Quotes of the Day:

As we reflect on D-Day, please take 15 minutes to watch this film and reflect on the contributions of the OSS: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OqD5UDNuANE

“This powerful film tells the story of allied special forces whose daring exploits changed the course of World War II and helped save the world from tyranny. Their courage and sacrifice deserve our eternal gratitude.”

- Leon Panetta

"I know you won't believe me, but the highest form of human excellence is to question oneself and others."

- Socrates

"As long as you live, keep learning how to live."

- Seneca

1. A Gold Star mom suggested Fort Liberty as the new name for Fort Bragg

2. Austin Talks Uncertainties of War as Ukraine Prepares Counteroffensive

3. USMC Force Design 2030 Annual Update June 2023

4. Austin Talks Uncertainties of War as Ukraine Prepares Counteroffensive

5. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 5, 2023

6. What is Russia’s Strategy in Ukraine?

7. At Normandy D-Day celebrations, echoes of Ukraine’s looming fight

8. Ukraine Conflict Update - June 6, 2023 | SOF News

9. What we know about Nova Kakhovka dam attack

10. Wagner mercenaries capture Russian brigade commander

11. 'The Torch of Freedom:' Remarks by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Commemorating 79 Years Since D-Day (As Prepared)

12. Army Wants Confederate Names Gone from National Ranger Memorial. Retired Soldiers Object

13. Ukraine Conflict Update - June 6, 2023 | SOF News

14. As Army Chief McConville Prepares To Depart, His Service Is In Its Best Shape In Decades

15. Marine Corps pushes ‘dramatic change’ for its reconnaissance forces

16. Opinion | Sunday’s sonic boom was the sound of a system that’s working

17. The Pentagon is to blame for industrial base failures​

​18. ​The Debt Deal’s Defense Threat

19. Defend ‘every inch’ of NATO territory? New strategy is a work in progress.

20. Destruction of Ukraine Dam Floods Front Line, Scrambling Battle Plans

21. What are disinformation and extremism? And why should troops be aware?

22. A Sanctuary No Longer? Examining the Defense Department’s Prioritization of the Homeland

23. 6 Swing States Will Decide the Future of Geopolitics

24. A Convocation of Spies

25. How to Read Xi Jinping​: ​Is China Really Preparing for War?

26. Ground Rules for the Age of AI Warfare

27. Why Marcos Jr is poking and not appeasing China

​28. ​Remembering D-Day: Key facts and figures about epochal World War II invasion

1. A Gold Star mom suggested Fort Liberty as the new name for Fort Bragg

I am now fully on board with Fort Liberty. I will never again question the decision. We are honoring a fallen soldier and Gold Star Mother.

A Gold Star mom suggested Fort Liberty as the new name for Fort Bragg

“Liberty is the cause he was fighting for," said Patti Elliott, whose son Lucas was killed in Basra in 2011.

BY MATT WHITE | PUBLISHED JUN 2, 2023 5:27 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Matt White · June 2, 2023

Army Lt. Gen. Christopher Donahue saluted a flag detail, strode to a nearby podium and spoke his first words as the commander of the Army’s newest renamed post.

“Welcome to Fort Liberty,” Donahue told an assembled crowd Friday morning.”The center of the universe.”

With a short on-base ceremony punctuated by a 15-gun artillery volley and the unfurling of a new post flag, Fort Bragg officially became Fort Liberty on Friday.

Though the crowd on hand for the ceremony included generals, admirals and command sgt. majors in tailored and heavily-badged uniforms, Donahue made clear that the name “Liberty” owed its origin to a woman seated in the front row, Patti Elliott, who wore a simple white dress.

White is the color Gold Star mothers traditionally wear to honor their fallen children.

It was Elliott, Donahue and other officials said Friday, that had inspired the name Liberty to replace Bragg as the post’s namesake when many associated with the base lobbied for competing names.

“What Patti did is, she made us raise our vision and become more conscious of who we really are,” Donahue said. “It is about liberty. This is about America. This is about what we all stand up for. It took a Gold Star mom for all of us to get out of those silos and do what is right.”

A Patriotic Son

Patti’s son, Spc. Daniel “Lucas” Elliott, was a 21-year-old Military Police Officer when he was killed July 15, 2011 in an improvised explosive device attack in Basra, Iraq.

“He was always very patriotic,” Elliott told Task & Purpose Friday. “He had tattoos of American flags. Liberty is the cause he was fighting for and that everyone on this base fights for.”

An Eagle Scout and competitive rifle marksman, Lucas left high school a semester early to enlist in the Army Reserves, joining the 805th Military Police Company in Cary, North Carolina. The 2011 deployment was Lucas’ second to Basra.

Army Spc. Daniel “Lucas” Elliott was killed in 2011 in Basra. “Liberty is what he fought for,” said his mother, Patti, when suggesting the name to replace Fort Bragg. Photo courtesy Patti Elliott.

“Their first deployment had been a relatively safe deployment. They didn’t lose anybody,” Patti said. “I blame that for why he was in the lead vehicle in the convoy. Because he knew the streets and he knew the routes. And so he was valuable to his team to be in that first first vehicle.”

During a movement through the city, a cell-phone activated device shot a projectile into Lucas’ vehicle.

“It was his time,” Patti said.

The Key Meeting

In the years after Lucas’ death, Patti threw herself into Gold Star organizations. By 2021, she was the president of the North Carolina chapter of American Gold Star Mothers and served on the Army’s survivor advisory working group.

It was those roles that led to Elliott joining the Naming Commission Community Forum, a group of North Carolina-based officials formed in 2021 to nominate a locally preferred name to federal officials — if one could be agreed on.

Liberty was not among 87 initial “finalist” names released in early 2021 by The Naming Commission, the federal body charged in 2021 with finding new names for nine Army bases named for Confederate generals. The list did include several soldiers with deep ties to Fort Bragg who had received the Medal of Honor, including: Delta Force operators Master Sgt. Gary Gordon and Sgt. 1st Class Randy Shughart, who were killed during the Battle of Mogadishu while defending the crash site of a Black Hawk helicopter; Master Sgt. Roy Benavidez, a Green Beret medic in Vietnam who fought so savagely during a six hour battle that a US doctor who recovered him thought he was dead; and Sgt. Alvin York, who led a World War I trench raid with a handful of soldiers and captured over 130 German soldiers.

Patti Elliott walks with Lt. Gen. Chris Donahue, the commander of Fort Liberty, on June 1 in the inaugural Sunset Liberty March. Army photo by Spc. Omar Joseph.

But “Liberty” began to emerge, officials said Friday, after Elliott spoke emotionally during a commission meeting at the base’s Iron Mike Conference Center in the summer of 2021.

As the meeting dragged on, officials said Friday, advocates for different soldiers made their case, but none seemed ready to compromise and no clear favorite emerged. Then Elliott spoke up.

“I’m not one to keep quiet,” she said Friday. “I said, with all due respect, I appreciate everyone had their special interest group that they were representing and that’s exactly what they were there to do, is advance their cause and I totally got that. But as each one spoke they were leaving out this one, or that one, or the one over here, or the one still to come.”

Though the names of soldiers were usually associated with on-base units like the 82nd Airborne Division or Special Forces, Elliott said, “Liberty” was at the heart of all of Fort Bragg’s missions.

“There had to be a way that we could include everyone and make it significant for those who have come before and those who will come in the future to make the legacy that we are building now,” Elliott said Friday.

From that meeting forward, Liberty quickly emerged as the leading candidate, said fellow commission member, retired Army Gen. Dan McNeill, a former commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan.

“She carried the day,” said McNeill.

Of the Naming Commission’s 87 early names, 85 were people, one a geographic location and one a “value”: Courage. Liberty, Elliott told Task & Purpose Friday, essentially occurred to her on the fly.

“It kinda tumbled out of my mouth,” she said with a laugh.

The latest on Task & Purpose

• Navy destroyer USS John Finn’s commanding officer fired
• Navy destroyer USS John Finn’s executive officer fired along with ship’s captain
• The long journey home for a Marine veteran killed in Ukraine
• A Norwegian airline is banking on USS Gerald R Ford sailors having lots of unprotected sex
• Stolen valor and ‘homeless veterans’: Inside a failed hoax

taskandpurpose.com · by Matt White · June 2, 2023

2. Austin Talks Uncertainties of War as Ukraine Prepares Counteroffensive

Austin Talks Uncertainties of War as Ukraine Prepares Counteroffensive

https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3417229/austin-talks-uncertainties-of-war-as-ukraine-prepares-counteroffensive/

June 5, 2023 | By Jim Garamone , DOD News |   

The Ukrainian military is prepared for a counteroffensive against the Russian invaders, but this is war and supporters of Kyiv must be ready for the long haul, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III said yesterday.War is uncertain, Austin said. "Anybody that thinks they can accurately produce any type of outcome in a war, … have another think coming to them, because … it doesn't happen that way," the secretary said to reporters in Singapore. "There will be stops and starts. There will be things that happen that [the] Ukrainians didn't anticipate. There will be opportunities for the Ukrainians to exploit."

There is no certainty in war, and all those who support Ukraine in its existential fight need to be prepared to continue to support Ukraine "for as long as it takes," he said.

Allies understand this uncertainty and recognize that support to Ukraine could be required much longer than anyone anticipated, Austin said. The secretary spoke to reporters at the Shangri-La Dialogue.

Ukraine has been preparing for a counteroffensive against the Russian troops that invaded their country. "Our goal has been to provide them with the capability so that they have an opportunity to be successful," the secretary said.

Ukraine has been remarkably successful in combating the Russian military, which has more troops and more equipment. The Ukrainian military has "managed to really inflict significant damage on Russian forces and destroyed a lot of their equipment" he said.

The aid Ukraine has received allowed the country to create nine additional motorized and mechanized brigades to add to its combat power. "It will make a difference," he said. "In addition to that, we trained an additional three brigades to serve as reserve or follow-on forces. Those brigades are now in Ukraine as well, so that's a total of 12 brigades."

Even as preparations for a counteroffensive continue, nations opposed to Russia's invasion continue training and equipping Ukrainian forces. "But what I convey to our colleagues in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group is, this doesn't end when [Ukrainian forces] cross the line of departure."

Countries need to be ready to provide further support to "continue to help them maintain and I think everybody has that mindset," Austin said. "Everybody's hopeful that you'll see overwhelming success, but … I think most people have a realistic outlook on this."

Austin said what really matters is what the Ukrainian leaders feel, and he believes Ukrainian leaders are "increasingly confident in the capabilities that they have and opportunities that they may have," he said.

Spotlight: Support for Ukraine 

3. USMC Force Design 2030 Annual Update June 2023

The 16 page document can be downloaded here: https://t.co/Z0L7ZA6SE1

Force Design 2030 Annual Update June 2023

INTRODUCTION 

Today, the Marine Corps is better prepared to serve as a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness and operate inside actively contested maritime spaces in support of joint campaigns. While our continued experimentation and learning will undoubtedly uncover additional refinements to improve our force, we are confident our collective efforts will result in a Marine Corps organized, trained, and equipped to meet the global challenges of the 21st century. 

In last year’s Force Design 2030 Annual Update, we traced the genesis of Force Design 2030 (FD2030) from its roots in the 31st Commandant’s Hunter Warrior (1997) and Urban Warrior (1999) experiments, to the 33rd Commandant’s Concept for Distributed Operations (2005), to the 37th Commandant’s testimony (2019) about our need for modernization. In addition to the observations of previous Commandants, FD2030 was informed by numerous wargames and the directions contained in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which were reinforced and expanded in the 2022 National Defense Strategy. These milestones shaped our approach to keeping pace with the changing character of the operating environment. 

