18. Why Pakistan is happy to pay a heavy price this time for strategic depth in Afghanistan
Conclusion:
For Pakistan, this is a dream come true: For the first time in over 75 years not only are there no Indian advisors in Afghanistan, but there are also now Pakistani advisors in their stead. This alone may be worth the price that Pakistan will continue to pay for its victory in Afghanistan.
Why Pakistan is happy to pay a heavy price this time for strategic depth in Afghanistan
For the first time in over 75 years not only are there no Indian advisors in Afghanistan, there are now Pakistani advisors in their stead. This alone may be worth the price that Pakistan will continue to pay for its victory in Afghanistan
January 24, 2022 11:22:14 IST
File image of Pakistan prime minister Imran Khan. AP
For the first time in 20 years, Pakistan believes it has a friendly government in Kabul. All of the pesky nuisances — such as the United States and India — have been vanquished and their embassies shuttered, while the embassies of Pakistan, China and Russia (Pakistan’s newest ally) remain open for business. That business is not salubrious for the international community or most importantly for Afghans. This has come at a steep price: Pakistan’s own Tehreek-e-Taliban-Pakistan has been revivified within Pakistan. Yet, more Afghans are trying to flee the brutality of Pakistan’s puppet regime and Pakistan is the only option as the international efforts to evacuate Afghans have wrapped up. And the Taliban — just like every other regime in Kabul — repudiate the colonial-era Durand Line, which Pakistan recognises as the rightful border.
Far too many ingénues have been busy drafting lugubrious repines for the troubles faced by Rawalpindi and Islamabad, the seat of the army’s power and that of the ISI and their selected prime minister, Imran Khan, respectively. These are all prices that Pakistan’s real political masters in khaki are happy to pay. It is the ordinary Pakistani who will pay the price. Fortunately for the Khaki Condominium running Pakistan, the country is not a functioning democracy, rather a praetorian state with a democratic patina. This means that while Imran Khan may not be re-elected, it will not be because of Pakistanis’ immiseration. Instead, it will be because the Men in their Pajeros have finally created an alternative to Imran Khan after he’s ceased being a useful idiot. From the points of view of the army and the intelligence agency it controls, the ISI, these are not merely prices but investments for the future. Here, I explain why.
Imran Con: Pakistan's Selected Prime Minster. Image courtesy C Christine Fair
For much of the time period of the Raj, Afghanistan was a fealty of the British. British Indians were very active in Afghanistan. With the onset of World War I (1914-18), Afghans supported Ottoman Turkey against the British. Following the defeat of Ottoman Turkey, the so-called Khilafat Movement (1919-24) would start in earnest in South Asia. Afghan’s ruler, Habibullah Khan, navigated a policy of non-involvement in the war while British Indians were dispatched to fight in it. Habibullah was assassinated in February 1919 by anti-British activists. His son, Amanullah Khan, took the throne and promised complete independence from Britain. Persons. With this declaration, the Third Anglo-Afghan War began in May 1919. War-weary Britain was drained and the British Indian Army was exhausted from the brutal demands of World War I. In August 1919, both sides signed a treaty in Rawalpindi — not Calcutta or Delhi.
After a month of desultory skirmishes, the Afghans had successfully secured their own sovereignty with a caveat. Afghanistan had always been a rentier state, dependent upon the financial support of the British to maintain its military among other important functions. When the British left, they took their coffers with them. Consequently, prior to formalising the treaty, Amanullah’s government signed a treaty of friendship with the Bolshevik regime in the Soviet Union. In fact, Afghanistan was one of the first states to formally recognise the Soviet Union. Increasingly, the Soviets picked up Afghanistan’s tab and their involvement culminated in the Christmas Day invasion of the country of 1979.
With India’s Independence, the Afghan government preferred to work with Indians as the Afghan government repudiated the Durand Line, which was the international and lawfully recognised border with the new state of Pakistan; rejected Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations; launched military incursions along the border; and fanned the flames of Pashtun irredentism. From Pakistan’s point of view, a further irritant was a reliance upon Indians advising the various Afghan regimes from 1947 up until the 1988 Geneva Accords which formally ended the Russian occupation of Afghanistan. During this period, estimates of Indian advisors aiding the various governments in Kabul at any given time vary between several hundred and 1,500. After the Soviets withdrew, Afghanistan entered a long and protracted period of civil war followed by the Taliban regime which terrorised Afghans from 1994-2001, when the United States routed them.
For Pakistan, this is a dream come true: For the first time in over 75 years not only are there no Indian advisors in Afghanistan, but there are also now Pakistani advisors in their stead. This alone may be worth the price that Pakistan will continue to pay for its victory in Afghanistan.
The writer is a professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University. She is the author of ‘In Their Own Words: Understanding the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba’ and ‘Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War’. She tweets @cchristinefair. Her website is christinefair.net. Views expressed are personal.
19. Russia's Desert Storm: Putin's Plan to Use America's Military Playbook Against Ukraine?
Excerpts:
What Is Russia’s Next Move?
I hope I’m wrong. But military analysts point out Russia’s current build-up along Ukraine is different from previous ones, it is far more serious and comprehensive. Moscow is using all tools of coercion and compellence it has in its arsenal.
Years of lazy analysis have led Western policymakers to console themselves that Putin is a mere opportunist, as they failed to craft their own strategy to deter him. Indeed, Putin never paid a real price for his aggression, certainly sanctions alone did not do the trick in the absence of, for instance, strategic placement of aero-space forces in Europe and the Middle East. Western weakness over the years continuously embolden Putin; those who saw being tough as too escalatory may soon behold what being too weak achieved instead.
Russia's Desert Storm: Putin's Plan to Use America's Military Playbook Against Ukraine?
Don’t look now, but we may be about to see a Russian version of Desert Storm in Ukraine. Allow me to explain Russia’s potential plan of action.
Desert Storm was perhaps one of the most decisive and influential military operations of the twentieth century. Executed during of the 1991 Gulf War, the operation’s objectives were far-reaching; the campaign entailed a forty-two-day US-led coalition air campaign supported by space and cyber capabilities, followed by an overwhelming ground operation. The principle idea entailed the deployment of precision air, missile, space, and cyberspace strikes to degrade and destroy national command and control, thereby empowering decisive ground operations.
Desert Storm Was Historic
No one else up to that point had carried out such an operation; it was a game-changer and a resounding success. Desert Storm effectively shattered the war-hardened Iraqi military by eliminating its ability to command and control its fielded forces and maintain situational awareness of battlefield conditions. The Iraqi war machine was subjected to a decapitating cyber, air, and missile strikes and left its army to be annihilated in the deserts of Kuwait and Iraq.
The principle idea of Desert Storm has dominated modern warfare ever since. Importantly, Desert Storm exposed the military inferiority of the Soviet Union, especially its air defenses and military doctrine, and also military hardware, as much of Iraq’s arms were Soviet purchases. As Graham E. Fuller, former Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the Central Intelligence Agency wrote in summer 1991, “Even in the best light…the Soviet military did not look good in the encounter.”
Russia Studies the Gulf War
The Gulf war ended in February 1991, and the Soviet Union collapsed in December the same year–but the Soviet military and security apparatus took to heart the lessons of Desert Storm. They studied and debated these lessons intensely. And after December 1991, many also could not forgive the Soviet Union’s loss in the Cold war.
Russia’s military, for its part, remained plagued by a multitude of problems in the 1990s and early 2000s. But after an especially embarrassing performance in the Russia—Georgia war of August 2008 (Russia finally prevailed but with great difficulties, over a much smaller opponent), the Russian military undertook a series of comprehensive reforms. Earlier reform efforts failed, but the latest attempt began over time to yield real results. As Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky wrote, the reforms addressed the problems revealed in the Georgia war by the use of IT-RMA [Information Technology Revolution in Military Affairs]. Adamsky added, “The aim of the Russian reforms since then has been to rebuild the conventional military and to advance it toward the ideal type of RSC [reconnaissance-fire complexes or contours].”
Vladimir Putin, for his part, who once famously lamented the breakup of the Soviet Union was the greatest tragedy of the twentieth century, along with those in his circle, also studied the fall of the Soviet Union carefully and extracted many lessons. Over the years, Russian military analysts extensively studied US-led military operations, especially in the Middle East and in Kosovo. They understood that they lost in the greatest geopolitical battle of the twentieth century to a technologically superior adversary that operationally employed cyber, air and space operations to achieve decisive strategic effects. To return as a great power, Russia had to address its inferiorities and disadvantages. Moreover, Russia, a country “doomed” to be a great power, as former Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev once famously remarked, was going to come back one way or the other.
And come back it did—at first slowly and then all at once, to paraphrase Ernest Hemingway. In the backdrop of continuous military improvements whose foundations had been laid in the mid 1980’s under USSR Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov’s information-technological revolution, Moscow grew resurgent. Lessons from Desert Storm helped inform the development of Russia’s current reconnaissance strike complex. Russia’s military procurements and burgeoning large scale national exercise program over the years reflected a shift towards greater interest in what was termed aerospace warfare which emphasized the development of a so-called C4ISR (command, control, computers and communication, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) systems that integrated precision long-range fires strike systems. Moscow’s experiences in Chechnya, where it learned it had to dominate information narratives, and its recognition that to defeat U.S air and space operations it required significant efforts to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum, all contributed to the evolution of the Russian way of war.
