Happy Lunar New Year/Seollal - 많이 받으세요
Quotes of the Day:
“For there is no other way to guard oneself from flattery unless men understand that they do not offend you in telling you the truth.”
- Machiavelli
"Intelligence is not to make no mistakes, but quickly to see how to make them good."
- Bertolt Brecht
“When books are run out of school classrooms and libraries, I’m never much disturbed. Not as a citizen, not as a writer, not even as a schoolteacher… which I used to be.
What I tell kids is, don’t get mad, get even.
Don’t spend time waving signs or carrying petitions around the neighborhood. Instead, run, don’t walk, to the nearest non-school library or the local bookstore and get whatever it was that they banned.
Read whatever they are trying to keep out of your eyes and your brain, because that’s exactly what you need to know.”
-Stephen King
1. U.S. says it is seeking diplomacy, other measures, over N. Korea's missile launches
2. Korean Unification: What Would It Actually Take?
3. North Koreans forced to attend lectures to solidify personality cult of Kim family
4. North Korea documentary shows limping Kim as he tackles 'worst-ever hardships'
5. Cyber-hacking as a Means of “Self-reliance”
6. North Korea's Kim Jong Un blasts his way onto Biden's foreign policy agenda
7. 'Big dates, big fireworks': North Korea signals more launches as anniversaries loom
8. Kim Jong Un Is Ready to Exploit U.S. Distraction in Ukraine
9. North Korea Tests Longest-Range Missile Since 2017
10. North Korea ranks 174th among 180 countries on corruption index: report
11. What Mandate Will South Korea's Next President Have?
12. Biden mulls visit to S. Korean in late May: news report
13. (South Korea) Air Force creates 'future planning center' for tech-based defense strategy
14. Politically Isolated North Korea Garners Support From Two Nuclear Powers At UN – OpEd
15. How to Get North Korea to Negotiate over Its Nuclear Weapons and Missiles
1. U.S. says it is seeking diplomacy, other measures, over N. Korea's missile launches
(LEAD) U.S. says it is seeking diplomacy, other measures, over N. Korea's missile launches | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with Pentagon's statement; MODIFIES headline; ADDS photo)
WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 (Yonhap) -- The United States stated Monday that it is trying to find a diplomatic means to address the North Korea problem while pushing for "different steps" to hold the country responsible for its recent series of ballistic missile launches.
"Even as we seek to find ways to address this challenge diplomatically we're moving forward with different steps to hold the DPRK responsible and accountable," Ned Price, spokesperson for the State Department, said during a regular press briefing, using the acronym for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
He was responding to a question about a string of missile launches by Pyongyang this month.
On Sunday, North Korea fired an "intermediate-and long-range ballistic missile" toward the East Sea, the seventh round of missile testing in January.
"Of course the DPRK's ballistic missile and nuclear weapons program, this is a challenge that is long standing," the official added. "It is a challenge that has vexed successive administrations. We have developed an approach that at its center seeks to find a diplomatic means by which to achieve the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."
He also cited the Joe Biden administration's own sanctions on eight North Korean individuals and entities supporting the Kim Jong-un regime's major weapons programs.
"We are continuing to discuss this challenge in the U.N. as well," he said.
The Pentagon also said it still believes diplomacy is the "right way" to deal with the Kim regime, with the U.S. government willing to have dialogue without precondition.
It urged Pyongyang to stop those provocations, abide by the U.N. Security Council resolutions and quit "threatening" its neighbors in the region.
Speaking to reporters, Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby voiced concern about the North's "advancing" ballistic missile program, as the secretive regime learns from missile launches.
"That is why again we are focused on making sure that we have the right capabilities available to us and to our allies in the region," he added. "Until a peaceful denuclearization of the peninsula, we have an obligation to be ready and that's what we're focused on right now."
(END)
2. Korean Unification: What Would It Actually Take?
Good to see someone writing about this.
My thoughts from 2014 are here.
Should The United States Support Korean Unification And If So, How?
David S. Maxwell
Georgetown University
Abstract: This article argues that the priority for the ROK-U.S. alliance must shift to Korean reunification. President Parks’ Dresden Initiative provides an opportunity for the U.S. to support the ROK’s plans for reunification. There are four paths to reunification: the ideal one is peaceful unification; the second is internal regime change leading to the emergence of new leadership that seeks peaceful unification; the third is catastrophic collapse of the Kim Family Regime; and the fourth and worst case is conflict and war. However, if comprehensive policies and a strategy with balance and coherency among ends, ways, and means is developed that focuses on reunification regardless of the path followed, the alliance will eventually be able to reach the ideal path to reunification even if there is collapse or war.
http://icks.org/n/data/ijks/1482467285_add_file_7.pdf
Korean Unification: What Would It Actually Take?
Korean Unification Comes Up Again in the South Korean Presidential Campaign: South Korea’s presidential election is shaping up to be a sharp right-left choice, especially on foreign policy. The conservative candidate made waves by suggesting South Korea might need to preemptively strike North Korea. The leftist candidate conversely suggested that the Koreas should ‘de facto’ unify. The left-right/dove-hawk split in South Korea over North Korea is quite deep.
Preemptively striking North Korea – barring iron-clad proof that Pyongyang is about to attack – is a terrible idea. We do not know what Pyongyang’s red lines are. In 2017, even hawks opposed former US President Donald Trump’s talk of ‘fire and fury’ and a ‘bloody nose’ strike on the North, because it was easy to see that spinning out of control into unconstrained escalation. But the unification of Korea is a far more interesting policy idea.
Unification Requires the Two Koreas to be More Similar
The most obvious reason the two Koreas remain divided is their hugely different regime types. South Korea is a (mostly) consolidated liberal democracy, allied to another liberal democracy (the US), plus partnerships with many others. North Korea, of course, is the polar opposite – Orwellian, tyranny, cult-ish, brutal. And it too is allied to an analogous dictatorship, China.
That the two are so politically far apart routinely undercuts cooperation and interchange between them. The contrast with Germany is instructive. Like Korea, Germany too was divided by the Cold War, but East Germany never drifted into the genuinely frightening, 1984-style political netherworld North Korea has come to occupy. This made some interchange between the Germanies at least possible. East Germany was never so extreme that it was almost unrecognizable to the world. North Korea, by contrast, has created what is arguably the worst, most bizarre totalitarian cult-state in history. Interchange with it is routinely undermined by its paranoia, extreme politics, endemic corruption and criminality, and so on.
It is bizarre then when South Korean politicians – usually on the left – call for rapid steps to unification. Unification between the two Koreas in their current state would be either a farce – an ultra-thin covering federation with no effective integration which would resolve none of the actual differences between the two – or would so erode South Korea’s liberal democracy that it would likely violate the South Korean constitution, not to mention provoking a massive backlash from South Korean conservatives.
What Unification Might Actually Look Like
So the Koreas must become more similar to unify. This is how the Germanies unified. Specifically, East Germany became more like West Germany. The Berlin Wall opened in 1989. In the following year, East Germany liberalized enough that it had genuinely free elections. Those elections returned results in favor of both the liberalizing changes of 1990 and of unification. Communism and national division, when put to a vote, failed. East German choose liberalism and unity, making East and West Germany similar enough that unification could occur with violence. And that is what came to pass.
Realistically, peaceful unification in Korea requires something similar. The two must become more similar, and that is harder in Korea because the regime gap is so much greater because North Korea is so much more extreme than East Germany was. Formally, of course, South Korea could become more like North Korea, but that is hugely unlikely. South Korean voters are broadly supportive of their liberal democracy.
In practice then, genuine unification means North Korea becoming more like South Korea, which means its liberalization or at least moderation. The first step of that would be the deposition of the ruling Kim family and North Korea’s ‘graduation’ from an extreme totalitarian tyranny to a more moderate authoritarian dictatorship. This is a crucial point: an authoritarian North Korea, probably run by generals like in Myanmar, would be a major moral and political improvement despite being a dictatorship or a junta. The world has lots of awful dictatorships; they are nonetheless morally preferable to North Korea’s extremism.
No Idea How to Get There
Of course, no one knows actually knows how ‘improve’ North Korea from a totalitarianism to an authoritarian. Kim Jong Un’s rule in North Korea seems assured and fairly stable. He recently celebrated the ten-year anniversary of his ascension, and almost all the external commentary agreed that his reign is both stable and of the same totalitarian character as his father and grandfather. Any regime challenge would have to come from disgruntled insiders, and Kim has carefully bought off or liquidated any such opposition.