This report describes FD2030’s progress to date and directs follow-on actions for the next 12-24 months. We have made significant progress in both the design and delivery of the future force since initiating action in 2019 and are seeing tangible results from our modernization efforts today. The collective efforts of thousands of Marines across the combat development enterprise and Fleet Marine Force (FMF) have resulted in a Marine Corps that remains the premiere expeditionary, combined arms, and global crisis-response force. The Marine Corps, today, is capable of standing-in, alongside allies and partners, within reach of adversary weapon systems; denying the land, air, or maritime domains to an adversary; expanding maritime domain awareness for the fleet and combatant commanders; and seizing and defending key maritime terrain globally. We can now sense, makes sense, and act more rapidly than before, further expanding our advantage with maneuver warfare.

4. Austin Talks Uncertainties of War as Ukraine Prepares Counteroffensive

Austin Talks Uncertainties of War as Ukraine Prepares Counteroffensive

https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3417229/austin-talks-uncertainties-of-war-as-ukraine-prepares-counteroffensive/

June 5, 2023 | By Jim Garamone , DOD News |   

The Ukrainian military is prepared for a counteroffensive against the Russian invaders, but this is war and supporters of Kyiv must be ready for the long haul, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III said yesterday.War is uncertain, Austin said. "Anybody that thinks they can accurately produce any type of outcome in a war, … have another think coming to them, because … it doesn't happen that way," the secretary said to reporters in Singapore. "There will be stops and starts. There will be things that happen that [the] Ukrainians didn't anticipate. There will be opportunities for the Ukrainians to exploit."

There is no certainty in war, and all those who support Ukraine in its existential fight need to be prepared to continue to support Ukraine "for as long as it takes," he said.

Allies understand this uncertainty and recognize that support to Ukraine could be required much longer than anyone anticipated, Austin said. The secretary spoke to reporters at the Shangri-La Dialogue.

Ukraine has been preparing for a counteroffensive against the Russian troops that invaded their country. "Our goal has been to provide them with the capability so that they have an opportunity to be successful," the secretary said.

Ukraine has been remarkably successful in combating the Russian military, which has more troops and more equipment. The Ukrainian military has "managed to really inflict significant damage on Russian forces and destroyed a lot of their equipment" he said.

The aid Ukraine has received allowed the country to create nine additional motorized and mechanized brigades to add to its combat power. "It will make a difference," he said. "In addition to that, we trained an additional three brigades to serve as reserve or follow-on forces. Those brigades are now in Ukraine as well, so that's a total of 12 brigades."

Even as preparations for a counteroffensive continue, nations opposed to Russia's invasion continue training and equipping Ukrainian forces. "But what I convey to our colleagues in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group is, this doesn't end when [Ukrainian forces] cross the line of departure."

Countries need to be ready to provide further support to "continue to help them maintain and I think everybody has that mindset," Austin said. "Everybody's hopeful that you'll see overwhelming success, but … I think most people have a realistic outlook on this."

Austin said what really matters is what the Ukrainian leaders feel, and he believes Ukrainian leaders are "increasingly confident in the capabilities that they have and opportunities that they may have," he said.

Spotlight: Support for Ukraine 

5. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 5, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2023

Key Takeaways

• Russian and Ukrainian officials are signaling the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.
• Ukrainian forces conducted limited successful offensives north and southwest of Bakhmut.
• The pro-Ukrainian all-Russian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) claimed that it continues to operate in a Russian border settlement in Belgorod Oblast as of June 5.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Chechen forces are ready to defend against raids in Belgorod Oblast, likely partially in order to keep his forces out of combat in Ukraine.
• The Russian Black Sea Fleet is attempting to mitigate complications with logistical support in occupied Crimea by shifting resources to mainland Russia.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is continuing efforts to exacerbate the divide between the Wagner Group and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
• Russian milbloggers responded to the video of Lieutenant Colonel Venevitin with concern, indicating that several prominent pro-war voices are becoming increasingly concerned over the ramifications of the Wagner-MoD divide.
• Russian forces reportedly conducted unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force operations northeast of Kharkiv City and continued limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued limited offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts and made further limited tactical gains.
• Ukrainian forces continue to target rear Russian positions throughout southern Ukraine.
• Iran has allegedly signed contracts with Russia for about $1.74 million in ammunition for Russia to use in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian sources and Belarusian sources indicated that Belarus has been involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 5, 2023

Jun 5, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 5, 2023

Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, and Fredrick W. Kagan

June 5, 2023, 8pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2pm ET on June 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian and Ukrainian officials are signaling the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. ISW offers no assessment of these signals at this time. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 5 that Ukrainian forces conducted a “large-scale offensive” across five sectors of the frontline in southwestern Donetsk Oblast on June 4.[1] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled all Ukrainian attacks and assigned Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov to oversee the southwestern Donetsk frontline.[2] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar noted on June 5 that Ukrainian forces are “transferring to offensive actions” in some unspecified areas of the front.[3] Malyar added that Russian sources are actively spreading information about the Ukrainian counteroffensive to deflect attention from Russian losses in the Bakhmut direction. The Russian MoD’s claims that Russian forces immediately repelled Ukrainian counteroffensives are consistent with previous false Russian claims made during past counteroffensives. Ukrainian forces are likely making limited gains despite Russian denials. ISW will not attempt to assess at this time whether or not these gains are part of broader counter-offensive operations. ISW observed an increase in combat activity in different sectors of the frontline but will not speculate about the intent, weight, or focus of Ukrainian counteroffensives operations.[4] A successful counteroffensive operation may take days, weeks, or even months before its outcome becomes fully clear, during which time Russian sources may falsely claim to have defeated it.

Ukrainian forces made limited advances north and southwest of Bakhmut on June 5. Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces are conducting offensive operations on the eastern front in the Bakhmut area and advanced 200 to 1,600 meters in the direction of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), and 100 to 700 meters near Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut) and Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[5] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that mechanized Ukrainian forces also advanced from 300 meters to one kilometer in the direction of Zaliznyanske (13km north of Bakhmut) and Bohdanivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut).[6] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky thanked the Ukrainian forces in the Bakhmut direction for “moving forward” in their areas of responsibility on June 5.[7] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Ukrainian forces captured an unspecified part of Berkhivka (6km north of Bakhmut) and criticized the Russian military command for previously withdrawing Russian forces from the Berkhivksy Reservoir on May 12 to protect their positions in the settlement.[8] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults in the direction of Soledar (12km northeast of Bakhmut), likely referring to the wider area north and northeast of Bakhmut.[9] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces fought Ukrainian forces near Rozdolivka (19km northeast of Bakhmut).[10] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also attacked Russian positions in an unspecified location in the Siversk (31km northeast of Bakhmut) area.[11] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian assault near Mayorsk (21km southwest of Bakhmut) and north of Horlivka (26km south of Bakhmut).[12] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Ukrainian advances in the Bakhmut associated with these limited offensives on June 5.

The pro-Ukrainian all-Russian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) claimed that it continues to operate in a Russian border settlement in Belgorod Oblast as of June 5. Geolocated footage published on June 5 shows the RDK personnel operating in Novaya Tavolzhanka (a small settlement about 3km from the Kharkiv-Belgorod Oblast border).[13] The Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR), which conducted a raid into Belgorod Oblast with the RDK, published footage purportedly showing LSR forces striking Russian tanks and armored vehicles near the Shebekino checkpoint, about 7km northeast of Novaya Tavolzhanka.[14] The Russian MoD claimed on June 5 that Russian forces and the Russian Border Guard Service repelled two attacks near Novaya Tavolzhanka on June 4, but did not respond to the RDK’s claim that RDK personnel still operate in the settlement.[15]

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Chechen forces are ready to defend against raids in Belgorod Oblast, likely in part to keep his forces out of combat in Ukraine. Kadyrov claimed on June 5 that he has 70,000 Chechen servicemen serving in unspecified formations in the Russian military who could defend against the raids into Belgorod Oblast due to their extensive anti-terrorism training.[16] Kadyrov notably stated that the Russian “Commander-in-Chief” – implying Russian President Vladimir Putin – “knows better,” but that Kadyrov wanted to “remind” everyone that Chechen units could have dealt with ”terrorists who invaded Belgorod Oblast.” Kadyrov’s suggestion for Chechen forces to operate in Belgorod Oblast follows Putin‘s order deploying Chechen units to areas along the Donetsk frontline on May 31.[17] Kadyrov’s rhetorical shift towards suggesting that Chechen forces get involved in Belgorod Oblast may suggest a desire to preserve his forces from engaging in combat in more challenging sectors of the front.[18] ISW previously assessed that Kadyrov appeared to have been conserving forces and did not deploy forces to participate in large-scale offensive operations since summer 2022.[19] Kadyrov previously claimed on May 26 that 7,000 Chechen servicemen are operating in Ukraine.[20] If Kadyrov’s claims are close to accurate, only about 10 percent of available Chechen forces are serving in Ukraine, but his statements are impossible to verify.

The Russian Black Sea Fleet is attempting to mitigate complications with logistical support in occupied Crimea by shifting resources to mainland Russia. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk reported on June 5 that Russian forces are transferring the Black Sea Fleet’s logistics centers from Sevastopol, occupied Crimea, to Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai.[21] Humenyuk stated that Russian forces are moving the logistics centers because of widespread logistical and ammunition provision issues in occupied Crimea.[22] Humenyuk noted that Russian amphibious ships are continuing to maneuver in the Black Sea and enter Sevastopol, but that the overall center of gravity of the Black Sea Fleet appears to be shifting towards Novorossiysk.[23] Recent strikes on Russian concentration areas, logistics hubs, and transportation assets in southern Ukraine may be causing increased anxiety over the security of the Black Sea Fleet, and the move to Krasnodar Krai is likely in part reflective of this fact.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is continuing efforts to exacerbate the divide between the Wagner Group and the Russian MoD. Prigozhin’s press service published a video on June 4 showing a Wagner fighter interrogating a Russian soldier who identified himself as Lieutenant Colonel Roman Venevitin of the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Army Corps).[24] Venevitin admitted on camera that he ordered his unit to fire on a Wagner vehicle while intoxicated due to his own “personal animosity” towards Wagner.[25] Venevitin appeared to have sustained facial injuries during the time of his capture by Wagner.[26] Prigozhin also claimed that Wagner personnel engaged in a small skirmish with Russian MoD personnel in Semihirya (15km southeast of Bakhmut) on May 17 after the MoD personnel fired on Wagner fighters when they tried to stop the MoD personnel from laying mines in Wagner’s rear.[27] As ISW has previously assessed, Prigozhin continues to inject such anti-MoD narratives into the Russian information space in order to retain his status in the information space following the culmination of Wagner’s Bakhmut offensive and Wagner’s withdrawal from combat in Ukraine.[28] The suggestion that units operating under the Russian MoD are actively firing on Wagner while intoxicated strengthens Prigozhin’s argument that the Russian MoD is a combat-ineffective and somewhat nefarious force.

Russian milbloggers responded to the video of Lieutenant Colonel Venevitin with concern, indicating that several prominent pro-war voices are becoming increasingly concerned over the ramifications of the Wagner-MoD divide. One prominent milblogger called for Venevitin to be tried by the military prosecutor’s office, which would be normal practice in such cases, but noted that the Wagner-MoD conflict “continues to be unhealthy.”[29] Another milblogger who claimed to have personally spoken to Wagner commanders accused both Wagner and MoD units of not knowing what they are fighting for and all of trying to outcompete each other to be “heroes.”[30] Former Russian officer and prominent critical milblogger Igor Girkin noted that the video of Venevitin is another step towards “troubles” regardless of the circumstances of the incident and that Prigozhin is provoking an open war between units ostensibly on the same side of the war.[31] As Prigozhin continues his efforts to maintain informational relevance his rhetorical charades will likely further deepen the divide between the MoD and Wagner, thus hindering the overall combat-effectiveness of both forces and additionally generating increasing discontent in the information space that used to back him.