Russian military equipment being tested. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
By 2015, when Russia intervened in Syria, for the first time, Moscow demonstrated elements of a Desert Storm-like campaign, with its emphasis on multi-domain (air, surface ship, submarine, and ground forces) precision strikes that were supported by information and electronic warfare operations. Its military campaign announced to the world that the Russian conventional military had evolved from its Soviet past and now possessed certain peer capabilities to the United States. Adamsky wrote, “The General Staff saw the operation in Syria as a testing ground for refining its ability to integrate the ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance], C2, and fire systems.” In other words, Syria was a learning experience that aligned with Russia’s military reforms. Moreover, Valery Gerasimov, chief of staff of the Russian armed forces, said that lessons from Syria will serve to defend and promote Russia’s “national interests” outside Russia’s borders.
Veteran analyst of the Russian military Timothy Thomas best illustrates the above-described evolution. He wrote in July/August 2017 citing original Russian military sources, that initial period of war is crucial and “will include a targeted information operation, an electronic warfare operation, an aerospace operation, continuous air force harassment, the use of high-precision weapons launched from various platforms, long-range artillery, and weapons based on new physical principles.” Military experts will say that, in broad strokes, this is exactly what happened in Desert Storm. Thomas concluded by stating that the final period involves the employment of ground forces “to roll over or annihilate remaining units, primarily through use of ground troops.” Russian military procurement and doctrine have pursued the operational development and employment of a force capable of waging war in this manner over the past two decades.
How Could a Russian Desert Storm Unfold?
This brings us to Ukraine at present. No one has a crystal ball, but the pieces are set in place to allow Moscow to carry out a technology-driven aerospace power campaign, empowered by information and cyber warfare to empower a follow-on land campaign that could seize parts of Eastern Ukraine. Moscow has moved its air, missile, and electronic warfare forces from all of its Joint Operational Commands, including from the Far East, and coalesced them along the entire periphery of Ukraine. Thus, the first undertaking Thomas described— information and cyber warfare— has been in full swing. Its continuous diplomatic efforts to portray it as under threat and out of options, while the recent information and cyber operations, fit Thomas’s model of Russian modern warfare.
Although technically we do not have definitive proof, it is also difficult to believe, knowing Moscow’s playbook and history of cyber operations, that the Kremlin was not behind the latest cyberattacks in Ukraine. If it is, the logical conclusion is that electronic warfare operations and aerospace operations are next. Moscow’s activities along Ukraine’s border along with Belarus and the Black Sea more than provide for that. And most recently, on January 21, Russia’s Duma (Parliament) speaker Vyacheslav Volodin announced that “consultations” will be held next week on recognizing “the independence of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR)” in eastern Ukraine.
What Does Russia Want?
The Syria operation was not really about Syria, something I go into in detail in my recent book. In the same vein, Ukraine is not really about Ukraine. Both are about the Kremlin revising the US-led post-Cold war order on Moscow’s terms. Now, with Ukraine, Moscow has come full circle from the end of the Cold war, the perceived humiliation that began perhaps with Desert Storm, in Moscow’s eyes, continued, with NATO operation in Kosovo and the US invasion of Iraq.
If Russia now carries out the military operation in Ukraine as I described, it will announce to the world that Russia is a dominant conventional power, not just a nuclear power. The strategic employment of this force can cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea, rendering it economically inviable. It will also send a message that force is the best way to achieve political objectives and convince select European leaders it is time to renegotiate European security architecture.
Analysts have said Putin likely does not want a full-blown conventional war with Ukraine, and they are likely correct. But Desert Storm averted such a scenario and resulted in far fewer coalition casualties than anyone ever could have predicted, due to the limitations placed in that campaign. The scenario I outlined is a limited campaign. Nor has Putin has not necessarily backed himself into a corner, where has no choice but to go to war, as David J. Kramer recently wrote. The way of war Thomas highlights shows there are abundant options available before preceding to conventional methods. And, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky wrote on Twitter, “there are no minor incursions.”
What Is Russia’s Next Move?
I hope I’m wrong. But military analysts point out Russia’s current build-up along Ukraine is different from previous ones, it is far more serious and comprehensive. Moscow is using all tools of coercion and compellence it has in its arsenal.
Years of lazy analysis have led Western policymakers to console themselves that Putin is a mere opportunist, as they failed to craft their own strategy to deter him. Indeed, Putin never paid a real price for his aggression, certainly sanctions alone did not do the trick in the absence of, for instance, strategic placement of aero-space forces in Europe and the Middle East. Western weakness over the years continuously embolden Putin; those who saw being tough as too escalatory may soon behold what being too weak achieved instead.
Dr. Anna Borshchevskaya is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on Russia’s policy toward the Middle East. In addition, she is a contributor to Oxford Analytica and a fellow at the European Foundation for Democracy. She was previously with the Atlantic Council and the Peterson Institute for International Economics. A former analyst for a U.S. military contractor in Afghanistan, she has also served as communications director at the American Islamic Congress. Her analysis is published widely in publications such as Foreign Affairs, The Hill, The New Criterion, and the Middle East Quarterly. She is the author of the 2021 book, Putin’s War in Syria: Russian Foreign Policy and the Price of America’s Absence (I.B. Tauris, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing). Until recently, she conducted translation and analysis for the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office and its flagship publication, Operational Environment Watch, and wrote a foreign affairs column for Forbes. She is the author of the February 2016 Institute monograph, Russia in the Middle East. She holds a doctorate from George Mason University.
20. Biden Weighs Deploying Thousands of Troops to Eastern Europe and Baltics
Deterrence and contingency plans - to include NEO.
Excerpts:
The Biden administration is especially interested in any indication that Russia may deploy tactical nuclear weapons to the border, a move that Russian officials have suggested could be an option.
More than 150 U.S. military advisers are in Ukraine, trainers who have for years worked out of the training ground near Lviv, in the country’s west, far from the front lines. The current group includes Special Operations forces, mostly Army Green Berets, as well as National Guard trainers from Florida’s 53rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team.
Military advisers from about a dozen allied countries are also in Ukraine, U.S. officials said. Several NATO countries, including Britain, Canada, Lithuania and Poland, have regularly sent training forces to the country.
In the event of a full-scale Russian invasion, the United States intends to move its military trainers out of the country quickly. But it is possible that some Americans could stay to advise Ukrainian officials in Kyiv, the capital, or provide frontline support, a U.S. official said.
Biden Weighs Deploying Thousands of Troops to Eastern Europe and Baltics
The president is also considering deploying warships and aircraft to NATO allies, in what would be a major shift from its restrained stance on Ukraine.
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U.S. soldiers of the NATO Extended Presence Battlegroup participated in a military exercise in Latvia last March.Credit...Valda Kalnina/EPA, via Shutterstock
Jan. 23, 2022, 6:23 p.m. ET
WASHINGTON — President Biden is considering deploying several thousand U.S. troops, as well as warships and aircraft, to NATO allies in the Baltics and Eastern Europe, an expansion of American military involvement amid mounting fears of a Russian incursion into Ukraine, according to administration officials.
The move would signal a major pivot for the Biden administration, which up until recently was taking a restrained stance on Ukraine, out of fear of provoking Russia into invading. But as President Vladimir V. Putin has ramped up his threatening actions toward Ukraine, and talks between American and Russian officials have failed to discourage him, the administration is now moving away from its do-not-provoke strategy.
In a meeting on Saturday at Camp David, the presidential retreat in Maryland, senior Pentagon officials presented Mr. Biden with several options that would shift American military assets much closer to Mr. Putin’s doorstep, the administration officials said. The options include sending 1,000 to 5,000 troops to Eastern European countries, with the potential to increase that number tenfold if things deteriorate.
The officials spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to talk publicly about internal deliberations.
Mr. Biden is expected to make a decision as early as this week, they said. He is weighing the buildup as Russia has escalated its menacing posture against Ukraine, including massing more than 100,000 troops and weaponry on the border and stationing Russian forces in Belarus. On Saturday, Britain accused Moscow of developing plans to install a pro-Russian leader in Ukraine.
“Even as we’re engaged in diplomacy, we are very much focused on building up defense, building up deterrence,” Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken said in an interview that aired Sunday on CBS’s “Face the Nation.” “NATO itself will continue to be reinforced in a significant way if Russia commits renewed acts of aggression. All of that is on the table.”
So far, none of the military options being considered include deploying additional American troops to Ukraine itself, and Mr. Biden has made clear that he is loath to enter another conflict following America’s painful exit from Afghanistan last summer after 20 years.
And the deployment of thousands of additional American troops to NATO’s eastern flank, which includes Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Biden administration officials said, is exactly the scenario that Mr. Putin has wanted to avoid, as he has seen the western military alliance creep closer and closer to Russia’s own border.
In his news conference last week, Mr. Biden said he had cautioned Mr. Putin that a Russian invasion of Ukraine would prompt Washington to send more troops to the region.
“We’re going to actually increase troop presence in Poland, in Romania, etc., if in fact he moves,” Mr. Biden said. “They are part of NATO.”
During a phone call this month, Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III warned his Russian counterpart, Sergey Shoygu, that a Russian incursion into Ukraine would most likely result in the exact troop buildup that Mr. Biden is now considering.
At the time of the phone call — Jan. 6 — the Biden administration was still trying to be more restrained in its stance on Ukraine. But after unsuccessful talks between Mr. Blinken and the Russian foreign minister, Sergey V. Lavrov, on Friday, the administration is eying a more muscular posture, including not only diplomatic options like sanctions, but military options like increasing military support to Ukrainian forces and deploying American troops to the region.
