11/9/2021 Korean News and Commentary

Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"What is the use of living, if it be not to strive for noble causes and to make this muddled world a better place for those who will live in it after we are gone? How else can we put ourselves in harmonious relation with the great verities and consolations of the infinite and the eternal? And I avow my faith that we are marching towards better days. Humanity will not be cast down. We are going on swinging bravely forward along the grand high road and already behind the distant mountains is the promise of the sun."

- Winston Churchill

"People are always blaming their circumstances for what they are. I don't believe in circumstances. The people who get on in the world are the people who get up and look for the circumstances they want, and if they can't find them, make them."

- George Bernard Shaw

"Most people are mirrors, reflecting the moods and emotions of the times; few are windows, bringing light to bear on the dark corners where troubles fester. The whole purpose of education is to turn mirrors into windows."

- Sydney J. Harris

1. Prospects for Diplomacy With North Korea

2. U.S., S. Korea see 'eye-to-eye' on need to denuclearize Korean Peninsula: State Dept.

3. Satellite imagery shows continued operation of N. Korea's uranium enrichment plant: report

4. China can and should help steer N. Korea toward denuclearization: Pentagon spokesman

5. Japan reluctant to accept proposal to declare Korean War over

6. 'The UN's eyes': French Navy enforces North Korea sanctions

7. Twilight of the Kims?

8. U.S. lawmakers call on Biden to declare formal end to Korean War

9. N. Korea bristles at EU over UN resolution on human rights

10. Military holds meeting of generals, admirals on defense reform, leadership

11. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Infant deaths rampant due to medical collapse. Colds and diarrhea make them die quickly.

12. 23 U.S. reps get behind end-of-war declaration

13. 'US waits for next South Korean government over China issue'

14. What’s behind the emergence of Kim Jong-un-ism?

15. Seoul monitoring signs of N. Korea's border reopening amid reports of train operation

1. Prospects for Diplomacy With North Korea

Hesitant to provide sanctions relief? There is no justification to appease the regime with sanctions relief.

If we appease Kim wit sanctions relief Kim will assess his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies successful and he will double down.

Kim has made no effort to comply with the sanctions. If we lift sanctions based on the erroneous assumption that this will connote an end of the "hostile policy" and will bring to the negotiating table we are setting ourselves up for long term failure. And if we lift sanctions without compliance, what malign behavior by Kim do we wish to condone>.

Conclusion:

Because the Biden administration is hesitant to provide North Korea with sanctions relief and is unlikely to drop its “hostile policy”—and North Korea is similarly unlikely to change its demand for sanctions relief—it is not likely that U.S.-North Korea engagement will resume in the near future without further and more dramatic North Korean provocations or a dramatic change in policy on one or both sides. While a new DPK administration may attempt to improve inter-Korean relations, its ability to do so will be limited by the sanctions regime against North Korea. A change of power in South Korea would likely mark the end of proactive engagement with the North for the foreseeable future.

Prospects for Diplomacy With North Korea

Given political considerations in the United States and South Korea, a diplomatic approach with North Korea is likely unsustainable in the long term.

americanprogress.org · by Julia Cusick Director, Media Relations

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (L) and South Korean President Moon Jae-in (R) pose for photographs during the inter-Korean summit in Panmunjom, South Korea, April 2018. (Getty/Korea Summit Press Pool)

At the end of July 2021, South Korea announced that the two Koreas restored four communication lines that North Korea had cut off in June 2020 when North Korea severed all inter-Korean governmental communication. Days later, North Korea stopped answering routine South Korean calls in apparent protest of the joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises scheduled for August. In October, North Korea began answering military and liaison office communication lines again.

This resumption and halting of inter-Korean engagement and subsequent missile tests have raised questions about the possibility of further engagement, both between the Koreas as well as between North Korea and the United States. Looking ahead, sustained diplomacy is unlikely because the United States and North Korea have incompatible stances on the prerequisites for engagement, and major policy shifts in both countries are unlikely. While there are efforts to restore inter-Korean dialogue, its sustainability depends on the upcoming South Korean presidential election.

This issue brief explores North Korean, U.S., and South Korean perspectives on engagement and diplomacy and examines barriers in the United States that inhibit the executive branch from taking a more proactive approach to North Korea. It also outlines policy alternatives to the current approach, as discussed in the progressive community. This brief acknowledges that the term “progressive” is contested and does not necessarily represent the same views in both the United States and South Korea, nor are all self-proclaimed progressives in agreement about who can describe themselves with that term. For the purposes of this issue brief, the term refers to those who see the policies they advocate for as promoting a more just and equitable society and world.

What is motivating North Korea?

The resumption of inter-Korean calls marks a shift in relations since a sharp deterioration in mid-2020, and it came after a year of signals that North Korea was not interested in improving inter-Korean relations. In June 2020, after South Korea refused to restart inter-Korean projects that would have economically benefited the North, North Korea said it would cut off all communication with South Korea and treat the country as an “enemy.” Later that month, it blew up a shared joint liaison office near its border with South Korea. The recent resumption—and then halting—of communication lines, as well as the recent exchange of letters between South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un that led up to the decision to resume the communication channels, has generated speculation about North Korea’s motivations.

It is possible that the North Korean regime is using rapprochement to extract economic concessions and aid due to its significant domestic challenges. Natural disasters have threatened the country’s food and economic security; North Korea was hit by three typhoons in three weeks in the summer of 2020, causing severe flooding and widespread damage to crops. Trade with China, which comprised 95.4 percent of North Korea’s international trade in 2019, dropped by more than 80 percent due to North Korea’s closing its borders as a COVID-19 prevention measure. Kim announced at the Workers’ Party eighth congress in January 2021 that his country’s Five-Year Economic Plan had failed. Natural disasters have continued in 2021, and Kim noted that the country’s food situation is “tense.” South Korean aid could, therefore, be a means of relief from these economic pressures.

Yet the willingness of South Korea to respond favorably is uncertain. Its upcoming presidential election in March complicates any North Korean outreach as President Moon completes the final year of his single five-year term, and the race to succeed him has picked up steam. While the Moon administration has been forward-leaning on engagement with North Korea, there are no promises that the next administration will be. Kim may be hoping that Moon makes a last-ditch attempt to improve ties.

North Korea’s overtures may have another aim: to help South Korea’s Democratic Party of Korea (DPK). Historically, liberal parties such as the DPK have been more willing to advocate for engagement with North Korea, arguing that cooperation will lead to changes in the North Korean system over time and create the conditions for unification in the long term. To an extent, these parties have sought to de-securitize North Korea policy. Conservative parties, however, primarily view North Korea as a security threat. By creating a veneer of engagement with its southern neighbor, North Korea reduces the political vulnerabilities of a pro-engagement policy for the DPK: If North Korea is actively hostile, the DPK’s engagement policy can be criticized as a failure, whereas it is less of a liability if North Korea appears receptive.

Despite the possible advantages of projecting progress in the relationship, subsequent tension-raising activities suggest that creating space for the DPK may not be North Korea’s highest priority. North Korea has laid out its own expectations for engagement. Kim’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, called on the United States and South Korea to stop their annual summer joint exercise; these exercises had been reduced in scale since 2018 in response to the Singapore Summit agreement and today are largely computer-based. North Korea also asked for sanctions relief related to metal exports and fuel to restart talks with the United States—a smaller sanctions relief package than it had requested at the failed Hanoi Summit in February 2019. When the United States and South Korea conducted the exercises as planned, North Korea immediately signaled its displeasure: It stopped answering the inter-Korean hotlines and then began testing new missiles and systems, including a long-range cruise missile and a train-launched missile system. At the U.N. General Assembly, the North Korean permanent representative called for the end of the United States’ “hostile policy” toward the country. North Korea has appeared to soften slightly since then. In the beginning of October, the two Koreas once again restored communications and spoke of improving their relations.

While North Korea appears to be open to some engagement, the form that engagement takes will depend on whether South Korea or the United States is willing to pursue diplomacy on the terms the Kim regime has presented.

U.S. policy options and likely response to North Korea

The Biden administration describes its North Korea policy as a “calibrated, practical approach” with a goal of denuclearization. It has reached out to Pyongyang, saying that it is open to talks without preconditions, supports inter-Korean engagement, and is discussing diplomatic options for North Korea with partners such as South Korea and Japan. The Biden administration is also open to using humanitarian aid to incentivize North Korea’s return to talks. However, the administration does not appear willing to make some of the bigger concessions that North Korea has demanded—such as sanctions relief—or take greater political and diplomatic risks in an attempt to jump-start a diplomatic process.

Fundamentally, the Biden administration is in wait-and-see mode on North Korea: It is willing to engage in discussions about how to get North Korea to the table, but it is unlikely to make major policy shifts to induce North Korean cooperation, absent a major North Korean provocation. Its policy toward North Korea will also be affected by its purview on issues such as China and nuclear proliferation. The steps the Biden administration seems willing to take, when taken together, amount to a modest, phased approach. Sanctions relief, which would require expending political capital and a fundamental shift in approach to managing North Korea, appears to be off the table. Given that North Korea sees sanctions relief as a precondition to restarting talks, it is unlikely that sustainable engagement will resume unless at least one of the parties changes its policy.

During the past 30 years, the U.S. political space on North Korea policy has become more constricted as North Korea has become increasingly perceived as an unreliable partner through its abrogation of past agreements, all while refining its nuclear weapons capabilities. President Joe Biden’s approach to North Korea—supporting diplomacy to achieve denuclearization with limited willingness to make upfront concessions—reflects what his administration sees as sound policy, and it also manifests these increasingly restrictive structural constraints that have created a narrow Overton window on politically acceptable North Korea policy. Recent administrations’ policies demonstrate a dynamic in which North Korea must provide concessions to demonstrate its trustworthiness before the United States makes similar—or less significant—gestures. In its second term, the Obama administration demanded progress toward denuclearization as a prerequisite for talks. While President Donald Trump initially took an unconventional tack toward North Korea, the “grand bargain” he offered at the failed 2019 Hanoi Summit reflects a dynamic in which North Korea must make significant concessions before the United States will reciprocate. North Korea has so far been unwilling to do so, and, therefore, policy toward it has been in a decadeslong stalemate.

