Quotes of the Day:
“It was a shocking thing to say and I knew it was a shocking thing to say. But no one has the right to live without being shocked. No one has the right to spend their life without being offended. Nobody has to read this book. Nobody has to pick it up. Nobody has to open it. And if you open it and read it, you don't have to like it. And if you read it and you dislike it, you don't have to remain silent about it. You can write to me, you can complain about it, you can write to the publisher, you can write to the papers, you can write your own book. You can do all those things, but there your rights stop. No one has the right to stop me writing this book. No one has the right to stop it being published, or sold, or bought, or read.”
- Philip Pullman
“To criticize a person for their race is manifestly irrational and ridiculous, but to criticize their religion, that is a right. That is a freedom. The freedom to criticize ideas, any ideas - even if they are sincerely held beliefs - is one of the fundamental freedoms of society. A law which attempts to say you can criticize and ridicule ideas as long as they are not religious ideas is a very peculiar law indeed. It all points to the promotion of the idea that there should be a right not to be offended. But in my view the right to offend is far more important than any right not to be offended. The right to ridicule is far more important to society than any right not to be ridiculed because one in my view represents openness - and the other represents oppression”
- Rowan Atkinson
“Restriction of free thought and free speech is the most dangerous of all subversions. It is the one un-American act that could most easily defeat us."
[The One Un-American Act, Speech to the Author's Guild Council in New York, on receiving the 1951 Lauterbach Award (December 3, 1952)]”
- William O. Douglas
1. Weekend border crosser identified as N. Korean defector: S. Korea's military
2. Graffiti criticizing Kim Jong Un recently discovered in Pyongyang
3. Sanctions give NK ‘justification’ for nukes: senior diplomatic official
4. NK is one year closer to perfecting nuclear weapons due to Biden’s policy: Bolton
5. South Korean government calendars celebrate North Korean holidays
6. Lee Jae-myung demands OPCON transfer
7. S. Korean military launches branch dedicated to enhancing military space power
8. President's New Year speech slammed for failing to reflect reality
9. Moon pledges to pursue 'irreversible path to peace' with N. Korea until his term ends
10. North Korean authorities authorize plan to sell pine nuts to the Chinese through Nampo Port
11. South Korean soldier makes rare defection to Kim Jong-un's North
12. How Uygur and North Korea human rights activists can join forces to keep slave-made goods out of your closet
13. China and North Korea: A New Peak of Comradeship
14. Military criticized for continued border control failures
15. North Korea’s Strategic Vision for 2022: Focus on Rural Development
1. Weekend border crosser identified as N. Korean defector: S. Korea's military
He's back! If I am not mistaken this is the same defector who was reported to be a gymnast who was supposedly able to jump the South barrier Fence to make it into South Korea. He must have had no decline in his scales if he was able to return in the same manner (note my skepticism - although I will never say never but it seems not humanly possible to jump the fence due to the height. I would never offer an assessment that a gymnast could lnot eap over the South Barrier Fence.
But all the questions remain. If he was under surveillance why was he allowed to make his way to the DMZ? Why were their breakdowns in surveillance in the DMZ and the frontline areas? And of course what was this "defector" doing in South Korea and why did he go back? I am still skeptical that the north would use this method of infiltration and exfiltration of a spy when it would be much more effective to conduct espionage by infiltrating through commercial means. That said, I suppose if the priority information requirements were focused on how the South deals with defectors; e.g., how they are apprehended, processed, what kind of education, training and support they receive, how they are integrated into society what happens to them, how much surveillance is conducted after they are integrated, etc? And then there is the possible propaganda value of a defector defecting twice. We will have to see what becomes of this person if we can get any reporting out of north Korea.
(2nd LD) Weekend border crosser identified as N. Korean defector: S. Korea's military | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with official's remarks in paras 10-11; RECASTS headline)
By Song Sang-ho
SEOUL, Jan. 3 (Yonhap) -- The man who crossed the eastern inter-Korean border into North Korea over the weekend was found to be a North Korean defector, an official at South Korea's defense ministry said Monday.
Citing surveillance footage, the official said the man is the 30-something defector who had also used an eastern front-line route to reach the South in November 2020 but stressed no evidence of espionage has been found.
The incident on Saturday brought the South Korean Army's 22nd Division in charge of the eastern front-line area under renewed criticism for the latest border breach.
"In the footage, the man was recognized to be the same as the defector so we can call him the same person," the official told reporters on condition of anonymity.
On Saturday, the man crossed the barbed wire fence to enter the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas and then raced across the Military Demarcation Line despite eleventh-hour efforts to stop him.
After the defection to the South, the man is known to have worked as a cleaner here, an indication that he might have had economic difficulties here. Other details about him were not immediately known.
The defector had been out of contact since Thursday, while a surveillance camera installed in the Civilian Control Line near the land border captured him hours before his border crossing, the official said.
On Sunday, South Korea's military sent a message to the North twice regarding the border crossing through a western cross-border communication line. The North has replied it has received them, the official said.
"But there was no reply about our request for the protection of the person," the official said.
The redefection has spawned speculation the man might have engaged in spying activities. But an ongoing probe into the incident has yet to find any evidence of espionage, according to the official.
"We understand that the person was someone who had been well managed in line with relevant regulations here," the official said.
The latest incident came in spite of the South Korean military's pledge to overhaul its border defense system with stronger surveillance equipment to forestall any security lapses in the wake of earlier border breaches.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
2. Graffiti criticizing Kim Jong Un recently discovered in Pyongyang
So much to consider. Is this an indication of nascent resistance potential? One incident in the last three years would seem to indicate that control has been well maintained.
And note the citizen patrolling at 4:20am. Again, the political and security structure of the party continues to function.
Excerpts:
The graffiti read: “Kim Jong Un, you son of a *****. The people are starving to death because of you.”
A certain resident of Pyongchon District — identified by his family name of Kim — discovered the graffiti at around 4:20 AM while he was patrolling the neighborhood.
In accordance with protocol, the head of the inminban (people’s unit) reported the incident to the local security officer, who reported it to the district branch of the Ministry of State Security, which in turn reported it to the ministry’s city branch; finally, it was reported it to the ministry’s national branch.
Graffiti criticizing Kim Jong Un recently discovered in Pyongyang
North Koreans speculate that with the authorities installing CCTVs everywhere since Kim Jong Un took power, finding the culprit should take little time
By Lee Chae Un - 2022.01.03 12:07pm
Graffiti that directly criticized North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was recently discovered in Pyongyang.
The discovery came as the city hosted the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea.
According to a Daily NK source last Wednesday, graffiti was discovered on the outside of an apartment in Pyongyang’s Pyongchon District on Dec. 22.
The graffiti read: “Kim Jong Un, you son of a *****. The people are starving to death because of you.”
A certain resident of Pyongchon District — identified by his family name of Kim — discovered the graffiti at around 4:20 AM while he was patrolling the neighborhood.
In accordance with protocol, the head of the inminban (people’s unit) reported the incident to the local security officer, who reported it to the district branch of the Ministry of State Security, which in turn reported it to the ministry’s city branch; finally, it was reported it to the ministry’s national branch.
Afterwards, the Ministry of State Security’s national, city, and district branches mobilized all its agents to close off the scene of the incident and erase the graffiti.
North Korea strictly bans all acts that directly criticize the nation’s leader. The authorities have charged offenders with crimes against the state or sedition, sending them to political prison camps or even executing them.
In Mar. 2018, a colonel in the General Staff Department was publicly executed after he was named the ringleader behind graffiti left on Pyongyang’s landmark April 25 House of Culture that criticized Kim’s regime.
That a major incident has suddenly emerged after three years without a significant disturbance has caught the attention of North Korea’s security authorities.
The Mirae Scientists Street in Pyongyang / Image: Ryugong website
They worry that the graffiti may be evidence that the excessive regulations and controls implemented under the pretext of “emergency COVID-19 quarantine efforts” since early last year have generated more public discontent than expected.
Additionally, the appearance of the graffiti ahead of the Central Committee’s Fourth Plenary Meeting put the security authorities on full alert.
The source said the authorities are taking the incident even more seriously as the graffiti appeared around the time of the 10th anniversary of the death of late North Korean leader Kim Jong Il (Dec. 17), the birthday of Kim Jong Il’s mother Kim Jong Suk (Dec. 24), and the party’s plenary meeting from Dec. 27.
He said the national branch of the Ministry of State Security is laser focused on finding the culprit and is conducting an intense investigation.
In fact, the ministry’s Pyongchon District branch has been conducting “handwriting analyses” of workers at local factories and enterprises and even students since Dec. 23, as well as investigating their whereabouts that day.
However, people speculate that with the authorities installing CCTVs everywhere since Kim Jong Un took power, finding the culprit should take little time.
Meanwhile, the security authorities are on alert against similar incidents taking place in the provinces, given how this latest case took place in the capital Pyongyang, where residents are very loyal to the regime and enjoy better conditions across the board, including food provisions.
Relatedly, flyers and graffiti critical of Kim were found in Pochon County, Yanggang Province, and Chongjin, North Hamgyong Province, in 2016. Later that year, somebody spread dozens of KPW 5,000 bills defaced with similar criticism around downtown Hoeryong, North Hamgyong Province.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
3. Sanctions give NK ‘justification’ for nukes: senior diplomatic official
Wow. This is just an unbelievable position. The Kim family regime has been pursuing nuclear weapons since the 1950s.
The suffering of the Korean people in the north is not caused by the sanctions. They suffer because of the deliberate policies of Kim Jong-un who prioritizes nuclear and missile programs, advanced military capabilities, and support to the elite over the welfare of the Korean people.
But the idea that the US should lift sanctions to move the north toward denuclearization is troubling. And sanctions are not simply to punish the regime. They are implemented to halt resources that support the regime (which can be interpreted as punishment) and the development of nuclear weapons and missiles and military capabilities.