“This is clearly in response to the sudden stationing of Russian forces in Belarus, on the border, essentially, with NATO,” said Evelyn Farkas, the top Pentagon official for Russia and Ukraine during the Obama administration. “There is no way that NATO could not reply to such a sudden military move in this political context. The Kremlin needs to understand that they are only escalating the situation with all of these deployments and increasing the danger to all parties, including themselves.”
Another former top Pentagon official for Russia policy, Jim Townsend, said the administration’s proposal did not go far enough.
“It’s too little too late to deter Putin,” Mr. Townsend said in an email. “If the Russians do invade Ukraine in a few weeks, those 5,000 should be just a down payment for a much larger U.S. and allied force presence. Western Europe should once again be an armed camp.”
During the meeting at Camp David, Mr. Austin and Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appeared by video from the Pentagon and from General Milley’s quarters, where he has been quarantining since he tested positive for the coronavirus. Officials said that if Mr. Biden approved the deployment, some of the troops would come from the United States, while others would move from other parts of Europe to the more vulnerable countries on NATO’s eastern flank.
American officials did not describe in detail the ground troop reinforcements under review, but current and former commanders said they should include more air defense, engineering, logistics and artillery forces.
Besides the troops, Mr. Biden could also approve sending additional aircraft to the region.
Representative Michael McCaul of Texas, the top Republican on the Foreign Affairs Committee, said on Sunday that the United States also needed to conduct more training in those NATO nations.
“We need joint exercises in Poland, the Baltic States, Romania, Bulgaria, to show Putin that we’re serious,” Mr. McCaul said on “Face the Nation.” “Right now, he doesn’t see we’re serious.”
According to Poland’s defense ministry, there are currently about 4,000 U.S. troops and 1,000 other NATO troops stationed in Poland. There are also about 4,000 NATO troops in the Baltic States.
The United States has been regularly flying Air Force RC-135 Rivet Joint electronic-eavesdropping planes over Ukraine since late December. The planes allow American intelligence operatives to listen to Russian ground commanders’ communications. The Air Force is also flying E-8 JSTARS ground-surveillance planes to track the Russian troop buildup and the movements of the forces.
The Biden administration is especially interested in any indication that Russia may deploy tactical nuclear weapons to the border, a move that Russian officials have suggested could be an option.
More than 150 U.S. military advisers are in Ukraine, trainers who have for years worked out of the training ground near Lviv, in the country’s west, far from the front lines. The current group includes Special Operations forces, mostly Army Green Berets, as well as National Guard trainers from Florida’s 53rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team.
Military advisers from about a dozen allied countries are also in Ukraine, U.S. officials said. Several NATO countries, including Britain, Canada, Lithuania and Poland, have regularly sent training forces to the country.
In the event of a full-scale Russian invasion, the United States intends to move its military trainers out of the country quickly. But it is possible that some Americans could stay to advise Ukrainian officials in Kyiv, the capital, or provide frontline support, a U.S. official said.
21. State Department Tells Families of U.S. Diplomats in Ukraine to Leave
State Department Tells Families of U.S. Diplomats in Ukraine to Leave
Some U.S. Embassy staff members also have been authorized to depart
WSJ · by Michael R. Gordon
Updated Jan. 23, 2022 10:05 pm ET
As part of its announcement, the State Department is also recommending that all U.S. citizens in Ukraine consider leaving now. The U.S. Embassy won’t be in a position to help Americans depart the country if a Russian attack is under way, senior State Department officials said.
Mr. Biden met Saturday at Camp David with his national-security team to discuss the Russian military threat to Ukraine and efforts by the U.S. and its allies to deter an attack. National-security adviser Jake Sullivan and White House counselor Steve Ricchetti participated in person, while other national-security officials joined by video.
Civilians receiving basic combat training in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Saturday.
Photo: Sean Gallup/Getty Images
Mr. Biden has repeatedly warned that the U.S. and its allies will strengthen their forces on the eastern flank of North Atlantic Treaty Organization members closest to Russia, if Russian forces invade Ukraine.
“We’re going to actually increase troop presence in Poland, in Romania, et cetera, if in fact he moves because we have a sacred obligation in Article 5 to defend those countries. They are part of NATO,” Mr. Biden said last week. Mr. Biden was referring to a provision of NATO’s founding treaty that provides for collective defense.
Among the options currently under consideration is sending several thousand troops before a possible Russian attack, according to U.S. officials. If decided, such forces might not go to Poland, Romania or other eastern flank countries right away but could be positioned initially in another European country, according to some options under discussion.
The military rationale for sending the troops soon would be to get them in position so they could be quickly mobilized in the event of Russian aggression against Ukraine. Biden administration officials, however, are also wary of providing Russia with a pretext to attack Ukraine and don’t want to signal that Washington has given up all hope of a diplomatic solution with Moscow over Ukraine.
The consideration of sending several thousand more troops was first reported by the New York Times.
The anticipated decision to instruct diplomats’ family members to leave Ukraine has also posed sensitive diplomatic issues.
U.S. officials informed the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry of the decision Thursday, according to an adviser to the Ukrainian government. Ukrainian Foreign Ministry officials have privately said that any evacuation of U.S. Embassy staff would send a damaging message, telegraphing that the U.S. sees an impending Ukrainian armed conflict with Russia.
State Department officials said the U.S. Embassy will continue to operate without interruption.
“These are prudent precautions that in no way undermine our support for Ukraine,” a State Department official told reporters.
State Department officials declined to provide estimates of the number of U.S. citizens who are currently in Ukraine. They said U.S. citizens aren’t required to register with the embassy, and the embassy’s projections are for internal planning.
Russia has positioned more than 100,000 troops on three sides of Ukraine. In addition to troops to the east of Ukraine and in and around Crimea and the Black Sea, Russia has announced that it is conducting military exercises with Belarus, north of Ukraine. Western analysts have said that exercise is a pretext to pressure Ukraine to make concessions or invade the country.
The Russian deployments in Belarus and in Russian territory northeast of Ukraine have made Kyiv more vulnerable. Ukraine’s best forces have been positioned near Russian-backed separatists in Donbas, in the southeast portion of the country.
Ukrainian officials have warned that Russia may use tactics short of an invasion to destabilize Ukraine. The U.S. has said Russia was planning to deploy operatives to fabricate an incident as a pretext for an invasion. Over the weekend, the U.K. said it has exposed a plot by Russia to install a friendly government in Ukraine.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Sunday of the U.K. allegations that the U.S. has been “warning about just this kind of tactic for weeks.” Speaking on CNN, he added, “This is very much part of the Russian tool kit” of strategies for undermining Ukraine.
—Brett Forrest contributed to this article.
WSJ · by Michael R. Gordon
22. Exclusive: Iran nuclear agreement unlikely without release of U.S. prisoners, negotiator says
Exclusive: Iran nuclear agreement unlikely without release of U.S. prisoners, negotiator says
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U.S. Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley and Barry Rosen, campaigning for the release of hostages imprisoned by Iran, sit at a table during an interview with Reuters in Vienna, Austria, January 23, 2022. REUTERS/Francois Murphy
VIENNA, Jan 24 (Reuters) - The United States is unlikely to strike an agreement with Iran to save the 2015 Iran nuclear deal unless Tehran releases four U.S. citizens Washington says it is holding hostage, the lead U.S. nuclear negotiator told Reuters on Sunday.
The official, U.S. Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley, repeated the long-held U.S. position that the issue of the four people held in Iran is separate from the nuclear negotiations. He moved a step closer, however, to saying that their release was a precondition for a nuclear agreement.
"They're separate and we're pursuing both of them. But I will say it is very hard for us to imagine getting back into the nuclear deal while four innocent Americans are being held hostage by Iran," Malley told Reuters in an interview.
"So even as we're conducting talks with Iran indirectly on the nuclear file we are conducting, again indirectly, discussions with them to ensure the release of our hostages," he said in Vienna, where talks are taking place on bringing Washington and Tehran back into full compliance with the deal.
In recent years, Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards have arrested dozens of dual nationals and foreigners, mostly on espionage and security-related charges.
Rights groups have accused Iran of taking prisoners to gain diplomatic leverage, while Western powers have long demanded that Tehran free their citizens, who they say are political prisoners.
Tehran denies holding people for political reasons.
MESSAGE SENT
Malley was speaking in a joint interview with Barry Rosen, a 77-year-old former U.S. diplomat who has been on hunger strike in Vienna to demand the release of U.S., British, French, German, Austrian and Swedish prisoners in Iran, and that no nuclear agreement be reached without their release.
Rosen was one of more than 50 U.S. diplomats held during the 1979-1981 Iran hostage crisis.
"I've spoken to a number of the families of the hostages who are extraordinarily grateful for what Mr Rosen is doing but they also are imploring him to stop his hunger strike, as I am, because the message has been sent," Malley said.
Rosen said that after five days of not eating he was feeling weak and would heed those calls.
"With the request from Special Envoy Malley and my doctors and others, we've agreed (that) after this meeting I will stop my hunger strike but this does not mean that others will not take up the baton," Rosen said.
The indirect talks between Iran and the United States on bringing both countries back into full compliance with the landmark 2015 nuclear deal are in their eighth round. Iran refuses to hold meetings with U.S. officials, meaning others shuttle between the two sides.
The deal between Iran and major powers lifted sanctions against Tehran in exchange for restrictions on its nuclear activities that extended the time it would need to obtain enough fissile material for a nuclear bomb if it chose to. Iran denies seeking nuclear weapons.
