Quotes of the Day:

“Security underpins prosperity, prosperity creates power and pays for security, and a well-functioning society reduces economic and security risks.”

- Gordon de Brouwer

“We must believe in the power and strength of our words. Our words can change the world.” 

- Malala Yousafzai

“Fear is one of the main sources of superstition, and one of the main sources of cruelty. To conquer fear is the beginning of wisdom.’ -

 - Bertrand Russell

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 15, 2023

2. Small, Hidden and Deadly: Mines Stymie Ukraine’s Counteroffensive

3. The biggest obstacle to Ukraine’s counteroffensive? Minefields.

4. Markets Appear Convinced the Fed Can Pull Off a Soft Landing

5. Britain signs deal to join £12 trillion Indo-Pacific trade bloc

6. Threads app engagement drops off a week after launch

7. Elkins: Believing Putin Weak a Dangerous Misread of Events

8. Information warfare is the new battlefield facing the U.S.

9. Taiwan Not A Country; US Makes Another U-Turn As Tensions Simmer Between Taipei & Beijing

10. Intel leaders, White House argue for keeping digital spy powers

11. Chinese military's three-day show of force increases headache for Taiwan

12. After Suffering Heavy Losses, Ukrainians Paused to Rethink Strategy

13. Russia Pulls Back From Humanitarian Cooperation at U.N.

14. How Disinformation Is Undermining Our Human Rights

15. China’s economic self-destruction

16. Deng and ‘Gee, whiz’: the 1st PRC-based US reporters

17. Unorthodox Brilliance: Unconventional Eastern Military Tactics Throughout History

18. Deterrence by Resilience: The Case of Ukraine - Turkish Policy Quarterly

19. 'Simply Medieval': Russian Soldiers Held In Pits And Cellars For Refusing To Fight In Ukraine

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 15, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2023

Key Takeaways:

• Russian sources reported on July 15 that the Russian military command dismissed 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division Commander Major General Vladimir Seliverstov.
• Seliverstov’s dismissal may be a part of an ongoing purge of insubordinate commanders by the Russian military command and may suggest that the corrosion of the Russian chain of command in Ukraine is accelerating.
• The Russian military leadership is likely attempting to dissuade commanders from emulating recent cases of insubordination by punishing those involved in leaking Popov’s message of complaints.
• Growing insubordination will likely exacerbate existing factional divides within the Russian military and the wider Russian security sphere.
• Factions within the Russian security forces and the Kremlin appear to be fighting for control over the Russian insider information space.
• Polyakov’s arrest suggests that different factions within the Kremlin and Russian security entities are exploiting the Russian information space and secret information to advance their political and financial objectives against the backdrop of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on June 15 and reportedly made limited gains.
• The New York Times (NYT) reported that the Ukrainian military has adjusted its strategy to minimize Ukrainian casualties while continuing to attrit Russian forces, supporting ISW’s previous assessments.
• The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that it developed a plan for Wagner Group personnel to train Belarusian forces as Ukrainian, Russian, and Belarusian sources continue to report that Wagner forces are moving to Belarus.
• Russian authorities likely continue to forcibly integrate Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) dioceses into the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as part of a wider religious persecution campaign in occupied Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations and made limited territorial gains near Svatove.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly made limited territorial gains on Bakhmut’s southern flank, while Russian sources claimed that Russian forces made limited advances on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks.
• Russian forces continued limited offensive operations on the Donetsk City-Avdiivka line but did not make any territorial gains.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border and reportedly made limited gains.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations and reportedly made limited advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the completion of Russia’s spring 2023 conscription cycle on July 15.
• The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that the Kremlin launched a program to recruit young adults in Russia for service in occupation administrations in Ukraine.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 15, 2023

Jul 15, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 15, 2023

Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 15, 2023, 8pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:00pm ET on July 15. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 16 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian sources reported on July 15 that the Russian military command dismissed 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division Commander Major General Vladimir Seliverstov.[1] Russian sources stated that the reason for Seliverstov’s dismissal is currently unknown but speculated that it could be associated with Seliverstov’s reputation for speaking up on behalf of his soldiers.[2] Russian sources claimed that the 106th VDV Division has been operating in the Bakhmut area since January, and ISW has recently observed the 106th VDV Division’s 137th Guards VDV Regiment defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations on Bakhmut’s northern flank.[3] A Russian milblogger has claimed that elements of the 106th VDV Division are also supporting Russian defensive operations south of Bakhmut.[4] Relatives of mobilized personnel serving in the 137th VDV Regiment notably appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin, and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in April about poor conditions and lack of supplies in the unit.[5] Vocal discontent about conditions in areas where Russian forces are defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations may have prompted Seliverstov to appeal to the Russian military command, which may have contributed to his dismissal. ISW has not observed confirmation of Seliverstov’s dismissal, but Russian reporting about the dismissal follows a pattern similar to that of previous claims of command changes that have proven true.[6]

Seliverstov’s dismissal may be a part of an ongoing purge of insubordinate commanders by the Russian military command and may suggest that the corrosion of the Russian chain of command in Ukraine is accelerating. The Russian military command recently dismissed 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) Commander Major General Ivan Popov after he reportedly attempted to bypass Chief of the Russian General Staff and overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov and bring his complaints about the situation in western Zaporizhia Oblast directly to Putin.[7] Popov’s complaints reportedly centered on a lack of rotations for his troops, and in a leaked audio message Popov also complained about heavy losses and a lack of effective counterbattery capabilities.[8] These issues are likely impacting Russian forces throughout the theater in Ukraine, and reports of Seliverstov’s dismissal only four days after reports of Popov’s dismissal suggest that the Russian command may have fired Seliverstov for similar reasons.[9] ISW assessed that Popov’s insubordination is indicative of a pattern of behavior that has developed within the Russian command in Ukraine, in which commanders have challenged the authority of senior commanders and sought to use their responsibility for key sectors of the front to cajole the Kremlin to support them.[10]

Endemic problems within the Russian war effort in Ukraine, exacerbated by poor decisions made by senior political and military leaders, are likely prompting strong-willed commanders to challenge their senior commanders in efforts to preserve their forces and lead combat effective units.[11] The 58th Combined Arms Army‘s (CAA) and the 106th VDV Division’s relatively effective defense against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in their respective areas of the front thus far suggests that they are some of the most combat effective formations committed to the frontline, and Popov and Seliverstov likely contributed to their relative effectiveness by being willing to challenge superiors and the system. Popov’s reported actions clearly crossed the line to insubordination. Seliverstov may have followed Popov’s example or the Russian military leadership may have dismissed Seliverstov out of the fear that he would do so.

Seliverstov’s dismissal suggests that there is a deep concern within the Russian military leadership about the chain of command in Ukraine. Popov’s, Russian VDV Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky’s, and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s challenges to Gerasimov’s and Shoigu’s authority have established a precedent for insubordination that can hollow out support for the Russian military command among senior officers.[12] ”Vostok“ Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky, who leads forces defending against Ukrainian counteroffensives in western Donetsk Oblast, amplified Popov’s complaints about the lack of Russian counterbattery capabilities on July 15, suggesting that the controversy with Popov’s dismissal may be influencing other commanders to more publicly voice their frustrations.[13]  The apparently intensifying pattern of insubordination may prompt the Russian military leadership to replace commanders whom they perceive to be potentially insubordinate with loyal figures, preferring yes-men to competent and strong-willed officers able to maintain the combat capabilities of Russian formations defending in key sectors of the front in Ukraine.

The Russian military leadership is likely attempting to dissuade commanders from emulating recent cases of insubordination by punishing those involved in leaking Popov’s message of complaints. Shoigu is also likely attempting to mitigate the aftermath of Popov’s leaked audio recording within the Russian government and punish Russian State Duma Deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev for the leak. Russian sources speculated that Shoigu is demanding that the Russian State Duma Defense Committee expel Gurulev for leaking Popov’s audio message.[14] A Russian source close to Russian security officials claimed that the United Russia party is preparing a set of punishments that will include censoring Gurulev from discussing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[15] One source claimed that Gurulev’s fate in the State Duma depends on an upcoming meeting between Secretary of the General Council of United Russia Party Andrey Turchak and Shoigu.[16] Turchak previously publicly accused Gurulev of leaking the audio recording to stage a ”political show.”[17] Another source claimed that Gurlev was summoned to meet with Chairman of the Russian State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin on July 17.[18]

Growing insubordination will likely exacerbate existing factional divides within the Russian military and the wider Russian security sphere. A Russian source claimed that Dyumin unsuccessfully attempted to intercede to prevent Seliverstov’s dismissal in a trip to Moscow on July 14.[19] Dyumin may have been advocating for Seliverstov in opposition to Shoigu and Gerasimov or simply because the 106th VDV Division is headquartered in Tula Oblast. In either case Dyumin‘s intervention likely inflamed perceptions within the Russian military that the dismissal was associated with factionalism. Gerasimov and Shoigu may view Dyumin as an anti-MoD establishment figure due to his reported affiliations with Prigozhin, his reported involvement in negotiations that brought Wagner’s rebellion to an end, and widespread rumors following the rebellion that Dyumin would replace Shoigu as defense minister.[20] Shoigu and Gerasimov may also view insubordination within the VDV as the result of factionalism since Teplinsky is now the highest profile anti-Gerasimov officer following Prigozhin’s apparent denouement.[21] Russian sources notably claimed that the 106th VDV Division closely operated alongside Wagner forces in January 2023 as their offensive on Bakhmut intensified, and Gerasimov and his affiliates may view Seliverstov as an officer in a hostile camp due to his relationships with both Wagner and Teplinsky.[22] Russian forces also claimed that Seliverstov routinely opposed the command of former VDV commander and close Gerasimov affiliate Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov during the Russian offensive on Kyiv in the early stages of the full-scale invasion and may have established himself as a noted anti-Gerasimov commander at that time, since Serdyukov was in Gerasimov’s patronage.[23] Teplinsky’s and Prigozhin’s challenges to Gerasimov and Shoigu likely engendered a view within the MoD establishment that acts of insubordination are likely also factional power plays aimed at weakening their support with the Kremlin.[24] Gerasimov and Shoigu may increasingly view opposition to their decisions as evidence of factionalism and may use perceived factional affiliations as grounds for punishing or firing those they view as presenting a threat of insubordination.

Factions within the Russian security forces and the Kremlin appear to be fighting for control over the Russian insider information space. Russian insider Telegram channels routinely speculate on internal Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) politics and dynamics between Russian political factions. Russian authorities arrested on July 14 former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer Colonel Mikhail Polyakov, who reportedly ran several popular insider Telegram channels.[25] A Russian source claimed that Polyakov previously served as the head of the Moscow FSB service for the protection of the constitutional order.[26]  Russian insider sources claimed that Polyakov was in frequent contact with the Russian MoD’s Department of Military Representatives and used his affiliation with the FSB to advance his personal unspecified objectives - possibly using secret information to defame Russian officials.[27] One source claimed that Polyakov was involved in distributing Popov’s leaked audio recording.[28] An insider source also claimed that the recent arrest of Russian Deputy Minister for Digital Development Maxim Parshin for bribery was also related to inter-Kremlin fight for control over the online information space and noted that Presidential Administration officials such as First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Presidential Administration Sergey Kiriyenko also controls a number of Telegram channels.[29] One source sarcastically observed that the FSB has moved from controlling Russia to fighting for control over Telegram, while another noted that Polyakov’s arrest may be the start of a fight for control over insider sources on the Russian internet.[30]

Polyakov’s arrest suggests that different factions within the Kremlin and Russian security entities are exploiting the Russian information space and secret information to advance their political and financial objectives against the backdrop of Russia’s war in Ukraine. If Polyakov’s affiliation with numerous insider Telegram channels is true, then it is evident that Russian officials see the Russian information space as an important source of authority that allows them to promote their interests and discredit their opponents in the eyes of their constituencies. One Russian source, for example, rhetorically asked who would want to discredit the FSB via Polyakov’s arrest, while another milblogger observed that such infighting was not as evident prior to 2022.[31] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny may also have impelled Russian officials to seek to discredit or eliminate opponents who control some of the insider Telegram sources to maintain their standings or positions.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on June 15 and reportedly made limited gains. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces made limited gains south of Bakhmut near Andriivka (10km south of Bakhmut) and crossed the Siverskyi Donetsk Canal in the area.[32] Russian sources also claimed that Ukrainian forces made limited advances in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area southwest of Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast northeast of Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv).[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are ”constantly” moving reinforcements to the Bakhmut area and recently transferred an unspecified BARS (Russian Combat Reserve) unit from the Kreminna area to near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), indicating that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations continue to trigger transfers of Russian forces to the Bakhmut area.[34] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated in an interview with CNN published on July 14 that the counteroffensive is successful but acknowledged that the tempo of Ukrainian advances is slower than expected.[35] Tarnavskyi stated that Ukrainian forces are effectively defeating Russian forces at longer distances, likely referencing Ukraine’s continued interdiction campaigns in eastern and southern Ukraine.[36] Tarnavskyi also reported that Ukrainian forces received cluster munitions that can ”radically change [the battlefield]” and have yet to use them.[37]

The New York Times (NYT) reported that the Ukrainian military has adjusted its strategy to minimize Ukrainian casualties while continuing to attrit Russian forces, supporting ISW’s previous assessments. NYT reported that unnamed US and European officials estimated that Russian forces destroyed up to 20 percent of Ukraine’s Western-provided weaponry in the first two weeks of the counteroffensive.[38] The NYT reported that officials stated that the rate of losses has dropped to 10 percent in the subsequent weeks due to a change in Ukrainian strategy.[39] The NYT reported that the Ukrainian military has changed tactics to focus on wearing down Russian forces with artillery and long-range missiles instead of large-scale assaults, which is consistent with Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s statement on July 14 that increased Ukrainian indirect fire can both pin down Russian forces and minimize Ukrainian casualties.[40] ISW previously assessed on July 4 that Ukrainian forces appear to be focusing on creating an asymmetrical attrition gradient that conserves Ukrainian manpower at the cost of a slower rate of territorial gains, while gradually wearing down Russian manpower and equipment.[41] Ukraine‘s military has likely been refining its counteroffensive strategy for weeks, and the larger effects of those adjustments are only just becoming clear to some observers. Ukraine will likely continue to adjust its strategy and execution throughout the counteroffensive to facilitate continued progress.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that it developed a plan for Wagner Group personnel to train Belarusian forces as Ukrainian, Russian, and Belarusian sources continue to report that Wagner forces are moving to Belarus. The Belarusian MoD announced on July 14 that it developed a roadmap with ”Wagner leadership” for Wagner forces to train Belarusian forces and pledged to provide additional information about the plan.[42] Independent Belarusian monitoring group The Hajun Project reported that an anonymous source observed Belarusian traffic police escorting a convoy consisting of at least 60 vehicles with Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics’ license plates in Belarus on the morning of July 15.[43] The Hajun Project stated that the convoy was likely transferring Wagner personnel from Russia to Belarus and may be en route to a tent camp in Tsel (15km northwest of Aspovichy), Mogilev Oblast.[44] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Belarusian partisans confirmed that 240 Wagner personnel, 40 trucks, and a large number of weapons arrived in Aspovichy and that Wagner forces are staying in Tsel, Mogilev Oblast.[45] Several milbloggers also posted footage and photos claiming to show a convoy of Wagner vehicles en route to Belarus.[46] It is unclear if a single Wagner convoy traveled from Russia to Belarus or if multiple conveys are en route to Belarus at this time.

Russian authorities likely continue to forcibly integrate Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) dioceses into the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as part of a wider religious persecution campaign in occupied Ukraine. Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik announced on July 15 the incorporation of the Luhansk, Alchevsk, Severodonetsk, Starobilsk, and Rovenky UOC dioceses into the ROC.[47] The ROC has already seized the Berdyansk and Prymorsk dioceses in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, and a Russian news aggregator claimed that the Russian Ministry of Justice recently registered the Donetsk City and Horlivka dioceses as part of the ROC.[48] The new round of forced integration of the UOC dioceses in occupied Luhansk Oblast followed a Ukrainian court ruling that the Head of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra Metropolitan Pavel will go to a detention center instead of remaining under house arrest.[49] Russian sources attempted to portray the integration of UOC dioceses into the ROC as a response to claimed Ukrainian religious suppression of a Kremlin-run ROC. The ROC has explicit links to the Kremlin and has provided material and spiritual support to Russia during the war.[50] This explanation makes little sense, however, as the ROC clearly faces no threats from the Ukrainian government in Russian-occupied territory. The Ukrainian government is not engaging in religious suppression, moreover, but rather acting against religious elements it asserts are linked to the Kremlin’s war effort.[51] Russian authorities have conducted systematic religious persecution in occupied Ukraine since the start of the war, however.[52]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian sources reported on July 15 that the Russian military command dismissed 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division Commander Major General Vladimir Seliverstov.
• Seliverstov’s dismissal may be a part of an ongoing purge of insubordinate commanders by the Russian military command and may suggest that the corrosion of the Russian chain of command in Ukraine is accelerating.
• The Russian military leadership is likely attempting to dissuade commanders from emulating recent cases of insubordination by punishing those involved in leaking Popov’s message of complaints.
• Growing insubordination will likely exacerbate existing factional divides within the Russian military and the wider Russian security sphere.
• Factions within the Russian security forces and the Kremlin appear to be fighting for control over the Russian insider information space.
• Polyakov’s arrest suggests that different factions within the Kremlin and Russian security entities are exploiting the Russian information space and secret information to advance their political and financial objectives against the backdrop of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on June 15 and reportedly made limited gains.
• The New York Times (NYT) reported that the Ukrainian military has adjusted its strategy to minimize Ukrainian casualties while continuing to attrit Russian forces, supporting ISW’s previous assessments.
• The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that it developed a plan for Wagner Group personnel to train Belarusian forces as Ukrainian, Russian, and Belarusian sources continue to report that Wagner forces are moving to Belarus.
• Russian authorities likely continue to forcibly integrate Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) dioceses into the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as part of a wider religious persecution campaign in occupied Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations and made limited territorial gains near Svatove.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly made limited territorial gains on Bakhmut’s southern flank, while Russian sources claimed that Russian forces made limited advances on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks.
• Russian forces continued limited offensive operations on the Donetsk City-Avdiivka line but did not make any territorial gains.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border and reportedly made limited gains.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations and reportedly made limited advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the completion of Russia’s spring 2023 conscription cycle on July 15.
• The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that the Kremlin launched a program to recruit young adults in Russia for service in occupation administrations in Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) 

Russian forces conducted offensive operations and made limited territorial gains near Svatove on July 15. Geolocated footage published on July 15 shows that unspecified Russian infantry advanced slightly in Novoselivske (16km northwest of Svatove) and hold entrenched positions along the railroad near the settlement.[53] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations south of Novoselivske.[54] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger reported that Russian forces are also trying to seize a tactical height near Novoselivske and clear Ukrainian forces from the forests south of the settlement.[55] The milblogger claimed that neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces control Novoselivske and that movement in the settlement is difficult due to a lack of shelter and Ukrainian drone activity.[56] The milblogger also claimed that Russian artillery elements of the 21st Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) stopped a Ukrainian attack near Kuzemivka (16km northwest of Svatove).[57] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that Russian forces are most active in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions.[58]