So when South Korean politicians talk of unity with such a country, it is either politically empty rhetoric – playing to nationalist sympathies to rally voters – or wildly impractical. Even a light covering federation of the two would generate enormous practical difficulties – what about the UN sanctions on North Korea?; how would the Korea’s vastly divergent political systems interact?
In practice, such a federation would likely degenerate into South Korea subsidizing North Korea’s dysfunctional economy while little else changed. In effect that would mean South Korean taxpayers subsidizing North Korea, an absurd outcome no one in the South would support. Unification – barring war or North Korean collapse – is still far away.
Dr. Robert E. Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly; website) is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University. Dr. Kelly is now a 1945 Contributing Editor as well.
3. North Koreans forced to attend lectures to solidify personality cult of Kim family
The Propaganda and Agitation Department has to be really challenged to glorify Kim Jong-un in the face of all his failures and harmful policy decisions.
North Koreans forced to attend lectures to solidify personality cult of Kim family
Celebrations also push ‘Kimjongunism’ to mark current leader’s ascension to power 10 years ago.
By Myungchul Lee and Do Hyung Han
2022.01.31
North Koreans were forced to attend propaganda lectures last week lionizing the achievements of their country’s two previous leaders in celebration of their birthdays, sources in the country told RFA.
Kim Jong Il (1942-2011), the father and predecessor to current leader Kim Jong Un, was born on April 15, a date now known as the “Day of the Shining Star.” His father, national founder Kim Il Sung (1912-1994), was born on February 16, or the “Day of the Sun.”
The lectures and celebrations seek to solidify the cult of personality surrounding the Kim family, which has now ruled North Korea for three generations. In addition, the central government is hosting public discussions promoting the achievement of Kim Jong Un as North Korea prepares to usher in a new era of so-called “Kimjongunism” to mark to 10th anniversary of his ascension to power on April 13.
“A six-day political education event that emphasizes the achievements of previous leaders is starting today for everyone in the People’s army, to celebrate the upcoming Day of the Sun and Day of the Shining Star,” a military source from the northwestern province of North Pyongan told RFA’s Korean Service Jan. 24.
“All soldiers and officers must attend for one hour each day, every day this week. In the past, political education for military personnel has been conducted ahead of special occasions, but it is very rare for all the officers to participate for one hour each week,” said the source, who requested anonymity for security reasons.
As planned, the first three days were to be dedicated to study, with the final three days set aside for self-criticism. Self-criticism sessions typically happen once per week. Citizens must confess their shortcomings, and then criticize their colleagues for their mistakes.
“On the last day, individuals renew their determination to participate in upcoming celebration,” the military source said.
“In these kinds of lectures, they claim that the happiness of the people is possible because the previous leaders carried the country through a long journey, personally covering over 35,000 miles,” said the source, referring to the total documented distance traveled across the country by the first two leaders in personal visits meant to advise and encourage the people.
The source said that the authorities would likely also demand that officers and soldiers concentrate efforts into completing their winter training assignments more efficiently.
“They argued that we should identify what problems appear in combat preparations and take advantage of that as an opportunity to improve as we welcome the Days of the Sun and Shining Star.”
Every institution — the military, businesses, and cooperative farms — must participate, an official in the northeastern province of North Hamgyong told RFA.
“Selected lectures from senior members of each institution are the primary focus of the lectures, which will be held for six days through 29th. They keep attendance to ensure that all residents participate,” said the second source, who requested anonymity to speak freely.
Even people who are not affiliated with a company or institution must attend. This can be problematic for some because the wages from a government-assigned job is nowhere near enough to support a family, and adult family members who are officially not working actually bring in most of the family’s income by running a family business.
“They have to attend the lectures for an hour every morning, so they cannot go to the market for business and are having a hard time making a living,” the second source said.
Birth of Kimjongunism
North Korea held a widely publicized discussion that praised the achievements of Kim Jong Un on Jan. 25, state media reported.
Experts in South Korea said that it was a signal that the government is preparing to officially formulate a specific ideology of the current administration, which could be called Kimjongunism.
The term harkens back to Kimilsungism, or the ideas and policies of Kim Il Sung, and Kimilsungism-Kimjongilsm, which updates those ideas for the era when Kim Jong Il ruled.
North Korea has already begun using Kimjongunism internally, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service reported during the National Assembly’s audit of state affairs in October.
The discussion, called the “Symposium on Greatness and Exploits of Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un,” included high-ranking North Korean officials who are experts in ideology and governance theory. These included the Korean Workers’ Party’s Propaganda and Agitation Secretary, Ri Il Hwan, and the president of the Kim Il Sung Military University, Han Chang Sun.
“They said that the past ten years marked by dynamic advance under the leadership of Kim Jong Un were meaningful days when the validity and vitality of the Party's revolutionary ideas were fully demonstrated,” the state-run Korea Central News Agency reported.
“They praised the general secretary as a brilliant thinker-theoretician and distinguished statesman who shows the road ahead of revolution with his outstanding ideas and ushers in a new era of great changes by giving full play to the mental power of the popular masses,” the report said.
The symposium is just one of many examples of North Korea’s drive to idolize Kim since the beginning of this year, ahead of the 10th anniversary of the official beginning of his rule in April.
“This is part of an effort to transition to Kimjongunism,” Chung Young Tae, chair professor at South Korea’s Dongyang University told RFA. “To officially call it that, they are first showing a general pattern of reporting that will emphasize his achievements. This will intensify.”
Chung said that North Korea was politicizing its current economic difficulties. A closure of the Chinese border and suspension of trade two years ago at the start of the coronavirus pandemic have taken its toll. The economy is in shambles and nearly everything is in short supply. Though China and North Korea resumed rail freight earlier this month, recovery remains a long way off.
“North Korea attributes the reason for its economic hardship to external factors, such as pressure from the United States. They try to strengthen internal solidarity by highlighting Kim Jong Un as a divine being who can overcome difficulties,” Chung said.
Since last year, North Korea has been promoting Kim’s achievements in an effort to draw comparisons between him and his late grandfather Kim Il Sung, Director Cheong Seong-chang of the Center of North Korean Studies at the Sejong Institute told RFA.
Kim Il Sung founded the country and its Juche ideology of self-reliance and holds the most revered status in North Korea’s cultural psyche.
“They want to promote Kim Jong Un as a great leader like Kim Il Sung. This symposium is an opportunity to spread that idea throughout society,” Cheong said.
Translated by Claire Lee and Leejin Jun. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
4. North Korea documentary shows limping Kim as he tackles 'worst-ever hardships'
The regime's Propaganda and Agitation Department hard at work. But I have to wonder what kind of message they are trying to transmit when they show the apparent weakness of Kim.
North Korea documentary shows limping Kim as he tackles 'worst-ever hardships'
1/2
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspects the proposed building site for the Ryonpho Vegetable Greenhouse Farm in the Ryonpho area of Hamju County, North Korea, in this undated photo released January 28, 2022 by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). KCNA via REUTERS
SEOUL, Feb 1 (Reuters) - A North Korean documentary broadcast on Tuesday showed a limping leader Kim Jong Un as he tackles the impoverished country's "worst-ever hardships" amid the coronavirus pandemic and sanctions over its weapons programmes.
Titled "The Great Year of Victory, 2021", the 110-minute film chronicled a series of achievements throughout the year including on missile development, construction and efforts to beat the pandemic.
The narrator repeatedly lauded such projects as signs of "victory" led by a noticeably thinner Kim, in line with previous such documentaries used by state media to craft a semi-divine personality cult around him.
The film did not elaborate on the hardships but reclusive North Korea, unlike rich, democratic South Korea, faces deepening food shortages amid the sanctions, drought and floods, according to U.N. agencies.
North Korea has not confirmed any COVID-19 cases, but has closed its borders. It has been steadily developing its weapons systems amid an impasse over talks aimed at dismantling its nuclear and ballistic missile arsenals in return for relief from U.N. and U.S. sanctions.
At one point in the film, Kim was seen struggling to walk down makeshift stairs during a visit to a rainy construction site.
"This video showed his motherly side where he completely dedicated his own body to realise people's dreams," the narrator said.
In June, state media said North Koreans were "heartbroken" to see an "emaciated" Kim, in a rare such dispatch, after he reappeared following absence from the public eye of almost a month.
International media, intelligence agencies and experts closely watch Kim's health due to his tight grip on power and the uncertainty over succession plans.
The documentary also showed Kim watching the sunrise alone while riding a white horse on a beach. On another ride, he was seen with military officials including Pak Jong Chon, chief of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army, followed by a clip of tanks staging live-fire drills.
