Quotes of the Day:
"Early in life, I had to choose between honest arrogance and hypocritical humility. I chose honest arrogance and have seen no occasion to change."
- Frank Lloyd Wright
"The most important single ingredient in the formula of success is knowing how to get along with people."
- President Teddy Roosevelt
“Out of every one hundred men, ten shouldn’t even be there, eighty are just targets, nine are the real fighters, and we are lucky to have them, for they make the battle. Ah, but the one, one is a warrior, and he will bring the others back.”
— Heraclitus
1. N. Korea demands sanctions relief before discussing end-of-war declaration: NIS
2. N. Korea issues "emergency order" to arrest locals who violate nighttime curfew
3. U.N. committee approves draft resolutions calling for N. Korea to give up nukes
4. S. Korea, U.S. envoys hold phone talks on N.K. nukes, end-of-war declaration
5. N. Korea seen preparing to reopen border with China amid economic woes
6. Kim Jong-un Inherits Grandfather's 'Great Leader' Title
7. US conducting in-depth review of Korean War's end declaration: US official
8. North Korea’s Food Shortage Is a Lesson for US Policymakers
9. North Koreans drafted to harvest rice are strip searched to stop grain theft
10. Australia’s continued commitment to sanctions enforcement against North Korea
11. U.S. benefits from stronger bond between Seoul and Tokyo
12. ‘You Live With a Degree of Paranoia’ (north Korea sanctions evasion)
13. Cheong Wa Dae official rejects notion of S. Korea-U.S. rift over end-of-war declaration
14. Harry Kazianis: Joe Biden's North Korea policy is a disaster. Now is the time to get serious
15. Another ROK-North Korea Summit Won’t Make a Difference
16. US policymakers can't seem to figure out how to deal with South or North Korea
1. N. Korea demands sanctions relief before discussing end-of-war declaration: NIS
Good political warfare by the regime. By making this demand it is ensuring the blame for the continued armistice conditions (not war) rests on the US. If the US would just lift sanctions the the regime would DISCUSS an end of war declaration. This provides "ammunition" to the South to press the US for sanctions relief because the Moon administration is working hard to ensure the legacy of the "peace president."
A major line of effort of our north Korea policy and strategy should be calling out and informing Koreans, Americans, and the international community about the regime's political warfare strategy. And of course we need the ROK and the US to have sufficient alignment on the assumptions about the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. Most importantly, we must understand how Kim is trying to "play" the ROK and the US.
N. Korea demands sanctions relief before discussing end-of-war declaration: NIS
Pyongyang says S. Korea, US should at least suspend military drills
Published : Oct 29, 2021 - 15:38 Updated : Oct 29, 2021 - 16:00
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un speaks at a lecture to commemorate the 76th founding anniversary of the ruling Workers' Party on Oct. 10. (KCNA-Yonhap)
North Korea demanded UN sanctions relief and the suspension of South Korea-US military exercises as preconditions for talks on an end-of-war declaration, the South Korean spy agency said on Thursday.
The National Intelligence Service (NIS) confirmed Pyongyang’s position on the issue in a closed-door briefing at the parliamentary audit, Rep. Kim Byung-kee of the ruling Democratic Party of Korea and Rep. Ha Tae-keung of the main opposition People Party told a press conference.
North Korea conspicuously suggested the specific prerequisites just for its participation in a meeting on the end-of-war declaration, according to the members of the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee.
Pyongyang’s preconditions for opening dialogue include the suspension of the joint military exercises, and the partial lifting of the UN sanctions on refined oil, minerals, medicine, and other necessities.
North Korea specifically wanted UN economic sanctions banning exports of minerals and restricting imports of refined petroleum products lifted.
The UNSC Resolution 2321 prohibits North Korea from exporting minerals, such as copper, nickel, silver, and zinc, and Resolution 2397 caps the exports of refined petroleum oil to Pyongyang at 500,000 barrels a year.
Pyongyang also wants South Korea and the US to “at least” suspend joint military exercises before holding talks on declaring a formal end to the 1950-53 Korean War, Rep. Kim Byung-kee said, adding that the precondition is “virtually infeasible.”
Pyongyang’s demands are in line with its stance that was widely reflected in the recent statements issued under the name of North Korean senior officials, including the leader’s sister Kim Yo-jong.
North Korea has called for Washington and Seoul to withdraw their “hostile policy” toward the country and “double standards” over its military buildup in response to Seoul’s recent call for declaring a formal end to the Korean War.
Since South Korean President Moon Jae-in re-proposed the end-of-war declaration as a means to revive nuclear diplomacy in his UN speech in mid-September, Seoul has been making multiple efforts to that end.
Although North Korea’s insistence is not fresh, it is notable that North Korea has refrained from publicly demanding UN sanctions relief in the aftermath of the breakdown of the second Trump-Kim summit in February 2019. The country, instead, has broadly called for the withdrawal of what they call the US’ hostile policy.
The North’s position also runs counter to the Biden administration‘s position to meet North Korea “without preconditions.”
Food shortage and supply disruptions
During the closed-door briefing, the spy agency also shared assessments that there were indications of food insecurity and growing material shortages.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un instructed on mobilizing the entire population and military into efforts to overcome chronic food shortages. Rep. Ha Tae-keung said. Kim also reportedly ordered the country to secure every grain, saying that food shortages made him feel like “walking on thin ice.”
In mid-June, the North Korean leader unprecedentedly acknowledged that the country was experiencing a “tense” food situation mainly because of typhoon damage last year.
But the NIS assessed that this year’s overall grain output would exceed last year’s production due to an increase in sunshine hours. Pyongyang also completed its rice harvest around October 20, earlier than last year.
The South Korean spy agency also said the border shutdown has disrupted the supply of key materials, including essential medicine, and eventually hampered currency production and circulation.
North Korea’s suspension of imports of special ink and paper has stopped the production of banknotes, Rep. Ha said, explaining that the central bank has been issuing temporary currency for the country.
Amid growing supply shortages, Pyongyang has pushed forward its plans to resume transportation via cross-border freight trains. North Korea is in discussions with China and Russia regarding the reopening of overland routes, which have been shut down since January last year.
The South Korean spy agency also raised the possibility that North Korea might restart the operation of cargo trains that travel between Dandong and Sinuiju in China as early as November.
The NIS also detected the signs of North Korea additionally opening the Ryongchon Port at the mouth of the Yalu River as the now-opened Nampo port is saturated with cargo and supplies.
By Ji Da-gyum (dagyumji@heraldcorp.com)
2. N. Korea issues "emergency order" to arrest locals who violate nighttime curfew
Draconian population and resources control measures. Conditions must be seriously declining inside north Korea.
N. Korea issues "emergency order" to arrest locals who violate nighttime curfew - Daily NK
North Korean authorities issued an emergency order to the Ministry of Social Security early this month calling for sweeping arrests of locals who violate the nighttime curfew, according to a source.
A source in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Tuesday that, on Oct. 8, police boxes in Hoeryong received an order to arrest locals who violate the nighttime curfew. He added that the instructions follow an emergency order issued by the Ministry of Social Security on Oct. 7.
According to the source, the ministry order particularly stressed that branches in cities and counties along the Sino-North Korean border “absolutely must” arrest 10 people each in their respective jurisdictions “to make an example of them.” Police officers taking part in the crackdown are responding by sending violators to forced labor brigades regardless of who they are, even if they are out “just one minute, one second” past curfew.
A view of Yanggang Province from the Sino-North Korean border. / Image: Daily NK
The source said it appears the authorities have begun using the Ministry of Social Security to strongly clamp down on locals as violations have not diminished despite the change in curfew hours.
Signs that locals are defecting into China with the protracted border closure due to COVID-19 also appear to be a factor.
“[The authorities] are now using every method they can against local residents,” the source said, adding, “They are making use of the military, Ministry of State Security, and Ministry of Social Security to control the locals, but that won’t solve everything.”
According to the source, a police box in one area of Hoeryong is letting local residents in its jurisdiction go with warnings to “return home quickly so you won’t be late,” while arresting residents of other jurisdictions or districts.