I will say this again: The fundamental problem we have within the ROK/US alliance is that we do not have sufficiently aligned assumptions about the nature, objectives,and strategy of the Kim family regime. It is why we have friction about the pursuit of the end of war declaration, why we have friction about making concessions, and lifting sanctions, and why we have friction about training of military forces, among other frictions.
[Herald Interview] Sanctions give NK ‘justification’ for nukes: senior diplomatic official
NK should also take corresponding measures if US takes forward-looking steps
Published : Jan 3, 2022 - 15:04 Updated : Jan 3, 2022 - 16:20
Hong Hyun-ik, chancellor of the Korean National Diplomatic Academy (Park Hyun-koo/The Korea Herald)
Washington should ease sanctions on North Korea with a “snapback” clause, as current measures only give Pyongyang justification for nuclear armament, says the head of the Korean National Diplomatic Academy.
“The original purpose of sanctions is to make a country a normal state so that they stop further provocation or give up nuclear weapons. Punishment for doing wrong is incidental,” said Hong Hyun-ik, chancellor of the Korean National Diplomatic Academy, in an interview with The Korea Herald.
Hong sees the current US sanctions on the North as putting the cart before the horse and only punishing the regime. “This does not stop the North from giving up nuclear weapons and rather gives a justification for nuclear development.”
Hong was appointed as the chief of the academy in August. The academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs serves as a diplomatic and security research institution and educates diplomats. He formerly served as the head of Sejong Institute’s security strategy research division.
He believes sanctions only amplify the sufferings of ordinary North Koreans, while the ruling class continues to enjoy luxury and privileges.
“This could be a sanction that goes against the US stance of protecting North Korea’s human rights,” he said.
“To revive the original purpose of sanctions, it is necessary to negotiate with North Korea with a card to ease sanctions a little bit and obtain some kind of concession from the regime -- for instance, by freezing nuclear weapons or making some progress in denuclearization.”
“If North Korea fails to keep its promise, the US should take snapback measures to restore sanctions,” he said.
In early December, Hong attended a forum on US-North Korea relations’ outlook hosted by the US think tank Wilson Center in Washington, DC. At the time, he stressed the importance of the formally declaring the end of the Korean War, but the response on the US’ side was cold.
Through the visit, he learned why US politicians do not attach importance to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue or restoring peace on the Korean Peninsula, he says.
“Biden, for example, is now adopting a sort of ‘appeasement policy,’ such as withdrawing from Afghanistan or resuming nuclear talks with Iran. It is very burdensome to take another appeasement policy in problem areas like North Korea again,” he said.
“So if the US eases sanctions, North Korea should, in return, take corresponding measures, such as allowing the right to access the North Korean nuclear facility or freezing nuclear weapons. But because the US does not expect that much from North Korea, it is politically burdensome to take forward measures,” he said.
Simply put, he said, “To make the US proactively respond to the declaration of war, diplomacy is needed to prepare North Korea to take corresponding measures immediately.”
To have more diplomatic autonomy and take more initiative in the North Korean nuclear issue, he called for the quick takeover of wartime operational control as early as possible.
The wartime operational control is the right to control the military’s operations in an emergency on the Korean Peninsula. The United States Forces Korea commander currently holds Korea’s wartime operational rights.
“While continuing to maintain the ROK-US alliance, we should shift operational control and gradually reduce our dependence on the USFK so that our military capabilities can be improved. When we reduce dependence on the US, we can take less damage even if the US withdraws,” he said.
Both South Korea and the US agreed to resume the process of verifying whether Korea’s military capabilities meet the conditions for the conversion of operational rights next year. But they have not been able to set aside disagreements over the specific date. The US said it is appropriate to resume the verification process in the second half of this year, but South Korea insists on beginning in the first half.
Hong said, however, it is meaningless to verify the process either in spring or summer if the transition of the operational control is conditional, meaning only the US has the right to interpret and evaluate it.
“The transition of the operational control is impossible if it is conditional. This is because unless the South develops nuclear weapons, it can’t have capabilities to control North’s nuclear weapons,” he said.
He argues that the transition date should be specified now as the former Roh Moo-hyun administration did in the past with setting the date of April 17, 2012.
“Otherwise, it will be difficult for even the next government to transfer the operational control,” he said.
4, NK is one year closer to perfecting nuclear weapons due to Biden’s policy: Bolton
I sent out Ambassador Bolton's Oped yesterday. But this is how the Korean press is reporting on it.
NK is one year closer to perfecting nuclear weapons due to Biden’s policy: Bolton
Published : Jan 3, 2022 - 15:14 Updated : Jan 3, 2022 - 17:05
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un presides over a plenary session of the central committee of the ruling Workers` Party in Pyongyang last week, in a photo released by the Korean Central News Agency. (KCNA-Yonhap)
A former national security adviser to Donald Trump slammed Joe Biden’s foreign policy, saying North Korea is a year closer in perfecting its nuclear and ballistic missile technology as a result of Biden’s diplomacy on Pyongyang -- or lack thereof.
In an op-ed published by Washington-based news outlet the Hill on Sunday, John Bolton identified Iran and North Korea as the Biden administration’s nuclear proliferation failures in 2021.
Bolton, who championed a hawkish policy toward Iran and North Korea, said that while both Tehran and Pyongyang want Washington to release economic pressure on them, neither want it enough to “make the strategic decision to abandon pursuing deliverable nuclear weapons.”
“After a year of frenetic diplomacy and public optimism on Iran, and a year of frenetically doing essentially nothing on North Korea, the result in both cases is identical. Tehran and Pyongyang are one year closer to perfecting their nuclear and ballistic-missile technology, and for North Korea perhaps hypersonic cruise missiles,” Bolton said.
“Time is always on asset for the proliferator, needed to overcome the complex scientific and technological obstacles to becoming a nuclear-weapons state,” he said, adding both Iran and North Korea have made good use of 2021, while the US stood idly by.
Since Biden took office last January, Washington has consistently called on Pyongyang to engage in dialogue for denuclearization. But the North has reiterated that it will ignore the offer of dialogue, unless the US rolls back what it calls a “hostile policy” toward the North -- apparently referring to the joint military exercises between South Korea and the US, and international sanctions.
In the meantime, Pyongyang continued to beef up weapons capabilities throughout the year despite UN Security Council sanctions and repeated calls for engagement from Seoul and Washington. Last year, it tested a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, a long-range cruise missile, a train-launched ballistic missile and a hypersonic missile, among others.
While Pyongyang has kept its provocation and testing below the alarming level of nuclear and long-range ballistic missiles, observers say the regime could break its self-imposed moratorium on ICBMs and nuclear tests this year to gain leverage with Washington.
5. South Korean government calendars celebrate North Korean holidays
I admit that I have all north Korean holidays on my personal calendar. I obviously do that in the spirit of Sun Tzu, "to know our enemies." Since the regime has a history of conducting provocations around holidays (hours and theirs) it is important to know when they are so we can anticipate,
But I am not sure this calendar was made in the spirit of "know your enemy." It seems to me that this could be in violation of the South Korean nationals security law (which I have never supported by the way because it has long prevented South Koreans from learning about and better understanding the threat from the north).
But if ordinary citizens are punished for showing respect and adoration for the north then I think the UNification Ministry is showing the double standard. And what is truly sad is that there are probably people in the unification Ministry (political appointees not professional government officials) who somehow believe that showing this kind of "respect" will be good for north-South relations.
South Korean government calendars celebrate North Korean holidays - OKN
Disturbing news comes as end-of-war text allegedly agreed on by Seoul, Washington
The South Korean Ministry of Unification made and distributed 2022 calendars that include North Korean holidays. The conservative opposition People Power Party (PPP) asked, “Which country is the ministry representing?” and urged it to recall all calendars that it distributed and to apologize. The ministry argued that the calendar was aimed at helping its employees do their job by being familiar with North Korean holidays.
The calendar made by the Unification Ministry marked two days as holidays in February. One was February 8, which is “the North Korean People’s Army Establishment Day.” On February 16, it said “North Korea, Kim Jong-Il’s birthday.” Kim Jong-il is the father of current North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un. In February’s calendar, it included many other descriptions such as “North Korea declares that it acquired nuclear weapons,” and “North Korea’s 3rd nuclear test.” These are events that directly threaten the security of South Korea.
North Korea’s founder Kim Il-sung’s birthday, April 15, is also marked. His grandson Kim Jong-un’s birthday, January 8, is also marked in the calendar. The ministry also marked September 9 as the “Establishment of North Korea.”
Hwang Gyu-hwan, a spokesperson of the PPP, said that “[the Moon administration] unilaterally aided North Korea while getting nothing in return, and now they want to celebrate their holidays.” He added, “When I see the Unification Ministry’s commemoration of North Korean holidays, I wonder which country this is.”
“The current administration had enough of North Korea already for the past four years, but it failed to have a clear understanding of North Korea,” Hwang said. “This is the evidence that the current administration is unable to get out of its fantasy of North Korea.”
The Unification Ministry released a statement as stories about the unpatriotic calendar began surfacing in the media. It said, “The calendar is not for the public and was for our employees.” The ministry said it made the calendar to help its employees do their work, as these dates are things that employees need to plan for when they do their job.
The ministry also sent the calendars to members of the National Assembly. The ministry said that it sent them to aides of the members of the foreign affairs committee to help with their work.
There is also news on the Moon administration’s plan to declare an end to the Korean War. South Korean Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong said that “regarding the end-of-war declaration, South Korea and the United States have already shared the understanding on its importance, and the two sides have effectively reached an agreement on its draft text,” on Wednesday. “However, we are considering various ways on how to advance discussions with North Korea.”
When asked how the discussions with the United States went on North Korea’s prerequisites for talks on the issue, Chung did not directly answer the question, but reiterated the Biden administration’s position that Washington is willing to speak with North Korea “anytime, anywhere, without preconditions.”
“Please understand that it is difficult to share the details of how the end-of-war declaration is currently being promoted externally at this stage,” Chung said.