Key Takeaways

• Russian and Ukrainian officials are signaling the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.
• Ukrainian forces conducted limited successful offensives north and southwest of Bakhmut.
• The pro-Ukrainian all-Russian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) claimed that it continues to operate in a Russian border settlement in Belgorod Oblast as of June 5.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Chechen forces are ready to defend against raids in Belgorod Oblast, likely partially in order to keep his forces out of combat in Ukraine.
• The Russian Black Sea Fleet is attempting to mitigate complications with logistical support in occupied Crimea by shifting resources to mainland Russia.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is continuing efforts to exacerbate the divide between the Wagner Group and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
• Russian milbloggers responded to the video of Lieutenant Colonel Venevitin with concern, indicating that several prominent pro-war voices are becoming increasingly concerned over the ramifications of the Wagner-MoD divide.
• Russian forces reportedly conducted unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force operations northeast of Kharkiv City and continued limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued limited offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts and made further limited tactical gains.
• Ukrainian forces continue to target rear Russian positions throughout southern Ukraine.
• Iran has allegedly signed contracts with Russia for about $1.74 million in ammunition for Russia to use in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian sources and Belarusian sources indicated that Belarus has been involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces reportedly conducted unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force operations northeast of Kharkiv City on June 5. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group unsuccessfully attempted to cross the Russian border into Ukraine near Zelene (34km northeast of Kharkiv City).[32]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove) and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[33] Russian milbloggers also claimed that fighting was ongoing near Novoselivske and Bilohorivka.[34] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces seized Novomlynsk (21km northeast of Kupyansk), while other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near the settlement.[35] ISW has not observed visual evidence that Russian forces advanced toward or seized Novomlynsk. The pace of Russian attacks seemingly decreased since June 4.[36]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click here to read ISW’s retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.

See topline for Bakhmut.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on June 5. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked Ukrainian positions near Nevelske (17km northwest of Donetsk City) and Marinka (20km west of Donetsk City).[37] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks near Opytne (3km southwest of Avdiivka) and Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka), with one source characterizing the attacks as reconnaissance-in-force operations.[38] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks near Pervomaiske (10km southwest of Avdiivka).[39] The Russian MoD reported that Chechen “Akhmat” Special Forces (Spetsnaz) units continued to conduct offensive actions near Marinka.[40] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to seize the initiative in Marinka and seized unspecified Russian positions south of Marinka.[41]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts, and made further limited tactical gains on June 5. Geolocated footage published on June 4 and 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely advanced southwest of Velyka Novosilka and within 1.5km northwest of Storozheve (5km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces crossed the Shaitanka River and conducted assaults near Novodonetske (13km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) throughout the day.[43] Milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces out of Novodonetske and maintained a presence within the settlement as of the evening of June 5.[44] Russian ”Vostok” volunteer battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky, who is reportedly commanding forces near Novodonetske, confirmed that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence within the settlement.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 36th Combined Arms Army (Eastern Military District) and the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Kaskad” Operational Combat Tactical Formation also defended against Ukrainian advances around Novodonetske.[46] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled three Ukrainian “battalion tactical groups” (BTGs) reinforced with tanks that attacked IVO Novodonetske and Blahodatne (5km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[47] Ukrainian forces are not organized in BTGs so it is unclear what echelon of Ukrainian forces the Russian MoD claims is participating in these ground attacks. Russian milbloggers widely claimed that Russian forces recaptured Neskuchne (2km south of Velyka Novosilka) on June 5, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation that Russian forces did so.[48] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to advance near Novodarivka (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), Rivnopil (11km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), and Neskuchne and unsuccessfully attempted to seize Russian positions near Pryiutne (17km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Levadne (20km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[49] One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced 500 to 3,000 meters near Rivnopil and Neskuchne.[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of Novodarivka either on June 4 or 5, although a prominent milblogger claimed that neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces control the settlement.[51]

Ukrainian forces continue to target rear Russian positions throughout southern Ukraine. Ukrainian Commander of the Tavria Group of Troops Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi reported on June 4 that Ukrainian forces destroyed 18 Russian anti-aircraft guns and five ammunition storage areas in southern Ukraine.[52] Russian sources claimed on June 5 that Ukrainian forces struck Mykhailivka (40km north of Melitopol) with unspecified heavy fire and launched a missile strike on Melitopol.[53] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Ukrainian forces have recently started to target Russian rear areas in Zaporizhia Oblast more heavily, particularly with Tochka-U and Storm Shadow missiles.[54] Rogov claimed that Ukrainian forces are primarily targeting transport logistics and other infrastructure facilities.[55]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Iran has reportedly signed contracts with Russia to provide Russian with about $1.74 million in ammunition to use in Ukraine. An anonymous source reportedly showed Sky News two arms contracts between Russia and Iran.[56] The first document purportedly showed samples of artillery and tank ammunition worth over $1 million dated September 14, 2022, and the second document included a contract for artillery shells and barrels for T-72 tanks and howitzers worth $740,000. Sky News reported that it was unable to independently verify the authenticity of the documents.

Russian forces are reportedly improving their missile production and increasing missile stockpiles. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that the Kremlin is continuing attempts to transition the Russian economy to support the war effort by improving and increasing missile production.[57] Malyar stated that Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) is not likely able to entirely replenish its stockpiles to adjust for all the missiles Russian forces have used but can still replenish some of the missiles. ISW has previously reported on Russia’s renewed focus on missile production.[58]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian sources and Belarusian sources indicated that Belarus has been involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children. The Ukrainian Ministry of Reintegration reported on June 5 that the Belarusian Anti-Crisis Administration has recorded at least 2,150 deported Ukrainian children in Belarus since the start of the war.[59] The Ukrainian Ministry of Reintegration noted that the “Dolphin Foundation” and the “Belarusian Foundation” have helped to facilitate the deportation of Ukrainian children and identified three “places of stay” in Minsk Oblast and one in Gomel Oblast.[60] ISW has previously reported that Ukrainian officials are aware of the Belarusian facilitation of deportation schemes.[61]

Ukrainian sources reported that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is intensifying counter-partisan activity in occupied areas. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on June 5 that the FSB recently transferred agents to occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and are working with youth collaborators to identify underground partisan networks.[62] The Resistance Center also stated that the FSB is checking private homes in occupied Kherson Oblast to identify partisan activity and threaten local populations into receiving Russian passports.[63]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine is extraordinarily unlikely).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

6. What is Russia’s Strategy in Ukraine?

Conclusion:

In crafting strategy, there is a fundamental need to account for that of the enemy. This imperative is not new—as evidenced by Sun Tzu’s words in the epigraph that opened this article—and yet states throughout history have made the mistake of making strategy absent a sufficient understanding of those of their adversaries. It is crucial to assess Russia’s activities in Ukraine through a multifaceted lens in order to identify the pillars of its overarching strategy in pursuit of a political victory. Doing so allows Ukraine and its Western backers to attack Russia’s strategy rather than focusing solely on inflicting losses and recapturing lost territory. In the short term, Ukraine’s military should consider the safeguarding of its remaining industrial assets in the center of the country as well as pursuing any opportunity to increase its export volumes. This will provide the necessary economic means for future independent force generation while countering the vulnerability of an overdependence on Western financial and military aid that might become uncertain in the future. As it seems unlikely that the underlying political causes of the current conflict will be satisfactorily addressed at the negotiating table, the war between Moscow and Kyiv will be one of protracted attrition. Making Ukraine economically viable and less dependent on Western support will better enable it to defend against—and attack—Russia’s strategy. This will allow Ukraine to ultimately tip the balance in the Russian strategic calculus against the benefits of continuing the war in pursuit of its political goal.

What is Russia’s Strategy in Ukraine? - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu · by Marnix Provoost, Pieter Balcaen · June 5, 2023

“What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy.”

Churchill famously described Russia as “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” More than eighty years on, perhaps this same sense of mystery obscures the Kremlin’s reasons for invading Ukraine and annexing parts of it. Much has been written and said about what Russia’s leadership is trying to achieve in Ukraine and how these objectives are pursued. But what is Moscow’s fundamental strategy?

Some argue that the current full-scale invasion is a clear example of Russian imperialism, while others maintain that the annexation is aimed at recreating the so-called Novorossiya. Although imperialistic and revisionist motivations cannot be ruled out and can, to some degree, influence both strategic thinking and individual decisions, this view might be rather simplistic. Furthermore, it ignores a Russian tradition of rational yet idiosyncratic strategic thought concerning its decision-making in foreign policy.

Yet despite the Kremlin’s misleading rhetoric, opportunistic changing of declared goals, and general ambiguity, it is imperative that Ukraine and its Western backers understand Russia’s likely driving political objective and how this is pursued. Misinterpreting Russia’s strategy in Ukraine obscures what needs to be done to attack it, which is essential to denying the Russian leadership the chance to declare a political-strategic victory and to securing Ukraine’s future as a sovereign, economically viable nation. Ukraine and its Western backers must understand Russia’s strategy to counter and defeat it and force Russia to seriously negotiate with Ukraine, taking the latter’s terms into consideration.

At a basic level, Russia likely fears that an economically prosperous, democratic Ukraine might offer the Russian population the prospect of an alternative political and economic system other than an authoritarian-ruled kleptocracy. This might be partly why Russian President Vladimir Putin tends to characterize the war in Ukraine as existential in nature, which in turn enables the Kremlin to further mobilize the population against what it claims are the military and cultural threats of the eastwardly expanding NATO and EU.

After failing to subjugate the country completely, this then appears to be Russia’s principal political objective in Ukraine: keeping it from becoming an example of what an alternative political and economic path might bring the Russian people. Crucially, this is not done solely with military action, but rather with a coordinated concert of various instruments of power. Russia’s strategy in Ukraine has thus become one of attrition, using military, economic, and diplomatic activities to exhaust Ukraine and its Western backers until they accept the current situation as a new reality. Key to this exhaustion is Ukraine’s ability to resist Russia’s presence on its territory, not its seemingly infinite will to do so. However, this ability to continue the war effort has become almost fully dependent on Western support, both military and economic. This is a vulnerability unlikely to be overlooked by Russian strategists.

More than a Military Strategy

By identifying Russia’s chief political objective, it becomes possible to begin to trace the outlines of its overall strategy to achieve that objective. Doing so requires a broader view than the predominantly military-focused lens many analysts, commentators, and pundits use. Analyzing the course of the conflict and its possible outcomes by mainly assessing which side has suffered the most significant losses and has the best chances of (re)conquering Ukrainian territories is shortsighted when considering Russian warfare. Since he published it in an article in Military Review in 1989, Colonel Arthur Lykke’s formula has become a dominant paradigm through which strategy is understood. War, as he described it, is a strategic effort guided by political aims (ends), encompassing military, economic, and diplomatic activities (ways) and the resources and instruments with which to undertake the effort (means). But this conceptualization is not unique to American strategic culture or that of the West more broadly. In Russian strategic thinking, too, war is seen as the use of violence to resolve a policy clash, and these three activities—military, economic, and diplomatic—form the core components of Russian warfare. Military activities and objectives should therefore be analyzed in conjunction with diplomatic and economic activities, objectives, and effects. Combined, these efforts are aimed at contributing to achieving a political victory, rather than a purely military one. This theoretical framework is used as a lens to identify Russia’s strategy in Ukraine in pursuit of its assumed political goal, enabling it to ultimately declare a political-strategic victory.

