Quotes of the Day:

“You didn't wait six months for a feasibility study to prove that an idea could work. You gambled that it might work. You didn't tie up the organization with red tape designed mostly to cover somebody's rear end…You took the initiative and the responsibility. You went around end, you went over somebody's head if you had to. But you acted. That's what drove the regular military and the State Department chair-warmers crazy about the OSS.”

- William Casey, former DCI

"Great men are rarely isolated mountain-peaks; they are the summits of ranges." 

- Charles Wentworth Higginson

"All cruelty springs from weakness."

- Seneca

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 6, 2023

2. Washington isn’t listening to business on China any more

3. A Soldier’s View of the Battlefields and Trenches of Bakhmut

4. As Putin Bides His Time, Ukraine Faces a Ticking Clock

5. Senior Ukrainian officials fear counterattack may not live up to hype

6. Why Russia’s Wagner Group leader is ‘yelling mutiny’ in Ukraine war

7. ANALYSIS: China under Xi is trying to forge a new and authoritarian world order

8. 10 questions answered on the debt limit

9. US Marines abdicating a rescue role to China

10. Iran’s New Friends: Russia and China

11. Vietnam can’t trust China or US in South China Sea

12. ‘A deep friendship’: The Philippines, the US, and the rules-based international order

13. Hungry military families are bad for America

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 6, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations at the link:  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2023

Key Takeaways

• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov stated their intent on May 6 for Chechen “Akhmat” troops to replace Wagner Group forces in Bakhmut on May 10.
• Prigozhin and Kadyrov likely aim to frame the Russian MoD and regular Russian troops as ineffective and set conditions to blame the MoD for any Russian setbacks in the Bakhmut area.
• While the potential deployment of Akhmat troops to Bakhmut could increase Russian combat power to some degree, the claims made by Prigozhin and Kadyrov are greatly exaggerated.
• The Russian MoD has yet to respond to Prigozhin and Kadyrov’s coordinated posturing about Bakhmut and may have been caught flatfooted by Prigozhin and Kadyrov’s statements.
• At least one individual with claimed but unconfirmed affiliation to the Ukrainian government attempted to assassinate Russian “A Just Russia” State Duma party co-leader and prominent nationalist voice Zakhar Prilepin on May 6.
• CNN reported that Russian electronic warfare (EW) jamming has limited the effectiveness of Ukrainian HIMARS strikes in recent months.
• Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk and in the Kreminna area.
• Russian forces continued to make marginal gains within Bakhmut and Ukrainian forces likely conducted a successful limited counterattack southwest of Avdiivka.
• Russian occupation officials claimed that Ukrainian forces targeted Crimea with Hrim-2 short-range ballistic missiles.
• Ukrainian sources reported that Russian authorities are continuing various measures to forcibly mobilize residents of occupied areas of Ukraine.
• Russian occupation officials continue to plan for mass forced evacuations in Zaporizhia Oblast.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 6, 2023

May 6, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 6, 2023

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, and Mason Clark

May 6, 2023, 4:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov stated their intent on May 6 for Chechen “Akhmat” troops to replace Wagner Group forces in Bakhmut on May 10. Prigozhin published a letter to Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu on May 6 declaring that Wagner will hand over its positions to Akhmat units at exactly midnight on May 10, when Prigozhin claims Wagner will have entirely run out of combat potential.[1] Prigozhin expressed his confidence that Akhmat forces can capture the remaining 2.5 square kilometers of Bakhmut that remain under Ukrainian control.[2] Kadyrov responded to Prigozhin by stating he has addressed a letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin signaling his readiness to take Bakhmut and claimed that Chechen units are already working on a strategy with the Russian MoD for the Chechens to take over Wagner‘s positions.[3]

Prigozhin and Kadyrov likely aim to frame the Russian MoD and regular Russian troops as ineffective and set conditions to blame the MoD for any Russian setbacks in the Bakhmut area. Prigozhin’s decision to hand responsibility for Bakhmut over to the forces of a fellow silovik deliberately excludes the conventional Russian airborne (VDV) troops already operating on Wagner’s northern and southern flanks around Bakhmut, framing the battle of Bakhmut strictly as a Wagner – and now Akhmat – concern. This decision reflects Prigozhin’s ongoing distrust of the Russian military command, and postures himself as independent from the Russian military establishment and allows him to save face if Wagner forces cannot capture Bakhmut and avoiding a repeat of the capture of Soledar – where the Russian MoD took credit for what Prigozhin claimed was a Wagner success.[4] Kadyrov, in turn, could benefit from the positive reputational effect of entering such a high-profile operation with the backing of Prigozhin’s personal notoriety. Kadyrov recently met with several high-ranking Russian officials in Russia, likely to ameliorate his own reputation within Russian political circles.[5] The switch from Wagner to Akhmat troops may also set conditions to blame the Russian MoD for future failures down the line — if Akhmat forces experience similar difficulties to Wagner and are unable to completely capture Bakhmut, Prigozhin and Kadyrov may feasibly blame the MoD for failing to adequately support their efforts. Alternatively, if the Russian MoD prevents Akhmat forces from relieving Wagner (as it is unclear if Prigozhin and Kadyrov can execute this maneuver without any Russian MoD support as they claim), the two siloviki and their allies will likely brandish the hypothetical that if only the Russian MoD had supported the maneuver, Chechen forces would have captured Bakhmut quickly.

While the potential deployment of Akhmat troops to Bakhmut could increase Russian combat power to some degree, the claims made by Prigozhin and Kadyrov are greatly exaggerated. Akhmat forces have deployed throughout Ukraine, mostly in the Bilohorivka area in Luhansk Oblast and in scattered areas in the south, over the course of 2023 but have not been majorly committed to decisive offensive operations.[6] The Chechen forces that would deploy to Bakhmut are therefore likely substantially fresher and less degraded than Wagner forces which have remained on the front for months. However, Kadyrov’s suggestion that Akhmat will be able to rapidly advance in and occupy Bakhmut in “a matter of hours” is typical Kadyrov braggadocio and ignores the tactical situation on the ground in Bakhmut.[7] Additionally, Prigozhin’s suggestion that Wagner will lose its combat potential at exactly midnight on May 10 is a rhetorical point selected to avoid withdrawing before Victory Day on May 9 - fighting forces do not precipitously exhaust all their combat capabilities in one discrete instant. 

The Russian MoD has yet to respond to Prigozhin and Kadyrov’s coordinated posturing about Bakhmut and may have been caught flatfooted by Prigozhin and Kadyrov’s statements. ISW assesses that the Russian military is likely reprioritizing logistics and sustainment processes to transition to defensive operations in most areas of the theater ahead of an expected Ukrainian counteroffensive, and Prigozhin’s focus on Bakhmut may be at odds with changing Russian MoD priorities.[8] Russian forces likely do not have reserves they could commit to Bakhmut should Wagner’s ability to sustain operations in the city completely collapse, as Prigozhin is claiming.[9] The Russian MoD continues to claim that Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) are defending the flanks around Bakhmut, and ISW has not observed VDV elements directly contributing to Wagner’s offensive within the city itself.[10] The Russian military likely intends for these VDV elements to stabilize the wider Bakhmut salient given Wagner’s increasingly degraded combat effectiveness in the area, and Russian forces are unlikely to commit these elements to a final phase of attritional fighting in Bakhmut ahead of expected Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[11] The capture of the last remaining section of Bakhmut offers no wider operational benefits and would only provide limited informational benefits for the Kremlin. The MoD’s silence is likely reflective of a conscious decision to not offset Wagner’s degradation or placate Prigozhin’s expected anger, although the lack of response is allowing Prigozhin more maneuver space to shape the overall reaction to the de-prioritization of the Bakhmut offensive.

At least one individual with claimed but unconfirmed affiliation to the Ukrainian government attempted to assassinate Russian “A Just Russia” State Duma party co-leader and prominent nationalist voice Zakhar Prilepin on May 6. The attackers targeted Prelipin with an improvised explosive device (IED) on or near Prilepin’s car in Pionerskoye, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, killing Prilepin’s driver and severely injuring Prilepin.[12] The Russian Investigative Committee announced it is investigating the attack as a terrorist attack and stated Russian security forces arrested Oleksandr Permyakov, who Russian state-affiliated media claimed conducted the attack on the orders of Ukrainian Special Services (SBU).[13] Russian news aggregator Channel 112 claimed that Russian authorities detained a second unspecified attacker in a nearby forest area, but Russian authorities have not corroborated this report.[14] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova accused Ukraine and the West of orchestrating the attack, though Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that it is too early to know the attackers and orchestrators.[15] The Atesh Ukrainian-Tatar resistance movement claimed indirect responsibility for the attack, though Ukrainian and Russian officials have not corroborated this claim.[16] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin has reportedly fostered ties with ”A Just Russia” party leadership, though it is uncertain if the attack against Prilepin is related to Prigozhin.[17]

Many prominent Russian nationalist information space voices expressed anger at another attack against a prominent pro-war voice in Russia itself and connected the attack to the assassinations of Darya Dugina and Maxim Fomin (Vladlen Tartarsky).[18] Many milbloggers blamed Ukraine and Western states for orchestrating the attack and called on Russia to increase law enforcement measures.[19] Some milbloggers called on Russia to provide personal security for prominent milbloggers or to re-establish the Soviet-era SMERSH counterintelligence umbrella to combat enemy penetration attempts.[20]

CNN reported that Russian electronic warfare (EW) jamming has limited the effectiveness of Ukrainian HIMARS strikes in recent months.[21] CNN cited five US, UK, and Ukrainian sources as saying that US and Ukrainian forces have had to adapt workarounds to counter “evolving” Russian EW jamming efforts, and that Russian forces have subsequently developed countermeasures to those workarounds.[22] US officials stated that destroying Russian EW systems is a high priority in maintaining the battlefield effectiveness of HIMARS.[23] ISW is unable to confirm this report, but Russian forces retain at least some ability to adapt to battlefield conditions despite significant degradation.

Key Takeaways

• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov stated their intent on May 6 for Chechen “Akhmat” troops to replace Wagner Group forces in Bakhmut on May 10.
• Prigozhin and Kadyrov likely aim to frame the Russian MoD and regular Russian troops as ineffective and set conditions to blame the MoD for any Russian setbacks in the Bakhmut area.
• While the potential deployment of Akhmat troops to Bakhmut could increase Russian combat power to some degree, the claims made by Prigozhin and Kadyrov are greatly exaggerated.
• The Russian MoD has yet to respond to Prigozhin and Kadyrov’s coordinated posturing about Bakhmut and may have been caught flatfooted by Prigozhin and Kadyrov’s statements.
• At least one individual with claimed but unconfirmed affiliation to the Ukrainian government attempted to assassinate Russian “A Just Russia” State Duma party co-leader and prominent nationalist voice Zakhar Prilepin on May 6.
• CNN reported that Russian electronic warfare (EW) jamming has limited the effectiveness of Ukrainian HIMARS strikes in recent months.
• Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk and in the Kreminna area.
• Russian forces continued to make marginal gains within Bakhmut and Ukrainian forces likely conducted a successful limited counterattack southwest of Avdiivka.
• Russian occupation officials claimed that Ukrainian forces targeted Crimea with Hrim-2 short-range ballistic missiles.
• Ukrainian sources reported that Russian authorities are continuing various measures to forcibly mobilize residents of occupied areas of Ukraine.
• Russian occupation officials continue to plan for mass forced evacuations in Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk and in the Kreminna area on May 6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Synkivka, Kharkiv Oblast (8km northeast of Kupyansk); Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast (12km south of Kreminna); and Spirne, Donetsk Oblast (25km south of Kreminna).[24] Russian Western Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Sergey Zybinsky claimed that Russian forces destroyed four Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Novomlynsk, Kharkiv Oblast (20km northeast of Kupyansk) and Novoselivske, Luhansk Oblast (14km northwest of Svatove).[25] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in the direction of Lysychansk (20km southeast of Kreminna), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of recent Ukrainian counterattacks in this area of the front.[26]

Russian sources claim that Ukrainian forces struck Russian rear areas in Rubizhne, Luhansk Oblast (8km east of Kreminna) with four HIMARS rockets on May 6.[27]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued to make marginal gains within Bakhmut as of May 6. Geolocated footage published on May 6 indicates that Russian forces likely advanced further in western Bakhmut.[28] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Ukrainian forces currently control 2.5 square km of Bakhmut.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner fighters continued assaults in western Bakhmut and that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut).[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), Hryhorivka (9km northwest of Bakhmut), Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), and Niu York (30km southwest of Bakhmut).[31]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front on May 6. The Ukrainian General Staff claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka and Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).[32] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted positional assaults near the H-20 (Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka) highway west of Novobakhmutivka (13km northeast of Avdiivka) as of May 5.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful assault near Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka).[34] The milblogger also acknowledged that the tempo of Russian offensive operations along the Avdivika-Donetsk front has declined.[35] ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces have largely decreased the tempo of offensive operations throughout the theater, including along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front, in preparation for transitioning to defensive operations ahead of an expected Ukrainian counteroffensive.[36]

