Quotes of the Day:
"Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world."
- Nelson Mandela
"Always do your very best. Even when no one else is looking, you always are. Don't disappoint yourself."
- Colin Powell
"The purpose of art is washing the dust of daily life off our souls."
- Pablo Picasso
1. Former President Roh Tae-woo dies at 88
2. Why South Korea Shouldn’t Build Its Own Nuclear Bombs
3. Turkey, South Korea sign deal for Turkish Altay tank
4. Moon administration stays quiet about most North Korean provocations
5. Meeting held for trade-related officials in Yanggang Province
6. Three soldiers caught mimicking S. Korean dance moves sent to political prison camp
7. Chinese perspective on Moon Jae-in: THAAD and inconsistent messaging
8. Korea to provide another $5M to Asean Response Fund for Covid-19
9. Time for a Peace Declaration for the Korean Peninsula
10. Is Kim Jong Un angling for nuclear talks on his terms?
11. Should S.Korea Build Its Own Nukes?
12. A Coup in North Korea? Kim Jong-un Dead? Don't Believe the Rumors
13. Moon to meet with Pope Francis at G20 summit
1. Former President Roh Tae-woo dies at 88
I recall watching the democracy transition from 1986-1988 and witnessing the successful Seoul Olympics.
I think it is interesting that a former member of the Korean special forces was the first democratically elected president and as a former general was responsible for completing the democratic transition leading to the election of the first non-military/civilian president in 1993.
Excerpts:
Still, he has been credited with building ties with socialist states and promoting inter-Korean exchanges during his term.
In 1991, South and North Korea were simultaneously admitted to the United Nations. South Korea also established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1990 and China in 1992.
Roh oversaw Seoul's hosting of the 1988 Summer Olympics, which was deemed a success.
Inter-Korean relations improved with the first high-level inter-Korean talks in September 1989 and the 1991 adoption of the Basic Agreement that established the principle of non-aggression between the sides.
In December 1991, the Koreas signed a denuclearization agreement under which all testing, manufacturing and other processes involving nuclear weapons were banned.
To fulfill the agreement, all nuclear warheads were removed from U.S. military bases in South Korea.
(3rd LD) Former President Roh Tae-woo dies at 88 | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with more details)
By Lee Haye-ah
SEOUL, Oct. 26 (Yonhap) -- Roh Tae-woo, South Korea's last general-turned-president who played a key role in a 1979 coup before winning election through a direct vote at the start of South Korea's democratization, died Tuesday, aides said. He was 88.
Roh, who served as president from 1988-93, was recently admitted to a hospital after his health deteriorated but failed to recover, they said.
The former president received surgery for prostate cancer in 2002 and was frequently admitted to hospitals while living at his residence in Seoul. He also suffered from cerebellar atrophy and asthma, which together kept him largely out of the public eye.
The former Army general rose to prominence after helping Chun Doo-hwan seize power through a 1979 military coup in the wake of a political vacuum created by the death of former authoritarian President Park Chung-hee.
Roh, who was the commander of the 9th Army division at the time, belonged to the same class of the Korea Military Academy as Chun.
Under Chun, Roh served as the sports and interior ministers as well as a National Assembly member and chief of the then ruling Democratic Justice Party.
In June 1987, he won the party's presidential nomination and went on to win the election later that year.
Ahead of the election, pro-democracy rallies spread massively across the nation, prompting Roh to accept calls for a direct presidential system in what is known as the "June 29 Declaration."
He won the election through a direct vote.
In an apparent bid to shed his military image, Roh began his administration under the slogan of opening "an era of ordinary people."
Roh sought to overcome challenges facing the nation through gradual reform measures, but was dealt a blow by the ruling party's defeat in parliamentary elections two months after his inauguration.
To increase its size in parliament, the ruling party formed a coalition with two opposition parties in 1990, but the partnership was fraught with factional infighting, undermining Roh's grip on state affairs.
As a result, the former president experienced an early lame duck period beginning in the middle of his term and earned the nickname "Water Tae-woo" for his lack of resolve.
Still, he has been credited with building ties with socialist states and promoting inter-Korean exchanges during his term.
In 1991, South and North Korea were simultaneously admitted to the United Nations. South Korea also established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1990 and China in 1992.
Roh oversaw Seoul's hosting of the 1988 Summer Olympics, which was deemed a success.
Inter-Korean relations improved with the first high-level inter-Korean talks in September 1989 and the 1991 adoption of the Basic Agreement that established the principle of non-aggression between the sides.
In December 1991, the Koreas signed a denuclearization agreement under which all testing, manufacturing and other processes involving nuclear weapons were banned.
To fulfill the agreement, all nuclear warheads were removed from U.S. military bases in South Korea.
In 1996, Roh and Chun were convicted of corruption and mutiny for their role in the 1979 military coup and in the brutal crackdown on the 1980 pro-democracy uprising in the southwestern city of Gwangju.
Roh was sentenced to 17 years in prison and around 260 billion won (US$223 million) in fines. He was pardoned in 1997 under the government of then-President Kim Young-sam and belatedly paid his fines in full in 2013.
Roh was born on Dec. 4, 1932 in what is now Daegu, 302 kilometers southeast of Seoul, as the first son of a local government clerk.
He is survived by his wife, former first lady Kim Ok-suk, and a daughter and son. Roh's daughter is currently undergoing divorce proceedings with SK Group Chairman Chey Tae-won.
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
2. Why South Korea Shouldn’t Build Its Own Nuclear Bombs
To what military end?
Would the political cost be worth it?
The ROK has no need for nuclear weapons.
A key assessment in this conclusion:
From this perspective, the ongoing military developments in South Korea may be less harbingers of nuclear proliferation than evidence that Seoul is developing a serious non-nuclear approach to regional security. U.S. efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict — whether through arms control, crisis management exercises, or improved interoperability in support of South Korean conventional counterforce options — could strengthen the alliance, stabilize the Peninsula, and reduce proliferation pressures.
Why South Korea Shouldn’t Build Its Own Nuclear Bombs - War on the Rocks
Are nuclear weapons the answer to Seoul’s security challenges? Amidst a flurry of North Korean nuclear-capable missile testing and persistent stresses in the U.S.-South Korean security alliance, conservative candidates in South Korea’s presidential primaries have called on the United States to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula. Some have even argued that South Korea should “independently seek nuclear armament” if the United States does not agree to redeploy. These views found support from two American academics, Jennifer Lind and Daryl Press, who contend in a provocative Washington Post op-ed that South Korean nuclear weapons may be “the only way” to save the alliance. Arguing for allied proliferation is a highly unusual policy prescription. In contrast, we believe that South Korean nuclear acquisition would be counterproductive and dangerous, leaving both the alliance and South Korean security worse off.
Lind and Press posit that South Korea is stuck between a rock and hard place, “pulled apart by powerful geopolitical forces.” For Seoul, joining U.S.-led regional security initiatives risks alienating China, South Korea’s closest trade partner. Yet, resisting U.S. demands to more effectively counterbalance China could threaten the reliability of U.S. protection. Moreover, the authors suggest North Korea’s improving ability to target U.S. cities with nuclear weapons challenges the credibility of U.S. commitments to come to Seoul’s aid in an inter-Korean conflict. The best course to resolve these dilemmas, according to Lind and Press, might be a South Korean nuclear arsenal, one they argue should enjoy U.S. political support.
Although the U.S.-South Korean alliance does face significant geopolitical challenges, nuclear proliferation would be an ill-advised solution. South Korean nuclear weapons would likely make the regional security situation more precarious. Moreover, alliance credibility problems have not reached a magnitude that calls for such a drastic measure. Instead, strengthening cohesion within the U.S.-South Korean alliance through non-nuclear means offers a viable — and safer — path to address regional challenges from North Korea and China.
The China Problem
South Korean leaders understand their regional security environment, including the mounting threats from China and North Korea and the centrifugal forces these create in the U.S.-South Korean alliance. China’s increasingly aggressive security policy toward its near abroad and its willingness to use economic coercion pose distinct threats for Seoul. Indeed, South Korean officials keenly recall the painful Chinese unofficial sanctions after Seoul agreed to host the U.S. Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense missile defense system in 2017 that cost the South Korean economy an estimated $7.5 billion in losses.