Then-President Donald Trump pulled the United States out of the deal in 2018, reimposing punishing economic sanctions against Tehran. Iran responded by breaching many of the deal's nuclear restrictions, to the point that Western powers say the deal will soon have been hollowed out completely.
LEVERAGE
Asked if Iran and the United States might negotiate directly, Malley said: "We've heard nothing to that effect. We'd welcome it."
The four U.S. citizens include Iranian-American businessman Siamak Namazi, 50, and his father Baquer, 85, both of whom have been convicted of "collaboration with a hostile government".
Namazi remains in prison. His father was released on medical grounds in 2018 and his sentence later reduced to time served. While the elder Namazi is no longer jailed, a lawyer for the family says he is effectively barred from leaving Iran.
"Senior Biden administration officials have repeatedly told us that although the potential Iranian nuclear and hostage deals are independent and must be negotiated on parallel tracks, they will not just conclude the nuclear deal by itself," said Jared Genser, pro bono counsel to the Namazi family.
"Otherwise, all leverage to get the hostages out will be lost," he added.
The others are environmentalist Morad Tahbaz, 66, who is also British, and businessman Emad Shargi, 57.
Reporting by Francois Murphy in Vienna and Arshad Mohammed in Washington; Writing by Francois Murphy; Editing by Daniel Wallis
23. Food shortages, medical negligence and online dissent: The growing cracks in China’s zero-covid campaign
Excerpts:
Even as the zero-covid strategy sparks public backlash, and despite the sheer difficulty of containing delta and omicron, Chinese leaders seem bound to press on and do whatever it takes to keep the “zero” — or a number close to it — at the core of their pandemic policy. The February Olympic Games — to be held in China — are a key factor; the Games present a critical moment for the leadership to showcase once again that its strategy has been a success.
It’s possible that change may come through scientific advances. Chinese pharmaceutical companies are in trials for China’s own mRNA vaccine. If that vaccine proves safe and effective, it could help provide China an off-ramp from the strictures of zero-covid.
In the meantime, the zero-covid way of life — with all its trauma and frustrations — will likely only become more prevalent across the country as omicron spreads, and as local and national leaders engage in what Caixin, a Chinese news outlet, described as “hand-to-hand combat” with the virus in the coming weeks.
At some point, Huang said, something will have to give: “Even more people will be affected negatively by draconian pandemic control measures, the full lockdown, for example. The costs will be exponentially higher; they would probably no longer justify the continuation of this approach.”
Food shortages, medical negligence and online dissent: The growing cracks in China’s zero-covid campaign
A rising number of people across China are feeling the downsides of keeping covid locked out.
Last week, several districts in Xi’an, a northwestern Chinese city famous for its terracotta warriors, started to reopen after a nearly monthlong lockdown. Local government officials announced that they had reached their goal of zero-covid transmission — on paper, another triumph in China’s two-year campaign to vanquish the virus.
But Xi’an has paid a price for its success. It was Dec. 22 when the government suddenly thrust the city’s 13 million people into strict lockdown, in which no one could leave their homes. In the following weeks, residents in some districts started running out of food as the government failed to deliver promised groceries. “It looks like I need to eat bland noodles for a few more days just to survive,” one resident wrote on the social media site Weibo. “This is terrible. The Xi’an government is rotten to the core.” The post has since been censored.
Meanwhile, some of the city’s hospitals developed a kind of covid tunnel vision. One blocked a woman who was eight months pregnant from entering for hours because her covid test results had expired. In a video that went viral, she was shown sitting on a stool outside the hospital at night, a pool of blood gathering below her as she waited. Ultimately, her niece wrote a post saying she had miscarried due to the delay. In several other instances, medical staff prevented patients from receiving care, leading to at least one other miscarriage and two deaths.
The severity of China’s recent campaign against covid extends well beyond Xi’an and takes many forms. In the city of Guangzhou last week, the government ordered residents to get tested if they had received any international mail, saying the parcels could spread the virus. (Health officials outside of China have said it is extremely unlikely for covid to spread via international mail.)
These are just some of the lengths China has taken to ward off covid — almost no matter the cost — as the country faces its most trying test since the initial outbreak in Wuhan. More than 10 cities are experiencing outbreaks of delta or omicron — though caseloads are minuscule next to those in the U.S. and other parts of the world. While most Americans go about their daily lives with minimal restrictions, millions of people in China have been living under some form of severely restrictive lockdown.
Central government officials continue to steadfastly pursue the policy even as the challenges mount. They say China’s healthcare system might otherwise be overwhelmed by a surge in cases — something China has largely avoided since that first outbreak.
“The top policymakers and the general public seem to all agree that they cannot afford to have covid spreading all over the country like wildfire,” Yanzhong Huang, senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations, told Grid.
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But how long can China afford to stand by its zero-covid approach? A growing swath of the population is experiencing the sometimes-mundane and sometimes-horrific secondary effects of the policy, and the political costs are mounting as well, as people air frustrations with life under lockdown.
The Chinese government’s tight grip over society has made zero-covid possible, and party leadership has made its success in beating back the spread of the virus a point of national pride. But by stifling debate about the trade-offs and fixating on the policy as a validation of China’s political system, the party has also made it more difficult to chart any change in course, even as the burden on society rises.
Zero-covid wasn’t supposed to be a long-term strategy
Containment-at-all-costs is not a recent phenomenon for China. Almost from the onset of the pandemic, China’s approach has been as strict as any on earth; and it has without doubt been successful in blunting the toll of the pandemic.
Since the initial lockdown in Wuhan, local governments have followed a familiar playbook of mass testing, contact tracing, border controls and lockdowns after any outbreak — and “outbreak” in China has often been defined as a handful of cases. As for the results of these strict policies, to date China has recorded 106,000 cases and 4,600 deaths. The U.S. figures? Seventy million cases and more than 866,000 dead. Many experts believe China’s death toll is far higher, but even their models estimate that China, with four times the U.S. population, has had a lower death toll than the U.S.
The government has used these results to its political advantage, internally and around the world. “The CCP [Chinese Communist Party]’s strong leadership is the most reliable backbone when a storm hits,” President Xi Jinping said in a domestic speech in September 2020. “The pandemic once again proves the superiority of the socialist system with Chinese characteristics.”
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So in many ways, it stands to reason that China would hold fast to zero-covid.
But the policy was never intended to be a permanent solution. In a June 2020 paper in the Lancet, the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s Emergency Response Strategy Team wrote: “The current strategic goal is to maintain no or minimal indigenous transmission of SARS-CoV-2 until the population is protected through immunization with safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines.” The authors acknowledged that the strategy would be untenable if it continued for too long: “the socioeconomic costs to maintain such a situation are very high and unsustainable in the long term, particularly in view of the high population susceptibility.”
But more than two years after the Wuhan outbreak, China’s leadership, including a small pandemic working group led by Premier Li Keqiang, has yet to budge on the policy. Other global practitioners of zero-covid — most notably Australia and New Zealand — shifted away from their strict campaigns with the arrival of the delta variant, leaving China as one of the few remaining members of the global zero-covid club.
In July, one of China’s top public health experts, Zhang Wenhong, voiced support for a shift in approach. Writing on his personal Weibo account, Zhang said that “what we’ve been through is not the hardest part. What’s harder is finding the wisdom to coexist with the virus in the long run.” Zhang was quickly blasted by nationalist commentators who called the idea “Western”; the notion of coexisting with the virus was dismissed in a commentary from a former health minister in the state-run People’s Daily.
In an October interview, Gao Fu, the head of China’s CDC, said that if China reached an 85 percent rate of vaccination, it could consider opening its borders. China surpassed the 85 percent mark in December; the tight controls have remained in place.
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It hasn’t helped that omicron and delta have put the value of China’s domestically produced vaccines in question. Even before the latest variants, studies showed that the Chinese vaccines were less effective than Western mRNA shots, and in a recent study, people who had received two doses of the vaccine produced by China’s Sinovac did not have enough antibodies to protect against omicron. Experts say their homegrown vaccines should still offer some protection against severe illness, but how much remains unclear.
When zero-covid meets its match
Far from easing off the zero-covid strategy, in recent months the Chinese government has doubled down. Following the example of Xi’an, several other cities have gone into full or partial lockdown.
In early January, 20 cases were identified in the region surrounding Yuzhou, a city in central China; the local government ordered more than 1 million people into lockdown. (That same day, New York City recorded 38,000 cases.) A week later, two omicron cases sent Anyang — another city in the same province — and its 5.5 million people into lockdown. No one could leave their homes.
In the northern port city of Tianjin, just a 30-minute high-speed train ride from Beijing, a few hundred cases have been met with lockdowns. Some 50,000 university students have been unable to leave campus for the Lunar New Year holiday.
For all the pain and trauma of these measures, many Chinese people still say they support them. A middle-aged man in Tianjin who ran a produce market before the pandemic spoke with Grid in the midst of the latest outbreak. The man, who asked not to be named, was preparing for his third round of citywide testing. From his perspective, the Tianjin government has managed the outbreak well; he thinks people are largely behind the policy.
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“I can’t say it’s 100 percent of people, but more than 98 percent support the policy,” he said. “No one wants to get sick with this virus, and nobody wants to let their family members get sick. So everyone is quite supportive of the government’s work on this front.”
Government workers arrange groceries for residents under lockdown in Tianjin, China, on Jan. 12. (Future Publishing/Future Publishing via Getty Images)
Zero tolerance for opposition to zero-covid?