The U.S. Department of State told the Voice of America, “The United States remains committed to achieving lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and diplomacy with the DPRK. To this end, we will continue to seek engagement with the DPRK as part of a calibrated, practical approach in order to make tangible progress that increases the security of the United States, our allies, and our deployed forces.”
6. Lee Jae-myung demands OPCON transfer
I hope someone can educate candidate Lee about the command relationships within the alliance. The US does not have OPCON of Korean forces. OPCON is exercised by the ROK/US Combined Forces Command which is "equally co-owned" by the ROK and the US. There will eventually be a change of command of the ROK/US CFC with a Korean general officer in command. But just as the US commander does now, the Korean commander will answer to both countries. The sovereignty issue was really answered in 1978 and 1994 with the establishment of the ROK/US CFC and then the change in Strategic Directive Number 2 which put the ROK and US forces on equal terms - the ROK and US governments provide the forces to the ROK/US CFC when they decide to do so. The ROK/US CFC does not have forces under its control until both governments decide to provide forces to it.
Lee Jae-myung demands OPCON transfer - OKN
FILE PHOTO: South Korean marines take part in a U.S.-South Korea joint landing operation drill as part of the two countries' annual military training called Foal Eagle, in Pohang, South Korea, April 2, 2017. REUTERS/Kim Hong-Ji/File Photo
Leftist candidate’s comments are sure to stoke tension with Washington.
South Korea’s top liberal presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung argued this week that the United States should transfer wartime operational control (OPCON) to Seoul as soon as possible. Critics have said that South Korea does not meet the conditions for such a transfer, which could threaten the country’s security as North Korea continues to build its capabilities.
Lee attended a debate held by the Korea News Editor’s Association at the National Press Center on Thursday. He said, “There is no case around the world where a sovereign state leaves military operational control to another country.” Lee went on, “We need to end the verification process as early as possible by following the previously-agreed-upon protocol.”
“We can just transfer OPCON. Why are they saying that we need to verify our capability?” he asked. “The key to a sovereign state is a military sovereignty and operational control sovereignty. Leaving this sovereignty to another country is nonsense and very exceptional.”
He continued as follows:
“I just cannot understand how people think that it is not possible to defend ourselves unless we leave that [OPCON] to the United States. There are some people thinking that way in the military, and that just shocks me.”
Regarding the Moon Jae-in administration’s North Korea policy, Lee said, “I think they did their best but there are some things where I think they were lacking.” Lee argued that “they should not make an agreement that they cannot keep to, and if they made an agreement, they should have followed the agreement, but I think they did not do so well.” He added, “I will say what I have to say to North Korea, and I will prevent people from calling me humiliated.”
He was also asked about his thoughts on declaring an end to the Korean War. “The leaders of the two Koreas already agreed on this twice, and I think we have to declare the end of the war by all means even if it is symbolic,” he said.
“I think North Korea wants something in return rather than declaring it right away, and the United States seems to be the same,” Lee said. “Japan, on the other hand, opposes it openly, but the victim of the Korean War is us, so we have to take charge and declare an end to the war as soon as possible.” He did not specify who “we” is.
The South Korean conservative Munhwa Ilbo newspaper ran an editorial on Friday criticizing Lee’s comments, as they could destroy the alliance with the United States.
The newspaper argued that Lee’s comments represent populism on national security that defy a basic understanding of history. OPCON was given to the United Nations Command during the early stages of the Korean War, and President Syngman Rhee achieved signing the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States by taking difficult measures such as releasing anti-communist prisoners of war to have U.S. troops stay in Korea. The editorial said that the mutual defense treaty helped South Korea defend its national security and allowed it to become the 10th biggest economic power in the world.
It also pointed out the fact that European countries chose to defend themselves through NATO, where the U.S. commander is in charge of leading the NATO military. It noted that the mutual defense treaty between the United States and Japan allows the United States to defend Japan’s national security. This means that Lee’s comment that “there is no case around the world that a sovereign state leaves military operational control to another country” is blatantly false.
Lee’s previous comments also presented distorted historical views related to the United States. Lee suggested that the United States is responsible for the Japanese colonization of Korea and possibly the Korean War in a meeting with U.S. Senator Jon Ossoff (D-GA) in November. Lee said that “the reason why South Korea was merged with Japan was due to the United States, which approved the Taft-Katsura Agreement.” The agreement was made between the United States Secretary of War William Howard Taft and Japanese Prime Minister Katsura Taro in July 1905. They discussed East Asian affairs in the aftermath of Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War. At that time, Katsura observed that the Japanese colonization of Korea was a matter of absolute importance, as he considered Korea a direct cause of the recently-concluded Russo-Japanese War.
The Munhwa Ilbo newspaper said that “the Joseon Dynasty collapsed since it did not have the power to defend itself. Blaming the United States for the collapse is something that incites anti-American sentiment by distorting fact.”
Meanwhile, the latest poll by the Chosun Ilbo newspaper and Kantar Korea on Friday showed Lee leading the conservative candidate Yoon Seok-youl by 32.4 percent to 31.4 percent. Ahn Cheol-soo from the People’s Party followed them with 6.2 percent, and Sim Sang-jung from the far-left Justice Party received 3.7 percent. A further 21.9 percent of respondents were undecided.
7. S. Korean military launches branch dedicated to enhancing military space power
Excerpts:
Yang Uk, an adjunct professor of national defense strategy at Hannam University, pointed out space has become the crucial part of battle spaces as the military pays attention to the growing importance and need of the Multi-Domain Operations in a complex security environment.
In this context, Yang underscored the necessity and significance of establishing a coordinating body especially as each military branch, including the Army, Navy, and Air Force, has been making individual efforts.
“This is the right timing given that each force, including the Army and Air Force, has begun setting up and deciding its role and mission (in space operations),” Yang told The Korea Herald.
“Each force’s efforts are of course important. But it is more crucial to suggest ways to connect their efforts from a macro perspective at this juncture. Therefore, it is a very timely decision.”
S. Korean military launches branch dedicated to enhancing military space power
JCS takes lead in planning, executing joint space operations
Published : Jan 3, 2022 - 17:53 Updated : Jan 3, 2022 - 17:53
A United Launch Alliance Delta II rocket with the Soil Moisture Active Passive (SMAP) observatory onboard is seen in this long exposure photograph as it launches from Space Launch Complex 2. (NASA/Bill Ingalls)
The South Korean military launched a new coordinating body to develop military space capabilities, as well as to plan and execute joint space operations, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff announced Monday
“The Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Military Space Branch on Jan. 1 as a dedicated organization to lead our military’s development of military space capabilities,” the JCS said in a press statement, adding that the branch would play the role of “control tower.”
The Military Space Branch within the JCS directs military space-related affairs as a coordinating office to develop space and space-enabled capabilities based on cross-service cooperation across the Army, Navy and Air Force.
Notably, the JCS plays a key and leading role in national-level efforts to enhance military spacepower.
The JCS takes the responsibility for setting up military space strategy based on collaboration, as well as mapping out and deciding the mission of each force.
To achieve the strategic goals, the JCS also takes the initiative in establishing an operational concept of joint space operations and building up its executive system in connection with each operational command.
The JCS on Monday said it “has stepped up efforts in all areas to build military space capabilities,” including the launch of a project to formulate “doctrine of joint space operations,” which is a fundamental set of principles and the establishment of training systems against space threats.
The South Korean military has been intensively pushing forward space development projects since last year, after missile guidelines that had restricted Seoul’s missile developments were terminated. South Korea also launched its first domestically built satellite Nuri in October.
In November, South Korean Defense Minister Suh Wook, JCS Chairman Gen. Won In-choul and the top brass of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps held their first full-scale meeting on plans to develop space capabilities.
Specifically, the JCS put earnest efforts last year into establishing and systemically pushing ahead with the military space capacity development plan as well as developing the execution system of joint space operations with other South Korean forces.
Notably, the JCS also issued a joint defense space strategy for the first time, which entails strategic goals, guidance for operating space forces and national defense space architecture.
Based on the defense space strategy, the JCS set up the mid- and long-term goal of building up future-oriented space capabilities by 2050 in connection with the development of space science and technology and proposed a blueprint to that end.
“Along with the efforts we’ve made so far, the JCS’s Military Space Branch would mark an important milestone as a military space power and become a stepping-stone for the development of each force’s military space capabilities,” the JCS said in the statement.
Yang Uk, an adjunct professor of national defense strategy at Hannam University, pointed out space has become the crucial part of battle spaces as the military pays attention to the growing importance and need of the Multi-Domain Operations in a complex security environment.
In this context, Yang underscored the necessity and significance of establishing a coordinating body especially as each military branch, including the Army, Navy, and Air Force, has been making individual efforts.
“This is the right timing given that each force, including the Army and Air Force, has begun setting up and deciding its role and mission (in space operations),” Yang told The Korea Herald.
“Each force’s efforts are of course important. But it is more crucial to suggest ways to connect their efforts from a macro perspective at this juncture. Therefore, it is a very timely decision.”
By Ji Da-gyum (dagyumji@heraldcorp.com)
8. President's New Year speech slammed for failing to reflect reality
President's New Year speech slammed for failing to reflect reality
President Moon Jae-in delivers his New Year speech at Cheong Wa Dae, Monday. YonhapBy Nam Hyun-woo
President Moon Jae-in highlighted the achievements of his administration during his last New Year speech as the country's chief executive, but faced criticism that the government again failed to reflect on the difficulties people are facing due to COVID-19 restrictions and the widening wealth gap between the haves and have-nots.
During the televised speech, Moon said that Korea is now a developed country and highlighted his government's achievements with regards to pandemic responses, economic recovery, democracy, social fairness and inter-Korean relations. He also stressed that the accomplishments should not be downplayed.
"During the past 70 years, Korea has become the most successful country in the world," Moon said. "It is the only country which has seen its status elevated to a developed country from a developing one since World War II. … No one would be able to deny or belittle the national achievements of our people," he added.
Moon said the country's COVID-19 restrictions and disinfection measures have proven to be "superior" compared to those of other countries and that 2022 will be "the first year of recovery toward normal life."
