Quotes of the Day:
“The totalitarian attempt at global conquest and total domination has been the destructive way out of all impasses. Its victory may coincide with the destruction of humanity; wherever it has ruled, it has begun to destroy the essence of man. Yet to turn our backs on the destructive forces of the century is of little avail.”
— The Origins Of Totalitarianism (Harvest Book Book 244) by Hannah Arendt
https://a.co/9m87wSH
"A life is not important except in the impact it has on other lives."
- Jackie Robinson
"Culture is not a piece of baggage that immigrants carry with them; it is not static but undergoes constant modification in a new environment."
- Sau-ling Cynthia Wong
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 20 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. Russia, Failing to Achieve Early Victory in Ukraine, Is Seen Shifting to ‘Plan B’
3. US to send army contingent to Bulgaria as part of NATO battle group
4. Ukraine Rejects Russia’s Demand to Surrender Mariupol
5. Russian Soldiers Took Their City, Then Their Homes
6. Deputy Commander Of Russia's Black Sea Fleet Reportedly Killed In Action
7. Russia, China and the New Cold War
8. Intel Sharing Between U.S. and Ukraine 'Revolutionary' Says DIA Director
9. Russia's elite want Putin out, successor in mind: Ukraine intel chief
10. No gun. No helmet. No action: The frustrations of some novice Americans who signed up to fight in Ukraine.
11. Maria Stepanova: The war of Putin’s imagination
12. Biden turns to former Trump officials on China competition bill
13. Russian TV protester: "The Russian people are really against the war"
14. Ukraine War Update - March 21, 2022 | SOF News
15. For the U.S., a Tenuous Balance in Confronting Russia
16. Ukraine is getting Switchblade. It should be just the first wave of loitering munitions for Kyiv.
17. The war in Ukraine has reintroduced these words and phrases into our vocabulary
18. Zelensky: 'I'm ready for negotiations' with Putin, but if they fail, it could mean 'a third World War'
19. Does the Quad Plus add up?
20. Is Taiwan Next?
21. Taiwan's Civilian Soldiers, Watching Ukraine, Worry They Aren't Prepared
22. 70% Taiwanese willing to militarise amid fear over Chinese invasion, reveals new poll
23. FDD | Biden throws Putin a nuclear lifeline
24. Putin may be losing the information war, but Zelensky's NATO concession suggests Ukraine may be losing on the battlefield.
25. FDD | Congress must stop Team Biden from giving Russia a financial lifeline in Iran deal
26. FDD | Canada Must Bar Iranian Officials From Entering the Country
27. FDD | U.S. Should Seize and Sell Assets of Sanctioned Russian Elites to Aid Ukraine
28. The West Still Doesn’t Understand the Taliban
29. Why Deterrence Failed Against Russia
30. AP Exclusive: US admiral says China fully militarized isles
31. Russian Withdrawal Isn’t Enough
32. Ukraine defies Russian demand to lay down arms in Mariupol
33. Meet the Allies’ most dangerous spy in France during World War II
34. Biden administration formally determines Myanmar's military committed genocide
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 20 (PUTIN'S WAR)
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 20 (PUTIN'S WAR)
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 20
Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko
March 20, 4:00pm ET
Russian forces did not make any major advances on March 20. Russian forces around Kyiv are increasingly establishing defensive positions and preparing to deploy further artillery and fire control assets. Ukrainian forces repelled continuing Russian efforts to seize the city of Izyum, southeast of Kharkiv, and Russian forces did not conduct any other offensive operations in northeast Ukraine. Russian forces continue to make slow but steady progress on Luhansk Oblast and around Mariupol, but did not conduct any offensive operations towards Mykolayiv or Kryvyi Rih.
Key Takeaways
- The Ukrainian General Staff reported for the first time that the Kremlin is preparing its population for a “long war” in Ukraine and implementing increasingly draconian mobilization measures, including deploying youth military organization members aged 17-18.
- Ukrainian forces reportedly killed three Russian regimental commanders in the last 24 hours.
- Russia’s Wagner Group will likely facilitate the deployment of Libyan fighters to Ukraine.
- Russian forces are digging in to positions around Kyiv, including the first reports of the war of Russian forces deploying minefields.
- Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault on Izyum, southeast of Kharkiv, and inflicted heavy casualties.
- Russian forces continued their slow advance into Mariupol but did not achieve any major territorial gains.
- Ukrainian forces launched further localized counterattacks around Mykolayiv.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported for the first time that the Kremlin is preparing its population for a “long war” in Ukraine and implementing increasingly draconian mobilization measures.[1] The General Staff reported the Russian military commissariats of the Kuban, Primorsky Krai, Yaroslavl Oblast, and Ural Federal Districts are conducting covert mobilization measures but are facing widespread resistance. The General Staff reported the Russian PMC Wagner Group will facilitate the transport of Libyan fighters from LNA leader Khalifa Haftar’s forces to Ukraine. The General Staff reported universities in the DNR and LNR are conscripting students above the age of 18 and that most units in the DNR’s 1st Army Corps are comprised of the “mobilized population,” rather than trained soldiers, and face low morale and equipment shortages. The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) additionally reported on March 20 that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu signed an order to prepare to admit Unarmiya (Russian Youth Army, a Kremlin-run military youth organization) personnel aged 17-18 to fight in Ukraine on March 15.[2] The GUR further reported Colonel General Gennady Zhidko, head of the Russian Military-Political Directorate, is in charge of executing the order. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 19 that Russian officials “severely reprimanded” the head of the 652nd unit of Information and Psychological Operations for his “weak efforts” and inability to create a “Kherson People's Republic."[3]
Russian forces face mounting casualties among officers and increasingly frequent desertion and insubordination. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense reported on March 19 that “some [Russian] naval infantry units” (unspecified which, but likely referring to Eastern Military District units deployed to the fighting around Kyiv) have lost up to 90% of their personnel and cannot generate replacements.[4] The Ukrainian General Staff reported at noon local time on March 20 that Ukrainian forces wounded the commander of the 346th Independent Spetsnaz Brigade and claimed that Ukrainian forces killed the commanders of the 331st VDV Regiment, 247th VDV Regiment, and the 6th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, CMD) at unspecified times and locations.[5] The General Staff reported the Russian Black Sea Fleet is replacing 130 insubordinate soldiers in the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade with paratroopers from the 7th Airborne Assault Division – a measure highly likely to cause greater unit cohesion problems.[6] The General Staff additionally reported that Russian forces are increasingly using ”outdated and partially defective equipment” to replace combat losses.[7]
The Ukrainian MoD reported that forced mobilization in the DNR has demoralized Russian proxy forces, with many refusing to fight and accusing Russian leadership of forcing them into combat to find Ukrainian troop positions. The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported the number of insubordinate Russian personnel who are refusing combat orders is “sharply increasing” in the Kherson and Mykolayiv oblasts on March 20.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff reported the Russian military commandant office in Belgorod City is investigating 10 Russian servicemen of 138th Motor Rifle Brigade who refused to continue fighting in Kharkiv and agitated for other Russian servicemen to abandon their posts.[9]
Ukrainian military intelligence (the GUR) reported on March 20 that another group of mercenaries connected with Yevgeny Prigozhin and the “League”/Wagner Group began arriving in Ukraine on March 20.[10] The GUR claimed this group aims to eliminate Ukraine’s top military and political leadership, including Volodymyr Zelensky, Andriy Yermak, and Denys Shmyhal. The GUR claimed Russia is turning to assassination plans due to the failure of Russian conventional operations.
We do not report in detail on the deliberate Russian targeting of civilian infrastructure and attacks on unarmed civilians, which are war crimes, because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time:
- Main effort—Kyiv (comprised of three subordinate supporting efforts);
- Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv;
- Supporting effort 1a—Luhansk Oblast;
- Supporting effort 2—Mariupol and Donetsk Oblast; and
- Supporting effort 3—Kherson and advances northward and westward.
Main effort—Kyiv axis: Russian operations on the Kyiv axis are aimed at encircling the city from the northwest, west, and east.
Subordinate main effort along the west bank of the Dnipro
Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations northwest of Kyiv on March 20.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces continued to strengthen defensive positions in previously captured terrain.[12] The General Staff additionally specified Russian forces are deploying engineering support, preparing logistics, and extending their fire control systems.[13] The Ukrainian General staff has not previously mentioned a Russian focus on fire control systems. This Ukrainian assessment supports ISW’s forecast that Russian forces are likely seeking to set conditions for an expanded artillery and missile bombardment of Kyiv by moving into effective artillery range of its center after abandoning plans to encircle or assault the city in the coming weeks.[14]
Subordinate supporting effort — Chernihiv and Sumy axis
Russian forces strengthened their defensive positions northeast of Kyiv in the past 24 hours and reportedly began deploying minefields — the first Ukrainian General Staff report of Russian forces laying mines.[15] Russian forces continued to shell civilian settlements across northeast Ukraine.[16] Ukrainian forces additionally launched local counterattacks around Brovary on March 20. The Ukrainian General staff reported Ukrainian forces have cut off the fuel and food supplies of Russian forces near Brovary and destroyed an unspecified detachment of the Russian 6th Tank Regiment.[17]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv:
Russian forces did not conduct any notable activity around Kharkiv in the past 24 hours.[18] The Ukrainian Border Guard reported the detention of two Russian saboteurs in Kharkiv Oblast on March 20.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian forces are moving unspecified ”high-powered artillery” in Belgorod Oblast, Russia, as of noon local time on March 20.[20]
Ukrainian forces in Izyum repulsed a Russian attempt to capture the city center on March 19-20. The Ukrainian General Staff and local Kharkiv Oblast authorities reported Ukrainian forces inflicted heavy casualties on Russian forces.[21] Russian forces will likely continue attempts to seize Izyum to support a broader envelopment of Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine but are unlikely to seize the city in the near term.
Supporting Effort #1a—Luhansk Oblast:
Russian and proxy forces made limited territorial gains north of Rubizhne on March 19-20, capturing the village of Varvarivka.[22] The Ukrainian General Staff stated at noon local time on March 20 that Russian forces continued to attempt to capture the settlements of Rubizhne, Severodonetsk, and Popasna but were unable to break through Ukrainian defenses.[23]
Supporting Effort #2—Mariupol and Donetsk Oblast:
Russian forces continued their slow advance into Mariupol on March 20, though without any major territorial changes.[24] Russian and proxy forces continued to shell the city, including with thermobaric munitions.[25] Russian officials additionally confirmed on March 20 the that Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet for military-political affairs, Captain of the 1st Rank Andrei Paly, was killed in Mariupol on an unspecified date.[26] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed DNR forces advanced 3km towards Verkhn'otorets'ke, north of Mariupol, on March 19.[27]
Supporting Effort #3—Kherson and advances northward and westwards:
The Ukrainian General Staff reported at midnight local time on March 19 that Ukrainian forces restored an unspecified “front line of defense along some borders” in the “southern direction” - likely referring to continuing Ukrainian counterattacks around Mykolayiv.[28] The General Staff further stated Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations in the southern direction on March 20 and prioritized restoring combat effectiveness.[29] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Black Sea Fleet warships struck Ukrainian workshops and storage facilities in Mykolaiv with Kalibr missiles on March 20, though ISW cannot independently verify this claim.[30]
Immediate items to watch
- Russian forces will likely capture Mariupol or force the city to capitulate within the coming weeks;
- Russia will expand its air, missile, and artillery bombardments of Ukrainian cities;
- Russian forces will likely continue efforts to reach Kryvyi Rih and isolate Zaporizhiya;
- Russian forces around Kyiv will continue efforts to push forward into effective artillery range of the center of the city;
- Russian troops will continue efforts to reduce Chernihiv and Sumy.
[2] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/putin-i-shoihu-hotuiutsia-zadiiaty-u-viini-proty-ukrainy-nepovnolitnikh-dokument.html.
[8] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/zbilshuietsia-kilkist-okupantiv-iaki-vidmovliaiutsia-vid-podalshoi-uchasti-u-viini.html.
[10] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/okupanty-perekydaiut-v-ukrainu-cherhovi-terorystychni-hrupy-z-metoiu-likvidatsii-kerivnytstva-ukrainy.html.
[11]
2. Russia, Failing to Achieve Early Victory in Ukraine, Is Seen Shifting to ‘Plan B’
Plan B's are never good. Especially for the Ukrainian people. Photos, imagery, graphics, and video at the link.
Russia, Failing to Achieve Early Victory in Ukraine, Is Seen Shifting to ‘Plan B’
Tactical shift seeks to pressure Ukraine into accepting neutrality and Russian territorial claims, U.S. officials say
By Michael R. Gordon and Alex Leary
March 20, 2022 8:59 pm ET
After Russian forces failed to secure a quick victory over Ukraine, senior U.S. officials see signs the Kremlin is shifting to a new strategy to secure key territorial objectives while seeking leverage to compel the Ukrainian government to accept neutrality between Russia and the West.
The U.S. and its allies had widely interpreted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s initial objectives to include the seizure of Kyiv in a matter of days, and the replacement of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s government with a pro-Russian regime.
The new assessment of Mr. Putin’s intentions, which is shared by senior officials within the Biden administration, is to compel Kyiv to accept Russian claims to Ukraine’s southern and eastern territories. Having seized both Crimea and regions of Donbas in 2014, Russia seeks to secure a “land bridge” between western Russia and the Crimean Peninsula, and to expand Russian control of the Donbas region.
Mr. Putin would also continue his military pressure, including the pummeling of Ukrainian cities, calculating that it will lead Mr. Zelensky to abandon his hopes of joining the West and agree to a neutral status and other Russian demands.
Should Mr. Putin’s demands for territory and neutrality be rebuffed, he is expected to try to hold all of the ground his forces have taken, and fight on, U.S. officials said. “Based on our assessments militarily, it does appear that he is reverting to siege tactics,” said another U.S. official.
Putin Praises Russian Military at Moscow Rally
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Putin Praises Russian Military at Moscow Rally
Play video: Putin Praises Russian Military at Moscow Rally
Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed tens of thousands of supporters in a Moscow stadium, justifying the invasion of Ukraine at a rally marking the eighth anniversary of Russia’s seizure of Crimea. Photo: Sergei Guneyev/AFP/Getty Images
For Ukraine’s beleaguered citizens, the shifting strategy means weeks—possibly months—of attacks from a weakened Russian military often content to fire missiles and artillery from a distance, they said. This shift is designed to pressure Mr. Zelensky’s government into giving up territory and ceding security arrangements.
The assessment of Mr. Putin’s “Plan B,” as one official called it, comes with a number of important caveats. U.S. officials note Mr. Putin might expand his war aims, should his military begin to have more success against Ukraine’s forces. The status of the capital remains an open question, and given stout Ukrainian resistance, it is unclear whether the Russian military can marshal sufficient troops to tightly cordon off Kyiv and take the Ukrainian capital, some U.S. officials say.
The interpretation of Mr. Putin’s strategy isn’t the result of a formal intelligence community assessment, but is the view of some U.S. officials with access to classified information who are not saying the strategy will work. Some analysts note the difficulty of assessing Mr. Putin’s goals and objectives, and warn against reading too much into battlefield developments.
Russian invasion
Areas seized as of Saturday
Direction of invasion forces
RUSSIA
Controlled by or allied to Russia
Primary refugee crossing locations
Ukraine territory, recognized by Putin as independent
Nuclear facilities
BELARUS
Chernobyl
Not in operation
Kharkiv
Rivne
Kyiv
POLAND
Luhansk
Khmelnitsky
Dnipro
Lviv
Donetsk
UKRAINE
Controlled by
separatists
Mariupol
Zaporizhzhia
South
Ukraine
TRANSNISTRIA
Kherson
Sea of Azov
MOLDOVA
Odessa
ROMANIA
CRIMEA
Sevastopol
Black Sea
200 miles
200 km
Sources: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Russia-controlled area in eastern Ukraine); Dr. Phillip Karber, Potomac Foundation (Russian incursions, refugee crossing locations); International Atomic Energy Agency, Energoatom (Nuclear facilities)
Max Rust and Emma Brown/The Wall Street Journal
“His objective has not changed at all,” said Daniel Fried, a former senior State Department official who served as U.S. ambassador to Poland. “What has changed is his tactics.”
“The quick decapitation of the Ukrainian government didn’t work,” Mr. Fried said. “Now he just wants to pound them because they are resisting and therefore it must be purged. It’s Stalinesque.”
At present, Russian forces are faced with enormous challenges, including faulty logistics, a shrinking supply of precision-guided munitions and growing casualties, which could include as many as 7,000 Russian troops killed in action, according to U.S. calculations.
A building hit by Russian missiles in Kyiv on Sunday.
PHOTO: ATEF SAFADI/SHUTTERSTOCK
In Mariupol and other cities, his forces have reverted to some of the siege tactics they employed in Grozny in 1999 and 2000 during the second Chechen war when Mr. Putin rose to power as prime minister and then president.
In Chechnya, Russian forces sought to gain control of a major city in a Russian territory that is smaller than New Jersey. In Ukraine, Russia faces the challenge of trying to gain control of multiple cities in a country that had a population of 44 million before roughly 3.4 million fled Ukraine and is larger than France.
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After weeks of tough fighting, Russian troops have pushed into the streets of the port city of Mariupol, an important strategic objective for Moscow as it seeks to establish a corridor from the Crimean Peninsula to western Russia. Seizing control of the city would give the Russians a battlefield victory, though one achieved at a high cost.
“We’ve seen deliberate targeting of cities and towns and civilians throughout in the last several weeks,” Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said Sunday to CBS News. “He’s taking these kinds of steps because…his campaign is stalled.”
After initial rounds of negotiations, Ukraine and Russia remain far apart on key issues, including the Kremlin’s demands that the Zelensky government recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea, formally cede control of the Donbas region and renounce its longer-term aspiration to integrate with the West, including its goal of eventually joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
John Herbst, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, agreed that the Russian military had shifted its tactics on the battlefield, but said there was no indication that Mr. Putin had backed away from his maximum demands.
Mr. Putin’s main purpose in agreeing to talks with Ukraine, Mr. Herbst said, was to encourage the West to offer concessions while creating the impression for the Russian public that he is open to diplomacy. The talks, he added, aren’t being led on the Russian side by a top-level official.
“I think he began the negotiations at a much lower level because he realized things were not working out on the battlefield,” Mr. Herbst said. “He is still trying to win the war on the battlefield, but he has in no way publicly endorsed anything other than his maximalist checklist.”
President Biden is traveling to Brussels for a NATO summit on Thursday and will also participate in a European Council meeting. The trip comes as Mr. Biden has received both praise and criticism at home for his handling of the crisis. Some lawmakers continue to push a plan that would supply Soviet-built MiG-29 combat jets to Ukraine, an idea Mr. Biden and his advisers have rejected.
A satellite photo showing buildings burning amid Russian strikes in Mariupol.
PHOTO: PLANET LABS PBC/ASSOCIATED PRESS
Mr. Zelensky has sought to apply pressure on Mr. Biden and leaders in other countries to establish a no-fly zone to shield his country from air attacks. The U.S. and NATO nations have rebuffed that proposal and are moving to send more air defense systems to Ukraine so the Ukrainians can better defend their airspace on their own.
Russia says that it has fired two hypersonic missiles in recent days in an apparent effort to show it could overcome a no-fly zone and any air defenses Ukraine might field, experts say. Mr. Austin said in his television appearance that he would neither “confirm or dispute” that the Russians had used such a weapon. But he added the missile wasn’t “a game changer.”
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Appeared in the March 21, 2022, print edition as 'Putin Is Seen as Shifting to Plan B.'
3. US to send army contingent to Bulgaria as part of NATO battle group
I wonder how many US troops are in Europe and where. What were our numbers before Putin's war and what are they. now?
How long can we maintain the troop presence. I imagine DOD has worked out a rotational plan. I wonder at what point we will want to make the numbers permanent and are we planning on developing permanent basing facilities or will we continue to rotate troops for a s long as necessary (and how long do we think that will be? Perhaps as long as Putin remains in power?)
US to send army contingent to Bulgaria as part of NATO battle group
U.S. Army Strykers from 2nd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, convoy during Platoon Live Fire Exercise on Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, March 29, 2012. (Jose Ibarra/Stars and Stripes)
SOFIA, Bulgaria — Bulgarian Prime Minister Kiril Petkov said the United States would send a contingent of troops to the country to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank amid the war in Ukraine.
Petkov made the announcement after holding talks with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin in Sofia on Saturday.
The US Stryker army contingent is to be part of a NATO battle group in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Defense Ministry said.
Petkov assured that there would be no arms deliveries from Bulgaria to Ukraine.
“We have not talked in any way about military support for Ukraine,” he said during a news conference.
Before Austin’s visit, there was an uproar in Bulgaria over reports in the international media that Bulgaria might hand over its Soviet-designed S-300 air defense system to Ukraine.
Bulgarian President Rumen Radev warned against supplying weapons to Ukraine and thus involving Bulgaria more directly in the conflict.
Bulgaria will, however, continue to provide humanitarian support to Ukrainians, Petkov said. Austin had earlier praised Bulgaria’s aid to Ukraine and response to refugees fleeing the war.
Austin and Petkov had visited Bulgarian and U.S. military personnel training at a military compound in eastern Bulgaria on Friday.
4. Ukraine Rejects Russia’s Demand to Surrender Mariupol
The Ukrainian in Mariupol are and will continue to suffer horrendously under Russia attacks.
I wonder if the city will be ground zero for war crimes evidence in Putin's War. Maybe that is where they should try Putin's war criminals after the war is over.
Ukraine Rejects Russia’s Demand to Surrender Mariupol
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Service members of pro-Russian troops are seen atop of tanks during Ukraine-Russia conflict on the outskirts of the besieged southern port city of Mariupol, Ukraine on Sunday.ALEXANDER ERMOCHENKO/REUTERS
The Ukrainian government said it wouldn’t relinquish the besieged port city of Mariupol after Russia’s defense ministry on Sunday gave defenders until Monday morning to surrender.
“Ukraine rejects Russia's demand to surrender Mariupol,” the Ukrainian government said on Twitter. It cited the country’s Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk as saying that turning over the city wasn’t an option and that she demanded Russia give civilians safe passage to exit.
Mikhail Mizintsev, the head of the Defense Ministry’s National Defense Control Center, on Sunday said Kyiv must respond to Russia’s offer by 5 a.m. Moscow time on Monday, according to Interfax, a news agency.
Russia has inflicted a heavy toll on Mariupol. Ukrainian officials said an art school where around 400 people had been sheltering was bombed by Russia, trapping people beneath the rubble. Their condition couldn’t be determined.
The incident comes days after a theater in the city was bombed. Rescue workers had freed 130 people from the rubble as of Friday, though 1,300 people remained trapped in the basement of the theater, a local official said.
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5. Russian Soldiers Took Their City, Then Their Homes
I fear there will be too many stories like these. And when you mix incompetence with brutality and inhumanity this is what results.
Russian Soldiers Took Their City, Then Their Homes
Visual Investigations
As Russian forces pushed toward Kyiv, they stormed an apartment complex in a nearby suburb and held residents hostage. Some of it was caught on camera.
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March 20, 2022
KYIV, Ukraine — For days, Roman Naumenko and his neighbors at the Pokrovsky apartment complex outside Kyiv had been watching from a few short miles away as Russian forces tried to take over a nearby airport.
“I saw helicopters that were firing, coming one after the other,” he said. “It was a huge shock. I couldn’t believe it was real.”
Residents would stand outside their buildings filming the destruction with their cellphones.
Credit...Roman Naumenko
Each day, Russian forces drew closer and closer to the apartment complex. On March 3, one of the buildings was directly hit by a missile. More than 150 families were still in the 14-building residential complex at the time, a building manager told The New York Times.
And then, later that same day, troops were literally at Mr. Naumenko’s doorstep.
“We saw the Russian infantry on the security camera of our building,” he said. “From that moment, the Russians stayed.”
They made around 200 residents stay too, holding many of them hostage in the basements of their own buildings, forcing them to hand over their phones and taking over their apartments. Others were able to avoid detection but still were essentially prisoners in their own homes as Russian forces moved into the buildings, which had housed 560 families, and took up sniping positions.
The Times interviewed seven residents of the Pokrovsky apartment complex in the town of Hostomel, about 10 miles northwest of Kyiv. All experienced the assault and the captivity firsthand before finding ways to flee. Using their accounts, along with footage from security cameras and cellphones, The Times was able to piece together what it looked and felt like as Russian forces closed in.
“It was really scary,” said Lesya Borodyuk, a 49-year-old resident, tearing up at one point as she spoke. “I wrote to my daughter. I was saying goodbye to her. I told her that probably we will be bombed now.”
Outside in the parking lot, security cameras showed at least a dozen Russian troops and infantry fighting vehicles. Soldiers shuttled heavy machine guns and forced a man inside a building at gunpoint.
Ksenia, who asked to be identified only by her first name, watched with her husband and children from their second-floor window as Russian forces arrived at their building.
“We didn’t know what could happen to us,” she said. “It was just a total state of fear.”
One group of soldiers used rifles to smash open the front door of an apartment building. Once inside, they entered the elevator and destroyed its security cameras. In some buildings, soldiers went floor by floor tearing doors off hinges and raiding apartments, residents said.
Within a few hours, according to the seven residents The Times spoke to, Russian soldiers had seized the entire complex and trapped close to 200 civilians inside various buildings.
“People were kicked out of the apartments,” said Elena Anishchenko, who was planning to celebrate her 33rd birthday with neighbors the day the soldiers arrived. “They didn’t ask anyone anything, they would just tell them to go to the basement.”
Many of the residents had their phones and laptops confiscated or destroyed.
“They told us — ‘Don’t be mad at us, but if we find your phone, you will be shot on the spot,’” Ms. Anishchenko said.
Cut off from the outside world, Ms. Anishchenko said she couldn’t read the news or speak to her family.
Some residents like Ksenia were able to remain in their homes — perhaps because she had an infant.
Others went unnoticed. Mr. Naumenko and his wife hid on the seventh floor of their building. He still had his phone, which he would turn on once a day to text his family that he was still alive.
Families worry: ‘I cannot get in touch.’
Friends and relatives of those trapped in Pokrovsky were in agony. In chat groups and via text messages, they had seen clips and screen shots of Russian soldiers as they seized the complex. Then the messages from their loved ones just stopped.
