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1.. Opinion | A Look Back at Our Coming War With China

2. The U.S. Can Help Ukraine and Deter China

3. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 18, 2023

4. When Will the War in Ukraine End? Students discuss NATO, Crimea and America’s role in the invasion.

5. Building the Taiwanese ‘porcupine’ an arsenal of shooting quills

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10. U.S., Philippines Forces Training in Tandem As Countries' Alliance Expands

11. Two Officers Sat In A Nevada Bar And Planned, On A Napkin, A New Way Of Waging War In The Pacific

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13. Russian command structure ‘confusing at best’ after Wagner mutiny, says top U.S. general

14. Electronic Warfare Has Become A Defining Feature Of Future Conflict. Here’s Why.

15. Bickering Over the Defense Bill Is Undermining Our Military

16. Is the All-Volunteer US Military in Crisis?

17. Air Force Special Ops Wants Runway Independence, More Speed (UPDATED)

18. Creating a Codified Legal Response to Domestic Extremism in the Ranks

19. The Indo-Pacific Strategy’s Missing Continental Dimension

20. Book Review - The Jedburghs | SOF News

21. How China and Russia Use Intelligence Agencies to Undermine America

22. Ukraine’s Other Allies – The West Should Assist the Private Actors Helping Arm Kyiv

23. The Uncertain Future of the U.S. Military’s All-Volunteer Force

1. Opinion | A Look Back at Our Coming War With China

A useful review of a number of popular books about "our coming war with China."

Excerpts:

Brands and Beckley are wise to point out, contra Allison’s Thucydides trap, that countries can be rising and falling at the same time and that moments of great geopolitical peril happen not only when a country is on the rise but also when its ambition and desperation come together. Unfortunately, their practical proposals are obscured by the self-help buzzwords of the national security set. “The key is to take calculated risks — and avoid reckless ones,” they advise. And “Danger-zone strategy is about getting to the long game — and ensuring you can win it.” Brands and Beckley even call for Washington to deploy “strategic MacGyverism — using the tools we have or can quickly summon to defuse geopolitical bombs that are about to explode.” (Translation: Wing it and hope that someone supersmart will step in to fix any crisis.)

Adding “strategic” to any foreign-policy lingo immediately gives it a loftier vibe, of course, and Rudd is a master of this approach. In “The Avoidable War,” he invokes strategic perceptions, strategic adversaries, strategic equations, strategic logic, strategic thinking, strategic community, strategic direction, strategic offramps, strategic language, strategic literacy, strategic red lines, strategic cooperation, strategic engagement, strategic temperature and a joint strategic narrative — and that’s just in the introduction.

Opinion | A Look Back at Our Coming War With China

The New York Times · by Carlos Lozada · July 18, 2023

Carlos Lozada

A Look Back at Our Coming War With China

July 18, 2023

Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

Opinion Columnist and co-host of ‘Matter of Opinion’

It is unfair, but tales of war tend to be more exciting than stories of peace. The same is true, perhaps more so, for warnings of wars to come versus assurances of good will. Dire scenarios of risk and escalation are almost always more captivating than those dissenting voices that explain how to avoid a fight. It is a narrative advantage that hawks enjoy over doves, realists over idealists and those believing in nightmares over those who dream of the alternative.

The 360-degree rivalry between the United States and China has yielded a barrage of recent books about the possibility of armed conflict breaking out, with plenty of advice on how to forestall it. If “Who lost China?” was an American preoccupation of the early Cold War, “Who lost to China?” threatens to become its contemporary variant. After five decades of engagement between Washington and Beijing, a period that featured both America’s unipolar triumphalism and China’s ascent to economic superpower status, the two countries are now on a “collision course” for war, many of these books assert, even if the rationales are varied and at times contradictory.

In these works, the antagonists are bound for strife because China has become too strong or because it is weakening; because America is too hubristic or too insecure; because leaders make bad decisions or because the forces of politics, ideology and history overpower individual agency. A sampling of their titles — “Destined for War,” “Danger Zone,” “2034: A Novel of the Next World War” and “The Avoidable War” — reveals the range and limits of the debate.

I don’t know if the United States and China will end up at war. But in these books, the battle is already raging. So far, the war stories are winning.

The U.S.-China book club is insular and self-referential, and the one work that all the authors appear obliged to quote is 2017’s “Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?” by Graham Allison, a political scientist at Harvard. He looks at the war between ascendant Athens and ruling Sparta in the fifth century B.C. and echoes Thucydides, the ancient historian and former Athenian general, who argued that “it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.” Sub in China for Athens and the United States for Sparta, and you get the gist.

Allison, best known for “Essence of Decision,” his 1971 study of the Cuban missile crisis, does not regard a U.S.-Chinese war as inevitable. But in his book he does consider it more likely than not. “When a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, the resulting structural stress makes a violent clash the rule, not the exception,” he writes. He revisits 16 encounters between dominant and ascendant powers — Portugal and Spain fighting over trade and empire, the Dutch and British contesting the seas, Germany challenging 20th-century European powers and other confrontations — and found that in 12 of them, the outcome was war.

Demonstrators protest during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

As China continues amassing economic and political clout and an American-led global order appears less sustainable, it becomes “frighteningly easy to develop scenarios in which American and Chinese soldiers are killing each other,” Allison warns. When there is mistrust at the top, when worldviews are irreconcilable and when each side regards its own leadership as preordained, any nudge will do. “Could a collision between American and Chinese warships in the South China Sea, a drive toward national independence in Taiwan, jockeying between China and Japan over islands on which no one wants to live, instability in North Korea or even a spiraling economic dispute provide the spark to a war between China and the U.S. that neither wants?” he asks. (In “Destined for War,” this is a rhetorical question.)

Such story lines are the lifeblood of the U.S.-China literature. Hal Brands and Michael Beckley, senior fellows at the American Enterprise Institute, begin their 2022 book “Danger Zone” with a surprise Chinese invasion of Taiwan set in early 2025. U.S. forces in the western Pacific are too scattered to respond effectively, and soon enough an ailing President Biden is pondering a low-yield nuclear strike against Chinese forces in mainland ports and airfields. “How did the United States and China come to the brink of World War III?” Brands and Beckley ask. Too easily.

In “The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict Between the US and Xi Jinping’s China,” Kevin Rudd, a former prime minister of Australia and a longtime scholar of China, imagines 10 distinct plotlines, many revolving around the fate of Taiwan. For instance, what if China seeks to take the island by force and Washington opts to not respond? That would be America’s “Munich moment,” Rudd writes, eviscerating any American moral authority. Even worse would be the United States reacting with military force but then losing the fight, which would “signal the end of the American century.” Half the scenarios in his book, Rudd notes, “involve one form or another of major armed conflict.” And he’s the most dovish of the lot.

An extended war story is found in “2034,” a work of fiction written by Elliot Ackerman, a novelist and former Marine special operations officer who served in Iraq and Afghanistan, and James Stavridis, a retired four-star admiral and former supreme allied commander of NATO. Published in 2021, “2034” is basically a beach read about how we get to nuclear war. The authors imagine a seemingly chance standoff in the South China Sea between a flotilla of U.S. destroyers and a Chinese trawler toting high-tech intelligence equipment, which in a matter of months escalates into a world war that leaves major cities in ashes, tens of millions of people dead and neither Washington nor Beijing in charge. One of the main characters, a Chinese official with deep U.S. ties, recalls taking a class at Harvard, “a seminar pompously titled The History of War taught by a Hellenophile professor.” If it’s a dig at the ubiquitous Allison, it might also work as a homage, because in “2034” China and the United States are ensnared by Thucydides.

In “The Avoidable War,” Rudd cautions that the incentives for Beijing and Washington to escalate hostilities, whether to save lives or save face, “could prove irresistible.” Ackerman and Stavridis follow that script. In their novel, a recklessly hawkish U.S. national security adviser — with the perfect last name of Wisecarver — and a smugly overconfident Chinese defense minister keep going until cities like San Diego and Shanghai are no more and India emerges as a global power, both in terms of its military capabilities and its mediating authority. (The U.N. Security Council even relocates from New York to New Delhi.) “This conflict hasn’t felt like a war — at least not in the traditional sense — but rather a series of escalations,” an influential former Indian official declares near the end of the novel. “That’s why my word is ‘tragic,’ not ‘inevitable.’ A tragedy is a disaster that could otherwise have been avoided.”

By these accounts, the forecast for tragedy is favorable. Allison sees the rise of Chinese nationalism under President Xi Jinping as part of the long-term project to avenge China’s “century of humiliation,” from the First Opium War to the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949, and restore the country’s top rank. Both the United States and China view themselves in exceptional terms, Allison explains, as nations of destiny. Washington aims to sustain the Pax Americana, whereas China believes that the so-called rules-based international order is just code for America making rules and China following orders — an oppressive scheme to contain and sabotage China’s pent-up national greatness.

The extent and durability of that greatness are matters of disagreement in these books. Allison contends that the economic balance of power “has tilted so dramatically in China’s favor” that American pretensions to continued hegemony are unrealistic. But Brands and Beckley, writing five years later, see a middling Middle Kingdom, a nation that for all its “saber rattling” (an obligatory activity in foreign policy tomes) is threatened by enemies abroad and an aging population and faltering economy at home. “China will be a falling power far sooner than most people think,” Brands and Beckley declare. “Where others see rapid Chinese growth, we see massive debt and Soviet-level inefficiency. Where others see gleaming infrastructure, we see ghost cities and bridges to nowhere. Where others see the world’s largest population, we see a looming demographic catastrophe.”

Except that those interpretations do not render China any less dangerous to U.S. interests or security. Just the opposite, Brands and Beckley argue. As China sees its window of opportunity closing rapidly, it could decide to make a move now in pursuit of its goals — taking Taiwan, expanding its sphere of influence, achieving global pre-eminence. Thus, the 2020s is the decade when the U.S.-Chinese competition “will hit its moment of maximum danger.”

Pro-independence protesters in Taipei, Taiwan in 2018.Credit...Ritchie B Tongo/EPA, via Shutterstock

Note how Allison believes war is possible because China is on an inexorable path to growth and influence, whereas Brands and Beckley worry about conflict precisely because Chinese power may be waning. This is the occupational hazard of national-security thought leadership: Once you’ve decided conflict is likely, any set of conditions can credibly justify that belief.

The notion of the American dream is inseparable from the national identity of the United States, no matter that it can mean different things to different Americans. But there is also a Chinese dream, articulated, somewhat amorphously, by one individual: Xi, who is also the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and the chairman of the Central Military Commission.

The U.S.-China books devote much attention to the motives and intentions of China’s leader. Allison describes Xi’s Chinese dream as a combination of power, prosperity and pride, “equal parts Theodore Roosevelt’s muscular vision of an American century and Franklin Roosevelt’s dynamic New Deal.” Rudd devotes 11 chapters of his book to Xi’s ambitions and worldview, including his relentless focus on retaining power; his push for national unity, particularly regarding Taiwan; his need to maintain China’s economic expansion; his drive to modernize the military, especially China’s naval strength; and his effort to challenge Western-style liberal norms.

These goals may appear more attainable to Xi thanks to the “theory of American declinism” that gained currency among China’s foreign policy elites during the Obama years, Rudd writes, particularly after the post-9/11 wars and the Great Recession. The corollary of that theory, of course, is that the time for China’s primacy has arrived. In “2034” the same view comes alive in a melodramatic monologue by China’s defense minister. “Our strength is what it has always been — our judicious patience,” he declares, in contrast to the Americans, who “change their governments and their policies as often as the seasons” and who “are governed by their emotions, by their blithe morality and belief in their precious indispensability.” In 1,000 years, the United States “won’t even be remembered as a country,” he states. “It will simply be remembered as a moment. A fleeting moment.” In the novel, China seizes its moment to try to end America’s moment. Instead, both moments come to an end.

In “Party of One: The Rise of Xi Jinping and China’s Superpower Future,” Chun Han Wong, a correspondent for The Wall Street Journal, notes that the Chinese president has no deep animosity toward the United States and in fact has some affection for American culture. When Xi was vice president, Wong writes, he sent his daughter to study at Harvard, and he has shared his affection for American movies like “Saving Private Ryan.” Of course, a Chinese president’s fascination with a film about brutality, heroism and loss in a past world war may signal something less encouraging than the strength of America’s soft power.

Wong explains how Xi has hardened his control over the Chinese Communist Party with anti-corruption purges and has deployed state security and surveillance to suppress any threats to China’s stability and, more to the point, to his power. The president is an “ardent nationalist,” Wong writes, one who is “stoking a sense of Chinese civilizational pride,” among his country’s leadership and people. Xi has made a more robust military “a centerpiece of his China dream, demanding that the armed forces be ‘ready to fight and win wars.’ ” It doesn’t take much sleuthing to imagine who the opponent in such wars might be. Xi’s assertions of a rising East and a diminishing West “has become an article of faith within the party and beyond,” Wong writes. “Questioning such views is almost tantamount to disloyalty.”

Brands and Beckley are less fixated on Xi; they see China’s revisionist project as long predating China’s latest leader. “America has a China problem, not a Xi Jinping problem,” they write. But they might find validation in Wong’s reporting. By centralizing so much power and control in himself and by governing through fear, Xi “may have become the weakest link in his quest to build a Chinese superpower,” Wong writes. Scared of disappointing Xi, the state bureaucracy becomes paralyzed, while the party is so animated by a single personality that any potential successor could struggle to lead it.

“Xi’s China is brash but brittle, intrepid yet insecure,” Wong concludes. “It is a would-be superpower in a hurry, eager to take on the world while wary of what may come.”

Throughout these books on China and the United States, scenarios of war abound, while paths to peace are less obvious. Allison pines for the era of Washington wise men like George Kennan, George Marshall, Paul Nitze and other Cold War luminaries. The United States requires not one more “China strategy,” Allison admonishes, but serious reflection on American objectives in a world with a rival that could become more powerful than the United States. “Is military primacy essential for ensuring vital national interests?” Allison asks. “Can the U.S. thrive in a world in which China writes the rules?” We need the big thinkers, he writes, because “destiny dealt the hands, but men play the cards.”

Brands and Beckley are wise to point out, contra Allison’s Thucydides trap, that countries can be rising and falling at the same time and that moments of great geopolitical peril happen not only when a country is on the rise but also when its ambition and desperation come together. Unfortunately, their practical proposals are obscured by the self-help buzzwords of the national security set. “The key is to take calculated risks — and avoid reckless ones,” they advise. And “Danger-zone strategy is about getting to the long game — and ensuring you can win it.” Brands and Beckley even call for Washington to deploy “strategic MacGyverism — using the tools we have or can quickly summon to defuse geopolitical bombs that are about to explode.” (Translation: Wing it and hope that someone supersmart will step in to fix any crisis.)

Adding “strategic” to any foreign-policy lingo immediately gives it a loftier vibe, of course, and Rudd is a master of this approach. In “The Avoidable War,” he invokes strategic perceptions, strategic adversaries, strategic equations, strategic logic, strategic thinking, strategic community, strategic direction, strategic offramps, strategic language, strategic literacy, strategic red lines, strategic cooperation, strategic engagement, strategic temperature and a joint strategic narrative — and that’s just in the introduction.

No surprise, Rudd’s plan to avoid this avoidable war is something he calls “managed strategic competition.” It involves close and ongoing communication between Beijing and Washington to understand each other’s “irreducible strategic red lines,” thus lessening the chance of conflict through misunderstandings or surprises. (Rudd likens it to Washington and Moscow’s efforts to improve communication after the Cuban missile crisis.) Under managed strategic competition, both sides could then channel their competitive urges into economics, technology and ideology and their cooperative needs into arenas such as climate change and arms control.

Washington may be employing some form of Rudd’s playbook. Antony Blinken, the secretary of state, and Janet Yellen, the secretary of the Treasury, have recently visited China, and John Kerry, the special envoy for climate change, arrived this week. “We believe that the world is big enough for both of our countries to thrive,” Yellen said at a news conference after her meetings. Except thriving is no longer either side’s sole objective. Thriving under whose leadership and under whose terms? The Biden administration has imposed restrictions on the sale of semiconductor technology to China and is planning additional measures, whereas Chinese hackers recently penetrated the email account of the secretary of commerce, Gina Raimondo, who has been critical of China’s business policies — all reminders that economic tensions have ways of spilling beyond the purely commercial realm.

Antony Blinken, the secretary of state, meets with President Xi Jinping of China in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.Credit...Leah Millis/Reuters

Even Rudd admits that his preferred approach may just temporarily forestall an eventual conflict. He also acknowledges that managed strategic competition would require “unprecedented bipartisan consensus” among the American political class to ensure continuity regardless of the party in power. Normally, the need for bipartisanship only guarantees the failure of any Washington initiative, but China has been one of the few areas of some consistency across the Trump and Biden administrations. In a recent and much-discussed Foreign Affairs essay titled “The China Trap,” Jessica Chen Weiss, a former senior adviser with the State Department’s policy planning staff in the Biden administration, notes that the current U.S. president has “endorsed the assessment that China’s growing influence must be checked” and that on Capitol Hill “vehement opposition to China may be the sole thing Democrats and Republicans can agree on.”

The trap Weiss foresees is not China tricking the United States into conflict, which is what happens in “2034.” Rather, it is that Washington, understanding nothing but a zero-sum world, will accept that conflict with China is inevitable or necessary. In other words, bipartisanship may be required for peace, but it can also lead to war.

Weiss proposes meaningful U.S. discussions with China’s leaders not merely about how best to communicate during a crisis, “but also about plausible terms of coexistence and the future of the international system — a future that Beijing will necessarily have some role in shaping.” She calls for “an inclusive and affirmative global vision,” which sounds nice but is never explained in detail. “The United States cannot cede so much influence to Beijing that international rules and institutions no longer reflect U.S. interests and values,” Weiss argues. “But the greater risk today is that overzealous efforts to counter China’s influence will undermine the system itself.” It is the kind of distinction that can be parsed only in hindsight: Make sure you go far enough, but just don’t go too far.

In one of the disquisitions on world affairs and national character that crop up throughout “2034,” a Chinese official concludes that the United States suffers not from a lack of intelligence about other countries’ intentions but from a lack of imagination about how those intentions translate into actions. Judging from these various books, however, it seems that American and Western thinkers are perfectly capable of exercising their imaginations. That might be part of the problem. Writing recently in the journal Liberties, Ackerman wonders if a new world war becomes likelier when the generation that remembers the last one dies out. “Without memories to restrain us, we become reliant on our imaginations,” he writes. So far, though, the imagined scenarios for war are more persuasive than those for peace.

These need not be the only stories we tell. “China is like that long book you’ve always been meaning to read,” a U.S. intelligence official tells Brands and Beckley, “but you always end up waiting until next summer.” This is the summer I finally picked up that book. I hope there will be more to come, books in which the stories of peace have at least a fighting chance.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

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Carlos Lozada became a New York Times Opinion columnist in September 2022, after 17 years as an editor and book critic at The Washington Post. He is the author of “What Were We Thinking: A Brief Intellectual History of the Trump Era” and the winner of the 2019 Pulitzer Prize for criticism. @CarlosNYT

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The New York Times · by Carlos Lozada · July 18, 2023

2. The U.S. Can Help Ukraine and Deter China

Or said another way: we have to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time.

The headline would have been slightly better if modified this way: "The U.S. Can Help Ukraine WIN and Deter China"

The U.S. Can Help Ukraine and Deter China

The two countries have different needs, and long-term national-security objectives aren’t zero-sum.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-us-can-help-ukraine-and-deter-china-javelin-stinger-nat-sec-taiwan-9779ada5

By Michael Allen and Connor Pfeiffer

July 18, 2023 1:21 pm ET

A soldier holds a Javelin missile system during a military exercise near Rivne, Ukraine, May 26, 2021. PHOTO: GLEB GARANICH/REUTERS

How can the U.S. simultaneously arm Ukraine in its fight against Russia and deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan? It’s a false choice. A critical look at the weapons that Washington has transferred to Kyiv, what is needed in the Pacific, and when new production might become available reveals that the U.S. has enough resources both to arm Ukraine and to bolster deterrence in Asia.

Ukraine and Taiwan don’t need the same things. There is a large category of U.S. capabilities that are critical in the Pacific and that haven’t been provided to Ukraine. Taiwan is an island. To fight off a Chinese invasion it needs to develop its own undersea platforms and to field sea mines and fast-attack craft. For U.S. forces involved in a potential defense of Taiwan, the most critical capabilities would include bombers, attack submarines, hypersonic missiles and, especially, long-range antiship missiles. By the same token, many capabilities provided for Ukraine’s ground war, such as armored vehicles, counter-artillery radar, air-to-ground rockets and small arms, aren’t at the top of the list of what Taiwan needs from the U.S., according to numerous unclassified expert analyses. Aid to Taiwan and Ukraine isn’t zero-sum.

Where there is an overlap of preferred military capabilities, some prioritization is in order. The TOW antitank missiles, M1 Abrams tanks, and high-speed antiradiation missiles that Washington has supplied to Kyiv would have some applicability in the Pacific, but they are less critical to Taiwan in the short term. Ukraine, however, needs them right now. Similarly, weapons like the Harpoon antiship missile will be crucial to Taiwan’s air-sea battle. Taiwan has so far received Harpoons only from U.S. allies. The U.S. should move delivery of Taiwan’s pending Harpoon orders to the front of the line and, in the meantime, make transfers from its own stockpile of missiles slated for demilitarization or deep storage.

The U.S. has a variety of options to support both Ukraine and Taiwan. These include drawing down from U.S. stocks, ramping up production where possible, and making foreign military sales to Taiwan a priority. Take the portable Javelin and Stinger missile systems, which are important to both Taiwan and Ukraine. The U.S. reportedly has a stockpile of 20,000 to 25,000 Javelins, and production is increasing from 2,100 missiles a year before the war to nearly 4,000 by 2026. Consistent with operational needs for U.S. forces, the Defense Department should transfer significant quantities of stockpiled Javelins to Taiwan. For the Stinger, which the Army is currently replacing with a new mobile air defense system, reportedly one-third of U.S. stocks have gone to Ukraine. The Defense Department awarded a contract for production of 1,300 Stingers by 2026. At least several hundred stockpiled Stingers should be sent to Taiwan in the near term, given the importance of mobile air defense in the event of an invasion.