A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Kreminna and did not make any advances in the area on July 15. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group attempted to break through Russian defensive lines towards Dibrova (6km southwest of Kreminna) from the Serebryanske forest area (10km south of Kreminna).[59] The milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the forests west of Kreminna.[60]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kreminna and reportedly made limited territorial gains on July 15. The Ukrainian General Staff and Cherevaty reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations east of Novosadove (17km northwest of Kreminna), west of Dibrova, and east of Vesele (30km south of Kreminna) .[61] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled two Ukrainian attacks near Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna) and Torske (15km west of Kreminna).[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Torske and in the forests near Kreminna.[63] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced towards Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna) but that there is currently no reliable information on the control of terrain around Torske.[64] Another milblogger posted footage claiming to show elements of the Russian 228th Mechanized Infantry Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) along with unspecified elements of a Chechen ”Akhmat” reconnaissance unit assaulting Ukrainian positions near Kreminna.[65]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces reportedly made limited territorial gains on Bakhmut’s southern flank, as positional battles continued elsewhere along the Bakhmut frontline on July 15. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced near Andriivka (10km south of Bakhmut) and crossed the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal in the area.[66] Another Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kurdyumivka (15km southwest of Bakhmut) direction, while the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed that Russian Southern Group of Forces repelled Ukrainian attacks on Kurdyumivka.[67] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to attack Russian positions near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and unsuccessfully attempted to regain positions in the Berkhivka (6km north of Bakhmut) area.[68] The milbloger noted that the situation largely did not change in the Berkhivka and Rozdolivka (16km northeast of Bakhmut) areas, and several Russian milbloggers claimed that intense battles are ongoing in the Klishchiivka area.[69] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty observed that Ukrainian forces maintain the initiative on the Bakhmut frontline.[70]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces made limited advances on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks and continued to respond to Ukrainian counteroffensives by committing elite units to defend Bakhmut’s flanks on July 15. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces successfully counterattacked west and northwest of Klishchiivka and recaptured 500 meters of territory.[71] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully launched assaults southwest of Andriivka and in the Berkhivka area.[72] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Berkhivka, and Ukrainian forces were able to retain their positions.[73] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are constantly sending reinforcements to defend against Ukrainian attacks and have transferred an unspecified BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) unit from the Kreminna area to Klishchiivka.[74] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that elements of the Chechen ”Akhmat” Spetsnaz unit, 364th Special Purpose Brigade, and 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps) are operating in the Klishchiivka area.[75] A Russian milblogger indicated that elements of the 364th Special Purpose Brigade are involved in repelling Ukrainian counteroffensives near Klishchiivka.[76] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also noted that elements of the Russian 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division advanced south of the Berkhivka reservoir on July 13.[77] Russian commitment of numerous VDV and Spetsnaz units north and south of Bakhmut indicates that Ukrainian counteroffensives in the Bakhmut direction are continuing to trigger the deployment of further reinforcements, predominantly from the Luhansk frontline.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations on the Donetsk City-Avdiivka line but did not make any territorial gains on July 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations in the Pervomaiske (11km west of Avdiivka), Marinka (23km southwest of Donetsk City), and Novomykhailivka (29km southwest of Donetsk City) areas.[78] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions near Novokalynove (12km north of Avdiivka) and southwest of Avdiivka, while positional battles continued in Marinka.[79] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks on Novomykhaivlivka, Marinka, and Pervomaiske.[80]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizha Oblast border and reportedly made limited gains on July 15. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces gained a foothold near Hrusheva Gully (just south of Rivnopil).[81] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled two Ukrainian attacks near Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[82] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted attacks northwest of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and near Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[83]  A milblogger claimed on July 14 that Ukrainian forces conducted attacks near Novodonetske (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka), Urozhaine, Pryyutne, and Staromayorske.[84] Footage published on July 15 purportedly shows elements of the ”Bezumtsa” Company of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion (60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, 5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) operating in the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area.[85]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations and reportedly made limited advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 15. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces made limited advances northeast of Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv).[86] Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Administration Head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed that Russian forces repelled two platoon-sized Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups in the Pyatykhatky (25km southwest of Orikhiv) and Stepove (22km southwest of Orikhiv) directions.[87] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 14 that elements of the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) repelled Ukrainian attacks near Pyatykhatky-Zherebyanky (up to 27km southwest of Orikhiv).[88] Footage published on July 15 purportedly shows elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[89]

Ukrainian forces continue their interdiction campaign in southern Ukraine. Geolocated footage published on July 14 shows a Ukrainian strike on naval infantry elements of the Caspian Flotilla moving in a convoy northwest of Tokmak.[90] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike near a railway bridge near Chernihivka in Zaporizhia Oblast.[91]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to operate on east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near the Antonivsky Bridge and did not claim any Russian or Ukrainian advances in the area. Kherson Oblast Occupation Head Vladimir Saldo claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions near the Antonivsky Bridge and that Russian forces repel all Ukrainian attempts to cross the Dnipro River.[92] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled five of six small Ukrainian boats from landing on the east bank of the Dnipro River.[93]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the completion of Russia’s spring 2023 conscription cycle on July 15.[94] The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian Armed Forces conscripted 147,000 people in accordance with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s March 30 decree.[95] ISW assesses that the Kremlin remains unlikely to deploy newly conscripted personnel to participate in hostilities in Ukraine due to concerns about regime stability.[96] ISW has observed reports of conscripts serving in Russian border oblasts, and the Russian military may be relying on conscripts to fulfill border security roles as a result of the commitment of regular Russian forces to fighting in Ukraine.[97]

Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that the Russian military is forcing mobilized personnel operating in Ukraine to sign military service contracts.[98] Malyar reported on July 15 that Russian commanders blackmail their subordinates and threaten personnel with deployments to frontline positions without rotations to impress mobilized personnel to sign contracts for military service.[99] Malyar added that Russian military leadership is forcing mobilized personnel to sign military service contracts to increase recruitment statistics to appeal to the Kremlin.[100]

The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on July 15 that “Storm-Z” detachments (composed of prisoner recruits) are increasingly operating in Russian border areas near Belarus and Ukraine. The Resistance Center reported that sources within the Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) stated that they have observed “Storm-Z" detachments of the 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District) arriving in Spiridonov Buda, Bryansk Oblast (20km from the international Ukrainian-Russian border and 5km away from the Belarusian-Russian border).[101] The deployment of these ”Storm-Z’ detachments is likely meant to secure Russian border areas and do not represent preparations to conduct assaults along the northern axis in Ukraine.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems) 

The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that the Kremlin launched a program to recruit young adults in Russia for service in occupation administrations in Ukraine.[102] The Resistance Center reported that that the Kremlin’s Department for Internal Policy created the “GisStart” program and that the Russian Federal Youth Agency (Rozmolodezh) is overseeing the program, which invites Russians ages 18 to 35 to participate in “youth councils” and provides internships in occupation structures in Ukraine.[103]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

See topline text.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Small, Hidden and Deadly: Mines Stymie Ukraine’s Counteroffensive

With all the hand wringing over DPICM, we should not forget what Russia is doing.

Excerpts:

The fields Ukrainian forces must cross are littered with dozens of types of mines — made of plastic and metal, shaped like tins of chewing tobacco or soda cans, and with colorful names like “the witch” and “the leaf.”

Ukraine’s army is also hindered by a lack of air support and the deep network of defensive structures the Russians have built. But it is the vast array of mines, trip wires, booby traps and improvised explosive devices that has Ukrainian forces bogged down only a few miles from where they started.

“I couldn’t imagine something like this,” said a Ukrainian private named Serhiy, part of a unit that rescued the soldiers wounded by the explosions. “I thought mines would be lain in lines. But whole fields are filled with them, everywhere.”

Mines have long been a staple of Russian warfare, used extensively in Afghanistan and Chechnya and earlier phases of the fighting in Ukraine, stretching back to 2014. But the minefields in southern Ukraine are vast and complex, beyond what had been previously known, soldiers who have entered them say.

Small, Hidden and Deadly: Mines Stymie Ukraine’s Counteroffensive

The New York Times · by Andrew E. Kramer · July 16, 2023

To gain ground, Ukrainian forces have to make their way through a variety and density of Russian land mines they never imagined.

Ukrainian soldiers from the 102nd mine-clearing unit carrying inert antitank mines during training exercises in the Zaporizhzhia region last month.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times

Andrew E. Kramer has been reporting from near the front lines of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south.

July 16, 2023, 12:01 a.m. ET

It was a grisly scene of bloody limbs and crumpled vehicles as a series of Russian mines exploded across a field in southern Ukraine.

One Ukrainian soldier stepped on a mine and tumbled onto the grass in the buffer zone between the two armies. Nearby lay other Ukrainian troops, their legs in tourniquets, waiting for medical evacuation, according to videos posted online and the accounts of several soldiers involved.

Soon, an armored vehicle arrived to rescue them. A medic jumped out to treat the wounded and knelt on ground he deemed safe — only to trigger another mine with his knee.

Five weeks into a counteroffensive that even Ukrainian officials say is off to a halting start, interviews with commanders and soldiers fighting along the front indicate the slow progress comes down to one major problem: land mines.

The fields Ukrainian forces must cross are littered with dozens of types of mines — made of plastic and metal, shaped like tins of chewing tobacco or soda cans, and with colorful names like “the witch” and “the leaf.”

Antitank mines littering the ground at a former Russian position in the village of Novodarivka, which was recently recaptured by Ukraine’s 110th Territorial Defense Brigade and other forces.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times

Ukraine’s army is also hindered by a lack of air support and the deep network of defensive structures the Russians have built. But it is the vast array of mines, trip wires, booby traps and improvised explosive devices that has Ukrainian forces bogged down only a few miles from where they started.

“I couldn’t imagine something like this,” said a Ukrainian private named Serhiy, part of a unit that rescued the soldiers wounded by the explosions. “I thought mines would be lain in lines. But whole fields are filled with them, everywhere.”

Mines have long been a staple of Russian warfare, used extensively in Afghanistan and Chechnya and earlier phases of the fighting in Ukraine, stretching back to 2014. But the minefields in southern Ukraine are vast and complex, beyond what had been previously known, soldiers who have entered them say.

“To clear mines, you should have a lot of motivation and a cool head,” said Maj. Maksym Prysyazhnyuk, a Ukrainian demining expert who slips into the fields at night ahead of infantry advances. “It’s such delicate work, like of a surgeon, but at the same time, explosions are going off all around you” from artillery in the battle.

Demining specialists venture out with metal detectors and long, slender probes attached to poles, to gingerly poke at the ground to try to find buried mines without setting them off. “These are our tools — and an icon in the pocket,” said Major Prysyazhnyuk, referring to Orthodox religious images. He was at a medical stabilization point where soldiers wounded by mines turned up in a steady stream.

Ukrainian soldiers suffering from concussions being treated at a stabilization point where medical personnel tend to troops injured by artillery, gunfire and land mines.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times

The minefields are routinely set with booby traps and so-called anti-handling devices that cause mines to detonate if they are lifted, to thwart demining teams. A common tactic is what Major Prysyazhnyuk called a “trick for idiots” — burying anti-personnel mines in front of a trip wire, to target a soldier who might try to disable the trip wire.

More sophisticated explosives include the so-called jumping mines, which, when stepped on, pop up and spray shrapnel, hitting other soldiers nearby. Russia also uses mines triggered by slender, yellow-colored trip wires that stretch out a dozen or so yards, any of which when disturbed can set off an explosion and a spray of shrapnel.

The demining teams work by clearing a path about two feet wide, allowing the infantry to walk forward. Then, the de-miners work back along the path to expand it by another foot or more, to allow two soldiers to walk shoulder-to-shoulder while carrying a stretcher for soldiers wounded in the fight. Last month, a stretcher bearer carrying a wounded colleague triggered a mine because the path could not be widened quickly enough.

Danger exists even after the paths are cleared. Russian forces often fire rockets that scatter small, hard-to-spot green plastic “leaf” mines, also called butterfly mines, over the cleared area, Major Prysyazhnyuk said.

So-called butterfly mines like this one in Sulyhivka, in eastern Ukraine, spray shrapnel that can be hard to find in the bodies of wounded soldiers.Credit...Mauricio Lima for The New York Times

Volodymyr, who serves as a military medic at the stabilization point, performs amputations on soldiers whose feet or lower legs have been shorn off by mine explosions.

Mines, he said, have surpassed artillery as a leading cause of wounds. Because some mines are plastic, to avoid detection by demining teams, the shrapnel they spray into soldiers can be invisible to doctors in first-aid stations near the front, where medical teams use metal detectors to find and remove fragments, he said.

Like other soldiers interviewed, he spoke on the condition that he be identified by only his first name, for security reasons.

The soldiers are treated and sent to hospitals farther away. Last week, Volodymyr said, he amputated both hands of a demining expert who was wounded while trying to defuse a booby-trapped mine.

The past month has been a harrowing, difficult phase of the war for the Ukrainian army, which is under pressure to advance quickly and demonstrate to Western allies that the policy of arming Ukraine can turn the tide.

In his nightly address on Friday, President Volodymyr Zelensky again defended the pace of the counteroffensive, saying that Russia was throwing “everything they can” at Kyiv’s troops, and that “every thousand meters of advance” deserves gratitude.

In the south, Ukrainian troops are attacking in at least three locations but have not broken through the Russians’ main lines of defense. Mines are not the only difficulty they face. As they advance, Ukrainian soldiers move out of range of some of their air-defense systems and become vulnerable to Russian attack helicopters.

By this week, at its farthest point of advance, south of the village of Velyka Novosilka, the Ukrainian army had pushed a bulge about five miles deep into Russian lines. At the point where the soldiers became stranded in a minefield, south of the town of Orikhiv, Ukraine has advanced about a mile. To reach the Sea of Azov and cut supply lines to Russian-occupied Crimea, an objective in the counteroffensive, Ukraine must advance about 60 miles.

One bright spot as they fight through the minefields, Ukrainian soldiers say, is the protection provided by Western armored vehicles.

Where they have been used, these vehicles have not enabled the Ukrainian military to cross minefields, but they have saved lives with superior armor that protects against the blasts.

The American-made Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, with layered aluminum and steel armor, roll over anti-personnel mines with impunity. They are immobilized by Russian antitank mines, hefty circular devices that are laden with about 15 pounds of TNT, often without causing serious injury to the soldiers inside.

Denys, a military surgeon at another stabilization point near the front, said troops injured by mine explosions while riding in Bradleys fared much better than those in Soviet-legacy armored vehicles, and that the main consequence was a concussion rather than the loss of a limb.

“The Americans made this machine to save the lives of the crew,” said Serhiy, the private on the rescue team, who is now operating in his third Bradley after two earlier vehicles hit antitank mines. The second occurred when he and others were sent to evacuate wounded infantry stranded in a minefield.

A Ukrainian soldier from the 47th Brigade entering the back hatch of a Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. The thick armor protects those inside from mines.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times

The series of explosions was filmed by a Ukrainian drone and the footage posted online by a Ukrainian journalist. The episode was also described to The New York Times by Serhiy and other witnesses.

Driving into the minefield, the Bradley crew could hear over the rumble of the engine the pop of the less powerful anti-personnel mines exploding harmlessly as the vehicle’s tracks ran them over. To avoid antitank mines, they tried to follow tracks left by other vehicles that had driven into the field, but it was difficult.

Once they reached the wounded soldiers, a gunner, Serhiy, and a sergeant, also named Serhiy, focused first on shooting back at Russian machine gun positions in a distant tree line that were firing on the soldiers pinned down in the minefield.

Ukrainian soldiers, both named Serhiy, with a Bradley.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times

The medic, meanwhile, jumped into an artillery crater, apparently assuming the crater was clear of anti-personnel mines. He knelt and set one off, blowing off part of his leg.

The drone footage shows the medic applying a tourniquet to his maimed leg, then crawling back toward the Bradley, where another medic helps pull him aboard, leaving a streak of blood on the ramp.

Inside the Bradley, other medics put on a second tourniquet, Sergeant Serhiy said. Throughout the ordeal, which stretched to three hours, he had to leave the vehicle at times to carry casualties.

“It was scary to step out when you just saw somebody blown up on a mine,” he said.

As they drove out of the field, the Bradley hit an antitank mine and skidded to a stop. The explosion damaged the rear ramp, so the crew opened a hatch on the roof and lifted the wounded men through it, then lowered them to the ground. They then helped them limp toward another Bradley that drove them to safety.

Sergeant Serhiy returned to the site a few days later with an armored tow truck to retrieve the Bradley. As it was being pulled out, the Bradley rolled over another antitank mine, causing more damage.

The vehicle is now in Poland for repairs, Sergeant Serhiy said. He received another Bradley to continue the attempted advances over the minefields.

A soldier from Ukraine’s mine-clearing unit carrying inert anti-tank mines during training exercises in the Zaporizhzhia region.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times

Maria Varenikova contributed reporting from Orikhiv, Ukraine.

Andrew E. Kramer is the Times bureau chief in Kyiv. He was part of a team that won the 2017 Pulitzer Prize in International Reporting for a series on Russia’s covert projection of power. More about Andrew E. Kramer

A version of this article appears in print on , Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: Vast Fields Full Of Mines Hinder Ukraine’s Forces

The New York Times · by Andrew E. Kramer · July 16, 2023

3. The biggest obstacle to Ukraine’s counteroffensive? Minefields.

The biggest obstacle to Ukraine’s counteroffensive? Minefields.

Areas in front of Russian defensive strongholds in the south and east have been densely mined

By Isabelle Khurshudyan and Kamila Hrabchuk

July 15, 2023 at 3:39 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Isabelle Khurshudyan · July 15, 2023

Europe

Areas in front of Russian defensive strongholds in the south and east have been densely mined

ZAPORIZHZHIA REGION, Ukraine — In a painstakingly slow process that has come to define the speed of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, small groups of sappers on the front lines are crawling across minefields — sometimes literally on their stomachs — to detonate Russia’s defenses and clear a path for troops to advance.

The long buildup to the counteroffensive, which began about a month ago across multiple segments of the battlefield in the country’s east and south, gave the Russians time to prepare, soldiers said. Areas between 3 and 10 miles deep in front of the Russians’ main strongholds have been densely mined with antitank and antipersonnel mines and trip wires. These defenses have been successful in stalling the Ukrainian advance, they said.

As a result, Kyiv’s forces have changed strategy, Ukrainian military personnel said. Rather than try to break through with the infantry fighting vehicles and battle tanks that Western allies provided to aid Ukraine in this counteroffensive, units are moving forward, slowly, on foot.

“You can no longer do anything with just a tank with some armor, because the minefield is too deep, and sooner or later, it will stop and then it will be destroyed by concentrated fire,” Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s military chief, said recently in an interview with The Washington Post.

Ukraine’s struggles on minefields have exposed vulnerabilities of the personnel carriers and tanks — especially the newly arrived American Bradley fighting vehicles and German Leopard tanks — that officials had hailed as being key for Ukraine to seize back occupied territory from the Russians. The vehicles have won praise from soldiers — even after they’ve hit mines, most people inside survive with just minor injuries — but they have not been able to breach Russia’s defenses alone. Zaluzhny has said modern fighter jets, such as the U.S.-made F-16, and other systems are needed to better support ground operations.

“We need special equipment, we need special remote mine clearance equipment,” Zaluzhny said, adding that Ukraine is using U.S.-provided M58 Mine Clearing Line Charge (MICLIC) systems but that “they are also being destroyed, yes. There’s nothing wrong with that. It takes a lot of them.”