Tactical losses and operational setbacks in Ukraine tell a story, but an incomplete one. When assessing how Russia’s military activities contribute to achieving its political goals, it is essential to do so comprehensively and at the strategic level. After the Russian armed forces’ failed initial offensive and partial withdrawal in early 2022, their main effort shifted toward the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine. After the Ukrainian armed forces’ successful fall counteroffensive, the front line since then has remained largely unchanged. Although it has been argued that the Russian armed forces have failed in their winter offensive, it remains to be seen whether an operational-level offensive actually materialized. Another explanation might be that Russian armed forces launched local, tactical-level attacks to keep pressure on Ukraine’s armed forces. By forcing them to commit reserves, the Russian armed forces might possibly hinder the preparation of an anticipated counteroffensive, while simultaneously buying the Russian armed forces time to prepare a defense in depth. The key takeaway here is that Russian armed forces seem to consolidate their gains rather than launch coordinated operational-level offensives to gain new territory. Although there might be purely military reasons for a more defensive posture, these are presumably subordinate to, for example, the political ambition of conquering and occupying the remaining parts of the annexed oblasts. Thus, it might be that the current military situation is deemed sufficient to achieve the desired effects of the economic component of Russia’s strategy.

Although the effects of sanctions aimed at weakening the Russian economy have been the subject of widespread analysis, much less has been written on Russian efforts to weaken the Ukrainian economy. Targeting Ukraine’s economy contributes strongly to the Russian military-political objective of dismantling Ukraine as a strong, sovereign state. The Russian main effort in the southeast of Ukraine might not be driven only by goals such as the protection of ethnic Russians or the return of the historical regions of Novorossiya to Russia. Instead, underlying economic drivers might also be the aim of annexing these specific regions. The current occupied territories have a long history as Ukraine’s industrial motor, while during the Cold War, Ukraine was often referred to as “the bread basket” of the Soviet Union. Important parts of the former Soviet military-industrial complex are still situated in the southeastern provinces of Ukraine, and the Zaporizhzhia region constitutes an important producer of metals and machinery. Prior to the conflict, the Kherson region played a vital role in the production of vegetable products, vegetable fats, and oils, but with the occupation of the southern regions, Ukraine has lost about 20 percent of its farmlands. Even if Ukraine succeeds in retaking these territories, it could take up to ten years to demine and make them usable again.

The macroimpact of this occupation is not to be neglected. As illustrated in Figure 1 (visualizing regional contributions to Ukraine’s GDP prior to the conflict), the current Russian occupation of the majorities of the Luhansk (1 percent of prewar GDP), Donetsk (5.2 percent), Kherson (1.6 percent), and Zaporizhzhia (4.2 percent) regions results in a combined loss of 12 percent of Ukrainian GDP. Moreover, these losses need to be added to the economic losses Ukraine already suffered following the 2014 annexation of Crimea (3.05 percent of GDP in 2013) and the occupation of portions of Donetsk (a drop from 10.83 percent of Ukrainian GDP in 2013 to 5.78 percent in 2015) and Luhansk (a drop from 3.62 percent in 2013 to 1.2 percent in 2015) oblasts. In addition, far-reaching efforts have been made to “Russify” these regions at an accelerated pace. Ukrainian bank infrastructure and cash holdings were robbed, food stores (e.g., grain) were looted, Russian telecom providers have been installed, and the Russian ruble has been introduced as the only accepted means of payment.

Figure 1: Ukrainian GDP by region (percent of total GDP) in 2021, prior to the beginning of the large-scale offensive. (Source: authors’ visualization based on data from the Ukrainian State Statistics Service.)

Studying these regions in detail shows that Russia succeeded in occupying key infrastructure of importance to the rest of the Ukrainian economy. The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, for example, accounted for almost half of Ukraine’s nuclear power production prior to the conflict, whereas 40 percent of Ukrainian steel was produced in Mariupol. Furthermore, the Russian offensive in southern Ukraine resulted in the occupation of several of Ukraine’s major maritime ports (most importantly Mariupol and Berdyansk). This further facilitated Russian efforts to impose a maritime blockade. This confronts Ukraine with severe logistical challenges, since 75 percent of its foreign trade took place through sea routes prior to the war.. The consequences of this blockade are tangible for the rest of the world, as Ukraine is the largest exporter of sunflower oil and one of the main exporters of wheat, barley, and maize. The drop in Ukrainian exports has had a clear effect on world food prices, particularly in countries that rely heavily on Ukrainian imports such as Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. Despite the Black Sea Grain Initiative, signed in July 2022, enabling Ukraine to restart exports of grain and other products from the ports of Odessa, Yuzhne, and Chornomorsk, Russia continues to threaten to abandon deal if Russian demands are not met. Moreover, insurance costs for shipping companies have substantially increased, putting pressure on the profitability of export activities. This also partially explains why Russia identified Odessa as one of the strategic objectives, as taking the city and the area around it would effectively have allowed Russia to deny Ukraine all maritime exports.

Assessing Russian military-strategic objectives from an economic perspective also illustrates the rationale for Russia to have fought so hard, and at such cost, for control of Bakhmut—and for it to continue its war efforts in neighboring eastern regions, like Dnipropetrovsk. This region is almost absent from discussions as a strategic objective, despite its important and longstanding role as a center of metallurgy and military industry. During the Cold War, this region was the world’s biggest producer of nuclear missiles. The economic importance of this region comes to the fore when we look at the 2021 regional GDP contributions. As demonstrated in Figure 1, Dnipropetrovsk accounts for over 10 percent of Ukrainian GDP, serving as an important contributor to the Ukrainian economy. It moreover also serves as a hub for sea shipping. Hence, if Russia can shift the front line further to the west (getting the region’s key infrastructure into artillery range would suffice), it would be able to deal another serious blow to the Ukrainian economy.

Finally, the ongoing conflict forces the Ukrainian state to continue to channel budgetary means toward the war effort. More than 40 percent of the initially adopted state budget for 2023 was devoted to the security and defense sector, corresponding to 1.1 trillion hryvnias ($30 billion). In March, the budget was amended to further increase spending on defense by an additional 518.2 billion hryvnias ($14.1 billion). In total, spending on security and defense amounts to 26.6 percent of Ukraine’s GDP. Ukraine is choosing to prioritize guns over butter—but Kyiv almost certainly does not feel it has any other choice. Moreover, Ukraine is heavily dependent on support from the West to finance this spending. The attrition war, therefore, is not only being executed on the battlefield; both parties are also severely exhausting each other financially. As long as Russia will be able to exert pressure along the six-hundred-mile-long front line, Ukraine will be forced to maintain an enormous and costly security disposition.

Meanwhile, Russia’s diplomatic efforts are linked to both its military activities and the effects these have on Ukraine’s economy. Although Russia’s territorial gains in Ukraine might not seem impressive considering the military losses incurred to achieve them, Ukraine did witness a 35 percent drop in real GDP and a rise in inflation of over 20 percent. The war has confronted the country with severe economic challenges. Because Ukraine’s economy is dependent on substantial financial aid and economic support, Russia’s comprehensive attritional strategy aims to create a Western political perspective of doubt regarding the prospect of a quick and decisive Ukrainian victory that can end the war. The Western willingness to continue supporting Ukraine both militarily and financially is seen as critical for Ukraine’s ability to survive as a viable sovereign nation and continue its effective defense and counteroffensives. If the Russian military succeeds in keeping the Ukrainian armed forces from achieving a strategic victory in the foreseeable future, it remains to be seen what the effect will be on the continuation of substantial Western support. Russian diplomats might exploit the perspective of an endless war by displaying a willingness to negotiate while simultaneously voicing a narrative that it is the West that advocates its continuation. However, an armistice that consolidates the current front line would give the Russian leadership its desired political-strategic victory. If brokered with the United States and China, such an agreement would also imply recognition as a world power, while having demonstrated successful resistance to Western economic and military power, ultimately bringing Russia’s desired multipolar world closer. Most importantly, however, it will ensure Ukraine cannot become the economically viable, sovereign democracy that embodies an alternative reality for the closely related Russian people.

What Does This Mean for Ukraine—and its Supporters?

In crafting strategy, there is a fundamental need to account for that of the enemy. This imperative is not new—as evidenced by Sun Tzu’s words in the epigraph that opened this article—and yet states throughout history have made the mistake of making strategy absent a sufficient understanding of those of their adversaries. It is crucial to assess Russia’s activities in Ukraine through a multifaceted lens in order to identify the pillars of its overarching strategy in pursuit of a political victory. Doing so allows Ukraine and its Western backers to attack Russia’s strategy rather than focusing solely on inflicting losses and recapturing lost territory. In the short term, Ukraine’s military should consider the safeguarding of its remaining industrial assets in the center of the country as well as pursuing any opportunity to increase its export volumes. This will provide the necessary economic means for future independent force generation while countering the vulnerability of an overdependence on Western financial and military aid that might become uncertain in the future. As it seems unlikely that the underlying political causes of the current conflict will be satisfactorily addressed at the negotiating table, the war between Moscow and Kyiv will be one of protracted attrition. Making Ukraine economically viable and less dependent on Western support will better enable it to defend against—and attack—Russia’s strategy. This will allow Ukraine to ultimately tip the balance in the Russian strategic calculus against the benefits of continuing the war in pursuit of its political goal.

Major Marnix Provoost MA is an infantry officer in the Royal Netherlands Army and currently working as a PhD researcher at the Netherlands Defence Academy.

Captain Dr. Pieter Balcaen is an officer in the Belgian military and conducts research in the field of defense economics.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: kremlin.ru, via Wikimedia Commons

mwi.usma.edu · by Marnix Provoost, Pieter Balcaen · June 5, 2023

7. At Normandy D-Day celebrations, echoes of Ukraine’s looming fight

At Normandy D-Day celebrations, echoes of Ukraine’s looming fight

militarytimes.com · by Tara Copp · June 6, 2023

STE MARE EGLISE, France — While U.S. military officers caution against too direct a comparison between the 1944 D-Day landings and Ukraine’s upcoming counteroffensive, the echoes of what Kyiv faces today are a dominant theme of this year’s commemorations of the young U.S. soldiers who died on the Normandy beaches nearly 80 years ago.

For days the villages and towns surrounding Omaha and Utah beaches have held parades, memorial events, flyovers and parachute demonstrations to build up to the annual celebration of D-Day, the launch of Operation Overlord. The June 6, 1944, invasion marked the beginning of the Allies’ massive ground offensive, which would eventually lead to Germany’s surrender and the end of World War II in Europe.

The celebration is taking place as Ukraine prepares to launch its own counteroffensive against Russia — an impending fight for which many of those same allied forces have now provided billions of dollars in weapons and training to Kyiv’s soldiers to best prepare them to win.

U.S. Gen. Mark Milley, left, his wife Hollyanne Milley, 2nd left, veteran Sgt. Andrew Negra, center on wheel chair, and his family pose for a group photo during a gathering in preparation of the 79th D-Day anniversary in La Fiere, Normandy, France, Sunday, June 4, 2023. (Thomas Padilla/AP)

“There’s echoes of that of course,” said Joint Chiefs chairman Gen. Mark Milley. However, he cautioned against making a direct comparison to World War II’s Normandy invasion, where more than 150,000 troops made landfall in a 24-hour period and millions eventually fought across Europe to defeat the Nazis.

The goal “is certainly the same, to liberate occupied territory and to free a country that has been unjustly attacked by an aggressor nation, in this case, Russia,” Milley said.

Over the last several days, Ukraine has been a theme.

“(They are) very naive, those who think peace is eternal: History shows us quite the opposite,” said Alain Holley, mayor of Ste Mere Eglise, at a D-Day commemoration ceremony Sunday. “The proof is that today, the shells are again falling in Europe, two hours by plane from here. Where and when this new war will stop, no one knows today.”

Holley said it was imperative to stop “these arsonists, before the fire takes away our children, our grandchildren, as well as these brave young American paratroopers.”

At the spot where Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower established the first forward Supreme Allied Command headquarters in 1944, current U.S. Army Europe and Africa commander Gen. Darryl Williams said Eisenhower’s choice to push forward was like the West’s decision to continue arming Ukraine in that it was a sign of hope.

