Quotes of the Day:

"Love of power, operating through greed and through personal ambition, was the cause of all these evils."

- Thucydides

“Stop being offended

by a Facebook post,

by a piece of art,

by people, displaying affection,

or by what someone said to you.

Be offended by war, poverty, greed, and injustice”. 

- Sue Fitzmaurice

“The brave die never, though they sleep in dust, their courage nerves a thousand living men.”

- Minot J. Savage

1. How North Korea’s Hacker Army Stole $3 Billion in Crypto, Funding Nuclear Program

2. Lil Sister Takes Charge as Kim Jong Un Morphs Into Fat Elvis

3. First Flight of North Korea’s “Chollima-1” SLV Fails, but More Launches and More New SLVs Are Likely

4. Sohae Satellite Launching Station: New Activity at the Vertical Engine Test Stand

5. Sinpho South Shipyard: The SINPO-Class Submarine Moved to Drydock

6. Another Earthquake Strikes Near N.Korea's Nuke Test Site

7. N.K. launch window expires, but S. Korea not letting guard down

8. China lodges complaint with S. Korean ambassador in tit-for-tat summons

9. 16,000 S.Koreans died since 2018 waiting to reunite with family in North

10. Ruling bloc baffled by main opposition leader jabbing Yoon with China envoy

11. North Korea set for another plenary meeting on economy

12. Pyongyang fully mobilizes transportation services to get people to and from farms

13. North Korean soldier takes revenge on her tormentor

14. N. Korea suspends classes for elementary school students in some regions

15. Five ways to deal with Korea-China relations

1. How North Korea’s Hacker Army Stole $3 Billion in Crypto, Funding Nuclear Program

We have to execute a strategic strangulation campaign to cut off the regime's access to illicit funds, especially through its cyber theft operations. 

Excerpts:

International experts have long said that North Korea has been developing a digital bank-robbing army to evade harsh sanctions and support its ambitions to project geopolitical power through nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. A 2020 United Nations report found that the regime’s revenue-generating hacking has proven to be “low-risk, high-reward and difficult to detect, and their increasing sophistication can frustrate attribution.” 

For years the U.S. and other Western governments blamed North Korea for a string of brazen—and sometimes haphazardly executed—cyberattacks, ranging from the 2014 hack of Sony Pictures to a massive global ransomware attack in 2017. But the country has increasingly sought to focus its cyberattacks on generating cash, while dramatically improving its technical sophistication to pull off large-scale thefts, according to U.S. officials and security experts.

“Most nation-state cyber programs are focused on espionage or attack capabilities for traditional geopolitical purposes,” the White House’s Neuberger said. “The North Koreans are focused on theft, on hard currency to get around the rigor of international sanctions.”

In 2016, hackers linked to North Korea stole $81 million from the central bank of Bangladesh, part of an attempted $1 billion cyberheist that was disrupted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 

How North Korea’s Hacker Army Stole $3 Billion in Crypto, Funding Nuclear Program

Regime has trained cybercriminals to impersonate tech workers or employers, amid other schemes

By Robert McMillanFollow and Dustin VolzFollow

June 11, 2023 9:00 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-north-koreas-hacker-army-stole-3-billion-in-crypto-funding-nuclear-program-d6fe8782?mod

Last year an engineer working for the blockchain gaming company Sky Mavis thought he was on the cusp of a new job that would pay more money.

A recruiter had reached out to him via LinkedIn, and after the two spoke over the phone, the recruiter gave the engineer a document to review as part of the interview process.

But the recruiter was part of a vast North Korean operation aimed at bringing in funds to the cash-poor dictatorship. And the document was a Trojan Horse, malicious computer code that gave the North Koreans access to the engineer’s computer and allowed hackers to break into Sky Mavis. Ultimately they stole more than $600 million—mostly from players of Sky Mavis’s digital pets game, Axie Infinity. 

It was the country’s biggest haul in five years of digital heists that have netted more than $3 billion for the North Koreans, according to the blockchain analytics firm Chainalysis. That money is being used to fund about 50% of North Korea’s ballistic missile program, U.S. officials say, which has been developed in tandem with its nuclear weapons. Defense accounts for an enormous portion of North Korea’s overall spending; the State Department estimated in 2019 Pyongyang spent about $4 billion on defense, accounting for 26 percent of its overall economy.

Sky Mavis Chief Operating Officer Aleksander Larsen says ‘It’s an arms race with these hackers.’ PHOTO: SKY MAVIS

Although Sky Mavis has now repaid victims of the cyberattack, the incident threatened the very existence of the then-four-year-old company, said Aleksander Larsen, the firm’s chief operating officer. “When you look at the amount of funds stolen, [it] would look like an existential threat to what you are building.”

The incident also caught the attention of the White House, where it and other North Korean crypto attacks throughout 2022 have raised grave concerns. “The real surge in the last year has been against central crypto infrastructure around the world that hold large sums, like Sky Mavis, leading to more large-scale heists,” said Anne Neuberger, President Biden’s deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technology. “That has driven us to intensely focus on countering this activity.”

North Korea’s digital thieves began hitting their first big crypto attacks around 2018. Since then, North Korea’s missile launch attempts and successes have mushroomed, with more than 42 successes observed in 2022, according to data tracked by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

U.S. officials cautioned that so much is unknown about the nation’s sources of funds amid Western sanctions that it is not possible to have a precise understanding of the role crypto theft is playing in the increased rate of missile tests. But the test buildup by Kim Jong Un’s reclusive regime has occurred at the same time as a concerning upswing in crypto heists.

Roughly 50 percent of North Korea’s foreign currency funding for purchasing foreign components for its ballistic missile program is now supplied by the regime’s cyber operations, Neuberger said. That is a sharp increase from earlier estimates, which had put the figure at a third of overall funding for the programs.

U.S. officials say North Korea has built what is essentially a shadow workforce of thousands of IT workers operating out of countries around the world, including Russia and China, who make money—sometimes more than $300,000 a year—doing mundane technology work. But this workforce is often linked up with the regime’s cybercrime operations, investigators say.

They have pretended to be Canadian IT workers, government officials and freelance Japanese blockchain developers. They will conduct video interviews to get a job, or, as with the Sky Mavis example, masquerade as potential employers. 

To get hired by crypto companies, they will hire Western “front people”—essentially actors who sit through job interviews to obscure the fact that North Koreans are the ones actually being hired. Once hired, they will sometimes make small changes to products that allow them to be hacked, former victims and investigators say.

Starting two years ago, hackers linked to North Korea began infecting U.S. hospitals with ransomware—a kind of cyberattack where hackers lock up a victim company’s files and demand payment for their release—to raise money, U.S. officials say.

“It seems like a modern-day pirate state,” said Nick Carlsen, a former FBI analyst who works for the blockchain tracing firm TRM Labs. “They’re just out there raiding.”

Carlsen and others in the cryptocurrency industry say that weeding out these fake IT workers is a constant problem. 

International experts have long said that North Korea has been developing a digital bank-robbing army to evade harsh sanctions and support its ambitions to project geopolitical power through nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. A 2020 United Nations report found that the regime’s revenue-generating hacking has proven to be “low-risk, high-reward and difficult to detect, and their increasing sophistication can frustrate attribution.” 

For years the U.S. and other Western governments blamed North Korea for a string of brazen—and sometimes haphazardly executed—cyberattacks, ranging from the 2014 hack of Sony Pictures to a massive global ransomware attack in 2017. But the country has increasingly sought to focus its cyberattacks on generating cash, while dramatically improving its technical sophistication to pull off large-scale thefts, according to U.S. officials and security experts.

“Most nation-state cyber programs are focused on espionage or attack capabilities for traditional geopolitical purposes,” the White House’s Neuberger said. “The North Koreans are focused on theft, on hard currency to get around the rigor of international sanctions.”