In an address late Friday, President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged the difficulty of advancing. “We must all understand very clearly — as clearly as possible — that the Russian forces on our southern and eastern lands are investing everything they can to stop our warriors, he said. “And every thousand meters of advance, every success of each of our combat brigades deserves gratitude.”

A senior Ukrainian official, who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive military matters, said Kyiv received less than 15 percent of the quantity of demining and engineering materiel, including MICLICs, that it asked for from Western partners ahead of the counteroffensive. Some of that equipment arrived just last week, the official said.

Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov and Zaluzhny told The Post that they have informed their Western counterparts that they urgently need more mine-clearing systems, such as Bangalore torpedo explosive charges. Ukraine has held back some of the brigades and Western weapons prepared for the counteroffensive as it attempts to penetrate the minefields.

Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “opens up maps to me and says, ‘Look, there’s nothing here, there’s nothing here, there’s nothing here anymore,’” Zaluzhny said. “Minefields are one of the problems that certainly affects the pace of the offensive. This is a problem we see. Could it have been resolved more quickly? It could have been. How could it be solved? At least General Milley knows. The other question is, can he help with that? I don’t know.”

U.S. officials said that they have provided Ukraine with nearly every type of equipment it requested ahead of the counteroffensive. Officials cautioned that it is not always possible to provide the quantities Ukraine asks for, but said that with the MICLIC systems specifically, Washington is working to soon provide more of not only the system, but also the charges it uses to detonate a long row of mines.

The officials added that the U.S. decision to provide Ukraine with controversial cluster munitions will give Kyiv fire superiority for the first time in this conflict, allowing the Ukrainians the proper time and space to use the engineering equipment they already have.

Ukrainian military personnel on the ground also described hesitation to use the larger, more advanced demining equipment. Because, in the Ukrainians’ opinion, there are so few of the mine-clearing systems, they have become an easier target for Russian forces, which have prioritized striking them. The depth and density of the minefields are particular challenges along the southern Zaporizhzhia front line, where the Russians widely expected the Ukrainians to assault and attempt to sever a land corridor across the occupied region that connects the Russian border to Crimea, the Ukrainian peninsula that Moscow illegally annexed in 2014.

The area’s terrain is largely sprawling, open fields with few places for the Ukrainians to camouflage their larger equipment and vehicles. And the Russians chose the high ground for their positions, soldiers said.

A commander — The Post is identifying him by his call sign, Oskar, in accordance with Ukrainian military protocol — with an engineering and sapper unit in Ukraine’s 47th Mechanized Brigade said his group received a German-provided Wisent mine-clearance tank that it used ahead of the counteroffensive’s start in the Zaporizhzhia region. The tank and similar Soviet models successfully cleared some pathways for the brigade’s units to make their first push.

“But now their use is already ineffective, because the enemy expects the appearance of such equipment, which is massive, which is noisy, which is easy to see and, accordingly, to strike,” Oskar said.

Another officer in the 47th brigade said that on the counteroffensive’s first day, some of the brigade’s units, riding in Bradley fighting vehicles and Leopard battle tanks, mistakenly took a wrong route, into a minefield, instead of one that had been prepared by sappers in advance.

Obstacle-clearing vehicles were at the front of the columns, but the group was forced to stop when vehicles in the rear unexpectedly ran into mines and got trapped. The chaos created a cluster of vehicles in one spot. The Russians then started to attack the Ukrainians from helicopters overhead and with antitank missiles, badly damaging or destroying several of the personnel carriers and tanks. Some units that left their equipment behind still managed to seize Russian trench positions, according to the Ukrainian officer.

“When the enemy sees even a Leopard tank in front of him and special engineering equipment, he will destroy the special equipment first,” he said. “Because without it, all the others will not pass. And in just a couple of days of the offensive, several such vehicles were destroyed along with their crews.”

Because the Russians have drones in the sky on the lookout for any mine-clearance systems to target with artillery and missiles, the Ukrainians are trying for now to save the few they do have by doing the job manually. Sapper units — sometimes a group of just four people — will often wait for twilight to clear paths, as they are too visible in the daylight and can be seen through night-vision devices in the dark.

Walking with a metal detector is unrealistic, sappers said, because they are too visible. So they crawl, relying on their vision to spot mines.

“It slows us down a lot, because the work of a sapper, it needs time and tranquility,” said Lt. Col. Mykola Moroz, the commander of the 128th Mountain Assault Brigade’s engineering and sapper battalion. “It’s not possible to do our work in these circumstances.”

The Russians are also able to drop more mines from drones, reseeding areas that the Ukrainians had cleared. And once the Ukrainians get to a Russian trench line and seize the new position, that might be mined, too. Also, because they’re moving on foot instead of on their new Western vehicles, soldiers said that replenishing ammunition supplies and evacuating wounded is more challenging.

“We were preparing, but the Russians were also preparing,” said Reznikov, Ukraine’s defense minister. “They understand that engineering equipment right now is solving a key problem and is a game changer, so they want to destroy all of that first. I sent another letter to all of our partners to focus on this right now.”

Anastacia Galouchka contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Isabelle Khurshudyan · July 15, 2023

4. Markets Appear Convinced the Fed Can Pull Off a Soft Landing

Excerpts:

What could go wrong, then?

The obvious answer is that the Fed decides inflation hasn’t come down enough to stop tightening monetary policy, and surprises investors by continuing to raise interest rates past July, said Rhys Williams, chief strategist at Spouting Rock Asset Management. 

“Clearly the market is saying that inflation has peaked, the Fed is looking through the rearview mirror, and the incremental news is going to just keep getting better…but the data suggests the Fed might have to keep going for a while,” Williams said.

The Fed’s preferred inflation measure, the personal-consumption expenditures price index, rose 3.8% in May from a year earlier. That was the slowest pace in two years but still well above the central bank’s 2% inflation target.

Another risk is that economic momentum falters. Some indicators—such as the bond market’s yield curve, and the Conference Board’s leading economic index—have been at levels that have historically signaled recessions for months.

“We still think it’s coming,” said Jason Ware, chief investment officer of Albion Financial Group, regarding a recession. A downturn would likely hit corporate profits, sending stocks lower once again, he added.

The biggest worry some investors have is that they simply run out of reasons to keep pushing stock prices higher.

At this point, it seems as though the market has already priced in the good news: that inflation is less of a problem than investors feared, and that economic growth has at the same time been more resilient than investors anticipated, Conger said.

“It’s hard to see what will make the market go to even higher levels,” he added.

Markets Appear Convinced the Fed Can Pull Off a Soft Landing

Stocks surged this past week on evidence that inflation is cooling

By Akane Otani

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Updated July 16, 2023 12:06 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/markets-appear-convinced-the-fed-can-pull-off-a-soft-landing-700a40dd?mod=hp_lead_pos1

Wall Street is more convinced than ever that inflation is subsiding.

That’s giving investors hope that the Federal Reserve might be able to pull off what once seemed impossible: containing pricing pressures without tipping the economy into recession.

The economic data that came out this past week could hardly have been better. The consumer-price index, which tracks prices for everything from used cars to groceries, rose in June at the slowest year-over-year pace in more than two years. Inflation in wholesale prices cooled even more. An index measuring the prices fetched in June by warehouses, factories, farms and energy producers rose at its slowest pace since August 2020.

The reports should help ease what has been one of investors’ biggest fears over the past year. The Fed has been rapidly raising interest rates to try to rein in inflation. Many money managers have worried that the Fed’s moves would lead to a recession. That is because when interest rates go up, so does the cost of borrowing money. That typically slows down spending and hiring among consumers and businesses—often to the point that the economy tips into a downturn. 

For stocks, the economic data that came out this past week could hardly have been better. PHOTO: JUSTIN LANE/ZUMA PRESS

The longer it takes for the Fed to bring inflation back to prepandemic levels, the more likely a recession seems. If inflation cools quickly enough, however, investors believe the Fed might be able to finish its interest-rate increases while leaving the economic expansion intact.

That’s exactly what markets seem to be pricing in.

The S&P 500 rose 2.4% this past week, its biggest gain in a month. The index is up 17% for the year, while the Nasdaq Composite, which heavily weights technology stocks, has risen 35%.

The yield on the 10-year U.S. Treasury note, used to help set everything from mortgage rates to student loans, ended Friday at 3.818%, compared with 4.047% the previous week. That marked its biggest one-week slide since March.

In the week ahead, investors will have an opportunity to consider reports on retail sales and existing-home sales. PHOTO: SPENCER PLATT/GETTY IMAGES

“We all thought there would be a hurricane, but it hasn’t come yet,” said Brad Conger, deputy chief investment officer at Hirtle Callaghan.

This coming week, investors will get a look at fresh data on retail sales and existing-home sales, as well as earnings from companies including Morgan Stanley, United Airlines Holdings and Tesla.

Parts of the economy have undeniably slowed. The housing market, for example, has cooled. The median price for existing homes being sold around the country fell 3.1% in May from the previous year, the biggest decline since 2011, according to the National Association of Realtors. The manufacturing industry has weakened too. At the start of the month, data from the Institute for Supply Management showed activity in the manufacturing sector contracted in June for an eighth consecutive month.

But the fact remains that, so far, the overall economy has evaded recession. The biggest U.S. banks posted better-than-expected results Friday, thanks to consumers and businesses continuing to spend and borrow money in the second quarter.

Generally good economic news has kept the market climbing. 

“Earnings have been resilient, and inflation is less of a problem,” Conger said. “When you put those two things together, yeah, the market…it should be up.”

If the Fed ends up raising interest rates just one more time, as traders currently expect, and the economy keeps on chugging along, markets might have more room to climb, investors and analysts say.

What could go wrong, then?

The obvious answer is that the Fed decides inflation hasn’t come down enough to stop tightening monetary policy, and surprises investors by continuing to raise interest rates past July, said Rhys Williams, chief strategist at Spouting Rock Asset Management. 

“Clearly the market is saying that inflation has peaked, the Fed is looking through the rearview mirror, and the incremental news is going to just keep getting better…but the data suggests the Fed might have to keep going for a while,” Williams said.

The Fed’s preferred inflation measure, the personal-consumption expenditures price index, rose 3.8% in May from a year earlier. That was the slowest pace in two years but still well above the central bank’s 2% inflation target.

Another risk is that economic momentum falters. Some indicators—such as the bond market’s yield curve, and the Conference Board’s leading economic index—have been at levels that have historically signaled recessions for months.

“We still think it’s coming,” said Jason Ware, chief investment officer of Albion Financial Group, regarding a recession. A downturn would likely hit corporate profits, sending stocks lower once again, he added.

The biggest worry some investors have is that they simply run out of reasons to keep pushing stock prices higher.

At this point, it seems as though the market has already priced in the good news: that inflation is less of a problem than investors feared, and that economic growth has at the same time been more resilient than investors anticipated, Conger said.

“It’s hard to see what will make the market go to even higher levels,” he added.

Write to Akane Otani at akane.otani@wsj.com

5. Britain signs deal to join £12 trillion Indo-Pacific trade bloc

One of the biggest strategic mistakes the US has made in the 21st Century was pulling out of the TPP. We should recall that both candidates in the 2016 election (Trump and Clinton) called for pulling out of TPP. Regardless of who won we would have shot ourselves in the foot.

Britain signs deal to join £12 trillion Indo-Pacific trade bloc

​

KEY POINTS

• Britain’s Kemi Badenoch, the business and trade secretary, formally signed a treaty confirming accession to the vast Indo-Pacific CPTPP bloc.
• 
  
• Signed Sunday in New Zealand, the deal will now receive parliamentary scrutiny in the U.K., while other CPTPP nations will also complete their own legislative processes.

​

CNBC · by Matt Clinch · July 16, 2023

Secretary of State for International Trade and President of the Board of Trade, Minister for Women and Equalities Kemi Badenoch leaves 10 Downing Street.

Future Publishing | Future Publishing | Getty Images

LONDON — Britain's Kemi Badenoch, the business and trade secretary, formally signed a treaty confirming accession to the vast Indo-Pacific CPTPP bloc, the country's largest post-Brexit trade deal to date.

Signed Sunday in New Zealand, the deal will now receive parliamentary scrutiny in the U.K., while other CPTPP nations will also complete their own legislative processes. More than 99% of the current U.K. goods that are exported to CPTPP countries will soon be eligible for zero tariffs, the U.K. government said.

The 11-member Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership includes Canada, Mexico, Japan, Australia, Vietnam, Singapore and Malaysia, among others. The U.K. would be the first European nation to join the bloc, which the government says would unlock trade to a region with a total GDP of £12 trillion ($15.7 trillion).

It remains to be seen how much the deal actually benefits Britain's growth prospects. Based on the government's own estimates, the deal will raise long-term domestic GDP by just 0.08%, which will have little impact to offset European trade losses as a result of Brexit. The U.K. officially left the EU on Jan. 31, 2020.

Badenoch said Sunday that Britain was using its status as an independent trading nation to join an "exciting, growing, forward-looking trade bloc."

"[It] will help grow the U.K. economy and build on the hundreds of thousands of jobs CPTPP-owned businesses already support up and down the country," she said in a statement. One in every 100 workers in Britain was employed by a business headquartered in a CPTPP nation, according to the government citing 2019 data.

watch now

VIDEO2:4502:45

Trade deals like CPTPP can help address a polycrisis, Asian Trade Centre says

Capital Connection

Badenoch added that the deal would "open up huge opportunities and unparalleled access to a market of over 500 million people."

The trade pact evolved out of the now-defunct Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP, that originated in the United States but fell apart after former President Donald Trump scrapped U.S. involvement.

Sean McGuire, the Europe Director at the Confederation of British Industry, said that the deal, alongside an outward and strategic global trade agenda by Britain, has the "potential to drive export-led growth in critical sectors, like services and green tech, while also making our supply chains more resilient."

"As one of the largest agreements globally, including some of the world's most dynamic markets, U.K. firms will be eyeing up new trade and investment opportunities," he said in an emailed statement.

—CNBC's Sumathi Bala contributed to this article.

CNBC · by Matt Clinch · July 16, 2023

6. Threads app engagement drops off a week after launch

It is getting better for me each day. But will it catch on and replace twitter? I am using both.

Jul 14, 2023 - Economy & Business

Threads app engagement drops off a week after launch

• Hope King
• , author of Axios Closer

https://www.axios.com/2023/07/14/threads-twitter-engagement-launch?utmIllustration: Shoshana Gordon/Axios

The newness of Threads has worn off, according to estimates of user data.

By the numbers: Daily active users were down about 20% on Tuesday and Wednesday this week from Saturday, marketing data firm Sensor Tower says.

• Time spent has fallen from 20 minutes to 10 minutes.
• Separate data from Similarweb revealed similar patterns — a more than 25% drop in daily active users between July 7 and Monday among Android phone users.

What they're saying: Twitter competitor Threads "will need a more compelling value proposition than simply 'Twitter, but without Elon Musk,'"Anthony Bartolacci, managing director at marketing data firm Sensor Tower, tells CNBC.

Go deeper

• Threads is big, but no one knows where it's going
• Scoop: Branded content tools coming to Threads

7. Elkins: Believing Putin Weak a Dangerous Misread of Events

All warfare is based on deception. - Sun Tzu

Excerpts:

If a magician wants to magically transport an object from point A to B, he begins by distracting you.

To that end, Wagner’s actions appear more as a series of staged events designed to set Ukraine’s ongoing offensive on the backfoot by threatening to seize Kyiv or cut off Western supplies.

Some might be skeptical of such a grand act of deceit and suggest that this author might be the one buying into Russian narratives rather than the other way around.

However, if one is to watch how the pieces on the strategic board have shifted since last Thursday, Russian forces are now clearly in a much stronger position.

These events were also conveniently timed with the long-planned withdrawal of Wagner forces from the front, as well as the upcoming NATO summit.

It would be wiser than not to assume this was theater designed to achieve what we now see before our eyes.

Elkins: Believing Putin Weak a Dangerous Misread of Events

https://www.newsmax.com/world/globaltalk/baltics-belarus-putin/2023/07/13/id/1127020/?utm

Russia's President Vladimir Putin as he visits an exhibition of advanced developments in the field of quantum technologies of the state corporation Rosatom and Russian Railways during the Future Technologies Forum in Moscow - July 13, 2023. (Alexander Kazakov/AFP via Getty Images)

By Daniel Elkins    |   Thursday, 13 July 2023 01:42 PM EDT

Western Media had been brimming with enjoyment over others' misfortunes, as we watched The Wagner Group and Russian media clash.

The speculation of a coup, a collapsed Russian war effort, or general Russian disorder was quashed as quickly as it started.

While dissatisfying to many, media commentators have been quick to find a silver lining; the evil Wagner Group and their Bond-villain leader, Prigozhin, are in exile, and Putin is weaker for it.

This is a dangerous misunderstanding of Russian political theater and it's amisreading of the conclusion to very recent events.

The Wagner Group’s relocation to Belarus is comparable to NATO’s expansion into the Baltic Region. Using Minsk as a proxy, Moscow effectively has pushed Russia’s first line of military recourse closer to NATO pact or allied countries, with the potential to open new fronts on the borders of Poland, Latvia, Lithuania.

From a tactical perspective this also puts Wagner forces within striking distance of Kyiv and is reminiscent of the avenues of approach used in initial invasion of February 2022.

This is advantageous since it effectively bypasses the vast majority of Ukrainian defenses which are set up in eastern Ukraine.

The last week might have been an entertaining show for those living outside the borders of this war, but from the Ukrainian perspective, they will now have to anticipate a second line of defense to protect their capital from a new and formidable force in the north.

An effective strike from Belarus could cut supply lines from Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Moldova, thereby starving the Ukrainian war effort of its much-needed supplies.

Politically, Putin may appear weak after the weekend’s "rebellion."

However, his public addresses on the matter have been carefully worded and it is safe to assume Putin, Wagner CEO Prigozhin, and Belarusian President Lukashenko remain allied. Given the above, Russia’s strategic military position is exponentially better placed thanks to this unconventional military buildup in Belarus.

Putin can now strike Ukraine conventionally and without warning through both Wagner and nuclear forces placed in Belarus.

And what can be said of Ukraine, goes equally for NATO Allies on Belarus’s border.

Russian grey zone activities in the north of Ukraine and in the Baltics have been ongoing for years.

The Wagner Group’s introduction to this front brings the potential for kinetic action while maintaining a layer of deniability for the Kremlin since the West has now conveniently created a narrative gap between The Wagner Group and the Russian military.

This makes any article 5 response to Wagner actions more difficult or at least more confusing as compared to actions by the Russian military itself.

To replicate a Donbas scenario in the Baltics, Russia needs a non-attributable force staging out of Belarus.

The Wagner Group now sits along Belarus’s 775-mile border with NATO, and within 24 miles of Lithuania’s capital, Vilnius.

If a messy situation arises between NATO border guards and Belarusian militants, later revealed as Wagner troops, Putin will say Prigozhin and his troops are "mutinous exiles" with no affiliation to the Russian state or its interests.

And just as we saw over the past week, many in the West will eagerly fall for it.

The danger of grey zone warfare is that once it has begun, it is very difficult to stop, particularly through military force. NATO is designed to tackle external threats.

If a NATO ally is destabilized internally through Wagner troops posing as militant groups of Russian minorities within the Baltics, both the NATO ally and the wider alliance are caught in a trap of our own making, wondering "why are Russian exiles acting in the Kremlin’s interest?"

While we scratch our heads, Russia will have moved on an alliance member.

