Quotes of the Day:
“Military necessity does not admit of cruelty – that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, . . . nor of torture to extort confessions.”
- Abraham Lincoln, from his instructions to the troops in April 1863
“No passion so effectually robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear.”
- Edmund Burke
“The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
- Justice Louis Brandeis
1. Biden, Xi Open Talks on Friendly Note, With Tough Topics Ahead
2. Biden and Xi meet virtually as US-China chasm widens
3. Remarks by President Biden and President Xi of the People’s Republic of China Before Virtual Meeting
4. Biden and Xi Pledge More Cooperation, but Offer No Breakthroughs
5. Biden-Xi talks: China warns US about 'playing with fire' on Taiwan
6. Readout of President Biden’s Virtual Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China
7. The Taiwan Question: How to Think About Deterrence Now
8. China-Taiwan conflict: Island's 'guerilla' home guard gears up for David v Goliath battle with Beijing
9. Russia's 'Irregular War' Against NATO’s Eastern Flank Must Be Confronted
10. US urged to help more people escape Taliban-led Afghanistan
11. How the family of the ‘3212’ soldier who fell in Niger grappled with false and misleading information
12. ‘We are warriors’: Women join fight against military in Myanmar
13. US Manufacturing Decline is Hurting National Security, Report Warns
14. Hacking For Defense planners look to expand beyond military problems
15. Grenada, the Evacuation of Afghanistan, and the Future of War
16. Andrew Sullivan and the Narrative of the "MSM Narrative"
17. Disinformation is spreading beyond the realm of spycraft to become a shady industry – lessons from South Korea
18. Don’t believe the deglobalisation narrative
19. The military keeps finding it did nothing wrong when it investigates itself
20. FDD | Warfare Is More Than Just Bullets
21. It’s Time to Be Honest About Fossil Fuels’ Role in Energy Transition
22. FDD | Iranian Professor At US College Complicit In Crimes Against Humanity
23. Erdogan's veneer of respect conceals blatant antisemitism - opinion
24. Myanmar: how Bill Richardson used despot diplomacy to secure US journalist Danny Fenster’s release
25. Opinion | France admits it spreads disinformation. Other democracies should also own up.
26. When America Talks, China Doesn’t Listen
1. Biden, Xi Open Talks on Friendly Note, With Tough Topics Ahead
The should have called it a day after these comments:
“It seems to me our responsibility as leaders of China and the United States is to ensure that the competition between our countries does not veer into conflict, whether intended or unintended,” Mr. Biden said shortly before 8 p.m. ET, speaking to his counterpart via video.
Mr. Xi called Mr. Biden, the former vice president, his “old friend,” and said he wants the U.S. and China to “coexist in peace.”
“China and the United States need to increase communication and cooperation,” Mr. Xi said.
Biden, Xi Open Talks on Friendly Note, With Tough Topics Ahead
Chinese leader says he wants nations to ‘coexist in peace’; Biden says their responsibility is to avoid conflict
WSJ · by Alex Leary, Gordon Lubold and Andrew Restuccia
By Alex Leary, Gordon Lubold and Andrew Restuccia
Updated Nov. 15, 2021 9:15 pm ET
WASHINGTON—President Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping opened a virtual meeting Monday night with words designed to cool tensions between the two countries, as the leaders seek to work through areas of disagreement between the world’s largest economies.
“It seems to me our responsibility as leaders of China and the United States is to ensure that the competition between our countries does not veer into conflict, whether intended or unintended,” Mr. Biden said shortly before 8 p.m. ET, speaking to his counterpart via video.
Mr. Xi called Mr. Biden, the former vice president, his “old friend,” and said he wants the U.S. and China to “coexist in peace.”
“China and the United States need to increase communication and cooperation,” Mr. Xi said.
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The public comments before a closed-door discussion expected to last several hours reflected an effort by both sides to tamp down on hostilities that have marked the relationship since Mr. Biden took office in January. The president’s campaign espoused a tough line on China, and Mr. Biden’s predecessor, President Donald Trump, launched a trade war with China by raising tariffs on most of U.S. imports, to protect U.S. industry.
“China and the United States should respect each other, coexist in peace and pursue win-win cooperation,” Mr. Xi said. “I stand ready to work with you, Mr. President, to build consensus, take active steps and move China-U.S. relations forward in a positive direction.”
Building off a surprise joint declaration in Glasgow last week pledging cooperation on a transition to cleaner energy, Mr. Biden is expected to seek accord on issues including nuclear proliferation and health amid the Covid-19 pandemic. More troublesome topics likely to be raised include trade, human rights and China’s increasingly aggressive posture toward Taiwan.
Though trade is a major component of the relationship and the U.S. is pressing China to uphold purchase agreements under a deal cut by Mr. Trump, it wasn’t expected to be a major part of the discussion, U.S. officials said.
The White House views Mr. Biden as entering Monday’s meeting with a strong hand and earlier in the day, he signed a nearly $1 trillion bipartisan infrastructure bill. “We’ve risked losing our edge as a nation, and China and the rest of the world are catching up.”
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Mr. Xi is focusing his U.S. strategy on damage control rather than resetting the relationship, according to the people with knowledge of Beijing’s thinking. His priority is to ensure that the road is smooth, and he is willing to reopen channels of communication with Mr. Biden to prevent military conflict, they say.
“We are at a point where there is some shift under way,” said Danny Russel, a former senior official in the Obama administration now with the Asia Society Policy Institute, a nonpartisan think tank. “Both leaders are dissatisfied with the state of the relationship. They are both very mindful that some type of incident could occur that would create a problem that neither can afford right now.”
The two sides have plenty of contentious issues to discuss, from Taiwan to trade. On the call, Mr. Biden was expected to raise concerns over human rights, for which the U.S. has leveled sanctions, and Chinese economic practices, officials said.
Since Mr. Biden took office, the U.S. has strengthened security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, including a contentious submarine deal signed with the U.K. and Australia in September. The deal, initially overshadowed by a diplomatic row with France, showed that some allies, like Australia, which had hedged their bets in the region, are more firmly aligning with the U.S., officials said.
U.S. business leaders are eager for optimistic signals on trade and want Mr. Biden to address broader issues, including China’s industrial subsidies. The president has largely kept in place Trump-era tariffs, and he is not expected to offer concessions on Monday. But his administration has been engaging with Beijing, and both sides said talks have been positive.
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s priority for the coming year is to ensure a smooth transition to a tradition-busting third term in power.
PHOTO: LI XUEREN/ASSOCIATED PRESS
“While expectations are somewhat modest for the virtual Xi-Biden summit, we need constructive pragmatism and demonstrative steps that will stabilize relations, manage tensions and create room for more tangible progress going forward,” said Myron Brilliant, executive vice president and head of international affairs at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
A major sticking point remains Taiwan, the self-governed democratic island of 20 million people that China claims as part of its territory. Long a diplomatic flashpoint in the bilateral relationship, over the past year Taiwan has become a military one.
Beijing’s intentions with Taiwan amount to the most urgent concern for Washington. Mr. Xi was expected to seek clarity on the administration’s policy toward Taiwan, people with knowledge of Beijing’s thinking said.
A senior administration official said Mr. Biden would affirm that the U.S.’s fundamental “one-China” policy hasn’t changed. Washington takes no official stand on Taiwan’s sovereignty and adopts a stance known as “strategic ambiguity” on whether it would defend Taiwan in the event of military action by mainland China. Mr. Biden has recently made statements about defending Taiwan that irked Beijing and led U.S. aides to clarify that the policy remains in place.
The U.S. conducts a robust arms-sales program with Taiwan, and The Wall Street Journal in October reported the U.S. has quietly deployed a small group of troop advisers to Taiwan for at least a year.
Beijing has signaled that it could take the democratically controlled island by force to unify it with mainland China and has alarmed Taiwan and U.S. officials by sending waves of warplanes near Taiwan in shows of force. U.S. officials estimate that such a scenario could happen within five years, but others believe a miscalculation by any side could trigger a crisis sooner.
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Beijing has little motivation to compromise on the issues at the heart of the strained bilateral ties, including human rights, territorial disputes and China’s economic practices, they added.
Part of the calculus is Beijing’s belief that Mr. Biden, facing waning popular support, is being hamstrung by a Congress looking to advance legislation that could reorient America’s China policy toward competition from one centered on engagement. The $250 billion U.S. Innovation and Competition Act, passed by the Senate in June, is aimed at making the American economy more competitive against China by boosting government spending on technology research and development.
“It’s a different China,” said Robert Ross, an expert on U.S.-China relations at Boston College. “The Chinese are saying, ‘Fine, you want to posture with your hard line, we’ll wait you out.’ It’s a very different policy-making environment.”
CHINA
More WSJ coverage, selected by the editors
—Lingling Wei contributed to this article.
Appeared in the November 16, 2021, print edition as 'Talks With Xi to Test Biden’s China Policy.'
2. Biden and Xi meet virtually as US-China chasm widens
Biden and Xi meet virtually as US-China chasm widens
AP · by AAMER MADHANI and COLLEEN LONG · November 15, 2021
WASHINGTON (AP) — President Joe Biden opened his virtual meeting with China’s Xi Jinping on Monday by saying their goal is to ensure competition “does not veer into conflict.”
The two leaders are meeting by video amid mounting tensions in the U.S.-China relationship. Biden has criticized Beijing over human rights abuses against Uyghurs in northwest China, squelching democratic protests in Hong Kong, military aggression against the self-ruled island of Taiwan and more. Xi’s deputies, meanwhile, have lashed out against the Biden White House for interfering in what it sees as internal Chinese matters.
“It seems to be our responsibility as the leaders of China and the United States to ensure that the competition between our countries does not veer into conflict, whether intended or unintended, rather than simple, straightforward competition,” Biden said at the start of the meeting.
Xi told Biden the two sides need to improve communication. The two leaders traveled together when both were vice presidents and know each other well.
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“I stand ready to work with you, Mr. President, to build consensus, take active steps and move China-U.S. relations forward in a positive direction,” said Xi, who called Biden his “old friend.”
The U.S. president was joined in the Roosevelt Room for the video call by Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, national security adviser Jake Sullivan and national security aides Kurt Campbell, Laura Rosenberger and Jon Czin.
The high-level diplomacy had a touch of pandemic Zoom meeting informality as the two leaders waved to each other once they saw one another on the screen.
Biden would have preferred to meet Xi in person, but the Chinese leader has not left his country since before the start of the coronavirus pandemic.
The White House floated the idea of a virtual meeting as the next best thing to allow for the two leaders to have a candid conversation about a wide range of strains in the relationship.
Chinese officials said Taiwan would be their top issue for the talks. Tensions have heightened as the Chinese military has dispatched an increasing number of fighter jets near the self-ruled island of Taiwan, which Beijing considers part of its territory.
“The Taiwan issue concerns China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as China’s core interest,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said Monday. “It is the most important and sensitive issue in China-U.S. relations.”
The White House said Biden will abide by the longstanding U.S. “One China” policy, which recognizes Beijing but allows informal relations and defense ties with Taipei. Chinese military forces held exercises last week near Taiwan in response to a visit by a U.S. congressional delegation to the island.
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With Beijing set to host the Winter Olympics in February and Xi expected to be approved by Communist Party leaders to serve a third five-year term as president next year — unprecedented in recent Chinese history — the Chinese leader may be looking to stabilize the relationship in the near term. White House press secretary Jen Psaki added that the “condensing of power” in China made the leader-to-leader conversations essential.
Slowing economic growth and a brewing housing crisis also loom large for Beijing.
At the same time, Biden, who has seen his polling numbers diminish at home amid concerns about the lingering coronavirus pandemic, inflation and supply chain problems, is looking to find a measure of equilibrium on the most consequential foreign policy matter he faces.
Despite his domestic problems, White House officials made the case that Biden was coming into his meeting with Xi from a position of strength.
Earlier Monday, Biden signed into law a $1 trillion infrastructure bill, legislation to upgrade the nation’s crumbling infrastructure that the Democrat argued is crucial for the U.S. as it seeks to retain a competitive edge over China.
“Because of this law, next year will be the first year in 20 years American infrastructure investment will grow faster than China’s,” Biden said. “We will will once again have the best roads, bridges, ports and airports over the next decade.”
The White House set low expectations for the meeting with Xi: No major announcements or even a joint statement were anticipated.
The U.S. president has held up his relationship with Xi as evidence of his heartfelt belief that good foreign policy starts with building strong personal relationships.
The public warmth — Xi referred to Biden as his “old friend” when the then-vice president visited China in 2013, while Biden spoke of their “friendship” — has cooled now that both men are heads of state. Biden bristled in June when asked by a reporter if he would press his old friend to cooperate with a World Health Organization investigation into the coronavirus origins.
“Let’s get something straight: We know each other well; we’re not old friends,” Biden said. “It’s just pure business.”
Xi, however, at the start of the meeting gave a nod to the warmth in the earlier days of their relationship, saying, “I am very happy to see my old friend.”
Biden said he expected the two would spend plenty of time discussing areas where there is a gulf of differences, including human rights, economics, and “ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific.”
“We have always communicated with one another very honestly and candidly. We never walk away wondering what the other man is thinking,” Biden said.
AP · by AAMER MADHANI and COLLEEN LONG · November 15, 2021
3. Remarks by President Biden and President Xi of the People’s Republic of China Before Virtual Meeting
Remarks by President Biden and President Xi of the People’s Republic of China Before Virtual Meeting
NOVEMBER 15, 2021
•
Roosevelt Room
7:46 P.M. EST
PRESIDENT BIDEN: Good to see you, Mr. President. Next time, I hope we get to do it face to face like we used to when we traveled through China.
We’ve spent an awful lot –- a lot of time talking to one another, and I hope we can have a conver- — candid conversation tonight as well.
Maybe I should start more formally, although you and I have never been that formal with one another.
Good evening to everyone here in the United States, and good morning to you, Mr. President, in Beijing. I’m happy we had found time to meet, and I look forward to a candid and forthright discussion like all the discussions we’ve had thus far.
As I’ve said before, it seems to me our responsibility as leaders of China and the United States is to ensure that the competition between our countries does not veer into conflict, whether intended or unintended. Just simple, straightforward competition.
It seems to me we need to establish some commonsense guardrails, to be clear and honest where we disagree, and work together where our interests intersect, especially on vital global issues like climate change.
None of this is a favor to either of our countries –- what we do for one another -– but it’s just responsible world leadership. And you’re a major world leader, and so is the United States.
How our bilateral relationship evolves, seems to me, will have a profound impact not only on our countries but, quite frankly, the rest of the world.
We have a responsibility to the world, as well as to our people. It’s why we believe –- and you and I have talked about this — all countries have to play by the same rules of the road, why the United States is always going to stand up for our interests and values and those of our allies and partners.
If past is prologue, I am sure that today we’ll be discussing those areas where we have concerns — from human rights, to economics, to ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific.
And I think it’s very important, as I’ve told other world leaders when they ask about our relationship, is that we have always communicated with one another — with one another very honestly and candidly. And it’s — we never walk away wondering what the other man is thinking.
And I think that’s an important ingredient for this relationship: to be open and candid, in terms of our relationship.
And I think it’s important we communicate honestly and directly to one another about our priorities and our intentions.
I look forward to getting down to business and — on the extensive and substantive of agenda we have ahead of us. And I thank you very much.
And thank you for your congratulatory call when I won the election. It was very gracious of you.
Thank you. Thank you, thank you, thank you.
PRESIDENT XI: (As interpreted.) Good to see you, Mr. President, and your colleagues.
It’s the first time for us to meet virtually. Although it’s not as good as a face-to-face meeting, I’m very happy to see my old friend.
PRESIDENT BIDEN: Thank you.
PRESIDENT XI: (As interpreted.) Right now, both China and the United States are at critical stages of development, and humanity lives in a global village, and we face multiple challenges together.
As the world’s two largest economies and permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, China and the United States need to increase communication and cooperation.
We should each run our domestic affairs well and, at the same time, shoulder our share of international responsibilities and work together to advance the noble cause of world peace and development.
This is the shared desire of the people of our two countries and around the world, and the joint mission of Chinese and American leaders.
A sound and steady China-U.S. relationship is required for advancing our two countries’ respective development and for safeguarding a peaceful and stable international environment, including finding effective responses to global challenges such as climate change, which you referenced, and the COVID pandemic.
China and the United States should respect each other, coexist in peace, and pursue win-win cooperation.
I stand ready to work with you, Mr. President, to build consensus, take active steps, and move China-U.S. relations forward in a positive direction. Doing so would advance the interests of our two peoples and meet the expectation of the international community.
I now look forward to a wide-ranging and a comprehensive discussion with you, Mr. President, on overarching issues.
Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
7:57 P.M. EST
4. Biden and Xi Pledge More Cooperation, but Offer No Breakthroughs
LIVEUpdated
Nov. 16, 2021, 6:07 a.m. ET14 minutes ago
14 minutes ago
Biden and Xi Pledge More Cooperation, but Offer No Breakthroughs
President Biden and China’s leader, Xi Jinping, met for about three and a half hours. U.S. officials said the talks were meant to reassure both sides that misunderstandings would not lead to unintended clashes.
Here’s what you need to know:
Biden and Xi Discuss Taiwan, Trade and Human Rights: Live Updates
transcript
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transcript
Biden Meets Xi at Virtual Summit
President Biden and Xi Jinping opened talks on a friendly note, with the Chinese leader expressing his desire to move China-U.S. relations forward in a positive direction.
“As I’ve said before, it seems to me our responsibility as leaders of China and the United States, is to ensure that the competition between our countries does not veer into conflict, whether intended or unintended. Just simple, straightforward competition. It seems to me we need to establish some common sense guardrails, to be clear and honest where we disagree and work together where our interests intersect, especially on vital global issues like climate change.”
President Biden and Xi Jinping opened talks on a friendly note, with the Chinese leader expressing his desire to move China-U.S. relations forward in a positive direction.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times
President Biden and China’s leader, Xi Jinping, pledged at a virtual summit to improve cooperation, but offered no major breakthroughs after more than three hours of talks.
Mr. Biden emphasized the need to keep “communication lines open,” according to a White House readout of the meeting, as the two countries confront disagreements over issues like the future of Taiwan, the militarization of the South China Sea and cybersecurity.
Mr. Biden, seated in the Roosevelt Room at the White House before two large screens, opened the discussion shortly before 8 p.m. in Washington, noting that the two have “spent an awful lot of time talking to each other” over the years, dating to when Mr. Biden was vice president and Mr. Xi was a rising power.
“We need to establish some common-sense guardrails,” Mr. Biden said, using a phrase his administration has often cited as a goal for a challenging relationship. He added: “We have a responsibility to the world as well as to our people.”
Mr. Xi, speaking next from a chamber in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, also struck a conciliatory tone, especially compared to a series of acerbic statements by Chinese officials over the course of the year. He called Mr. Biden “my old friend” and said the two countries should work together.
China’s state television network reported that Mr. Xi “expressed his readiness to work with President Biden to build consensus and take active steps to move China-U.S. relations forward in a positive direction.” He also called for mutual respect, an implicit criticism of the Biden administration’s handling of relations.
The talks ended at around half-past noon in Beijing, after about three and a half hours, according to the Chinese state television network, C.C.T.V.
Since becoming president, Mr. Biden has spoken twice with Mr. Xi, but they have not met in person this year. Administration officials said the virtual meeting was meant to reassure both sides that misunderstandings and miscommunications would not lead to unintended clashes.
Mr. Biden has repeatedly suggested that it should be possible to avoid active military engagement with China, even as the United States engages in vigorous competition with Beijing and continues to confront the Chinese leadership on several significant issues.
But the call, which was initiated at Mr. Biden’s request, reflects his administration’s deep concern that the chances of keeping conflict at bay may be diminishing.
President Joe Biden meets virtually with Xi Jinping, China’s leader, at the White House on Monday.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times
From China’s perspective, the virtual meeting itself amounts to a vindication of its strategy to wait out the new administration.
After the tumult of the Trump years, China’s leaders hoped to reset the relationship with the United States when President Biden took office in January. When that didn’t happen, officials seemed surprised, then angry.
Senior officials lashed out as Mr. Biden’s national security team challenged China on a variety of issues — from Taiwan to the western Chinese region of Xinjiang, where the State Department has declared a genocide of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities is underway. In a speech in Beijing in July celebrating 100 years of the Chinese Communist Party, China’s leader, Xi Jinping, warned: “The Chinese people will never allow foreign forces to bully, oppress or enslave us. Whoever nurses delusions of doing that will crack their heads and spill blood on the Great Wall of steel built from the flesh and blood of 1.4 billion Chinese people.”
What Beijing did not do was compromise on any of its policy and behaviors that have stoked exactly those divisions, including menacing military patrols and exercises around Taiwan. Instead, it squeezed concessions out of the United States.
Those included the release in September of Meng Wanzhou, an executive of the telecommunications giant Huawei who had been detained in Canada in 2018 on an American arrest warrant. Beijing, infuriated by the detention at the time, retaliated by essentially taking two Canadians hostage.
China continues to warn the United States of its red lines, especially over the fate of Taiwan, but the tone of various public statements has mellowed considerably. That is also in China’s interest heading into the Winter Olympics in Beijing in February and the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party in November.
“I think that both countries want to bring down the temperature,” said Ali Wyne, an analyst focused on U.S.-China relations with the Eurasia Group, a consultancy based in Washington. “They both recognize that threshold between intensifying competition and unconstrained rivalry is tenuous.”
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A photo released by Taiwan’s defense ministry last year showed a fighter jet from the island, below, flying near a Chinese bomber. Chinese planes regularly sweep through the island’s air defense identification zone.Credit...Taiwan Ministry Of National Defense
China’s leader, Xi Jinping, urged the United States not to test his country’s resolve on the question of Taiwan, an island democracy Beijing claims is part of its territory.
“We are patient and are willing to strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification with the utmost sincerity,” Mr. Xi told President Biden, according to a readout on the meeting released by Chinese state media. “But China will have to take resolute measures if the ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces provoke, compel or even cross the red line.”
In vivid language that has come to define Beijing’s strident rhetoric, Mr. Xi criticized politicians in the United States who he said sought to use the island’s status as leverage over Beijing — a trend he described as dangerous. “It is playing with fire, and if you play with fire, you will get burned,” the Chinese readout cited Mr. Xi as saying.
No issue between the United States and China is more contentious than the fate of Taiwan, which functions as an independent nation in all but official recognition by most of the world.
The People’s Republic of China has claimed Taiwan since the defeated Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek retreated there in 1949, but in recent months Beijing has grown increasingly vocal in criticizing U.S. efforts to strengthen the island’s democracy and its military defenses.
Beijing’s assertive language is often coupled with displays of its growing military prowess. It has menaced Taiwan with military exercises simulating an amphibious assault and air patrols that have swept through the island’s air defense identification zone. Many military analysts, including some in the Pentagon, believe that the maneuvers by an increasingly well-equipped Chinese military could be a prelude to an invasion.
The Biden administration, like the Trump administration before it, has warned China that its military operations and threats are dangerous. The United States, which withdrew its official recognition of Taiwan as a condition of re-establishing relations with China in 1979, has responded by stepping up diplomatic efforts to bolster President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan.
That has included visits by officials and lawmakers, as well as weapon sales.
China says those efforts stoke popular sentiment in Taiwan to formally declare independence, which Beijing has warned would lead to war. Wariness in China intensified when President Biden answered a question at a televised town hall last month by declaring, imprecisely, that the United States was committed to Taiwan’s defense in the case of an attack.
In a phone call with Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken over the weekend, Mr. Wang, China’s foreign minister, warned, “Any connivance of and support for the ‘Taiwan independence’ forces undermine peace across the Taiwan Strait and would only boomerang in the end.”
A coal-fired power plant in Hanchuan, China. The country has announced steps to reduce its use of the fossil fuel, but it still has plans for new coal-fired power plants.
Climate policy is the rare area where the United States and China at least appear to be on the same page. At the United Nations climate summit in Glasgow this month, the two countries — the biggest polluting nations — signed a surprise pact to do more to cut emissions this decade.
Even so, the agreement was short on specifics, including any commitment from China on when it will start reducing the amount of carbon dioxide and other gases it generates by burning coal, gas and oil. Beijing has said only that it will do so by 2030.
China’s mighty manufacturing sector makes it the planet’s No. 1 emitter, responsible for around a quarter of all global emissions. It is also the reason Beijing’s leaders cannot dial back emissions easily or quickly.
Electricity demand is still growing rapidly in China. And the world still depends on Chinese factories to produce electronics, toys, exercise equipment and much else.