The film included rare images of a new 80-storey skyscraper and a large apartment district, as well as some clips and images of a defence expo in October and previous missile tests.
In December, Kim said the ruling party had some success in implementing a five-year economic plan he unveiled early last year, but warned of a "very giant struggle" this year, citing the pandemic and economic difficulties.
Additional reporting by An Sunghyuk; Editing by Nick Macfie
5. Cyber-hacking as a Means of “Self-reliance”
Cyber-hacking as a Means of “Self-reliance”
North Korea’s Ransomware-based Cyber-hacking for Economic Gains in the Absence of Regulations on Cryptocurrencies in Global Finance
Author: June Park
This policy paper was published in collaboration with The Wilson Center Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy and the National Committee on North Korea as a part of the "Understanding North Korea" roundtable series. This paper reflects the views of the author alone and not those of the National Committee on North Korea, the Wilson Center, or any other organizations.
As the pandemic unfolds and the digital economy expands, one of the biggest changes to North Korea’s capacity to enable “self-reliance” is its hacking mechanisms in cyberspace. The DPRK has engaged in various kinds of illicit activities – including drug production and tobacco counterfeiting to obtain foreign exchange to overcome chronic trade deficit and current account deficit – in the decades preceding multilateral and unilateral sanctions. In the last decade, it has developed domestic talent in computer skills and built an army of hackers focusing on data breach and cryptocurrency theft. The inability of existing sanctions to keep up with and punish North Korea’s illicit activities in cyberspace enabled this shift, leaving the task of assessment largely to the expertise of cybersecurity firms.
This policy paper is divided into three parts: first, it scrutinizes the evolution of North Korea’s cryptocurrency thefts by ransomware attacks for bitcoins, followed by money laundering. The second part is on sanctions, whereby the paper examines the actions taken for recourse in the form of unilateral sanctions by the U.S. Treasury and other U.S. institutions under Trump and Biden, due to the difficulty of addressing the issue multilaterally. The third part on empirical findings suggests that the ‘self-reliance’ that North Korea has stressed at the 8th Congress of the Worker’s Party is a recurring strategy that is currently built on exploitation of loopholes in current financial sanctions by planting ransomware, but not necessarily obtaining private keys or exploiting smart contracts. The fourth part addresses the recent crackdowns on cryptocurrencies by the U.S. to sanction ransomware under the Biden administration. Lastly, the final section concludes with policy recommendations that suggest a focus on targeting ransomware attacks by reverse hacks/attacks and digital asset freezes upon determination of perpetrators of digital financial crime.
About the Author
Dr. June Park is a 2021-22 Fung Global Fellow of the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies at Princeton University. She is a political economist by training and works on trade, energy, and tech conflicts with a broader range of regional focuses not just on the U.S. and East Asia, but also Europe. She studies economic pressures and conflicts, analyzing different policy outcomes based on governance structures – domestic institutions, leaderships, and bureaucracies that shape the policy formation process. Her current work pertains to post-pandemic geoeconomic conflicts in data governance and technology.
About the "Understanding North Korea Roundtable Series"
The Understanding North Korea roundtable series is a joint program of the National Committee on North Korea and the Wilson Center’s Hyundai Motor - Korean Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy. The roundtable series was established to enable emerging scholars of North Korea to share their research ideas with peers and experts in the field, and to publish their findings in a format accessible to a general audience.
6. North Korea's Kim Jong Un blasts his way onto Biden's foreign policy agenda
North Korea's Kim Jong Un blasts his way onto Biden's foreign policy agenda
By Hermes Auto The Straits Times2 min
There is no indication the Biden administration is particularly alarmed by Mr Kim Jong Un's missile tests. PHOTOS: REUTERS, AFP
WASHINGTON (BLOOMBERG) - As Mr Joe Biden spars with Russia's Vladimir Putin over Ukraine and China's Xi Jinping over human rights, the US President now has another pressing worry: Mr Kim Jong Un's missiles.
That effectively ended a halt to long-range missile tests put in place before his first summit in 2018 with former president Donald Trump, signalling Mr Kim is preparing to soon fire a intercontinental ballistic missile that can reach across the US, from Los Angeles to the White House.
So far the Biden administration hasn't budged, with an official on Sunday reiterating a long-held position that the door is open for Mr Kim to return to talks without preconditions.
For Mr Kim, it's an opportune time to bolster his nuclear programme and increase his leverage for whenever talks eventually resume.
China and Russia are unlikely to support any US proposals for new sanctions against his regime, limiting the downside for any fresh ICBM tests.
"The timing couldn't be better for North Korea to conduct these various weapons tests," said Ms Rachel Minyoung Lee, a non-resident fellow with the 38 North Program at the Stimson Centre who worked as an analyst for the CIA's Open Source Enterprise for nearly two decades.
Pyongyang wants to "increase its weapons capabilities to the maximum now, when it knows that not much can or will be done on North Korea issues".
Over the past year, Mr Kim has displayed advancements that show a much more sophisticated nuclear deterrent than when Mr Trump first took office.
Back then, the young leader was still testing Soviet-era Scud missile variants left over from when his father ruled the country until his death in late 2011.
By the time Mr Trump left, Mr Kim had modernised his arsenal with quick-strike missiles equipped with better guidance systems.
7. 'Big dates, big fireworks': North Korea signals more launches as anniversaries loom
Mark your calendars.
Excerpt:
“Kim’s finally flung the door open to unfettered weapons testing,” said Soo Kim, a policy analyst at the Rand Corp. think tank.
'Big dates, big fireworks': North Korea signals more launches as anniversaries loom
With Sunday’s firing of an intermediate-range missile that could strike all of Japan — and beyond — has North Korean leader Kim Jong Un opened the door to tests of increasingly powerful weapons after years of focusing on less provocative launches?
Two of the United States’ top allies in the region seem to think so.
Tokyo and Seoul found themselves in rare agreement on at least one thing this week: the growing possibility that North Korea will test-fire an intercontinental ballistic missile in the near future.
Following a record seven weapons tests in January, some experts are even predicting a year that echoes 2017, when the Korean Peninsula was pushed to the brink of nuclear war.
“Kim’s finally flung the door open to unfettered weapons testing,” said Soo Kim, a policy analyst at the Rand Corp. think tank.
Given the ramped-up pace of launches, as well as a number of key dates on North Korea’s calendar this year, she said “it’s quite possible” Kim Jong Un will “use these anniversaries to prolong tensions” with the U.S., South Korea and Japan.
The nuclear-armed North claimed Monday to have fired off a Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) a day earlier, testing one of its most powerful weapons for the first time since 2017 and inching closer to the end of Kim’s self-imposed moratorium on launches of longer-range weapons and tests of nuclear bombs.
The North’s official Korean Central News Agency reported that the latest test “was aimed to selectively evaluate the missile being produced and deployed and to verify the overall accuracy of the weapon system.”
It was the first time the North had suggested that the missile — which Japan said has a range of around 5,000 kilometers, putting all of the archipelago and the U.S. territory of Guam within range — was being deployed. Both Japan and Guam are home to key U.S. military bases that would be used in any crisis on the Korean Peninsula.
Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi speaks with reporters at the Defense Ministry in Tokyo on Monday about North Korea’s recent intermediate-range ballistic missile launch. | KYODO
Speaking to reporters Monday, Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi said Japan had concluded that, with a total of three tests of the Hwasong-12 IRBM in 2017 already under its belt, the North was using the latest launch to “suggest that it is in the practical application and production stage,” formally deploying the missile with its strategic forces.
Japan and South Korea both said the launch had hit an altitude of about 2,000 km and flew roughly 800 km on a “lofted trajectory,” meaning it had been launched at an angle to hit a high altitude while limiting its flight distance. In 2017, North Korea launched two longer-range missiles over the Japanese archipelago, triggering alarm and anger in Tokyo.
In an apparent attempt to ameliorate these fears, Monday’s KCNA report said the launch had used a lofted technique “in consideration of the security of neighboring countries.”
Still, Kishi signaled that Japan was girding itself for further missile launches or even nuclear tests.
“It’s clear that the aim is to unilaterally escalate the stage of provocation against the international community,” he told reporters Monday.
Denuclearization talks between the U.S. and the North have remained at a standstill since 2019.
Sunday’s launch was roundly criticized by both Japan and South Korea — a rare moment of alignment for the neighbors, who are embroiled in a bitter row over historical and trade issues.
Both Tokyo and Seoul have hinted that Pyongyang appears to be following a pattern similar to 2017, when tensions culminated in the test-firing of an intercontinental ballistic missile that experts believe could deliver a nuclear bomb to the continental United States.