Understandably, South Korea has resisted U.S. overtures to join the Quad initiative with Australia, India, and Japan in order to avoid provoking more Chinese retaliation. Clearly, Seoul does not desire a “new Cold War” with Beijing, and it will encourage steps to prevent that outcome. Yet, in practice, South Korea’s efforts to strengthen relationships in Southeast Asia and with India through a “New Southern Policy” demonstrate it is contributing to U.S. counterbalancing initiatives, albeit in indirect ways. The May 2021 summit between Presidents Moon Jae-in and Joe Biden also affirmed a shared vision for how the alliance extends beyond the Korean Peninsula, including by “maintaining an inclusive, free, and open Indo-Pacific.” Remarkably, the summit statement also emphasized “the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.”
Thus, in both words and actions, South Korea is actively working with, and complementing, the United States to contend with the China problem. China may yet become a more direct threat to South Korea in the future, such that an independent South Korean nuclear arsenal or nuclear sharing arrangement with the United States might become more relevant. For the foreseeable future, though, the allies appear quite capable of managing the China problem in ways that meet their respective interests without requiring nuclear weapons to keep the alliance together.
An Alliance Credibility Deficit?
Lind and Press also point to alliance credibility challenges as a reason why South Korea should build its own nuclear weapons. They are certainly not alone in warning that U.S. nuclear credibility may be crumbling, yet there is plenty of evidence indicating the political and military foundations of the U.S.-South Korean defense relationship remain strong. Recent public opinion surveys by the Chicago Council for Global Affairs showed that 62 percent of Americans support the use of U.S. military forces to defend South Korea against a North Korean attack. This is matched by attitudes in South Korea, where the public also continues to express high levels of support for, and confidence in, the alliance. A September 2021 Asan Institute poll, for example, showed 78 percent support for maintaining or strengthening the U.S.-South Korean alliance.
Proponents of a South Korean nuclear weapons program argue, however, that South Koreans are no longer confident in the United States — they point to high levels of public support for nuclear proliferation (70 percent in the recent Asan poll) and concerns that South Korea’s military alone is not sufficient to deter North Korea (72 percent, according to Asan). But deeper research paints a more nuanced picture of the credibility challenge. For example, research by Lauren Sukin found that, in 2019, 58 percent of South Korean survey respondents believed the United States would use nuclear weapons to defend South Korea from a North Korean nuclear attack. Other work shows robust U.S. public support for the nuclear security guarantee to South Korea. Scholars have similarly found that the U.S. public is willing to use nuclear weapons, including against North Korea, and even when there is a high risk of nuclear retaliation. So the claim by Lind and Press that “South Korea can’t be sure it can depend on its U.S. ally for protection” seems overblown.
This is not to argue that concerns about alliance credibility have no basis. Building confidence in the alliance among the South Korean public is an ongoing challenge, made much harder in the wake of the Trump administration’s extortionate approach to alliance burden-sharing negotiations. South Koreans were also alarmed in 2017 that President Donald Trump’s “fire and fury” might result in a war they did not want. Yet, neither of these are problems are fundamentally about the reliability of U.S. promises to aid South Korea in a security crisis. Rather, they point to a need for better alliance political and military cohesion, especially coordination about contingencies involving North Korea that could escalate to use of nuclear weapons. In sum, alliance credibility problems are real but not as severe as many have suggested, and nuclear weapons are far from a clear remedy for the problems that persist.
Would Nuclear Weapons Improve South Korean Security?
Even if the alliance problems were as profound as some analysts contend — and if South Korean nuclear proliferation did not somehow make them worse — a South Korean decision to acquire nuclear weapons would not necessarily improve Seoul’s security against North Korea or China, as advocates have claimed. Indeed, a lot would depend on how North Korea and China would react to South Korean proliferation.
South Korean nuclear weapons may not be especially useful politico-military tools against China. U.S. nuclear threats against China during the Korean War did not dissuade Beijing from continuing to fight. Nor has China hesitated to leverage its conventional military strength in territorial contests with nuclear-armed India. China’s ongoing modernization of its nuclear forces — whether by constructing missile silos or testing hypersonics — suggests Beijing may view the survivability and effectiveness of its arsenal as vital for deterring the United States, especially in the Taiwan Strait. Would South Korean nuclear weapons dissuade Beijing from undertaking coercive operations against Seoul? It seems unlikely. If anything, South Korean proliferation could plausibly invite more coercive Chinese economic and military pressures if Beijing interpreted Seoul’s nuclear arsenal as a direct challenge to its regional aspirations. Vis-à-vis China, then, South Korea could wind up counterintuitively less secure with nuclear weapons than without them.
South Korean nuclear weapons could similarly make the situation with North Korea much more dangerous. Already, joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises, which Pyongyang calls “exercises for a nuclear war,” have repeatedly prompted North Korea to issue aggressive rhetoric, engage in cross-border provocations, and conduct missile tests. In the face of a South Korean nuclear weapons program, it would be unreasonable to expect North Korea to take no countervailing actions. For example, it seems likely that South Korean proliferation could cause North Korea to further augment its nuclear arsenal, posture its nuclear weapons for first use, or take greater risks to gain the upper hand in an escalating military crisis. After all, even the United States, with its far superior nuclear arsenal, has had limited success deterring or compelling North Korea.
Moreover, even if South Korean nuclear weapons likely would deter large-scale violence by China or North Korea, they could make the threat of low-level conflict escalation greater than it already is today. This is especially important in the Indo-Pacific context, where the most prevalent threats and sources of crisis escalation — such as China’s overflights of contested territory or North Korea’s offensive use of cyber capabilities — exist far below the nuclear threshold. The “stability-instability paradox” of nuclear weapons suggests that, although mutual possession of nuclear weapons may reduce the chances of nuclear war, it may, at the same time, make conventional wars and militarized crises more likely, as well as incentivize greater risk taking at lower levels. A more moderated version of this argument suggests that nuclear weapons may not necessarily make low-level conflict more likely, but neither do they prevent it.
For instance, a nuclear-armed South Korea could be emboldened to respond more aggressively to North Korean provocations with proactive deterrence or “quid pro quo plus” military operations, the inherent escalation risks of which are intended to dissuade North Korea in the first place. Facing perceived “use or lose” pressures, North Korea may be quicker to cross certain escalation thresholds, such as the use of long-range rocket systems, as it seeks escalation dominance. The potential for these action-reaction dynamics to spiral into a race up the escalation ladder is clear. To be certain, this potential is already present, but it seems likely to worsen if South Korea possessed nuclear weapons. Reaction times during moments of crisis would be shorter, tensions higher; miscommunication and misperception easier, and nuclear use more accessible. South Korean proliferation could, then, make conflict more likely at worst and fail to deter it at best.
Alternatives to South Korean Nuclear Weapons
Before South Korean leaders opt to acquire nuclear weapons, they should weigh these potential risks against the putative deterrence benefits proliferation proponents claim. In our assessment, leaning into nuclear deterrence as the corrective for regional security challenges, as some experts have advocated, is likely to be counterproductive. This approach positions nuclear weapons — incorrectly — as the best solution to regional tensions, in turn making proliferation look more appealing. Prioritizing nuclear solutions to the primarily non-nuclear threats South Korea and the United States face also exacerbates the extended deterrence credibility challenges for Washington. The United States would simultaneously have to prove it is ready to use nuclear weapons in a broad range of contingencies, while also conveying it is appropriately restrained such that it would not drag South Korea into an unwanted conflict. The latter point is particularly important as the Biden administration seeks to mend damaged alliance relations in the wake of the Trump administration.
Rather than expand the role of nuclear weapons in addressing threats from China and North Korea — or, as Lind and Press suggest, accept the inevitability of South Korean nuclear proliferation in response to these threats — the United States and South Korea should focus on making the alliance more resilient to the types of conflict escalation scenarios that are most likely to occur. Prioritizing political and military cohesion makes a North Korean “wedging” strategy — intended to break apart the U.S.-South Korean alliance — less likely to succeed, while also creating more avenues to satisfy Washington’s interests in engaging Seoul in broader regional security efforts. Peacetime consultations, improved crisis communications, and exercises intended to bolster military interoperability would all contribute to alliance reassurance, while improving military readiness for a variety of crisis situations. The alliance should especially prepare for threats below the nuclear threshold, including by planning for gray zone contingencies and adapting to new and emerging threats, like those posed by cyber operations.