Xi Jinping, the Communist Party’s top leader, has announced steps to reduce China’s use of coal, the dirtiest fossil fuel. But the country still has extensive plans for building coal-fired power plants and for mining more coal, a need that has been highlighted by recent power shortages caused partly by a lack of coal. China already digs up and burns more of the fuel than the rest of the world.
Although China has been racing to put up wind and solar projects, it has not been able to shift from coal toward natural gas, which emits less carbon dioxide when burned, as quickly as the United States.
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Xi Jinping speaking during an evening news program, as seen on a TV at a mall in Beijing on Thursday.
Lurking beneath the many tensions between Beijing and Washington is the question of whether the two countries are slipping into a Cold War, or something quite different.
One of the few areas of agreement between Xi Jinping, China’s leader, and President Biden is that letting relations devolve into Cold War behavior would be a mistake of historic proportions.
Mr. Xi said in a speech on Thursday that “the Asia-Pacific region cannot and should not relapse into the antagonism and division of the Cold War era.” Addressing the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum with a recorded message, he urged Asian countries to resist forming “small circles on geopolitical grounds,” a clear reference to Mr. Biden’s efforts to shore up alliances of democratically minded countries to counter China.
Mr. Biden has insisted that the United States is not seeking a new Cold War. His national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, said last week, “we have the choice not to do that.” The summit meeting between the two leaders is part of a White House effort to make sure that the right choices are made — and that accidents and misunderstandings do not propel either country in the wrong direction.
There are many reasons to argue that what is happening today is quite different from the Cold War. The amount of economic interchange, and entanglement, between the United States and China is huge; with the Soviet Union it was minuscule. Both sides would have a huge amount to lose from a Cold War; Mr. Xi and Mr. Biden both know that and have talked about the risks.
Other deep links — the mutual dependencies on technology, information and raw data that leaps the Pacific in milliseconds on American and Chinese-dominated networks — also never existed in the Cold War.
“The size and complexity of the trade relationship is underappreciated,” Mr. Biden’s top Asia adviser, Kurt M. Campbell, said in July as part of his argument of why this moment significantly differs from the Cold War of 40 years ago.
Still, with his repeated references this year to a generational struggle between “autocracy and democracy,” Mr. Biden has conjured the ideological edge of the 1950s and ’60s. And so has Mr. Xi at moments, with his talk about assuring that China is not dependent on the West for critical technologies, while also trying to make sure that the West is dependent on China.
At the same time, the United States announced that it would provide nuclear submarine technology to Australia, with the prospect that its subs could pop up, undetected, along the Chinese coast. It did not escape Chinese commentators that the last time the United States shared that kind of technology was in 1958, when Britain adopted naval reactors as part of the effort to counter Russia’s expanding nuclear arsenal.
Xi Jinping, center, during a meeting of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee in Beijing last week.Credit...Xie Huanchi/Xinhua, via Associated Press
That the summit was taking place virtually, not in person, was a concession to China’s leader, Xi Jinping.
The White House had hoped that he and President Biden would meet at the Group of 20 gathering in Rome last month, but Mr. Xi did not attend. He has not left China since Mr. Biden took office in January — in fact, not since January 2020, when the coronavirus was beginning to spread from China.
The ostensible reason for remaining home still seems to be Covid-19, but some experts have speculated that Mr. Xi could not afford to be away before an important political gathering that ended last week.
He used that forum to solidify his stature within the Communist Party, bolstering his case for what is widely expected to be a third five-year term as China’s paramount leader, beginning next year. With the coronavirus still a threat, it is conceivable that Mr. Xi might stay home until the party’s national congress next November.
That reflects more than just internal political machinations. It is in keeping with China’s increasing insularity, forged by a growing confidence — hubris, some might say — that the country under Mr. Xi’s leadership is the master of its own destiny, less dependent on the rest of the world for validation as its economic and military might solidifies.
Still, Mr. Xi’s absence has coincided with the withering of China’s international standing, with public sentiment in many countries turning against the country’s behavior at home and abroad. He faced sharp criticism for submitting a letter to the climate talks in Glasgow and for joining India in watering down the final statement to reduce pressure on cutting the use of coal.
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- Mao Zedong and Richard Nixon in Beijing, 1972
- Deng Xiaoping and Gerald Ford in Beijing, 1975
- Deng and Jimmy Carter in Washington, 1979
- Jiang Zemin and Bill Clinton in Washington, 1997
- Barack Obama and Hu Jintao in Beijing, 2009
- Stephen Crowley/The New York Times
- Donald Trump and Xi Jinping in Beijing, 2017
- Doug Mills/The New York Times
Ever since President Nixon stunned the United States in 1971 by announcing that he would travel to China, meetings between American and Chinese leaders have become milestones in a relationship fraught with hope.
In the five decades that have followed, the relationship between the two countries has lurched between cooperation and confrontation. In 1979, Mao Zedong’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, met President Carter in Washington to normalize diplomatic ties and end years of mutual hostility.
That was followed by meetings with Ronald Reagan in 1982 and George H.W. Bush in February 1989 — that one just months before Deng ordered a brutal military crackdown on student protests around Tiananmen Square in Beijing.
Mr. Bush responded to the massacre by suspending all official contacts with the Chinese, but a month later surreptitiously dispatched his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, to keep open channels with a country then allied with the United States’ efforts to contain its Cold War rival, the Soviet Union.
There was not another official visit until 1997, when President Clinton played host to Jiang Zemin, who emerged as the country’s leader after Deng’s death, which officials hoped would usher in a new era of openness.
After a while, meeting with Chinese leaders and senior officials became a goal in itself of American foreign policy. The idea was that regular meetings would entwine the Chinese economy with the world’s.
In 2006, President George W. Bush and Hu Jintao announced the creation of a strategic economic dialogue, where officials from both sides could meet regularly to resolve proliferating trade disputes.
When President Obama came to office, the strategic economic dialogue in 2009 became the strategic economic and security dialogue, reflecting emerging conflicts over China’s expansionism in the South China Sea.
A criticism of both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations was that the Chinese smothered the Americans with talk, while doing as they pleased — whether cyberattacks, or militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea.
U.S.-China summitry may have peaked in 2017. President Trump invited Xi Jinping to his Mar-a-Lago resort in April, where he informed him over “the most beautiful chocolate cake you’ve ever seen” that the United States had bombed Syria.
The two leaders met again that November, when Mr. Trump traveled to Beijing, becoming the first foreign leader to dine in the Forbidden City. “You’re a very special man,” he told Mr. Xi, banking on flattery to win over the Chinese leader. It didn’t.
Ships loaded with containers in Lianyungang, China, in September. The Biden administration wants China to curb manufacturing subsidies.Credit...Alex Plavevski/EPA, via Shutterstock
Nearly two years after the Trump administration concluded the first phase of a trade agreement with Beijing, the pact increasingly looks like an enduring framework for relations between China and the United States.
Trade, and the truce known as the Phase 1 agreement, was expected to be a focus of the virtual summit between President Biden and Xi Jinping, China’s top leader.
While Mr. Biden questioned the Trump administration’s aggressive trade approach during his presidential campaign, his White House has continued trying to counter China’s industrial subsidies and trade measures with tariffs and other investment restrictions. The Biden administration remains wary of any broad lifting of tariffs unless China curbs its wide array of government subsidies to advanced manufacturing industries.
Mr. Xi hinted this month in a video speech to an import expo in Shanghai that his government would be willing to discuss some subsidies. But Beijing is broadly committed to greater economic self-reliance, a policy founded on subsidies to industries like semiconductors and commercial jets, for which China relies heavily on imports.
China is also reportedly close to allowing Boeing 737 Max jets to return to its skies after crashes about three years ago in Ethiopia and Indonesia. The Federal Aviation Administration approved the plane late last year, and it has since been widely used elsewhere without incident.
Katherine Tai, the U.S. trade representative, announced last month that the Biden administration would restart a Trump-era procedure for excluding a few specific products from tariffs. The exemptions are for products that American companies can prove that they genuinely need and cannot readily purchase elsewhere.
China was allowed to retain some tariffs on U.S. goods under the Phase 1 agreement, but has already issued exemptions for most of its tariffs.
Mr. Biden’s economic deputies are traveling elsewhere in Asia this week, strengthening ties to counterbalance the Chinese relationship. Ms. Tai and Commerce Secretary Gina M. Raimondo are touring the region, meeting with economic officials in Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea and India.
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A semiconductor factory in Yancheng, China, last month.Credit...Alex Plavevski/EPA, via Shutterstock
The long-smoldering clash between China and the United States over the future of technology hit a rare moment of accord in September, when the Justice Department helped broker a deal that led to the release of a senior executive at the Chinese telecom equipment maker, Huawei.
The two countries will struggle to find any more common ground in that area.
President Biden has done little to roll back measures put in place under the Trump administration aimed at limiting China’s access to American technology. U.S. officials fear China will use American software and equipment to build government-supported rivals and develop tools to strengthen its surveillance state, including advanced computers, artificial intelligence and facial recognition systems.
Huawei itself remains a point of contention. American authorities helped secure the release of Meng Wanzhou, the Chinese executive who was detained in Canada. But they are still restricting Huawei’s access to critical American semiconductors and software, crimping its business.
While parts of the Biden Administration have called for improving economic ties, many American lawmakers are pushing for even tougher measures on Chinese technology firms. Mr. Biden has invoked competition with China to help pass his infrastructure bill, which seeks to bolster American technology competitiveness.
On China’s side, the country’s drive for self-reliance will likely take precedence over taking steps to regain access to American technology. Beijing is unlikely to back away from its tough limits on the flow of data or free expression online. Those positions have effectively locked most major foreign internet firms out of China. One of the last, LinkedIn, said last month it would shut down there.
The two sides could clash over cybersecurity as well. This summer, the United States accused China of a new type of cyberattack that underscored its growing sophistication. China has long insisted it is a victim of hacks and points to revelations from Edward Snowden that showed how American intelligence operators broke into its systems, including Huawei’s computers.
Police officers patrolling in Kashgar, Xinjiang, in May.Credit...Thomas Peter/Reuters
During the summit, President Biden is expected to raise concerns about China’s repression of individual rights, which has escalated under Mr. Xi’s authoritarian leadership. Beijing is likely to be dismissive.
China has come under criticism from Western democracies over its crackdown in Xinjiang, where the authorities have rounded up and detained Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in large numbers, and in Hong Kong, where a harsh national security law has undone many of the city’s democratic traditions.
The Biden administration has stuck by the Trump administration’s accusations of genocide in Xinjiang, and more recently, also raised concerns over the fate of Zhang Zhan, a citizen journalist whose family and friends say is critically ill in prison. Ms. Zhang is being held for documenting the chaos of the early days of the outbreak of the coronavirus in Wuhan.
President Biden has worked quickly to enlist allies to join his campaign to pressure China on issues such as human rights and trade. The U.S. Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, said this year that Beijing was routinely undercutting Hong Kong’s autonomy, and that the Biden administration would push back against what he described as coercion from China.
But Mr. Xi, China’s most powerful leader in decades, is not likely to be receptive to Mr. Biden’s opinions. He has previously dismissed such challenges, saying Beijing will not be lectured by outsiders.
When the United States imposed sanctions on Chinese officials over Hong Kong and Xinjiang, Beijing retaliated with its own penalties. Beijing has also responded to the recriminations with its own criticisms. Chinese diplomats and state media hit out at the United States over the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan.
It remains to be seen how firmly Mr. Biden will push Mr. Xi on human rights. In the first face-to-face meeting of American and Chinese officials of Biden’s administration in Alaska, the raising of such issues led to mutual denunciations, setting the tone for a testy relationship.
5. Biden-Xi talks: China warns US about 'playing with fire' on Taiwan
Is Taiwan an equal "red line" for both leaders?
Biden-Xi talks: China warns US about 'playing with fire' on Taiwan
Chinese President Xi Jinping has used a virtual summit with US counterpart Joe Biden to warn that encouraging Taiwanese independence would be "playing with fire".
The talks are the most substantial since Mr Biden took office in January.
Both sides emphasised the two men's personal relationship and the summit was an attempt to ease tensions.
But they could not escape one of the most sensitive topics: the self-ruled island of Taiwan.
China sees Taiwan as a breakaway province to be reunified with the mainland one day.
The US recognises and has formal ties with China. But it has also pledged to help Taiwan defend itself in the event of an attack.
China's state-run Global Times said Mr Xi blamed recent tensions on "repeated attempts by the Taiwan authorities to look for US support for their independence agenda as well as the intention of some Americans to use Taiwan to contain China".
"Such moves are extremely dangerous, just like playing with fire. Whoever plays with fire will get burnt," it said.
The White House said Mr Biden "strongly opposes unilateral efforts to change the status quo or undermine peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait".
IMAGE SOURCE,REUTERS
Image caption,
The leaders spoke to each other virtually
Despite the strong words on Taiwan, the meeting began with both leaders greeting each other warmly, with Mr Xi saying he was happy to see his "old friend" Mr Biden.
Mr Biden said the two had "always communicated with one another very honestly and candidly," adding "we never walk away wondering what the other man is thinking".
Mr Xi said the two countries needed to improve "communication" and face challenges "together".
"Humanity lives in a global village, and we face multiple challenges together. China and the US need to increase communication and co-operation." said Mr Xi.
What else was discussed?
The world's two most powerful nations do not see eye-to-eye on a number of issues, and Mr Biden raised US concerns about human rights abuses in Hong Kong and against Uyghurs in the north-west region of Xinjiang. China accuses the US of meddling in its domestic affairs.
On trade, Mr Biden highlighted the "need to protect American workers and industries from the PRC's [People's Republic of China's] unfair trade and economic practices".
Mr Xi also appeared to have made a strong comment on the issue, with Reuters reporting that he had told Mr Biden that the US needed to stop "abusing the concept of national security to oppress Chinese companies".
Climate change was also discussed. Last week the two sprung a surprise by issuing a joint declaration to address climate change, at talks in Glasgow, Scotland.
This was the third time the two leaders have spoken since Mr Biden's inauguration in January. The talks lasted three-and-a-half hours, longer than expected.
Mr Xi has not left China in nearly two years, since the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic.
The China-US relationship is crucial to both parties and the wider world, with Beijing having called repeatedly on the new administration in Washington to improve relations which deteriorated under Mr Biden's predecessor, Donald Trump.
Both men are facing domestic concerns, with Mr Biden's poll numbers slumping in the face of inflation, the threat of coronavirus and the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan. Mr Xi is tackling energy shortages and a property crisis.
That this meeting has happened at all between the world's two most powerful leaders tells you that both sides believe that the previous open hostility between Beijing and Washington wasn't working for either of them and was potentially dangerous.
Their relationship had become so toxic and so dysfunctional that these video discussions have been, in part, an attempt to ensure that competition between China and the US didn't drift into armed conflict due to a misunderstanding at a global hotspot.
On the one hand, we should probably be pretty happy they they're steering away from war before it can happen but, on the other, it is quite something that they have felt the need to do so.
In fact, if you see the optics at this conference this is the warmest things have appeared for a long time with Chinese and US leaders.
These efforts to make the discussions cordial with waving, talk of "the global village" and "humanity's challenges" was a far cry from the meltdown in Alaska this March when senior representatives from both administrations ended up sledging one another in public.
This does appear to be a genuine attempt at a reset and we should actually expect this to alter global geopolitical relations in a concrete way.
6. Readout of President Biden’s Virtual Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China
Readout of President Biden’s Virtual Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China
NOVEMBER 16, 2021
•
President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. met virtually on November 15 with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The two leaders discussed the complex nature of relations between our two countries and the importance of managing competition responsibly. As in previous discussions, the two leaders covered areas where our interests align, and areas where our interests, values, and perspectives diverge. President Biden welcomed the opportunity to speak candidly and straightforwardly to President Xi about our intentions and priorities across a range of issues.
President Biden underscored that the United States will continue to stand up for its interests and values and, together with our allies and partners, ensure the rules of the road for the 21st century advance an international system that is free, open, and fair. He emphasized the priority he places on far-reaching investments at home while we align with allies and partners abroad to take on the challenges of our time.
President Biden raised concerns about the PRC’s practices in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong, as well as human rights more broadly. He was clear about the need to protect American workers and industries from the PRC’s unfair trade and economic practices. He also discussed the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific, and communicated the continued determination of the United States to uphold our commitments in the region. President Biden reiterated the importance of freedom of navigation and safe overflight to the region’s prosperity. On Taiwan, President Biden underscored that the United States remains committed to the “one China” policy, guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances, and that the United States strongly opposes unilateral efforts to change the status quo or undermine peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
President Biden also underscored the importance of managing strategic risks. He noted the need for common-sense guardrails to ensure that competition does not veer into conflict and to keep lines of communication open. He raised specific transnational challenges where our interests intersect, such as health security. In particular, the two leaders discussed the existential nature of the climate crisis to the world and the important role that the United States and the PRC play. They also discussed the importance of taking measures to address global energy supplies. The two leaders also exchanged views on key regional challenges, including DPRK, Afghanistan, and Iran. Finally, they discussed ways for the two sides to continue discussions on a number of areas, with President Biden underscoring the importance of substantive and concrete conversations.
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7. The Taiwan Question: How to Think About Deterrence Now
Excerpt:
There are indeed steps the United States could take to help restore its deterrence position in this case. But unless/until the stark deterrence problem is recognized for what it is, recommendations in this regard undoubtedly will fall on deaf ears. No variations in the repeated U.S. affirmations of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan—including more or less ambiguity—nor new labels for U.S. deterrence strategies can address the structural challenge to U.S. deterrence goals posed by the shifting correlation of forces and the political background of the Taiwan Question. Changes in language suggest action, but cannot solve basic political and material problems. Herman Kahn emphasized this point regarding deterrence more than six decades ago: “About all an unprepared government can do is to say over and over, ‘the other side doesn’t really want war.’ Then they can hope they are right. However, this same government can scarcely expect to make up by sheer determination what it lacks in preparation. How can it persuade its opponent of its own willingness to go to war if the situation demands it?”[26] And, “Usually the most convincing way to look willing is to be willing.”[27] The basic structure of the deterrence equation in this case appears to argue that China is the more willing and that uncertainty need not work in favor of the United States—these realities must be the starting point for U.S. deterrence considerations.
The Taiwan Question: How to Think About Deterrence Now
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Keith B. Payne, The Taiwan Question: How to Think About Deterrence Now, No. 509, November 15, 2021
The Taiwan Question: How to Think About Deterrence Now
Dr. Keith B. Payne is a co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, professor emeritus and former Department Head of the Graduate School of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and former Senior Advisor to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Introduction
A prominent deterrence challenge now confronting Washington is how to deter China from resolving the Taiwan Question forcefully. There are many nuances to the Taiwan Question and the U.S. deterrence challenge involved, but the fundamental deterrence question is: can the United States now deter the Communist Party of China (CCP) from deciding to forcefully change the status quo on Taiwan, i.e., from removing the current democratically-elected governing authority and installing the CCP’s own repressive governing authority instead? China’s recent harsh repression in Hong Kong in violation of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration looms large in the background.
Deterrence success in this regard is not to end in any definitive sense China’s desire to unite Taiwan with the Chinese mainland; that is a much heavier political burden than deterrence can or should be expected to bear. But, effective U.S. deterrence in this case is for the Chinese leadership to conclude, when considering its options for Taiwan, that the risks/costs of moving against Taiwan forcefully are intolerable compared to the relative greater safety of deciding, “not this year.” Deterrence surely cannot solve all geopolitical problems, but it may be able to accomplish that much.
Numerous commentators and academics present their competing opinions on how the United States should pursue deterrence in this case—there seems to be a daily publication on the subject. In most cases, however, this advice is derived from jargon and principles taken from America’s Cold War deterrence experience. That is understandable, but a mistake. The current deterrence challenge posed by China and the Taiwan Question is unprecedented and much Cold War-derived thinking about deterrence, including extended deterrence, is now of limited value.
The Taiwan Question
The Taiwan Question, of course, is whether Taiwan will continue to have political autonomy, free of the CCP’s dictatorial rule, or come under China’s heavy thumb via Beijing’s use of force or coercion to change the status quo. Chinese leaders appear determined to resolve the Taiwan Question, whether peacefully or forcefully, within this current generation of CCP leadership. Although a precise deadline for this action is not obvious and may not exist, the CCP appears to have a general timetable that does not conveniently postpone this pending crisis to the distant future.
In contrast, the United States has declared its commitment to ensuring the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Question via Congress’ 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and subsequent policy statements by a succession of U.S. presidents. Indeed, the TRA provides the fundamental elements of enduring U.S. policy regarding the Taiwan Question:
- “The United States’ decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.”
- “It is the policy of the United States…to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.”
- “It is the policy of the United States…to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character.”
- “It is the policy of the United States…to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”
- “The United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”
- “The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom.”
Since the TRA, the United States has walked the fine balance between two different unwanted possibilities: 1) backing Taiwan’s autonomy to such an extent that U.S. support effectively encourages Taiwanese leaders to declare formal sovereign state independence from China; and, 2) failing to support Taiwan’s autonomy to the extent that the CCP feels free to resolve the Taiwan Question forcefully. The United States has pursued this balancing act via a general policy of “strategic ambiguity.” That is, a measure of ambiguity in the depth and scope of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan is intended to discourage Taiwan from provoking China by moving toward full sovereign state independence, while the same ambiguity also is intended to help deter China from moving forcefully against Taiwan.
Deterrence and Ambiguity
It may seem counterintuitive that ambiguity or uncertainty in the scope of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan should be thought of as contributing to the deterrence of China. An ambiguous message is not typically thought of as the most efficient means of shaping behavior. Yet, in 1995, Harvard professor and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye exposed the expected deterrence value of “strategic ambiguity” when he said to Chinese officials that, in the event of China moving militarily against Taiwan: “We don’t know what we would do, and you don’t—because it is going to depend on the circumstances.”[1] This advertised uncertainty regarding prospective U.S. behavior explicit in Nye’s statement is expected to have deterrent effect. For many years, U.S. officials appear to have had considerable confidence in the value of uncertainty for sustaining the deterrence of China while simultaneously not stirring Taiwan toward independence.[2]
It is critical to understand the presumption underlying the expected deterrence value of strategic ambiguity. Uncertainty regarding the scope of prospective U.S. actions permits the listener, in this case the CCP, to conclude the U.S. response to a Chinese attack on Taiwan might be very powerful. The long-standing U.S. expectation that uncertainty provides decisive deterrent effect presumes that Chinese calculations will be determined by the deterring possibility of a very robust U.S. military commitment to protecting Taiwan and not by the alternative possibility also inherent in uncertainty, that the United States would not be so committed.
When considering the deterrence issues now associated with the Taiwan Question, this convenient presumption underlying the expected deterrence value of uncertainty and “strategic ambiguity” must be understood: the Chinese leadership is expected to decide that because the United States might respond very forcefully, it will not attack Taiwan rather than deciding that the United States might not respond so forcefully, and therefore it can risk attack. The Chinese fear of the possibility of a very strong U.S. reaction will render the U.S. deterrent sufficiently credible to be effective rather than the alternative possibility that China will instead be reassured by ambiguity regarding the U.S. response and thereby conclude that the risk of moving against Taiwan would be acceptable. In short, uncertainty is expected to compel prudent caution rather than invite aggression. If the former expectation regarding CCP perceptions and calculations is valid, then “strategic ambiguity” may be consistent with effective deterrence; if the latter is the case, then “strategic ambiguity” may provoke the failure of deterrence.
Clearly, it is comforting and convenient to expect that uncertainty will compel an opponent’s caution and contribute to deterrence rather than encourage aggression and undermine deterrence. Yet, it must be recognized that because there is no way of accurately predicting future CCP calculations in this regard, relying on uncertainty or ambiguity to provide reliable deterrent effect is largely an act of faith. As Colin Gray observed in 1986, “The virtue of uncertainty that looms so large in Western theories of deterrence could mislead us. Strategic uncertainty should provide powerful fuel for prudence, but it might also spark hope for success.”[3]
U.S. deterrence theory and policy has long been based on the possibly optimistic presumption that uncertainty will contribute to, rather than undermine, deterrence. This enduring theme in U.S. deterrence theory and policy can be traced to the pioneering work of Thomas Schelling, an early architect of U.S. deterrence thinking, and his famous formulation that effective deterrence can be based on a threat that “leaves something to chance,”[4] i.e., the fear of uncertainty.