Iryna Khomyakova, a resident’s daughter, saw the closed-circuit television footage of the soldiers entering the elevator. Worried, she called her mother, who said that Russian soldiers had just entered the building and that she was forced with others into the basement.
“My mom’s phone died,” she said on March 9, and she hadn’t heard from her in days.
Hanna Yaremchuk told The Times via text message that she was out of touch with her father for days, adding that he was also being held in a basement. She wondered: “Is he alive at all? !!! I do not know!”
Living with soldiers
For those being detained, the ability to move around depended on the guards.
Ms. Borodyuk and others in her basement were permitted to go to their apartments to get food and warm clothes to help withstand the cold of the brick basement. Neighbors were permitted to cook together and intermingle.
The Russians guarding Ms. Anishchenko’s basement were more strict. They allowed the residents only short, supervised visits to their apartments to get food and supplies for everyone.
Infantry fighting vehicles outside the Pokrovsky complex.Credit...The New York Times
“People were panicking,” Ms. Anishchenko said, “Everyone was past their breaking point.”
Eventually, a hundred or more soldiers were patrolling outside the buildings, and some were even living in the apartments.
On the seventh floor, Mr. Naumenko and his wife continued to evade detection. Recent shelling in the area had blown out their windows and the temperature had dropped below freezing. With no electricity, they improvised ways to cook, lighting oil in a saucer to warm up food and using a candle to heat a can of water. Without heat in the building, they slept fully dressed and wearing jackets.
The Naumenkos heating up water using a candle and a water can.Credit...Roman Naumenko
In Ksenia’s apartment, each day involved securing enough food to feed her children and surviving to the next morning. Her new life was a far cry from what she envisioned.
“We were waiting for this apartment for four years,” Ksenia said. “We invested in the renovation. But even this doesn’t matter now.”
Russia-Ukraine War: Key Things to Know
Card 1 of 4
Signs of a stalemate take shape. With Russia’s advance on Ukraine’s major cities stalled and satellite imagery showing soldiers digging into defensive positions around Kyiv, a consensus is emerging in the West that the war has reached a bloody stalemate.
A Ukrainian base is hit. A missile attack on barracks in the southern city of Mykolaiv killed more than 40 marines, a Ukrainian official said. That would make it one of the single deadliest attacks on Ukrainian forces since the start of the war, and the death toll could be much higher than reported.
Chernobyl workers are relieved. After more than three weeks without being able to leave the nuclear power plant in northern Ukraine, 64 workers were able to be rotated out, officials said. Staff at the plant have been trapped since Feb. 23, a day before Russian forces took control of the site.
‘We will liberate you from Nazis’
Outside, the fighting was relentless.
“We got used to the sounds of shooting and we learned to tell one from the other,” Mr. Naumenko said. “Whether it was far or close. Whether it was going into our building or above the building. We could hear that.”
Inside the apartment complex, the soldiers were telling their prisoners that Ukraine was about to be liberated, Ms. Anishchenko said.
Ms. Borodyuk recalled a more senior Russian officer attempting to comfort a girl in the basement where they were detained. “He said: ‘My daughter is 8 years old too. I love her very much. I miss her. Don’t be afraid, little girl, we will liberate you from Nazis.’”
Ms. Borodyuk said some of the younger Russian troops didn’t even know why they were in Ukraine. When captives asked one soldier why he was here, he replied, weeping: “Where am I? What should I do?”
Evacuated by chance
On March 9, Russia and Ukraine agreed to briefly establish several humanitarian corridors to allow civilians safe passage out of conflict areas. But the Russian soldiers at Pokrovsky failed to inform their prisoners.
Ms. Anishchenko heard by chance. During a supervised food visit to her apartment, she saw a convoy moving with white flags from the window and asked a Russian soldier what was happening. He told her there was a 72-hour no-strike corridor in place. She and some of her neighbors packed a bag and ran.
An Instagram story posted by Elena Anishchenko after she fled her home. It reads: “Thanks to everybody who worried about me and prayed for me — I survived and even ran away from this hell after being held 7 days in the basement. Hostomel, residential area ‘Pokrovsky.’ This is how our home looks now.”Credit...The New York Times
On their way out, the scene was grim. “We saw dead bodies laying on the ground,” she said. “We saw crashed and burned cars with bodies inside.”
Mr. Naumenko turned his phone on and saw information in a WhatsApp group about the humanitarian corridor evacuation. He and his wife quickly gathered their things.
While leaving the complex, a soldier warned them that he would not shoot him, but those patrolling elsewhere might.
They fled anyway and escaped unharmed — along with all the other residents The Times spoke with. Naumenko is now in Kyiv, where he plans to stay — and perhaps fight.
“The things I saw in Hostomel were a nightmare. I don’t want this to come here,” he said.
Videos edited by Dmitriy Khavin.
6. Deputy Commander Of Russia's Black Sea Fleet Reportedly Killed In Action
It appears the Russians are losing a lot of senior leaders (if the reports are accurate). Reporting here from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that is being broadcast in Russia.
Deputy Commander Of Russia's Black Sea Fleet Reportedly Killed In Action
March 20, 2022
Captain 1st Rank Andrei Paly
The deputy commander of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet has been killed in battle near the Ukrainian port city of Mariupol, the Kremlin-installed governor of the Russia-occupied city of Sevastopol said.
"Captain 1st Rank Andrei Nikolayevich Paly was killed in the fighting [near Mariupol]," Mikhail Razvozhayev said on his Telegram channel.
Reports said the general was 51 years old.
The Russian Navy did not respond to a request for comment.
Sevastopol, a port city on the Crimea Peninsula, is the base of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Crimea was seized and annexed by Russia in 2014.
If confirmed, it would mark the latest fatality among Russia’s top military officers following reports of several being killed in action during the invasion of Ukraine.
On March 19, an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy claimed that the commander of the Russian Eighth Army, Lieutenant General Andrei Mordvichev, had been killed at the Chornobaivka airfield near the city of Kherson.
The Ukrainian Presidency at the time said the general was the fifth top-ranking officer killed since the invasion began on February 24, an unprecedented number of fatalities among a military leadership in such a short period of time.
The claims could not be independently confirmed.
With reporting by Reuters
All Of The Latest News
March 20, 2022
7. Russia, China and the New Cold War
Still lessons to learn from the Korean War. And interesting parallels. One of them is the belief that it would be over quickly and victory would be easy. One of the differences is that Kim il Sung effectively played Mao and Stalin off each other. I supposed Putin was Kim-like when he went to Beijing for the Olympics and probably told Xi it would be over quickly and easily and that the west would not dare intervene (which is kind of partially true in terms of direct intervention but not in terms of material support).
Excerpts:
An example is a November 2021 address in which Mr. Xi said, in Mr. Pottinger’s paraphrase, “that the Korean War was an act of enormous strategic foresight by Comrade Mao Zedong, as he calls him in the speech. It’s a recurring theme in a lot of Xi’s speeches, the idea that China now needs to study the spirit of that war.”
Mr. Xi laid out what Mr. Pottinger describes as almost a case for pre-emptive war: “He says that Mao Zedong in that war had the strategic foresight to, quote, ‘start with one punch so that 100 punches could be avoided.’ He talked about how Mao had the determination and bravery to adopt an attitude of not hesitating to ruin the country”—that is, China—“internally in order to build it anew.” Mr. Pottinger puts this in contemporary terms: “The attitude of being willing to destroy institutions, companies, attitudes and even political norms is something that neither Xi nor the Communist Party that he leads should shy away from.”
The personal relationship between Messrs. Xi and Putin has become central to China’s conflict with the West. “It is an unnatural partnership in many ways, because it’s not deep and wide, society to society, economy to economy, nation-state to nation-state. But it is extremely meaningful from the standpoint of two men,” Mr. Pottinger says. “Those two men happen to be the dictators that make all of the important decisions in their respective systems. And these two guys have a mind meld that we’ve not seen between a Chinese and Russian leader since Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin met six months before the North Korean invasion of South Korea.”
Russia, China and the New Cold War
Matt Pottinger, an architect of Trump’s security strategy, sees Ukraine as analogous to Korea, a ‘hot opening salvo’ in a global conflict between the free world and a bloc of dictatorships.
Matt Pottinger has been thinking of another conflict. Mr. Putin’s attempted conquest, and his burgeoning partnership with China’s Xi Jinping, reminds Mr. Pottinger of the Korean War. “In 1950, Stalin and Mao and Kim Il Sung badly miscalculated how easy the invasion would be and miscalculated American resolve, much as we’re seeing today,” Mr. Pottinger, 48, who served in the Trump White House’s National Security Council, says this week. “The roles are now reversed, with Xi playing the role of Stalin and Putin playing the role of Mao sending his troops to the slaughter. It’s even conceivable that this war may end in a similar fashion, with some kind of a stalemate in a divided country.”
The analogy extends to the free world. Although the Cold War began in 1945, “it really took several more years for public attitudes in the West to catch up to what strategists like Winston Churchill and George Kennan knew about the nature of the Soviet Union.” With the Korean conflict, “the Cold War crystallized in the public imagination in the West.” Today, it’s “really hard to avoid the conclusion that these developments reflect a new cold war that Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have initiated against the West.”
Mr. Pottinger believes the new conflict’s “ideological underpinnings” formed as the old one was winding down. “The Chinese leadership was badly rattled by the events of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, the lopsided American-led victory over Saddam Hussein’s forces in the first Gulf War and then the collapse of the Soviet Union.” They came to regard the U.S. as their “primary adversary.”
In this view, Ukraine is the “hot opening salvo in a cold war pitting Washington and its allies against a fragile but increasingly powerful bloc of dictatorships.” The logic of the Cold War “will provide us with explanatory and predictive value. It’ll help us understand and anticipate the moves by Putin and Xi and the other dictatorships that play supporting roles in their global strategy, such as Iran,” he argues. “We would be remiss not to learn lessons from the original Cold War, not least because we won.”
In recent decades American policy makers tried and failed to convert Beijing into a responsible contributor to the U.S.-led international order. Today there is a bipartisan consensus that the Chinese Communist Party is the greatest external threat to American security, but much of Washington was slow to accept it. As President Trump’s senior director for Asia, then deputy national security adviser, Mr. Pottinger urged them along.
He contributed to the 2017 National Security Strategy, which called China a “revisionist” power and warned that “great power competition” had returned. H.R. McMaster, who served as White House national security adviser in 2017-18, called Mr. Pottinger “central to the biggest shift in U.S. foreign policy since the Cold War, which is the competitive approach to China.”
His understanding of the Chinese threat and the dangerous new global environment is more widely held now, though not everyone accepts the idea of a new cold war. A former Journal reporter in China fluent in Mandarin, Mr. Pottinger says reading Chinese government documents that aren’t translated into English has shaped his views.
“When Xi Jinping gives speeches—especially important ones and ones where he is laying out an aggressive case for Chinese actions in this de facto cold war that he’s waging—those speeches are kept secret, but they’re not kept secret forever,” he says. “They surface in Chinese-language-only party publications. More often than not, those speeches are ignored by Western analysts, news reporters and even intelligence agencies.”
An example is a November 2021 address in which Mr. Xi said, in Mr. Pottinger’s paraphrase, “that the Korean War was an act of enormous strategic foresight by Comrade Mao Zedong, as he calls him in the speech. It’s a recurring theme in a lot of Xi’s speeches, the idea that China now needs to study the spirit of that war.”
Mr. Xi laid out what Mr. Pottinger describes as almost a case for pre-emptive war: “He says that Mao Zedong in that war had the strategic foresight to, quote, ‘start with one punch so that 100 punches could be avoided.’ He talked about how Mao had the determination and bravery to adopt an attitude of not hesitating to ruin the country”—that is, China—“internally in order to build it anew.” Mr. Pottinger puts this in contemporary terms: “The attitude of being willing to destroy institutions, companies, attitudes and even political norms is something that neither Xi nor the Communist Party that he leads should shy away from.”
The personal relationship between Messrs. Xi and Putin has become central to China’s conflict with the West. “It is an unnatural partnership in many ways, because it’s not deep and wide, society to society, economy to economy, nation-state to nation-state. But it is extremely meaningful from the standpoint of two men,” Mr. Pottinger says. “Those two men happen to be the dictators that make all of the important decisions in their respective systems. And these two guys have a mind meld that we’ve not seen between a Chinese and Russian leader since Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin met six months before the North Korean invasion of South Korea.”
Messrs. Xi and Putin met ahead of the Beijing Winter Olympics a few weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine, and Mr. Pottinger says “there’s little question” that both “understood that an invasion was in the offing.” On Feb. 4, Moscow and Beijing released a 5,000-word statement declaring their relationship had “no limits.” It’s important to take that claim seriously, Mr. Pottinger says: “What you really have are two revanchist, authoritarian dictatorships that have decided, like Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, to go back to back and point their guns outward to say, ‘Look, we’re not going to worry about our long border dispute, which has been a recurring theme for centuries. We’re going to help each other expand our respective spheres of influence to undermine democracies.’ ”
They saw an opportunity in signals of weakness from President Biden: “When Biden came into power, one of the first things he did was end the negotiation over New Start”—the 2010 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty—“and gave Putin the five-year renewal that Putin was seeking. He eased off on restrictions on Nord Stream 2”—Russia’s gas pipeline to Europe—“and he also began to restrict lethal aid to Ukraine.”
At the same time, the administration began negotiations to revive the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which President Trump left in 2018. “We’re not actually even negotiating directly, but using Russian and other diplomats as a go-between,” Mr. Pottinger says. “This sends a profound signal of weakness.” Israel and Arab states “see a Biden administration that’s more eager to cut deals with our common adversary than to engage meaningfully with longstanding partners.”
Does all that suggest Russia wouldn’t have invaded Ukraine if Mr. Trump had won in 2020? “We’ll never know,” Mr. Pottinger answers. Mr. Putin might have “wanted to see whether President Trump would unilaterally take action to undermine NATO and he didn’t want to interrupt that process while it was a possibility.” That said, “there was a genuine unpredictability about President Trump and what he might or might not do, and that may have, more frequently than people appreciate, caused Xi and Putin to delay some of their plans.”
Mr. Pottinger thinks Mr. Trump’s record isn’t viewed with enough nuance: “President Trump’s statecraft, as idiosyncratic as it was, was a lot more sophisticated than either the press or even American adversaries really understood.” Mr. Pottinger sums that approach up as a “close and respectful diplomacy at the top, but also his willingness to knee his counterparts in the groin.” In Russia’s case that included Mr. Trump’s opposition to Nord Stream 2, hard bargaining on New Start, supplying lethal aid to Ukraine, expulsion of Russian spies and diplomats, and sanctions.
Mr. Pottinger argues that Russia’s aggression has discredited the idea that the U.S. can divert its attention from other regions while confronting China. “The war in Ukraine underscores why we cannot compartmentalize our cold war to a specific geography or even to a specific player. There’s no question that Beijing is the mother ship of authoritarianism in the world now,” he says. “But if we fail to see how these adversaries are linked with one another and how they are increasingly coordinated with one another, we run the risk of making big blunders.”
America has a powerful counter in its alliances. The 30-nation North Atlantic Treaty Organization has shown impressive cohesion in the face of Russia’s onslaught in Ukraine. Asian-Pacific alliances are looser, but Mr. Pottinger talks up the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue involving Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. “India made the disappointing, and in my view a mistaken, decision not to hold Russia accountable for its invasion of a peaceful sovereign neighbor,” he says. “We shouldn’t get ahead of ourselves on what the Quad can ultimately achieve. But it is nonetheless a substantive group that gives Beijing quite a lot of heartburn.” The group is “talking about things like supply chains and building in resiliency and figuring out ways to counter Chinese disinformation.”
What about Taiwan? In light of Mr. Putin’s difficulties in Ukraine, “a logical and dispassionate analysis would suggest that Chinese war planners are having second and third thoughts,” Mr. Pottinger says. “But logic and dispassionate analysis are not the hallmarks of Xi Jinping. Xi is viewing the world in the reflection of fun-house mirrors at this point.”
He says unwinding Taiwan’s economic ties to the mainland is critical and that President Tsai Ing -wen “has made significant progress in really taking charge of the military services that she commands and getting them to focus on truly asymmetric capabilities, by which I mean ones that are not only quite lethal to China, but also quite affordable for Taiwan.” The Taiwanese “need to show China that the war doesn’t end at the beaches. It will continue in the ports, in the cities, in the countryside and in the mountains.”
The U.S., he says, also needs a show of strength and determination: “What we have to do is double our defense spending immediately. We’re still spending about half of what we spent as a percentage of GDP during the Reagan administration, and the Reagan administration wasn’t even the peak of our Cold War spending.” Can the U.S. afford a $1.5 trillion Pentagon budget? “Our defense expenditures are minor in comparison to our entitlement programs. Universal healthcare is an amazing thing, but it’s not going to save Europe and Taiwan or, in the end, our own national security and way of life.”
If this is a new cold war, what would victory look like? “It involves trying to manage the conflict so that it does not become a head-on confrontation between nuclear great powers. Winning involves permitting the weaknesses of the authoritarian powers to erode their advantages over time. Winning involves maintaining solidarity and common cause with the people of Russia and China even as we call out candidly the actions of the dictators who lead those two nations.”
Mr. Pottinger is fundamentally bullish on the West’s chances against Messrs. Putin and Xi. “We need to shed a sense of defeatism, and we need to have the courage of our convictions about what makes our system unique and powerful. That means doubling down on capitalism and democracy and freedom, but containing—I’ll use the C-word—China and Russia’s ability to exploit our freedoms and our markets in ways that are parasitic,” he says.
“The longer the dictators stay in power, the sharper the paradox between confidence and paranoia. And I think both of these men are getting less and less reliable information in their diets and are therefore prime to make strategic miscalculations,” he says.
While Messrs. Putin and Xi may share an antipathy for the democratic West, their countries aren’t natural allies: “I think that the logic of national interest will eventually reassert itself over the interests of two dictators who drew up this pact. That’ll take time to play out, but I think in many respects, it’ll be only downhill from here between Moscow and Beijing.”
Mr. O’Neal is a Europe-based editorial page writer for the Journal.
8. Intel Sharing Between U.S. and Ukraine 'Revolutionary' Says DIA Director
A good sign and positive development.
Intel Sharing Between U.S. and Ukraine 'Revolutionary' Says DIA Director - USNI News
The 22nd Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier speaks at the 2021 Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DoDIIS) on Dec. 6, 2021. DIA Image
The director of the Defense Intelligence Agency described the sharing of information and intelligence between the United States and the Ukrainians as “revolutionary in terms of what we can do” at a Thursday congressional hearing.
Army Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier told the House Armed Services subcommittee on intelligence that he could go into greater detail on how this is being done in a closed session.
Army Gen. Paul Nakasone, who heads both Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, said that “in my 35 years” he has never seen a better sharing of accurate, timely and actionable intelligence than what has transpired with Ukraine.
The value of sharing information and intelligence with allies is that it “builds coalitions” and can “shine a light on disinformation” campaigns like the one Russia used to lay the groundwork for their invasion, Nakasone added. The question came down to “how do we share information that is relevant … and usable by the Ukrainians” in the conflict.
When asked specifically about “deep fakes,” including a recent faked video where Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is telling his countrymen to lay down their arms, Nakasone said, NSA “is working to understand the key pieces of what is real and what is fake” and pass that information on to other parts of the Pentagon, the executive branch and the private sector where appropriate.
“We continue to watch very carefully and react quickly” to these efforts to spread lies and add to the confusion over what is actually happening in Ukraine and around the world.
Nakasone added the “secret sauce” for NSA’s success has been its ability to work outside the country, seeing “what our adversary is doing” and how that can affect the United States. He said the nation needs platforms as established as Air Force KC-135s, space satellites and sensors and on-the-ground collection to be effective.
As to whether one person should continue as the senior officer in Cyber Command and also direct the NSA, Ronald Moultrie, undersecretary for intelligence and security, said there was “sentiment on both sides not to do any harm” if the decision was made to split the responsibilities apart.
Gen. Paul Nakasone testifying before Congress in 2019. U.S. Cyber Command Photo
Cyber Command was established in 2010.
Nakasone said having the command and agency under a single control provides a “unity of effort” and agility to respond to everything from problems with Iran to ransomware attacks and Russian aggression in Ukraine.
When the question of establishing a new subordinate command to coordinate U.S. information operations in CYBERCOM was raised at the hearing, Nakasone said, “we need more information ops trained personnel” coming from the services. “That’s what we got to get to first” before establishing a new command.
As to how DIA should go about buying “open source” material – imagery and data – for its use, Berrier said the agency was developing questions about the scope of the purchase and whether it could be limited to buying what is needed only when it is needed. “There are open source [materials] that can help us in Afghanistan,” he added.
Right now, the United States is conducting over-the-horizon intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in Afghanistan that has major limitations, outgoing Marine Corps Gen. Kenneth McKenzie told Congress this week.
Rather than asking a direct question of Berrier, Scott said he believed DIA should also be gathering information now on the impact of the war in Ukraine on the world food market since Kyiv has exported in the past “50 million metric tons” of wheat and was “the largest supplier to the World Food Program.”
Compounding the problem is “Russia is saying it’s not going to export grains” or fertilizers and the same is true with its partner Belarus, said Scott. By shutting down the Black Sea grain export market that includes corn, barley, and sunflower seeds as well as wheat and fertilizer, “Vladimir Putin has started World War III when it comes to food supply.”
He noted availability and rising costs are already having an effect on nations like Sri Lanka, 4,000 miles away from the fighting.
Scott added he has discussed with regional combatant commanders the impact of the war on food supply in their areas of responsibility.
The Washington Post in an editorial Friday noted “the loss of some of these crops cannot be made up overnight, because it takes months to plant and harvest grains. In many ways this is harder to rectify than the oil supply crisis.”
Related
9. Russia's elite want Putin out, successor in mind: Ukraine intel chief
Hmmm....Wishful thinking? Any chance of this? I fear if true and if the elite can make this happen and put their choice in charge it may not solve the security problems.
Russia's elite want Putin out, successor in mind: Ukraine intel chief
Newsweek · by Thomas Kika · March 20, 2022
Russian elites are allegedly planning to remove President Vladimir Putin, according to Ukrainian intelligence, with a successor already in mind.
The incendiary claim came from the Chief Directorate of Intelligence for the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine on Sunday via a post on the ministry's official Facebook page. The post boldly begins with, "Poisoning, sudden disease, accident—Russian elite considers the possibility of removing Putin."
"In the environment of the Russian business and political elite, a group of influential persons opposing [Vladimir Putin] is formed," the post reads. "Their goal is to remove Putin from power as soon as possible and restore economic ties with the West, destroyed due to the war in Ukraine."
Ukrainian intelligence officials claim that a group of Russian elites are planning to remove Russian President Vladimir Putin from power over the invasion of Ukraine. Above, a shot of Putin during a meeting with other members of the Russian government in March 2022. Mikhail Klimentyev/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images
The alleged group is not only planning to potentially assassinate Putin, the post claims, it has also decided on a potential successor: Alexander Bortnikov, who currently serves as Russia's Federal Security Service director, and headed up the analysis of the Ukrainian population and military capabilities ahead of the recent invasion.
The Chief Directorate claims that Putin and Bortkinov have recently had a falling out, with the Russian president blaming his subordinate for the country's difficulties in taking over Ukraine. Bortkinov is now reportedly working with the group of Russian elites in devising potential ways to remove Putin.
"It is Bortnikov who has recently fallen out of favor with the Russian dictator," the post alleges. "The official reason for the FSS leader's downfall is fatal miscalculations in the war against Ukraine. It was Bortnikov and his department who were responsible for analyzing the views of the Ukrainian population and the capacity of the Ukrainian army."
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The possibility of Putin being forcibly removed from power, either by assassination or other means, has been an ongoing topic of conversation on the world stage since the invasion of Ukraine started. As that conflict has inflicted immense losses on the Ukrainian people and as crippling economic sanctions have been leveled against Russia as a result, the notion, however controversial, has persisted.
Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, who is from South Carolina, has recently come under fire for repeatedly implying that Putin ought to be assassinated to bring about an end to the Ukrainian conflict. Experts warn that such rhetoric could give the impression that the U.S. government supports the antagonistic idea.
"The only way this ends is for somebody in Russia to take this guy out," Graham said tweeted on March 3. "You would be doing your country—and the world—a great service."
White House press secretary Jen Psaki strongly denounced his words and assured the international community that the Biden administration does not advocate for any such action.
"No, we are not advocating for killing the leader of a foreign country or a regime change," Psaki said at a press conference the day after Graham's tweet. "That is not the position of the United States government and certainly not a statement you'd hear come from the mouth of anybody working in this administration."
Newsweek · by Thomas Kika · March 20, 2022
10. No gun. No helmet. No action: The frustrations of some novice Americans who signed up to fight in Ukraine.
They are not as good as the thought or useful as they thought they would be. And it is not as romantic as they thought it would be.
No gun. No helmet. No action: The frustrations of some novice Americans who signed up to fight in Ukraine.
KYIV, Ukraine — Before he decided to buy a one-way plane ticket to Ukraine, Adam worked two jobs, as a security guard and as a cashier at a dollar store. He owned guns and fired them at shooting ranges, but the only fighting he had ever done was in mixed martial arts classes.
That didn’t stop the tall, lanky 24-year-old from Thousand Oaks, a Los Angeles suburb, from flying to this war-torn capital earlier this month. He joined a new international legion set up to fight Russian forces about 15 miles outside the city.
Adam, sporting camouflage pants, is unfazed by his inexperience in combat. He will rely, he said, on sheer determination — to save Ukraine and protect American values.
“Democracy and freedom are very important to the whole world,” said Adam, seated in the lobby of a Kyiv hotel, along with other foreigners dressed in their new military camouflage who have joined his unit. “What [Russian President Vladimir] Putin is doing is simply wrong. And Ukraine is the underdog, so they need help.”
Since Russia invaded Ukraine, thousands of Americans and other foreign nationals have signed up to fight for Ukraine, answering a call to action by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Now, with the conflict in its fourth week, a growing number of foreign volunteers are flowing into the capital, signing contracts and receiving weapons and combat training before getting deployed to one of the numerous front lines of the war.
They have been compared to the 32,000 foreigners, mostly Americans and Europeans, many of them equally unprepared, who joined the republican forces in Spain’s 1936-39 civil war. That conflict became a losing battle against nationalists led by General Francisco Franco, with the support of Nazi Germany and the fascist Italian government of Benito Mussolini.