In 2016, hackers linked to North Korea stole $81 million from the central bank of Bangladesh, part of an attempted $1 billion cyberheist that was disrupted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 

The U.S. announced charges in Los Angeles against a North Korean national in a range of cyberattacks several years ago. PHOTO: MARIO TAMA/GETTY IMAGES

The North Koreans also have stolen money from ATMs and even made more than $100,000 in cryptocurrency from a quickly spreading worm called WannaCry, but nothing has been as lucrative as their string of crypto heists, which began in earnest in 2018, according to Erin Plante, the vice president of investigations with Chainalysis. “They were really early into crypto, and they were some of the most advanced users of crypto early on.”

At the same time Pyongyang has been showing more audacity with social engineering, its hackers are getting more technically sophisticated. The skill of North Korea’s cybercrime over the past year has impressed U.S. officials and researchers, and some said they have seen the country’s hackers pull off elaborate maneuvers that haven’t been observed anywhere else. 

In one notable attack earlier this year, hackers linked to North Korea pulled off what security researchers said was a first-of-its-kind cascading supply-chain attack. They broke into software makers one at a time and corrupted their products to gain access to the computer systems of their customers.

To orchestrate the attack, they first compromised a maker of online trading software called Trading Technologies. A corrupted version of that company’s product was subsequently downloaded by an employee of 3CX, itself a software development company, and then used the access to 3CX systems to corrupt that firm’s software.

From there, the North Koreans attempted to break into 3CX customers, including cryptocurrency exchanges, according to investigators.

Trading Technologies says it has hired a forensics firm to investigate the incident, but that it decommissioned the software in question in April 2020, about two years before 3CX was compromised. 

3CX says it has enhanced its security measures since the hack. The company doesn’t know how many customers were ultimately affected but suspects that it is a small number because it was caught quickly, said Chief Executive Nick Galea.

“It’s an arms race with these hackers,” Sky Mavis’s Larsen said. 

Write to Robert McMillan at robert.mcmillan@wsj.com and Dustin Volz at dustin.volz@wsj.com

2. Lil Sister Takes Charge as Kim Jong Un Morphs Into Fat Elvis

Lil Sister Takes Charge as Kim Jong Un Morphs Into Fat Elvis

ALL SHOOK UP

Kim Yo Jong is becoming the dynasty’s voice of authority as intel reports claim her brother is spiraling into dependency on booze, sleeping pills and imported cheeses.

Donald Kirk

Updated Jun. 11, 2023 2:45AM ET / Published Jun. 10, 2023 7:01PM ET 

The Daily Beast · June 10, 2023

Illustration by Elizabeth Brockway/The Daily Beast

Little sister Kim Yo Jong appears to have taken over many of Kim Jong Un’s duties with the North Korean leader reportedly giving up on his diet, wallowing in alcoholism and unable to rule effectively.

Yo Jong, who’s often spoken for her big brother in the past, has again taken up the mantle and is projecting the image of the most powerful member of the ruling dynasty while Jong Un pigs out on expensive imported cheeses, drinks night and day and chain-smokes foreign cigarettes, according to intelligence reports

Although Jong Un holds on to his titles of general secretary of the ruling party, president of state affairs and, of course, “supreme leader,” Yo Jong has resumed her role as the voice of authority in a country mired in poverty, hunger, and disease.

“Kim Yo Jong has always wanted to be a politician, according to reports from her early teenage years,” Bruce Bennett of the Rand Corporation told The Daily Beast. “Her brother has allowed her to play the ‘really bad cop’ to his ‘tough cop’—no good cops around.” Bennett believes Jong Un “trying to gain her some credibility with his military in case he ever wants or needs to elevate her role”—and “is not in good health.”

The most convincing evidence for Kim Jong Un’s failure to abide by the diet that doctors had prescribed for him consists of photographs released by the North’s state media from a public appearance on May 16.

South Korea’s pervasive National Intelligence Service, with an assist from artificial intelligence, says he’s packing 140 kilograms, about 310 pounds, on his 5-foot-7-inch frame. That’s up about 50 pounds from the weight to which he had descended while on the diet more than two years ago.

One image mentioned by North Korea-watchers was the resemblance between Kim Jong Un’s health and diet issues and those of Elvis Presley. At 5 feet, 10 inches, Presley weighed an astonishing 350 pounds when he died in 1977 at 42. At 39, Kim is catching up at an alarming pace.

Jong Un appeared with his beloved tween-aged daughter, Ju Ae, last month to watch the launch of a satellite capable of spying on the North’s enemies. It was another opportunity for Jong Un to present his daughter as a viable long-term successor, but the May 31 launch was a bust, with the satellite plunging into the Yellow Sea.

Afterwards, it fell to Yo Jong to cover for her brother, blasting the U.S. and the UN Security Council who spoke out against the North for another obvious effort at testing the technology for long-range missiles.

More important than the failure of the missile was the revelation of the complete breakdown of Jong Un’s will to control his weight as well as his drinking and smoking habits. “Her brother’s health is a big concern,” says Bruce Bechtol, a former intelligence analyst at the Pentagon. “He has the maladies of a 70-year-old man.”

Intel reports that North Koreans have been looking in foreign markets for medicine to deal with insomnia also suggests that Jong Un “is suffering from significant sleep disorders,” according to a report by the director of the South’s National Intelligence Service.

The NIS, briefing members of the South’s National Assembly, “stated that it is closely watching the possibility of Kim falling into a vicious circle of depending more on alcohol and nicotine and suffering worsening insomnia.”

While the rest of the country sinks into poverty and hunger reminiscent of the famine that killed approximately 2 million people in the 1990s, the report said, “the North has been importing large quantities of foreign cigarettes and high-quality snacks.”

Yo Jong, who is four years younger than her brother, avoided any mention of the failed satellite launch while justifying North Korea’s right to put one into orbit regardless of what the North’s enemies, the U.S., Japan and South Korea, might think.

“It is today’s universal reality that over 5,000 satellites with various aims and missions are now in their orbits around the Earth,” she said in a statement carried in English by Pyongyang’s Korean Central News Agency. “This being a hard reality,” she said, “the UNSC is continuously taking discriminative and rude action to take issue with only the launch of a satellite by the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.]”

Several days earlier, Yo Jong asked rhetorically, “Who is escalating the tension unnecessarily and destabilizing the regional security situation?” It was “neither surprising nor new” for the U.S. to be “letting loose hackneyed gibberish prompted by its brigandish and abnormal thinking,” she said, blaming the UNSC resolution on “U.S. gangster-style logic.”

While Yo Jong has issued colorfully harsh statements in the past, her latest outbursts seemed particularly significant considering her brother’s inability to discipline his eating, drinking and smoking habits.

Big bro’s “lifestyle” suggests he’s “not destined to live to a ripe old age,” said Evans Revere, a retired senior U.S. diplomat who still follows North Korea closely.

Yo Jong, said Revere, has made a strong case for being on the succession short list when the time comes by demonstrating fierce loyalty to her brother, by the experience she has gained working at his side in the Party and government, and by being part of the “Paektu bloodline,” a reference to the legend that Jong Un’s father, Kim Jong Il, was born on the slopes of Mount Paektu, a sacred mountain on the Chinese border.

The fact that Yo Jong was able to fire off two statements in rapid succession showed her potential as a power figure in the ruling Kim dynasty and also the need to publicize her for the benefit of domestic as well as foreign audiences.

Yo Jong holds the relatively modest title of vice department director of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, but her power goes way beyond that level. She does not have to take over any of Jong Un’s titles to be recognized as the power behind the throne if not the occupant of a throne.

“What we are seeing is the pattern that has been taking place over the past five or six years,” said David Maxwell, a retired special forces officer now with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “The evil sister is continuing her role as the bad cop.”

Yo Jong must, however, resign herself to the place of a woman in an irredeemably male-chauvinist society.

She’s still “working at the pleasure, or sufferance, of her older brother,” observed David Straub, who analyzed North Korea as a political officer at the American embassy in Seoul while with the State Department. “North Korea’s dictatorship is still very much a man’s world, and she is unlikely to become a power in her own right.”

Just to show the need to adopt a veneer of relative modesty, Straub cited the assassination in 2017 of Jong Un’s older half-brother, Kim Jong Nam, at the airport serving the Malaysian capital of Kuala Lumpur.

“Her older brother’s execution of their uncle,” Straub noted, “shows what happens when he feels his position threatened or even just upstaged.”