When residents and officials have spoken out about the costs of the zero-covid measures, the government has allowed for some limited debate. But many dissenters have faced censorship, or worse.
The food shortages in Xi’an, as the government struggled to deliver food to millions stuck at home, triggered a flurry of online comments. In one post, a Xi’an resident wrote about an old man in the neighborhood who hadn’t eaten anything in three days: “If the building manager took full responsibility, would this kind of thing happen?”
Christian Göbel, a professor of modern China studies at the University of Vienna, tracked the online discussion. During a five-day period, he found nearly 700 posts on Weibo and the official government complaint message board related to hunger or difficulty receiving food. In one viral video posted on Weibo, community security officers were seen beating a man who had gone out to buy steamed buns because he was hungry.
For Göbel, the lockdowns provide a window into the boundaries of public debate about the pandemic in China. Because most of the online comments were related to local government services, rather than explicitly targeting central government policy, they weren’t immediately censored, he said. “Complaints about public services and the quality of public services are very common, and they’re even encouraged by the central government,” he added.
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In some cases, the online criticisms appeared to spur action from local officials. The Xi’an government suspended the two hospitals that failed to care for patients, and two hospital officials were fired. Two city officials from the district with the most food shortage complaints were also dismissed.
But while some debate is allowed, the government has cracked down on others for simply discussing the lockdown. A number of people in Xi’an were placed under short-term detention for “disturbing public order” by sharing posts online. In one case, a resident posted about a person who had tried to flee the city in an apparent attempt to escape the restrictions; the police accused the resident of spreading false information about the lockdown.
Police officers patrol the empty Xi'an Railway Station during lockdown on Dec. 23, 2021, in Xi'an, China. (VCG/VCG via Getty Images)
The government also censored Jiang Xue, an independent investigative journalist, who wrote a diary from Xi’an detailing life under the lockdown, in which she described the streets as “still like a wasteland.” At the end of her account, Jiang wrote, paraphrasing a friend who supports the zero-covid policy: “‘We must be willing to make any sacrifice.’ This phrase is fine, but every average person probably should consider, are we the ‘we’, or are we the ‘sacrifice?’”
Jiang’s diary was censored soon after, an echo of the citizen journalists who documented the early days of lockdown in Wuhan. One of those journalists, Zhang Zhan, remains imprisoned and is reportedly in poor health after a hunger strike.
At high levels of the Chinese government, few have publicly questioned the strict measures in any way. One Chinese official with the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese who criticized the Xi’an lockdown online was accused of spreading “false rumors” and fired.
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“Despite all the dissenting voices on the social media,” said the Council on Foreign Relations’ Huang, “we still basically haven’t been seeing public debate on the validity — the effectiveness of this approach at the policy level.”
No backing down — for now
Even as the zero-covid strategy sparks public backlash, and despite the sheer difficulty of containing delta and omicron, Chinese leaders seem bound to press on and do whatever it takes to keep the “zero” — or a number close to it — at the core of their pandemic policy. The February Olympic Games — to be held in China — are a key factor; the Games present a critical moment for the leadership to showcase once again that its strategy has been a success.
It’s possible that change may come through scientific advances. Chinese pharmaceutical companies are in trials for China’s own mRNA vaccine. If that vaccine proves safe and effective, it could help provide China an off-ramp from the strictures of zero-covid.
In the meantime, the zero-covid way of life — with all its trauma and frustrations — will likely only become more prevalent across the country as omicron spreads, and as local and national leaders engage in what Caixin, a Chinese news outlet, described as “hand-to-hand combat” with the virus in the coming weeks.
At some point, Huang said, something will have to give: “Even more people will be affected negatively by draconian pandemic control measures, the full lockdown, for example. The costs will be exponentially higher; they would probably no longer justify the continuation of this approach.”
24. Opinion | It’s Not Just About Ukraine. Putin Wants to Evict the U.S. From Europe.
Excerpts:
Contrary to Mr. Putin’s premise in 2008 that Ukraine is “not a real country,” Ukraine has been a full-fledged member of the United Nations since 1991. Another Russian assault would challenge the entire U.N. system and imperil the arrangements that have guaranteed member states’ sovereignty since World War II — akin to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990, but on an even bigger scale. The United States and its allies, and Ukraine itself, should take this issue to the United Nations and put it before the General Assembly as well as the Security Council. Even if Russia blocks a resolution, the future of Ukraine merits a global response. The United States should also raise concerns in other regional institutions. Why is Russia trying to take its disputes in Europe to Asia and the Western Hemisphere? What does Ukraine have to do with Japan, or Cuba and Venezuela?
Mr. Biden has promised that Russia “will pay a heavy price” if any Russian troops cross Ukraine’s borders. If Mr. Putin invades Ukraine with no punitive action from the West and the rest of the international community, beyond financial sanctions, then he will have set a precedent for future action by other countries. Mr. Putin has already factored additional U.S. financial sanctions into his calculations. But he assumes that some NATO allies will be reluctant to follow suit on these sanctions and other countries will look the other way. U.N. censure, widespread and vocal international opposition, and countries outside Europe taking action to pull back on their relations with Russia might give him pause. Forging a united front with its European allies and rallying broader support should be America’s longer game. Otherwise this saga could indeed mark the beginning of the end of America’s military presence in Europe.
Opinion | It’s Not Just About Ukraine. Putin Wants to Evict the U.S. From Europe.
Guest Essay
It’s Not Just About Ukraine. Putin Wants to Evict the U.S. From Europe.
Jan. 24, 2022, 1:00 a.m. ET
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Ms. Hill was an intelligence officer on Russia and Eurasian affairs for Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama and served on the National Security Council under President Donald Trump.
We knew this was coming.
“George, you have to understand that Ukraine is not even a country. Part of its territory is in Eastern Europe and the greater part was given to us.” These were the ominous words of President Vladimir Putin of Russia to President George W. Bush in Bucharest, Romania, at a NATO summit in April 2008.
Mr. Putin was furious: NATO had just announced that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually join the alliance. This was a compromise formula to allay concerns of our European allies — an explicit promise to join the bloc, but no specific timeline for membership.
At the time, I was the national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia, part of a team briefing Mr. Bush. We warned him that Mr. Putin would view steps to bring Ukraine and Georgia closer to NATO as a provocative move that would likely provoke pre-emptive Russian military action. But ultimately, our warnings weren’t heeded.
Within four months, in August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia. Ukraine got Russia’s message loud and clear. It backpedaled on NATO membership for the next several years. But in 2014, Ukraine wanted to sign an association agreement with the European Union, thinking this might be a safer route to the West. Moscow struck again, accusing Ukraine of seeking a back door to NATO, annexing Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and starting an ongoing proxy war in Ukraine’s southeastern Donbas region. The West’s muted reactions to both the 2008 and 2014 invasions emboldened Mr. Putin.
This time, Mr. Putin’s aim is bigger than closing NATO’s “open door” to Ukraine and taking more territory — he wants to evict the United States from Europe. As he might put it: “Goodbye America. Don’t let the door hit you on the way out.”
Russian President Vladimir Putin.Credit...Pool photo by Evgeny Odinokov
As I have seen over two decades of observing Mr. Putin, and analyzing his moves, his actions are purposeful and his choice of this moment to throw down the gauntlet in Ukraine and Europe is very intentional. He has a personal obsession with history and anniversaries. December 2021 marked the 30th anniversary of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, when Russia lost its dominant position in Europe. Mr. Putin wants to give the United States a taste of the same bitter medicine Russia had to swallow in the 1990s. He believes that the United States is currently in the same predicament as Russia was after the Soviet collapse: grievously weakened at home and in retreat abroad. He also thinks NATO is nothing more than an extension of the United States. Russian officials and commentators routinely deny any agency or independent strategic thought to other NATO members. So, when it comes to the alliance, all Moscow’s moves are directed against Washington.
In the 1990s, the United States and NATO forced Russia to withdraw the remnants of the Soviet military from their bases in Eastern Europe, Germany and the Baltic States. Mr. Putin wants the United States to suffer in a similar way. From Russia’s perspective, America’s domestic travails after four years of President Donald Trump’s disastrous presidency, as well as the rifts he created with U.S. allies and then America’s precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan, signal weakness. If Russia presses hard enough, Mr. Putin hopes he can strike a new security deal with NATO and Europe to avoid an open-ended conflict, and then it will be America’s turn to leave, taking its troops and missiles with it.
Ukraine is both Russia’s target and a source of leverage against the United States. Over the last several months Mr. Putin has bogged the Biden administration down in endless tactical games that put the United States on the defensive. Russia moves forces to Ukraine’s borders, launches war games and ramps up the visceral commentary. In recent official documents, it demanded ironclad guarantees that Ukraine (and other former republics of the U.S.S.R.) will never become members of NATO, that NATO pull back from positions taken after 1997, and also that America withdraw its own forces and weapons, including its nuclear missiles. Russian representatives assert that Moscow doesn’t “need peace at any cost” in Europe. Some Russian politicians even suggest the possibility of a pre-emptive strike against NATO targets to make sure that we know they are serious, and that we should meet Moscow’s demands.
For weeks, American officials have huddled to make sense of the official documents with Russia’s demands and the contradictory commentary, pondered how to deter Mr. Putin in Ukraine and scrambled to talk on his timeline.
All the while, Mr. Putin and his proxies have ratcheted up their statements. Kremlin officials have not just challenged the legitimacy of America’s position in Europe, they have raised questions about America’s bases in Japan and its role in the Asia-Pacific region. They have also intimated that they may ship hypersonic missiles to America’s back door in Cuba and Venezuela to revive what the Russians call the Caribbean Crisis of the 1960s.