Ukrainian forces likely conducted a successful limited counterattack southwest of Avdiivka. Geolocated footage published on April 30 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely conducted a limited counterattack north of Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka) and made marginal gains in the area.[37] The Russian MoD claimed on May 6 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in the Avdiivka area as well as around Bakhmut.[38] ISW has previously assessed that reports of Ukrainian counterattacks throughout Donetsk Oblast appear to be a part of an ongoing pattern of localized and limited Ukrainian counterattacks.[39]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on May 6.[40] Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Alexander Gordeev claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force operation in western Donetsk Oblast on May 5.[41]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian occupation officials claimed that Ukrainian forces targeted Crimea with Hrim-2 short-range ballistic missiles on May 6. Crimean Occupation Head Sergey Aksyonov and Advisor Oleg Kryuchov claimed that Russian forces shot down two Hrim-2 missiles over Privetne, Crimea (10km northwest of Staryi Krim), causing no casualties or damage.[42] Neither official specified the strike’s target. Russian sources amplified footage allegedly of the missile remnants in a large field.[43] Russian occupation authorities and milbloggers previously claimed that Ukrainian forces targeted Feodosia, Crimea and the Kerch Strait Bridge with Hrim-2 missiles on April 8 and April 22, respectively.[44]

Russian occupation officials expressed continued concern over a prospective Ukrainian counteroffensive in Zaporizhia Oblast. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov claimed that Ukrainian forces will be able to launch a counteroffensive in Zaporizhia Oblast in the coming days and claimed that Ukrainian forces have intensified strikes against frontline and rear areas.[45] Rogov noted that weather conditions in Zaporizhia Oblast have improved and that the ground in Zaporizhia Oblast has dried out.[46] Weather forecasts for Tokmak, Hulyaipole, and Vasylivka Zaporizhia Oblast predict that there is a 50 percent chance of rain on two of the coming 14 days.[47] Russian state nuclear energy agency Rosatom officials denied rumors that it had instructed Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) personnel to evacuate from occupied Enerhodar and claimed there is no reason for concern.[48] Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Head Yevgeny Balitsky announced that Enerhodar is one of 18 cities and settlements in the oblast currently undergoing partial evacuations, as ISW has previously reported.[49]

Russian occupation authorities temporarily suspended transport across the Kerch Strait Bridge on May 6. Occupation officials claimed that authorities closed the bridge due to unspecified technical reasons and that traffic has since resumed.[50] Russian authorities announced the completed restoration of the Kerch Strait rail bridge and plans for over 80 inspection points for road traffic across the bridge on April 26.[51]

Russian forces continued heavy fire against areas west of Hulyaipole and in Kherson and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts on May 6.[52] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Head Serhii Lysak reported that Ukrainian forces shot down four Russian UAVs targeting Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[53]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Ukrainian sources reported on May 6 that Russian authorities are continuing various measures to forcibly mobilize residents of occupied areas of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated that Russian authorities seek to amend the law on “the procedure for evacuating the population, material, and cultural values to safe areas” in order to filter male residents of occupied areas into separate camps when evacuating populations from certain areas.[54] The Resistance Center noted that these men will then be handed over to military commissars for mobilization and emphasized that this may also happen in Russian territory in order to compensate for personnel losses.[55] Head of the Ukrainian Reservist Council Ivan Tymochko relatedly stated on May 6 that Russian authorities are using mass passportization efforts in occupied areas to mobilize residents because residents are subject to mobilization upon receipt of Russian citizenship.[56]

Russian authorities continue efforts to digitize mobilization processes. The Russian Ministry of Digital Development submitted a proposal to create a unified digital register of military records, which will be phased into use in various stages up until 2025.[57] The Russian Ministry of Digital Development plans to first approve the methodological, organization, and technical conditions of the register, gradually implement its use throughout 2024, and enter it into full use with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) on January 1, 2025.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continue to plan for mass forced evacuations in Zaporizhia Oblast. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky held a working meeting on May 5 to discuss and facilitate the “temporary relocation” of residents away from frontline areas of Zaporizhia Oblast due to shelling and combat clashes.[58] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov noted that the occupation administration, Ministry of Emergency Situations, and law enforcement elements are removing residents and reported that the occupation administration is receiving evacuated residents in Berdyansk.[59] Rogov stated that individuals will have their documents checked, which suggests that the occupation administration may use this as an opportunity to further passportize residents when checking their documents at evacuation points.[60] Rogov also indicated that parents of evacuated children may ”choose” to send their children to rest and rehabilitation camps.[61] Russian occupation organs will likely use the massive evacuations to support various lines of effort meant at strengthening social, bureaucratic, and administrative control of occupied areas of Zaporizhia Oblast.

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense stated on May 6 that unspecified Belarusian Special Forces brigades, maneuver elements, and missile forces units conducted exercises as part of the ongoing combat readiness check.[62]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Washington isn’t listening to business on China any more

Wow. What a conclusion:

In the longer term, a reduction in tension requires something more fundamental — a new security order for east Asia based on the accommodation of China’s historic rise. The fact that stating this evident truth in Washington today is likely to be judged either treasonous or non-planetary is a measure of the danger we are in.

Washington isn’t listening to business on China any more

The waning of the ‘peace interest’ leaves multi-billion-dollar investments hanging by a thread

https://www.ft.com/content/5e38eec5-8caa-41d1-b4fd-b0ac5e8ca58a

Financial Times · by Adam Tooze · May 5, 2023

The writer is an FT contributing editor and writes the Chartbook newsletter

The US is not eager for war with China. This is the message prominent spokespeople for the Biden administration have been sending in the past few weeks. The fact that this needs saying tells you something about the state we are in. In Washington today, it can seem as though war is just over the horizon. Perhaps as soon as 2025.

It has become a cliché that the one thing that America’s divided democracy can agree on is policy against China. But if the dogs of war are in full cry, what is worth noting is the dog that no longer barks. The “peace interest” anchored in the investment and trading connections of US big business with China has been expelled from centre stage. On the central axis of US strategy, big business has less influence today that at any time since the end of the cold war.

The idea of a “peace interest” — a transnational social and economic constituency opposed to war — was coined by the economist and social theorist Karl Polanyi, who used it to explain the long era of great power peace in Europe between 1815 and 1914. The make-up of the peace interest can change. After the shock of the French Revolution and Napoleon, it was Europe’s conservative dynasts who opposed war. From the mid-19th century, it was bourgeois advocates of free trade.

Of course, not all big business is interested in peace. Military spending is an easy source of profit. Through history, business interests have propelled imperial conquest and cemented international alliances. The business interest in peaceful globalisation, if it is to be influential, needs to be organised.

The first effort to do so deliberately was made after the first world war. American financial interests, led by JPMorgan, hoped to pacify Europe and east Asia with dollar diplomacy. That thin network of stability was torn apart by the 1930s Depression.

During the cold war, the severing of economic and commercial relations by the iron curtain meant that the peace interest operated mainly within the western bloc, most notably in propelling European integration.

From the 1970s, business interests began to extend across the iron curtain and became truly ascendant in US relations with China from the 1990s onwards. Hank Paulson, former Goldman Sachs chief executive, appointed as Treasury secretary by President George W Bush specifically to manage the strategic relationship with China, personified the peace interest. Today a figure like Paulson would be an embarrassment to the Biden administration.

Of course, western business in China continues on a huge scale. But the globalising political coalition of the 1990s and early 2000s has collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions. In recent weeks, the Biden administration has buried neoliberalism and declared a new Washington consensus. National industrial policy is all the rage. National security adviser Jake Sullivan boasts that it is not part of his job description to defend the interests of American investors in China. As a result, multibillion-dollar investments in China hang, in political terms, by a thread.

For the left in the US, this is cause for celebration. The waning of business influence and the turn away from globalisation creates the space for economic policy centred on the needs of American society. But what is the foreign policy this progressive domestic agenda is flanked by?

The space vacated by the likes of Paulson has been filled by a president bent on reviving a cold war-style alliance of democracies against the axis of “autocracy”. Meanwhile, the “blob” — the network of government agencies and think-tanks that shape hard power in Washington DC — is free to pursue its hawkish agenda. Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine cements their grip.

The balance of influence can be read off America’s federal budget. If over the next half a decade, spending on the Chips Act, infrastructure bill and Inflation Reduction Act matches the $886bn annual defence budget to be requested by the Biden administration in 2024, we will be lucky.

This is how Beijing will judge speeches on Sino-US relations such as that delivered recently by Treasury secretary Janet Yellen. She sought to demarcate boundaries for healthy competition and co-operation, but left no doubt that national security trumps every other consideration in Washington today.

With escalation in the air, it would be vain to hope for a return to the old days of business hegemony. The era of “Davos man” is over.

Since the question of war has been posed, a diplomatic effort at the highest level is required. The first priority should be to defuse tension over Taiwan, as seemed on the cards after the Biden-Xi meeting at the G20 in Indonesia. Those hopes were dashed, however, by the gratuitous escalation of the Chinese “spy” balloon incident in February.

In the longer term, a reduction in tension requires something more fundamental — a new security order for east Asia based on the accommodation of China’s historic rise. The fact that stating this evident truth in Washington today is likely to be judged either treasonous or non-planetary is a measure of the danger we are in.

Financial Times · by Adam Tooze · May 5, 2023

3. A Soldier’s View of the Battlefields and Trenches of Bakhmut

Photos and videos at the link link.

A Soldier’s View of the Battlefields and Trenches of Bakhmut

Video captured from Ukrainian troops’ helmets depict the intense attacks and daily moments of tragedy and victory in scenes that recall World War I

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-russia-war-bakhmut-video-6c986b18?mod=hp_lead_pos7

For weeks, Ukraine’s Honor Company held back Russian forces on the road to Bakhmut.

The two sides traded fire with artillery, machine guns and rifles in trenches and fields that recalled scenes from the destroyed landscapes of northern France and Belgium during World War I. The Ukrainians staked out front-line positions in dugouts along a line of trees, under constant threat from artillery assaults. Hundreds of Russian rounds sliced through tree trunks and left nearby fields covered in craters.

Honor Company soldiers would spend only a few hours at a time on the front line to safeguard their mental and physical well-being. Winter rain and snow turned the trench system into a muddy bog. Those heading to forward positions scampered in ones and twos to avoid being targeted.

The positions were critical to Ukraine’s efforts to keep open the supply line to its besieged forces in Bakhmut, the eastern city that has been Moscow’s main target in recent months. Then, on April 9, the Russians launched a fresh effort to overwhelm Honor Company’s positions.

Two soldiers from the unit captured footage of the fighting on cameras attached to their helmets, which the Ukrainian military shared with The Wall Street Journal. This article is based on the footage and interviews with Honor Company members. The following videos contain scenes of graphic violence. 

On that day, First Lt. Oleksandr Yabchanka, a 42-year-old pediatrician with Honor Company, was walking toward a dugout on the front line when he saw a blast and a plume of smoke up ahead.

“Oh dear, oh dear,” said the lieutenant, known to fellow soldiers simply as Yabchanka. 

The dugout, where other company members were hunkered down, had been hit. It was their most advanced position along the line of trees that juts north from the O-0506 road into Bakhmut.

The task for the Ukrainians on the front line was to hold their positions. They mostly hid from artillery fire in dugouts, praying there wouldn’t be a direct hit. They had to periodically overcome their fear and emerge from the bunkers to shoot in the direction of the advancing enemy infantry, to keep them at bay. 

Yabchanka arrived to a scene of destruction. The explosion had come from a 120mm mortar bomb that had hit the dugout.

“Lyokha, are you OK?” Yabchanka called out. Lyokha gave a thumbs-up. 

The gesture calmed the other men in the bunker, Yabchanka said—but the assault was about to escalate.

Buying time

Honor Company arrived in early March to the western outskirts of Bakhmut, a once-prosperous city of some 70,000. It is now mostly in ruins. By the end of February, Russian forces had advanced around Bakhmut’s northern and southern edges and were threatening to cut off Ukrainian troops by slicing their two main supply roads.

There is little strategic value to the city. But the Ukrainians decided to stick it out instead of withdrawing and dispatched reinforcements to defend the roads. Their calculation was that by staying and fighting for each block and field they could grind down the Russian forces. By bogging down the battle here, they would also be able to buy time to prepare for a bigger offensive of their own elsewhere.

Direction of Russian assaults

Bakhmut

UKRAINE

Line of trees held by Ukrainian troops

Craters from artillery

Area of detail

BAKHMUT

Road into Bakhmut

Source: Maxar (satellite images)

Russian forces still haven’t managed to cut off Bakhmut, but have seized most of the city with brutal street-to-street fighting that has hemmed Ukrainian soldiers into a few blocks in the west. Wagner, the paramilitary group made up largely of convicted criminals, has led Russian assaults on the city. Late last week, Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin threatened to Moscow that he would withdraw his troops from Bakhmut, citing growing losses.

Honor Company’s leader is 28-year-old Second Lt. Serhiy Filimonov, who founded a Ukrainian nationalist group that protested corruption and once starred as a gangster in an acclaimed Ukrainian film. When Russia invaded, he turned his movement, called Honor, into a fighting unit, which later became part of the 67th Mechanized Brigade.

They spent their first days in the Bakhmut area scouting out Russian positions using aerial drones. They dropped grenades from the drones and hammered the Russians with artillery, including mortars and howitzers. Then a squad of fighters moved up through the trees and flushed the Russians out almost to the top edge of the field by the road.

There, they set up a coordinated defensive system including sniper and machine-gun positions that enabled them to hold off the attackers and killed hundreds of Russians, said Lt. Filimonov. The company, with more than 100 soldiers, has suffered painful losses, mostly from artillery strikes. Five have died, with more lost to injuries.

The company fortified positions including a dugout known as Zhmur, or Stiff, because of the four Russian corpses that lay inside. They had been abandoned by their comrades from Wagner. The Ukrainians didn’t risk removing the bodies since any movement was likely to attract artillery fire, so the bodies remained in the bunker, a grim reminder of the war’s toll.