Doing this allows the police to fill their quota without drawing the ire of residents of their jurisdiction, he added.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
3. U.N. committee approves draft resolutions calling for N. Korea to give up nukes
If only we could get the Security Council on board!
U.N. committee approves draft resolutions calling for N. Korea to give up nukes | Yonhap News Agency
By Chae Yun-hwan
SEOUL, Oct. 29 (Yonhap) -- A U.N. General Assembly committee has approved three draft resolutions concerning North Korea, including one reaffirming the Assembly's commitment to the "complete, verifiable and irreversible" abandonment of Pyongyang's nuclear program, its website showed Friday.
On Wednesday, the First Committee in charge of disarmament and security affairs approved 25 resolutions and decisions, including those related to the North, amid reports that the recalcitrant regime has been doubling down on its nuclear and missile programs.
Among the three resolutions is one entitled "Joint courses of action and future‑oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons." It includes provisions calling for the North to renounce nuclear arms.
"Other provisions would have the Assembly reaffirm its commitment to the complete, verifiable and irreversible abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions," a summary of the committee session reads. DPRK is the North's official name.
Another approved document, titled, "Comprehensive Nuclear‑Test‑Ban Treaty," carries the Assembly's call for the North to fully comply with U.N. Security Council resolutions.
"The Assembly would reiterate its condemnation of the six nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions and urge that country's full compliance," the summary said.
"It would welcome all efforts and dialogue to that end, including inter‑Korean summits and summits between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," it added.
North Korea has been under multiple U.N. Security Council sanctions for its weapons programs, although it has not tested nuclear and long-range missiles since late 2017.
A North Korean delegate rebuked the resolution, claiming hostility from the United States is the cause of the instability of the Korean Peninsula.
The delegate, in a coverage document, cited the committee's adopting a "double standard" of criticizing North Korea, while keeping quiet on joint military exercises between the United States and "its servile forces," apparently referring to South Korea.
The resolution is expected to be officially adopted at a plenary meeting of the U.N. General Assembly in early December.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
4. S. Korea, U.S. envoys hold phone talks on N.K. nukes, end-of-war declaration
The key to this is what I recommended at the beginning of the Biden administration. The ROK and US must sufficiently align on the strategic assumptions on the nature, objectives, and strategy for the Kim family regime. Without sufficient alignment on the assumptions it is hard to synchronize policy, strategy, and actions.
S. Korea, U.S. envoys hold phone talks on N.K. nukes, end-of-war declaration | Yonhap News Agency
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Oct. 29 (Yonhap) -- The top nuclear envoys of South Korea and the United States had phone talks Friday on stalled nuclear negotiations with North Korea and Seoul's proposal for an end-of-war declaration, Seoul's foreign ministry said Friday.
Noh Kyu-duk, special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, and his American counterpart, Sung Kim, agreed on the need to "stably manage the situation" on the peninsula, the ministry said.
"They held constructive consultations over North Korean nuclear issues, including the end-of-war declaration," the ministry said in a statement.
"They will continue close consultations and cooperation for a quick resumption of the Korea peace process."
The phone talks followed their back-to-back in-person meetings in Seoul and Washington earlier this month, in which they discussed a proposed declaration formally ending the 1950-53 Korean War as a way to give much-needed momentum to the stalled dialogue with Pyongyang.
The talks came amid worries about possible disparity between the allies over the proposal. On Wednesday, White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said Seoul and Washington may have "different perspectives on the precise sequence or timing or conditions for different steps" for the declaration.
In response, a senior Seoul government official said Thursday the two sides have been holding "fast-paced and serious" discussions in a "mutually desirable" direction and that diplomatic consultations can narrow their differences on details.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
5. N. Korea seen preparing to reopen border with China amid economic woes
The regime must open the border if it was the Korean people to survive.
But here is the buried leaded: "Kimjongunism."
The NIS said the North has removed portraits of Kim's father and grandfather, former leaders Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung, respectively, from the backdrop of official meetings in an apparent move to depart from the shadow of his predecessors.
The North is also internally using the term Kimjongunism, like the former leaders' Kimilsungism and Kimjongilism, according to the spy agency.
"Kim has effectively secured a political status comparable to his predecessors," Cha said.
N. Korea seen preparing to reopen border with China amid economic woes | Yonhap News Agency
By Choi Soo-hyang
SEOUL, Oct. 29 (Yonhap) -- North Korea appears to be making earnest preparations to reopen its train routes with China after a period of COVID-19-induced border controls, Seoul officials said Friday.
Cha Duck-chul, deputy spokesperson of the unification ministry, said that South Korea has detected signs indicating preparations for a trade resumption in the regions bordering China, such as the construction of a quarantine facility.
On Thursday, the National Intelligence Service (NIS) reported to lawmakers that the North is in talks with China and Russia to resume train operations across the border, and that those connecting Sinuiju and Dandong -- border cities of the North and China, respectively -- could resume as early as in November.
"It's hard to predict the exact date of their resumption. We will continue closely monitoring related movements," Cha told a regular press briefing.
The North has recently reopened its sea routes to receive international organizations' medical supplies and other goods necessary for its citizens following a prolonged COVID-19 lockdown, which is thought to have taken a toll on its economy already hit by crippling sanctions.
Meanwhile, the ministry said the North appears to be continuing to elevate leader Kim Jong-un's political status as it's been 10 years since he took power in late 2011.
The NIS said the North has removed portraits of Kim's father and grandfather, former leaders Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung, respectively, from the backdrop of official meetings in an apparent move to depart from the shadow of his predecessors.
The North is also internally using the term Kimjongunism, like the former leaders' Kimilsungism and Kimjongilism, according to the spy agency.
"Kim has effectively secured a political status comparable to his predecessors," Cha said.
scaaet@yna.co.kr
(END)
6. Kim Jong-un Inherits Grandfather's 'Great Leader' Title
Great Leader and Kimjongunism.
If accurate this is an indication that Kim has not only solidified his rule but that he intends to continue to rule. That said, if he is having health problems as some have speculated this could be laying the groundwork for succession. This puts him on par with his father and grandfather and therefore he should theoretically have the legitimacy to name his successor (could it be his sister?). I am not convinced this has anything to do with succession and more to do about the Kim family regime narrative and the veneration of Kim Jong-un which is a key part of the mythology of the Kim family regime.
Kim Jong-un Inherits Grandfather's 'Great Leader' Title
October 29, 2021 11:42
North Korean state media have started referring to Kim Jong-un as the "great leader," a title previously reserved for his grandfather and nation found Kim Il-sung. His father Kim Jong-il was the "dear leader," which suggests a slightly lesser deity.
The 37-year-old Kim has long copied his grandfather's clothes and hairdo and even some mannerisms from the early days of his rule, but now his usurpation of the revered mantle seems complete.
Jong Kyo-jin at the Korea University Institute for Unification Studies said, "Kim Jong-il did not use the title during his lifetime, because it could have made him appear to have parted ways with the teachings of his father and challenged his quasi-divine authority."
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un arrives at an arms expo in Pyongyang on Oct. 11, in this grab from the official [North] Korean News Agency the following day.
The National Intelligence Service here said Thursday that the North Korean leader has removed portraits of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il from the wall of the Worker's Party hall.
According to lawmakers who were briefed by the NIS, North Korea is now also using a term that roughly translates as "Kimjongunism" in an attempt to shift away from communism or his grandfather's disastrous "juche" or self-reliance doctrine.
That suggests Kim Jon-un is now confident of his leadership after grappling with internal power struggles at the beginning of his rule and has taken the first step in placing himself in the same league as his grandfather.
Portraits (bottom) of former North Korean leaders Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il can be seen at the back of a meeting hall in Pyongyang in 2016 but have disappeared this year.
The developments come amid unprecedented challenges for the regime amid the coronavirus pandemic and total economic failure.
But the NIS dismissed as "groundless" some claims made in the U.S. and Japan that the slimmer, trimmer Kim Jong-un seen in public these days is an imposter. The NIS has apparently used cutting-edge facial recognition and health analysis tools to establish this.
- Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com
7. US conducting in-depth review of Korean War's end declaration: US official
Of course the US supports an end to the war. But I think what the US wants is a substantive end to the war that does not put the ROK at risk. The US does not want the end of war (EOW) declaration to be exploited by Kim Jong-un in support of his political warfare strategy (and we're already seeing him exploit it that way).
Representative Sherman and Kim are two congressmen who need to be educated about the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.
Excerpts:
Meanwhile, a group of U.S. lawmakers is expected to send a letter to President Biden next week to urge diplomatic engagement with North Korea and also U.S. support for the Seoul-proposed end of war declaration, an informed source said.
Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA) told Lee that he and Rep. Andy Kim (D-NJ) had sought to send such a letter to the president this week, but decided to wait for others to join, according to the source, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
Sherman was quoted saying that he expected around 10 members of the House of Representatives to sign the letter that he said will also be sent to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken
US conducting in-depth review of Korean War's end declaration: US official
Lee Seok-hyun, vice chairman of South Korea's National Unification Advisory Council, a presidential advisory board, is seen speaking with Deputy Assistant of Secretary for Korea and Japan Mark Lambert during their meeting in Washington, Oct. 28. Yonhap
The United States is reviewing the possibility of declaring a formal end to the Korean War from various angles, a ranking U.S. diplomat has said, according to a South Korea official visiting the U.S.
Mark Lambert, deputy assistant secretary of state for Korea and Japan, made the remark in a meeting with Lee Seok-hyun, vice chairman of South Korea's National Unification Advisory Council, according to Lee. The council offers policy recommendations to the South Korean president.
Lambert's remark comes after White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan noted possible differences between South Korea and the U.S. over when a declaration of the war's end could be or should be made.
"We may have somewhat different perspectives on the precise sequence or timing or conditions for different steps," Sullivan said earlier when asked if the U.S. believed an end of war declaration could help restart dialogue with North Korea.
South Korean President Moon Jae-in proposed declaring a formal end to the 1950-53 war as a catalyst to resume dialogue with the North.
Pyongyang has stayed away from denuclearization talks since 2019. It also remains unresponsive to numerous overtures for dialogue from the Joe Biden administration that came into office in January.
Lee said U.S. outreach to the reclusive North so far included a dialogue proposal through email.
"The U.S. continues to propose holding dialogue, even sending an email to North Korea in recent days, but North Korea is not responding," the South Korean official said while speaking with reporters in Washington, adding the North appears to be uninterested in talking directly with the U.S.,at least for now.
Meanwhile, a group of U.S. lawmakers is expected to send a letter to President Biden next week to urge diplomatic engagement with North Korea and also U.S. support for the Seoul-proposed end of war declaration, an informed source said.
Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA) told Lee that he and Rep. Andy Kim (D-NJ) had sought to send such a letter to the president this week, but decided to wait for others to join, according to the source, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
Sherman was quoted saying that he expected around 10 members of the House of Representatives to sign the letter that he said will also be sent to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken. (Yonhap)
8. North Korea’s Food Shortage Is a Lesson for US Policymakers
Very insightful analysis here:
China is ready to increase support to North Korea during the economic crisis. Beijing’s biggest concern is the collapse of the North Korean regime. China often describes the bilateral relationship as a “lips and teeth relationship,” emphasizing that North Korea’s survival is part of China’s core national security interests. China identified its interests on the Korean Peninsula as “no war, no chaos, no nuclear.” Among these three interests, Foreign Minister Wang Yi identified “no war” and “no chaos” as Beijing’s “unquestionable redline,” indicating that the Chinese leadership’s biggest concern is the stability of North Korea.
China’s priority is to maintain North Korea as a buffer zone against the United States and its allies. As the China-U.S. great power competition intensifies, Beijing also views North Korea as a hegemonic magnet that divert American pressure away from China to the Korean Peninsula. As a result, China wants to support North Korea through this economic difficulty. During a meeting with the North Korean ambassador to Beijing, Wang Yi declared that “China firmly supports the DPRK in developing its economy and improving people’s livelihood and is willing to continue to provide the DPRK with assistance within its capacity.” Wang’s quote indicates that China is ready to resume trade with North Korea once the border is open and is likely to provide food aid to North Korea as well.
The North Korean food shortage presents a unique case to the U.S. policymakers. It is an opportunity to study the impact of a hypothetical “perfect sanctions regime” on North Korea – it is very unlikely that any international sanction effort could be as complete as North Korea’s self-isolation since January 2020. First and foremost, the lesson is that the Kim regime is incredibly resilient. Despite this severe isolation and food shortage, there is no sign of North Korean collapse. There is also no report on institutional breakdowns as seen during the 1990s famine.
Second, China and North Korea will continue their “lip-and-teeth” relationship. Despite the alleged Beijing-Pyongyang conflicts, both sides still view the symbiotic relationship as a core interest. This case shows that any attempt to freeze North Korea to collapse is unlikely to succeed.
North Korea’s Food Shortage Is a Lesson for US Policymakers
If North Korea’s extreme self-inflicted COVID isolation isn’t enough to break the Kim regime, external sanctions have no chance.
Advertisement
During a Korean Worker’s Party central committee meeting in June 2021, Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un admitted that North Korea is facing a serious food shortage. Kim stated to his senior officials that “the people’s food situation is now getting tense.” This was not the first time Kim admitted the country’s serious economic troubles. In April, he called for officials to “wage another, more difficult ‘Arduous March’ in order to relieve our people of the difficulty, even a little,” bringing to mind the great famine of the 1990s, referred to as the Arduous March by his father.
Kim attributed the food shortage to weather patterns. Three typhoons hit North Korea during the 2020 storm season. The heavy rain and flooding caused over 20 deaths and destroyed over 16,000 houses. Moreover, it took a severe toll on agricultural production. The Korean Central News Agency, official mouthpiece of the North Korean government, reported that the flooding destroyed over 40,000 hectares of cropland. The typhoons had a particular disastrous impact on harvests along the coastline. Internal documents showed that floods destroyed over 42 percent of farmland in North Hamgyong province and 30 percent of farmland in South Hamgyong province. As a result, a Chinese government-affiliated agency reported that North Korea’s 2020 harvest suffered a 1.5 million-ton shortfall from 2019.
In 2021, more bad weather exacerbated the food shortage. A heatwave during the summer caused a drought and exacerbated the rural water shortage problem. That led to a significant reduction in crop production and killed livestock. Then heavy rain in August caused severe floods and damaged much farmland.
The disruption in China-North Korean trade also contributed greatly to the food shortage in North Korea. Starting in January 2020, North Korea closed its border and shut down all trade activities with China due to concern over the spread of COVID-19. China is North Korea’s biggest aid provider and trade partner. In 2019, China food exports to the North were worth nearly $600 million. Those exports included 400,000 ton of cereals, which was about 9 percent of North Korea’s cereal production in 2019. In addition, China is North Korea’s largest provider of fertilizer and agricultural machinery.
China’s exports played a significant role in stabilizing North Korean food prices despite poor harvests in 2018 and 2019. In 2020 and 2021, with the border shut tight, North Korea could not supplement its lost agricultural production with imports from China.
Facing the current economic crisis, the leadership in Pyongyang is seeking to resume economic relations with China, which have been halted by COVID-19. Since February 2021, North Korea has been transforming an airport in Uiju into an import disinfection center in order to resume trade with China. The failure to open this facility on time enraged Kim, who described this failure as a “grave incident” during an enlarged Politburo meeting in July. He removed several top officials as punishment. The June speech by Kim suggests that the severe food shortage has forced him to move decisively to resume trade with China.
China is ready to increase support to North Korea during the economic crisis. Beijing’s biggest concern is the collapse of the North Korean regime. China often describes the bilateral relationship as a “lips and teeth relationship,” emphasizing that North Korea’s survival is part of China’s core national security interests. China identified its interests on the Korean Peninsula as “no war, no chaos, no nuclear.” Among these three interests, Foreign Minister Wang Yi identified “no war” and “no chaos” as Beijing’s “unquestionable redline,” indicating that the Chinese leadership’s biggest concern is the stability of North Korea.