Korea received international plaudits for its early response to the coronavirus outbreak. However, the daily caseloads increased at the end of last year, following a hasty easing of the country's social distancing measures which then had to be abruptly reversed.
Coupled with insufficient compensation for restriction-affected small business owners and their deteriorating finances, doubts have been increasing over the government's overall response to the pandemic.
But Moon remained optimistic.
"With the public's cooperation, the strengthened restrictions are showing desirable effects. The number of cases is declining, patients with severe symptoms as well as the death toll are also expected to show a downturn," Moon said.
Moon said the Korean economy grew stronger in spite of the pandemic.
"During this crisis as well as the rapid changes, our economy has become stronger, showing noticeable growth in quantity and quality," Moon said. "Among advanced nations, Korea posted the highest average growth rate in the past two years, consolidating its status as the 10th strongest economy globally.
"Along with the growth, the country's income inequality and social polarization are being alleviated, with its income quintile share ratio, Gini coefficient and relative poverty rates all improving. In addition, this is all the result of the government's consistent inclusive growth policies and efforts to protect the livelihood of the underprivileged class."
Though Moon cited three indices that are improving, other statistics have shown that the country's income gap between the rich and poor has been widening in the wake of the pandemic.
According to data from Statistics Korea, the average net assets of the upper 20 percent of Koreans stood at 1.29 billion won in March last year, up 125.5 times more compared to that of the bottom 20 percent. This is an uptrend from 99.8 times in 2017, 106.3 times in 2018, 125.6 times in 2019 and a staggering166.6 times in 2020.
President Moon Jae-in speaks during an online New Year meeting with government officials and participants from the private sector at Cheong Wa Dae, Monday. YonhapHis government has been criticized for failing to curb the inflated prices of homes in Seoul and the surrounding metropolitan area. In fact, Moon did not mention this, but just said, "The government will strive to keep the recent housing price downtrend stable and expedite efforts to provide homes to meet actual market demand."
Moon also said his administration reformed investigative agencies "for checks and balance" among them and "to prevent them from abusing power." However, his remarks did not reflect the recent controversy that the new investigative body, the Corruption Investigation Office for High-Ranking Officials (CIO), examined phone records of the main opposition People Power Party (PPP) candidate Yoon Suk-yeol, dozens of PPP lawmakers, journalists and civilians.
The PPP said Moon's speech was tantamount to "self-praise" and described it as "an empty novel" which "failed to see the real world."
"The President talks about 'advancement in democracy' while the Moon government damaged the separation of powers and constitutionalism through the monopoly of the National Assembly. He praised the 'reform of investigative bodies' although he created a 'monstrous' CIO that conducts illegal surveillance of opposition lawmakers, journalists and citizens," PPP spokesman Hwang Kyu-hwan said in a written commentary.
"Self-employed people are about to decide whether to temporarily shut down their businesses (in protest of the government's social distancing restrictions) and people are suffering from skyrocketing prices. But the President was busy praising himself by mentioning the soon-to-be-achieved per capita income of $40,000, a figure which people can't actually feel," he said.
9. Moon pledges to pursue 'irreversible path to peace' with N. Korea until his term ends
Excerpts:
"I will not stop efforts to institutionalize sustainable peace," Moon said in the nationally televised address, adding South Korea will make final efforts for normalization of inter-Korean relations and a path toward irreversible peace.
By institutionalizing peace, Moon appeared to be referring to his initiative to adopt a declaration with North Korea and other countries of a formal end to the 1950-53 Korean War as part of efforts to kickstart long-stalled talks with Pyongyang.
"If we resume dialogue and cooperation, the international community will respond," Moon said. "The government will pursue normalization of inter-Korean relations and an irreversible path to peace until the end. I hope efforts for dialogue will continue in the next administration too."
(LEAD) Moon pledges to pursue 'irreversible path to peace' with N. Korea until his term ends | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: ADDS remarks, details, photo; AMENDS headline)
By Kim Deok-hyun
SEOUL, Jan. 3 (Yonhap) -- President Moon Jae-in said Monday he will pursue an "irreversible path to peace" on the Korean Peninsula until his term ends, calling for dialogue and cooperation with North Korea.
In his final New Year's speech as president, Moon admitted South Korea still has a long way to go to improve inter-Korean relations, despite many achievements during his five-year term.
"I will not stop efforts to institutionalize sustainable peace," Moon said in the nationally televised address, adding South Korea will make final efforts for normalization of inter-Korean relations and a path toward irreversible peace.
By institutionalizing peace, Moon appeared to be referring to his initiative to adopt a declaration with North Korea and other countries of a formal end to the 1950-53 Korean War as part of efforts to kickstart long-stalled talks with Pyongyang.
"If we resume dialogue and cooperation, the international community will respond," Moon said. "The government will pursue normalization of inter-Korean relations and an irreversible path to peace until the end. I hope efforts for dialogue will continue in the next administration too."
Moon's speech came after North Korea wrapped up a key party meeting but stopped short of providing the outside world with fresh clues to its key policies related to inter-Korean ties and denuclearization talks with the United States.
South Korean officials said that Seoul and Washington have made considerable progress over the declaration ending the 1950-53 Korean War, but North Korea has been unresponsive to their overtures for dialogue.
Denuclearization negotiations between the U.S. and the North have remained stalled since the two countries' no-deal Hanoi summit in 2019.
"Peace is an essential prerequisite for prosperity. But, peace tends to be shaken if it is not institutionalized," Moon said.
With the COVID-19 pandemic entering its third year, Moon expressed his gratitude toward public health workers for their hard work during the pandemic, while offering condolences to those who died of the disease.
Last November, South Korea eased long-enforced restrictions on private gatherings and business operations as part of efforts to return to normalcy in phases under the "living with COVID-19" scheme.
Since then, daily virus cases had surged to almost 8,000 in mid-December, prompting the government to reimpose tighter virus curbs. Recently, daily cases showed signs of slowing down.
Moon said he "will make the year 2022 the first year of normalization by fully recovering from the crisis."
The number of serious or critical cases is expected to soon decline as the pace of vaccination of third shots picks up and more hospital beds are secured, Moon said.
However, Moon warned against complacency due to concerns about the highly-transmissible omicron variant.
Moon said the government will spare no efforts to fight against the omicron variant, adding that "it is a matter of time" for the omicron to become a dominant strain in South Korea.
Moon's single, five-year term ends in May and the presidential election will be held on March 9.
Moon said he hopes the upcoming presidential election to become "an election for unity that includes people's hope, not confrontation, hatred and division."
kdh@yna.co.kr
(END)
10. North Korean authorities authorize plan to sell pine nuts to the Chinese through Nampo Port
north Korean economic theory. The party is at the center of all theories and processes.
The source explained that the province has long earn foreign currency through the smuggling of pine nuts purchased by provincial authorities. The COVID-19 pandemic, however, threw up barriers to smuggling, and selling the pine nuts domestically did not go as well as expected.
Following discussions between the province’s party committee and people’s committee, the provincial leadership proposed the plan to sell the pine nuts to the Central Committee. Provincial authorities determined that they could no longer stand by and do nothing to sell pine nuts in their possession this year.
North Korean authorities authorize plan to sell pine nuts to the Chinese through Nampo Port
In return for the pine nuts, the Chinese will reportedly provide “food, sugar, fertilizer, [cooking] oil, and other items sorely needed by ordinary people to improve their lives"
North Korean authorities recently authorized a plan by North Hamgyong Province officials to sell pine nuts in their possession to China through Nampo Port.
According to a source in the province on Thursday, after the North Hamgyong Province people’s committee received the authorization, the province’s trade agency has begun preparing to transport the pine nuts to Nampo Port.
The source explained that the province has long earn foreign currency through the smuggling of pine nuts purchased by provincial authorities. The COVID-19 pandemic, however, threw up barriers to smuggling, and selling the pine nuts domestically did not go as well as expected.
Following discussions between the province’s party committee and people’s committee, the provincial leadership proposed the plan to sell the pine nuts to the Central Committee. Provincial authorities determined that they could no longer stand by and do nothing to sell pine nuts in their possession this year.
“The supply of pine nuts include those harvested by the province itself from late September and those harvested by individual farmers and purchased by the province,” the source said. “The provincial trade agency has been allowed [by the central government] to transport the pine nuts to Nampo Port by the end of this month.”
Pine nut trees / Image: Daily NK
Following the central government’s authorization, the province concluded a contract to sell the pine nuts for foreign currency with a Chinese trading company. This fact was then reported to the central government.
The province also reported to the central leadership that, in return for the pine nuts, the Chinese would provide “food, sugar, fertilizer, [cooking] oil, and other items sorely needed by ordinary people to improve their lives.”
In response to this report by the provincial authorities, the central leadership told the province to send the pine nuts to Nampo Port “due to the lack of preparations [surrounding the building of] quarantine and disinfection facilities for trade [in North Hamgyong Province].” The central government also ordered provincial authorities to conduct trade “as long as measures are taken to the fullest extent to prevent the spread of the contagious virus [COVID-19].”
According to the source, the leadership further emphasized to the province that it needs to adhere to the country’s “emergency quarantine system,” further mentioning that “the most important issue is the thorough quarantine of imported items and preventing repercussions [from failing to do so].”
The source added that the central government ordered that the common people should be given priority for the goods received from the sale of the pine nuts as part of a “New Year’s distribution.”
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Jong So Yong is one of Daily NK’s freelance reporters. Questions about her articles can be directed to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
11. South Korean soldier makes rare defection to Kim Jong-un's North
I have seen no reporting from SOuth Korea that says the person was a South Korean soldier.
South Korean soldier makes rare defection to Kim Jong-un's North
An unnamed South Korean soldier has made a shocking defection across the border to Kim Jong un's North Korea
Mirror · by Kieren Williams · January 2, 2022
A South Korean soldier has made a shock defection across the border to Kim Jong-un’s North Korea.
This marks a rare defection when the soldier made a daring escape northwards through the heavily fortified demilitarised zone.