The Daily Beast · June 10, 2023

3. First Flight of North Korea’s “Chollima-1” SLV Fails, but More Launches and More New SLVs Are Likely

Excerpt:

The quick construction of the Chollima-1 launch site also raises the intriguing possibility that the SLV itself was rushed into development, or at least rushed to launch, which might help explain the failure of the second stage during the May 31 launch.

First Flight of North Korea’s “Chollima-1” SLV Fails, but More Launches and More New SLVs Are Likely

• BY: VANN H. VAN DIEPEN
• JUNE 7, 2023

https://www.38north.org/2023/06/first-flight-of-north-koreas-chollima-1-slv-fails-but-more-launches-and-more-new-slvs-are-likely/?utm_source=pocket_saves

North Korea’s initial launch on May 31 of the new “Chollima-1” space launch vehicle (SLV), carrying the new “Malligyong-1” military reconnaissance satellite, was unsuccessful; the second stage booster apparently failed to ignite. Based on photos of the launch released in North Korean media, the first stage of the new SLV is based on the Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The second and third stages appear to be optimized for space launch, with new engines and apparently differences in propellant. The cause of the failure is unknown, but South Korean authorities are working to recover the second and third stages, and perhaps even the payload, from the Yellow Sea, which would shed more light on their capabilities.

The SLV was launched from a new pad at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station built in just over a month, underscoring the political impetus of the launch and the overall satellite program. Pyongyang has pledged to conduct another reconnaissance satellite launch as soon as possible, which could take months from a technical standpoint, but could also occur sooner if the regime has political reasons to do so.

Based on previous statements the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) has made about its satellite ambitions, we can expect multiple launches over the next several years once the Chollima-1’s problems are resolved, if North Korea can keep up production of reliable satellites within the SLV’s payload capability. The regime’s plans for networks of reconnaissance, weather, earth observation, and communication satellites also make it likely that a larger SLV is in development, as suggested by modifications since March 2022 at the original Sohae launch pad.

Information to Date

On May 31, North Korea announced it had conducted the first launch of a “new-type” SLV, the “Chollima-1,” from the Sohae Satellite Launching Station on the country’s northwest coast. (Chollima is a mythological horse “synonymous with great speed and progress in the DPRK.”) The SLV was reportedly carrying the “military reconnaissance satellite, ‘Malligyong (telescope)-1.’” According to the announcement, the SLV failed “after losing thrust due to the abnormal starting of the second-stage engine after the separation of the first stage during the normal flight.” That failure was attributed to “the low reliability and stability of the new-type engine system applied to carrier rocket ‘Chollima-1’ and the unstable character of the fuel used.” The National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA), North Korea’s space agency, undertook to “thoroughly investigate the serious defects revealed in the satellite launch, take urgent scientific and technological measures to overcome them and conduct the second launch as soon as possible through various part tests.”

South Korea confirmed the timing and location of the failed launch and released photographs of a 15-meter portion of the booster found in the Yellow Sea about 270 kilometers off its west coast.[1] The following day, the North released two photographs showing what appeared to be a three-stage SLV with a large payload fairing, rising above a newly constructed launch pad at Sohae.

Analysis

A new SLV. The Chollima-1 is, indeed, a new type of SLV that is distinct from its ICBMs, although, as noted below, its first stage is based on the Hwasong (HS)-17 ICBM. The new SLV appeared to have been depicted in a blurred-over image of a display seen during Kim Jong Un’s visit to NADA in April. The upper stages probably have been designed for long-burning, low-thrust flight to maximize the ability to put a satellite into orbit and limit unnecessary vibration effects on a satellite payload.

An ICBM-based first stage. The nature of the exhaust plume from the first stage indicated the use of liquid propellants, and the first-stage engines appeared to be the same type used on the HS-12 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and HS-15 and HS-17 ICBMs. According to one analyst, the North Korean photos indicate the first stage uses the engines in the same configuration as the HS-17 (two twin-chambered rocket engines, for a total of four rocket nozzles), and the overall SLV is about 29 meters long (including nozzles). The HS-17 has the most powerful North Korean booster seen to date, and even in an ICBM configuration should be able to put about 400 kilograms into the 500-km orbit apparently intended on May 31, compared to about 200 kg for the previous Unha (Taepodong-2) SLV. Differences in the opacity of the rocket plume from previous HS-12/-15/-17 launches seen in the North Korean photographs, and post-launch imagery of the launch pad showing a light gray residue apparently deposited by the first-stage burn, suggest the first-stage propellants may have been modified in some way.

New upper stages are the source of failure. Unlike the continuous-diameter two-stage HS-17, the Chollima-1 uses a second and third stage with a smaller diameter than the first. Assuming the Chollima-1’s first stage is the same diameter as the HS-17 (about 2.6 meters), this same analyst estimates the two upper stages to each be about 2.1 meters in diameter—in between the HS-12 IRBM (1.65 meters) and HS-15 ICBM (about 2.25 meters) and thus further consistent with the use of a “new-type engine system” as claimed by North Korea.

The 15-meter booster portion found by South Korea is consistent with the estimated combined length of the Chollima-1’s second and third stages, suggesting the “abnormal starting of the second-stage engine” also resulted in the third stage failing to separate. The failure of the SLV’s second stage, as reported in North Korean media, supports the idea that it contained a new-type engine, which would carry a higher risk of failure than the relatively well-proven ballistic missile engines used in the first stage. Based on the photos of the booster portion found by South Korea[2] and its location relative to the danger areas announced by the North Koreans prior to launch,[3] the second stage does not appear to have ignited at all.

The North Korean coverage also mentioned “the unstable character of the fuel used” in conjunction with the “new-type engine system,” presumably in the second stage. It is unclear what propellants were used in the Chollima-1’s upper stages or what “unstable character” they possessed that might have contributed to the failure. South Korea will hopefully be able to answer these kinds of questions once it recovers and analyzes the launch debris.

Payload details unclear. We do not know how much the Malligyong-1 satellite weighed or how capable its imaging system was. A satellite seen in photographs of Kim Jong Un’s May 16 visit to NADA to inspect the “military reconnaissance satellite No. 1,” said to be “ready for loading after undergoing the final general assembly check and space environment test,” was estimated to have dimensions of some 1.5 by 1.2 by 0.6 meters and to weigh between 200 and 500 kilograms.[4]

We also do not know if the SLV’s third stage was intended to boost the satellite into its final orbit or if the payload also included an apogee motor (or “kick motor”) for that purpose; the weight of any such motor is unknown. The failure of the Chollima-1 after the first stage operation deprived us of important information on how much payload the SLV is capable of putting into orbit. It remains possible that South Korea will locate the remains of the payload.

Implications

Satellite launching is a priority, but a second-tier one. Satellite launches are apparently an important enough objective, both politically and substantively, for North Korea to devote the resources necessary to develop an optimized SLV. But the seven-year hiatus between space launches, during which Pyongyang has launched scores of ballistic missiles, including four new types of ICBM, indicates space takes a distinct back seat to the ballistic missile force. To the extent it had used SLV launches in the past as a stalking horse for ICBM development, such an artifice is no longer necessary, given Pyongyang’s open testing of ICBMs since 2017.

Political motivations are paramount. North Korea clearly has good substantive reasons to possess reconnaissance satellites, as well as the weather, earth observation and communication satellites Kim Jong Un has mentioned seeking. But Kim has also noted space as “a demonstration of the overall national power” and has gone out of his way to associate himself with the North’s space program and use it as a source of national prestige and both domestic and international propaganda.

The importance of political motivations was clearly shown in the circumstances leading up to the Chollima-1 launch, calling into question assessments that the advent of the satellite program “shows a shift toward practical rather than political goals.”