China’s priority is to maintain North Korea as a buffer zone against the United States and its allies. As the China-U.S. great power competition intensifies, Beijing also views North Korea as a hegemonic magnet that divert American pressure away from China to the Korean Peninsula. As a result, China wants to support North Korea through this economic difficulty. During a meeting with the North Korean ambassador to Beijing, Wang Yi declared that “China firmly supports the DPRK in developing its economy and improving people’s livelihood and is willing to continue to provide the DPRK with assistance within its capacity.” Wang’s quote indicates that China is ready to resume trade with North Korea once the border is open and is likely to provide food aid to North Korea as well.
The North Korean food shortage presents a unique case to the U.S. policymakers. It is an opportunity to study the impact of a hypothetical “perfect sanctions regime” on North Korea – it is very unlikely that any international sanction effort could be as complete as North Korea’s self-isolation since January 2020. First and foremost, the lesson is that the Kim regime is incredibly resilient. Despite this severe isolation and food shortage, there is no sign of North Korean collapse. There is also no report on institutional breakdowns as seen during the 1990s famine.
Second, China and North Korea will continue their “lip-and-teeth” relationship. Despite the alleged Beijing-Pyongyang conflicts, both sides still view the symbiotic relationship as a core interest. This case shows that any attempt to freeze North Korea to collapse is unlikely to succeed.
9. North Koreans drafted to harvest rice are strip searched to stop grain theft
How desperate are the conditions inside north Korea? What comes next"? Have we dusted off the contingency plans?
North Koreans drafted to harvest rice are strip searched to stop grain theft
People mobilized for the “rice sheaf transportation battle” chafe at the body searches.
North Koreans mobilized to bring in this year’s rice harvest in the absence of machinery and fuel are chafing at body searches conducted by officials to look for hidden grain, sources in the country told RFA.
Chronically short of fuel and equipment necessary to transport harvested rice from the fields to threshing sites, the government has drafted people to carry the grain on their backs, describing the backbreaking free labor as the “rice sheaf transportation battle.”
With North Korea facing severe food shortages that have caused starvation deaths, authorities are concerned that hungry conscript farm workers might be hiding grains of rice in their clothes.
After toiling in the fields all morning, the workers are body searched before they are allowed to return to their homes.
“Residents have been helping the rice sheaf transportation battle at farms that have finished harvesting. They must move the rice sheaves from the paddies to the thresher, hundreds of meters away,” said a resident of South Pyongan province’s Songchon county, near the capital Pyongyang.
“The central committee has ordered that the harvest be completed in time so that not even a single grain is lost. This non-paid farmwork is being carried out from early morning until just before lunchtime,” the source told RFA’s Korean Service on condition of anonymity.
Mobilizing people for harvesting crops takes manpower away from family businesses that North Koreans rely on to survive in the face of paltry salaries from their government-assigned jobs.
“It is absurd that the residents are unable to run their businesses and are made to work,” the source said.
The residents resent sacrificing their time and labor for a government that does not trust them and “are protesting the behavior of the search patrols, saying they are being treated as if they are criminals stealing grain,” the source said.
The lack of fuel and equipment caused severe delays bringing in the harvest in nearby North Pyongan province’s Unsan county, so authorities there fully mobilized every single resident for the battle, a resident told RFA.
“Residents can only go home after they finish transporting their assigned quota to the thresher…then the authorities rummage through their handbags as they leave,” the second source said.
“They are angry at the body searches and harshly complain about the absurd crackdown, saying, ‘Just order us to carry the rice sheaves naked.’”
North Korea has been chronically short of food for decades, but the current food security crisis is a direct result of the decision by Pyongyang and Beijing to shut down their border and suspend all trade at the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic in early 2020.
The move devastated the North Korean economy, causing food prices to skyrocket without imports from China covering the gap between domestic food production and demand.
The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization projected in a recent report that North Korea would be short about 860,000 tons of food this year, about two months’ consumption. The UN World Food Program estimates that about 40% of North Korea’s population is undernourished.
Following a steady drumbeat of warnings on food shortages, in mid-October, authorities told citizens to tighten their belts through at least 2025, warning them that the possibility of reopening border trade with China before that was very slim.
In April, authorities told the people to prepare for an economic situation worse than the “Arduous March,” the Korean name for the 1994-1998 famine that killed millions, or as many as 10 percent of the country, by some estimates.
In July, the ruling Workers’ Party ordered citizens to start growing their own food in anticipation of a food shortage that could last three years.
Reproted by Hyemin Son for RFA’s Korean Service. Translated by Claire Lee. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
10. Australia’s continued commitment to sanctions enforcement against North Korea
I think coalition contributions to sanctions enforcement are overlooked.
Australia’s continued commitment to sanctions enforcement against North Korea
28 October 2021Royal Australian Navy frigate HMAS Warramunga has joined international efforts to enforce United Nations Security Council sanctions on North Korea.
This is the sixth time Australia has deployed a warship on Operation Argos, Australia’s commitment to the enforcement of these sanctions, since it began in 2018. Operation Argos is an important part of Australia’s efforts to support nuclear non-proliferation and the ongoing stability and security of the Indo-Pacific.
Warramunga will monitor and deter North Korea’s illegal ship-to-ship transfers of sanctioned goods.
Chief of Joint Operations, Lieutenant General Greg Bilton said the deployment will add weight to Australia’s economic and diplomatic pressure on North Korea.
“Enforcing UN sanctions supports the international community’s goal of the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of North Korea,” Lieutenant General Bilton said.
“Australia is committed to the stability and security of our region and will continue to enforce sanctions until North Korea takes concrete steps towards denuclearisation.”
Warramunga will contribute to a multinational force including Canada, France, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The ship is the second to deploy on Operation Argos this year, following the deployment of HMAS Ballarat in May 2021.
Royal Australian Air Force P-8A maritime patrol aircraft have contributed to Operation Argos on nine occasions, most recently in August 2021.
HMAS Warramunga is currently conducting a deployment to Southeast and Northeast Asia, which includes several navy-to-navy engagements with partner nations across the region.
Media contactsMinisterial and Executive Coordination and Communication,
Department of Defence, Canberra, ACT
11. U.S. benefits from stronger bond between Seoul and Tokyo
Absolutely, It would be great to have a trilateral alliance but that is a bridge too far (but maybe we can get 90% success as Monty said about Market Garden)
U.S. benefits from stronger bond between Seoul and Tokyo
By James Jay Carafano and H.R. McMaster - - Wednesday, October 27, 2021
OPINION:
Our enemies see a diminished America as a win for them. Our friends see it as a loss. When we work together with friends and allies, we — and all the free world — win.
Consider Northeast Asia. Cooperation in dealing with the concerns posed by North Korea and China pose major threats there, yet we have valuable allies in South Korea and Japan. Working together, Seoul, Tokyo and Washington help secure peace and prosperity for each other, as well as other nations in Asia and the Pacific.
Yet much more could be done. For too long, divisions sown by history, domestic politics, sovereignty disputes and other disagreements have hamstrung cooperation between Japan and South Korea. America must help bring the two nations closer if we are to forge stronger trilateral relations.
The U.S. can’t win by taking sides in the finger-pointing that has strained Japanese-Korean relations in the past. But Washington can’t ignore these past troubles either. The friction that hinders full-throated cooperation across the economic, security, and diplomatic space hurts us, undermining the U.S. goal of partnering to secure a free and open Indo-Pacific where trade, energy, peoples and prosperity flow on a peaceful current from the Northeast Asia across the expanse of the Indian Ocean to the doorways of Middle East and Africa. If historic progress is going to be in this endeavor, America cannot be hands-off.
In an era when Americans don’t seem to agree on much, investing in the trilateral relationship offers one opportunity for a common agenda. Past administrations of both parties have made progress when working quietly behind the scenes, engaging and pressing both Tokyo and Seoul to find paths forward. We have both seen that firsthand. We have also seen that, when the U.S detached itself, bilateral relations deteriorated.