South Korean military officials confirmed the escape on Sunday.
The trend has been defectors heading south across the border, from the dictatorial north, to the democratic south.
The defector was spotted by South Korean military surveillance near the eastern part of the border, Joint Chiefs of Staff officers said.
Troops were dispatched to recover the individual but failed to do so, and instead could only watch as they ran north of the border.
South Korean Soldier stands guard on the DMZ, where the defector fled across, North Korea is in the background (
Image:
Getty Images)
An officer requesting anonymity, reportedly said south Korea sent a message to North Korea, requesting that the safety of the defector was ensured, but did not receive a response.
The defector crossed a zone that has an estimated two million landmines across the 155-mile-long and 2.5-mile-wide strip that is guarded on both sides and lined with barbed wire, anti-tank traps and soldiers.
A few months ago in September, North Korean troops shot and killed a South Koran fisheries official.
North Korean dictator Kim Jong un (
Image:
via REUTERS)
The dead official was found floating in the water because of what have been branded draconian anti-virus rules to deal with Covid, that allow troops to shoot at anyone illegally crossing the border.
Defections from South Korea northwards are incredibly rare.
But around 34,000 North Koreans have fled to South Korea since the late 1990s, usually through China.
This comes as North Korean leader Kim Jong-un vowed to further bolster his country’s military capabilities, and maintain draconian anti-covid laws at a political conference this week.
The plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the ruling Workers' Party in North Korea (
Image:
via REUTERS)
At a speech given to the a meeting of the ruling Workers’ Party, the official Korean Central News Agency reported he said: "The increasingly unstable military environment on the Korean Peninsula and international politics have instigated calls to vigorously push forward with our national defense build-up plans without any delay.”
However, during a party congree 12 months ago, Kim admitted his economic plans had failed the country and left them in the “worst-ever” situation.
This is largely because trade with North Korea’s biggest economic partner China, shrank by about 80% in 2020 before it plunged again by two-third last year.
In 2020, the economy suffered its biggest contraction since 1997 and grain production dropped to the lowest level since Kim took power in 2011.
Read More
Read More
Mirror · by Kieren Williams · January 2, 2022
12. How Uygur and North Korea human rights activists can join forces to keep slave-made goods out of your closet
Linkage in Chinese and north Korean human rights.
How Uygur and North Korea human rights activists can join forces to keep slave-made goods out of your closet
How many things do you own that were made by slaves—specifically, enslaved North Koreans or Uygurs? The bad news is that no one knows, because most of the evidence is hidden deep within the supply chains. The good news is that this may be changing just enough to make the use of slave labor unprofitable for the retailers you buy from and the sweatshops in China that employ it.
“Royal Blood-Fresh”
Chinese manufacturers have a long history of sourcing their goods from North Korean state-owned sweatshops that sew “Made in China” tags onto the wares. It’s up to 75 percent cheaper for Chinese manufacturers to use North Korean labor.
“North Korean workers can produce 30 percent more clothes each day than a Chinese worker,” said the Korean-Chinese businessman.
“In North Korea, factory workers can’t just go to the toilet whenever they feel like, otherwise they think it slows down the whole assembly line.”
“They aren’t like Chinese factory workers who just work for the money. North Koreans have a different attitude — they believe they are working for their country, for their leader.” [Reuters]
According to the Financial Times, the use of North Korean labor in Dandong is long-established and extensive. Of course, we expect this kind of class exploitation and enslavement of the proletariat from … the Chinese Communist Party and the Workers’ Party of Korea. It’s more disappointing when a self-described progressive democracy does it. While the Kaesong Industrial Complex was operating, North Korean labor and components manufactured there were probably leaking into U.S. commerce with “Made in Korea” labels. If you’re tempted to defend the labor practices at Kaesong and haven’t yet read Marcus Noland’s 2014 paper, “See No Evil: South Korean Labor Practices in North Korea,” you should probably do that now. Before 2011, various people imported women’s garments, motorcycle helmet linings, and other items from North Korea, most of them probably as via Kaesong. In 2006, Ikea imported quilts and pillows made with fabric from “Pakistan, India, China, or North Korea.” At the time, this was all perfectly legal, which may be the reason some of South Korea’s least ethical investors recently spent nearly a million dollars on lobbyists on a campaign to convince Congress to relax U.S. sanctions and reopen Kaesong.
Then there was the curious case of one Sean Kim of Torrance, California, who imported North Korean dietary supplements—which is terrifying if you know anything about North Korea’s reputation for medical quackery. Even more terrifying is the supplement’s name: “Royal Blood-Fresh.” Pugang claimed that Royal Blood-Fresh was a preventive for deep-vein thrombosis. Shockingly, at least one doctor dismissed that claim as non-scientific.
According to the Washington Post, the North Korean manufacturer of Royal Blood-Fresh, Pugang Pharmaceutic Co. Ltd., is a part of the North Korean conglomerate she described as “Pugang Corporation.” In 2005, the Treasury Department designated and froze the assets of a company called Korea Pugang Trading Company for being a subsidiary of Korea Ryonbyong Trading Company, which was involved in (wait for it) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In 2007, Customs missed that connection and let Mr. Kim’s supplements in despite the blocking order. In 2015, Pugang’s head even sat for an interview with a Washington Post reporter and openly confessed to conspiracy to commit money laundering to evade the blocking action. According the Post, Pugang was selling the supplements with the marking “Made in Korea,” but the 2007 Customs ruling indicates that they were marked “Made in DPR Korea,” which would have been understood by all of twelve American consumers. Pugang also sold its products to South Koreans. In 2017, three Russians were arrested for smuggling them into Busan without government approval.
So, in what universe did anyone think Royal Blood-Fresh was a good idea?
2011-2017: The Legal Landscape Changes
In 2011, President Obama signed Executive Order 13,570, which banned all imports of goods, services, and technology from North Korea. Then, in August of 2017, President Trump signed (or was forced to sign, because it had passed by a veto-proof margin) the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017. Section 321 of the CAATSA created a rebuttable presumption that any goods “mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part by the labor of North Korean nationals or citizens” are the products of forced labor, and therefore excluded from U.S. commerce under a longstanding provision of the Tariff Act, at 19 U.S.C. 1307 (you’re welcome, humanity). The presumption can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence[1] that the products are not, in fact, made with forced labor. Let the engagers among you take note—were Pyongyang ever to allow its workers to keep their own wages and work under fair and humane conditions, the importer could, hypothetically, have overcome that presumption.
In October of 2017, just two months after the CAATSA became law, Kevin McAleenan, the nominee to be Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, testified at his confirmation hearing that CBP had used CAATSA 321 to stop stop six shipments of Chinese seafood made with North Korean labor. In a set of Questions For the Record CBP returned to the Committee later, CBP claimed to have stopped eleven shipments, valued at $564,775. (As OFK readers know, it’s highly likely that the seafood was actually caught by Chinese ships in North Korean waters; in case you were also wondering, McAleenan didn’t say whether the seafood was canned, frozen, or … fresh.) CBP says it meets regularly with civil society organizations “to ensure we are aware of trends, insights, and concerns that these groups possess into forced labor issues.” As we’ll see, it also makes good use of OSINT from press reports. CBP took its new legal obligations seriously. The rebuttable presumption cleared the fog that hides Chinese sweatshops’ enslavement of North Koreans, and changed the game on how North Korean-made imports are treated.[2]
2021: The Case of Poof Apparel
In Resolution 2397, the UN Security Council stated that Pyongyang’s exports of textiles and seafood contribute revenue to its WMD programs. In December 2020, a retailer called Poof Apparel tried to bring in two shipments of women’s and girl’s clothing from China. Poof sourced the clothing from a manufacturer called Dandong Huayang Textiles and Garments Co., Ltd. For those of you who don’t follow North Korea news closely, Dandong is a Chinese port very close to North Korea, which has a long history of sanctions-busting, money laundering, maritime smuggling, and (as we’ll soon see) forced labor involving North Korea. CBP stopped the shipment at the Port of Newark on suspicion that it was made with North Korean labor.
(That’s probably also true of Dandong.)
The intelligence units in CBP’s Office of Trade had done their homework on which Chinese manufacturers use North Korean labor. CBP notified Poof of its exclusion decision and told Poof that if it wanted its shipment to clear customs, it would have to answer a list of questions and provide “documentation detailing how Dandong Huayang employees are recruited, identification cards and payroll records or other proof of payment.” Poof protested that the goods were made with Chinese labor, not North Korean labor, and appealed the ruling.
The appeal did not go well for Poof, however. CBP noted several discrepancies in Poof’s documentation that fell short of “clear and convincing.” Poof submitted the report of an outside auditor on Dandong Huayang’s labor practices, claiming that Dandong Huayang only used native-speaking Chinese laborers, but CBP noticed discrepancies in the date of the report, and that the auditor was only allowed to inspect certain parts of Dandong Huayang’s sprawling, massive factory grounds. The photocopies of the workers’ identity documents were illegible. The auditor only interviewed ten out of 49 workers (as Noland’s report about Kaesong confirms, North Korean minders don’t allow nonbelievers to talk to their charges). And now we come to the part where a sharp-eyed CBP attorney noticed something in Poof’s appeal exhibits:
The WRAP report also included photographs of the Dandong Huayang production facility that are date-stamped November 3, 2020. Although the photographs are slightly blurry, one particular photograph stood out from the rest. The photograph labeled “Production process: Packing” depicts Dandong Huayang workers next to a stack of boxes of personal protective equipment (PPE), specifically disposable clothing.
These boxes of PPE are identical to images of PPE boxes featured in The Guardian’s November 2020 exposé of North Korean forced labor used in Dandong Province factories in the production of PPE coveralls. The three-month investigation found evidence that protective coveralls ordered for the UK Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) originated from Dandong factories, including Dandong Huayang, using North Korean forced labor. The exposé further revealed that the PPE has been exported to the United States, Italy, Germany, South Africa, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Myanmar.