The U.S. defense industrial base is already kicking into a higher gear. The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or Himars, is a Ukraine mobilization success story. In each quarter of this year, American industry will produce almost as many Himars launchers as the total number provided to Ukraine from U.S. prewar stockpiles. Production of Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System rockets has also increased significantly. Like Himars, these weapons are under new multiyear Pentagon contracts. Taiwan’s pending Himars order will be fulfilled by 2026, but that isn’t soon enough. The timeline should be accelerated, even if the Pentagon has to pay other customers to wait.

The Patriot air-defense system is also critical to both Ukraine and Taiwan. Taiwan operates several Patriot batteries as part of its integrated air-defense system, and a U.S.-provided battery in Ukraine has downed Russian missiles targeting civilian infrastructure. Because of growing demand, industry is increasing production capacity to 12 Patriot systems a year. Taiwan is in the process of upgrading its Patriot batteries and interceptors, and while there are other countries waiting to take delivery of Patriot orders, the U.S. should make sure that Taiwan is at the front of the line.

The long-delayed decision to provide Ukraine with cluster munitions is a sign of progress, not desperation. The Pentagon is working with industry to significantly increase production of 155mm artillery rounds, from 3,250 shells a month before the war to 40,000 by the end of 2025. While production ramps up, cluster munitions provide a bridge capability for the Ukrainians to sustain offensive bombardments against Russian ground forces. This Ukraine-driven surge in artillery production will pay dividends for deterrence in the Pacific by bolstering U.S. stocks that can eventually be transferred to Taiwan. Not only are artillery shells a less applicable munition for what will primarily be an air-sea battle in the Pacific, but Taiwan also has the ability to manufacture them on its own soil.

The twin imperatives of backing Ukraine and bolstering deterrence in Asia are achievable for now. But Ukraine urgently needs more weapons, and the U.S. must act quickly to strengthen deterrence in Asia, even if a Chinese invasion of Taiwan might not come until 2027. A narrow trade-off argument focused on Javelins and Stingers obscures the real problem—the limitations of the U.S. defense industrial base. Stated plainly, even if the U.S. stopped providing assistance to Ukraine today, the most glaring obstacles to deterrence in the Pacific—from surface ships and submarines to precision-guided munitions—would remain.

The good news is that the war in Ukraine has catalyzed action to revitalize America’s industrial base, which will ultimately put the U.S. in a better position to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The Pentagon is investing billions in industrial capacity. To remain the arsenal of democracy, the U.S. must allocate additional resources, authorize long-term weapons purchases, and reform glacial bureaucracies. Only then can the U.S. sustain its longer-term national security objectives in Asia and Europe.

Mr. Allen was special assistant to President George W. Bush for national security affairs. Mr. Pfeiffer is executive director of the Forum for American Leadership.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 18, 2023

Jul 18, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 18, 2023

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 18, 2023, 7:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2:30pm ET on July 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The July 17 Kerch Strait Bridge attack is likely having immediate ramifications on Russian military logistics in southern Ukraine. Footage and imagery published on July 17 and 18 show extensive traffic jams and accidents reportedly on the E58 Mariupol-Melitopol-Kherson City highway – Russia’s current main logistics line connecting Russia to southern Ukraine – at various points between Mariupol and Berdyansk, and in Kherson Oblast.[1] Russian occupation authorities claimed to have reduced traffic at Crimea-Kherson Oblast checkpoints near Chonhar and Armiansk following significant traffic jams in the morning.[2] Russian occupation authorities also advertised alternate routes and rest stops along them for tourists to drive from occupied Crimea through occupied Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts – rear areas in a war zone – to return to Russia.[3] Russian authorities also announced additional measures to mitigate resulting traffic jams and logistics issues, including a temporary road bridge next to the Kerch Strait Bridge, the reconstruction of a 60-kilometer stretch of road between Crimea and Kherson Oblast through Armiansk, and lowering security measures at the Kerch Strait Bridge checkpoints.[4] Russian authorities reopened one span of the Kerch Strait Bridge to one-way road traffic towards Russia on July 18, and plan to reopen the same span to two-lane traffic on September 15 and the whole bridge to road traffic in November.[5] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on July 18 that the Russian government is still developing measures to increase the security of the Kerch Strait Bridge, and Russian milbloggers continued to criticize the claimed Russian security failure to adequately protect the bridge.[6]

Russian forces conducted a strike campaign ostensibly against Ukrainian military objects in southern Ukraine in explicit retaliation for the Kerch Strait Bridge attack. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian retaliatory strikes hit port infrastructure in Odesa City and to have destroyed Ukrainian fuel storage facilities holding a combined 70 thousand tons of fuel near Odesa and Mykolaiv cities.[7] Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down all six Russian Kaliber missiles and 31 of 36 Shahed 131/136 drones targeting these areas, but that falling missile fragments damaged port infrastructure and a residential area in Odesa.[8] Russian milbloggers heavily criticized the Russian MoD for only targeting Ukrainian military assets in retaliation for Ukrainian military ”provocations” rather than targeting these assets as part of the war effort.[9] These complaints are consistent with prior milblogger criticisms to the same effect following other major military events, including the October 2022 Kerch Strait Bridge attack.[10] The Russian MoD also accused Ukrainian forces of targeting occupied Crimea with 28 drones overnight on July 17 to 18 and claimed that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare systems downed all 28 drones.[11]

The dismissal of former Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov and the issues he cited continue to have effects on Russian military operations in southern Ukraine and the discourse around these operations. A prominent, Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger accused Ukrainian forces of attempting to exhaust Russian forces defending in southern Ukraine and noted that the Russian military command has not solved the force rotation issues Popov outlined before his dismissal.[12] Another prominent milblogger supported Popov, noting that the issues Popov outlined seem more important issues for the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to address than transferring Popov to Syria or other information mitigation measures.[13] Some Russian milbloggers amplified reports of several Russian assault groups with forces of up to a platoon simultaneously surrendering to Ukrainian forces in the Zaporizhia direction.[14] Persistent issues with Russian logistics and operations in southern Ukraine may have contributed to these forces’ inability or unwillingness to fight and reported resulting surrender.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive actions on at least three sectors of the frontline against the backdrop of increased Russian offensive operations and claimed tactical gains along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border on July 18. Russian and Ukrainian sources noted that Russian forces have recently increased offensive operations in the Kupyansk area (between northeastern Kharkiv Oblast and northwestern Luhansk Oblast).[15] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 2km along the front and up to 1.5km in depth in an unspecified area in the Kupyansk direction.[16] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar and Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Russian forces continue to transfer reinforcements to the Bakhmut direction and are concentrating their main forces in the Kupyansk direction due to Ukrainian advances in the Bakhmut area, supporting ISW‘s assessment that Russian forces aim to draw Ukrainian reserves to the Kupyansk area and away from critical areas of the theater where Ukrainian forces are conducting counteroffensive operations.[17] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will not likely make tactically significant advances or an operationally significant breakthrough between northeastern Kharkiv Oblast and Luhansk Oblast in part due to the poor quality of Russian forces deployed in this area. Russian and Ukrainian sources noted that elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District) and convict-formed “Storm-Z” units are operating in the Kupyansk area.[18] ISW has previously assessed that the elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army are heavily degraded and that “Storm-Z” units suffer from poor morale and discipline.[19]

Russia continues legislative manipulations to repress domestic dissent through introducing fear of criminal liability. Russian State Duma Deputy Vasily Piskarev stated on July 18 that he and several other deputies submitted a bill for consideration to the Duma on “liability for propaganda and justification of the ideology of extremism” that will introduce a 300 thousand ruble (roughly $3,297) fine and up to five years in prison for violation of the amendment.[20] ISW has previously reported on similar laws and amendments that are meant to set high penalties and criminal liability for anything that Russian authorities assert is “extremist” or “terroristic” behavior in order to encourage self-censorship and facilitate crackdowns against any dissenting parties.[21] Some facets of the Russian information space expressed concern that Russian authorities could use the law to crack down against any expressed viewpoints that contradict those of the Russian state, including support for Russian opposition parties or figures.[22]

The Telegraph concluded that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Belarusian authorities are actively involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children. The Telegraph quoted the head of the Belarusian opposition group National Anti-Crisis Management, Pavel Latushka, who alleged that Lukashenko is personally responsible for the forced displacement of Ukrainian children to Belarus and that he gave direct instructions on how to carry out and finance the displacement.[23] The Telegraph found that Belarusian authorities actively worked with Russian authorities to transport some Ukrainian children to Belarus and others to far eastern regions of Russia. The Telegraph reported that Belarusian and Russian authorities collaborated to forcibly transport at least 2,150 Ukrainian children to Belarus since September 2022 and that the number of Ukrainian children in Belarus will likely reach 3,000 by fall of 2023.[24] The European Parliament Foreign Affairs Council had previously called for an arrest warrant against Lukashenko in early June for actions relating to Ukrainian children and for facilitating other crimes committed in Ukraine.[25] ISW has long assessed that Belarus is involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children to Belarus and the Russian Federation.[26]

Key Takeaways:

The July 17 Kerch Strait Bridge attack is likely having immediate ramifications on Russian military logistics in southern Ukraine.
Russian forces conducted a strike campaign ostensibly against Ukrainian military objects in southern Ukraine in explicit retaliation for the Kerch Strait Bridge attack.
The dismissal of former Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov and the issues he cited continue to have effects on Russian military operations in southern Ukraine and the discourse around these operations.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive actions on at least three sectors of the frontline against the backdrop of increased Russian offensive operations and claimed tactical gains along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border on July 18.
Russia continues legislative manipulations to repress domestic dissent through introducing fear of criminal liability.
The Telegraph concluded that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Belarusian authorities are actively involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children.
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, southwest of Kreminna, and in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka-Donetsk City areas and made limited territorial gains in all sectors.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations around Bakhmut and advanced north of Bakhmut.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly made limited advances.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblast area and recently made limited advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Some Russian sources suggested that recent measures supporting the development of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) allow it to posture as an alternative Russian military formation.
Russia continues to formalize methods of social programming targeted at youth in occupied areas of Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line and made tactical gains in this area on July 18. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 2km along the front and up to 1.5km in depth in an unspecified area in the Kupyansk direction.[27] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including “Storm-Z” assault detachments, took control of the remainder of Novoselivske (16km northwest of Svatove).[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces from the 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) advanced 3km west of Lyman Pershyi (11km northwest of Kupyansk) in the Kupyansk direction, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked west of Lyman Pershyi.[29] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted ground attacks and gained territory in Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), Kuzemivka (16km northwest of Svatove), and Karmazynivka (12km southwest of Svatove).[30] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including convict-formed “Storm-Z” detachments, captured Novoselivske (16km northwest of Svatove).[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are transferring reserves to the area to counterattack and defend against Russian advances.[32] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that Russia has concentrated over 100,000 personnel along the entire Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border.[33]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks southwest of Kreminna and made limited gains on July 18. Geolocated footage published on July 18 shows Russian forces have made marginal advances northwest of Dibrova (about 8km southwest of Kreminna).[34] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Artem Lysohor reported that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian forces near Dibrova, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations west of Dibrova.[35] The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported that Russian forces attempted to push west through the forests west of Kreminna.[36] Russian Central Grouping of Forces (Central Military District) Spokesperson Alexander Savchuk claimed that Russian forces counterattacked Ukrainian forces near the Serebryanske forest area southwest of Kreminna.[37] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces from the Center Group of Forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Dibrova.[38] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces engaged with Ukrainian forces near Torske (15km west of Kreminna).[39]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations around Bakhmut and advanced north of Bakhmut as of July 18. Geolocated footage posted on July 17 shows that Ukrainian forces advanced west of Yahidne (3km northwest of Bakhmut).[40] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces have occupied almost all the dominant heights around Bakhmut.[41] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian units unsuccessfully attempted to break through Russian defensive lines in the direction of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[42]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Bakhmut area and made limited territorial gains south of Bakhmut on July 18. Geolocated footage posted on July 18 shows that Russian forces advanced near Ozaryanivka (14km southwest of Bakhmut).[43] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Bohdanivka (5km southwest of Bakhmut), Minkivka (13km northwest of Bakhmut), Ivanivske (5km west of Bakhmut), and southwest of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut).[44] Malyar stated that Russian forces are panicked at Ukraine’s recent advances in the Bakhmut area and that Russian actions in different directions, particularly the Kupyansk direction, are intended to distract and draw Ukrainian forces away from where they are making advances.[45] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russian forces are transferring reserves to Bakhmut to stop Ukrainian advances despite the fact that Russia is concentrating its main forces in the Kupyansk direction.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian counterattacks made no advances near Ozaryanivka and in the direction of Ivanivske, Hyrhorivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut), Orikhovo-Vasylivka, and Vesele (20km northeast of Bakhmut).[47]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area and made limited territorial gains on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City on July 18. Geolocated footage published on July 18 shows that Russian forces advanced west in Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[48] Additional geolocated footage published on July 18 shows that Russian forces took control of some ground near the Trudovska Mine east of Marinka and advanced south of Krasnohorivka (on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[49] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that a Russian armored group broke through Ukrainian defensive lines near the Trudovske Mine area, captured the mine area, and advanced one kilometer towards Krasnohorivka.[50] One milblogger claimed that the loss of the mine severely impacts Ukrainian positions in the Marinka area.[51] The Trudovske Mine area is approximately 2 kilometers away from the control of terrain lines that have existed since Russia’s 2014 annexation of the Donbas. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka, Marinka, and Krasnohorivka.[52]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia area and reportedly made gains in the area on July 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted successful operations in the Velyka Novosilka-Urozhaine direction (up to 9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[53] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are advancing in the Staromayorske area (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and that they conducted attacks north of Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[54] Russian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Oleg Chekhov claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks in the Staromayorske direction, while a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks in the same direction.[55] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Volodymyrivka (12km southeast of Vuhledar) and Urozhaine.[56]

Russian forces also conducted limited ground attacks in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblast area and did not make any confirmed or claimed gains on July 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Rivnopil (8km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Novodarivka (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[57]

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly made limited advances on July 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted successful operations in the Mala Tokmachka-Novopokrovka direction (9-13km southeast of Orikhiv).[58] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks north of Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv) and that Ukrainian forces hold positions near Orikhiv that Ukrainian forces previously captured from the 7th Company of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District).[59] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Novodanylivka (6km south of Orikhiv), Mali Shcherbaky (17km southwest of Orikhiv), and Stepove (22km southwest of Orikhiv).[60] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are attempting to exploit the lack of rotations among Russian servicemen that former Commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Major General Ivan Popov complained of by attacking near Robotyne.[61] Ukrainian forces have continually conducted attacks near Robotyne since before rumors of Popov’s dismissal, however.[62] The milblogger is likely trying to set conditions to excuse potential Russian failures in repelling Ukrainian attacks in the area. Milbloggers previously attempted to use the Wagner rebellion to explain Russian failures on the frontline.[63]

Russian forces recently made limited advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on July 17 shows that Russian forces made limited gains northeast of Robotyne.[64]

Ukrainian forces continue their interdiction campaign in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported explosions in Melitopol and Mykhailivka (47km northwest of Melitopol).[65] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted a missile over Melitopol and Molochansk (42km northeast of Melitopol).[66]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to operate on the east (left) bank Kherson Oblast and that Ukrainian forces made limited gains the area. A Russian milblogger claimed on July 17 that Ukrainian forces made limited gains near the Antonivsky Bridge and that heavy fighting is ongoing in the area.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 18 that Russian forces repelled small Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups attempting to cross the Dnipro River in the Antonivsky Bridge and Hola Prystan areas.[68]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Some Russian sources suggested that recent measures supporting the development of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) allow it to posture as an alternative Russian military formation. Russian newspaper Vedomosti reported that Rosgvardia “can count on an influx of” Wagner Group fighters do not want to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), though it is unclear whether these fighters would choose Rosgvardia over retirement.[69] ISW has not yet observed reports of former Wagner fighters signing contracts with Rosgvardia. Vedomosti noted that the influx of former Wagner personnel, heavy weapons allocations, and the recent transfer of “Grom” special forces from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) to Rosgvardia strengthens Rosgvardia as an “alternate source of military power.”[70] Vedomosti claimed that some Grom officers are upset at the transfer, however.

Wagner Group forces reportedly conducted a limited force rotation in the Central African Republic (CAR). A Belarusian insider source claimed that Wagner forces in CAR conducted a partial rotation, and that some of the fighters had been deployed to CAR without leave for over two years.[71] Russian milbloggers claimed that there are additional reports of hundreds of Wagner personnel arriving in CAR.[72]

The Kremlin continues efforts to invigorate the Russian defense industrial base. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin claimed that Russian tank producer Uralvagonzavod delivered another batch of Russian T-90M Proryv and T-72B2M tanks to the Russian MoD on July 18.[73] Mishustin also claimed that Uralvagonzavod has tripled its production output within the last year.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russia continues to formalize methods of social programming targeted at youth in occupied areas of Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed the Russian Ministry of Education and Science and the Russian Federal Agency on Youth Affairs (Rosmolodezh) to take additional measures to “intensify work” with the youth of occupied Donetsk, Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Luhansk oblasts to “harmonize interethnic relations” and strengthen an “all-Russian civic identity.”[74] The mention of “interethnic relations” is likely in reference to the fact that Russian occupation authorities are increasingly facilitating the relocation of Russian ethnic minority communities to occupied areas of Ukraine, as ISW has previously reported.[75] Russian occupation officials continue to target Ukrainian youth in occupied areas to consolidate administrative agendas and strengthen social control of occupied areas.

Russian occupation authorities continue forcible passportization of occupied areas of Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) reported on July 17 that MVD employees are working in occupied Kherson Oblast to issue Russian passports to residents, particularly in the area that is within a 15km radius of the east (left) bank of Kherson.[76] The MVD claimed that between May 30 and July 16 of this year, 4,527 residents of Kakhovka received Russian passports and that for each applicant MVD employees collected fingerprints.[77] Russian occupation officials are likely using the practice of forced passportization to collect personal and biometric data on residents of occupied areas in order to consolidate administrative control of occupied areas.[78]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko signed a law on July 17 on the creation of a people’s militia (народное ополчение) in Belarus.[79] The law will create the legal basis for the “voluntary participation” of Belarusian citizens to assist territorial internal affairs bodies in protecting areas under martial law (largely border areas).[80] The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) clarified that the recruitment for the people’s militias will be carried out on a volunteer basis among those who are not liable for military service or have not been mobilized, and the operations of the people’s militias will be funded by local territorial budgets.[81] One Russian milblogger erroneously suggested that this law essentially ”legalizes” Wagner in Belarus as a private military company (PMC) because it militarizes eligible citizens who have not been conscripted or mobilized, which hypothetically could include Wagner fighters as they continue to arrive to and establish a permanent presence in Belarus.[82] However, the law is more likely meant to formalize certain territorial formations as ”people’s militias” (which are distinct from PMCs) that will likely train under the Wagner Group. ISW has previously reported that Wagner fighters trained analogous people’s militias in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts, and Wagner instructors have already begun training some Belarusian territorial defense troops.[83] It is likely that Lukashenko is creating official people’s militias to train under Wagner, but the law itself does not legalize Wagner as a PMC in Belarus, as suggested by the milblogger.

The Wagner Group continues to prepare to establish a permanent presence on the territory of Belarus. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate Spokesperson Andrii Yusov stated on July 17 that about 500 to 700 Wagner fighters have redeployed to Belarus and suggested that a portion of the fighters will train with Belarusian armed forces, while some will be deliberately involved in anti-NATO posturing.[84] Independent Belarusian monitoring group “The Hajun Project” reported that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s official business jet landed at the Belarusian Machulischy airfield from St. Petersburg in the morning of July 18.[85] Several opposition and pro-Wagner Russian sources reported that another Wagner convoy arrived in Belarus, including vehicles marked with license plates from the Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples’ Republics (DNR and LNR).[86]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

4. When Will the War in Ukraine End? Students discuss NATO, Crimea and America’s role in the invasion.

Some interesting insights from the academy, students and professors alike.

When Will the War in Ukraine End?

Students discuss NATO, Crimea and America’s role in the invasion.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/when-will-the-war-in-ukraine-end-russia-putin-sanctions-fighting-19bd82eb?utm

Editor’s note: In this Future View, students discuss the war in Ukraine. Next we’ll ask: “After the Supreme Court struck down Biden’s $430 billion student-loan cancellation, the Biden administration is still trying to cancel debt. The Education Department canceled $39 billion in student-loan debt in July for 800,000 borrowers. Is the president overstepping? Should the government cancel student loans?” Students should click here to submit opinions of fewer than 250 words before Aug. 1. The best responses will be published that night.

Vladimir Putin Needs to Go

The war in Ukraine is part of Vladimir Putin’s political immortality project. As a former KGB agent, Mr. Putin is motivated by the prospect of restoring Russia to what he believes is its former Soviet glory.

This would explain Mr. Putin’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and his 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the former of which gave Russia a warm-water port. Mr. Putin wants to provoke the West by expanding Russia’s territory and consolidating power—all under the guise of demilitarizing Ukraine.

The war in Ukraine ends when Mr. Putin loses his power. After he’s gone maybe Russia will become a democratic nation if sanctions and antiwar protests amount to anything consequential. Or maybe an equally corrupt autocrat will replace Mr. Putin and retain the current political system. If Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of Wagner Group, had succeeded in his mutiny, we would likely have seen an end to the war but a continuation of the oligarchy.