Honor Company’s leader, Second Lt. Serhiy Filimonov, last month. PHOTO: JOSEPH SYWENKYJ FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

First Lt. Oleksandr Yabchanka in Lviv at the grave of a friend and fallen soldier. PHOTO: JOSEPH SYWENKYJ FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

At his command post on April 9, Lt. Filimonov, known as Filya, was struggling to get a clear picture of what was happening at Zhmur—the dugout that had just been hit.

Video feeds from drones usually gave him an early warning that enemy forces were approaching, but weeks of bombardments had taken their toll on the battalion’s pilots. The more experienced ones were recovering from concussions. Their replacements were struggling to fly because Russian forces had deployed electronic-warfare systems to interfere with their signals. 

After changing the drone’s battery and sending it back to Zhmur, Filya saw through the video feed that two groups of Russians were already almost on top of his men.

Filya called to his troops over the radio. “The f—rs have got into our trench.”

Two groups comprising about eight Russians soldiers were advancing from the top edge of the trees. One set off down a trench in one field, seeking to flank around the Ukrainian positions. The other group closed in on Zhmur from the second field.

If the Ukrainians had left through the dugout’s main entrance, they would have been gunned down. Instead, Yabchanka, who previously headed the company’s medical service, and another Ukrainian soldier, a boxer in his mid-20s known as Tykhiy, popped out of a hole they had made in the dugout roof a few days earlier.

As the Russians sought desperately to crawl away, he fired at them in turn.

After Tykhiy saw that the Russians were killed or gravely wounded, he called to his colleagues in the dugout to come out. 

The company was firing from several positions now, including from machine guns and snipers.

Ukrainian artillery, meanwhile, began targeting a group of some 30 Russian troops that had gathered to the north of the trees, ready to advance.

Tykhiy ordered his fellow soldiers to take up firing positions, remain calm and conserve ammunition. In the trench running down the edge of the field about 30 yards in front of them, silhouettes of more Russian soldiers came into view.

Tykhiy asked Filya over the radio where the Russians were. Filya replied that a Russian to the left was still moving. The Ukrainians shot at them again. A badly wounded man can still throw a grenade. 

The Russians in the trench were now blocked by a small group of Ukrainian soldiers who had entered it from the south. That made them an easy target for the Ukrainians at Zhmur, who fired whenever they spotted movement.

At that moment, the battle for the dugout was won. 

In a moment of triumph, Tykhiy yelled, “This is our line of trees, f—rs!”

With artillery thudding all around, Filya ordered the soldiers back into the bunker, apart from Yabchanka, who kept firing into the trench.

Filya told him to stop. The Ukrainian soldiers in the trench were pushing northward to clear it.

Tykhiy commanded the men at Zhmur to take ammunition from the dead Ukrainian soldier in the dugout. They needed to prepare for the next assault.

Write to James Marson at james.marson@wsj.com

4. As Putin Bides His Time, Ukraine Faces a Ticking Clock

As Putin Bides His Time, Ukraine Faces a Ticking Clock

The New York Times · by Andrew E. Kramer · May 6, 2023

Ukraine is feeling short-term pressure from its Western backers for success in a looming counteroffensive. Vladimir Putin seems to be operating on a longer timeline.

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Ukrainian troops training at a firing range in the Zaporizhzhia region last month.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times

By Paul Sonne and

May 6, 2023, 5:37 a.m. ET

Both armies have tanks, artillery and tens of thousands of soldiers ready to face off on the battlefields of Ukraine in a long-anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive against Russia. But one thing clearly sets the two sides apart: time.

Ukraine is feeling immense short-term pressures from its Western backers, as the United States and its allies treat the counteroffensive as a critical test of whether the weapons, training and ammunition they have rushed to the country in recent months can translate into significant gains.

If the Ukrainians fall short of expectations, they risk an erosion of Western support. It is a source of anxiety for top officials in Kyiv, who know that beyond battlefield muscle and ingenuity, victory may ultimately come down to a test of wills between the Kremlin and the West — and which side can muster more political, economic and industrial staying power, possibly for years.

As a result, there is a sense in Ukraine that its war effort faces a ticking clock.

“In countries that are our partners, our friends, the expectation of the counteroffensive is overestimated, overheated, I would say,” Ukraine’s defense minister, Oleksiy Reznikov, said in an interview this past week in Kyiv, the capital. “That is my main concern.”

The expectations of military success are only one pressure point for Ukraine. A presidential election in the United States looms next year, with the potential for a new, less supportive Republican administration.

In Russia, President Vladimir V. Putin faces his own challenges but is showing signs of operating on a much longer timeline, encumbered by economic and military limitations but free from the domestic political pressures that make continuing Western support for Ukraine so uncertain.

Having already mobilized some 300,000 recruits last September, Mr. Putin is laying the groundwork for a possible new round of conscription, having changed the law so Russian authorities can draft men by serving them with a “digital summons” online.

Conscripted soldiers receiving a blessing from a priest at a recruiting office in Moscow last year. President Vladimir Putin of Russia is considering a new round of conscription in the coming months.Credit...Nanna Heitmann for The New York Times

In private conversations, his defense minister, Sergei K. Shoigu, has professed a willingness to dig in for the long haul, vowing to carry out more mobilizations if necessary and emphasizing that Russia is capable of conscripting as many as 25 million fighting-age men, a senior European official said.

Russia’s economy is under increasing strain, and its defense sector, like the West’s, is struggling to provide enough matériel for the front. There are signs of simmering anxiety over the Ukrainian counteroffensive. On Friday, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner mercenary group, castigated Russian military leadership over a lack of ammunition and threatened to pull his forces from the fighting in the embattled city of Bakhmut within days.

But Mr. Putin has defined the war effort as a top priority and vital national interest, telling Russians in a New Year’s address that “we must only fight, only keep going” against Western democracies intent on Russia’s destruction.

“Certainly I think there is a calculation in the Kremlin that Russia is more resilient than the West,” said Thomas E. Graham, a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, who served as senior director for Russia on the National Security Council from 2004 to 2007.

“They do think about these electoral cycles,” Mr. Graham said. “Who knows what is going to happen in 2024 in the United States? It’s not clear where the American people are on this over the long run. I think the Kremlin and Putin do believe that in that sense, time is on their side.”

Ukraine’s leaders, on the jittery doorstep of the counteroffensive, have been making a point of projecting confidence — but not too much.

If they appear too ambitious, they could stir fears that Russia could respond with a tactical nuclear strike. Appear too modest, in contrast, and criticism arises that billions of dollars in military aid to Ukraine has been spent in vain.

Ukrainian officials point to the considerable successes they have already achieved: forcing the Russian military to retreat from Kyiv last year; sinking the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva; and recapturing thousands of square miles of territory in two counterattacks last fall.

“After that, the world is ready to see the next stage of this competition, if we can use a sports metaphor,” Mr. Reznikov said.

Civilians crossing a damaged bridge in Staryi Saltiv, a small village that was liberated from Russian troops last year.Credit...Mauricio Lima for The New York Times

“We have a lot of supporters of Ukraine cheering for us,” he said. “That is why they are waiting for the next match. But for us, it’s not a sports game. For us, it’s a serious challenge. For us, it’s the lives of our soldiers.”

He said the operation must be viewed as part of a larger whole.

“For me, every success during this war becomes a new stage, a new step, on the road to victory,” Mr. Reznikov said. The counteroffensive, he said, will be “just one story” in the war.

Military analysts have pointed to a likely period of probing assaults, feints and long-range strikes in the opening phase of the attack. Degrading the Russian military’s combat abilities will be as important as liberating territory, Mr. Reznikov said.

The Ukrainians see their enemy as having expended its offensive ability and as eager for a pause in fighting that could buy time to rearm and attack again.

Despite Ukraine’s worries about waning Western support, its allies have so far remained resolute, pledging hundreds of billions of dollars in weapons and aid, training Ukrainian soldiers, imposing sanctions and, to varying degrees, weaning their economies off Russian energy. NATO’s secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, has said the alliance must brace itself to back Ukraine over a long war, and has singled out a summit planned for July in Lithuania as a moment to formalize that commitment.

In Washington, President Biden has pledged to support Kyiv for “as long as it takes,” and could request an additional supplemental aid package for Ukraine later this year, regardless of the counteroffensive’s outcome. Administration officials expect to retain bipartisan congressional support.

But Mr. Biden is heading into a presidential election cycle that could upend U.S. backing for Ukraine, particularly if Americans elect former President Donald J. Trump, the Republican front-runner. Mr. Trump has criticized Mr. Biden’s support for Ukrainian forces, saying in an interview this year with Fox News that “ultimately,” Mr. Putin “is going to take over all of Ukraine.”

President Biden has pledged to support Kyiv for “as long as it takes,” but the upcoming U.S. election could upend American backing for the war effort.Credit...Daniel Berehulak/The New York Times

“In Ukraine, we understand we have a shortage of time as well as ammunition,” Volodymyr Ariev, a member of Parliament in the European Solidarity Party, said in an interview. “Financial aid of the European Union and G7 seems not to be endless.”

In countries like Syria and Libya, Mr. Putin for years has exploited the tendency of Western governments to lose focus or shift priorities when it comes to foreign affairs.

“Russia’s hope right now is that the peak of Western military support is going to be around the summer,” and then will dissipate, said Michael Kofman, the director of Russia studies at CNA, a research institute in Virginia.

Already, the war has stretched for more than 14 months, making a yearslong protracted conflict more likely. Once wars have gone on for more than a year, they tend to last for more than a decade on average, the Center for Strategic and International Studies found in an analysis that used data on conflicts since 1946.

Mr. Putin has little incentive to end the war now, unless his hand is forced, because its continuation helps him retain power, said Andrea Kendall-Taylor, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a former deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia. Any negotiations after a military defeat would look like capitulation and make him more vulnerable at home, she said.

“Even if Ukraine is wildly successful in its upcoming counteroffensive, he is not going to be forced into some negotiated settlement,” Ms. Kendall-Taylor said. “Instead, he has every incentive to fight through the challenges.”

The only exception is if Mr. Putin can come away from negotiations with something he can sell back home as enough of a victory, she said.

Crowds celebrated Russia’s assertion that it was annexing four regions of Ukraine last September.Credit...Yuri Kochetkov/EPA, via Shutterstock

Only 7 percent of authoritarian leaders with governments like Russia’s have found themselves unseated during a conflict that began on their watch, Ms. Kendall-Taylor found in an analysis of conflicts since 1919, which she conducted with the political scientist Erica Frantz.

“Leaders, when they initiate the war, they are rarely ousted so long as the war continues,” Ms. Kendall-Taylor said.

Some analysts believe Mr. Putin’s calculation could change if the Ukrainian counteroffensive manages to threaten Crimea.

“In polls, the only thing the Russian public was not willing to negotiate over was the status of Crimea,” said Max Bergmann, the director of the Europe, Russia and Eurasia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “If Crimea is being bombarded, then it’s a failure. I think that would change things, potentially.”

Mr. Putin is also likely facing pressures that remain opaque to the outside world. In an authoritarian system, threats to the stability of a government often prove unpredictable.

Mr. Graham, the Council on Foreign Relations distinguished fellow, said Mr. Putin has security, business and political elites he still must keep on his side, noting that “it’s wrong to assume that Putin can just do anything he wants to at this point.”

“There are institutions of power and centers of power,” he added, “that you have to manage, control and dominate in some way if you’re going to stay in the game.”

Adam Entous contributed reporting.

The New York Times · by Andrew E. Kramer · May 6, 2023

5. Senior Ukrainian officials fear counterattack may not live up to hype

Graphics and photos at the link. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/06/ukraine-counteroffensive-expectations-hype-russia/

Senior Ukrainian officials fear counterattack may not live up to hype

By Siobhán O'Grady, Isabelle Khurshudyan, Laris Karklis and Samuel Granados

May 6, 2023 at 4:09 p.m. EDT

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/06/ukraine-counteroffensive-expectations-hype-russia/

KYIV, Ukraine — The Ukrainian military has spent nearly 15 months exceeding the world’s expectations. Now, senior leaders are trying to lower those hopes, fearing that the outcome of an imminent counteroffensive aimed at turning the tide of the war with Russia may not live up to the hype.

“The expectation from our counteroffensive campaign is overestimated in the world,” Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said in an interview this past week. “Most people are … waiting for something huge,” he added, which he fears may lead to “emotional disappointment.”

The planned counterattack — made possible by donated Western weapons and training — could mark the most consequential phase of the war, as Ukraine seeks to snatch back significant territory and prove it is worthy of continued support.

Offensive military operations typically require overwhelming advantage, and with Russian forces dug into heavily fortified defenses all across the 900-mile-long front, it is hard to gauge how far Ukraine will get.

The buildup ahead of the assault — the details of which remain secret — has left Ukrainian officials grappling with a difficult question: What outcome will be enough to impress the West, especially Washington?

Some fear that if the Ukrainians fall short, Kyiv may lose international military assistance or face new pressure to engage with Moscow at a negotiating table — not on the battlefield. Such talks would almost certainly involve Russian demands for a negotiated surrender of sovereign territory, which Ukraine has called unacceptable.

“I believe that the more victories we have on the battlefield, frankly, the more people will believe in us, which means we will get more help,” President Volodymyr Zelensky said in an interview Monday with The Washington Post in his heavily fortified headquarters building.