In Ukraine’s brutal modern war, though, the romance of adventure and political convictions can quickly vanish as volunteers get pounded by airstrikes, Grad rockets and artillery shells, or engage in urban warfare on the streets of cities.
While some experienced American veterans of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are said to be among the volunteers, many of these would-be fighters, like Adam, are novices at best.
They say they do share a sense of righteous conviction. They’ve seen the images of civilians being killed by Russian bombardments, and like those who went to Spain, they believe they are on the right side of history.
“I’ve got very little military experience, but I am willing to go and fight and die with this guy,” said Brian, a Canadian business analyst, referring to Adam standing nearby, “because my Ukrainian relatives are here.”
“I have been a hunter all my life,” Brian said. “I got assigned to a sniper team here. I am going to kill every ... Russian I can,” he said, using an expletive to describe Russians.
“Never killed a man in my life, but ... I am going to enjoy [it].”
All the foreign volunteers interviewed for this article did not want their last names to be used. Some were concerned about their security, while others wanted to protect their relatives or had not yet told their families they were in Ukraine to fight the Russians.
It remains unclear what added utility the arriving foreign recruits can bring as soldiers, medical aides or logistics personnel on the battlefields.
And the government’s volunteer program, at times, appears to be disorganized, according to interviews with five volunteers and an ethnic Georgian commander who has enlisted Americans and other foreigners into his own paramilitary force in Ukraine. Some would-be fighters are processed in their home nations. Others are landing in the capital without contacts or speaking the language, hoping that someone will get them trained and shipped to the front.
If nothing else, the foreigners may be useful for public relations purposes, demonstrating the global support for Ukraine.
“This is a way of tying in populations from other countries to the Ukrainian war and the outcome of the war,” said Ilmari Kaihko, an associate professor of war studies at the Swedish Defense University who has researched Ukraine’s conflict. “The political might be more important in the long term than the actual military contribution.”
But there is concern that some of these American and other Western volunteers could become liabilities on the battlefield. If Americans get captured by Russian forces, they could become fodder for the Kremlin’s propaganda machine, held up as evidence that Ukraine’s resistance is really an American and Western plot. If they get killed, it could bring more pressure on the United States to retaliate.
Adam just wants to get on the battlefield as soon as possible. His first choice, he said, is to be a medic because he took a first aid class in the United States, he said. His second choice?
“A sniper,” he said.
He has no experience at either job.
In the days after the Feb. 24 invasion, Adam said, he couldn’t stop watching the news. As a Jew with dual U.S.-Israeli citizenship, he said he saw similarities between the Russian assault on Ukraine and Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians. He believed that both Ukraine and Israel were “being attacked unprovoked” and that both nations needed more military help to fight their enemies.
He was working odd jobs and getting a degree in automotive technology at a local community college in the San Fernando Valley. “Not much going on at home,” Adam said.
He said he liked “guns, cars, building stuff, basketball, sports and MMA,” referring to mixed martial arts, the sport where fighters battle inside a cage. At shooting ranges, Adam said, he would “shoot moving targets and practice pulling out my weapon and reloading.”
For months, he was planning to move to Israel and join the Israel Defense Forces, he said. But he decided to make a stop in Ukraine first.
Adam didn’t know much about the county, but he felt he knew Eastern Europe because his family descended from Polish and Lithuanian immigrants. He didn’t tell his parents, his three sisters and brother that he was going to fight the Russians, he said. He told them instead that he was going to help Ukrainian refugees entering Poland.
He didn’t reach out to the Ukrainian Embassy or consulate. Nor did he log into its recruitment website, fightforUA.org, where foreign volunteers are supposed to register and learn about the process of joining Ukraine’s armed forces, Adam said.
“I only found out about fightforUA.org when I was already here,” he said.
He flew to Istanbul and then to Warsaw. He hitched a ride to the border and crossed into Ukraine, passing through the western city of Lviv and finally reaching Kyiv.
As many as 20,000 foreigners have expressed interest in joining the International Legion of Territorial Defense of Ukraine, as it is officially called, according to the Ukrainian government. That includes an estimated 4,000 Americans, an official with the Ukrainian Embassy in Washington told The Washington Post last week.
They had to sign contracts saying they will fight until the end of the war. Other volunteers said they were told the contracts meant Geneva Convention rules would apply if they get captured or killed, though experts say it’s unclear if they would be treated with full prisoner of war status.
Each volunteer would receive a salary of roughly $3,000 a month, the same as a soldier, said Yaroslav, a Ukrainian military officer and head organizer of the International Legion in western Ukraine who declined to give his last name for security reasons.
There are already concerns about the international legion. Volunteers complain of delays in contracts, extensive paperwork, not getting weapons or training quickly enough, and days of waiting before getting assigned to battlefield units.
“There is a big bureaucracy, even now when there is war, and those guys have to experience that bureaucracy,” said Mamuka Mamulashvili, commander of the Georgian National Legion, a paramilitary force that has been fighting Russian separatists and forces in eastern Ukraine for eight years. “For me, it seems very amateur.”
He said “there is a very big flow” of inexperienced Americans and foreigners wanting to fight in Ukraine. “We cannot just take some guy from Brooklyn who wants to fight on the front line,” he said, adding that anyone with no military experience is turned away from his force.
Yaroslav says they are not disorganized. He said there is a thorough vetting process and only those with battlefield experience are allowed to fight.
“When they don’t have any experience, they aren’t useful here. We tell them they can be volunteers for something else.”
Foreigners can also join other Ukrainian militias that have lower requirements to join and allow volunteers to leave more easily for family or work reasons. All could face risks on the battlefield, and not just from bullets and bombs: A spokesman for Russia’s Defense Ministry, Igor Konashenkov, recently described the foreign volunteers as “mercenaries” who, if caught, could be “prosecuted as criminals.”
Legally, Americans can take part in another country’s war. But the Biden administration has urged U.S. military veterans and other Americans not to join the Ukrainian forces and to leave if they are already in the country.
Kelso, another volunteer, didn’t listen. The Montana-born construction worker left his job after seeing on the news “innocent civilians being directly targeted and attacked,” said the tall, slim former U.S. soldier, who was also in Adam’s group of foreign volunteers.
He said he had served in the U.S. Army for four years after high school, but had never seen combat. “This is my first war,” Kelso said.
He registered on the Ukrainian government’s recruitment website and filled out the forms. But he didn’t hear back for days. “I am not going to wait for an email response while there are people dying,” he said.
So, with some money saved, he paid $700 for a one-way flight to Poland. He carried warm clothes, a sleeping bag, medical supplies, family photos and a bulletproof vest a friend had donated. When he arrived at the border, he was connected to people with the international legion, he said.
“I do believe that God is on our side here,” Kelso said. “We are on the side of good. What the Russians brought is pure evil.”
Steps away stood other volunteers, among them a German who said he had served in Afghanistan for 4½ months with the German military, part of the NATO security forces there, and a Scottish grandfather who said he was a British army veteran and that he had fought against the Islamic State in Syria with the YPG, or the People’s Protection Units, a mainly Kurdish militia.
Some have been waiting for nearly 10 days for their contracts and other paperwork to be approved.
Zelensky “said we would be welcome here and we would be armed and ready to go,” said Rob, 61, the grandfather from Edinburgh. “We should be at the front lines. There are young Ukrainians who are at this moment dying. And we are here.”
“I came here to fight for Ukraine,” Rob said.
Adam has not told his mother that he’s part of a fighting unit, despite her concerns about his well-being expressed in messages on WhatsApp.
“I don’t really need her to ruin my mental aspect right now,” Adam said. “I am here on a mission.”
Minutes later came the sound of an air raid siren, from an app on Adam’s phone, and a message came up in Ukrainian. “I can’t read it,” Adam said. “But I know there is a missile somewhere.”
On Saturday, when reached by phone, Adam was angry and emotional. Despite the legion’s assurances of proper vetting, he was now in the northern section of the capital with a territorial defense unit mostly composed of Ukrainian civilians turned militiamen.
Adam still hadn’t received a bulletproof vest, a helmet — or a weapon. And he could hear the sounds of shelling, he said.
“I have been here 15 days now and still nothing is happening,” he said in a phone interview. “I am not putting up with that.”
“They expect me to guard the base with no guns, no armor, no vest, no helmet and no knowledge of the Ukrainian language,” he continued. “It makes absolutely no sense. I am not going to stand around and get hit with a missile with no guns or nothing. If am going to die, I’d rather get to the front line and do that.”
So he was now trying to join another unit closer to the front line.
Adam said he intended to get as close as possible to the city of Irpin on Kyiv’s northern fringes, a volatile battle zone where three journalists were recently killed.
“I got all the way here by myself. I will be just fine,” he said.
11. Maria Stepanova: The war of Putin’s imagination
Putin's war from Putin's imagination.
A very powerful essay. Superb writing.
Excerpts:
The aggressor in this unjust war in a foreign territory, with its war crimes and its victims (who already number in the millions if we include not just the casualties but those who are left homeless, without loved ones, without a future), operates as if he’s making a piece of art, a book or a film, in which the events are controlled by their creator. But this particular book has a bad author. Bad in all senses, as a person and as a writer with scant interest in his own characters. He doesn’t care if they survive or die; he doesn’t care what their needs or desires are; and he’s definitely not interested in recognising their freedoms.
The only thing that he cares about is his own authorship, the affirmation of his will, and his control of the text and events. This is what is occupying Putin at this moment: the enactment of his personal will, the attempt to rewrite the history of Ukraine and Europe, to change our present and determine our future. He plans to draw Ukraine, Russia, Europe, the world (and everyone who is constantly refreshing the live news) into the appalling book he has himself written. He believes that from now on we will exist only within his book; he wants to be our author, our screenwriter, the one who knows how to change our lives for the better. But now the results of his handiwork are clear for all to see.
Maria Stepanova: The war of Putin’s imagination
An award-winning Russian writer on how fear as well as dictatorship led her homeland to launch its disastrous invasion of Ukraine
Financial Times · by Maria Stepanova, translated by Sasha Dugdale · March 18, 2022
I can’t stop looking at photographs taken in Ukraine during these unending days of war, a war so unthinkable that it’s still hard to believe in the reality of what is happening. The streets of Kharkiv — rubble, concrete beams, black holes where windows should be, the outlines of beautiful buildings with their insides burnt away. A station, a crowd of refugees trying to board a departing train. A woman carrying a dog, rushing to get to a shelter in Kyiv before the shelling begins. Bombed houses in Sumy. A maternity hospital in Mariupol after a raid — this I will not describe.
An 80-year-old friend told me of a dream she’d once had: a huge field filled with people lying in rows of iron beds. Rows and rows of people. And rising from this field, the sound of moaning. I always knew, she said, that this was to be expected. It would come to pass.
Dreams about catastrophe are common in what was once called the “post-Soviet world”; other names will surely appear soon. And in these recent days and nights, the dreams have become reality, a reality more fearful than we ever thought possible, made of aggression and violence, an evil that speaks in the Russian language. As someone wrote on a social media site: “I dreamt we were occupied by Nazis, and that those Nazis were us.”
The word “Nazi” is one of the most frequently used in the political language of the Russian state. Speeches by Vladimir Putin and propaganda headlines often use the word to describe an enemy that they say has infiltrated Ukraine. This enemy is so strong that it can and must be resisted with military aggression: the bombing of residential areas, the destruction of the flesh of towns and villages, the living tissue of human fates.
A billboard in St Petersburg displays the ‘Z’ symbol along with the slogan ‘We don’t abandon our own’ © Anatoly Maltsev/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock
Although ‘Z’ doesn’t exist in the Cyrillic alphabet, Russian forces in Ukraine have been using it as an identifying sign © Anatoly Maltsev/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock
The word still horrifies us, and in our world there are certainly candidates for its application. But propagandists use the word like the black spot in Treasure Island, sticking it wherever it suits them. If you call your opponent a Nazi, that explains and justifies all and any means.
The means in this war have been carefully calculated. The army, usually spoken of as modern, technological and highly effective, is using tactics that could have been borrowed from old war films. Any war is terrible, repugnant, but this one seems in another league: the tank units stretched along roads, the bombing raids, the residential districts turned into ruins — everything that we’re watching on screens and that those in Ukraine are watching in real life. It all looks like some hideous reconstruction, a film set into which live rounds are fired, with real people as the targets.
This is something new and very far from being a pragmatic military operation; yet at the same time it is incredibly anachronistic — a 20th-century war shifted into the frame of the 21st century. We watch in real time, trembling in our shame and grief that this is happening here and now: once again, someone wants to arrange the world as he sees fit, without any regard to what humanity thinks about this. The use of violence as a decisive argument in any discussion of the future places that future under threat — and what is happening now in Ukraine (and Russia and Belarus, both of which have long since become the hostages of their rulers) has implications for every one of us.
What we are living through might be termed the death of the conceivable. Over many decades, the western imagination (across many genres and forms, from high literature to Hollywood and television series) has used the industry of the imagination as a sort of training ground for experience. Fearful dystopian scenarios are played out, tested for accuracy, and thereby become normalised and safe, like films about zombies and aliens. After all, they’re just inventions! Total surveillance, the war of the powerful against the weak, ecological catastrophes — all come to pass in the guise of the artistic experiment: yes, this scenario is impossible in real life, but let’s play it through to see how it might work out.
The ruins of a street in Kharkiv after Russian rocket attacks © Contrasto / Eyevine
An apartment block in Kyiv that was destroyed by an artillery strike © Associated Press
Having to accept that the unthinkable, what we have rejected from the collective imagination as both impossible and impermissible, could actually come to pass on an unremarkable winter’s morning would be a catastrophe. It destroys all our notions of the contemporary world and a social contract that recognises the need for mutual understanding, empathy, common sense (and a certain scepticism towards alarmist pronouncements). But today all this has come to pass and we are standing among the ruins.
The aggressor in this unjust war in a foreign territory, with its war crimes and its victims (who already number in the millions if we include not just the casualties but those who are left homeless, without loved ones, without a future), operates as if he’s making a piece of art, a book or a film, in which the events are controlled by their creator. But this particular book has a bad author. Bad in all senses, as a person and as a writer with scant interest in his own characters. He doesn’t care if they survive or die; he doesn’t care what their needs or desires are; and he’s definitely not interested in recognising their freedoms.
The only thing that he cares about is his own authorship, the affirmation of his will, and his control of the text and events. This is what is occupying Putin at this moment: the enactment of his personal will, the attempt to rewrite the history of Ukraine and Europe, to change our present and determine our future. He plans to draw Ukraine, Russia, Europe, the world (and everyone who is constantly refreshing the live news) into the appalling book he has himself written. He believes that from now on we will exist only within his book; he wants to be our author, our screenwriter, the one who knows how to change our lives for the better. But now the results of his handiwork are clear for all to see.
A Russian armed forces vehicle with a ‘Z’ marking © Reuters
A ‘Z’ symbol painted on the side of a Russian armoured vehicle © Reuters
You could say that this is the essence of every dictatorship and the logic of every dictator — the need to assert his own solipsism, a sense of the living populated world as a still-life painting, a nature morte, in which the meek china plates on the table won’t scream out if you smash them. But to my mind this is a special case: there is, behind the movement of Russian military vehicles, a genuine fear of the existence of an Other, a desperate desire to crush this Other, to reform it, ingest it, draw it in, gulp it down, swallow it.
CS Lewis describes something similar in The Screwtape Letters: the demons feed on human suffering and despair, and their own brotherly love is expressed as a desire to eat their younger brethren. Whenever I hear Russian politicians explaining that the fraternal Ukrainian nation simply needs to be taught a bit of common sense, I smell a distinct whiff of sulphur.
One of the first tasks of the ‘military operation’ was to turn the clock back. Viktor Yanukovych is taken out of the trunk in the attic, only slightly mouldy, and eight years of democratic freedom fade like a dream
Putin is waging war in Ukraine with the unwavering fury of a man who has his own scores to settle, who is ready to do anything to win; to win, not as countries win conflicts in an age of nuclear non-proliferation, through negotiation, treaties and compromise, but as if everything that had significance for him was merely a script, lovingly devised and with a clear compensatory aim.
Ukraine must be humiliated, it must lose all the attributes of an independent sovereign state, from its legitimately elected government (its “denazification”) to its army (the country must be demilitarised). It must give up its territorial claims to Donbas and Crimea. But even that is not enough. Even before any process of negotiation, Ukraine must be ritually punished, publicly, openly, in front of a live audience; it must be forced to its knees, made an example of, so that its residents and anyone else watching see what happens to those who don’t submit.
The cruelty of this war is inexplicable if you don’t take into account what you might call this “educational” aspect. If Europe is home, then Putin wants to show who is master in this home. Destroyed towns and ruined lives are a visual aid, a long-term reminder. But there is also another aspect to this, and it seems important to me.
The events of today are occurring in a symbolic space, just as irrevocably as they are occurring physically in the fields and bomb shelters of Ukraine. Ukraine today is the arena of an ancient battle between good and evil, however grandiose that might sound; its outcome affects every one of us, not just Ukraine and Russia.
Evil is an old-fashioned concept. The postwar decades have taught us to see things automatically from the perspective of our opponent in order to establish understanding, compromise and dialogue. But sometimes there is no one to speak with — in the place of an interlocutor there is only impenetrable darkness, and it insists on its own outcome at any cost.
Right now a decision is being made about the sort of world we will live in and, in some ways, have already been sucked into: we exist and act in the black hole of another’s consciousness. It calls up archaic ideas of nationhood: that there are worse nations, better ones, nations that are higher or lower on some incomprehensible scale of greatness; that all Ukrainians (or Jews, Russians, Americans and so on) are weak, greedy, servile, hostile — and these cardboard cut-outs are already promenading through the collective imagination, just as they were before the second world war. As they say in Russia, “the dead take hold of the living”, and here these dead are ideas and concepts into which new blood flows and they begin killing, just as in a horror film.
Time returns obediently into that stifling past that so filled our nights with horrors. One of the first tasks of the “military operation” was to turn the clock back eight years, to return Ukraine to the state in which the Kremlin would like to preserve it for ever. Viktor Yanukovych is taken out of the trunk in the attic, only slightly mouldy, ready to be placed on the presidential throne as if he had never left it, and the Maidan protests and eight years of democratic freedom simply fade like a dream.
War in the 21st century imitates the 20th century, wants to return to an age of wholesale massacre and monstrous historical experiments. Now it is inseparable from a fashionable dependence on the image — but on our screens all we see are the deep tombs of the past. Resisting today means freeing ourselves from the dictatorship of another’s imagination, from a picture of the world that grasps us from inside and takes hold of our dreams, our days, our timelines, whether we want it or not. A battle for survival is going on right now in Ukraine; a battle for the independence of one’s own rational mind. It is going on in every house and in every head. Here as well as there, we must resist.
Yesterday I wanted to send birthday greetings to a friend. I wrote, as I often write in such circumstances, “ura!” I stopped. A bad word, with military associations.
“Everything is burning and smoking” is an idiom we use to mean there’s a lot going on, that you can’t manage all your tasks at once. But now that phrase is impossible. Things are burning and smoking, but not here.
There was a proverb I used to like: “a soldier would never hurt a child” — a phrase you could use to suggest that everything would be OK, we’ll find a way. The proverb has vanished: now we read about soldiers and children in publications that are forbidden in Russia, via a virtual private network.
At a rally in St Petersburg, a protester holds a placard with the words ‘No to war’ © Polaris / Eyevine
I’m writing this in Russian and with every sentence it gets harder. The ridge of language, its living conversational edge, changes first. It’s like an ancient minefield, and the old mines begin exploding as you pick your way across. They are all live now, these mines. The language isn’t to blame, just as the earth isn’t. But it has changed, it is rutted and cratered. And the craters will only grow in number.
Maria Stepanova is a poet and writer living in Russia. Her latest book, ‘In Memory of Memory’, was awarded the Big Book Prize, Russia’s main literary award, and shortlisted for the International Booker Prize
© Copyright 2022 Maria Stepanova and Sasha Dugdale
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Financial Times · by Maria Stepanova, translated by Sasha Dugdale · March 18, 2022
12. Biden turns to former Trump officials on China competition bill
Glad to see the Biden administration reach out. And this is what two national security professionals who take a non-partisan approach to national security and national prosperity. Both McMaster and Pottinger are affiliated with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. McMaster is the Chairman of the Center for Military and Political Power and Pottinger is Chairman of the China Program. They and their support to the Biden administration embody the description of FDD: "a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy." They call balls and strikes based on what they believe is good for our national security rather than what is good for a party.
Biden turns to former Trump officials on China competition bill
Axios · by Hans Nichols · March 20, 2022
The Biden administration is enlisting former Trump officials on Monday to convince Congress to pass legislation bolstering America’s semiconductor industry.
Why it matters: Officials believe the bill will make American manufacturing more competitive with China. By coordinating with Trump officials, the Biden team is trying to depoliticize and add urgency to the legislation.
- The bill has stalled because of differences between the House and the Senate on how much — and where — to spend billions of dollars to strengthen America's supply lines.
Driving the news: Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo is hosting H.R. McMaster, President Trump’s former national security adviser; Matthew Pottinger, another Trump NSC official; Eric Schmidt, the former CEO of Google; and members of Congress, including Sen. Todd Young (R-Ind.), on Monday for a virtual conversation about semiconductor manufacturing.
- “This is clearly a national security issue, so we’ll be bringing together experts from both sides of the aisle, including Trump supporters,” Raimondo told Axios. “Every day that we wait is a day that we fall behind.”
- “Best-case scenario is we get this done in the next couple of months,” she said. “The worst-case scenario is nothing happens.”
The backstory: Last week, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) took a procedural step to resolve differences between the House- and Senate-passed versions.
- Both bills include some $52 billion to incentivize companies to build semiconductor manufacturing facilities in the U.S.
- The Senate bill, which received 18 Republican votes, totaled $250 billion, and included money for other industries on the front lines of the U.S-China rivalry. In addition, it had funding to overhaul the National Science Foundation.
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The House version grew to $335 billion and includes money for workers whose jobs have been outsourced, in addition to environmental and trade provisions. Only one Republican supported it.
The big picture: President Biden and his Cabinet have been hosting almost weekly events to press Congress to act on a China competitiveness bill.
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He's also sought focus on his long-term proposals to address supply chain snarls that have led to the highest inflation in more than 40 years, especially in battleground states.
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For a short-term fix, the White House considered, then rejected, sending Americans gas cards, Axios' Sophia Cai reported on Saturday.
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On Monday, the president will address CEOs from a variety of industries at the Business Roundtable. He'll talk about his plans to lower costs and create union jobs.
Between the lines: The CEOs of ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, along with other executives, have been invited to the White House for a separate event with senior Cabinet and economic officials on Monday, people familiar with the matter tell Axios.
- Biden officials have been warning oil and gas producers not to use high oil prices as a way to gouge customers at the pump.
- A White House official said other expected attendees include clean-energy companies (Pattern and Invenergy) and refiners (Marathon Petroleum), as well as financial services (Visa, JP Morgan, Bank of America), food/agriculture (Land O’Lakes, Cargill) and manufacturing firms (Dow, U.S. Steel).
Go deeper: Lawmakers have been arguing that the war in Ukraine, and Western sanctions against Russia, have revealed the vulnerability of America’s supply lines, especially in semiconductors — used in everything from fighter jets to refrigerators.
- Raimondo is trying to drive home a similar point.
- “In three weeks, we have massively disrupted Russian military operations and economy by cutting off their access to crucial technology,” she said.
- “I shudder to think what other countries can do to the United States of America, with so many of our semiconductors produced outside of the country.”
Axios · by Hans Nichols · March 20, 2022
13. Russian TV protester: "The Russian people are really against the war"
She would seem to be fortunate to get off with only a fine. But I think we should still be concerned for her safety.
Russian TV protester: "The Russian people are really against the war"
Axios · by Ivana Saric · March 20, 2022
Russian journalist Marina Ovsyannikova, who last week protested against Russia's invasion of Ukraine on live television, told ABC's "This Week" Sunday that the majority of Russians are against the war, adding that "this is Putin's war."
Driving the news: Ovsyannikova was detained after she interrupted a live taping at Russia's state-run Channel One broadcaster — where she worked — to hold up a sign reading, "Stop the war. Don’t believe propaganda. They’re lying to you."
- Ovsyannikova was taken into custody overnight and subsequently fined 30,000 rubles (about $280) for an “administrative offense” related to an earlier video she had filmed, per ABC News.
The big picture: Earlier this month Russian lawmakers passed legislation allowing journalists and people to be punished with up to 15 years in prison for publishing what Moscow deems to be "fake" information about the war.
- Ovsyannikova could still be charged under this new law, per ABC News.
What they're saying: "The Russian people are really against the war. It's Putin's war, not Russian peoples' war," Ovsyannikova said.
- Ovsyannikova said her protest on live TV was "spontaneous."
"But the dissatisfaction with the current situation has been accumulating for many years, because the propaganda on our state channels was becoming more and more distorted, and the pressure that has been applied in Russian politics could not leave us indifferent."
— Marina Ovsyannikova
Ovsyannikova said her action was meant to "demonstrate to the world that not all Russian people believe the same. And I believe that many people — more than half of the people in Russia — are against the war."
- She called the global sanctions levied against Russia a "correct decision," but stressed that these sanctions also hurt ordinary Russians who oppose the war.
- "I wanted to show to the world that it's not just black and white in Russia, and I wanted to show to our Russian people that they need to think critically and analyze the information that is being presented to them," she said, adding that state-run media present a "very different" picture of reality.
Axios · by Ivana Saric · March 20, 2022
14. Ukraine War Update - March 21, 2022 | SOF News
Ukraine War Update - March 21, 2022 | SOF News
Curated news, analysis, and commentary about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, tactical situation on the ground, Ukrainian defense, and NATO. Additional topics include refugees, internally displaced personnel, humanitarian efforts, cyber, and information operations.
Photo: On March 16, 2022 the Russian Federation flag was lowered in front of the headquarters of the Council of Europe. (One of the middle flagpoles is missing a flag). COE announced that the Russian Federation has ceased to be a member of the Council of Europe. Read more on the expulsion of Russia from the COE by Andreas N. Ludwig in “Europe’s Division Deepens with Russia’s Council of Europe Expulsion”, E-International Relations, March 18, 2022.