Any president who deviates from this precedent on North Korea policy faces significant political headwinds. Any engagement opens an administration up to criticism as observers argue over what preconditions the United States should have for talks with North Korea—and once talks begin, what constitutes an appropriate exchange and pace of concessions. For example, critics of the Agreed Framework—through which the United States and partners promised to provide oil and two nuclear power reactors in exchange for North Korea halting the construction and use of nuclear reactors that could produce fissile materials—called the deal a form of “appeasement”: It was rewarding bad behavior, and the United States must not be perceived as doing that. Whether rightly or wrongly in the case of the Agreed Framework, concerns of being seen as soft on North Korea limit the space within which policymakers can operate. While President Trump upended tradition in his meeting with Kim Jong Un, he, too, was criticized for legitimizing the regime through leader-level dialogue. This ties to a routine hitch in U.S.-North Korea engagement: Even if the United States is open to engagement, it does not want to be seen as giving North Korea gifts just for talking. The Biden administration appears to be at this point—it wants to talk, but it does not want to be seen as paying North Korea for its time.

However, North Korea has little incentive to respond to this approach. Why would the regime sacrifice its nuclear capabilities—which it sees as critical to regime survival—for the promise of more modest concessions in the future from a negotiating partner that has not demonstrated its own trustworthiness? In demanding significant upfront steps toward denuclearization without offering proportional concessions, the United States is treating North Korea as an untrustworthy “bad guy” that must be punished until it behaves, not a fellow nation-state. This is in part borne out of an assumption that the Kim regime is near collapse or could be brought to the verge—if further sanctions are enacted and the regime’s security becomes too precarious, the regime will finally end its illicit activities or return to the negotiating table. Therefore, it would be premature to offer concessions when pressure would better serve the United States’ bargaining position. While this line of policy thinking is politically tenable, it has not achieved its objectives: North Korea continues to expand and improve its nuclear weapons program as it doubles down on malign activities to finance the regime. The assumption underpinning U.S. policy therefore appears faulty.

The United States is treating North Korea differently than other authoritarian dictatorships and unacknowledged nuclear weapons states. This is not to say that the Kim regime has not engaged in egregious, reprehensible behavior or failed to abide by its commitments, but rather that the United States has taken a more hard-line approach toward engaging with North Korea than it has with other unsavory states. This narrative in which North Korea is the only party that lacks credibility also ignores the instances when the United States has mishandled diplomatic opportunities. For example, in the 1990s, the United States was delayed in delivering oil promised to North Korea by Congress. Letters exchanged between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump encapsulate this dynamic: Kim repeatedly called for the United States to take its promised actions while Trump ignores these pleas. The memory of Libya also generates concerns in Pyongyang about nuclear negotiations: Would the Kim regime similarly find itself vulnerable to foreign military intervention should it give up its nuclear capabilities? Taken together, the Kim regime is far from a model state, but it also maintains understandable concerns about U.S. intentions. The United States is not wrong to have boundaries in how it engages with North Korea but must also reflect on how its own behavior has influenced North Korea’s bargaining stance.

The U.S. legislative branch is an additional hurdle in changes in policy toward North Korea. In addition to run-of-the-mill congressional pushback when members disagree with the executive branch’s decisions about North Korea, U.S. sanctions policy toward North Korea has a substantial legislative component. In 2016, Congress passed the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act, which enacted unilateral sanctions and upheld U.N. sanctions on North Korea for a multitude of malign activities, including human rights abuses, proliferation, and cybercrimes. Congress revised and strengthened these sanctions the following year in the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. While the president has some latitude to suspend sanctions on national security grounds, North Korea’s actions would have to progress across many areas of concern to justify formal suspension or termination of these sanctions.

Therefore, any effort to engage seriously with North Korea, which would require openness to sanctions relief or other concessions, would require substantial political capital to gain congressional support. So far, President Biden does not appear willing to make these efforts a priority in his first term. Given the Democrats’ narrow majorities in the House of Representatives and the Senate and the midterm elections in 2022, it would be risky for the Biden administration to court potentially costly political backlash on a lower-priority issue. This is especially true given the level of political capital that Biden has already spent on his top priorities, such as infrastructure and domestic economic recovery. In the current political climate, North Korea effectively needs to be a high-priority issue—as it was for Trump—for an executive branch to make a major policy change.

Biden’s decision to stay the course is understandable and reflects how North Korea policy is the “land of lousy options.” There is no foolproof policy that would address all U.S. concerns and guarantee denuclearization; make improvements in the social, political, economic, and human rights of North Korean citizens; and mark the end of North Korean criminal activities. By accepting a phased approach to denuclearization, Biden has shown to move the needle in a more realistic direction—but now, it is unlikely to be enough to actually change the current state of U.S.-North Korea relations.

Alternatives to Biden’s policy

While political considerations inhibit the Biden administration from taking a more forward-leaning approach to North Korea, there is discussion in the progressive community about alternative policy options. This section is not a comprehensive discussion of these conversations, but rather a short introduction to a handful of alternative perspectives.

Some analysts advocate for the United States to make unilateral, upfront concessions to build trust and induce cooperation. Frank Aum, senior expert on North Korea at the U.S. Institute of Peace, and George Lopez, a professor of peace studies at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, advocate for a graduated reciprocation in tension reduction (GRIT) approach: The United States should take a conciliatory approach to North Korea involving unilateral concessions to generate diplomatic momentum while maintaining a long-term goal of denuclearization. Van Jackson, a professor of international relations at Victoria University of Wellington, goes a step further, arguing that the United States should take unilateral actions, including declaring the end of the Korean War—which has never formally ended—and reducing denuclearization-related rhetoric to create space for an arms control paradigm with North Korea. Jessica Lee, senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, also argues that an end-of-war declaration could be the first step in creating a new, proactive U.S. agenda for the Korean Peninsula. These arguments echo what progressives in South Korea are asking of the United States: President Moon’s foreign minister requested that the United States outline specific incentives it would offer North Korea to break the stalemate, although the United States claims it has done so already.

These arguments are based on a different theory of change regarding North Korea and suggest that there is some political space in the progressive community for a new tack toward North Korea. Recent U.S. policy is predicated on a belief that pressure and an emphasis on upfront denuclearization as a precondition for improved relations can change North Korean behavior. Progressive advocates instead argue that by making bolder concessions, the United States can help shift how North Korea perceives its own security situation. If the United States emphasizing pressure and denuclearization makes the Kim regime fearful for its survival, the regime is less likely to seriously engage in talks about denuclearization. But if the United States is open to more comprehensive discussions about its relationship with North Korea, perhaps it can engage in arms control discussions with North Korea in the short term while creating conditions that might allow for peace and denuclearization in the long term.

There have also been moves in the progressive advocacy community that have reverberated in the halls of Congress supporting diplomacy with North Korea. In February 2021, more than 40 organizations signed a letter calling for members of Congress to support a reciprocal process toward denuclearization. Korea Peace Now!—a global coalition of women’s peace movements—calls for the United States, North Korea, and South Korea to reach a peace agreement as soon as possible. Calls for an end of the Korean War have not gone unnoticed. In 2019, Rep. Ro Khanna (D-CA), with 51 co-sponsors, introduced a resolution in the House calling for “the President and Secretary of State, or their designees, to detail for Congress and the American people a clear roadmap for achieving a permanent peace regime and the peaceful denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.” Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA), with 22 co-sponsors, then introduced an act in 2021 that would require the secretary of state to produce a road map for a peace agreement on the Korean Peninsula.

While these currents in progressive discourse suggest some political will in certain constituencies to consider new ways of managing North Korea, there are no indications that the Biden administration is ready to embrace them. The U.S. Department of Defense is “open to a discussion about an end of war declaration,” but it is unlikely that the Biden administration will move proactively to end the Korean War. The administration is also reportedly in talks about what the content of a declaration might look like. Because the United States tends to view anything North Korea-related through the lens of denuclearization, providing an end-of-war agreement that North Korea does not seem interested in can raise concerns of sacrificing leverage in future talks. While it might be used down the line in negotiations or in the presentation of ideas to North Korea, it will likely not be made without some promise of North Korean cooperation on denuclearization.

For the Biden administration, it is likely too risky politically to adopt a new theory of change toward North Korea policy. While there might be willingness to support creative concessions at the margins—such as in discussions surrounding inter-Korean engagement—it is unlikely to center U.S. policy under the assumption that if the United States makes bolder concessions toward North Korea, North Korea would change. The costs of being wrong are seen as too high: What if North Korea just keeps building more nuclear weapons? And there are fears of being accused of bolstering the Kim regime’s survivability. These costs are also more immediate than the gains one would get from being “right”: It would take many years—or even decades—to see this theory of change out.

How might South Korea respond?

In the near term, South Korea is likely to support engaging with North Korea—with some limits. Despite the diplomatic stalemate between the United States and North Korea, President Moon is still eager to reengage with North Korea. He reportedly shares credit with Kim Jong Un for the reconnecting of phone lines, and Moon pushed for a resumption of both inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korea dialogue. Improved relations with North Korea is a legacy issue for Moon. While he supported the international economic pressure campaign on North Korea during the early days of his tenure, he also wanted to be “the president who built a peaceful relationship between the North and the South.” During the period of engagement between President Trump and Kim, Moon attempted to play the role of mediator. When U.S.-North Korea talks fell apart, his administration tried to keep inter-Korean engagement alive and to pacify the Kim regime on issues such as the distribution of leaflets across the Demilitarized Zone by activist groups.