Regardless, Mr. Putin’s foundation is cracking as Russian citizens and political figures declare their opposition to the Putin regime. The West needs to take advantage of that by continuing to support Ukraine on the global stage.

—Rafael Arbex-Murut, University of California, Berkeley, information and data science

It’s Up to Ukraine

Ukraine’s defense of its territory is righteous. The Ukrainian people deserve praise for their valor and love of country. But that doesn’t make Ukrainian victory and Russian defeat a vital U.S. interest. The U.S. needs to re-examine its policies surrounding Ukraine, particularly its commitment to aid and expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Council on Foreign Relations has reported that total U.S. aid to Ukraine has surpassed $76 billion—more than double what the European Union has provided to the same cause and more than five times what the U.S. spent in recent years on the next six aid recipients. Though still dwarfed by entitlements, spending at this scale won’t receive Congress’s blessing forever.

President Biden displayed geopolitical ignorance when he committed recently to one day welcoming Ukraine into NATO. Russia now has an incentive to prolong the conflict indefinitely. Why would it end the war when Uncle Sam has pledged to keep Ukraine out of the trans-Atlantic alliance while the clash persists?

A weakened Russia would lead to a safer world, but this goal can be achieved through aggressive sanctions and increased weapons production for Ukraine purchases. Through foreign military financing, the U.S. could offer Ukraine loans to purchase weapons, which it could eventually pay for using Russian assets frozen by the U.S. and EU.

Only Ukraine can decide if it wants to end the war in settlement or victory. Retaking Crimea is certainly a possibility, but Ukraine will need to decide if doing so is worth the price.

—William Rampe, Hamilton College, government

Think of America’s Image

The U.S. plays a crucial role in Russia’s war on Ukraine. On the ground, the safety of Ukrainian civilians is predicated on U.S. aid. Our advanced air- and ground-defense systems have protected countless women and children who would otherwise be ruthlessly shelled by Russian artillery.

On the geopolitical level, any settlement that doesn’t return Crimea to Ukraine looks bad for the U.S. President Biden’s disastrous Afghanistan withdrawal, during which countless allies were left behind, made the U.S. appear weak on the world stage. Foreign adversaries, particularly China, are now looking to Ukraine as a litmus test of U.S. strength abroad. Let them see a country that is resolved in its mission to preserve liberty and protect its allies.

—Stephen Tahbaz, University of Pennsylvania, politics, philosophy and economics

Give It Time

The failures of Russia’s campaign have devolved the Russian military into an irreconcilable mess of private armies and opened fissures between Russian soldiers and their political masters. Wagner’s abortive coup last month was only the most recent example of this degeneration. It will not be the last.

Mr. Putin previously relied on deception, economic warfare and limited application of military force to achieve his goals abroad, but this strategy has reached its limit. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization shows no signs of decreasing its support to Ukraine, and Europe has almost completely broken its dependency on Russian energy imports in favor of non-Russian liquefied natural gas imports. Russia has essentially become a pariah state, as seen recently in the International Criminal Court’s indictment of Mr. Putin.

Even as Ukraine faces setbacks in its counteroffensive, time is still on its side. While a dramatic breakthrough is highly desirable, Ukraine can also win by slowly pushing Russia’s weakened and demoralized forces all the way back to its proper 1991 borders.

—Eli Kravinsky, Haverford College, political science

The Forever War

The war in Ukraine will never be over. The fighting may cease, and diplomatic resolutions may be reached, but an economic war will persist. Drones, satellites, trade restrictions and economic sanctions are the modern weapons of war. Russia may park its tanks, but the status of war in Eastern Europe is ongoing as long as they jockey for financial hegemony through hostile means.

The U.S. may not be in active combat over Ukraine, but through lending and leasing war supplies, we too are fighting. Foreign aid will always be available to Ukraine, even when the time for sending physical instruments of war has passed. The fight for liberty and justice will never be over, and it would be foolish to proclaim it so. Still, when the conflict starts costing dollars instead of lives, we should take care to celebrate.

—Sam Walhout, Brown University, economics

Click here to submit a response to next week’s Future View.

5. Building the Taiwanese ‘porcupine’ an arsenal of shooting quills

Excerpts:

Taiwan should seek to procure or develop one-way attack drones by prioritizing open architecture, simple designs, and modular capabilities to keep cost and complexity down. Allowing the same basic drone to use control kits to either follow GPS waypoints, use home-on-jam/anti-radiation seekers, virtual reality controls, or even autonomous strike capabilities cued by image recognition software would give Taiwan a flexible drone force capable of inflicting severe damage on PLA forces.

The good news is that Taiwan has already developed at least one drone well-suited to this mission — the Chien Hsiang loitering munition, which homes in on enemy radars. The bad news is that the Taiwanese have reportedly ordered only 104 Chien Hsiangs. Taipei needs at least an order of magnitude more anti-radiation loitering munitions and thousands more drones of various types to be an influential force in the face of any Chinese aggression.

The time is now for Taiwan to embrace the asymmetric drone playbook and shift focus away from procuring mostly low-density, expensive systems, such as ships and aircraft, to acquiring asymmetric capabilities starting with one-way attack drones, loitering munitions, and other small drones. Taipei needs to become a porcupine quickly and drones are the quills it needs.

Building the Taiwanese ‘porcupine’ an arsenal of shooting quills

By Ryan Brobst and Lt. Col. James Hesson

Jul 18, 12:20 PM

c4isrnet.com · by Ryan Brobst · July 18, 2023

The massive military exercises that China launched over the past year in response to the meetings between Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen and U.S. Speakers of the House Nancy Pelosi and Kevin McCarthy demonstrated that the military balance of power in the Taiwan Strait is trending steadily towards Beijing.

The growing quantitative gap between the Taiwanese military and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) makes competing symmetrically an increasingly difficult task.

Instead, Taipei should seek to deter Beijing asymmetrically by becoming a “porcupine”— an animal that defends itself by inflicting such grievous wounds on the predator that hunting it is not worth the cost. The quills of this porcupine should include cheap and numerous one-way attack drones, similar to the Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones that have seen success in conflicts in the Middle East and Europe.

Both state and non-state actors wrote the playbook on how to use drones against more powerful adversaries over the last decade. Early adopters included ISIS, Iran, Iranian-backed groups like the Houthis, Hamas, Hezbollah and various militia groups in Iraq and Syria.

These groups frequently use drones to attack their targets, including a March 2023 attack that killed a U.S. contractor and wounded five servicemembers. Conventional militaries have increasingly adopted these tactics, as seen in Iran’s use of one-way attack drones during the Abqaiq-Khurais attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure in 2019 and Azerbaijan’s heavy use of Israeli-made drones to help win a clear victory over Armenia in the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh war.

While these drones have been a persistent threat in the Middle East, the first major war in which both sides have used one-way attack drones (also called suicide or kamikaze drones) for strikes at scale is currently underway in Ukraine. Both sides have seen considerable success in using these weapons to strike targets at the front and behind the lines.

The Russian military has used Iranian-made Shahed-131/-136 drones in conjunction with its remaining missile arsenal to nearly run the Ukrainian military out of air defense interceptors while significantly damaging Ukraine’s electrical grid and critical infrastructure. Russia has also used its domestically produced Lancet and KUB-BLA loitering munitions to target Ukrainian tanks, artillery, radars, air defense systems and ships.

Ukraine, largely bereft of long-range strike capabilities, has used one-way attack drones to destroy or damage Russian aircraft, power stations, and petrochemical facilities. Ukraine’s grenade-dropping quadcopters have also eliminated hundreds of Russian ground vehicles while showcasing heavy Russian losses to the world.

Much like the introduction of tanks or airplanes to the battlefield, one-way attack drones, loitering munitions, and quadcopters are disruptive technologies that will permanently change how wars are fought. Their advent allows everyone from non-state actors to great powers to have deep strike, air interdiction, and close air support capabilities.

The low cost of drones relative to aircraft and high-end missiles allows for these systems to be procured in far greater numbers, and mass has a quality of its own. These characteristics make small drones ideal for smaller groups or countries seeking to deter a larger adversary with limited resources — precisely what Taiwan needs to do.

The unfortunate reality is that Taiwan does not have the resources to field a military that can match the PLA system for system. The solution to this problem isn’t buying more expensive and scarce naval vessels and fighter aircraft, it’s a shift towards cheaper and more survivable asymmetric forces. To be a relevant capability, these drones must be cheap enough to be available in mass as well as mobile and easily dispersible to present a survivable counterforce even if Taiwan loses its ships and jets.

In the face of an invasion, Taiwan could use long-range one-way attack drones to strike against the Chinese mainland, targeting staging facilities, airbases, ships in port, and fuel depots. These systems could provide Taiwan with disruptive effects by overwhelming defenses and increasing lethality by striking in conjunction with high-end systems, such as SLAM-ER cruise missiles and Harpoon anti-ship missiles.

Since a Shahed-136 reportedly costs around $20,000, while a missile like SLAM-ER costs roughly $500,000, Taiwan can still manufacture or purchase large quantities of them on a relatively small budget. Hundreds of drones and missiles arriving within minutes of each other would overwhelm air defense systems and even the small warheads carried by drones could cause significant damage to soft targets like fuel and ammunition depots, parked planes, or electrical infrastructure. The disruptions and delays caused by these attacks could prove critical to preventing a successful PLA amphibious landing, which would require thousands of systems to operate together on tight timetables.

Shorter-range systems like the Switchblade-600 or Lancet could strike Chinese landing ships as they approach the shore — Russian forces have already demonstrated proof of concept by using Lancets to strike Ukrainian gunboats. And if PLA forces do gain a foothold, small drones, like the Switchblade-300 or quadcopters, can help push the invaders back into the sea or at least enable a prolonged defense by targeting and harassing Chinese positions and troops. The war in Ukraine has shown that tens of thousands of these systems will be needed; Taipei should apply that lesson and not skimp on the quantities procured.

Taiwan should seek to procure or develop one-way attack drones by prioritizing open architecture, simple designs, and modular capabilities to keep cost and complexity down. Allowing the same basic drone to use control kits to either follow GPS waypoints, use home-on-jam/anti-radiation seekers, virtual reality controls, or even autonomous strike capabilities cued by image recognition software would give Taiwan a flexible drone force capable of inflicting severe damage on PLA forces.

The good news is that Taiwan has already developed at least one drone well-suited to this mission — the Chien Hsiang loitering munition, which homes in on enemy radars. The bad news is that the Taiwanese have reportedly ordered only 104 Chien Hsiangs. Taipei needs at least an order of magnitude more anti-radiation loitering munitions and thousands more drones of various types to be an influential force in the face of any Chinese aggression.

The time is now for Taiwan to embrace the asymmetric drone playbook and shift focus away from procuring mostly low-density, expensive systems, such as ships and aircraft, to acquiring asymmetric capabilities starting with one-way attack drones, loitering munitions, and other small drones. Taipei needs to become a porcupine quickly and drones are the quills it needs.

Ryan Brobst is a senior research analyst at the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Lt. Col. James Hesson is a visiting military analyst. The views expressed do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Air Force or the Department of Defense.

6. Russian fighter jet flies ‘dangerously’ close to US special forces surveillance plane

Russian fighter jet flies ‘dangerously’ close to US special forces surveillance plane

Official said the incident was an escalation in a string of encounters between the two countries’ aircraft in Syria in recent weeks

The Telegraph · by Our Foreign Staff

A Russian fighter jet flew very close to a US surveillance aircraft over Syria, forcing it to go through the turbulent wake and putting the lives of the four American crew members in danger, US officials said Monday.

The officials said the incident, which happened just before 7am GMT on Sunday, was a significant escalation in what has been a string of encounters between US and Russian aircraft in Syria in recent weeks.

They added that the intercept by the Russian Su-35 impeded the US crew’s ability to safely operate their MC-12 aircraft, and called it a new level of unsafe behaviour that could result in an accident or loss of life.

In recent weeks, Russian fighter jets have repeatedly harassed US unmanned MQ-9 drones, but the latest incident raised alarms because it endangered American lives.

The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss details of a military operation, would not say how close the Russian jet got to the US warplane. The MC-12, which is a twin-engine turboprop aircraft routinely used by special operations forces, was doing surveillance in support of operations against the Islamic State groups in Syria, the officials said.

Increasing Russian aggression

On multiple occasions in the past two weeks, Russian fighter jets flew dangerously close to MQ-9 Reapers, setting off flares and forcing the drones to take evasive manoeuvres. US and Russian military officers communicate frequently over a deconfliction phone line during the encounters, protesting the other side’s actions.

The US is considering a number of military options to address the increasing Russian aggression in the skies over Syria, which complicated efforts to strike an Islamic State group leader earlier this month, according to a senior defence official. The US was eventually able to launch a strike and kill the militant.

The official, who also spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss military operations, declined to detail the options under consideration but said the US will not cede any territory and will continue to fly in the western part of the country on anti-Islamic State missions.

The Russian military activity, which has increased in frequency and aggression since March, stems from growing cooperation and coordination between Moscow, Tehran and the Syrian government to try to pressure the US to leave Syria.

There are about 900 US forces in the country, and others move in and out to conduct missions targeting Islamic State group militants.

The Telegraph · by Our Foreign Staff

7. Putin turns to his dad’s army as veterans of 70 face call-up to Ukraine

Putin turns to his dad’s army as veterans of 70 face call-up to Ukraine

The Times · by Marc Bennetts · July 18, 2023

Russia has increased the maximum age at which men can be mobilised to fight in Ukraine by up to ten years, raising the prospect of 70-year-olds being deployed to the front.

Under a law approved by Russia’s rubber-stamp parliament, men who have completed their compulsory service can be drafted back into the army until the age of 55, rather than 45.

Reservists with the highest ranks can now be called back into service up to the age of 70 rather than 65. There were also five-year increases in the military eligibility age for senior ranks up to 65 and junior officers up to 60.

Putin calls Crimea bridge strike a “terrorist attack”

Hundreds of thousands of men of fighting age fled Russia in September after President Putin ordered a mobilisation without warning.

At least 47,000 Russian soldiers have been killed since the Kremlin launched its invasion of Ukraine last year, according to a recent report by Russian opposition media. The figure is three times higher than the casualties the Soviet Union suffered in its decade-long war in Afghanistan. Russia claims that just over 6,000 soldiers have died.

The war has exacerbated Russia’s demographic crisis, with birth rates at their lowest since Putin took power 23 years ago, according to official statistics. Mikhail Murashko, the health minister, urged Russian woman to prioritise having children over education and careers. Otherwise, he said, they would not have time to have “a third or fourth child”.

The move to raise the maximum mobilisation age came as members of an influential think tank that advises the Kremlin issued a statement condemning its own chairman’s nuclear rhetoric.

Sergey Karaganov, head of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, supports a nuclear strike on Europe — but many council members disagree

ALEXANDER ZEMLIANICHENKO/AP

Sergey Karaganov, an honorary chairman at the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy in Moscow, wrote last month that Russia should escalate its nuclear threats to try to force western countries to halt weapon supplies to Ukraine — and if this failed, the Kremlin should order nuclear attacks on European cities. He said that the United States would be unlikely to retaliate after a limited strike on Europe out of fear that it could lead to the destruction of American cities in a full-scale nuclear war.

Putin and senior Russian officials have frequently threatened a nuclear strike or warned that the conflict in Ukraine could trigger a world war. State television has also called for nuclear missiles to be launched at western countries, including Britain.

Alexei Arbatov, one of the council members who signed the statement, said it was designed to signal that its chairman’s rhetoric was not the position of the entire Russian Federation

MONTEREY INITIATIVE IN RUSSIAN STUDIES

However, a statement signed by 28 members of the advisory council read: “Hoping that a limited nuclear conflict can be managed and prevented from escalating into a global nuclear war is the height of irresponsibility. These are no longer theoretical concepts. This is not only a direct threat to all mankind, but also a very specific proposal to kill everyone who is dear to us and whom we love.”

Alexei Arbatov, a council member who signed the statement, said that it was intended to signal to the world that Karaganov’s “irresponsible and provocative” rhetoric was not the position of the entire Russian Federation.

The council said that the statement did not represent its official stance but that it had taken the decision to publish it at the request of a number of members. The Kremlin has not commented.

The council has more than 200 members, ranging from military analysts to economists. Comments from ordinary Russians about the anti-nuclear statement were overwhelmingly positive. “I agree entirely,” wrote Vadim Rozanov on the council’s website. “Well done. It’s time to stop these irresponsible idiots.”

President Biden has said twice since the start of the war in Ukraine that Putin’s nuclear threats should be taken seriously. However, he said last week that there was “no real prospect” that Russia would launch nuclear attacks.

The Times · by Marc Bennetts · July 18, 2023

8. Analysis | Biden administration goes after two more spyware firms

Analysis | Biden administration goes after two more spyware firms

Analysis by Tim Starks

with research by David DiMolfetta

July 19, 2023 at 6:56 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Tim Starks · July 19, 2023

Welcome to The Cybersecurity 202! Ah, “It’s Always Sunny in Philadelphia” Season 16, it’s bittersweet for your finale to already be upon us tonight. I mourned you even as you lived.

Was this forwarded to you? Sign up here.

Below: The United States will soon seek feedback on harmonizing cyber regulations, and a bill that aims to stop warrantless police retrieval of phone data has momentum. First:

Intellexa and Cytrox are latest spyware firms to face U.S. wrath

The Biden administration struck its latest blow against foreign spyware makers on Tuesday, placing two Europe-based companies on its list that restricts U.S. companies’ business dealings with them.

As our own David DiMolfetta reported Tuesday with Aaron Gregg, the step is “the most significant since President Biden issued an executive order in March that sets limits on U.S. agencies’ use of spyware and bars the technology’s use when there’s a risk it could be exploited by foreign governments to target Americans or violate human rights.”

Greece-based Intellexa and the Hungarian company Cytrox are now on the Commerce Department’s “Entity List,” alongside related entities in Ireland and Macedonia, respectively. The organizations join Israeli spyware makers NSO Group — the company behind the Pegasus spyware — and Candiru on the list.

Spyware critics say it’s a move that puts the United States ahead of other nations in combating surveillance technology that’s been used to spy on journalists, politicians and activists.

“This rule reaffirms the protection of human rights worldwide as a fundamental U.S. foreign policy interest,” Deputy Secretary of Commerce Don Graves said in a statement. “The Entity List remains a powerful tool in our arsenal to prevent bad actors around the world from using American technology to reach their nefarious goals.”

On the companies

Cytrox is reportedly a part of Intellexa, but the relationship between the two companies is “murky at best,” according to the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab.

Researchers have found the Cytrox- and Intellexa-linked Predator spyware on the phones of an Egyptian politician and journalist, as well as a Greek journalist.

Intellexa has reportedly worked with governments in Europe and Southeast Asia.
Likely Cytrox customers include Armenia, Egypt, Greece, Indonesia, Madagascar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Serbia, according to Citizen Lab.

Positive reaction

“The proliferation of commercial spyware poses distinct and growing counterintelligence and security risks to the United States, including to the safety and security of U.S. government personnel and their families,” the State Department’s office of the spokesperson said Tuesday. “The misuse of these tools globally has also facilitated repression and enabled human rights abuses, including to intimidate political opponents and curb dissent, limit freedom of expression, and monitor and target activists and journalists.”

On Twitter, Citizen Lab’s John Scott-Railton praised the entity list additions. The additions follow not only the Biden administration’s executive order, but also a March joint statement with other nations to counter the proliferation of spyware.

BREAKING: US adds 2 European mercenary spyware firms to export control list.#Cytrox & #Intellexa = *notorious* proliferators of #Predator spyware,

Linked to abuses around globe, Greek #spywaregate, hacking of Americans...1/

Rule: https://t.co/ZzEvHLVXju pic.twitter.com/Q9W22XTUQO

— John Scott-Railton (@jsrailton) July 18, 2023

“Very heartening to see US’ first regulatory action since Spyware Executive order,” he wrote. “Clear opportunity for diplomatic engagement on heels of WH Joint Statement on #spyware.”

A European lawmaker who has been pushing governments there to take action against spyware said on Twitter that the U.S. crackdown put some countries on her continent to shame.

The rapporteur for the European Union’s Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware, Sophie in 't Veld, tweeted that “While the Greek and EU authorities are still very busy doing nothing about #spyware the US have blacklisted #Intellexa. The inertia of Europe is deeply embarrassing.”

The final report of the so-called PEGA Committee criticized Greece, Hungary and other nations for their handling of spyware.

What the companies say

Intellexa and Cytrox haven’t commented yet on being added to the list. Spyware companies have often touted their technology’s uses for countering terrorism and crime.

Tal Dilian, a former Israeli intelligence officer who now heads Intellexa, told Reuters in 2020 that the company was a force for good, one that could be used to aid in the fight against problems like covid-19.

“I really believe this industry is doing more good than bad,” Dillan said. “Now is a good time to show that to the world.”
The story also noted: “Intellexa’s Dilian fled Cyprus last year after an arrest warrant was issued for him, on accusations that he used a surveillance van to illegally intercept communications in the country. Dilian denies the allegations, returned to Cyprus last month and said he is cooperating with authorities.”

The keys

U.S. government will request feedback on harmonizing cyber regulatory goals

The Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD) will issue a request for information (RFI) as soon as this week that would seek public feedback on cybersecurity regulatory harmonization and reciprocity, said Kemba Walden, the acting national cyber director.

Walden, speaking at a Chamber of Commerce event, said the RFI aims to help clarify “what that cybersecurity environment baseline should look like” across every critical infrastructure sector.

The announcement comes alongside a recently unveiled implementation plan for the Biden administration’s national cyber strategy.
The RFI aligns with the very first strategic objective in the plan that also directs ONCD to engage with private-sector representatives “to understand existing challenges with regulatory overlap and explore a framework for reciprocity for baseline requirements.”
ONCD representatives have previously said a harmonized approach initiative could take years to complete.