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Russian Campaign Update. The current Russian offensive appears to be over. Until significant numbers of Russian units deploy into Ukraine and the Russian logistics system is fixed the war is a stalemate. The Ukrainians can halt the Russians in the offensive operations and conduct localized offensive counterattacks. But they do not have the weapons or strength to go on a general offensive across the country. Many observers have pointed out that the Russian campaign was poorly planned and executed and that logistics has played an important role. There is another factor of why the Russian campaign has not gone well. Read more in “Communication Breakdown: How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Bogged Down”, Radio Free Europe, March 19, 2022. Russian killed or wounded have been about 1,000 a day according to Western intelligence estimates.
Fight for the Skies. Neither the Russians or the Ukrainians are commanding the skies. The anti-air defenses of both countries is too strong. Russia is relying on long-range missiles launched from ground or air platforms from inside its borders. The continued supply of Stingers and other shoulder-fired MANPADs provided by the West are enhancing the air defense capabilities of the Ukrainian military. Read more in “The Russian Air Force Over Ukraine”, SOFREP, March 19, 2022.
S-300s for Ukraine (Slovakia). Several news sources say that the The Netherlands and Germany are sending their Patriot anti-missile batteries to Slovakia. One social media account noted that German Patriots were traveling on a Czech highway on Saturday (Mar 19). The Patriots are presumed to be a temporary replacement for the Slovakian S-300s that may be heading to Ukraine. These mid-range weapons will complement the short-range capabilities of the Stinger and other MANPADs.
S-400s for Ukraine (Turkey)? So will Turkey release some of its S-400 anti-aircraft systems to Ukraine? Apparently the United States has quietly floated the idea to Turkey. Wouldn’t that be a turn of events? For a number of years that Russians got a lot of play out of the fact that Turkey, a NATO member, was buying a Russian air defense system instead of opting for the U.S. made Patriot. Turkey received the first S-400s in July 2019. Of course, there will likely be something in it for Turkey. Perhaps reconsideration of involvement in the F-35 program and relief from sanctions on Turkey’s defense industry. Chances of this happening are close to zero. (Reuters, Mar 19, 2022).
Maritime Activities. An amphibious landing force on several ships is still positioned in the Black Sea off the coast of Odessa to land a substantial element of Russian naval infantry. The Russian blockade of Ukrainian shipping continues.
Belarus Railways. There are reports that Belarusian railway workers have been sabotaging the railway lines leading to Ukraine. This will further complicate the already troubled Russian logistic situation in Ukraine. The railway junctions connecting the Ukrainian and Russian railways had been blown up on February 26th.
Kyiv and Kharkiv and Rivne. The Russian assault on Kyiv appears to be on hold. The Ukrainian defense has halted the Russian advance on the capital city. The second largest city of Ukraine, Kharkiv, located in the northeast of the country is still held by the Ukrainians . . . and there is no indication that the Russians will or can capture the city. Two Russian missiles hit the military training grounds of Rivne on Sunday (Mar 20), located 300 km west of Kyiv.
Russian Ultimatum for Mariupol. A demand for surrender of Mariupol has been issued to the Ukrainians. In the demand Russia said that it would only establish a humanitarian corridor if Mariupol surrenders. The answer was a firm “No”. The deadline for the surrender acceptance was Monday morning (Mar 21). There are reports that Ukrainians in the city are being taken to camps, checked for documentation, and then taken out of the city to Russia proper. Read more in “Thousands of Mariupol residents ‘forcibly’ taken to Russian camps”, New York Post, March 19, 2022. News reports continue to be published about the shelling of residential areas of the city. “Officials: Russia bombed Mariupol school housing 400”, Washington Examiner, March 20, 2022.
Situation Maps. War in Ukraine by Scribble Maps. Read an assessment and view a map of the Russian offensive campaign by the Institute for the Study of War. See the current SITMAP (20 Mar) posted by Ukraine War Map @War_Mapper. One open-source investigative group has published an interactive map of civilian facilities destroyed by Russia in the course of its invasion of Ukraine.
Humanitarian Crisis
Refugees and IDPs. As of March 20, over 3,500,000 refugees have left Ukraine according to data provided by the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR). The situation in the cities of Mariupol and Sumy are extremely dire, with residents facing critical shortages of food, water, and medicine. Odessa, on the Black Sea Coast, is short on food for its 450,000 residents. Ukrainian refugees have (in excess of 3 million) have found safety and shelter in the neighboring countries of Moldova, Romania, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Ninety per cent of the refugees are women and children. Almost 162,000 of those that fled Ukraine are third-country nationals. Read a summary of the humanitarian crisis in a March 18, 2022 press release from the United Nations. The Ukrainian government, in concert with other organizations, are organizing ‘humanitarian corridors‘ for residents of settlements affected by the Russian invasion. On Sunday (Mar 20) only four out of seven agreed-upon humanitarian corridors were able to carry out evacuations.
Refugees in Moldova. One of Europe’s poorest nations has taken in almost 350,000 Ukrainian refugees. Many of them are fleeing from the Russian onslaught on cities in southern Ukraine near Crimea and along the coast of the Black Sea. Moldova is a small country with less than 4 million residents. Living in temporary shelters in Moldova the refugees wonder what comes next. (USA Today, Mar 20, 2022).
General Information
Ukrainian International Legion? A temporary visa-free regime has been established for foreigners who wish to join the Ukraine International Legion. Find out more here.
Overthrowing Putin? A group of influential Russians are looking for an opportunity to overthrow the Russian leader. According to a Facebook post from the Chief Directorate of Intelligence for the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine a group wants to end the war, end the sanctions, and remove Putin. Of course, this all could be disinformation on the part of the Ukraine intelligence. “Russian elites planning to overthrow Putin: Ukrainian intelligence”, New York Post, March 20, 2022.
Russian Medals for Ukraine “Special Military Operation”. Apparently the Russian military was prepared for a quick success in Ukraine. One social media account says that Russia had pre-minted medals for the ‘occupation of Kiev and Lviv’ and the ‘liberation of Odessa’. Things that make you go “hmmm”.
The Coming Resistance
NATO, Ukraine, and ‘Resilience’. Since the Russian invasion of Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine in 2014 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has developed the concept of resilience as a way for a small nation to deter and defeat a future invasion by Russia. This resilience is associated with the Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) advanced by Special Operations Command – Europe (SOCEUR) and other NATO countries. Julian Reid, a professor of International Relations at the University of Lapland, Finland, informs us that “Ukraine is proving to be a laboratory for the testing of resilience as a strategy of national defence.” He notes that proponents of resilience in NATO will be encouraged; however, it will also make society itself into a more direct agent of war . . . and therefore a target in a war. “Resilient Ukraine and the Future of War in Europe”, E-International Relations, March 17, 2022.
Cyber and Information Operations
Urban Myths of Ukraine War. Stories like the one about the 13 Coast Guard members who were killed on Snake Island in the Black Sea rather than surrender to a Russian warship or of a Ukrainian air force pilot who continues to knock Russian jets out of the sky over Kyiv are inspiring. The tale of a heroic Ukrainian MiG-29 pilot who shot down six Russian fighters in a single day over the capital city in the early days of the war got bigger when, days later, he was reported to have shot down four more Russian jets. Do these stories have to be true? Not necessarily. Are they helpful to Ukraine’s cause? Yes, Ukrainians need hope. “The Ghost of Kyiv and the Urban Myths of Warfare”, Clearance Jobs, March 11, 2022.
Paper – Mis & Disinformation: Handling the 21st Century Challenge in the Humanitarian Sector, Digital Humanitarian Network , February 2022, 26 pages. View here.
Cyber, IO, and Intel Sharing. During testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on Thursday (Mar 17) the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency describe the intelligence sharing between the United States and Ukraine as revolutionary. The head of the National Security Agency testified that there has never been a better sharing of accurate, timely and actionable intelligence about Ukraine. Much of this intelligence is quickly employed to discount the information warfare activities of Russia and to defend against its cyber attacks. Much more information was briefed to the House during a follow-on classified hearing. “Intel Sharing Between U.S. and Ukraine ‘Revolutionary’ Says DIA Director”, USNI News, March 18, 2022.
World Response
Video – Volunteers and Safe Passage Out of Ukraine. How do people find safe passage out of Ukraine during Russia’s War? BBC News, YouTube, March 19, 2022, 5 minutes.
Russia – Impact of Sanctions and Trade Actions. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine the United States and other nations around the world imposed financial sanctions and trade actions. There is a move in Congress to revoke Russia’s permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status. There is the possibility of action to be taken by the World Trade Organization (WTO). Read a summary of these different punitive measures that includes the background, impact on imports from removing PNTR, and various issues associated with WTO actions. Invasion of Ukraine: Russia’s Trade Status, Tariffs, and WTO Issues, Congressional Research Service, CRS IN11881, March 18, 2022, PDF, 4 pages.
Commentary
Boost Military Assistance. Michael McFaul, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia, says that Ukrainians will ultimately defeat Putin’s army. But there are some questions. How long will it take and how many Ukrainians will have to die? McFaul argues more weapons and more sanctions are needed immediately. “Why the West must boost military assistance to Ukraine”, The Washington Post, March 16, 2022.
Ukraine – Validating USMC’s Force Design 2030. Christopher Corrow, a strategy analyst in the Headquarters of the Marine Corps and OIF veteran, says that the Marine Corps Force Design 2030 is a necessary change that positions the Marine Corps as a unique and necessary element of U.S. military power. This move to the future by the USMC saw the divestment of much of its tank force and some of its short-range fire support. “The Russian Losses in Ukraine Validate the Marine Corp’s Force Design”, National Review, March 18, 2022.
For Russia – Is Ukraine Enough? NATO is busy reinvigorating itself against an enemy it thought had gone away. Many feel that Russia will stop with acquiring parts of Ukraine. But others fear that the invasion of Ukraine is only the beginning. The Baltic states are vulnerable from land and sea. Will NATO defend them? “Russia may not stop with Ukraine – NATO looks to its weakest link”, Reuters, March 21, 2022.
More Nukes in the World? In 1994, Ukraine agreed to destroy the nuclear stockpile, the world’s third largest, it inherited from the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It did this in exchange for security guarantees from Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Without NATO membership and its own nuclear weapons, it was unable to deter Russia from invading. Our nations are taking notice. “Will Putin’s war force more medium-sized states to seek nuclear weapons?”, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), March 21, 2022.
Putin – Making NATO Great Again. General (Ret.) David Petraeus was interviewed by Peter Bergen last week. Bergen is a national security analyst with CNN. The retired general and former CIA director says that the war “has played out in its first three weeks.” He believes it will become a conflict of urban warfare which will generally favor the Ukrainians. The Russians are unlikely to take the Ukrainian capital Kyiv. Instead of weakening NATO, Putin has unified it and made it stronger. “Russian forces ‘clearly have very poor standards,’ General Petraeus says”, MSN.com, March 19, 2022.
Putin’s War and Africa. Russia has received some support from a few African nations. Most African governments, however, appear wary of becoming embroiled in the conflict and many are discouraging their citizens from joining the fight – whether to support Russia or Ukraine. “African Reactions to Russia’s Unprovoked Invasion of Ukraine”, IntelBrief, The Soufan Center, March 21, 2022.
Post-War Europe. The European backlash against Russia will likely endure even has hostilities cease. RAND Corporation’s Raphael Cohen examines the longer-term implications for Europe, assessing how it will affect European energy policy, military preparedness, and overall unity. “Europe After the Ukraine War”, Lawfare, March 20, 2022.
Events and Podcasts
Online Event – OSS Society. Dr. Robert Gates (former Secretary of Defense) and Dr. Michael Vickers (former DoD official, CIA officer, and Green Beret) will have a discussion about Ukraine, Putin’s War, and resistance during an online event sponsored by the OSS Society. Wednesday, March 23, 2022, 3:00 PM – 4:30 PM EDT.
Online Event – Press Club Brussels Europe. The Ukrainian Think Tanks Liaison Office in Brussels and the Polish Institute of International Affairs Brussels Office are holding an online Zoom event (English) entitled “How to support Ukraine in resisting the Russian invasion”. The event will be held on March 22, 2022.
SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, defense, or the current conflict in Ukraine then we are interested.
Maps and Other Resources
UNCN. The Ukraine NGO Coordination Network is an organization that ties together U.S.-based 501c3 organizations and non-profit humanitarian organizations that are working to evacuate and support those in need affected by the Ukraine crisis. https://uncn.one
Maps of Ukraine
Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.
Ukrainian Think Tanks – Brussels. Consolidated information on how to help Ukraine from abroad and stay up to date on events.
Janes Equipment Profile – Ukraine Conflict. An 81-page PDF provides information on the military equipment of the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces. Covers naval, air, electronic warfare, C4ISR, communications, night vision, radar, and armored fighting vehicles, Ukraine Conflict Equipment Profile, February 28, 2022.
Arms Transfers to Ukraine. Forum on the Arms Trade.
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15.
Excerpts:
The balancing act informs every aspect of American policy about the war, including the scope of the punishing sanctions imposed on the Russian economy, the granularity of the battlefield intelligence provided to Ukrainian troops, the killing power of the weapons systems coming over the border and whether, as Mr. Biden did this past week, to label President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia as a war criminal.
...
American intelligence about Mr. Putin’s decision making is maddeningly imprecise, and the West does not have a strong track record predicting what he might consider an aggression that cannot be tolerated. William J. Burns, the C.I.A. director, told Congress this month that Mr. Putin’s views had “hardened over the years.”
...
Intelligence officials have, in fact, told the administration that the MIGs could trigger a Russian move against NATO. During the congressional briefing, the generals said that the main issue was the capability of a MIG-29 to threaten Russian soil.
...
What has been missing thus far is a large-scale Russian cyberattack that knocks out the power grid or communications systems inside Ukraine, which for the most part continue to operate despite the withering Russian barrage of artillery and airstrikes.
Until the invasion began, United States Cyber Command had a unit based in Kyiv that was helping the government fend off attacks. It is now operating from a nearby NATO country. There is fragmentary evidence that the United States and its allies worked to counter some of the attacks and to prevent others from being launched. But action seems to have been limited.
Inside the Biden administration, there is a view that Mr. Putin could be choosing his moment to launch a cyberattack against the American financial system in retaliation for the devastating financial sanctions imposed on his country by the United States and its allies. Unless and until that happens, the administration appears resolved not to launch a significant first strike and invite retaliation — especially given the risks to the U.S. economy and financial system if Russia were to target them.
For the U.S., a Tenuous Balance in Confronting Russia
By Mark Mazzetti, Helene Cooper, Julian E. Barnes and David E. Sanger
March 19, 2022
Navigating between aiding Ukraine and avoiding an escalation with Moscow has led to a tangle of decisions and sometimes tortured distinctions over weapons and other elements of policy.
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A damaged residential building in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Friday. The Biden administration is trying to help Ukraine defend against Russia’s invasion without inciting a broader conflict.Credit...Ivor Prickett for The New York Times
March 19, 2022, 11:42 a.m. ET
WASHINGTON — In the first weeks of the first major European land war of the 21st century, the United States has sent tank-killing weapons to Ukrainian forces, but not fighter jets. It is equipping embattled Ukrainian troops with lightweight “kamikaze” attack drones, but not, at least in an obvious way, conducting an aggressive cyberwar to degrade Russia’s technological advantage.
The White House will commit no American or NATO planes to the skies above Ukraine, a move American officials fear could risk turning a regional war into a global conflagration, but it is providing Ukraine with missiles that could accomplish the same task of destroying Russian aircraft.
Such is the tenuous balance the Biden administration has tried to maintain as it seeks to help Ukraine lock Russia in a quagmire without inciting a broader conflict with a nuclear-armed adversary or cutting off potential paths to de-escalation.
Navigating this path has led to a tangle of decisions, and sometimes tortured distinctions, when it comes to what kinds of assistance Washington should provide, even as the situation on the ground evolves, pictures of dead civilians circulate around the globe and President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine pleads with Congress and President Biden to do more to help.
The balancing act informs every aspect of American policy about the war, including the scope of the punishing sanctions imposed on the Russian economy, the granularity of the battlefield intelligence provided to Ukrainian troops, the killing power of the weapons systems coming over the border and whether, as Mr. Biden did this past week, to label President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia as a war criminal.
C.I.A. officers are helping to ensure that crates of weapons are delivered into the hands of vetted Ukrainian military units, according to American officials. But as of now, Mr. Biden and his staff do not see the utility of an expansive covert effort to use the spy agency to ferry in arms as the United States did in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union during the 1980s. They have judged that such a campaign would be an unnecessary provocation, in part because NATO supply lines remain open and there is a functioning government in Kyiv.
The new war has forced a recalculation on other fronts. In one example, American officials have floated the idea of Turkey’s government providing Ukraine with the sophisticated S-400 antiaircraft system. It is the very system, made by Russia, that American officials punished Turkey — a NATO ally — for buying from Moscow several years ago. Now American diplomats see a way to pull Turkey away from its dance with Russia — and give the Ukrainians one of the most powerful, long-range antiaircraft systems in existence.
In the White House and the Pentagon, there have been active debates over which lethal weapons delivered to Ukraine meet the nuanced interpretations of what international law allows. American officials acknowledge that the judgments of government lawyers are valuable only up to a point, and that all that really matters is the judgment of one person: Mr. Putin.
The Russian president has his own complex calculus about when the military support to Ukraine from the United States and its NATO allies crosses the line. He has his own reasons not to escalate, given the combined power of the NATO members and his own military’s evident difficulties against Ukrainian forces. But he is also unlikely to accept defeat or a stalemate in Ukraine without further testing American resolve, despite explicit public warnings from Washington against the use of chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons.
American intelligence about Mr. Putin’s decision making is maddeningly imprecise, and the West does not have a strong track record predicting what he might consider an aggression that cannot be tolerated. William J. Burns, the C.I.A. director, told Congress this month that Mr. Putin’s views had “hardened over the years.”
The Russian threshold could also be changing by the day, or even the hour. On Friday, Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey V. Lavrov, suggested that his country was prepared to raise the costs for any nation helping the Ukrainians in their struggle, declaring that all vehicles shuttling weapons into Ukraine would be considered legitimate military targets.
A Clash Over Fighter Planes
On Wednesday, the task of articulating the intricacies of America’s military policy toward Ukraine fell to a group of generals under a barrage of questions from top members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.
Mr. Biden has made clear that he will not accede to Mr. Zelensky’s insistent pleas that NATO impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine. Clearing hostile aircraft from the skies would put the United States and its allies in combat with Russian forces. And a required step for a no-fly zone — suppressing enemy antiaircraft weaponry — would mean attacking Russian air defense installations inside Russian territory.
But during the closed-door session, lawmakers pressed members of the Pentagon’s Joint Staff about another flashpoint: the administration’s decision not to help supply Ukraine with the MIG-29 fighter jets that Poland has offered and that Mr. Zelensky has said his forces desperately need.
Administration officials have said the move would be “escalatory,” and, according to people briefed on the exchanges, the lawmakers asked the generals if there was any hard intelligence that the jets might push Mr. Putin toward intensifying the conflict by treating the United States as a “cobelligerent” in the war.
MIG-29 fighter jets in Vasylkiv, Ukraine, in 2016. The United States has declined to help supply Ukraine with fighter jets that Poland has offered.Credit...Gleb Garanich/Reuters
Intelligence officials have, in fact, told the administration that the MIGs could trigger a Russian move against NATO. During the congressional briefing, the generals said that the main issue was the capability of a MIG-29 to threaten Russian soil.
In contrast to a Javelin antitank missile that has only limited range on the battlefield, a MIG-29 could fly from Kyiv to Moscow in a matter of minutes, the generals said, a capability that the Kremlin might see as a direct threat.
The same day, the White House put forth another consideration: that to be delivered to Ukraine, the MIGs would have to take off from an air base in a NATO country, possibly inviting retaliation on NATO territory by the Russians.
As a matter of international law, the provision of weaponry and intelligence to the Ukrainian Army has made the United States a cobelligerent. But while Mr. Putin has made threats about launching attacks to impede the military assistance, he has not yet acted to stop it by attacking bases in neighboring countries — NATO allies — where the equipment originates.
That could change, U.S. officials said, especially if Mr. Putin thinks he is cornered or in danger of losing.
“It is a fine line the administration is still walking in every dimension of its support for Ukraine,” said Andrea Kendall-Taylor, a former senior intelligence official who specialized in Russia and is now at the Center for a New American Security. “They are trying to figure out how do you get right up to the line without crossing over in a way that would risk direct confrontation with Russia.”
Planes with pilots might be off the table, but armed drones are not. This past week, Mr. Biden announced that the United States would ship small Switchblade drones to Ukraine that could be used to blow up Russian armored vehicles. The single-use kamikaze drones have blade-like wings, do not require either a long runway or a complex satellite uplink, and can be controlled to dive-bomb tanks or troops, self-destructing when they explode.
Unlike the large Predator and Reaper drones used for decades in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and other countries, the portable drones pose no threat to Russian soil. Still, the White House authorized an initial shipment of only 100 of them to Ukraine — a small batch that could be intended to see how Mr. Putin reacts to their deployment on the Ukrainian front lines. Depending on the response, hundreds or thousands more could be on the way.
The proposal for Turkey to supply Ukraine with Russian-made S-400 antiaircraft systems would also test what Mr. Putin is willing to accept from NATO — and how far a NATO ally that in recent years often appeared to be building bridges to Moscow is willing to go in reiterating its commitment to the alliance and backing Ukraine.
The idea came up when Wendy R. Sherman, the deputy secretary of state, visited Turkey two weeks ago. Ms. Sherman declined to talk about her discussions.
A different senior American official said the United States knew the proposal would anger Mr. Putin. Ukraine already uses Turkish-made drones, but Turkey is worried that providing the antiaircraft systems could make the country a target of Russia’s wrath.
At the same time, the upside for Turkey could be substantial: It was suspended by the Trump administration from the F-35 fighter program — in which it was both a buyer and a manufacturer of parts for the advanced aircraft — after its purchase of the Russian S-400s. A deal to send the antiaircraft systems to Ukraine could open the door to re-entry into the F-35 program.
The State Department declined to comment. Officials at Turkey’s embassy in Washington did not respond to messages seeking comment.
Russia-Ukraine War: Key Things to Know
Card 1 of 4
The Biden-Xi talk. In a two-hour call with China’s president, Xi Jinping, President Biden discussed the Russian invasion of Ukraine, detailing the implications and consequences if Beijing were to provide material support to Russia in its attacks.
Displaced Ukrainians. The United Nations said that more than a fifth of the 44 million people who were living in Ukraine before Russia invaded have been internally displaced or have fled to other countries, according to the body’s estimates.
The Conflict of the Future, Delayed
The Ukraine war features tank columns and trenches, all features of Europe’s bloody conflicts of the past century. Thus far, there is little evidence that the United States — or Russia — is eager to escalate the conflict in the 21st century battleground of cyberspace.
Days before the war began, there was a flurry of cyberattacks on Ukrainian financial institutions and government ministries, including one that was found and partly neutralized by Microsoft. A European satellite system sometimes used by the Ukrainian military was also hit, knocking out service, though it is still unclear whether the Russians carried out the attack.
A Ukrainian soldier with a disabled Russian tank this month in Mykolaiv, Ukraine.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times
What has been missing thus far is a large-scale Russian cyberattack that knocks out the power grid or communications systems inside Ukraine, which for the most part continue to operate despite the withering Russian barrage of artillery and airstrikes.
Until the invasion began, United States Cyber Command had a unit based in Kyiv that was helping the government fend off attacks. It is now operating from a nearby NATO country. There is fragmentary evidence that the United States and its allies worked to counter some of the attacks and to prevent others from being launched. But action seems to have been limited.
Inside the Biden administration, there is a view that Mr. Putin could be choosing his moment to launch a cyberattack against the American financial system in retaliation for the devastating financial sanctions imposed on his country by the United States and its allies. Unless and until that happens, the administration appears resolved not to launch a significant first strike and invite retaliation — especially given the risks to the U.S. economy and financial system if Russia were to target them.
Keeping the Temperature Down
“The water in Afghanistan must boil at the right temperature,” Pakistan’s president, Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, told his intelligence chief as Pakistan began supplying the mujahedeen in their grueling battle against Soviet troops in neighboring Afghanistan.
In other words, hot enough to convince the Russians that the country was not worth the struggle, but not so hot to provoke a broader war in the region.
The weapons that helped turn the tide of that conflict, shoulder-fired Stinger surface-to-air missiles, are now being unloaded from cargo planes in NATO countries and delivered to Ukrainian troops on the front lines to help keep Russia from controlling the skies.
American officials are divided on how much the lessons from Cold War proxy wars, like the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan, can be applied to the ongoing war in Ukraine. Some officials say those conflicts established that the great powers could ship small arms and missiles to proxy forces without a triggering a wider war.
At the same time, Ukraine is far more important to Mr. Putin than Afghanistan was to Soviet leaders.
President Biden during a signing ceremony on Wednesday after announcing $800 million in military aid for Ukraine, with Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken; Kathleen H. Hicks, the deputy defense secretary; and Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.Credit...Kenny Holston for The New York Times
Given Russia’s bloody history with Stinger missiles, American officials have been wary of advertising their use in Ukraine. During a trip to an airfield near Ukraine’s border this month with Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reporters watched Stinger missiles being unloaded from a cargo plane but were barred from disclosing the whereabouts of the base.
Even after two senior American officials told the House Armed Services Committee during a public hearing that Stinger missiles were among the munitions being sent to Ukraine, spokespeople avoided using the S-word from the lecterns at the White House and Pentagon.
Until this past week. On Wednesday, the White House released a detailed list of the weapons it was providing as part of an $800 million package of arms to Ukraine.
At the top of the list: “800 Stinger antiaircraft systems.”
Eric Schmitt, Adam Goldman and Michael Crowley contributed reporting.
16. Ukraine is getting Switchblade. It should be just the first wave of loitering munitions for Kyiv.
Ukraine is getting Switchblade. It should be just the first wave of loitering munitions for Kyiv. - Breaking Defense
Two experts from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies argue that loitering munitions are the right weapon for Ukraine, and call on its supporters to open their arsenals.
By RYAN BROBST and BRADLEY BOWMAN
on March 18, 2022 at 11:53 AM
A US Marine launches a Switchblade Drone during a training exercise at Camp Lejeune, N.C., July 7, 2021. (U.S. Marine Corps/Sarah Pysher)
Loitering munitions — essentially small suicide drones capable of tracking a target and then striking it — have been around for years, but the technology emerged as a key weapons in the 2021 conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the kind of urban warfare occurring in Ukraine, the system may be even more valuable. In a new op-ed, two Foundation for Defense of Democracies experts lay out why loitering munitions are the perfect tool for Ukraine’s resistance and what systems could be sent to Kyiv.