“We particularly need hope today, because the dark clouds of war once again hang over Europe.”

Just 20 miles (32 kilometers) from Omaha beach, the larger town of Carentan was the site of a key victory allowing Allied forces to advance. The commander of the current air assault troops — whose predecessors gave their lives freeing Carentan one week after D-Day — said the grounds were a hallowed reminder of the present.

The unit was one of the first sent back to Europe after Russia invaded last year, to bolster Eastern European defenses.

“While we did not return to fight, we were ready to fight,” said Col. Ed Matthaidess, commander of the 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. “So we stand here in Carentan today, and across Normandy this week, in remembrance not only of our past, but also mindful of our present.”

Two days before the annual celebration of Operation Overlord, Ukraine’s ministry of defense posted a video to Twitter of soldier after soldier putting his finger to his lips, in a hint that Kyiv’s much anticipated counteroffensive is imminent.

“Plans like silence,” the video text read. “There will be no announcement of the start.”

There’s usually a Ukrainian military delegation here as part of the commemorations, but not this year, as they focus on the fight at home, said a U.S. official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters.

Ste Mere Eglise became the first French town liberated by Allied forces; its namesake church was made famous by 82nd Airborne Division paratrooper John Steele, whose parachute got caught on the church steeple, leaving him hanging there for two hours during the initial invasion.

“D-Day is a commemoration. I think it’s also a warning,” said Army Col. Marty O’Donnell, spokesman for U.S. Army forces in Europe “While certainly there is not a world war going on right now, we certainly must reflect upon the history as we deal with current events.”

8. Ukraine Conflict Update - June 6, 2023 | SOF News

Ukraine Conflict Update - June 6, 2023 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · June 6, 2023

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, tactical situation on the ground, in the air, and on the seas. Additional topics include NATO, aid to Ukraine, refugees, internally displaced personnel, humanitarian efforts, cyber, and information operations.

Image / Photo: Staff Sgt. Dave Servida, 436th Aerial Port Squadron ramp supervisor, directs weapons cargo bound for Ukraine onto a C-17 Globemaster III during a security assistance mission at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, Aug. 19, 2022. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Cydney Lee)

Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).

Big Picture of the Conflict

Failed Winter Offensive (Russia) and Future Counteroffensive (Ukraine). The results of fighting over the winter was costly for both sides of the conflict. Now all eyes are watching the Ukrainian military for its expected spring offensive. Some analysts believe it will be a major attack at one focal point with the intent to thrust deep into the Russian rear area reaching the Sea of Azov. But others think it will be a series of shorter offensives spread across the front line. Currently, Ukraine is attacking Russian logistical depots and command and control centers behind enemy lines with artillery and missiles. Ukrainian officials are being quiet on when the counteroffensive will take place and have mounted a campaign against public disclosure of details – “Words are very unnecessary. They can only do harm”. (Twitter, June 4, 2023)

Has It Begun? There is speculation that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has already begun. U.S. officials say there are signs that a counteroffensive is now underway. Fighting is raging at several points on the front line. Most military analysts believe the attack will be concentrated on southern Ukraine in an attempt to sever the land bridge between western Russia and occupied Crimea.

News Reports on Counteroffensive:

• “This is Ukraine’s D-Day”, by Jamie Dettmer, Politico Europe, June 6, 2023.
• “Ukraine Intensifies Attacks on Russian Frontline Positions”, The New York Times, June 5, 2023. (subscription)
• “Is Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Here?”, The New York Times, June 5, 2023. (subscription)
• “Ukraine war: Kyiv says troops advance on eastern front”, BBC News, June 6, 2023.

NATO-Trained Units and the Coming Offensive. Ukrainian units have had personnel trained by European nations for months. Some of these units have been made from scratch – like the brand-new 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade that received its training at a NATO base in Germany. The 47th brigade and other assault units have been armed with Western weapons, including Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and Leopard tanks, that will allow it to cross minefields and trenches into the deep Russian rear area of operations. “NATO-trained units will serve as tip of spear in Ukraine’s counteroffensive”, The Washington Post, June 4, 2023. (subscription)

Battle for Bakhmut. The fight for the small industrial city on the frontlines in eastern Ukraine is in a temporary operational lull. The Russians appear to have reached their culminating point (no more capacity to conduct offensive operations) and are relying on the use of artillery and mortars to continue the fight around the city. The Russians announced that they achieved their objective of capturing the city. The Russian paramilitary organization, the Wagner Group, is pulling its forces to the rear for rest and refit; while the ground held is being turned over to regular and airborne Russian military troops. A Ukrainian defense spokesman said that at the end of May Ukrainian forces maintained control over the southwestern outskirts and entrance to Bakhmut City.

Increased Global Support for Ukraine. The Biden administration has given the green light for other nations to provide F-16s to Ukraine. This is one of many ‘signals’ that global support for Ukraine has increased and that nations are more willing to provide more lethal offensive weapons to that nation; weapons that can strike deep behind enemy lines and threaten Russian positions in Crimea. Ukraine is enjoying strong support throughout most of the world – even as the conflict rages on. Some think the conflict is at a turning point. “Did Ukraine just win the war?”, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 30, 2023.

Microsoft Report – Russian Cyber Operations. A Microsoft Threat Intelligence report has been published that analyzed Russian tactics over the twelve-month period since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. The 18-page PDF examines what the investigative team has learned about Russian state tactics so far and what may be on the horizon. “A year of Russian hybrid warfare in Ukraine”, Microsoft, March 15, 2023. The United States is reported to have provided $37 million in cybersecurity assistance to Ukraine. (The Kyiv Independent, June 5, 2023).

Ground Situation

Tank Numbers. When the Russians invaded Ukraine in February 2022 they had a significant advantage in tanks and armored vehicles. However, the tank numbers are now about equal due to Russian losses and tanks provided to Ukraine by European nations. “Ukraine now probably has as many tanks as Russia”, Euromaiden Press, June 1, 2023.

Minefields and Fortifications. The Russians have been digging in for months in anticipation of an expected Ukrianian offensive to recapture territory taken by the Russians since February 2022. One expected axis of approach for the Ukrainian offensive is Zaporizhzhia region and the city of Melitopol. However, it is unknown if Ukraine has the necessary quantity of mine clearing and fortification breaching equipment to rapidly push through the Russian lines. “To liberate territory, Ukraine must smash fortified Russian defenses”, The Washington Post, June 2, 2023. (subscription)

SOF – Preparing the Battlefield. Expectations are high for a widely anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive; perhaps too high. However, Kyiv is already making the first moves of the campaign with its special operations forces. “Ukrainian Special Forces – Preparing the Battlefield”, Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), May 22, 2023.

Chechen Leader Criticizes Wagner Group. Ramzan Kadyrov has come out vocally against the leader of the Wagner Group – Yevgeny Prigozhin. He says that the leader of the Russian paramilitary group should not criticize the Russian military and should provide more vocal support for Putin. Chechen “Akhmat” forces have been active on the frontlines supporting the Russian occupation of Ukraine. Prigozhin has accused the Kremlin of fabricating a rift between him and Kadyrov.

The Other Russian Mercenaries. While the Wagner Group gets most of the headlines there are numerous private military groups in Russia . . . some fighting in Ukraine. “Everyone is talking about Wagner. But who are Russia’s other mercenairies?”, Euronews, May 16, 2023.

Sabotage Cells in Russia. Ukraine has cultivated sabotage agents inside Russia and is giving them drones to stage attacks. The drones have been launched from inside Russia; some targeting the Kremlin. (CNN Politics, June 5, 2023).

Situation Maps. War in Ukraine by Scribble Maps. The Institute for the Study of War presents a map that depicts the assessed control of terrain in Ukraine as of March 6, 2023, 3:00 PM ET. View more Ukraine SITMAPs that provide updates on the disposition of Russian forces.

News Updates. A detailed daily update of the war – a daily review – is provided by Euromaidan Press. And, of course, there is the always comprehensive daily report by the Institute for the Study of War.

Fight for the Skies

Air Attacks Continue. Despite reports over the past several months that Russia has been expending its supply of missiles the pace of the air attacks is continuing. A combination of drone and cruise missiles have targeted command and control nodes and logisitical facilities over the past four weeks – many times in the nations capital of Kyiv. In the past month over 400 Iranian Shahed drones and 114 cruise missiles (Politico) have struck Ukraine.

F-16s for Ukraine. There is a lot of support for NATO nations to provide F-16s to Ukraine. After months of public lobbying by Ukraine there appears that some may be going to Ukraine. In May, President Joe Biden said that the U.S. will support training Ukrainian pilots to fly the aircraft and has said he supports the providing of F-16s to Ukraine by Poland and other European nations. While the public may have high expectations for the F-16 there are many factors that will need to be taken into account. “What F-16s Will (and Won’t) Do For Ukraine”, The RAND Blog, May 31, 2023. See also “Ukraine’s Quest for Air Superiority: The Implications of F-16 Fighter Jets in the Conflict”, SOFREP, May 20, 2023.

Drones – Cost Effective. One defense expert has conducted research on the cheapest and most effective means of destroying infantry or armored units. He has found that, in many instances, the use of small drones comes out on top. “Study shows drones the cheapest, most effective in battle against Russian invasion”, Euromaiden Press, May 28, 2023.

Maritime Activities

Ukrainian Naval SOF Unit. A quiet but intense battle is raging near Kherson, which Ukraine recaptured from Russia last year. The fight is happening along the Dnipro River, which divides Ukrainian and Russian-held territory. The 73rd Naval Center of Special Operations appears to be leading the effort for Ukraine. “A secretive SEAL-like unit is leading Ukraine’s shadowy battle against Russia in a vital corner of the country”, Business Insider, May 28, 2023.

Importance of the Black Sea. Mara Karlin, assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans, and capabilities spoke at the Black Sea and Balkans Security Forum in Bucharest, Romania in mid-May 2023. In her comments she stated that the Black Sea is a crucial crossroads for the world and is an area of critical geostrategic importance. “U.S. Official Looks to Deter Russia in Black Sea Region”, DoD News, May 19, 2023.

General Information

Report – Middle East and North Africa: Implications of the Russia-Ukraine War. Congressional Research Service (CRS), updated June 2, 2023, PDF, 30 pages.

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47160

Documentary on Mariupol. A film named “20 Days in Mariupol” made its premiere in Ukraine on June 3, 2023, when it was seen by the first time by some of the Ukrainian medics and first responders who were chronicled in the documentary. The film is a joint project between The Associated Press and PBS Frontline and footage was taken from three Ukrainian journalists who were in Mariupol during the seige and capture by the Russians. “Award-winning Mariupol documentary screened for 1st time in Ukraine”, AP News, June 4, 2023.

Ukraine and Military Observers. History shows us that sending military officers to observe foreign wars yields benefits. We should send some to Ukraine to prepare our forces for the future. “U.S. Military Observers and Why They Are Needed in Ukraine”, War on the Rocks, May 12, 2023.

Additional U.S. Assistance. On May 31, 2023, the U.S. Department of Defense announced that President Biden has authorized the 39th drawdown of U.S. arms and equipment for Ukraine. This will provide an additional $300 million worth of equipment. The security package includes significant air defense capabilities, ammunition for HIMARS and artillery, and other field equipment. Some of the air defense equipment includes additional munitions for Patriot air defense systems, Avenger air defense systems, Stinger antiaircraft systems, and AIM-7 missiles for air defense. A Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine (dated May 31, 2023) details the security assistance provided to Ukraine since February 2022.

Body of U.S. Green Beret Recovered. Nick Maimer, a former U.S. Special Forces soldier, was killed in the embattled city of Bakhmut in mid-May 2023. He was performing humanitarian work and training defense forces when he was killed. The Russian paramilitary organization, Wagner Group, turned the body after efforts by Perry Blackburn, another former Green Beret associated with the non-profit organization AFGfree, interceded into the affair. “Body of US Special Forces Veteran Turned Over by Russian Mercenary Group”, Military.com, May 26, 2023. Watch a video about the death of Maimer in “CNN pieces together clues about American killed in Bakhmut”, CNN World, May 26, 2023.