Uncertainty In U.S. Cold War Deterrence Policy
During the Cold War, Joseph Nye clearly emphasized the expected value of uncertainty as the basis for the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence covering NATO, not the rationality of a U.S. nuclear escalation threat: “So long as a Soviet leader can see little prospect of a quick conventional victory and some risk of events becoming out of control and leading to nuclear escalation, the expected costs will outweigh greatly any benefits.”[5]
The U.S. extended deterrence threat to escalate a conflict in Europe to a superpower thermonuclear war could hardly be logical for the United States given the potentially self-destructive consequences. Nevertheless, the possibility of U.S. nuclear escalation and the uncertain risk/cost involved for Moscow were expected to deter Soviet leaders. In a 1979 address to an audience of Europeans and Americans, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger emphasized the irrationality of the U.S. nuclear escalation deterrence threat with considerable candor: “If my analysis is correct we must face the fact that it is absurd to base the strategy of the West on the credibility of the threat of mutual suicide…and therefore I would say—what I might not say in office—that our European allies should not keep asking us to multiply strategic assurances that we cannot possibly mean, or if we do mean, we should not want to execute, because if we execute, we risk the destruction of civilization.”[6] Nevertheless, the United States and NATO continued to expect that the possibility that events could be beyond control and the United States could illogically escalate to thermonuclear war (and had the capabilities to do so) would help deter Soviet leaders reliably.[7]
The expected value of uncertainty clearly was not confined to academic discussions. The official NATO Handbook during the Cold War stated that the alliance’s nuclear deterrence intention was “leaving the enemy in doubt” about “the escalation process.”[8] A now-declassified 1984 Department of Defense report entitled, Report on the Nuclear Posture of NATO, stated similarly that NATO’s response to Soviet aggression could take a variety of possible forms that would involve “a sequence of events” that posed “risks” for Moscow “which could not be determined in advance.”[9] Perhaps more importantly, Secretary of State Dean Rusk employed this approach to deterrence, i.e., relying on the opponent’s expected fear of uncertain risk to provide reliable deterrent effect, in a direct exchange with the Soviet leadership. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev raised the fundamental question about U.S. will and deterrence credibility when the potential U.S. suffering for carrying out its deterrent threat could easily have been intolerable for the United States. Khrushchev directly challenged Rusk regarding the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella by asking: “Why should I believe that you Americans would fight a nuclear war over Berlin?”[10] Clearly, Khrushchev’s question asked aloud why Moscow should fear the U.S. deterrent threat when executing that threat on behalf of an ally could have led to horrific regrets for the United States itself.
Secretary Rusk’s response to Khrushchev reflected the U.S. expectation of deterrence via uncertainty. Rusk moved the question away from any rational logic of the U.S. threat to escalate and brandished instead the uncertainty of U.S. behavior as the basis for U.S. deterrence. Khrushchev should be deterred, he said, because the United States just might illogically escalate to nuclear war despite the potentially self-destructive consequences of such a decision. Secretary Rusk tells of this exchange with Khrushchev: “That was quite a question, with Khrushchev staring at me with his little pig eyes. I couldn’t call [President] Kennedy and ask, ‘What do I tell the [expletive] now?’ So I stared back at him, ‘Mr. Chairman, you will have to take into account the possibility we Americans are just [expletive] fools.’”[11] Secretary Rusk had put into practice the proposition that uncertainty deters over high stakes and at the highest possible political level.
Deterrence via Uncertainty Now
When now considering deterrence and the Taiwan Question, it must be understood that the presumption that uncertainty will support deterrence, as opposed to degrade deterrence, is the privilege of the power that is dominant in perceived will and/or capabilities for deterrence. That is, the expectation that a context of uncertainty will deter the opponent more than the deterrer is the prerogative of the dominant power. If the state seeking to deter, in this case the United States, is not manifestly dominant in its deterrent power position relative to its opponent, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that it will be any less driven to caution by uncertainty than will be the opponent. A presumed greater U.S. willingness to engage in a competition of threats in the context of uncertainty can logically only come from some perceived advantage over the opponent. This advantage may be in will, risk tolerance, manifest determination, and/or military options—but there must be an advantage that allows the United States to be more resolute in an uncertain context than is the opponent. The dominant power may reasonably anticipate that its power relationship with its opponent is so manifestly asymmetrical that even a small, uncertain chance that it would respond forcefully will reliably deter that opponent from a highly provocative act. The weaker opponent must fear the dominant power’s potential reaction, and that fear may reasonably be expected to produce caution and deterrent effect. In the absence of some level of dominance, however, that expectation has no reasonable basis.
It is no surprise that the founders of U.S. deterrence theory were from that generation of thinkers and policy makers active immediately after the Second World War—when the United States was at the height of its power relative to the rest of the world. The U.S. power advantages at the time suited the narrative that the United States could endure uncertainty with greater determination than any other state. Most deterrence theorists and officials almost naturally embedded that context in their notions of U.S. deterrence policy: opponents could be deterred by uncertainty, but it would not compel the more powerful United States to similar caution and susceptibility to the opponent’s deterrent threat.[12]
NATO’s reliance on nuclear extended deterrence continued throughout the Cold War because, “at no point…did the [NATO] allies face up to the feasibility of conventional defense in Europe and the possibility of successfully meeting a conventional attack with conventional forces.”[13] Even as the United States lost its position of dominance during the Cold War, it continued to base its extended nuclear deterrence “umbrella” to NATO allies on this comforting presumption that uncertainty regarding a U.S. nuclear response would contribute to, rather than undermine, deterrence. As the Soviet Union continually built up its nuclear and conventional forces, the United States sought to ameliorate the increasing illogic of its nuclear escalation threat on behalf of allies—and the corresponding increasing doubt about the credibility of that threat—by placing significant “trip wire” forces (including large numbers of nuclear forces) in Europe and integrating them with allied forces, and by repeatedly affirming its commitment to allies. Sizable U.S. forces deployed in Europe could not magically make an illogical nuclear escalation threat reasonable, but they did provide “tangible evidence” of “the risk of escalation to total nuclear war.”[14]
The United States took these steps in a bid to sustain the credibility of an extended nuclear deterrent threat built on uncertainty even as the United States lost its dominant position and that U.S. deterrence threat became manifestly illogical given the likely regrets for the United States. Deterrence via uncertainty in this case also surely was aided by the history of U.S. support for European allies in two world wars and the U.S. commitment to Western Europe demonstrated after World War II by the U.S. Marshall Plan and the creation of the NATO alliance with its collective defense provisions.
Given the apparent great Cold War success of extended deterrence based ultimately on uncertainty, and the apparent past success of U.S. “strategic ambiguity” for deterring China from resolving the Taiwan Question forcefully, most commentators continue to assert essentially familiar narratives regarding deterrence as guidance for contemporary U.S. deterrence policy. There are, however, several solid reasons for doubting the comforting expectation that deterrence “oldthink” now provides helpful guidance in this case.
Contemporary CCP Goals and Deterrence
Discussions of deterrence pertinent to the Taiwan Question often focus immediately and even solely on the balance of forces at play, with uncertainty as the implicit, assumed basis for deterrence. But the oft-neglected contemporary political background of the Taiwan Question is of paramount significance in this regard, and very different from the political background of the superpower deterrence engagement during the Cold War.
The key political background questions that must now precede U.S. considerations of how to deter and calculate the capabilities needed for deterrence involve CCP perceptions of cost and risk versus benefit: how does the CCP leadership define cost and what value does it place on changing the status quo on Taiwan? Does the CCP envisage a tolerable alternative to changing the status quo on Taiwan? And, how tolerant of risk is the CCP leadership likely to be when it makes decisions regarding the Taiwan Question? These are the first-order questions when seeking to understand the contemporary deterrence challenge confronting the United States. Answers are a function of the CCP perceptions of power relations and regime interests, including the national myths that shape those perceptions of power and interests, and CCP perceptions of U.S. will and power. The prevalent discussions in Washington of deterrence and the forces needed for it are unlikely to be meaningful for deterrence purposes unless they follow from the answers to these questions, however tentative they might be.
For deterrence to function by design in any context, the opponent must decide that some level of accommodation or conciliation to U.S. demands is more tolerable than testing the U.S. deterrent threat. There must be this space for deterrence to work. Yet, with regard to the Taiwan Question, the CCP appears to have left itself little or no room to conciliate in the way that the Soviet Union did in its Cold War pursuit of hegemony in Eurasia. This is not to suggest that there was any philanthropy on the part of Soviet leaders, but they typically left themselves room to conciliate if they met forceful resistance. This boundary on provocative Soviet expansionism followed the Leninist adage to probe with bayonets; if you encounter mush, proceed; if you encounter steel, stop. It also facilitated U.S. deterrence success.
In contrast, Chinese officials have stated openly that they have no room to conciliate on the Taiwan Question. The Chinese leadership appears unanimous in the view that Taiwan is part of China, and that reintegrating Taiwan with the mainland under CCP rule is a matter of territorial integrity and regime legitimacy—an existential requirement. This appears to be a fundamental animating national myth across the Chinese political spectrum—akin to President Abraham Lincoln’s Civil War commitment to reincorporating the South into the United States.[15] Most recently, the spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry spoke explicitly in this manner: “When it comes to issues related to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and other core interests, there is no room for China to compromise or make concessions. Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory. The Taiwan issue is purely an internal affair of China that allows no foreign intervention.”[16]
Such expressions might simply be CCP posturing to intimidate Western observers, but they appear to fit the high-risk circumstances that the CCP has essentially created for itself by making the incorporation of Taiwan into China an essential condition for its continuing legitimacy to govern. Chinese leader Xi Jinping has been explicit in proclaiming that this must be done, peacefully or via force, within the forthcoming general time period. In a prominent speech in October 2021, Xi proclaimed, “The historical task of the complete reunification of the motherland must be fulfilled, and will definitely be fulfilled.”[17] And, as the Hoover Institution’s Elizabeth Economy has concluded, “One thing that you can learn about Xi Jinping from reading all of his speeches and tracking his actions is that there’s a pretty strong correlation between what he says and what he does.”[18]
This necessary incorporation of Taiwan may be a near-term requirement. ADM Philip Davidson, then-Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, reported to the Senate Armed Services Committee that, “Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions …I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact, in the next six years.”[19] Taiwanese intelligence reportedly has claimed that Chinese leaders have discussed making this move circa 2024.[20] Others have suggested even sooner.[21]
It should be noted that historical arguments that dispute the CCP’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan are an appropriate interest for historians and perhaps international lawyers, but they are irrelevant to this deterrence question. What matters in this regard is not whether Chinese leaders’ beliefs are historically correct, but whether they are strongly and widely held—which certainly appears to be the case.
Contemporary Deterrence and the Political Context
The primary U.S. deterrence goal is to prevent the CCP from using force to achieve a goal that the Chinese leadership appears to consider an existential requirement for its governing legitimacy—uniting by force, if necessary, a part of China, i.e., Taiwan, deemed to have been unfairly wrested from the motherland. The apparent CCP perspective that Taiwan is a part of China and must be reunited or risk the loss of legitimacy to rule is of enormous significance for deterrence. Multiple studies show that decision-makers who consider themselves aggrieved and responding to the prospect of loss may accept increased levels of risk in their behavioral choices.[22] Equally important for U.S. deterrence considerations in this regard is the pertinent conclusion, based on a careful examination of historical case studies, that: “To the extent that leaders perceive the need to act, they become insensitive to the interests and commitments of others that stand in the way of the success of their policy.”[23] In this case, the United States would be the party standing in the way.
CCP perceptions and calculations of risk, cost and reward with regard to Taiwan appear to combine both of these factors and so render the U.S. deterrence goal an unparalleled challenge: Chinese leaders believe Taiwan to be an unarguable part of China—it is rightfully theirs—and they must act sooner rather than later to unite Taiwan with the motherland, with force if necessary. This is a matter of restoring China after past humiliation. The CCP’s perceived need may be near absolute and Chinese leaders may thus be relatively “insensitive to the interests and commitments of others” who stand in the way of their cherished goal. If so, they have given themselves little or no room to conciliate—no space for deterrence to work.
If the basic CCP political beliefs are properly characterized here, fundamental questions must be asked: is there deterrence space to operate in this case, even in principle? If so, does an uncertain U.S. commitment to support Taiwan, i.e., “strategic ambiguity,” now contribute to or degrade deterrence? Can the old notions that the opponent’s uncertainty about U.S. actions—with repeated U.S. expressions of a general commitment—provide adequate U.S. deterrence credibility? These fundamental questions seem to be only rarely aired, perhaps because an old seeming deterrence truth is convenient and comforting, i.e., deterrence is promoted by uncertainty and repeated U.S. expressions of a commitment.
Yet, as noted, the approach to extending deterrence that simply complements uncertainty with repeatedly-expressed U.S. commitments is a potentially coherent and logical strategy only for the dominant power. And, while, during the Cold War, the United States essentially continued to follow this general deterrence strategy even as U.S. military dominance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union faded, it took costly steps to preserve its deterrence position that appear to be nowhere in sight for Taiwan. Perhaps more importantly, the United States never had to contend with a Soviet leadership that was driven by the belief that NATO territory belonged to Moscow—territory which, as a matter of national integrity and regime survival, had to be recovered sooner rather than later. Cold War extended deterrence did not have to carry such a heavy load. Indeed, the political background of the contemporary deterrence goal could not be more different from that of the Cold War, nor more challenging for deterrence as U.S. dominance ebbs vis-à-vis China in Asia. In short, the United States now faces the unprecedented question of how, without forms of dominance, to deter an opponent who may perceive an existential risk in not violating U.S. deterrence redlines?
This political background of the contemporary Taiwan Question makes the U.S. deterrence goal much more problematic, especially as the United States appears to be losing the military dominance that could, in principle, make its favored approach to deterrence coherent—in this case characterized by “strategic ambiguity.” The United States, understandably, would like to continue enjoying the benefits of effective deterrence via uncertainty without expending the effort now needed to sustain a dominant position, but the past circumstances that favored this U.S. approach to deterrence are not a U.S. birthright. The United States took extensive and expensive steps to help preserve its deterrence position during the Cold War even as it lost dominance. However, unlike in the Cold War, and in the absence of any comparable steps, the United States appears now to face a foe that is virtually compelled by the political context to challenge the U.S. position, by force if necessary. Indeed, in its pursuit of Taiwan, China likely cannot, and does not appear to share the caution generally practiced by the Soviet Union in its pursuit of expansionist goals—caution possible for the Soviet Union because it was not dedicated to an expansionist goal it deemed to be of existential importance. This fundamental difference in the political context degrades the value of the early U.S. Cold War deterrence experience that underlies most contemporary discussions of the subject. Commentary on deterrence and its requirements that misses this unique critical political context is unlikely to be helpful.
A Changing Correlation of Nuclear Forces and Contemporary Deterrence
Nuclear forces are far from the entire picture with regard to CCP and U.S. deterrence decision making pertinent to the Taiwan Question. Yet, nuclear weapons will, without doubt, cast a shadow over any great power confrontation, and the potential effects of that shadow on the resolution of the Taiwan Question may be significant, even decisive. Even a quick look reveals that, again, the United States faces an unprecedented deterrence challenge.
Unlike the U.S. extended deterrent to allies during the Cold War that included the threat of nuclear escalation in the event of Soviet attack, the United States does not have any apparent nuclear umbrella commitment to Taiwan and no bloody history of national sacrifice for Taiwan. And, while the Cold War extended deterrent was accompanied by the U.S. deployment of large numbers of “trip wire forces” and thousands of forward-deployed nuclear weapons to buttress its credibility, the United States appears to have no serious “trip wire” forces on Taiwan and eliminated virtually all of its forward-deployable, non-strategic nuclear weapons following the end of the Cold War.[24] Even the venerable submarine-launched, nuclear-armed cruise missile (TLAM-N) was retired from service a decade ago.
In contrast, China may leave open the option of nuclear first use with regard to the Taiwan Question and has numerous and expanding nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to support the forceful resolution of the Taiwan Question, if necessary. The United States now faces the possible reality of an opponent with both local conventional force advantages and a nuclear escalation threat in the event of a conflict over Taiwan. The United States must, correspondingly, deal with the caution that context must force on Washington—it has no readily-apparent deterrence advantage in this context, no deterrence dominance. The United States and NATO built their deterrence policy against the Soviet Union on the presumption that Soviet leaders would be compelled to caution by the West’s threat of nuclear escalation—however uncertain. Yet, now it is the United States that must face a possible Chinese nuclear escalation threat with no apparent advantages to mitigate its deterring effect other than the capability to engage in a nuclear escalation process that could be self-destructive. The CCP understandably appears to express the view that it is not China but the United States that will be compelled to greater caution by the uncertainty and risks of this context.[25] The potential for Chinese nuclear escalation and its overriding determination given its stakes in this case certainly makes this turnabout plausible. The United States must calculate whether it or China is the party more willing to risk great injury if the CCP decides to resolve the Taiwan Question forcefully. The basic facts of the engagement hardly point to greater U.S. will to engage in a competition of threats, potentially including nuclear threats, in the absence of U.S. advantages that help to mitigate the risks for the United States.
For decades, the United States has been the undisputed dominant power in the Taiwan Strait. Given this power position, reliance on “strategic ambiguity” and uncertainty to deter was a logical option once the United States proclaimed its commitment to Taiwan. The CCP could reasonably be expected to be cautious and thus deterred by uncertainty given the significant U.S. power advantages. That U.S. dominance appears to be fading fast or has ended. Yet, the United States still appears to rely on uncertainty to deter. Unfortunately, in the absence of some U.S. deterrence advantage that is not now obvious, there is no apparent reason for the CCP to be more cautious in an uncertain context than the United States—and given the asymmetry of stakes involved, there is reason to expect the CCP to be less cautious than the United States. These are the harsh structural deterrence realities imposed by the context of this case, particularly its political background. Pointing to the currently larger raw number of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons alone does not alter these basic realities.
Conclusion
There are indeed steps the United States could take to help restore its deterrence position in this case. But unless/until the stark deterrence problem is recognized for what it is, recommendations in this regard undoubtedly will fall on deaf ears. No variations in the repeated U.S. affirmations of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan—including more or less ambiguity—nor new labels for U.S. deterrence strategies can address the structural challenge to U.S. deterrence goals posed by the shifting correlation of forces and the political background of the Taiwan Question. Changes in language suggest action, but cannot solve basic political and material problems. Herman Kahn emphasized this point regarding deterrence more than six decades ago: “About all an unprepared government can do is to say over and over, ‘the other side doesn’t really want war.’ Then they can hope they are right. However, this same government can scarcely expect to make up by sheer determination what it lacks in preparation. How can it persuade its opponent of its own willingness to go to war if the situation demands it?”[26] And, “Usually the most convincing way to look willing is to be willing.”[27] The basic structure of the deterrence equation in this case appears to argue that China is the more willing and that uncertainty need not work in favor of the United States—these realities must be the starting point for U.S. deterrence considerations.
If the United States is to deter by design in this case, it must recover some form of deterrence advantage that addresses a context in which the opponent appears to be extremely committed to an existential goal in opposition to the U.S. deterrence redline, and has consciously sought to shift the correlation of forces, including nuclear forces, to its advantage for the very purpose of defeating the U.S. deterrence position and attaining its goal. The fundamental deterrence questions that must be addressed by the United States are what form of dominance might it preserve, or more likely regain, that would support the credible deterrence strategy it needs to uphold the U.S. position expressed in the 1979 TRA, and how can it achieve that position?
Identifying that advantage and moving toward it is likely to involve considerable expense—much as it did in Europe during the Cold War. More costly, however, would be a successful CCP campaign to forcefully take and occupy Taiwan. The consequences for the United States in terms of its alliances, nuclear proliferation, and the ability to operate freely in the Pacific would be disastrous, if not existential.
It is, however, an open question whether U.S. policy makers will recognize and respond adequately to the deterrence challenge now facing the United States and the demands for innovative U.S. thinking and actions that challenge now imposes on Washington. U.S. leaders must identify how to restore the U.S. deterrence position and then decide if the value of doing so is worth the price tag. It seems self-evident that effective deterrence is well worth the cost, but the United States has had a persistent and strong internal political call for deterrence without undue effort and, for some, the Cold War lesson made possible by the combination of unparalleled U.S. power and a generally prudent Soviet foe seems to be that the United States can declare its deterrence commitments and foes will reliably bow to U.S. dominance and comply with expressed U.S. redlines. But, that world no longer exists. The deterrence lesson from the Cold War that should now inform us is that the United States needs to recover an advantageous deterrence position tailored to the opponent and context if it hopes to deter by design vice luck. Unfortunately, that context and opponent with regard to the Taiwan Question now present unprecedented challenges for U.S. deterrence goals. The previous generations of U.S. civilian and military leaders took extensive steps to help preserve an adequate deterrence position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The question is whether the current generation of U.S. leaders will seek to do the same vis-à-vis China and accept the expense involved, or cling to past notions of deterrence as an enduring U.S. birthright that are likely to fail in current circumstances. The consequences of the latter would be disastrous, but the verdict is not yet in and time will tell.
The author would like to thank Amb. Robert Joseph, David Trachtenberg and Matthew Costlow for their helpful comments on this Information Series.
Notes:
[1] Quoted in Martin L. Lasater, “A U.S. Perception of a PLA Invasion of Taiwan,” in Peter Kien-hong Yu, ed., The Chinese PLA’s Perception of an Invasion of Taiwan (New York: Contemporary U.S.-Asia Research Institute, 1996), p. 252. See also, Press Briefing by Deputy Press Secretaries Barry Toiv and David Leavy, August 13, 1999, Transcript released by the Office of the White House Press Secretary, available at, http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/urires/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/13/8.text.1; and, Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, National Economic Advisor Gene Sperling, and Press Secretary Joe Lockhart, Sky City Hotel, Auckland, New Zealand, September 11, 1999, Transcript released by the Office of the White House Press Secretary, available at, http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/urires/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/9/12/7.text.1.
[3] Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986), p. 146.
[4] See, Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp.187-188.
[5]Joseph S. Nye, “The Role of Strategic Nuclear Systems in Deterrence,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Spring 1988), p. 47. (Emphasis added).
[6] See, Henry Kissinger, “The Future of NATO,” in, NATO, The Next Thirty Years, Kenneth Myers, ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), p. 8.
[7] British Defence Minister Denis Healy captured this belief with his famous dictum that, “it takes only five percent credibility of American retaliation to deter the Russians,” i.e., an almost entirely incredible threat would suffice for deterrence. See Denis Healey, The time of my life (London: Michael Joseph, 1989), p. 243.
[8] NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Information Series, February 1974), p. 16.
[10] Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990), p. 228.
[11] Ibid. See also, Arnold Beichman, “How Foolish Khrushchev Nearly Started World War III,” The Washington Times, October 3, 2004, p. B 8.
[12] See the discussion of this expectation reflected in U.S. deterrence theory in, Keith B. Payne, The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice From the Cold War to the Twenty-First Century (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2008), pp. 255-261.
[13] Lawrence S. Kaplan, Donald D. Landa, and Edward J. Drea, The McNamara Ascendancy 1961-1965, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Vol. 5, (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006), p. 309.
[14] NATO Handbook, op cit., p. 16.
[15] The author would like to thank Heino Klinck, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, for suggesting this analogy regarding the CCP commitment to reuniting Taiwan with the Chinese homeland.
[18] Quoted in, Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “Washington Shies Away From Open Declaration to Defend Taiwan White House Official Says Shift to ‘Strategic Clarity’ Would Carry ‘Downsides’ in Face of China’s Belligerence,” Financial Times Online (UK), May 5, 2021, available at, https://www.ft.com/content/26b03f60-ac06-4829-b2ed-da78ac47116a.
[22] See the discussion in, Jack S. Levy, “Applications of Prospect Theory to Political Science,” Synthese, Vol. 135, No. 2 (May 2003), pp. 215-241. See also, Robert Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” Political Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1992), pp. 187-204; Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), p. 70; and, Thomas Scheber, “Evolutionary Psychology: Cognitive Function, and Deterrence,” in Understanding Deterrence, Keith B. Payne, ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 65-92.
[23] Richard Ned Lebow, “The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?,” in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology & Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 183.
[26] Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 213-214.
The National Institute for Public Policy’s Information Series is a periodic publication focusing on contemporary strategic issues affecting U.S. foreign and defense policy. It is a forum for promoting critical thinking on the evolving international security environment and how the dynamic geostrategic landscape affects U.S. national security. Contributors are recognized experts in the field of national security. National Institute for Public Policy would like to thank the Sarah Scaife Foundation and the Smith Richardson Foundation for the generous support that made this Information Series possible.
The views in this Information Series are those of the author and should not be construed as official U.S. Government policy, the official policy of the National Institute for Public Policy or any of its sponsors. For additional information about this publication or other publications by the National Institute Press, contact: Editor, National Institute Press, 9302 Lee Highway, Suite 750 |Fairfax, VA 22031 | (703) 293- 9181 |www.nipp.org. For access to previous issues of the National Institute Press Information Series, please visit http://www.nipp.org/national-institutepress/informationseries/.