Now that the dust has settled around the "coup," we can see the status quo remains effectively unchanged except for some shake ups at the Russian Ministry of Defense and, now, Wagner forces are deployed to Belarus.

If a magician wants to magically transport an object from point A to B, he begins by distracting you.

To that end, Wagner’s actions appear more as a series of staged events designed to set Ukraine’s ongoing offensive on the backfoot by threatening to seize Kyiv or cut off Western supplies.

Some might be skeptical of such a grand act of deceit and suggest that this author might be the one buying into Russian narratives rather than the other way around.

However, if one is to watch how the pieces on the strategic board have shifted since last Thursday, Russian forces are now clearly in a much stronger position.

These events were also conveniently timed with the long-planned withdrawal of Wagner forces from the front, as well as the upcoming NATO summit.

It would be wiser than not to assume this was theater designed to achieve what we now see before our eyes.

The views expressed in the preceding column do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense, or of the United States Government.

Daniel Elkins, is founder and president of  the Special Operations Association of America.

Read more: Elkins: Believing Putin Weak a Dangerous Misread of Events | Newsmax.com

8. Information warfare is the new battlefield facing the U.S.

Conclusion:

It is important to note that this is not a matter of Republican or Democratic debate; it is a national security concern. The Chinese Communist Party has infiltrated America with their psyop operatives and exert influence over certain statesmen, whom they utilize as puppets in the information war. Vigilance and critical thinking are vital in questioning prevailing narratives. It is also worth keeping a watchful eye on the Suffolk community as well, because the fight for our sovereignty will end within the community itself.​

Information warfare is the new battlefield facing the U.S. - The Suffolk News-Herald

suffolknewsherald.com · by Staff Reports · July 14, 2023

Information warfare is the new battlefield facing the U.S.

Published 2:19 pm Friday, July 14, 2023

By Drew Varner

With the Fourth of July now behind us, it is crucial to reflect on the significance of our independence and sovereignty. Safeguarding our liberties is a responsibility we must uphold, as America faces psychological attacks on multiple fronts.

We find ourselves amidst what experts refer to as fifth generation warfare, specifically information warfare. Distinguished researchers from Virginia, Drs. Jill and Robert Malone, are diligently studying and documenting this fifth Generation Warfare in their forthcoming book titled “PsyWars: The 21st Century Battlefield.”

According to the Malones, fifth-gen warfare builds upon strategies and tactics of asymmetric and insurgent warfare, integrating both conventional and unconventional military methods, including the exploitation of political, religious, and social causes. This modern form of warfare leverages the internet, social media and the 24-hour news cycle to manipulate the cognitive biases of individuals and organizations. It can be conducted by various groups, organized or decentralized, and led by nation states, non-state actors, organizations, NGOs, or even individuals. An essential characteristic of fifth gen warfare is its concealed nature, aiming to disrupt and defeat opponents by instilling new cognitive biases.

This style of warfare employs a combination of truth and falsehood to achieve a particular outcome—propaganda. The intention is to use falsehoods to persuade and weaponize the American mind, aligning it with the agenda of those in control. Presently, this psychological warfare permeates various aspects of American society, including schools, social media, television, mainstream media,and involves foreign agents, pseudo statesmen, federal government agencies and wealthy individuals.

It is our duty to resist this psychological warfare and safeguard the minds of our children from being weaponized. Today’s warfare differs significantly from conflicts of the past, and we should not expect it to conform to traditional notions. A larger conflict looms over America, and we are not the only militarily powerful nation in the world. China, in particular, has expanded its influence into our vicinity, seeking our land, resources and economy. In a speech to the Chinese Communist Party in 2003, retired People’s Liberation Army General and former Minister of National Defense Chi Haotian revealed China’s long-term strategy of colonizing America, rather than destroying it. He also proclaimed the Chinese as the superior race. Although the CIA’s Chinese pivot under President Obama shifted intelligence operations to focus on Asia, it raises questions about whether it was enacted in time. This issue is crucial for our state’s survival.

It is important to note that this is not a matter of Republican or Democratic debate; it is a national security concern. The Chinese Communist Party has infiltrated America with their psyop operatives and exert influence over certain statesmen, whom they utilize as puppets in the information war. Vigilance and critical thinking are vital in questioning prevailing narratives. It is also worth keeping a watchful eye on the Suffolk community as well, because the fight for our sovereignty will end within the community itself.

Drew Varner researcher and writer who resides in Suffolk.

suffolknewsherald.com · by Staff Reports · July 14, 2023

9. Taiwan Not A Country; US Makes Another U-Turn As Tensions Simmer Between Taipei & Beijing

Does one simple word make a difference?

Taiwan Not A Country; US Makes Another U-Turn As Tensions Simmer Between Taipei & Beijing

eurasiantimes.com · by Sakshi Tiwari · July 15, 2023

The US State Department suddenly dropped the word ‘country’ from its travel advisory notice for Taiwan when China’s aggression against Taiwan became the major driver of tensions with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Russia Now Has ‘100% Protection’ Against US-Supplied HIMARS With Its Upgraded Defense System – Rostec

The website now features a “Taiwan international travel information” page instead of the “country information page” for Taiwan that the travel advisory previously pointed users to.

When contacted by Taiwan News to comment on the latest development, the spokesperson of the American Institute in Taiwan, considered the de facto embassy in the self-ruled island state, said that US policy on Taiwan remains unchanged without giving more specific details.

The spokesperson stated that the US state department updates its factsheets and webpages frequently, reflecting “longstanding, strong, bipartisan US support for Taiwan, in line with our One-China policy.” The US has been arming Taiwan to bolster its military capability in the face of rising Chinese aggression and intimidation in recent years.

China claims Taiwan as a renegade Chinese territory with “secessionist” forces ruling the island. The last couple of years have seen Beijing asserting this more strongly, vowing to unite Taiwan with the Chinese mainland, with force if necessary.

It has also increased military activity around the island, with recent military exercises serving as a reminder of its intentions.

A screengrab from the US State Department website compiled by Taiwan News.

The US continues to project force in the region and send subtle messages through its military activities in and over the contentious Taiwan Strait. For instance, on the third day of recent Chinese drills, a US Navy P-8A reconnaissance aircraft flew over the strait and was monitored by the PLA Air Force.

The US seventh fleet also regularly sends its destroyers to transit the strait under its Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs).

The visit of the US House of Representatives speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan in August last year aggravated tensions that refuse to abate even now. Going over and beyond all previous assertions for Taiwan, US President Joe Biden went so far as to say that his country would militarily support Taipei if Chinainvadedf the self-ruled island.

The US also continues to supply sophisticated military equipment to Taiwan, including the F-16 Viper fighter jets and the PAC-3 Patriot batteries. China has continued to condemn the US arms supplies to Taiwan, touting it as interference in China’s internal affairs and a violation of its sovereignty.

“The United States has ignored China’s core concerns, violently interfered in China’s internal affairs, and deliberately pushed up tensions in the Taiwan Strait,” a spokesperson for China’s Ministry of National Defense, Tan Kefei, said in a statement earlier this month.

Against that backdrop and an unrelenting backing of Taiwan at the expense of tensions with China in the region, the change in the travel advisory and deleting the word ‘country’ has certainly caught attention. Ironically, the official US position is that it does not recognize Taiwan’s independence under the One China principle.

America’s Official Taiwan Policy Favors China

The US government has always officially maintained that it adheres to the One China principle, which fundamentally contradicts Taiwan’s independence. Since 1972, the United States formally “acknowledged” Beijing’s claims that Taiwan is a part of China and that there is only one China.

When the United States decided to de-recognize the Republic of China (ROC) and recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1979, it declared that the PRC government was “the sole legal Government of China.” In this context, “sole” refers to the PRC as only China, with the ROC not considered a separate sovereign state.

However, despite Chinese pressure, the United States refused to acknowledge Chinese rule over Taiwan, which is what it prefers to be called since it chose to de-recognize the ROC. On the other hand, Washington accepted Beijing’s stance that Taiwan was a part of China.

Owing to their respective geopolitical interests of the time, the United States and the PRC were both eager to move through with diplomatic recognition.

Moreover, the US Congress came up with the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in 1979 to safeguard the major US security and commercial interest in Taiwan. Without formal diplomatic relations, the TRA offered a framework for ongoing cooperation.

The “Six Assurances,” announced in 1982 and ratified by the US government in 2016, also govern relations between the US and Taiwan. They provided reassurance that the US had not decided to stop arming Taiwan or change the Taiwan Relations Act, and they defined the country’s position on Taiwan.

After all, the news about deleting the word country from the travel advisory page may not be an aberration. Taiwan is no longer referred to as a country on the state department’s other pages about US-Taiwan ties and hasn’t been since at least 2019. However, a 2022 study of Taiwan’s human rights record was called a “Country Report.”

US President Joe President Biden with Chinese President Xi Jinping (via Twitter)

Except for the State Department’s website, most US government websites normally do not refer to Taiwan as a country, except the CIA, which does so throughout its World Factbook profile.

On being probed about the development, Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry stated they had nothing to say about the decision. However, the ministry reasserted that theirs was an independent and democratic country.

“The Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are not subordinate to each other, and the future of the ROC, Taiwan, must follow the will of all Taiwanese people,” which is similar to the language that the island state uses to describe issues related to its sovereignty.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari9555 (at) gmail.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

eurasiantimes.com · by Sakshi Tiwari · July 15, 2023

10. Intel leaders, White House argue for keeping digital spy powers

Excerpts:

Still, some lawmakers are worried about weakened privacy protections for Americans. Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Oregon, pointedly asked Lt. Gen. Timothy Haugh, the president’s nominee to lead the NSA and U.S. Cyber Command, whether he would install “backdoors” into encryption tools should he be confirmed.

Haugh vowed not to, because encryption is “critical to defend our national security systems and our weapons systems. If confirmed, we will not weaken encryption for Americans.”

Lawmakers have proposed implementing a probable cause standard, or requiring agencies to get a warrant before using 702. But Paul Abbate, the FBI’s deputy director, said that would make it useless.

“It's not legally required—and that's been stated by the FISA court, and other courts as well,” Abbate said Thursday during the conference. “But, importantly beyond that, if we had to get a warrant, each and every instance, the delay that that would cause would essentially…undermine the effectiveness of the tool, the query, itself.”

Intel leaders, White House argue for keeping digital spy powers

Agencies have less than six months to convince a divided Congress to re-up an expiring warrantless surveillance authority.

defenseone.com · by Lauren C. Williams

The controversial law used to digitally spy on foreigners in other countries is widely misunderstood, according to lawmakers and others who want to re-up the expiring legislation. The problem, they say, is that the information that could convince skeptics is largely classified.

“We desperately need to get 702 reauthorized,” Sen. Mark Warner, who chairs the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said Wednesday during the confirmation hearing for the next head of the National Security Agency. “We have not done a very good job, the [intelligence community] and the FBI and the administration, in making clear that the 702 we're talking about today is very different than the 702 that was reauthorized back in 2018,” he said, referencing reforms the FBI made to how it uses the database after the FISA court uncovered abuses that including “broad, suspicionless” queries.

Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act allows intelligence agencies to spy on foreigners that are not located in the U.S., but who use its infrastructure. The tool, a queryable database that can be accessed without a warrant, is used to prepare the president’s daily brief and has also been flagged for inadvertently collecting Americans’ data. Authority to use it is set to expire in December.

It’s a divisive law and practice. Intelligence leaders and some members of Congress support the reauthorization, while other lawmakers align with civil liberties groups that worry the law—even with reforms—infringes on Americans’ privacy. House members have been pushing for more reforms since earlier this year.

Jonathan Finer, the White House’s principal deputy national security advisor, said the administration is “prepared” to make changes to 702 that strengthen privacy and oversight, while keeping the tool viable.

“We are prepared to be responsive to what many members of Congress have called for and many people in our own administration strongly support, which is enhancements to oversight and privacy protections under Section 702,” Finer said Friday during a keynote at the Intelligence and National Security Summit.

“We're in close dialogue with Congress about a number of steps that we have already taken that we'd be willing to codify and about a number of additional steps that we would look at and building into reauthorization as it comes up for consideration by Congress later this year.”

Finer said the information intelligence agencies collect, including through 702, is directly connected to the United States’ ability to warn allies and partners.

"Our ability to warn is only as good as our collection and our insights," he said. "Section 702 has helped us uncover gruesome atrocities committed by Russia in Ukraine, including the murder of non-combatants, the forced relocation of children, and the detention of refugees fleeing violence. And we remain in dialogue with Congress on a series of unprecedented improvements."

But there’s still the issue of educating members with examples that aren’t publicly releasable.

The director of national intelligence declassified a report that detailed how the IC uses commercially available data to help make a case for reauthorizing the law.

Sen. John Cornyn, R-Texas, said during the intelligence committee hearing, “Part of the conundrum in trying to convince the American people, much less members of Congress, about these authorities is a lot of the information that would demonstrate the necessity of that is classified information by its nature.

“But I think we've got a very heavy lift on our hands and, frankly, it's going to start with the House of Representatives. We're going to have to make some changes with the FBI's authority, particularly when it—as regards to US citizens and US persons when they use lawfully collected 702 information for law enforcement purposes.”

The House intelligence committee launched a bipartisan focus group to investigate 702 abuses in March. (There’s also a push in the House to limit how the intelligence community uses data brokers.)

But part of the challenge, intelligence leaders say, is conveying extremely complicated information about 702 to lawmakers and the general public.

Employing 702 is “extremely technical” and must “evolve with the state of technologies that we're interacting with,” said George Barnes, the NSA’s deputy director, during a panel at the Intelligence and National Security Summit on Thursday. But it’s also the IC’s job to “demystify” the processes, procedures, and how connections are made.

David Cohen, the deputy director for the Central Intelligence Agency, called 702 “valuable in the full suite of national security issues that we spend our time working on,” adding that the authority helps identify foreign actors and U.S. victims of cyberattacks, as well as supply routes for chemicals used to make fentanyl. For the latter, he said, the current version of 702 is needed to “effectively address that.”

Still, some lawmakers are worried about weakened privacy protections for Americans. Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Oregon, pointedly asked Lt. Gen. Timothy Haugh, the president’s nominee to lead the NSA and U.S. Cyber Command, whether he would install “backdoors” into encryption tools should he be confirmed.

Haugh vowed not to, because encryption is “critical to defend our national security systems and our weapons systems. If confirmed, we will not weaken encryption for Americans.”

Lawmakers have proposed implementing a probable cause standard, or requiring agencies to get a warrant before using 702. But Paul Abbate, the FBI’s deputy director, said that would make it useless.

“It's not legally required—and that's been stated by the FISA court, and other courts as well,” Abbate said Thursday during the conference. “But, importantly beyond that, if we had to get a warrant, each and every instance, the delay that that would cause would essentially…undermine the effectiveness of the tool, the query, itself.”

defenseone.com · by Lauren C. Williams

11. Chinese military's three-day show of force increases headache for Taiwan

Chinese military's three-day show of force increases headache for Taiwan | CNN

CNN · by Brad Lendon · July 14, 2023

CNN —

China’s military has been on a surge of activity around Taiwan this week, sending dozens of warplanes past the median line of the Taiwan Strait and into the key regions of the island’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ).

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) activity has a range of implications, none of them positive for Taiwan or cross-strait stability, analysts say.

According to figures from Taiwan’s Defense Ministry, 38 PLA aircraft were detected around the island in the 24 hours ending at 6 a.m. local time on Wednesday, 33 in the same period Thursday and 30 during the same period Friday.

Over those 72 hours, 73 PLA aircraft either crossed the strait’s median line – an informal demarcation point that Beijing does not recognize but until recently largely respected – or entered the southeastern or southwestern parts of the island’s ADIZ.

China’s ruling Communist Party claims the self-governing democracy of Taiwan as its territory despite never having controlled it, and has spent decades trying to isolate it diplomatically. Beijing has not ruled out using force to take control of the island.

The PLA aircraft detected this week included fighter jets, H-6 bombers, anti-submarine warning aircraft and reconnaissance drones, Taiwan’s Defense Ministry said.

The ministry said it tasked combat air patrol warplanes, naval vessels and land-based missile defense to monitor the PLA aircraft, along with nine Chinese warships that were present around the island.

Their response underscores the problem that increased PLA activity poses to Taiwan, said Carl Schuster, a Hawaii-based analyst and former director of operations at the US Pacific Command’s Joint Intelligence Center.

CNN

video

Taiwan's military is preparing in case China attacks. See how

When Taiwan’s military responds to PLA operations, it taxes the island’s systems and equipment.

“Constant use creates a maintenance headache that reduces readiness until (spare) parts are delivered and installed,” he said. “Also, air frames and hulls require inspection and refurbishment as certain age and stress times are reached.”

He also says surges in PLA activity are aimed at wearing down the mental ability of Taiwan’s people to resist a potential takeover by Beijing.

“Beijing hopes Taipei will just accept unification as inevitable and allow Chinese forces in without resistance. They are trying to diminish if not destroy the Taiwan population’s will to resist,” he said.

But even if that tactic does not work, the continued presence of large numbers of PLA warplanes and ships around Taiwan can lull the island’s defenders – both the Taiwanese military and any potential external reinforcements – into complacency, he said.

Taiwan's Foreign Minister Joseph Wu speaks during a news conference in Taipei, Taiwan, on March 26.

Carlos Garcie Rawlins/Reuters

Military exercises suggest China is getting 'ready to launch a war against Taiwan,' island's foreign minister tells CNN

Under the Taiwan Relations Act, Washington has agreed to give Taiwan the ability to defend itself, largely through weapons sales, although President Joe Biden has said repeatedly that US troops would defend the island in the event of a Chinese invasion.

Either way, with US equipment or even fighting troops, it may become too late for Washington to come to Taipei’s rescue if large amounts of PLA planes and ships are already on station around the island.

“The longer the delay in reacting to PLA buildups, the less time available to match or counter that buildup. The US margin of advantage is too slim to achieve success if its forces move too late,” Schuster said.

From the PLA’s perspective, sustained drills are a necessary part of readiness to execute any move on Taiwan, the former US Navy captain said.

“PLA forces need constant training since such skills are perishable and exercises offer both training in those skills and opportunities to rehearse and examine some aspects of war plans,” he said.

“Military operations are complex, like American football. The plays and drives require constant practice and rehearsal to be conducted effectively,” Schuster added.

A Chinese fighter jet refuels during military exercises near Taiwan on April 12, 2023.

Xinhua/AP

US flight in Taiwan Strait

China last held three days of intensive military drills around Taiwan in April, exercises the PLA said “comprehensively tested joint combat capabilities of its integrated military forces under actual combat situation.”

“Forces in the command is ready for combat at all times, and will resolutely destroy any type of ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist or foreign interference attempts,” a PLA statement after the April drills said, according to state broadcaster CCTV.

As for this week’s drills, a report in the state-run Global Times said they “aim to safeguard national sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity.”

“Such drills are becoming more combat-oriented and more intensive in order to deter and prepare for interferences from external forces,” the report said, citing Chinese experts.

Meanwhile, the activity in and around the Taiwan Strait in the past few days hasn’t been limited to the PLA.

Getty Images

China and Taiwan loom large behind Ukraine at NATO summit

A US Navy P-8A reconnaissance jet transited the strait on Thursday, according to a statement from the US 7th Fleet in Japan.

“The aircraft’s transit of the Taiwan Strait demonstrates the United States’ commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. The United States military flies, sails and operates anywhere international law allows,” the statement said.