One important avenue for strengthening alliance cohesion involves greater U.S. support to South Korea’s development of conventional counterforce capabilities and strategies. A conventional counterforce strategy relies on accurate, secure, and sufficiently impactful conventional forces for damage-limiting first-strikes and secure and punitive second strikes. In the last decade, and especially under the Moon administration, South Korea has invested considerable sums in developing very precise ballistic and cruise missiles to deter and respond to North Korea’s potential use of nuclear weapons. According to two senior South Korean military officers, Seoul’s acquisition of conventional counterforce capabilities “raises the expected costs of North Korea’s nuclear provocations and reduces the possibility of it achieving the desired political and military goals through the use of nuclear weapons.”
From this perspective, the ongoing military developments in South Korea may be less harbingers of nuclear proliferation than evidence that Seoul is developing a serious non-nuclear approach to regional security. U.S. efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict — whether through arms control, crisis management exercises, or improved interoperability in support of South Korean conventional counterforce options — could strengthen the alliance, stabilize the Peninsula, and reduce proliferation pressures.
Lauren Sukin is a Ph.D. candidate at Stanford University’s department of political science and a pre-doctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation.
Toby Dalton is a senior fellow at, and co-director of, the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
3. Turkey, South Korea sign deal for Turkish Altay tank
The South Korean defense industry is flourishing.
Turkey, South Korea sign deal for Turkish Altay tank
ANKARA — Turkey and South Korea have signed a letter of intent by which two Korean companies will supply engines and transmission mechanisms for the Altay, Turkey’s indigenous tank in the making.
The deal, penned Oct. 22, came at a meeting of Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and Korean Minister in charge of the country’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration, Kang Eun-ho.
“This is a landmark development for the Altay program,” Cavusoglu announced via Twitter.
Turkish armored vehicles manufacturer BMC, the maker of the Altay, has been negotiating strategic agreements with two South Korean companies for joint work on a power pack for the new tank.
Under the deals, South Korean manufacturers Doosan and S&T Dynamics will supply the engine and transmission mechanism for the Altay.
“The letter of intent elevates the talks from a company-to-company to government-to-government level,” said one Turkish procurement official.
The Altay program has faced major delays due to failed access to significant components like the engine, transmission and armor.
Turkey had hoped to power the Altay with the German MTU engine and RENK transmission, but talks with German manufacturers over the past couple of years failed due to a federal arms embargo on Turkey. Germany is one of a number of European governments that have limited exports to Turkey over its involvement in the Syrian civil war.
Under the deal, the South Koran companies will supply the power pack and assist with integrating it into the Altay. A test phase will follow. If all goes well, BMC officials say, the Altays may be powered by Doosan and S&T Dynamics within 18 months.
BMC won the multibillion-dollar Altay contract in November 2018. The contract involves the production of an initial batch of 250 units, life-cycle logistical support, and the establishment by the contractor of a tank systems technology center and its operation. As part of the contract, BMC will design, develop and produce a tank with an unmanned fire control unit.
The Altay program is broken into two phases: T1 and T2. T1 covers the first 250 units, and T2 involves the advanced version of the tank. Turkey plans to eventually produce 1,000 Altays, to be followed by an unmanned version.
4. Moon administration stays quiet about most North Korean provocations
I think we should keep in mind that former President Trump and President Moon have set a red line that is a very high bar: no nuclear tests and no ICBM testing. They have provided Kim Jong-un with a large gray zone to conduct a variety of provocations in support of blackmail diplomacy which is the use of increased tension, threats, and provocations to gain political and economic concessions. By default we have given KJU the initiative in the gray zone.
Moon administration stays quiet about most North Korean provocations
By Kang Seung-woo
The Moon Jae-in administration has refrained from firmly condemning North Korea's military provocations, a lawmaker said, Tuesday.
President Moon Jae-in / YonhapAccording to Rep. Kang Min-kuk of the main opposition People Power Party, the Kim Jong-un regime has carried out provocative actions, including missile and nuclear tests, on a total of 40 occasions since President Moon took office in May 2017.
However, the current administration has struck back with counter-remarks in only 12 instances, or 30 percent of the time, the lawmaker added.
Taking a closer look, Moon has denounced the North's military actions as provocations only seven times.
In addition, the President last issued a strong warning to North Korea for its tension-generating moves, May 9, 2019, in an interview marking the second anniversary of his inauguration, the lawmaker noted. Earlier in the day, the totalitarian state had launched short-range missiles.
"Anyway, however, I'd like to warn North Korea that if such behavior by North Korea is repeated, it could make the current dialogue and negotiation phase difficult," Moon said at the time.
Rep. Kang said, "In response to North Korea's military provocations, the counter-message from the President, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, should be firm and strong as well as reassuring to the people."
The Moon administration has been taking flak from some for its low-key stance on the North Korean regime's provocative actions, in the effort not to provoke North Korea or disrupt its peace efforts to engage the country into giving up its nuclear weapons program.
In addition, the South Korean military has conducted its annual combined military drills with the U.S. in a low-key manner, due to concerns over Pyongyang's strong resistance, but many have taken issue with it, saying that a lack of exercises could undermine Seoul's war deterrence.
Inter-Korean ties have been deadlocked since February 2019, when the Hanoi summit between the United States and North Korea ended without a deal.
5. Meeting held for trade-related officials in Yanggang Province
I think unless the border is opened soon and the draconian population and resources control measures are relaxed, the economy may be unrecoverable and the suffering of the Korean people in the north may become catastrophic.
Meeting held for trade-related officials in Yanggang Province - Daily NK
Trade officials who attended the meeting are saying the authorities might open the border soon
By Jong So Yong - 2021.10.26 3:17pm
View into North Korea from across the Tumen River in China’s Jilin Province. Image: Daily NK
Daily NK has learned that the Propaganda Department of the ruling party committee of Yanggang Province recently held a four-day ideological training session for trade-related officials.
A source in Yanggang Province told Daily NK on Monday that the Propaganda Department gathered together trade officials from the Trade Management Bureau and other units in the provincial party’s general meeting room for four days of lectures and meetings from Oct. 18 to 21.
The lectures were led by eight officials, including a deputy section chief of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, the deputy chief of the Cabinet’s Trade Management Bureau, the head of the provincial party’s Propaganda Department, and an official from the Organizational Department of the provincial party.
About 90 cadres and officials from trade-related bodies and customs officials also took part in the meeting. The participants reportedly discussed the matter of “thoroughly realizing the ideas of putting the nation and self-effort first in all trade activities through the power of ideology.”
In fact, according to the source, the meeting consisted of discussions and workshops to ensure that trade officials were not carrying out activities from the perspective that money is everything, drenched in the “capitalist ideology of the almighty dollar” as they were prior to the closure of the border. They also discussed the ideology officials who undertake inspections, quarantines, imports and exports should follow once trade resumes in earnest following state approval.
Firstly, the meeting stressed that trade officials should remember that they are “qualified to play their role only if they hold firm ideological principles” because they experience the boundary between socialism and capitalism up close and personal. They should carefully watch what they say and be ideologically proper in all their actions.
The meeting then stressed that improving and bolstering ideological efforts is “a vital demand” on the overseas trade sector. Only trade officials that “protect party policy and who are armed with revolutionary ideology” can do their part for the party, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and the state and become “the needed officials who can work miracles while making their way through the hardships and difficulties faced by the party and state.”
The meeting appealed to the attendees to return to their posts, repeatedly study what they learned, and prepare to conduct trade in the future “thoroughly armed ideologically.”
In particular, the meeting ended with comments such as “the party, too, knows that if it unconditionally closes the border so you can’t trade, you can’t make a living” and “it’s party policy to demand the strengthening of ideological education of trade officials so that they would think and act according to party policy if trade were approved right away.” In North Korea, this has sparked greater anticipation that trade will resume.