This and future administrations should follow the formula that works: persistent, low-profile engagement between the two capitals that builds trust and confidence, resolves issues and commits to sustaining agreements.
Now is a good time to ramp up this effort. Japan’s new prime minister, Fumio Kishida, was foreign minister in 2015 and 2016 when two key bilateral agreements were signed — one on the historical legacy of “comfort women,” the other on intelligence-sharing.
South Korea will soon have a new leader as well. President Moon Jae-in is constitutionally precluded from running for a second term. It’s time to lay the groundwork for the kind of discussions that can blossom next spring into productive, cooperative progress.
In addition to behind-the-scenes work, the U.S. should help build out the trilateral framework to facilitate more fulsome cooperation. The three nations’ foreign ministers met recently, following numerous bilateral and trilateral meetings (one of them including national security advisors) earlier this year. The logical next step is for Washington to push for a 2+2+2 framework, with the defense and foreign ministers of the three countries meeting periodically to hammer a common agenda.
Cybersecurity is one item that should top the agenda. In Washington’s bilateral discussions with South Korea and Japan, no topic pops up more frequently. It ought to headline trilateral meetings, with a goal of developing a framework that could serve as a model for partnerships throughout Asia.
South Korea, in particular, could benefit from agenda items that broaden and transcend classic security issues — most notably, concerns about North Korea. Considering the range of complementary capabilities the three countries bring to the table, they could address everything from cooperation in space to engaging Pacific Island nations, technology innovation, energy and the environment, maritime situational awareness, and global public-health security.
Strong, resilient U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation could be a powerful anchor for American power in the Pacific, while immeasurably benefiting the peace and prosperity of all three nations. A forward-looking and timely cooperative effort is more than worthy of U.S. investment.
• A Heritage Foundation vice president, James Jay Carafano directs the think tank’s research on issues of national security and foreign relations. Retired Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the author of “Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World.”
12. ‘You Live With a Degree of Paranoia’ (north Korea sanctions evasion and cyber)
Another application of the regime's "all purpose sword."
Korea watchers are seeing a lot of phishing attempts. We are seeing LinkedIn requests from prominent Korea watchers who (when queried) tell us they have no linkedin account. We are seeing emails from journalists from VOA and RFA which lok very official and legitimate until you notice there is one letter difference in the email address. So it is not surprising they are going after the UN panel of experts.
‘You Live With a Degree of Paranoia’
Inside North Korea’s campaign to penetrate the U.N. sanctions experts’ wall of secrecy.
Foreign Policy illustration/Getty Images
Aaron Arnold, an American investigating sanctions violations for the United Nations in North Korea, received what seemed to be an innocuous email last October. James Sutterlin, a U.N. official in the office that manages sanctions experts, ostensibly forwarded a link to what was described as the U.N. Security Council’s forecast of its activities for the month, according to a copy of the email reviewed by Foreign Policy. Only, Sutterlin had not written the email, and the link, they would later discover, was part of a phishing attempt by the North Korean government.
Over the past decade, North Korea has developed an elaborate system for evading U.N. sanctions, deploying an army of front companies, secret bank accounts, and ransomware attacks to evade scrutiny and amass billions of dollars in cash revenue. But North Korea’s premier intelligence agency, the Reconnaissance General Bureau, has also taken a particular interest in snooping on U.N. sanctions experts and the U.N. bureaucrats and diplomats who oversee their work.
Sanctions have never been more popular, but the system for enforcing them at the United Nations is breaking down. In this two-week series, FP looks at why that is and what can still be done to fix it.
“The attacks can range from simple to sophisticated,” Arnold said, who stepped down from the panel earlier this year. “It is something the panel has to be aware of and has to deal with on a weekly and monthly basis.”
The cyberattacks against the panel of experts began several years ago with a series of clumsy email phishing attempts, rife with misspellings and mysterious, easy-to-spot email addresses. But the efforts have grown increasingly sophisticated as North Korea’s hackers succeeded in penetrating the experts’ personal and U.N. accounts as well as developed a deeper understanding of the inner workings of the sanction specialists. Today, the experts receive as many as three or four hacking attempts a month, via email, LinkedIn, Facebook, and other social media platforms, disguised as messages from Chinese diplomats, journalists, colleagues, and others.
“The North Koreans have definitely stepped up efforts in the past two to three years,” said Jenny Town, a senior fellow at the Stimson Center and director of the North Korea news site 38 North who has been the target of North Korea hacking efforts since around 2014. Her email address was slightly amended by North Korean hackers to breach the accounts of U.N. sanctions experts. “They used to be really clumsy. You could always tell because they used bad grammar, typos, and it was obvious they were not written by a proficient English speaker.”
The onslaught of cyberattacks underscores the challenges faced by an ad hoc team of financial, maritime, and weapons experts with varying degrees of experience with cyber measures as well as a wobbly U.N. information technology system that lacked the capacity to ferret out intrusions for years. Several former panel experts have expressed frustration with what they see as the U.N.’s inadequate training and protective measures, leaving it to the experts themselves to devise their own security arrangements to prevent the North Korean government as well as powerful U.N. Security Council members like China and Russia from spying on their work. The U.N.’s IT department never implemented basic safeguards, including two-step verification and encrypted U.N. laptop computers, until late 2017 and early 2018.
“You live with a degree of paranoia,” said William Newcomb, a former U.S. Treasury Department economist who served on the panel of experts from 2011 to 2014. “During the three years I was on the panel, we never felt secure on any information we stored on our office computers,” noting the experts would leave their U.N. quarters to discuss sensitive matters off campus. “We weren’t secure having confidential discussions in our office. We felt everything was vulnerable.”
The threats were not coming only from North Korea. Experts were also concerned about leaks of their internal findings to China and Russia, which each had a representative on the panel. “Everything that came into the panel was immediately shared with the Russians and Chinese,” said Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, a former U.S. member of the panel.
South Korean military soldiers take part in live fire exercises as they prepare for possible threats in Pocheon, South Korea, on Oct. 20, 2006, after a nuclear test by North Korea. Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images
The U.N. Security Council first imposed sanctions on North Korea on Oct. 14, 2006, just days after Pyongyang conducted its first nuclear detonation. The measures targeted the export of conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction, and missile-related goods as well as luxury goods. They also restricted the travel of North Koreans engaged in banned activities. The council established a panel of experts in June 2009 to ensure compliance with the previously leaky sanctions. The panel is composed of experts from the Security Council’s five veto-wielding permanent members—Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States—and other key regional powers, including Japan and South Korea. They have documented North Korea’s efforts to evade sanctions.
The spate of cyberattacks coincides with concerns among U.S. policymakers that U.N. sanctions against North Korea are not being fully implemented. Washington points to the Security Council sanctions committee’s refusal to act on dozens of U.S. requests to sanction individuals, entities, or vessels, many of which are linked to China.
Asked if a recent barrage of North Korean missile tests merited an increase in sanctions, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Linda Thomas-Greenfield recently said: “Look, we already have a sanctions regime in place. We just need to be more serious about the implementation of that regime. Frankly, the [North Korea sanctions] committee is not doing its job. We need to enforce these violations. We need to ramp up the implementation of the sanctions. And we’ve not done that.”
The sanctions panels, which conduct highly sensitive investigations into sanctions evasions by governments and other groups, have always been a target-rich environment for foreign snooping. But the United Nations has little capacity to protect the inspectors from foreign spying. Since its inception, the North Korea panel has devised its own system for securing its investigation materials. Several experts said they received little support from the U.N. Secretariat, which lacked the skills to detect breaches.
“I pitched up at the U.N. in June 2014, and on my first day, I saw my desk with an ancient computer with no virus protection software,” said Hugh Griffiths, who stepped down as the coordinator of the North Korea panel of experts in 2019.
The first major intrusions were detected by the FBI, which warned the inspectors about breaches to their accounts, and later by Microsoft, which discovered soon after that panel members had been hacked.
“The zip file was sent with a highly personalized message which shows the hackers have very detailed insight into the panel’s current investigations structure and working methods,” the email read.