Kyiv is eager to make a rapid breakthrough in what has essentially slowed to a grinding artillery war in the country’s east and south, with neither side making significant territorial gains. Experts say it will be difficult, if not impossible, to push the Russians back to their positions before the invasion started on Feb. 24, 2022, when Moscow held parts of Luhansk and Donetsk and the illegally annexed Crimean Peninsula.

Potential scenarios for a new Ukrainian counteroffensive

Ukrainian reclaimed territory through previous counteroffensives

Russian-built fortifications

RUSSIA

BELARUS

Russian-controlled area

POLAND

Kyiv

Kharkiv

UKRAINE

Kupiansk

Lviv

Zaporizhzhia

nuclear

power plant

Bakhmut

Area held by

Russian-backed

separatists

since 2014

SLOV.

Dnipro

Luhansk

Kakhovka

hydroelectric

plant

Vuhledar

Zaporizhzhia

Donetsk

HUNG.

RUSSIA

MOL.

Kherson

Mariupol

Melitopol

ROMANIA

Odessa

‘Land bridge’

Crimea to Russia

Black Sea

CRIMEA

Illegally annexed by

Russia in 2014

The pressure comes in part from Ukraine’s past battlefield wins — first repelling Russia’s attempt to capture Kyiv and later dislodging the invaders from strongholds in surprise attacks in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions.

“We inspired everywhere because the perception was that we will fall during 72 hours,” Reznikov said. But the track record means Ukraine’s partners now have a “joint expectation that it would be successful again,” he said.

Leaked U.S. files show deep rift between Russian military and Wagner chief

Western partners have told him, he said, that they now need a “next example of a success because we need to show it to our people. … But I cannot tell you what the scale of this success would be. Ten kilometers, 30 kilometers, 100 kilometers, 200 kilometers?”

A major success could rally more support for the Western arms and ammunition Ukraine needs to continue the fight and offer a much-needed morale boost for the civilian population, which relished Ukrainian forces’ resilience against Russia’s efforts to take Kyiv last spring and later their surprise autumn offensive in the Kharkiv region, which retook hundreds of miles of territory in a matter of days.

But in Kharkiv the Ukrainians had an advantage when they stormed Russian troops — who had lowered their defenses — by surprise. Many who remained simply fled without a fight. And in Kherson to the south, Ukraine had a major geographic edge, with Russia struggling to supply troops west of the Dnieper River.

Now, Russia may have the geographic advantage and stronger numbers. Some 500,000 Russian troops are currently focused in Ukraine, with at least 300,000 inside Ukrainian territory, Reznikov said.

SCENARIO

Reclaiming Zaporizhzhia

nuclear power plant

Ukraine has 15 functional nuclear reactors, which together supplied 51 percent of its electricity in 2020. Six of those reactors are at the Zaporizhzhia plant, the largest facility of its kind in Europe. It has been under Russian control since March 4, 2022.

Marganets

Nikopol

Zaporizhzhia

nuclear

power plant

Khakovka Reservoir

Dnieper River

Thermal

power plant

Enerhodar

Ivanovka

Power

transmission

lines

750kV

Vodyane

Blahovishchenka

RUSSIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS

Transmission lines

330kV

2 MILES

One key objective for Ukraine, and perhaps an early sign of success, would be to break the so-called land bridge between mainland Russia and occupied Crimea, severing crucial supply lines to Russian troops in the Zaporizhzhia region, and isolating Russian bases on the peninsula.

SCENARIO

Reclaiming Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant

Railway

Beryslav

Dnieper River

P47

Kakhovka

Kakhovka

Kakhovka hydroelectric

power plant

Lvove

Russian-built

fortifications

Nova

Kakhovka

This hydroelectric dam is the only crossing in the area and serves as

the source for a vital canal that delivers water south to Crimea.

Petropavlivka

RUSSIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS

P47

To the

south

Chornianka

T2202

To Crimea

Semenivka

Northern

Crimean

Canal

3 MILES

Another top imperative is to regain control over hugely valuable critical infrastructure facilities, including the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, Europe’s largest atomic energy station, which is located in the occupied city of Enerhodar, and the Kakhovka hydroelectric plant in the southern Kherson region.

A Flakpanzer Gepard antiaircraft tank that is part of Ukraine's counteroffensive operations in Kharkiv and Kherson. (Serhiy Morgunov for The Washington Post)

Recognizing the formidable obstacles, Ukrainian officials have continued to press for additional materiel from supporters in the West.

Ukraine will be ready to launch the assault “as soon as the weapons that were agreed with our partners are filled,” Zelensky said. The timeline could also depend on weather, because of unseasonably damp ground along the country’s front lines.

Reznikov said that Ukraine’s “first assault formation” is more than 90 percent prepared to begin but that some designated troops are still finishing training programs abroad.

The rise and violent demise of pro-Russian war blogger Vladlen Tatarsky

The huge front line creates numerous potential avenues of attack.

Ukraine could focus its efforts south and attempt to seize the city of Melitopol, which Russia has established as the occupied regional capital of Zaporizhzhia, and then push forward in an effort to sever the land bridge.

SCENARIO

Attack south through Zaporizhzhia region,

aiming to take Melitopol and break the “land bridge”

Donetsk

Zaporizhzhia

UKRAINE

M14

Mariupol

Kherson

Melitopol

RUSSIA

Berdyansk

E105

Russia controls this

road that creates a

land bridge

to Crimea.

Sea of Azov

50 MILES

CRIMEA

Ukraine could also attack Crimea itself, probably with naval operations and possibly even beach landings. Satellite imagery shows extensive trenches that Russian forces have dug in preparation for a potential assault.

SCENARIO

Attack on Crimea

From Kherson

region

From Zaporizhzhia

region

RUSSIAN-CONTROLLED

AREAS

E105

Russian-built

fortifications

Henichesk

Sea of Azov

E97

Dzhankoi has proved to be a strategic target as it is the only point where rail lines can reach the naval base of Sevastopol.

Dzhankoi

Chernomorskoye

CRIMEA

Illegally annexed by

Russia in 2014

Kerch

Railway

Yevpatoria

Popivka

Simferopol

Primorkyi

Black Sea

Completed in 2018,

the Crimean Bridge

was the only link Russia

had to Crimea. An explosion

damaged the bridge on Oct. 8.

Sevastopol

50 MILES

Other scenarios could see the Ukrainians attacking east through the fiercely embattled city of Bakhmut, or from the town of Kupiansk, in a push to regain control of areas in the Luhansk region.

SCENARIO

Attack east from Kupiansk

Donets

River

RUSSIA

Kharkiv

Oskil

River

Russian-built

fortifications

UKRAINE

Kupiansk

On Sept. 9, Ukrainian soldiers reentered Kupiansk, a strategic enclave that has a bridge across the Oskil River as well as a railway depot that can be used for resupply.

A counteroffensive from this area would be aimed at controlling eastern cities north of Luhansk.

RUSSIAN-CONTROLLED

AREAS

Svatove

P07

Starobilsk

Izyum

Severodonetsk

Lyman

Slovyansk

Lysychansk

Donets

River

Kramatorsk

Bakhmut

Luhansk

25 MILES

Yevgeniy Prigozhin, the founder of Russia’s Wagner mercenary group, has threatened to withdraw his forces from Bakhmut, which would leave the city vulnerable. Another option would be for the Ukrainians to attack Russian positions through the southern city of Vuhledar toward occupied Mariupol on the Sea of Azov.

Zelensky said he would consider reoccupying any Ukrainian territory to be “a success.”

“I can’t tell you which towns or cities, which borders are a significant success for us and which are average … only because I don’t want to prepare Russia for how, in which directions, and where and when we will be,” he said.

SCENARIO

Retaking Bakhmut and Soledar

Kreminna

Rubizhne

Severodonetsk

Lyman

Lysychansk

Donets River

Bakhmut has seen the most intense fighting for territorial control for many months now, and the Pentagon indicated that since December, Russia has suffered 100,000 casualties, including more than 20,000 killed.

Siversk

Slovyansk

M03

Zolote

Soledar

Kramatorsk

Popasna

Canal

Russian-built

fortifications

Bakhmut

Chasiv

Yar

Druzhkivka

M03

RUSSIAN-CONTROLLED

AREAS

Kostiantynivka

5 MILES

Ideally, Reznikov said, the offensive will not only liberate villages and cities but also “cut logistic chains of [Russian] troops” and “reduce their offensive capacity.”

Western leaders insist Ukraine is well-equipped for the fight ahead.

But U.S. intelligence assessments disclosed in a massive leak of classified documents on the Discord forum revealed U.S. misgivings about Ukraine’s ability to make major progress this spring, in part due to assessed “deficiencies in training and munitions supplies.”

“We are currently losing in the sky,” Zelensky said in the interview with The Post in Kyiv. The Ukrainian president has been pleading for American-made F-16s. President Biden has pointedly denied the request, saying Zelensky does not need the planes.

Zelensky said that Ukraine will not wait for more fighter jets to start the offensive but that “it would be much easier for us” if they had them.

And although Ukraine recently received the U.S.-made Patriot missile-defense system, “we also need to remember that the name alone does not protect people,” Zelensky said.

More air defense is “priority number one,” Reznikov said.

Gen. Richard Barrons, commander of the U.K. Joint Forces Command from 2013 to 2016, said there are concerns that Ukraine’s still-depleted air defenses could face a barrage from Russian missiles once the counteroffensive begins.

The United States, he said, might have to strip its own systems in order to counter the weakness. “There is a question mark over Ukraine’s ability to control its own airspace,” Barrons said, adding that it had been a clear Russian tactic throughout winter to try to exhaust Ukrainian air defenses, which had mostly consisted of Russian or Soviet-made equipment.

Ukraine is also pleading for more long-range strike capabilities as the counteroffensive nears its start. Kyiv’s partners have long expressed fears that such equipment could be used to strike inside Russia — potentially triggering a major escalation from Moscow. But the lack of such weaponry is putting Ukraine at a serious disadvantage, Zelensky said.

A crater is visible next to a block of apartments in Chasiv Yar in the Donetsk region in April. (Ed Ram for The Washington Post)

“I don’t quite understand, I’ll tell you frankly, why we can’t get long-range artillery,” he said, contending he has offered assurances that Ukraine would not use such equipment to strike inside Russia, as some allies fear.

This lack of equipment, Zelensky said, is why Ukrainian forces, after retaking the southern city of Kherson in November, have been unable to push Russian forces out of the territory they control just across the Dnieper River.

It’s from those riverside positions that Russian forces regularly lob ammunition into the now Ukrainian-controlled city. Dozens of civilians have been killed in such shelling in the months since Kherson’s liberation.

“They can take troops from there and move them to the east or to the south. And still, they are reinforcing,” Zelensky said. “Why? Because they know that we cannot reach them … and we suffer every day because they have the ability to shoot at our people.”

SCENARIO

Attack across the Dnieper River

into Kherson region

Dnieper

To Kakhovka

hydroelectric

power plant

Antonovsky

railway

bridge

Antonovsky

Bridge

Kherson

T2206

Tsiurupinks

There are only two

crossing points along

the Dnieper River east of

the Kherson city area.

Dnieper

Delta

Russian-built

fortifications

Kardashynka

RUSSIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS

E97

Nova Zburybka

KHERSON REGION

5 MILES

To Crimea

Kremlin accuses Washington of directing drone attack on Putin

Russian forces in Kherson knew that Ukraine lacked long-distance strike capabilities, so “they withdrew all their command posts, fuel depots, ammunition depots, more than 120 kilometers away,” Reznikov said.

“That’s why we need something interesting with a range capability of 150 kilometers,” he said. “It’s become more difficult for them logistically. But we need to push them deeper and deeper.”

Sources: Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project, OpenstreetMap, Openinframap. Brady Africk, who analyzed satellite imagery from Copernicus Open Access Hub, provided fortifications data, which does not include all fortifications in Ukraine; some defenses predate Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Karklis reported from Washington and Granados from Malaga, Spain. Catherine Belton in London contributed to this report.

6. Why Russia’s Wagner Group leader is ‘yelling mutiny’ in Ukraine war

Excerpts:

In a separate video released Thursday night, Prigozhin filmed dead Wagner fighters and cursed at Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Gen. Valery Gerasimov, who is overseeing the Ukraine war for Moscow.

“You think that you are the masters of life and you think that you have a right to master their lives, too,” Prigozhin said, pointing to the dead soldiers behind him. “If you give us the normal ammunition, there will be five times less bodies here.”

The accusations underscore a growing internal divide between Moscow and a key ally in the Ukraine war. Prigozhin has also warned that should he pull out, the frontline in Bakhmut would collapse.

...

But he said Prigozhin is “basically yelling mutiny” ahead of Victory Day, a major holiday honoring Moscow’s triumph over Nazi Germany in World War II. Russian President Vladimir Putin is expected to speak in Moscow during celebrations next week.

“This is not anything that Putin or his people want to have to deal with,” Hoh said. “The perception is that things are out of control.”

Why Russia’s Wagner Group leader is ‘yelling mutiny’ in Ukraine war

 BRAD DRESS - 05/06/23 4:00 PM ET

The Hill · · May 6, 2023

The announced withdrawal of Wagner Group fighters from the town of Bakhmut is another setback for Russia at a crucial moment in its war in Ukraine, exposing an enormous rift between the figures leading the effort just as Kyiv prepares to launch a counteroffensive.

Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin said Friday on Telegram that his mercenary company would leave the city in the Eastern Donetsk region May 10 after he accused Russia’s Defense Ministry of depriving his fighters of ammunition and generally failing in the war effort.