Commentary

What Ukraine Must Do to Win. Two retired U.S. Special Forces officers, Erik Kramer and Paul Schneider, provide their perspective on what the Ukrainian military needs to do to be victorious in the conflict with Russia. They are co-founders of the Ukraine Defense Support Group headquartered in Kyiv, Ukraine. They observed a series of common trends: lack of mission command, effective training, and combined arms operations. The logistic and maintenance systems are ad hoc. The use of special operations forces needs to be fine-tuned. One specific aspect of training that is needed is the implementation of a 30-day train-the-trainer program that focuses on mission command of combined arms from the brigade level down. “What the Ukrainian Armed Forces need to Do to Win”, War on the Rocks, June 2, 2023.

What is Russia’s Strategy? Putin may have already attained his goals in Ukraine. He has occupied the entire western coastline of the Sea of Azov, captured vital Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov, established a land corridor between Russia and Crimea, and occupied swaths of agricultural and industrial regions of eastern Ukraine. His military will outlast Ukraine’s in a war of attrition, the vital support of western nations may ebb over time, and Ukraine’s economic future is in peril. Read more in “What Is Russia’s Strategy in Ukraine?”, Modern War Institute at West Point, June 5, 2023.

Resources about the Ukraine Conflict

Maps of Ukraine

https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/maps.html

Weapons of the Ukraine War.

https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/weapons.html

Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.

Ukrainian Think Tanks – Brussels. Consolidated information on how to help Ukraine from abroad and stay up to date on events.

UNCN. The Ukraine NGO Coordination Network is an organization that ties together U.S.-based 501c3 organizations and non-profit humanitarian organizations that are working to evacuate and support those in need affected by the Ukraine crisis. https://uncn.one

sof.news · by SOF News · June 6, 2023

9. What we know about Nova Kakhovka dam attack

What we know about Nova Kakhovka dam attack

BBC · by Menu

• Published
• 27 minutes ago
• 
  

Image source, Reuters

Image caption,

Ukraine's state nuclear energy company Energoatom released this photo claiming to show the dam

A huge dam in the Russian-controlled area of southern Ukraine has been destroyed, unleashing a flood of water.

Ukraine's military and Nato have accused Russia of blowing up the dam, while Russia has blamed Ukraine.

Thousands of people are being evacuated from communities in the surrounding areas, with fears that any flooding could be catastrophic.

Here's what we know so far.

Where is the dam?

The Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant is in the city of Nova Kakhovka in Ukraine's Kherson region, which is currently under Russian occupation.

It was built in the Soviet era and is one of six dams that sit along the Dnipro river, which stretches all the way from the very north of the country into the sea in the south.

It's huge - locals call it the Kakhovka Sea as you cannot see the other bank in certain places. The dam holds water equal to the Great Salt Lake in the US state of Utah, according to Reuters.

What happened?

Stills and video show a massive breach in the dam, with water surging through it and flooding downstream in the direction of Kherson.

It's unclear when exactly the dam was first damaged, but satellite images verified by the BBC suggest its condition has deteriorated over a number of days.

A road across the dam appears to be damaged from 2 June, but there does not seem to be a change to the flow of the water until 6 June when the breach of the wall and collapse of nearby buildings can be clearly seen on video. It is currently unclear whether the damage to the road is linked to the 6 June breach.

While it is unclear how extensive the flooding downstream will be, there are fears it could be devastating for settlements in a critical zone, home to around 16,000 people.

Images from Nova Kakhova show buildings surrounded by floodwaters and even swans paddling around a local government office.

Media caption,

Watch: Swans seen swimming though Nova Kakhovka

The authorities in Kherson, less than 50 miles downstream, have warned residents in low lying parts of the city to evacuate as quickly as possible and seek shelter on higher ground.

The head of the Kherson region, Oleksandr Prokudin, told Ukrainian TV this morning that eight villages had been fully or completely flooded already, with more expected to be flooded.

Ukrainian hydro power dam operator UkrHydroEnerho said the station was "fully destroyed" and could not be restored.

Media caption,

Watch: President Zelensky shared a video of the dam on Telegram

Why has it been attacked?

It's not yet clear what caused the breach in the dam, but Ukraine's military has accused Russia of deliberately blowing it up. This seems plausible, as Moscow may have feared that Ukrainian forces would use the road over the dam to get troops across the river into Russian-held territory, as part of a counter-offensive.

Russian-installed officials have blamed Ukraine for striking the dam, but they say only the plant's upper part was destroyed by shelling - not the dam itself.

Neither Ukraine or Russia's claims have been verified by the BBC.

The dam is very important and serves a number of purposes.

It holds back a vast reservoir that supplies water for a host of communities upstream. Farmers upstream of Kakhovka rely on the water to grow their crops, so this could impact tens of thousands of people if it recedes far enough and causes issues with irrigation for farmers and local residents.

The dam also provides cooling water to the nuclear power station at Zaporizhzhia, around 100 miles upstream, which is under Russian control and relies on the reservoir.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said there was no immediate nuclear safety risk but it was monitoring the situation.

It later said in a statement that if the dam did fall below 12.7m, the lowest level at which water can still be pumped upstream to Zaporizhzhia, there were alternative water sources to keep the nuclear plant cool, including a large cooling pond next to the site.

But as well as that, the dam is a vital channel carrying water from the Dnipro to Russian-occupied Crimea, meaning water supplies there are likely to be affected.

After Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, Ukraine blocked a channel carrying water from Nova Kakhovka, triggering a water crisis on the peninsula.

Russian forces reopened the channel soon after last year's full-scale invasion. But without the dam, dropping water levels could once again jeopardise the flow of water along the channel.

Russia has previously carried out several attacks on dams throughout Ukraine since the invasion, causing widespread flooding and disrupting power supplies.

BBC · by Menu

10. Wagner mercenaries capture Russian brigade commander

Think about the chaos caused by Wagner operations versus Russian operations. How can we exploit this? Or is this something for Bonaparte; "Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake." Surely Putin's employment of the Wagner Group is a long term mistake. Now if we could just get them to take their fight to Russian territory and leave Ukraine alone we could watch Putin deal with the threats of his own creation.

Wagner mercenaries capture Russian brigade commander

Wagner vs. Russian army.

BY JEFF SCHOGOL | PUBLISHED JUN 5, 2023 1:57 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · June 5, 2023

In a bizarre turn of events, Russia’s Wagner Group private military company has captured a man in Ukraine who identified himself as a Russian lieutenant colonel and forced him to confess on video to opening fire on Wagner mercenaries.

The video shows Lt. Col. Roman Venevitin, commander of Russia’s 72nd Brigade, being interrogated as if he were a captured member of Ukraine’s military.

In the video, Venevitin tells his off-camera interrogator that he fired on a car that belonged to Wagner forces while he was drunk “due to personal animosity.” He further says that he and between 10 and 12 of his soldiers disarmed a Wagner quick response force.

When asked how his actions can be described, Venevitin pauses for several seconds and then says, “Guilty.”

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This incident illustrates how little control Russia’s defense ministry has over the Wagner Group, said Kateryna Stepanenko, a Russia analyst with the Institute for the Study of War think tank in Washington, D.C.

A mural depicting mercenaries of Russia’s Wagner Group that reads: “Wagner Group – Russian knights” on a wall in Belgrade, Serbia, Tuesday, Sept. 20, 2022. (AP Photo/Darko Vojinovic)

Although Wanger Group forces depend on the Russian defense ministry for their ammunition, they are mostly independent from the Russian military, Stepanenko told Task & Purpose.

“In their ability to decide where they want to operate, which direction of the front line they want to reinforce, we are increasingly seeing that Wagner is their own boss, essentially; whereas other units, such as the 72nd Brigade, are more subordinate to the Russian ministry of defense, even though this organization is an irregular formation,” Stepanenko.

Moreover, the Wagner Group’s owner Yevgeny Prigozhin has shown personal animosity toward Russia’s 72nd Brigade, which he accused of abandoning its position near Bakhmut last month, Stepanenko said.

“The 72nd Brigade f–ked up around 3-square kilometers this morning, where I had lost around 500 men,” Prigozhin said in a May 9 video.

Prigozhin later claimed that his mercenaries had captured Bakhmut after a monthslong bloody battle. In order to continue to remain relevant, Prigozhin is trying to portray Russian military forces as weak and ineffectual, Stepanenko said.

Wagner Group chief Yevgeniy Prigozhin in a May 4, 2023 video. (Twitter)

“He is trying to blame the 72nd Brigade, alongside other regular forces, for losses around Bakhmut after Wagner’s withdrawal from the city,” Stepanenko said. “This is a way to amplify his political goals, to appeal to his followers on social media and so on. So, there is a longstanding conflict between the 72nd Brigade and Prigozhin that was initiated by Prigozhin himself.”

It is unclear whether the Wagner Group may have crossed a red line by capturing a Russian military officer and shaming him on video, Stepanenko said. Prigozhin has already indirectly criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin and lashed out at Russia’s top military leaders.

Additionally, the 72nd Brigade was not part of the Russian army before the latest invasion of Ukraine, Stepanenko said. The unit was formed in 2022 from volunteer battalions, which were created to replace Russian losses in Ukraine.

“I don’t think that this unit is perceived within the Russian military command as a conventional unit,” Stepanenko said. “So, I don’t know to what extent this is an attack that could translate to a bigger escalation in the relationship between Prigozhin and the Russian military of defense at this point.”

Putin has long used a strategy of divide and conquer to rule Russia, and he is using the same approach toward the country’s security forces by pitting various factions against each other, said Ivana Stradner, a Russia expert with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies think tank in Washington, D.C.

FILE: Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu attends an expanded meeting of the Russian Defence Ministry Board at the National Defence Control Centre in Moscow, on December 21, 2022. (Sergey Fadeichev/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images)

With Russian forces performing so poorly in Ukraine, Putin has tried to pull off a balancing act between Wagner and military forces that are under the control of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Stradner told Task & Purpose.

“There have been numerous problems between Shoigu and Prigozhin over the last – at least – six months,” Stradner said. “Having those internal problems within the Russian army and different military groups is one of the best gifts that we can have in the West.”

The rivalry between Prigozhin and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu boiled last month, when Prigozhin’s press service accused Russian troops of placing land mines on routes that Wagner forces needed to leave Bakhmut on May 17 and then opened fire on Wagner mercenaries who were clearing the mines, Business Insider reported.

In light of the ongoing conflict between Wagner and Russia’s military, it is not surprising that Prigozhin’s forces captured the commander of the 72nd Brigade to send a message to Russia’s defense ministry, Stradner said.

By acting almost totally independently of the Russian military establishment, Priozghin serves several functions for Putin, said Ivan Fomin, Democracy Fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Prizoghin and the Wagner Group serve as a counterweight to the Russian military’s political influence, Fomin told Task & Purpose.

“It is precisely because Prigozhin’s Wagner Group operates independently that it is sometimes more militarily effective than the regular army,” Fomin said. “It can bypass the Russian army structure with its defects and limitations in terms of organization, communication, and recruitment.”

Prigozhin also serves as a safety valve for the Kremlin by calling for a total mobilization of Russia’s military to fight the war in Ukraine, Fomin said.

“For the Kremlin, this might seem to be a relatively safe way to channel these sentiments shared by some parts of the Russian public,” Fomin said. “To play this role, Progozhin also needs to be independent from the army, which may seem too soft and ineffective.”