The source said trade officials who attended the meeting are saying the authorities held the ideological training session because they might open the border soon.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
6. Three soldiers caught mimicking S. Korean dance moves sent to political prison camp
Another indicator that Kim Jong-un fears the Korean people (and Korean soldiers) more than the US. Counter ideology and outside information that contributes to it, is an existential threat to the regime.
Three soldiers caught mimicking S. Korean dance moves sent to political prison camp - Daily NK
The soldiers represented the first “example” of military personnel being tried for crimes related to “reactionary culture” after North Korea enacted a new law
By Kim Jeong Hun - 2021.10.26 3:08pm
Soldiers at a summer retreat to a revolutionary historical site in Mt. Baekdu recently. / Image: Rodong Sinmun
The incident took place at Sokhu Station in South Hamgyong Province on Aug. 5, 2020. A train bound for Hyesan from Pyongyang was carrying soldiers to a tour of Mount Paekdu when it stopped at the station due to a power outage. The soldiers were then granted some recreation time, during which three did the BTS dance. They were instantly arrested at the scene.
A propaganda officer from the Propaganda Department of the General Political Bureau and a section chief from the Military Security Command — both of whom were on the train to accompany the soldiers on the trip — saw the dance and called the station’s security personnel to have the men dragged off.
It was initially believed they were transported back to their unit, but it was later learned they were turned over to the Military Security Command.
They were reportedly arrested for “imitating a decadent dance from South Choson (South Korea) during a trip to Mount Paekdu, a holy site of the revolution, to learn the revolutionary spirit of the patriotic martyrs.” That is to say, they were allegedly imbued with the spirit of “bourgeois delinquents.”
The three were model soldiers both in their ordinary military lives and during training. Nevertheless, at the end of a six month preliminary hearing from August to February, the Military Security Command stripped the soldiers of their “political honor” and their civil rights and sent them to Kaechon Political Prison Camp, operated by the Ministry of Social Security.
Even when they were arrested, people believed they would simply face a dishonorable discharge or six months of disciplinary labor. Their actual sentence, however, far exceeded expectations.
The Military Security Command based its sentence on the following.
Firstly, they made a big deal out of what they deemed a “decadent phenomenon of reactionary ideology and culture” during a trip to the historical site Mount Paekdu, a “holy site of the revolution.” Moreover, not only were other soldiers watching, but cadres from the General Political and Military Security Command themselves made an issue of the dance, too. So the punishment the soldiers received was necessarily severe.
The Military Security Command also took issue with the soldiers’ behavior during questioning. It accused the soldiers of having faulty understandings and attitudes as well. Namely, it said the soldiers dishonestly told them they did not know the dance was from South Korea, inconsistently testified that they learned the dance in their unit but at the same time danced South Korean dances “following trends” prior to their conscription, and protested that the authorities were taking issue now when they had overlooked the dance when they did it during recreation time back in Pyongsong, where they were based.
The Military Security Command thus decided it could not take the matter lightly and sentenced the soldiers to a political prison camp.
Above all, the soldiers represented the first “example” of military personnel being tried for crimes related to “reactionary culture” after North Korea enacted a new law calling for “the rejection of reactionary ideology and culture” in December 2020, when the soldiers were undergoing preliminary proceedings. Authorities therefore had little choice but to come down hard on them.
Within the military, soldiers raised doubts after the incident, wondering how the Military Security Command could accurately name the title of a South Korean song just by watching some dance moves. In particular, they wonder whether the Military Security Command so quickly recognized the BTS dance because they themselves have watched South Korean videos.
The Military Security Command must watch foreign videos for three hours a week as part of their duties, so this would not cause any problems. In fact, the Military Security Command was commended for ferreting out “counter-revolutionary elements” during a military tour to Mount Paekdu.
Meanwhile, the North Korean military responded to the incident by bolstering educational efforts. The General Political Bureau distributed political educational materials to the military on Aug. 8, 2020, entitled “Capitalist Ideology and Culture and the Issue of Young Soldiers of the New Generation.” Discussions based on the materials were undertaken within individual organizational units.
In the materials, the General Political Bureau cited the incident involving the three soldiers, stressing that “the main target of the imperialists’ schemes of ideological and cultural infiltration is the gun-toting young soldiers of the new generation.” It also said “reality demands high vigilance against imperialist schemes to melt down the youth.”
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
7. Chinese perspective on Moon Jae-in: THAAD and inconsistent messaging
It is all about messaging.
Chinese perspective on Moon Jae-in: THAAD and inconsistent messaging
By Lee Seong-hyon
With President Moon Jae-in's term winding down, and with Seoul and Beijing's relationship to mark their 30th anniversary next year, now may be an appropriate time to pause and ask some questions about the quality of Moon's diplomatic outreach to China ― from the Chinese perspective.
One of the interesting questions is this: Moon is known to be the most "pro-China" South Korean leader in recent decades. Then, why hasn't Chinese leader Xi Jinping attempted a single visit to South Korea during Moon's term, despite Moon's repeated invitations?
COVID-19 serves as a convenient diplomatic cover. Both Seoul and Beijing officials often cite it as the primary reason. But interviews with Chinese interlocutors reveal a more nuanced picture.
Even during the pandemic period, for instance, Xi has fielded numerous virtual summits with many state leaders. Xi has one scheduled with President Biden next month too. But there are none scheduled with Moon. There have been no announcements of a summit scheduled with Moon in the near future.
This situation warrants further probing. This author's preliminary research reveals that the Chinese side doesn't see the necessity of holding a summit with Moon.
From China's perspective, there are two occasions that warrant a summit: one, when its relationship with another nation is supremely good (this condition includes the compatibility of their state ideology, say, North Korea), and two, when the relationship is not necessarily good, but the other nation is important enough that they feel the need to sort out their issues at the top leadership level (in the case of, say, the U.S.).
"South Korea belongs to neither category," one interlocutor told me.
It all started with THAAD. It sowed discord in bilateral relations between the two countries, as we know. The THAAD issue has as its substance the issue of security, but from the Chinese view, it also has a problem of style in the way that the Moon government conveyed the matter with China. And that boils down to inconsistency in messaging.
Back in 2012 when Moon was a presidential candidate, he took the position that the THAAD deployment decision should be postponed for the next president to decide. China saw this strategic ambiguity posture as favoring China. China came to have such a view because Moon's interlocutors hinted that Moon, once elected, would not approve of the deployment of THAAD.
When the incumbent President Park Geun-hye in 2016 made a public announcement about the deployment of THAAD, Moon's interlocutors still assured the Chinese side that Moon would reverse the move. He did not.
After getting elected, Moon referred to the THAAD deployment as something "temporary," leaving leeway. For a while, such messaging gave hope to the Chinese side. However, the Chinese side got frustrated when the "temporary" deployment actually become a "permanent" one through the course of Moon's presidency until today.
When the Chinese side took issue with the THAAD's powerful radar facing China, Moon's interlocutors told them that the direction of the radar could be reoriented, so that it would not face the Chinese side. But at that time they weren't sure whether the South Korean side has authority over the U.S. military asset operated by the U.S. military personnel inside a U.S. military base in South Korea. South Korea doesn't.
The ritual of Seoul sending mixed messages, stretched over a year, really frustrated the Chinese interlocutors, who also felt heat when they reported it to the senior Chinese leadership, who got angry and also felt humiliated.
Slowly and gradually, the Chinese side developed distrust toward the Moon administration and its wordings. Recently, the Chinese side reportedly also concluded that the Moon administration's so-called "3-No Promise" doesn't hold water.
"The Moon government says one thing and does another," said a Chinese scholar who advises the government. "We have a trust problem with the Moon administration."
The "3-No Promise" refers to the Moon government's assurance to China that there will be no additional THAAD, no joining the U.S. missile defense network and no Korea-U.S.-Japan trilateral military alliance. The South Korean government officially calls it "positions," not "promises." However, Moon's critics called it "humiliating diplomacy."