In a separate video released Thursday night, Prigozhin filmed dead Wagner fighters and cursed at Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Gen. Valery Gerasimov, who is overseeing the Ukraine war for Moscow.

“You think that you are the masters of life and you think that you have a right to master their lives, too,” Prigozhin said, pointing to the dead soldiers behind him. “If you give us the normal ammunition, there will be five times less bodies here.”

The accusations underscore a growing internal divide between Moscow and a key ally in the Ukraine war. Prigozhin has also warned that should he pull out, the frontline in Bakhmut would collapse.

Matthew Hoh, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy who served with the U.S. military in Afghanistan and Iraq, said Russian forces can backfill any holes left by Wagner Group forces.

But he said Prigozhin is “basically yelling mutiny” ahead of Victory Day, a major holiday honoring Moscow’s triumph over Nazi Germany in World War II. Russian President Vladimir Putin is expected to speak in Moscow during celebrations next week.

“This is not anything that Putin or his people want to have to deal with,” Hoh said. “The perception is that things are out of control.”

The chaos Prigozhin’s video unleashed among the Russian military also tells a troubling narrative of the war ahead of Ukraine’s counteroffensive, said Anna Arutunyan, a fellow at the Wilson Center.

“It was a very emotional rant, a very emotional message — he hasn’t screamed at them so directly in the past,” she said. “Prigozhin is fed up. He’s fed up, and I think he’s reflecting a sense of others who are fed up with this.”

“Bodies are piling up. There’s not enough ammunition to go around as Russia prepares for a counteroffensive from Ukraine,” she added. “There’s a deep sense of how this [counteroffensive] is going to pan out.”

Arutunyan, who has written a new book about Russia’s hybrid war in Ukraine, said Prigozhin is likely engaging in “emotional blackmail” to win concessions from Moscow. She added that the mercenary leader may reverse course if he gets what he wants.

“What we’ve seen in the past is that he will make these public attacks and then he will back down and say, ‘Yes, they’re giving us more ammunition,’” she said. “So, it’s a matter of how the Kremlin chooses to finesse this and the signals that it wants to send.”

The Kremlin has so far not publicly commented on Prigozhin’s accusations and planned retreat.

But Russian state-run media outlet TASS ran a brief articleFriday quoting a Defense Ministry spokesperson, who said the assault on Bakhmut was pressing ahead.

Wagner Group, known for its meddling in conflicts in Africa and Syria, has played a crucial role in the Ukraine war since deploying fighters to the country in March of last year.

Mercenary fighters helped take the cities of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in the Eastern Luhansk region last spring. And Russian forces, led by Wagner Group, began a major assault on Bakhmut in October. The town in the Donetsk region is a strategic point for Russian forces to push further west and seize the Eastern Donbas, the core of Moscow’s offensive launched over the winter.

Wagner Group achieved a minor victory in January when it took the nearby town of Soledar, allowing forces to descend upon Bakhmut from another direction. But they have since only made incremental gains at a huge cost to ammunition and soldiers, including thousands of troops recruited from prisons.

The White House estimates that Russia has lost nearly 20,000 soldiers since December, with nearly half of those killed from Wagner Group.

But Wagner Group has also heavily damaged elite Ukrainian units while Russian forces have committed limited armed forces personnel, said Hoh, the Center for International Policy expert.

“Wagner has been very helpful to the Russian army because by using the prisoners, the Wagner mercenary forces fight rather than your regular army forces,” he said.

Prigozhin has been complaining for months about a perceived lack of ammunition. Earlier this year, he sent a representative to Russia’s military headquarters in Ukraine to ask for more supplies and was apparently denied.

Russia has faced an ammunition shortage for more months, but still has significantly more resources and firepower than Ukraine, which is facing its own supply issues.

Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, also said Wagner Group has “had a significant artillery advantage in Bakhmut and received preferential support” from Russian military leaders.

“This is likely a reflection of the MoD rationing ammunition before Ukraine’s counteroffensive,” he tweeted, remarking on Prigozhin’s Thursday video. “The MoD has to defend the whole front but Prigozhin only cares about taking Bakhmut.”

Russian military bloggers also said the problem of ammunition shortages and heavy losses are not limited to Wagner Group.

Blogger Igor Girkin wrote on Telegram that “our entire Active Army” is “acutely short of ammunition,” asking who would be left if everyone facing the problem left the front.

Prigozhin on Friday said he is withdrawing his fighters to the rear to “lick our wounds” but would still eventually deliver victory for the Russian people.

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Ukrainian officials have yet to publicly comment on the rant from Prigozhin, who is prone to outbursts on social media and has long courted media attention.

Lera Burlakova, a fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis, said Prigozhin’s announced withdrawal could be a ploy designed to trick Ukrainians.

“It’s very common for Prigozhin to make some kind of hysterical statement,” she said. “I really don’t believe any military figure in Russia is powerful enough to just make his own decisions … without some very serious consequences.”

The Hill · · May 6, 2023

7. ANALYSIS: China under Xi is trying to forge a new and authoritarian world order

Again, my thesis: China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, and displace democratic institutions.

Excerpts:

China’s English-language nationalist tabloid, the Global Times, said the agreement was “another proof that unipolarity no longer exists and that we are already in a de facto multipolar world order.”

“The Middle East and the world are not only in a post-America order, but also in a post-West order,” the paper said.

But while the agreement seems like a public relations coup for Beijing, Gering said Saudi and Iran already had plenty of motivation to reach an agreement on their own, and the resumption of ties had followed years of low-level dialogue between the two governments.

He said brokering the final deal was a “low-risk” strategy for China, which had simply picked the right moment to intervene, and dismissed Beijing’s 12-point peace plan for Ukraine as “ridiculous.”

“Just like in the Middle East, China actually doesn’t want to replace the United States because it doesn’t want to get its hands dirty,” Gerin said. “In such conflicts, [China] first considers whether it can benefit from them with very low risk as it did with the Iran-Saudi Agreement.”

ANALYSIS: China under Xi is trying to forge a new and authoritarian world order

americanmilitarynews.com · by Radio Free Asia · May 6, 2023

This article was originally published by Radio Free Asia and is reprinted with permission.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s ongoing visit to Russia forms part of a bid by Beijing to rebrand China’s international image and reshape the international community along authoritarian lines, commentators told Radio Free Asia in recent interviews and broadcasts.

Xi will have an “in-depth exchange of views” with Putin on major international and regional issues of mutual interest, with a view to boosting strategic coordination and practical cooperation, China’s foreign ministry said of the current trip, during which the two leaders will sign a declaration that their relationship is entering “a new era,” a reference to a favored Xi buzzword.

The trip comes as Xi emerges victorious from a lengthy power struggle for sole control of the levers of party, military and state, which saw him approved for an indefinite third term in office as party leader at the party congress in October 2022 and at the annual National People’s Congress session in Beijing earlier this month.

Xi is now free to steer Chinese diplomacy into his new era, which he says will be “a shared future for humanity,” a phrase analysts say means Beijing will be looking to forge stronger alliances with other authoritarian regimes to counter “U.S. hegemony” and export China’s model of party-state governance around the world.

New role as mediator

Tuvia Gering, a non-resident fellow at the Global China Hub of the Atlantic Council, said China’s foreign policy in recent decades has typically focused on following other countries’ lead, or facilitating international arrangements, rather than projecting it as a global power for other nations to follow.

“In the mediation of regional conflicts, China tends to play the role of follower [or] facilitator rather than leader,” Gering said. “This time it is surprising that China not only leads but also successfully mediates international disputes without the presence of the United States.”

He was referring to Xi Jinping’s visit to Saudi Arabia last December where he met with all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, swiftly followed by a visit to Beijing by Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, followed by a March 10 trilateral statement from Saudi Arabia, Iran and China announcing that Riyadh and Tehran would resume diplomatic relations.

“This is a clear success for Beijing — its first in the troubled Middle East region — and it could be followed by others,” columnist Marco Carnelos wrote in the March 17 edition of Middle East Eye.

Given that China is planning an unprecedented high-level meeting between Arab monarchs and Iranian officials in Beijing later this year, Carnelos wrote, “it would be difficult to imagine a bigger slap in the face to U.S. Middle Eastern diplomacy.”

China’s English-language nationalist tabloid, the Global Times, said the agreement was “another proof that unipolarity no longer exists and that we are already in a de facto multipolar world order.”

“The Middle East and the world are not only in a post-America order, but also in a post-West order,” the paper said.

But while the agreement seems like a public relations coup for Beijing, Gering said Saudi and Iran already had plenty of motivation to reach an agreement on their own, and the resumption of ties had followed years of low-level dialogue between the two governments.

He said brokering the final deal was a “low-risk” strategy for China, which had simply picked the right moment to intervene, and dismissed Beijing’s 12-point peace plan for Ukraine as “ridiculous.”

“Just like in the Middle East, China actually doesn’t want to replace the United States because it doesn’t want to get its hands dirty,” Gerin said. “In such conflicts, [China] first considers whether it can benefit from them with very low risk as it did with the Iran-Saudi Agreement.”

Aspiring global actor and standard-setter

Moritz Rudolf, fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center, said he believes China is also trying to become a serious global actor and standard-setter, however.

“As the U.S. enters the presidential election season, I think we wouldn’t be surprised to see a lot more engagement with China in just the next two years,” Rudolf said.

“From the Chinese perspective, their foreign policy direction appears to be looking towards the global south, with attempts to build coalitions with those countries and to use them in the pursuit of long-term goals, such as changing the international order,” he said.

“To me, there appears to be a real strategic goal to shape the global order through the use of the law.”

The use of international treaties, laws and other binding agreements to further Beijing’s policy goals will have a powerful side-effect, Rudolf predicted.

“Once China becomes a global actor, its legal system will also extend,” he said. “This is one of those issues that can fundamentally change how the world functions.”

“It’s an incremental process, and at some point, you wake up and realize that the global order has changed. The rules have become more Chinese, and the global order has become more Chinese as well,” he warned.

Veteran political commentator and former 1989 Tiananmen protest leader Wang Dan agreed, citing the Middle East agreement and Xi’s “global civilization initiative.”

“All of this shows us that Xi Jinping wants to become a world leader, and spread his ideology around the world,” Wang wrote in a recent commentary for RFA Mandarin, citing the Saudi-Iran agreement.

“But all of this is the stuff that is visible on the surface,” he added. “What the rest of the world also needs to look at is the way that Xi Jinping is targeting … [U.S. interests] in more secretive ways [around the world].”

Gering said further international posturing will likely follow from Beijing.

“I think we’re going to see China get more involved in the world stage,” he said. “Whenever there are opportunities [like the Iran-Saudi agreement] they will jump on it.”

Exporting arms

According to Wang, one key indicator that China is exporting influence and power alongside the rhetoric lies in recent international arms sales data.

Central Command’s General Michael Kurilla told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 16 that China’s ability to move quickly on military sales in the Middle East and South Asia could have dire consequences, pointing to an 80% increase in Chinese military sales to the region over the past decade.

According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the U.S. was the world’s top weapons exporter from 2018 to 2022, accounting for 40% of all arms exports. China ranked fourth, accounting for just over 5% of sales.

And China tripled its sales of weapons to sub-Saharan Africa between 2017 and 2020, with most of the weapons going to five nations that have signed up to Beijing’s Belt and Road infrastructure program.

Meanwhile, Russian entities received around 1,000 assault rifles, 12 tons of body armor, and drone parts from Chinese companies that could be used on the battlefield, since the war in Ukraine began in early 2022, Politico Europe reported last week.

“These goods weren’t handed over to Russia directly at the border, but arrived in Russia after passing through Turkey,” Wang wrote.

“China is of course doing this to evade supervision and sanctions from the international community, but Turkey and [other countries] are willing to cooperate actively, which shows us that China has made deep deployments in a traditional sphere of influence of the United States, actively wooing allies and queering the United States’ pitch,” he said.

“These new developments are very dangerous signals, not just for the United States, but for the whole world.” Wang warned.

“If Xi Jinping has made up his mind, in order to fight for world hegemony, for China’s global expansion, and to solve once and for all the containment from the United States on the Taiwan issue, he will not hesitate to combine the forces of Russia, Iran and North Korea to confront and clash with the United States head-on, or even upgrade the cold war into a hot war,” he said.

“This could pose a serious threat to world peace.”

Growing backlash following Ukraine invasion

For David Plášek, analyst at the European Values Center for Security Policy, there is also a growing backlash against communist and formerly communist countries, which he says stems directly from the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

“Everyone [in Europe] knows that China is standing behind Russia,” Plášek said. “The Ukrainian war has greatly shocked Europeans. People’s feelings are very personal, with Ukrainian refugees pouring into every small town in Eastern European countries.”

He said the current situation has eroded public support for Russia in Eastern Europe.

“After the war, I would say less than 10% remain,” he said of Putin’s supporters. “The political landscape is undergoing enormous changes, which also affects people’s views on China.”

“In Eastern European countries such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Lithuania, people used to talk about China’s investments and job opportunities as important, but after a series of events, they have become aware of the danger of the Chinese Communist Party,” he said.

“China is aggressive in diplomacy, and Xi Jinping even reminds people of figures like Mao Zedong and Stalin,” he said.

americanmilitarynews.com · by Radio Free Asia · May 6, 2023

8. 10 questions answered on the debt limit

10 questions answered on the debt limit

BY ARIS FOLLEY - 05/06/23 5:00 PM ET

The Hill · by Jesse Byrnes · May 6, 2023

As Congress battles over how to keep the nation from defaulting on its debt ahead of a looming deadline, Americans are getting a primer on the country’s borrowing limit.