• On April 18, Kim Jong Un visited NADA and “set forth the militant task to organize a non-permanent satellite-launching preparatory committee to make sure that the military reconnaissance satellite No. 1 completed as of April will be launched at the planned date, [and] speed up its final preparations…”
• The new launch pad at Sohae used in the May 31 launch began construction between April 19 and 30, according to analysis of commercial imagery.
• North Korea notified the proper Japanese authorities under International Maritime Organization (IMO) procedures on May 29 of a forthcoming satellite launch between May 31 and June 11.
• On May 30, the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Committee noted that “military reconnaissance satellite No. 1” is “to be launched in June.”
• Commercial imagery also showed the new pad and associated facilities—including a launch stand, SLV erector, and a retractable shelter able to cover the launch area—had been completed between May 22 and 30, an unusually short amount of time of roughly a month from start to finish.
• Some have also speculated the Chollima-1 launch was intended to preempt or match South Korea’s launch of a satellite on its Nuri SLV.[5] On April 11, South Korea announced it would conduct the Nuri’s second launch of a satellite on May 24, and the launch occurred on May 25. This possibility cannot be ruled out.

More launches to come. North Korea’s May 31 announcement made clear that another reconnaissance satellite launch will occur “as soon as possible.” That announcement described a fairly methodical series of steps that would be taken to diagnose and resolve the cause of the Chollima-1 failure, including “various part tests” of presumably the relevant second-stage components and any fixes. From a technical standpoint, the amount of time required for this would probably be on the order of months, depending on how useful the telemetry data Pyongyang received from the SLV was, the difficulty of diagnosing and resolving any problems, and the degree of ground testing chosen to confirm the fixes and check out the entire SLV once modified. For example, the North took eight months from the April 2012 in-flight failure of the Unha SLV to launch again. But if Kim Jong Un decides another launch needs to occur sooner for political reasons, that will almost certainly take precedence despite how unready the Chollima and its developers may be.

Kim noted during his April 18 NADA visit the need for “deploying several reconnaissance satellites on different orbits in succession in the future.” Such a network would be necessary to ensure a large enough volume and frequency of imagery collection to make a military difference. Adding in the weather, earth observation, and communication satellites Kim has endorsed, each of which would need small networks of their own, we can expect quite a few satellite launches over the next several years after the Chollima-1’s problems are resolved, assuming North Korea can keep up production of reliable satellites within the SLV’s payload capability. Pyongyang may choose not to pre-notify SLV launches in the future, as it threatened on June 4 in reaction to the IMO’s condemnation of the May 31 launch.

And probably larger SLVs, too. The apparent need for more satellites in orbit, and presumably for larger satellites over time, highlights the Chollima-1’s likely payload limitations and makes a case for larger SLVs in the future. North Korea is reportedly also interested in launching multiple satellites on a single SLV, which would be easier with a larger SLV. One explanation for why the North Koreans hastily constructed a new launch pad for the Chollima-1 rather than use the preexisting launch pad is that the latter has been under modification since March 2022 for an even larger new SLV. We should expect to see further evidence of a larger SLV soon and expect progressively larger North Korean SLVs to be developed over the next several years.

1. [1]
2. See Colin Zwirko, “North Korea says it failed to launch spy satellite but will try again soon,” NK News, May 31, 2023, https://www.nknews.org/2023/05/rok-says-north-korea-launched-military-spy-satellite-triggering-alerts-in-seoul; and Kim Seung-wook and Park Soo-yoon, “이종섭 “확보한 北발사체는 2단 부분…모레쯤 인양될듯”(종합),” Yonhap News Agency, June 1, 2023, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20230601089051504.
3. [2]
4. See Nathan J. Hunt. Twitter Post, May 31, 2023, 7:20 p.m., https://twitter.com/ISNJH/status/1664049267458322432; Dr. Jeffrey Lewis. Twitter Post, June 1, 2023, 12:09 p.m., https://twitter.com/ArmsControlWonk/status/1664303127699529730; and Dr Marco Langbroek. Twitter Post, June 1, 2023, 4:39 a.m., https://twitter.com/Marco_Langbroek/status/1664190031106547713.
5. [3]
6. See Dr. Jeffrey Lewis. Twitter Post, May 31, 2023, 10:36 a.m., https://twitter.com/ArmsControlWonk/status/1663917298803957765 and Jonathan McDowell. Twitter Post, May 30, 2023, 8:15 p.m., https://twitter.com/planet4589/status/1663700578613047303.
7. [4]
8. See “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Preparatory Committee for Launching Reconnaissance Satellite,” Korean Central News Agency, May 17, 2023, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1684276877-205317905/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-inspects-reconnaissance-satellite-launch-preparatory-committee/; Marco Langbroek, SatTrackCam Leiden (b)log, May 17, 2023, https://sattrackcam.blogspot.com/2023/05/gearing-up-for-new-north-korean.html; Josh Smith, “New North Korean space rocket features engine from ICBMs, analysts say,” Reuters, June 1, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/new-north-korean-space-rocket-features-engine-icbms-analysts-say-2023-06-01; “N.K.’s space vehicle possibly had technical glitch from ‘excessive route change’: S. Korean spy agency,” Yonhap News Agency, May 31, 2023, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230531011200320; and RocketSchiller. Twitter Post, May 18, 2023, 2:03 a.m., https://twitter.com/RocketSchiller/status/1659077307334549511.
9. [5]
10. See Hyung-Jin Kim and Kim Tong-hyung, “North Korea spy satellite launch fails as rocket falls into the sea,” AP News, May 31, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-launch-military-spy-satellite-db6ce3f08e1ec8e23674aef519d04403; and Jeongmin Kim, “North Korea rushed satellite launch after seeing ROK rocket success, Seoul says,” NK News, June 1, 2023, https://www.nknews.org/2023/06/north-korea-rushed-satellite-launch-after-seeing-rok-rocket-success-seoul-says.

4. Sohae Satellite Launching Station: New Activity at the Vertical Engine Test Stand

Imagery at the link below.

Sohae Satellite Launching Station: New Activity at the Vertical Engine Test Stand

• BY: PETER MAKOWSKY
• JUNE 10, 2023

https://www.38north.org/2023/06/sohae-satellite-launching-station-new-activity-at-the-vertical-engine-test-stand/

Commercial satellite imagery of North Korea’s Sohae Satellite Launching Station from June 9 reveals new activity at the Vertical Engine Test Stand (VETS), which may indicate preparations for a new liquid-fuel engine test.

Figure 1a. Close up of the Vertical Engine Test Stand on imagery from June 5, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com; Figure 1b. New activity at the VETS suggestive of engine test preparations. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Since June 5, the retractable environmental shelter has been moved forward onto the ramp which connects the apron to the test stand, and four to five vehicles have arrived on the apron.

During periods between tests, the retractable shelter is typically parked next to the test stand. In October, the shelter had been moved back onto the apron while construction work commenced.

The second stage failure during the satellite launch attempt on May 31 was attributed to the use of a new fuel, according to North Korean state media. Subsequent statements have indicated additional launches would follow soon, suggesting engine testing is needed.

6. Sinpho South Shipyard: The SINPO-Class Submarine Moved to Drydock

Imagery at the link below. 

Sinpho South Shipyard: The SINPO-Class Submarine Moved to Drydock

• BY: PETER MAKOWSKY
• JUNE 10, 2023

https://www.38north.org/2023/06/sinpho-south-shipyard-the-sinpo-class-submarine-moved-to-drydock/

Commercial satellite imagery of North Korea’s Sinpho South Shipyard from June 10 indicates the SINPO-class ballistic missile submarine (SSB) has been moved into the drydock. The purpose is unclear, but may be related to routine hull maintenance, minor repairs, or some kind of modification.

The SINPO-class SSB is normally berthed in the secure boat basin beneath an awning, which largely conceals the submarine’s presence. A small support vessel is typically seen in the open, at the submarine’s stern, and the submersible missile test barge berthed at the north wall of the basin. While the SINPO-class SSB was not visible on June 7, some churn in the water was observed to the south side of the covering, suggesting small craft movement.

Figure 1a. Water churn at the secure boat basin on imagery from June 7, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com; Figure 1b. Secure boat basin on imagery from June 10, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

On June 10, the small support vessel associated with the SINPO-class SSB had been moved to the north basin wall, ahead of the submersible barge, which had been moved farther from the quay.

Figure 2a. Empty drydock on imagery from June 7, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com; Figure 2b. The SINPO-class SSB moved to drydock on imagery from June 10, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

The SINPO-class SSB was last observed in the drydock in December 2021 after an at-sea launch of a submarine-launched ballistic missile. It was unclear what work was conducted on the submarine at that time—whether routine maintenance or post-launch repairs.