An advisory panel in February encouraged the creation of an office that would seek to untangle conflicting cyber responsibility rules. An ONCD official at the time said those recommendations “align very well with the strategic goals of the [cyber] strategy.”

9. Get serious about data, US intelligence leaders tell agencies

Excerpts;

But there’s still the need for people who can make that happen.

“How do we work across, not only inside our buildings, but across the IC, across the [U.S. government], with our industry academic partners, so that we can really bring the best of what there is to bear in support of our mission,” said Lakshmi Raman, the Central Intelligence Agency’s director of AI innovation, during a panel discussion at the Intelligence and National Security Summit on Friday. “We don't have enough resources to do everything that we need to do.”

Get serious about data, US intelligence leaders tell agencies

defenseone.com · by Lauren C. Williams

Petri Oeschger

ODNI’s new three-year plan aims to turn data-gathering from afterthought to key asset.

By Lauren C. Williams

Senior Editor

July 18, 2023 01:04 PM ET

It’s time to get serious about data—how it’s collected, curated, and capitalized upon by humans and machines—lest the country lose its intelligence edge, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence says in its new three-year data strategy.

“To date, we have not significantly prioritized data as a strategic and operational [intelligence community] asset. The central challenge remains that the IC is not fielding data, analytics, and artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled capabilities at the pace and scale required to preserve our decision and intelligence advantage,” the document said.

To fix that, the IC wants to fine-tune the “data flow lifecycle from collection and acquisition, to transporting, ingesting, curating, exploiting, disseminating, and disposing of IC data.”

The strategy outlines four main goals: improve data management, ensure data is human and AI-ready with new services and tools, directly work with the private sector and academia, and develop intelligence officers who are fluent in how data works.

The ODNI’s strategy calls for automation to prepare and label data to reduce the time it takes to absorb datasets from days to minutes.

Also, every time data is collected or purchased, intel agencies will have to lay out how it will be transported, ingested, curated, exploited, disseminated, and disposed of “with consideration for its ethical and appropriate use, consistent with law and policy,” according to the strategy. That type of data management will help solidify “minimum common standards for the use, protection, dissemination, interoperability, and generation of IC data.”

Bolstering partnerships is another key pillar of the strategy, which could help with not having a full data workforce.

“Data acumen has to become a core skill for every member of the workforce—not just for data professionals. The workforce and supporting contractors need to know, understand, and value data utilization and sharing for mission value and insight,” the document said.

But there’s still the need for people who can make that happen.

“How do we work across, not only inside our buildings, but across the IC, across the [U.S. government], with our industry academic partners, so that we can really bring the best of what there is to bear in support of our mission,” said Lakshmi Raman, the Central Intelligence Agency’s director of AI innovation, during a panel discussion at the Intelligence and National Security Summit on Friday. “We don't have enough resources to do everything that we need to do.”

10. U.S., Philippines Forces Training in Tandem As Countries' Alliance Expands

Excerpts:

These incidents have become a key focus in the U.S.-Philippine alliance. Washington is one of the Philippines’ many supporters in countering China’s coercion and violations, providing equipment and training to Philippine maritime forces.

Raymond Powell, Project Myoushu lead at Stanford University, told USNI News that these enlarged exercises with the Philippines come at “a crucial time” and that they help the U.S. demonstrate commitment to the alliance by helping the Philippines in countering China’s violations.

“Now is when the Philippines needs both moral and material support from its friends because there is where its leverage against China’s bullying resides. Beijing knows how to exert pressure on government, civic, and business officials of countries that don’t bend to its will, and this pressure is likely especially intense now,” Powell said.

U.S., Philippines Forces Training in Tandem As Countries' Alliance Expands - USNI News

news.usni.org · by Aaron-Matthew Lariosa · July 18, 2023

Marine Corps Sgt. Samuel Whitty, a radio operator with 3d Marine Littoral Regiment, 3d Marine Division, showcases 3d MLR’s communication assets to Philippine Marines with Battalion Landing Team 10 during Marine Aviation Support Activity 23 at Naval Base Camilo Osias, July 15, 2023. US Marin Corps Photo

U.S. forces are back in the Philippines for another round of joint exercises with their Filipino counterparts as Washington and Manilla expand cooperation.

Marine Aviation Support Activity 2023 and Cope Thunder 2023-2 kicked off last week. Both sets of drills are now underway across the Philippines, keeping up an almost continuous series of U.S.-Philippine military exercises that started in February.

Marine Aviation Support Activity (MASA) started July 6. U.S. forces will continue training with the Armed Forces of the Philippines until July 21.

This iteration of the exercise is the largest to date, with 2711 personnel and 43 aircraft from both forces partaking in drills in Palawan and Luzon. The majority of American personnel at MASA 23 come from I and III Marine Expeditionary Forces.

MV-22B Ospreys and CH-53E Super Stallions from Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 163 deployed to Antonio Bautista Air Base for activities in Palawan. Additional equipment, including HIMARS, was also flown in by Air Force C-17 Globemasters. Antonio Bautista is one of nine Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement sites that Philippine military bases that U.S. troops and equipment can access.

Marines with 3d Littoral Combat Team, 3d Marine Littoral Regiment, 3d Marine Division, and Philippine Marines with Battalion Landing Team 4 board A U.S. Marine Corps CH-53E Super Stallion attached to Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462 during Marine Aviation Support Activity 23 at Naval Education, Training and Doctrine Command, Philippines, July 13, 2023. US Marine Corps Photo

F/A-18 Hornets from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323 conducted a trans-Pacific flight from Marine Corps Air Station Miramar to Subic Bay International Airport. The last time Hornets operated in the Philippines was four years ago during Balikatan 2019.

F-35C Lightning IIs from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314 flew from Australia for MASA 23, marking the first deployment of the 5th generation fighter on Philippine soil. In previous years, F-35s taking part in the exercises launched from amphibious ships.

The Marine Hornets and Lightning IIs were slated to take part in a Sinking Exercise (SINKEX) on July 13, but the drill was canceled due to weather conditions. SINKEX would have taken place in the coastal waters of the South China Sea, the same location as Balikatan 2023. It would have been the second SINKEX held between the U.S. and the Philippines.

Former BRP Lake Caliraya (AF-81) was used as the SINKEX vessel. Donated to the Philippine Navy by the Philippine National Oil Company in 2014 and commissioned in 2015, Lake Caliraya held the distinction of being the first Chinese-built ship in Philippine service. Due to maintenance issues, Lake Caliraya’s only served for five years and was decommissioned in 2020.

It looks like the decommissioned Navy tanker, which was supposed to be shot down during Thursday's SINKEX or sinking exercise, has run aground in Morong, Bataan. The exercise was called off at the last minute due to bad weather

— David Y. Santos (@davidyusantos) July 14, 2023

Due to worsening weather conditions, the drill was canceled at the last minute for the safety of the participants. Lake Caliraya ran aground during an attempt to bring back the tanker after the SINKEX’s cancellation.

Maj. Natalie B. Batcheler, deputy director, Communication Strategy and Operations for the 3d Marine Air Wing told USNI News that “there will likely not be another go at the SINKEX” during MASA 23 due to previous commitments made to “re-open the operating area to local fishermen and mariners.” However, the activity still had value due to the joint planning that was conducted, Batcheler said.

“Regardless of the fact that the evolution did not execute in its entirety, there was great training value in rehearsing our ability to plan, orchestrate and deliver integrated firepower against a target under safe but realistic conditions,” Batchler said.

Other activities that took take place during MASA 23 include coastal defense drills, bilateral air assaults, airfield seizures, and joint forward arming and refueling at locations across the Philippines.

Like MASA, CT 23-2 started July 6 and will end on 21. This version of the two-part U.S.-Philippine Air Force exercise builds upon activities seen in May during the first edition. CT 2023 is the first iteration of the drills since the 1990s when the exercise was moved to Eielson Air Force Base and evolved into Red Flag Alaska.

During the first edition, Pacific Air Forces deployed F-16 Fighting Falcons for fighter training over Luzon. In the second edition, U.S. and Philippine aircraft will practice large-force deployment at airfields, including three EDCA sites, throughout the Philippines.

For CT 23-2, PACAF brought U.S. Air Force F-22A Raptors, A-10C Warthogs and C-130 Hercules’ to train with Philippine FA-50PH Golden Eagles and A-29B Super Tucanos. CT 23-2’s deployment marks the second time Raptors have operated from Philippine soil, the first being in March to practice the service’s new Agile Combat Employment concept. These Raptors are from Hawaiian-based 19th and 199th Fighter Squadrons, while the first to debut in the Philippines came from the Alaska-based 525th Fighter Squadron.

U.S. Army units have been training in the Philippines this month alongside their Marine and Air Force counterparts. The Long Range Fires Battalion of the Army’s 1st Multi-Domain Task Force fired off 20 rockets from HIMARS on July 7 in a demonstration for Philippine forces as part of Salaknib Phase II. Rangers from both countries also completed Bronze Ram last week.

Expanding Cooperation

Marines with Marine Air Control Squadron 4 watch the sun set during Marine Aviation Support Activity 23 at Laoag International Airport, July 12, 2023. US Marine Corps Photo

The Philippines and the United States have participated in the largest and most complex exercises in 2023. This year alone will have around 500 small and large engagements between the two militaries, reflecting a reinvigorated relationship.

These exchanges come as Manila seeks to modernize its armed forces, which are among the least capable in the region. Collin Koh, senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told USNI News that expanding and more complex exercises help Manila’s military modernization efforts as they allow Filipino troops to gain experience in modern operations and equipment from their American counterparts.

“Larger exercises mean exposure for the AFP to larger-scale military operations and deepening of interoperability between the allies. This, of course, has the long-term effect of helping to build capacity within the AFP, given past decades of focus on internal security and the present shift towards territorial defense posture, which necessitates a credible conventional warfighting capability,” Koh said.

In the first set of U.S.-Philippine Bilateral Defense Guidelines, “training exchanges, exercises, and other operational activities” were highlighted as one of the ways the two countries would modernize their defense capabilities. The guidelines also mentioned a five-year-long Security Sector Assistance Roadmap, which seeks to transfer “priority defense platforms and force packages that will bolster combined deterrence and capacity to resist coercion.”

Marine Corps Staff Sgt. Timothy W. Jones, chief instructor with Expeditionary Operations Training Group, supervises the execution of the Helicopter Rope Suspension Techniques during Marine Aviation Support Activities 22-2, July 21, 2022, Subic Bay, Philippines. US Marine Corps Photo

The two countries also agreed on the expansion of EDCA, allocating an additional four sites across the Philippines. Of the four new sites, two lie in Northern Luzon facing Taiwan and one is in Palawan adjacent to the South China Sea.

American-led large-scale exercises are “part of the broader shift and adjustment in its military posture” in the Indo-Pacific region, focusing on “honing warfighting proficiency against a near-peer adversary,” Koh said.

In May, the first-ever trilateral coast guard exercise between the U.S., Philippines and Japan took place in the South China Sea. This combined drill came after a series of high-profile incidents between the Philippine and China Coast Guards in the South China Sea in March and April.

These incidents have become a key focus in the U.S.-Philippine alliance. Washington is one of the Philippines’ many supporters in countering China’s coercion and violations, providing equipment and training to Philippine maritime forces.

Raymond Powell, Project Myoushu lead at Stanford University, told USNI News that these enlarged exercises with the Philippines come at “a crucial time” and that they help the U.S. demonstrate commitment to the alliance by helping the Philippines in countering China’s violations.

Staff Sgt. Gerson Carrillo, left, a platoon sergeant with 3d Littoral Combat Team, 3d Marine Littoral Regiment, 3d Marine Division, teaches Marine Corps Martial Arts to Philippine Marines with Battalion Land Team 4 during Marine Aviation Support Activity 23 at Parades Air Station, Philippines, July 14, 2023. US Marine Corps Photo

“Now is when the Philippines needs both moral and material support from its friends because there is where its leverage against China’s bullying resides. Beijing knows how to exert pressure on government, civic, and business officials of countries that don’t bend to its will, and this pressure is likely especially intense now,” Powell said.

Recently, Manila has taken a more assertive stance against foreign incursions by exposing intruders. This has led to the release of photos of smaller Philippine ships facing their far larger and armed Chinese counterparts within Philippine waters. However, for the Philippines to keep up this new approach, Powell highlighted the need for increased foreign support.

“Its confidence in its like-minded friends will be crucial to its ability to stay the course. That confidence will be built not just on their words of encouragement but on their visible, material support,” Powell said.

news.usni.org · by Aaron-Matthew Lariosa · July 18, 2023

11. Two Officers Sat In A Nevada Bar And Planned, On A Napkin, A New Way Of Waging War In The Pacific

Just as an aside, I wonder if our warfighting decline and our lack of intellectual focus on warfighting has coincided with the decline of officers' clubs and happy hour events for officers. Maybe we need more bar napkin analysis on Friday nights. We can no longer encourage traditional social events because they are not politically correct. But I know from personal experience that many great ideas are generated at a bar. It is just that I don't always have a napkin to write them down on and I later cannot recall them. (note the attempt at humor here).

Two Officers Sat In A Nevada Bar And Planned, On A Napkin, A New Way Of Waging War In The Pacific

Forbes · by David Axe · July 17, 2023

U.S. Marine Corps Maj. Robert Ahern, an F-35C Lighting II pilot, prepares to conduct aerial refueling over the Pacific Ocean last month.

Lance Cpl. Gadiel Zaragoza photo

The U.S. Marine Corps is the smallest of the U.S. military branches. But its size—just 210,000 active and reserve personnel, compared to nearly a million in the U.S. Army—isn’t always a disadvantage. Not when it comes to deterring Chinese aggression in the Western Pacific.

A year ago, Lt. Col. Michael O’Brien, commanding officer of Marine Fighter-Attack Squadron 314, an F-35 squadron in California, sat at a bar in Nevada with his counterpart from the Royal Australian Air Force’s No. 3 Squadron, Wing Commander Adrian Kiely, and planned a major Pacific deployment—on a napkin.

“Our lack of bureaucracy allows us to attack short-fuze missions such as preparing to deter China … a lot more aggressively than organizations that are a lot larger, such as the Air Force and Navy,” O’Brien said.

VMFA-314 flies Lockheed Martin F-35Cs—the big-wing, long-range carrierborne variant of the popular stealth fighter. No. 3 Squadron flies the land-based F-35A with its slightly smaller wing and smaller fuel tanks.

The two F-35 models are similar enough that the two squadrons could, in theory, fly and fight together—sharing runways, fuel, weapons, spare parts and, most importantly, ground crews.

O’Brien and Kiely wanted to prove the theory—and also prove the two squadrons could link up fast, on short notice, to put high-tech firepower within range of a possible aggressor.

“Over the past year, No. 3 Squadron has operated with VMFA-314, aiming to deepen operational and maintenance interoperability,” Kiely said in a statement.

Last year, the two squadrons trained together in Nevada and Hawaii. “In 2023, specifically, we are seeking to test and prove interchangeability, with a specific focus on our maintenance and logistics workforces.”

With official approval of their bar-napkin deployment plan, VMFA-314 last month launched six of its F-35Cs and, with assistance from U.S. Air Force and contracted tankers, hopped them across the Pacific Ocean to RAAF Base Williamtown in New South Wales in southeastern Australia.

The tankers returned home, leaving the Marines and Aussies to spend three weeks pretending to wage, with minimal support, an air war over the Western Pacific.

A VMFA-314 F-35C at Williamtown.

Sgt Joshua Brittenham

The Marines traveled light. “What we bring is manpower and firepower and aggressiveness, but we don’t necessarily bring the parts tail,” O’Brien said.

The F-35 is a complex and maintenance-hungry machine. To fight the hardest, a deploying squadron either must bring parts with it, or fall in a stash of spares at the overseas location. For VMFA-314, No. 3 Squadron with its 10 F-35s was the logical host. “Kenny has been great helping us out,” O’Brien said, referring to Kiely by his callsign.

The Marines often deploy without attached Air Force tankers and cargo planes, which are in high demand and short supply and largely dictate the pace of U.S. military fighter deployments in the Asia-Pacific region.

But the same lightness that allows the Marines to move fast and on short notice also constrains their operations once they arrive.

The Pacific is vast. It’s 1,800 miles from Williamtown to Darwin, Australia’s northernmost fighter base. It’s another 2,200 miles from Darwin to the northern Philippines. From there, it’s 500 miles to Taiwan, the likeliest locus of a major war in the region.

An F-35A ranges just 650 miles, there then back, with full tanks and a few missiles. The F-35C travels slightly farther. An F-35 squadron fighting in the Western Pacific has two options: refuel in mid-air a lot ... or leapfrog from one small island base to the next. “This is all a time-distance-fuel problem,” O’Brien said.

The Marine-Aussie team, despite some local support from USMC KC-130 and RAAF KC-30 tankers, made its choice by opting to deploy light and fast. It’s rehearsing a largely tanker-free war.

That means putting in practice a distributed “hub-and-spoke” concept, whereby squadrons leave their heaviest equipment at some big air base—Williamtown, for instance—and stage a few maintainers, some weapons and a little gas at austere airfields closer to the front lines. Say, in The Philippines or Malaysia or on some Japanese island.

Any location with 6,000 feet of clean runway is a candidate, O’Brien and Kiely said. To keep things simple, the leapfrogging Marines wouldn’t even plug into the F-35’s centralized Autonomic Logistics Information System, O’Brien said. They’d fix planes the old-fashioned way.

The host country would have to approve the plan, of course. “When we talk about operating in austere locations and different areas in the region, not only is our capability a key factor in that, but also host-nation authorization,” said Maj. Natalie Batcheler, a 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing spokesperson.

Assuming allies agree to let American and Australian F-35s stage from their territory, it’s possible to imagine mixed flights of USMC and RAAF F-35s moving quickly across the Western Pacific in a time of crisis.

More bar-napkin plans could lead to more short-notice exercises that result in more and more pilots, maintainers and planners getting comfortable with the idea.

Forbes · by David Axe · July 17, 2023

12. This soldier ‘used his body as a shield’ to stop a violent assault

While all the news focuses on PV2 King's defection to north Korea at the JSA, we should think more about great soldiers like Specialist Rodriguez.

This soldier ‘used his body as a shield’ to stop a violent assault

armytimes.com · by Davis Winkie · July 18, 2023

A junior enlisted soldier stationed at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii will receive the Soldier’s Medal on Wednesday afternoon for intervening in a violent assault, according to service officials.

Spc. Rene Rodriguez is assigned to 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry, which is part of the 25th Infantry Division’s 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, according to a division press release. The award ceremony will take place on the division’s parade field, named for Gen. Frederick C. Weyand.

The Soldier’s Medal is the Army’s highest award for non-combat heroism, and qualifying circumstances must carry “a clearly recognizable personal hazard or danger and the voluntary risk of life,” according to service regulations. Less than 0.1% of the Army’s active duty troops wear the award, said division commander Maj. Gen. Joseph Ryan in a July 14 video newsletter.

On Oct. 22, 2022, while in the vicinity of Wahiawa on the island of Oʻahu, Rodriguez saw a man violently assaulting a woman off-post, according to the release, Ryan’s remarks, and the soldier’s award citation.

“Rodriguez, with complete disregard for his own safety, swiftly moved to protect a woman enduring a violent assault,” reads his award citation, a copy of which was provided to Army Times. After “recognizing the woman’s risk of serious injury or death,” he pushed through a crowd of bystanders and placed his body between the victim and the attacker.

“He used his body as a shield, endured numerous strikes from the assailant, all while moving the woman into his vehicle to depart the scene,” according to the citation. “He continued to protect the woman until law enforcement arrived on the scene.”

The specialist was unaware that the man “was a felon on the lam from California, wanted for murder,” Ryan said in the video newsletter.

Rodriguez’s heroism stands out even among the “little over 240″ active duty soldiers who have earned the award, Ryan said.

According to the Army’s award regulations, the Army Secretary may certify that a Soldier’s Medal recipient displayed “extraordinary heroism…equivalent to that required for award of the [Distinguished Service Cross],” the service’s second-highest award for valor. Enlisted troops recognized for extraordinary heroism will receive a 10% boost to their retirement checks should they reach 20 years.

Ryan confirmed that Rodriguez’s heroism was formally deemed extraordinary in his video statement.

“He did the right thing because he had a bias for action,” Ryan said. “And we’re damn proud of him.”

About Davis Winkie and James Clark

Davis Winkie is a senior reporter covering the Army. He focuses on investigations, personnel concerns and military justice. Davis, also a Guard veteran, was a finalist in the 2023 Livingston Awards for his work with The Texas Tribune investigating the National Guard's border missions. He studied history at Vanderbilt and UNC-Chapel Hill.

James is the editor of Army Times and a Marine Corps veteran.

13. Russian command structure ‘confusing at best’ after Wagner mutiny, says top U.S. general

Military "kremlinology" remains a necessary skill.

Russian command structure ‘confusing at best’ after Wagner mutiny, says top U.S. general

By LARA SELIGMAN

07/18/2023 02:33 PM EDT

Politico

The Ukraine war “is going to be long, it’s going to be hard, it’s going to be bloody,” Joint Chiefs Chair Gen. Mark Milley predicted.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is seen in a meeting with a regional leader on July 17, 2023. The failed mutiny that ended with Yevgeny Prigozhin’s exile has thrown Russia’s military command structure into disarray. | Alexander Kazakov/AP Photo

07/18/2023 02:33 PM EDT

The Russian military’s command structure is “confusing at best” after last month’s failed rebellion led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, chief of the Wagner mercenary group, a top U.S. general said on Tuesday.

Thousands of Prigozhin’s soldiers have been deeply involved in the Ukraine conflict. But those troops are now handing over their weapons to the Russian military, in an apparent end to their operations in Ukraine.

The failed mutiny that ended with Prigozhin’s exile has thrown Russia’s military command structure into disarray, Joint Chiefs Chair Gen. Mark Milley told reporters at the Pentagon.

“The command-and-control apparatus at the strategic level is certainly confusing at best and probably challenging,” Milley said.