China's distrust toward Moon deepened after Moon held a summit with Biden in Washington. The joint statement mentioned not only the "South China Sea," but also "Taiwan." The latter's inclusion really upset the Chinese side, prompting the Chinese side to embark on a "fact-finding" mission via Zoom conferences with South Koreans.
"Let's say that China and South Korea hold a summit. That will help Moon's political party in the upcoming election. But how can it help China?" posed a Chinese interlocutor.
Lee Seong-hyon, Ph.D. (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), is a visiting scholar at Harvard University's Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies.
8. Korea to provide another $5M to Asean Response Fund for Covid-19
Korea is a middle power contributing globally.
Tuesday
October 26, 2021
Korea to provide another $5M to Asean Response Fund for Covid-19
President Moon Jae-in takes part in the 22nd Korea-Asean summit over video conference from the Blue House in central Seoul Tuesday. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]
Korea will provide an additional $5 million to the Asean Response Fund for Covid-19 to speed along vaccination and strengthen the global supply chain to contribute to Southeast Asia's economic recovery, said President Moon Jae-in Tuesday.
Moon said in a virtual summit with leaders of Southeast Asian nations that Korea and Asean must "share a deeper friendship in order for better recovery" from the Covid-19 pandemic and "build an inclusive and sustainable future together." He voiced concerns over the spread of the Delta variant in regions with low vaccination rates and the constraints faced by the global economy.
He added in his opening remarks at the 22nd Korea-Asean summit that "solidarity and cooperation is the only way to overcome Covid-19," focusing on ways to cope with the public health crisis and strengthen regional partnership.
To assist coronavirus response efforts in the region, the Korean government has contributed $6 million to Asean for the Covid-19 response fund, $5 million in Covid-19 test kits and protective gear, $19 million in a comprehensive support program, and another $3 million allocated to Myanmar for humanitarian assistance.
Moon urged to deepen the strategic partnership with Asean nations under his administration's New Southern Policy that aims to diversify Korea's economic portfolio through strengthening cooperation with Southeast Asia.
The Moon administration introduced the upgraded New Southern Policy Plus mechanism to further expand cooperation in public health infrastructure capacity building, promote connectivity by revamping supply chains and jointly strengthening the East Asian regional architecture.
The two sides also acknowledged the shared principles of the New Southern Policy and the "Asean Outlook on the Indo-Pacific," first introduced in June 2019 which aims to solidify Asean centrality.
The 10 Asean countries are: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. However, Myanmar did not take part in this summit.
The leaders issued a joint statement following the summit and agreed to advance the Asean-Korea strategic partnership "into a more substantial, dynamic and mutually beneficial relationship to better respond to regional and global opportunities and challenges and contribute to enhancing peace, stability and prosperity in the region."
They stressed three areas of cooperation: people, prosperity and peace.
The two sides agreed to work toward the United Nation's sustainable development goals and cooperate in areas including Covid-19 and public health emergency response, environment and climate change, biodiversity conservation and disaster management.
The also agreed to cooperate in education, science and technology, human resources development in response to the future of work and digital transformation, and cultural and people-to-people exchanges.
Korea and the Asean nations plan to strengthen economic resilience and trade and investment, support for businesses such as small- and medium-sized companies and start-ups and improve energy transitions and green growth. They also will cooperate in digital economy, digital innovation, digital connectivity, cybersecurity and the fourth industrial revolution.
They also agreed to work on maritime security and safety cooperation, as well as marine sustainability, including addressing plastic debris in the oceans.
Korea signed separate bilateral FTAs with Cambodia and the Philippines Tuesday.
Moon also urged for the implementation within the year of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a multilateral trade pact signed by Korea, China, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the Asean countries last year, referred to as a "mega-FTA."
On Wednesday, Moon will take part in the East Asian Summit (EAS) and Asean Plus Three summit, bringing South Korea, China and Japan together with the Southeast Asian countries.
BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]
9. Time for a Peace Declaration for the Korean Peninsula
Here is an excerpt from a paper I wrote that will eventually be published by the One Korea Network regarding HR 3446 calling for the US to approve an end of war declaration.
The idea that an end of war declaration will be a starting point that will create the conditions for Kim to negotiate is simply a fantasy. If he does agree to it, it will be because he believes it will support his political warfare strategy and blackmail diplomacy. He cares nothing about an end of war declaration for a symbolic message or as a stepping stone to denuclearization. To assume otherwise is a major strategic error.
End of War Declaration and “A Solid Peace Regime”
Congress must consider the history and who were and still are the belligerents in the Korean Civil War - with emphasis on the conflict being a civil war between North and South. A review of the UN Security Council resolutions of 1950 (82-85) shows that the United Nations clearly identified the North as the hostile aggressor who attacked South Korea. The UN called on member nations to come to the defense of freedom in South Korea. It established the UN Command and designated the United States as executive agent for the UN Command which included providing the commander.
The United States did not declare war on the North. It intervened under UN authority and fought under the UN command. President Rhee placed the remainder of the Korean forces under the control (not command) of the UN Command. China did not officially intervene in the war. It sent "volunteers"- the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV), to defend the north. The 1953 Armistice was signed by military representatives the UN Command and the north Korean People's Army (nKPA) and then later by the Chinese People's Volunteers and the Commander in Chief of the nKPA.
The logical end to the Korean Civil War and adoption of a peace treaty must be brokered between the two designated belligerents (the North and South). The US and PRC could provide security guarantees, but they should not be parties to the peace treaty and the US should not try to have a separate peace treaty with the North. A separate peace is exactly what the regime has demanded for years so that it could then force the removal of U.S. troops. This also worries Koreans in the South who fear a separate peace that would allow the U.S. to abandon the South. This has been a key element of the regime’s political warfare strategy.
There is a challenge to a peace agreement between North and South which is their current constitutions. Both countries do not recognize the existence of the other and in fact both claim sovereignty over the entire Korean peninsula and Korean population. A peace treaty would undermine both constitutions because signing a peace treaty would mean recognizing the existence of two Koreas.
If the North and South sign a peace treaty ending their hostilities it is logical to argue that the UN Command should be dissolved. The relevant UN Security Council Resolutions must be rescinded (82-85), though they would be subject to veto by any of the members of the P5. Also, there is nothing in the Armistice that says the signatories of the Armistice must also sign a peace treaty. International lawyers are going to hash this out especially since both North and South are now members of the UN, unlike in 1950. While a logical argument can be made for the dissolution of the UN Command, and surely the regime will make it, an end of war declaration or peace agreement will have no bearing on the presence of U.S. troops.
The ROK/U.S Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea exist separately from the Armistice. They are present because of the bi-lateral agreement, the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1953. Note that the MDT makes no mention of North Korea or the DPRK. The treaty only states that its purpose is to defend both countries from threats in the Asia-Pacific region. A peace agreement should technically have no impact on the presence of US forces.
The most important question concerning an end of war declaration and peace agreement is how they will ensure the security of the ROK. Assuming the regime continues executing its seven decades old strategy it will seek to exploit such an agreement to try to drive U.S. troops off the peninsula and undermine the ROK/U.S. alliance. Most importantly the existential threat will still be present across the DMZ. There is no piece of paper that can defend against an attack from the North.
Time for a Peace Declaration for the Korean Peninsula
Once North Korea possesses a certain ability to threaten the American homeland, the alliance with South Korea will be placed in doubt.
One senses that the Biden administration is becoming desperate. How will it get North Korea to communicate?
It’s a relatively new question. Not too many years ago engagement wasn’t an issue. Relations were nonexistent and contact limited. For instance, after George W. Bush’s designation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as a member of the “Axis of Evil,” few would expect a welcome word from Pyongyang.
However, President Donald Trump transformed the relationship. Two full summits and one truncated DMZ meeting, significant contact among other officials in both Washington and Pyongyang, and twenty-seven “love letters” between the two leaders created a very different set of expectations.
Yet so far Kim Jong-un has rejected Washington’s advances. An evidently frustrated Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman recently complained: “We have reached out directly to Pyongyang and stand ready to meet without preconditions, and as we have said publicly on multiple occasions, the United States does not harbor hostile intentions toward the DPRK.”