6. Another Earthquake Strikes Near N.Korea's Nuke Test Site

I always ask this every time I see a report of an earthquake here. Have six nuclear tests had an impact on the fault line in the area? Has it made the area more unstable and prone to earthquakes?

Excerpt:

Until the sixth nuclear test, no natural earthquakes occurred in the area.

The test itself caused an artificial quake of magnitude 5.7 due to an estimated 150 kt yield from what the regime claimed was a "hydrogen bomb." The yield of the atomic bomb that dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 was 15 kt.

Another Earthquake Strikes Near N.Korea's Nuke Test Site

english.chosun.com

June 09, 2023 09:47

An earthquake of magnitude 2.1 occurred Wednesday in Punggye-ri in North Korea's North Hamgyong Province, where the regime had conducted six nuclear tests, the Korea Meteorological Administration here said Thursday.

It was the sixth earthquake near the nuclear test site since early this year and the 44th that hit the area since the North's last nuclear test in September 2017.

"Ground subsidence in Punggye-ri is clearly serious," a geologist said. "A fresh nuclear test could cause a nuclear disaster."

Until the sixth nuclear test, no natural earthquakes occurred in the area.

The test itself caused an artificial quake of magnitude 5.7 due to an estimated 150 kt yield from what the regime claimed was a "hydrogen bomb." The yield of the atomic bomb that dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 was 15 kt.

The North built the underground test site in an area of hard granite rock which it believed could withstand the powerful shocks and vibrations of nuclear blasts and prevent leakage of radioactive materials.

Only artificial quakes were reported from the first nuclear test in 2006 to the fifth test in 2016. But since the sixth nuclear test the natural quakes have been frequent and getting stronger.

Just as a big natural earthquake is usually followed by a series of smaller tremors, the artificial quake seems to have triggered a series of aftershocks.

Six quakes of magnitude 2 to 2.9 have occurred in the first half of this year alone within a 50 km radius of the test site, progressively destabilizing the ground.

Things could get even worse if the North conducts another nuclear test there, and experts fear the ground could collapse entirely and leakage of radioactive materials could contaminate all of Northeast Asia.

A KMA official said, "A geological survey of the Punggye-ri area is necessary, but it seems that the ground is already dangerously weak."

Radioactive materials could spread on westerly winds and contaminate soil and water. A North Korean defector from the region said, "Kilju is a bowl-shaped area where water gathers after flowing from Mt. Mantap in Punggye-ri, where the nuclear test site sits." Underground water veins in the area are probably already contaminated.

Five of 10 defectors who arrived here from Kilju after the sixth nuclear test showed a radiation dose exceeding 250 mSv, the chromosomal anomaly detection threshold, in exposure testing. One 48-year-old woman even had a dose of 1,386 mSv, the level for a high risk of cancer.

The annual permissible radiation for engineers at nuclear power plants is about 50 mSv.

N.Korea's Uranium Facility Still Operating, Nuke Watchdog Warns

Activities Spotted at N.Korea's Dismantled Nuke Test Site

N.Korea's Nuclear Facility 'Getting Busy'

N.Korea Reactivates Uranium Enrichment Plant

Is N.Korea Restarting Uranium Enrichment?

Unusual Activities Detected at Yongbyon Reactor

• Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com

english.chosun.com

7. N.K. launch window expires, but S. Korea not letting guard down

N.K. launch window expires, but S. Korea not letting guard down | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 장재순 · June 11, 2023

SEOUL, June 11 (Yonhap) -- The office of President Yoon Suk Yeol said Sunday it is not letting its guard down even though the window for North Korea's satellite launch has expired, as the country can go ahead with a launch at any time.

North Korea had set a period between the start of May 31 and the start of June 11 as the window for a satellite-carrying space rocket launch. The country fired the rocket on the first day of the window, but the launch ended in failure with the rocket crashing in the Yellow Sea.

At the time, the North acknowledged the launch failed due to an engine problem and said it would try again as soon as possible. South Korean officials warned that a second launch could still come within the launch window.

"Though the notice period is over, North Korea can launch a long-range ballistic missile at any time without prior notice," a senior presidential official told Yonhap News Agency.

North Korea claims it has the right to launch a space vehicle to put a satellite into orbit, but many in the international community believe it is a disguise for a test of its intercontinental ballistic missile technology.

Under U.N. resolutions, the North is banned from any activity using ballistic missile technology.

"South Korea and the United States are continuing surveillance activity," the senior official said. "We will go ahead with the sharing of missile warning information between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan as planned."

Another official also said nothing has changed even though the launch window has passed.

"We will make sure to keep our readiness posture," the official said.

This photo provided by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency on June 1, 2023, shows the launch of the North's new Chollima-1 rocket, allegedly carrying a military reconnaissance satellite, Malligyong-1, from Tongchang-ri on the North's west coast at 6:29 a.m. the previous day. The projectile fell into waters some 200 kilometers west of the South's southwestern island of Eocheong following its flight over the waters far west of the border island of Baengnyeong. In just about 2 1/2 hours after the launch, the North confirmed its failure, citing the "abnormal starting of the second-stage engine." (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 장재순 · June 11, 2023

8. China lodges complaint with S. Korean ambassador in tit-for-tat summons

China lodges complaint with S. Korean ambassador in tit-for-tat summons | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 장재순 · June 11, 2023

BEIJING, June 11 (Yonhap) -- China called in South Korean Ambassador Chung Jae-ho and lodged a complaint, Beijing's foreign ministry said Sunday, in a tit-for-tat after the Chinese ambassador to Seoul was summoned over remarks warning Seoul against betting against China.

Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Nong Rong met with the South Korean envoy on Saturday and expressed serious concerns and a complaint over what it called an unfair response that South Korea showed about a meeting between Chinese Ambassador Xing Haiming and opposition leader Lee Jae-myung.

Xing said during Thursday's meeting with Lee, chairman of the main opposition Democratic Party, that it is a wrong bet to believe that China will lose in the rivalry with the United States. He also warned that "those betting on China's defeat will certainly regret it later."

On Friday, South Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Chang Ho-jin called in Xing and "sternly warned" against the envoy's "unreasonable and provocative" remarks. Chang also warned Xing's remarks could be seen as interference of South Korea's domestic politics.

During Saturday's meeting, the Chinese assistant minister explained Beijing's stance on relations with South Korea and said it is part of Xing's duties to meet with people from various circles of the host nation with the purpose of promoting understanding and facilitating cooperation.

The Chinese official also asked South Korea to reflect on where the problem lies in relations between the two countries, respect the spirit of the joint statement adopted when the two countries established diplomatic relations, and work with China for a healthy and stable development of relations, according to the ministry.

Chinese Ambassador to South Korea Xing Haiming (L) speaks with Lee Jae-myung, leader of the main opposition Democratic Party, before their dinner meeting at the envoy's residence in Seoul on June 8, 2023. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 장재순 · June 11, 2023

9. 16,000 S.Koreans died since 2018 waiting to reunite with family in North

Just another indication of the evil nature of the regime. IMagine these people spending 7 decades hoping for a reunion with their families across the DMZ only to be denied by three people: Kim Il Sung, King Jong Il, and now Kim Jong Un. This is another indication that the regime fears the people more thanthe RO/US Combined Forces Command.

16,000 S.Koreans died since 2018 waiting to reunite with family in North

koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · June 11, 2023

Over 16,000 elderly South Koreans who had applied for a reunion with their separated families in North Korea have passed away in the absence of reunion events since August 2018.

The annual number of South Korean applicants for reunions who have died has ranged from 3,300 to 3,700 since 2018, according to data provided by South Korea's Unification Ministry to Rep. Yang Kyung-sook of the main opposition Democratic Party of Korea on Sunday.

The most recent state-organized in-person reunion event for families who were separated during the 1950-53 Korean War occurred in August 2018 at the Mount Kumgang resort in North Korea, following inter-Korean Red Cross talks.

But from 2019 until May of this year, an additional 15,313 reunion applicants have died.