© National Institute Press, 2021
8. China-Taiwan conflict: Island's 'guerilla' home guard gears up for David v Goliath battle with Beijing
Resistance operating concept.
Excerpts:
"There needs to be more of a territorial or homeland defence mission with associated training so that it presents a layered defence, as opposed to the current model which is that these reserve forces would be plugging gaps at the beachhead," said Heino Klinck, former deputy assistant secretary of defence for East Asia.
"There are plenty of worldwide examples that Taiwan can pick and choose from that best matches the Taiwan specific environment."
Klinck has previously argued the US, as guarantor of Taiwan's security and its biggest arms supplier, should show "tough love" to push Taipei to fine tune its military priorities.
The Taiwanese ministry of defence said it welcomed the Senate bills and was building an "asymmetric combat force" to meet the needs of defence operations and the changing enemy threat. The military had "demonstrated its determination to defend itself", it said in a statement.
Its latest biennial military strategy report, released this month, focused on investing in a large number of small, survivable weapons, including sea mines and coastal missile systems, to inflict maximum damage on Chinese forces while they are crossing the Taiwan Strait.
Kolas Yotaka, spokeswoman for Taiwan's presidential office, added that as the security environment changed, "Taiwan has been upgrading our defence in every sense. Updating strategy, raising budgets, and improving co-ordination with partners.
"Taiwanese are survivors. We are alert and prepared," she said. "Although maintaining peace is our goal and our priority, we are not ignoring the risks we face."
China-Taiwan conflict: Island's 'guerilla' home guard gears up for David v Goliath battle with Beijing - NZ Herald
On a busy street in Taiwan's capital city, bystanders are rushing to help the injured.
Some bandage arms or try to stem the blood running from open gashes; others evacuate wounded people on stretchers or perform CPR on motionless bodies.
The blood and broken bones in Taipei's recent mass casualty simulation were fake, but as the possibility of war with neighbour China grows, the fears behind the event are very real.
"We are at the point where the level of threat we face is so high and the cost so huge, potential consequences unacceptable and unbearable that I think we just need to see how each of us can do more," Enoch Wu, the founder of the NGO behind the event, Forward Alliance, told the Telegraph.
The hope is that such public training courses will lay the foundation for a future civil defence force that could be activated if the worst comes to the worst - whether in a disaster or conflict.
"We hope that this capability will deter war. Civil defence is a big part of that equation," Wu said.
Taiwan, a lush Pacific Island of 23.5 million people, is keenly aware that it sits on geographical and geopolitical fault lines that make it vulnerable to the risk of an attack from Beijing - a risk that appears to be growing every month.
Taiwan is home to 23.5 million people. Photo / AP
The Chinese Communist Party has recently increased threats to take the territory by force if Taipei does not agree to Chinese rule. In October, as Beijing's warplanes buzzed Taiwan's air defence zone in unprecedented numbers, Chiu Kuo-cheng, the Taiwanese defence minister, warned China would be capable of launching a "full scale" invasion by 2025.
The escalating crisis has raised pressure on the government and defence ministry to hike and refocus military spending and to reform the armed forces to maximise deterrence capabilities.
But ordinary Taiwanese are also being forced to confront how they would respond to the worst-case scenario of their homeland being devastated by conflict, and amid the constant bellicose rhetoric from Beijing, some such as Wu - a rising local politician - have started to take matters into their own hands.
The goal of Forward Alliance is to equip some 10,000 people with First Aid and survival skills to steer their own local communities through disasters or wartime emergencies to form the building blocks of a nationwide homeland defence force, he explained.
"Our civil defence vision is a community-based, localised organisation that complements our conventional forces and supports our professional responders, from fire to police," he said.
"The idea is that with that kind of civ-mil co-operation we can actually implement a whole-of-society defence concept. You want as many people as possible to have the will and the capability to protect themselves and to help each other."
The result would be just as useful in the case of a deadly earthquake as in a war: "If disaster strikes – natural disasters or industrial – then we want to be able to minimise casualties."
As a result, his initiative has received mentoring support from the de facto US embassy as part of its humanitarian assistance and disaster relief programme. The one-day courses see medics, firefighters and police officers offer professional instruction to hundreds of participants.
Reservists to be trained in 'guerilla warfare'
Despite hopes that it will deter war and limit any casualties, there is no military component to Forward Alliance's work.
However, the question of whether to train civilians in urban insurgency tactics is one that has occupied Taiwan's strategists in recent years, particularly given how unevenly matched a potential war with China would be.
Beijing has a defence budget estimated to be 16 times larger than Taipei's, while China's 1 million ground troops dwarf Taiwan's 210,000 active personnel. Beijing has rapidly expanded its missile arsenal, air and naval power in recent years, adding combat-ready aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered submarines to its fleet.
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Admiral Lee Hsi-min, chief of general staff from 2017 to 2019, raised the proposal of special operations forces taking on this mission as part of his "Overall Defence Concept" (ODC) doctrine.
Under the ODC, Taiwan would wield its natural strategic advantages as a mountainous island to repel and resist Chinese control.
But Admiral Lee told the Telegraph a key part of his deterrence doctrine was to transform the current reservist system into a "territorial defence force" to carry out "guerrilla warfare" using light portable weapons like Manpads and IEDs, adding depth to a conventional campaign.
"[China] will still have to think how to deal with this kind of homeland defence. That is deterrence because you complicate their operational plan. If you can always complicate their operational plan they will wait," he said.
The proposal goes much further than the current debate on gradual reforms to the reservist system and four-month compulsory military service, which have been criticised for failing to adequately prepare recruits who would be called up during a war.
Chen Hsieng-you, a mechanical engineer who did his national service two years ago, reflected a widespread view that he would be willing to defend Taiwan but did not feel confident in his training.
"Young people will say they would like to fight but I don't think I can use my combat skills or shooting skills in a war. How can I fight as a soldier?" he said.
Frustration in Washington
The ministry of national defence, which recently proposed longer refresher training for reservists, said it was constantly reviewing the combat effectiveness of its active and reserve forces.
But frustration lingers in Washington that reforms are not being made fast enough.
Two draft US Senate bills this month proposed billions in military financing aid on condition that Taipei raises its defence budget, focuses on asymmetric warfare rather than flashy items like fighter jets that could quickly be overwhelmed, and reforms its reserves into a more robust territorial force.
"There needs to be more of a territorial or homeland defence mission with associated training so that it presents a layered defence, as opposed to the current model which is that these reserve forces would be plugging gaps at the beachhead," said Heino Klinck, former deputy assistant secretary of defence for East Asia.
"There are plenty of worldwide examples that Taiwan can pick and choose from that best matches the Taiwan specific environment."
Klinck has previously argued the US, as guarantor of Taiwan's security and its biggest arms supplier, should show "tough love" to push Taipei to fine tune its military priorities.
The Taiwanese ministry of defence said it welcomed the Senate bills and was building an "asymmetric combat force" to meet the needs of defence operations and the changing enemy threat. The military had "demonstrated its determination to defend itself", it said in a statement.
Its latest biennial military strategy report, released this month, focused on investing in a large number of small, survivable weapons, including sea mines and coastal missile systems, to inflict maximum damage on Chinese forces while they are crossing the Taiwan Strait.
Kolas Yotaka, spokeswoman for Taiwan's presidential office, added that as the security environment changed, "Taiwan has been upgrading our defence in every sense. Updating strategy, raising budgets, and improving co-ordination with partners.
"Taiwanese are survivors. We are alert and prepared," she said. "Although maintaining peace is our goal and our priority, we are not ignoring the risks we face."
Additional reporting: John Liu
9. Russia's 'Irregular War' Against NATO’s Eastern Flank Must Be Confronted
Excerpts:
Simply put: Moscow wants to get paid – not just in additional revenue from the surging gas prices, but in political currency, in which the key states in the EU recognize that the Russian Federation is again both a European power and a power in Europe, able to shape what happens on the continent to its liking. Most importantly, this crisis may spell the end of any hope of a regional solution to the crisis in Eastern Europe, for if/when Russian border guard units start patrolling the Belarusian border with NATO, there will be no doubt of who defines what stability along that border means and what it takes to restore order. This final de facto absorption of Belarus into Russia will go beyond the current full military and intelligence services integration between the two states, and leave Ukraine alone, exposed to Russian pressure and increasingly devoid of Western support, regardless of what the Balts, Poles, or Romanians do to try to salvage Kyiv’s sovereignty.
...
So today the ball is in NATO and the EU’s corners: Will the West finally stand up, impose the penalties on Russia and Belarus that will break their ambition (canceling Nord Stream 2 altogether would be a good start)? Or will the same hand-wringing declarations be all we are capable of, while violence against the alliance’s borders unleashed from Minsk and Moscow continues unabated?
The decision is up to us.
Russia's 'Irregular War' Against NATO’s Eastern Flank Must Be Confronted
If you believe you are engaged in strategic competition while your adversary is engaged in a war against you, for all practical purposes you have already lost. This adage could well be applied to NATO as its leaders stare at the unfolding crisis along the alliance’s eastern border, with thousands of migrants from the Middle East and Central Asia herded by the Belarusian government and pushed to force their way into Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland.
This crisis has been building for weeks now. Precious little attention was paid to it in Western media initially, perhaps because it was happening somewhere “out there” on the borders – to paraphrase a twentieth-century British politician – of faraway countries many in Europe know little about. But we are now at a stage where this assault on Europe’s eastern flank can no longer be ignored.
Along NATO and EU borders desperate people – many of whom have paid thousands to the Lukashenka regime to be ferried to the border – have been transformed into human bullets. The crisis has been ratcheted up by Putin’s military actions, with Russian bombers escorted by Belarusian fighters flying close to NATO’s Eastern frontier. In addition, Russian and Belarusian snap exercises saw the two countries’ airborne troops parachuted just kilometers away from NATO’s border. Putin is concentrating his military on the border with Ukraine, stirring fears across the alliance that he may invade the country once more. Meanwhile, Minsk has announced that it is in talks with Moscow about instituting “joint patrols” by Belarusian and Russian border security forces along the borders with Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland.
Putin’s irregular warfare (IW) playbook aims to hit the West at the heart of our axiological fabric, where values and assumptions about the sanctity of human life clash head-on with the irreducible duty of the state to provide for border integrity and security. The narrative of the migrants’ human suffering is being superimposed by Moscow on the constitutional obligations confronting each and every Western government, rendering thus far something akin to leadership paralysis among the largest EU countries.
Last night border security forces in Lithuania, Latvia, and especially Poland reported hundreds of attempts to breach their borders, with migrants pushed by Belarusian security forces, instructed to throw tree trunks and branches at the concertina wire separating the borders, to cut wire fences with wire cutters provided by Lukashenka’s forces, and to hurl rocks at the border guards, police and the military standing their ground on the other side of NATO/EU borders. The propaganda narrative emanating from Minsk and Moscow has been relentless, painting the Balts and the Poles as criminally liable for this humanitarian disaster, notwithstanding the fact that the three allies are simply defending their borders while the entire operation has been engineered, funded, and run by Lukashenka and Putin.
So, what’s Moscow intent in this IW campaign?
I would submit that this is another step by Putin to insert Russia deeply into European politics, making the Kremlin’s preferences and decisions a defining factor in how Europe’s relations with Russia evolve going forward. Putin has reason to believe he can get away with it. Moscow recently scored a major coup when the Biden administration lifted sanctions on the completion of Nord Stream 2, and what it wants now is the final deal to make the new pipe operational, consolidating Russia’s position as the principal supplier of energy to the European Union.
Simply put: Moscow wants to get paid – not just in additional revenue from the surging gas prices, but in political currency, in which the key states in the EU recognize that the Russian Federation is again both a European power and a power in Europe, able to shape what happens on the continent to its liking. Most importantly, this crisis may spell the end of any hope of a regional solution to the crisis in Eastern Europe, for if/when Russian border guard units start patrolling the Belarusian border with NATO, there will be no doubt of who defines what stability along that border means and what it takes to restore order. This final de facto absorption of Belarus into Russia will go beyond the current full military and intelligence services integration between the two states, and leave Ukraine alone, exposed to Russian pressure and increasingly devoid of Western support, regardless of what the Balts, Poles, or Romanians do to try to salvage Kyiv’s sovereignty.
In 2015 when the Balkan migrant crisis unfolded, we witnessed the fundamental weakness of the West in plain view for all to see, for the European Union proved unable to find a workable compromise that would reaffirm the sovereign rights of democracies to control who enters their homes and the humanitarian considerations that will always be an essential part of what we stand for. Instead, the après nous le deluge approach that best encapsulates the lack of leadership in 2015 that first opened Europe’s borders wide to a flood of migrants, and then sought to cut deals with external players, especially Turkey, to block the human torrent into Europe. This taught Putin and Lukashenka a valuable lesson: turn the values the West espouses against it and it will inevitably fold.
So today the ball is in NATO and the EU’s corners: Will the West finally stand up, impose the penalties on Russia and Belarus that will break their ambition (canceling Nord Stream 2 altogether would be a good start)? Or will the same hand-wringing declarations be all we are capable of, while violence against the alliance’s borders unleashed from Minsk and Moscow continues unabated?
The decision is up to us.
Andrew A. Michta is a Contributing Editor for 1945. The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
10. US urged to help more people escape Taliban-led Afghanistan
US urged to help more people escape Taliban-led Afghanistan
A coalition of organizations working to evacuate people who could be targeted by the Taliban rulers in Afghanistan appealed Monday for more assistance from the U.S. government and other nations as conditions deteriorate in the country.
Members of the AfghanEvac Coalition met in a video call with Secretary of State Antony Blinken to press the case for additional resources to help tens of thousands of people get out of Afghanistan, now faced with a deepening economic and humanitarian crisis in addition to a precarious security situation following the U.S. withdrawal.
Participants said afterward they were grateful for what the State Department has done so far, including helping to arrange a series of evacuation flights for U.S. citizens and residents since the withdrawal, but more will be needed in the months ahead.
“The State Department doing enough isn’t enough; we need whole of government solutions; we need the international community to step up and we need it quickly,” said Peter Lucier, a former Marine who served in Afghanistan who works with coalition-member Team America. “Winter is coming. There is a famine already. "
Private groups, particularly with ties to the veteran community, have played an important role in the evacuation and resettlement of tens of thousands of Afghans since the U.S. ended its longest war and the government fell to the Taliban. Members of the coalition, which includes about 100 organizations, have been working to help people get on the scarce flights out of the country and helping them get settled in communities once they reach the United States.
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Troops with family members still in the country can notify the Pentagon to help coordinate their escape.
State Department spokesman Ned Price said the call included discussion of what he called “our collective efforts” to aid visa holders and applicants and to “facilitate the departure of these individuals who are at a stage where it is appropriate to do so.”
About 82,000 people have come to the U.S. so far under what the Biden administration calls Operation Allies Welcome. The Department of Homeland Security said 10 percent were American citizens or permanent residents.
The rest were a combination of people who had obtained special immigrant visas, for those who had worked for the U.S. government as interpreters or in some other capacity; people applying for one of the visas but who hadn’t yet received it; or other Afghans who might be vulnerable under the Taliban, such as journalists or government officials, and qualified to come as refugees. Nearly half were children.
As of Monday, DHS said about 46,000 are still being housed at domestic U.S. military bases until they can be resettled by private refugee organizations around the country. Another 2,600 remain at overseas transit points, dubbed “lily pads,” as they undergo security vetting and health screening before coming to the U.S.
The AfghanEvac Coalition has urged the U.S. government to establish more of the “lilly pads,” and work with other nations to create more pathways for people to reach safety. It’s unclear how many people need to be evacuated but organizations have estimated the number conservatively in the tens of thousands. Aid agencies said about 300,000 have fled Afghanistan into Iran, including many members of Shiite communities seeking refuge from both the Taliban and attacks by the Islamic State affiliate in the country.
Lucier and Shawn VanDiver, a founder of the coalition, said without providing specifics that they raised “specific stumbling blocks” and “choke points,” that are preventing people from reaching safety in the U.S. or elsewhere. Both said it will require more time and input from other parts of the government to solve those problems.
“The answers are complex,” Lucier said. “There are no simple technical fixes to a lot of this.”
The meeting takes place against a backdrop of intense criticism by some Republicans in Congress, attacking a frantic evacuation, which was set in motion by President Donald Trump’s decision to sign a peace deal with the Taliban and set a withdrawal date, and for what they have alleged is insufficient vetting of refugees. They have also accused the administration of understating the number of American citizens left behind.
Republicans on the House Foreign Affairs Committee wrote Blinken on Monday seeking interviews with more than 30 State Department officials to address what they called the “many unanswered questions about the planning – or lack thereof – that preceded the drawdown and evacuation.” Those include the number of American citizens and residents still in Afghanistan and mechanisms for continued evacuations.
Afghan women and children refugees living in Indonesia hold posters during a rally outside a building that houses UNHCR representative office in Jakarta, Indonesia, Monday, Nov. 15, 2021. Hundreds of Afghan refugees and asylum seekers living in Indonesia rallied in front of the U.N. refugee agency office in Jakarta on Monday to urge it to speed up their resettlement. (Achmad Ibrahim/AP)
As of Monday, the U.S. has assisted the departure of 435 American citizens and 325 permanent residents since Aug. 31, including with some recent flights, Price said.
Blinken said Friday that the U.S. has offered the opportunity to leave Afghanistan to all American citizens and permanent residents it has identified as remaining in the country who wish to depart and have appropriate travel documents. Several hundred Americans are reported to still be in Afghanistan, though not all have indicated they want to leave, Biden administration officials have said.
The Gulf nation of Qatar has agreed to represent the United States in Taliban-run Afghanistan following the closure of the American Embassy in Kabul and will handle consular services for American citizens in Afghanistan and will deal with routine official communications between Washington and the Taliban government.
11. How the family of the ‘3212’ soldier who fell in Niger grappled with false and misleading information
Such a tragedy.
Excerpts:
LaDavid decided on the Niger trip that he wanted to go to Special Forces Selection and become a Green Beret, his comrades and widow told me. His comrades had deployed with him to Niger previously and asked for him to join them on the 2017 trip.
The autopsy photos show that inside one of the body bags shrouding his remains, which were stripped of everything except his bloodied t-shirt and pants and his bullet-pierced helmet, was a small cloth patch adorned with three skulls on a shield, emblazoned, “ODA 3212,” and neatly placed on his chest by a comrade for the journey home to Miami.
Last July at Fort Bragg, Lt. Gen. Francis Beaudette presented LaDavid Johnson and Jeremiah Johnson with honorary Green Berets, an unprecedented honor given to support soldiers.
How the family of the ‘3212’ soldier who fell in Niger grappled with false and misleading information
Early in the four-year investigation I led with my ABC News colleagues, which unfolds in the new feature documentary “3212 UN-REDACTED” about the 2017 ISIS ambush of a Green Beret team in Tongo Tongo, Niger, the family of fallen Sgt. LaDavid T. Johnson recounted a startling phone call.
LaDavid’s widow Myeshia Johnson and his mother Cowanda Johnson said that the day after LaDavid was reported missing in action in the Oct. 4, 2017, gunfight, they received a phone call from an Army officer informing them that the young mechanic had been captured by the enemy. Three of his 10 teammates had lost their lives in an attack by more than 100 jihadist fighters that stunned the public, the U.S. military, Congress and the Trump White House.
“I get a call saying that they have an American soldier, and they are willing to do a trade,” Myeshia Johnson told us in an interview for the documentary.
Myeshia, who at the time was 25 and pregnant with the couple’s third child, said the caller told her the information had come from a villager in a remote part of northwest Niger, who claimed that militants were holding LaDavid captive and wanted to swap him for an unnamed ISIS commander’s “brother” who was being held in prison.
Myeshia Johnson wearing Sgt. LaDavid Johnson’s camouflage Army jackets during an interview for an ABC News documentary on Sept. 14, 2021. (3212 UN-REDACTED/ABC/Hulu)
“They just said they’re willing to do a trade,” Myeshia recalled as she sat across from me wearing one of LaDavid’s camouflage Army jackets. “In my mind, they still didn’t find my husband. I don’t know what’s going on. So any little thing that somebody tells me, I’m thinking, could this be my husband?”
The next day, however, brought no new news of a prisoner swap ― just a knock on the door from a U.S casualty assistance officer that dashed those hopes.
“He told me, ‘As of Oct. 6, Sgt. Johnson went from missing in action to KIA,’” Myeshia remembered. “Everybody went bananas. I was screaming and crying, and my mother-in-law was throwing glasses and screaming and crying. She’d fallen on the floor. She was throwing things.”
“Oct. 6, 2017 was a day I think I went insane,” Cowanda told us.
Had Sgt. LaDavid Johnson truly been captured after the Oct. 4 ambush? The military would later say that he had not. But that hardly satisfied a family left reeling by grief, doubt and a string of inconsistent information from the Army.
The mystery of that Army phone call stating that LaDavid Johnson had been captured by ISIS — which our investigation ultimately determined was based on an uncorroborated intelligence report quickly knocked down at the time by military intelligence officers in Niger — is one of the earliest examples of conflicting and false statements by U.S. military leaders given to the families of the four fallen soldiers of Operational Detachment-Alpha 3212, which are scrutinized in the ABC documentary streaming on Hulu beginning Nov. 11.
Despite a public pledge in late 2017 by then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford to “go to every last length to provide the families with accurate information,” the Johnsons told us they felt the exact opposite happened.
In fact, so did the families of the other three other fallen soldiers: Staff Sgt. Dustin Wright, Sgt. 1st Class Jeremiah Johnson and Staff Sgt. Bryan Black.
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A roughly 45-minute video filmed by one of the four U.S. soldiers slain in the 2017 Niger ambush was quietly recovered during a French operation.
They have spent four years fighting back against the core claims made by U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM): that their loved ones were part of a small Special Forces team that went on a rogue mission unapproved by senior commanders to kill an ISIS commander, and that they were inadequately trained, incompetent compared to other special operations teams, and unprepared to face the enemy, as former top commander Marine Gen. Thomas Waldhauser claimed publicly in 2018.
Sgt. LaDavid Johnson is seen in this undated photo. Johnson was killed in October 2017 in southwest Niger on a joint U.S. and Nigerien patrol. He assigned to 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, N.C. (Myeshia Johnson)
But for LaDavid Johnson’s family, the lingering doubt over whether the young man — known in his Miami neighborhood as the “Wheelie King” for his legendary ability to ride his bike for miles on a single wheel — was captured and had his wrists bound behind his back and possibly tortured before he was executed, as news reports claimed at the time, is almost unbearable.
No one from the military ever explained to them who called or why they were told that LaDavid had become an ISIS prisoner, family members said. It was just one of the many pieces of confusing information given to the families that we dug into for the film.
“If I could go back and figure out who gave them that first report I’d f***ing choke the s*** out of them. I mean, it’s just, it’s egregious that somebody would share that unconfirmed report with them and unconscionable that the family would be given conflicting statements,” Mark Mitchell, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Acting) overseeing U.S. special operations at the time, says pointedly in the film.
The family says they believed for a long time that LaDavid had, in fact, been captured, bound and executed by ISIS, despite denials by military officials.
“I believed that. I felt that my husband was captured,” Myeshia told us. Over time, she has come to believe it less and less as more information from our three-year investigation came to light.
As alleged in the ABC/Hulu documentary I co-produced with director Brian Epstein and editor Andrew Fredericks, this was merely the first of numerous private and public misstatements and missteps made by the U.S. military regarding the Tongo Tongo gunfight — and LaDavid Johnson’s death, in particular.
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ABC News' James Gordon Meek's new documentary — 3212 Un-redacted — hits Hulu Nov. 11, after spending three years uncovering what he claims is the truth behind the fatal ambush of a team of Army Green Berets in Tongo Tongo, Niger, on Oct. 4, 2017.
The cloud of doubt would spread over the families of the other soldiers. Our investigation found that they, too, had encountered officials who engaged in questionable behavior, presented false allegations, buried material facts, failed to explain peculiarities, and misled them in order to protect senior leaders, according to other top commanders and officials we interviewed on camera and off.
Mitchell, himself a highly-decorated Green Beret colonel, strongly criticized the official investigation of the attack, making him the highest-ranking whistleblower to come forward. The investigation was led by the AFRICOM commander Gen. Waldhauser’s own chief of staff, in what Mitchell and many others say was a clear conflict of interest.
ABC’s investigation since 2017 found no support for Waldhauser’s core claims about the team’s “true task and purpose,” including what he stated about the team’s supposed effort to find intelligence on the whereabouts of Jeffery Woodke, an aid worker kidnapped in 2016 who remains in captivity.