Mr. Putin is a master of coercive inducement. He manufactures a crisis in such a way that he can win no matter what anyone else does. Threats and promises are essentially one and the same. Mr. Putin can invade Ukraine yet again, or he can leave things where they are and just consolidate the territory Russia effectively controls in Crimea and Donbas. He can stir up trouble in Japan and send hypersonic missiles to Cuba and Venezuela, or not, if things go his way in Europe.
Mr. Putin plays a longer, strategic game and knows how to prevail in the tactical scrum. He has the United States right where he wants it. His posturing and threats have set the agenda in European security debates, and have drawn our full attention. Unlike President Biden, Mr. Putin doesn’t have to worry about midterm elections or pushback from his own party or the opposition. Mr. Putin has no concerns about bad press or poor poll ratings. He isn’t part of a political party and he has crushed the Russian opposition. The Kremlin has largely silenced the local, independent press. Mr. Putin is up for re-election in 2024, but his only viable opponent, Aleksei Navalny, is locked in a penal colony outside of Moscow.
So Mr. Putin can act as he chooses, when he chooses. Barring ill health, the United States will have to contend with him for years to come. Right now, all signs indicate that Mr. Putin will lock the U.S. into an endless tactical game, take more chunks out of Ukraine and exploit all the frictions and fractures in NATO and the European Union. Getting out of the current crisis requires acting, not reacting. The United States needs to shape the diplomatic response and engage Russia on the West’s terms, not just Moscow’s.
To be sure, Russia does have some legitimate security concerns, and European security arrangements could certainly do with fresh thinking and refurbishment after 30 years. There is plenty for Washington and Moscow to discuss on the conventional and nuclear forces as well as in the cyber domain and on other fronts. But a further Russian invasion of Ukraine and Ukraine’s dismemberment and neutralization cannot be an issue for U.S.-Russian negotiation nor a line item in European security. Ultimately, the United States needs to show Mr. Putin that he will face global resistance and Mr. Putin’s aggression will put Russia’s political and economic relationships at risk far beyond Europe.
Contrary to Mr. Putin’s premise in 2008 that Ukraine is “not a real country,” Ukraine has been a full-fledged member of the United Nations since 1991. Another Russian assault would challenge the entire U.N. system and imperil the arrangements that have guaranteed member states’ sovereignty since World War II — akin to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990, but on an even bigger scale. The United States and its allies, and Ukraine itself, should take this issue to the United Nations and put it before the General Assembly as well as the Security Council. Even if Russia blocks a resolution, the future of Ukraine merits a global response. The United States should also raise concerns in other regional institutions. Why is Russia trying to take its disputes in Europe to Asia and the Western Hemisphere? What does Ukraine have to do with Japan, or Cuba and Venezuela?
Mr. Biden has promised that Russia “will pay a heavy price” if any Russian troops cross Ukraine’s borders. If Mr. Putin invades Ukraine with no punitive action from the West and the rest of the international community, beyond financial sanctions, then he will have set a precedent for future action by other countries. Mr. Putin has already factored additional U.S. financial sanctions into his calculations. But he assumes that some NATO allies will be reluctant to follow suit on these sanctions and other countries will look the other way. U.N. censure, widespread and vocal international opposition, and countries outside Europe taking action to pull back on their relations with Russia might give him pause. Forging a united front with its European allies and rallying broader support should be America’s longer game. Otherwise this saga could indeed mark the beginning of the end of America’s military presence in Europe.
Fiona Hill is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. She served as national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia and senior director for Europe and Russia at the National Security Council. She is co-author of “Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin” and author of “There Is Nothing for You Here: Finding Opportunity in the 21st Century.”
25. Russia, the West, and the info war
Excerpts:
As a contradiction to the popular narrative in the West, in a recent statement Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky rightly said about war with Russia that “risks have existed for more than a year, and they haven’t increased. What has increased is the hype around them.”
Similarly, Ukrainian Security and Defense Council secretary Alexey Danilov has said in the past that there is no evidence that a Russian invasion is imminent.
However, President Zelensky has also called for pre-emptive sanctions against Russia, which may be akin to pouring gasoline on a smoldering fire.
In conclusion, the widely watched nature of the crisis has given rise to unintended diplomatic, security and financial consequences – consequences that may drive Russia, Ukraine and NATO toward escalation rather than easing of tensions.
The escalation may not boil over into full-scale war but will indefinitely prolong the toxic exchange of hostile messaging from all parties involved.
Russia, the West, and the info war
Narratives and public diplomacy are playing a role in shaping the Russia-Ukraine crisis
Fears of war breaking out between Russia and Ukraine have dominated headlines in the international press. Information warfare is an undeniable reality of modern conflicts, and its impact is often strategic in demoralizing the adversary’s forces and populace.
In many of its doctrinal and strategic publications, Russia acknowledges that the information domain is an active battleground, regardless of the contending sides being in a state of war or peace. Despite spirited official denials, it is fair to say that Russia gives as good as it gets in the information domain.
In the latest round of public jousting around hybrid and information warfare, both sides have led with accusations and official public statements.
The Russian Ministry of Defense has alleged that American mercenaries are present and looking to orchestrate a chemical attack in the Donbas region of Ukraine. Meanwhile the US State Department has released a fact sheet detailing the alleged Russian “destabilization campaign in Ukraine.” British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss has made a statement accusing Russia of planning “to install pro-Russian leadership in Ukraine.”
Russia’s approach to building up forces on Ukraine’s border is best characterized as Clausewitzian, meaning it’s aimed toward achieving political goals through other means.
Given the astronomical costs of launching an overt military operation, it is more likely the deployment is meant as a tool for strategic signaling.
The Russian intent, as announced publicly, is to compel the US and its NATO allies into addressing long-standing security concerns of the Kremlin. By deploying forces within its own territory, Russia has not only brought its adversaries to the negotiating table but has demonstrated its centrality to European security.
Public diplomacy, war of narratives
In the ever tumultuous and interconnected world of information warfare and influence operations, public diplomacy becomes the arbiter of narratives. Russia recently published two draft treaties, one addressed to the US and the other to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, demanding “legally binding security guarantees” before any actual meeting between diplomats could take place.
According to Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, the public release of the draft treaties was “meant to avoid manipulation in the press.”
A similar measure to set the record straight was also observed in November, as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s correspondence with his German and French counterparts was made public.
Russia’s chief negotiator in the ongoing dialogues with NATO and the US, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, believes Russia has the initiative, which the US and the collective West are following.
While the US has agreed to provide a written response to proposed Russian draft treaties, it has not agreed to the major concerns highlighted in them as yet.
CSTO intervention in Kazakhstan
The Collective Security Treaty Organization, a security bloc made up of some former Soviet countries and led by Russia, recently conducted a successful operation in Kazakhstan, quelling widespread unrest.
The speed with which the CSTO approved and conducted the operation and then withdrew finds almost no parallel in post-Cold War history, especially when viewed in contrast with quagmires like the US war in and withdrawal from Afghanistan. With this latest operation, Russia has not only reinforced its key role in Central Asia and the post-Soviet space, but also proved that it is a much more dependable ally than the US.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken took a jab at the CSTO intervention, saying, “Once Russians are in your house, it’s sometimes very difficult to get them to leave.” However, with the withdrawal of Russian and other CSTO troops from Kazakhstan now complete, it can be said that Blinken’s “concern” was unfounded.
Measures against economic coercion
In the wake of the events in Crimea in 2014, the US and its allies responded by imposing backbreaking sanctions on Russia, causing widespread damage to its economy. Since then sanctions and the mere threat of them have become a key coercive tool in US foreign policy.
As many international observers have opined, this has led Russia to prioritize decoupling its economic interests with its adversaries and “de-dollarize” its holdings as well as foreign trade.
The “de-dollarizing” policy measures have not ensured a tight seal, so to say, insulating the Russian economy from instability, volatility and decline.
Recently the Russian stock market and currency reportedly saw some volatility and downturn ushered in by anxieties over a kinetic conflict and ensuing Western sanctions on Russia. Russia’s domestic inflation and high food prices are also bearing down heavily on the overall situation.
Cooperation against cyber-criminals
Ukraine was hit by cyberattacks on January 14, which it connected to a group allegedly linked to Belarus, after initially suspecting Russia in a knee-jerk reaction. On the same day, the Russian domestic intelligence agency FSB conducted an operation against a well-known cybercriminal group, REvil.
The Russian authorities asked the US to take action against the group. The timing and public release of information on the operation signal that Moscow may have offered an olive branch to the US and the collective West despite the ongoing tension.
Zelensky is right – and wrong
As a contradiction to the popular narrative in the West, in a recent statement Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky rightly said about war with Russia that “risks have existed for more than a year, and they haven’t increased. What has increased is the hype around them.”
Similarly, Ukrainian Security and Defense Council secretary Alexey Danilov has said in the past that there is no evidence that a Russian invasion is imminent.
However, President Zelensky has also called for pre-emptive sanctions against Russia, which may be akin to pouring gasoline on a smoldering fire.
In conclusion, the widely watched nature of the crisis has given rise to unintended diplomatic, security and financial consequences – consequences that may drive Russia, Ukraine and NATO toward escalation rather than easing of tensions.
The escalation may not boil over into full-scale war but will indefinitely prolong the toxic exchange of hostile messaging from all parties involved.