Some in the Japanese government have noted the possibility of a fresh ICBM or nuclear test by the North in the near future as Pyongyang shifts into what one senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official said was a more “confrontational stance.”
South Korean President Moon Jae-in, a staunch proponent of dialogue with the North who has, at times, appeared to avoid antagonizing Pyongyang, has even voiced growing concern that his nuclear-armed neighbor had “moved closer to scrapping” its moratorium.
The United States has said that it shares its allies’ concerns that the escalating missile launches could be precursors to resumed tests of nuclear weapons and ICBMs.
“They are looking to take actions, which we believe are fundamentally destabilizing, as a way to increase pressure,” a senior U.S. official said late Sunday in Washington, adding that “there probably is a component that is also to validate the systems that they’ve developed and further refine them.”
It was not clear if the lRBM had prompted a shift in tactics, with the U.S. official reiterating the administration of President Joe Biden’s offer of no-strings-attached direct talks with the North.
U.S. President Joe Biden speaks to reporters after arriving on Air Force One at Joint Base Andrews in Maryland on Friday. | AFP-JIJI
Following the conclusion of a lengthy review of the United States’ North Korea policy earlier this year, Biden has repeatedly said that his administration harbors no “hostile intent” toward Pyongyang and is prepared to meet “unconditionally” with a goal of “the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”
“Publicly, the U.S. doesn’t seem to be sending North Korea a clear message about its red lines,” said Rand’s Kim. “If anything, Washington’s responses appear to be encouraging Kim or egging him on to do more. So we’re essentially creating more opportunities for Kim to provoke.”
Regardless, Kim has appeared uninterested in Biden’s pitch, condemning the U.S. offers as a “petty trick.”
Observers say the North Korean strongman has no intention of relinquishing his nuclear arsenal, as he believes it is key to his regime’s survival. Instead, he has ordered his regime to double down and prepare for a “long-term confrontation” with the United States.
In January last year, he unveiled a five-year plan to expand his atomic arsenal, including smaller “tactical” and “super-sized” warheads, as well as “pre-emptive” and “retaliatory” strike capabilities that would allow North Korean nuclear bombs to “strike and annihilate” targets 15,000 km away — a distance that would include Washington.
Although an ICBM launch could kill two birds with one stone for Kim — demonstrating his ability to reliably hit the continental U.S. with nuclear-tipped missiles and drawing Biden’s attention — it’s unclear if Kim even wants to talk at this point, some experts say.
Despite three rounds of talks with Biden’s predecessor, former President Donald Trump, the North Korean leader failed in a concerted push to squeeze sanctions relief out of the mercurial Trump.
Indeed, those summits may have entrenched a belief in Kim’s mind that an even stronger hand is necessary if he is to return to the negotiating table.
“I’m much more inclined to think that Pyongyang is essentially resigned to unchanged sanctions from Washington and that their determination to diversify the force mix of their strategic weapons eclipses any consideration of potential sanctions relief,” said Andrew O’Neil, an expert on North Korea and a professor at Griffith University in Australia.
“The days of North Korea using its strategic weapons program as a bargaining chip are long gone.”
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspects a munitions factory producing a major weapon system at an undisclosed location in this picture released Friday. | KCNA / KNS / VIA AFP-JIJI
Kim’s determination to grow and refine his arsenal could play out on a number of dates this year, according to experts, including before, during and after the Feb. 4-20 Beijing Winter Olympics.
Although the North’s recent spate of launches has surprised some observers who expected more deference to China — Pyongyang’s primary patron and main economic lifeline — in the runup to the Games, recent history paints a different picture.
On May 14, 2017, as Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted world leaders for a major Belt and Road infrastructure summit, Kim oversaw the first successful test of the Hwasong-12. A few months later, on Sept. 3, the North conducted its first-ever thermonuclear test, just hours before Xi was to speak at a summit of five major emerging economies, leaving the Chinese leader red-faced.
“Yes, Kim Jong Un sticks it to China, too. That’s how the DPRK gets respect, not only from South Korea and the U.S., but also its pesky patron states, China and Russia,” Lee Sung-yoon, a North Korea expert at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, said using the acronym for the North’s formal name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
But even deferring to Xi over the Olympics would not limit Kim’s options, with a number of key anniversaries in the ensuing months.
The North has already begun preparations for an apparent military parade ahead of the important dates, according to the South Korean military, including the 80th birthday of leader Kim Jong Un’s late father, Kim Jong Il, and the 110th birthday of his grandfather and national founder, Kim Il Sung, on Feb. 16 and April 15, respectively.
The regime has been known to stage shows of force on or around dates marking every fifth or 10th anniversary, and military parades have often been employed to unveil powerful new weapons.
Lee said that Kim would almost certainly test more missiles, and could use any number of key dates to showcase his burgeoning arsenal, including ICBMs.
Besides the Feb. 16 and April 15 celebrations, Lee noted the Feb. 8 anniversary of the Korean People’s Army’s founding, the 90th anniversary of the creation of the KPA’s predecessor on April 25 and also the 10th anniversaries of Kim assuming the top positions of first secretary of the ruling party and first chairman of the now-abolished National Defense Commission on April 11 and April 13, respectively.
“Rockets will flare through February, March and April,” Lee said. “These big dates demand fireworks.”
In a time of both misinformation and too much information, quality journalism is more crucial than ever.
By subscribing, you can help us get the story right.
PHOTO GALLERY (CLICK TO ENLARGE)
8. Kim Jong Un Is Ready to Exploit U.S. Distraction in Ukraine
Comments from many of us.
Note my comments included political warfare and blackmail diplomacy and not solely warfighting.
Kim Jong Un Is Ready to Exploit U.S. Distraction in Ukraine
The White House knows it can’t afford to fight Russia and China at the same time, and so does Kim—who is seizing the chance to make trouble.
Donald Kirk
Updated Jan. 31, 2022 8:13AM ET / Published Jan. 31, 2022 5:05AM ET
Andrey Rudakov/Bloomberg via Getty Images
Washington’s preoccupation with Ukraine evokes the nightmare of wars on either side of the globe, and Kim seems pretty sure the U.S. is not about to risk that.
Not since World War II, when American forces battled Nazi Germany in Europe and imperial Japan in Asia, has the U.S. been so close to shooting wars in regions that are geographically so far apart against forces that are so menacing. In Europe, it’s the Russians whom the Americans are up against, and in Asia it’s the Chinese supporting the North Korean dictator as he orders missile tests at an unprecedentedly rapid clip while hinting at another nuclear test.
“The Biden team is way over its head, flailing and struggling,” Nicholas Eberstadt, long-time Korea-watcher at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C., told The Daily Beast. “Anyone can recognize that, including our friend in Pyongyang.”
Kim clearly stands to benefit from the growing antagonism between the U.S. and North Korea’s greatest benefactors, China and Russia. The U.S. “cannot engage in two wars at the same time,” Ahn Cheol-soo, a wealthy entrepreneur and third-party candidate in South Korea’s hotly contested presidential election in March, said in response to The Daily Beast’s question at the Seoul Foreign Correspondents Club. “The U.S. does not have sufficient resources.”
In a game of intimidation while his country writhes under the pandemic and sanctions placed by the U.S. and UN, Kim ordered seven missile tests off the east coast in January. On Sunday an intermediate-range shot, the strongest in four years, soared 2,000 kilometers before splashing down 500 kilometers from the launch site.
Pyongyang’s Korean Central News Agency said Monday the test “confirmed the accuracy, security and effectiveness” of the Hwasong 12 now “under production.” In the fifth and sixth tests last week, the North fired pairs of long-range cruise missiles and short-range models, said KCNA, to update the cruise system and confirm the power of conventional warheads.
Never before has North Korea conducted so many tests in a single month. The meaning is obvious: Kim is gearing up for the first test of an ICBM since November 2017 and the first of a nuclear warhead since the North exploded its sixth in September 2017.
Bruce Bechtol, author of books and studies on North Korea's leadership and armed forces, predicted, “North Korea is likely to test BOTH its nuclear weapons and to do test launches of ICBM's,” that is intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying warheads to the U.S.
“The reasons are simple,” Bechtol told The Dail Beast. “These systems have recently been upgraded, but the Hwasong-14 has only been tested twice and the Hwasong-15 has only been tested once. Of course, these tests will also be timed to increase tensions and to push the USA/ROK (Republic of Korea, South Korea) into talks that Pyongyang wants to use to ease sanctions.