However, while President Moon might be supportive of both inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korea diplomacy, he was not willing to go as far as totally canceling joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises to appease the North. In fact, South Korea’s defense budget has increased annually by an average of 7.4 percent during the Moon administration, and it recently tested its first submarine-launched ballistic missile. Moon appears committed to maintaining a credible deterrent against North Korea rather than appeasing North Korean demands in the security realm.

In the long term, the outcome of the leadership race in South Korea could dramatically affect the country’s approach to North Korea. A win by the conservative opposition People Power Party (PPP) would drastically shift South Korea’s policy. Recent articles from party spokespeople have attacked Moon’s policy as the “total opposite” of what is necessary for South Korean security and accused Moon of seeing North Korea through rose-colored glasses. Leading candidate in the PPP race Yoon Seok-youl questioned how meaningful the restoration of communications was and sees negotiations on nuclear weapons as the foundation of inter-Korean relations. Other leading PPP candidate Hong Joon-pyo said that his North Korea policy will be based on “mutual noninterference” and that his administration would work with the United States to create a NATO-like nuclear sharing agreement to deal with North Korea’s nuclear weapons. The head of the PPP has even called for the dissolution of the South Korean Ministry of Unification, which is responsible for inter-Korean relations.

Even in supporting engagement, the potential progressive successor to President Moon is attempting to somewhat distance himself from Moon’s policy. The DPK candidate in the upcoming presidential election, Lee Jae-myung, announced his “pragmatic” reunification policy based on five principles: a pragmatic approach to the North Korea nuclear issue, building a peace economy on the peninsula, pragmatic North Korea policy, pragmatic diplomacy based on national interests, and pragmatic diplomacy that contributes to citizens’ lives. He drew an explicit contrast between his policy and President Moon’s by stating that he will call North Korea out when it behaves badly. He also supported the Moon administration’s decision not to delay joint exercises.

Accordingly, a win by Lee Jae-myung could portend a South Korea that continues to attempt to improve inter-Korean relations. A win by a PPP candidate would instead move the focus of inter-Korean relations largely to deterrence and managing nuclear concerns. However, even if a South Korean president is in favor of dialogue and engagement, it does not mean that the Biden administration is ready to support those desires to the extent that a liberal South Korean president might want.

Conclusion

Because the Biden administration is hesitant to provide North Korea with sanctions relief and is unlikely to drop its “hostile policy”—and North Korea is similarly unlikely to change its demand for sanctions relief—it is not likely that U.S.-North Korea engagement will resume in the near future without further and more dramatic North Korean provocations or a dramatic change in policy on one or both sides. While a new DPK administration may attempt to improve inter-Korean relations, its ability to do so will be limited by the sanctions regime against North Korea. A change of power in South Korea would likely mark the end of proactive engagement with the North for the foreseeable future.

Tobias Harris is a senior fellow for Asia policy at the Center for American Progress. Abigail Bard is the policy analyst for Asia policy at the Center. Haneul Lee is the research assistant for Asia policy at the Center.

This issue brief is the first in a series of publications from the Center for American Progress addressing a progressive vision for the U.S.-South Korea alliance. It was written based on consultations and conversations with a network of progressive U.S. and South Korean foreign policy thinkers, including but not limited to Heungkyu Kim, professor at Ajou University, and Jessica Lee, senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. This brief, however, does not represent their views nor those of their organizations. The Center for American Progress thanks the Korea Foundation for its support of this project.

Endnotes

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Hyonhee Shin and Josh Smith, “North Korea not picking up hotlines after warning South, U.S. over joint drills,” Reuters, August 10, 2021, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/nkorea-says-us-skorea-face-security-threats-with-military-drills-2021-08-09/.
Hyung-Jin Kim, “Koreas talk on hotline restored after North’s missile tests,” The Associated Press, October 4, 2021, available at https://apnews.com/article/seoul-south-korea-north-korea-7ee05e6c8defa9e60575e6372bb02513.
Hyung-Jin Kim, “North Korea cuts off all communication with South Korea,” The Associated Press, June 8, 2020, available at https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-north-korea-international-news-seoul-pyongyang-c74e0b479ab14c2c80dd5ba2ebc4746e; Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Cuts Off All Communications Lines to South Korea,” The New York Times, June 8, 2021, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/08/world/asia/north-korea-south-korea-communications.html.
BBC, “North Korea blows up joint liaison office with South in Kaesong,” June 16, 2020, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53060620.
Yonhap News Agency, “(2nd LD) Restoration of inter-Korean liaison hotlines requested by Kim Jong-un: NIS,” August 3, 2021, available at https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210803004752315?section=national/politics.
Jay Song and Benjamin Habib, “Typhoons and Human Insecurity in North Korea,” The Diplomat, October 21, 2020, available at https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/typhoons-and-human-insecurity-in-north-korea/; The Star, “Food supply a concern amid N. Korea floods,” August 8, 2020, available at https://www.thestar.com.my/aseanplus/aseanplus-news/2020/08/08/food-supply-a-concern-amid-n-korea-floods.
Kim Il-gyeong, “2019nyeon bukhanui daeoemuyeok donghyang,” Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, July 29, 2020, available at https://news.kotra.or.kr/user/globalBbs/kotranews/787/globalBbsDataView.do?setIdx=249&dataIdx=183721&pageViewType=&column=&search=&searchAreaCd=&searchNationCd=&searchTradeCd=&searchStartDate=&searchEndDate=&searchCategoryIdxs=&searchIndustryCateIdx=&searchItemCode=&searchItemName=&page=1&row=10; BBC, “Kim Jong-un says North Korea’s economic plan failed,” January 6, 2021, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55563598.
BBC, “Kim Jong-un says North Korea’s economic plan failed.”
Deutsche Welle, “North Korea: Heavy flooding destroys homes, farmland,” August 12, 2021, available at https://www.dw.com/en/north-korea-heavy-flooding-destroys-homes-farmland/a-58836629; Josh Smith and Minwoo Park, “Homes flooded, fields and roads damaged as heavy rain hits North Korea,” Reuters, August 6, 2021, available at https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/homes-flooded-fields-roads-damaged-heavy-rain-hits-north-korea-2021-08-06/; Holly Ellyatt, “North Korea’s food situation is ‘tense,’ Kim Jong Un says,” CNBC, June 17, 2021, available at https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/17/north-koreas-food-situation-is-tense-kim-jong-un-says.html.
Victor Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future (New York: Harper Collins, 2012), p. 147.
Sung-han Kim and Geun Lee, “When security met politics: desecuritization of North Korean threats by South Korea’s Kim Dae-jung government,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 11 (1) (2011): 25–55, available at https://academic.oup.com/irap/article-abstract/11/1/25/668895.
Timothy W. Martin, “Kim Jong Un’s Sister Blasts U.S.’s ‘Dangerous War Exercises,’ Threatens to Bolster Military,” The Wall Street Journal, August 10, 2021, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/kim-jong-uns-sister-vows-to-boost-deterrence-after-being-ignored-by-u-s-11628579896.
Hyonhee Shin, “N.Korea wants sanctions eased to restart U.S. talks -S.Korea lawmakers,” Reuters, August 3, 2021, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/nkoreas-kim-asked-reopening-hotlines-skorea-lawmaker-2021-08-03/; BBC, “Trump-Kim summit breaks down after North Korea demands end to sanctions,” February 28, 2019, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47398974.
Sangmi Cha and Hyonhee Shin, “North Korea says open to talks if South drops double standards,” Reuters, September 24, 2021, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-says-suggestion-declare-end-korean-war-is-premature-kcna-2021-09-23/.
Koh Byung-joon, “(5th LD) Koreas restore cross-border hotlines 55 days after suspension,” Yonhap News Agency, October 4, 2021, available at https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20211004000355325?section=nk/nk.
The White House, “Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Jen Psaki Aboard Air Force One En Route Philadelphia, PA,” Press release, April 30, 2021, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/04/30/press-gaggle-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-aboard-air-force-one-en-route-philadelphia-pa/.
U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing – August 3, 2021,” Press release, August 3, 2021, available at https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-august-3-2021/; U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing – July 27, 2021,” Press release, July 27, 2021, available at https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-july-27-2021/.
Song Sang-ho and Kim Seung-yeon, “(3rd LD) U.S. ready to help address N.K. humanitarian concerns regardless of denuclearization: envoy,” Yonhap News Agency, September 14, 2021, available at https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210914000553325.
For more on the Overton window, see Mackinac Center, “The Overton Window,” available at https://www.mackinac.org/OvertonWindow (last accessed October 2021).
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Armin Rosen, “The Long History of (Wrongly) Predicting North Korea’s Collapse,” The Atlantic, August 6, 2012, available at https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/08/the-long-history-of-wrongly-predicting-north-koreas-collapse/260769/.
Catherine Killough, “Begun is Half Done: Prospects for US-North Korea Nuclear Diplomacy” (Washington: Plougshares Fund, 2019), available at https://www.ploughshares.org/sites/default/files/resources/Begun-is-Half-Done-2019.pdf.
U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, “Denuclearization and the Two Koreas, 1993–2001,” available at https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/two-koreas (last accessed October 2021).
Robert L. Carlin, “The Real Lessons of the Trump-Kim Love Letters,” Foreign Policy, August 13, 2021, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/08/13/north-korea-trump-kim-jong-un-love-letters-diplomacy-nuclear-talks/.
Megan Specia and David E. Sanger, “How the ‘Libya Model’ Became a Sticking Point in North Korea Nuclear Talks,” The New York Times, May 16, 2018, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/16/world/asia/north-korea-libya-model.html.
North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, Public law 114-122, 114th Cong., 2nd sess. (February 18, 2016), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/757/text.
Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, Public Law 115-44, 115th Cong., 1st sess. (August 2, 2017), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3364/text.
Victor Cha, “Giving North Korea a ‘bloody nose’ carries a huge risk to Americans,” The Washington Post, January 30, 2018, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/victor-cha-giving-north-korea-a-bloody-nose-carries-a-huge-risk-to-americans/2018/01/30/43981c94-05f7-11e8-8777-2a059f168dd2_story.html.
Frank Aum and George A. Lopez, “A Bold Offensive to Engage North Korea,” War on the Rocks, December 4, 2020, available at https://warontherocks.com/2020/12/a-bold-peace-offensive-to-engage-north-korea/.
Van Jackson, “Risk Realism: The Arms Control Endgame for North Korea Policy” (Washington: Center for a New American Security, 2019), available at https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/risk-realism.
Jessica J. Lee, “It’s Time for Biden to End the Korean War,” Foreign Policy, October 19, 2021, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/19/biden-end-korean-war/.
John Hudson, “South Korea to Biden administration: North Korea is ‘strengthening’ its missile program,” The Washington Post, September 30, 2021, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/korea-north-south-diplomacy-nuclear/2021/09/30/3ccfd0f4-2174-11ec-8fd4-57a5d9bf4b47_story.html.
Win Without War and others, “Statement of Pro-Diplomacy Groups Regarding U.S. Policy Toward North Korea,” Press release, February 21, 2019, available at https://winwithoutwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/With-signers45-_NK-StatementofPrinciples__2_21_19_microsoft.pdf.
Korea Peace Now!, “Path to Peace: The Case for a Peace Agreement to End the Korean War” (Washington: 2021), available at https://koreapeacenow.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Path-to-Peace-WEB.pdf.
Calling for a formal end of the Korean war of 2019, H.R. 152, 116th Cong., 1st sess. (February 26, 2019), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-resolution/152/text.
Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act, H.R. 3446, 117th Cong., 1st sess. (May 20, 2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3446/text.
David Choi, “Pentagon ‘Open to Discussion’ That Ties Formal End of Korean War to Denuclearization,” Military.com, September 23, 2021, available at https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/09/23/pentagon-open-discussion-ties-formal-end-of-korean-war-denuclearization.html.
Hwang Joon-Bum, “US, S. Korea discussing draft text of end-of-war declaration,” Hankyoreh, October 21, 2021, available at http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/1016125.html.
Hyonhee Shin, “South, North Korea reopen hotlines as leaders seek to rebuild ties,” Reuters, July 27, 2021, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/china/south-north-korea-have-restored-once-severed-hotline-blue-house-2021-07-27/.
Moon Jae-in, “Speech at 76th session of U.N. General Assembly,” September 21, 2021, available at https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/10.0010/20210921/AT2JoAvm71nq/KDhm4ENlT3yQ_en.pdf.
Jane Sit and Paula Hancocks, “From North Korean refugee parents to the Blue House: meet South Korean president Moon Jae-in,” CNN, September 28, 2017, available at https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/28/asia/moon-talk-asia/index.html.
Michelle Ye Hee Lee, “South Korea’s President Moon is the man in the (very precarious) middle,” The Washington Post, May 28, 2018, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/south-koreas-president-moon-is-the-man-in-the-very-precarious-middle/2018/05/28/58355b60-6201-11e8-81ca-bb14593acaa6_story.html.
Republic of Korea Ministry of Unification, “2020 Ministry of Unification Work Plan: Tangible Changes, Republic of Korea 2020,” Press release, March 3, 2020, available at https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&mode=view&cntId=54230&category=&pageIdx=; Josh Rogin, “South Korea’s new anti-leaflet law sparks backlash in Washington,” The Washington Post, December 17, 2020, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/12/17/south-koreas-new-anti-leaflet-law-sparks-backlash-washington/.
Choe Sang-Hun, “After Trump ‘Failed,’ South Korean Leader Hopes Biden Can Salvage Nuclear Deal,” The New York Times, April 21, 2021, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/21/world/asia/biden-north-korea-nuclear-deal-president-moon.html.
Lami Kim, “A Hawkish Dove? President Moon Jae-In and South Korea’s Military Buildup,” War on the Rocks, September 15, 2021, available at https://warontherocks.com/2021/09/a-hawkish-dove-president-moon-jae-in-and-south-koreas-military-buildup/.
BBC, “North and South Korea test ballistic missiles hours apart,” September 15, 2021, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58554326.
Shin In-gyu, “North Korea’s recurring security threats, South Korea’s security depends on the President’s Will for Security,” People Power Party, Press release, August 12, 2021, available at http://www.peoplepowerparty.kr/renewal/news/briefing_delegate_view.do?bbsId=SPB_000000002176448; Hwang Bo Seung-hee, “The Moon Administration should no longer insult heroes and veterans,” People Power Party, Press release, June 25, 2021, available at http://www.peoplepowerparty.kr/renewal/news/briefing_delegate_view.do?bbsId=SPB_000000002115307.
Son Deok-ho, “Lee Jae-myung and Lee Nak-yeon ‘Peace on the Korean Peninsula,’ Yoon Seok-yeol and Choi Jae-hyung, ‘Bombing the liaison office and killing of public officials,’” Chosun Biz, July 27, 2021, available at https://biz.chosun.com/policy/politics/2021/07/27/YTVRB7R55RGQRKYBHZGH56NVOA/; Yang Beom-soo, “Yoon’s five visions for his administration,” Chosun Biz, August 25, 2021, available at https://biz.chosun.com/policy/politics/2021/08/25/DROW7NOCEJE7VKWIRHERTYR7FA/.
Lee Dae-Kyung, “Hong Jun-pyo promises to abolish the air traffic control agency and correct the broken process,” Chunji News, August 25, 2021, available at http://www.newscj.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=894132.
Ahn Sung-mi “Call to scrap Unification Ministry stirs debate,” The Korea Herald, July 11, 2021, available at http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210711000193.
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Choi Won-hee, “Lee Jae-myung’s difference from the Moon administration: will tell North Korea if it does something wrong,” TV Chosun, August 22, 2021, available at http://news.tvchosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2021/08/22/2021082290046.html.
Kang Min-woo, “Lee Jae-myung, ‘the claim to postpone the South Korea-U.S. joint exercise only causes confusion… government judgments must be trusted,” SBS, August 7, 2021, available at https://news.sbs.co.kr/news/endPage.do?news_id=N1006421560.