Accordingly, the photograph does not establish with clear and convincing evidence that the excluded garments were not made with forced labor, rather it establishes that it is highly likely the workers that were making the subject excluded garments were also making the disposable PPE garments and therefore, likely were North Korean nationals. [CBP Ruling, Mar. 5, 2021]
CBP denied the appeal on CAATSA Section 321 grounds. It later issued a press release on the ruling. Dandong Huayang’s website still advertises its PPE. This brings us to two other North Korean forced labor scandals involving Dandong Huayang, starting with The Guardian’s exposé:
It is claimed that the North Korean workers in Dandong, who are mostly women, work for up to 18 hours a day, with little or no time off. They are under constant surveillance and are unable to freely leave the factories.
Sources indicate that the North Korean workers in PPE factories in Dandong have about 70% of their wages seized by the North Korean state.
“The workers have no days off. They are not allowed to go out. The North Korean [state] controls them. They make money for the country,” said a manager at one factory. [The Guardian]
State-Sponsored Slavery
Dandong Huayang denied using North Korean labor, but there is plenty of evidence that it does. Our friend, Remco Breuker, even found an interview in which a Dandong Huayang manager boasts about all the money his company made by using it to make goods to export to the United States. According to Panjiva documents I found online, different Dandong Huayang subsidiaries source more than 80 percent or more than 90 percent of their shipments from North Korea (see also). Dandong Huayang mainly exports to the United States and Canada, and ships some of its wares through Busan, South Korea. This was not the last scandal for one of Dandong Huayang’s buyers, either. In November 2021, the Canadian retailer Reitmans pulled consignments of women’s clothing from its shelves and severed its relations with Dandong Huayang after a CBC report found that it had purchased more than 100 shipments from Dandong Huayang that may have been made with North Korean forced labor.
Beyond the reputational risks, the manufacturers, exporters, and importers also face legal risks. Not only does this trade violate UN Security Council resolutions that ban North Korean textile exports, but also of our country-of-origin labeling laws and Executive Order 13570, violations of which are punishable by up to twenty years in Allenwood, plus fines, penalties, and forfeitures. (CBP has its own administrative forfeiture authority.)
Breuker’s report documents the use of North Korean labor in Dandong’s sweatshops extensively. Mining Chinese customs data, he finds that starting in 2010, the number of North Korean visits to China for “worker and crew” reasons began to rise sharply. Between 2008 and 2015, the number of such recorded visits almost doubled. Another suspicious fact is that a high percentage of those North Koreans were women—who are most likely to be sent to work in Chinese canneries and sweatshops, and North Korean restaurants. North Korean officials are frequent visitors to those factories, to negotiate the arrangements. Provincial statistics show that these “cross-border production networks” may have exported hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of goods to the United States since 2015. That boom came just in time to buffer the effects of the closure of Kaesong in 2016.
After the UN Security Council—including China—voted unanimously to ban North Korean labor and textile exports, most of the factory managers in Dandong surveyed said, “Meh.” That’s probably because, according to Breuker’s paper, Chinese authorities had encouraged factories in Dandong to use North Korean labor to boost export earnings. The fact that the Port of Dandong was deeply in debt was probably also a consideration. So was their longstanding pattern of sanctions evasion to bail Kim Jong-un out. In other words, this commerce is unquestionably state sanctioned, on both sides of the border. (You can follow Remco on Twitter here.)
The Uygur Connection
The result of this is that corporate lawyers are now warning their clients that they face greater legal, financial, and reputational risks than ever if they use North Korean labor. This corporate consulting firm that helps companies avoid the taint of human rights abuses is also warning of the risk from North Korean labor. Up until 2017, our enforcement against North Korean imports clearly hadn’t been enough to change the behavior of the sweatshops and canneries. In fact, the laws didn’t even prohibit most of that trade. That has begun to change, and the rebuttable presumption provision that first appeared in the CAATSA, and which CBP seems to be taking seriously, is an important part of that.
All of this will soon be true of Uygur labor, too. A provision patterned on Section 321 has since found its way into Section 3 of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which is a glorious thing. C4ADS has done characteristically excellent work investigating the supply chains for Uygur forced labor. Just as Uygur human rights activists have learned legal and legislative lessons from North Korean human rights activists, North Korean human rights activists can learn from how Uygur human rights activists trace supply chains to Uygur forced labor. Both can learn to combine their research with CBP’s petition process at 19 C.F.R. § 12.42, to effectively blacklist Chinese manufacturers that are known to use North Korean labor, and to ask CBP to apply enhanced NKSPEA 205 inspections to seafood and textiles from Dandong, except for those that have allowed transparent inspection of their work forces.
The new law is likely to target cotton textiles made with Uygur slave labor. It would not surprise me in the least if the same Chinese sweatshops that use enslaved North Koreans also use cotton grown by enslaved Uygurs. Another fruitful area for Uygur and North Korean human rights activists to investigate may be wigs and false eyelashes, given reports that wigs and false eyelashes are made in this North Korean prison camp for export, and the evidence that Elf Cosmetics was penalized for selling false eyelashes sourced from North Korea.
~ ~ ~
[1] According to CBP’s ruling, “[c]lear and convincing evidence is a higher standard of proof than a preponderance of the evidence, and generally means that a claim or contention is highly probable.”
[2] Separately, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has also warned importers about the forced labor risks associated with North Korean fisheries and labor.
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13. China and North Korea: A New Peak of Comradeship
Conclusion:
In sum, depending on the result of South Korea’ presidential election and the situation in Taiwan Strait, North Korea may return to the cycle of major provocations, and Beijing is most likely to support Pyongyang’s position. Beijing always prioritizes North Korea’s regime stability over the country’s denuclearization. If the tension between the US and China further escalates and China-South Korea relationship deteriorates, Beijing will most likely double down on strengthening China-North Korea relations. The comradeship appears to be heading to its highest point in decades in 2022.
China and North Korea: A New Peak of Comradeship
Sungmin Cho
21 December 2021
In July 2021, commemorating the 60th anniversary of mutual defense treaty, Chinese President Xi Jinping said bilateral relations between China and North Korea should “unceasingly rise to new levels” in the world “undergoing profound changes unseen in a century.” How can one explain, in Xi Jinping’s own words, China’s “unswerving support” of North Korea in 2021? What events are likely to impact China-North Korea relations in 2022? Answering these questions should start with reviewing what China has done for North Korea in 2021.
First of all, Beijing reaffirmed the value of “the Sino-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance” signed in 1961. It means that the two countries also confirmed their commitments to providing military support to each other in the event of an attack. China also continued to provide economic support for North Korea: according to the Chinese General Administration of Customs, China imported $14.3 million worth of goods from North Korea in September, which is a twofold increase from the $6.2 million in August. The September import figures are the highest since December 2019 before the outbreak of COVID-19. In addition to said official trade, China has allowed North Korea to export coals and sands to China in violation of international sanctions authorized by the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). Consequently, Washington accused Beijing of failing to act against illicit ship-to-ship petroleum transfers in China’s territorial waters.
On the diplomatic front, Beijing took the initiative to ease the international sanctions against North Korea. China and Russia tried to redraft the UNSCR, where they claim the sanctions be lifted “with the intent of enhancing livelihood of the civilian population” in North Korea in times of global crisis given by the COVID-19 pandemic. During the top diplomats’ meeting between China and South Korea, Beijing also expressed its diplomatic support for the Moon Jae-in government’s push for the declaration of the end of the Korean War . Beijing’s official position is to support the peaceful resolution of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. However, Chinese analysts themselves acknowledge China and North Korea have shared interests in diminishing US military influence in East Asia, and that the end of war declaration may lead to Beijing and Pyongyang demanding the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea.
The increasingly close ties between China and North Korea in 2021 can be explained by the two factors of (1) intensification of the US-China strategic competition and (2) Moon Jae-in government’s foreign policy orientation. First, as the US-China strategic rivalry deepens, Beijing is incentivized to strengthen its ties with Pyongyang. Beijing perceives that the Biden administration’s China policy is not so different from the Trump administration’s hawkish approach. Even worse, as in the case of AUKUS - a trilateral security pact among Australia, the UK, and the US - shows, Washington has been trying to form a coalition of willingness against China with its allies and partners. To counter the US’ efforts, Beijing also seeks to strengthen its ties with countries like Russia, Iran, Myanmar, and Cambodia, among others. In this context, China has interests in enhancing its relations with North Korea, its only treaty ally.
Second, whether it intends to or not, Moon Jae-in government’s foreign policy has been aligned with China’s diplomatic strategy in practice. Though the Moon administration seems to perceive itself as pursuing a balanced diplomacy between China and the US, some American analysts view South Korea’s “balanced approach” as relatively “pro-China” when compared with other treaty allies such as Japan and Australia. Knowing this well, security experts in China tend to perceive South Korea as “a weak link” of the US alliance system. They praised Seoul’s restraints from commenting on sensitive issues like Hong Kong and Xinjiang as signs of “Seoul’s rationality in dealing with Washington.” China’s state media insisted that “South Korea is much wiser than Japan in keeping a diplomatic balance,” while emphasizing South Korea’s economic dependence on Chinese market and trade. In short, China attempts to expand its influence on the Korean Peninsula by strengthening its ties with North Korea and weaking South Korea’s ties with the United States.
In 2022, the possibility of two events is likely to further strengthen the bilateral ties between China and North Korea. First, South Korea’s China policy may dramatically change depending on the outcome of the presidential election on 9 March, 2022. The ruling Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung announced that, if elected, he would continue the Moon administration’s policy of engaging with North Korea, including the end of war declaration. On the contrary, the opposition People Power Party’s candidate, Yoon Suk-yeol, publicly opposed the end of war declaration before any tangible progress is made on North Korea’s denuclearization. More importantly, he emphasized the expanded deterrence from the strong alliance with the US and the revival of security cooperation with Japan, while proposing to open trilateral communication hotlines among Seoul, Pyongyang, and Washington, notably excluding Beijing.