Evans Revere, former senior U.S. diplomat in Seoul and Washington, agreed. “U.S. relations with three key adversaries—Russia, China, and North Korea—are as bad as they have been for many years, and there's a serious prospect they will get even worse in the months to come,” he told The Daily Beast. “This begs the question of whether each of these three actors now sees an advantage to be gained because of the worsening ties between Washington and the other two.”
Moreover, Revere added, “It also gives rise to concern that there may be some cooperation or coordination between and among them designed to distract the United States as it faces multiple, simultaneous international challenges.”
On Thursday, China unequivocally supported Russia’s President Vladimir Putin by publicly announcing that Beijing’s foreign minister had told U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken that the “legitimate security concerns” of Russia should be “taken seriously.” Coincidentally, Kim and his younger sister, Kim Yo Jong, visited a munitions factory where Pyongyang’s Korean Central News Agency said Friday he admired “leaping progress in producing major weapons.”
Right now Kim is watching and waiting while revving up what he calls North Korea’s “defense” against U.S. invasion. As he told a meeting of the politburo of his ruling Workers’ Party, the time had come to consider “more thorough preparation” against “the U.S. imperialists” by “restarting temporarily suspended activities.”
With the U.S. placing 8,500 troops on alert to deploy to Europe and Biden threatening strong sanctions if Russia’s President Vladimir Putin invades Ukraine, Kim’s missile tests are a stark reminder of his potential to ignite a second Korean war. He would still need approval and support from China, just as his grandfather, Kim Il Sung, relied on China’s Mao Zedong to turn back U.S. and South Korean troops during the Korean War. The overwhelming difference between now and then, though, is the proliferation of nuclear weapons and North Korea’s success as the latest unacknowledged member of the nine-nation nuclear club—unacknowledged, that is, by the U.S., which refuses to see the North as a nuclear power.
The regions now threatened in Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia are far smaller than the vast territories over which U.S. forces ranged eight decades ago, but the danger exists of wider wars with weaponry far more advanced than in those dark days. The U.S. has 55,000 troops in Japan, mostly in Okinawa, and 28,500 in South Korea—not nearly enough to defend either country if war were to break out.
To Choi Jin-wook, president of the Center for Strategic and Cultural Studies in Seoul, “Ukraine tension clearly reduces the hope for any breakthrough on the North Korea issue.” As he told The Daily Beast, “Growing conflict between the U.S. and Russia will be another burden.” That’s on top of “rivalries between the U.S. and China,” said Choi, that “keep the U.S. from devoting itself to North Korea, both militarily and diplomatically.”
Intrinsic in the potential danger facing the U.S. in Northeast Asia is China’s persistence in claiming its right to rule Taiwan, the off-shore island redoubt to which forces under Chiang Kai-shek fled before the victory of Mao’s Red Army on the Chinese mainland in 1949. South Korea, under the liberal government of President Moon Jae-in, would not want U.S. troops in South Korea to rush to Taiwan’s defense. Nor would Moon be likely to commit South Korean troops to defending Taiwan while China could easily retaliate by encouraging North Korea to attack the South.
“The bigger concern is a China-Taiwan conflict that could involve the U.S.,” said Steve Tharp, who’s spent more than 40 years in Korea as an army officer and civilian official with US Forces Korea. “The U.S. needs regional alliance partners to effectively deal with these two and three simultaneous war scenarios. We can't do it alone without much more air and naval resources than the American taxpayers should be paying for.”
The timing is all the more propitious for Kim while South Korea is embroiled in a campaign for a new president in which the leading candidates take diametrically opposed views on dealing with him. The left-leaning Lee Jae-myung of the ruling Minjoo or Democratic Party calls for reconciliation and dialogue, playing down the historic U.S alliance and the need for military exercises with South Koreans; his conservative foe, Yoon Suk-yeol, says it’s time to “rebuild” ties with the U.S., at odds with the South’s on concluding an end-of-war agreement with the North.
“The North’s saber-rattling has posed an unsettling setback for Seoul striving to salvage its fragile peace drive,” said Yonhap, the South Korean news agency, with “Washington preoccupied with tensions between Russia and Ukraine, and Beijing setting the mood for its successful hosting of the Winter Olympics set to begin Friday.”
As Kim’s missile tests make clear, he’s eager to exploit divisions in the South as well as U.S. involvement in Ukraine. A sign of conflict between Washington and Seoul is that Biden has waited for more than a year to designate a new ambassador to South Korea as a successor to Harry Harris, a retired U.S. admiral who previously commanded U.S. forces in the Pacific and upset Moon’s administration by a hardline position on North Korea and the need for military exercises involving U.S. and South Korean troops.
Philip Goldberg, reportedly the ambassador-designate, who once aided in enforcing UN sanctions against North Korea and has served as ambassador to several countries, has yet to jump through the hoops of a hearing by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and then get the approval of the full senate. That should be routine, but the Texas Republican Ted Cruz has been holding up appointments while demanding Biden pressure Germany not to let the Russians ship in natural gas via a new pipeline.
In the intersection of politics and diplomacy in Washington, Team Biden, waiting to see how the South Korean presidential election turns out, wasn’t too eager to get a new ambassador to South Korea before a new Korean president takes office. Washington and Seoul have long opposed South Korea’s call for an end-of-war agreement with North Korea that outgoing President Moon wants as his legacy. The new ambassador will have to walk a fine line delivering the message to the man who follows Moon, who can’t run for a second term under Korea’s constitution.
All of which adds to distractions over Ukraine and Taiwan that indeed give Kim the chance “to support his objective and strategy,” said David Maxwell, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington.
He’s “preparing for a warfighting campaign to be able to attack South Korea,” said Maxwell, a retired U.S. army officer who served five tours in the South with the special forces. Whatever Kim does, militarily or diplomatically, Maxwell told The Daily Beast, the goal is “to force U.S. forces from the peninsula” and “unify the peninsula by force.”
At the American Enterprise Institute, however, Nick Eberstadt said Kim might not go too much beyond rhetoric while struggling with COVID-19. “The North Korean regime has been all but incapacitated by the pandemic,” he said. “We can be quite confident, when the regime recovers, we’ll see a more aggressive stance from Pyongyang.”
As for Team Biden, Eberstadt said that “they have so little bandwidth, they’re deferring the problem of the Korean peninsula.”
9. North Korea Tests Longest-Range Missile Since 2017
North Korea Tests Longest-Range Missile Since 2017
North Korea ended its most active month of missile tests to date by launching an intermediate-range ballistic missile.
Advertisement
North Korea on Sunday fired what appeared to be the most powerful missile it has tested since U.S. President Joe Biden took office, as it revives its old playbook in brinkmanship to wrest concessions from Washington and neighbors amid a prolonged stalemate in diplomacy.
The Japanese and South Korean militaries said the missile was launched on a high trajectory, apparently to avoid the territorial spaces of neighbors, and reached a maximum altitude of 2,000 kilometers (1,242 miles) and traveled 800 kilometers (497 miles) before landing in the sea.
The flight details suggest the North tested its longest-range ballistic missile since 2017, when it twice flew intermediate-range ballistic missiles over Japan and, separately, three intercontinental ballistic missiles that demonstrated the potential to reach deep into the American homeland.
Sunday’s test was North Korea’s seventh round of launches this month. The unusually fast pace of tests indicates its intent to pressure the Biden administration over long-stalled nuclear negotiations as pandemic-related difficulties put further stress on an economy broken by decades of mismanagement and crippling U.S.-led sanctions.
While desperate for outside relief, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has showed no willingness to surrender the nuclear weapons and missiles he sees as his strongest guarantee of survival. Analysts say Kim’s pressure campaign is aimed at forcing Washington to accept the North as a nuclear power and convert their nuclear disarmament-for-aid diplomacy into negotiations for mutual arms reduction.
South Korean President Moon Jae-in called an emergency National Security Council meeting where he described the test as a possible “mid-range ballistic missile launch” that brought North Korea to the brink of breaking its 2018 self-imposed moratorium on the testing of nuclear devices and longer-range missiles.
Japanese Defense Minister Kishi Nobuo also told reporters that the missile was the longest-range the North has tested since its Hwasong-15 ICBM in November 2017.
Kim Jong Un chaired a ruling party meeting on January 20, where senior party members made a veiled threat to lift the moratorium, citing what they perceived as U.S. hostility and threats.
Advertisement
The latest launch suggests Kim’s moratorium is already broken, said Lee Choon Geun, a missile expert and honorary research fellow at South Korea’s Science and Technology Policy Institute.