Hours after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy delivered an impassioned plea for help to the U.S. Congress on March 16, President Joe Biden announced that Washington will provide $800 million in additional security assistance to Ukraine, including 100 Switchblade loitering munitions (LMs), commonly referred to as “suicide drones.” While members of Congress have pushed for the potential transfer to Ukraine of Polish MiG-29s, the White House is wise to prioritize weapon systems that can quickly bolster Ukrainian combat capability while minimizing logistical burdens and vulnerability to Russian attack.
The problem, however, is Ukraine will likely expend those 100 Switchblades in mere days, and the variant of the Switchblade Washington is most likely sending is of no serious use against Russian armor. Accordingly, Washington should work with NATO allies to urgently provide Ukraine with additional shipments consisting of greater quantities and varieties of loitering munitions, or LMs.
LMs are a combination of missiles and aerial surveillance drones. They blend the ability to maneuver, conduct surveillance, and strike targets into a single platform, reducing the time between detection and engagement of a target. That could prove decisive for Ukrainian defenders who may encounter more close-quarters urban combat in the coming days.
LMs vary in size and capability. Loiter time above potential targets can range from minutes to hours, while their munition can be sized to target troops, equipment (with and without armor), or military infrastructure. The systems carry cameras to identify targets and transmit images back to the operator. LMs can be difficult for adversaries to detect and destroy because of their low radar, visual, and thermal signatures.
Some LMs can be mounted on and launched from ground vehicles. Smaller versions, such as the Switchblade, can be carried even in backpacks and employed by individual soldiers. This will provide Ukrainian infantry squads with increased combat power that can be easily transported, concealed, and operated. And unlike manned aircraft and larger drones, LMs don’t depend on airfields for employment. That will create real problems for Russian forces, which will have to assume that any Ukrainian infantry may have this capability.
Ukraine has already employed some types of drones during the conflict. The Ukrainians have used their Turkish TB-2 armed drones, which are not loitering munitions, to devastating effect, as demonstrated in numerous videos on social media. Turkey provided Ukraine with a much-needed resupply of these drones during the conflict’s first week. TB-2s, however, are quite large, with a wingspan of approximately 12 meters, and must operate from fixed airbases that can and have been targeted by Russia.
To help address urgent military requirements for smaller drones, Ukraine has recruited drone hobbyists operating commercial drones to conduct reconnaissance, and Ukrainians have sometimes resorted to jerry-rigging explosives to the bottom of commercial drones. Ukraine has even created a basic LM system by pairing the Punisher drone with a smaller reconnaissance drone called Spectre, which together have reportedly conducted strikes.
The United States and likeminded allies should immediately send more inexpensive commercial systems instead of forcing Ukraine to rely on Chinese DJI drones, which might compromise the operator’s information or be restricted from flying in certain areas via geofencing. But LMs can fill an important gap between the TB-2s (which rely on airfields and incur a significant logistical burden) and makeshift commercial drones that take time to prepare and are less effective than LMs in targeting ground forces.
Accordingly, the United States and likeminded allies should systematically equip the Ukrainian military with a large arsenal of purpose-built LMs. This is especially important because Russia may be starting to jam the command and control of TB-2 drones. Moscow has also begun to better integrate its own reconnaissance and combat drones, including the ZALA KYB loitering munition.
There are several different LMs that countries willing to provide lethal aid to Ukraine have in their arsenal. The aforementioned U.S. Switchblade has seen service in Afghanistan. But while it is effective in short-range urban combat and ambushes on unarmored convoys, the Switchblade has limited range compared to some other LMs. And contrary to some current reporting, the Switchblade 300 variant Washington appears to be sending Ukraine (as opposed to the Switchblade 600 variant) cannot destroy most armored vehicles, due to its small munition. Plus, the 100 Switchblades announced this week are only a fraction of the quantity of LMs that Ukraine needs.
So, while Congress should press the administration to send Ukraine more American-made LMs, the United States should solicit help from other countries as well. Turkey operates the Kargu-2, which has seen combat in Libya, and Australia manufactures the Drone-40, both of which can be useful in an urban environment. Poland’s Warmate-series of LMs can strike targets out to roughly 9 km. The Warmate’s portability and range make it suitable for disrupting Russian supply convoys from a safe distance.
If these LMs are not already being sent to Ukraine en masse, they should be.
Notably, Israel operates some of the most advanced LM capabilities but thus far has not provided Ukraine with lethal aid, needing to tread carefully with Moscow given that Russia could hamper Israeli operations in Syria against their arch-enemy, Iran. Not providing military capabilities to Ukraine may also enable Jerusalem to help mediate an end to the war. However, if Israel decides to permit third-party transfers of Israeli-made weapons to Ukraine, the Harop and Orbiter LMs should be at the top of the list.
LMs can provide Ukraine with a robust additional capability to strike Russian forces from the air, especially as those forces linger on roads, consolidate around Ukrainian cities, or move into urban areas. LMs can deliver this capability in large quantities at a fraction of the cost and logistical footprint associated with operating and maintaining fighter jets or large drones.
The U.S. arms shipment announced Wednesday is a positive step, but it should not be the last. Working with allies, Washington should urgently send another tranche of weapons to Ukraine, and that shipment should include a greater quantity and variety of loitering munitions.
Ryan Brobst is a research analyst at the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Bradley Bowman is senior director.
17. The war in Ukraine has reintroduced these words and phrases into our vocabulary
From A to Z. An interesting list.
The war in Ukraine has reintroduced these words and phrases into our vocabulary
NPR · by Bill Chappell · March 21, 2022
Pedestrians cross a street in front of a billboard displaying the letter "Z" in the colors of the ribbon of St. George and a slogan: "We don't give up on our people," in support of the Russian armed forces, in St. Petersburg, on March 7. AFP via Getty Images
Russia's invasion of Ukraine has many of us using words and phrases we weren't before, from geopolitical terms like rump state to military lingo such as MANPADS.
We're also learning to decipher slogans and spot differences between Russian and Ukrainian spellings amidst a conflict where information is treated as its own battlefield.
Tracking surges in the words we use is part of linguist Grant Barrett's job. He is the co-host of A Way with Words, a public radio show about words and language, and a vice president of the American Dialect Society.
"As a word watcher, we get a sense of the worries of the world," he told NPR.
Barrett points out how the term Cold War has now been supplanted by the term "hot war" – a violent conflict with many of the worst burdens borne by civilians.
With Barrett's help, NPR created a kind of war glossary, explaining some of the terms people are using to discuss the war Russia and President Vladimir Putin are waging on Ukraine.
Appeasement
The Western world is debating whether permitting Putin to retain some of the territory he has seized would "be like the 1938 appeasement of Hitler by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain," Barrett said.
Some experts, noting that Russia seized Crimea in 2014, warn that Putin could be further emboldened by any accommodations.
The circumstances have led to talk of a "smell of Munich" being in the air, Barrett said, referring to the 1938 Munich Agreement that allowed Nazi Germany to annex part of Czechoslovakia — an unsuccessful attempt to prevent further fighting.
Bomboshovište
The Ukrainian word for bomb shelter – a new necessity that's forced libraries and other facilities into new roles of protecting civilians.
Residents prepare tea as they sit in a basement being used as a bomb shelter in Irpin, on the outskirts of Kyiv, Ukraine, on March 13. Felipe Dana/AP
Cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities
In general, a "cessation of hostilities" is temporary and can be localized, while a cease-fire is meant to be permanent and comprehensive.
The United Nations lists at least seven terms that describe pauses in violence, many of which are aimed at allowing civilians to reach safety or access help — or, in the best cases, providing time to negotiate a lasting peace.
Cluster munitions
From the earliest days of the war, human rights groups accused Russia of using these controversial weapons, which open midair and indiscriminately spray wide areas with dozens or even hundreds of small "bomblets" — often with tragic effects, especially in urban or civilian settings.
Unexploded cluster bombs are seen here in 2020, collected during the military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Aris Messinis/AFP via Getty Images
Donbas
"Donbas" comes from an abbreviation meaning "Donets coal basin," Barrett said. Leaders in this region of eastern Ukraine have recently favored Russian control, and it's home to Luhansk and Donetsk — the Ukrainian territories that Russia recognized as independent republics.
Finlandization
The term describes a nation that, while technically neutral and independent on the international stage, yields to the policies of a larger, more powerful neighbor, as Finland deferred to the USSR during the Cold War in return for maintaining its sovereignty.
In the weeks before the war, the term made occasional headlines — in part because it's generally seen as a pejorative. It could resurface if Ukraine and Russia agree to negotiate.
Hedgehog
Also known as the Czech hedgehog, the spiky-looking steel obstacles can divert or delay tanks. Ukrainian civilians have been DIY-ing hedgehogs, welding two bars or beams at an angle to make a cross, and then a third to ensure it holds its shape even if it's knocked over.
Volunteers connect I-beams to make anti-tank obstacles known as Czech hedgehogs, in a workshop in Lviv, western Ukraine, on March 3. Daniel Leal/AFP via Getty Images
Humanitarian corridor
"Specific routes and logistical methods agreed upon by all relevant parties to allow the safe passage of humanitarian goods and/or people from one point to another in an area of active fighting," the United Nations said.
People rest as they take shelter from attacks in a metro station in Kharkiv, Ukraine, on March 10. Emre Caylak/AFP via Getty Images
Javelins
The anti-tank missiles are "very, very effective" at knocking out tanks and armored vehicles, former U.S. Army Brigadier General Peter Zwack told NPR. Javelins went into full production in 1997.
A U.S. soldier walks with a Javelin surface-to-air missile launcher in the countryside of Deir Ezzor in northeastern Syria in December 2021. Delil Souleiman/AFP via Getty Images
The weapon's ability to destroy Russian armor has made it a cultural phenomenon in Ukraine, where it even has its own meme: St. Javelin.
Koloradi
A derisive Ukrainian nickname for pro-Russian separatists, many of whom wear orange-and-black St. George ribbons that symbolize Russia's military strength.
Koloradi, on the other hand, is the Ukrainian term for the Colorado potato beetle, an invasive, destructive pest whose stripes resemble the ribbons.
MANPADS
Man-portable air-defense systems, sometimes called MPADS, are portable surface-to-air missiles. In Ukraine, they've been seen carried by soldiers – and reportedly bringing down Russian aircraft.
There are many types of MANPADS, although the most famous is the U.S.-made Stinger.
MiG
The jet warplanes are named after the Mikoyan-Gurevich aviation company. The MiG-15 fought in the Korean War of the 1950s. Ukraine's air force uses the MiG-29 — and Poland recently threw the U.S. a curveball by announcing a plan to give Ukraine more Russian-made MiG-29s.
A MiG-31 fighter of the Russian air force takes off at an air base during military drills in Tver region, Russia, in a photo provided by the Russian Defense Ministry Press Service in February. Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP
No to War (нет войне)
The phrase is used by Russians who are against the war in Ukraine — even in the face of detention, arrests and the threat of steep fines and other punishments. Even children have been taken into custody for holding homemade signs.
No-fly zone
Ukrainian leaders have repeatedly asked their allies in Europe and the U.S. to "close the skies" over Ukraine, to give their ground forces a chance against Russia's invading military. But Western nations have stopped short of calling for this measure.
A protester in Paris calls on NATO to enforce a no-fly zone over Ukraine during a demonstration on Feb. 26. Peter Dejong/AP
"The only way to actually implement something like a no-fly zone is to send NATO planes into Ukrainian airspace and to shoot down Russian planes, and that could lead to a full-fledged war in Europe," U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said. "President Biden has been clear that we are not going to get into a war with Russia."
Oligarch
"The use of 'oligarch' to refer specifically to wealthy Russians dates to the 1990s, although general use of the term dates to the 1600s," he said.
Orcs
Ukrainians have invoked the Lord of the Rings villains to refer to Russia's force, saying the hordes were being sent to loot their country and dismantle its democracy. Those using the term include a doctor in Melitopol who filmed and posted video of a protest to social media.
Owls
Ukraine's defense intelligence service features an owl in its insignia. In it, the owl hovers above a global map, stabbing a sword down from the sky into Russia. The service recently promised that its owls would track down Russian marines that Ukraine says attacked civilians.
Ukraine's defense intelligence service uses an owl in its insignia — and the owl is pointing a sword directly at Russia. Ukraine Defense Intelligence / Screenshot by NPR
Putin nicknames (derogatory)
Critics of Putin use a range of "blended names" for the Russian leader. Barrett cites a chapter from Language of Conflict: Discourses of the Ukrainian Crisis, published in 2020, for some examples:
Russian President Vladimir Putin listens to St. Petersburg's governor Alexander Beglov during their meeting in the Kremlin in Moscow on March 1. Alexei Nikolsky/AP
- Putler: Putin + Hitler
- Kaputin: Kaput + Putin
- Haputin: Ukrainian khapaty хапати (which means "grab") + Putin
Rump state
The term refers to any nation that has seen a large portion of its territory carved away and absorbed into another country.
The Russian Federation is sometimes considered to be a rump state of the USSR. Now Putin wants to turn Ukraine into a rump state, expert Fiona Hill recently said.
Slava Ukraini!
"Glory to Ukraine!" now peppers many statements coming out of Ukraine. It's often followed by the reply, "Heroiam slava!" — glory to the heroes.
People stand in front of a huge banner with the lettering "Slava Ukraini" as they take part in a demonstration in support of Ukraine on Freedom Square in Tallinn, Estonia, on Feb. 26. Raigo Pajula/AFP via Getty Images
The phrase dates at least as far back as Ukraine's war for independence (1917-1921); it also had a resurgence when Ukraine left the Soviet Union in 1991.
Special Military Operation
Putin's term for his country's attack on Ukraine is at best a euphemism, and at worst a sign of the gap between the reality of what is taking place in Ukraine and the narrative many Russian people are being fed. While the rest of the world sees a tragic humanitarian crisis, the Kremlin has insisted it is on a peacekeeping effort in Ukraine.
SWIFT
The global bank messaging system operated by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications is a crucial part of the harsh sanctions on Russia.
Thermobaric bomb (or vacuum bomb)
Russian Army TOS-1A "Solntsepyok (Blazing Sun)" multiple rocket launcher and thermobaric weapon mounted on a T-72 tank chassis seen during the annual Army Games defense technology international exhibition. Leonid Faerberg/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images
"These are very devastating weapons that create a gas [fuel] cloud that then explodes," Jeffrey Edmonds, a research scientist who is a former director for Russia at the National Security Council, told NPR. "These are the weapons they used to clear out Aleppo" in Syria, he added.
Edmonds describes them as "very indiscriminate weapons that cause mass destruction." Thermobaric weapons are not explicitly banned — the U.S. has them as well — but critics question their legality.
Z
The letter, which isn't part of the Cyrillic alphabet used by both Ukraine and Russia, is now seen as a Russian pro-war symbol. It was painted on Russian tanks and other military vehicles as a large white Z. It's also often rendered in the same colors of the ribbon of St. George.
"In the beginning, it looks like it was just simply a way for the Russians to mark their vehicles in some kind of internal classification," Barrett said. "But the Russians quickly realized that they could capitalize on it and use it as kind of a badge of honor."
NPR · by Bill Chappell · March 21, 2022
18. Zelensky: 'I'm ready for negotiations' with Putin, but if they fail, it could mean 'a third World War'
What is the acceptable durable political arrangement that can satisfy both sides to bring peace? I listen to reports speculating and worry that Zelensky could give up too much.
Zelensky: 'I'm ready for negotiations' with Putin, but if they fail, it could mean 'a third World War'
Washington (CNN)Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Sunday that he's "ready for negotiations" with Russian President Vladimir Putin but warned that if they fail "that would mean that this is a third World War."
"I'm ready for negotiations with him. I was ready for the last two years. And I think that without negotiations we cannot end this war," he told CNN's Fareed Zakaria.
"I think that we have to use any format, any chance in order to have a possibility of negotiating, possibility of talking to Putin. But if these attempts fail, that would mean that this is a third World War," he added.
Zelensky has urged more negotiations in recent days as Russia's invasion of Ukraine nears its fourth week. In a video message posted Saturday, he called for talks "without delay," warning that otherwise Russia's losses would be "huge."
"We have always insisted on negotiations. We have always offered dialogue, offered solutions for peace," he said. "And I want everyone to hear me now, especially in Moscow. It's time to meet. Time to talk. It is time to restore territorial integrity and justice for Ukraine."
Zelensky has previously said that his priorities in the talks are clear: "The end of the war, security guarantees, sovereignty, restoration of territorial integrity, real guarantees for our country, real protection for our country."
Zelensky also told Zakaria on Sunday that if Ukraine "were a NATO member, a war wouldn't have started."
"I'd like to receive security guarantees for my country, for my people. If NATO members are ready to see us in the alliance, then do it immediately. Because people are dying on a daily basis," he said, while also adding that he was grateful for the aid NATO has provided since the invasion began.
NATO, a security alliance currently made up of 30 North American and European nations, was created in 1949 in response to the start of the Cold War. Its original purpose was to protect the West from the threat posed by the Soviet Union.
Since the end of the Cold War, many former Soviet satellite states and three former Soviet republics have joined NATO, meaning Russia now shares a land border with the world's largest military alliance.
'We are trying to defend our sovereignty'
Asked how he is holding up amid the war, Zelensky told CNN that he was "doing just everything that everyone else in Ukraine is doing."
"We have made up our team to defend our country, so it seems to me that the person does not need to turn into anyone else. That is important when you can be just yourself," he said. "So I am holding up quite well," he added.
Zelensky also admitted that as of now his weakest point is losing people and children in these "huge numbers."
"I go to sleep with this information about children who were killed and we are continuing to pray in order to prevent new losses of people, but so far we haven't attained these results," he said, adding that "we are trying to defend our sovereignty, defend our country."
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights said Sunday that since the start of the war, 11 girls and 25 boys have been killed.
"I'm not afraid of anything except for people, but the fact -- the fact is that if he is serious about this statement, he might be capable of very horrendous steps because that would mean that this is not a game for him," Zelensky said.
This story has been updated with additional reaction and background.
CNN's Chris Liakos contributed to this report.
19. Does the Quad Plus add up?
Four options:
Option 1: establish a system of “dialogue partnership”
Option 2: hold informal consultations with a broader group of countries
Option 3: offer the Quad up as a dialogue partner to existing regional organisations such as ASEAN
Option 4: offer individual countries the opportunity to be involved with ad hoc activities
Does the Quad Plus add up?
The four-way security group should walk its talk about an
inclusive region by stepping up dialogue with other countries.
The Quad is highly unlikely to admit new members. Other large Indo-Pacific democracies, such as the Republic of Korea or Indonesia, do not align strategically with the four Quad countries to the extent necessary to make them viable members. And expansion risks the group becoming diluted and unwieldy.
Even so, the Quad will not live up to its promise of inclusiveness if it does not provide non-members a platform for engagement and participation in the group’s activities. At the February 2022 meeting of Quad foreign ministers, the group reportedly agreed with a suggestion of Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison that the Quad should be expanded to include “dialogue partners”.
Are there any good options to make this happen?
Option 1: establish a system of “dialogue partnership”
Many regional organisations, notably the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), The Indian Ocean Rim Association, the Pacific Islands Forum and the Mekong River Commission grant “dialogue partner” status to allow non-member countries to participate selectively in their meetings or activities.
More proactive Quad engagement with non-members is not without risks: countries in Southeast Asia who worry about the Quad undermining ASEAN centrality may not like outreach that is too assertive.
However, these groups all boast secretariats and are more institutionalised than the Quad, which remains a flexible grouping rather than a formal institution.
Option 2: hold informal consultations with a broader group of countries
The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) summit provides another model for how Quad Plus could work. It has on several occasions been held in tandem with a broader group of countries, for example, in 2016 India invited BIMSTEC leaders to attend what it called a “BRICS-BIMSTEC Outreach Meeting”. In 2017, China hosted the annual BRICS summit in tandem with a one-off conference called the “Dialogue of Emerging Market and Developing Countries”, including leaders from Thailand, Egypt and Tajikistan. Leaders from the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Eurasian Economic Union have also been invited to attend previous BRICS summits.
President Joe Biden listens to Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison during the Quad Leaders’ Summit, 24 September 2021, in the East Room of the White House (Adam Schultz/White House/Flickr)
Option 3: offer the Quad up as a dialogue partner to existing regional organisations such as ASEAN
Rather than establishing its own system of dialogue partnership, the Quad could instead seek to present itself as a dialogue partner to existing regional institutions such as ASEAN. This would reinforce Quad members’ claim to support the role of existing regional institutions. A first step would be to explore whether ASEAN would be willing to engage with Quad countries as a group, for example at officials’ or foreign minister level.
This is practically feasible, but politically challenging. Most Quad countries probably prefer to deal with ASEAN one-on-one. And while some ASEAN countries would see an advantage in taking the initiative, some would almost certainly oppose the idea.
Option 4: offer individual countries the opportunity to be involved with ad hoc activities
As the Quad moves to operationalise cooperation in particular areas of focus, it could involve additional countries on a case-by-case basis. For example, non-Quad countries could be brought into working groups, such as on critical and emerging technology, or work on supply chain resilience. Non-Quad countries could also be encouraged to sign up to Quad-led statements and standards, such as the 2021 Quad Principles on Technology Design, Development, Governance, and Use, which countries such as New Zealand or Singapore may have an interest in supporting.
This is the most viable approach for “Quad Plus” cooperation, although even this may not be straightforward. Many countries who are anxious about increasingly confrontational relations between China and the Quad countries may be reluctant to sign up to Quad-branded initiatives.
Finding friends
More proactive Quad engagement with non-members is not without risks: countries in Southeast Asia who worry about the Quad undermining ASEAN centrality may not like outreach that is too assertive. In the longer term though, the Quad will eventually need to walk its talk on inclusivity.
An approach prioritising stepped-up informal consultations with Indo-Pacific countries is likely to align most closely with the Quad’s strengths and priorities. Such an informal “friends of the Quad” could mirror the Quad’s approach of starting on less contentious issues and gradually developing dialogue on more sensitive regional issues such as maritime security.
More ambitiously, this could be done by convening a broader regional outreach conference of countries on a topic of common priority in tandem with another meeting that a Quad country is hosting, such as the G20 (which India will host in 2023). These informal engagements at the official or political level would provide opportunities to build regional support for Quad-led approaches to issues such as maritime security, economic coercion or countering disinformation.
Importantly, this low-key approach would not preclude Quad countries from establishing a dialogue partner mechanism for non-member countries in future years.
20. Is Taiwan Next?
Not yet. Perhaps not anytime soon. I think (and hope- though not a course of action) Putin's war is a wake up call for both Taiwan and the PRC.
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Taiwan’s national flag is seen from a cafe window in Dongyin, Taiwan.Credit...Ann Wang/Reuters
By
March 20, 2022
A fragile peace
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has amplified fears that the world is teetering back to a Cold War-like era in which the most powerful countries compete for dominance.
That could mean not only Russia exerting control over Eastern Europe but also China imposing itself over East and Southeast Asia — particularly Taiwan.
China has laid claim to Taiwan since the island split off from the mainland in 1949 and has threatened to forcibly reunite the two. It views the issue as a top priority: Days after Russia’s invasion, Chinese officials reiterated that they were committed to “resolving the Taiwan question.” In a Friday call with President Biden about Russia’s invasion, China’s leader, Xi Jinping, seemed more concerned about the fate of Taiwan than the war in Ukraine.
China, like Russia, appears to see a void after Western powers pulled back from the world stage, sidelined by internal disputes and the failed U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the West, a Cold War victory had convinced many that a new democratic world order would keep the peace — without realizing how fragile that peace really was.
“People forgot about great power politics,” said Jennifer Lind, an expert on East Asia at Dartmouth College. “People had hoped we had transformed international politics, and we didn’t.”
But Russia’s failure so far to overpower Ukraine, and the West’s rush to punish and isolate Russia for its invasion, should make great or rising powers skeptical of similar incursions, experts said.
China, after all, has benefited from the relatively peaceful world order of recent decades; it transformed into the only real economic rival to the U.S. as the world became increasingly integrated. An invasion of Taiwan could disrupt that order and potentially isolate China from the global economy, as Russia’s experience has shown.
So what happens in Taiwan will likely be influenced by what happens in Ukraine. If Russia succeeds in overtaking Ukraine, it increases the danger for Taiwan. If Russia ultimately retreats, or suffers lasting, damaging consequences, that could be good news for the island.
Why China might hesitate
Taiwanese military during a drill.Credit...Ritchie B. Tongo/EPA, via Shutterstock
Because Russia’s invasion has gone poorly, Chinese officials are likely to be more cautious about sending troops into Taiwan, said Liang-chih Evans Chen at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research in Taiwan.
That would be a relief for Taiwan, an island of almost 24 million people with a strong liberal democracy — it is the only Asian government to legally allow same-sex marriages — and a modern economy.
Taiwan does not expect that it could outright defeat China’s powerful military, especially without direct help from the U.S. Taiwan’s aim, instead, is to make a war look so costly for China that it is deterred from invading.
The war in Ukraine has shown how this could play out. Ukrainian resistance has been fiercer than anyone expected — killing thousands of Russian troops, according to U.S. estimates. The same could prove true in Taiwan, where polls find that nearly three-quarters of the population is willing to fight a Chinese invasion.
The West’s sweeping sanctions on Russia also suggest that an invasion of Taiwan could result in economic pain for China. Along with the weapons shipped to Ukraine, the sanctions show Western countries’ willingness to support democracies that are under attack.
The West’s resolve could go even further in Taiwan, with the possibility of U.S. forces directly intervening against an invasion. Biden has said American troops will not fight in Ukraine, but the U.S. keeps a deliberately vague line on Taiwan.
China’s advantages
China has strengths that Russia does not. Its economy is far bigger and more diversified, cushioning the damage that sanctions could inflict. The countries that would stand to impose sanctions on China, from the U.S. to European nations to Japan, are generally more reliant on trade with China than they are on trade with Russia.
Unlike Ukraine, Taiwan is not recognized globally as an independent country — not even by the U.S. — potentially leading to questions about whether China’s attack would be an invasion at all.
China also has an enormous military advantage, with about a million active-duty ground troops, compared with Taiwan’s 88,000. (Although, unlike Russia, China would have to cross 100 miles of water to invade — a difficult, complex undertaking.)