This week, the Treasury Department warned it could run out of “extraordinary measures” to stave off a federal default as soon as June 1. If the U.S. runs out of cash to pay its bills, experts fear the global economy and financial system could face a catastrophe.

Here’s ten questions and answers about the debt limit, what’s at stake and what Washington is doing about it.

What is the debt ceiling?

The debt limit — also referred to as the debt ceiling or the country’s borrowing limit — is a cap on how much money the Treasury can owe to cover the country’s bills.

Raising or suspending the debt limit doesn’t authorize new spending. Doing so simply allows the government to keep borrowing money to pay expenses that were already approved by Congress and the White House.

How high is the debt ceiling?

The debt ceiling was last raised to roughly $31.4 trillion in late 2021 after a tumultuous showdown between the White House and Senate Republicans.

The national debt hit that threshold in January, prompting the Treasury to take emergency measures to buy time for congressional action. Those measures involve suspending investments of certain funds that count against the debt limit, the department explained at the time.

House Republicans introduced a bill — the Limit, Save, Grow Act of 2023 — last month that would raise the debt limit by $1.5 trillion or through March 2024, whichever occurs first. But they attache a host of partisan spending proposals to the plan that most Democrats will not support.

What happens if the U.S. defaults on its debt?

Experts and lawmakers have warned of disastrous effects to the economy if the federal government defaults.

While experts expect the nation could see a recession sometime later this year, they warn a federal default would likely speed up that timeline, raising the threat of a drastic slowdown.

“It would affect lending and borrowing and financial markets,” New York University economics professor Mark Gertler told The Hill, adding that the combination of less borrowing and less spending would trigger recession.

The nation would also likely see higher interest rates on its debt in the event of a default, as the U.S. would be seen as a less trustworthy borrower. Higher borrowing would not slow the economy and make it difficult for the U.S. to power through a potential recession

U.S. Treasury bonds are currently regarded as among the world’s safest assets, affording the government a reputation as a reliable borrower on the global stage. That standing allows the government to borrow more money to fulfill its financial obligations.

Why does the U.S. have a debt ceiling?

The debt ceiling was created through the Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917, which gave the Treasury Department the authority to issue bonds and borrow money to fund spending approved by Congress and the president, according to a 2015 report from the CRS.

Before the Second Liberty Bond Act, the Treasury Department could only borrow money and issue bonds according to specific instructions from Congress. As the size of the U.S. economy and federal budget exploded during World War I, lawmakers were unable to keep up with the volume and complexity of federal spending.

To keep the the nation’s finances in check, the Second Liberty Bond Act imposed a cap on how much debt the Treasury could take on to fund spending, thus creating the debt limit.

In subsequent years, changes were made to allow the Treasury “more flexibility in debt management and to allow modernization of federal financing,” CRS noted.

How many times has the debt ceiling been raised?

Lawmakers have acted to “permanently raise, temporarily extend, or revise the definition of the debt limit” on 78 different occasions in the past 63 years, the Treasury Department says on its website.

Forty-nine of those instances occurred under Republican administrations, and 29 happened under Democratic administrations.

Has the U.S. ever defaulted on its debt?

A deliberate default by Congress would be unprecedented in recent history, experts say.

There is debate around whether the nation technically experienced a brief default in 1979, after the federal government missed some payments to investors. The incident was chalked up to technical issues at the time, but not without some added costs, research in the years that followed showed.

“Because of severe technical difficulties, the U.S. government was unable to repay investors in Treasury bills (T-bills) in late April through early May, 1979. This incident led to a 60 basis point increase in T-bill rates at the initial occurrence of the default,” finance professors Terry L. Zivney and Richard D. Marcus wrote in their 1989 piece, “The Day the United States Defaulted on Treasury Bills.”

“The default apparently warned investors that Treasury issues were not completely riskless,” they also wrote.

What happens to Social Security payments and other benefits if the US defaults?

Experts warn anyone relying on a check from the government could be a bind if the nation defaults.

In a recent piece, Brookings Institution senior fellows Wendy Edelberg and Louise Sheiner said Social Security beneficiaries, agencies and contractors could see their payments delayed if the U.S. runs out of cash.

While federal agencies would still possess “legal authority, provided by Congress, to obligate funds,” they warn federal workers could also have to worry about delayed paychecks.

The Treasury would still be obligated to pay federal workers if they U.S. defaults, but experts say they may be unable to do so until the debt limit is raised.

What happens to my investments if the U.S. defaults?

A federal default would likely cause a meltdown in financial markets as trillions of dollars in U.S. Treasury bonds — a linchpin of the global financial system — plummet in value.

Edelberg told The Hill in an interview that the stock market could go into a free-fall if the U.S. defaults., with firms “laying off workers en masse because now they are worried about what the economy is going to look like over the next few years.”

“Even the brinkmanship we saw in 2011 imposed costs on the economy. During that crisis, consumer confidence and the stock market plummeted. It also harmed the international reputation of the US,” said John Buhl, a researcher at the Urban Institute, said.

“A repeat of that, let alone an actual default, would make the Fed’s attempt at a ‘soft landing’ a lot more difficult,” Buhl said.

What is Washington doing to address the debt limit?

Republicans are lining up behind the House GOP bill, which they have called a good starting place in bipartisan debt limit talks. But Democrats, who oppose tying any spending cuts to raising the debt limit, have come out in strong opposition against the plan.

House Republicans have proposed capping government spending at fiscal 2022 levels and limiting spending growth to 1 percent every year for the next decade.

Other proposals featured in the bill would impose tougher work requirements for programs like Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, put an end to popular student loan actions implemented under the Biden administration, and target parts of a signature economic bill passed by Democrats last year without GOP support.

Democrats have instead pushed for raising the debt limit in a “clean” bill without conditions after Republicans approved three debt limit increases under former President Trump without reducing the debt.

But Republicans have drawn red lines against raising the limit without fiscal reforms.

Members expect more information about next steps following Biden’s scheduled meeting with Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) and other congressional leaders on May 9.

How much higher will the debt limit rise?

The national debt subject to the borrowing limit is on track to potentially reach $52 trillion in 2033, according to a February report from Congressional Budget Office.

McConnell warns he won’t back debt-ceiling increase without ‘substantive’ reforms Five things we learned about the economy this week

The CBO also projected the federal budget deficit would reach $1.4 trillion in fiscal 2023 and warned that future annual deficits would average $2 trillion over roughly the next decade.

Republicans and Democrats have offered ideas on how to address the nation’s deficits, but both sides have been far apart in their approaches.

Republicans have pushed for defense spending increases with sharp reductions in nondefense spending to tackle future deficits. Democrats have instead pressed for tax hikes on the wealthy to bring in more revenue to go toward deficit reduction and help cover boosts to nondefense spending.

The Hill · by Jesse Byrnes · May 6, 2023

9. US Marines abdicating a rescue role to China

Excerpts:

Now back to General Berger’s mea culpa.

When a Marine Corps second lieutenant screws up, the only answer is, “No excuse, sir.”

He’ll be lucky if he still has a career.

When a 19-year-old lance corporal driving a two-ton truck to a training area turns it over and Marines are injured, he’ll likely be at a court martial and facing jail time.

And when the Marine Corps’ top officer fails at his so-called “Title 10” duties to have the corps ready to respond?

Most marines know the answer to that.

US Marines abdicating a rescue role to China

US Marine failures in Turkey and Sudan open the way for China to subsume global rescue role – and all the influence and prestige that comes with it

asiatimes.com · by Grant Newsham · May 6, 2023

The failure of the US Marine Corps to respond to recent crises is inexcusable. The Marines are supposed to be “most ready when the nation is least ready.”

Marine Corps Commandant General David Berger told a United States congressional committee the other day that he had let down the “combatant commander.” The United States Marines Corps was unable to have Marines in position to assist US citizens during the ongoing fighting in Sudan and to provide assistance after a recent earthquake in Turkey.

But he’s not quite right. He also let down his nation.

The backbone of the Marine Corps’ global rapid response to crises is the three marine expeditionary units/amphibious ready groups (MEU/ARG) that are constantly “floating” worldwide. One of these is typically made up of three amphibious ships (the ARG) and a couple thousand marines (the MEU) with all their hardware, weapons, and aircraft.

They are just as capable of saving lives as they are of taking them.

The MEU that should have been on hand to respond to Sudan and Turkey was in North Carolina. Thus, it had left the region uncovered.

In the event, the United States flew in a rescue force of Navy SEALs from Djibouti to evacuate the 75 or so Embassy personnel and dependents from Khartoum. That was a success.

As for the other thousands of American citizens in Sudan, the US government’s response to shelter in place or get yourself out was the equivalent of, “See ya, wouldn’t want to be ya.”

Crowds of rescue-seekers swell at Sudan’s main seaport. Photo: screengrab from video / westernslopenow.com

Blame it on the US Navy

The French and the British did better at getting in and assisting. And the Chinese did too. Indeed, Global Times crowed about the Chinese Navy‘s efforts to evacuate over 1300 Chinese from Sudan — and other nations’ citizens as well.

This was a far cry from the days when Americans overseas knew that the Marines would be coming. And the local authorities — or warlords — did as well.

Read the commandant’s statements and it’s the US Navy that’s to blame as it hasn’t provided (or built) enough amphibious ships to transport the marines.

Make no mistake, the “amphib navy” is not the US Navy’s fair-haired child. Spending money on amphibious ships is only done grudgingly.

But in this case, the navy might argue a degree of confusion about what the Marine Corps wanted. A year or two ago it seemed the commandant and the Marines just wanted 30 new light amphibious warships.

The idea was these ships would be used to shuttle marines and supplies to and from their island hideouts in the Western Pacific. There, they would watch for Chinese ships in the event of war.

“Force Design 2030” — the Commandant’s plan to remake the Marine Corps — was the primary focus.

General Berger’s judgment called into question

And, anyway, amphibious assault wasn’t something Marines would be doing anymore. It was old-school. And probably not even possible, given today’s persistent surveillance from satellites and drones. Not to mention long-range weaponry.

One knowledgeable observer said it makes sense if you believe in:

General Berger’s strategic vision, [which] is to get out of the business of forcible amphibious landings. “That is sooo WWI …. The PLA have missiles you know…. We now have cyber … did well in defense of Wake Island…. We are NOT another US Army.. America doesn’t need ANOTHER air force in addition to USAF and Naval Air ー too expensive, you know.

Now the commandant is complaining that he hasn’t got enough full-sized “amphibs” to do operations like Turkey and Sudan. No kidding.

General David Berger. Image: Screengrab / YouTube

A retired insider’s perspective

One retired Marine put it thusly:

General Berger’s testimony for 30 of those light amphibious warships at US$300 million per copy — which were to flit among the islands but withdraw from the [area of operations] in the event of armed conflict — really shook confidence in his professional military judgment.

In the waning days of his office, for him to now claim, “What I meant to say was I really really need those full-up 31 amphib big decks” just doesn’t resonate.

Meanwhile, Beijing gets it

It almost seems as if the commandant and his advisors had forgotten about the things that a military service has to do in peacetime. You need to be able to do things that you would not or could not do in wartime — but that are essential.

Non-combatant evacuation operations — think Sudan — are a main one. And so are humanitarian assistance and disaster relief — think Turkey. To do these, the MEU/ARG, and enough of them afloat, are a prerequisite. This requires amphibious ships.

The US Navy hasn’t got enough of them, which means the Marines don’t either. And thus the MEU (the marine part of the amphibious task force) was sitting in North Carolina when the nation needed it in the Mediterranean and East Africa.

It’s humiliating.

The Chinese have their own version of MEU/ARGs ready to go and could put together three of them if they wanted. Before long, they will. And the Chinese Navy and Marines will be providing global coverage — along with the prestige and political influence that comes with it. Beijing gets it.

Get priorities straight

The Marine Corps leadership is going to have to do some clear thinking. That is something already being done farther down the ranks.

And the US Navy needs to clear its head, too. Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro recently said that climate change and diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) are the Navy’s top priorities — on a par with warfighting.

Maybe to him. But not to Americans stuck in some place with hopped-up locals with guns and knives running around. Or to Americans caught up in a natural disaster. They just want the Marines to show up.

Settling up

Now back to General Berger’s mea culpa.

When a Marine Corps second lieutenant screws up, the only answer is, “No excuse, sir.”

He’ll be lucky if he still has a career.

When a 19-year-old lance corporal driving a two-ton truck to a training area turns it over and Marines are injured, he’ll likely be at a court martial and facing jail time.

And when the Marine Corps’ top officer fails at his so-called “Title 10” duties to have the corps ready to respond?

Most marines know the answer to that.

Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine Corps officer and former US diplomat. He is the author of the book When China Attacks: A Warning To America. This article was first published by JAPAN Forward and is republished with permission.

asiatimes.com · by Grant Newsham · May 6, 2023

10. Iran’s New Friends: Russia and China

Iran’s New Friends: Russia and China

Having viewed both powers warily for years, the Islamic Republic sees its best prospects for survival as the junior partner in an anti-Western alliance

By David S. CloudFollow

May 5, 2023 11:05 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/irans-new-friends-russia-and-china-4b2f1f00

Today Iran is in the midst of a far-reaching geopolitical realignment, in defiance of the wishes expressed by Mr. Khomeini more than four decades ago.