Of course, “hostile intentions” are in the eye of the beholder. The United States retains an alliance with the Republic of Korea directed against the North, deploys significant military forces throughout the region to back that commitment, and routinely attacks weaker states, often without international legal sanction. It should surprise no one that Kim continues to express skepticism of American policy.
Moreover, Kim has reason to play the reluctant suitor even after the brief, tempestuous Trump “love affair.” He might believe he was played false in Hanoi, though Trump administration officials insist that the problem was mostly on North Korea’s side. In any case, an important opportunity was lost and Kim was publicly embarrassed, not a position any dictator enjoys.
Another possibility is that Kim hopes to use ongoing missile developments, recently showcased to the world, to wring further concessions from Washington. North Korea watcher Andrei Lankov has noted that “showing off kinetic capabilities while also signaling openness to dialogue are not contradictory at all for the North Koreans. The regime is run by people who are masters of survival. And their goal is to nudge the U.S. toward relieving sanctions while working to ensure the election of a pro-engagement president in the South.”
“I will say that there's a school of thought and I'm inclined to believe it that . . . the fact that North Korea is beginning to send external messaging suggests to me that North Korea is at least contemplating the terms under which it will reengage with the rest of the world,” Biegun said.
The United States does have a strong incentive to negotiate with the North since the alternative, an updated form of “strategic patience” ignoring Pyongyang’s activities, is not an option. With a forecast that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could have two hundred nuclear weapons by 2027, a concerted effort to freeze if not reverse the North’s progress is essential. Yet Washington wants to avoid appearing to be too eager, which would advantage Pyongyang.
Seoul and Washington were united in seeking better relations with North Korea when Kim turned to summitry in 2018. After the failure of the Hanoi meeting, however, Kim turned not just frigid but dismissive toward the ROK, apparently angry that the latter would not deliver any benefits to Pyongyang without U.S. approval. Kim proved little more willing to talk with America, but at least acknowledged its essential role in winning any sanctions relief.
However, Kim recently staged another policy pirouette and turned back to Seoul. He offered to restore the inter-Korean hotline, which was done a couple of weeks ago. It is an important reversal from last year when the DPRK demolished the liaison office constructed by Seoul. The most plausible reasons for the latest shift, as Lankov suggested, are to push the U.S. towards sanctions relief and create favorable tailwinds for the March ROK presidential election.
This process might provide an opportunity for Washington. “From my point of view, the most important thing is, in fact, a communications link,” observed Biegun. “So I very much welcome the fact that South Korea and North Korea are directly speaking again. And I hope the case will be soon, if it's not already, that the United States will be able to find a way to open and then sustain communications with North Korea for its part.”
This possibility has led to increased conversation between Seoul and Washington. Last week representatives of South Korea, Japan, and the United States met to discuss policy toward North Korea. America’s Special Representative for the DPRK Sung Kim urged the North to “engage in sustained and substantive dialogue.” Although public attention was focused on various DPRK missile tests, diplomats involved said that the majority of discussion, perhaps 60 percent, was on proposals for a peace declaration to help entice the North to make an agreement.
“South Korea and the U.S. have reached a consensus that the declaration on the war's end is quite useful as an opportunity to resume dialogue with North Korea,” the official said. They later added that “this consensus is gradually growing.”
Others involved in the conversation indicated that this claim overstated the level of agreement. The differences between Seoul and Washington reportedly are modest but important. The South contends that a peace declaration would be symbolic and nonbinding, and thereby would have no practical impact. However, it could be used to help entice North Korea to enter talks.
In contrast, the Biden administration apparently worries about unintended consequences and prefers to offer such a proclamation as part of a process toward denuclearization after progress has been achieved. “The US deems it highly necessary to examine the impact of adopting the end-of-war declaration, and is considering it in depth internally,” according to a South Korean official. Indeed, The Hankyoreh claimed that the State Department brought in outside lawyers to review the proposed proclamation. Nevertheless, ROK representatives privately predicted that Washington would ultimately back an effort led by the South to use a proposed statement to jump-start talks.
U.S. objections are based not on what such a declaration would do, which is nothing, but on how it might affect support for the alliance. That is, acknowledging the obvious, that there is no ongoing war, might encourage some policymakers to argue against continued military exercises and/or deployments in the South and even Japan and continued sanctions on the North. Such a statement also might be seen by the DPRK, at least, as a reward for its proliferation activities. And to reduce criticism of Pyongyang would irritate the bipartisan War Party on Capitol Hill (remember Sen. Lindsey Graham’s (R-S.C.) cheerily idiotic endorsement of nuclear war on the peninsula, since it would be “over there”).
This is a very weak bill of particulars against a peace declaration. The United States maintains alliances with and troops in Germany and Japan, as well as a large supporting cast of nations, even though World War II formally ended. The lack of a legal state of hostilities is irrelevant. What matters is the reality on the ground.
Instead of emphasizing the continuing need for an American presence, alliance advocates apparently fear a long overdue debate might break out. Those on the hawkish side appear to doubt the strength of their own case. After all, almost seven decades after the conclusion of hostilities the ROK is dramatically stronger—significantly greater population, vastly larger economy, enormous technological edge, much more international support. Changing circumstances, not the formal legal status of a conflict years in the past, is what raises doubts about the necessity of America’s continued presence.
In any case, a peace declaration should merely be the starting point. It should be an enticement for talks, with the expectation of more to come, including a formal treaty ending the war. “Because this would be a lengthy process, Washington and Seoul should discuss what ending the war would mean in the short, medium, and long term, and how to manage risks associated with it,” suggested Jessica Lee, a senior research fellow in the East Asia Program at the Quincy Institute. “Ideally, such consultation would take place before moving from an end-of-war declaration to a peace treaty replacing the Armistice Agreement.”
North Korea remains a problem with only the second-best answers. South Korean President Moon Jae-in is in a hurry though since only five months remain before the election of his successor. However, President Joe Biden also should be in a hurry since the North continues to expand its arsenal. Once the DPRK possesses a certain ability to threaten the American homeland, the alliance with the ROK will be placed in doubt. Kim appears to have opened the door ever so slightly to a peace initiative. Washington should back Seoul in moving forward as quickly as possible.
Image: Reuters
10. Is Kim Jong Un angling for nuclear talks on his terms?
Kim will do nothing unless it is on his terms until he has no other options. The problem is concessions and appeasement provides him with options to continue to execute his political warfare strategy and blackmail diplomacy.
Is Kim Jong Un angling for nuclear talks on his terms?
The Hill · by Robert A. Manning, Opinion Contributor · October 25, 2021
Don’t look now, but a clever gambit by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un may be an effort by Pyongyang to gain leverage to press the Biden administration into new nuclear talks — on his terms.
This may help explain a quiet flurry of U.S. intelligence and diplomatic activity in recent days, with U.S. intelligence chiefs meeting with their South Korean counterparts. At the same time, Biden’s top North Korea envoy, Sung Kim, has been meeting with his South Korean and Japanese opposite numbers to coordinate new policy approaches. The U.S. and South Korea (ROK) appear to be groping for new ways to entice Pyongyang into talks, including using a coordinated package of humanitarian aid as a lure. But Kim’s maneuvers suggest they should be careful what they wish for.
Seoul has been pushing for an “End of War” declaration in hopes it would jump start U.S.-North Korea and North-South talks. This is not a new idea. It is just a declaration of intent. But it only makes sense as part of a comprehensive peace process in parallel with denuclearization. During the Six-Party talks in 2005, it was seen as a first step toward negotiating a peace treaty.
President Trump considered an End of War declaration before the Hanoi Trump-Kim summit. By itself, it is just a piece of paper. North Korea has blown hot and cold on it. In a recent statement, Kim’s sister and apparent No.2, Kim Yo Jong, said Moon’s End of War declaration proposal was “an admirable idea,” but only if “preconditions” – an end to the U.S. “hostile policy” (e.g; end sanctions, end U.S.-ROK alliance) – were met. Otherwise, she said, “it does not make any sense to declare the end of the war…” If the U.S. and ROK issue such a statement, it will likely play into Kim’s efforts to steer diplomacy in his direction.