americanprogress.org · by Julia Cusick Director, Media Relations

2. U.S., S. Korea see 'eye-to-eye' on need to denuclearize Korean Peninsula: State Dept.

Excerpts:

"We will continue to seek engagement with the DPRK as part of what we've called a calibrated and practical approach in order to make tangible progress that increases security not only for the United States, but also for our regional allies," said Price, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

He also declined to comment directly when asked if topics of Kritenbrink's talks with his South Korean counterparts in Seoul would include an end of war declaration.

"I would suspect that the threat that is posed by the DPRK's ballistic missile and nuclear program will certainly be on the table, as will our strategy to advance the prospects for the complete and total denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," said Price.

"But our relationship with the ROK, our treaty ally, is broad and it's deep, so there will be a number of issues that they will discuss together," he added.

U.S., S. Korea see 'eye-to-eye' on need to denuclearize Korean Peninsula: State Dept. | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · November 9, 2021

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, Nov. 8 (Yonhap) -- The United States and South Korea fully agree on the need to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula through diplomacy, a state department spokesperson said Monday, reaffirming U.S. commitment to engage with North Korea.

Ned Price, however, declined to comment on whether the U.S. agrees with a Seoul-proposed declaration of an end to the Korean War.

"We see eye to eye with our South Korean counterparts that achieving a complete denuclearization and lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and diplomacy is the best and the most effective course," he said when asked if Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink would seek to discuss a possible difference between South Korea and the U.S. over an end of war declaration during his upcoming trip to Seoul.

Kritenbrink is set to visit South Korea from Wednesday, following his ongoing trip to Japan that began earlier this week.

U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan earlier hinted at a possible difference between Seoul and Washington over an end of war declaration.

"We may have somewhat different perspectives on the precise sequence or timing or conditions for different steps. but we are fundamentally aligned on the core strategic initiative here and on the belief that only through diplomacy are we going to really, truly be able to effectively make progress," Sullivan said late last month.

Seoul insists declaring a formal end to the 1950-53 Korean War may help bring North Korea back to the dialogue table by offering some security assurances to the reclusive state.

Pyongyang has stayed away from denuclearization negotiations since 2019. It is also ignoring all U.S. overtures for dialogue, accusing the U.S. of harboring what it claims to be a hostile intent toward its regime.

He also declined to comment directly when asked if topics of Kritenbrink's talks with his South Korean counterparts in Seoul would include an end of war declaration.

"But our relationship with the ROK, our treaty ally, is broad and it's deep, so there will be a number of issues that they will discuss together," he added.

ROK stands for the Republic of Korea, South Korea's official name.

bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · November 9, 2021

3. Satellite imagery shows continued operation of N. Korea's uranium enrichment plant: report

Anyone surprised?

Satellite imagery shows continued operation of N. Korea's uranium enrichment plant: report | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · November 9, 2021

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, Nov. 8 (Yonhap) -- North Korea continues to operate its key uranium plant, a U.S. think tank said Monday, suggesting a steady growth in North Korea's stockpile of the material used to build nuclear weapons.

Citing recent satellite imagery, Beyond Parallel, a project of the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, reported the North's Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant remains operational and is producing uranium concentrate.

"The main plant of the Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant continues to show activity consistent with the continued production of uranium concentrate and ongoing maintenance efforts," the report said, citing commercial satellite imagery collected between April and October.

It said some panels on the roof of a "leaching and classifying building" at the Pyongsan plant appeared to have been replaced due to deterioration that it said "is caused by acid vapor condensing on the underside of the roof panels."

The report noted the Pyongsan plant remains the "sole verified producer of uranium concentrate," also known as yellowcake.

"As such it represents the foundation upon which the nation's production of fissile material for nuclear weapons is built," it said.

The Pyongsan facility is located some 45 kilometers north of the inter-Korean border.

North Korea has staged six nuclear tests with its last test being conducted in September 2017.

The North, however, has repeatedly vowed to continue bolstering its nuclear capability as a deterrent against what it claims to be U.S. hostility toward it.