Iran is forging closer ties with Russia and China, hoping to ease its economic woes and build a powerful new axis of revisionist powers capable of countering the U.S.-led West. A dramatic sign of this shift came in March when Beijing brokered an agreement to restore diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. That followed Iran’s surprising decision last year to sell armed suicide drones to Moscow to aid its war against Ukraine.

It’s a strategy that Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi has been pitching to Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping since last year, advising joint resistance to the threat that all three say they face: military encirclement and economic strangulation by the U.S. and its allies.

“Resistance will turn the threat into an opportunity for progress, while backing off in face of the threat will only result in failure,” Mr. Raisi said in January in the first state visit to Beijing by an Iranian leader in two decades.

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, who has been seeking an alliance with Russia and China since last year , hosts Vladimir Putin in Tehran, July 19, 2022. PHOTO: SPUTNIK/SERGEI SAVOSTYANOV/REUTERS

Iran’s overtures to Russia and China could well dictate the stability of its regime for years to come. Tehran’s 2015 deal with world powers to limit its nuclear program had eased longstanding sanctions, but the Trump administration withdrew from the agreement in 2018. Last fall, the regime unleashed a brutal crackdown on a nationwide protest movement, all but ending any prospect for escaping Western sanctions.

For Iran’s leaders, the picture is now clear: They have watched with alarm as regimes in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen and Syria toppled or nearly fell in recent decades. They fear that Iran could be next, unless it can break out of the isolation imposed by Washington, analysts say.

“It’s a very lofty, ambitious goal, but the Iranian goal is, ‘We can establish a parallel international order,’” said Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar, an expert in Iranian affairs at Texas A&M University. “And they see Russia and China as big partners to establish this international order in the long term so the U.S. can no longer harm them economically and militarily.”

With two permanent members of the U.N. Security Council more firmly in its corner, Iran would have more international cover as it weighs whether to build nuclear weapons, a step that some Iranian officials see as the best guarantee of the regime’s survival.

‘Those three countries together are going to be problematic for many years to come.’

— Mark Milley, chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Red Army invaded and reoccupied northern Iran at the start of World War II, in a coup de main with London aimed at protecting Allied supply lines, securing Iranian oil fields and denying Germany a foothold. Russian troops departed in 1946, but Moscow’s influence in Tehran remained a constant preoccupation for Reza Shah’s son and for Washington throughout the Cold War.

Russia and Iran have long been rivals more than partners in a centuries-old contest for control of the Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf trade routes. In the 19th century, the Russian czar’s armies inflicted humiliating defeats on the Persian Empire in the Caucuses. A 1907 deal with Britain gave Moscow control over northern Iran until Mohammad Reza’s father reunified the country and crowned himself Reza Shah.

China’s Cold War ties with Tehran were minimal until then-Communist Party Chairman Hua Guofeng visited in 1978, one of the last foreign officials to meet with the Shah before his regime’s collapse, a move that deepened Mr. Khomeini’s suspicions. Though official relations have since flourished, Beijing long seemed ambivalent about linking closely with Iran because of its own deep trade ties with the U.S. and reliance on oil imports from Tehran’s Middle East adversaries.

Now China and Russia are drawing closer to Tehran because of shared hostility for the U.S. and short-term pragmatism, said Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, a Washington think tank. “They have a commonality in not wanting to see the United States’ unipolarity be the defining characteristic of the world order,” he said.

China, Iran’s biggest oil customer, has increased its purchases in the past year, helping to support the Iranian economy amid Western sanctions. A tanker carrying Iranian crude oil docks at Zhousan in eastern China in 2018. PHOTO: YAO FENG/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Washington is taking notice.

“I wouldn’t call it a true full alliance in the real meaning of that word, but we are seeing them moving closer together, and that’s troublesome,” Gen.Mark Milley, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Congress last month about Iran, Russia and China. “Those three countries together are going to be problematic for many years to come.”

The notion that Iran should find allies and economic partners outside the West first arose under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a conservative who took office in 2005 seeking to differentiate his policies from his pro-Western predecessor, Mohammad Khatami. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which had emerged as an increasingly powerful voice within the Iranian leadership, saw Russia as a potential supplier of advanced arms and China as a source of technology.

But when Iran’s hard-liners began pursuing this so-called “Look East” strategy, almost no one took it seriously, including China and Russia. Within Iran, some conservative clerics saw it as a betrayal of a core tenet of the 1979 revolution.

Aligning more closely with China and Russia was also opposed by Iran’s moderates and members of its wealthy elite, who have long seen themselves as economically and culturally tied more closely to the U.S. and Western Europe. Their hopes seemed to pay off in 2015 when the Obama administration and Tehran reached a deal to limit Iran’s nuclear program in return for easing sanctions.

When the Trump administration exited the deal and imposed even stricter sanctions, Mr. Khomeini’s successor as Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, began publicly endorsing closer relations with Moscow and Beijing. “We should look East, not West,” Mr. Khamenei told a group of academics in 2018.

“The Iranians have concluded, rightly or wrongly, that the United States simply never will accept Iran,” said Mr. Parsi. “There’s been a convergence around the view that making it work with the West is not an option.”

The outbreak of the Ukraine war last February provided Tehran with its best opportunity for the IRGC to put Mr. Khamenei’s directive into practice. Locked in a grinding war against an increasingly well-armed foe, Russian President Vladimir Putin was especially in need of friends.

Tehran’s decision to provide drones to Russia was the first time it had intervened in a war on behalf of a predominantly non-Islamic country since the 1979 revolution, analysts said. It is also planning to construct a factory in Russia for producing the unmanned aircraft and is said to be considering sales of ballistic missiles.

An Iranian-made drone that Tehran provided to Russia approaches for an attack in Kyiv, Ukraine, Oct. 17, 2022. PHOTO: YASUYOSHI CHIBA/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

In return, Iran has asked for jet fighters and other advanced weapons from Moscow and is seeking to expand trade and investment. Tehran hopes that Moscow can help its efforts to modernize its own conventional armed forces, heightening the risks for Israel or the U.S. if they decide to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities.

For Iran, “everything that helps Putin continue this war is good, and every partnership that keeps the war machine going is preferential,” said Alexander Gabuev, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Moscow offers “advanced arms that Iran probably can’t get anywhere else.”

Iran’s conservative clerics once saw little difference between the atheistic Soviet Union and the decadent West. But since the Cold War, Moscow and Tehran have forged a relationship of convenience, starting in 1991 when cash-strapped Russia agreed to build Iran’s nuclear reactor at Bushehr. The relationship has been fitful and wary, with trade and even military ties progressing slowly. But it has gained momentum over the last decade as Russia and Iran have cooperated in providing military aid to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in his country’s 12-year long civil war.

Mr. Putin’s embrace of religiosity, his tolerance of Islam and his generally conservative values have smoothed his dealings with Tehran. He has aggressively wooed Mr. Khamenei, who visited Moscow for the first time in a decade in 2015, and the two have met repeatedly since. They have bonded over their mutual hostility to what they describe as U.S. hegemony.

Bolstering ties with Beijing is proving more difficult than with Moscow, but that goal is more critical for Tehran, analysts say.

“While Russia is challenging the United States and some norms in the international order in its war of territorial aggression, China has the capability to directly attempt to alter the rules-based global order in every realm and across multiple regions,” the U.S. intelligence community concluded in its 2023 Threat Assessment, an annual report released in February.

China is Iran’s biggest oil customer and a key market preventing its heavily sanctioned economy from collapsing. China imported a record 1.2 million barrels a day of Iranian oil in December, up 130% from a year earlier, according to commodity-data firm Vortexa. Those purchases are often at a heavy discount from international prices.

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (right) and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi sign a 25-year cooperation pact between their countries in Tehran, Mar. 27, 2021. PHOTO: AFP/GETTY IMAGES

Beijing signed a 25-year economic and security cooperation agreement with Tehran in 2021 to invest in areas such as nuclear energy, ports, railroads, military technology and oil and gas development. Beijing also provides sophisticated technologies that Iran uses to tighten control over its restive population.

After years of shunning the Middle East’s messy disputes, Beijing is playing a more active diplomatic role in the region. It shares with Tehran a desire to counter U.S. power but fears that aligning too closely with the Islamic Republic could jeopardize its broader relations in the Persian Gulf, analysts say. Beijing is Saudi Arabia’s top trading partner and the biggest buyer of its oil, a trend that is only expected to accelerate. Riyadh has started importing sensitive missile technology from the Chinese military.

With leverage over both Riyadh and Tehran, China was able to play a mediating role in forging last month’s agreement between the two Middle East rivals to restore diplomatic relation after seven years of estrangement—a feat that eased Iran’s isolation and challenged Washington’s position as the region’s pre-eminent power.

“Rather than China coming in and tilting toward Iran because Iran is opposed to the U.S., instead you see China continuing to play a neutral role and playing footsie with the Saudis at the expense of the Americans,” said Mr. Parsi.

For all the indications of deepening ties, the limits on Iran’s collaboration with Russia and Moscow remain substantial. Direct investment by Russian and Chinese companies in Iran remains minimal, analysts say. Both countries are still fearful that tying their economies too closely to Iran will make them a target of U.S. sanctions on Iran.

“The same dynamics that have really thwarted Russia-Iran economic cooperation and China-Iran cooperation since basically 2012 are still there. And many of them are arguably worse,” said Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, chief executive officer of the Bourse and Bazaar Foundation, a London-based think tank that studies the Iranian economy.

Though driven together by mutual resentment at what they describe as U.S. hegemony, their alignment has few trappings of a formal alliance. Tehran is in the final stages of joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a political and security bloc dominated by China and Russia. But their differing and at times conflicting aims will make deeper security cooperation difficult, says Nicole Grajewski, a fellow at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government.

An Iranian Army helicopter joins a joint naval military drill with Russia and China in the Gulf of Oman, in a photo provided by Iran on March 15, 2023. PHOTO: HANDOUT/REUTERS

“China’s interests don’t necessarily align with the Iranians, and the Russians have been kind of forced to turn more strongly to Iran,” she said. “I don’t think we’ll be seeing the appearance of a trilateral defense pact,” said Ms. Grajewski.

For the U.S., Iran’s success in breaking out of its isolation raises new concerns. Tehran’s outreach to China has provided an economic lifeline that lessened the urgency to conclude a nuclear agreement with the West that would lift sanctions, says Henry Rome, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “This clearly undermined U.S. interests,” he said. At the same time, Russia’s promise to sell advanced fighters to Tehran this year could make it a much more substantial military threat to the U.S. and its allies in the Middle East.

Iran’s burgeoning ties with Moscow and Beijing won’t turn it into a colossus capable of driving the U.S. from the region or destroying Israel, as it has long vowed to do. But the new alliances may extend indefinitely the life of a regime that only months ago seemed to be running out of options.

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the May 6, 2023, print edition as 'Iran’s New Friends Iran Looks For Anti-U.S. Allies'.

​11. Vietnam can’t trust China or US in South China Sea

Excerpts:

Vietnam has also conducted several low-key joint exercises with Japan. These enhance interoperability between navies and coast guards on a range of issues, such as unplanned encounters, antipiracy, illegal fishing and disaster relief.

Vietnam’s maritime cooperation with India and Japan has grown significantly in the face of challenges from China, while engagement with the United States has been more selective.

Although recent US efforts to re-engage Hanoi signal that US-Vietnam maritime cooperation will not stall forever, fear of antagonizing China and a lack of trust will continue to limit cooperation.

India and Japan — as capable and willing partners — provide a solution for Hanoi to keep a safe distance from Washington, while still securing external support to build up its maritime capacity.

Vietnam can’t trust China or US in South China Sea

Vietnam has a China problem in the contested waters but enduring lack of trust in the US has limited Hanoi’s strategic hedging

asiatimes.com · by Minh Phuong Vu · May 6, 2023

In March 2023, China and ASEAN resumed negotiations on the South China Sea (SCS) Code of Conduct, which aims to reduce the risk of conflict in the disputed maritime zone. But such progress has not calmed the situation.

In February 2023, the Chinese Coast Guard harassed a Filipino Coast Guard crew with a “military-grade” laser, sparking an intense response from Manila.

Vietnam has been comparatively quieter, but silence does not mean that all is well. On 25 March 2023, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel sailed near oil and gas wells belonging to Vietnam’s Vanguard Bank, resulting in a dangerous encounter between Chinese and Vietnamese patrol boats.

Given Beijing’s ongoing efforts to assert greater control in the SCS, states like Vietnam and the Philippines are seeking greater support from external partners to help resist China’s grey zone activities. In March 2023, the Philippines joined a three-way security framework with Japan and the United States to counter China’s growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific.

This raises questions about the direction of Vietnam’s maritime cooperation with its key partners as Vietnam adheres to a non-alliance principle, which limits its involvement in formal and informal military coalitions. But Vietnam can still develop security relations that contribute to its defense capability.

Hanoi recognizes the importance of fostering maritime cooperation with capable partners like the United States, India and Japan to deter Chinese escalation in the SCS. But not all these relationships have equal growth prospects and Hanoi may prefer advancing some ties over others.

The 2014 Chinese oil rig crisis in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zones pushed Vietnam to strengthen its cooperation with Washington, who subsequently removed its ban on non-lethal weapon sales to Vietnam. These security ties have since grown, with Washington transferring two refurbished US Coast Guard Hamilton-class cutters to Vietnam.

An oil rig (C) which China calls Haiyang Shiyou 981, and Vietnam refers to as Hai Duong 981, is seen in the South China Sea, off the shore of Vietnam in this May 14, 2014 file photo. Photo: Agencies / File Photo

In 2018, Vietnam participated in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) for the first time and welcomed the first port visit by a US aircraft carrier in over 40 years. Maritime security has also become a key feature of their annual US–Vietnam Political, Security and Defense Dialogue.