On its English-language website, the PLA accused the US military of hyping the situation, and a spokesperson for the Eastern Theater Command said PLA troops tracked and monitored the US plane.

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin told CNN Thursday that he doesn’t see confrontation between the US and China involving Taiwan as “imminent” or “unavoidable.”

“But having said that it’s my job to make sure that we have to continue to maintain a credible deterrence in the Indo-Pacific,” he said. “The most credible deterrent is a combat capable force and that’s what we have today.”

CNN’s Zahid Mahmood contributed reporting.

CNN · by Brad Lendon · July 14, 2023

12. After Suffering Heavy Losses, Ukrainians Paused to Rethink Strategy

Excerpts:

The Ukrainian authorities say the army has so far advanced the deepest in southern areas of the Donetsk region, but no more than about five miles from the former front line at Velyka Novosilka. It faces another 55 miles to reach the Sea of Azov, a primary goal of the counteroffensive, as it would cut the land bridge to Crimea, wreaking havoc with Russia’s already shaky logistics. Ukraine’s forces are also advancing in two areas in the Zaporizhzhia region.

It is even slower near Orikhiv in the Zaporizhzhia region, where the bulk of Bradleys and Leopards have been sent to an area of open fields with little cover. There, Ukraine’s army has advanced only about a mile.

After Suffering Heavy Losses, Ukrainians Paused to Rethink Strategy

By Lara Jakes, Andrew E. Kramer and Eric Schmitt

Lara Jakes reported from Rome, Eric Schmitt from Washington and Andrew E. Kramer from Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine.

The New York Times · by Eric Schmitt · July 15, 2023

Early in the counteroffensive, Ukraine lost as much as 20 percent of its weapons and armor. The rate dropped as the campaign slowed and commanders shifted tactics.

Ukrainian recruits in the Azov regiment disembarking from an American tactical vehicle during training in March.Credit...Mauricio Lima for The New York Times

July 15, 2023

In the first two weeks of Ukraine’s grueling counteroffensive, as much as 20 percent of the weaponry it sent to the battlefield was damaged or destroyed, according to American and European officials. The toll includes some of the formidable Western fighting machines — tanks and armored personnel carriers — the Ukrainians were counting on to beat back the Russians.

The startling rate of losses dropped to about 10 percent in the ensuing weeks, the officials said, preserving more of the troops and machines needed for the major offensive push that the Ukrainians say is still to come.

Some of the improvement came because Ukraine changed tactics, focusing more on wearing down the Russian forces with artillery and long-range missiles than charging into enemy minefields and fire.

But that good news obscures some grim realities. The losses have also slowed because the counteroffensive itself has slowed — and even halted in places — as Ukrainian soldiers struggle against Russia’s formidable defenses. And despite the losses, the Ukrainians have so far taken just five of the 60 miles they hope to cover to reach the sea in the south and split the Russian forces in two.

One Ukrainian soldier said in an interview this week that his unit’s drone picked up footage of a half-dozen Western armored vehicles caught in an artillery barrage south of the town of Velyka Novosilka.

“They all burned,” said the soldier, who identified himself as Sgt. Igor. “Everybody is hoping for a big breakthrough,” he said, adding a plea that those scrutinizing from afar appreciate the importance of slow and steady advances.

Russia had many months to prepare for the counteroffensive, and the front is littered with mines, tank traps and dug-in troops, while Russian reconnaissance drones and attack helicopters fly overhead with increasing frequency.

Given those fortifications, experts say, it is not surprising that Ukraine would sustain relatively severe losses in the early stages of the campaign.

A photograph released by the Russian Defense Ministry reportedly showing destroyed Bradley vehicles and Leopard tanks in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region.Credit...Russian Defense Ministry, via Shutterstock

This week, Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, acknowledged that there had been a brief pause in operations some weeks ago but blamed it on a lack of equipment and munitions, and called on Western allies to quicken the pace of deliveries.

American officials acknowledged that pause and said that the Ukrainians had begun moving again, but more deliberately, more adept at navigating minefields and mindful of the casualty risks. With the influx of cluster munitions from the United States, they said, the pace might pick up.

“It’s not as fast, but it’s not catastrophically behind schedule,” the British defense minister, Ben Wallace, said on Wednesday. “It is doing what anyone else would do having to fight through minefields towards the Russian line.”

The problems come into focus out in the farm fields in southern Ukraine where much of the counteroffensive is being fought. There the Bradley Fighting Vehicles, long coveted by the Ukrainians, have been running over anti-tank mines on a daily basis, soldiers who have fought in the vehicles say.

The vehicles, which weigh about 34 tons, are designed to carry infantry soldiers through areas exposed to gunfire or artillery. A rear ramp opens to allow soldiers to pile out and fight. In planning for the counteroffensive, the Bradleys were meant to carry soldiers across open fields to reach Russian trenches and bunkers.

The Bradleys have done part of their job well; their thick armor has provided good protection for most soldiers, who have survived many of the mine blasts with few injuries.

“Your ears ring and things inside fly around,” said one soldier, who asked to be identified only by his first name and rank, Pvt. Serhiy. He survived such an explosion last month in fighting south of the town of Orikhiv in the Zaporizhzhia region. But in many cases the blasts severely damaged the vehicles, immobilizing them well before they could reach the Russian lines.

A soldier from Ukraine’s 68th Brigade with a heavy machine gun in the turret of a U.S.-made armored vehicle.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times

Military experts have long said that the first 15 miles of the counteroffensive would be the hardest, as attacking troops generally need three times more power — whether in weapons, personnel or both — than defending forces.

Ukraine’s top military officer, Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, expressed frustration that Ukraine is fighting without Western F-16 warplanes, which the United States only recently agreed to allow Ukrainian pilots to be trained on, but which are not expected to be delivered for several months at least. That has left the Ukrainian troops vulnerable to the Russian helicopters and artillery.

Military analysts cautioned that it was still too early to draw definitive conclusions about the counteroffensive. “It does not mean that it is doomed to fail,” said Camille Grand, a defense expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations and a former NATO assistant secretary general.

Nevertheless, he added, the absence of air superiority and air defenses that Western jets could provide for Ukraine’s attack means “that casualty rates are likely to be higher than in other conventional conflicts.”

The precise numbers of weapons and armored vehicles that have been destroyed in the counteroffensive, as opposed to “mobility kills” that can be repaired, are closely guarded secrets, and the U.S. officials did not give raw numbers, though they did agree on the percentages of weaponry lost. But a combination of open source data and official estimates can provide a snapshot in time of the destruction, particularly in the early going.

Ukraine’s 47th Mechanized Brigade, one of the three Western-equipped and trained units that were deployed early in the campaign, was set to receive 99 Bradleys, according to the leaked U.S. military plans for the counteroffensive from February — still the most recent that have been made public.

Data from Oryx, a military analysis site that counts only losses that it has visually confirmed, show that 28 of those Bradleys have been abandoned, damaged or destroyed, including 15 in a village in Zaporizhzhia Province on June 8 and 9 as the 47th was attacked by helicopters while trapped in a minefield. Six additional Bradleys were reported abandoned or destroyed in Mala Tokmachka on June 26, but Oryx researchers said these losses had occurred earlier, although it is not clear exactly when.

Ukrainian soldiers with a Bradley Fighting Vehicle in the Zaporizhzhia region.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times

Given that the 47th was the only brigade initially slated to receive the Bradleys, that means that nearly one-third of the original vehicles have been lost — although all but seven of them were blown up at one battleground.

“It is within the realm of possibility that Ukrainian forces have seen losses at this level,” said Dylan Lee Lehrke, an analyst with the British security intelligence firm Janes, adding that a “significant” level of lost weapons was generally a hallmark of wars of attrition, like the one in Ukraine.

The Oryx data show that only 24 tanks were lost for the entire month of June, including some from Ukraine’s own arsenal in addition to those supplied by Western allies.

Ten of them were German-made Leopard tanks and mine-clearers, the data show. Presumably, they were lost in battle with Ukraine’s 33rd Mechanized Brigade, one of the three units deployed early in the counteroffensive, and which was slated to receive 32 Leopards in the U.S. planning documents from Feb. 28.

That would mean that the brigade lost 30 percent of the Leopards it was given — all but two of them in the first week of fighting, the Oryx data show.

The Ukrainian authorities say the army has so far advanced the deepest in southern areas of the Donetsk region, but no more than about five miles from the former front line at Velyka Novosilka. It faces another 55 miles to reach the Sea of Azov, a primary goal of the counteroffensive, as it would cut the land bridge to Crimea, wreaking havoc with Russia’s already shaky logistics. Ukraine’s forces are also advancing in two areas in the Zaporizhzhia region.

It is even slower near Orikhiv in the Zaporizhzhia region, where the bulk of Bradleys and Leopards have been sent to an area of open fields with little cover. There, Ukraine’s army has advanced only about a mile.

Justin Scheck contributed reporting from London.

Lara Jakes is a foreign correspondent focused on the war in Ukraine. She has been a diplomatic and military correspondent in Washington and a war correspondent in Iraq, and has reported and edited from more than 60 countries over the last 25 years. More about Lara Jakes

Andrew E. Kramer is the Times bureau chief in Kyiv. He was part of a team that won the 2017 Pulitzer Prize in International Reporting for a series on Russia’s covert projection of power. More about Andrew E. Kramer

Eric Schmitt is a senior writer who has traveled the world covering terrorism and national security. He was also the Pentagon correspondent. A member of the Times staff since 1983, he has shared four Pulitzer Prizes. More about Eric Schmitt

The New York Times · by Eric Schmitt · July 15, 2023

13. Russia Pulls Back From Humanitarian Cooperation at U.N.

Excerpt:

Putin is “reminding the world that he can set the world on fire if he wants to,” said Natasha Hall, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

Russia Pulls Back From Humanitarian Cooperation at U.N.

Moscow ends Syrian aid corridor and may block renewal of Black Sea grain deal

By​ ​Jared Malsin and​ ​William Mauldin

July 16, 2023 12:01 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-pulls-back-from-humanitarian-cooperation-at-u-n-a871ae5d?mod=hp_lead_pos10

Russia is poised to end its cooperation at the United Nations in key humanitarian areas as the Kremlin faces a difficult fight in Ukraine and is eager to shore up support at home amid recent domestic instability, Western officials said.

In recent weeks, Russia has pushed for the removal of a U.N. peacekeeping mission from Mali, blocked a critical U.N. aid supply line for Syria, and is now threatening to end an agreement that allowed Ukraine to resume its Black Sea grain exports, officials say.

Moscow’s renewed efforts at bare-knuckle diplomacy at the U.N. come as Russia is facing a war in Ukraine with no end in sight and weeks after an armed insurrection by the Wagner group, which posed the most serious challenge in more than a decade to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s grip on power.

“Among the Russian elite and the Russian people at large, it is considered that the government is making too many concessions, that they’re not getting too much in return,” said Dimitri Simes, an analyst of U.S.-Russian relations, referring to the grain deal, which is set to end Monday.

Signed in Istanbul in July last year, the Black Sea Grain Initiative is one of the few diplomatic breakthroughs of the war, allowing Ukraine to export more than 32 million tons of wheat, corn, sunflower oil and other goods around the world. The deal opened a special maritime corridor in the Black Sea for both commercial ships and charter vessels that the U.N. uses to ship Ukrainian grain to crisis-stricken countries such as Sudan, Yemen and Somalia.

Grain is loaded at a Ukrainian port. The grain agreement is one of the few diplomatic breakthroughs of the war. PHOTO: ANDREW KRAVCHENKO/ASSOCIATED PRESS

The Turkish government, which along with the U.N. helped broker the initial deal, has played a central role in keeping Russia from breaking with the agreement over the past year, U.S. officials and Western diplomats say. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has expressed a renewed willingness to cooperate with the West in recent weeks, agreeing to green-light Sweden’s entrance to NATO after a yearlong standoff.

Erdogan said on Friday that he and Putin were on the “same page” regarding an extension of the deal, without elaborating. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters that Moscow is still weighing the issue. 

“If Moscow follows through on its threat, developing countries including in the region will pay the price including quite literally with higher food prices as well as greater food scarcity,” U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said at a gathering Friday in Jakarta, Indonesia. 

Russia has threatened to cancel the deal in the past and briefly suspended its cooperation with the accord last October after a Ukrainian attack on its forces in Crimea. Ukrainian and U.S. officials say they are concerned that Russia is increasingly willing to back out of the agreement because of Putin’s growing international isolation and domestic instability.

A U.S. official said the Kremlin may be evaluating the shifting costs and benefits to the grain deal, with concerns mounting that putting pressure on Ukraine economically could outweigh the diplomatic repercussions of ending the deal, especially at a time of domestic uncertainty in Russia.

U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres wrote to Putin this past week proposing a continuation of Ukraine’s grain exports in return for reconnecting a subsidiary of Russia’s agricultural bank to the Swift international payments system. 

In New York, Russia has for decades used its influence as one of the five veto-wielding members of the U.N. Security Council to heap pressure on the West and other opponents, but diplomats and analysts say Putin now appears unusually willing to break with past agreements such as the grain deal and the Syrian aid lifeline.

“Russia has gone from a posture of grumpy accommodation to all-out obstructionism,” said Richard Gowan, the U.N. director at the International Crisis Group, a nonprofit that monitors conflicts.

Russia’s mission to the U.N. didn’t reply to a request for comment.

Trucks loaded with U.N. supplies for Syria in February. Russia recently blocked a U.N. aid supply line for the country. PHOTO: GHAITH ALSAYED/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Russia on July 11 vetoed a resolution at the U.N. Security Council needed for humanitarian groups to supply food, water and medicine to more than four million people living in rebel-held Syria. Russia signaled it is unwilling to negotiate a compromise on the issue, urging the U.N. to instead accept a Syrian government proposal for it to take control over aid deliveries from Turkey.

If the U.N. accepts the proposal, it would effectively bring to an end a nearly decadelong effort through which the international body has been able to bring aid to rebel-held parts of Syria without seeking Damascus’s approval. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has long sought to strangle off food and other supplies to opposition-controlled areas of the country, seeking to deprive the rebels of popular support.

Putin is “reminding the world that he can set the world on fire if he wants to,” said Natasha Hall, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

Write to Jared Malsin at jared.malsin@wsj.com and William Mauldin at william.mauldin@wsj.com

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

14. How Disinformation Is Undermining Our Human Rights

Graphics at the link: https://www.disinformationindex.org/blog/2023-07-13-how-disinformation-is-undermining-our-human-rights/

Some data and interesting insights:

Disinformation polarises communities and societies by feeding audiences with divisive and misleading content that obscures, contradicts and undermines scientific, fact-based information critical to public health and safety. Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services.” When disinformation destabilises public trust in institutions, these human rights are threatened. During the COVID-19 pandemic, a rise in pseudo or anti-science disinformation undermined informed and accurate decision making around personal and community health.

‘The Great Reset’ is a prolific disinforming narrative that emerged from the pandemic with roots in anti-semitism and conspiratorial claims of a new world order controlled by global elites. Specifically, the Great Reset claims that COVID-19 and/or the vaccine was purposefully introduced as a population control plan implemented to help the global elite consolidate their power. GDI has found examples of monetised articles that promote this theory and weaken trust in scientific fact.

...

While these examples may seem outrageous, it is exactly this type of disinformation that garners the most attention and clicks. “Content Prioritisation” - the design and algorithmic methods that tech platforms use to promote or downrank content that appears in front of users - goes to the very heart of pluralism, diversity and the access to accurate, reliable information - a key aspect of freedom of expression and the foundation of a democratic society.

The algorithms used by tech companies for search, social and news feeds, are optimised for increasing advertising revenue. Algorithms promote highly engaging, often polarising content to users. The more people use a platform, the more advertising revenue is generated.

However, tech companies have recently shown a clear willingness and interest to better adhere to international human rights law. The foundational principles enshrined in the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights suggest that enterprises “should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.” As the United Nations has stated, businesses looking to prevent human rights violations “requires taking adequate measures for their prevention, mitigation and, where appropriate, remediation”. There is still ample space for companies to step up and exercise due diligence to comply with human rights law, where human rights refers to internationally recognized human rights

A variety of solutions have been proposed and piloted to confront the disinformation challenge, both from a legal and policy front as well as from a technology perspective. Some of these policy solutions, such as the Digital Services Act (DSA) within the EU, aim to protect users’ rights in online spaces, which are based upon existing international frameworks. Algorithms - unless regulated - often amplify the most polarising content. At its most extreme, adversarial narratives deliberately designed to promote real harm run directly counter to human rights for all.

How Disinformation Is Undermining Our Human Rights

The Global Disinformation Index

disinformationindex.org

Over the past century, the world has focused on defining and securing human rights for all. In 2022, the Human Rights Council affirmed in resolution 49/21 that “disinformation can negatively affect the implementation and realisation of all human rights.” Though disinformation has always existed, the digital revolution has allowed it to spread farther and faster around the globe. Meanwhile, advertising technology has enabled the monetisation of harmful content, and as harmful content is often engaging, this has created an economic incentive to peddle disinformation. To avoid unravelling the progress we have already made and ensure human rights for the generations to come, it’s critical for countries around the world to take the threat of disinformation seriously.

Data shows that disinformation is significantly undermining human rights all over the world by disrupting civic integrity, eroding faith in public institutions and inflaming social hatred. The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression reiterated the need to build social resilience against disinformation and promote multi-stakeholder approaches that engage civil society as well as states, companies and international organisations.

GDI aims to contribute to building social resilience and protecting information integrity by increasing transparency around monetisation of content, therefore supporting responsible choices to disincentivise the creation and spread of online disinformation.

We view disinformation through the lens of ​adversarial narrative conflict​ which exacerbates socio-cultural divisions, fuels anger among individuals and seeks to uproot trust in democratic institutions. Our definition of disinformation is grounded in and informed by internationally recognised human rights standards, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Examples of adversarial narratives undermining some of our most basic human rights are, unfortunately, not difficult to find. Below are just a few examples of how disinformation impacts civic integrity, trust in institutions and sows hatred.

Democracy and Civic Integrity

The right to free and fair elections has been mandated by the United Nations as a human right since 1976. The UN Human Rights Committee has also asserted that states and their governments are required to ensure that voters are free from interference and can form their own opinions independently. For this to take place, voters must have access to trustworthy and reliable sources of information regarding candidates and where, when and how to vote. The production and circulation of disinformation from both governments and individuals online can, and has, stopped such free and fair elections from taking place.

During Kenya’s 2022 General Election disinformation was used to undermine women’s capacity to make informed political decisions. It also undermined their roles in public institutions, including running for political office. The spread of these narratives on platforms such as TikTok and the open web inflamed political tensions, which stoked fears of election-related violence. This attempt to dissuade women from running for office and participating in the electoral process has disturbing effects on civic integrity and lays the ground to exclude women from the basic right to self-governance. Below is just one example of this phenomenon.

It has also been seen in major atrocities such as the Rwandan genocide and more recently, during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Such examples of anti-Ukrainian narratives have been extensively tracked by GDI since the outbreak of the conflict, with just one example of this below.

Which human rights are impacted by democracy and civic integrity disinformation?