Until now, Pyongyang has ignored U.S. entreaties for unconditional talks, as well as U.S. ideas floated for ways to move forward. Instead, Kim’s signaling has mainly taken the form of missile tests – five since September, the latest a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test on Oct. 19 – along with openings to South Korea and curious statements hinting at other possibilities. Most recently, Kim said that war itself, not the U.S., is the enemy. More about that later.
Over 25 years of nuclear diplomacy, North Korea has often displayed tactical brilliance in shaping the agenda. Now, after hermetically sealing North Korea, shutting its borders for 18 months, Pyongyang has begun to do just that. In late September, it suggested to Seoul reopening a North-South crisis hotline, with hints of a possible North-South Summit.
South Korean President Moon Jae-in has viewed North-South reconciliation as his (now in doubt) legacy. Kim subsequently rejected 2018 North-South agreed peace accords. Moon pushed Trump, and now Biden to ease sanctions to allow inter-Korean economic cooperation. By enticing Seoul, Kim bet it would energize Moon to press Biden to restart talks.
Kim’s overture to Seoul was, as usual, punctuated by a series of missile tests to underscore that growing North Korean missile and nuclear capabilities – including what Kim said was a recent hypersonic missile – showed Kim was building, as he put it, an “invincible military.” For effect, the show was posted on YouTube. The event showcased a full array of its most advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the Hwasong 15 and the still untested Hwasong 16.
Where it gets interesting are Kim’s remarks against the backdrop of his ostentatious muscle-flexing. While he blamed the root cause of tensions on the U.S. “hostile policy,” Kim pivoted away from Pyongyang’s longstanding vitriolic North Korean rhetoric vilifying the U.S. Instead, he argued that his sophisticated arsenal was solely for deterrence: "We are not discussing war with anyone, but rather to prevent war itself and to literally increase war deterrence for the protection of national sovereignty."
The reveal was the punchline: “Our arch-enemy is war itself, not South Korea, the United States or any other specific state or forces. But our external efforts for peace does not in any way mean giving up our rights to self-defense.”
What does all this add up to? In case there was any doubt, Kim implied North Korea will never give up his nukes, its ultimate security guarantee. But the decided change in tone hints that Kim may be willing to discuss arms control, based on mutual deterrence. This likely means that if diplomacy does restart, it will not be about denuclearization but more likely a nuclear and missile freeze.
But Pyongyang’s continued silence in response to stepped up U.S. calls for dialogue suggests, before any new diplomacy is initiated, that Kim will try to leverage U.S. and South Korean calls for talks into concessions. High on the list would be an easing of United Nations Security Council sanctions — at a time when many in the U.S. want to ramp them up further.
All this portends a dilemma for the Biden administration. Kim’s goal, as North Koreans have told me, is to be accepted as a de facto nuclear weapons state, like Israel or Pakistan, and be treated as a normal nation. That is what is driving Pyongyang’s machinations.
After 25 years of efforts to denuclearize North Korea, is the U.S. prepared to scrap its goal and settle for half a loaf: a cap and freeze of Kim’s nuclear and missile programs? Doing so would likely cause a political firestorm in Washington, even if, as expected, it would be packaged as an “interim step” toward denuclearization, a dubious figleaf. But given the long trail of failed denuclearization diplomacy and the qualitatively new threats of Pyongyang’s dangerous development of ever more capable nukes and delivery systems, a freeze, though highly improbable, may be worth at least exploring.
There are at least two big issues. First, there is the question of what price the U.S. is prepared to pay. The consequences of normalizing North Korean nukes will ripple across U.S. foreign policy and perceptions of it. It would be a huge blow to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). North Korea is the only nation to withdraw from it. How would Iran react?
Perhaps the biggest reason such a deal would be improbable is the lack of transparency. Previous deals, the 1994 Agreed Framework and the September 2005 denuclearization deal, have collapsed over North Korean refusal to allow verification. Pyongyang has refused to provide a full declaration of its nuclear weapons program or allow the IAEA to verify and fully monitor its weapons program. How can you freeze what you don’t know exists? And absent adequate International Atomic Energy Agency verification, Pyongyang could easily stash away a few nukes.
Expect a wild ride, as maneuvering toward diplomacy plays out. Ultimately, North Korea is one of those wicked problems that may not have a solution and can only be managed. But current developments should be a cautionary note to the U.S. and its South Korean ally.
Robert A. Manning is a senior fellow of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. He was a senior counselor to the undersecretary of State for global affairs from 2001 to 2004, a member of the U.S. Department of State policy planning staff from 2004 to 2008 and on the National Intelligence Council strategic futures group from 2008 to 2012. Follow him on Twitter @Rmanning4.
The Hill · by Robert A. Manning, Opinion Contributor · October 25, 2021
11. Should S.Korea Build Its Own Nukes?
In my opinion no. It is not necessary.
A followup from their WAPOST OPED earlier this month.
But this is an interesting argument from the NPT perspective.
Should S.Korea Build Its Own Nukes?
Lind and Press said it is legal for South Korea to bolt from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons citing Article 10 and develop its own nuclear weapons. Article 10 of the NPT states, "Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country."
◆ The nuclear threat from North Korea, they add, clearly qualifies as an "extraordinary event."
"When Jenny and I wrote this, we received a good number of communications from colleagues of ours, who are experts on the region, who say, I've been coming to the same conclusion as well," Press told the Chosun Ilbo. "But it didn't seem like the right time to say it. And so I do not think that we are the only people who have come to this conclusion. I think the contradictions in the alliance and questions about the nuclear deterrence issues are becoming apparent to many people. Because the logic of the U.S. keeping its deterrence commitments to South Korea becomes more and more difficult to explain in a world in which North Korea can destroy American cities."
◆ The U.S. government says it cannot condone South Korea arming itself with nuclear weapons, since that would threaten the very principle of non-proliferation.
"What we currently have is a situation where a country can violate the NPT and threaten the security of an NPT member in good standing," Lind says. "And that's a disastrous situation for an international institution. No institution could survive if its members found their security threatened by complying. But that's why the founders of the NPT were created article 10. They said, if you're a law-abiding member, and if you're facing... these extraordinary circumstances, you can legally withdraw... I think that denying compliant members the right to protect themselves, that would really harm the NPT."
◆ What made you to submit your op-ed to the Washing Post?
"One of the many triggers was the realization that if you asked which of the nine nuclear weapons countries in the world faces a greater external security threat than South Korea, I think the answer is none of them," Press explains. "None of the nine nuclear weapon states have a security threat, anything like South Korea, where South Korea has an adversary with military forces 60 km from its capital, who routinely threatens it, and who possesses nuclear weapons in violation of international law. None of the nuclear weapon states face that. No. 2 is I was on a phone call not very long ago, and a real expert in this area said, the reason South Korea won't get nuclear weapons is that it would prefer to have Samsung... And what he meant was that if South Korea were to acquire nuclear weapons, it would become a pariah to like the North Korea. I stopped him in the middle of the meeting. And I said, why would that be? South Korea's nuclear weapons would be legal, they would withdraw from the NPT. And they would be legitimate because they face routine threats from an illegal nuclear weapons state. So why would the world's countries possibly sanction South Korea? And he didn't have an answer. My point is, many South Koreans might think that this would isolate their country and there's no reason to believe that. As long as they have friends in the world, who will speak for them in the Security Council, there's no reason in the world for South Korea to suffer diplomatically or economically from this."
◆ Are you telling South Korea to convince the U.S. and EU to support its exit from the NPT?
"I'd say yes," Press replies. "But I think that conversation should probably take about an hour. From a South Korean standpoint, whether it's worth it to go nuclear, that's a complicated decision. But if South Korea decides to do this, to explain to the United States and to friendly countries in Europe why it requires to do so, it's the simplest thing in the world. How can Great Britain say no, you don't deserve them? And yet we in Great Britain do, when they don't face any kind of a threat like you? Can France say that? So I think yes, you should formally declare that you intend to withdraw from the NPT."
◆ Progressive experts in South Korea do not believe North Korea will use its nuclear weapons. And they seem to believe that the North is developing nuclear weapons only as a deterrent against the U.S. threat.