The actions of the chain of command and AFRICOM devolved even further following the Oct. 5, 2017 call informing LaDavid’s loved ones that he’d been a prisoner of ISIS, known for beheading hostages.
Army officers arrived at the home of LaDavid’s parents Richard and Cowanda Johnson in a working-class neighborhood of Opa-Locka, Florida, and undertook questionable actions, the family alleges.
Then-3rd Special Forces Group commander Col. Bradley Moses — the only person in the chain of command who never received any sort of reprimand, despite overseeing the ill-fated missions of ODA 3212 — told them that LaDavid had been missing in action for 48 hours because he was thrown from his Toyota Hilux during the first hour of the firefight, the family said.
“Col. Moses told me that LaDavid was in the back of the truck. The truck hit the tree,” Cowanda says in the film. “He said that LaDavid flew 900 meters and wound up in the bushes. Yes.”
Col. Moses, in a call to me last year denied that he ever told the family that LaDavid was thrown from his truck.
But the now-retired commander for Northwest Africa special operations did admit to doing something else the Johnsons found fishy, which was asking for the last text messages LaDavid sent during the mission to his family. “As a commander I thought, maybe this is something that could help put a puzzle piece in place to have a broader understanding of what happened,” Moses explained to me.
The family refused to show Moses the texts because the request seemed suspicious to them, since he was not part of AFRICOM’s investigation into the incident. Family members, however, provided the messages to me.
LaDavid texted his young wife Myeshia about a baby stroller she wanted to purchase, not about details of the mission.
It was, as the mission plan had called for, a reconnaissance mission where they would attempt to lock onto a cell phone signal associated with an ISIS commander named Doundoun Cheffou, which had been detected by a U.S. drone. The idea was track but not kill Cheffou, more than a dozen sources inside the military and intelligence community told me.
LaDavid texted Myeshia from his base at Oulluam, Niger, at 5:52 a.m. on Oct. 3, minutes before the team rolled outside the wire. “Going on mission bae,” he wrote.
Later during the mission, Myeshia sent LaDavid a selfie to show him how her pregnant belly was growing. Hours passed without a response, so she sent another note through WhatsApp. “Bae,” she tapped into her phone. LaDavid never saw the photo or her affectionate text. By then he was dead.
Sgt. LaDavid Johnson is seen in this undated photo. Johnson was killed in October 2017 in southwest Niger on a joint U.S. and Nigerien patrol. He assigned to 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, N.C. (Myeshia Johnson)
Sgt. LaDavid Johnson’s body was recovered by another team, ODA 3216, after village children found him on Oct. 6 amid five spent 5.56 mm shell casings from his M4 carbine and brass from enemy AK-47s.
Officials failed to explain LaDavid’s horrific wounds, the details of which his family poured over in the autopsy report, in photos and in other official documents. They also failed to explain why, evident among the 50 autopsy photos reviewed by ABC News, his remains arrived home with two pairs of pants and a French-made jacket in the body bag, which didn’t belong to him. One of the Green Berets who recovered his remains told me that villagers had picked up discarded military clothing in the desert and placed it with LaDavid, whose head they covered with a white scarf.
The family’s confusion and questions didn’t end there.
Moses and 2nd Battalion commander Lt. Col. David Painter largely remained out of sight for four years during the ensuing multiple investigations of the incident in Niger, avoiding the families and the press while family members say some Pentagon officials slow-rolled the release of information, refusing to turn over AFRICOM’s redacted 268-page report to the families until June 2019 — 20 months after the attack — at a meeting at Fort Bragg, N.C., where Myeshia and Cowanda Johnson walked out in frustration.
The information the Johnson family had shared with us about the phone call informing them of LaDavid’s supposed capture was partially laid out deep inside that report’s redacted pages, which stated that the Nigerien Army had received “an unverified report” from a villager “that a hostage had been taken to a village near the Mali border.” The U.S. military believed the report pertained to LaDavid but soon “the unverified report proved false,” AFRICOM stated.
“It didn’t shake out because it was completely false,” one Special Forces operator with the 3rd Special Forces Group, who was part of the recovery effort in Niger, told me. Special operators prepared to raid a village but an officer said he simply dialed up a source they had in the village.
“We said, ‘Hey, is ISIS there?’ The answer was no,” the operator told me. “They went down that rabbit hole along with whoever called LaDavid’s family. They were planning an operation based on it before anybody bothered to ask, ‘What was the source of the report?’”
In another macabre twist, Maj. Alan Van Saun told me that when he accompanied AFRICOM investigators to Tongo Tongo a few weeks after the gunfight, they dug several of LaDavid’s teeth out of the sand under the thorny tree where the AFRICOM report said he made his last stand. His parents still hold onto them and it gave them another reason to fear he was executed.
Was the official military autopsy conclusive in knocking down any claims he had been captured, bound and executed?
I asked a former top medical examiner and retired Navy captain who worked at Dover and also led worldwide POW-MIA recovery efforts for the military, Dr. Edward Reedy, to examine the written autopsy report and 50 photos.
“I see no evidence of binding, torture or restraint,” Reedy told me this year, agreeing with the official findings. “He has a tremendous number of gunshot wounds.” But none were point-blank execution style wounds.
The veteran medical examiner said he was saddened but hardly surprised by the poor communication with the Johnson family.
“I can really relate to this family’s anguish. I’ve been involved in a number of these cases where communication between leadership and the family has not been clear. It has caused no end of problems,” Dr. Reedy said.
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Team Ouallam was ambushed by an assaulting force three times their size and equipped with medium and heavy machine guns, rocket propelled grenades and mortars.
Eventually, the fallen soldiers of ODA 3212 were honored with valor awards, although some were downgraded by commanders. LaDavid Johnson received the Silver Star for his actions, which included suppressing enemy fire with an M240 machine gun and sniper rifle that Staff Sgt. Bryan Black had taught him to use. One teammate said LaDavid, the team mechanic, fought “just like a Green Beret.”
But Myeshia let her feelings be known at the 2019 valor award ceremony, at one point turning away from Army officers in tears. “I was angry. angry,” she says in the film. “I wanted my husband to be here with me. No award, medal, anything could bring him back. I’m angry, and I’m still angry to this day.”
Sgt. LaDavid Johnson is seen in this undated photo. Johnson was killed in October 2017 in southwest Niger on a joint U.S. and Nigerien patrol. He assigned to 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, N.C. (Myeshia Johnson)
LaDavid decided on the Niger trip that he wanted to go to Special Forces Selection and become a Green Beret, his comrades and widow told me. His comrades had deployed with him to Niger previously and asked for him to join them on the 2017 trip.
The autopsy photos show that inside one of the body bags shrouding his remains, which were stripped of everything except his bloodied t-shirt and pants and his bullet-pierced helmet, was a small cloth patch adorned with three skulls on a shield, emblazoned, “ODA 3212,” and neatly placed on his chest by a comrade for the journey home to Miami.
Last July at Fort Bragg, Lt. Gen. Francis Beaudette presented LaDavid Johnson and Jeremiah Johnson with honorary Green Berets, an unprecedented honor given to support soldiers.
James Gordon Meek is an award-winning national security investigative reporter for ABC News. He has covered the rise of Al Qaeda since 1998, from the Millennium Plot to reporting from the ground outside the Pentagon after a hijacked plane hit it on Sept. 11, 2001, and on combat patrols with Special Operators and U.S. infantrymen in Afghanistan.
Editor’s note: This is an Op-Ed and as such, the opinions expressed are those of the author. If you would like to respond, or have an editorial of your own you would like to submit, please contact Military Times managing editor Howard Altman, haltman@militarytimes.com.
12. ‘We are warriors’: Women join fight against military in Myanmar
Excerpts:
The experience of displacement also motivated Nway Oo Pan to join the local people’s defence force in her native Moebye township, Shan State.
“After the military’s inhumane treatment toward people, I thought to myself, ‘Am I going to get treated badly just like that, living as a displaced person, or am I going to fight back?’” asked the 20-year-old, who before the pandemic was also a university student.
Now, she is living and training alongside male and female recruits. “We face many challenges. I have never lived in the forest; I have spent my whole life studying. We have to climb up and down mountains and hills daily under the sun and rain. I have gained totally new experiences,” she said.
“I don’t even notice my menstrual cramps anymore because I have to train and travel a lot in the forest. Before, whenever I had menstrual cramps, I always stayed in bed. Now, I am in the forest and I live with others. I cannot stay like that anymore.”
Nway Oo Pan chose to be a combat fighter, where more than fearing for her life, she worries that she will be a burden to other fighters if she cannot keep up. But day by day, she is gaining confidence.
“My mindset has become strong that we can do what men do,” she said. “I want to achieve gender equality through this revolution.”
‘We are warriors’: Women join fight against military in Myanmar
Before taking up arms against the military regime in July, Kabya May had never worn trousers.
Like many women in Myanmar, the 23-year-old teacher from Sagaing region was accustomed to wearing an ankle-length sarong called a htamein. Now, she is a member of the Myaung Women Warriors, Myanmar’s first publicly announced all-female fighter group.
“I joined because I want to root out the dogs,” said Kabya May, using what has become a derogatory term for Myanmar security forces. “The reason I joined a women’s only resistance group is to show that women can do what men are doing.”
Kabya May is one of an increasing number of women who have joined the armed resistance to military rule since the coup on February 1. Four female fighters told Al Jazeera that along with destroying the military dictatorship, they want to overturn traditional gender norms and ensure women play an equal role in building a new nation.
Al Jazeera is using pseudonyms for Kabya May and the other women featured in this article due to the risk of military reprisals.
Women have played a prominent role in the protest movement that emerged after army chief Min Aung Hlaing seized power.
Garment factory workers were among the first to take to the streets, and women continue to march on the front lines of pro-democracy demonstrations. They have also been prominent in an ongoing Civil Disobedience Movement and in leading calls for ethnic minority rights.
Women have at times actively used their femininity as a tool of resistance. Challenging a superstition that it is emasculating for a man to pass under, or come into contact with, a woman’s lower garments, women have waved flags made of sarongs, affixed coup leader Min Aung Hlaing’s image to sanitary pads, and strung sarongs, knickers and used sanitary pads across streets to mock and humiliate security forces and stop them in their tracks.
Women have not been spared the military’s crackdown on dissent: the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) told Al Jazeera that out of 1,260 people killed by security forces since the coup, at least 87 were women, while more than 1,300 of the 12,000 people sentenced, jailed or charged have been female.
Women’s participation in armed resistance movements in Myanmar is not new. Some of the country’s largest ethnic armed organisations claim hundreds of women in their ranks, and Naw Zipporah Sein, the former vice-chairperson of the Karen National Union, served as the lead negotiator for ethnic armed organisations during 2015 peace talks that led to a landmark ceasefire agreement with the military.
The Myaung Women Warriors following the attack on the police station with a group of People’s Defence Forces[Supplied]
But a study on women in ethnic armed organisations in Myanmar published in 2019 by the Peace Research Institute Oslo found that overall, women have played subordinate roles, that male leaders failed to recognise women’s abilities and ignored their ideas, and that women’s potential to contribute to peace in Myanmar was “greatly undervalued”.
Fight for equality
The coup has sparked a broad reevaluation of such entrenched views, and the protest movement – led mainly by young people – is demanding a sweeping overhaul not only of a flawed political system, but also social inequities.
Amara, spokesperson for the Myaung Women Warriors, told Al Jazeera that the group seeks to challenge restrictive gender categorisations. “Society frames certain tasks for men and women,” she said. “We march to break these stereotypes, and to show that the hands that swing the [baby] hammock can be part of the armed revolution too.”
Before the coup, Amara had never imagined she would be a revolutionary fighter. But witnessing the killings and violence around her compelled her to take what she saw as a necessary step.
“I took up arms only when I had no other choice,” she said. “I have anxiety about what kind of danger will befall me … On the other hand, we are determined that we have to win this. We are preparing our mentality; we don’t feel normal, but we have to control our minds.”
The Myaung Women Warriors is one of hundreds of armed resistance groups, known commonly as People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), which have emerged across the country since about April.
“As the whole country is in the revolution, we are playing our role, and also promoting women’s role,” said Amara.
On October 29, they were part of a coalition of people’s defence forces that burned down a police station. Amara said the act was meant to deter soldiers and police from using the station as a base from which to attack local villages.
Women attend a PDF training session. Those Al Jazeera spoke to said they had become tougher as a result of the training and were determined to show they were as strong as the men [Supplied]
Photos of the operation have gained wide traction on social media.
Amara says that seeing the public’s support has given the women strength to continue, but that they remain focused on their mission.
“We are women warriors, which means we are ready to fight anytime and anywhere. Warriors are brave, decisive, and loyal … We are ready to fight for the people.”
Kabya May, the former teacher, joined the armed resistance two months before the Myaung Women Warriors group was established. Like many young people across Myanmar, she decided to take up arms after facing mounting hardships, physical insecurity and an increasingly bleak future.
“Since the coup, nothing has gone well,” she said. “Young people feel we are wasting our time. We cannot travel freely. When the [military] dogs come, people are afraid. I don’t want to see those things anymore.”
The oldest of five children, she had graduated from teacher-training college in early 2020, fresh with hope that her monthly salary could enable her father to retire from spraying pesticides on local farms for daily wages.
But months later, schools closed across the country because of the pandemic, and she began working at a barbecue shop instead.
The coup prompted mass teacher strikes against working under a military-run administration, and Kabya May signed on. When the barbecue shop where she was working shut down, she joined her father spraying pesticides and taking other labour jobs she could find. “My family is big and we depend on daily wages,” she said. “If we don’t work for a day, we have nothing to eat.”
When she heard that people from her township were forming an armed resistance group, she asked whether women could join too. In July, she began training.
It was not only her first time wearing trousers, but also the first time she had stayed in close quarters with men from outside her family.
“When I first joined, I felt shy, but later on, I felt comfortable and we became comrades,” she said. “When I trained with [men], like push-ups, I tried to keep up … I faced muscle and back pain, but I endured it.”
Revolutionary life
In Kayah State and neighbouring townships in Shan State near Myanmar’s southeastern border with Thailand, two young women told Al Jazeera that they joined local armed resistance groups after the pandemic and coup destroyed their educational plans, and they were forced from their homes by escalating conflict.
Women practise physical training after joining up with a PDF. The struggle is not only against military rule but to overturn traditional attitudes towards women [Supplied}
Since May, PDFs in these areas have joined existing ethnic armed organisations to wage a formidable front against the military, which has responded with tactics including air attacks, arson and indiscriminate shelling. Some 165,000 people have been displaced across Myanmar’s southeast, out of 223,000 newly displaced across the country since February, according to the United Nations.
When clashes spread across Kayah State in May, Pale fled her village in Demoso township, running to the mountains with her family and others from her village.
“The weather was cold and water scarce. We didn’t bring sweaters or coats and we brought food for only one to two days,” said the 21-year-old, who had been attending university until the pandemic. “We had to come back under bullets and combat to collect necessities.”
As days turned to months, Pale’s hopes of a prompt return faded, and she began thinking about ways to support the resistance movement. In July, when a friend invited her to join the local people’s defence force, she agreed.
Assigned to be a medic, she is treating patients including those injured by the conflict. She also participates in physical conditioning and training, takes turns in the kitchen, and tends to farms abandoned by displaced villagers, giving them some of the crops in the camps where they are now living.
While some people cannot handle the rigorous demands or following orders, Pale says it has toughened her up. She has also become accustomed to the sounds of war.
“The first time I heard gunfire, I was so scared,” she said. “We have become used to it now because we hear it all the time. We believe that our lives are in God’s hands, and when our time comes, we will die … This is how we motivate each other to continue.”
Even though women and men at times take on different roles, Pale says that the experience of the hardships of revolutionary life together has fostered a sense of camaraderie and equity. “There are many roles women can play. Some women want to join, but their parents do not allow them because people see us women as soft and weak,” she said. “We need to show that we are able. We can do it.”
Weapons training for women at a training camp of the Demoso People’s Defence Force [Supplied]
The experience of displacement also motivated Nway Oo Pan to join the local people’s defence force in her native Moebye township, Shan State.
“After the military’s inhumane treatment toward people, I thought to myself, ‘Am I going to get treated badly just like that, living as a displaced person, or am I going to fight back?’” asked the 20-year-old, who before the pandemic was also a university student.
Now, she is living and training alongside male and female recruits. “We face many challenges. I have never lived in the forest; I have spent my whole life studying. We have to climb up and down mountains and hills daily under the sun and rain. I have gained totally new experiences,” she said.
“I don’t even notice my menstrual cramps anymore because I have to train and travel a lot in the forest. Before, whenever I had menstrual cramps, I always stayed in bed. Now, I am in the forest and I live with others. I cannot stay like that anymore.”
Nway Oo Pan chose to be a combat fighter, where more than fearing for her life, she worries that she will be a burden to other fighters if she cannot keep up. But day by day, she is gaining confidence.
“My mindset has become strong that we can do what men do,” she said. “I want to achieve gender equality through this revolution.”
This article was supported by a grant from ARTICLE 19 under Voices for Inclusion, a project funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
13. US Manufacturing Decline is Hurting National Security, Report Warns
Excerpts:
The report’s task force—chaired by former Lockheed Martin CEO Marillyn Hewson and David McCormick, a former Bush administration Treasury official who now runs the hedge fund Bridgewater Associates—also calls for an update to the Defense Production Act as well as deeper manufacturing ties between the U.S. and its closest allies. The panel included Republican and Democratic members of Congress and executives from non-defense firms including Walmart and Johnson & Johnson.
U.S. defense companies have increasingly reported supply chain disruptions, largely caused by the coronavirus pandemic, that are leading to delays in weapons manufacturing.
“I still see the U.S. defense industrial base as the strongest in the world” but “we can't assume that that will be the case going into the future,” Northrop Grumman CEO Kathy Warden said Monday at a Brookings Institution virtual event.
Warden pointed to workforce shortages, Congress routinely passing defense budgets late, and China increasing its annual military spending at a higher rate than the United States.
“All of these are issues that are not foreign to the defense industry and to me and my peers,” she said. “But these are things that we have to work to address to just remain at parity with other nations—let alone to be able to work at speeds that are faster [than] them and deliver capabilities that are greater than what other nations are able to produce for their governments.”
US Manufacturing Decline is Hurting National Security, Report Warns
A Ronald Reagan Institute task force says the government needs to spend more on job training and manufacturing infrastructure.
Unless the federal government helps train two million extra workers by 2030 and spends $100 billion annually to improve American manufacturing, the U.S. economy may become unable to keep up with China’s national-security threats, a new think tank report warns.
The findings of a study conducted by the conservative Ronald Reagan Institute arrive as supply chain meltdowns highlight the U.S. reliance on foreign-made items and the tired American infrastructure that brings them from ports to domestic assembly lines.
“Our declining manufacturing competitiveness leaves America’s economic infrastructure and defense capabilities underprepared for geopolitical events, global competition, and even major armed conflict,” the report states. “To revive our manufacturing base and maintain our edge as the world’s leading economy, the United States must employ innovative thinking from both the public and private sectors.”
But there’s no easy fix.
“One piece of legislation is not going to not going to solve this problem,” Rachel Hoff, policy director at the Ronald Reagan Institute, said in an interview Monday. “It really has to be something that's taken holistically by the various key stakeholders in sustained effort over time.”
The report’s authors call on policymakers to spend more to train American workers, particularly in high-demand trades, and to allow high school graduates to use federal education grants to earn credentialed skills offered by employers.
The goal should be to bring 2 million “new or retrained workers into strategic manufacturing sectors by 2030 to address the critical skills gap in the current workforce, prepare for future manufacturing needs, and ensure a broad base of inclusive economic growth,” they write.
In 2017, the federal government spent $14 billion on job training and education, down from a peak of $20 billion eight years previously.
The report also calls for spending $100 billion annually on “plants, infrastructure, and related capabilities to accelerate the adoption of Industry 4.0 digital technologies and processes.”
Finally, it calls for more public-private partnerships to pay for improvements to domestic manufacturing sectors that are critical to national security.
“The federal government must develop the capability to work with private sector employers, as well as state and local governments, to provide liquidity and low-cost capital to critical domestic manufacturers and infrastructure,” the report states.
The report’s task force—chaired by former Lockheed Martin CEO Marillyn Hewson and David McCormick, a former Bush administration Treasury official who now runs the hedge fund Bridgewater Associates—also calls for an update to the Defense Production Act as well as deeper manufacturing ties between the U.S. and its closest allies. The panel included Republican and Democratic members of Congress and executives from non-defense firms including Walmart and Johnson & Johnson.
U.S. defense companies have increasingly reported supply chain disruptions, largely caused by the coronavirus pandemic, that are leading to delays in weapons manufacturing.
“I still see the U.S. defense industrial base as the strongest in the world” but “we can't assume that that will be the case going into the future,” Northrop Grumman CEO Kathy Warden said Monday at a Brookings Institution virtual event.
Warden pointed to workforce shortages, Congress routinely passing defense budgets late, and China increasing its annual military spending at a higher rate than the United States.
“All of these are issues that are not foreign to the defense industry and to me and my peers,” she said. “But these are things that we have to work to address to just remain at parity with other nations—let alone to be able to work at speeds that are faster [than] them and deliver capabilities that are greater than what other nations are able to produce for their governments.”
14. Hacking For Defense planners look to expand beyond military problems
As an aside, I cannot believe that Georgetown gave up participating in Hacking for Defense, But I am glad that Chris Taylor was able to take the project to George Washington University.
Excerpts:
Earlier this year CMP launched their new hacking programs, focused on issues like environmental sustainability, diplomacy and homeland security issues. The hope is that the lessons learned from the military partnerships can provide similar creative approaches to other social issues.
“People ask me ‘what problems do you want to work on?’ and I tell them that I want to work on them all,” he said. “This is about bringing more people into all of our problem solving processes.”
It’s also about showing future leaders more about social issues they hadn’t considered as part of their career paths. Gallo said a number of students in the Hacking For Defense courses had reservations about working directly with the military, only to take jobs after graduation in the industry because of newfound familiarity with the people and missions.
“And now we’re seeing some kids come into these courses as engineers, but leaving as environmentalists,” he said. “They recognize that the environment or defense or national security is in fact their life’s calling. And then they bring that new viewpoint into those problems.”
Hacking For Defense planners look to expand beyond military problems
For the last five years, Army veteran Alex Gallo and the Common Mission Project have been partnering with military officials to use teams of college students in solving a host of equipment and personnel challenges at the Defense Department.
Now the team wants to expand that idea to the rest of the world’s problems too.
“We’re doing programs on hacking for the oceans and the environment and hacking for climate and sustainability at five different universities already,” said Gallo, co-founder and executive director of CMP. “In society today, we solve too many problems in silos. This is a way to bring different groups together in a constructive problem solving process.”
The group’s Hacking For Defense program has drawn headlines in recent years for its unusual approach to Pentagon problems, with programs at more than 50 college campuses, including England.
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Teams of college students — would-be engineers, computer scientists, public policy specialists and more — work together for a semester on an issue presented by military partners, with the goal of finding outside-the-box solutions.
Recent topics tackled with help from the the National Security Innovation Network include developing anti-drone technology for special forces vehicles, improving portable batteries for personal battlefield use, and improving mental health support for military specialists facing higher rates of suicide.
Gallo, who served as an Army officer in Iraq, said the value of having individuals outside the military evaluate and propose answers to those problems is they aren’t limited by military preconceptions about what the solutions should be
“When we arrived in Kuwait before entering into Iraq, we got a lot of cool equipment,” he said. “And our soldiers tried it out in the desert. And when we went into Iraq, that stuff stayed in storage for an entire year.
“It was all solutions in search of problems. We had a ton of problems in Iraq that year, but none of what they gave us solved our problems.”
Students in the course (more than 500 have gone through the program so far) meet with front-line troops as well as military planners and leaders throughout the semester, to better understand the scope of the problems.
In one past project, Navy SEALs approached a class to help develop better health monitoring equipment for trainees, after several cases of hypothermia stalled training exercises.
Gallo said after extensive interviews, students determined the problem had less to do with trainees being unprepared for the elements than with insufficient navigation experience, which led to more time in colder temperatures trying to finish exercises. Instead of wearable health monitors, they recommended revamping how those skills were trained and tested.
“The SEALs also made it clear that any monitoring equipment they were issued was going to end up at the bottom of the ocean, which doesn’t solve the problem,” Gallo said.
Officials from the Common Mission Project said that over the last five years of the defense classes, they’ve seen changes in how defense officials approach problem solving, and more openness on behalf of commanders to listen to outside views to challenges they would have dealt with internally in the past.