• The UN strongly supports democratic governance, namely a set of values and principles that support greater participation, equality, security and human development as embodied in the UN Charter, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and other core international human rights law conventions and standards. Therefore, threats to democratic governance and international order risks and undermines these rights.
• A democratic and equitable international order fosters the full realisation of all human rights for all, and everyone is entitled to it (see UN Human Rights Council, HRC, Resolution 18/6, 33/3, 36/4, 39/4, 42/8, 45/4, 48/8 ,75/178).
• Democratic and equitable international order means that all peoples have:
• Rights to peace, international solidarity, development and self-determination.
• Right to exercise effective sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources.
• Right to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
• Right to have equal opportunity to participate meaningfully in regional and international decision-making.
• Right to have a shared responsibility to address threats to international peace and security.
• Other requirements include:
• Promotion and consolidation of transparent, democratic, just and accountable international institutions in all areas of cooperation.
• Promotion of a free, just, effective and balanced international information and communications order.
• Full respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, the non-use of force or the threat of Force in international relations and nonintervention in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.
• Art 21 (3) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); art 25(b) ICCPR; art 5(c) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD); art 7 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
• Right to take part in the government of your country, directly or through freely chosen representatives- art 21(1) UDHR, art 25(a) ICCPR, art 5 ICERD, art 7 CEDAW.
• Right to equal access to public service in your country- art 21(2) UDHR, art 25(c) ICCPR, art 5 ICERD, art 7 CEDAW
• Right to vote shall be subject to only reasonable restrictions such as age limit others such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, disability or other status constitute discrimination.
• Right to equality and non-discrimination art 2(2) and art 3 of ICESCR; art 3 and 26 of ICCPR; art 2 ICERD, art 1, 2 and 8 CEDAW etc.

Prerequisite rights to enable an environment for free and genuine elections:

• Freedom of opinion and expression and to access information- art 19 ICCPR.
• Voters should be able to form opinions independently, free of violence or threat of violence, compulsion, inducement or manipulative interference of any kind (para 19 CCPR 25 of 1996).
• Freedom of peaceful assembly- art 21 ICCPR.
• Freedom of association- art 22 ICCPR.
• Freedom of movement- art 12 ICCPR.
• Right to education- art 13 and 14 ICESCR.
• Right to life - art 6(1) ICCPR.
• Right to liberty and security of person- art 9(1) ICCPR.

Trust in Science

Disinformation polarises communities and societies by feeding audiences with divisive and misleading content that obscures, contradicts and undermines scientific, fact-based information critical to public health and safety. Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services.” When disinformation destabilises public trust in institutions, these human rights are threatened. During the COVID-19 pandemic, a rise in pseudo or anti-science disinformation undermined informed and accurate decision making around personal and community health.

‘The Great Reset’ is a prolific disinforming narrative that emerged from the pandemic with roots in anti-semitism and conspiratorial claims of a new world order controlled by global elites. Specifically, the Great Reset claims that COVID-19 and/or the vaccine was purposefully introduced as a population control plan implemented to help the global elite consolidate their power. GDI has found examples of monetised articles that promote this theory and weaken trust in scientific fact.

Which human rights are impacted by anti-science disinformation?

• Right to highest attainable standard of mental and physical health
• art 12 of ICESCR .
• art 24(1) of CRC on children.
• people with disabilities art 25 CRPD on people with disabilities.
• principle 11 Resolution 46/91 on elderly persons.
• art 10(h), 11(f), 12(1) and 14 (2)(b) CEDAW on women.
• art 5(d)(iv) ICERD on race, colour, ethnicity or nationality.
• art 25(1)(a), 28, 43(1)(e), 45(1)(c) and 70 CRMW on migrant workers and their families .
• Right to enjoy benefits of scientific progress and its applications - art 15(1)(b) of ICESCR.
• Right to equality and non-discrimination - art 2(2) and art 3 of ICESCR; art 3 and 26- ICCPR .
• Benefits of science and technology shall not infringe on rights of individual or group, particularly privacy, human personality, physical and intellectual integrity- art 6 Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress.

Where narrative promotes actions that contradict what is needed to globally bring an end to the pandemic:

• Principle of international cooperation and solidarity
• art 22 UDHR.
• art 55 and 56 UN Charter and ICESCR.
• Right to international solidarity in response to global health emergencies- art 2(b)- Draft RTI.
• Negotiations launched in 2021 for a ‘Global Pandemic Treaty’ to establish more specific obligations.

Hate Speech

Under Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, individuals of any nationality, race and or religion are protected from hatred that incites discrimination, hostility or violence. Some of the most dangerous disinformation campaigns emerge from known hate groups or frequent sources of hate speech. When hate speech paves the way for real-world harm against protected groups, international human rights law is violated.

A recent judgement from the European Court of Human Rights emphasised that to exempt a producer - i.e. a person who has taken the initiative of creating an electronic communication service for the exchange of opinions on predefined topics - “from all liability might facilitate or encourage abuse and misuse, including hate speech and calls to violence, but also manipulation, lies and disinformation” (see Sanchez v. France [GC] no. 45581/15, §185, 15 May 2023). The recent ruling concerned the very specific case of an individual, in his capacity as a politician, who was fined for failing to delete Islamophobic comments by third parties from his publicly accessible Facebook “wall” used for his election campaign. The third parties were also convicted.

Which human rights are impacted by hate speech?

• States must protect national, ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities - art 1 (1) 1992 Declaration .
• States parties must respect and ensure rights of individuals within its territory - art 2(1) ICCPR.
• Right to equality and non-discrimination ( art 2(2) and art 3 of ICESCR; art 3 and 26 of ICCPR).
• Right to self-determination and by future of this right, the right to freely pursue cultural development - art 1 (1) ICESCR.
• Right to take part in cultural life - art 15(1)(a) and conserve, develop and diffuse culture - art 15 (2) ICESCR.
• Ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities shall not be denied the right to enjoy their own culture, profess or practise their own religion, or use their own language
• art 27 ICCPR.
• art 30 CRC.
• States must prohibit and eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law - art 5 of ICERD. Other civil rights such as:
• Right to nationality art 5 (d)(iii).
• Right to assembly and association art 5 (d)(ix).
• Right to opinion and expression art art 5 (d) (viii).
• Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion - art 18(1) ICCPR:
• Same applies to refugees - art 4 of COSR.
• Same applies to the child - art 14 (1) of CRC.
• Same applies to migrant workers- art 12 (1) and (2) CRMW.
• Right to privacy - art 17 ICCPR
• Right not to be subject to coercion that would impair freedom to have or to adopt religion or belief - art 18 (2) ICCPR.
• Right of parents and legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions - art 18 (4) ICCPR, art 13(3) ICESCR and art 14 (2) CRC.

Where advocating or inciting hate, discrimination and violence (not exhaustive):

• The inherent right to life which shall be protected by law (art 6 of ICCPR).
• Right to liberty and security of person (art 9 ICCPR).
• Requirement to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse (art 19 CRC).
• Use of custom, tradition or religious considerations to avoid elimination of violence against women (art 4 DEVAW).
• Right to be free from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment ( art 1 and art 4 of CAT).

Looking Forward

While these examples may seem outrageous, it is exactly this type of disinformation that garners the most attention and clicks. “Content Prioritisation” - the design and algorithmic methods that tech platforms use to promote or downrank content that appears in front of users - goes to the very heart of pluralism, diversity and the access to accurate, reliable information - a key aspect of freedom of expression and the foundation of a democratic society.

The algorithms used by tech companies for search, social and news feeds, are optimised for increasing advertising revenue. Algorithms promote highly engaging, often polarising content to users. The more people use a platform, the more advertising revenue is generated.

However, tech companies have recently shown a clear willingness and interest to better adhere to international human rights law. The foundational principles enshrined in the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights suggest that enterprises “should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.” As the United Nations has stated, businesses looking to prevent human rights violations “requires taking adequate measures for their prevention, mitigation and, where appropriate, remediation”. There is still ample space for companies to step up and exercise due diligence to comply with human rights law, where human rights refers to internationally recognized human rights

A variety of solutions have been proposed and piloted to confront the disinformation challenge, both from a legal and policy front as well as from a technology perspective. Some of these policy solutions, such as the Digital Services Act (DSA) within the EU, aim to protect users’ rights in online spaces, which are based upon existing international frameworks. Algorithms - unless regulated - often amplify the most polarising content. At its most extreme, adversarial narratives deliberately designed to promote real harm run directly counter to human rights for all.

disinformationindex.org

15. China’s economic self-destruction

Excerpt:

To Xi Jinping, everything is now subordinate to national security and party control. The era of reform and opening, as far as it every existed, is dead. Xi may have hoped that western investors, so gullible in the past, would not notice, or would simply grit their teeth and go along with it, seduced by the mythical promise of the China market. There’s long been a view in Beijing that foreign companies would put up with almost anything for a slice of the China market, but calculations are changing, and many are now concluding that Xi’s China is simply not worth the ordeal.

China’s economic self-destruction

The Spectator · by Ian Williams · July 15, 2023

1. Coffee House

Ian Williams

The country wants foreign investment while attacking foreign companies

• 15 July 2023, 8:12am

Xi Jinping and his wife, Peng Liyuan (photo: Getty)

Mao Zedong had a big thing about contradictions. They were the basis of life, driving it forward, the old despot once mused. But even he might have struggled to understand today’s Communist party – which is desperately trying to drum up foreign investment while simultaneously hounding foreign companies out of the country.

The latest figures on inward investment will have made grim reading for the elderly leaders in Zhongnanhai, their compound in Beijing. Foreign investment fell to $20 billion in the first quarter of 2023, compared with $100 billion over the same time last year, according to the research firm Rhodium Group. This comes as the economic recovery following China’s reopening after Covid-19 is rapidly running out of steam. June exports fell 12.4 per cent year on year, youth unemployment at more than 20 per cent is at its highest level since China began publishing data in 2018, and analysts are scrambling to cut their growth forecasts.

There are whispers that the country is becoming uninvestable

Beijing has labelled this year the ‘Year of Investing in China’. Regional leaders have sent delegations around the world to drum up interest, with little to show for it. At a World Economic Forum event in the Chinese port city of Tianjin last month, China’s premier Li Qiang told a round table of business leaders, ‘I want to take this opportunity to affirm China’s commitment to opening up.’ While this week, Xi Jinping himself was quoted by state television as calling for greater foreign cooperation in trade, investment and financial innovation.

It all smacked a bit of desperation after months of Xi trying to bring foreign companies to heel. This including questioning staff at consulting firm Bain and Co and raiding and detaining staff at the Beijing office of the due diligence company Mintz Group. Both of these companies deal in information, making the sort of insights into the market and about would-be partners that are essential in the opaque world of Chinese business. The CCP seems intent on closing down sources of information it does not control. China has barred its companies from buying from US chipmaker Micron Technology and has introduced a vaguely worded anti-espionage law, which allows for the inspection of electronic devices and baggage. It has also raised fears that business activities long regarded as routine, such as market research, could be criminalised. All of this has added to the perception in foreign boardrooms that doing business in China has become very risky. There are whispers that the country is becoming uninvestable.

The strange juxtaposition of opportunistic charm and thuggery is also evident in Hong Kong. The government has launched a ‘Happy Hong Kong’ campaign to woo back tourists and business. But just as this was getting up to speed the Hong Kong authorities announced they were offering a HK$1 million (£100,000) award for information leading to the arrest of eight exiled pro-democracy activists. John Lee, the territory’s tin-pot leader, announced that the activists should be treated like ‘street rats’. Earlier this week, Hong Kong police took away for questioning the parents and brother of Nathan Law, one of the wanted activists, who is now in the UK.

It is not just foreign businesses which are finding the business climate in China more challenging. The CCP has also tightened its control of nominally private domestic businesses, particularly tech companies. There is also evidence of stepped up capital flight. Economists at Goldman Sachs believe as much money will flow out of the country this year as will come in – and that’s just the money we know about. The property bubble continues to deflate, with real estate companies – the main engine of the economy – still in severe difficulty and local government swimming in debt. Some are hoping for a big government stimulus to pump up the economy, but the return from these infrastructure splurges has been declining for some time. China’s growth model seems to have reached its limits. These old remedies no longer work.

China’s leaders have shown themselves to be very prickly when it comes to western talk of ‘de-risking’, the buzz-phrase that has replaced ‘de-coupling’. ‘Governments should not over-reach themselves, still less stretch the concept of risk or turn it into an ideological tool,’ premier Li Qiang complained in Tianjin. The CCP’s anger at ‘de-risking’ suggests western governments have got it about right.

The CCP will still lay the red carpet out for the likes of Tesla’s Elon Musk and Wall Street banks, but that is because China needs them. It wants to lead the world in EV technology and its financial system requires more expertise. Wall Street has also been a powerful lobbyist for the CCP in the past. They will be welcomed as long as they serve a purpose for the CCP, after which the door will be slammed shut on them. That has long been the CCP’s notion of opening.

To Xi Jinping, everything is now subordinate to national security and party control. The era of reform and opening, as far as it every existed, is dead. Xi may have hoped that western investors, so gullible in the past, would not notice, or would simply grit their teeth and go along with it, seduced by the mythical promise of the China market. There’s long been a view in Beijing that foreign companies would put up with almost anything for a slice of the China market, but calculations are changing, and many are now concluding that Xi’s China is simply not worth the ordeal.

Written by

Ian Williams

Ian Williams is a former foreign correspondent for Channel 4 News and NBC, and author of The Fire of the Dragon: China’s New Cold War (Birlinn).

The Spectator · by Ian Williams · July 15, 2023

16. Deng and ‘Gee, whiz’: the 1st PRC-based US reporters

Deng and ‘Gee, whiz’: the 1st PRC-based US reporters

With Americans getting scarce on the ground, time to remember hopeful pioneers who covered big changes from ’79

asiatimes.com · by Mike Chinoy · July 14, 2023

The deterioration in Sino-American relations in recent years has led, among many other consequences, to a dramatic drop in the size of the American press corps based in China. For reasons that include expulsions and visa denials, the number of American journalists on the ground in China is lower than at any time in decades. It’s an appropriate time to look back on the pioneering generation of reporters who opened the first US news bureaus in China after the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979. Their stories are recounted in this excerpt from Assignment China: An Oral History of American Journalists in the People’s Republic, a new book by Mike Chinoy, who served as CNN’s first Beijing bureau chief. –Editors

With the establishment of diplomatic relations, the Chinese government agreed to allow American news organizations to open bureaus in Beijing, and the Carter administration welcomed Chinese journalists to be based in Washington. For the newly arrived American reporters, Deng Xiaoping’s policies of economic reform and opening China to the world up after the isolation of the Mao years was the major story.

Sandy Gilmour had been the NBC News Houston correspondent when asked by the network to open its bureau in Beijing.

Sandy Gilmour, NBC News, reporting from Shenzhen, Photo courtesy of Sandy Gilmoour

Sandy Gilmour, NBC News:

Clearly the primary story was the economic opening to the West, China beginning to develop some semblance of private enterprise, to reform this socialist command economy. I tried to do as many stories along those lines as I could. And slice-of-life. Those kinds of stories were always very popular. You could go out on the street, and you could shoot street scenes, bicycles, people walking, the cabbage piled up on the sidewalks in the wintertime for storage, stores and shops and so forth. You could go up to people and ask them questions, although many didn’t want to answer because they were afraid of the potential consequences, even if it was a nonpolitical question such as “How do you enjoy life?” But to get into a Chinese enterprise, to go to a collective farm, a factory, those kinds of things took weeks and weeks of preparation, of phone calls, of begging and pleading and wheedling with the office in the Foreign Ministry that permitted correspondents to get out and do their business. It was extremely frustrating.

§

CBS sent Bruce Dunning, who had spent years covering the war in Vietnam.

Bruce Dunning (1940-2013). Photo: the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan

Bruce Dunning, CBS News:

A lot of us were trying to counteract the years of “Red China Menace” kind of stories and say, “These are people.” It’s the largest country in the world. What are they really like? There was generally a lot of good feeling. Early on, you could get almost anything on the air. There was just that novelty, you know: We have a bureau in Beijing. We have a presence in China. They were willing to put almost anything on the air.

§

Jim Laurie, who arrived for ABC News, also had covered Vietnam and had been one of the few American journalists to stay in Saigon after the Communist victory.

L-R, Frank Ching, Wall Street Journal, and Jim Laurie, ABC News, with Deng Xiaoping, Beijing, January 1979. Photo courtesy of Jim Laurie

Jim Laurie, ABC News:

In the early days, the opening of China to the West, there was a “gee whiz” mentality. If you go back and look at the programming on ABC, NBC and CBS in 1979, that is very much reflected. China opening up. Every little innovation that was part of the reform program that Deng was outlining was seized upon. The first private restaurant. The first private car. It was all a series of firsts. There was an insatiable appetite for slice-of- life stories, particularly if you could get good images. It’s hard to understand now, but you’ve got to realize that in this period, ’79 to ’83, this was “coming out” for China. Very little had been seen of China, especially by American TV viewers. So almost anything that was visually interesting went.

§

Bruce Dunning, CBS News:

We did stories on private restaurants. People would set up restaurants in their homes and those were some of the first examples of private enterprise.

I remember when free markets began to show up on the outskirts of Beijing, just a few farmers setting up primitive benches and selling produce, but it was such an improvement over the state stores and the quality of produce just increased remarkably.

§

Linda Mathews, who had been working in Hong Kong for the Asian Wall Street Journal, opened the Los Angeles Times bureau.

Linda Mathews, Los Angeles Times:

On Good Friday 1980, some of the churches were just being reopened after being shut down during the Cultural Revolution. We walked into a church and met this bishop named Moses Xie. There was a choir practicing for Sunday services, and they had hand-lettered hymnals because the real hymnals had been burned during the Cultural Revolution. They were singing in Chinese, “Rise up, you men of God.” It was a magical moment to be in a Chinese church, which had been a factory for years and years, and here was a choir and a couple of Jesuits.

Linda’s husband Jay, who had studied Chinese at Harvard, became the Washington Post bureau chief. They faced a special problem, as neither of their papers was happy having its correspondent married to the competition.

Jay Mathews, Washington Post, and Linda Mathews, Los Angeles Times, at the Ming Tombs, Beijing, Photo courtesy of Jay and Linda Mathews

Jay Mathews, Washington Post:

The Washington Post had a tradition of correspondents signing a letter of understanding before they went overseas. There was a paragraph in my letter which said, Don’t you dare ever be beaten by your wife on any kind of story, and if you can beat her as often as possible, that’s fine. And I signed that very happily. But we’ve learned, as correspondents go overseas, that they do team up.

§

As part of his reforms, Deng Xiaoping authorized the establishment of four special zones along the country’s southeastern coast as laboratories to experiment with market-style economics, and, he hoped, spearhead economic growth. For the first time since the Communist revolution, capitalist activities such as private enterprise and foreign investment were not only permitted but actively encouraged. The first zone was Shenzhen, at the time just a small fishing community directly across the border from Hong Kong.

Frank Ching, born in Hong Kong, edited China stories for several years for the New York Times. In 1974, he returned to the territory to join the Asian Wall Street Journal before being assigned to Beijing.

Frank Ching, Wall Street Journal:

Shenzhen was nothing. A little village, very few people. When you first went down, there was nothing to see. They hadn’t done anything yet. But they talked about their plans. Now there are millions of people. It’s incredible that China could build up a city like this almost overnight.

§

Pulitzer Prize-winning photojournalist Liu Heung-Shing, himself seldom photographed, in a home movie. Photo courrtesy of Sandy Gilmour.

Liu Heung-shing, who had also been born in Hong Kong, joined the Associated Press bureau in Beijing. He was later to move to Time.