“They identified two accounts were being hacked, and all the emails were being forwarded [to a North Korean account],” Griffiths said. “The truth of the matter is that we got warned by the FBI, and the Secretariat did nothing.”
A May 2017 letter to the sanctions committee from Griffiths warned that the experts were facing a “sustained cyber campaign,” according to the email, which was reported by Reuters. Griffiths wrote that one of the expert’s computers had been breached on May 8 of that year.
“The zip file was sent with a highly personalized message which shows the hackers have very detailed insight into the panel’s current investigations structure and working methods,” the email read. Griffith also noted that a number of government representatives on the U.N. sanctions committee, which oversees the work of the experts, had also been the target of a 2016 attack.
The U.N. Secretariat has also introduced a number of other security measures, including withholding the identity of U.N. panel experts on public websites, routine sweeps for bugs in their offices, the provision of locked office doors, and the installation of sound-proofing equipment in the experts’ conference room. Arnold said the U.N.’s current strategy for detecting cyber intrusions has improved, and it is now “relatively good.”
“I think there is a much better awareness of the cyberthreat,” he added. “It’s important to remember, however, that [North Korea] is not a naive actor and is quite good at adapting their modus operandi.”
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspects the test fire of an intercontinental ballistic missile, Hwasong-14, at an undisclosed location on July 4, 2017. KCNA/AFP via Getty Images
North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau manages Pyongyang’s cyber activities through two hacking branches, including the Lazarus Group, which is responsible for generating income through cyber heists and sanction evasion. A second branch, the Kimsuky group, which was established in 2013 and oversaw a number of cybercells, focused on Korean targets and the wider U.N. community.
Jenny Town recalls the crude phishing attempts beginning around 2014 and 2015, when hackers would urge recipients to click links in broken English or toss up an institutional email address next to a fake one. By 2017 and 2018, hackers had evolved, honing their phishing techniques, cutting and pasting her email text from another hacked email, and sending them to targets with an infected link. Their English had also improved.
“It’s been gradually escalating, not just for the U.N. panel of experts,” Town said. “It’s a huge problem in the whole policy community, and it’s gotten worse in the last couple of years.”
In September 2019, France’s National Cybersecurity Agency issued a report indicating that North Korea may have been targeting accounts of five countries on the Security Council: Belgium, China, France, Peru, and South Africa. They identified one email address, allegedly belonging to a Chinese diplomat, Sun Lei, who oversaw U.N. sanctions in North Korea.
Read More
Are its U.N. panel obstructions about short-term leverage, or are they intended as an existential threat to the system?
China’s method for blocking sanctions regimes.
How the world came to depend on U.N. punitive measures and why the enforcement system is under threat—the first in a series by FP’s Colum Lynch.
The following month, according to the U.N. panel, members of the Kimsuky group sent at least eight spear-phishing emails to the official and personal accounts of current and former Security Council members, including an infected “concept note” for a supposed briefing on “the promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security: international humanitarian law.”
In January 2020, the United States also informed the panel that at least three of its experts were being targeted by North Korean hackers. The activities have continued unabated, but the panelists have grown increasingly alert to the threat. In the case of the October phishing attempt, Arnold and his colleagues quickly determined the email was fake.
In an effort to identify the sender, Arnold fired off an email reply: “Great to hear from you! Thanks for sending. In preparation for our meeting on Tuesday, here’s the investigative summaries for the cases the Panel is currently working on.”
The email didn’t include the summaries but rather a link that directed the hacker to the experts’ public website. The email also included an IP address logger. The hacker took the bait, clicking the link and enabling the experts to identify the sender’s IP address.
“It’s funny that it actually worked,” Arnold said. “Someone at the other end clicked on the link, twice.”
13. Cheong Wa Dae official rejects notion of S. Korea-U.S. rift over end-of-war declaration
Normal diplomacy between allies. There is never 100% alignment on issues, policies, objectives, and strategies. (But we do need to get our assumptions sufficiently aligned).
Cheong Wa Dae official rejects notion of S. Korea-U.S. rift over end-of-war declaration | Yonhap News Agency
By Lee Haye-ah
SEOUL, Oct. 28 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States may have "somewhat different perspectives" on the issue of declaring a formal end to the Korean War, but the perspectives should not be seen as a "difference of views," a senior Cheong Wa Dae official said Thursday.
Park Soo-hyun, senior Cheong Wa Dae secretary for public communication, made the remark in response to speculation that Washington is reluctant to support President Moon Jae-in's vision for an end-of-war declaration that would jumpstart peace talks with North Korea.
The 1950-53 conflict ended in an armistice, not a peace treaty, leaving the two sides technically at war.
Skepticism about Washington's interest has grown after U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said Tuesday that the allies "may have somewhat different perspectives on the precise sequence or timing or conditions for different steps" regarding the resumption of talks with Pyongyang.
"The remarks of U.S. National Security Adviser Sullivan are only to be expected," Park said during a YTN radio interview. "We may have somewhat different perspectives, but I am against interpreting that as a difference of views."
Park also advised against having "hasty" expectations about the government's push to bring lasting peace to the Korean Peninsula, including through an end-of-war declaration with Pyongyang.
"Be it inter-Korean issues or North Korea-U.S. issues, the Korean Peninsula Peace Process must take an extremely careful and gradual path," he said, adding that the allies continue to have in-depth consultations on the subject.
Park declined to elaborate on the prospect of a North Korea visit by Pope Francis amid expectations that the issue will come up during Moon's meeting with the pope at the Vatican later this week.
"This is a diplomatic issue between North Korea and the Vatican," he said.
Still, given that Moon's meeting with the pope will take place on the margins of the Group of 20 summit to be held in Rome, Park said he has "cautious expectations" that the right international conditions will be created to advance the peace process on the peninsula.
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
14. Harry Kazianis: Joe Biden's North Korea policy is a disaster. Now is the time to get serious
In defense of the Administration there has hardly been time to implement the policy and everyone seems to think there is a silver bullet (sanctions relief?) that will somehow be a game changer. Kim is trying to set favorable conditions for his political warfare strategy. Don't we need to shape the conditions in a favorable way to the US and the ROK/US alliance?
I think this represents the South Korean position:
First, the Biden Team needs to actually come out with a real policy when it comes to North Korea. Washington must state clearly and loudly what the focus of those talks would be, what concessions could be on offer by both sides, and what expectations it has in a timetable in operationalizing any agreements. The Trump Team did this well in a mix of leaks to the press, official statements, and direct communications with North Korea
Next, we need to realize that continuing to say over and over again that full denuclearization is the goal and nothing else will do is a pipedream. The Biden team needs to follow what the Trump Administration had hoped for, in that a series of smaller agreements at limiting and eventually capping the North Korean nuclear arsenal for portions of sanctions relief could build trust between both sides. That is the only true way to get any progress towards denuclearization.
Harry Kazianis: Joe Biden's North Korea policy is a disaster. Now is the time to get serious
Gen. Keith Kellogg on the White House expressing concern for North Korea’s missile firing missiles and China bolstering its nuclear power.
NEWYou can now listen to Fox News articles!
The Biden administration lacks any sense of urgency in dealing with North Korea’s growing missile and nuclear weapons programs—weapons that can strike America and could be sold in whole or in part to nations like Iran or other rogue states around the world.
Such lack of urgency has resulted in a North Korea policy that has already failed, throwing away the progress made by then-President Donald Trump.
Despite calling Pyongyang his greatest national security challenge back in March, the Biden Administration, staffed with many of the same officials from the Obama years, has adopted a slightly modified—albeit extremely vague—version of the same sham policy called "strategic patience."
Strategic patience is essentially Washington-speak for kicking the can down the geopolitical road, nothing more than a sanitized version of appeasement.
The policy demands that North Korea come to the bargaining table first with an offer of serious concessions or making a unilateral move towards dumping their nuclear weapons as a precursor to even talking to Washington. And as North Korea never made such a move, Obama simply washed his hands of the problem.
In an inexcusable twist, the Biden version of strategic patience was never even rolled out in a formal manner. After a multi-month policy review, the Biden team’s North Korea policy was unveiled by Press Secretary Jen Psaki during a press avail in the back of Air Force One in a response to a reporter’s question on North Korea.