The reaction to Russia’s invasion has also exposed some limits in how far the West is willing to go, with countries declining to send troops to defend Ukraine. And the U.S.’s ambiguity on Taiwan leaves room for American forces to stay out of combat.
Most important, China has time: Any invasion of Taiwan could be years away, if it happens at all, experts said. That gives China time to build up its military, insulate its economy from possible sanctions, study what Russia got wrong in Ukraine and see whether Western resolve actually holds.
The return of great power politics, then, could hinge on the outcome of the war in Ukraine — and whether it was ultimately worth it from Russia’s perspective.
21. Taiwan's Civilian Soldiers, Watching Ukraine, Worry They Aren't Prepared
So how do you prepare? One line of effort could be to re-establish the Taiwan Resident Detachment (circa 1957-1974 permanently manned by member sofht 1st Special Force Group)) now with cross functional teams from the 1st Special Forces Command to advise and assist Taiwan SOF in developing a resistance operating concept with Taiwanese characteristics for aTaiwan unique territorial defense force or citizen's militia.
Taiwan's Civilian Soldiers, Watching Ukraine, Worry They Aren't Prepared
TIME · by Natalie Tso/Taipei
Eric Chung has been following the brutal war in Ukraine with apprehension. “I didn’t think Russia would invade, but they did, so China could do the same. War has become a reality for us,” the 27-year-old engineer says.
Chung has completed the four-month military service required of all Taiwanese men, but he says he doesn’t feel fully prepared for combat if he is called up. For Chung and the other young men who make up the island’s 1.65 million-strong military reserve, the conflict in Ukraine is prompting soul searching about how they would react if faced with an invasion by a People’s Liberation Army that is far larger and better equipped than Taiwanese forces. ”We’re too small,” says 24-year old Jason Hsu. “China would win.”
The war in Ukraine has seen hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians in the military reserve called up to active duty, and tens of thousands of citizens join the Territorial Defense Force to resist the Russian invasion. Western military and intelligence experts, many of whom expected Ukraine to fall quickly under the might of the much larger and more heavily armed Russian military, have credited these forces with helping to slow the Russian advance.
Scenes of ordinary Ukrainians defending their homeland have awakened Taiwan’s own spirit of resistance; Taiwan is considering extending the length of military service, and calls have been rising for the government to train civilians. The geopolitical differences between Taiwan and Ukraine are extensive, but Taiwan has long lived under the threat of invasion by mainland China, which views the self-ruled democratic island of 24 million as a rogue province that must be reunited with the rest of the country—preferably peacefully, but by force if necessary.
Anti-tank fortifications from previous conflicts line the shore along a beach in Lieyu, an outlying island of Kinmen that is the closest point between Taiwan and China on Feb. 4, 2021.
An Rong Xu—Getty Images
“When the Ukraine war started, people in Taiwan were anxious, but now they’re inspired by Ukraine’s resistance,” says a junior officer in Taiwan’s Republic of China Armed Forces, who asked for anonymity because he is not authorized to speak to the media.
He adds that the war has helped Taiwan’s military leaders see the need to mobilize civilians. Taiwan has yet, however, to set up anything akin to Ukraine’s Territorial Defense Forces, which have organized militias and trained civilians since 2014. Mei-ling Yu, a 50-year old paralegal, hopes the government establishes such a force. “If all of us are trained and determined to protect our homeland, the PLA won’t be able to take over Taiwan,” she says. “Even if they invade, we’ll outnumber them.”
Enoch Wu, the founder of Forward Alliance, an NGO that trains civilians in medical skills needed in the event of disasters or military attack, says Taiwanese people have rushed to join in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine. The waiting list for the short workshop has grown to more than 1,000 people.
For now, though, the defense of Taiwan is up to the military and its reserves. Currently, Taiwan has 169,000 active-duty military personnel, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ The Military Balance. That’s a figure dwarfed by the PLA’s 2-million-strong military. The PLA air force operates more than 2,400 combat-capable aircraft, including J-20 Mighty Dragon stealth fighter jets. Taiwan has 474 combat aircraft, and most of its fighter jets are decades old. China also boasts the world’s largest navy, including two aircraft carriers with a third on the way.
To bolster its defense forces, Taiwan has mandatory military service for men. But, the commitment is only four months—compared to 18 months in South Korea, and about two years in Israel and Singapore. “We only had basic training, but it wasn’t enough.” says Chung. “I’d like to have more training in combat skills and psychological warfare.”
The service was reduced from one year in 2013. Now that the Russian attack on Ukraine has people more worried about a cross-strait conflict, legislators are calling to change the service back to a year or longer. This month, a TVBS poll shows 78% of respondents support the idea, and 56% want to include women. “Four months is too short; that’s like summer camp,” says 28-year old Young Sun, who served for a year. “A year is sufficient, but China is so much stronger than us. We can only do our best to hold out.”
Hsu, who has completed his four-month service, doesn’t agree with extending the term. Instead, he says that Taiwan should improve the salaries of volunteer full-time military personnel.
Since transitioning to an all-volunteer active-duty force in 2018, Taiwan’s military has fallen short of its recruitment goals. Most Taiwanese don’t see the military as an attractive career—a common way to describe someone who has enlisted is, “he signed his life away.” The starting salary for an entry-level soldier is $1,235 per month, which is 18% less than the average salary of $1,500 on the island.
Ukrainian military volunteers seen lining up as they report to the Kyiv defense battalion to defend the capital city on March 4, 2022.
Mykhaylo Palinchak—SOPA Images/LightRocket/Getty Images
However, even if Taiwan’s military grows, most analysts say that the island would not be able to stop a full-scale invasion on its own—and Ukraine’s situation has sparked debate over whether anyone would come to Taiwan’s aid. Although the U.S. and allies have sent thousands of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles and other weapons to Ukraine, they have stayed out of the fighting, and rejected calls to set up a no-fly zone, which would bring U.S. and NATO aircraft into direct confrontation with Russian pilots. “The Ukrainian situation has taught us a lesson,” says Alexander Huang, a strategic and wargaming studies professor at Tamkang University in Taiwan. “Your friend may not be able to send military forces to fight for you or with you.” Former President Ma Ying-jeou, of the opposition Kuomintang Party, has publicly predicted that the U.S. would send weapons, but not troops to defend Taiwan.
Sun, too, worries that the U.S. would not come to Taiwan’s rescue. “I don’t think they’d sacrifice themselves for us.”
The U.S. has long held a policy of “strategic ambiguity” on how it would react if the mainland attacked Taiwan—a policy President Joe Biden’s Administration has continued. Despite this, the President vowed to defend Taiwan in response to questions last October, only for his team to walk those comments back. Japan and Australia have also increasingly signaled that they might become involved in a military conflict over Taiwan.
Wang Ting-Yu, the co-chair of the legislature’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee, says that the U.S. should abandon this ambiguity. “The U.S. needs to tell Beijing that if it starts a war, it will pay a price it can’t afford,” he says.
However, war is far from certain for Taiwan. First, unlike Russia and Ukraine, Taiwan and mainland China don’t share a land border, and mounting an amphibious invasion across the 110-mile Taiwan Strait is a far more complex and costly task. Additionally, Taiwan occupies a unique role in the world—with more than 90% of the most advanced microchips being made on the island. An invasion that jeopardizes chip production would likely spark a massive global response.
Beijing has also sought to temper comparisons with Ukraine, with Qin Gang, the Chinese Ambassador to the U.S., writing in the Washington Post that the dispute over Taiwan is an “internal matter” for China. “The future of Taiwan lies in peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and the reunification of China. We are committed to peaceful reunification, but we also retain all options to curb “Taiwan independence.”
Huang says that unlike Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping prizes national stability, but “the long term risk will depend on Xi’s mindset on his legacy.” Xi has promised to complete Taiwan’s “reunification” with the mainland.
Taiwanese army soldiers during a Readiness Enhancement Drill, amid escalating Taiwan-China tensions, in Taiwan, in Jan. 2022.
Ceng Shou Yi—NurPhoto/Getty Images
Still, the war in Ukraine, along with China’s increasingly aggressive stance has many Taiwanese people on edge, and thinking about what it would take to defend the island. PLA warplanes dramatically stepped up their incursions into Taiwanese airspace in the last 18 months, with nearly 1,000 flights in 2021, according to Taiwan’s military.
In Taiwan, conscripts retire from the reserves at age 36, and volunteer soldiers are out at 45. Wang, the lawmaker, says men well past those ages have been calling his office to re-join. At a recent dinner Wang had with successful businessmen in their 50s, he says they all chimed in, “Don’t think we’re too old. Give us a chance. We want to be trained to defend our homeland!”
Wang adds: “This is unusual. Ten years ago, most people just wanted to make money and not provoke China. People in Taiwan have learned this spirit from the Ukrainians.”
Chung, the 27-year-old engineer, says he, too, would be proud to fight for Taiwan—despite reservations about his training. “Civilians in Ukraine have joined the war,” he says. “Their immense courage is inspiring. If a stranger came to our home, we would also fight to the end to protect it.”
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TIME · by Natalie Tso/Taipei
22. 70% Taiwanese willing to militarise amid fear over Chinese invasion, reveals new poll
Should be not "if" war breaks out but "before" war breaks out.
70% Taiwanese willing to militarise amid fear over Chinese invasion, reveals new poll
Last Updated: 21st March, 2022 06:41 IST
A recent poll suggests that more than 70% of Taiwanese citizens are willing to militarise to protect the country against China if war breaks out.
Written By
Image: AP/ Shutterstock
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has raised concerns for Taiwan as China refuted the sovereignty of the independent nation and has stated that Taiwan eventually will be part of China. However, a recent poll suggests that more than 70% of Taiwanese citizens are willing to military protect the country if war with China breaks out in the future. As per the reports of Asia Times, there is also rising public support for reforming military reservist training and extending mandatory military service if required in order to provide complete defence against any future invasion by China.
Despite the fact that the two sides have been ruled separately for more than seven decades, Beijing claims full sovereignty over Taiwan, which has a population of about 24 million people. Taiwan, on the other hand, has responded to Chinese aggression by strengthening strategic connections with democracies, especially the United States, which Beijing has often condemned. China has claimed that Taiwan's independence will lead to war.
'China wants to overturn the international order'
Taiwan's Foreign Minister, Joseph Wu, cautioned China on Saturday not to disrupt the international order by spreading authoritarianism in the region. In an interview with Australia's Sky News, Wu stated that China wants to overturn the international order and extend its authoritarian regime to Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific. He also stated that if Taiwan collapses, the whole of the region will suffer. He also claims that Taiwan must be very strong in rejecting the spread of authoritarianism and that they will fight very hard to safeguard not only Taiwan's sovereignty but also Taiwan's democracy.
China will face consequences if proved that it is providing support to Russia: Biden
In the meanwhile, amid the Russian aggression in Ukraine, which was started nearly a month ago, US President Joe Biden had a conversation with Chinese President Xi Jinping on Friday where they discussed the Ukraine crisis, with Xi Jinping stating that the action is not something they want to see and that the events demonstrate that countries should not get to the point of meeting on the battlefield. Biden warned that China will face consequences if proved that it is providing material support to Russia's military action in Ukraine.
(Inputs from ANI)
Image: AP/ Shutterstock
First Published: 21st March, 2022 06:41 IST
23. FDD | Biden throws Putin a nuclear lifeline
Excerpts:
But perhaps the worst collapse by the Biden team in Vienna was the inclusion of an “inherent guarantee” to the regime. Reports out of Tehran and other Middle Eastern capitals suggest that the Biden team offered a written guarantee stipulating that if the Iranians say there is a breach of the agreement, including if a future administration exits the deal (as Trump did in 2018), the regime in Iran will have the right to enrich uranium at 60% and to install thousands of advanced centrifuges. In other words, the Biden administration has reportedly decided to legitimize Iranian nuclear blackmail. This guarantee will, in all likelihood, be part of a series of side letters. Just as it happened in 2015, the world will never see the text of these promises. Indeed, the American public may never know the extent of Biden’s concessions.
For the Biden White House, the point of these extreme concessions has always been to put the Iranian nuclear problem “in a box” so that Washington could pivot to contain the rise of the revisionist powers: Russia and China. But the agreement will feed the Iranian war machine in the Middle East. It’s also a jack-in-the-box; the Iranian nuclear program springs out once restrictions sunset. As Putin has just made crystal clear: An unhinged regional aggressor backed with nuclear weapons is a nightmare to contain. The clerical regime in Iran almost certainly seeks to follow his lead.
This may, in fact, be the plan. The terms of the new Iran agreement were brokered by Russia. Putin only agreed to it because it would help to undermine the U.S.-led world order. Tehran would never assent to a deal without Putin’s consent because the regime knows it will need Russia in the future.
The world has changed since Feb. 24, when Vladimir Putin ordered his army to invade Ukraine. Whatever the Biden White House thought it would achieve in Vienna, it must think again. This is the time for deterring, not empowering, rogue regimes.
FDD | Biden throws Putin a nuclear lifeline
Mark Dubowitz
Chief Executive
Jonathan Schanzer
Senior Vice President for Research
fdd.org · by Mark Dubowitz Chief Executive · March 18, 2022
The Russian war of aggression in Ukraine has significantly encumbered the Biden administration’s drive to reach a renewed Iran nuclear deal. Seeing an opportunity to build leverage against the United States and Europe as they impose sanctions on Russia, Vladimir Putin threw a grenade into the Iran talks taking place in Vienna. The Russian strongman demanded a “white channel” with Tehran to circumvent international sanctions. This was apparently a bridge too far for U.S. diplomats, who had until that point seemed willing to cave on any and every Iranian demand to seal a deal.
The negotiators left Vienna to reassess their options, but that didn’t stop Russia and Iran from sending their counterparts clear messages. Since then, Russia has unleashed unspeakable violence on Ukraine, while the Iranian regime fired missiles near the American Consulate in northern Iraq. If the latest reports are true, the U.S. has just agreed to allow Russia to carry out nuclear work mandated under the 2015 nuclear deal: uranium swaps with Iran, work on the Fordow nuclear facility, and the provision of nuclear fuel to Iranian reactors.
The Biden White House is apparently indifferent to the terrible optics. While war rages on the edge of Europe and the U.S.-led world order hangs in the balance, a deal is now in the works that is set to empower Putin’s Russia and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Islamic Republic.
If it wasn’t clear before, it should be now: This is no time for a deal with either of those authoritarian regimes.
Already under fire at home for its disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan last year, the Biden administration is undeniably struggling to find its equilibrium after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is uncertain about imposing the most effective sanctions, such as cutting off all Russian banks from global commerce and tying up Russian energy revenues. And it is unwilling to deploy force. The White House thus appears content to rally the international community to express its collective outrage. But that will do little to stop Putin’s destruction of Ukraine, let alone mitigate Americans’ sticker shock at gas stations and supermarkets as oil and food prices soar. It also will not help preserve the American-led world order, which is increasingly under assault by Russia, Iran, and China.
There may have been a moment when the Biden White House believed a deal with Tehran might demonstrate American leadership amid the crisis in Ukraine. But that moment has passed, as Putin seems to have settled into the driver’s seat there as well. The Russian negotiator in Vienna, Mikhail Ulyanov, has emerged as the dominant advocate for Iran’s case. Ulyanov recently boasted, “Iran got much more than it could expect in [the] Vienna talks.” This is now undeniably the truth. But Russia’s perks are not inconsiderable, either.
The American concession that enables Russia to conduct nuclear work with the Islamic Republic, even as Putin threatens to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, is foreign policy malpractice. It’s hard to argue otherwise. Still, some might say that at least the White House held firm and denied the Russian request for a sanctions “white channel” to trade with Iran. Yes, that was technically taken off the table. However, Russia will effectively get a white channel anyway because the Biden administration would never sanction Iranian entities transacting with Russian businesses once a deal is signed. Indeed, the administration has already surrendered to Iranian nuclear blackmail. Besides, it’s also possible that the U.S. will provide secret guarantees to Iran or even Russia in side letters. Washington struck secret side deals in the last agreement that were never made public. Nothing prevents the White House from doing so again.
Not to be left out, China reportedly is also asking for a special carve-out for Chinese entities previously sanctioned. Russia recently approached Beijing to help finance the war effort in Ukraine. Should Joe Biden agree to any of this, it would be a political collapse of epic proportions.
What makes this all so baffling is the fact that the Iran deal of 2015 was no great achievement in the first place. Tehran did not need to cheat to reach threshold nuclear-weapons capabilities. With key constraints set to sunset, the regime was prepared to wait for a decade while the terms of the deal yielded the regime an industrial-size enrichment program, a near-zero breakout time, an advanced centrifuge-powered clandestine path to a nuclear warhead, long-range ballistic missiles that could threaten America, and access to advanced conventional weaponry to target America’s allies across the Middle East. The estimated $150 billion in sanctions relief granted to Iran enabled it to fund its terrorist proxies to expand the regime’s regional dominance. Worse, those funds increasingly immunized the regime against future Western sanctions.
Former President Donald Trump exited the original deal in 2018. Biden’s team has vowed to restore it. But the “new” deal promises to be far worse than the original. Biden’s chief negotiator in Vienna, Rob Malley, reportedly aims to remove the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from the State Department’s list of terror groups; the Guard has been responsible for terrorist attacks worldwide. He was reportedly ready to cave on U.S. sanctions against the regime’s top human rights abusers, including the current president, Ebrahim Raisi, who is responsible for murdering thousands of Iranian dissidents in the 1980s. Biden was also prepared to lift sanctions on the office of Khamenei, a human rights abuser himself, along with his multibillion-dollar slush fund.
As our colleague Saeed Ghasseminejad calculated, under the new deal, the Islamic Republic could immediately gain access to a total sanctions relief package of up to $130 billion. And that doesn’t include tens of billions in additional perks as the regime plugs back into international banks and businesses. This is not only an outrage to our regional allies, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Israel, which are under constant threat of Iranian missiles and terrorism. It’s also an outrage to American gold star families of soldiers killed by Iran-backed terrorists. More than 1,000 of them have signed a letter urging Biden not to give the clerical regime this money, particularly when they are owed billions in damages for Iranian terrorist attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and elsewhere. Biden has not answered their letter.
Team Biden has similarly shrugged off the controversy surrounding reports that the negotiators agreed to close one file currently open with the International Atomic Energy Agency involving the regime’s production of enriched uranium metal that is key to building the core of a nuclear bomb. On three other files related to undeclared nuclear materials and activities, Biden’s team agreed to let the IAEA keep trying to get answers until June. After that, based on past patterns, the Biden team will likely ignore Iran’s nuclear intransigence and block punitive action by the IAEA Board of Governors.
But perhaps the worst collapse by the Biden team in Vienna was the inclusion of an “inherent guarantee” to the regime. Reports out of Tehran and other Middle Eastern capitals suggest that the Biden team offered a written guarantee stipulating that if the Iranians say there is a breach of the agreement, including if a future administration exits the deal (as Trump did in 2018), the regime in Iran will have the right to enrich uranium at 60% and to install thousands of advanced centrifuges. In other words, the Biden administration has reportedly decided to legitimize Iranian nuclear blackmail. This guarantee will, in all likelihood, be part of a series of side letters. Just as it happened in 2015, the world will never see the text of these promises. Indeed, the American public may never know the extent of Biden’s concessions.
For the Biden White House, the point of these extreme concessions has always been to put the Iranian nuclear problem “in a box” so that Washington could pivot to contain the rise of the revisionist powers: Russia and China. But the agreement will feed the Iranian war machine in the Middle East. It’s also a jack-in-the-box; the Iranian nuclear program springs out once restrictions sunset. As Putin has just made crystal clear: An unhinged regional aggressor backed with nuclear weapons is a nightmare to contain. The clerical regime in Iran almost certainly seeks to follow his lead.
This may, in fact, be the plan. The terms of the new Iran agreement were brokered by Russia. Putin only agreed to it because it would help to undermine the U.S.-led world order. Tehran would never assent to a deal without Putin’s consent because the regime knows it will need Russia in the future.
The world has changed since Feb. 24, when Vladimir Putin ordered his army to invade Ukraine. Whatever the Biden White House thought it would achieve in Vienna, it must think again. This is the time for deterring, not empowering, rogue regimes.
Mark Dubowitz is CEO of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Jonathan Schanzer is senior vice president. Follow them on Twitter @mdubowitz and @JSchanzer. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Mark Dubowitz Chief Executive · March 18, 2022
24. Putin may be losing the information war, but Zelensky's NATO concession suggests Ukraine may be losing on the battlefield.
A cautionary note.
Putin may be losing the information war, but Zelensky's NATO concession suggests Ukraine may be losing on the battlefield. The West must not fool itself into thinking otherwise, writes military expert BILL ROGGIO
PUBLISHED: 17:53 EDT, 18 March 2022 | UPDATED: 13:52 EDT, 19 March 2022
Daily Mail · by Bill Roggio For Dailymail.Com · March 18, 2022
As Russia's brutal invasion of Ukraine grinds on into its fourth week, the physical war rages in the cities and countryside, while an information war is waged over the airwaves and on the internet and social media.
On the actual battlefield, the Russian offensive has undoubtedly slowed over the past week. But what is being described as a 'stalled' takeover may be the result of the Russians taking time to reorganize their forces and improve their logistics.
On the Western side of the information war, we were told from the opening days of the conflict that the Russian military would break due to high casualties and defections, loss of tanks, armored vehicles, artillery and aircraft, and domestic opposition.
Videos of Russian battlefield setbacks abound in the media, and strangely there is little reporting on Ukrainian losses.
And yet, over three weeks into the war, Vladimir Putin remains president and the Russian war machine has not collapsed but in fact continues its plodding, imperfect, and messy advance.
Ukraine certainly has won the war on social media and in the press. This gives the average Western viewer the impression of a lopsided victory in favor of Ukraine.
Additionally, the Pentagon has taken the unprecedented step of conducting daily briefings on the war, even though the U.S. is not at war.
The Pentagon assessments often track closely with assessments given by the Ukrainian government.
The Russian military has used a mix of maneuver and siege warfare in an effort to achieve its goal of breaking the Ukrainian military and government and conquering vast regions of the country.
This is not a condemnation of the West's use of information and disinformation.
These tactics play a role in the management of conflicts. But the West should not delude itself into believing that the Ukrainians will be saved by wishful thinking.
Russia has waged its own clumsy disinformation campaign in an effort to show that its people are united in Putin's so-called 'special military operation' – the name he gives for his country's illegal invasion and war.
On Friday, Russia organized a massive rally in an effort to show the Russian people stand behind him. Meanwhile, thousands of Russians have been arrested for protesting the war.
Putin has also issued a chilling warning to dissenters in his country, likening them to gnats and signaling new repression, while passing laws that make protests illegal and protesters are subject to fines and even prison sentences.
The leader of a unified cause does not employ these tactics.
While each side attempts to promote its narrative of success, one potential sign of the true condition of the Ukrainian defense is Volodymyr Zelensky's recent concession on NATO membership.
Zelensky appears to have caved on one of Putin's reasons for going to war.
'It is clear that Ukraine is not a member of NATO; we understand this,' the Ukrainian president said. 'For years we heard about the apparently open door, but have already also heard that we will not enter there, and these are truths and must be acknowledged.'
Without NATO membership, Zelensky must rely on Western weapons shipments, sanctions, economic embargoes, and other forms of soft support. It remains to be seen if these efforts are enough to turn the tide against the Russians.
The truth on the ground is that Ukrainians are putting up stiff resistance everywhere in an effort to defend their cities and make the Russians pay for every inch of ground.
But short of the quick capture of Kyiv and the collapse of President Zelensky's government, the Russian assault on Ukraine was always going to take time.
Conventional warfare is a time, manpower and equipment consuming effort and quick victories are rare.
On Friday, Russia organized a massive rally in an effort to show the Russian people stand behind Putin. Meanwhile, thousands of Russians have been arrested for protesting the war.
We must remember that it took the U.S. military three weeks to take Baghdad and 42 days to conquer Iraq in 2003.
The Russian military is far less proficient than its American counterpart, and the Ukrainians are superior defenders and more highly motivated that Saddam Hussein's army.
As I've written previously, the Russian offensive was launched on multiple fronts and has four major targets: the capital of Kyiv; Kharkiv, Ukraine's second largest city and the north; the east, including areas west of the Donbas region, and the south, including the ports on the Black and Azov seas.
The Russian military has used a mix of maneuver and siege warfare in an effort to achieve its goal of breaking the Ukrainian military and government and conquering vast regions of the country.
Where the Ukrainians have put of stiff resistance in the cities, Russian forces are bypassing them to take other key objectives, while at the same time the Russians are attempting to surround the cities and pound them into submission with deadly air and artillery strikes.
This can be most easily seen in the north on the Kharkiv front, where Russian troops hit a wall north of the city.
The Russian military is now attempting to encircle Kharhiv, while pummeling it with artillery.
They also dispatched troops southward towards the town of Izium, which U.S. Defense officials said was taken yesterday.
If the Russians can push south of Izium, they can encircle Ukrainian troops in the northeastern part of Ukraine and cut them off from resupply.
This is a classic military maneuver. Once a force is surrounded, they will begin to run out of necessities, like food and ammo.
While each side attempts to promote its narrative of success, one potential sign of the true condition of the Ukrainian defense is Volodymyr Zelensky's recent concession on NATO membership.
Run out of ammo and you can't defend yourself – it's that simple.
In the south, the situation is also tenuous for the Ukrainians as Russia controls all major coast areas except for Odesa and Mariupol.
The latter city is completely surrounded, being hammered by artillery and starved.
The Russian force is slowing pushing northward from there.
Further west, Odesa is proving to be a tough nut to crack as Russian forces are finding it difficult to reach the city.
Some Russian forces are also pushing north to Kryvyi Rih with the likely goal of reaching Dnipro.
If the Russians could reach Dnipro, the entirety of eastern Ukraine would be in danger of falling to the Russians.
In and around Kyiv, the situation has stabilized for the Ukrainians for the time being.
But Russian forces are on the outskirts of the city, and only the areas south of Kyiv are open.
Ukraine is understandably prioritizing the defense of its capital. However, this likely drawing resources from other fronts.
West of Kyiv, Russia forces have stepped up long range attacks, hitting Ukrainian bases with missile strikes, including some key air bases near the Polish border.
While the information campaigns have clouded the reality of the situation on the ground, what has also become clear is that Russian military does not pose a conventional threat to NATO.