"Given the observed level of activity and North Korean statements concerning the importance of continued development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and barring any unforeseen developments, the plant will undoubtedly remain operational for the foreseeable future," said the report.

"The dismantlement of the Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant should be an essential component to any meaningful future "complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement" nuclear agreement between the United States and North Korea," it added.

bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · November 9, 2021

4. China can and should help steer N. Korea toward denuclearization: Pentagon spokesman

But it will not.

China can and should help steer N. Korea toward denuclearization: Pentagon spokesman | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · November 9, 2021

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, Nov. 8 (Yonhap) -- China has the ability to help steer North Korea toward a diplomatic solution of its nuclear standoff, the Pentagon Press Secretary said Monday.

John Kirby insisted one way for China to do so would be to faithfully implement U.N. Security Council sanctions on the North.

"China does have influence in Pyongyang and we all, the international community, would like to see them use that influence in a constructive way to put some bite into the sanctions that are already in place under the U.N. Security Council," the defense department press secretary said in a daily press briefing.

"They have influence and they should use that influence to help steer North Korea towards a diplomatic solution to this and the denuclearization of the peninsula, which, one has to assume, is also in China's interest as well," he added.

His remarks follow a series of missile tests by North Korea, which prompted strong condemnations from the U.S. and many other countries.

China, on the other hand, has kept mostly silent, while it has also been criticized by the U.S. and others for failing, if not refusing, to fully implement the sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council, to which it is a permanent member.

An earlier report said China and Russia have also circulated a draft resolution at the U.N. Security Council, calling for reduced sanctions on North Korea.

"I'm not suggesting they have absolute control (over North Korea). I understand that there's some tensions there, too," said Kirby.

"But ... they haven't used the influence they have to try to steer Pyongyang to a better, more sustainable path here and a path towards diplomacy and the denuclearization of the peninsula," he added.

Kirby also confirmed that North Korea continues to remain unresponsive to U.S. overtures for dialogue.

"The (Joe) Biden administration has made clear that we want to pursue dialogue and diplomacy with North Korea to find a diplomatic way to end or to denuclearize North Korea and the peninsula. We've made that very clear," he said.

"To date, there has been no interest shown by Pyongyang to move in that direction. And that's regrettable."

bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · November 9, 2021

5. Japan reluctant to accept proposal to declare Korean War over

Unfortunately the most alignment the US has for Northeast Asia security issues is with Japan.

But it is Kim and north Korea who will prevent an end of war declaration.

Japan reluctant to accept proposal to declare Korean War over

english.kyodonews.net · by KYODO NEWS

Japan has shown reluctance to accept a proposal by South Korea to declare a formal end to the Korean War as a way to entice North Korea to negotiations on its denuclearization, diplomatic sources said Saturday, revealing gaps in the efforts also involving the United States.

Tokyo has been concerned that such a preceding conciliatory move would complicate its position for resolving the issue of past abductions by North Korea of Japanese citizens at the same time as that of the nuclear and missile development programs pursued by Pyongyang in defiance of U.N. Security Council resolutions, the sources said.

The United States and North Korea remain technically in a state of war as the 1950-1953 Korean War -- in which U.S.-led U.N. forces fought alongside the South against the North, backed by China and the Soviet Union -- ended in a cease-fire, not a peace treaty.

Japan expressed its concern last month when its senior official in charge of North Korea met with his U.S. and South Korean counterparts in Washington. The United States then did not make its position clear, according to the sources.

Combined photo shows (from L) Takehiro Funakoshi, head of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, Sung Kim, U.S. special representative for North Korea, and Noh Kyu Duk, South Korea's special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs. (Kyodo)

South Korean President Moon Jae In said in his speech at the U.N. General Assembly in September that he will seek to declare a formal end to the Korean War, naming China as a potential partner along with the two Koreas and the United States. He did not mention Japan.

At the senior officials' meeting on Oct. 19, Noh Kyu Duk, the South's special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, underscored the need to proceed with the proposal by Moon, the sources said.

In response, Takehiro Funakoshi, head of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, said it is "premature" to discuss the proposal, citing that North Korea has repeatedly test-fired missiles, said the sources.

Sung Kim, U.S. special representative for North Korea, did not argue the pros and cons of the proposal, they said.

After the meeting, a Japanese government source only said the three agreed to continue diplomatic efforts in dealing with North Korea and working toward beefing up regional deterrence.

In its part, North Korea has said it will reject any South Korean proposal to declare a formal end to the war unless the United States withdraws its "hostile policy" toward the North, according to its state-run media.

english.kyodonews.net · by KYODO NEWS

6. 'The UN's eyes': French Navy enforces North Korea sanctions

A growing number of countries are supporting the enforcement of UN sanctions.

'The UN's eyes': French Navy enforces North Korea sanctions

Flying above the Yellow Sea between Korea and China, a French naval crew scans the ocean surface for signs of contraband headed for North Korea.

msn.com · by AFP 23 hrs ago

Flying above the Yellow Sea between Korea and China, a French naval crew scans the ocean surface for signs of contraband headed for North Korea.

The team is part of an international mission enforcing United Nations sanctions on Pyongyang, flying surveillance trips from the US Futenma base in Japan's Okinawa.

"The UN sends us information on vessels suspected of illicit behaviour," and then a flight plan is drawn up, explained Guillaume, the lieutenant commander who leads the team and can only be identified by his first name.

On board their Falcon 200 aircraft, the team of six uses radar as well as ships' AIS -- the automatic identification system that transmits information including a vessel's identity and its route.

But their best tool remains visual observation: two crew members sit next to the plane's windows, scanning the ocean surface with binoculars and taking photographs.

"We're the eyes of the United Nations in the area," said Guillaume.

Suddenly, the team is on alert: a ship has been spotted with its AIS deactivated, a move considered suspect behaviour.

The pilots reroute the plane, making two passes at an altitude of less than 150 metres (500 feet), looking for the boat's name on its stern and trying to establish radio contact with its crew.

Briefing the team before the flight, Guillaume stressed the importance of a "cordial and professional response" in instances of suspicious behaviour.

"In the context of the international tensions in the area, the goal is to avoid poisoning the situation. We have to be firm but courteous."

Load Error

- 'France's credibility' -

A little farther away, the team spots two stationary ships, hull to hull.

A first pass reinforces suspicions: pumping pipes connect the larger of the ships, whose waterline indicates it is fully loaded, to the smaller one, a merchant ship.

The latter is "ideal for carrying contraband, but could also simply be refuelling fishermen", a team member explains.

When contact is established with the larger boat, the crew claims no knowledge of why the smaller vessel is attached.

The French team gathers as much information as possible on the vessels to send to the UN, which will investigate for violations of Resolutions 2375 and 2397 limiting the sale, supply and transfer of natural gas and petroleum to North Korea.

If a violation is found, a case could move forward against the ships and their owners.

The team arrived in Japan from their base in French Polynesia in mid-October.

French forces have participated in the surveillance missions regularly since 2018, alongside eight other countries and under the supervision of the Enforcement Coordination Cell responsible for implementing UN resolutions.

For France, the missions are also a way to increase its profile in the region, after the 2019 unveiling of its Indo-Pacific defence strategy.

France has 1.6 million citizens and a vast exclusive economic zone of nine million square kilometres in the region, which has particular strategic value given Beijing's growing territorial ambitions and US-China tensions.

And its mission under the UN aegis also illustrates "its interest in the region beyond its Indo-Pacific priorities," said Hugo Decis, a research analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

It confirms "the capacity of French forces to work with their partners and allies and in that sense contributes to France's credibility as a power, even if a secondary one, in the Pacific."

mac/sah/kaf/axn/qan

msn.com · by AFP 23 hrs ago

7. Twilight of the Kims?

We should also keep in mind that the north can be a spoiler in Strategic competition with China.

And the new script the US is writing? (per the article's subtitle)- The new script is the US will not give up sanctions. One of the most important actions by both Trump and Biden is and will be the fact we have not lifted sanctions.

Excerpts:

Biden’s overarching focus on China, North Korea’s sole ally and source of economic support, also does not bode well for Kim. To be sure, the North Koreans have probably concluded, correctly, that a more fractious US-China relationship will make China less likely to twist their arms on the nuclear issue. Given today’s tensions, it is highly unlikely that China would do the US any more favors in this regard.

But Chinese help with the North Korean nuclear issue has only ever been intermittent at best. Because China does not want Korean refugees flooding over its border or a US ally in control of the entire Korean Peninsula, it still has an interest in limiting Kim’s provocations.

In any case, having China in his corner is probably the best that Kim can hope for in the next act of the drama. By bolstering US allies and deepening mutual cooperation, America’s strategic commitment to Asia not only represents a bulwark against China’s own military ambitions; it also changes the balance of forces surrounding the Korean Peninsula. Australia’s investment in nuclear submarines and enhanced alliance relations with the US and the United Kingdom represent future capabilities that can focus on Pyongyang. And Kishida’s Liberal Democrats back a boost in Japan’s defense spending to 2% of GDP.

For its part, Pyongyang would do well to consider these and other forthcoming strategic changes affecting the Korean Peninsula. America’s Asian partners, with their strong economies, world-class technology, and modern defense forces, are well prepared for the twenty-first century. Time is not on Kim’s side.

Twilight of the Kims? | by Kent Harrington - Project Syndicate

project-syndicate.org · by Kent Harrington · November 8, 2021

Having failed to improve its economic prospects, North Korea is once again launching missiles and hoping that saber-rattling will lead to a loosening of international sanctions. But the United States and its allies are already familiar with this script and have decided to write a new one of their own.

ATLANTA – Nearly three years after his failed bromance with Donald Trump, North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un is once again angling for US attention. North Korea has tested a new, high-tech missile and hinted that it may agree to restart talks with South Korea, where President Moon Jae-in desperately wants to resuscitate his moribund outreach to the North. But if Kim is expecting a positive reaction from US President Joe Biden, he shouldn’t hold his breath. With issues like China and the rebuilding of US alliances topping Biden’s agenda, overtures to Kim are unlikely.