Liu Heung-Shing, Time, Associated Press:

They were laying out their blueprints and telling us where they’re going to build a highway and where they’re going to build a Holiday Inn hotel and convention center, where they’re going to build the port.

And the reaction from my colleagues on that trip was that, “Yeah, right.”

§

Like Jay Mathews, Richard Bernstein had studied Chinese at Harvard. He had been serving as Time magazine’s Hong Kong correspondent.

Richard Bernstein, (Time,) on a train, Photo courtesy Liu Heung-Shing

Richard Bernstein, Time:

I think what we got wrong was, we totally underestimated the ability of China to change rapidly. Nobody could have predicted. We certainly didn’t predict the extent to which China would become a country like a lot of others.

§

Some of the most dramatic changes began to unfold in the countryside, where Deng Xiaoping authorized the breakup of that symbol of radical Maoism, the people’s communes. The collective farms, set up during the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s, were replaced by a system of household family farming that sharply boosted rural incomes.

Melinda Liu, a Chinese American from Ohio, opened the Newsweek bureau.

Melinda Liu, Newsweek:

The People’s Commune system was such an icon of Maoism. The fact that it was being broken up into family-based farms, which turned out to be much more productive than the big collectives, was very telling. On the group visits, the challenge was, how do you get anything out of it that’s not the same as everyone else? There was one of these group visits to Anhui where a People’s Commune was being literally parceled out. I kind of infiltrated a family and they were so excited and really happy. One farmer was like, “Yeah, I got such and such a plot, [of land].” They had even divided up the wheelbarrow so that someone had half, and someone had the other half. “My neighbor got the wheel, and I got the rest of it.” And I’m like, “How is that going to work?” But they were so happy.

§

Indeed, as the Mao years faded into memory, the dominant theme in the China of Deng Xiaoping was hope.

Jay Mathews, Washington Post:

We were fairly hopeful. This very strong culture was coming back, was building businesses, was creating a government that was more responsive to the people’s needs, was letting people talk more freely, if not in the public press. That was unleashing all kinds of interesting and hopeful changes in the way Chinese were going about their lives – and producing flashes of humor, creative art, filmmaking, things they hadn’t had before and were going in interesting directions. I am an optimist, so I was always looking to see the glass half full, and I thought the glass was really getting much fuller.

###

Mike Chinoy, a non-resident senior fellow at the University of Southern California’s US-China Institute, spent 24 years as a foreign correspondent for CNN, serving as the network’s first Beijing bureau chief and senior Asia correspondent. He won Emmy, Dupont and Peabody Awards for his coverage of Tiananmen Square. He is the author of five books including China Live: People Power and the Television Revolution; Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis; The Last POW; and Are You With Me: Kevin Boyle and the Rise of the Human Rights Movement. This excerpt adapted from his Assignment China: An Oral History of American Journalists in the People’s Republlic, is copyright © 2023 Columbia University Press. Used by arrangement with the publisher. All rights reserved.

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asiatimes.com · by Mike Chinoy · July 14, 2023

17. Unorthodox Brilliance: Unconventional Eastern Military Tactics Throughout History

Unorthodox Brilliance: Unconventional Eastern Military Tactics Throughout History

sofrep.com · by SOFREP · July 14, 2023

by SOFREP 1 day ago

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A Shinobi sneaking in the night. (Image generated using AI)

Unconventional warfare, with its emphasis on asymmetrical tactics and unconventional methods, has long played a significant role in military history. While Western military traditions have often focused on conventional strategies and large-scale battles, the Eastern approach has embraced the unorthodox, utilizing unique tactics and techniques to achieve their objectives.

In contrast to Western military doctrines, which tend to rely on overwhelming force and direct confrontation, the East traditions have emphasized flexibility, adaptability, and unconventional thinking. Instead of engaging in head-on clashes, Eastern armies often employed stealth, guerrilla warfare, and psychological manipulation to gain advantages over their adversaries. From the cunning stealth of ninjas to the thunderous charge of war elephants, let us delve into these unconventional maneuvers that have indelibly left their mark on the pages of history.

Ninjas and Shinobi

Employed by ancient Japanese military forces, ninjas, also known as shinobi, were highly skilled warriors who operated in the shadows. They emerged during a time of political turmoil, where powerful factions vied for control, and stealth and espionage became essential tools for survival. There are known for utilizing stealth, espionage, and unconventional combat techniques to carry out sabotage, intelligence gathering, and assassinations. With their mastery of disguise and guerrilla warfare, these shadowy figures struck fear into the hearts of their enemies. But their primary purpose was usually not to engage in direct battles but to gather information, disrupt enemy operations, and carry out covert missions that would undermine the opposition.

Image source: Wikimedia Commons

Historically, shinobis have made an impact on Japanese military history and have extended beyond the battlefield. Their reputation and mystique have endured through countless legends and tales, capturing the imagination of people worldwide, just as spies and undercover agents rose to prominence in pop culture. The image of the ninja as a shadowy figure clad in black had become iconic, symbolizing stealth, agility, and mastery of unconventional warfare.

Mongolian Horse Archers

Image source: Wikimedia Commons

The Mongol Empire’s military prowess was epitomized by its skilled horse archers. Founded by Genghis Khan in the 13th century, these archers employed hit-and-run tactics, feigned retreats, and mobile warfare to overwhelm and disorient their enemies, all while mounted on fast and agile horses. Their ability to rain down a hail of arrows while in motion made them a formidable force on the battlefield. Typical tactics include luring enemy forces into pursuing them, only to turn around suddenly and launch a counterattack. This creates confusion and disarray among their adversaries, who find themselves vulnerable and too late to react. Its effectiveness led the Mongol Empire to conquer vast territories and establish one of the largest empires in history.

Chinese Fire Arrows

Image source: Wikimedia Commons

The Chinese military developed fire arrows as a unique weapon during ancient times. These arrows were equipped with explosive or incendiary tips, allowing them to disrupt enemy formations and set fire to structures. The fire arrows added an element of surprise and caused further chaos on the battlefield, creating a significant psychological impact on the enemy. Its introduction paved the way for a new form of long-range attack that forced enemies to adapt their defensive and counterattack strategies on the battlefield.

Indian War Elephants

Image source: Wikimedia Commons

In ancient Indian warfare, the use of war elephants was a formidable tactic that instilled fear in adversaries. These majestic creatures were trained to charge enemy lines, trample infantry, and create chaos on the battlefield. The sheer size and power of war elephants made them a formidable force capable of breaking through enemy defenses. Their employment provided a significant advantage in battles, as their presence alone could intimidate and disrupt enemy formations. The historical impact of war elephants in Indian warfare was substantial, as they played a decisive role in numerous battles, symbolizing power and dominance.

Korean Turtle Ships

Image source: Wikimedia Commons

During the Joseon Dynasty, Korean naval forces pioneered using “turtle ships.” These heavily armored warships featured spiked roofs resembling a turtle’s shell, providing protection and serving as floating fortresses against enemy naval attacks. The unique design of these ships allowed for effective defense and strategic positioning, turning the tide of many naval engagements. The historical impact of Korean Turtle Ships was significant, as they revolutionized maritime warfare and showcased Korea’s innovative approach to naval defense. Their formidable presence deterred enemy forces and provided a platform for successful naval operations.

Gurkha Warfare

Ghurkas in action (Image source: Wikimedia Commons)

Gurkha soldiers from Nepal have a long history of employing unconventional warfare tactics. Renowned for their fierce reputation and mastery of guerrilla warfare, ambushes, and stealth, the Gurkhas have proven formidable opponents on the battlefield. Their tenacity, adaptability, and unconventional tactics have earned them a place among the world’s most respected military units. Gurkha warfare has made a historical impact through their contributions to various conflicts, where their unique tactics and unwavering bravery have often turned the tide of battles.

Arab Bedouin Raids

Arab Bedouin Warrior (Image source: Wikimedia Commons)

Bedouin tribes in the Arabian Peninsula were known for their hit-and-run raiding tactics. Harnessing their exceptional horsemanship skills, these warriors launched surprise attacks on enemy forces and swiftly retreated into the vast desert. Their agility, knowledge of the terrain, and lightning-fast strikes made them elusive and difficult to counter. Arab Bedouin raids served as a crucial aspect of desert warfare and had a historical impact by keeping adversaries on edge and disrupting enemy supply lines and communication networks.

The Sikh Khanda Formation

Sikh warriors would form a circular defensive formation, with the strongest soldiers in the center providing excellent defense. This also allowed close-quarters combat against larger enemy forces. The unity and resilience displayed by Sikh warriors in this formation symbolized their unwavering determination and commitment to their cause. Historically, the Sikh Khanda formation stood out in its effectiveness in battles, where it showcased the strength and strategic acumen of Sikh warriors.

Korean Hwacha Rocket Launchers

The back view of a Hwacha battery. (Image source: Wikimedia Commons)

The Koreans developed a formidable weapon, the Hwacha, a multiple rocket launcher mounted on a cart. Capable of firing a barrage of arrows or rockets, the Hwacha had a devastating effect on enemy ranks. Its ability to rain down projectiles from a distance gave Korean forces a significant advantage in battle, allowing them to deliver a concentrated and powerful assault. What made Hwacha rocket launchers a remarkable unconventional tactic lies in their role in defending against enemy forces and inflicting heavy casualties, shaping the outcomes of several Korean conflicts.

Japanese Kamikaze Attacks

In the desperate final stages of World War II, Japanese pilots carried out kamikaze attacks as their last-ditch effort to turn the tides around in their favor. This unconventional tactic involves suicide missions, intentionally crashing their aircraft into enemy ships to inflict maximum damage and psychological impact. While highly controversial, these extreme tactics demonstrated the unwavering dedication and sacrifice of the Japanese military.

***

These unconventional Eastern military tactics highlight the ingenuity, adaptability, and strategic thinking of ancient and medieval armies. By thinking outside the box and embracing unorthodox approaches, these warriors achieved remarkable results on the battlefield. Their legacies inspire military strategists and enthusiasts alike, reminding us that brilliance often lies in breaking the mold and embracing the unexpected.

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sofrep.com · by SOFREP · July 14, 2023

18. Deterrence by Resilience: The Case of Ukraine - Turkish Policy Quarterly

Conclusion:

The Russo-Ukraine War demonstrates the limits of extended deterrence and the vulnerability of aspiring states seeking admission into NATO. NATO’s core interest as a defensive alliance remains protected. Escalation from conventional to nuclear weapons remains deterred as of May 2023. From the Russian perspective, NATO has not directly intervened on Ukraine’s behalf and has not supplied weapons that would alter the strategic environment against Russia. In these three instances, threat's capability, capacity, and communication exceed the potential benefit of action. Where deterrence did fail to alter Russia’s aggression, the war has demonstrated that NATO can effectively reinforce a state’s resilience to enable deterrence by denial. The war also verifies Shelling’s theory that deterrence can effectively stop escalation between levels of weapons from conventional to nuclear. A major implication for NATO policy is that extended deterrence for non-member states requires costlier signaling than can be provided by money and training alone, and that when extended deterrence fails, the money and training required to impose high costs on an aggressor are significantly higher.

Deterrence by Resilience: The Case of Ukraine - Turkish Policy Quarterly

​by Rebecca Jensen and​ Larry D. Caswell

turkishpolicy.com

10.58867/IBIS9578/ODXQ1683

The 1964 noir-classic Dr. Strangelove describes the cornerstone of alliances – bound together, an adversary must carefully consider attacking. NATO as an international organization boasts a military force over one-million strong. The Alliance has demonstrated the ability to deploy coordinated, lethal force anywhere in the world. NATO warned Russia that there will be consequences for attacking their partner, Ukraine. In January 2022, Russia still attacked. Why? Did NATO and the U.S. fail to properly implement a strategy of deterrence? Did Russia in fact deter NATO as it used brute force to impose their will on their neighbor? Does this mean extended deterrence is dead? With Russia’s expected three-day action entering its second year, what can the world observe of deterrence?

Deterrence is the art of producing in the mind of the enemy…. the fear to attack (Dr. Strangelove, 1964).

Examining the Russo-Ukraine war through the lens of deterrence theory provides a framework to assess a cornerstone of U.S. and NATO strategy for the past 75 years in practice. As the international community exits a unipolar environment and resumes great power competition, the war validates requirements to effectively implement a deterrence strategy, demonstrate its effectiveness, and increase its future effectiveness. Close examination demonstrates deterrence is effective and extended deterrence, while ineffective in Ukraine, can be effective through increasing partner resilience.

What is Deterrence?

In practice, deterrence takes two forms: punishment and denial.[1] In deterrence by punishment, the protagonist threatens military force to punish an antagonist if it takes a specific action; if the antagonist does not act, the protagonist does not punish. In deterrence by denial, a protagonist threatens to use military force to keep an antagonist from achieving their desired outcomes or to make it so expensive it isn’t worth trying. Again, if there is no action by the antagonist, the protagonist does not use force.

NATO policy provides two examples of this. NATO maintains nuclear weapons as a cornerstone of defense – an attack on the core interest of Allies’ sovereignty could result in a nuclear response.[2] This threat of overwhelming response to punish aggression and ambiguity on thresholds for crossing from the conventional to nuclear layer deters aggression against the Alliance. NATO also maintains over 40,000 troops in a high-readiness level, prepared to respond within 15 days of activation. This force could block aggression against the Alliance and keep an aggressor from ever meeting the goals of their military offensive. In both these examples, NATO seeks to change the cost-benefit calculation of aggressors.

NATO also maintains over 40,000 troops in a high-readiness level, prepared to respond within 15 days of activation. This force could block aggression against the Alliance and keep an aggressor from ever meeting the goals of their military offensive. In both these examples, NATO seeks to change the cost-benefit calculation of aggressors.

According to Deterrence Theory, threats of punishment and denial alone are insufficient to impact an aggressor’s cost-benefit calculation. To be effective, the protagonist’s threat must be capable, credible, and effectively communicated.[3]The antagonist must believe the protagonist has the capability to impose the threat – does the state have the power to carry out the threat? The antagonist must believe the protagonist will use the threat – does the state have the will to commit the blood and treasure to carry out the threat? Finally, the antagonist must understand the threat – does the state effectively communicate the cost to an aggressor for taking an action and the cost avoidance if it doesn’t? Without these three components, a threat will not adjust the aggressor’s calculations or deter an action.

Implementing the three components have separate challenges. Capability is the most straight forward – an assessment of NATO’s capacity to take military action across the air, cyber, land, sea, and space domains compared to Russia’s ability to defend in these domains indicates capability. Credibility is less mathematical as it assesses if the 30 members of NATO can agree to unified military action. Can one member carry the Alliance forward or does the Alliance have to pull a member(s) along? What does history and the current political environment suggest? Finally, communication can offer the biggest challenge – communicating across cultures the consequences of action, the assurance of no threat for inaction, opportunities to avert conflict, and the capability and credibility to use force if Russia acts must take different forms. Public statements, diplomacy, and military mobilization are forms of communication that must be clearly understood to be effective. If the protagonist and antagonist do not have similar understandings of the capability, credibility, and communication, deterrence will not be effective.[4]

The modern environment continues to make deterrence more complex to successfully implement as a strategy. For instance, an actor (or group of actors) can offer extended deterrence, where the protagonist offers a threat to an antagonist to deter actions against a protégé. Generally associated with a nuclear threat, extended deterrence usually has an elevated challenge with credibility as the protagonist must convince the antagonist it would go to war for the protégé.[5] The intervening protagonist has many levers to deter action, including reassuring the protégé of its protection against the antagonist, accommodating the antagonist to promote a level of peace, restraining the protégé’s threats, or using deterrent threats to stop to antagonist.[6] Ukraine’s innovative use of technology and potential targeting inside Russia demonstrate that in extended deterrence, the protégé’s actions can be as impactful as the protagonist’s or antagonist’s actions. Even prior to the 2014 invasion of Ukraine, NATO has tried to bolster the effectiveness of extended deterrence, through deterrence by resilience.

Similar to Schelling’s “deterrent defense”, NATO’s deterrence by resilience relies on states (both Allies and partners) hardening their ability to resist offensive action to ultimately deny the aggressor’s objectives or allow NATO time to mobilize a response to deny or punish the aggressor.[7],[8],[9] By 2022, NATO established the new Resilience Committee observing “[r]esilience is both a national responsibility and a collective commitment”.[10] While the Committee sets priorities and the requirements change, maintains baseline requirements, including continuity of government services, energy supply resiliency, displaced personnel management, food and water security, and communications network resiliency.[11]

NATO, Russia, and Ukraine

Before examining Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine it is important to understand fundamentals of NATO. Founded in 1949, the Alliance’s founding document, the North Atlantic Treaty, outlines NATO’s enduring purpose, which is to achieve collective defense for preserving peace and security.[12] NATO’s core interest is safeguarding members’ sovereignty through deterrence and collective response. NATO maintains a strong interest in the security and stability of its neighbors. The founding Treaty is specific that the defensive agreement protects Treaty Allies and that to enjoy those protections, a state must join the Alliance.

NATO, Russia, and Ukraine have been tied together since 1994 when Ukraine – heirs of the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal – signed the Budapest Memorandum. Ukraine pledged to end its nuclear weapons program and transfer all Highly Enriched Uranium to Russia through this document, also signed by Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In exchange, signatories affirmed – not guaranteed – to “respect the independence and sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine” and to “refrain from the threat or use of force” against that country.[13],[14],[15] A decade later in 2008, Ukraine demonstrated intention for even greater partnership with NATO as they became a contributing nation to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force.[16] The same year, NATO re-affirmed its commitment to states’ right to self-determination of alliances and started the Annual National Programme (ANP) for Ukraine, publicly recognizing that Ukraine would become a NATO member.[17]

Ukraine’s goals of joining NATO directly clashed with Russia’s sense of security. As early as 1990, when NATO sought to bring a unified Germany into the Alliance, Russia sought concessions that NATO would not expand further west.[18]In February 2014, following the Revolution of Dignity, Russia disregarded its commitment to respect Ukrainian sovereignty and seized the Crimean Peninsula, which increased Ukrainian resolve to join NATO.[19] After 2014, NATO and individual NATO members sought to build Ukrainian capacity in key areas across 13 support measures including Capacity and Institution Building, Logistics and Standardization, Cyber Defense, and Medical Rehabilitation.[20]

Continuing to progress membership, President Zelenskyy approved Ukraine's new National Security Strategy in 2019, outlining an enhanced partnership with NATO to work toward membership.[21] NATO publicly supported Ukraine’s goal of membership and lauded Ukraine’s progress in annual ANP reporting. By December 2021, Russia’s concern with NATO expansion into Ukraine came to a head as troops massed on the Ukraine border. President Putin demanded formal agreements from NATO that Ukraine would not be able to join NATO, stating “the ball is in their court… they must answer us something."[22]

Analyzing the Deterrent Threats

In deterrence, initiative belongs to the antagonist, who chooses whether and when to attack. With Ukraine still a partner, not a NATO member, there were still several deterrent threats that Russia likely considered when deciding to act. Tools to evaluate Russian assessments are limited but comparing conditions in 2014 to 2022 is useful.

Capability

In 2022 as in 2014, NATO’s conventional and nuclear capacity were unrivaled in the world. Drawing on the resources of 30 countries, NATO possessed the military capability to both punish and deny objectives. NATO does have limitations. In 2013, the U.S. redeployed its last forward stationed armored unit from Europe. The deployment of an armored battalion set in 2014 allowed for combined arms training but signaled that the U.S. military, a significant contributor of combat forces, would not immediately contribute significant combat force to a NATO response.[23] NATO also substantially relies on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Doubts about the U.S. willingness to engage in nuclear war over Europe and the lack of tactical nuclear weapons on the continent could drive NATO to a conventional response to a nuclear event. These two shortfalls in capability could be opportunities for Russia.