Smaller, non-NATO members, such as Moldova, are not so lucky.
Whatever successes the Russian military has had in Ukraine, the operation has exposed serious flaws in its ability to wage war against an adversary with advanced weaponry and sophisticated tactics.
Author Bill Roggio was embedded with the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Army, and Iraqi forces in Iraq between 2005 and 2008, and with the Canadian Army in Afghanistan in 2006. From 1991 to 1997, Bill served as a signalman and infantryman in the U.S. Army and New Jersey National Guard.
The Russian air force's inability or unwillingness to gain air superiority over the whole of Ukraine against a less capable foe raises questions about its performance in a potential war against the West.
NATO air power is far superior to that of Ukraine, and would very likely savage Russian armor, ground forces and its logistical support.
NATO ground forces would exploit the Russian military's inability or unwillingness to deploy its infantry to screen against mobile anti-armor teams.
In conclusion, the Ukrainians are currently playing for time, slowly ceding ground while whittling down Russian armor and infantry.
The Russians strategy is also predicated on time; its multi-front offensives also seek to grind down Ukrainian forces and encircle them requires time to execute.
It remains be seen if time is on the Ukrainian or Russian's side. Good arguments can be made for both.
Wars are ultimately about will – the will to sacrifice soldiers, civilians, material, and land in order to set the conditions for victory. Both sides have shown they have the will to continue the fight.
Daily Mail · by Bill Roggio For Dailymail.Com · March 18, 2022
25. FDD | Congress must stop Team Biden from giving Russia a financial lifeline in Iran deal
Excerpts:
Congress can play a role in preventing a cash windfall for Russia. Lawmakers should immediately pass legislation requiring the administration to sanction Rosatom. The bill should also include US sanctions against Iranian and any other foreign entities that trade or transact with sanctioned Russian entities. Congressional committees should hold hearings to ascertain whether Russia could use Iran to evade Ukraine restrictions.
This misguided Iran policy already threatens to undermine the strong international response to Putin’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. President Biden should ask whether an expiring Iran nuclear deal is really worth giving Russia a financial lifeline.
FDD | Congress must stop Team Biden from giving Russia a financial lifeline in Iran deal
Anthony Ruggiero
Senior Fellow
Andrea Stricker
Research Fellow
fdd.org · by Anthony Ruggiero Senior Fellow · March 18, 2022
Washington appears determined to undermine its own economic-sanctions campaign against Russian President Vladimir Putin for his unprovoked invasion of Ukraine — and aid a second dictatorship in the process.
The State Department confirmed Tuesday that the Biden administration would “not sanction Russian participation in nuclear projects that are part of resuming full implementation” of a new deal with Iran. In effect, Washington is guaranteeing Moscow a multibillion-dollar payout. Congress should stop President Joe Biden from throwing Putin this financial lifeline while he maims and kills innocent civilians.
Team Biden has been negotiating the revival of a weaker, shorter version of the Iran agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, since last year. It’s allowed Russia an outsized role in the talks, with the country’s head delegate, Amb. Mikhail Ulyanov, providing frequent public updates. In one instance, Ulyanov praised Tehran’s negotiating style, candidly stating, “Iran got much more than it could expect.”
While Russia’s gambit may seem part of the standard give-and-take of negotiations, Moscow’s real motive was financial. As Putin and his oligarchs start to feel the pain of Ukraine sanctions, Russia can’t afford to miss out on a major payday in Iran. Hidden in the 2015 nuclear deal is tacit permission for Russia to expand Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant, a project worth some $10 billion to the Kremlin.
Tehran reportedly owes another $500 million to Russia’s state nuclear agency, Rosatom, for past work. Rosatom is the entity Russia has installed to assume operational control of Ukrainian nuclear power plants — most recently the largest plant in Eastern Europe, the Zaporizhzhya facility, as well as the shuttered Chernobyl plant — after Moscow’s irresponsible shelling and takeovers of the facilities.
As recently as a week ago, Team Biden was considering sanctions against Rosatom for its role in the Ukraine conflict. But when Moscow threatened to scuttle the Iran talks in retaliation, the administration quickly backed down.
Russia may also try to use Iran as a financial conduit to evade Ukraine sanctions. A revival of the nuclear deal would remove most US sanctions against hundreds of Iranian banks, companies and individuals. If sanctioned Russian banks, companies or individuals trade or transact with newly unsanctioned Iranian counterparts, the Biden administration could not “re-sanction” the Iranian entities for doing business with Russia — it would be a violation of the JCPOA.
If Iran nuclear negotiations are successful, the Bidenites will be under enormous pressure to ensure that Tehran receives economic benefits from the deal. They may decline to take action against US and other nations’ banks and companies to stop Russian transactions with Iran that would run afoul of Ukraine sanctions.
The Biden team may have agreed to much more than it bargained for when it permitted exemptions for Moscow’s nuclear work in Iran. At Tuesday’s press briefing, State Department spokesman Ned Price made clear that the administration hadn’t thought through the possibility for broader sanctions evasion, dismissing a reporter’s question on the subject as “a hypothetical wrapped in another hypothetical.”
Congress can play a role in preventing a cash windfall for Russia. Lawmakers should immediately pass legislation requiring the administration to sanction Rosatom. The bill should also include US sanctions against Iranian and any other foreign entities that trade or transact with sanctioned Russian entities. Congressional committees should hold hearings to ascertain whether Russia could use Iran to evade Ukraine restrictions.
This misguided Iran policy already threatens to undermine the strong international response to Putin’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. President Biden should ask whether an expiring Iran nuclear deal is really worth giving Russia a financial lifeline.
Anthony Ruggiero is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Andrea Stricker is a research fellow. Ruggiero served in the US government for more than 19 years, most recently as senior director for counterproliferation and biodefense on the National Security Council (2019-2021). Twitter: @NatSecAnthony and @StrickerNonpro. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Anthony Ruggiero Senior Fellow · March 18, 2022
26. FDD | Canada Must Bar Iranian Officials From Entering the Country
FDD | Canada Must Bar Iranian Officials From Entering the Country
fdd.org · by Tzvi Kahn Research Fellow · March 18, 2022
It was, at first glance, an unremarkable sight.
A man in his 60s, sporting a green T-shirt and blue shorts, walks on a treadmill in a Toronto-area fitness center. Younger men and women exercise on adjacent machines, wearing ordinary gym clothes. One woman, just a few feet away, boasts tight black leggings. Another woman has donned a tank top exposing her midriff.
Yet the man on the treadmill is no ordinary gym rat. He is Morteza Talaei, the police chief of Iran’s capital city of Tehran from 2001 to 2006. In this capacity, he helped enforce a stringent dress code on Iranian women, including mandates to wear a headscarf and to abjure even mildly revealing outfits. Talaei also enforced bans on mixed parties.
Talaei’s workout, caught on video in January, reflects the fundamental hypocrisy of the clerical regime in Iran. Even as its leaders publicly lambast the supposedly corrupting influence of Western culture, they often later take advantage of the freedom and prosperity that countries like Canada provide.
Ottawa shouldn’t let them. Instead, Canada should deny visas to former regime officials and impose sanctions on them, welcoming only Iranians who seek to escape Tehran’s persecution.
Under Talaei’s stewardship, Tehran’s police force, then known as the Law Enforcement Force (LEF) of the Islamic Republic of Iran, had an infamous record. In 2006, Talaei established a new unit in Tehran consisting of 50 cruisers to ensure public compliance with the national dress code.
“In our campaign, we will confront women showing their bare legs in short pants,” he said. The patrols would also “combat women wearing skimpy headscarves” and “short and form-fitting coats.” The unit would even punish taxi drivers for transporting women who fail to adhere to the dress code.
But Talaei’s human rights abuses extend beyond his treatment of women. In 2003, the LEF and other security agencies arrested an untold number of people, including students, for joining or supporting month-long pro-democracy protests in Tehran.
In particular, authorities detained Iranian-Canadian journalist Zahra Kazemi as she photographed families of incarcerated dissidents outside the notorious Evin Prison in Tehran. The LEF and other security agencies alternately retained custody of Kazemi. Yet nearly three weeks after her apprehension, she died in a Tehran military hospital. An examination of her body showed signs of torture and rape. Canada responded to the murder by withdrawing its ambassador from Iran.
Kazemi’s killers remain unpunished to this day.
Before his tenure with the LEF, Talaei served as a commander in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a paramilitary force tasked with advancing the clerical regime’s radical Islamist ideology. Talaei, who rose to the rank of brigadier general, thus bears complicity in the IRGC’s decades-long, bloody campaign to become a regional hegemon unencumbered by dissent at home.
The IRGC and the LEF, renamed as the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) in late 2021, often work together. The two groups, after all, have similar missions. While the LEC nominally seeks, like any other police force, simply to maintain law and order, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has asserted that the police must preserve “moral and social” security as well. In other words, the LEC, like the IRGC, must safeguard the regime’s authority and enforce the Islamist creed that drives it.
Talaei’s presence in Canada has triggered a public outcry. In February, eight human rights organizations released an open letter criticizing the government for allowing Talaei to enter the country — even as Ottawa inexplicably turns away many Iranian refugees legitimately seeking safe harbor.
The letter calls on Ottawa to consider sanctioning Talaei pursuant to the 2017 Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act, also known as the Global Magnitsky law. Sanctions imposed under this statute, which targets foreign nationals responsible for or complicit in gross violations of human rights, would bar Talaei from entering Canada and prohibit Canadians from conducting financial transactions with him.
Ironically, Talaei has responded angrily to the publicity surrounding his presence in Canada, declaring that his travel is nobody’s business. But as many critics pointed out, that’s hardly the position he took about the personal lives of the Iranian people. Talaei’s “brutality runs deep,” the open letter states. Canada should act accordingly.
Tzvi Kahn is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he contributes to FDD’s Iran Program and Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP). For more analysis from Tzvi, the Iran Program, and CEFP, please subscribe HERE. Follow Tzvi on Twitter @TzviKahn. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_Iran and @FDD_CEFP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Tzvi Kahn Research Fellow · March 18, 2022
27. FDD | U.S. Should Seize and Sell Assets of Sanctioned Russian Elites to Aid Ukraine
Excerpt:
The Ukrainian people’s bravery and resilience have inspired the world. But with the worst of the war likely yet to come, Washington must do more. It can start by using money seized from Putin’s cronies to aid Ukrainians fighting his aggression.
FDD | U.S. Should Seize and Sell Assets of Sanctioned Russian Elites to Aid Ukraine
John Hardie
Research Manager and Research Analyst
Matthew Zweig
Senior Fellow
fdd.org · by John Hardie Research Manager and Research Analyst · March 18, 2022
A bipartisan group of senators introduced legislation on Tuesday that would enable Washington to seize and sell assets of sanctioned Russian elites and then use the proceeds to support Ukraine. As Washington ramps up sanctions against Russian elites, this legislation would help put their frozen assets to good use.
The Asset Seizure for Ukraine Reconstruction Act, introduced by Senators Roger Wicker (R-MS), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), Lindsey Graham (R-SC), and Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), mirrors similar bipartisan legislation introduced in the House earlier this month. The two bills would allow the U.S. government to seize assets belonging to foreign persons who are under U.S. sanctions related to human rights violations, corruption, Russia’s “malign influence,” or its conflicts in Ukraine, and whose wealth derives at least partly from corruption or political support for Vladimir Putin’s regime.
The United States could then sell those assets and use the proceeds to support Ukrainian refugees, humanitarian assistance, and post-conflict construction in Ukraine, as well as “democracy and human rights programming and monitoring” for the Russian people. The money could also fund “weapons” for the Ukrainian military and help “ensure the free flow of information to the Ukrainian people.”
Under current U.S. law, funds belonging to sanctioned persons are frozen in their accounts, while physical assets such as real estate or yachts are put under lock and key. The government cannot access these assets absent a separate legal authority, which usually entails linking them to criminal activity. This process is often exceedingly difficult and can take years. By contrast, sanctions designations require a much lower burden of proof.
Since Russia invaded Ukraine, Washington and its allies have sanctioned a raft of Russian oligarchs and officials. Assets frozen as a result — such as a $588 million superyacht belonging to EU- and UK-sanctioned billionaire Andrey Melnichenko, impounded by Italy last Saturday — are now unusable by their owners but still legally their property.
The new legislation would thus make it easier to access frozen Russian assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction, such as luxury real estate, which Russian elites have long used to stash wealth. A similar proposal is under consideration in the United Kingdom, whose capital has earned the moniker “Londongrad” because it has long been a favorite destination for Russian elites and their money. Some estimates suggest Russian elites could hold close to $1 trillion offshore in various locations worldwide.
These initiatives dovetail with a new “Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs” multilateral task force launched by Washington and various allies on Wednesday. According to a Treasury Department press release, the task force aims to help the allies “share information to take concrete actions, including sanctions, asset freezing, and civil and criminal asset seizure, and criminal prosecution.” The Justice Department launched a complementary initiative on March 2 called “Task Force KleptoCapture.”
Yet Congress could still bolster these efforts in several ways. First, the Senate and House versions permit the seizure of assets worth at least $2 million and $5 million, respectively. Congress should drop the dollar-value threshold, thereby putting at risk all U.S. assets of qualifying persons.
Second, lawmakers should adjust the legislation’s weapons-related language to authorize the use of funds for materiel other than “weapons,” such as body armor and radios. Moreover, that provision should explicitly apply to any Ukrainians fighting Russia within Ukraine, including irregular forces, not merely to Ukraine’s official military.
Finally, the legislation should apply to qualifying persons subject to any Russia-related sanctions. When designating Russian oligarchs and other elites, Treasury has often provided very specific justifications — such as the target’s operations in Russia’s technology sector — that may not qualify for asset seizure under the current legislation.
The Ukrainian people’s bravery and resilience have inspired the world. But with the worst of the war likely yet to come, Washington must do more. It can start by using money seized from Putin’s cronies to aid Ukrainians fighting his aggression.
John Hardie is research manager and a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Matthew Zweig is a senior fellow. They both contribute to FDD’s Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP). For more analysis from the authors and CEFP, please subscribe HERE. Follow Matthew on Twitter @MatthewZweig1. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_CEFP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research center focused on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by John Hardie Research Manager and Research Analyst · March 18, 2022
28. The West Still Doesn’t Understand the Taliban
Excerpts:
But those hoping that the Taliban will accede to Western demands regarding the formation of an inclusive government and respect for human rights will likely be disappointed. The Taliban may bend to small conditions—allowing a few more girls to go to school, humanitarian aid being funneled through nongovernmental organizations, restraining reprisals or public beatings—but loftier expectations are, unfortunately, baseless.
The unlikelihood of getting the Taliban to change their basic approach to governance and society make major economic investments in the country unlikely. Yet secondary levels of humanitarian assistance, divorced from politics, ought to be feasible. Afghanistan should receive aid on the basis of the suffering of its people, not as a reward to its government for being a cooperative partner. The Biden administration’s controversial decision to devote half of the Afghan government’s $7 billion in frozen assets to humanitarian assistance, given directly to the Afghan people rather than through the Taliban government, appears to be a recognition of the limitations of working with the Taliban. It is also a sign of the powerful forces pushing the Taliban and the United States apart. The United States has few interests in Afghanistan, and in terms of domestic politics, giving U.S. taxpayer dollars to a former enemy would likely receive only lukewarm support at home. But while the degree of financial assistance necessary to sustain economic growth is politically infeasible, the United States and the international community should nonetheless avoid cutting the Taliban off.
As the United States and others think through how to engage with the new Taliban regime, any good strategy will require policymakers to practice patience, not assume the worst, and above all to try to learn more about their interlocutors. One does not have to like the Taliban to see that Dam offers sound policy counsel.
The West Still Doesn’t Understand the Taliban
How to Engage With the New Afghan Regime
March 21, 2022
Foreign Affairs · by The American War in Afghanistan: A History · March 21, 2022
The Taliban have been in power in Afghanistan for more than half a year. During that time, the United States and its allies have struggled to come up with a coherent policy response. Western leaders would generally like the Taliban to form an inclusive government, respect women’s rights, refrain from persecuting members of the former Afghan state, and renounce international terrorism. Amid an economic and humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, international policymakers are confronted with a serious dilemma: either they choose to continue to treat the Taliban as an international pariah and thereby withhold most forms of support, or they provide economic assistance to the country and effectively prop up the regime.
The policy debate is hindered by how surprisingly little the world knows about the new regime. The Taliban’s intentions, interests, and decision-making structure are foggy; its current leader, Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada, has neither been seen on television nor photographed in years; other members of the Taliban’s leadership, such as Mullah Mohammad Hassan, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, and Sirajuddin Haqqani, are also rarely or never seen. A helpful guide to understanding the new Taliban regime is Bette Dam’s recent book, Looking for the Enemy: Mullah Omar and the Unknown Taliban. Dam’s richly detailed study, based on years spent tracking the Taliban as an investigative journalist, exposes many of the inner workings of the group—and highlights how little the West truly understands about how the movement functions. Offering a far more nuanced view of the group than has generally been portrayed in the West, her research suggests that policymakers should neither attempt to marginalize the regime completely nor expect the Taliban to bow to international demands. Rather, policymakers should aim to craft an open-minded but clear-eyed policy that avoids overly punitive actions while taking time to understand the organization and identify areas where cooperation is feasible. Thereby, they can avoid needlessly turning the Taliban into an enemy or expending valuable resources pressing for far-reaching concessions that are unlikely to ever occur. And crucially, in adopting such an approach, they may be able to prevent the country from sliding further into humanitarian disaster.
FILLING IN THE BLANKS
Dam has studied Afghanistan since the early 2000s, and in 2012 began writing a book about Mullah Mohammad Omar, the one-eyed leader of the first Taliban regime, which hosted Osama bin Laden and ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, when it was overthrown by the United States. Mullah Omar had rarely been seen in public after the fall of the regime and has always been a somewhat mythical figure. Dam’s effort to track down the elusive Taliban leader led her on a years-long quest throughout the Afghan hinterlands, which she recounts in Looking for the Enemy. The conventional wisdom has long been that Omar led the Taliban from Pakistan in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. But amazingly, after years of persistent investigation, Dam reveals good evidence that he was based in Afghanistan—at times only a short distance from U.S. forces—right up to his death in 2013. Omar had evaded detection by living in a modest mud dwelling, communicating infrequently with his subordinates through cassette tapes or handwritten instructions.
Omar was never well understood. He was often portrayed in books and the media, especially in the early years of the war, as something of an extremist who gave sanctuary to al Qaeda. But Dam makes the case that Western policymakers and the media are biased against Omar and the Taliban because they know so little about them, complicating assessments of their connections with terrorism. “The mainstream media were talking up the enemy and in doing so were prolonging the war,” Dam writes scathingly. “Remarkably little credible information was to be found about Omar after his departure from Kandahar at the end of 2001. He and bin Laden were the key targets for the Americans and their allies in Afghanistan, but it was as if the two men had disappeared off the face of the Earth.” Indeed, when Omar died in 2013, no one outside a small coterie of Taliban members knew about it, and it would take more than two years for the information to leak out to the world.
A member of the Taliban in Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2021
Jorge Silva / Reuters
Dam argues that the Taliban are widely misunderstood. She offers her account as a corrective to stereotypical portrayals of the group as oppressive zealots best known for banning music, instituting oppressive punishments, and barring the activities of women. Through extensive interviews with people who lived under Taliban rule, Dam demonstrates that life under the Taliban was never so uniform. Throughout the 1990s, communities under Taliban control could listen to traditional music, have poetry readings, and play sports. Though women were generally confined to the home, some girls attended primary schools. And, she writes, “There is little evidence for the common assumption that executions and stonings were being held every Friday in large stadiums in cities such as Kabul and Kandahar, and that local people were forced to attend.”
She also offers evidence that the movement commanded more popular support than is generally recognized, at least in the rural parts of the country. The residents of Kandahar, for instance, appreciated the Taliban’s efforts in 1994 to clear out warlords who had been taxing and harassing them and to ensure basic security and stability. Living in a traditional society, they were not taken aback by the Taliban’s strictures. Even in Kabul, some residents cheered in 1996 when the Taliban entered the city and ended the anarchy. And although enforcement of the new restrictions on daily life—and women’s lives, in particular—could be harsh, some were pleased as food and fuel became cheaper and the airport reopened.
Dam also complicates assessments of the Taliban’s support for al Qaeda—perhaps the issue of greatest concern to the United States and the world. She shows that the relationship between Omar and bin Laden was ambiguous. Although Omar allowed bin Laden to stay in Afghanistan, he was displeased with bin Laden’s calls for international terrorism and tried to prevent him from talking to the media. Bin Laden’s son later told Dam: “Relations were not good. Omar didn’t really want anything to do with my father but he couldn’t ignore him totally, precisely because he was being attacked so fiercely abroad.”
Dam argues that the Taliban are widely misunderstood.
The United States mismanaged this complexity, Dam argues. Washington’s efforts to marginalize the Taliban in the 1990s proved largely counterproductive. The United States’ pariah treatment of the Taliban obstructed mutual understanding, exacerbated biases, and deterred compromise, especially when dealing with al Qaeda. Military actions designed to compel the Taliban to repudiate al Qaeda instead triggered intransigence and entrenched Omar’s refusal to turn over bin Laden. When, for instance, the United States attacked al Qaeda camps in eastern Afghanistan in 1998 after the group’s bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Omar was outraged. “If the whole world carries on opposing us despite our assurances and keeps asking for bin Laden, then we won’t hand him over,” he exclaimed. “Instead, we’ll defend him to our last drop of blood.” Shortly thereafter, Omar warned the U.S. diplomat Tom Malinowski that such attacks would only increase Islamic solidarity and hostility toward the United States. In the words of one of Malinowski’s aides, “The sixty cruise missiles essentially drove him into bin Laden’s arms.”
Yet Dam also seeks to temper hopes that the group might be willing to make broader concessions in exchange for a degree of engagement with the West. As she observes, Taliban leaders have often prioritized their faith, at whatever cost that may bring to their international reputation, over practical compromises with the international community. After the Taliban destroyed two monumental Buddha statues near the central Afghan town of Bamiyan in 2001 and was met with global condemnation, for instance, Omar remarked: “I’m not concerned about our relations with the world. My task is to implement the rules of Islam, no more or less than that.” Moreover, Omar famously refused to give up bin Laden to the United States out of fear that “enemies … would tear into him and label him a fake Muslim if he were to hand over such a big prize to the United States.” Omar even looked to his dreams for guidance, a practice that has a strong tradition among Afghan religious leaders. Policymakers would do well to pay close attention to these examples: the Taliban’s current leader, Haibatullah, seems to model himself on Omar. Haibatullah similarly stays in Kandahar, avoids the camera, and is said to likewise privilege following his interpretation of Islam—a reading of Islamic law as the sole source of law and authority—over pragmatic dealmaking. Dam’s book is a reminder to Washington and others that the Taliban’s dedication to Islam is real, that they genuinely believe it is for the betterment of their country, and that they often value it over diplomatic compromise, often no matter the cost.
The strength of Taliban beliefs is evident not only in their relationship with the United States but with their primary benefactor, Pakistan. Dam shows that the Taliban’s relationship with Afghanistan’s neighbor has often been ambivalent and fraught: although the Taliban have accepted Pakistani aid and support, she writes, they resent what they perceive as Pakistan’s arrogant treatment of Afghanistan as one of its provinces. “The Taliban saw foreign interference as a curse. […] It was important for everyone to realize that the Taliban had emerged ‘from within’ the country.” Dam quotes Omar scolding a Pakistani party leader for daring to advise him: “What exactly are you doing here? [...] You need to focus on getting an Islamic state in Pakistan first.”
A NEW CHAPTER?
Dam’s research helps policymakers chart a potential new course with the Taliban. Treating them as a reviled extremist movement may possibly inflame the very terrorist support that the United States and its allies fear most. Washington’s conventional method of countering potential terrorist threats by launching strikes on Afghan soil comes with far more blowback than many U.S. policymakers have realized. Especially when civilians are killed, such strikes have turned local populations powerfully against the United States. If their use continues, it could prompt Afghans to rally around the Taliban regime—and potentially around other extremist groups in the region. Patient diplomacy to compel the Taliban to turn over wrongdoers is the better choice.
Per Dam’s assessment of the Taliban, diplomatic engagement with the organization is the sensible option—perhaps even, as time passes, granting the regime a seat in the United Nations or even reopening a U.S. embassy. The Biden administration has been wise to allow banks to transact in Afghanistan and the international community to unfreeze their respective Afghan government assets and deliver aid without fear of U.S. retribution. While the Biden administration recently decided to authorize transactions involving the Afghan people, Washington should also consider repealing existing U.S. sanctions on financial transactions and trade with the Taliban government specifically. Both the United States and the Taliban would benefit from a neutral and independent Afghanistan, which would reduce the chances of the country becoming a field for great power rivalry and rekindling the civil war.
Treating the Taliban as a reviled extremist movement may inflame the very terrorist support that Washington fears most.
But those hoping that the Taliban will accede to Western demands regarding the formation of an inclusive government and respect for human rights will likely be disappointed. The Taliban may bend to small conditions—allowing a few more girls to go to school, humanitarian aid being funneled through nongovernmental organizations, restraining reprisals or public beatings—but loftier expectations are, unfortunately, baseless.
The unlikelihood of getting the Taliban to change their basic approach to governance and society make major economic investments in the country unlikely. Yet secondary levels of humanitarian assistance, divorced from politics, ought to be feasible. Afghanistan should receive aid on the basis of the suffering of its people, not as a reward to its government for being a cooperative partner. The Biden administration’s controversial decision to devote half of the Afghan government’s $7 billion in frozen assets to humanitarian assistance, given directly to the Afghan people rather than through the Taliban government, appears to be a recognition of the limitations of working with the Taliban. It is also a sign of the powerful forces pushing the Taliban and the United States apart. The United States has few interests in Afghanistan, and in terms of domestic politics, giving U.S. taxpayer dollars to a former enemy would likely receive only lukewarm support at home. But while the degree of financial assistance necessary to sustain economic growth is politically infeasible, the United States and the international community should nonetheless avoid cutting the Taliban off.
As the United States and others think through how to engage with the new Taliban regime, any good strategy will require policymakers to practice patience, not assume the worst, and above all to try to learn more about their interlocutors. One does not have to like the Taliban to see that Dam offers sound policy counsel.