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So Gallo said he wants to see if that bureaucratic turnaround can happen in other industries too.
Earlier this year CMP launched their new hacking programs, focused on issues like environmental sustainability, diplomacy and homeland security issues. The hope is that the lessons learned from the military partnerships can provide similar creative approaches to other social issues.
“People ask me ‘what problems do you want to work on?’ and I tell them that I want to work on them all,” he said. “This is about bringing more people into all of our problem solving processes.”
It’s also about showing future leaders more about social issues they hadn’t considered as part of their career paths. Gallo said a number of students in the Hacking For Defense courses had reservations about working directly with the military, only to take jobs after graduation in the industry because of newfound familiarity with the people and missions.
“And now we’re seeing some kids come into these courses as engineers, but leaving as environmentalists,” he said. “They recognize that the environment or defense or national security is in fact their life’s calling. And then they bring that new viewpoint into those problems.”
Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.
15. Grenada, the Evacuation of Afghanistan, and the Future of War
Conclusion:
Chaos, uncertainty, and lack of control over wartime circumstances are the new normal. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley has noted, the conditions of future wars will be “extremely austere,” with troops expected to “be comfortable with being seriously miserable every single minute of every single day.” The compressed timelines, lack of resources, and disruptive confusion of the Kabul mission are exactly what Milley’s world may look like in practice. Yet despite his warning, the shocked reaction within the military to the Kabul evacuation suggests that this message has not been fully received or internalized. The U.S. military has grown accustomed to fighting battles where it holds almost all the cards, and the enemy is the underdog. Those days are now almost certainly over. Unexpectedly, our class last month taught us that today’s military forces may not fully understand how much future U.S. wars will differ from their experiences in the most recent ones.
Grenada, the Evacuation of Afghanistan, and the Future of War - War on the Rocks
Last month, our graduate students taught us an important lesson about the future of war. We examined the 1983 invasion of Grenada, in which one of us participated as a 29-year-old Ranger company commander. Our class includes about a dozen U.S. military officers, and after listening to the first-hand account of the confusion and missteps that characterized the operation, many of them were shocked. As the discussions continued, we realized that during the past two decades of war, the U.S. military did not experience a large-scale operation marked by such intense chaos, confusion, and near failure until the evacuation of Kabul in August. We also realized that the wars our students will fight in the future will look far more like the invasion of Grenada and the chaotic evacuation of Kabul than what most members of the U.S. military have come to expect.
Our students sat rapt as one of us shared his vivid experiences of the Grenada invasion. He began by saying, “Everything that could go wrong, did go wrong.” Launched on very short notice to rescue American medical students stranded on a tiny Caribbean island amidst a bloody Marxist coup, the invasion was mounted by a quickly assembled, all-service pickup team that immediately ran into trouble. On the first day alone, three U.S. helicopters were shot down by enemy fire, and numerous others were so badly shot up that they were no longer flyable. The complex choreography of initial landings that were supposed to take place under the cover of darkness unfolded during daylight instead, with deadly results. Special operations forces failed to reach several of their objectives, and were cut off and surrounded at another objective by surprisingly aggressive enemy forces. Army, Marine, and special operations forces could not communicate with each other or with Air Force aircraft overhead, since their radios were either incompatible or required frequencies and call signs that had not been shared. And each service used different tourist maps of the island because even the most basic intelligence information was not available. By the end of the first day, many important objectives remained in enemy hands, and the rapidly cobbled-together U.S. invasion force had suffered over a dozen killed and over three dozen wounded at the hands of an unexpectedly capable enemy. By nightfall, that young company commander thought, “This is what losing feels like.”
As we fielded questions from our class about this brief and nearly forgotten episode of Cold War history, we were particularly taken aback by the reactions of our military students. They were astonished by the vividly described litany of failures and screw-ups, and they found it inconceivable that the U.S. military could have undertaken such a poorly planned, and often badly executed, operation. It was simply unimaginable to them. Most were unaware that the countless military foul-ups in Grenada provided one of the key reasons why Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols reforms in 1986, which completely transformed U.S. military operations.
As professors with a slightly longer view of U.S. military history, we were surprised at these reactions. But then we realized that this generation of military leaders has simply never experienced large-scale battlefield failures. Unlike their predecessors from World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, these officers have only participated in campaigns in which the United States consistently had the upper hand. Make no mistake, there was plenty of bloody, hard fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. And the courage and tenacity shown by the troops that fought there rival that of any other American conflict. But throughout both wars, U.S. forces operated with impunity in the air, in space, and in cyberspace; relied upon responsive and effective U.S. firepower in emergencies; and could quickly receive enough reinforcements to bail out any unit that got into trouble. During 20 years of war, no U.S. units were ever overrun and defeated by insurgents, even at the platoon level. The idea that a significant U.S. military operation like the Grenada invasion could be so badly conceived, chaotically executed, and nearly result in an embarrassing failure was just unthinkable to our students who had served in the recent wars.
Suddenly, we better understood the pain and anger that exploded among many veterans and those in uniform during the evacuation of Kabul in August. The visceral shock and outrage over the botched evacuation extended far beyond the normal professional criticism of a difficult mission. It was widely described as an unconscionable failure that was ineptly planned and led to a feckless abandonment of allies, rather than as a plausible outcome of a mission that was planned and executed within nearly impossible constraints of time, force size, and geography. Those reactions suggest that the past two decades of war have conditioned many Americans, including those in the military, to expect that sound planning and smart choices about troops and timelines will prevail whenever American forces are committed — and that chaotic, confused, or even desperate missions should never be one of the potential outcomes.
There is plenty about the evacuation from Kabul that deserves criticism (as does much in the Afghanistan war writ large). In no way are we excusing the failures of intelligence and anticipation that contributed directly to the painful outcome. But the outrage over the evacuation suggests to us that today’s military, and even the broader American public, have been conditioned to believe that clever design, astute planning, and well-trained troops can overcome the fog, friction, chaos, and confusion that are inherent in war. Such a belief — whether conscious or not — implies that a highly trained, professional military should always be able to set conditions that assure success, to maintain enough control over its circumstances to avoid being heavily disadvantaged, and to remain largely shielded from battlefield failure. It overlooks the fact that wars almost always require militaries to fight in deeply unfavorable circumstances, with grossly inadequate intelligence, and with insufficient time for detailed planning, thorough coordination, and effective execution. Moreover, those are exactly the types of conditions that the U.S. military is likely to face in any future great-power conflict.
As the U.S. military looks to the future, wars fought on terms that are heavily disadvantageous to the United States are very likely to be the norm, especially at the outset. The chaotic experience of the Grenada invasion and the tumultuous planning and disorganized execution of the Kabul evacuation are not simply unhappy exceptions to the dominant American way of war — they are powerfully revealing glimpses into the future. In both operations, the nearly insurmountable constraints of time, intelligence, troop numbers, and political sensitivity suddenly placed the U.S. military in a perilous position fraught with uncharted risks. In both operations, the United States could not control the initial circumstances on the ground or quickly shift the dynamics in its favor. And in both operations, the objectives were put at risk because they involved so many poor decisions, miscalculations, and outright failures.
The wars of the future are far more likely to resemble the invasion of Grenada and the evacuation of Kabul than the two decades of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. They will provide many unexpected setbacks and defeats, uncertainty and random chance, surprise, and repeated battlefield shocks. Highly capable adversaries will initiate many of these conflicts on their own terms, thus requiring the U.S. military to fight from positions of deep disadvantage under sometimes devastating circumstances. As we have written before, the services need to invest in the ability to adapt and build the organizational, material, and psychological resilience needed to sustain brutal shocks. The military must retain the ability to fight effectively when communications don’t work, plans unravel, data is corrupted or spoofed, and wartime clashes spiral out of control. And it must steel itself to dealing with wartime parameters that are seemingly impossible — such as wholly inadequate time, the lack of critical capabilities and resources, and the immutable tyranny of geography and distance — while most or all of the advantages belong to the enemy.
Chaos, uncertainty, and lack of control over wartime circumstances are the new normal. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley has noted, the conditions of future wars will be “extremely austere,” with troops expected to “be comfortable with being seriously miserable every single minute of every single day.” The compressed timelines, lack of resources, and disruptive confusion of the Kabul mission are exactly what Milley’s world may look like in practice. Yet despite his warning, the shocked reaction within the military to the Kabul evacuation suggests that this message has not been fully received or internalized. The U.S. military has grown accustomed to fighting battles where it holds almost all the cards, and the enemy is the underdog. Those days are now almost certainly over. Unexpectedly, our class last month taught us that today’s military forces may not fully understand how much future U.S. wars will differ from their experiences in the most recent ones.
Lt. Gen. David W. Barno, U.S. Army (ret.) and Dr. Nora Bensahel are visiting professors of strategic studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and senior fellows at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies. They are also contributing editors at War on the Rocks, where their column appears monthly. Sign up for Barno and Bensahel’s Strategic Outpost newsletter to track their articles as well as their public events.
16. Andrew Sullivan and the Narrative of the "MSM Narrative"
It is hard for me to take seriously the charge that all our ills are because of the biased narrative of the mainstream media. Blaming the media is convenient and makes some people feel good but it is not unhelpful nor founded in critical and objective analysis.
I have faith in and value the fourth estate.
Excerpts:
What and/or who is “the mainstream media”? Is it the New York Times and the Washington Post? The AP? NBC News and CNN? Ryan Lizza’s Twitter feed? The Los Angeles Times? BuzzFeed? Axios? NPR? Maggie Haberman’s book?
The “mainstream media”—I’m going to stop putting that in quotes, but keep imagining that I’m saying it sarcastically—is probably made up of several thousand individuals and then a three-figure number of institutions. At any given moment, on any given story, some number of these people and institutions will communicate facts that are eventually understood to be misleading or incorrect. Some of these people and institutions are better at their jobs than others.
The point is that the MSM universe is so large that you’re always going to be able to cherry-pick examples to support the notion that “they” are feeding “us” false narratives.
...
But pace Sullivan, I’d argue that the mainstream media’s continued openness to self-correction over the last few years is evidence of its overall reliability and health—even in the face of our democracy having hit a real-deal constitutional crisis.
Actually I’d go even further: We are on the cusp of a media crisis that no one is talking about.
As we move toward 2024, the big concern should be how the media would cover an openly anti-democratic presidential candidate. Would they treat said candidate as a danger to America? Or would they attempt to remain neutral and pretend that he was just another generic politician doing normal political things?
If this scenario comes to pass, that would be something entirely new in media.
And it’s not clear to me that anyone is really gaming this problem out yet.
Andrew Sullivan and the Narrative of the "MSM Narrative"
(Photos: Shutterstock. Art: Hannah Yoest.)
Over the weekend Andrew Sullivan published a jeremiad against the “mainstream media” that tracks pretty closely with the Matt Taibbi-Glenn Greenwald-Bari Weiss view: that one of America’s most pressing concerns is woke activists at the New York Times.
You can read it here if you want. A flavor of his complaint:
Think of the other narratives the MSM pushed in recent years that have collapsed. They viciously defamed the Covington boys. They authoritatively told us that bounties had been placed on US soldiers in Afghanistan by Putin—and Trump’s denials only made them more certain. They told us that the lab-leak theory of Covid was a conspiracy theory with no evidence behind it at all. (The NYT actually had the story of the leak theory, by Donald McNeil, killed it, and then fired McNeil, their best Covid reporter, after some schoolgirls complained he wasn’t woke.) Wrong. Wrong. Wrong.
The MSM took the ludicrous story of Jussie Smollett seriously because it fit their nutty “white supremacy” narrative. They told us that a woman was brutally gang-raped at UVA (invented), that the Pulse mass shooting was driven by homophobia (untrue) and that the Atlanta spa shooter was motivated by anti-Asian bias (no known evidence for that at all). For good measure, they followed up with story after story about white supremacists targeting Asian-Americans, in a new wave of “hate,” even as the assaults were disproportionately by African Americans and the mentally ill.
As Greenwald noted, the NYT “published an emotionally gut-wrenching but complete fiction that never had any evidence—that Officer Sicknick’s skull was savagely bashed in with a fire extinguisher by a pro-Trump mob until he died.” The media told us that an alleged transgender exposure in the Wi Spa in Los Angeles was an anti-trans hoax (also untrue). They told us that the emails recovered on Hunter Biden’s laptop were Russian disinformation. They did this just before an election and used that claim to stymie the story on social media. But they were not Russian disinformation. They were a valid if minor news story the media consciously kept from its audience for partisan purposes.
More recently, the MSM were telling us for months that inflation is a phantasm. We were told that the “2021 Inflation Scare is another in a series of false alarms going back several decades.” We were assured that “the numbers at least for now are on the side of those expecting the trend to subside and then stabilize at lower levels.” Any concern was “fearmongering politics.” And now we wake up to the highest inflation in 30 years, counter-balancing wage increases. Still, they tell us, all will be well.
We were told that vaccines would end the Covid pandemic. But they merely altered Covid to a manageable disease that you could still contract while vaccinated. We were told that the migrant surge at the border was just seasonal, and nothing out of the ordinary, even as 1.7 million migrants were illegally trying to get into the country in the last year. We were told that sending migrants back to their home countries was a wicked and unconscionable Trump tactic — even as the Biden administration swiftly copied it with Haitian immigrants — to much success. The cruelty is the point, eh?
This is nonsense. Let’s unpack all of it.
“We” and “They”
What and/or who is “the mainstream media”? Is it the New York Times and the Washington Post? The AP? NBC News and CNN? Ryan Lizza’s Twitter feed? The Los Angeles Times? BuzzFeed? Axios? NPR? Maggie Haberman’s book?
The “mainstream media”—I’m going to stop putting that in quotes, but keep imagining that I’m saying it sarcastically—is probably made up of several thousand individuals and then a three-figure number of institutions. At any given moment, on any given story, some number of these people and institutions will communicate facts that are eventually understood to be misleading or incorrect. Some of these people and institutions are better at their jobs than others.
The point is that the MSM universe is so large that you’re always going to be able to cherry-pick examples to support the notion that “they” are feeding “us” false narratives.
Let’s take a couple for-instances:
Sullivan claims that there is a mainstream media narrative calling inflation just a big nothingburger. In support of this he links to a column in Forbes and a piece on CNBC. (These outlets are also the MSM.)
Is that the dominant “media narrative?”
I could do this all day, but you get the idea. We have had a robust conversation about whether the inflation we’re seeing is transitory, or not. There are different signals pointing in different directions. Of the thousands of people who make up the MSM, some give more credence to one view, some to the other.
The same is true for literally every other example Sullivan cherry-picks. Jussie Smollett was not an “MSM narrative.” It was a crime-blotter case that the media reported, and then continued reporting on, even as the subsequent reporting took Smollett’s story apart.
Chicago police have opened a hate crime investigation after a cast member of the television show "Empire" alleged he was attacked by men who shouted racial and homophobic slurs at him and physically attacked him.
Police didn't name the victim but Fox Entertainment identified him as 36-year-old Jussie Smollett. The actor, who identifies as gay, told police he was attacked while walking downtown around 2 a.m. Tuesday.
Police said the victim reported two people approached him and began shouting "racial and homophobic slurs" at him. The men allegedly struck the victim in the face, "poured an unknown chemical substance" on him, and wrapped a rope around his neck, according to a police statement.
In a follow-up interview with police, Smollett said his attackers yelled "MAGA country" during the assault, Chicago police confirmed to CBS News.
As of Tuesday evening, police said they had yet to find surveillance video that showed the crime. "Thus far, no video of the alleged assailants or a vehicle has been discovered but we are continuing to broaden our search," Chicago Police Department spokesperson Anthony Guglielmi said on Twitter.
Is that pushing a media narrative? Or is it carefully worded reporting that conspicuously avoids any conclusions?
Both the New York Times and New York Post were highly skeptical and did reporting that suggested that Smollett had been lying to the police.
And within a couple of weeks, Smollett’s story fell apart entirely.
Surely some people in or around the MSM were more credulous than they should have been. Some people were skeptical from the start. There was no “narrative” except the one that exists in Andrew Sullivan’s head.
As I said, we could do this all day long.
And of the dozens of thousands of meta-stories the MSM has covered over the last five years, much of the reporting has added real value to our world, yes?
For instance, if you only relied on reporting from the MSM about COVID, you would have been much better informed than if you’d relied on, say, Facebook, or conservative media. Reporting on the 2020 election lawsuits and allegations of fraud in the MSM were, in the main, very helpful.
Sullivan also reaches for non-stories—unless you’re Very Online, I doubt you’ve heard of the Wi-Spa trans controversy—and then tries to use a big-time journalistic malpractice moment (Rolling Stone’s UVA rape hoax) as an indictment of the media. But the Rolling Stone case is actually a proof of concept for the media.
Remember: It wasn’t a faceless blob called “the media” that published the UVA story. It was Rolling Stone. And it was a collection of reporters at various “mainstream media outlets” who took the Rolling Stone story apart.
It Has Always Been Thus
Sullivan is outraged at how the Daily Beast and the New Republic ascribed anti-gay animus to the Pulse nightclub shooting. He thinks that maybe this is all Trump’s fault, that Trump broke the media’s collective brain:
We need facts and objectivity more than ever. Trump showed that. What we got in the MSM was an over-reaction, a reflexive overreach to make the news fit the broader political fight.
I mention this history not to damn the mainstream media, but to show that what Sullivan laments isn’t new. There is no golden past. People in the media make mistakes. Sometimes big ones. Bigger, even, than the “narrative” on the Covington kids.
Sometimes, as in the case of Walter Duranty, it takes decades to fix those mistakes.
Other times, as in the case of the Covington kids, it takes a week or two.
What’s the Alternative?
Undergirding Sullivan’s essay is a notion that someone ought to do something.
Well, we tried that. “Conservative media” in its modern incarnation—the Washington Times, Fox News, the Federalist—was created as a corrective to the endemic flaws in the mainstream media.
How’s that working out for us?
In conservative media, there is no self-corrective outside of the legal system.
Any Club at Hand
Ask yourself this: If Glenn Greenwald is so concerned about accuracy, then why does he go on Fox News to complain about the media when Fox formally testifies that it traffics in “exaggeration” and “non-literal commentary”?
It’s almost like Glenn Greenwald is doing his Scourge of the Media shtick for some other reason.
I suspect that the same is true of Sullivan, only his reason is more honorable.
Andrew Sullivan has always been a man of passions.
Why has Sullivan recently become so exercised about the dangers of MSM narratives? I suspect because we often write what we know.
In recent years Andrew Sullivan has been othered by parts of the MSM for sins against current political orthodoxy. To him, these recent developments feel like a big, all-consuming story. Because for him, personally, they have been.
And I’ll be honest: I get that.
I get that a lot.But someone has to defend the honor of the dreaded mainstream media. Because here is the very boring truth about “MSM narratives”:
The media is a vast space where actors and institutions are interconnected, but operate semi-independently, according to a variety of incentives. Sometimes independent actors make good-faith mistakes. Sometimes they make bad-faith mistakes. But in most cases—in nearly every case, actually—the marketplace of ideas eventually wins and the truth outs.
The MSM is like a giant peer-review system, but where the peer-reviewing takes place after publication. Jonathan Rauch talks about this at length in The Constitution of Knowledge—that the scientific enterprise and the journalistic enterprise have similar modes of operation. Is the journalistic mode great? No. Like democracy, it is the worst system there is—except for all the others.
By its diffuse nature, the media can’t be optimized. There will always be flaws and inefficiencies.
But pace Sullivan, I’d argue that the mainstream media’s continued openness to self-correction over the last few years is evidence of its overall reliability and health—even in the face of our democracy having hit a real-deal constitutional crisis.
Actually I’d go even further: We are on the cusp of a media crisis that no one is talking about.
As we move toward 2024, the big concern should be how the media would cover an openly anti-democratic presidential candidate. Would they treat said candidate as a danger to America? Or would they attempt to remain neutral and pretend that he was just another generic politician doing normal political things?
If this scenario comes to pass, that would be something entirely new in media.
And it’s not clear to me that anyone is really gaming this problem out yet.
If you made it this far—well, God love you. And I hope you’ll sign up for Bulwark+.
We do this every day.
17.Disinformation is spreading beyond the realm of spycraft to become a shady industry – lessons from South Korea
Excerpts:
South Korea has been at the forefront of online disinformation. Western societies began to raise concerns about disinformation in 2016, triggered by disinformation related to the 2016 U.S. presidential election and Brexit. But in South Korea, media reported the first formal disinformation operation in 2008. As a researcher who studies digital audiences, I’ve found that South Korea’s 13-year-long disinformation history demonstrates how technology, economics and culture interact to enable the disinformation industry.
...
The expansion of the disinformation industry is troubling because it distorts how public opinion is perceived by researchers, the media and the public itself. Historically, democracies have relied on polls to understand public opinion. Despite their limitations, nationwide polls conducted by credible organizations, such as Gallup and Pew Research, follow rigorous methodological standards to represent the distribution of opinions in society in as representative a manner as possible.
Public discourse on social media has emerged as an alternative means of assessing public opinion. Digital audience and web traffic analytic tools are widely available to measure the trends of online discourse. However, people can be misled when purveyors of disinformation manufacturer opinions expressed online and falsely amplify the metrics about the opinions.
Meanwhile, the persistence of anti-Communist nationalist narratives in South Korea shows that disinformation purveyors’ rhetorical choices are not random. To counter the disinformation industry wherever it emerges, governments, media and the public need to understand not just the who and the how, but also the what – a society’s controversial ideologies and collective memories. These are the most valuable currency in the disinformation marketplace.
Disinformation is spreading beyond the realm of spycraft to become a shady industry – lessons from South Korea
Disinformation, the practice of blending real and fake information with the goal of duping a government or influencing public opinion, has its origins in the Soviet Union. But disinformation is no longer the exclusive domain of government intelligence agencies.
Today’s disinformation scene has evolved into a marketplace in which services are contracted, laborers are paid and shameless opinions and fake readers are bought and sold. This industry is emerging around the world. Some of the private-sector players are driven by political motives, some by profit and others by a mix of the two.
South Korea has been at the forefront of online disinformation. Western societies began to raise concerns about disinformation in 2016, triggered by disinformation related to the 2016 U.S. presidential election and Brexit. But in South Korea, media reported the first formal disinformation operation in 2008. As a researcher who studies digital audiences, I’ve found that South Korea’s 13-year-long disinformation history demonstrates how technology, economics and culture interact to enable the disinformation industry.
Most importantly, South Korea’s experience offers a lesson for the U.S. and other countries. The ultimate power of disinformation is found more in the ideas and memories that a given society is vulnerable to and how prone it is to fueling the rumor mill than it is in the people perpetrating the disinformation or the techniques they use.
From dirty politics to dirty business
The origin of South Korean disinformation can be traced back to the nation’s National Intelligence Service, which is equivalent to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The NIS formed teams in 2010 to interfere in domestic elections by attacking a political candidate it opposed.
The NIS hired more than 70 full-time workers who managed fake, or so-called sock puppet, accounts. The agency recruited a group called Team Alpha, which was composed of civilian part-timers who had ideological and financial interests in working for the NIS. By 2012, the scale of the operation had grown to 3,500 part-time workers.
South Korean President Moon Jae-in (left) campaigning in 2014 for Kim Kyoung-soo (right), who became governor of South Gyeongsang Province in 2018 but was subsequently convicted of opinion rigging.
Since then the private sector has moved into the disinformation business. For example, a shadowy publishing company led by an influential blogger was involved in a high-profile opinion-rigging scandal between 2016 and 2018. The company’s client was a close political aide of the current president, Moon Jae-in.
In contrast to NIS-driven disinformation campaigns, which use disinformation as a propaganda tool for the government, some of the private-sector players are chameleonlike, changing ideological and topical positions in pursuit of their business interests. These private-sector operations have achieved greater cost effectiveness than government operations by skillfully using bots to amplify fake engagements, involving social media entrepreneurs like YouTubers and outsourcing trolling to cheap laborers.
Narratives that strike a nerve
In South Korea, Cold War rhetoric has been particularly visible across all types of disinformation operations. The campaigns typically portray the conflict with North Korea and the battle against Communism as being at the center of public discourse in South Korea. In reality, nationwide polls have painted a very different picture. For example, even when North Korea’s nuclear threat was at a peak in 2017, fewer than 10 percent of respondents picked North Korea’s saber-rattling as their priority concern, compared with more than 45 percent who selected economic policy.
Across all types of purveyors and techniques, political disinformation in South Korea has amplified anti-Communist nationalism and denigrated the nation’s dovish diplomacy toward North Korea. My research on South Korean social media rumors in 2013 showed that the disinformation rhetoric continued on social media even after the formal disinformation campaign ended, which indicates how powerful these themes are. Today I and my research team continue to see references to the same themes.