"The progressives in South Korea will be horrified to find out that we agree with them," laughs Press. "I believe that North Korea's nuclear weapons are for regime security and for defense principally. The North Korean military has eroded dramatically. It is a shell of its former self. And I believe that North Korea's nuclear weapons are a crucial regime security tool. Now, if that's true, people might say, well, then why do we think South Korea needs nuclear weapons if the North simply wants to defend itself? And the answer, I think, is, because war could still happen on the Korean Peninsula. It could happen in many different ways. That war could happen through mistake, through some sort of escalated crisis that gets out of control, or through the partial collapse" of North Korean regime.
"And the fact that North Korea has these regime-security weapons means that it will be very difficult to prevent a conventional war from going nuclear. And that's why it's essential that South Korea has whatever capability it needs to maximize its deterrent capability. If war comes, I pray that South Korea has the most powerful deterrent [possible], whether that's in South Korean hands or the United States hands. In my opinion South Korea would be better off if it had its own."
◆ Do you think if South Korea had nuclear weapons, this would result in formally recognizing North Korea as a nuclear power?
"North Korean nuclear weapons as decreed by international law are illegal," Lind says. "North Korea is in violation of several UN sanctions, and has been the recipient of sanctions because of that. So nothing has changed in that sense."
◆ North Korea's nuclear missiles are capable of striking targets in Japan. In that case, couldn't Japan cite Article 10 as well? And there are concerns that South Korea's possession of nuclear arms could trigger a domino effect in the region.
Lind disagrees. "Japan is in an extremely different situation in all aspects. It's not the direct adversary of North Korea. Also the U.S. and Japan are cooperating extremely closely, probably more closely than ever, with respect to managing China's rise. So that alliance is just not in trouble to the same degree that the U.S.-South Korea one is."
"Then the last point is the incredible difference in domestic attitudes toward nuclear technology. Something like 60-70 percent of South Koreans favor this move. But obviously, Japan has a history of first two nuclear strikes by the United States. And then the [Fukushima disaster] So the Japanese people are not supportive of this. There are several dominoes that didn't fall, for example, Soviet Union, China, North Korea. It's just very far from an automatic outcome."
◆ Once South Korea announces its exit from the NPT to the UN Security Council, how would China and Russia respond?
"To me, there's two issues, and I think they're both solvable," Press says. "Issue No. 1 is, would South Korea suffer any UN Security Council resolutions that sanction them or punish them? Three of the Security Council members who have vetoes I believe can all be brought along to be on South Korea's side on this. So there's not going to be a Security Council resolution against South Korea."
"The other question is, would South Korea suffer in some other manner, from bilateral economic sanctions from one country or another. There can be some concerns about the economic relationship with China. China will not like it at all. That's the big cost. It's going to harm the South Korean and Chinese relationship for some time. If I were South Korea, I would just explain to China that China has nuclear weapons. And we don't desire this, we're only doing this because your partner has got nuclear weapons. So if you want to solve the problem of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula, our friends in Beijing, the way to do so is to sit down with your friends in Pyongyang."
"I think China, after an immediate angry reaction, can be brought along to see that South Korea is not the problem. The problem is North Korea. But if they can't, and if they decide that South Korea must be severely economically punished through bilateral sanctions, it's a strong signal that China does not have your interest to start with. That's a sign that they are not on your side," he adds.
12. A Coup in North Korea? Kim Jong-un Dead? Don't Believe the Rumors
Concur. Do not believe the rumors. However, the rumors should ask us whether we have done a tabletop exercise (TTX) to plan our potential actions for when we do learn that Kim Jong-un is dead. Do we have contingencies in place? We must not assume that the two previous dynastic successions will forecast a third. If Kim Jong-un has not designated a successor as his father and grandfather did, there could be challenges to a succession process that will have to be ad hoc because there is no party process for one.
A Coup in North Korea? Kim Jong-un Dead? Don't Believe the Rumors
A media report that Kim Jong-un’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, deposed her brother in a coup and replaced him over the summer has been shot down by South Korea’s National Intelligence Service on October 24. An American tabloid called The Globe said that Kim Jong-un’s sister led a coup against Kim Jong Un between May 6 and June 5. The Globe article stated that Kim Jong-un, who has shown a marked weight loss in media photos, is really an impostor.
Is Kim Jong-un Alive or Dead?
This is not the first time that Kim Jong Un has been rumored to have died. He was allegedly in a coma in 2020 and reportedly perished. But, as has happened many times before, the mercurial North Korean Supreme Leader was photographed in September at what has been described as a military exhibition or parade looking thinner and in good spirits in an image released by North Korean state-run media.
Sister Kim Yo Jong Consolidates Power
The leader’s younger sister, Kim Yo Jong, is often the subject of palace intrigue. North Korea’s propaganda arm, the KCNA, said Kim Yo Jong was named to a key power position on the State Affairs Commission in September. Kim Yo Jong has long held an enigmatic Rasputin-like advisory role to her brother and is often seen as his heir apparent. Her promotion to North Korea’s State Affairs Commission is the highest rung of power that she has climbed so far. She previously was elected to the Supreme People’s Assembly in 2019 and visited the South in 2018 during the Winter Olympics.
Independent information from North Korea is notoriously difficult to corroborate and often devolves into speculation that the South Korean government has to eventually refute. For example, in July the National Intelligence Service had to put another rumor to rest that claimed Kim Jong-un was sick and not attending to his leadership duties. Kim, a known binge drinker, eater, and smoker, is often the target of speculation that he is in ill health. He has been absent from public appearances in the past fueling rumors of his demise. He has been seen limping, which may be the result of swelling feet and gout.
Reported Coups Should Be Met with Skepticism
Obviously, anything printed by The Globe, and other tabloids such as the National Enquirer, should be taken with a grain of salt. It is interesting that South Korean intelligence assumed the rumors of a possible coup against Kim Jong-un should be taken seriously. It does stand to reason that Kim’s sister is likely next in line to power. The 37-year-old Kim Jong Un is reportedly distrustful of many aides and regularly fires, jails, or even kills unlucky staff, diplomats, and generals who run afoul of the regime.
Image credit KCNA.
Kim Jong-un recently said he wants his country to have an “invincible military.” The Hermit Kingdom has boasted of recent successful tests while showcasing hypersonic, cruise, ballistic, and air defense missiles. Over the summer, Kim stated that he wants his country to be ready for both “dialogue and confrontation” with the United States. Meanwhile, the Biden administration is attempting to come up with a novel approach to diplomatic relations with North Korea.
13. Moon to meet with Pope Francis at G20 summit
Will a Pope visit to north Korea really contribute to peace? How will that influence Kim Jogn-un?
Moon to meet with Pope Francis at G20 summit
Posted October. 23, 2021 07:32,
Updated October. 23, 2021 07:32
Moon to meet with Pope Francis at G20 summit. October. 23, 2021 07:32. by Jin-Woo Shin niceshin@donga.com.
South Korean President Moon Jae-in will meet with Pope Francis at the Vatican at the end of this month. Meeting with the pontiff for the second time following the one in 2018, Moon will likely urge Pope Francis to add momentum for peace on the Korean Peninsula by visiting North Korea.
According to the presidential office on Friday, President Moon will meet with the pope when he visits Italy to attend the G20 summit late this month. “Since Pope Francis already expresses his intention to visit the North, we think President Moon will naturally request him to visit the North,” a presidential office official told The Dong-A Ilbo on the day. “We expect the pope’s visit to the North will be an important beachhead amid a phase of inter-Korean dialogue.” When meeting with President Moon in October 2018, Pope Francis said, “I can go,” in strongly expressing his intention to visit the Stalinist country.
The presidential office Cheong Wa Dae expects the pope’s visit to Pyongyang will provide a “steppingstone” towards improving inter-Korean relations along with Seoul’s suggestion to Washington to declare end of the Korean War, over which Seoul and Washington have been widely discussing lately. Some insiders in the ruling party predict if the pope actually visits the North around the year’s end, it would be also possible for the leaders of the two Koreas to meet in China during the winter Olympics in February next year.
The pope is also scheduled meet with U.S. President Joe Biden late this month. Both Moon and Biden are sincere Catholics.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