Foreign Affairs · by The American War in Afghanistan: A History · March 21, 2022
29. Why Deterrence Failed Against Russia
Sir Lawrence Freedman: "Deterrence works.Until it doesn't."
But it will never work if you say you will not use your military capabilities. I think we could be doing what we are doing now without putting US troops in direct combat, but I think it will be documented in history that the major strategic error of Putin's War was our public pronouncement that we would not commit US troops, we would not establish a no-fly zone (whether practical or not), and that we feared escalation to nuclear war and will not conduct actions that could lead to it. As Dr. Schadlow says, Putin interpreted those statements as a green light.
In fact deterrence does work when you are deterring yourself. We are guilty of self deterrence.
Why Deterrence Failed Against Russia
The U.S. has a formidable military. When Biden said he wouldn’t use it, Putin saw it as a green light.
Illustration: Chad Crowe
A credible deterrent is designed to alter a potential aggressor’s calculations of risk and reward. Vladimir Putin determined that the potential cost of invading Ukraine was relatively low, and on Feb. 24 he attacked. It will be the job of historians to try to understand why deterrence failed.
Deterrence involves two factors: capability and will. Capability means having the military strength to deliver intolerable damage to an adversary. Will is the determination to use that strength and deliver that damage.
The U.S. spends hundreds of billions of dollars a year to strengthen its military capabilities, and they are formidable. Resolve costs nothing, but it is priceless when it comes to deterring aggression. By signaling that the U.S. had no intention of using its capabilities, the Biden administration seriously weakened their deterrent value.
The White House has consistently broadcast what it won’t do, removing a crucial component of deterrence: the ability to amplify risk through ambiguity. Mr. Putin now knows exactly how much to escalate the conflict because U.S. officials have told him exactly what the maximum U.S. response will be.
In early December, President Biden ruled out the possibility of using U.S. military power, stating that any consideration of American combat troops in Ukraine was “off the table.” In January, even after trying to explain his comment that a “minor incursion” wouldn’t warrant a forceful response, Mr. Biden repeated what he wouldn’t do. There wouldn’t be “any American forces moving into Ukraine,” he said. In February he did it again, explaining that U.S. actions were “totally defensive” and that we “had no intention of fighting Russia.”
What is particularly puzzling is that these messages were broadcast against a backdrop of increasing intelligence that Russia was preparing for war. While the White House apparently had a strategy to “aggressively release” intelligence, it concurrently made clear that it wouldn’t act on this intelligence to deter Mr. Putin.
Most recently, Secretary of State Antony Blinken discounted the possibility of deploying North Atlantic Treaty Organization warplanes to support the Ukrainian resistance. He explained publicly that he was worried such an arrangement might drag the U.S. and NATO into open conflict with Russia. This view was repeated by top military leaders. The commanding general of the U.S. European Command announced that the American intelligence community had assessed that the “transfer of MiG-29s to Ukraine may be mistaken as escalatory.” In case this wasn’t clear, the command further clarified that it had no plans to “facilitate an indirect, or third party transfer of Polish aircraft.”
Such statements consistently play down the will of the U.S. The Biden administration’s repeated statements that it is unwilling to escalate under any circumstances increases the risks of unintended escalation. Mr. Putin and his military are calculating American will based on what they see and hear. This is likely why they are acting as though there is little threat of resistance from any power more potent than the Ukrainian military.
This doesn’t necessarily mean that the U.S. should deploy its troops to Ukraine or establish a no-fly zone by contesting Russian aircraft. The current bipartisan consensus is that such actions aren’t in the American interest. But there is no reason to broadcast our reservations and reveal the weakness of our will.
Why share internal policy discussions and military deliberations with an adversary? A plausible explanation is that the White House has decided to give priority to the U.S. domestic audience, as opposed to signaling to Russia. But by openly taking options off the table, not only does the administration undercut its operational flexibility, it gives the enemy additional clarity. There is value in ambiguity—especially when Russia is a master at it.
The Russians, with their vivid history of resisting better-equipped armies from imperial Sweden, France and Germany, understand the importance of will. It is a key component of their military doctrine and is expressed in their concept of “escalate to de-escalate.” That means that the Russian military has stated its willingness to increase the intensity of violence to end a war on favorable terms. Few observers doubt either Mr. Putin’s ability or willingness to do so.
Could this conflict have been averted with a more convincing demonstration of American resolve? We will never know for sure. Deterrence is an art, not a science. But the U.S. almost certainly faces a challenge if it wants to keep the peace in the future. Restoring the perception of American will to deter conflict may, ironically, require an even more forceful manifestation of that will on the battlefield. In a world of diminished deterrence, the desire for peace could make conflict more certain.
Ms. Schadlow is a fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Hudson Institute.
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30. AP Exclusive: US admiral says China fully militarized isles
AP Exclusive: US admiral says China fully militarized isles
AP · by JIM GOMEZ and AARON FAVILA · March 20, 2022
OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA (AP) — China has fully militarized at least three of several islands it built in the disputed South China Sea, arming them with anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems, laser and jamming equipment, and fighter jets in an increasingly aggressive move that threatens all nations operating nearby, a top U.S. military commander said Sunday.
U.S. Indo-Pacific commander Adm. John C. Aquilino said the hostile actions were in stark contrast to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s past assurances that Beijing would not transform the artificial islands in contested waters into military bases. The efforts were part of China’s flexing its military muscle, he said.
“I think over the past 20 years we’ve witnessed the largest military buildup since World War II by the PRC,” Aquilino told The Associated Press in an interview, using the initials of China’s formal name. “They have advanced all their capabilities and that buildup of weaponization is destabilizing to the region.”
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There were no immediate comments from Chinese officials. Beijing maintains its military profile is purely defensive, arranged to protect what it says are its sovereign rights. But after years of increased military spending, China now boasts the world’s second-largest defense budget after the U.S. and is rapidly modernizing its force with weapons systems including the J-20 stealth fighter, hypersonic missiles and two aircraft carriers, with a third under construction.
Aquilino spoke with the AP onboard a U.S. Navy reconnaissance aircraft that flew near Chinese-held outposts in the South China Sea’s Spratly archipelago, one of the most hotly contested regions in the world. During the patrol, the P-8A Poseidon plane was repeatedly warned by Chinese callers that it illegally entered what they said was China’s territory and ordered the plane to move away.
“China has sovereignty over the Spratly islands, as well as surrounding maritime areas. Stay away immediately to avoid misjudgment,” one of the stern radio messages said in a veiled threat.
But the U.S. Navy plane dismissed the multiple warnings and pressed on defiantly with its reconnaissance in brief but tense moments witnessed by two AP journalists invited onboard. “I am a sovereign immune United States naval aircraft conducting lawful military activities beyond the national airspace of any coastal state,” a U.S. pilot radioed back to the Chinese.
“Exercising these rights is guaranteed by international law and I am operating with due regard to the rights and duties of all states,” he said.
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Navy commanding officer Joel Martinez, who led the P-8A Poseidon’s crew, said there has been an incident when a Chinese jet flew close to a U.S. aircraft in a dangerous maneuver in the disputed region. The U.S. flight crew calmly reminded the Chinese to comply with aviation safety regulations, he said.
As the P-8A Poseidon flew as low as 15,000 feet (4,500 meters) near the Chinese-occupied reefs, some appeared to be like small cities on screen monitors, with multi-story buildings, warehouses, hangars, seaports, runways and white round structures Aquilino said were radars. Near Fiery Cross, more than 40 unspecified vessels could be seen apparently anchored.
Aquilino said the construction of missile arsenals, aircraft hangars, radar systems and other military facilities on Mischief Reef, Subi Reef and Fiery Cross appeared to have been completed but it remains to be seen if China will pursue the construction of military infrastructure in other areas.
“The function of those islands is to expand the offensive capability of the PRC beyond their continental shores,” he said. “They can fly fighters, bombers plus all those offensive capabilities of missile systems.”
He said any military and civilian plane flying over the disputed waterway could easily get within range of the Chinese islands’ missile system.
“So that’s the threat that exists, that’s why it’s so concerning for the militarization of these islands,” he said. “They threaten all nations who operate in the vicinity and all the international sea and airspace.”
China sought to shore up its vast territorial claims over virtually the entire South China Sea by building island bases on coral atolls nearly a decade ago. The U.S. responded by sending its warships through the region in what it calls freedom of operation missions. The United States has no claims itself but has deployed Navy ships and aircraft for decades to patrol and promote free navigation in international waterway and airspace.
China routinely objects to any action by the U.S. military in the region. The other parties — the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei — claim all or part of the sea, through which approximately $5 trillion in goods are shipped every year.
Despite China’s aggression, the long-simmering territorial conflicts should only be resolved peacefully, Aquilino said, and cited the Philippine government’s successful move to bring its disputes with China to international arbitration in 2013 as a good template.
A U.N.-backed arbitration tribunal that handled the case invalidated China’s sweeping historical claims in the South China Sea under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Beijing dismissed the ruling as sham and continues to defy it.
Washington’s main objective in the disputed region is “to prevent war” through deterrence and promote peace and stability, including by engaging American allies and partners in projects with that objective, Aquilino said.
“Should deterrence fail, my second mission is to be prepared to fight and win,” said Aquilino, who leads the largest U.S. combatant command with 380,000 military and civilian personnel covering 36 nations and territories.
___
Associated Press writer David Rising in Bangkok contributed to this report.
AP · by JIM GOMEZ and AARON FAVILA · March 20, 2022
31. Russian Withdrawal Isn’t Enough
Conclusion:
If Russian troops withdraw from Ukraine but Mr. Putin is still in charge in Moscow, it will be a severe defeat for America. In his meeting with all 30 NATO nations, Mr. Biden must cross his Rubicon. He must declare that the sanctions crippling Russia will remain in full force, with no exit ramps, as long as Mr. Putin remains in power. America’s objective isn’t a return to the status quo ante; it requires removing Mr. Putin in order to reinforce, or perhaps restore, America’s role as the defender of liberty. If Mr. Biden doesn’t clearly state that objective at this week’s NATO meeting, when the world is united behind him, he won’t do so in the future.
Russian Withdrawal Isn’t Enough
Biden should tell NATO that sanctions will continue until Putin leaves power.
President Joe Biden speaks at the White House, March 16.
Photo: Patrick Semansky/Associated Press
In January 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt met Prime Minister Winston Churchill in Casablanca, Morocco. They agreed that the objective of the war was unconditional surrender. This week President Biden meets with leaders from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussels. His objective in imposing sanctions on Russia was to deter an invasion of Ukraine. That failed. So what should Mr. Biden’s objective be now? The NATO meeting is the ideal setting to announce it.
Mr. Biden and Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky have different objectives. Ukraine is fighting alone because NATO has refused it membership. It is understandable if Ukraine reaches terms whereby the Russians leave, while Ukraine accepts some sort of neutrality. Mr. Zelensky’s objective is to end the destruction of his country, while retaining its freedom.
Mr. Biden’s objective must be broader. Mr. Putin has challenged America as the defender of democracy and of Western values. NATO is providing aid to Ukraine, within timorous strictures. After Mr. Putin muttered threats, Mr. Biden forbade the transfer of MiG-29s, to be flown by Ukrainian pilots over Ukrainian territory. The president said adding those MiGs to the Ukrainian air force would escalate the conflict. The administration is clearly hedging. Satellite images show Russian warships gathered off Odessa. These are legitimate targets. Yet antiship missiles are absent from the weapons the administration has approved for Ukraine.
President Biden has called Mr. Putin a “war criminal.” From Ukrainian sources and communications intercepts, it is highly likely that the Biden administration and NATO know the identities of all Russian generals in Ukraine and the commanders of the units accused of war crimes. Yet the administration hasn’t named them publicly or banned them from the West. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, President George H.W. Bush declared, “This will not stand.” Such a robust declaration from Mr. Biden is noticeable by its absence.
Why the timidity? In 1991 U.S. forces easily hurled the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait. That option isn’t even considered today because Russia has nuclear weapons. A disturbing lesson is that having nuclear weapons enhances an aggressor’s inclination to attack with conventional forces. In any putative assault against Taiwan, Xi Jinping is likely to threaten the use of nuclear weapons to deter the U.S. from intervening with conventional force. For Mr. Putin to emerge intact after tearing apart Ukraine sets a terrible precedent.
If Russian troops withdraw from Ukraine but Mr. Putin is still in charge in Moscow, it will be a severe defeat for America. In his meeting with all 30 NATO nations, Mr. Biden must cross his Rubicon. He must declare that the sanctions crippling Russia will remain in full force, with no exit ramps, as long as Mr. Putin remains in power. America’s objective isn’t a return to the status quo ante; it requires removing Mr. Putin in order to reinforce, or perhaps restore, America’s role as the defender of liberty. If Mr. Biden doesn’t clearly state that objective at this week’s NATO meeting, when the world is united behind him, he won’t do so in the future.
Mr. West, a former assistant secretary of defense, is author, most recently, of “The Last Platoon: A Novel of the Afghanistan War.”
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32. Ukraine defies Russian demand to lay down arms in Mariupol
The brave, heroic people of Ukraine and Mariupol.
Ukraine defies Russian demand to lay down arms in Mariupol
- Summary
- 'Lay down your arms' before dawn, Russian general said
- Ukraine replies: 'No question of surrender' in Mariupol
- Hundreds of thousands of civilian trapped under siege
- EU begins talks on possible energy embargo against Russia
LVIV, Ukraine, March 21 (Reuters) - Ukraine defied a Russian demand that its forces lay down arms before dawn on Monday in Mariupol, where hundreds of thousands of civilians have been trapped in a city under siege and already laid to waste by Russian bombardment.
Russia's military had ordered Ukrainians inside the city in the country's southeast to surrender by 5 a.m., saying that those who do so would be permitted to leave through safe corridors.
"There can be no question of any surrender, laying down of arms" in the city, Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk responded. "We have already informed the Russian side about this."
Russia's assault on Ukraine, now in its fourth week, has stalled along most fronts. Russia has failed to seize a single major Ukrainian city much less capture the capital Kyiv or swiftly topple the government of President Volodymyr Zelenskiy.
But Russia has pounded residential areas, causing massive destruction. Nowhere has suffered worse than Mariupol, a port on the Sea of Azov, home to 400,000 people before the war. It has been under siege and constant bombardment, with no food, medicine, power or fresh water, since the invasion's early days.
Some people have been allowed out in private cars, but Russian forces have not permitted aid convoys or buses to evacuate civilians to reach the city.
"Lay down your arms," Colonel-General Mikhail Mizintsev, director of the Russian National Center for Defence Management, said in a briefing distributed by the defence ministry, announcing the ultimatum. "All who lay down their arms are guaranteed safe passage out of Mariupol."
Ukrainian Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov praised the city's "heroic defenders", saying that by continuing to hold out they had helped thwart Russia's march on other big cities across the country.
"By virtue of their dedication and superhuman courage, tens of thousands of lives throughout Ukraine were saved. Today Mariupol is saving Kyiv, Dnipro and Odesa."
Greece's consul general in Mariupol, Manolis Androulakis, who arrived home on Sunday after a four-day journey since escaping the siege, the last European diplomat to leave the city, said: "What I saw, I hope no one will ever see."
He described Mariupol as standing alongside Guernica, Leningrad and Russia's previous targets Grozny and Aleppo in a list of cities "completely destroyed by war". read more
Mariupol is in territory in the east which Moscow demands be ceded to Russian-backed separatists. Their leader, Denis Pushilin, said it would take more than a week to capture it: "I am not so optimistic that two or three days or even a week will close the issue. Unfortunately, no, the city is big."
1/8
A rescuer walks through debris at the site of a bombing at a shopping center as Russia's invasion of Ukraine continues, in Kyiv, Ukraine March 21, 2022. REUTERS/Marko Djurica
Russia calls the war, the biggest attack on a European state since World War Two, a "special military operation" to disarm Ukraine and protect it from "Nazis". The West describes this as a false pretext for an unprovoked war of aggression to subdue a country President Vladimir Putin describes as illegitimate.
Nearly a quarter of Ukraine's 44 million people have already been driven from their homes, including 3.4 million who have fled abroad, according to the United Nations, one of the fastest exoduses ever recorded. A U.N. tally includes more than 900 confirmed civilian deaths but the true total is unknown.
Thousands of Russian and Ukrainian troops have died, and Russia's artillery-heavy army has suffered large losses in tanks and armour. Five Russian generals have already been killed, a loss of senior commanders in such a short period almost unheard of in modern warfare.
"We are fighting for our salvation against one of the world's biggest armies, against missiles, bombs and rocket artillery, against planes and helicopters on which the Russians are already writing 'To Berlin' because they want to go further, much further, than Ukraine," President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said in his latest video address on Monday.
THE CITY 'WILL SURVIVE'
Ukrainian officials hope that Moscow, having failed to secure a quick victory, will cut its losses and negotiate a withdrawal. Both sides hinted last week at progress in talks on a formula which would include some kind of "neutrality" for Ukraine, though details were scarce.
The Kremlin repeated accusations on Monday that Kyiv was holding up negotiations. "There has been no significant progress so far," said Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov.
In the capital, Kyiv officials imposed a day-and-a-half curfew from Monday night. While suburbs in the path of Russia's advance have been reduced to rubble, defenders have managed to prevent Kyiv itself from coming under a full-scale assault. However, it has been subjected to deadly shelling and missile strikes nightly. In the latest, authorities said at least eight people were killed by shelling that destroyed a shopping centre.
Apart from Mariupol, the eastern cities of Kharkiv, Sumy and Chernihiv have been hardest hit by Russia's tactic of flattening urban areas with artillery.
Kharkiv Mayor Igor Terekhov said hundreds of buildings, many of them residential, have been destroyed in the country's second largest city.
"The city is united... Kharkiv will survive," Terekhov said, describing hundreds of buildings destroyed. "It is impossible to say that the worst days are behind us, we are constantly being bombed, there was shelling again overnight."
European Union foreign and defence ministers meet on Monday to discuss imposing further sanctions on Moscow, especially whether to introduce an embargo on Russia's lucrative oil and gas sector. read more
International sanctions have cut Russia off from the global financial system to a degree never before imposed on such a big economy. But Europe, Russia's main customer for energy, has so far made an exception for Russian exports of oil and gas.
Reporting by Reuters bureaus Writing by Peter Graff Editing by Mark Heinrich
33. Meet the Allies’ most dangerous spy in France during World War II
Heroic and selfless service. What a great American. Awarded the DSC. Does she deserve an upgrade to the Medal of Honor? I should think so.
For all those who think women cannot serve in special operations, I offer you the "limping lady."
“She got some makeup artist to teach her how to draw wrinkles on her face,” said Purnell. “She also got a fierce, a rather sort of scary London dentist to grind down her lovely, white American teeth so that she looked like a French milkmaid.”
However, Hall’s superiors at the time were wary of placing a woman in charge of such an operation, and so the OSS would only make her a deputy. Nonetheless, Hall made her way back to Paris, where she began organizing more than a thousand resistance fighters. They would go on to spend months blowing up bridges, cutting telephone lines, and conducting ambushes — with Hall reporting almost daily to London about their activities — ahead of the Allied landings in Normandy and the subsequent advance across Europe and into Germany.
Hall continued her intelligence work with the CIA until her retirement in 1966, but she was relegated to office duties. The nature of this activity also meant that her accomplishments remained fairly unknown for years. In addition to the Distinguished Service Cross, which then-President Harry Truman had offered to present publicly before Hall declined, she was also made a member of the Order of the British Empire. Once more Hall was recognized for her valor with little fanfare, so as to not compromise her identity.
Hall passed away in 1982, but in recent years her story, as well as those of other women who worked for the OSS and other intelligence organizations during World War II, have begun to be shared and given the public recognition they deserve. And while Hall rarely, if ever, talked about her accomplishments, the “limping lady” can be remembered as one of the most formidable spies of World War II.
Meet the Allies’ most dangerous spy in France during World War II
For almost three years, she operated in France, evading detection and organizing resistance against Nazi occupiers
BY MAX HAUPTMAN | PUBLISHED MAR 17, 2022 11:10 AM
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In September 1945, just as World War II ended, a small ceremony was held during which Virginia Hall was presented the Distinguished Service Cross by Maj. Gen. William Donovan, head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Hall was the only civilian woman to receive the award, the Army’s second-highest decoration for valor, during the war. She had spent years undercover in occupied France, gathering intelligence, helping downed pilots evade capture, and eventually organized more than a thousand resistance fighters to conduct sabotage operations. Due to her efforts, she had been declared the Allies’ “most dangerous spy,” but the ceremony was kept private to protect her identity as she went on to serve in the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency for another two decades.
By the time Hall joined the OSS and eventually received her commendation, though, she was already an experienced intelligence agent.
Hall was born in 1906, to an affluent Baltimore, Maryland family. After studying briefly at Radcliffe and Barnard colleges, she moved to Paris, hoping to become a diplomat with the State Department. The prospects for such employment were slim to none for most women at the time, and Hall could only land a clerical job, first at the embassy in Poland and later at a consular office in Turkey.
Virginia Hall, American journalist, member of the Special Operations Executive and Office of Strategic Services during WWII (Photo by Apic/Getty Images).
After a hunting accident there, her left leg was amputated below the knee, necessitating the use of a wooden prosthetic for the rest of her life.
“She had been given a second chance at life and wasn’t going to waste it. And her injury, in fact, might have kind of bolstered her or reawakened her resilience so that she was in fact able to do great things,” Craig Gralley, a retired CIA officer who wrote a biography about Hall, told NPR in 2019.
In 1939, with war breaking out across Europe, Hall volunteered to drive an ambulance in France. With France’s defeat, she was forced to move to London, where she caught the eye of Britain’s Special Operations Executive (SOE), which was tasked with conducting espionage and irregular warfare in occupied territory. As the citizen of a then-neutral country who could speak French and had traveled extensively in the region, Hall was sent back to France as the agency’s first female operative, posing as a reporter for the New York Post while she operated in the cities of Toulon and Lyon.
Initially sent only to collect intelligence on economic and political conditions in occupied France, Hall’s mission soon grew to encompass reporting on German troop movements, documenting the construction of submarine bases and recruiting a network of other spies to operate in the country.
Under the codename Heckler, the mission became the primary hub for British spy operations in France, supplying agents with money, documents and safehouses, covertly shuttling downed airmen around the country, and providing information on German military activity.
It was dangerous work, as around 25% of SOE agents were killed during their missions, and many others would face torture and deportation to concentration camps when captured. That includes 39 women agents sent to France by the Special Operations Executive — a third of whom never returned.
Adept at disguise, and with her seemingly unassuming demeanor, Hall evaded detection for a year.
“She could be four different women in the space of an afternoon, with four different code names,” said Sonia Purnell, author of the Hall biography “A Woman of No Importance,” in a 2019 interview with NPR.
During her time in Lyon, the Gestapo was never able to identify Hall, who operated under the codename “Germaine”, knowing only that they were pursuing a “limping lady.”
Barbie would later escape to South America, before being arrested and returned to France in 1983.
With the Allied invasion of North Africa in late 1942 and the German occupation of Vichy France, Hall was forced to flee the country. In November of that year, Hall trekked 50 miles across a snowy, 7,500-foot pass through the Pyrenees Mountains to Spain. She was briefly arrested there, but eventually secured her release.
Once back in London, British intelligence considered Hall too compromised by the Gestapo to return to France, but it was now 1944 and the American-led OSS was expanding its own operations in France ahead of the planned invasion of Normandy.
In March 1944, under the codename “Diane,” Hall was back in France, once again relying on her guile and disguises to remain undetected.
“She got some makeup artist to teach her how to draw wrinkles on her face,” said Purnell. “She also got a fierce, a rather sort of scary London dentist to grind down her lovely, white American teeth so that she looked like a French milkmaid.”
However, Hall’s superiors at the time were wary of placing a woman in charge of such an operation, and so the OSS would only make her a deputy. Nonetheless, Hall made her way back to Paris, where she began organizing more than a thousand resistance fighters. They would go on to spend months blowing up bridges, cutting telephone lines, and conducting ambushes — with Hall reporting almost daily to London about their activities — ahead of the Allied landings in Normandy and the subsequent advance across Europe and into Germany.
Hall continued her intelligence work with the CIA until her retirement in 1966, but she was relegated to office duties. The nature of this activity also meant that her accomplishments remained fairly unknown for years. In addition to the Distinguished Service Cross, which then-President Harry Truman had offered to present publicly before Hall declined, she was also made a member of the Order of the British Empire. Once more Hall was recognized for her valor with little fanfare, so as to not compromise her identity.
Hall passed away in 1982, but in recent years her story, as well as those of other women who worked for the OSS and other intelligence organizations during World War II, have begun to be shared and given the public recognition they deserve. And while Hall rarely, if ever, talked about her accomplishments, the “limping lady” can be remembered as one of the most formidable spies of World War II.
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Max Hauptman has been covering breaking news at Task & Purpose since December 2021. He previously worked at The Washington Post as a Military Veterans in Journalism Fellow, as well as covering local news in New England. Contact the author here.
34. Biden administration formally determines Myanmar's military committed genocide
Biden administration formally determines Myanmar's military committed genocide
CNN · by Jennifer Hansler, CNN
(CNN)The Biden administration has formally determined that Myanmar's military committed genocide and crimes against humanity against the Rohingya, a US official told CNN on Sunday.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken will publicly announce the determination, which human rights groups have been advocating for years, at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC, on Monday.
Reuters first reported on the administration's recognition of genocide.
Until now, the US had stopped short of declaring the atrocities -- including mass killings and rape -- committed in 2017 against the Muslim minority Rohingya population a genocide. The violence forced nearly a million people to flee, and the United Nations recommended that top military officials face genocide charges.
"I applaud the Biden administration for finally recognizing the atrocities committed against the Rohingya as genocide. While this determination is long overdue, it is nevertheless a powerful and critically important step in holding this brutal regime to account," Democratic Sen. Jeff Merkley, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in a statement Sunday.
America, the Oregon Democrat said, "must lead the world to make it clear that atrocities like these will never be allowed to be buried unnoticed, no matter where they occur."
A US State Department report released quietly in 2018 found that violence against the Rohingya in Myanmar's northern Rakhine State was "extreme, large-scale, widespread, and seemingly geared toward both terrorizing the population and driving out the Rohingya residents."
The State Department has sanctioned a number of Myanmar military officials, including commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing, for their role in committing those human rights abuses.
This story has been updated with comments from Sen. Jeff Merkley.
CNN · by Jennifer Hansler, CNN
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