The dangers of a disinformation industry
The disinformation industry is enabled by the three prongs of today’s digital media industry: an attention economy, algorithm and computational technologies and a participatory culture. In online media, the most important currency is audience attention. Metrics such as the number of page views, likes, shares and comments quantify attention, which is then converted into economic and social capital.
Ideally, these metrics should be a product of networked users’ spontaneous and voluntary participation. Disinformation operations more often than not manufacture these metrics by using bots, hiring influencers, paying for crowdsourcing and developing computational tricks to game a platform’s algorithms.
The expansion of the disinformation industry is troubling because it distorts how public opinion is perceived by researchers, the media and the public itself. Historically, democracies have relied on polls to understand public opinion. Despite their limitations, nationwide polls conducted by credible organizations, such as Gallup and Pew Research, follow rigorous methodological standards to represent the distribution of opinions in society in as representative a manner as possible.
Public discourse on social media has emerged as an alternative means of assessing public opinion. Digital audience and web traffic analytic tools are widely available to measure the trends of online discourse. However, people can be misled when purveyors of disinformation manufacturer opinions expressed online and falsely amplify the metrics about the opinions.
Meanwhile, the persistence of anti-Communist nationalist narratives in South Korea shows that disinformation purveyors’ rhetorical choices are not random. To counter the disinformation industry wherever it emerges, governments, media and the public need to understand not just the who and the how, but also the what – a society’s controversial ideologies and collective memories. These are the most valuable currency in the disinformation marketplace.
[The Conversation’s science, health and technology editors pick their favorite stories. Weekly on Wednesdays.]
18. Don’t believe the deglobalisation narrative
Excerpts:
Why hasn’t deglobalisation taken hold? Companies make decisions about production based on hard calculations about their bottom line over the medium- to long-term. Building a new supply infrastructure takes considerable time and resources. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co is building a semiconductor factory in Arizona that won’t be operational until 2024, for example. Most supply chains don’t repattern at the push of a button.
It may be those decisions are already in train, but not announced. Still, foreign companies can plug into sophisticated, deep supplier networks, large and efficient ports and an able workforce in China. And while many started off using Chinese inputs for exports, they now want access to a big and rapidly growing economy. Auto parts manufacturers originally entered China to produce for their home markets, but the growth of the Chinese domestic market means that they now have reason to expand, not leave.
Costs are going up in China and trade tensions with the US persist. And we don’t know how the geopolitics of China will play out. What is more likely than deglobalisation is the developing “China Plus One” strategy: keep factories in China but hedge your bets with suppliers elsewhere. FDI has been growing significantly in Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia.
There’s no doubt supply chains will shift in the aftermath of the pandemic. The just-in-time inventory system is likely to change, and China may lose some business. But globalisation of production is too well-established and makes too much business sense to reverse.
Don’t believe the deglobalisation narrative
The writer is a senior fellow at Harvard Kennedy School
When the Covid-19 pandemic hit, as China locked down and countries around the world struggled to source personal protective equipment, many wrote an obituary for China-focused globalisation. It seemed a logical view, given the economic nationalism of Donald Trump and Brexit and the US-China trade war. But there is little evidence that the pandemic has prompted companies to abandon China en masse or sparked deglobalisation.
A rough metric of globalisation is the ratio of world trade to world goods. After rising significantly from 1970 until the financial crisis, this has broadly moved sideways since. Overall trade balances cannot give us granular information on supply chains or globalisation. But if companies are pulling out of overseas locations and moving back home, we might expect trade balances to shrink. The US trade deficit hit a record as imports reached an all-time high of $288.5bn in September. China’s trade surplus, meanwhile, has exceeded pre-pandemic levels.
If companies are near- or onshoring, we should expect long-haul shipping routes to be less congested. The busiest trade lane in the world remains the transpacific eastbound between Asia and North America. The port of Los Angeles saw record volumes in September.
Foreign direct investment flows into China should be shrinking if companies are pulling out. But China overtook the US as the top destination for new FDI last year. According to data released by China’s Ministry of Commerce, actually utilised FDI in China hit a record in 2020 and, based on figures for the first nine months of 2021, is on track to exceed that record this year.
Deglobalisation should also be reflected in capital flows. According to data from the Institute of International Finance, non-resident capital exited Chinese equity markets in March 2020 as part of a broader exodus of capital from emerging markets. But since then, Chinese debt and equity markets have experienced capital inflows nearly every single month.
The hard data don’t support the deglobalisation narrative. What about survey data? According to HSBC, in September six in 10 companies were either currently expanding their supply chains in China or planning to do so over the next year. The respondents were from 10 countries (excluding Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) and are all either doing business in China or expect to be. Ninety-seven per cent of companies said they planned to keep investing in China, with nearly one-fifth aiming to invest at least 25 per cent of their operating profit there.
The annual China Business Report from the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai found similar results. Of US manufacturers in China, 72 per cent have no plans to move production out of the country in the next three years. Of the remaining 28 per cent, zero were relocating production from China to the US. Nearly 60 per cent of respondents have increased their investment in China this year.
Why hasn’t deglobalisation taken hold? Companies make decisions about production based on hard calculations about their bottom line over the medium- to long-term. Building a new supply infrastructure takes considerable time and resources. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co is building a semiconductor factory in Arizona that won’t be operational until 2024, for example. Most supply chains don’t repattern at the push of a button.
It may be those decisions are already in train, but not announced. Still, foreign companies can plug into sophisticated, deep supplier networks, large and efficient ports and an able workforce in China. And while many started off using Chinese inputs for exports, they now want access to a big and rapidly growing economy. Auto parts manufacturers originally entered China to produce for their home markets, but the growth of the Chinese domestic market means that they now have reason to expand, not leave.
Costs are going up in China and trade tensions with the US persist. And we don’t know how the geopolitics of China will play out. What is more likely than deglobalisation is the developing “China Plus One” strategy: keep factories in China but hedge your bets with suppliers elsewhere. FDI has been growing significantly in Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia.
There’s no doubt supply chains will shift in the aftermath of the pandemic. The just-in-time inventory system is likely to change, and China may lose some business. But globalisation of production is too well-established and makes too much business sense to reverse.
19. The military keeps finding it did nothing wrong when it investigates itself
Yes it is easy to find these terrible and very public anomalies. But there are so many more investigations that are conducted that reveal incidents and bring them to light and that are then dealt with correctly and justly. But those do not make the news.
The military keeps finding it did nothing wrong when it investigates itself
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In war, things inevitably go wrong and people die as a result. But as events in Syria, Kabul, and Niger and elsewhere have shown, the military has a tendency to use its investigations to absolve itself rather than to hold senior leaders accountable for their mistakes.
The New York Times recently revealed that a U.S. airstrike in March 2019 may have killed dozens of civilians at Baghouz, Syria. However when an Air Force lawyer and an evaluator with the Defense Department Inspector General’s Office tried to get military leaders to investigate whether a war crime had occurred, they were reportedly thwarted at every turn.
The circumstances surrounding the incident are complicated. Making things even murkier, a secretive group known as Task Force 9 may have repeatedly bypassed the process for determining if U.S. airstrikes would kill civilians by claiming that American or allied forces were in imminent danger, New York Times reporters Dave Philipps and Eric Schmitt revealed.
On March 18, 2019, the Islamic State group was making its last stand at Baghouz, where tens of thousands of women and children were mixed in with ISIS fighters. That morning, America’s Syrian Kurdish allies reported they were under attack and a U.S. special forces officer ordered an airstrike, according to the New York Times. The officer was relying on video from a drone with a standard definition camera and he was unaware that another drone in the area with a high-definition camera revealed women and children were present.
In the resulting airstrike, an F-15E dropped three bombs that may have killed up to 64 women and children, but military officials repeatedly undermined efforts to determine if the incident rose to the level of a war crime, the New York Times reported.
FILE PHOTO: Smoke after the shelling of Islamic State’s last holdout of Baghouz by Kurdish-led forces backed by US warplanes. (Getty Images.)
“The only assessment done immediately after the strike was performed by the same ground unit that ordered the strike,” according to the New York Times. “It determined that the bombing was lawful because it killed only a small number of civilians while targeting Islamic State fighters in an attempt to protect coalition forces, the command said. Therefore no formal war crime notification, criminal investigation or disciplinary action was warranted, it said, adding that the other deaths were accidental.”
The New York Times details how Air Force attorney Lt. Col. Dean W. Korsak along with Gene Tate, then with the Defense Department Inspector General’s Office, tried to get the incident investigated as a possible war crime but they could not overcome opposition from their superiors.
“I think the NYT captured the facts pretty well,” Tate told Task & Purpose. “Korsak reported a war crime and our review of the documents and videos found him to be credible. That should have immediately required the actions mandated by DoD Directive 2311.01 (which has since been rewritten). The directive was never followed and every time we tried to remind leadership of that, they just ignored us.”
Korsak could not be reached for comment.
The U.S. military’s “civilian casualty credibility assessment” and 15-6 investigation ultimately found that at least four civilians were killed and another eight were wounded in the March 18, 2019 airstrike, but it is “highly likely that there were additional civilians killed,” said Navy Capt. Bill Urban, a spokesman for U.S. Central Command.
A woman and her children, who were evacuated out of the last territory held by Islamic State sit outside Baghouz, Syria, Tuesday, March 5, 2019.(AP Photo/Andrea Rosa)
It is unclear whether 60 of the casualties resulting from the airstrike were combatants or not because several women and at least one child were shown carrying weapons in the drone video, Urban said in a statement. CENTCOM provided no evidence that the women and child were armed.
“The 15-6 investigation concluded that these two strikes were legitimate self-defense strikes in support of SDF forces under fire, that they were proportional due to the unavailability of smaller ordinance at the time of the request, and that appropriate steps were taken to rule out the presence of civilians at the time of the strike,” Urban said. “To prevent unintended casualties in the future, the investigation recommended requiring high-definition video for similar strikes in the future, and the requirement for the strike cell to coordinate with any coalition surveillance assets in the area at the time of the strike, and those recommendations were implemented. Finally, in accordance with the findings, the investigating officer determined that no disciplinary actions were warranted.”
Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said the Defense Department takes its commitment to avoiding civilian casualties seriously.
“Without speaking to this specific event or any potential future decisions, Secretary Austin remains focused on making sure we do everything we can to both prevent these tragic outcomes and to be as forthcoming as we can be about them,” Kirby said.
But the Syria airstrike is not an aberration, and may just be the latest example of the limitations of military investigations. An Aug. 29 drone strike by the U.S. military in Kabul accidentally killed 10 civilians, including seven children. The strike was based on intelligence that ISIS planned to attack U.S. forces using a white Toyota Corolla – a car so ubiquitous in Afghanistan that in 2015 roughly 90% of the cars registered in the country were Corollas, Stars and Stripes reported at the time.
In a picture taken on April 22, 2013, Toyota Corolla cars of various production years ply the streets of Kabul. (Manjunath Kiran/AFP via Getty Images)
An investigation into the drone strike found that while U.S. troops had made faulty assumptions about a car under surveillance and a house that it visited, the attack was not a violation of the Law of Armed Conflict, Air Force Lt. Gen. Sami D. Said, the service’s inspector general, told reporters recently.
“It’s an honest mistake,” Said told reporters during a Nov. 3 Pentagon news briefing. “I understand the consequences, but it’s not criminal conduct, random conduct negligence.”
It will be up to the service members’ chain of command to decide whether any disciplinary action should be taken, he said.
When a reporter asked Said if the white Toyota Corolla considered a threat ever existed in the first place, Said replied: “We actually never ended up tracking the actual Toyota Corolla. We didn’t. It certainly wasn’t the one we did track and struck. We just didn’t pick up the Toyota Corolla that we believe we should have picked up that might have been involved in something that’s worth knowing.”
Military investigations also sometimes find ways to shift blame from senior leaders to lower ranking service members, such as the Navy’s attempts to scapegoat Capt. Brett Crozier for the deadly COVID-19 outbreak aboard the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt in 2020.
Capt. Brett Crozier, commanding officer of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), addresses the crew during an all-hands call on the ship’s flight deck. Theodore Roosevelt is conducting routine operations in the Eastern Pacific Ocean. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Nicholas Huynh)
“Its institutional reaction, unfortunately, appears largely oriented toward showing that, in the case of the Theodore Roosevelt, the commanding officer and senior medical officer made mistakes and/or undermined efforts of senior staffs to assist them,” the study found. “This might be true—we make no assessment of relative culpability—but the outcome does not suggest strategic resilience.”
Four years later, a documentary by ABC investigative journalist James Gordon Meek revealed that the military attempted to scapegoat the Special Forces captain in charge of the soldiers killed in Niger. The captain had strenuously objected to his troops being sent on the mission in lightly armored vehicles without any backup or the ability to evacuate any wounded members of his team, but was ultimately overruled by his superior.
“I was left with the impression that this guy was a screw-up,” Arnold Wright, the father of Staff Sgt. Dustin M Wright, one of the soldiers killed in the ambush, told ABC News. “And he screwed up and carried my son off and got him killed – because that’s what I was led to believe. And my anger was directed toward somebody completely innocent of what they told me he did.”
More great stories on Task & Purpose
is the senior Pentagon reporter for Task & Purpose. He has covered the military for 15 years. You can email him at schogol@taskandpurpose.com, direct message @JeffSchogol on Twitter, or reach him on WhatsApp and Signal at 703-909-6488. Contact the author here.
20. FDD | Warfare Is More Than Just Bullets
Excerpts:
Will the “Three Warfares” doctrine really enable the CCP to conquer Taiwan “without a fight”? Color me skeptical. When push comes to shove, I think Taiwan won’t roll over so easily.
But in the meantime, there is plenty the U.S. and its allies can do to highlight the various ways the “Three Warfares” doctrine is being implemented—both inside America and Taiwan. The FBI, Department of Justice, and National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) have all provided the public with examples of how this all works. But they could do more to educate the American people on the CCP’s various machinations both at home—and abroad.
FDD | Warfare Is More Than Just Bullets
Understanding the “Three Warfares” concept China is already using against Taiwan—and the U.S.
fdd.org · by Thomas Joscelyn Senior Fellow and Senior Editor of FDD's Long War Journal · November 12, 2021
The fate of Taiwan is a hot topic in Washington these days. The clear and present danger from Beijing is growing. Less clear is the extent to which America is willing to rise to Taipei’s defense. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said this week that the U.S. would take “action” if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decided to use force against the tiny island nation, but no one really knows what that would entail.
Much of the discussion surrounding America’s commitment to Taiwan, or lack thereof, focuses on the possibility of a full-scale invasion by China’s military. Given the Chinese military’s increasingly aggressive behavior just off Taiwan’s shores, this concern is well-placed. But a large-scale offensive is only one scenario policymakers are currently weighing.
According to a new report published by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, the CCP’s goal is “seizing Taiwan without a fight.” How? The answer lies in the CCP’s “Three Warfares” doctrine.
The “Three Warfares” concept is also discussed in the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) annual report on China, which was submitted to Congress earlier this month. The Pentagon explains that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began developing the strategy as early as 2003. The PLA’s intent is “to demoralize adversaries and influence foreign and domestic public opinion during conflicts.” Simply put, the PLA wants to undermine its adversaries willingness to fight even before the battle begins.
The PLA’s “Three Warfares” are: psychological, public opinion, and legal.
According to DoD, China’s psychological warfare “uses propaganda, deception, threats, and coercion to affect the adversary’s decisionmaking, while also countering adversary psychological operations.” Simultaneously, the PLA employs public opinion warfare in an attempt to “guide and influence” how both “domestic and international audiences” perceive a conflict. Meanwhile, the CCP also uses legal warfare, via both “international and domestic laws,” to “gain international support, manage political repercussions, and sway target audiences.”
According to Taiwan’s military, the CCP is already deploying its “Three Warfares” doctrine against Taipei. The U.S. Defense Department has come to the same conclusion with respect to Washington—Americans are already in the crosshairs of this type of asymmetrical warfighting.
The Taiwanese military explains that all three of the PLA’s warfares can be understood as “cognitive warfare,” which relies on a variety of tactics. For starters, China’s massive economy gives the PLA “leverage,” which it is using “to solicit support from the business sector and the people in Taiwan.” (The CCP has done the same thing with American businesses, using access to China’s giant market as a lever to stymie criticism.) The PLA’s increasing military incursions off the shores of Taiwan, both in the air and at sea, are intended to intimidate the island’s citizens.
Then there are the CCP’s verbal arrows. Taiwan’s military paper outlines four ways in which the PLA is attempting to shape the narrative. The first is known as “propaganda mode,” which involves official statements and messages produced by the CCP’s “wolf warrior” diplomats. The second is known as “pink mode,” which relies on “internet commentators” and “ghostwriters” to push pro-Beijing messages. This includes both disinformation and blatant cheerleading. The work of these CCP agents is amplified by the “content farm mode,” which relies on bots and other online tools to ensure that such messages are disseminated widely. The fourth and final category is known as “collaboration mode,” which highlights the stories of collaborators inside Taiwan, with the intent of undermining the will of any resistance.
It is not clear if these tactics are all equally effective, or even what their overall effect really is. Regardless, the CCP’s assault on Taiwan has already begun—once you understand that warfare is more than just bullets.
The Defense Department’s report to Congress briefly outlines some of the general ways in which the “Three Warfares” doctrine is already shaping the rivalry between the U.S. and China. The CCP is conducting various “influence operations to achieve outcomes favorable to its security and military strategy objectives by targeting cultural institutions, media organizations,” as well as the “business, academic, and policy communities of the United States.” These influence operations are intended to shape public opinion concerning the CCP’s “one China principle” (under which Taiwan is considered an inseparable part of the Chinese nation), the “One Belt, One Road” initiative (a massive international economic undertaking), the status of Hong Kong (another formerly semi-autonomous entity) and Tibet, as well as the CCP’s “territorial and maritime claims” throughout the South China Sea.
All of this messaging is coordinated through official bodies within the CCP’s autocratic regime, including “the United Front Work Department, the Propaganda Department, and the Ministry of State Security (MSS).”
Will the “Three Warfares” doctrine really enable the CCP to conquer Taiwan “without a fight”? Color me skeptical. When push comes to shove, I think Taiwan won’t roll over so easily.
But in the meantime, there is plenty the U.S. and its allies can do to highlight the various ways the “Three Warfares” doctrine is being implemented—both inside America and Taiwan. The FBI, Department of Justice, and National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) have all provided the public with examples of how this all works. But they could do more to educate the American people on the CCP’s various machinations both at home—and abroad.
Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for FDD’s Long War Journal. Follow Tom on Twitter @thomasjoscelyn. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, non-partisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Thomas Joscelyn Senior Fellow and Senior Editor of FDD's Long War Journal · November 12, 2021
21. It’s Time to Be Honest About Fossil Fuels’ Role in Energy Transition
Excerpts:
The outlines of a successful energy policy are clear. It would look at the real, all-in cost of each fuel and the full-cycle cost of green policies such as a shift to electric cars. It would refrain from beating up on domestic producers of oil and gas—which has only led to global shortages and price spikes benefiting Russia and OPEC. A successful energy policy requires diversification of energy sources and a focus on the complicated transmission of energy to homes and businesses. The current energy crisis is not just a fleeting global price rise but represents a systemic challenge that requires a fundamental new policy approach—one that abandons the culture wars over fossil fuels versus renewables and smartly employs both to lower emissions, maintain a modern lifestyle, and promote national security.
It’s Time to Be Honest About Fossil Fuels’ Role in Energy Transition
An expert's point of view on a current event.
As soaring fuel inflation turns into a political risk, Biden needs a smarter energy policy fast.
By Brenda Shaffer, a faculty member at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.
Oil pumps operate in Long Beach, California on April 21, 2020. APU GOMES/AFP via Getty Images
The global energy crisis has hit U.S. shores: Fuel prices are rising, and a global supply shortage of natural gas is driving up the cost of heat and electricity as winter approaches. The Biden administration, worried that rising energy prices could cost votes and kneecap its ability to implement policies, has begged OPEC to pump more oil and Russia to step up gas supplies to Europe. At the same time, the Republicans have no useful energy policy alternative on offer. The United States needs a fundamentally new energy policy that will deliver reliable energy supplies at affordable prices with low impact on the environment and climate.
Any energy policy will have to start by considering several inconvenient but incontrovertible facts.
First, no matter how quickly the administration wants to raise the share of energy from renewable sources, U.S. energy security will require continued domestic oil and natural gas production for transportation, heating, industry, and electricity generation. Faced with the current energy crisis, the Biden administration is debating a new transition policy that recognizes fossil fuels will be necessary for the next decade or two. President Joe Biden’s current transition strategy—as embodied in the Build Back Better program—is not enough to get what the United States and the world need to solve the energy crisis: the return of U.S. oil and gas production after plummeting during the COVID-19 pandemic and not recovering to its previous level since then. Capital will not return to the U.S. oil and gas patch if the administration’s regulations limit production—nor if the administration continues to beat up on fossil fuel producers, leaving investors uncertain about the future of U.S. oil and gas. The administration’s ongoing evaluation of planned fuel and crude pipelines, which could result in their cancellation, adds to the industry’s concerns.
The global energy crisis has hit U.S. shores: Fuel prices are rising, and a global supply shortage of natural gas is driving up the cost of heat and electricity as winter approaches. The Biden administration, worried that rising energy prices could cost votes and kneecap its ability to implement policies, has begged OPEC to pump more oil and Russia to step up gas supplies to Europe. At the same time, the Republicans have no useful energy policy alternative on offer. The United States needs a fundamentally new energy policy that will deliver reliable energy supplies at affordable prices with low impact on the environment and climate.
Any energy policy will have to start by considering several inconvenient but incontrovertible facts.
First, no matter how quickly the administration wants to raise the share of energy from renewable sources, U.S. energy security will require continued domestic oil and natural gas production for transportation, heating, industry, and electricity generation. Faced with the current energy crisis, the Biden administration is debating a new transition policy that recognizes fossil fuels will be necessary for the next decade or two. President Joe Biden’s current transition strategy—as embodied in the Build Back Better program—is not enough to get what the United States and the world need to solve the energy crisis: the return of U.S. oil and gas production after plummeting during the COVID-19 pandemic and not recovering to its previous level since then. Capital will not return to the U.S. oil and gas patch if the administration’s regulations limit production—nor if the administration continues to beat up on fossil fuel producers, leaving investors uncertain about the future of U.S. oil and gas. The administration’s ongoing evaluation of planned fuel and crude pipelines, which could result in their cancellation, adds to the industry’s concerns.
What’s more, a group of leading Democrats in the U.S. Congress, led by Sen. Elizabeth Warren, has called for reinstating the ban on U.S. crude exports. If the ban were implemented, it would impede the return of investment in U.S. oil production even further. The current plan to release oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve is an attempted quick fix that will not make a long-term dent in the oil price. While Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm blamed OPEC for high oil prices, the numbers are clear: It is U.S. oil production, not OPEC’s, that is missing from the markets. For that, the Biden administration has itself to blame.
The failure of U.S. energy policy is not a partisan issue: Both deeply Republican Texas and ultra-progressive California have unreliable electricity.
Second, a smart U.S. energy policy should not be framed as a binary choice between renewables or fossil fuels. The current generation of renewables—hydropower, wind, and solar—cannot deliver electricity or heat without reliable baseload energy generation, most often from natural gas. Politicians, journalists, and other advocates of wind and solar are being dishonest when they say that a power system run on some percentage of renewable energy or the price of renewable energy is now competitive with that of fossil fuels. Those weather-dependent renewables can only run thanks to the backup power and grid stability provided by natural gas. That backup power system costs money and drives up costs even when it isn’t running. Energy security policies should focus on the costs and stability of transmission of energy, not just production numbers.
Third, the current set of renewable energy sources cannot deliver the energy the United States needs due to their low energy output and efficiency, no matter how much money Washington throws at them. Instead of subsidizing consumption of the current generation of wind, solar, and other renewables, governments around the world should focus hard on developing new technologies and funding research and development.
Fourth, Washington should recognize that the failure of U.S. energy policy is not a partisan issue. Both deeply Republican Texas and ultra-progressive California have unreliable electricity, even though both states are among the richest areas of the world. Energy security is complicated and is not achieved by ideology, no matter which side of the political divide you’re on. Unlike Texas’s free market model, energy security requires government involvement or mandates in storage, redundancy, and backup. And California can’t halt nuclear power and natural gas and still expect to keep the lights on. Both Biden and former President Donald Trump turned to OPEC to manage oil price trends. Neither president identified a new policy for the United States.