The fallout from the rebellion, in addition to logistics problems, “significant” officer casualties and poor training, have contributed to eroding morale among Russian forces, Milley said.

Russian troops have had several months to boost their defenses in Ukraine, including laying complex minefields, installing barbed wire and digging trenches, Milley said. But Ukraine is working through the front lines “slowly and deliberately.”

Kyiv has so far struggled to retake significant territory during the much-anticipated counteroffensive, but Milley explained that Ukrainian forces are “preserving their combat power” and have not sent in their best soldiers.

“This is going to be long, it’s going to be hard, it’s going to be bloody,” Milley predicted. But “it is far from a failure, in my view.”

The main challenge for Ukrainian troops is minefields, which are forcing soldiers to move slowly, Milley said. The coalition is focused on providing Ukraine equipment to help clear and defend against those mines, as well as air defenses to protect against Russian air attacks.

Milley’s comments echo those by another senior Pentagon official last week. Colin Kahl, who recently left his position as undersecretary of defense for policy, told reporters that Ukraine has not yet brought the “majority of their combat power” to bear.

Ukraine’s strategy is to deliberately probe the Russian lines for weak spots across the east and south, Kahl said.

“I think the real test will be when they identify weak spots or create weak spots and generate a breach,” Kahl said. “How rapidly they’re able to exploit that with the combat power that they have in reserve and how rapidly the Russians will be able to respond.”

POLITICO

Politico

14. Electronic Warfare Has Become A Defining Feature Of Future Conflict. Here’s Why.

Excerpts:

Countries that don’t try to keep up with the latest innovations in EW quickly fall behind, and General CQ Brown, the nominee to be next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, observed in confirmation hearings last week that the joint force has allowed some of its skills to atrophy.

So, Ukraine is a wakeup call, because the diversity and intensity with which electronic warfare is being waged there is a harbinger of things to come.

The Russians began the war by trying to jam Kyiv’s air-defense radars, only to discover that in the process they were disrupting their own communications.

Both sides use electronic warfare to disable the other side’s drones by interfering with communications links. That is not hard to do when militaries are using off-the-shelf commercial drones as Ukraine does. The Economist reports that Ukraine loses thousands of drones per month, often to Russian jamming.

There are so many facets to EW that the uninitiated can easily get lost in the discussion of countermeasures and counter-countermeasures.

Electronic Warfare Has Become A Defining Feature Of Future Conflict. Here’s Why.

Forbes · by Loren Thompson · July 18, 2023

The electromagnetic spectrum has become a warfighting domain.

Army.mil

The biggest lesson coming out of the fighting in Ukraine isn’t about drones or artillery, it’s about electronic warfare.

Electronic warfare, or EW, focuses on efforts to control and exploit the electromagnetic spectrum for the benefit of friendly forces, while denying that advantage to adversaries.

Without access to the spectrum, most of the tools of modern warfare won’t work, from radios to radars to GPS.

US forces didn’t worry much about securing access during the global war on terror, but with the focus of national defense strategy now shifted to great-power competition it has become a hot topic among military planners.

The war in Ukraine has seen more intensive use of electronic warfare by both sides than any other conflict in history.

The Russians, who are invested heavily in EW, have used it to “jam” GPS signals to smart bombs supplied by Western nations, meaning that they generate so much power in the same frequency as the satellites that receivers on the weapons can’t pick up the relatively weak signals.

The Pentagon long ago developed a countermeasure to deal with this threat in the form of more powerful signals—which are harder to jam—but with the nearest GPS satellites over 12,000 miles distant, jamming is still a potential option for enemies.

The radiated power of jamming devices generally diminishes as a square of their distance from targeted receivers, so the stronger a signal is, the closer the jammer needs to be to negate it.

The US joint force has developed a series of measures designed to secure navigation and timing data even in a GPS-denied environment. This is only one facet of EW, but it illustrates the continuous competition for dominance of the spectrum.

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Countries that don’t try to keep up with the latest innovations in EW quickly fall behind, and General CQ Brown, the nominee to be next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, observed in confirmation hearings last week that the joint force has allowed some of its skills to atrophy.

So, Ukraine is a wakeup call, because the diversity and intensity with which electronic warfare is being waged there is a harbinger of things to come.

The Russians began the war by trying to jam Kyiv’s air-defense radars, only to discover that in the process they were disrupting their own communications.

Both sides use electronic warfare to disable the other side’s drones by interfering with communications links. That is not hard to do when militaries are using off-the-shelf commercial drones as Ukraine does. The Economist reports that Ukraine loses thousands of drones per month, often to Russian jamming.

There are so many facets to EW that the uninitiated can easily get lost in the discussion of countermeasures and counter-countermeasures.

It doesn’t help that the boundaries of the field are so fluid. For instance, the Army combines the discussion of EW and cyber warfare in the same field manual, even though the two disciplines are different.

Similarly, the practice of signals intelligence—electronic eavesdropping and analysis—involves many of the same tools and principles as EW. And “anti-radiation” missiles that home in on the signals emitted by radars are often characterized as a form of EW, even though they are kinetic weapons.

At its heart, though, EW is waged on the electromagnetic spectrum using carefully crafted signals that overwhelm, circumvent or deceive adversaries.

EW was already an advanced discipline when the Cold War ended, but the digitization of all things military is adding new wrinkles to its practice, while also breaking down the distinction between EW and cyber warfare.

Needless to say, these topics don’t get much of an airing in general media, because they require some grasp of technical detail even when they aren’t classified.

The most fundamental feature of the electromagnetic spectrum is that as signal frequency (vibrations per second) increases, wavelength (the distance between the peaks of successive waves) decreases.

This dynamic dictates how various segments of the spectrum can be used, with military activity largely confined to radio, infrared and optical (visible light) waves.

Within the thousands of usable bandwidths comprising these segments, electronic warfare is waged in three basic ways: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic support.

The F-35 fighter is equipped with sensors, processors and weapons to perform all three functions, with the outer edge of the aircraft carrying embedded systems for detecting both radar-guided and heat-seeking weapons. The signals are fused into an integrated picture of threats that the plane can evade, jam, deceive or kinetically attack as circumstances dictate.

Planned upgrades to the F-35 will further enhance these features, in part by installing a new electronically-scanned radar array that can precisely jam hostile emitters. The F-35 EW system is also being installed on the Air Force’s B-21 bomber.

Much of this is classified, and thus difficult to characterize. What the Ukraine war demonstrates, though, is that EW isn’t just about waging the high-end fight anymore—it is ubiquitous across the modern battlefield.

For instance, a Northern Virginia military contractor called CACI (a contributor to my think tank) has developed a library of over 400 signals used to control and communicate with drones—signals that can be disrupted to prevent the drones from accomplishing their intended missions.

Other companies have developed defensive systems that disable heat-seeking missiles by targeting their infrared sensors with directed energy that makes it impossible to maintain a lock on targets.

A handful of companies such as BAE Systems and RTX have developed integrated strategies for exploiting technologies ranging from jamming pods to directed energy in conducting electronic warfare. These strategies typically view the spectrum as a unified warfighting domain.

That increasingly is the way the US joint force will view it too, because the verdict from Ukraine is that if you can’t control the electromagnetic spectrum, you probably can’t win the war.

Forbes · by Loren Thompson · July 18, 2023

15. Bickering Over the Defense Bill Is Undermining Our Military

Excerpts:

Peter Feaver, a political scientist who has written on the growing gap between civilian and military leaders, says the political tug-of-war over the NDAA hurts the military and shakes public confidence in the institution.

Indeed, a recent Gallup poll that measures confidence in American institutions confirms Feaver’s contention. Gallup found that 60% of Americans have a “great deal” or “fair amount” of confidence in the military — a 9-point drop from the same survey two years ago. By comparison, in 2009, the level of confidence was 82%. And Americans have only an 8% level of confidence in Congress.

It’s time for Congress to think holistically about our military budget. This means ensuring we have the assets and capabilities to address the global threats we face. But it also means, first and foremost, addressing the needs of our service members and their families who defend our country. Without them, our operational readiness is weakened.

Former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper perhaps said it best in his book, “A Sacred Oath”: “A soldier, sailor, airman, guardian or Marine who feels included, respected and valued will work harder, stay longer and fight better.”

Bickering Over the Defense Bill Is Undermining Our Military

Published 07/18/23 08:30 AM ET

Rear Adm. (Ret.) Tom Jurkowsky

themessenger.com · July 18, 2023

The recent passage of the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) in the House of Representatives by a mere nine votes should concern every American who cares about our military, its people who wear the uniform, and their families.

The Pentagon in Arlington, Va.Alex Wong/Getty Images

The NDAA is an important annual piece of legislation that specifies the budget and expenditures of the Department of Defense (DOD). It also sets policies under which money will be spent. Since the passage of the first NDAA in 1961, it typically has won bipartisan support — even during the recent years of political polarization.

The detailed work leading up to full votes in the House and Senate is done by the Armed Services Committees in both chambers. In June, it appeared the 2024 NDAA would receive the same type of bipartisan support that it has previously. In fact, the basic legislation won a clearly bipartisan 58-1 vote from the House Armed Services Committee.

But in the weeks following, things began to unravel as members added riders to the bill to address social issues such as abortion, funding for diversity, equity and inclusion programs, and the ability of transgender people to serve in the military. In previous years, such social issues would have been left to the military’s leadership to resolve.

Now the question is what the Democratic Senate will do.

One legislator, a Democrat, said the bill that came out of committee sent a clear message to our allies and partners, global competitors and the American people that democracy works and Congress is still functional. But, he said, “That bill no longer exists.”

What captures the media’s attention about the NDAA is the inventory of ships, aircraft and other weapons systems that are part of the legislation. When Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Ala.) became the House Armed Services Committee chairman in January, he discussed the unprecedented threats our nation faces. But knowing that our military cannot rely on hardware alone to win, Rogers established the committee’s Servicemember Quality of Life panel (led by a member of the Military Officers Association of America, on whose board I sit). Rogers said his goal was to examine the pay, benefits and morale of troops to see if improvements can be made or any solutions found to better entice recruits and retain the people we have.

Accordingly, in addition to a 5.2% pay raise, this year’s NDAA contained language that would help struggling junior men and women in uniform by providing new monthly bonuses. Another measure would allow more members to qualify for a basic-needs stipend. An expansion of education benefits is also included.

Other quality-of-life measures in the legislation aim to resolve problems that have languished for years. For example, many on-base housing units have deteriorated, and some have mold, leaky roofs and vermin. As hard as it may be to believe, mold in military housing has been evident for decades but, despite repeated complaints and reports of illness, such problems have persisted. On-base housing is currently exempt from the legal requirements of basic habitability imposed on housing units that are managed by private companies under contract.

Similarly, barracks or housing for unaccompanied service members would legally have to meet standards that would make them habitable. Until now, barracks have been exempt from meeting basic habitability standards and have also been plagued by mold. Some were deemed health hazards. Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth told Congress in April that there are some barracks she would not want her daughters to live in.

Language in the NDAA is meant to help resolve this issue. But because of the divisive nature of defense legislation, will all these items remain in the bill? Our armed forces have a reason to be concerned — can you blame them?

Correcting these problems via the NDAA would send a powerful message to reassure military personnel and their families that they deserve decent living quarters. It would add substance and meaning to the phrase, “Thank you for your service.”

Also of concern is the effect that political polarization will have on a serious situation involving recruiting. What we’ve seen transpire over the past several weeks validates one of the perceptions some potential recruits (and their influencers) have about today’s military. The military once prided itself on being nonpartisan, but today’s military — regarded as the world’s most capable — risks being dragged in another direction.

Adm. Mike Mullen, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was quoted recently as saying that some influencers — veterans, parents, relatives — are telling young people not to go into the service. “Moms, dads, uncles, coaches and pastors don’t see it as a good choice,” he said. Again, is it any wonder? It remains to be seen whether or not the provisions discussed above make it into the final NDAA and are approved. But to some individuals, the damage has been done.

Peter Feaver, a political scientist who has written on the growing gap between civilian and military leaders, says the political tug-of-war over the NDAA hurts the military and shakes public confidence in the institution.

Indeed, a recent Gallup poll that measures confidence in American institutions confirms Feaver’s contention. Gallup found that 60% of Americans have a “great deal” or “fair amount” of confidence in the military — a 9-point drop from the same survey two years ago. By comparison, in 2009, the level of confidence was 82%. And Americans have only an 8% level of confidence in Congress.

It’s time for Congress to think holistically about our military budget. This means ensuring we have the assets and capabilities to address the global threats we face. But it also means, first and foremost, addressing the needs of our service members and their families who defend our country. Without them, our operational readiness is weakened.

Former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper perhaps said it best in his book, “A Sacred Oath”: “A soldier, sailor, airman, guardian or Marine who feels included, respected and valued will work harder, stay longer and fight better.”

Divisive rhetoric among our congressional leaders does not send positive messages to our service people that they are respected and valued. Rhetoric — backed by action — that says, “We support you fully and recognize your sacrifices,” would go so much further.

Retired Rear Adm. Tom Jurkowsky began his 31-year active-duty career as an enlisted sailor. A board member of the Military Officers Association of America, he is the author of “The Secret Sauce for Organizational Success: Communications and Leadership on the Same Page.” The opinions expressed here are his alone.

themessenger.com · July 18, 2023

16. Is the All-Volunteer US Military in Crisis?

I especially like the second reason: "To The Extent It’s a Problem, It Will Bring Focus." We need to address the issues and use that as a positive step forward rather than believing the sky is falling.

Excerpts:

Every few years, consultants, think tanks, retired politicians, and other various chicken littles start clucking about how we’re destined to see a foreign flag hoisted over our Capitol unless we’re willing to part with another trillion dollars to address the dire emergency in our AVF. But what I have noticed is that the actual fighting we conduct is unaffected by all this vacuous jib-jab.

There is no crisis. There is more than ample capacity to deal with the defense threats to the US, albeit with a continued commitment to revising how we think about threats and posture ourselves to deter and, if necessary, defeat them.

But if all this breathless yapping helps bring attention to some aspects of the AVF which could do with some TLC, then hey, I’m all for it.

Is the All-Volunteer US Military in Crisis?

I think not. Three reasons the sky isn't falling.

TONY CARR

JUL 18, 2023

theroguesgallery.substack.com · by Tony Carr

Credit: The Atlantic

Seems we’re coming around to that season again, which we do with depressing regularity, wherein various narratives about the US military’s All-Volunteer Force (AVF) are wheeled out from short-term storage and paraded in the popular media. The purpose of these narratives is to stir alarm about whether America’s fighting forces are at risk should it find itself in a major kerfuffle. They are typically injected into popular consciousness by parties with a vested interest in continued and expanded investment in what already stands as history’s most massive and formidable military force.

This latest iteration of hand-wringing, opportunistically catalysed about a year ago as the Russian invasion of Ukraine reached its crescendo of American interest, evinces all-too-familiar tropes. These include, but are not limited to:

Not enough young Americans are qualified to serve
Not enough qualified young Americans are motivated to serve
Therefore, we might not meet our massive recruitment goals
Therefore, national security might be at risk

I will pause here to emphasise how this discussion never actually publishes its own assumptions, much less transparently question or assail them. To do this might compel us to ask a series of important questions. Like why we need to recruit 150,000 Americans into military service every year to sustain our force levels, and whether the quality of life in the ranks is sufficient to retain experienced individuals rather than accept 10% annual turnover. Or whether the qualifications we’ve declared for service are still the right ones, having changed precious little in several decades.

We might even ask deeper questions. Such as why we need a standing military force of 1.4M to defend a nation not currently engaged in any major or minor conflict. And if we do, why we’ve extended and exposed ourselves to global instability to an extent requiring such a massive and expensive force. Or perhaps why the huge size and budget of our military seems impervious to changes in context. Whether at war or in peace, it is remarkably thirsty for the best part of a trillion dollars year-in, year-out, typically gathering a budget between 3-4% of US GDP whether the nation is at war, not at war, or in multiple wars at once. This suggests spending is not keyed to readiness so much as to the static costs of running any massive organization.

With that context, let me provide three reasons why it’s actually okay and maybe even a good thing that we’re having trouble feeding this machine.

It’s Not a Crisis. One thing you can believe with total confidence is that if the military services were at risk of not achieving their mission, to include their estimated/projected mission in a foreseeable conflict scenario, the generals and admirals charged with assuring US national defense would be jumping up and down about it. Legislative agendas would be crowded with readiness issues, media would be reporting about it, and direct public pronouncements from military and defense leaders would be notorious. Even before these developments, you’d see internal shifts in spending and priorities within the services, who play an internal game to fund their favoured projects at marginal risk to readiness and sometimes substantial risk to the experience of their troops. I wrote about this recently; our services will generally make a priority out of weapons and programmes which suit their visions of themselves until they are forced to make a priority out of people.
To The Extent It’s a Problem, It Will Bring Focus. George W. Bush famously quipped to reporters in 2006 that if he’d had to wage his war in Iraq with conscripts rather than volunteers, he’d have been impeached. This sort of dark humour aligns perfectly with military sensibilities, but is really not funny for the nation. We have for too long been afforded the tragic luxury of waging reckless and elective wars that give birth to countless litters of ideological and electoral pets for politicians and their lackeys, but make our world less stable and secure while taking advantage of the intrinsic motivations and soul-emblazoned patriotism of the American rank-and-file. Congress has abetted by occasionally interrupting its perpetual torpor to transfer money from American wallets to the grubby hands of defense contractors under the guise of funding American security. If we suddenly didn’t have unlimited volunteers propelled by unlimited money, we might stop waging war on an unlimited scale and timeline. We might focus on which priorities truly matter to our defense. The services might be forced to stop bleeding talent and actually clarify and resource their missions with greater clarity instead of having the luxury to promote pet projects. I have long held that the best organizations and systems are self-limiting, because an organization without limits will become self-referential to the point of abandoning its core values. The AVF is an example of this. Service today is not nearly as good a deal for young Americans as it once was, and for those of us who served during the elective war after 9/11, there is a painful awareness that the services stopped working hard to deserve America’s best and brightest long ago. Perhaps some reasonable limits will bring focus and change.
It Says Something Great About Young Americans. I definitely don’t understand why it would be a bad thing that only 9% of Americans of service age are interested in fighting and killing as a profession. That’s a good thing. Undoubtedly, a few percent more are ambivalent enough to be drawn into the notion. Let the services do a better job of persuading them by making service life attractive enough. But let’s not look past the encouraging headline that despite the recent coarseness of its politics and general combativeness of its society, America’s future is interested in tranquility.

Every few years, consultants, think tanks, retired politicians, and other various chicken littles start clucking about how we’re destined to see a foreign flag hoisted over our Capitol unless we’re willing to part with another trillion dollars to address the dire emergency in our AVF. But what I have noticed is that the actual fighting we conduct is unaffected by all this vacuous jib-jab.

There is no crisis. There is more than ample capacity to deal with the defense threats to the US, albeit with a continued commitment to revising how we think about threats and posture ourselves to deter and, if necessary, defeat them.

But if all this breathless yapping helps bring attention to some aspects of the AVF which could do with some TLC, then hey, I’m all for it.

Thank you for reading The Rogue's Radar. This post is public so feel free to share it.

Tony Carr is a retired US Air Force Lieutenant Colonel and former Senior Editor of Harvard Law School’s National Security Journal. He is passionate about the plight of the US military veteran in the post-9/11 era and about America’s relationship with war.

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theroguesgallery.substack.com · by Tony Carr

17. Air Force Special Ops Wants Runway Independence, More Speed (UPDATED)

Air Force Special Ops Wants Runway Independence, More Speed (UPDATED)

nationaldefensemagazine.org · by Stew Magnuson

7/14/2023

Air Force photo

TAMPA, Florida — Air Force Special Operations Command has a long technology wish list.

The command is tasked with transporting commandos covertly, quickly and across long distances and to penetrate where other aircraft can’t normally go. Naturally, it wants to improve its performance in all these categories, especially the latter, taking personnel to locations where there are no runways — a job best carried out by rotary-wing aircraft.

But what if almost three-fourths of the planet could serve as a runway by allowing fixed-wing aircraft to land on water? The entire Indo-Pacific could be considered a runway, SOCOM Acquisitions Executive James Smith told reporters recently.

That’s the reasoning behind the idea to bolt pontoons onto a MC-130J airlifter to convert it into a float plane, a concept the command has been studying for more than two years.

Air Force Col. Ken Kuebler, program executive officer for fixed-wing aircraft at SOCOM, said: “We continue to push forward with some of that technology [but] it’s a really hard engineering problem,” he said during a presentation at the SOF Week conference.

The office is carrying out hydro- and sub-scale testing, studying how it would perform in various sea states, and is moving toward a critical design review, he said.

In addition, the command is looking at more mundane day-to-day operations such as maintenance and support, equipment needs, training and “how do we go with this whole systems of systems approach to be able to do that,” he said.

The command is working with several organizations to carry out the studies and tests. “We are looking at two to three years to go do a demonstration of the full capability,” he said.

Kuebler was asked if the command would consider acquiring the ShinMaywa US-2 fixed-wing amphibious aircraft — which is flown by the Japan Self-Defense Force — as a stopgap solution.

Nothing has been ruled out, Kuebler said. The program executive office has had talks with Japan about its float plane capabilities, especially as it works out concepts of operation and training, he said.

“We are looking across the globe at these capabilities,” he said. “I think everything in the acquisition strategy is still on the table as we look at different lines of efforts to make sure that we can have a runway independent and amphibious capability,” he said.

The ShinMaywa US-2 can land on runways or water and is primarily used for search-and-rescue missions. It can carry a crew of 11 plus 20 passengers, or 12 on stretchers. It is driven by four Rolls-Royce AE 2100 engines, has a 108-foot wingspan and cruises at about 300 miles per hour. It can operate in sea states of up to nine feet and on land only requires about one-quarter of the distance of a typical commercial airliner to take off and land, making it practical for many of Japan’s remote and austere runways.