In his strongest comments toward the North in years, Moon said the situation around the Korean Peninsula is beginning to resemble 2017, when North Korea’s provocative run in nuclear and long-range missile testing resulted in an exchange of war threats between Kim and then-President Donald Trump.
Moon said the North’s latest moves violated U.N. Security Council resolutions and were a “challenge toward the international community’s efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, stabilize peace and find a diplomatic solution” to the standoff.
The North “should stop its actions that create tensions and pressure and respond to the dialogue offers by the international community including South Korea and the United States,” Moon said, according to his office.
Moon’s efforts to reach out to North Korea derailed after the collapse of the second Kim-Trump meeting in 2019, when the Americans rejected North Korea’s demand for major sanctions relief in exchange for a partial surrender of its nuclear capabilities.
The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said the United States condemned North Korea’s testing activity and called on Pyongyang to refrain from further destabilizing acts. It said the latest launch did not “pose an immediate threat to U.S. personnel, territory, or that of our allies.”
Still, White House officials said they saw the latest missile test as part of an escalating series of provocations over the last several months that have become increasingly concerning.
The Biden administration plans to respond to the latest missile test in the coming days with an unspecified move meant to demonstrate to Pyongyang that Washington is committed to allies’ security in the region, according to a senior administration official who briefed reporters on the condition of anonymity.
The official said the administration viewed the latest missile test as the latest in a series of provocations to try to win sanctions relief from the United States. The Biden administration again called on North Korea to return to talks but made clear it doesn’t see the sort of leader-to-leader summits Trump held with Kim as constructive at this time.
Funakoshi Takehiro, director-general for Asian and Oceanian Affairs at Japan’s Foreign Ministry, discussed the launch in separate phone calls with Sung Kim, Biden’s special envoy for North Korea, and Noh Kyu-duk, South Korea’s nuclear envoy. The officials shared an understanding that Sunday’s missile was of enhanced destructive power and reaffirmed trilateral cooperation in the face of the North Korean threat, Japan’s Foreign Ministry said.
Advertisement
Experts say the North could halt its testing spree after the start of the Beijing Winter Olympics on Friday out of respect for China, its major ally and economic lifeline. But there’s also expectation that it could significantly up the ante in weapons demonstrations once the Olympics end in February to grab the attention of the Biden administration, which has been focusing more on confronting China and Russia over its conflict with Ukraine.
“North Korea is launching a frenzy of missiles before the start of the Beijing Olympics, mostly as military modernization efforts. Pyongyang also wants to boost national pride as it gears up to celebrate political anniversaries in the context of economic struggles,” said Leif-Eric Easley, a professor at Ewha University in Seoul.
“It wants to remind Washington and Seoul that trying to topple it would be too costly. By threatening stability in Asia while global resources are stretched thin elsewhere, Pyongyang is demanding the world compensate it to act like a ‘responsible nuclear power,’” Easley added.
The U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Linda Thomas-Greenfield, said Washington had imposed sanctions against North Korea in the past few weeks and was looking at other options.
“We are open to having diplomatic discussions. We have offered this over and over to the DPRK. And they have not accepted it,” Thomas-Greenfield said on ABC’s “This Week.”
“Our goal is to end the threatening actions that the DPRK is taking against their neighbors,” she said, referring to North Korea’s formal name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
North Korea has justified its testing activity as an exercise of its right to self-defense. It has threatened stronger action after the Biden administration imposed fresh sanctions following two tests of a purported hypersonic missile earlier this month.
10. North Korea ranks 174th among 180 countries on corruption index: report
At least it is not the worst.
North Korea ranks 174th among 180 countries on corruption index: report
gettyimagesbank North Korea retreated four notches in an annual international corruption ranking to 174th among 180 countries last year, a report by an anti-corruption watchdog showed Monday.
The reclusive North scored 16 out of 100 in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) report issued by the Berlin-based Transparency International, down two points from the previous year.
The index evaluates countries based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be, using data collected "by a variety of reputable institutions, including the World Bank and the World Economic Forum."
North Korea does "not have the basic institutional infrastructure ― such as mechanisms for administration and rule of law ― to form an integrity system," the watchdog said.
South Korea climbed a notch to rank 32nd with 62 points, while Denmark, Finland and New Zealand shared the top spot with 88 points. South Sudan was at the bottom of the list with 11 points. (Yonhap)
11. What Mandate Will South Korea's Next President Have?
It depends on who wins. It is a pretty tight race that is now too close to call.
What Mandate Will South Korea's Next President Have?
Fragmentation in the South Korean Presidential Election Means a Weak Mandate for its Next President: South Korea’s presidential election is in March. The polling is very tight. The primary right-wing and left-wing candidates are running neck-and-neck, in the low 30s%. There is also an alternative left-wing candidate polling around 3% and an alternative moderate right-wing candidate polling around 17%. The remainder of voters are split among outsider candidates or are undecided.
This is a highly fragmented electorate – made even worse by sharp ideological polarization. Despite months of campaigning and some rather outlandish scandals on both sides, the polling has not moved much. Neither major party candidate has broken 40% in polling, and neither is remotely close to a majority – breaking the 50% barrier. Indeed, if the last few months of polling hold, then the winner will win the presidency with little more than 1/3 of the electorate’s support and just a few more points than his opponent.
Fragmentation in Modern Democracies like South Korea
Political science worries a lot about party fragmentation. Although voters often complain that parties are corrupt or the platform of vanity and ambition, political science tends to prefer stable, coherent parties. Parties groom and socialize future elites. They channel the voters’ interests into established institutions and patterns which, hopefully, reduces radicalism and enhances policy predictability over time. Parties are no guarantee of stability, of course. But stable democracies tend to have stable parties which can reach a wide audience and build coherent and durable coalitions behind elected governments.
This is eroding in many contemporary democracies, where the pressures of populism have broken established coalitions recently. In South Korea, this has meant a decline in the mobilizing capacity of the country’s mainstream right and left parties, as their chronically weak polling illustrates. The reasons for this are not clear. The right has recently suffered from severe infighting. A conservative president was impeached in 2017, which nearly lead to the implosion of the mainstream right-wing party. Korea’s left-wing party, with a basic social democratic orientation akin to left-wing parties in Europe, has also, curiously, lost voter support despite decades of a coherent political identity.
In the 1960s and 70s, political science discussed notions of ‘ungovernability’ and ‘overload.’ The argument went that as democracies mature, they are overrun by interest groups and are increasingly unable to make hard policy choices that inflict clear losses on losers. Stasis sets in, and political divisions ossify. Parties prove unable to win clear majorities, and the system calcifies. Political scientist Maurice Duverger referred to this as ‘immobilism.’
A South Korean election that returns a president with only a 35% plurality victory looks suspiciously like these political science concerns. 35% would formally be legitimate of course. The South Korean constitution awards the presidency to the candidate with the highest vote total – a plurality in a first-past-the-post race. But realistically, a new South Korean president with such a low vote total would have no mandate. And if that weak-mandate president were from the right, the system would almost certainly gridlock, as the South Korean legislature has a leftist majority.
An Unconsolidated Two-Party System
Duverger thought one answer to this fragmentation would be the desire to win elections. He argued that in a first-past-the-post plurality electoral system, there were powerful incentives for small, alternative left- and right-wing parties to drop out of elections in order to avoid throwing elections to the other side. The most famous example of this is the Florida election in the US 2000 presidential race. That election was famously thrown into a protracted recount fight. But had the alterative left-wing candidate Ralph Nader not run president then, his votes would mostly have gone to Al Gore, and Gore would have easily won the state.
This logic – in which a plurality election contest drives the consolidation of a two-party system – is so robust that political science calls it ‘Duverger’s Law.’ But curiously, South Korea does not conform to this, even though its presidential race is a plurality system. If, for example, the alternative left-wing candidate exited the race, her 3% polling, although small, would noticeably elevate the mainstream left-wing candidate because the race is so close.
The French Two-Ballot System?
Many presidential democracies have similar issues. (The US does not because of the Electoral College, a unique system no other democracy employs.) Presidential races attract attention-seekers and vanity candidates, which is almost certainly one of South Korea’s candidates and who also showed in up California’s recall elections in 2003 and 2021.
France devised a solution to this fragmentation – a second election conducted two weeks after the first one. Anyone can run in the first ballot, but the second is restricted to the top two vote winners of the first ballot. This two-candidate choice in the second ballot mathematically forces a majority vote for the winner. It is a purposeful effort to engineer a mandate to govern, even if one is not forthcoming in the first ballot.
The French system has its problems too. But South Korea, like other presidential democracies, need presidential winners who can actually govern, but this year’s fragmented polling suggests a hamstrung winner will emerge.