More specifically, the number of deceased individuals among reunion applicants for separated families increased by 16,510 from the end of August 2018 to May this year, as indicated by the Unification Ministry's website dedicated to providing statistics on separated families.

As of the end of August 2018, out of a total 132,731 reunion applicants since 1988, 76,024 individuals, accounting for 57.3 percent, had passed away. By May of this year, out of 133,680 total applicants, the number of deceased individuals had increased to 92,534, making up 69.2 percent.

In the span of only five months since the start of this year, another 1,483 elderly individuals have passed away.

By the end of May, out of the total 41,146 surviving reunion applicants, approximately 31.1 percent were aged 90 or older. Furthermore, about 67 percent of the applicants were aged 80 or older.

The number of deceased individuals includes those who were fortunate to have reunited with their separated families through face-to-face reunions, officially facilitated by the two Koreas from 2000 to 2018, as well as a few who met their North Korean families with the assistance of private organizations in a third country.

Considering that the majority of reunion applicants are elderly, the number of surviving separated family members is likely to decline rapidly in the coming years.

Reunions for separated families commenced in August 2000, as a result of the agreement reached in the June 15 Joint Declaration following the inter-Korean summit. Since then, a total of 21 face-to-face reunions and seven video family reunions were organized by the South Korean regime and North Korean authorities until August 2018.

However, reunion meetings have been suspended for almost five years with no signs of resumption due to strained inter-Korean relations following the sudden collapse of the Hanoi Summit between former US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in February 2019.

"It is regrettable that there has been no progress in holding reunion meetings in the past five years, although the two Koreas marked the 23rd anniversary of the June 15th Inter-Korean Joint Declaration, which includes a significant agreement on reunions for separated families," Rep. Yang said in a press statement. "Both South and North Korea should promptly prioritize efforts to facilitate reunions for separated families based on humanitarian considerations."

The National Assembly Research Service advised the South Korean government once again to propose to North Korea the confirmation of the living status and addresses of separated families in a report titled "Measures to Revitalize Reunions for Separated Families" submitted upon the request of Rep. Yang.

But North Korea did not respond to the official proposal made by South Korean Unification Minister Kwon Young-se in September of last year to hold inter-Korean talks for reunions of separated families. Moreover, regular contact between the two Koreas has been suspended since North Korea unilaterally severed all inter-Korean communication channels on April 7 without a clear explanation.

By Ji Da-gyum (dagyumji@heraldcorp.com)

koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · June 11, 2023

10. Ruling bloc baffled by main opposition leader jabbing Yoon with China envoy

As I learned from my friend Mark Tokala on Friday, Ambassadors meet with opposition parties to learn about them not to scold them. The Chinese message should have either been delivered privately to the ROK government or offereded publicly. But it should not have been delivered privately to the opposition party.

Ruling bloc baffled by main opposition leader jabbing Yoon with China envoy

South Korean, Chinese foreign ministries each summon respective ambassadors

koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · June 11, 2023

South Korean main opposition Democratic Party of Korea leader Rep. Lee Jae-myung has stoked rebuke for backing Chinese ambassador Xing Haiming’s criticism of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s foreign policy last week.

At a dinner event with Xing at the ambassador’s residence on Thursday, Lee suggested that the relationship between South Korea and China has soured since Yoon administration came into office.

“The latest developments in international politics and economy appear to be having a significant impact on our 31 years of bilateral ties,” he said.

“There are concerns the degree of trust and respect between the people of the two countries have dwindled recently,” he said, adding that there need to be “extra efforts” on the government level to restore mutual confidence.

Many in the National Assembly, but mainly ruling People Power Party lawmakers, criticized Democratic Party leader Lee for failing to represent national interests by joining the Chinese ambassador in his blame of the South Korean government.

Rep. Ahn Cheol-soo, a former presidential contender, said Lee was stepping out of his place to insinuate that the Yoon administration was responsible for a setback in South Korea-China ties.

“Lee essentially went along with Ambassador Xing in condemning our government,” said Ahn, who is on the National Assembly foreign affairs committee. “He should know that political attacks should not extend beyond our borders.”

Rep. Kim Gi-hyeon, who heads the ruling People Power Party, said Lee’s speech at his dinner with the Chinese diplomat exemplified how he was “willing to bow to China” if it meant he could denounce Yoon. He also accused the opposition leader of following the previous President Moon Jae-in’s pro-China tendencies.

At Thursday’s dinner, Lee said South Korea and China should join efforts in protesting Tokyo’s plan to release approximately 1.32 million tonnes of wastewater stored at destroyed Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant. The wastewater will be treated and diluted, and its release gradual over the next 20 to 30 years, the Japanese government has said.

“As neighboring countries, I would like us to raise our voices if possible and come up with measures to respond to this problem together,” said Lee, who has been fiercely critical of Yoon administration's push to mend ties with Japan along with the rest of his party.

Lee also told the Chinese ambassador that South Korea “actively supports the ‘One China' principle,” apparently diverging from Yoon's stance. The South Korean president said tensions surrounding Taiwan were a global issue and not just China’s in an April interview with Reuters.

In a speech that followed Lee’s, Xing echoed the Democratic Party leader, saying it wasn’t Beijing that was responsible for its deteriorating relationship with Seoul.

“Our bilateral relationship is facing many difficulties at the moment. Frankly, the responsibility does not lie with China,” he said.

Xing said it was “external factors” such as the changing international landscape and the US pressure campaign against China that were challenging its relations with South Korea. He then called on South Korea to “stay out of external factors when dealing with China.”

“In a situation where the US is pressuring China with all its might, some are betting that the US will win and China will lose," he said. "What I can say for sure is that those who bet now on China's defeat will surely regret it later."

On Taiwan, he said he would like the South Korean side to “clearly respect China’s core interests.”

The Chinese Foreign Ministry on Sunday filed a complaint with South Korean Ambassador to China Chung Jae-ho over the South Korean Foreign Ministry's summoning of Xing two days prior.

In calling in Xing on Friday, Seoul’s Vice Foreign Minister Chang Ho-jin said the Chinese ambassador’s criticism of South Korea was “contradicting diplomatic customs” and “untrue and unforgivable.”

Despite pushback from Seoul, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wengbin endorsed the remarks made by Xing, reiterating in Friday’s press conference that the “current difficulties and challenges in the China-ROK relations are not caused by China.”

Yoon once again signaled a stronger alignment with Washington and Tokyo in his new national security strategy unveiled last week.

In the 42-page document, the length of the section indirectly or directly addressing China was about a third of that on Japan. While the last three South Korean administrations called China a “strategic cooperation partner” in their respective strategies, those words were not used to refer to China by the Yoon administration.

Yoon and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida held two consecutive summit talks in Tokyo and then in Seoul, before meeting again at the Group of Seven summit in Hiroshima last month. He and the Chinese President Xi Jinping have yet to follow up their first summit in November last year on the sidelines of the Group of 20 summit.

By Kim Arin (arin@heraldcorp.com)

koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · June 11, 2023

11. North Korea set for another plenary meeting on economy

Can politics and ideology fix the north Korean economy? (I think we all know the answer to that rhetorical question - you cannot eat ideology). 

North Korea set for another plenary meeting on economy

The Korea Times · June 11, 2023

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visits a rice farm damaged by heavy rain, in this Aug. 6, 2020, photo. North Korea is preparing to convene another plenary meeting of the ruling Workers' Party in a week or two to discuss economic issues. Analysts said Sunday that the unusual frequency of such gatherings ― the third one in just six months ― suggests an unusually bad food situation. Yonhap

Third gathering in six months is sign of food shortages, loosening of control: experts

By Jung Min-ho

North Korea is preparing to convene another plenary meeting of the ruling Workers' Party in a week or two to discuss economic matters. Analysts believe the unusual frequency of such gatherings ― the third one in just six months ― suggests an unusually bad food situation.

The party will hold the eighth plenary meeting of its eighth central committee sometime this month to review the implementation of national economic plans in the first half of 2023 and discuss policy issues, four months after the previous one held on the same agenda. Usually, the party convenes a plenary meeting once or twice a year.