Fifth, Washington cannot adequately promote U.S. national security while abandoning the geopolitics of energy, which still hinges on oil and gas. Why should the United States as the world’s largest producer of oil and natural gas call on OPEC and Russia to save the West during this energy crisis? Biden, however, has completely pulled back from engaging in energy geopolitics, aptly illustrated by the White House’s “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.” In this document, nearly all mentions of energy are in the context of promoting “clean energy”—even though fossil fuels provide more than 80 percent of global energy consumption. A national security strategy that completely ignores the fuels on which every country in the world depends to keep its people alive and economy running is no viable strategy at all.
Finally, the administration’s energy policies do little to avert climate change while damaging the environment. Supporters of Biden’s energy policy say Americans must make economic sacrifices today in order to save the planet. Yet without today’s other major emitters—China and India—on board, U.S. steps to address climate change are effectively meaningless. China’s and Russia’s lack of high-level participation at the recent United Nations climate summit and India’s pushing the goal post to achieve net-zero emissions only in 2070 illustrate that there is no meaningful global commitment to change. The United States is making serious changes to its economy as part of its climate policy, while China, the world’s largest carbon emitter, has made only unenforceable declarations to “make best efforts” to phase down (not out) coal consumption after 2030.
What’s more, U.S. policies packaged as green aren’t always green on closer look. Converting U.S. transportation to electricity, one of the key elements of Biden’s plan, would likely not result in a significant net drop in emissions—not just because of the gas and coal used to produce electricity, but also from the higher emissions produced in manufacturing electric cars, especially their resource-intensive batteries. In addition, the current generation of renewable energy technologies is not only inefficient and resource-intensive to produce but also has significant environmental impact, not least from land use.
The outlines of a successful energy policy are clear. It would look at the real, all-in cost of each fuel and the full-cycle cost of green policies such as a shift to electric cars. It would refrain from beating up on domestic producers of oil and gas—which has only led to global shortages and price spikes benefiting Russia and OPEC. A successful energy policy requires diversification of energy sources and a focus on the complicated transmission of energy to homes and businesses. The current energy crisis is not just a fleeting global price rise but represents a systemic challenge that requires a fundamental new policy approach—one that abandons the culture wars over fossil fuels versus renewables and smartly employs both to lower emissions, maintain a modern lifestyle, and promote national security.
Brenda Shaffer is a faculty member at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and is writing a textbook on Operational Energy for the U.S. Department of Defense.
22. FDD | Iranian Professor At US College Complicit In Crimes Against Humanity
Excerpts:
Mallahati is but one example of former Iranian officials complicit in crimes against humanity who have found employment in Western academia. The regime’s former ambassador to Germany, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, teaches at Princeton University. On Mousavian’s watch as ambassador, the Iranian regime assassinated Iranian-Kurdish dissidents at the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin in 1992.
Mahallati, who sports the moniker “professor of peace” at Oberlin, has blood on his hands. It is time that both Oberlin College and McGill University take action.
FDD | Iranian Professor At US College Complicit In Crimes Against Humanity
fdd.org · by Alireza Nader Senior Fellow and Benjamin Weinthal Research Fellow· November 15, 2021
Mohammad Jafar Mahallati, Iran’s former ambassador to the UN, is complicit in crimes against humanity by using his position as an Iranian diplomat to cover up the 1988 executions of 5,000 dissidents in Iran. Yet that record did not prevent him from securing his PhD in Islamic Studies from McGill University in 2006 and his professorship in religion at Oberlin College in 2007. McGill should revoke his PhD. Oberlin should dismiss him.
Yet the executions were known to the US media and the global public. The New York Times reported in 1988 that Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, the UN’s special rapporteur on human rights in Iran at the time, “accused Iran of serious human rights violations, including a wave of political executions last summer when Iraq got the upper hand in the war in the Persian Gulf.”
There was overwhelming evidence already in 1988 that Iranian leaders had committed unspeakable crimes in Iran’s vast penal system. When the UN released documents and passed a resolution in 1988 asserting that Iran’s regime carried out mass executions, Mahallati dismissed them as “propaganda,” “fake information,” and “unjust.”
Lawdan Bazargan, the sister of a victim of the 1988 executions, told us: “While Mahallati was enjoying a high-ranking position in an oppressive Islamic regime, my brother was behind bars fighting for human rights and human dignity. Why does a liberal art school such as Oberlin College, which must be the beacon of hope, protect the perpetrators instead of the victims?”
In October 2020, Bazargan and the prominent Canadian-Iranian attorney Kaveh Shahrooz, who lost his uncle in the 1988 bloodletting, tweeted: “In fact, we know that Mr. Mahallati was aware of the killings. Because he is quoted about them in UN reports. But he is quoted as denying and downplaying them. He effectively misled the international community so the killings could continue.”
Mahallati is complicit in other human rights abuses as well. In April, new disclosures by the student paper Oberlin Review show that Mahallati helped lay the ideological foundation for the violent persecution of the Bahai community in Iran. While at the UN in 1983, as the Iranian representative assigned to the UN Commission on Human Rights, Mahallati charged the Bahais with terrorism and denied the extrajudicial murders that Tehran committed against them. He also lashed out at the Bahais as “sexual abusers.” Mahallati has not shown a scintilla of regret over his language dehumanizing the Bahai community.
UN and US government reports have long documented the Islamic Republic’s arrests and forced exclusion of Bahais from public life. As far back as 1983, the regime executed 22 Bahais merely for practicing their faith. To this day, the Islamic Republic refuses to recognize the Bahai faith as a religion and tyrannizes its adherents.
McGill’s academic training of Mahallati should not be surprising, as the university has long received donations from Iran. The Alavi Foundation, a regime controlled “charitable” organization in New York, has funded numerous academic and cultural activities in the United States and Canada.
In 2009, US federal prosecutors disclosed that the Iranian government controls the foundation. It began to donate funds to McGill as early as 1987, said Christopher P. Manfredi, provost and vice-principal at the university, in 2013. McGill’s Institute of Islamic Studies took in $270,000 between 2004 and 2010 from the Alavi Foundation. The university was the largest recipient of cash from the foundation in Canada. In 2014, the U.S. government seized a 36-story building in New York owned largely by the foundation, accusing the foundation of hiding its ties to the Iranian government in violation of U.S law.
Mallahati is but one example of former Iranian officials complicit in crimes against humanity who have found employment in Western academia. The regime’s former ambassador to Germany, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, teaches at Princeton University. On Mousavian’s watch as ambassador, the Iranian regime assassinated Iranian-Kurdish dissidents at the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin in 1992.
Mahallati, who sports the moniker “professor of peace” at Oberlin, has blood on his hands. It is time that both Oberlin College and McGill University take action.
Alireza Nader is a senior fellow focusing on Iran and US policy in the Middle East at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Benjamin Weinthal is a research fellow. Follow them on Twitter @AlirezaNader and @BenWeinthal. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Alireza Nader Senior Fellow · November 15, 2021
23. Erdogan's veneer of respect conceals blatant antisemitism - opinion
Erdogan's veneer of respect conceals blatant antisemitism - opinion
Turkish president Erdogan's early political career was characterized by antisemitism which he has tried to move away from in his rise to power.
By AYKAN ERDEMIR, ENIA KRIVINE Published: NOVEMBER 15, 2021 21:37
In Turkey, you can go to jail for calling someone a Jew. Earlier this month, a Turkish court sentenced a man to ten months in prison, which the judge then commuted to a $700 fine, for a 2020 Facebook post in which he referred to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as “a Jew who disguises himself as a Muslim.” The accused’s lawyer said the word “Jew” is not an insult, but the judge appeared to agree with Erdogan’s attorney, who described the word as offensive “toward the president’s honor, dignity, and reputation.”
This peculiar disagreement between antisemites helps explain both the precarious state of Turkey’s dwindling Jewish community as well as the hot-and-cold ties between Turkey and Israel. At times, both Erdogan and his critics find it convenient to pretend that they have only the utmost respect for a fellow people of the book, yet their visceral antisemitism is plainly visible behind that veneer.
This is not the first time Erdogan has become a target of antisemitic critics who claim that the Turkish leader is a crypto-Jew. In 2007, an ultranationalist author went as far to publish The Children of Moses, an entire book of antisemitic conspiracy theories about Erdogan, whom he insisted was Jewish. It is a testament to Turkey’s toxic antisemitic climate – worse than Iran’s according to the Anti-Defamation League’s cross-cultural surveys – that Erdogan has become a victim and not just a perpetrator of antisemitic attacks.
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Since the rise to power of his Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, Erdogan has moved away from the overt antisemitism of his early career. Back in the 1970s, when he was a youth leader in Turkey’s leading Islamist political party, Erdogan openly propagated antisemitic conspiracy theories. He even directed and starred in a play called Mason-Communist-Jew, in which a Jewish agitator poses as a Muslim Turk to incite workers against a factory owner. In the play, one devoutly Muslim character recites the moral of the story: “All evil regimes are Jewish inventions!” It should not be surprising that Erdogan’s antisemitic critics suspect him of having a Semitic pedigree!
ONCE IN power, Erdogan switched to using antisemitic dog whistles so that he could have plausible deniability when faced with accusations of antisemitism. Following the nationwide protests that rocked Turkey in 2013, Erdogan alluded to a treacherous “interest-rate lobby” working behind the scenes, an unmistakable reference to global Jewry. The following year, the Turkish leader yelled at a protester whom he called “Israeli spawn.” Also in 2014, Erdogan first mentioned the so-called “mastermind” that conspires against Turkey. A documentary on a pro-AKP channel has since revealed the mastermind to be a millennia-long Jewish conspiracy to dominate the world.
Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan talks to media after attending Friday prayers at Hagia Sophia Grand Mosque in Istanbul, Turkey August 7, 2020. (credit: REUTERS/MURAD SEZER/FILE PHOTO)
Sometimes, Erdogan slips and employs crude antisemitic stereotypes. Earlier this year, he attacked Israel by saying, “They are murderers, to the point that they kill children who are five or six years old. They only are satisfied by sucking their blood.” The US State Department and the House Bipartisan Task Force for Combating Antisemitism condemned Erdogan, the latter slamming his statements as being “tantamount to blood libel against the Jewish people.”
Erdogan, however, also devotes a lot of effort to thwarting accusations of antisemitism and demonstrating his tolerance toward the Jewish community. Over the years, the Turkish president has held well-publicized meetings with Jewish leaders in Ankara, London, New York and Washington. These meetings, however, do not always have the intended effect. In 2016, when Erdogan met with Jewish leaders in Washington, a Haaretz contributor asked, “Is Erdogan trying to co-opt US Jewish leaders to launder his reputation?”
In London, Erdogan did not meet authentic leaders of the British Jewish community. Rather, he hosted Neturei Karta, a fringe group of anti-Zionist Jews with whom Iranian leaders often meet, hoping in vain to dispel accusations of antisemitism. It worked no better for Erdogan than for the Tehran regime.
AMONG ALL the Erdogan government’s clumsy attempts to shield itself from accusations of antisemitism, the award goes to the fiasco that took place on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly this year. When Erdogan failed to secure an appointment with leading American Jewish groups, the Turkish American National Steering Committee (TASC), a Turkish-American organization with close ties to the Erdogan government, announced on September 21 the cosigning of a joint declaration with the Orthodox Jewish Chamber of Commerce (OJC), a small New Jersey- and New York-based initiative, in support of the Abraham Accords and against the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) campaign. Turkey’s deputy foreign minister joined both organizations in posing with the declaration, even though Ankara echoed Tehran last year by slamming the Abraham Accords and the Turkish government also sponsored, this June, a symposium dedicated to promoting BDS and delegitimizing the Jewish state, an event organized by a convicted Palestinian Islamic Jihad conspirator.
It did not take long for the Erdogan government, and hence TASC, to walk back from its publicity stunt in New York. Within 24 hours, TASC announced, “Due to lack of proper consensus, TASC is withdrawing from the Joint TASC-OJC Declaration.” The following day, TASC went even further by issuing an apology, implying that Turkey’s deputy foreign minister wasn’t really aware of the content of the joint declaration with which he posed for a photo.
Over the years, Erdogan’s opportunistic relationship with the Jewish people and the Jewish state has led to wild mood swings in Turkish-Israeli relations. Erdogan has built an entire political career on the scapegoating of Jews, but he also wants to perform the role of the tolerant leader toward Jews and other religious minorities, modeled after the Ottoman sultans and their putative benevolence toward their subjects. Similarly, Erdogan wants to benefit from cordial relations with Israel, especially in trade, defense and diplomacy, but he would like these benefits to accrue while he bashes the Abraham Accords, supports the BDS campaign and provides Hamas a logistical base in Turkey.
Given that Erdogan’s lifelong antisemitism appears to be beyond cure as he approaches his seventies, Turkey and the world will need to wait until he is voted out of office for Ankara’s relations with Israel and the Jewish people to return not only to sanity but also to the win-win relationship of the 1990s.
Dr. Aykan Erdemir is a former member of the Turkish parliament and the senior director of the Turkey Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Enia Krivine is the senior director of the Israel Program and the National Security Network. Follow them on Twitter at @aykan_erdemir and @EKrivine.
24. Myanmar: how Bill Richardson used despot diplomacy to secure US journalist Danny Fenster’s release
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Myanmar: how Bill Richardson used despot diplomacy to secure US journalist Danny Fenster’s release
- The former US diplomat and his staff frequently act as intermediaries for families of Americans kidnapped, detained or killed abroad
- US journalist Danny Fenster was freed on Monday from an 11-year sentence in Myanmar after Richardson’s ‘private humanitarian mission’
By AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE South China Morning Post3 min
Former US diplomat Bill Richardson speaks to the media at Hamad International Airport in Qatar on Monday. Photo: AFP
The release on Monday of US journalist Danny Fenster from a Myanmar prison was the latest in US-diplomat-turned-freelance-fixer Bill Richardson’s long career of dealing with notorious dictators.
Fenster – handed an 11-year sentence last week for incitement, unlawful association and breaching visa rules – was freed on Monday, a day before he was to face terror and sedition charges that could have seen him jailed for life.
The 37-year-old looked gaunt, with his hair and beard grown longer during captivity, as he emerged from a jet in the Qatari capital Doha with Richardson.
01:49
Myanmar frees American journalist Danny Fenster days after he gets 11-year prison sentence
“I was arrested and held in captivity for no reason … but physically I was healthy,” he told journalists at the airport. “I wasn’t starved or beaten.”
Myanmar’s military has squeezed the press since taking power in a February coup, arresting dozens of journalists critical of its crackdown, which has killed more than 1,200 people according to a local monitoring group.
More than 100 journalists have been arrested, according to monitoring group Reporting Asean, which says at least 30 are still in detention.
Fenster had been working at Frontier Myanmar, a local outlet in the Southeast Asian country, for around a year and was arrested as he headed home to see his family in May.
The junta said Fenster was pardoned and released on “humanitarian grounds”, ending 176 days spent in a colonial-era prison where many of Myanmar’s most famous dissidents have been held.
His release was secured following “face-to-face negotiations” between Richardson and junta chief Min Aung Hlaing, Richardson’s organisation said in a statement.
Richardson visited Myanmar earlier this month on what was described as a “private humanitarian mission”.
He said at the time that the US State Department had specifically asked him not to raise Fenster’s case during his visit.
Richardson’s visit earlier drew fire from activists accusing him of giving the junta legitimacy, a familiar line of criticism in his more that a quarter century of dealing with notorious foreign leaders.
He got his start in hostage negotiations in 1994. Then a member of the US House of Representatives, he travelled to North Korea to discuss a nuclear accord struck by President Bill Clinton.
As Richardson was travelling to the country, North Korea shot down a US military helicopter that had entered its territory, killing one pilot and capturing the other, and the congressman ended up staying several weeks to negotiate.
Soon after, Richardson sat down with Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein to secure the release of two Americans detained after straying over the border from Kuwait.
“The first rule of negotiating, with me, is you’ve got to relate to your adversary personally. You have to respect them. You’ve gotta know what … makes them tick,” Richardson said on a podcast produced by Foreign Policy magazine in 2018.
“You’ve gotta let the other side save face and find some ways that they get some credit, that they’re getting something out of the negotiation, when in effect the only thing may be praise for a humanitarian gesture.”
Richardson later served as US ambassador to the United Nations and energy secretary under Clinton, before being elected governor of New Mexico in 2002. He ran unsuccessfully for the Democratic Party’s nomination for president in 2008.
Richardson and his staff at the Richardson Centre for Global Engagement now frequently travel on private missions, without the US government’s imprimatur, at the request of the families of people kidnapped, detained or killed in countries with testy relations with Washington.
In 2014 he returned to North Korea, alongside Google CEO Eric Schmidt, to ask North Korea to release Korean-American missionary Kenneth Bae.
He also worked for the release of student Otto Warmbier, who was brought back to the United States in 2017 in dire health and died soon afterwards.
Richardson dealt with Iran’s Islamist leaders to help in the release of Xiyue Wang in 2019 and Michael White in 2020.
He became involved in Myanmar in the mid-1990s, he recounted to Foreign Policy, first to get the generals to release opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi from prison and into house arrest.
He later clashed with Nobel laureate Suu Kyi over the arrest of two Reuters journalists detained while reporting on killings of Rohingya Muslims in 2017, after she had risen to de facto leader of a civilian administration. Richardson failed to get the two reporters released.
25. Opinion | France admits it spreads disinformation. Other democracies should also own up.
Excerpt:
....Yet the reality is that state-sponsored lies have long been a tool in geopolitical sparring for most nations, including ours, the United States, especially in times of conflict. The supposed good guys just don’t usually own up to it. France’s admission that it does indeed conduct influence operations, then, is significant — and dialogue among like-minded governments is essential.
Opinion | France admits it spreads disinformation. Other democracies should also own up.
“False, manipulated or subverted information is a weapon,” French Minister of the Armed Forces Florence Parly said last month. She’s right that disinformation is a weapon. The question is whether her country and others like it should be able to use it.
Facebook in the winter of 2020 took down two opposing foreign influence operations in the Central African Republic: One by Russia, a usual suspect, and one, to some onlookers’ surprise, by France. Democracies have publicly — and sanctimoniously — bridled at electoral meddling by the authoritarian states most commonly associated with such malfeasance. Yet the reality is that state-sponsored lies have long been a tool in geopolitical sparring for most nations, including ours, the United States, especially in times of conflict. The supposed good guys just don’t usually own up to it. France’s admission that it does indeed conduct influence operations, then, is significant — and dialogue among like-minded governments is essential.
France claims its disinformation isn’t Russia’s disinformation or China’s or Iran’s, according to a recently released defense strategy document. The country insists that it can carry out these active measures in a manner compliant with international law, “strictly limited” to the military context; the doctrine vows “respect for noninterference in peacetime.” The rationale is tempting: Allowing only terrorists and lawless regimes to exploit these techniques gives bad actors an advantage over those who devote themselves to defense alone. If responsible citizens can avail themselves of the same methods, they can — in Ms. Parly’s words — “win without fighting.”
There is ample reason, however, for caution. The world shouldn’t want to embark on an information arms race; fighting fire with fire in this case means fighting falsehoods with falsehoods — and ensuring an Internet whose users can trust even less of what they read. Democracies risk their credibility in fighting for free and fair elections at home when they undermine those very features in contests abroad. Democracies also risk their credibility as they ask social media sites to root out influence operations by adversaries. There very well may be rules that would guard against these harms without ceding all digital territory to the most ruthless, but drawing these lines brightly isn’t easy.
With its forthrightness, France has invited a conversation. There’s a perfect place to continue it. President Biden’s Summit for Democracy in December will bring together nations invested in openness, honesty and human rights. Defense against disinformation is sure to be on the agenda, but disinformation as offense ought to be, too. The answer may be to proceed with care, or the answer may be not to proceed at all. But the United States and its allies can’t find out without asking the question in the first place.
26. When America Talks, China Doesn’t Listen
When America Talks, China Doesn’t Listen - OKN
WASHINGTON, DC - FEBRUARY 14: (AFP OUT) U.S. Vice President Joe Biden (R) and Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping talk during an expanded bilateral meeting with other U.S. and Chinese officials in the Roosevelt Room at the White House February 14, 2012 in Washington, DC. While in Washington, Vice President Xi will meet with Biden, President Barack Obama and other senior Administration officials to discuss a broad range of bilateral, regional, and global issues. (Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)
President Joe Biden will speak over the phone with Chinese leader Xi Jinping on Nov. 15.
The Chinese dictator might be on the other end of the line, but he probably won’t be listening.
About a decade ago, Singapore was criticizing the U.S. government for some failing or other. This writer had occasion to ask an official at the U.S. Embassy why the Singaporeans weren’t also chastising the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—since the Chinese were doing the same thing as the Americans.
He said he had asked, and the Singaporeans told him: “They [the Chinese] won’t listen to us.”
The Americans should have figured this out long ago. China rarely listens to the United States.
But it’s hard for zealous Americans to overcome their uniquely American conceit that if they can just talk with China about anything—for example, climate challenges—that will eventually establish a rapport that will then open the door for discussing other issues, which will lead to a negotiated agreement.
No. It’s not going to happen. China will not listen to us. There is a reason a state of war still exists on the Korean peninsula (a 68-year old armistice to cease combat operations). China will not listen to us—unless it has to.
When Does China Listen to the US?
One American observer with four decades of front-line experience in China puts it this way:
- When the United States is stronger than China in the categories of wealth and power.
- When the United States has something China wants.
- When the United States can reduce the value of a key asset (or assets) China holds.
If the United States is not on course to any one of the three above (all three would be great), then Beijing will not listen to Washington.
What Is China Doing When It ‘Listens’?
Even when China “listens,” it is not the way Americans think of “listening.”
China waits patiently for the United States to finally arrive at its own self-discovery that the Chinese side is “correct thinking.”
Notice Xi’s remarks last week about “working with” the United States to re-establish mutual relations? In Beijing-speak, “working with” means we will help you to accept what we want.
And sometimes China “listens” when it wants to know what words we want to hear from it, in order for us to give it what it wants. What are those words? “Win-win,” “mutual respect,” “mutual benefit,” “new great power relationship,” “good for American farmers/consumers/etc.,” to name a few.
In other words, when Beijing listens, it’s just to be better equipped to get the jump on us. So, it’s not just useless, it can be harmful.
What About All Those Painstakingly Negotiated Agreements?
Even if the United States has the upper hand and the Chinese do talk and negotiate, and agree to do something, there is scant evidence they keep their promises.
To name a few examples:
-
Xi promised President Barack Obama at the White House in 2015 that China would not militarize its artificial islands in the South China Sea.
- Xi’s promise to do something about fentanyl flows into the United States that are killing tens of thousands of Americans every year.
- The Genocide Convention—a treaty that the PRC has signed.
- The PRC’s commitments to obey World Trade Organization rules.
- The PRC’s commitments to abide by the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.
- Climate change agreements. Just look at the recent U.S.-China agreement on climate—Beijing’s vague promises to do nothing in particular, and are made by people who won’t be alive when the commitments come due and who know they won’t be held accountable, including by climate activists (who know China won’t listen to them).
The list of commitments that Beijing has kept is much shorter. Maybe the only international agreement the Chinese communists have kept is the China-North Korea treaty. They’ve kept the North Korean regime afloat for nearly 70 years. Yet, the Americans still haven’t given up trying to get Beijing to “listen” to them about North Korea.
Back to Talking the Talk
Despite the hard lessons of decades of experience—and the Trump administration’s successful, if short lived, attempts to turn the tables on China and not waste time talking when the communists aren’t listening—the Americans of all stripes are once again hell-bent on talking with the Chinese.
U.S. military commanders are hot to re-establish communications with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), as if they can “talk” their counterparts into good (by U.S. standards) behavior. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, seems keenest of all, including to tipping off Beijing if the president is planning something he doesn’t approve of.
The U.S. business community is insisting the Biden administration to start talking, and do whatever is necessary to give the Chinese what they want so they can get back to “business as usual” with China. And Team Biden probably will. U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai and U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo are both eager to “recouple” with China and to chart a “middle way.” Presumably they mean “win-win”?
Apparently, John Kerry, the “Climate Czar,” has never stopped talking and giving the Chinese (and other American enemies) what they want.
Will we ever learn that the Chinese regime won’t listen? And that when it does, it isn’t listening for the reasons we think it is. And when Beijing is negotiating, it’s just wearing us down and setting us up.
Probably not.
Some Americans just can’t help themselves.
Grant Newsham is a retired U.S. Marine officer and a former U.S. diplomat and business executive who lived and worked for many years in the Asia/Pacific region. He served as a reserve head of intelligence for Marine Forces Pacific, and was the U.S. Marine attaché, U.S. Embassy Tokyo on two occasions. He is a senior fellow with the Center for Security Policy.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.