It has a range of 2,980 miles, which is roughly five and a half times farther than a typical search-and-rescue helicopter, according to information from its manufacturer ShinMaywa Industries Ltd.

Japan currently has eight of the aircraft with plans to build six more. The company said the aircraft has saved more than 1,000 lives so far. ShinMaywa Industries is actively seeking export opportunities but has yet to find an overseas buyer for the aircraft.

Former AFSOC deputy commander Maj. Gen. Eric Hill before he retired visited Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni in Japan in April 2022 to check out the US-2 and flew in it to observe the crew carrying out exercises, according to Stars and Stripes. The amphibious aircraft is “an incredible platform,” he said.

“Flying an airplane that can land on water isn’t a new concept, but few aviators have the experience of amphibious aviation,” Hill told the newspaper. “Gaining lessons from our partners will help us learn what to anticipate as we begin to build our own tactics and techniques moving forward.”

The purpose of the visit was to gather facts as SOCOM explores its own amphib program, he said. “We think partnering with our allies here and learning from them, seeing that they’re on their second variant of a seaplane, and I think there is a lot of education we can share back and forth,” Hill added.

Smith, while not specifically addressing the US-2, said not every country has what it takes to partner with SOCOM when it comes to developing new technologies, but Japan does check off all the boxes.

“We’re always looking for what I refer to as the ‘Goldilocks partnership,’” he said.

First, Japan has invested heavily in its own special operations forces. Not every nation does, Smith noted.

A potential partner should also have a robust industrial base capable of producing advanced technology. Obviously, Japan fits that description.

Finally, they must have strong cybersecurity protocols in place to protect any information SOCOM shares with them, he said.

“When we find a country that hits all three of those marks, we are interested in working with them,” he said.

Meanwhile, Kuebler shared details on another new program being developed in partnership with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency that has “runway independence” near the top of its requirements list.

The agency in March revealed the Speed and Runway Independent Technologies, or SPRINT, X-plane demonstration project. Its Tactical Technology Office is soliciting proposals to design, build, certify and fly an X-plane to demonstrate speed and runway independence for a next generation of air mobility platforms, an agency statement said.

The announcement said runway independence was “envisioned as the ability to operate and hover near unprepared surfaces, such as sections of damaged runways, remote highways/roadways, unprepared fields with dry grass, parking lots, etc.”

The broad agency announcement released March 9 did not mention whether the aircraft should be crewed, uncrewed, or optionally piloted. The announcement also did not mention whether it should use conventional or hybrid engines, only that it “must demonstrate the ability to generate and distribute power in all modes of flight and during transition between these modes of flight.”

The announcement did, however, specify that the aircraft be scalable, cruise at speeds from 400 to 450 knots and at relevant altitudes between 15,000 and 30,000 feet. It should carry a payload of 5,000 pounds, with a substantial 30-foot-long, eight-foot-wide cargo bay capable of carrying a small vehicle or two and a half pallets, it said. The initial requirement for endurance is one and a half hours and 200 nautical miles.

While the announcement stressed runway independence, the most important capability AFSOC is looking for in the new X-plane is high speed, Kuebler said. What is the definition of “high-speed?” It’s whatever the program can provide, he said.

“If I tell you 400 knots, then tomorrow I’ll be asking for 450 knots and the next day I’ll ask for 500, but we’re really trying to get after that win,” he added.

It will be a three-phase project, with the first phase seeking proposals. The entities selected will share $15 million to refine their concepts. The second part includes a downselect with $75 million for risk reduction work and air certification approvals, then a further downselect to build and fly the aircraft. That amount was undisclosed.

“The goal of SPRINT is to reach first flight of the demonstrator no more than 42 months from contract award,” the announcement said.

The artist’s concept that accompanied the post portrayed an aircraft that looked much like the next-generation, autonomous hybrid-electric commuter aircraft that several companies are currently developing.

Geoffrey Downer, SOCOM’s program executive officer for rotary wing, said a host of established aircraft makers and startups are offering so-called “flying cars” — all electric or electric-hybrid, runway independent vertical takeoff and landing vehicles that may appear to be a perfect fit for special operations missions — but so far, none impress.

The PEO has studied many of the nascent industry’s commuter aircraft offerings but found that they are all lacking the requirements needed for special ops missions.

“All these electric configurations don’t meet our helicopter missions based on the studies that we’re looking at,” he said.

Special operations helicopters need to hover for long periods of time, and the new wave of electric aircraft don’t do that, he said. The amount of downwash is also problematic, as is the ability to get the crew in and out of the aircraft quickly, he said.

PEO Rotary Wing will also start a program in 2024 with DARPA to look at hybrid-electric aircraft with the goal of increasing speed.

“The studies that we’ve done [have] shown that you can get anywhere from 25 percent to 100 percent increase in speed,” he said. That could take it from 90 knots to 170 to 180 knots, he said. Or it could result in a 25 to 75 percent increase in range. “That’s huge,” he added. ND

Correction: A previous version of this story incorrectly stated the ShinMaywa US-2 has six Rolls-Royce AE 2100 engines.

Topics: Acquisition, Aviation, Air Force News

nationaldefensemagazine.org · by Stew Magnuson

18. Creating a Codified Legal Response to Domestic Extremism in the Ranks

Conclusion:

Military commanders are entrusted with a grave responsibility. To fulfill it, the good order and discipline of the force are paramount. Extremism amongst the ranks is an insubordination that should be rooted out by commanders. Codifying domestic extremism as a punitive article under the Uniform Code of Military Justice will allow for the prosecution of military members who engage in acts that threaten the loyalty, discipline, or morale of fellow servicemembers. Adopting a punitive article will also help restore civilians’ faith in the military as an institution and protect them from domestic terror attacks. If allowed to fester, domestic extremism will pose a growing danger to the military and the country.

Creating a Codified Legal Response to Domestic Extremism in the Ranks - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Michael Schrama · July 19, 2023

While serving as a Coast Guard lieutenant, Christopher Hasson made plans to kill “journalists, Democratic politicians, professors, Supreme Court justices and those he described as ‘leftists in general.’” On Jan. 31, 2020, he pled guilty to drug- and firearm-related offenses, receiving thirteen years in jail. Despite describing Hasson as a domestic terrorist, federal prosecutors chose these more minor charges due to the fact that no domestic terrorism statute currently exists. The Coast Guard, for its part, also lacked more precise legal means to address Hasson’s crimes.

As an active-duty Air Force military judge, I have seen firsthand a rising population of military members engaging in extremist activities. In 2021, 17.6 percent of domestic terrorism plots and attacks were committed by active-duty or reserve personnel. In January 2021, the United States saw an attack on federal property when an organized group of extremists stormed the United States Capitol. Approximately 12 percent of those individuals charged in federal court for their role in the activities had some form of military experience, including members currently on active duty. There is more than ample evidence that military members are a ripe population for extremist recruitment and that the rise of domestic extremism in the military ranks is a threat to national security.

Become a Member

Unfortunately, the United States Criminal Code and the Uniform Code of Military Justice do not currently provide the tools to deal with this crisis, as they do not treat domestic extremism as a specific criminal offense. Codifying domestic extremism as a punitive article under the military code would provide a means for commanders to adequately address the rising tide of domestic extremism. This step would give more resources and focus to military prosecutors and help prevent politicization in targeting clearly prohibited conduct. Furthermore, it would enable the Department of Defense and society at large to more accurately track domestic extremism in the military, ultimately enhancing trust in the institution as a whole.

The Threat of Extremism

Extremist groups actively recruit military members because of their inherent value to the group. All military members undergo basic training during which they learn how to handle weapons, and many learn far more during their time in the military than what is offered in basic training. Military members also have access to the military itself — strategy, intelligence, insider information, and weapons — all things that can be valuable to those who seek to enact violent extremist attacks. Military members are taught a sense of discipline and structure while serving, qualities that are highly valued by violent extremist leaders, especially in groups that lack well-educated members. In addition, having military members lends extremist groups an “air of legitimacy.” The groups with military members are able to paint themselves as orderly and rational and thus respectable members of society. This also allows the extremist group to paint itself as patriotic — doing what is needed to protect individual rights.

Extremist groups can also be attractive to military members, especially veterans. The need for belonging is frequently cited amongst veterans as a motivation for joining terrorist and violent extremist groups. For people with prior military experience, the need for belonging often comes as a desire for a lost sense of community — the opportunity to join a group that can offer them a similar sense of camaraderie, mission, and loyalty can be incredibly enticing. Just as extremist groups value the discipline and structure of military members, the military member appreciates the sense of order in an extremist group and the pursuit of a perceived common good that many might not find in civilian life.

Another reason veterans might be susceptible to recruitment is that many feel animosity toward the government for not offering them the physical, psychological, or vocational support that they need to succeed in civilian life. Russian President Vladimir Putin has long sought to target and exploit United States military members for the same reason. Russian operatives target specific subgroups to capitalize “on latent grievances or sensitive touch points.” Russia exploits legitimate grievances that military members might have and uses them to create a foothold to foment discord and promote narratives that “the system” is irrevocably broken. Similarly, many extremist groups create narratives that veterans are not valued or that the ideals they fought for in the military are now under assault.

Another factor that contributes to extremist recruitment is that the U.S. military is an all-volunteer force. Without a draft of personnel from the general population, military institutions tend to become more conservative and isolated from civilian society. Volunteers have a longer initial term of service, reenlist in much higher numbers, and have a far lower turnover rate than draftees. These conservative tendencies are constantly reinforced, and young military members can be easy prey for the extreme right-wing groups that relate through similar conservative ideology. Finally, many people with military experience might see extremist groups as a chance to continue fighting for a noble cause. Military members become convinced that America’s heritage and culture are under attack and they are being called on as patriotic defenders.

Military members’ participation in domestic extremism has the potential to irrevocably harm the U.S. military. Active participation in domestic extremism undermines morale and reduces combat readiness of our nation’s military. Morale and cohesiveness among personnel within a military unit are critical, both directly and indirectly, to that unit’s mission readiness and potential for success. Trust and camaraderie are necessary for a team to function and fight effectively and are highly dependent on the ability of the members to communicate at all times. The U.S. military is the preeminent power in the world because of the different backgrounds, viewpoints, cultures, and experiences of our military members, not in spite of these differences. Supremacist views, discrimination, and disparate treatment of individuals jeopardize combat readiness by weakening interpersonal bonds, fomenting distrust, and eroding unit cohesion, and they will ultimately negate a unit’s ability to operate to its full potential. Domestic extremism will ultimately disrupt good order and discipline.

Beyond the threat to the military’s own personnel and missions, violent extremism within the military can also be a threat to the society at large. Violent extremists might receive training from the military, either because they became radicalized after joining the military or, in rarer circumstances, because they joined the military specifically for the purpose of receiving training. This weapons training and access to weapons make these individuals even more dangerous to their potential victims. Violent extremists with military experience might funnel out weapons or provide training to their groups, thus increasing the lethality of not only the individual, but also the entire violent extremist network.

Participation in domestic extremism by military members damages the nation’s trust in the institution. In the long term, this could harm recruitment and reduce the willingness of the American people to fund or support the military. Civilians have the right to know that their servicemembers are protecting them, not planning their destruction because of their race, origin, or political beliefs.

Legal Responses

If a military member participates in domestic extremism, no specific domestic extremism law exists under the Uniform Code of Military Justice to properly charge them. This means that commanders are instead left to address domestic extremism through a potpourri of punitive articles. These include Article 88 (contempt toward officials), Article 94 (mutiny or sedition), Article 116 (riot or breach of peace), and Article 117 (provoking words or gestures). Commanders may also use Article 92 (failure to obey an order or regulation or general order) to cover a broad range of minor misconduct. For example, Department of Defense Instruction 1325.06 forbids military personnel from participating in political activities in uniform or taking a leadership role in such activities. Two other overarching articles are Article 133 (conduct unbecoming an officer) and Article 134 (conduct that is disorderly or service-discrediting). Finally, depending on the circumstances of the offense, a commander could use clause 3 of Article 134 to charge offenses that violate federal civilian law, such as law made applicable through the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act.

In place of this piecemeal approach, Congress should adopt a punitive article that addresses domestic extremism directly. This would have a number of benefits. First, it would give the military a definition for identifying conduct that constitutes extremism and a corresponding tool to prosecute it. Commanders already see misconduct and know the harmful effect it will have. A punitive article will give them a framework to categorize that behavior. Additionally, a punitive article will serve as a deterrent to all military members, warning them that engaging in domestic extremism is not consistent with the values of being a servicemember.

Further, a codified charging scheme will be a clarion call to commanders to enforce the law. Arguably, it is already prohibited for military members to engage in domestic extremism. But the lack of a clear prohibition has inspired uncertainty among commanders regarding whether distasteful behavior is truly prohibited — in especially in light of perpetrators distorting claims of freedom of speech and personal liberty arguments. Making the prohibition explicit will give commanders the freedom to act as the military institution requires them to act.

Finally, the current framework makes it difficult to monitor domestic extremism. The government, Congress, and citizens have no real way to accurately monitor instances of domestic extremism in the military and the disposition of said offenses. Adopting a punitive article would allow the proper identification and tracking of the offense, as well allowing law enforcement agencies to have a repository of information to use in monitoring and future investigations. A data-driven understanding of the nature of extremist behavior among military personnel could help inform and prioritize educational efforts.

Challenges and Solutions

There are several obstacles that have so far prevented the military, and the society at large, from adopting a domestic extremism statute. All of them, however, can and should be overcome, particularly in the military context.

First, domestic extremism cases are difficult ones for the government to prove. Prosecutors must prove a defendant’s participation and motive, requiring a fact-finder to infer the intent of the accused. Yet the military has embraced difficult litigation in the past — for example, in prosecuting sexual assault cases. As a result, the system and its personnel are prepared for such an undertaking.

Second, prosecuting domestic extremism will be a politically delicate undertaking. But the military establishment already has the rationale and resources to operate independently of political pressures. Codifying a domestic extremism punitive article is consistent with the National Strategy for Countering Domestic Extremism, which states that “our law makes no distinction based on political views — left, right, or center — and neither should we.” Adopting a punitive article aligns with pillar three of the national strategy, enabling appropriate enhanced investigation and prosecution of domestic terrorism crimes.

Finally, the freedom of speech protections under the First Amendment drastically limit the ability of criminal statutes to regulate content and viewpoints in a domestic setting. There is a concern that the application of a domestic extremist punitive article will violate the First Amendment. Certainly, every effort must be made to avoid undermining servicemembers’ constitutional rights. However, the Supreme Court has been consistent in giving deference to the military to determine and create policies for itself. In fact, policies aimed at keeping the military “insulated from both the reality and the appearance of acting as a handmaiden for partisan political causes” are “wholly consistent with the American constitutional tradition of a politically neutral military establishment under civilian control.” The Court’s deference extends to military policies that restrict individual rights, which are constitutionally protected for civilians.

The Supreme Court has not held that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights are inapplicable to the military, but it has held that the executive branch and Congress have extraordinary leeway to determine the extent of those rights. Accordingly, the military can curtail a servicemember’s rights far more than civilian authorities can curtail a civilian’s rights. The Supreme Court often refers to the military as a “separate community” with the wholly unique purpose of providing for the nation’s defense and waging the nation’s wars: “The different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of [First Amendment] protections.” Courts base the argument for the separate community doctrine on the military’s exigent function, on which the survival of the nation depends and which has no analogue or parallel in civilian society. To provide for the nation’s defense and survival, this separate community abides by strict rules of discipline that will necessarily involve restriction of otherwise constitutionally provided protections.

Conclusion

Military commanders are entrusted with a grave responsibility. To fulfill it, the good order and discipline of the force are paramount. Extremism amongst the ranks is an insubordination that should be rooted out by commanders. Codifying domestic extremism as a punitive article under the Uniform Code of Military Justice will allow for the prosecution of military members who engage in acts that threaten the loyalty, discipline, or morale of fellow servicemembers. Adopting a punitive article will also help restore civilians’ faith in the military as an institution and protect them from domestic terror attacks. If allowed to fester, domestic extremism will pose a growing danger to the military and the country.

Become a Member

Lt. Col. Michael Schrama is currently a military judge assigned to the Air Force Trial Judiciary, District 1, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, VA. In this capacity, he serves as a trial judge at general and special courts-martial worldwide. Lt. Col. Schrama has served as an assistant staff judge advocate, area defense counsel, appellate defense counsel, environmental litigation attorney, deployed staff judge advocate, special assistant to the United States Attorney General, and deputy staff judge advocate. Lt. Col. Schrama also teaches military law at the William and Mary School of Law.

This article represents the opinions of the author and does not represent the opinions or policy of the William and Mary Law School, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Michael Schrama · July 19, 2023

19. The Indo-Pacific Strategy’s Missing Continental Dimension

Thank you to the authors. This has always troubled me since we adopted INDOPACOM for the old Pacific Command. We seem to be avoiding the Asian land mass (perhaps that is because we heed the age old, advice never start a war in Asia).

But I think the questions that should be asked now are: Is INDOPACOM too big (it is the largest geographic command)? Should we have an INDOPACOM and a Northeast Asia Command? (recognizing that wherever we establish boundaries we will create potential gaps and seams and command and control and roles and missions challenges.)

The Indo-Pacific Strategy’s Missing Continental Dimension

Anxiety over the rise of China and the authoritarian threat to the liberal democratic order has driven a maritime-heavy strategy. But don’t forget about the Eurasian landmass.

thediplomat.com · by Naoki Nihei · July 18, 2023

As China continues on its global superpower trajectory, policymakers in Beijing have taken increasingly aggressive measures to affirm their nation’s clout. These efforts have included attempts to expand China’s territorial claims in the East and South China Seas and discussions about a potential annexation of Taiwan. Additional issues include Beijing’s pursuit of partnering countries for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project – which has been marred by frequent allegations of “debt trap diplomacy” – as well as the recent Global Development Initiative (GDI) to provide aid for projects in developing countries that promote the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The leading democratic countries that uphold the liberal international order have expressed concerns over China’s attempts to garner international influence. Prominent government and business officials in these countries have accused China of attempting to overturn the current world order in favor of an authoritarian alternative. Consequently, China has emboldened other authoritarian regimes, most notably Russia, to take more forceful action in upending liberal democratic hegemony – with the Russian invasion of Ukraine bringing this growing brazenness to the forefront.

Anxiety over the rise of China and the authoritarian threat to the status quo has driven the G-7 and the world’s other leading democracies to collaborate on an “Indo-Pacific Strategy” to contain China while simultaneously bolstering their authority in Asia as a whole. Notable efforts include the EU’s renewed plan of Indo-Pacific engagement; the Quad, a loose security alliance composed of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia; and the Blue Dot Network, a U.S, Japan, and Australia-led challenger to the BRI.

A marked feature of these democratically aligned countries’ Indo-Pacific Strategy is their focus on maritime affairs. Joint naval exercises and additional maritime security activities serve as major components of the EU’s Indo-Pacific agenda, as well as the foundation for the Quad’s cooperation. While the Blue Dot Network is less explicitly focused on maritime issues, the fact that it was first announced at the 35th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Thailand, as well as its ties to the leading countries of the Quad (sans India), hint at its oceanic orientation.

While these maritime initiatives show promise regarding the democratic countries’ efforts to balance China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific region, they also expose a major flaw in their strategy thus far: What about the “continental dimension” of Indo-Pacific engagement? What is the democratic powers’ plan of action for strengthening ties with China’s inland neighbors – namely, the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan?

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Although the leading democratic countries have taken some measures to forge stronger ties with Central Asia, their efforts have proven underwhelming thus far. To their credit, they have pursued such initiatives as the EU-Central Asia strategy, Japan’s Central Asia plus Japan political dialogue, and the U.S. C5+1 initiative. These programs have helped promote democratization, human rights protection, sustainable economic development, and related policies in Central Asia. However, the democratic countries have been relatively limited in the scope of their collaboration with Central Asia and have done less multinational coordination – especially when compared to their more varied activities regarding the Indo-Pacific Strategy.

China and Russia still wield far more influence in Central Asia than their democratic counterparts. The Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), China’s aforementioned BRI, and the multilateral Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) have exponentially increased China and Russia’s economic and security influence in Central Asia.

The economic and strategic aspects of bolstered engagement with Central Asia, however, are growing increasingly difficult to overlook. The region’s clout was on full display at the “Central and South Asia 2021” conference in Tashkent, which served as a platform to promote investment in Uzbekistan and greater Central Asia. The event emphasized Central Asia’s economic capacity by highlighting its vast mineral resource endowments and capacity to become a major producer of renewable energy via its solar, wind, and hydropower potential.

Furthermore, Central Asia’s long-standing reputation as “the continental crossroads” could transform global trade. The conference stressed the need to promote connectivity with South Asia in particular by constructing a greater number of trade and transport routes to India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. One of the most notable ongoing initiatives is the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline, which could bolster revenues for the Turkmen energy sector while providing 1.5 billion people in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India with secure energy access.

While these aspirations have faced, and will continue to face, reconfiguration as a result of the Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan, they should remain goals to strive for. Deepened integration with South Asia would provide the Central Asian states with massively enhanced economic opportunities on both a regional level and through access to sea-based international trade routes. In turn, the expansion of additional trade markets for Central Asian goods would lessen Chinese and Russian hegemony in the region.

South Asian countries also stand to gain from Central Asian connectivity. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that the Central Asian states could fulfill their “vast economic potential” through heightened trade with India, especially through the Indo-Iranian Chabahar Port and the massive International North- South Transport Corridor (INSTC) transit project. Then-Prime Minister Imran Khan of Pakistan discussed developing and enhancing infrastructure ties between Pakistan and the Central Asian states, particularly through the country’s Karachi and Gwadar ports. Central Asian integration with South Asia would also have ripple effects throughout the Eurasian continent, as the region’s market reach could extend into Southeast Asia, Western Asia, and Europe through the bridges from the Indian Ocean to the continental mainland. The linkages created could revive the spirit of the Silk Road and forge new flows of ideas and goods throughout greater Eurasia.