But other considerations have dampened expectations of greater maritime cooperation.

China-US competition is intensifying and may manifest in a conflict over Taiwan. Conscious of its geographical proximity to and economic reliance on Beijing, Vietnamese leaders are cautiously navigating their relationship with Washington.

In 2022, Vietnam did not participate in RIMPAC and canceled two port calls by US aircraft carriers, reportedly due to Vietnam’s “concerns about a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan.”

Vietnam’s lack of political trust in the United States could further limit cooperation. Washington’s continuing promotion of democracy in its Indo-Pacific strategy could irritate Hanoi. Its distrust has deepened since the Trump administration withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and accused Vietnam of currency manipulation.

Vietnam has avoided major US weapon purchases and US aircraft carriers have not been allowed to dock near Vietnam’s main naval base at Cam Ranh Bay.

Compared to its hesitancy over maritime cooperation with the United States, Hanoi appears more comfortable with India and Japan. Like the US, India and Japan are concerned about China’s activities in the SCS but do not seek to unduly antagonize Beijing.

Maritime cooperation with Tokyo and New Delhi allows Vietnam to keep enough distance from the United States to avoid upsetting Beijing while still maintaining its maritime security.

A higher level of trust also makes India and Japan attractive partners for Vietnam. A shared principle of non-alignment provides a solid foundation for cooperation with India, while Japan’s credibility is unmatched due to its role in facilitating Vietnam’s economic modernization.

Maritime cooperation with India and Japan has strengthened significantly over the past decade. In 2014, New Delhi provided US$100 million credit to help Vietnam build 12 high-speed patrol boats that were delivered in 2022. In 2015, Tokyo transferred six used vessels to the Vietnam Fisheries Resources Surveillance force.

In 2016, India again offered Vietnam $500 million credit for a larger-scale defense procurement, which will be finalized soon. In 2020, Japan provided funding for six Aso-class patrol boats and a satellite-based surveillance system, which would enhance Vietnam’s domain awareness and law enforcement capability. Additional Japanese defense equipment and technology exports to Vietnam are expected following a 2021 agreement.

Maritime cooperation with India and Japan also includes dialogues, naval exercises, ship visits and joint training programs. Since 2018, Vietnam and India have carried out bilateral maritime exercises in the SCS and Indian warships have regularly visited Vietnam’s ports.

Vietnamese Defense Minister Phan Van Giang, left, and Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi review honor guards in Hanoi, Vietnam September 12, 2021. Photo: Nguyen Trong Duc / VNA

Vietnam has also conducted several low-key joint exercises with Japan. These enhance interoperability between navies and coast guards on a range of issues, such as unplanned encounters, antipiracy, illegal fishing and disaster relief.

Vietnam’s maritime cooperation with India and Japan has grown significantly in the face of challenges from China, while engagement with the United States has been more selective.

Although recent US efforts to re-engage Hanoi signal that US-Vietnam maritime cooperation will not stall forever, fear of antagonizing China and a lack of trust will continue to limit cooperation.

India and Japan — as capable and willing partners — provide a solution for Hanoi to keep a safe distance from Washington, while still securing external support to build up its maritime capacity.

Minh Phuong Vu is PhD candidate at ANU Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs researching the South China Sea.

This article is part of the ‘Blue Security’ project led by La Trobe Asia, University of Western Australia Defence and Security Institute, Griffith Asia Institute, UNSW Canberra and the Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy and Defence Dialogue (AP4D).

Views expressed are solely of its author/s and not representative of the Maritime Exchange, the Australian Government, or any collaboration partner country government.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

asiatimes.com · by Minh Phuong Vu · May 6, 2023

12. ‘A deep friendship’: The Philippines, the US, and the rules-based international order

Excerpts:

A Stratbase-commissioned Pulse Asia survey, conducted in late 2022, revealed that eight in 10 Filipinos believe that the Marcos administration must strengthen our military capability to effectively address the issues in the West Philippine Sea, and conduct joint maritime patrols and military exercises with allied countries. The survey also showed that the United States continues to enjoy the trust of most Filipinos — 84% — as we defend our sovereignty. The results have been consistent since we first tracked this in 2016. The US is followed by Japan and Australia with 52% and 25%, respectively.

This is how our people feel about China’s blatant disrespect for our sovereign rights that our leaders must heed. We look upon our leaders to steer the nation as we face the complex and multi-polar challenges of the times, not only as a nation but as part of the Indo-Pacific region and as part of the community of law-abiding, peace-loving, rights-respecting nations. Building our defense capabilities and strengthening our ties with like-minded states like the US are key strategies toward this end.

If our beloved chairman, former Ambassador and Secretary Albert del Rosario, were still with us, he would have eagerly listened and passionately shared his thoughts. ADR, our friend, mentor, and inspiration, demonstrated unwavering commitment to the cause of protecting our sovereignty and building linkages with our allies. Indeed, when he passed away last month, he left a void in each of our hearts. But he has motivated us to be relentless in fighting for peace and security in a rules-based international order.

We are happy to continue his legacy and live up to that challenge.

‘A deep friendship’: The Philippines, the US, and the rules-based international order - BusinessWorld Online

bworldonline.com · by Neil · May 2, 2023

PHILIPPINESTAR/ WALTER BOLLOZOS

This week’s meeting between President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. and United States President Joseph Biden at the White House comes at a critical time.

The meeting took place just a few days after the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) reported another instance of bullying from China. On April 28, the PCG released a statement saying there were over 100 Chinese vessels in the West Philippine Sea. These include Chinese maritime militia vessels, a People’s Liberation Army Navy corvette, and two China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels.

The PCG also said two of its vessels — the BRP Malapascua and BRP Malabrigo — were involved in a “confrontation” with CCG vessels near Pag-asa Island and Ayungin Shoal where one of them engaged in “dangerous maneuvers” to block the PCG patrol.

Such actions and rhetoric from the Chinese highlight the importance of this week’s bilateral meeting between the Philippine and US presidents.

“The US remains ironclad in our commitment to the defense of the Philippines, including the South China Sea,” said President Biden. “We’re going to continue to support the Philippines’ military modernization goals.”

And it’s not only a partnership, Biden added. “We share a deep friendship, one that has been enriched by millions of Filipino Americans in the communities all across the United States of America.”

The US president recalled Marcos’ statement during their meeting in New York last year, when the latter said the relationship between the two countries has to continue to evolve as we face the challenges of this new century.

“Together, we’re tackling climate change, we’re accelerating our countries’ transition to clean energy, we’re standing up for our shared democratic values and workers’ rights, and the rule of law,” Biden said.

Biden also announced that the US is sending a first-of-its-kind presidential trade and investment mission to the Philippines. The economic cooperation between the two countries, he said, is mutually beneficial and will continue to deepen.

“I can’t think of any better partner to have than you.”

*****

The Marcos-Biden meeting and the latest encounter with the CCG serve as serious context for the last town hall discussion organized by Stratbase ADR Institute together with the US Embassy in the Philippines, which tackled the relevant subject of “Modernizing Philippine Defense Capabilities and Elevating Security Partnerships.”

Former Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. Emmanuel Bautista talked about the new Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites, as well as the opportunities and challenges in the Philippine security landscape. General Bautista, who was chief of staff when the EDCA was signed in 2014, said the challenges are: winning the information war, advancing the Philippine narrative, and achieving continuity. He said we should stand on the moral high ground attained with our arbitral victory and build on the enhanced economic component brought about by EDCA.

The general said any dialogue with China should be from the position of a co-equal, not a subservient nation.

Brett Blackshaw, political counselor for the US Embassy in the Philippines, talked about “Enhancing Maritime Security Cooperation within the US-Philippine Alliance.” He said that as we have seen too often, a policy of appeasement does not work. The Philippines needs to display confidence and develop capabilities so it can stand up for its rights. He also emphasized the importance of transparency — shining a light and letting the world know of acts of harassment or pressure coming from another state.

Stratbase ADRI Trustee and Program Convenor Dr. Renato de Castro urged the Marcos administration to formulate a national security strategic policy that addresses the very real Taiwan threat, and to lock our modernization plan with that of our allies.

The former Director for Strategic Plans and Policy of the US Indo-Pacific Command, Major General Joaquin Malavet USMC (Ret), shared his views on “Leveraging Indo-Pacific Cooperation for a Rules-Based International Order.” He pointed out that EDCA would help bring about thriving communities and induce business investments and true public-private partnership around the designated sites.

Dr. Virginia Bacay Watson, Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, believes that we need to rethink the concept of defense modernization to bring it up to speed with new and emerging threats.

*****

A Stratbase-commissioned Pulse Asia survey, conducted in late 2022, revealed that eight in 10 Filipinos believe that the Marcos administration must strengthen our military capability to effectively address the issues in the West Philippine Sea, and conduct joint maritime patrols and military exercises with allied countries. The survey also showed that the United States continues to enjoy the trust of most Filipinos — 84% — as we defend our sovereignty. The results have been consistent since we first tracked this in 2016. The US is followed by Japan and Australia with 52% and 25%, respectively.

This is how our people feel about China’s blatant disrespect for our sovereign rights that our leaders must heed. We look upon our leaders to steer the nation as we face the complex and multi-polar challenges of the times, not only as a nation but as part of the Indo-Pacific region and as part of the community of law-abiding, peace-loving, rights-respecting nations. Building our defense capabilities and strengthening our ties with like-minded states like the US are key strategies toward this end.

If our beloved chairman, former Ambassador and Secretary Albert del Rosario, were still with us, he would have eagerly listened and passionately shared his thoughts. ADR, our friend, mentor, and inspiration, demonstrated unwavering commitment to the cause of protecting our sovereignty and building linkages with our allies. Indeed, when he passed away last month, he left a void in each of our hearts. But he has motivated us to be relentless in fighting for peace and security in a rules-based international order.

We are happy to continue his legacy and live up to that challenge.

Victor Andres “Dindo” C. Manhit is the president of the Stratbase ADR Institute.

bworldonline.com · by Neil · May 2, 2023

13. Hungry military families are bad for America

Excerpts;

Eliminating military family food insecurity will require system changes from the top down that strike at this fundamental issue. Federal and local governments and the military services must institute policy changes such as improving access to childcare, giving families more control in whether and where they move and, perhaps most important of all, removing the Basic Allowance for Housing from SNAP eligibility calculations. That our government disqualifies families from SNAP based on their housing allowance, which is already insufficient to pay for the housing they need, is unconscionable.

Military spouses like Jamie S. should never have to choose between the well-being of her family and her husband’s military service. We can and must act for the sake of our national security, and our brave men and women in service.

Hungry military families are bad for America

BY KATHY ROTH-DOUQUET, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 05/06/23 12:00 PM ET

The Hill · · May 6, 2023

After 14 years and 10 moves, military spouse Jamie S. finds herself unable, in her words, to “put food in our boys’ bellies” because the duty station her husband is assigned to is expensive, and she’s unable to work because child care is too high and jobs aren’t flexible enough to accommodate her husband’s training and deployments.

She’s not alone — 33.8 million Americans are food insecure according to a new report from National Center for Health Statistics, and studies show that statistic includes more than one-quarter of enlisted families. That’s shocking and unacceptable — both because it’s a violation of the implicit contract that we take care of those who sacrifice for us through military service, and because it undermines our ability to field and retain a fighting force, which we all need for our continued freedom and security. It’s a factor in the Army failing to meet its recruiting requirements by nearly 15,000 people in 2022. It’s an even bigger factor because research shows that most recruits come from military families, and military families who are struggling are less likely to recommend service.

Jamie explained to me and my team at Blue Star Families that she and her husband sold their second car, didn’t renew memberships to the zoo or science museum for their four boys, and made other sacrifices just to survive. We believe that we as a nation owe Jamie and her family more than that.

To be sure, there are those who are taking up the fight. Craig Newmark, the founder of craigslist, recently announced a $1 million dollar donation to my organization to address both food insecurity and the underlying issues facing military families. This builds on previous multi-million dollar gifts from Newmark and targets solutions more deeply. These funds will help tremendously but it’s not the end of the battle. We need the government to step up.

Military family food insecurity is different from civilian and even veteran food insecurity. It is caused by challenges inherent in the military lifestyle that require system change to fix. To be clear, much of the military lifestyle is awesome. As the spouse of a Marine who served 30 years, I know firsthand how terrific a lifestyle of service and adventure can be for a family. But I also know it’s not without its challenges.

Multiple moves, not onto installations, but into local communities lead to broken trust networks so families don’t have local relationships and the ability to navigate challenges and solve problems. This exacerbates military families’ inability to field a second income in expensive markets — resulting in housing insecurity and the aforementioned food insecurity.

The time is ripe to transform food labels It’s time to combine the fights for climate change and reproductive justice

Eliminating military family food insecurity will require system changes from the top down that strike at this fundamental issue. Federal and local governments and the military services must institute policy changes such as improving access to childcare, giving families more control in whether and where they move and, perhaps most important of all, removing the Basic Allowance for Housing from SNAP eligibility calculations. That our government disqualifies families from SNAP based on their housing allowance, which is already insufficient to pay for the housing they need, is unconscionable.

Military spouses like Jamie S. should never have to choose between the well-being of her family and her husband’s military service. We can and must act for the sake of our national security, and our brave men and women in service.

Kathy Roth-Douquet is the co-founder of Blue Star Families.

The Hill · · May 6, 2023

​

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com