Strategic patience is nothing more than a sanitized version of appeasement.
From there, all we have is background quotes in articles from the Washington Post and other outlets that explain the policy, as the Biden Administration has never had an official rollout, and even a speech by President Biden on North Korea policy, despite being in office for ten months.
What we do know of Biden’s North Korea policy is that it entirely hinges on an offer to talk to Pyongyang without any preconditions. However, Team Biden will not tip its hand at all about the focus of the talks, what Washington would be willing to concede, and what they expect from North Korea in return. If North Korea never sits down for talks, Biden does nothing, washing hands of the problem.
No wonder Pyongyang is not exactly eager to enter negotiations and keeps testing missile after missile, as there is no sense of clarity of what Team Biden is driving negotiations towards, or if any sort of deal is remotely possible. No nation would.
This failed policy from the Obama years is the reason why North Korea now has hydrogen bombs that can be mounted to long-range missiles that can destroy U.S. cities. And make no mistake, Biden’s strategy will be the reason Pyongyang acquires cruise, hypersonic and submarine-launched missiles fired from submarines, weapons the North Koreans are starting to test as we speak.
Now, to be fair, and for many reasons, there is at least some rationale for the Biden Administrations’ lack of interest in taking on a challenge like North Korea and its dangerous weapons program.
The chaos of U.S. politics, COVID-19, an economy grappling with supply chain woes and inflation, and a rising China all conspire to make North Korea’s nuclear arsenal seems like a long-term problem to worry about later.
But know this: such an attitude is the reason why North Korea has such fearsome weapons in the first place. To put it bluntly, with the weapons Pyongyang now pocesses and what they could sell to our adversaries means we are out of the proverbial road to kick this nuclear can down anymore.
In fact, North Korea seems ready to go back to its old, escalatory ways as a response to Washington’s lack of interest.
While sending mixed signals, North Korea—struggling from what is likely mass starvation due to a self-imposed blockade due to fear of a COVID-19 outbreak—feels it must show strength in the fact of Biden’s lack of policy direction. And that can mean only one thing: Pyongyang is back to testing weapons platforms that seem to get ever more advanced by the day.
In this photo provided by the North Korean government, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un speaks during a parliament meeting in Pyongyang, North Korea Wednesday, Sept. 29, 2021. Independent journalists were not given access to cover the event depicted in this image distributed by the North Korean government. The content of this image is as provided and cannot be independently verified. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP) (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP)
From there, things could get much worse. Kim could soon even test a new intercontinental ballistic missile, something he personally promised then-President Trump he would not do, setting the stage for a showdown as we saw back in 2017.
The good news is none of this needs to happen.
Now is the time for the Biden Administration to get serious on the North Korea issue, using the Trump Administrations’ template for diplomacy as a blueprint, even if they don’t want to admit it.
First, the Biden Team needs to actually come out with a real policy when it comes to North Korea. Washington must state clearly and loudly what the focus of those talks would be, what concessions could be on offer by both sides, and what expectations it has in a timetable in operationalizing any agreements. The Trump Team did this well in a mix of leaks to the press, official statements, and direct communications with North Korea
Next, we need to realize that continuing to say over and over again that full denuclearization is the goal and nothing else will do is a pipedream. The Biden team needs to follow what the Trump Administration had hoped for, in that a series of smaller agreements at limiting and eventually capping the North Korean nuclear arsenal for portions of sanctions relief could build trust between both sides. That is the only true way to get any progress towards denuclearization.
Lastly, any deals with North Korea must ensure that they stop selling any missile, and more importantly, any nuclear technology. Pyongyang has sold countless missile designs to Iran and even tried to build a nuclear reactor for Syria. This is not something that can be allowed to continue.
But perhaps most important of all, President Biden must once again ensure that North Korea gets back on his national security radar and is a focus for this administration. If not, we will face a North Korea that could someday have the ability to destroy nearly every major U.S. city and will sell that technology to the highest bidder. And this is something we cannot ever accept.
15. Another ROK-North Korea Summit Won’t Make a Difference
I concur with Professor Kelly. A summit is unlikely to be productive without a strong foundation of diplomatic preparation.
An unfortunate situation outlined in the conclusion. Kim knows that Moon's sole concern is to ensure his legacy as the peace president and this provides Kim with an advantage he can exploit.
Excerpt:
Moon will try again. He has no other play. But the optics will be uncomfortable. Moon has already been criticized in the press for cloying supineness before Kim in his desperation for a deal, especially now that new team of President Joe Biden clearly signaled that they are just waiting Moon out. Thus, it is unlikely that Kim will agree to another summit.
Another ROK-North Korea Summit Won’t Make a Difference
Playing hard to get with the South and reserving its main energies for the Americans also snubs South Korea and reminds it that the North views it as an American lackey despite all its superior wealth and modernity.
There is talk in South Korea of another summit between its president, Moon Jae-in, and North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong-un. Ostensibly on the agenda is reopening communications between the two sides, with the hardly disguised hope of bringing Kim to the table for wider discussions and, ideally, nudging him to speak to the Americans.
Moon and Kim have met three times already and little has come of the meetings. Some minor inter-Korean deals were struck, but their primary purpose was to lay the groundwork for a North Korean-U.S. rapprochement. The North takes inter-Korean summits less seriously than the South does, as the North is focused on the United States and tends to read the South as a junior alliance partner whose foreign policy is dominated by the Americans.
North Korea is content to chat with South Korea, but it rarely makes major deals or concessions with the South. The North assumes the Americans put constraints on the South’s bargaining space. This may not but formally true, but it is likely informally true. More importantly, the North wants the prestige of speaking to the Americans. It wants the global superpower to treat it as an equal sovereign state, and as an equal Korean state. Playing hard to get with the South and reserving its main energies for the Americans also snubs South Korea and reminds it that the North views it as an American lackey despite all its superior wealth and modernity.
This raises the question of the purpose of yet another summit. That is not necessarily a reason to refrain from meeting again. It is always possible that one more meeting might be the one where the North finally starts to negotiate seriously with the South. Given just how dangerous North Korea is, it is usually best to keep on engaging, to keep on trying.
Certainly, the South Korean government wants these meetings to lead to progress. Moon has been trying for years to forge his own inter-Korean peace track without tying every serious change on the peninsula to U.S.-North progress. This has not worked to date, but it is a deeply held belief of Moon’s left-wing coalition that the South must continually try to engage the North, even if that means distance from the Americans, who—ex-President Donald Trump’s made-for-TV summits aside—tend to be much more skeptical of leader-level meetings with the North.
This also goes down uneasily with the South Korean public, with whom the U.S. alliance is popular. Past inter-Korean summits have mostly been pageantry, primarily because the North insists on serious dealing only with the Americans, which do not encourage enthusiasm. Summit hype today is far lower than it was in 2018, if only because no one really expects much from such meetings anymore. Moon’s coalition will support his effort of course, but the South Korean center has lost faith in Moon’s ability to bring Pyongyang to the table. Meanwhile, the staunchly anti-communist South Korean Right is now deeply suspicious that Moon is a North Korean sympathizer.
So, it increasingly looks like this would be more process for process’ sake. The logic here is that if the United States keeps talking and talking to North Korea, then a breakthrough might somehow occur. Also, at minimum, North Korea will not launch a provocation on the border if talks are in progress.
Finally, the real reason for any further summit is likely that Moon is desperate because he has bet his presidency on a North Korea breakthrough.
Moon ran for president on a domestic program of social democracy, emphasizing issues like transparency, reducing corruption, equity, and so on. This fairly typical left-of-center messaging plays well in South Korea, where there is a strong perception that business and political elites are an unaccountable dominant class. Moon’s foreign policy views—to robustly engage Pyongyang—were known but not the focus of his campaign.
Now, Moon’s focus on the North has completely taken over his efforts and energies. His leadership on the coronavirus pandemic has been excellent, and last year’s world-class quarantine effort has justifiably propped up his polling. But it is a revolution in North-South relations that truly moves him, and he has more strenuously—or more slavishly, according to his critics—engaged the North than any of his predecessors.