Strategic implications also make it imperative for the democratic countries to add a more robust continental element in their Indo-Pacific Strategy. Securitizing Central Asia gained increased attention in the aftermath of the Taliban’s rapid takeover of Afghanistan. Governments sought to alleviate regional spillover effects, including refugee flows and increased terrorist activity, as well as to protect the proposed super projects envisioned for the region. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine further emphasized the critical geostrategic significance of Central Asia. The Central Asian states have tiptoed around not openly condemning Moscow while also signaling support for Ukraine. Anxieties over the possibility of Russia repeating an invasion in their territories, as well as fears of becoming too dependent on Chinese investment, have motivated Central Asian leaders to expand their geopolitical partnerships.

Given the global energy insecurity that has resulted as a consequence of the war in Ukraine, establishing alternative energy routes that bypass Russia has become of critical importance to multiple countries around the world. Caspian-based routes have emerged as viable contenders to this objective, and thus the Central Asian states, along with Turkey and the Caucasus states of Azerbaijan and Georgia (Armenia has not been included in most of the current major projects), are becoming increasingly vital players in catering to global energy demands. Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan have been in negotiations over the development of a Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCP), which would connect Turkmenistan’s bountiful natural gas reserves – the fourth largest in the world – to the Caucasus, Turkey, and Europe via linkages such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP).

Energy and transit networks could also be expanded into the other Central Asian states through such initiatives as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), which aims to facilitate intercontinental trade and could provide a key outlet for Central Asian resources and products to more easily reach markets beyond Russia and China. Given all these factors, Central Asia should serve as the linchpin for any strategy determined to maintain stability and secure vital supplies in Eurasia and beyond.

With these factors in mind, the democratic countries should revise their current Indo-Pacific strategy to give greater priority to Central Asian engagement. To balance out the heavy maritime focus of the current strategy, these countries should shift to inter-regional connectivity via both land and sea. They can continue the Central Asian regional projects they have pursued as individual states, but should aim to deepen their involvement in these projects while developing multilateral initiatives – similar to their cooperation in the East and South China Seas. The democratic countries should unite in their objectives and resources to collaborate with each other and the Central Asian states to secure the success of their aims more effectively.

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The payoffs of such coordination have immense potential: market integration could mutually benefit multiple states through the expansion of trade networks, which in turn could foster greater interregional cooperation, securitization, and poverty alleviation. Furthermore, strengthening Central Asian alliances would serve as a key means of countering Chinese and Russian authoritarian influence, which would serve as wise preventative measures to protect against territorial concerns expanding beyond Ukraine and possibly Taiwan.

The Central Asian land nexus is a critical component to fortify the South and Southeast Asian maritime dimension of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, and thus should be continued and strengthened. In doing so, the leading democracies can promote value-based diplomacy throughout Eurasia and more effectively ensure successful engagement in the region – from both a continental and maritime standpoint – for years to come.

GUEST AUTHOR

Naoki Nihei

Naoki Nihei is a former official of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). His research focuses on Central Asia.

GUEST AUTHOR

Marin Ekstrom

Marin Ekstrom is a lecturer and researcher based in Tokyo, Japan. She received her M.A. in International Relations from Central European University in 2020. Her research interests include Eurasian integration and language policy and education.

thediplomat.com · by Naoki Nihei · July 18, 2023

20. Book Review - The Jedburghs | SOF News

Book Review - The Jedburghs | SOF News

sof.news · by Guest · July 19, 2023

By How Miller.

“The Jedburghs” by Bill Irwin is an illuminating portrayal of the direct predecessors of the U.S. Army Special Forces. Each of us can picture ourselves in the roles depicted, and hope that we would have been as resourceful and lucky to have overcome the obstacles before us.

The Jedburghs were the core of what an A-Team is today. After rigorous recruitment, selection, and training, a select few were chosen to be parachuted in as part of a Jedburgh team, sometimes referred to as a “Jed.” Typically a Jed would be a three man team including a radio operator and two officers. At least one of the team was to be indigenous to the area of operation, and a minimum of one had to be either a Brit from SOE or an American from OSS. Most were also multi-lingual.

The book, both extensively researched over twenty years, and told from multiple perspectives, shows the process of assisting and guiding the many active and potential resisters of Nazi occupation in France and beyond. The uncountable number of acts of bravery by those Maquis were made more effective by the equally brave, tenacious, and wise British SOE and the American OSS working side by side with them, providing arms, training, and coordination with the Allied Armed Forces. All the high-ranking generals expressed their deep appreciation of how much the resistance accomplished, both in direct actions and in intelligence provided. For example, it is quite possible the Normandy invasion may have failed without their help.

The breadth of the story gives the reader both an overall understanding of the process and the importance to the Allied Victory, as well as a very relatable recounting of the ground actions of several Jedburgh teams. Some very familiar names are shown in their earlier days, such as “Wild” Bill Donovan, Aaron Bank, and William Colby, along with the first official naming of Special Force HQ.

I was struck by the many parallels described by COL(Ret) Mark Rosengard at SFACON 2022 with Task Force DAGGER and beyond, including gaining trust and coalition building to achieve the prime objective. “By, with and through” is alive and well within the regiment.

The book, first released in 2005, is available in Kindle, audiobook, hardcover, paperback, and audio CD. It contains charts of participants and much more.

**********

This book review of The Jedburghs by How Miller was first published by Sentinel, a periodical of Chapter 78, Special Forces Association on July 2023. Reprinted with permission of the editor of Sentinel. The book author, Will Irwin, is a Resident Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University. He is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces officer with experience as a defense analyst, researcher, historian, instructor, and writer.

sof.news · by Guest · July 19, 2023

21. The New Spy Wars: How China and Russia Use Intelligence Agencies to Undermine America

Excerpts:

During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union industrialized intelligence collection, using computers to attack each other’s cryptology. Spying moved from on land, deep under the sea, into the stratosphere, and then even into space. Today, Western governments are in a new cold war with Russia and China that is again transforming the nature of espionage. This new cold war is not a repeat of the last one, but it does have continuities and similarities, including a stark asymmetry in the East-West intelligence conflict. It was colossally difficult for Western clandestine services to collect reliable intelligence on closed police states behind the Iron Curtain; now it is even more difficult for them to operate effectively in Russia or China, with their Orwellian domestic surveillance systems. Meanwhile, it is relatively easy for Russia and China to steal secrets from the open, free, and democratic societies of the West, just as it was for the Soviets before them.

But the similarities between this superpower conflict and the last one should not blind us to their differences. China’s massive economic weight and integration into the global economy differentiate it from the Soviet Union. Today’s information landscape is also much different from that of even the recent past. Commercial satellite companies, for example, now offer capabilities that until recently would have been the preserve of governments. Open-source and commercial intelligence are transforming national security. In the last Cold War, approximately 80 percent of U.S. intelligence was derived from clandestine sources while 20 percent came from open sources. Today, those proportions are thought to be reversed. The future of Western intelligence lies not with governments but with the private sector. The challenge for Western governments is to harness the capabilities of commercial intelligence providers. This will require new public-private partnerships.

What Western governments need more than anything, however, is imagination when it comes to intelligence collection about closed police states. Imagination is what led the CIA to develop high-altitude U-2 planes that were capable of spying behind the Iron Curtain when other methods were impossible. Similar imagination is needed today in areas at the forefront of national security, including open-source intelligence gathering, the use of machine learning and artificial intelligence, and quantum computing. These will be the weapons of this century’s cold war—and those that will determine its outcome.

The New Spy Wars

How China and Russia Use Intelligence Agencies to Undermine America

By Calder Walton

July 19, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Calder Walton · July 19, 2023

The Cold War never ended. That, at least, is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s view. The clearest indication that the Kremlin continued its titanic struggle against the West even after the Soviet Union collapsed can be seen in the activities of Russia’s security and intelligence services. In their operations and in the vast power they wield in Russian society, they have picked up where Soviet intelligence left off. Since 1991, these agencies have been driven by a revanchist strategy to make Russia great again and to overturn the post–Cold War U.S.-led international order. Putin’s war in Ukraine is the bloody conclusion of that strategy.

China is also seeking to reverse the outcome of the Cold War. With the “no limits” alliance proclaimed on the eve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Putin and China’s leader, Xi Jinping, are attempting to upend the international system—and they are leaning heavily on their intelligence organs to do so. Spy agencies can do what other branches of government cannot: execute non-avowed foreign policy. Both Russian and Chinese intelligence have done so in the furtherance of their revisionist goals, taking advantage of the United States while it was distracted by the “war on terror” to damage U.S. national security, undermine Western democracies, and steal as many scientific and technical secrets as possible.

ALL THE TSAR’S MEN

Russia’s intelligence services view themselves as the direct heirs of the KGB. Although the KGB was disbanded in 1991, many of its former officers and all of its tradecraft, files, and even agents in the West were transferred to Russia’s new security service, now known as the FSB, and foreign intelligence service, the SVR. For years after the end of the Cold War, Russian intelligence continued to run former Soviet agents in the West, including the CIA counterintelligence official Aldrich Ames and the FBI agent Robert Hanssen. It was business as usual for Russia. The SVR’s first director, KGB veteran Yevgeny Primakov, continued the Soviet intelligence agency’s traditions of coercion and blackmail—tactics that he himself had fallen victim to as a young man. According to material smuggled from the KGB’s archives, Primakov had been blackmailed into serving the agency while working as a journalist in the Middle East in the 1960s. The founding father of the FSB, Rem Krassilnikov, was also a former KGB officer and communist true believer; his wife’s name, Ninel, was Lenin spelled backward. According to an FSB defector who worked under Krassilnikov in the 1990s, the FSB used the same training manuals as the KGB, but with the ideological sections about communism simply ripped out.

Then there is Putin himself, whose experience in the KGB’s foreign intelligence directorate profoundly shaped his subsequent political career. While stationed in Dresden in East Germany—a KGB sideshow, since the real action was in East Berlin—Putin witnessed the Soviet empire’s disintegration firsthand. It was, as he later said, the greatest catastrophe of the twentieth century. Putin calls himself a “Chekist,” in honor of the early Soviet secret police, the Cheka, and had a statue of Cheka founder Felix Dzerzhinsky in his office when he was the FSB director. To this day, Putin walks with the gunslinger gait of an FSB man, left hand swinging but right hand motionless next to an invisible side arm, to let everyone know he’s trained.

Like many Russians, Putin has suffered from something like phantom limb syndrome ever since the Soviet Union collapsed. As a result, in the 1990s, it took little to convince him that NATO was by definition hostile to Moscow. Soviet intelligence used to call the United States “the main enemy”—and once the main enemy, always the main enemy. In the 1990s, Russia’s intelligence services were, if anything, more aggressive toward the United States than the KGB had been in the later Soviet period. Nothing breeds aggression like humiliation.

To this day, Putin walks with the gunslinger gait of an FSB man.

By the end of the 1990s, the SVR was using the Internet to spread disinformation to discredit the United States. SVR officers stationed in the United States bombarded U.S. media outlets and messaging boards with themes straight from the Soviet propaganda script, including the U.S. government’s secret racist agenda and its illegal development of biological weapons. Sometime around 1996, Russian hackers instigated a massive breach of sensitive U.S. government databases, including those of NASA and the Pentagon.

U.S. intelligence was not sitting on its hands, of course. As Russia’s economy tanked in the late 1990s, the CIA was able to reel in some valuable Russian recruits who betrayed—for cash—their spymasters and blunted Moscow’s intelligence operations against the West. But then came 9/11.

BLINDED BY THE FIGHT

At first, it seemed that the war on terror might be a chance for a reset, an occasion for greater U.S.-Russian intelligence cooperation. After his first meeting with Putin in 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush famously remarked that he had been “able to get a sense of his soul” and believed him to be trustworthy. Russia’s intelligence services did initially cooperate with the United States on counterterrorism. But according to CIA officials, the U.S.-Russian intelligence honeymoon after 9/11 was short-lived, giving way to an era of clandestine Russian aggression. Meanwhile, Washington was looking the other way. Throughout the war on terror, the U.S. government plowed overwhelming resources into counterterrorism at the expense of efforts to deal with threats from resurgent powers such as Russia and China.

So did many U.S. allies, including the United Kingdom. According to a 2020 report by its parliamentary intelligence and security committee, the British security service MI5 devoted a staggering 92 percent of its work to counterterrorism in 2006. This was the same year that a former FSB officer, Alexander Litvinenko, was assassinated in London with radioactive polonium. Later, a British public inquiry found that Putin himself had probably approved the murder, as had then FSB head Nikolai Patrushev, another KGB veteran who now sits on Putin’s national security council. There is no corresponding public data on how U.S. intelligence agencies divided their attention and resources between counterterrorism and other priorities after 9/11, but U.S. intelligence officers I interviewed said that counterterrorism was the overwhelming focus of the U.S. intelligence community. As late as 2017, counterterrorism was still the top budget item for the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Putin has run Russia as a militarist mafia regime.

Putin’s genius was to obscure from Western powers after 9/11 that although he was cooperating on counterterrorism, he was also using his intelligence services to solidify his authoritarian regime and make Russia into a great power again. At home, he silenced dissent, crushed the free press, and eliminated his opponents, following the Stalinist tradition of “no man, no problem.” In Russia’s near and far abroad, Putin sought to prevent the expansion of NATO and contain what he saw as U.S. subversion in eastern Europe by invading Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014, and the rest of Ukraine in 2022. NATO expansion fed Putin’s fears about Western subversion, but it is fanciful to suppose that without enlargement of the alliance Russia would have been a peaceful or responsible player in global politics. Putin has run Russia as a militarist mafia regime.

Since coming to power three decades ago, Putin has made Russia’s security and intelligence services into a virtual state within a state. He relies on a clique of Chekist siloviki, or “men of force,” who have intelligence and military backgrounds and who wield disproportionate influence in his police regime. According to CIA insiders, an overwhelming majority of the Kremlin technocrats who run Russia’s economy had such backgrounds in 2020.

It is little wonder, then, that Russia’s strategy and tactics are straight from the Soviet playbook, albeit updated for the cyber-age. Social media and digital interconnectivity provide new means for older ends, giving Russia’s spy services capabilities that the KGB could only have dreamed of. Putin has used a variety of covert actions to subvert his opponents in the West. He has interfered in Western democratic elections, most strikingly in the U.S. presidential election in 2016, preserving a Soviet tradition stretching back to at least 1948. Putin has also kept alive the Soviet practice of deploying deep cover “illegals” in Western countries, some of whom have been arrested and traded back to Moscow in spy swaps that resemble those of the last century’s Cold War.

Although Putin has encouraged the notion that he is a master spy, in reality he has presided over a succession of intelligence failures. In 2010, for example, the FBI and CIA wound up a network of Russian illegals in the United States. They did so by recruiting a key officer inside the SVR’s illegals program who fed Washington secrets. But Putin’s greatest intelligence failure preceded his decision to invade Ukraine in February 2022. U.S. and British intelligence agencies successfully pieced together Putin’s war plans and exposed them to the world, thereby removing his ability to concoct pretexts for the invasion.

If it ever becomes possible to see the intelligence that Putin was given in the lead-up to the war in Ukraine, it would not be surprising to find that it confirmed, rather than contradicted, his overestimation of Russia’s military strength. There is little room for truth telling in Putin’s court, just as there was in Stalin’s. The murderous nature of Putin’s rule guarantees that he is given sycophantic intelligence. Since the start of the war, Russian intelligence has suffered a series of operational failures, including the dismantling of its spy networks in Norway, Sweden, and Slovenia.

NOT JUST ANY OLD SPY SERVICE

Like Russia, China also exploited the U.S.-led war on terror to advance its interests. According to CIA officers with deep China expertise, Beijing’s principal civilian intelligence service, the Ministry of State Security, declared war on U.S. intelligence in 2005. From then on, while Washington was consumed by the war on terror, the MSS threw its best resources and officers at the U.S. government and U.S. corporations, stealing as many scientific and technical secrets as possible to bolster China’s economy and its military power. Internal MSS deliberations from this time were marked with glee that the United States was mired in the Middle East and inattentive to China’s clandestine successes.

The MSS’s assault on the United States soon paid off. In 2010, the Chinese spy agency dismantled a major CIA network in China, leading to the murder or imprisonment of more than a dozen U.S. sources, according to an investigative report published by The New York Times. It remains unclear exactly how Chinese intelligence compromised the CIA network, but the damage was undeniable. Ten years later, a U.S. intelligence official with firsthand knowledge of these events told me that the CIA had still not recovered in China.

Under Xi, China has become the world’s principal cyberthief.

Since Xi came to power, China’s intelligence offense against the West and the United States, in particular, has grown exponentially. The mission of Chinese intelligence is to execute Xi’s grand strategy: to make China into the number one military and economic power in the world and invert the existing technological landscape, making other countries dependent on Chinese technology instead of American technology. Chinese spy services employ a “whole of society” approach to collecting intelligence: they hoover up human, cyber, and signals intelligence (using balloons and apparently an eavesdropping base in Cuba) while also exploiting publicly available sources, including social media. Through a series of draconian national security laws passed under Xi, the Chinese Communist Party also compels Chinese businesses to cooperate with intelligence agencies whenever requested, thus fusing spying and buying. The result is a Chinese mercantilist authoritarian model without parallel in the West. The CCP uses talent programs and cultural exchanges for espionage by another name. Beijing also exploits Chinese communities in Western countries, pressuring them to pass on intelligence, often by blackmailing them or threatening family members in China.

Under Xi, China has become the world’s principal cyberthief, stealing more personal and business data from Americans than every other country combined, according to the FBI. In 2021, the FBI reported that it was opening a new China-related counterintelligence investigation every 12 hours. And in July 2023, the United Kingdom’s parliamentary intelligence and security committee reported that the Chinese government has penetrated every sector of the British economy.

Phrases such as “U.S.-Chinese competition” do not do justice to the ugly reality. Like Russian intelligence agencies, Chinese intelligence services compete according to fundamentally different rules from those followed by their Western counterparts. Unlike U.S. or European spy agencies, the MSS is not subject to the rule of law or to independent political oversight. Nor is the MSS publicly accountable to Chinese citizens or scrutinized by a free press. These differences mean that statements such as “all states spy,” often used to discount Chinese espionage, are dangerously misleading. Just because all armies have guns does not mean they are the same. Unlike Western services, there are few meaningful restraints on Chinese or Russian intelligence agencies. In fact, Chinese and Russian services are limited only by operational effectiveness—what they can get away with. Western governments and publics need to wake up to this threat.

OLD GRUDGES, NEW WEAPONS

During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union industrialized intelligence collection, using computers to attack each other’s cryptology. Spying moved from on land, deep under the sea, into the stratosphere, and then even into space. Today, Western governments are in a new cold war with Russia and China that is again transforming the nature of espionage. This new cold war is not a repeat of the last one, but it does have continuities and similarities, including a stark asymmetry in the East-West intelligence conflict. It was colossally difficult for Western clandestine services to collect reliable intelligence on closed police states behind the Iron Curtain; now it is even more difficult for them to operate effectively in Russia or China, with their Orwellian domestic surveillance systems. Meanwhile, it is relatively easy for Russia and China to steal secrets from the open, free, and democratic societies of the West, just as it was for the Soviets before them.

But the similarities between this superpower conflict and the last one should not blind us to their differences. China’s massive economic weight and integration into the global economy differentiate it from the Soviet Union. Today’s information landscape is also much different from that of even the recent past. Commercial satellite companies, for example, now offer capabilities that until recently would have been the preserve of governments. Open-source and commercial intelligence are transforming national security. In the last Cold War, approximately 80 percent of U.S. intelligence was derived from clandestine sources while 20 percent came from open sources. Today, those proportions are thought to be reversed. The future of Western intelligence lies not with governments but with the private sector. The challenge for Western governments is to harness the capabilities of commercial intelligence providers. This will require new public-private partnerships.

What Western governments need more than anything, however, is imagination when it comes to intelligence collection about closed police states. Imagination is what led the CIA to develop high-altitude U-2 planes that were capable of spying behind the Iron Curtain when other methods were impossible. Similar imagination is needed today in areas at the forefront of national security, including open-source intelligence gathering, the use of machine learning and artificial intelligence, and quantum computing. These will be the weapons of this century’s cold war—and those that will determine its outcome.

CALDER WALTON is Assistant Director of the Applied History Project and the Intelligence Project at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He is the author of Spies: The Epic Intelligence War Between East and West.

Foreign Affairs · by Calder Walton · July 19, 2023

22. Ukraine’s Other Allies – The West Should Assist the Private Actors Helping Arm Kyiv

Excerpts:

The West must acknowledge the significant impact that seemingly small actions by nonstate actors have on the war in Ukraine. The United States and its allies can significantly enhance the campaign to defeat Russia and restore Ukraine’s sovereignty through integrating these actors into a more flexible, irregular strategy of statecraft. To achieve this outcome, the United States and its allies and partners should remove obstacles and bureaucratic hurdles to informal assistance.

For starters, policymakers need to modify the State Department’s International Trade in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which governs the export of defense and military technologies. Although these rules are primarily aimed at sensitive technologies like night-vision goggles, they impede the export of certain types of body armor and parts for vehicles. By carving out a policy exception for Ukraine, the State Department would make it easier for Ukrainian NGOs to receive nonlethal supplies from private sources. Additionally, the United States should authorize the U.S. embassy in Kiev to coordinate directly with properly vetted NGOs to enhance the impact of private support, expand the lines of communication, and further expedite the provision of assistance in Ukraine. For example, the Weatherman Foundation has relayed to us that they could expedite the evacuation and repatriation of Americans wounded and killed in the war if the embassy formally recognized their humanitarian operations inside of Ukraine.