When Russia seized Crimea in 2014, Ukraine had significant challenges responding. Without any formal defensive agreements with other nations, Ukraine’s armed forces were the only available response. Outnumbering the Ukrainian army by more than four to one, Russia had a significant overmatch in equipment and personnel. At the same time, a combination of laws prohibiting use of the army, political corruption, and lack of trust between the people and the government significantly hindered the Ukrainian response to Russian aggression.[24]

In the seven years after Russia commenced its attack on Ukraine, the Ukrainian armed forces progressed with NATO assistance. Leader training, combat training and support missions with ISAF developed resilience in the armed forces. NATO’s 2019 assessment found Ukraine’s armed forces had progressed from a 150,000-strong force that could only muster one brigade capable of combat operations to a capable 250,000-strong force, many of whom had benefitted from NATO training missions and with limited numbers of advanced NATO weapons. Under President Zelenskyy, Ukraine also reduced corruption, with NATO estimating that corruption reforms in between 2016 and 2018 saved the country $2 billion.[25]

Russia likely considered its own military strengths when weighing advances in Ukrainian capability. Beginning in 2008, the “New Look” reforms transitioned the Russian Army from a 5-million-man force based on conscription, to a leaner force balancing conscription and professional soldiers in a brigade structure.[26] The 2014 occupation of Ukraine, subsequent engagements, and operational deployments to Syria confirmed the efficacy of these modernizations to Russian officials. Operations in Syria also enabled Russia to trial integrating private armies such as the Wagner Group.

Credibility

Ahead of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in May 2014, NATO had many competing claims for its attention, from the Arab Spring movement, the Eurozone crisis, and the disruption to intelligence sharing in the wake of the Snowden leaks. Against this backdrop of domestic and international turmoil, NATO did not respond militarily to the fait accompli of a partner nation’s territory being annexed, merely using sanctions to attempt to coerce Russia to withdraw.

Ahead of the 2022 attack on Ukraine, NATO countries were even more internally focused, due to COVID and containment measures, market disruptions, and Brexit. The U.S. evacuation from Afghanistan in August of 2021 caught international and local headlines as the U.S. ended a 17-year occupation, causing a mass refugee migration out of Afghanistan. The U.S. also expended trillions of dollars to mitigate the impacts of COVID and started to see significant inflation from a demand-driven market.

Considering the two time periods, Russia could estimate an attack on a NATO partner in early 2022 would not bring a military response from NATO. Despite closer ties with Ukraine for training, NATO was still not committed to a military response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Russia likely understood that an attack on a NATO ally would result in punishment and denial, but an assault on a non-ally would not result in a military retaliation.

Communication

The most observable communication of threat is the movement of forces. Following the Russian annexation in 2014, NATO communicated two messages. At the Wales Summit of 2014 NATO agreed to deploy a rotational multinational force to Baltic allies and Poland.[27],[28] In the same summit, NATO further committed to work with their Partner of Distinction, Ukraine, with a mission “designed to enhance Ukraine's ability to provide for its own security” through “substantial new programmes with a focus on command, control and communications, logistics and standardisation, cyber defence, military career transition, and strategic communications.”[29],[30] Agreements resulted in rotational battalions in Baltic states and Poland and NATO members (primarily the U.S) investing over $4 billion in Ukrainian resilience.[31]The clear message was that NATO reserves military presence for allies but will assist partners to develop resilience to deny Russian victory.

In the buildup to Russia’s 2022 invasion, NATO reinforced these messages. The Brussels Summit in June 2021 highlighted the Alliance’s preparedness for mutual defense if Russia attacked a NATO state. The conference also highlighted that “resilience is essential for credible deterrence and defence” and that NATO would help partners enhance their resilience.[32] Consistent with messaging of other NATO Allies, the U.S. made it clear the U.S. would not deploy troops to defend Ukraine.[33] At the same time, President Zelensky met with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg seeking security commitments to help deter a renewed Russian invasion predicted weeks away. Consistent with earlier engagements, the Secretary General committed to Ukraine’s future path to join the Alliance and severe economic punishment for Russia if it attacked, but not military support.[34]

When to Act?

For Russia to decide to attack, the perceived benefit for the action would need to exceed the risk from the deterrent threats. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has viewed NATO expansion and “Westernization” of border states as a significant security threat. An attack on a NATO ally would almost certainly result in significant military, political, and economic punishment and likely denial of any military objectives – NATO clearly communicated this, had the capacity to enforce, and credibility would act. Further military action in Ukraine could finally halt eastward expansion of NATO and European Union membership and reestablish overwhelming influence in Ukraine. The benefits of this action must overcome two threats – a NATO threat of extended deterrence through punishment and a Ukrainian threat to deny military and political objectives.

NATO clearly stated that there was no threat of military response with the statements came both from President Biden and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. They clearly stated that there would be no military response for Russian action.[35],[36],[37] Ukraine’s threat of denial was equally ineffective. In 2014 Ukraine could only muster 6,000 troops to conduct operations at that rate of readiness. NATO training and member equipment would improve the performance of Ukraine, but Russia could overcome the limited weapon systems through their superiority in mass numbers. It also perceived that if the Ukrainian military stood to fight, the government would likely flee. These shortfalls in both deterrent threats would not outweigh potential benefits for Russia.

Observations and Implications

1) Denial by Resilience can work. Since 2014 and the rise of Russian aggression in Europe, NATO has focused on national resilience for both allies and partners. Ukraine’s ability to survive the initial invasion with adequate government, military, and civil systems in place provided an opportunity for the international community to support the country. This is particularly critical as NATO’s Strategic Concept maintains minimal forces in a “very high ready” state, with the bulk of forces planned to reinforce within 14-30 days. This observation also adds credibility to the threat of deterrence by resilience (denial), requiring a state to analyze the fragility of an opposing state before taking military action.

2) The International Community can reinforce resilience without nuclear escalation. Experience in Ukraine demonstrates NATO can help build and reinforce a partner nation’s capability to fight without decisive engagement. This is demonstrated through the effectiveness of the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) in building capacity and the ability to reinforce Ukraine’s materiel requirements. NATO can provide conventional support to Ukraine without a nuclear response from Russia. This increases the capacity and credibility of the partner’s threat of denial. Looked at in another way, this capability provides NATO a means to extend the deterrent umbrella and not rely on coercive threats to support partners.

3) Signaling nuclear escalation remains an effective deterrent against NATO. Since the beginning of the 2022 offensive, Russia has leveraged their Strategic Deterrence concept to threaten nuclear retaliation to deter support for Ukraine. In addition to using energy as a weapon for blackmail, Russia has suggested that NATO intervention could escalate the conflict from the conventional to nuclear layer. To add credibility and further communicate this, Russia announced in October 2022 that the “annexed” states were integrated parts of Russia and that efforts to retake them were attacks on Russia core interests.[38] Faced with a capable, communicated threat with some credibility, Russia’s threat is a likely cause of NATO’s choice to has limit the range and effectiveness of systems provided to Ukraine.

Russia has also demonstrated that credibility is perishable. Despite threats, NATO has trained and supplied Ukraine troops since the beginning of the conflict without a response. China and India have both publicly stated that the use of nuclear weapons is unacceptable. As trading partners and economic lifelines around NATO-led sanctions, Russia is very unlikely to defy these powers. As inaction and international disapproval erode credibility, deterrence plays less in NATO’s decision as demonstrated through supplying more advanced, longer-range systems to Ukraine.

Despite threats, NATO has trained and supplied Ukraine troops since the beginning of the conflict without a response.

This situation increases the risk of escalation. As the situation develops, NATO must continue to assess Russian communication and evaluate the credibility of the Russian threat to avoid overlooking a redline that might lead Russia to use nuclear weapons.

4) NATO’s Credibility in extended deterrence remains a vulnerability that jeopardizes aspiring nations. Structured as a defensive treaty, NATO remains challenged to extend the deterrence umbrella. The 2022 Strategic Concept demonstrates NATO’s commitment to defense, highlighting that all the three core missions are to “ensure collective defence and security of all Allies”.[39] NATO has recently demonstrated at least three options to help assure partners and deter aggressors in this vulnerable period. The most promising is expedited membership, demonstrated by efforts to fast-track membership for Sweden and Finland. Unfortunately, NATO has demonstrated that the fast track for concurrence from 30 sovereign states isn’t fast. Another option would be tripwire forces, such as the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) troops deployed to the Baltic states. This option assures the allies and partners of NATO’s intentions, while causing a deterrent dilemma for an aggressor state of attacking member forces. The third option is increasing resilience of the aspiring member as demonstrated in Ukraine. As Ukraine met conditions for the CAP, it increased the resilience of the entire government, including military and civilian response forces. NATO members also contributed billions of dollars to improve military capability. The investment in an aspiring partner did not prove effective in deterring Russian aggression, but it did prove effective in realizing denial of Russian victory. Of the three options to mitigate the risk to aspiring partners, only NATO members’ investment in resiliency proves effective in bolstering capability of a deterrent threat.

Concluding Remarks

The Russo-Ukraine War demonstrates the limits of extended deterrence and the vulnerability of aspiring states seeking admission into NATO. NATO’s core interest as a defensive alliance remains protected. Escalation from conventional to nuclear weapons remains deterred as of May 2023. From the Russian perspective, NATO has not directly intervened on Ukraine’s behalf and has not supplied weapons that would alter the strategic environment against Russia. In these three instances, threat's capability, capacity, and communication exceed the potential benefit of action. Where deterrence did fail to alter Russia’s aggression, the war has demonstrated that NATO can effectively reinforce a state’s resilience to enable deterrence by denial. The war also verifies Shelling’s theory that deterrence can effectively stop escalation between levels of weapons from conventional to nuclear. A major implication for NATO policy is that extended deterrence for non-member states requires costlier signaling than can be provided by money and training alone, and that when extended deterrence fails, the money and training required to impose high costs on an aggressor are significantly higher.

[1] Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (S.L.: Yale University Press, 1966): 69-73

[2] NATO, “STRATEGIC CONCEPT Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid.” 22 June 2022, 7-8. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf

[3] T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz, Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Paul, 2009): 3.

[4] Tami D. Biddle, “Coercion Theory: A Basic Introduction for Practitioners,” Texas National Security Review, Vol. 3 (Spring 2020): 97.

[5] Paul, Complex Deterrence, 279-282.

[6] Paul, Complex Deterrence, 289-292.

[7] Schelling, Arms and Influence, 78.

[8] NATO, Strategic Concept, 9-11.

[9] Jamie Shea, “NATO Review - Resilience: A Core Element of Collective Defence.” NATO Review. 30 March 2016. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2016/03/30/resilience-a-core-element-of-collective-defence/index.html

[10] NATO, “Resilience Committee.” 7 October 2022. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50093.htm#:~:text=The%20Resilience%20Committee%20%28RC%29%20is%20the%20senior%20NATO.

[11] Shea, “NATO Review.”

[12] NATO. 1949. “The North Atlantic Treaty.” NATO. 4 April 1949. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm

[13] Steven Pifer, “The Budapest Memorandum and U.S. Obligations.” Brookings, 4 December 2014. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/12/04/the-budapest-memorandum-and-u-s-obligations/

[14] “EIR Ukraine: The Budapest Memorandum of 1994.” 2014. https://policymemos.hks.harvard.edu/files/policymemos/files/2-23-22_ukraine-the_budapest_memo.pdf?m=1645824948

[15] Aaron Blake, “Analysis | What the Budapest Memorandum Means for the U.S. on Ukraine,” Washington Post, 1 February 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/01/what-budapest-memorandum-means-us-ukraine/

[16] “ISAF Regional Commands & PRT Locations Herat Qala-e-Naw.” 2008. NATO. https://www.nato.int/isaf/placemats_archive/2008-04-01-ISAF-Placemat.pdf

[17] NATO, “Bucharest Summit Declaration - Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008.” NATO. 3 April 2008, 23. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm

[18] Andrew Wolff, “The Future of NATO Enlargement after the Ukraine Crisis.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) Vol. 91, No. 5 (2015): 1105-1106. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24539021

[19] Daniel Treisman “Why Putin Took Crimea,” Foreign Affairs. 18 April 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/why-russian-president-putin-took-crimea-from-ukraine

[20] NATO, “Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine.” NATO. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_09/20160920_160920-compreh-ass-package-ukra.pdf

[21] NATO, “Relations with Ukraine.” NATO. 28 October 2022. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm

[22] Patrick Reevell, “Amid Ukraine Invasion Fears, Putin Says West Must Give NATO Guarantees,” ABC News, 23 December 2021. https://abcnews.go.com/International/tensions-rise-russia-ukraine-putin-places-blame-west/story?id=81913009

[23] Michael S. Darnell, “American Tanks Return to Europe after Brief Leave,” Stars and Stripes. 31 January 2014. https://www.stripes.com/news/american-tanks-return-to-europe-after-brief-leave-1.264910#:~:text=In%20April%20last%20year%2C%20the%20last%20Abrams%20tanks

[24] David Takacs, “Ukraine‘s Deterrence Failure: Lessons for the Baltic States.” Journal on Baltic Security, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2017): 4. https://doi.org/10.1515/jobs-2017-0001

[25] Jane Cordy, “Committee on The Civil Dimension Of Security (CDS) Ukraine: Five Years After The Revolution Of Dignity Report.” 9-11. NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security (CDS).

[26] Dr. Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, The Russian Way of War: Force Structure Tactics and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces(Fort Leavenworth Press, 2019): 10, 27-32.

[27] NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales.” NATO. 5 September 2014. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?mode=pressrelease

[28] NATO, “NATO’s Readiness Action Plan Fact Sheet.” Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) – Press & Media Section – Media Operations Centre (MOC). https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_10/20151007_1510-factsheet_rap_en.pdf

[29] NATO, “Whales Summit”.

[30] NATO, “Joint Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission,” NATO. 4 July 2014. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112695.htm?mode=pressrelease

[31] Rick Larsen “Special Report: Ukraine’s Fight for Freedom & Allied and Global Response to Russia’s War,” 3-4. NATO Parliamentary Assembly. NATO Parliamentary Assembly Defence and Security Committee.

[32] NATO, “Brussels Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021.” NATO. 14 June 2021, 30. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm

[33] Jarrett Renshaw, “Biden Says He Warned Putin of ‘Heavy Price’ over Ukraine,” Reuters, 31 December 2021, sec. Europe. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/biden-speak-with-ukraine-president-sunday-white-house-2021-12-31/

[34] Michael Schwirtz, “NATO Signals Support for Ukraine in Face of Threat from Russia,” The New York Times, 16 December 2021, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/16/world/europe/ukraine-nato-russia.html

[35] Justin Gomez, “Biden Warns of ‘Severe Consequences’ If Putin Moves on Ukraine,” ABC News. 8 December 2021. https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/biden-warns-severe-consequences-putin-moves-ukraine/story?id=81627505

[36] Andrew Rettman, “No Obligation to Defend Ukraine from Russia, NATO Chief Says,” EUobserver. 1 December 2021. https://euobserver.com/world/153689

[37] “NATO Secretary General with the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 16 December 2021.” NATO News. 16 December 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kH8eM-jI3Fs

[38] Paul Kirby, “What Russian Annexation Means for Ukraine’s Regions,” BBC News. 30 September 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63086767

[39] NATO, 2022 Strategic Concept, 3.

CONTRIBUTOR

Rebecca Jensen

Dr. Rebecca Jensen is an Assistant Professor at the Canadian Forces College.

Larry D. Caswell

Colonel Larry Caswell is a student at the U.S. Army War College.

turkishpolicy.com

19. 'Simply Medieval': Russian Soldiers Held In Pits And Cellars For Refusing To Fight In Ukraine

Excerpts:

Popova told RFE/RL's Russian Service that soldiers who are subjected to such punishment are often hesitant to undertake a legal fight as well.

"They were under stress for a long time, in conditions where the law does not work, and only force and violence work," she said.

Relatives of the conscripts shown in the video from the cellar released last week told Astra that they had been unable to contact the soldiers after the footage was released online.

'Simply Medieval': Russian Soldiers Held In Pits And Cellars For Refusing To Fight In Ukraine

rferl.org · by Carl Schreck · July 15, 2023

A Russian soldier convicted of insubordination was among a group of conscripts who accused their superiors of locking them up in a cellar in eastern Ukraine after they refused to fight, subjecting them to unsanitary living conditions and an insufficient diet, according to a report by an independent Russian news outlet.

The conviction of soldier Yevgeny Frolov in the far-eastern city of Spassk-Dalny on July 13 came days after new video footage emerged purporting to show Russian soldiers in Ukraine placed in captivity for refusing to go to the front line with insufficient equipment and support.

"We are locked up in this pit for refusing to go to the front line," a man out of frame can be heard saying in the video, which shows men in camouflage lying in a dank cellar-like room with crumbling walls.

"There are no commanders that would take us to the front line. There is no equipment, evacuation teams, radios. We are just thrown into the woods like dogs," the man adds in the video, which was published by the independent Russian Telegram channel Astra on July 8.

The video was the latest evidence of more than a dozen such makeshift holding facilities used to allegedly punish Russian soldiers who refused to fight in Ukraine published by Astra, which identified the men in the new video as members of Russia's 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade.

Frolov, the soldier convicted of insubordination in a military court in Spassk-Dalny, was among a group of Russian conscripts allegedly held in a similar cellar in the village of Zavitne Bazhannya in Russian-controlled territory of Ukraine's eastern Donetsk region, Astra reported.

RFE/RL was unable to independently confirm that Frolov was held in that cellar for refusing to fight in Ukraine, though the Spassk-Dalny military court's website states he was convicted of insubordination. He was sentenced to 2 1/2 years in prison, according to Astra, which cited his relatives and fellow soldiers.

Inquiries to Frolov's listed attorney went unanswered on July 15.

'Savage Methods'

Yelena Popova, a Russian soldiers' rights activist, told RFE/RL's Russian Service that the main goal of forcing soldiers to stay in these battlefield holding pens is to "force you to go to the front again."

"A commander in a war zone does not need to imprison a person, but he needs to force him here and now to go kill and die. Therefore, he resorts to such savage methods," Popova said, calling the practice "simply medieval."

In November 2022, one of the Russian soldiers allegedly held in a cellar with Frolov in Zavitne Bazhannya for refusing to fight filed an appeal to the Russian Investigative Committee alleging "tactical and strategic miscalculations by the higher command, constant lies to subordinates, [and] insufficient medical and material support."

"My confidence in the commanders has been shaken," the soldier, Mikhail Nosov, wrote in the complaint.

Maksim Grebenyuk, an attorney who represented Nosov, told RFE/RL's Russian Service in December that he had several Russian soldiers as clients who were "thrown into basements, where they were kept in inhuman conditions without formalization of procedural documents, no charges were brought."

Popova told RFE/RL's Russian Service that soldiers who are subjected to such punishment are often hesitant to undertake a legal fight as well.

"They were under stress for a long time, in conditions where the law does not work, and only force and violence work," she said.

Relatives of the conscripts shown in the video from the cellar released last week told Astra that they had been unable to contact the soldiers after the footage was released online.

rferl.org · by Carl Schreck · July 15, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com