Dr. Robert E. Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly; website) is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University. Dr. Kelly is now a 1945 Contributing Editor as well.
12. Biden mulls visit to S. Korean in late May: news report
Biden mulls visit to S. Korean in late May: news report | Yonhap News Agency
TOKYO, Feb. 1 (Yonhap) -- U.S. President Joe Biden is considering a visit to South Korea in late May after a new president is inaugurated in the Asian country, according to a news report Tuesday.
Biden is pushing for a trip to Japan for a Quad summit with his Japanese, Australian and Indian counterparts in the latter half of May, the Yomiuri Shimbun, a Japanese daily, reported, citing multiple government sources.
It would provide Biden with a chance to make his first visit to South Korea as U.S. president, especially as a new president is scheduled to take office on May 10.
(END)
13. (South Korea) Air Force creates 'future planning center' for tech-based defense strategy
Air Force creates 'future planning center' for tech-based defense strategy | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Feb. 1 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's Air Force has created an office tasked with crafting a future policy strategy that harnesses artificial intelligence (AI), drones, robots and other new technologies to bolster defense capabilities, its officials said Tuesday.
The launch of the future planning center last month came as the armed service is stepping up efforts to reshape itself into a "smart" force capable of responding more effectively to an array of potential security challenges, including those from outer space, they said.
"I expect the center to put forward a blueprint that will enable the Air Force to play a leading role in responding to the shift in the paradigms of future warfare," Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Park In-ho was quoted by his office as saying.
The office consists of three teams in charge of formulating the Air Force's future policies, incorporating new technologies in its security operations and handling matters related to unmanned defense systems, respectively.
In particular, the Air Force plans to capitalize on AI, metaverse technology, robots and autonomous driving for its future defense operations in various security domains, including space, according to the officials.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
14. Politically Isolated North Korea Garners Support From Two Nuclear Powers At UN – OpEd
China and Russia are complicit in not only sanctions evasion but also human rights abuses. And of course they are providing support at the UN.
Politically Isolated North Korea Garners Support From Two Nuclear Powers At UN – OpEd
By Thalif Deen
North Korea, long described as a “hermit kingdom”, apparently isn’t living in total political isolation or is cut off from the rest of the world.
Or so it seems, judging by the failure of the US and some of its UN allies to impose sanctions on five North Korean officials—sanctions really aimed at a country that continues to defy the West with its multiple ballistic nuclear tests.
A proposal to impose sanctions on the North Koreans, at a closed-door meeting of the UN Security Council (UNSC) on January 20, was blocked by two of the permanent members in the Council: China and Russia.
If the US proposal was later introduced as a formal resolution in the Council chamber, it would have been vetoed by, not one, but two of the big powers in the UNSC. But the US, conscious of the possible consequences, refused to take that path
Asked about North Korea’s seventh ballistic missile test in a single month—and the longest-range missile tested since 2017—US Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield told ABC TV on January 30: “It is provocative, and it is something that we have very, very strongly condemned in the Security Council”.
“The United States, as you know, imposed unilateral sanctions in the past few weeks against the DPRK (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or North Korea). And we have pushed for sanctions within the Security Council. And I will be engaging with our allies—the Koreans, as well as Japanese, who are also threatened by this—to look at other options for responding”.
Asked whether it is time for President Joe Biden to engage personally with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, she said: “You know, we have been clear on that from the beginning. We are open to having diplomatic discussions. We’ve offered this over and over to the DPRK. And they’ve not accepted it. But we’re absolutely open to a diplomatic engagement without preconditions. Our goal is to end the threatening actions that the DPRK is taking against their neighbours.”
Following North Korea’s first nuclear test, the Security Council initially imposed sanctions on DPRK in 2006 and additional sanctions in response to further nuclear tests triggering economic hardships in the country.
Meanwhile, despite all the humanitarian assistance from the United Nations to a country suffering from food shortages, North Korea continued with its nuclear weapons program unhindered.
According to a 2019 report from the Rome-based World Food Programme (WFP), there were 11 million people undernourished (2019 Needs and Priorities report) and 1 in 5 children stunted in a population of 25.5 million people.
John Delury, a professor of history at the Yonsei University in Seoul, was quoted in the New York Times January 28 as saying: “No amount of sanctions could create the pressures that Covid-19 created in the past two years. Yet do we see North Korea begging and saying: “take our weapons and give us some aid”?
“The North Koreans will eat grass”, he said, rather than give up their nuclear weapons—a quote reminiscent of a famous statement made by Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who said: “We will eat grass, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own (nuclear bombs). We have no other choice!”
Bhutto’s statement followed India’s “peaceful” nuclear explosion in 1974.
Of the world’s nine nuclear powers, four are from Asia: China, India, Pakistan and North Korea, while the remaining five include the US, UK, Russia, France and Israel.
Joseph Gerson, President of the Campaign for Peace, Disarmament and Common Security, and Vice-President of the International Peace Bureau told IDN the nuclear crisis with Korea has multiple origins, not the least of which are the numerous times, beginning in the Korean War, that the US has prepared and threatened to attack North Korea with nuclear weapons and missed opportunities by 21st century US presidents.
President George W. Bush, he pointed out, made a massive error when he rejected the comprehensive agreement with North Korea negotiated by former Secretary of Defense Perry and former Secretary of State Albright. It was then that Pyongyang began its nuclear weapons tests.
President Barack Obama pursued the failed policy of “benign neglect” during which North Korea advanced both its nuclear and missile capacities. Then, the refusal of President Trump and National Security Advisor Bolton to pursue a step-by-step nuclear arms control with North Korea was another lost opportunity, said Gerson.
“North Korea, an isolated, authoritarian and highly militarized state has felt threatened by US-South Korean war games which have included practice runs for regime change in Pyongyang.”
He said North Korea has insisted that before progress in disarmament negotiations can be made, the US much cease its hostile policies directed against it.
“With the Biden Administration focused on reinforcing US power and influence in Europe, and now on the Ukraine crisis with Russia, and the priorities that Biden and Blinken have been giving to increasing containment pressures on China, little attention in Washington has been devoted to Korea. Hence Kim Jong UN’s recent disturbing missile tests,” declared Gerson.
An important step that the Biden Administration should take to signal an end to the United States’ hostile approach to North Korea, would be finalizing a declaration with Seoul, now under discussion, declaring an end to the 72-year-old Korean War.
“More will be needed, but it would be an important first step in building the mutual trust and confidence essential to denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia,” he noted.
Kevin Martin, President, Peace Action Coordinator, Korea Peace Network, told IDN “I think it’s unfortunate, but mostly consistent with DPRK actions over the years/decades”.
The North Korean government still feels, quite reasonably, insecure with the US/South Korea (and you can throw in Japan) military alliance arrayed against it, what it terms the “hostile policy.”
The Biden Administration should commence much more urgent and serious diplomacy with North Korea, and quickly while South Korean President Moon Jae-in is still in office as a partner for peace, said Martin.
Christine Ahn, executive director of Women Cross DMZ (De-Militarized Zone), a global movement of women mobilizing to end the Korean war and ensure women’s leadership in peacebuilding, told IDN “I think the takeaway of North Korea’s 7th launch this month is that it’s demonstrating its ability to deter any unilateral first strike from the US”.
Despite all its overtures of willingness to talk to the DPRK, “anywhere, anytime,” the US’ “hostile” policy has not shifted one slight bit.
In fact, Biden just appointed Philip Goldberg as US ROK (Republic of Korea) Ambassador who is most known as a sanctions-enforcer and regime change.
This signals that the US is ready to dig in its heels and continue its failed policies of military exercises and sanctions, which only embolden North Korea to further strengthen its military capability.
“This is a dangerous game of brinkmanship that can be resolved with genuine diplomacy towards replacing the ceasefire with a peace agreement,” said Ahn.
According to the WFP website, the DPRK continues to face a wide range of food and nutrition security challenges, which add to the protracted humanitarian situation in the country.
Agriculture annually falls short of meeting food needs, due to shortages of arable land, lack of access to modern agricultural equipment and fertilizers, and recurrent natural disasters.
Droughts, floods, typhoons and heat waves continue to affect the country every year, causing soil leeching, erosion, landslides and damage to crops and infrastructure.
Even minor disasters can significantly reduce agricultural production and the availability of food, stressing communities’ already limited coping capacities. In late 2018 a severe heatwave in the provinces considered to be the ‘food basket’ of the country pushed temperatures 11 degrees higher than average.