Speaking to The Korea Times on Sunday, experts said the meeting plan might be a sign of two things: The economy is in trouble and, even without any feasible plans to turn it around, Kim Jong-un, leader of North Korea, still wants the meeting to happen as a means of uniting the party and strengthening his grip on power.

"Little has changed regarding its economic prospects since its previous plenary meeting. This means that the regime wants to hold the meeting for political purposes," said Park Won-gon, an expert on North Korea at Ewha Womans University.

"Perhaps the only possible way for North Korea to improve the situation quickly is resuming trade with its allies such as China and Russia. But it won't be easy, given its low vaccination rate among other reasons. So far, there have not been any definite signs that it is opening up its borders."

Expectations were high that North Korea may return to the international sports scene after the coronavirus pandemic, with 14 athletes registered to participate in an international weightlifting competition in Cuba. But according to the governing body of the sport, Friday, North Korea decided eventually not to send them.

North Korea had been facing serious food shortages for decades. But the international sanctions for its weapons program and lockdowns caused by the pandemic appeared to have made it even worse. Speaking before the National Assembly last month, Unification Minister Kwon Young-se said the problem aggravated this year, compared with 2022.

A North Korean pays money to a cashier at a supermarket in Pyongyang, in this Sept. 12, 2018, photo. AP-Yonhap

Experts say North Korea is likely to focus solely on economic issues and refrain from sending messages targeting other countries.

"Kim Yo-jong (sister of the North Korean ruler) issued the North's messages when deemed necessary regarding South Korea or the U.S. I don't see any reason for additional messages," said Cha Du-hyeogn, a senior researcher at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, a think tank.

"If North Korea is to say anything in regard to foreign policies, it would probably be about strengthening relations with China or Russia. So far, North Korea has been quite consistent in its stance that it does not want to talk to South Korea or the United States under current President Joe Biden."

Two weeks ago, Pyongyang attempted to launch a military reconnaissance satellite into space, which ended in failure. Given that most North Koreans are still unaware of the botched project, the regime is likely to remain quiet, experts added.

"If North Korea succeeded, there would be a message, given directly by Kim Jong-un. Given what happened, North Korea will most likely avoid mentioning it," Park said.

The Korea Times · June 11, 2023

12. Pyongyang fully mobilizes transportation services to get people to and from farms

The buried lede is that the Korean people are forced to leave the city and go work on the farms during the agriculture mobilization period" but they are happy to have better transportation to go to and from the farms. They are in fact being used as slave labor for the party. This is why I like to describe north Korea as the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State. We must exploit that through information and influence activities.

Pyongyang fully mobilizes transportation services to get people to and from farms

Pyongyangites have generally reacted positively to the city’s efforts to improve transportation, according to a source in the city

By Jong So Yong - 2023.06.09 4:00pm

dailynk.com

A train stopping at a metro station in Pyongyang. (Roman Harak, Creative Commons, Flickr)

Pyongyang recently mobilized the city’s various transportation services to reduce people’s travel times to and from nearby farms during the country’s “agriculture mobilization period,” Daily NK has learned.

North Korea has made “grain production” the nation’s top economic development task this year, and the move suggests that the government is making an all-out-effort to boost agricultural production.

Speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons, a source in Pyongyang told Daily NK on Monday that the mobilization order was handed down earlier this month, and instructed the city’s trolleybus and tram authorities, along with inner and inter-city bus authorities, to run at full capacity from 4 AM to midnight for 20 days beginning May 15.

In handing down the order, the city authorities appear to have recognized the difficulties faced by many people to get to and from work on the farms during the agricultural mobilization period.

Despite being North Korea’s capital city, Pyongyang has long suffered chronic shortages of electricity and oil, and some vehicles in the city’s public transportation sector have not been properly repaired due to a lack of parts. Reflecting this situation, Pyongyang’s city government even issued an order to party cadres to “fully guarantee electricity and oil for transportation.”

Following the city’s order for transportation services to run at full capacity, transportation agencies have lengthened the work hours of their drivers and operators, calling on them to work until every last Pyongyang resident returns to the city in the evening. This has sparked rumors that almost all drivers and operators have been mobilized this year, unlike in the past, when only some transportation personnel were mobilized during agricultural production campaigns.

Pyongyang’s efforts are welcomed by local residents

Pyongyangites have generally reacted positively to the city’s efforts to improve transportation, according to the source.

“We used to work hard on the farms and then dispiritingly wait in line forever [for a bus or trolleybus], but this year, we can get back and forth in ease. The city party committee seems to be doing its job. People say things are much better now that cadres are racking their brains to figure out how to improve things.

“With buses operating so well this year, it is not as common to see great crowds of people heading to the farms on bicycles, so the streets seem peaceful.”

In regards to a recent report by the Rodong Sinmun that “rice-transplantation was finished on main farm fields” throughout North Korea, the source told Daily NK that “work is still ongoing in the two Hwanghae provinces and other regions” given that “people are still going to and from farms to engage in farmwork in those places.”

Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Daily NK works with a network of sources who live inside North Korea, China and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous due to security concerns. More information about Daily NK’s reporting partner network and information gathering activities can be found on our FAQ page here.

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com

13. North Korean soldier takes revenge on her tormentor

So sad and tragic. But an act of individual resistance in the face of oppression nonetheless.

North Korean soldier takes revenge on her tormentor

Having grown accustomed to continuous nighttime calls and unwelcome touches for two years, the soldier decided to kill her superior officer - and then kill herself

By Kim Jeong Yoon - 2023.06.09 10:00am

dailynk.com

A photo of a women's unit in the Korean People's army taken in 2010. (Wikimedia Commons)

One summer night in August of 2021, Ok Ju (an alias) — a female soldier attached to a military hospital in the North Korean military’s Fourth Corps — trudged into the headquarters of the division command, her medical bag strapped to her shoulder. Her heart was palpitating even before she reached the entrance of the headquarters.

The 21-year-old nurse’s job was to treat cadres and she had just received a call from the director of the unit’s political department, who complained of insomnia and would ask for her every two days. It was extremely difficult to put up with the 50-something-year-old head of the political department, who would grope her as she administered the injections, but she endured the indignity nonetheless.

But that night, Ok Ju planned to change everything. Having grown inured to the political department director’s continuous nighttime calls and unwelcome touches for two years since she was 19, she planned to kill him that night, and then kill herself.

Hailing from South Pyongan Province, Ok Ju lost her father when she was young. Living with her grandmother, she graduated from nursing school and entered the army late as a “laborer youth.” Even if one is a qualified nurse, the competition is 50 to one to be assigned as a nurse at a divisional military hospital. However, Ok Ju suddenly received orders assigning her as a nurse to a military hospital.

She would find out later, but the head of the political department — who had come to her basic training camp as a guidance officer — ordered her assignment as his nurse after seeing her and her 170-centimeter willowy body and fair complexion.

From that time on, Ok Ju lived in hell. For two years, the political department director called her to his office at any time, making her a target of his sexual desire.

Ok Ju takes revenge on her tormentor

Ruminating over this nightmarish past, Ok Ju knocked on the door of the political department head’s office and entered. Like always, she first gave him a cup of hot omija tea. The political department head drank half a cup and lied down on the office sofa. A few minutes after receiving an injection, he closed his eyes as if sleeping.

In the meantime, Ok Ju secretly emptied an ampule of pink rat poison into the omija tea and handed it to the political department director, who — suspecting nothing — drank the remaining tea.

Ok Ju hurriedly ran out of the office and made her way to a mountainside near the headquarters. She sat under a giant tree, mixed four ampules of rat poison in water and drank it. Her dead body was discovered the next day.

The political department director was discovered by a staff duty officer on the night of the incident. He had his stomach pumped and recovered consciousness 10 minutes later. When he later learned that Ok Ju — the person who tried to kill him — had died, he issued a special order and had all the nurses responsible for treating cadres at the divisional hospital reassigned to lower units.

Moreover, in documents pertaining to Ok Ju, she was written up as a “dangerous element” who supposedly tried to poison the political department head out of spite when he refused her request to become a party member.