The latest on Task & Purpose

• Air Force said AI drone killed its human operator in a simulation
• The Army says it’s made ‘significant improvements’ to its troubled new infantry squad vehicle
• What we know about China’s hacking of Navy systems
• Taliban moving captured US military vehicles and Soviet tanks to Iranian border
• Five juveniles arrested for attack on Marines caught on video

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · June 5, 2023

11. 'The Torch of Freedom:' Remarks by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Commemorating 79 Years Since D-Day (As Prepared)

'The Torch of Freedom:' Remarks by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Commemorating 79 Years Since D-Day (As Prepared)

defense.gov

Thank you, sir.

It’s an honor to be in France today.

Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests, and above all, the World War II veterans here today: I am absolutely humbled to join you at this hallowed place on this fateful day.

Seventy-nine years ago, France and much of the rest of Europe lay beneath the Nazi boot.

The night before Operation Overlord, General Eisenhower met with U.S. troops from the 101st Airborne. Some thought that he looked nervous. But one soldier called out: “Now quit worrying, General. We’ll take care of this thing for you.”

And they did.

Young men from the United States, Britain, Australia, Canada, France, and other countries rallied together, as President Roosevelt said, “to set free a suffering humanity.”

The largest armada in history carried tens of thousands of Allied troops to the gate of Nazi-occupied France.

The Allied pilots flew low, under relentless German fire.

The paratroopers jumped into cloudy skies, and improvised when many of them landed miles from their drop zones.

Soldiers weighed down by gear waded off the boats, and were raked by Nazi guns.

And the medics dove in to care for the wounded as the cold waters turned red.

It’s easy to forget how desperate the battle was, how loud the clash was, how many things could have gone wrong, and how many things did go wrong.

But on D-Day, courage won out over terror, daring over cruelty, and liberty over tyranny.

“Quit worrying, General. We’ll take care of this thing for you.”

One of the soldiers who took care of things was 1st Lieutenant Waverly Wray—known as Charlie—of the 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment—known as the Panthers.

Lieutenant Wray jumped into Normandy before dawn on D-Day. His battalion was on its own until it could be reinforced by the Allied amphibious forces storming the beaches. So Wray’s unit, Company D, faced terrifying odds. German forces outnumbered them by more than 20 to one.

But the Nazis didn’t count on the Panthers. And they didn’t count on citizen-soldiers like Charlie Wray.

Wray’s battalion commander ordered him to counterattack the German flank. And Wray personally found and destroyed the German command post in Sainte-Mère-Église. And it became the first town in France that the Allies liberated from Nazi occupation.

After the fighting, Wray returned to report—with part of his right ear sliced off by a German bullet and his own blood caked on his neck and shoulder. And Wray’s commander said, “They’ve been getting kind of close to you, haven’t they, Waverly?”

And Lieutenant Wray grinned and said, “Not as close as I’ve been getting to them, sir.”

That’s the spirit that took the beaches.

That’s the courage that liberated a continent.

And that’s the valor that swung the hinge of fate from tyranny to freedom.

Since the days of ancient Athens, historians have known that free soldiers will fight more bravely than the armies of tyrants.

The men who landed here on D-Day did just that.

And they wrote themselves into the pages of history as a grand refutation of Hitler’s bile.

D-Day reminds us that there is no force multiplier stronger than a just cause.

And the democratic ideals carried by the troops of Operation Overlord still inspire free people everywhere.

Ladies and gentlemen, it was one of the great honors of my life to serve, some 50 years after D-Day, as the commander of the 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry.

In fact, I jumped into Normandy with my battalion for the 50th anniversary of D-Day.

With pride, we shouldered the legacy of liberty passed down by Charlie Wray and his brothers in arms.

And it is all of our duty to defend with undimmed vigor the principles for which the Allies fought.

We still seek a world where aggression is a sin.

Where human rights are sacred.

Where those who preach hatred, tyranny, and genocide are cast out.

Where civilians are safe from the ravages of war.

Where sovereignty and territorial integrity are respected.

And where all states and all peoples can pursue their own destinies in freedom.

Ladies and gentlemen, today’s open world of rules and rights was built on the shoulders of those who took the beaches code-named Utah, Omaha, Gold, Juno, and Sword.

Today’s rules-based international order is the legacy of those who won the bloodiest war in history.

And it is our task to carry forward their mighty work.

For most of us, the demands of democratic citizenship today are far less stern than they were in 1944.

But we must meet today’s challenges with our full strength—soldier and civilian alike.

If the troops of the world’s democracies could risk their lives for freedom then, surely the citizens of the world’s democracies can risk our comfort for freedom now.

And some of our friends no longer have that choice.

On a recent trip to a U.S. training post in a free Germany, I met brave young men and women from Ukraine who were learning how to fight for their lives and their country.

And today, I am more determined than ever to stand by them for as long as it takes.

In our unsettled times, we again hear some sneer that tyranny is the future, that people long for strongman rule, that the unity of free people will shatter, and that the hour of democracy has passed.

They are wrong.

And every D-Day, citizen by citizen, we remember that we each have the ability—and the responsibility—to fight for the principles that drove the Allied armies forward.

Seventy-nine years ago, General Eisenhower told the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines of the Allied Expeditionary Force, “The eyes of the world are upon you. The hopes and prayers of liberty-loving people everywhere march with you.”

The eyes of the world are still upon the heroes of D-Day.

They are upon us as well.

And we will not let the torch of freedom go out.

Every time a veteran of D-Day is gathered to his Maker in the fullness of time, after a long life lived in freedom, he wins a final victory over Hitler.

To the veterans of World War II: we salute you.

You saved the world.

We must merely defend it.

So may God bless the American and Allied troops who fought and fell 79 years ago today.

May God bless the United States of America.

And may God bless all those who still fight for freedom.

Thank you.

defense.gov

12. Army Wants Confederate Names Gone from National Ranger Memorial. Retired Soldiers Object

Army Wants Confederate Names Gone from National Ranger Memorial. Retired Soldiers Object

military.com · by 5 Jun 2023 Columbus Ledger-Enquirer, Ga. | By Mark Rice · June 5, 2023

More than 100 retired U.S. Army Rangers signed a letter sent to Congressional leaders to "strenuously object to the defacement and desecration of the National Ranger Memorial."

That's how those veterans describe the decision to remove from the memorial the names of Rangers associated with the Confederacy.

The May 23 letter the National Ranger Memorial Foundation sent to Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) and U.S. Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Ala.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, doesn't mention the names targeted for removal.

But an April 28 letter retired Brig. Gen. Joseph Stringham, the foundation's chairman, sent to fellow Rangers says Col. Colin Mahle, garrison commander of Fort Moore (formerly Fort Benning) directed the foundation to remove four names from the thousands on the memorial and the pavers leading to it:

— Confederate Col. John S. Mosby

— William Quantrill

— George Bowman

— Jackson Bowman.

The directive is based on the September 2022 final report the U.S. Department of Defense Naming Commission sent to Congress, which recommended removing names associated with the Confederacy from U.S. military assets.

Last month's change of Fort Benning's name to Fort Moore is part of that process.

In its report, the commission recommended the Army remove Mosby's name from display on the memorial and in the Ranger Hall of Honor at the National Infantry Museum. The commission also recommended the Army remove the names of Quantrill and the two Bowmans from pavers on the walkway leading to the memorial.

The memorial, established in 1992, was constructed and is maintained solely by private donations, according to the foundation.

"In attempting to address the abominable treatment of our citizens of African descent," the foundation's letter says, "Fort Moore leadership has unfortunately taken a one-size-fits-all approach, which is itself abominable treatment of other citizen groups."

___

(c)2023 the Columbus Ledger-Enquirer (Columbus, Ga.)

Visit the Columbus Ledger-Enquirer (Columbus, Ga.) at www.ledger-enquirer.com

Distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC.

military.com · by 5 Jun 2023 Columbus Ledger-Enquirer, Ga. | By Mark Rice · June 5, 2023

13. Ukraine Conflict Update - June 6, 2023 | SOF News

Ukraine Conflict Update - June 6, 2023 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · June 6, 2023

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, tactical situation on the ground, in the air, and on the seas. Additional topics include NATO, aid to Ukraine, refugees, internally displaced personnel, humanitarian efforts, cyber, and information operations.

Image / Photo: Staff Sgt. Dave Servida, 436th Aerial Port Squadron ramp supervisor, directs weapons cargo bound for Ukraine onto a C-17 Globemaster III during a security assistance mission at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, Aug. 19, 2022. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Cydney Lee)

Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).

Big Picture of the Conflict

Failed Winter Offensive (Russia) and Future Counteroffensive (Ukraine). The results of fighting over the winter was costly for both sides of the conflict. Now all eyes are watching the Ukrainian military for its expected spring offensive. Some analysts believe it will be a major attack at one focal point with the intent to thrust deep into the Russian rear area reaching the Sea of Azov. But others think it will be a series of shorter offensives spread across the front line. Currently, Ukraine is attacking Russian logistical depots and command and control centers behind enemy lines with artillery and missiles. Ukrainian officials are being quiet on when the counteroffensive will take place and have mounted a campaign against public disclosure of details – “Words are very unnecessary. They can only do harm”. (Twitter, June 4, 2023)

Has It Begun? There is speculation that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has already begun. U.S. officials say there are signs that a counteroffensive is now underway. Fighting is raging at several points on the front line. Most military analysts believe the attack will be concentrated on southern Ukraine in an attempt to sever the land bridge between western Russia and occupied Crimea.

News Reports on Counteroffensive:

• “This is Ukraine’s D-Day”, by Jamie Dettmer, Politico Europe, June 6, 2023.
• “Ukraine Intensifies Attacks on Russian Frontline Positions”, The New York Times, June 5, 2023. (subscription)
• “Is Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Here?”, The New York Times, June 5, 2023. (subscription)
• “Ukraine war: Kyiv says troops advance on eastern front”, BBC News, June 6, 2023.

NATO-Trained Units and the Coming Offensive. Ukrainian units have had personnel trained by European nations for months. Some of these units have been made from scratch – like the brand-new 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade that received its training at a NATO base in Germany. The 47th brigade and other assault units have been armed with Western weapons, including Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and Leopard tanks, that will allow it to cross minefields and trenches into the deep Russian rear area of operations. “NATO-trained units will serve as tip of spear in Ukraine’s counteroffensive”, The Washington Post, June 4, 2023. (subscription)

Battle for Bakhmut. The fight for the small industrial city on the frontlines in eastern Ukraine is in a temporary operational lull. The Russians appear to have reached their culminating point (no more capacity to conduct offensive operations) and are relying on the use of artillery and mortars to continue the fight around the city. The Russians announced that they achieved their objective of capturing the city. The Russian paramilitary organization, the Wagner Group, is pulling its forces to the rear for rest and refit; while the ground held is being turned over to regular and airborne Russian military troops. A Ukrainian defense spokesman said that at the end of May Ukrainian forces maintained control over the southwestern outskirts and entrance to Bakhmut City.

Increased Global Support for Ukraine. The Biden administration has given the green light for other nations to provide F-16s to Ukraine. This is one of many ‘signals’ that global support for Ukraine has increased and that nations are more willing to provide more lethal offensive weapons to that nation; weapons that can strike deep behind enemy lines and threaten Russian positions in Crimea. Ukraine is enjoying strong support throughout most of the world – even as the conflict rages on. Some think the conflict is at a turning point. “Did Ukraine just win the war?”, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 30, 2023.

Microsoft Report – Russian Cyber Operations. A Microsoft Threat Intelligence report has been published that analyzed Russian tactics over the twelve-month period since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. The 18-page PDF examines what the investigative team has learned about Russian state tactics so far and what may be on the horizon. “A year of Russian hybrid warfare in Ukraine”, Microsoft, March 15, 2023. The United States is reported to have provided $37 million in cybersecurity assistance to Ukraine. (The Kyiv Independent, June 5, 2023).