This was followed in late August 2018 by Typhoon Soulik that brought heavy rains to South Hamgyong and Kangwon provinces, as well as flash floods to North and South Hwanghae provinces.
Economic and political issues add further difficulties, with restrictions on international trade and investments imposed by the United Nations Security Council.
In February 2021, the WFP said the country’s pandemic-related restrictions have “curtailed” the group’s ability to bring in food, deploy staff members and monitor its aid program.
15. How to Get North Korea to Negotiate over Its Nuclear Weapons and Missiles
How to Get North Korea to Negotiate over Its Nuclear Weapons and Missiles
It is possible that Kim will continue to escalate his tests in the near to mid-term from the Lunar New Year holiday on 1 February to the birthdays of Kim Jong-il (16 February) and Kim Il-sung (15 April) among other upcoming important dates. He is likely escalating because he is not successfully coercing the ROK, the U.S., and the international community into providing concessions. However, if nations decide to appease him it is very likely that he will judge his strategy as a success and continue to execute from the seven decades old Kim family regime playbook that calls for increased tensions, threats, and provocations to gain political and economic concessions.
Policymakers and strategists continue to be at a loss as to how to stabilize the Korean situation. The proposed courses of action range from military demonstrations to actual operations to a return to “sunshine-like“ policies of twenty years ago. However, there is one course of action that has never been executed with anything more than halfhearted efforts and lip service. While there have been attempts at maximum pressure and maximum engagement neither has employed a holistic, synchronized, and comprehensive information and influence campaign to shape the decision-making, behavior, and attitudes of the elite, the second tier and military leadership, and the Korean people in the North. The U.S. and the ROK/U.S. alliance has never been willing to “lead with influence,” employing sophisticated and well-orchestrated activities to influence multiple target audiences.
While external pressure is important, it is not sufficient to force Kim to change his calculus. The only way he will change course is if he feels internal pressure from the elite and military leadership and they collectively force him to negotiate an end to the nuclear and missile programs in return for the resources necessary for their survival. They must understand their current path is destined to fail and that they must convince Kim to negotiate.
It is assumed they understand this based on the actions of the international community (e.g., sanctions and military readiness of the ROK/U.S. alliance). Unfortunately, life-long indoctrination, the system of social control, and the Propaganda and Agitation Department’s around-the-clock propaganda have been effective in preventing leaders from correctly interpreting the intent and the actions of the ROK, the U.S., and the international community. There has been no effort to compete with the diabolical North Korean social control system and propaganda efforts for the past seven decades.
This has long been an unfortunate missed opportunity because external information is an existential threat to the Kim family regime. This is why Kim Yo-jong coerced the ROK into passing the anti-leaflet law in December 2020 by threatening and then actually destroying the ROK liaison building in Kaesong. Escapees/defectors from the North have been working diligently for years to try to send information into the north and expose the people to the outside work. As Dr. Jung Pak has often asked, who does Kim fear more: The U.S. or the Korean people in the North? The fact is it is the people armed with information about the outside world and South Korea in particular.
The U.S. must take the lead in establishing an aggressive information and influence activities campaign. This is problematic given the view of the current South Korean administration which seeks to engage the regime and refrain from “upsetting” it as evidenced by the anti-leaflet law.But the U.S. and the international community can no longer wait for the ROK to get on board though perhaps the next president will understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the regime and be willing to partner on an influence campaign. After all, South Korea is the key to any successful outcome on the Korean peninsula.
A comprehensive plan requires nation-level planning, organization, and execution. It will require national leadership to make this a priority, but it should not be feared as resource-intensive or expensive. A wide range of tools, processes, capabilities, and platforms are already in place. They need to be harnessed, synchronized, and employed to meet the influence objectives.
Image of North Korean Road-Mobile ICBM. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
The most important objective is to undermine the legitimacy of the Kim family regime and drive the elite and military leadership to influence Kim Jong-un to negotiate in the belief that it is the only path for regime, elite, and military survival. Kim must fear the loss of internal control if he fails to negotiate a deal that will ensure survival. Kim is actually in a position of significant weakness with COVID mitigation measures that have closed the borders, the recent natural disasters, the poor fall harvest, diversion of resources to nuclear and missile development, and UN and U.S. sanctions. Kim has decided to exploit COVID by implementing draconian population and resources control measures to further oppress the population to prevent any kind of popular resistance. His strategy must be exposed not only to the international community but to the Korean people who suffer at the hands of his policy decisions. The seven missile events of 2022, so far, may be a sign that Kim must ‘externalize” his problems to divert attention from the internal contradictions of the regime. This must be exploited.
The overall influence activity is to recognize, understand, expose, and attack regime strategy. The major theme should be built on the fact that it is Kim Jong-un’s decision-making that is responsible for the suffering across North Korean society from the elite to the general population. His political warfare strategy of subversion, coercion, extortion, and blackmail diplomacy combined with the development of warfighting capabilities to provide him with the option to use force to dominate the peninsula must be understood, explained, and exposed. The condition Kim requires for success is the “divide to conquer” effort – divide the ROK/U.S. alliance to conquer the ROK. It is imperative that every action Kim takes to weaken the alliance results in visible ROK and U.S. efforts to strengthen it. This must be exploited.
While the regime accuses the U.S. of having a hostile policy it is the regime’s own hostile policy, to include the intent to subvert South Korea and dominate the peninsula under the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State that must be consistently transmitted to target audiences inside and outside North Korea. There must be a constant refrain from officials that it is the north that harbors the hostile policy, not the U.S. This must be exploited.
Finally, Kim Jong-un must deny the human rights of the Korean people to remain in power. One of the great many human rights abuses identified in the 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry report is the deliberate isolation of the Korean people and the that they are denied access to information. The international community has a moral obligation to get information into the North. Paradoxically, when the international community focuses on Kim’s nuclear program his legitimacy is enhanced, but when it focuses on his crimes against humanity his legitimacy is undermined. This must be exploited.
This effort requires an overall organization to orchestrate all influence activities across the instruments of national power. Diplomatic, economic, and military activities must be synchronized with the effort to lead with influence. Every action by government agencies must be considered for their influence effects. Common themes and messages must be distributed to all agencies and agency spokespeople and high-level officials up to including the President and his senior advisors must consistently transmit them as a matter of routine. The State Department’s Global Engagement Center should have a dedicated Korea division that connects to all relevant agencies of the U.S. government as well as allies in the region.
The power of the U.S. Global Media Agency which supervises the two most important information conduits into the North, the Korean services of Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA), must be harnessed in this effort. Since the mission of these organizations is to provide factual news and explain U.S. policies to foreign audiences, senior U.S. government officials should be interviewed and allowed to explain U.S. government policies on a routine basis and not as an afterthought. U.S. government officials should have more media engagements with VOA and RFA than other media outlets.
North Korean military conducts a “strike drill” for multiple launchers and tactical guided weapon into the East Sea during a military drill in North Korea, in this May 4, 2019 photo supplied by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
U.S. officials at the UN must expose North Korean strategy and activities. They must push back on UN processes that allow North Korea to take a leading role in the UN Disarmament Forum. In addition, the U.S. must expose the Chinese and Russian efforts to facilitate sanctions evasion activities within the UN Panel of Experts. In addition, every UN organization that addresses human rights must hear from U.S. officials about the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity being committed by the regime. No one can be silent on these issues.
There are myriad technological solutions that can contribute to effective influence. These include penetrating internal networks and indigenous social media platforms as well the existing nearly 5 million smartphones in the hands of many of the people in the north. In addition, communications capabilities and devices could be developed for use by the people in the North.
One of the least exploited resources is the escapee or defector community. Among them are key communicators and people with the expertise to advise on relevant and effective themes and messages. A Korean Defector Information Institute should be established to harness the power of these escapees/defectors to effectively communicate with the Korean people in the North.
The above outlines a few of the very basic steps that should be incorporated into a comprehensive influence strategy. Kim’s weakness has provided opportunities for the international community to exploit. If done properly it may create internal pressure for the elite to influence Kim to negotiate. If he does not, these efforts will prepare the information environment for other outcomes that will be favorable to the U.S. and ROK/U.S. alliance.
Image: A Screenshot from KCNA TV.
However, information and influence activities may not be satisfying to officials, the press, and pundits. They will not yield quick results. It would have been better to have invested in such a program years ago. While most will want to focus on the short term it is time to take a long-term view and establish the foundation for influence activities that will achieve effects over time. But to do so will require leadership at the highest levels.
David Maxwell, a 1945 Contributing Editor, is a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 20 years in Asia and specializes in North Korea and East Asia Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is the editor of Small Wars Journal and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