To fully harness the potential of informal aid, both in Ukraine and in conflicts to come, Western military strategists need to move beyond the familiar cliché of whole-of-society approaches to problems and threats. In a complicated, protracted war involving many different security needs, informal contributions from volunteers and groups that have special military, technological, and medical expertise can add significantly to performance on the battlefield. Moreover, because it relies on grass roots efforts by interconnected civil society around the world, informal assistance confers an advantage that authoritarian adversaries are unable to match. Mobilizing these informal networks will not only help the United States and its allies and partners translate their significant aid packages to Ukraine into lasting success against Russia. It will also establish a template for building a more effective, multipronged response to other would-be aggressors.

Ukraine’s Other Allies

The West Should Assist the Private Actors Helping Arm Kyiv

By Jahara Matisek, William Reno and Sam Rosenberg

July 19, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Jahara Matisek · July 19, 2023

At this month’s NATO summit in Vilnius, the extensive security assistance that the West is providing Kyiv was brought into sharp focus. At the meeting, the United States and its allies announced a plan to train Ukrainian pilots to fly F-16s—a follow-on to the Biden administration’s May 2023 decision to allow NATO allies to send the fighter jets to Ukraine. The French government announced that it was sending long-range SCALP cruise missiles. These announcements build on other recent pledges, including Germany’s promise in May to provide $3 billion in military aid, including tanks, artillery, and antiaircraft guns. Given the size and military importance of these transfers, it may seem that the West is covering Ukraine’s war needs.

But major weaponry and ammunition are only part of the story. Despite its growing access to advanced Western systems, Ukraine continues to face critical deficiencies in many essential areas, including protective equipment, maintenance and logistics, and spare parts for weapons and vehicles. Combined with shortfalls in various forms of nonlethal aid and equipment, these gaps not only significantly limit Ukrainian performance on the battlefield but also blunt the impact of the Western aid packages. Moreover, Western governments, despite their best efforts, are often not able to respond rapidly to these shifting immediate needs.

To address this problem, a veritable army of private actors and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have quietly stepped in. Over the past year, such informal assistance has come to play a crucial role in many aspects of the Ukrainian war effort and counteroffensive. For instance, the Sabre Training Advisory Group, a donor-funded NGO based in Ukraine, recently trained platoon and company level tactics for Ukraine’s 68th Jaeger Brigade, transmitting skills and expertise that helped the unit liberate Blahodatne and Zaporizhzhia in early June. Similarly in June, another Ukraine-based NGO, Anomaly, discovered that Ukraine’s 23rd Mechanized Brigade had been sent to the front without any medical supplies. Within three days, Anomaly was able to provide the unit with medical supplies and training. By operating largely out of public view, such support has significantly enhanced Ukraine’s fighting capacity. Nonetheless, some Western governments, including that of the United States, have hindered this work, whether by blocking the private transfer of some nonlethal equipment or by imposing excessive bureaucratic hurdles for export licenses or for requirements for retired U.S. service members who are seeking to train Ukrainian military personnel.

With the right kind of support, this innovative strategy could provide the edge that Ukraine needs to sustain a grueling ground war that is likely to last for months to come. It could also provide a template for how open societies can respond to future conflicts. But to have this impact, it will require sustained support, including from Western governments themselves. Particularly now that Ukraine’s counteroffensive is at a critical juncture and many daily needs have become acute, the United States and its allies should reevaluate the role of informal assistance and do more to facilitate it—or at a minimum, to not hinder private actors from improving Ukrainian military effectiveness.

COSSACKS AND CYBERPUNKS

Although it has received relatively little scrutiny, informal assistance to Ukraine has already shown several distinct advantages over formal state-based aid. It offers greater flexibility and responsiveness. It can be delivered at low risk to Ukraine’s Western supporters, increasing the lethality of the Ukrainian military in ways that Russia does not perceive as escalatory. And whereas formal state-to-state military assistance tends to be highly centralized, with equipment and weapons delivered from logistical hubs to depots and requiring multiple steps to reach combat zones, informal assistance can often be provided directly. Relying on their own trusted networks and private contacts in the field, volunteers and NGOs—such as Sabre Training Advisory Group and Anomaly—can enable point-to-point delivery of equipment and aid to commanders and units, allowing assistance to be tailored to specific needs, times, and locations. They can also bypass cumbersome bureaucratic processes and limit the diversion of supplies during transit.

Since Russia’s February 2022 invasion, the United States has provided over $41 billion of military assistance, with allies and partners providing an additional $13 billion in security aid. But much of this has been in the form of lethal equipment such as tanks, missile systems, and munitions. Comparatively little aid is directed toward the urgent everyday needs of soldiers. Volunteers, crowdfunding, charitable groups, NGOs, and international corporations step in to address those equally important needs, whether they are feeding troops, giving instruction in combat medicine, demining and defusing Russian munitions, supplying modified commercial drones, or providing helmets, body armor, and basic safety equipment.

Much like the Cossacks’ introduction of irregular tactics and flexible warfighting strategies in the sixteenth century, informal assistance has helped shape and transform the tenacious Ukrainian way of war. Crucial to Ukrainian success has been the ability to fight with minimal resources, integrate weapons and technologies in novel ways, and utilize non-standard help, including from volunteers, NGOs, donations, and private chat groups with Western military advisers. Taken together, these developments provide an alternative, more agile foundation for Ukraine’s warfighting capacity than Western governments themselves are able to provide. Innovative and evolving, Ukrainian forces have learned to combine the old, the new, and the available to generate the most effective outcomes on the battlefield. One British military trainer we interviewed described Ukrainian artillery tactics as a “cyberpunk approach” to spotting, prioritizing, targeting, and shooting Russian positions as they adapted to the need to conserve ammunition. Novel Cossack-style adaptation has become a crucial way for Ukraine to sustain its counteroffensive and will be vital in its efforts to use attrition and maneuver to recapture Russian-occupied areas over the medium to long term.

Most groups assisting Ukraine provide nonlethal equipment and training.

Informal support is likely to become only more important the longer the war continues. For example, while formal Western training programs generally lack the capacity to rapidly adapt to changing demands, volunteers, NGOs, and private organizations are constantly updating and streamlining their instruction programs with Ukrainian forces. Informal assistance networks can be activated to fill crucial gaps in real time to respond to pressures on supply lines and maintenance and to quickly replenish basic equipment, an advantage over slower-moving Western aid packages. Furthermore, if the war becomes protracted, sustaining strong political support in Western capitals could become increasingly challenging. In the event of shifting political winds, informal assistance would offer a modest backstop.

Despite their demonstrable value, many volunteers and groups active in Ukraine have run into bureaucratic roadblocks. In interviews with us, some have suggested that the U.S. State Department is wary of private organizations becoming involved in Ukrainian aid, because of the perceived risk that the government could lose control over the direction and outcomes of assistance efforts and because of concern that it may signal another step of escalation against Russia. Yet most groups assisting Ukraine provide nonlethal equipment and training. These forms of support are defensive and non-escalatory, and they can provide an essential and complementary function to formal Western aid, ensuring that Ukrainian forces remain operational in prolonged combat and helping them outthink and outfight their Russian adversaries.

RIFLE PARTS AND FIREPROOF SUITS

After 16 months of war, examples of the impact of informal assistance on the war are legion. In March, the Ukrainian World Congress, an NGO based in Canada, raised $40 million to purchase 25 armored vehicles for the Ukrainian territorial defense forces. The vehicles have been used to outfit Ukraine’s 127th Brigade of the territorial defense forces of Kharkiv, a unit that fought in Bakhmut in May. Since much of the state-based aid is directed toward Ukraine’s regular army units, this informal support for territorial defense units addresses a critical and often overlooked element of Ukraine’s security, as these units were regularly being rotated through Bakhmut in 2023. Similarly, Atlas Global Aid is a nonprofit that has provided Ukrainian troops with over 10,000 articles of cold-weather gear, 408 sleeping systems, 350 pieces of body armor, 200 medical kits, 93 helmet attachments and adapters, 23 infrared lasers, 20 drones, and other gear and training. Such efforts give Ukrainian soldiers a qualitative edge against the lesser-equipped Russian troops.

Blue/Yellow Ukraine, an NGO based in Lithuania and the United States, has been traveling along the frontlines and distributing a simple $3 part to repair American-made M-4 rifles used by Ukrainian forces. The part breaks easily with heavy use and prevents the weapon from firing. Unfortunately, frontline units do not receive spare parts or kits to fix their M-4 rifles. By addressing this minor issue, the organization has been able to ensure that the Ukrainian forces have fully functional weapons. Or consider the Ukrainian Air Force. Most units do not have the funds to purchase protective flight equipment, such as aviation helmets and fireproof flight suits and gloves, making them vulnerable to foreseeable hazards in the cockpit during a hard landing or an ejection. To answer this need, in March 2023, Trevor Gersten, a recently retired lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Air Force, started his donation initiative, known as Flight Gear Ukraine, which has provided more than 200 flight suits along with dozens of jackets, gloves, vests, and generators, as well as hundreds of individual first-aid kits.

Sabre Training Advisory Group has received approval from a Ukrainian brigade to purchase and transport supplies. It can do this more quickly and cheaply than Ukraine’s own Ministry of Defense, and can ensure proper tactical training and logistics to sustain long-term combat. For one Ukrainian brigade, the advanced medical training provided by Sabre proved critical during a battle in the Donbas: after the brigade received 40 casualties, Ukrainian soldiers were able to use their training, and all but one survived. Noting how unprepared and untrained Russia’s own units are, the political scientist Tanisha M. Fazal has described Ukraine’s military medicine as a “critical advantage” that has allowed it to avoid Russia’s very high death rate.

Informal security assistance has also been used to address overlooked elements within Ukraine’s security apparatus. For instance, in November 2022, Spirit of America—a U.S.-based organization that is the only NGO operating in Ukraine with the U.S. government’s official support—provided seed funding to establish a captain’s career course within Ukraine’s territorial defense forces to ensure better decision-making in the current counteroffensive. Additionally, Spirit of America has supported a Ukrainian initiative to refurbish thousands of dilapidated military vehicles to augment Ukraine’s logistical ability to transport supplies through rough terrain on the front.

Many groups have leveraged rapid fundraising to meet urgent needs. Saint Javelin, an organization based in Canada and Ukraine, have raised over $2 million through clothing sales and fundraisers to pay for pickup trucks, generators, medical aid kits, and other crucial items for Ukrainian forces. The Ukraine Defense Fund, an NGO based in Ukraine and run by a former Silicon Valley tech entrepreneur, has raised over $6.5 million for a variety of military needs, including commercial drones for intelligence-gathering—support that has had a measurable effect on Ukrainian military performance. According to the group’s CEO, the average Ukrainian artillery team needs 60 rounds to a hit a target, whereas an artillery team that is equipped with drone-spotting capabilities needs only five rounds to destroy an enemy target. Given that most Ukrainian units have acquired drones via informal channels, this improvement in performance underscores the stark advantages that informal nonlethal aid can bring.

NIMBLE, CHEAP, EFFECTIVE

In addition to providing kinds of support that states cannot, informal aid can leverage the distinct advantages of the private sector. In the early months of the war, for example, Russian drones used infrared optics to identify Ukrainian special forces on reconnaissance missions. To better conceal these operators, Ukrainian special forces needed infrared blankets to mask their signatures at night. But the U.S. government did not have these blankets in existing stocks and lacked a mechanism for purchasing them. Spirit of America stepped in to help, buying blankets off the shelf and getting them into Ukrainian hands in time to save lives. A senior officer at U.S. Special Operations Command commented that the NGO “provided the lion’s share of nonlethal equipment received by Ukrainian Special Operations Forces, which served as a lifeline to keep them alive and functioning during the earlier period of the war.”

Informal assistance can avoid the bureaucracy and political baggage that usually accompanies formal state-based aid. By connecting Western resources directly to the Ukrainians who need them, private efforts often achieve outsize results from relatively modest investments. Similarly effective are informal exchanges of information, such as secure messaging group chats between Western military personnel and Ukrainian forces. Through these unofficial channels, advice and expertise is rapidly shared, covering topics such as vehicle maintenance and the optimal use of weapons systems. The emergence of this “over-the-horizon” advising gives Ukrainian forces another way to improve and refine their tactics in real time on the frontlines, far from formal Western-backed training courses.

In some cases, informal assistance extends to new strategies to disrupt or compromise Russian forces. The North Atlantic Fella Organization (NAFO), a global grassroots movement with more than 20,000 civilian volunteers from various walks of life, works to counter Russian propaganda online and to provide intelligence analysis, vehicles, modified drones for combat use, and supplies to Ukraine. Several members of NAFO’s decentralized hierarchy acknowledge that the group also may support saboteur activities of separatists inside Russia, including the targeting of infrastructure, fuel depots, and railroads, which has further complicated Russian war efforts and logistics.

NEW MODEL ARMY

The West must acknowledge the significant impact that seemingly small actions by nonstate actors have on the war in Ukraine. The United States and its allies can significantly enhance the campaign to defeat Russia and restore Ukraine’s sovereignty through integrating these actors into a more flexible, irregular strategy of statecraft. To achieve this outcome, the United States and its allies and partners should remove obstacles and bureaucratic hurdles to informal assistance.

For starters, policymakers need to modify the State Department’s International Trade in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which governs the export of defense and military technologies. Although these rules are primarily aimed at sensitive technologies like night-vision goggles, they impede the export of certain types of body armor and parts for vehicles. By carving out a policy exception for Ukraine, the State Department would make it easier for Ukrainian NGOs to receive nonlethal supplies from private sources. Additionally, the United States should authorize the U.S. embassy in Kiev to coordinate directly with properly vetted NGOs to enhance the impact of private support, expand the lines of communication, and further expedite the provision of assistance in Ukraine. For example, the Weatherman Foundation has relayed to us that they could expedite the evacuation and repatriation of Americans wounded and killed in the war if the embassy formally recognized their humanitarian operations inside of Ukraine.

To fully harness the potential of informal aid, both in Ukraine and in conflicts to come, Western military strategists need to move beyond the familiar cliché of whole-of-society approaches to problems and threats. In a complicated, protracted war involving many different security needs, informal contributions from volunteers and groups that have special military, technological, and medical expertise can add significantly to performance on the battlefield. Moreover, because it relies on grass roots efforts by interconnected civil society around the world, informal assistance confers an advantage that authoritarian adversaries are unable to match. Mobilizing these informal networks will not only help the United States and its allies and partners translate their significant aid packages to Ukraine into lasting success against Russia. It will also establish a template for building a more effective, multipronged response to other would-be aggressors.

JAHARA MATISEK is a Military Professor at the U.S. Naval War College and a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Air Force. The views expressed here are his own.
WILLIAM RENO is Professor and Chair of the Political Science department at Northwestern University.
SAM ROSENBERG is a Ph.D. candidate at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas and a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army. The views expressed here are his own.

Foreign Affairs · by Jahara Matisek · July 19, 2023

23. The Uncertain Future of the U.S. Military’s All-Volunteer Force

Excerpts;

Congress has grappled with the future of the draft for years. In 2020, a national commission studied the Selective Service system and recommended keeping the draft and highlighted the need for “institutionalized exercises of national mobilization processes” and more public engagement to ensure awareness of the system. But a public awareness campaign is a tiny step to solve the growing civil-military divide, the unfair policies used to retain manpower during the GWOT, and general apathy that most Americans hold toward serving their country in the military. Moreover, the National Guard and Reserves, which were designed as a stopgap, have evolved into operational forces with missions critical to any war mobilization effort and day-to-day homeland defense. A future long war will not have the available to relieve the all-volunteer active duty. Instead, the active and reserves will go to war together.

The United States needs innovative ideas and new forums to encourage young men and women to fill their obligations to public service, but it also needs a redesigned military to ensure timely access to the manpower needed to defend the nation and to increase the equity and fairness for the cost of war across our society. It is time for a new Gates Commission—a comprehensive review of the structure of our military and the development of specific guidelines on when and how conscription will be used in future conflict.

The Uncertain Future of the U.S. Military’s All-Volunteer Force

The United States military has a manpower problem and it’s not just due to today’s recruiting shortages. It’s time for a comprehensive plan to solve the personnel shortfalls.

U.S. Joint Chiefs Chairman General Milley addresses reporters at the Pentagon in Arlington Erin Scott/ Reuters

Blog Post by Erin M. Staine-Pyne

July 18, 2023 12:05 pm (EST)

cfr.org ·

This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of United States’ all-volunteer military force. It also coincides with one of the worst recruiting years for the U.S. military since 1973. The army missed its 2022 recruiting goal by fifteen thousand soldiers, and the army, air force, and navy all expect to miss their goals in 2023. The shortage is blamed on a confluence of domestic issues: a competitive job market, lack of in-person recruiting during the pandemic, and a population of young adults who are less informed, less interested, and less qualified for military service. The lack of qualified recruits has received a lot of attention, but the fact that our young population does not see the value of military service should also ignite great concern.

The Global War on Terror (GWOT) hurt the military’s brand and reputation, not just because some Americans did not support the wars, but because of the cost paid by service members who were repeatedly deployed to combat zones. The all-volunteer force has been called one of the United States’ greatest success stories, but it was not used as designed during GWOT, and today it is inadequate to meet current personnel needs. It is time to address the shortfalls of the all-volunteer force with a renewed Gates Commission, before the United States’ next long war.

Transition to an All-Volunteer Force

In 1973, the United States transitioned from a conscription-based military to an all-volunteer force after a comprehensive review by the presidentially directed Gates Commission. While there were calls to abandon the Selective Service system (the federal agency charged with matters concerning the draft), the commission recommended keeping it in case of a major conflict that would require the reinstatement of the draft. The new military structure was built to support a long war by utilizing a draft so that the active-duty volunteers could spend two years at home for every year in a combat zone (a “1:2 dwell time”) and the National Guard and Reserves could be home six years for every year mobilized (a “1:6 dwell time”). The dwell goal for the Guard and Reserves has since changed to a 1:4 dwell time, but this system the Guard and Reserve Components as a temporary stopgap to relieve active-duty forces until the president and Congress reinstate a draft.

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Despite the length of the wars and substantial number of troops deployed, the Selective Service system was never activated for the GWOT. In 2002, the active-duty army was able to deploy 105,000 soldiers at a 1:1 dwell time and 70,000 soldiers at 1:2 dwell time. The army deployed soldiers at higher rates than could be sustained and at close to a 1:1 dwell until 2009. Additionally, the reserve , which was designed to be a stopgap, at just over a 1:2 dwell time. By 2010, more than two million service members had deployed, with 43 percent serving multiple deployments. The impact of repeated deployments on the health of service members is well documented.

The workforce shortage drove the services, particularly the army, to extreme measures. The army implemented a stop-loss policy from 2001 until 2010. This policy was involuntary servitude and prevented troops from leaving the service despite having completed their voluntary commitment and often having completed at least one combat tour. The army also recalled thousands of separated soldiers back to active duty. It implemented internal personnel management policies shifting soldiers from units that returned from deployment to units preparing to leave, substituting a desired specialty for one that could or could not fit the unit mission, and pulling soldiers from training or force generation capabilities. Soldiers stationed in Korea and Europe were moved to units in the United States as those units prepared for combat tours. The army grew its end strength—the number of troops authorized by Congress—by more than 70,000 to a total of 561,979 soldiers, and increased deployment lengths to fifteen months. The Department of Defense surged contractors and civilians into war zones at unprecedented numbers in roles previously requiring legal combatants status, and shared traditional army missions, such as convoy operations and base defense, across the air force and navy. Despite the many challenges and the toll of multiple deployments, moving back to a draft was never on the table.

The Draft Under Consideration

On December 31, 2002, a year after the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, the opinion page of the New York Times read, “Bring Back the Draft.” Representative Charles Rangel (D-NY), who voted against the Iraq War, warned that an all-volunteer force would lead to adventurism and thought a renewed draft would help citizens appreciate the cost of war. By 2004, despite sending 130,000 soldiers into Iraq during the invasion, any debate about enacting a draft was over. The House of Representatives held a vote to implement the draft, primarily to draw criticism to the Iraq War during an election year. The bill was summarily rejected by a vote of 402 to 2. Also, despite the large shortages, the Defense Department wanted no part of a draft, preferring to grow its end strength and create more professional soldiers rather than train, deploy, and motivate draftees. The result was a small percentage of American citizens who sacrificed more than their fair share, an increase in the civil-military divide, and a future in which the activation of a draft is extremely unlikely.

A New Gates Commission

Congress has grappled with the future of the draft for years. In 2020, a national commission studied the Selective Service system and recommended keeping the draft and highlighted the need for “institutionalized exercises of national mobilization processes” and more public engagement to ensure awareness of the system. But a public awareness campaign is a tiny step to solve the growing civil-military divide, the unfair policies used to retain manpower during the GWOT, and general apathy that most Americans hold toward serving their country in the military. Moreover, the National Guard and Reserves, which were designed as a stopgap, have evolved into operational forces with missions critical to any war mobilization effort and day-to-day homeland defense. A future long war will not have the available to relieve the all-volunteer active duty. Instead, the active and reserves will go to war together.

The United States needs innovative ideas and new forums to encourage young men and women to fill their obligations to public service, but it also needs a redesigned military to ensure timely access to the manpower needed to defend the nation and to increase the equity and fairness for the cost of war across our society. It is time for a new Gates Commission—a comprehensive review of the structure of our military and the development of specific guidelines on when and how conscription will be used in future conflict.

The views expressed in this article represent the personal views of the author and are not necessarily the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force or The Air University.

This post was written for the Council on Foreign Relations’ Renewing America initiative—an effort established on the premise that for the United States to succeed, it must fortify the political, economic, and societal foundations fundamental to its national security and international influence. Renewing America evaluates nine critical domestic issues that shape the ability of the United States to navigate a demanding, competitive, and dangerous world. For more Renewing America resources, visit https://www.cfr.org/programs/renewing-america and follow the initiative on Twitter @RenewingAmerica.

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cfr.org · by Thomas J. Bollyky

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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