Kim’s dog-eared script is not helping his cause. The latest drama has unfolded all too predictably. In Act One, Kim Yo-jong, Kim’s sister and the North’s spokesperson on North-South affairs, averred that the regime might be interested in discussing a peace treaty with South Korea – an idea that Moon himself had proposed in September. She hastened to add, however, that South Korea will have to distance itself from US demands for nuclear disarmament and end joint military exercises with US forces.

The predictable saber-rattling came a few days later, in Act Two. Following the announcement that the regime had launched a new hypersonic missile and carried out a half-dozen other tests, Kim took to the podium (with his missilery in the background) to tout the North’s “world class defense capability.” Although the Biden administration had sent “signals that it is not hostile,” he declared that the North has “no reason to believe it.” By challenging US credibility, Kim was all but asking the United States to respond, ideally by following its Korean ally’s lead and publicly throwing a bone his way.

But the newly slimmed-down Kim isn’t the only one reusing an old script. Moon’s offer to negotiate a peace treaty as a prelude to nuclear negotiations has been a perennial feature of North-South talks. As if following Kim Yo-jong’s cue, Moon’s Democratic Party followers duly played their part by calling for a suspension of military exercises and other preconditions for negotiations.

Yet, in seizing on the prospect of new nuclear talks, the political leadership in Seoul seems to have already forgotten what Kim said at North Korea’s Eighth Party Congress in January: “We must develop tactical nuclear weapons that can be applied in different means in the modern war [sic]… and continue to push ahead with the production of super-large nuclear warheads.”

As always, North Korea’s blandishments and bluster are geared toward only one goal: to loosen the vice of nuclear-related economic sanctions. Despite making economic development his domestic priority five years ago, Kim has failed to improve basic living conditions in the country. Battered by floods, food shortages, and a pandemic-induced lockdown, his initiatives – market-based reforms, decentralized decision-making, and more social investment – have stalled, tanking trade and economic growth. Kim acknowledged as much at the party congress in January, emphasizing the need for “self-reliance” and explicitly sidelining reform.

Unfortunately for Kim, there is a new audience in the White House, and it is far tougher than the incumbents in Seoul. Speaking before a joint session of Congress in April, Biden made clear that Kim should not expect the kind of pre-emptive concessions that Trump offered at the summits in Singapore in 2018 and Hanoi in 2019. According to Biden, the US is prepared to talk anytime without preconditions about the peninsula’s denuclearization, but there will be no mano-a-mano deal-making. As Biden’s press secretary explained after his speech, “We have and will continue to consult with the Republic of Korea, Japan, and other allies at every step along the way.”

Biden’s priorities in Asia pose a big problem for Kim. In early October, CIA Director William Burns announced the creation of a new China Mission Center and then disclosed that the agency’s North Korea mission center will be shut down. Although countries like North Korea and Iran will remain priorities, that work will be absorbed into the agency’s regional divisions. According to a State Department official, US intelligence agencies “will continue to remain in close consultation and coordination with our South Korean allies on issues of mutual concern,” especially North Korea.

For Kim, the implications of this reorganization are obvious. While Trump was willing to backhand longstanding US allies for the sake of his summitry theater, Biden insists on working closely with America’s partners. The consequences of this change are already apparent across the region. In South Korea, conservative politicians campaigning for next year’s presidential election are calling for greater pressure on the North and to repair ties with Japan, which have become badly frayed under Moon.

Similarly, in his first conversation with Biden as Japan’s newly installed prime minister, Fumio Kishida emphasized the importance of allied cooperation. Reportedly singling out the threat from a nuclear-armed North Korea, he highlighted Japan’s need for stronger missile and naval defenses.

project-syndicate.org · by Kent Harrington · November 8, 2021

8. U.S. lawmakers call on Biden to declare formal end to Korean War

With all due respect to these lawmakers, they just do not have a good understanding of the nature, objectives, and the strategy of the Kim family regime.

Paper and words do not trump steel. There should be no end of war declaration unless and until there are conventional forces reductions in the frontline area to reduce the threat to the ROK and to provide great warning time should the regime decide to attack.

Bottom line: How does an end of war declaration provide security for the ROK and prevent war? This question must be examined and understood.

1. HR 3446 is based on an erroneous assumption – An end of war declaration will bring Kim Jong-un to the negotiation table – it will be sufficient to show the end of the alliance hostile policy and satisfy Kim Jong-un

• It does not meet KJU’s definition of hostile policy and the requirements to demonstrate its end.

• In addition to ending the hostile policy Kim demands an end to sanctions in return for an EOW declaration.

2. KJU will double down: An EOW declaration will result in KJU assessing his blackmail diplomacy and political warfare strategy a success and he will double down. Things will get worse, not better.

3. KJU also demands sanctions relief. Keep in mind that appeasement will not result in changed behavior – what malign behavior do we wish to condone if we lift sanctions?

U.S. lawmakers call on Biden to declare formal end to Korean War | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · November 9, 2021

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, Nov. 8 (Yonhap) -- A group of U.S. lawmakers sent a letter to President Joe Biden last week, urging his administration to quickly engage with North Korea and discuss declaring a formal end to the Korean War, an activist group said Monday.

The letter was also sent to Secretary of State Antony Blinken, according to the Korean American Public Action Committee (KAPAC).

"We wish to highlight the importance of the United States continuing its efforts to facilitate peace between South Korea and North Korea and bring about democracy for all residents of the Korean Peninsula," says the letter, released by the KAPAC.

The letter, dated Nov. 4, was signed by Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA) and 22 other lawmakers here, according to the KAPAC.

The lawmakers note South Korean President Moon Jae-in renewed his proposal to declare a formal end to the Korean War in his address to the U.N. General Assembly this year.

"An official end to the state of war between North Korea, South Korea, and the United States is not a concession to North Korea. Rather, it is a vital step towards peace that serves the national interest of the United States and our allies alike," said the letter.

"To that end, we urge the Administration and the Secretary of State to prioritize active diplomatic engagement with North Korea and South Korea with the goal of a binding peace agreement constituting a formal and final end to the state of war between North Korea, South Korea, and the United States."

The divided Koreas technically remain at war, as the 1950-53 war ended only with an armistice.

Seoul believes declaring a formal end to the war may help restart denuclearization negotiations with North Korea, which have stalled since 2019.

U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, however, has hinted at a possible difference between Seoul and Washington over when an end of war declaration should be made.

"We may have somewhat different perspectives on the precise sequence or timing or conditions for different steps," he said late last month when asked if the U.S. supported Seoul's proposal for a war's end declaration.

John Kirby, spokesperson for the U.S. Department of Defense, noted earlier Monday the North continues to ignore U.S. overtures to date.

bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · November 9, 2021

9. N. Korea bristles at EU over UN resolution on human rights

Human rights is a national security issue. Kim must deny human rights in order to remain in power. KIm prioritizes his weapons, military modernization and support to the elite over the welfare of the Korean people living in the north.

When we focus on Kim's nuclear weapons and missiles we reinforce his legitimacy (particularly domestic legitimacy). When we focus on human rights abuses and crimes against humanity we undermine regime legitimacy.

N. Korea bristles at EU over UN resolution on human rights

koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · November 9, 2021

By Yonhap

Published : Nov 9, 2021 - 10:39 Updated : Nov 9, 2021 - 10:39

North Korean flag (Reuters-Yonhap)

North Korea on Tuesday slammed the European Union (EU) for leading a UN resolution condemning its human rights situation, calling the move an act of hostility based on "false and fabricated" documents.

The resolution, drafted by the European countries, was submitted to the United Nations' Third Committee for approval late last month. If passed, it will be put to a vote at the UN General Assembly in mid-December.

"We have long rejected this slanderous 'resolution' full of false and fabricated documents to blindly defame our human rights policy and situation," an official at a North Korea-EU association said in a commentary posted on the North's foreign ministry website.

North Korea has been bristling at accusations of its human rights violations, calling them a US-led attempt to topple its regime.

"The European countries with the worst records of human rights should do their job first, which is to deal with their own human rights trashes," the official added.

South Korea has taken part in the adoption process by consensus, not as a co-sponsor of the resolution, since 2019 amid efforts to resume inter-Korean talks and nuclear negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang. (Yonhap)

10. Military holds meeting of generals, admirals on defense reform, leadership

Excerpts:

Won called for the top military officers to work with a "sense of crisis," stressing uncertainty over the current security environment in the region is "greater than at any time," his office said in a press release.

"I expect this meeting to serve as an opportunity to envision a better future of our military that we can hand down to our future generations and take a new look at the leadership of generals that befits the current times," Won was quoted by his office as saying.

The participating generals and admirals discussed a wide range of issues, including a military buildup based on inter-service cooperation and the use of cutting-edge technologies for field operations, such as drones and artificial intelligence.

Military holds meeting of generals, admirals on defense reform, leadership | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · November 8, 2021

By Song Sang-ho

SEOUL, Nov. 8 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's military held an annual meeting of general-grade officers from all armed services via video links Monday to discuss defense reform, inter-service cooperation and other security issues, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said.

JCS Chairman Gen. Won In-choul and the top brass of the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps attended the Mugunghwa Meeting that the military has held since 1973 to discuss national security issues. Mugunghwa, the rose of Sharon in English, is the country's national flower.

The meeting came as South Korea's military is striving to maintain firm defense readiness following a series of North Korean missile launches in recent months, including the test-firing of a submarine-launched ballistic missile in October.

Monday's meeting took place as the military as a whole has been striving to stamp out rivalries among armed services and reinforce their cooperation in countering threats from all security domains, including space.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · November 8, 2021

11. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Infant deaths rampant due to medical collapse. Colds and diarrhea make them die quickly.