Ok Ju’s comrades did not have the heart to speak about what happened at the time, but after their discharge, they visited Ok Ju’s lonely mother one-by-one, and told her the truth of what happened. Having lost her only daughter, she visited the General Political Bureau and corps political department every day to express her burning anger. Ok Ju was gone, but she did not want any more women soldiers like her daughter to suffer the same indignity. However, the cries of Ok Ju’s mother were met with silence.

Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Daily NK works with a network of sources who live inside North Korea, China and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous due to security concerns. More information about Daily NK’s reporting partner network and information gathering activities can be found on our FAQ page here.

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

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14. N. Korea suspends classes for elementary school students in some regions

The desperation of the party. It must exploit its elementary school age slaves. And our messaging should tell that story of exploitation and human rights abuses. The regime violates its own constitution because among the many rights articulated in the constitution (to include freedom of speech and religion) the right to an education is being violated here as the article notes.

N. Korea suspends classes for elementary school students in some regions

In what appears to be a violation of their right to access education, the students are being forced to engage in farmwork

By Lee Chae Un - 2023.06.09 6:00pm

dailynk.com

This 2010 photo shows North Korean girls on their way to school. (Roman Harak, Creative Commons, Flickr)

North Korea recently suspended classes for elementary school students in certain regions of the country to mobilize them for rice planting, leading to complaints from their parents, Daily NK has learned.

“Kaechon declared May 10 to May 31 a general mobilization period for rice planting and mobilized everyone in the city to engage in farmwork,” a Daily NK source in South Pyongan Province said Tuesday, speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons. “Students took part in the mobilization, with the classes being suspended from May 20 to May 31.”

According to the source, students helped plant rice from 2 PM to 8 PM, after their classes had ended for the day. From May 20, however, their classes were suspended entirely, and they had to spend all day in the fields.

For years, North Korean authorities have mobilized young students to help plant rice under the slogan that “everyone who eats rice must help out.” However, parents have grown increasingly upset at how their children are forced into the fields to do work even adults find difficult.

This is not the first time the authorities have suspended classes for students, either. The authorities justify the measure by saying, “We can fight against the enemy and win only if there’s a lot of food.” However, some people are quietly criticizing the government’s violation of their children’s right to access education, saying that the nation’s people “need to fight and win by using their brains.”

Some students get out of mobilizations through bribes

Broadly speaking, North Korea’s education system is heavily discriminatory towards those without money to spare. This year, as in the past, the children of the country’s wealthy entrepreneurial class, or donju, and the offspring of cadres often got out of the rice planting campaign by slipping their teachers money, the source said.

“Poor students were all mobilized to the fields because they would be treated as ideologically problematic if they missed even a single day.”

Students who took part in the rice planting mobilizations even had to prepare boxed lunches every day.

“The problem is that there are many poor families that substitute watery gruel for meals because they can’t even put a single meal on the table,” the source said. “Given these circumstances, parents who have to prepare boxed lunches for their children every day have no choice but to complain.”

Despite this situation, North Korean authorities continue to adhere to “principles.”

“If students miss even a single day of mobilizations due to life circumstances or health reasons, [the authorities] convene an ideological struggle session and shame them with intensive criticism,” the source said. “Rather than being focused [on political ideology], I think the government’s duty is to first fill their people’s bellies before putting them to work, even if the food is just maize mixed with rice.”

Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Daily NK works with a network of sources who live inside North Korea, China and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous due to security concerns. More information about Daily NK’s reporting partner network and information gathering activities can be found on our FAQ page here.

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

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15.  Five ways to deal with Korea-China relations

Conclusion:

China’s diplomatic offensives that have come to the surface pose serious challenges to the Yoon administration’s diplomacy. Today, whatever steps the government takes with the U.S. and Japan is directly linked to China. The diplomatic achievements by the president from his summits with Biden and Kishida can be accurately gauged only when you take into account their repercussions on Korea-China relations. I expect successful diplomacy from the government.

Wednesday

June 7, 2023

 dictionary + A - A 

Five ways to deal with Korea-China relations

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/06/07/opinion/columns/Korea-China-relations/20230607201717380.html

Wi Sung-lac

The author is a former South Korean representative to the six-party talks and head of the diplomacy and security division of the JoongAng Ilbo’s Reset Korea campaign.

A red light is blinking for Korea-China relations. Beijing started to complain about Seoul getting ever closer to the United States. After canceling all levels of consultations with the Korean government, China gave an ultimatum-like warning against Korea’s stance heavily leaning toward the U.S. After the exchange of toughened diplomatic rhetoric between Seoul and Beijing, China is fiddling with retaliatory measures against Korea. Beijing even claims that Korea-China relations are the worst since the normalization of bilateral ties in 1992.

Such alarming developments were forewarned. After the launch of the Yoon Suk Yeol administration last year, China worried about the possibility of Korea siding with the U.S. in holding China in check. So, Beijing demanded a respect for China’s national interest from Seoul. China believes that the Korean government betrayed China even though it has helped Korea reap economic gains over the past three decades since the establishment of diplomatic ties. Beijing has turned to the offensive after concluding that the Yoon government crossed the line particularly after his summit with U.S. President Joe Biden in Washington.

Despite China’s shift to the hard-line, the Yoon administration won’t pause the consolidation of the alliance with America. President Yoon will certainly participate in the NATO Summit in July and visit Washington for a tripartite summit with Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. If Korea continues to join U.S.-led supply chains, China will most likely take retaliatory actions.

Russia is no exception. After Seoul sent a strong message underscoring the importance of an international alliance to safeguard liberty, the U.S. and other members of the international community demanded Korea play a role, including weapon supplies for Ukraine. If Korea complies, Russia will be angry. That will also provoke China and Russia to side with North Korea over the nuclear issue. In that case, Pyongyang will find it easier to ratchet up the level of its nuclear weapons.

That demands answers from stakeholders. After the division of the world into the West and the Russia-China camp since the Ukraine war, Korea cannot but take steps with the U.S. But at the same time, Korea cannot dismiss diplomacy with China and Russia given the need for their help in achieving peace, prosperity and unification of the Korean Peninsula in the face of geopolitical risks.

How to solve the dilemma? First, the Yoon administration had better avoid worsening the situation by exchanging tits for tats with China. It may look easy at first glance. But it is not. Given the public sentiment against China, the government could expect public support for its friction with China. But the government should be careful.

Second, Korea must strengthen communication with China on various levels. Given the low probability of China gladly accepting a summit proposal from Korea, the government must have sincere working-level talks with the neighbor. Allowing the National Security Council with full authority on the issue to take the initiative could be a good idea.

Third, for substantial dialogue with China, the government must first establish its policy direction toward China. The government must deal with its China policy in connection with its U.S. policy — not separately. In the past, Korea often addressed conflict with China through a quick fix in the course of cooperation with America. But since the U.S.-China rivalry reached a new height — and as their demands grew even stronger — such a naïve approach doesn’t work anymore. The government must set an integrated, coordinated and strategic frame of diplomacy before resolving conflicts. If the government stops short of fixing an effective coordinate to find the room for coordination with the U.S. as well as with China and Russia, it cannot have meaningful dialogue with Beijing, not to mention sustainable policy coordination with Washington.

Fourth, based on that paradigm, the government must find areas of common interest for trilateral cooperation among Korea, the U.S. and China and separate it from the tense U.S.-China contest. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and free and fair trade could serve as good topics for tripartite cooperation.

Fifth, worsening Korea’s relations with China and Russia at the same time not only poses a heavy burden for the country but also does not help strategically. In the beginning, Russia was more forward-looking than China on the issue of North Korean nuclear weapons program, but Russia increasingly took China’s side amid the U.S.-Russia confrontation. The government must draw Russia to Korea’s side. It needs to take a prudent approach to weapons support for Ukraine from the strategic point of view.

China’s diplomatic offensives that have come to the surface pose serious challenges to the Yoon administration’s diplomacy. Today, whatever steps the government takes with the U.S. and Japan is directly linked to China. The diplomatic achievements by the president from his summits with Biden and Kishida can be accurately gauged only when you take into account their repercussions on Korea-China relations. I expect successful diplomacy from the government.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com