Follow Aditya Pareek on Twitter @CabinMarine
26. The Big Lie’s lasting damage to American democracy
Conclusion:
That doesn’t mean there’s nothing to worry about. To the contrary, Lieberman defines four conditions that lead to democratic breakdown:
- A politics of “us versus them”;
- Conflict over who belongs as a full member of society;
- Economic inequality;
- And excessive concentration of power in the executive branch
“Every crisis of democracy the United States has had over the course of its history has involved one or some combination of these threats,” he said. “This is the first time that we’ve ever had all four present at once.”
The Big Lie’s lasting damage to American democracy
As democracy “backslides” around the world, the U.S. is no exception.
Almost half of Americans tell pollsters that they don’t believe President Joe Biden legitimately won the 2020 election. This is the “Big Lie” that inspired rioters to attempt to block the certification of the presidential election last January and remains at the center of the democratic emergency in the United States.
Behind this false belief is a concerted disinformation campaign funded by allies of former president Donald Trump. The campaign and high-profile supporters orchestrated rallies around the country that popped up days after the election took place. But even a year after Biden took office, the Big Lie continues to have a strong pull on the Republican Party.
Hear more from Anya van Wagtendonk about this story:
The belief that U.S. elections are vulnerable to corruption threatens to undermine voters’ faith in democracy itself — and that faith, experts say, is part of what maintains the system.
“Historically, this is a pretty severe crisis,” said Robert Lieberman, a political scientist at Johns Hopkins University, who co-authored the book “Four Threats: The Recurring Crises of American Democracy.” “We are in a real … inflection point now. It compares with some of the darkest periods we’ve seen in our history.”
The Big Lie looms large over the political system. According to the Washington Post, “at least 163 Republicans who have embraced Trump’s false claims are running for statewide positions that would give them authority over the administration of elections.” Few Republicans go out of their way to disavow it.
When Americans head back to the polls this fall, the electoral system itself will be on the ballot.
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Flashback to 2020
Trump did something no modern president had done before: He refused to concede. Instead, he and his allies mounted a disinformation campaign to discredit the outcome, spreading false claims about the election that is often dubbed the “Big Lie.”
Trump’s campaign mounted more than 60 legal challenges in battleground states, all but one of which were withdrawn or dismissed, and called for recounts in Georgia (twice) and part of Wisconsin. Trump traveled the country promoting conspiracy theories about his loss.
Trump allies, meanwhile, coordinated “Stop the Steal” rallies across the nation. That phrase was first seeded in 2016 by Trump’s longtime adviser Roger Stone, in preparation for a presumed loss to Hillary Clinton. In 2020, that movement was funded by a dark-money group that has backed other right-wing causes, including the pro-Trump student organization Turning Point USA.
Trump supporters attended those rallies and turned up at recount sites to try to observe the fraud they were convinced had hijacked Trump’s victory. And they communicated online, where their rage fomented.
All of this culminated in a violent breach of the Capitol. But the dramatic events of Jan. 6 were not the end of the Big Lie’s influence. It is also reshaping how elections are administered nationwide. According to the Brennan Center for Justice, 19 states have enacted at least 33 new laws since January 2021 that will restrict voting access.
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Efforts are also underway in nearly a dozen states to give partisan bodies, such as state legislatures, more power over election administration.
Long after Biden was sworn in as president, Arizona Republicans even conducted an elaborate audit of their state’s results. That monthslong process only affirmed Biden’s victory in the state and found no evidence of voter fraud. But the mere existence of such a review can give more oxygen to distrust in the election’s results.
“We’ve built a pretty remarkable system in this country of professional, nonpartisan election administration,” said Lieberman. “And the Republicans now see that as a vulnerability or as an opportunity for them to capture that apparatus and use it in their favor.”
How did we get here?
According to Julia Azari, a political scientist at Marquette University who focuses on the American presidency and political change, historians argue among themselves about how old American democracy truly is. On one side is the idea that democracy is as old as the nation itself. But others argue that American democracy only truly began after women’s suffrage, at the turn of the 20th century, and the civil rights movement of the 1960s, which protected the right to vote for Black Americans.
Azari argues that, for decades, presidents crafted narratives about their victories that have helped to shape an “age of mandate politics.” It’s a way to justify the enormous power of the executive office, she argues, but has built in the American public a “tolerance for election fiction.”
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“It kind of opened the door to lots of fictions about elections,” she said. “Elections are really about whatever symbolic story you can tell and you can sell and get people to believe.”
Azari also argues that it contributes to the intense polarization of modern politics. Clean narratives love a stark contrast. “It’s easier to credibly claim that the election was a referendum on a particular set of ideas when the parties are distinct,” Azari recently wrote.
Another key context for the Big Lie, experts say, is race-based political identity construction. Despite recent gains made among some voters of color, particularly Latino voters, the Republican base is still whiter and more rural, while Democrats rely on a multicultural and urban base. As the country becomes more racially diverse and cities grow denser, those divisions would, in theory, shift power toward the Democratic Party.
“The party division is overlapping with the racial division in a way that hasn’t happened in the United States in a very, very long time,” said Lieberman.
The election of Barack Obama proved what could happen when a multicultural coalition organizes. But after the U.S. elected its first Black president, an incredible backlash awakened.
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The most visible face of that backlash was Trump, an elected leader with authoritarian tendencies.
The polling looks bad
Most Americans say they will trust elections even if their preferred candidate loses in 2024 — but it’s not an overwhelming majority, and that trust breaks down significantly by party, according to a November poll conducted by NPR, PBS NewsHour and Marist.
That survey found that 62 percent of Americans say they’ll trust the 2024 election. That breaks down to 82 percent of Democrats compared with only 33 percent of Republicans. Only 58 percent of Americans reported trusting that elections are fair.
This crisis of confidence represents a significant shift from previous years, said John Carey, a social scientist at Dartmouth College and co-founder of Bright Line Watch, which monitors threats to democracy in the United States.
While there has always been a small partisan gap when it comes to confidence in the fairness of elections, Carey said, it’s usually of just a few points — not 50.
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“Democracy is a multidimensional thing,” he said. “But at its core, it’s about choosing who governs through elections, and if the confidence in elections is not there — if what we call ‘losers’ consent’ is not there — then all the rest of it is in a precarious state.”
That polarization is bad news. Hyperpolarization is one of the warning signs that a democracy is in decline, and it can sow the seeds of violence. As people’s identities become wrapped up in what they believe, challenges to those beliefs become existential threats.
The polling data bears out that threat, too. In February 2021, the American Enterprise Institute’s Survey Center on American Life found that about two-fifths of Republicans support the statement that, “if elected leaders will not protect America, the people must do it themselves, even if it requires violent actions.”
Of course, polling is imperfect. People don’t always share their true feelings with pollsters, and there’s a difference between believing and direct action. (The overwhelming sentiment in recent polling is that Republicans are ready to “move on” from Jan. 6.) And without clearer data on how many people self-identify as Republicans, Azari questions the real-world impact of those sentiments.
“Some percentage of Republicans believe all of these … anti-democratic things, but what actual percentage of that is that of our society?” she said. “And how many people need to believe these types of things to really erode democracy?”
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That’s part of why small shifts in election administration are worrisome, said Risa Brooks, a political scientist specializing in comparative civil-military relations at Marquette University.
“It’s these mundane, boring, but kind of demobilizing or difficult-to-mobilize-around attenuations of democracy that I think we really need to be paying attention to,” she said. “The upshot of all of this happening together is that, one way or another, we potentially end up with outcomes and elections that are very inconsistent with what actual voters wanted.”
A few key actors in positions of authority could subvert a legitimate election in favor of their preferred candidate.
That may be why Trump himself continues to spread the Big Lie as he reemerges into public. In an online video posted before a political rally on Jan. 15, Trump alluded to efforts to change how voting is done in the U.S.
“Sometimes the vote-counter is more important than the candidate,” he said.
The Big Lie heard around the world
Other democracies are facing similar pressure, and what is happening in the U.S. is part of a pattern of “backsliding” around the world.
“Leaders who are elected via a fairly free and fair election then go on to use the tools of democracy, use its institutions, use its laws, to actually undermine the spirit or the quality of democracy itself,” Brooks said.
“In countries that have democratized or are considered democracies — there’s a recession there, they’re moving backward,” she said, citing changes in Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Brazil and elsewhere.
According to the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Research Project, a Sweden-based institute that studies and ranks democracies according to hundreds of indicators, only 14 percent of the world’s population now lives in a state that can be defined as a liberal democracy. Meanwhile, an “accelerating wave of autocratization” is sweeping countries and affecting billions of people, including the populations of the United States and India, where democracy languishes.
Worldwide, that wave looks different from the violent and extrajudicial coups that were once associated with the overthrow of democracies, Brooks said.
In the same way, she said, a dramatic event like Jan. 6 is not the start or end of that process in the U.S. The question is not whether the U.S. will devolve into another bloody civil war. Rather, she said, democratic institutions are being eroded from the inside.
“I see that violence captures a lot of attention, it captures our imagination. But in reality, when we look at the U.S. case, I see it much more as ongoing,” she said. “Democracy is not going to end; democracy is ending right now,” through its own democratic institutions.
The consequence of this occurring in the United States can be seen in its ratings on global measures of democracy. The United States was long considered the oldest continuous democracy in the world, according to the Center for Systemic Peace, another researcher of democracies.
But the country’s rating was downgraded in the aftermath of the Jan. 6 insurrection; now Switzerland holds that distinction.