More indications of the horrendous suffering of the Korean people living in the north.

＜Inside N. Korea＞ Infant deaths rampant due to medical collapse. Colds and diarrhea make them die quickly.

asiapress.org

(Photo) Penicillin is produced in North Korea, which is in short supply, and there is a large amount of fake medicine on the market. Photographed by ASIAPRESS in April 2015.

◆ "Coronavirus Shutdown" Leads to Medicines Depletion

Since October, when the weather has become colder in North Korea, the number of infants dying from illnesses has increased. Imports of medicines from China have been stagnant since last year, and hospitals and health institutions are almost out of supplies and unable to treat them. "The situation is serious," several reporting partners in the northern region told us at the end of October. Although the authorities have been alerted to the situation, they cannot help due to the shortage of medicine (Kang Ji-won / ISHIMARU Jiro).

"Three children died in my neighbourhood in one week at the end of October. I found out that they were two boys and a girl, ages 3, 2, and 1. The deaths were due to whooping cough, influenza, and tuberculosis. With no medicines or vaccinations, old people and children are dying quickly from colds and diarrhoea."

Our reporting partner in Ryanggang Province described the situation in her neighbourhood in this way.

◆ No saline solution in the hospital.

The Kim Jong-un regime has severely restricted trade since February 2020 to block the influx of the coronavirus, and medicines have stopped coming in from China. In the spring, supplies became scarce, and the price of black-market sales skyrocketed. In the summer, most drugs disappeared from hospitals in provincial cities, leading to many deaths among the elderly.

Embassy of RUSSIA to the DPRK has let many of its staff leave the country since the beginning of this year, saying on its Facebook page that the reason is " a serious shortage of necessities, including medicine."

"There are no medicines in hospitals or pharmacies at this time. Not even saline solution. The medicines sold in the dark are costly. Although hospital visits are usually free of charge, doctors tell you to 'take medicine, get acupuncture, or try folk remedies.' Sometimes domestic medicines are sold, but the quality and efficacy are poor, and there are many fake medicines, so they cannot be trusted. Even if a child gets sick, there is nothing parents can do to help."

Another reporting partner explained the current situation of hospitals in Ryanggang Province. The economic downturn has drastically reduced the cash income of most people, and their nutritional status has deteriorated, lowering their immunity, and increasing the number of people suffering from colds, flu, typhoid, and tuberculosis.

The number of infant deaths has increased, and the authorities are getting tense.

"People's groups and schools are sending people from public health centres and hospitals to give hygiene lectures. However, the lectures are not very useful, as they only teach how to prevent colds or drink water after boiling it. Therefore, parents with children are still worried."

◆ North Korea Finally Accepts UN Aid

The North Korean government has refused to accept medical supplies from international organizations. This is because of the possibility of the coronavirus being carried on them (Only China and Russia have been accepted).

Finally, in October, the government allowed the WHO (World Health Organization) and other UN agencies to bring in relief supplies, although they were mainly coronavirus-related supplies.

On the other hand, North Korea has not stopped all trade. According to trade statistics released monthly by the General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China, North Korea's top import in September was cigarettes with a value of $2,105,253. It is unclear if it is medicines, but the item labelled "medicine" ranked 12th in imports, with a value of $485,128.

Kim Jong-un's regime has lost its ability. It has no apparent will to provide its people with vital public goods such as adequate nutrition, sanitation, health care, drinking water, and electricity. Health care is in a state of collapse. Such a state would be classified internationally as a "fragile state."

※ASIAPRESS contacts its reporting partners in North Korea through smuggled Chinese mobile phones.

asiapress.org

12. 23 U.S. reps get behind end-of-war declaration

This is troubling not so much for the action and the desire for peace of course but for the lack of understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime as well as the erroneous assumptions behind this effort. While absolutely supporting peace (and unification) on the Korean peninsula, One Korean Network (https://onekoreanetwork.com/) is in the process of completing an extensive monograph with 11 authors analyzing this bill. (Now we just have to finish the editing process!). We will make sure each of these 23 representatives get a personal copy of the monograph.

Tuesday

November 9, 2021

23 U.S. reps get behind end-of-war declaration

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2021/11/09/national/diplomacy/endofwar-declaration-US-House-of-Representatives-Joe-Biden/20211109162727585.html

A copy of a letter sent by a group of 23 lawmakers from the U.S. House of Representatives to President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Nov. 4, urging them to prioritize engagement with North Korea and aim for a formal declaration to end the1950-53 Korean War, shared by Democratic Rep. Brad Sherman of California on Twitter Monday. [TWITTER]

A group of 23 American lawmakers sent a letter to U.S. President Joe Biden urging him to "prioritize" engagement with North Korea and support a formal declaration to end the 1950-53 Korean War.

The letter dated Nov. 4 was addressed to Biden and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and called on them to work with South Korea to officially end the Korean War, which ended with an armistice agreement in June 1953 rather than a peace treaty, according to a press release by the office of Democratic Rep. Brad Sherman of California Monday.

"An official end to the state of war between North Korea, South Korea, and the United States is not a concession to North Korea," read the letter. "Rather, it is a vital step towards peace that serves the national interest of the United States and our allies alike."

The House lawmakers urged Biden and Blinken "to prioritize active diplomatic engagement with North Korea and South Korea with the goal of a binding peace agreement constituting a formal and final end to the state of war between North Korea, South Korea, and the United States."

The letter referred to President Moon Jae-in's proposal to formally declare an end to the Korean War in an address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York in September.

It also "applauded" the Biden administration's "support for the Singapore framework, which identifies peace on the Korean peninsula as an objective of any future negotiations between the United States and North Korea," referring to the agreement between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and former President Donald Trump signed in June 2018 in Singapore. North-U.S. denuclearization negotiations have been at a standstill since that summit collapsed, however.

The lawmakers conveyed their "deep sense of concern over continued tensions in the Korean Peninsula," but noted that "the state of war makes progress on the nuclear issue more difficult."

They added that the initiative was also for the sake of nearly 2 million American citizens of Korean descent.

"An official end to the state of war is a critical first step that allows South Korea to build the trust necessary to pursue critical U.S. and South Korean objectives, such as restarting stalled talks on denuclearization," said Sherman in a statement. "My colleagues and I urge the Biden administration to prioritize working with President Moon Jae-in on this critical step towards peace on the Korean peninsula."

Sherman, a member of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, has been an active voice in Congress on Korea-related issues, including co-sponsoring a Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act in May urging diplomatic engagement in pursuit of a binding peace agreement to formally end the Korean War. The bill was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Other signatories to the Nov. 4 letter included Reps. Andy Kim of New Jersey and Grace Meng of New York, also co-sponsors of the Korean Peninsula Act.

Sherman posted a signed copy of the letter on his Twitter account Monday, and wrote, "A mutual declaration ending the 1950 state of war between the United States, South Korea and North Korea is not a concession to Pyongyang – it's a vital step towards peace."

The Korean American Public Action Committee, a California-based activist group, confirmed the sending of the letter to Biden Monday.

Amid multiple rounds of discussions between South Korean and U.S. officials on Seoul's end-of-war proposal in recent weeks, there are questions as to whether the two allies are on the same page on the issue.

When asked if the U.S. agrees to an end-of-war proposal, Ned Price, spokesman for the State Department, avoided a direct answer and replied in a briefing Monday, "We see eye-to-eye with our South Korean counterparts that achieving a complete denuclearization and lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and diplomacy is the best and the most effective course."

On Oct. 26, U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan admitted that Seoul and Washington may have "somewhat different perspectives on the precise sequence or timing or conditions for different steps," referring to the end-of-war declaration.

The Biden administration, while open to humanitarian cooperation with the North, has been adamant about not backing down from sanctions on the regime. In turn, the North has conducted a series of missile tests since September, including a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) last month.

Daniel Kritenbrink, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, will visit Seoul this week amid speculation that he may discuss the end-of-war declaration issue with South Korean officials.

Daniel Kritenbrink

Price said the North's "ballistic missile and nuclear program will certainly be on the table [during Kritenbrink's visit], as will our strategy to advance the prospects for the complete and total denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."

John Kirby, spokesman for the U.S. Defense Department, said in a press briefing Monday that despite the Biden administration's diplomatic overtures, "To date, there has been no interest shown by Pyongyang to move in that direction, and that's regrettable."

He said the international community would like to see China use its sway with Pyongyang in a "constructive way" and "put some bite into the sanctions that are already in place under the UN Security Council" to steer North Korea to dialogue.

Kritenbrink, making his first trip to Asia since taking on the post in September, arrives in Seoul Wednesday after a four-day trip to Tokyo.

The State Department said his trip will "emphasize the importance of bilateral and trilateral cooperation" among the United States, Japan, and South Korea to "promote peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and beyond."

However, Japan has different priorities in regard to North Korea issues. Takehiro Funakoshi, director general of the Asia Pacific and Oceania bureau at the Japanese Foreign Ministry, expressed objection to Moon's end-of-war proposal in talks with South Korean top nuclear envoy Noh Kyu-duk on Oct. 19 in Washington, calling it "premature," reported Japan's Kyodo News Agency Saturday, citing diplomatic sources. Japanese Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihiko Isozaki did not confirm or deny the report Monday.

During his three-day trip to South Korea, Kritenbrink will hold talks with Yeo Seung-bae, Seoul's deputy foreign minister for political affairs, and other senior officials. Kritenbrink is also expected to meet with South Korean presidential candidates during the visit.

Lee Jae-myung, the presidential candidate of the ruling Democratic Party (DP), will meet with Kritenbrink Thursday, confirmed DP officials.

BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]

13. 'US waits for next South Korean government over China issue'

The headline of course is speculation by Korean commentators and not the US official position of course. And of course this speculation is driven by the Assistant Secretary's background and expertise and the plans (if accurate) that he intends to meet with presidential candidates.