Therefore, if Yoon is elected, South Korea’s relationship with China will likely turn more confrontational. Directly commenting on China, Yoon suggested that he would invalidate the Moon administration’s so-called “3-No” position: in the 2017 agreement, South Korea committed to no additional deployment of the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery, no South Korean integration into a US-led missile defense system, and no trilateral alliance with the US and Japan. Reversing the commitment may invite China’s retaliation with coercive economic measures, but Yoon’s new anti-China initiative is likely to gather public support. According to an April 2021 survey, 60% of South Korean respondents view China as an economic threat, while 37% see it as an economic partner. 83% view China as a security threat, with only 12 % perceiving China as a security partner. The negative view around China among the South Korean populace is even worse than Japan’s.
Second, the security situation in the Taiwan Strait may have an impact on the Korean Peninsula. As the possibility of war looms large across Taiwan Strait, American scholars have called for closer cooperation with allies like Japan and South Korea to deter China’s invasion of Taiwan. As I wrote elsewhere, if the tension somehow escalates to the verge of military conflict, China would undoubtedly want to prevent the deployment of US armed forces from Japan and South Korea to the Taiwan Strait. Given that North Korea also poses a security threat to Japan, Beijing would not oppose Pyongyang’s concurrent provocations to pin down US, Japanese, and South Korean military forces. From Pyongyang’s perspective as well, a contingency in the Taiwan Strait means a distraction of the US’ strategic focus, which creates an opportunity for major provocation such as nuclear or long-range missile tests. That way, Pyongyang could press Washington to concede on the denuclearization negotiation. Pyongyang already signaled it links the situation in Taiwan to Korean affairs. In October 2021, North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister Pak Myong-ho said that “the huge forces of the US and its satellite states, which are being concentrated near Taiwan,” can be “committed to a military operation targeting the DPRK at any time.”
In sum, depending on the result of South Korea’ presidential election and the situation in Taiwan Strait, North Korea may return to the cycle of major provocations, and Beijing is most likely to support Pyongyang’s position. Beijing always prioritizes North Korea’s regime stability over the country’s denuclearization. If the tension between the US and China further escalates and China-South Korea relationship deteriorates, Beijing will most likely double down on strengthening China-North Korea relations. The comradeship appears to be heading to its highest point in decades in 2022.
Dr. Sungmin Cho is Professor at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), an academic institute of the US Department of Defense. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ alone and do not reflect the official position of APCSS or the US Department of Defense.
14. Military criticized for continued border control failures
Excerpts:
According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Sunday, personnel of Korea's 22nd Infantry Division observed the person in the DMZ at around 9:20 p.m. by using a thermal observation device (TOD). While investigating it, the division belatedly confirmed footage of the man climbing a fence at around 6:40 p.m.
It brought criticism over the military's lax discipline, as the timeline showed the military failed to detect the man until about three hours after the border breach. Then the military again failed to stop him from crossing into North Korea, as he crossed the military demarcation line (MDL) into North Korea at around 10:40 p.m.
Adding to the criticism is the fact that the military has been making similar mistakes in its border control in recent years. Asides from this case, there have been other cases of North Koreans coming to the South Korean side by crossing the inter-Korean border.
Military criticized for continued border control failures
A guard post in the Demilitarized Zone in Goseong, Gangwon Province, is seen in this Feb. 14, 2019, photo. YonhapBy Jung Da-min
The military has come under fire for repeated failures in border control, especially as multiple border crossing cases have taken place in recent years in the eastern coastal region.
On Sunday, the military said an unidentified person had crossed the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) into North Korea the night before. On Monday, it said that the person is presumed to be a North Korean defector who had come to the South in November 2020 by passing through the DMZ in the opposite direction.
An official of the Ministry of National Defense said the military has identified the man using surveillance footage at the civilian passage restriction line on the South Korean side in Goseong, Gangwon Province.
"He was seen in Jan. 1 surveillance footage captured by a camera installed around the civilian control line at around noon. In the process of identifying the person, the military found that he is highly likely to be the man who defected from the North to the South in November 2020, based on his appearance," the official told reporters.
According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Sunday, personnel of Korea's 22nd Infantry Division observed the person in the DMZ at around 9:20 p.m. by using a thermal observation device (TOD). While investigating it, the division belatedly confirmed footage of the man climbing a fence at around 6:40 p.m.
It brought criticism over the military's lax discipline, as the timeline showed the military failed to detect the man until about three hours after the border breach. Then the military again failed to stop him from crossing into North Korea, as he crossed the military demarcation line (MDL) into North Korea at around 10:40 p.m.
Adding to the criticism is the fact that the military has been making similar mistakes in its border control in recent years. Asides from this case, there have been other cases of North Koreans coming to the South Korean side by crossing the inter-Korean border.
In February 2021, a defector in a wetsuit and wearing swimming flippers made it down the eastern coast undetected through a damaged drain pipe. He was found walking around a road after he came ashore in the South. In 2012, a defecting North Korean soldier scaled barbed-wire border fences without being detected and knocked on the door of a South Korean barracks to get attention.
The South Korean military has since ?installed more surveillance gear, including the electronic sensors. Nevertheless critics say more border control failures could keep happening as long as the current lax vigilance continues.
"The military's response was poor, as they failed to do anything for three hours," the main opposition People Power Party said in a statement, Sunday. "This is the chronic disease caused by the Moon Jae-in administration's easygoing sense on the issue of security."
15. North Korea’s Strategic Vision for 2022: Focus on Rural Development
A very useful rundown.
North Korea’s Strategic Vision for 2022: Focus on Rural Development
The 4th Plenum: Main Takeaways
The 4th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee of the Korean Worker’s Party convened in Pyongyang for five days, from December 27 to December 31, 2021. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un participated in the meeting in his capacity as Secretary General of the Party and gave at least two major speeches. As in 2020 and 2021, this public appearance at a major event around the beginning of the new year replaced the hitherto customary New Year Address.
(Source: Rodong Sinmun)
Concerning formal aspects, it seems that the North Korean leadership has learned from what they might have come to see as past communication mistakes. Rather than providing the complete texts of Kim Jong Un’s speeches, as was done at the 7th Party Congress in 2016, this year state media reported about them in third person and only in the form of rough summaries. They omitted details on sensitive issues and thus made interpretation by outside observers more difficult. For example, readers of state media were merely informed that the leader “referred in detail to the shortcomings and important lessons revealed in this year’s work and the ways for settling them.” We can assume that more detail might be provided in internal ideological education materials, but until these are leaked, this is all there is.
As far as we know, Kim Jong Un gave two speeches or reports at the 4th Plenum. Under the title “On the Orientation of the Work of the Party and State in 2022,” he summarized in a relatively standardized form the achievements of the past and outlined some priorities for the coming year. His second report was more specific, and focused entirely on rural development and agriculture: “Let us open up a new great era of our style socialist rural development.”
The major takeaways from the two speeches are easily summarized.
- There was no reference to foreign policy; neither to the relationship with the US, nor to the relationship with South Korea. No new initiatives were announced, but also no new threats were issued. No complaints were made about sanctions, military exercises or “hostile policies.”
- The military was mentioned only very briefly. No new weapons systems have been announced, and there have been no threats of nuclear or ICBM tests. This does not mean none of these will take place in 2022. Given the seemingly low position North Korea has on the Biden administration’s priority list, such strategic weapons tests—which have not taken place since 2017—would be among the most obvious choices for Pyongyang to pursue if the leadership decides it needs more attention.
- There were no signs of new market-oriented economic reforms or liberalization. Rather, we find approaches and terminology that date back many years, if not decades. Maintaining his position as announced at the 8th Party Congress in January 2021, the North Korean leader seems intent on dealing with the current situation by strengthening the role of the state, undoing previous reformist experiments, and re-focusing the economy on import substitution and the highest possible degree of self-reliance and autarky. The term socialism/socialist (사회주의) appears 60 times in the related KCNA article, and Kim Jong Un reportedly praised “the might of collectivism” and strict “plan discipline.”
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The most important and central topic of Kim Jong Un’s public appearances during the 4th Plenum was on “solving the food, clothing and housing problem for the people,” in particular, development and agriculture. Despite having promised an “improvement of people’s living conditions” (인민생활향상) ten years ago at the beginning of his rule, the leader has not yet fulfilled that mission. His focus on this issue now could thus be as much a reference to his own past as it is to current conditions and challenges. Earlier attempts from 2012 pointed at a willingness to experiment with elements, such as Chinese-style land reform, smaller work teams, decentralization, and marketization. In his speeches at the 4th Plenum, Kim Jong Un went the opposite direction: farmers are supposed to be ideologically motivated, the state’s economic guidance in agriculture is to be strengthened, and a modernization modeled after the Three Revolutions Movement of the 1970s is supposed to make living in the countryside more attractive and productive. The magic bullet to increase output is going to be science and technology, not a more effective incentive system.
The First Speech: On the Orientation of the Work of the Party and State in 2022
Even in formal terms, the leader’s remarks resembled what could be called typical, traditional and orthodox in North Korean fashion. Seemingly dramatic and dynamic terminology such as “decisive,” “agony,” or “change” is softened and effectively devalued by formulations that imply continuity, statism, and lack of progress: “the strategic importance of the next year’s work… will just be as huge and important as this year’s.” Kim Jong Un characterized the year 2021 as “a year of great victory,” but then went on to say that it “opened up a prelude to… great change.” Most North Koreans are well-trained enough to not think too much about the inherent contradiction of such statements, but outside observers are left wondering: victory, or prelude?
Another recurring characteristic of a classical and conservative approach to state socialism as it could be observed in many countries of the Eastern Bloc is an emphasis on “correct” policies. This is intellectually related to the idea that socialism, unlike capitalism, is a scientific worldview. Kim Jong Un explained that: “only when we correctly understand and judge the present external and internal situation and make a right stride along the correct orientation with accurate fighting policies, can we move to the next stage.” It is no coincidence that the term “science” (과학) appears 28 times in the report. (Emphasis added by author.)