Unfortunately for his legacy though, little concrete has come of all this effort. Moon met Kim three times; Trump met Kim three times. There was enormous hype for years. Before the pandemic, I attended one conference after another about ending the Korean war via a North-South “peace regime” or “peace economy,” sanctions rollback, mutual disarmament, and so on. There was a tremendous vibe of movement and change. Moon relentlessly talked this up in his speeches. So enthusiastic was he in comparison to the unchangingly dour North Korean response that South Korean conservatives started calling him North Korea’s foreign minister.
Now, as Moon slides into lame-duck status with the presidential election less than a year away, he is almost certainly desperate. He took a big gamble on the North and he has precious little to show for it. The situation on the ground—North Korea’s gulags, forward-deployed forces flush against the demilitarized zone, weapons of mass destruction, a deal with the Americans—remains completely unrealized.
Moon will try again. He has no other play. But the optics will be uncomfortable. Moon has already been criticized in the press for cloying supineness before Kim in his desperation for a deal, especially now that new team of President Joe Biden clearly signaled that they are just waiting Moon out. Thus, it is unlikely that Kim will agree to another summit.
Robert E. Kelly is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University.
This article was published earlier and is being reprinted due to reader interest.
Image: Reuters
16. US policymakers can't seem to figure out how to deal with South or North Korea
A provocative headline that seems based on the assumption that the US can strong arm its ally and entice the north.
But how we "handle" or "deal with" our allies is through deft diplomacy and sustained engagement at all levels. And most importantly it requires understanding of the other's position and I think we have a very good understanding of ROK and north Korean positions. We will work with our ally and deal with north Kroea as it really is rather than as others (to include the ROK) would wish it to be.
And there is no silver bullet for the Korea problem. But that is what everyone seeks.
US policymakers can't seem to figure out how to deal with South or North Korea
The Hill · by Donald Kirk, opinion contributor · October 28, 2021
The U.S. faces a near-impossible mission with South Korea in a diplomatic minuet that’s sorely trying the cliché of U.S.-Korean diplomacy, “There’s no daylight between us.” American diplomats may still use that term, but we’re hearing it far less than when it seemed as though every Secretary of State or Defense secretary or assistant secretary included it in every hail and farewell on arrival or departure from Seoul.
Now U.S. negotiators are more restrained in their choice of words as they spar delicately, and privately when possible, with their South Korean interlocutors. But daylight shows through cracks in the glue they would like to believe cements the relationship. The plain fact is, the White House simply does not agree with the government of South Korean President Moon Jae-in on what to do about North Korea. Nor is it just that Moon would like to be remembered as a North-South peacemaker when he steps down next spring at the end of five years. He can’t run again, under a “democracy” constitution adopted in 1987 after the worst protests since the country’s birth as the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1948.
Another wave of protests, the Candlelight Revolution, in which hundreds of thousands turned out nightly five years ago carrying LED candles along the broad avenue leading to the restored Gyeongbok Palace in central Seoul, led to the arrest, jailing, impeachment and ouster of Park Geun-hye. Daughter of the long-ruling dictator Park Chung-hee, assassinated in 1979, convicted of corruption and abuse of power, she remains in prison. Moon, having failed to reform a system in thrall to the conglomerates that dominate the economy, still yearns to be remembered for North-South Korean reconciliation.
Americans and Koreans now must consider Moon’s final bid for greatness: affirmation that the Korean War is over. An agreement to that effect would update the armistice that ended the war in July 1953 but never was replaced by a formal peace treaty. The end-of-war agreement would serve as a major step on the way to a peace treaty that, in theory, would mean the military forces facing each other on either side of the demilitarized zone that divides the peninsula no longer pose a threat — and might not be necessary.
Moon, intent on persuading the United States on the beauty of an agreement, has had his top aides engage in one-on-one talks with their American counterparts in a full-court press. If Lee Jae-myung, the leftist governor of Gyeonggi Province surrounding Seoul, nominated to succeed Moon by the ruling Democratic Party, is elected in March as president, pressure will intensify for coming to terms with the North and reducing U.S. military presence, already down to 28,500 troops.
Neither the U.S. nor the Korean government wants to confront each other in open outbursts, but Sung Kim, the U.S. envoy on North Korea, was hard-pressed after a recent visit to Seoul to think of ways to paper over the differences after talks with his counterpart, Noh Kyu-duk. The best he could summon was an artful expression of “continuing to work” with Noh “on different ideas and initiatives,” among them the “end-of-war proposal” put out by the ROK.
The fact that Sung Kim carefully attributed the end-of-war agreement to South Korea shows the U.S. distaste for an idea that’s denounced privately by voices within the Pentagon and, more politely, the State Department. No sooner had Kim arrived in Seoul than the State Department spokesman, Ned Price, was telling news media that the United Nations Security Council resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) “remain in effect and all UN member states are bound by their obligations.” As for humanitarian aid, he argued, “The simple truth is that the DPRK regime itself is responsible for the humanitarian situation in the country.”
The statements came after North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ordered a test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile that conceivably could be fired from a submarine approaching any number of likely targets in the U.S. The test hardly posed an immediate threat. It’s unlikely North Korean physicists and engineers have figured out how to attach a warhead to such a missile, and it’s also not certain if the missile was test-fired from a real sub.
Still, Kim Jong Un clearly thinks he can contribute to the sense in Seoul and Washington that the U.S. must come up with concessions, possibly an easing of sanctions. The U.S. response, so far, has been to say “we’re ready to talk any time but the North isn’t answering the call.” Wendy Sherman, deputy secretary of State, said in a speech to a Korea Society anniversary dinner in New York that the U.S. is “ready to meet” the North Koreans “without preconditions” and “does not harbor hostile intentions.” However, she made clear that its missile tests “violate multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions.” The U.S. must “chart a path” with its allies, particularly South Korea and Japan, toward “complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula,” she said. That wording did not exclude a deal before denuclearization but was tougher than Seoul’s turn toward appeasement.
Others at the dinner decried the rift between the U.S. and South Korea. One U.S. diplomat acknowledged the Americans and South Koreans “don’t see eye to eye,” but doubts the U.S. would be taken in by an end-of-war declaration.
At another dinner in Washington, marking the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, the mention of an end-of-war agreement inspired concern. Nicholas Eberstadt, economist and North Korea watcher with the American Enterprise Institute, told me he’s worried that President Biden, having received Moon at the White House in May and otherwise paying little attention to Korea, might fall for persistent demands by the South as well as Korean leftists in the U.S.
North Korean commentaries often defend missile tests as necessary for defense and do not single out the U.S. or Japan as targets. Kim Jong Un’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, has called an end-of-war agreement “interesting and admirable,” while urging the U.S. to drop its “hostile policy” — meaning, no doubt, the end of sanctions and U.S.-South Korea war games followed by a withdrawal of U.S. forces. Kim Jong Un, focusing on the North’s grave economic issues and COVID-19, presumably is waiting for the U.S. to show signs of yielding before agreeing to talks. China, a signatory to the Korean War truce along with the U.S. and North Korea, has endorsed an end-of- war agreement but isn’t pursuing it.
Interestingly, while the U.S., China and North Korea all signed the truce, South Korea’s first president, Syngman Rhee, stayed away, refusing to sanctify a deal that he believed would justify permanent division of the Korean peninsula. He had to submit to the terms of the armistice, but an end-of-war agreement indeed would represent the South’s first formal affirmation that the Korean War is over. That’s one reason for Moon to keep pleading his case while the Americans think of ways and reasons to avoid the whole annoying topic.
Donald Kirk has been a journalist for more than 60 years, focusing much of his career on conflict in Asia and the Middle East, including as a Washington Star correspondent on Asia and Chicago Tribune correspondent on the Far East. He currently is a freelance correspondent for several magazines and newspapers, covering North and South Korea. He is the author of several books about Asian affairs.
The Hill · by Donald Kirk, opinion contributor · October 28, 2021
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