Of course if this was the official US government position we would be ceding influence to China. We cannot "wait" for new administrations to emerge when there are very real issues that are 25 meter targets. Of course this is in the back of people's minds but we cannot just put alliance issues with China on hold.

Excerpts:

Although it is not known yet why Kritenbrink is seeking to meet the presidential candidates, it is regarded as quite exceptional for a U.S. official to meet the candidates openly, given that six months are still left in the Moon Jae-in administration's term, which will end in May next year, according to diplomatic observers.

"As Kritenbrink is a key figure in the Biden administration regarding regional matters, his meetings with the presidential candidates, with Moon still remaining in office, indicates the U.S. policy direction is to prepare for the next South Korean government, while seeking to maintain the status quo with the current administration," said Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University.

Park said Kritenbrink was seeking to meet the candidates even though the U.S. was well aware of how the event will be interpreted.

"The assistant secretary is a China expert and the Biden administration's priority is to curb China's global influence, but the current South Korean government is not actively engaged in the U.S.-led anti-China alliance. In that sense, the meetings between Kritenbrink and the presidential candidates are delivering a message that the U.S. cares about who will be in power here during its campaign against Beijing," he said.

'US waits for next South Korean government over China issue'

The Korea Times · November 9, 2021

By Kang Seung-woo

Unusual meetings scheduled for the U.S. diplomat in charge of East Asia policy and the presidential candidates of South Korea's two main political parties are offering a hint that the Joe Biden administration is waiting for the next government to be installed here before discussing bilateral issues, including containing China.

Daniel Kritenbrink / Korea Times fileAssistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Daniel Kritenbrink, who arrives in Seoul Wednesday, will have separate talks with Lee Jae-myung, the presidential candidate of the ruling Democratic Party of Korea, and Yoon Seok-youl of the main opposition People Power Party, Thursday and Friday, respectively, according to the parties.

Along with the meetings, the American diplomat will also meet with his South Korean counterpart and other senior officials here to discuss North Korea and other regional issues.

Although it is not known yet why Kritenbrink is seeking to meet the presidential candidates, it is regarded as quite exceptional for a U.S. official to meet the candidates openly, given that six months are still left in the Moon Jae-in administration's term, which will end in May next year, according to diplomatic observers.

"As Kritenbrink is a key figure in the Biden administration regarding regional matters, his meetings with the presidential candidates, with Moon still remaining in office, indicates the U.S. policy direction is to prepare for the next South Korean government, while seeking to maintain the status quo with the current administration," said Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University.

Park said Kritenbrink was seeking to meet the candidates even though the U.S. was well aware of how the event will be interpreted.

"The assistant secretary is a China expert and the Biden administration's priority is to curb China's global influence, but the current South Korean government is not actively engaged in the U.S.-led anti-China alliance. In that sense, the meetings between Kritenbrink and the presidential candidates are delivering a message that the U.S. cares about who will be in power here during its campaign against Beijing," he said.

Ahead of the presidential election in 2017, Joseph Yun, then U.S. special representative for North Korea policy, visited Seoul and held back-to-back talks with then presidential hopefuls or their aides.

However, things are currently different from four years ago, Park noted.

"At the time, South Korea was embroiled in an impeachment saga, while North Korea was staging a series of provocative actions. But currently, the situation on the Korean Peninsula is being managed stably," he said.

Although North Korea has test-fired newly developed missiles since September, it is not expected to "act out of line" by launching an intercontinental ballistic missile.

"In addition, Yun was an official in charge of North Korea issues, but Kritenbrink's main job is to contain China, so coming here to meet the presidential candidates is exceptional," Park added.

Along with the China issue, the allies have differing views on declaring a formal end to the Korean War, which was proposed by President Moon in September.

The Korea Times · November 9, 2021

14. What’s behind the emergence of Kim Jong-un-ism?

Good comments from each of the interviewees below.

What’s behind the emergence of Kim Jong-un-ism?

koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · November 9, 2021

Kim’s confidence in power, achievements

Pyongyang’s initiative to establish a distinct ideology is also a manifestation of Kim Jong-un’s confidence in his achievements.

“In some ways, the emergence of Kim Jong-un-ism is also a congratulatory gesture to Kim Jong-un for having not only survived as Pyongyang’s leader, but also exceeded the expectations of the international community,” said Soo Kim, a policy analyst at the Rand Corp. and a former CIA analyst.

“This may also mean an even more emboldened Kim Jong-un.”

Cheong Seong-chang, director of the Center for North Korean Studies at the Sejong Institute, echoed similar views, saying Kim Jong-un-ism is a sign that Kim Jong-un is secure in his role.

“During his initial period in office, it was onerous for Kim Jong-un to suggest a ruling ideology that is discrete from the ones presented during the era of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.”

When Kim Jong-un inherited control in December 2011 after the sudden death of his father, he was largely overshadowed by his predecessors. The following year, the Kim Jong-un regime presented “Kim Il-sung-ism and Kim Jong-il-ism” as the sole “guiding ideology” of the Workers’ Party of Korea.

“The completion of the state nuclear force in 2017 raised his authority within the North Korean leadership and served as an opportunity for Kim Jong-un to make a complete escape from the halo of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il,” Cheong said, adding that the completion of the nuclear force was a watershed for his leadership.

Why now? Economic challenges, expanded information access

Kim Jong-un-ism comes in time for the 10th anniversary of his ascension to power. But economic challenges have heightened the need to ramp up ideological campaigns to bolster Kim’s rule.

Gause, of CNA, raised the possibility that Kim Jong-un-ism is “tied to the legitimacy question which is under assault because of the failure in the economic plans.”

Kim Jong-un needs to play his cards right if he is to show his country that he is competent and has the right vision. Missteps in nuclear negotiations and the lack of economic progress have implications for his legitimacy.

The emergence of Kim Jong-un-ism could be linked to his goal of refocusing on economic growth while pulling away from or at least scaling back the country’s nuclear and missile programs.

“In order to do that without taking a major hit in terms of his legitimacy, he needs to have some other ideological elements that will mitigate the fallout of that shift because he will still be dealing with an economy that is heavily challenged,” Gause said.

Kim Jong-un-ism is also connected to the need to firm up ideological indoctrination and information, says Lee of the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security.

According to Lee, Pyongyang sees a need to “solidify Kim Jong-un’s monolithic ruling system as it has become difficult to control the people’s thoughts amid the deepening of informatization.”

In a broader context, North Korea has stepped up its large-scale nationwide ideological campaign to wipe out “non-socialist and anti-socialist practices” since the eighth Party Congress this January.

People-first, state-first principles

Still, Pyongyang appears to be in the stage of fleshing out Kim Jong-un-ism. It is likely to embrace the long-established Kim Il-sung-ism and Kim Jong-il-ism, demonstrate Kim Jong-un’s achievements, and bespeak his outstanding leadership as differentiated from that of his predecessors.

Experts also shared the view that the core ideas of Kim Jong-un-ism are the people-first and state-first principles.

“The people-first principle is suitable for winning the hearts of the public, given that it highlights the people as the main agents of the revolution,” Lee said, explaining that Pyongyang also added on the concept of patriotism by proposing the state-first principle.

“That is, this is the logic that people recompense the leader’s pursuit for love for the people with patriotism,” Lee said.

In addition, experts say Pyongyang could use Kim Jong-un-ism to appease the people amid the economic downturn.

“The underlying intention is to soothe antipathy toward the leader that could arise in the face of the prolonged COVID-19 pandemic and economic sanctions by highlighting Kim Jong-un as a people-friendly leader,” Kwak said, adding that the ideology could also be exploited to shift responsibility to party and government officials.

Mark Tokola, vice president of the Korea Economic Institute of America, said Kim Jong-un-ism, likely centered on the people-first principle, is the leader’s policy choice rather than a means to his ideological ends.

Tokola dismissed the view that Kim Jong-un was creating a distinctive ideology or modifying the eponymous Kim Il-sung-ism and Kim Jong-il-ism.

“Kim Jong-un’s rhetoric and motivations are now the same as those of any dictator trying to stay in power,” Tokola told The Korea Herald.

But in the long run, Kim’s emphasis on the people-first principle could jeopardize the regime’s survival, which has been the top priority of the Kim family.

“I would agree that he is putting the regime’s long-term survival at risk by saying that its purpose is to improve the lives of the North Korean people,” Tokola said. “If he fails to do that, it would undermine the regime’s legitimacy.”

By Ji Da-gyum (dagyumji@heraldcorp.com)

koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · November 9, 2021

15. Seoul monitoring signs of N. Korea's border reopening amid reports of train operation

The Korean people in the north need a safety valve.

Seoul monitoring signs of N. Korea's border reopening amid reports of train operation | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 최수향 · November 9, 2021

By Choi Soo-hyang

SEOUL, Nov. 9 (Yonhap) -- South Korea is closely monitoring signs of North Korea's reopening of its border long closed due to the coronavirus, a unification ministry official said Tuesday, amid reports a train in operation was spotted in the region bordering China.

Local media broadcast footage of a train crossing the bridge over the Amnok River connecting Sinuiju in North Korea to the Chinese port city of Dandong on Monday, saying it appears to be a test operation ahead of an imminent border reopening.

Yet, Seoul's unification ministry remained cautious to say whether the train in the footage actually ran from the North to China.

"The government has been closely monitoring related moves on the basis of the assessment that the preparations to resume train operations between North Korea and China are in their final stage," the official told reporters on background. "But it's hard to predict exactly when the operations will resume as consultations between North Korea and China should be wrapped up first."

The official said the government will continue monitoring other signs before making a conclusion on the North's reopening of its land routes.

South Korea's National Intelligence Service said last month the North was in talks with China and Russia to resume train operations across the border and those connecting Sinuiju and Dandong could resume as early as in November.

The North has recently reopened its sea routes to receive international organizations' medical supplies and other goods necessary for its citizens, following the prolonged lockdown, which is believed to have taken a toll on its economy already hit by crippling sanctions.

scaaet@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 최수향 · November 9, 2021

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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