The reporting on the leader’s first speech was very general and shallow. Take, for example, the paragraph on the metallurgical industrial sector. It should “produce iron and steel as scheduled by supplying fuel and raw materials in time and… push ahead with the expansion of capacity and modernization.” This is equivalent to telling an audience of wine makers that wine can be made out of grapes. And it is not the only such instance: “[Kim Jong Un] stressed the need for the fishing industrial sector to… catch more fish.”
The agricultural field was and remains the Party’s “top priority.” The introduction of new scientific methods is supposed to make farming independent of climate changes. Good work is to be rewarded ideologically, for example, by sending “thanks in the name of the Party Central Committee to the exemplary agricultural officials, workers, scientists and technologists…” Progress is to be achieved by further strengthening “plan discipline” and the “unified guidance and control of the state over economic work” (경제사업에 대한 국가의 통일적지도와 통제). In construction, the leader gave priority to residential buildings in Pyongyang and in the countryside, and to making Samjiyon City something like a model for other localities.
The pandemic shines through occasionally in Kim’s report, for example, when he mentions the task for the chemical industry to “boost the production of materials for… the pharmaceutical industry,” or that “that the emergency epidemic prevention work should be made a top priority in the state work,” and when he demands to put “the country’s foundation of epidemic prevention on a scientific foundation and firmly [prepare] the material and technological foundation of the epidemic prevention sector.”
Despite the overall very general and often empty nature of the report as mentioned above, a few details stand out as being at least somewhat noteworthy.
For example, schools were asked to “strengthen the meritocratic educational system” (수재교육체계). That is not necessarily what one would expect from a collectivist society. There are, however, parallels to a traditional Korean approach to education, and to other—long gone—state socialist systems that have been highly competitive in their search for and promotion of talent. In East Germany, for example, despite a few ideologically motivated exceptions, most students could only advance to high school (11th and 12th grades) if they had an almost perfect score in their 10th grade.
Another detail was the leader’s demand to develop the economy “in a balanced and simultaneous way” (균형적으로, 동시적으로), a point he had made already back in 2016 at the 7th Party Congress. Those familiar with related theories will recognize this as the official North Korean answer to a central strategic question of economic development: balanced versus unbalanced growth, i.e., investing a little of the country’s scarce resources into each of the sectors of the economy versus focusing on massive investment in only a few key areas in the hope that the market will then lead to an automatic catching up by the rest.
Considering that in the past, plans have suddenly disappeared from media reporting without further notice, it is also noteworthy that the current five-year plan is still officially on the agenda.
Last but not least, compared to previous reports and speeches, criticism of ideological misconduct was very subdued this time. There is just one short paragraph with a reference to “further positively conducting the struggle against anti-socialist and non-socialist practices in the entire Party and the whole country and society,” and establishing and strengthening law and order. There is an even shorter passage calling on the Party to “wage a major ideological battle against formalism.” Taken out of context, these words might sound dramatic, but they pale in comparison with the long and detailed rant against “abuse of authority, bureaucratism, corruption and decadence” at the 7th Party Congress in 2016. It is noteworthy that Kim Jong Un, who had heavily criticized officials in the past, praised them this time for having shown “improvement in their work style.” Does he really think so, or is he anxious to secure their loyalty?
The Second Speech: “Let us open up a new great era of our style socialist rural development”
Since this speech focused on only one topic, reporting was more detailed. Confirming the existing trend of retreating to old-fashioned state socialist principles and approaches, Kim Jong Un noted the need to enhance the “level of ideological awareness of agricultural workers,” that “the major task of rural development strategy at present is to transform all the agricultural workers into revolutionary agricultural workers,” and that it is “of paramount importance to put priority efforts into transforming the thought of agricultural workers and enhancing their political awareness…” In other words, increases in production are supposed to be achieved through ideological incentives, not via market mechanisms. This stands in contrast to previous policies by Kim Jong Il, and also by Kim Jong Un himself. It is not clear what has prompted such a reversal: lack of success, or reluctance to pay the ideological price for the introduction of de facto capitalist elements such as private ownership and demand/supply-oriented price setting?
Kim Jong Un is not the only politician in the world to make long-term promises. In this case, Kim pledged to “completely solve the food problem of the country,” to be attained gradually over the next ten years. But what often works well in a democracy where the maker of a promise is unlikely to still be in power once the due date arrives, Kim Jong Un might find himself in a position in 2032 to explain why such a lofty goal could not be attained. Does that even matter? Indeed: it would be difficult to count the numerous occasions in which one of the three Kims has made similar announcements in the past. So far, the North Korean population has not held its leaders responsible for what turned out to be failure after failure. Political repression, lack of information, and reference to adverse weather conditions and sanctions have managed to suppress any major protest. But how much longer will this strategy work? The past two decades have witnessed a dramatic increase in the level of education and knowledge among North Koreans about economic issues, and new media have made access to alternative information not easy, but definitely easier.
Kim Jong Un’s direct reference to the so-called Three Revolutions (ideological, technical, and cultural) is another indicator of the deeply conservative, orthodox and anything but innovative policy line currently being applied. It goes back to at least the early 1970s, which suggests some parallels to China’s Cultural Revolution, and has been more recently revived in a major conference in Pyongyang in November 2021. The emphasis in Kim’s speech on turning farmers into devout and ideologically pure revolutionaries stands in sharp contrast to attempts earlier during his tenure, when he allegedly introduced the so-called 6.28 measures in 2012, effectively giving the farmers more individual decision-making power over what to grow and how to market their products.
A relatively new and potentially game-changing idea has been somewhat hidden in the long report: wheat farming. So far, the staple food of North Koreans is rice, at least theoretically. Maize, potatoes and barley are produced too, but in smaller quantities and only on land where rice cannot be grown. The problem with rice is that it needs very specific conditions. Apart from the inefficiencies of the socialist economic system and the lack of key inputs such as fertilizer, weather conditions have been a major problem for rice production. North Korea tends to be very dry in the spring, when rice needs lots of water to grow; and it is very wet in autumn, when rice needs dry weather to ripen. If wheat is introduced not just to supplement rice, but to at least partially substitute it, the yields could become more stable.
There are many “ifs” involved here, including acceptance of this policy by the farmers, the readiness of consumers to adjust their preferences, and the suitability of Korea’s conditions for wheat farming. But in principle, changing the planted crops is a globally applied strategy to deal with dynamic conditions, whether because of climate change or other reasons. In addition, due to potentially larger plot sizes, wheat farming is more suitable for mechanization, which could relieve the chronic shortage of farm labor in North Korea that frequently leads to campaigns of sending the urban population out to the countryside to help farmers during rice transplanting and harvest. In his speech, Kim Jong Un referred to this practice. As a side effect, increasing plot sizes would make larger collectives more efficient, and thereby help undo previous decentralization efforts that have obviously fallen out of grace.
It remains to be seen what exactly Kim Jong Un’s remark on wheat farming means or what the effects of such a policy shift will eventually be, but this is nevertheless an aspect that deserves our attention.
Another noteworthy and easily overlooked detail is Kim’s explicit promise to forgive state loans, which many farms have been unable to service properly. Could this be an indicator of a domestic debt crisis? This would correspond with earlier and—so far—anecdotal reports about cash shortages.
Why This Focus on Rural Development?
A question that analysts will surely discuss intensively in the coming days and weeks is why rural development received such attention and prioritization by the leader at this Plenum. Second-guessing the intentions of Kim Jong Un is not an exact science, but we can consider what factors might be driving this focus.
The prioritization of rural development could, for instance, be like the signs I saw in 2010 at the Chinese side of the Sino-North Korean border, prohibiting “shouting at the other side” and “drug smuggling”: it tells us what is actually going on. Kim Jong Un could have decided to demonstrate more interest in the countryside in reaction to actual or potential discontent in the provinces. This assessment is supported by a certain mismatch: before the tightening of sanctions in 2017 and the pandemic, when the economy was doing much better than it is now, Kim Jong Un had been much more critical and self-critical. But now that the country is under the threat of a severe economic crisis, with trade levels and state budget figures at historic lows, Kim’s remarks at the 4th Plenum, at least as far as they have been reported, are almost devoid of dramatic wording. The tone of his speech could therefore be seen as an indicator of his eagerness to convey a message of optimism to calm the worries of his people, including the middle class and the elite.
A more functional interpretation, however, would be relatively simple: North Korea does not produce enough food; to increase food production, the attractiveness of life in the countryside needs to be improved.
Finally, we should not forget that a focus on rural development is by no means new or unique, especially under the conditions prevalent in North Korea. Related attempts have not even been limited to state socialist systems. Under dictator Park Chung Hee in the early 1970s, and around the time the Three Revolutions Movement was initiated in the North, South Korea had its own rural development initiative called New Village Movement (새마을 운동). Comparisons of that campaign with Kim’s current policy are therefore tempting, but potentially misleading. The background of Park’s initiative was not a looming famine, but the desire to balance rapid urbanization, to spread a spirit of developmentalism, to reduce social conflict by providing a more equal distribution of income across the country, and to prop up domestic construction companies through Keynesian infrastructure projects. Nevertheless, the actual measures taken in rural areas are very similar: ideological indoctrination, improved education, expansion of cultural facilities, transfer of new technologies, improvement of health services, and even supply of cement.
For the US and South Korea, the absence of an open invitation for talks or diplomatic initiatives does not necessarily mean that North Korea is not interested. In fact, if the leader’s focus on rural development is indeed a sign of economic difficulties, he might be more open to related offers than it seems.
Even though a solution of North Korea’s economic problems cannot be expected from the currently promoted orthodox policies, the 4th Plenum confirmed that a more reform-oriented approach is not in sight. The North Korean leadership seems confident to survive nevertheless. This suggests that they expect external support—and Beijing might consider it to be in its interest to lend a hand, in the context of the emerging Cold War 2.0 in East Asia. If that assessment is correct, then North Korea could be able to keep muddling through without having to risk a change of system and too much interaction with the West. But this will only postpone a solution to its fundamental economic development issues, and it remains to be seen how long the North Korean population will be willing to accept that reality.
References:
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