The annual Edelman Trust Barometer, released Jan. 18, indicates that global faith in democratic institutions, including government and the press, is at an all-time low.
About half of that survey’s 36,000 respondents said they believe media and government are divisive, and two-thirds believe that government “purposely” misleads people. Most people also believe that the press is too commercial and sensationalized.
And the biggest decreases in public trust occurred in democracies often considered some of the world’s strongest: Germany, Australia, the Netherlands and South Korea.
This is part of a pattern of democratic expansion and contraction, said Lieberman.
“There have been numerous times in American history when we’ve been at real risk of moving … away from a more complete and robust democracy and toward something constrained or autocratic,” he said. “Americans like to tell ourselves a story of the progressive realization of democratic ideals. But it’s been much more back and forth than that.”
That doesn’t mean there’s nothing to worry about. To the contrary, Lieberman defines four conditions that lead to democratic breakdown:
- A politics of “us versus them”;
- Conflict over who belongs as a full member of society;
- Economic inequality;
- And excessive concentration of power in the executive branch
“Every crisis of democracy the United States has had over the course of its history has involved one or some combination of these threats,” he said. “This is the first time that we’ve ever had all four present at once.”
27. SAS on Ukraine standby to 'extract' UK officials if war breaks out
A specific unit identified. That seems unusual for the UK.
SAS on Ukraine standby to 'extract' UK officials if war breaks out
Members of SAS E Squadron will lead a rescue if Russian troops and armour pour deep into Ukraine. British Foreign Office officials may be rescued by special forces in case of war
Mirror · by Chris Hughes · January 20, 2022
A secretive SAS unit has been put on standby to “extract” UK officials from Ukraine if war breaks out, the Daily Mirror can reveal.
Members of SAS E Squadron will lead a rescue if Russian troops and armour pour deep into Ukraine.
As many as 126,000 Russian combat forces are now amassed close to Ukraine’s border - including ground troops and amphibious attack personnel.
More are pouring into neighbouring Belarus, putting Ukraine’s capital Kiev at risk if President Vladimir Putin orders a full-scale invasion.
Moscow’s commanders have ordered large amounts of multi-launch rocket systems to be transported into Belarus, which could be used as a launch point for an invasion.
A Ukrainian soldier in a trench on the front line in Pisky (
Image:
Getty Images)
American President Joe Biden has already warned he believes an attack is “imminent” and bungled by hinting an American response depends on the severity of an incursion.
Many observers believe full-scale invasion is unlikely but if that takes place British Foreign Office officials may be rescued by special forces.
It is believed crack UK special forces may also be placed strategically within Ukraine acting as military advisers, along with US counterparts.
Russia's President Vladimir Putin holds a meeting with government ministers via video link from the Moscow Kremlin (
Image:
Alexei Nikolsky/TASS)
One security source told the Daily Mirror: “British intelligence is watching developments all over Ukraine but in particular in Crimea, which is occupied by Russian forces.
“All of the other manoeuvres may have been a ruse to deflect from Crimea and Putin may want to expand it towards contested Donbas.”
Tonight the UK Ministry of Defence told the Daily Mirror: "We do not comment on special forces."
Joe Biden has warned he believes an attack is 'imminent' (
Image:
AFP via Getty Images)
Ukraine’s troops along a 250-mile trench border through Donbas, in Donestk and Luhansk, are on high alert for an attack by Moscow’s forces.
They are preparing to launch a guerrilla warfare against attacking Russian soldiers if they roll over the frontline, using UK-supplied shoulder-launched NLAW missiles.
They have pitted crossing points with anti-tank mines and other defences, preparing to retreat and then launch counter-attacks against an invasion force.
Experts warned Russia will act quickly and decisively if it invades.
A satellite image shows Russian battle groups and vehicles parked in the town of Yelnya (
Image:
via REUTERS)
'Russia to act quickly and decisively in invasion of Ukraine'
Hugo Crosthwaite, lead analyst for Eurasia at security intelligence firm Dragonfly, said the Russian plan was to get concessions on Ukrainian NATO membership and Donbas.
Putin is keen to stop Ukraine from becoming a NATO member but the US has insisted on making no promise.
Moscow also wants pro-Russian separatist occupied Donbas to be officially part of Russia and some experts believe sanction threats will not deter the Kremlin.
He said: “A Russian invasion of Ukraine is a likely scenario in the coming weeks.
“There have been several military and diplomatic developments that point to a sustained severe interstate conflict risk, including Russian troops deploying to Belarus and further efforts by the Kremlin to create a pretext for an attack.
Ukrainian servicemen work on their tank close to the front line with Russian-backed separatists near Lysychansk (
Image:
AFP via Getty Images)
“The combined efforts of the US, the EU and NATO to deter Russia in recent months appear to have failed.
“Even the sanctions the US has threatened seem to have had little impact, with Russia having effectively sanction-proofed its economy.
“Russia’s military build-up means it can now begin a ground operation or launch a devastating missile and artillery attack at little to no notice.
“Rhetoric from the Kremlin has become more belligerent, including unevidenced accusations that the US is training ‘anti-Russia’ units and Ukraine is preparing to attack separatist forces in Donbas - a tactic the Kremlin used in 2014 to justify its annexation of Crimea.
“We still doubt that Russian forces would attack Kyiv, either via ground assault or air and missiles, and assess that Russia’s main goal in any military operation would be to force Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to resign quickly, and offer wide-ranging concessions from NATO membership to the status of Donbas.”
Mirror · by Chris Hughes · January 20, 2022
28. The Heart of Strategic Influence: Aristotle’s Contribution to Addressing DisInformation
Classical philosophy remains relevant today. This is worth the minute or two to read.
The Heart of Strategic Influence: Aristotle’s Contribution to Addressing DisInformation - HS Today
We must discern the nature of the conflicts we are in, and whether or not we fight with effective weapons.
Aristotle argued that there is a sense in which poetry has greater truth value than history. He meant that while history refers to specifics, poetry refers to the nature of the topic (or, as Plato said, its Form). Where history refers to the details of a war, poetry refers to the nature of War. While history may reference the details and consequences of a particular love affair, poetry refers to the nature of Love itself. While history may trace the impacts of a major decision, poetry addresses the universal human experience of approaching a fork in the road.
History is about particular things while poetry is about the nature of particular things. Poetry speaks to larger truths. It is in the Aristotelean sense that what philosophers call the “truth value” of poetry is greater than that of history.
A correlative claim that can be made of the Aristotelean distinction is that one can claim that a history is inaccurate or false, but one cannot make a sensible similar accusation about a poem. A poem may fall flat. It may not resonate. But to claim that it is non-factual is to misunderstand the nature of poetry itself. It is to misunderstand its power.
Poetry does not strive for factual coherence; it strives to touch the deep meaning of human experience. Its target is the heart, not the mind.
Narrative is poetic. It is not historical.
Why should NATO participants and national defense professionals care about the distinctions that an ancient philosopher made hundreds of years before the birth of Christ? Because understanding that distinction may mean the difference between containing Russian aggression or not. The distinction may determine whether or not nation states can hold themselves together in the face of strategies seeded to collapse them from within.
Understanding this classical philosophical distinction between history and poetry will determine whether or not we are able to discern the nature of the conflicts we are in, and whether or not we fight with effective weapons. Using history as a weapon against poetry is to use the wrong tools in a misidentified battle space.
“Disinformation” is an incorrect label for a narrative that influences public opinion. If it was non-information or wrong information, then it could simply be countered with correct information. It would be in the category of history, the facts of which could legitimately be disputed.
When “Disinformation” is effective it is because it is told in poetic, narrative form and cannot be countered with recourse to “truth” or “facts.” It can only be countered in poetic form – that is, the deeper resonance with human experience is what has to be addressed. Information is unarmed against a poetic narrative. As is history. The “facts” of history can be retold, and be given any variety of resonate meaning.
What the facts mean is what matters to the human heart more than what the facts are.
Influential narratives give we human beings that thing we crave: meaning. When disinformation is influential it is because it means more to the target audience than the truth or the facts or verified information. Information is just raw data and we do not crave raw data. Raw data has no inherent appeal.
Homer’s Illiad, for example, has had profound influence in western cultures even though it is not a factual historical account. It is in the category of the poetic. It speaks to the nature of a heroic quest therefore gives its audience a way to frame their own challenges. It enables the audience to view their own battles with obstacles and hurdles in a heroic light. The lack of truth value is irrelevant to the meaning it imparts to our experiences. The lack of truth value does not negatively affect its meaning value.
The gods and goddesses of ancient Greece, Rome, and India are archetypes. We recognize them. As types they refer to something beyond actual individual persons. The Muse speaks to us about the nature of inspiration. Sirens are not “real”; they strike a chord in us regarding the nature of temptation.
Rather than continuing to be dumbfounded by the influence of disinformation, we need to get a grip of this ancient distinction and get our categories straight. Technological advances have not altered the nature of the beast. And they cannot help us fight it if we cannot even identify what it is we are up against.
To the extent that truth-telling is part of our narrative strategy, it cannot be reactive; we cannot chase our adversaries around matching their lies with the truth because, as recent cognitive science has demonstrated, countering lies by repeating them with the word “no” (or some other negative) attached actually has the opposite effect. It strengthens the false statement in the mind of the audience (“Don’t Think of an Elephant” is George Lakoff’s challenge). Truth and facts should be a part of our narrative, but it is in determining the meaning of the truth and lies that we must dominate. That is the heart of influence.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