Ground Situation

Tank Numbers. When the Russians invaded Ukraine in February 2022 they had a significant advantage in tanks and armored vehicles. However, the tank numbers are now about equal due to Russian losses and tanks provided to Ukraine by European nations. “Ukraine now probably has as many tanks as Russia”, Euromaiden Press, June 1, 2023.

Minefields and Fortifications. The Russians have been digging in for months in anticipation of an expected Ukrianian offensive to recapture territory taken by the Russians since February 2022. One expected axis of approach for the Ukrainian offensive is Zaporizhzhia region and the city of Melitopol. However, it is unknown if Ukraine has the necessary quantity of mine clearing and fortification breaching equipment to rapidly push through the Russian lines. “To liberate territory, Ukraine must smash fortified Russian defenses”, The Washington Post, June 2, 2023. (subscription)

SOF – Preparing the Battlefield. Expectations are high for a widely anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive; perhaps too high. However, Kyiv is already making the first moves of the campaign with its special operations forces. “Ukrainian Special Forces – Preparing the Battlefield”, Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), May 22, 2023.

Chechen Leader Criticizes Wagner Group. Ramzan Kadyrov has come out vocally against the leader of the Wagner Group – Yevgeny Prigozhin. He says that the leader of the Russian paramilitary group should not criticize the Russian military and should provide more vocal support for Putin. Chechen “Akhmat” forces have been active on the frontlines supporting the Russian occupation of Ukraine. Prigozhin has accused the Kremlin of fabricating a rift between him and Kadyrov.

The Other Russian Mercenaries. While the Wagner Group gets most of the headlines there are numerous private military groups in Russia . . . some fighting in Ukraine. “Everyone is talking about Wagner. But who are Russia’s other mercenairies?”, Euronews, May 16, 2023.

Sabotage Cells in Russia. Ukraine has cultivated sabotage agents inside Russia and is giving them drones to stage attacks. The drones have been launched from inside Russia; some targeting the Kremlin. (CNN Politics, June 5, 2023).

Situation Maps. War in Ukraine by Scribble Maps. The Institute for the Study of War presents a map that depicts the assessed control of terrain in Ukraine as of March 6, 2023, 3:00 PM ET. View more Ukraine SITMAPs that provide updates on the disposition of Russian forces.

News Updates. A detailed daily update of the war – a daily review – is provided by Euromaidan Press. And, of course, there is the always comprehensive daily report by the Institute for the Study of War.

Fight for the Skies

Air Attacks Continue. Despite reports over the past several months that Russia has been expending its supply of missiles the pace of the air attacks is continuing. A combination of drone and cruise missiles have targeted command and control nodes and logisitical facilities over the past four weeks – many times in the nations capital of Kyiv. In the past month over 400 Iranian Shahed drones and 114 cruise missiles (Politico) have struck Ukraine.

F-16s for Ukraine. There is a lot of support for NATO nations to provide F-16s to Ukraine. After months of public lobbying by Ukraine there appears that some may be going to Ukraine. In May, President Joe Biden said that the U.S. will support training Ukrainian pilots to fly the aircraft and has said he supports the providing of F-16s to Ukraine by Poland and other European nations. While the public may have high expectations for the F-16 there are many factors that will need to be taken into account. “What F-16s Will (and Won’t) Do For Ukraine”, The RAND Blog, May 31, 2023. See also “Ukraine’s Quest for Air Superiority: The Implications of F-16 Fighter Jets in the Conflict”, SOFREP, May 20, 2023.

Drones – Cost Effective. One defense expert has conducted research on the cheapest and most effective means of destroying infantry or armored units. He has found that, in many instances, the use of small drones comes out on top. “Study shows drones the cheapest, most effective in battle against Russian invasion”, Euromaiden Press, May 28, 2023.

Maritime Activities

Ukrainian Naval SOF Unit. A quiet but intense battle is raging near Kherson, which Ukraine recaptured from Russia last year. The fight is happening along the Dnipro River, which divides Ukrainian and Russian-held territory. The 73rd Naval Center of Special Operations appears to be leading the effort for Ukraine. “A secretive SEAL-like unit is leading Ukraine’s shadowy battle against Russia in a vital corner of the country”, Business Insider, May 28, 2023.

Importance of the Black Sea. Mara Karlin, assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans, and capabilities spoke at the Black Sea and Balkans Security Forum in Bucharest, Romania in mid-May 2023. In her comments she stated that the Black Sea is a crucial crossroads for the world and is an area of critical geostrategic importance. “U.S. Official Looks to Deter Russia in Black Sea Region”, DoD News, May 19, 2023.

General Information

Report – Middle East and North Africa: Implications of the Russia-Ukraine War. Congressional Research Service (CRS), updated June 2, 2023, PDF, 30 pages.

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47160

Documentary on Mariupol. A film named “20 Days in Mariupol” made its premiere in Ukraine on June 3, 2023, when it was seen by the first time by some of the Ukrainian medics and first responders who were chronicled in the documentary. The film is a joint project between The Associated Press and PBS Frontline and footage was taken from three Ukrainian journalists who were in Mariupol during the seige and capture by the Russians. “Award-winning Mariupol documentary screened for 1st time in Ukraine”, AP News, June 4, 2023.

Ukraine and Military Observers. History shows us that sending military officers to observe foreign wars yields benefits. We should send some to Ukraine to prepare our forces for the future. “U.S. Military Observers and Why They Are Needed in Ukraine”, War on the Rocks, May 12, 2023.

Additional U.S. Assistance. On May 31, 2023, the U.S. Department of Defense announced that President Biden has authorized the 39th drawdown of U.S. arms and equipment for Ukraine. This will provide an additional $300 million worth of equipment. The security package includes significant air defense capabilities, ammunition for HIMARS and artillery, and other field equipment. Some of the air defense equipment includes additional munitions for Patriot air defense systems, Avenger air defense systems, Stinger antiaircraft systems, and AIM-7 missiles for air defense. A Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine (dated May 31, 2023) details the security assistance provided to Ukraine since February 2022.

Body of U.S. Green Beret Recovered. Nick Maimer, a former U.S. Special Forces soldier, was killed in the embattled city of Bakhmut in mid-May 2023. He was performing humanitarian work and training defense forces when he was killed. The Russian paramilitary organization, Wagner Group, turned the body after efforts by Perry Blackburn, another former Green Beret associated with the non-profit organization AFGfree, interceded into the affair. “Body of US Special Forces Veteran Turned Over by Russian Mercenary Group”, Military.com, May 26, 2023. Watch a video about the death of Maimer in “CNN pieces together clues about American killed in Bakhmut”, CNN World, May 26, 2023.

Commentary

What Ukraine Must Do to Win. Two retired U.S. Special Forces officers, Erik Kramer and Paul Schneider, provide their perspective on what the Ukrainian military needs to do to be victorious in the conflict with Russia. They are co-founders of the Ukraine Defense Support Group headquartered in Kyiv, Ukraine. They observed a series of common trends: lack of mission command, effective training, and combined arms operations. The logistic and maintenance systems are ad hoc. The use of special operations forces needs to be fine-tuned. One specific aspect of training that is needed is the implementation of a 30-day train-the-trainer program that focuses on mission command of combined arms from the brigade level down. “What the Ukrainian Armed Forces need to Do to Win”, War on the Rocks, June 2, 2023.

What is Russia’s Strategy? Putin may have already attained his goals in Ukraine. He has occupied the entire western coastline of the Sea of Azov, captured vital Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov, established a land corridor between Russia and Crimea, and occupied swaths of agricultural and industrial regions of eastern Ukraine. His military will outlast Ukraine’s in a war of attrition, the vital support of western nations may ebb over time, and Ukraine’s economic future is in peril. Read more in “What Is Russia’s Strategy in Ukraine?”, Modern War Institute at West Point, June 5, 2023.

Resources about the Ukraine Conflict

Maps of Ukraine

https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/maps.html

Weapons of the Ukraine War.

https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/weapons.html

Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.

Ukrainian Think Tanks – Brussels. Consolidated information on how to help Ukraine from abroad and stay up to date on events.

UNCN. The Ukraine NGO Coordination Network is an organization that ties together U.S.-based 501c3 organizations and non-profit humanitarian organizations that are working to evacuate and support those in need affected by the Ukraine crisis. https://uncn.one

sof.news · by SOF News · June 6, 2023

14. As Army Chief McConville Prepares To Depart, His Service Is In Its Best Shape In Decades

As Army Chief McConville Prepares To Depart, His Service Is In Its Best Shape In Decades

Forbes · by Loren Thompson · June 6, 2023

It is now less than 60 days until General James McConville, the Army’s 40th Chief of Staff, ends his active military career by entering retirement. Like his childhood neighbor in Quincy, Massachusetts, Marine General Joe Dunford, McConville is one of the most important military leaders of his generation.

Under McConville and his predecessor, General Mark Milley—another Massachusetts boy—the U.S. Army has undergone a transformation of its culture and capabilities.

The Army has never been more professional, more progressive or more imaginative than it is today. Its people are well-trained and motivated, as reflected in high retention rates. Its readiness for combat is unsurpassed in recent history. And its emerging arsenal of weapons for distant sensing, precision strike and agile maneuver is without equal anywhere in the world.

This is a remarkable achievement for a service that consumes barely a fifth of the nation’s military budget, and yet always suffers the most casualties when that nation goes to war. Say what you will about air power or sea power, no form of combat is more demanding than land warfare.

General James McConville, 40th Chief of Staff of the Army.

Wikipedia

You might not think that from a chance encounter with General McConville. Unlike Joint Chiefs Chairman Milley, who has a personality akin to the tanks he once commanded, McConville is an engaging team player who seldom betrays strong feelings. He sticks to his agenda and defends his service without becoming excited.

Being a team player, McConville is predictably humble about the role he has played in transforming the Army. He typically gives credit to the soldiers beneath him, who frequently must face trials unknown to civilians. There aren’t many careers where potentially dying or being disabled at work is an accepted part of the job description.

McConville has seen that side of the Army as a master aviator who commanded in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Like his nominated successor, General Randy George, he has spent his adult life in an institution that has been continuously at war for decades.

But being continuously at war doesn’t guarantee that a military service will be well-led, as President Lincoln learned to his dismay during the early years of the Civil War. What made General McConville’s generation of Army leaders different from many past ones was the emergence of a cohesive and collegial team at the top of the institution that shared a common vision of what the Army must become.

General Milley was a critical player on that team, selected as Army Chief of Staff by President Obama in 2015. Like his predecessors, Milley made readiness his top priority, but he also reorganized the service for a new era of fast-paced, digital warfare—including the creation of a Futures Command in 2018 to oversee the assimilation of new technology.

By that time Milley had been joined by McConville as Vice Chief of Staff, and by two former soldiers that President Trump selected to be Secretary and Under Secretary of the Army. Those two appointees, Mark Esper and Ryan McCarthy, worked with Milley and McConville to fashion a step-by-step modernization plan to revitalize Army technology.

Army modernization had not gone well in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, thanks to big budget cuts followed by a prolonged counter-insurgency campaign in Southeast Asia. As a result, the service had not seen a fundamental overhaul of its core warfighting systems since the Reagan years.

The new team set out to change that by focusing on six pillars of capability—long-range fires, new combat vehicles, advanced rotorcraft, digital networks, air defense and soldier lethality. The Army’s research agenda was reoriented to support those six pillars, and dozens of legacy efforts were scaled back or killed to provide the necessary funding.

Previous Army leadership teams might have argued over priorities, but during McConville’s time as Vice Chief and then Chief of Staff, the team was unified and forceful in support of its goals. Some of those priorities have been proven prescient, as the centrality of fires and threats from drones have demonstrated in Ukraine.

Because General McConville was present at the creation of this modernization vision, he was able to carry it forward in a new administration after Trump’s election defeat. Having a former Army armor officer, Douglas Bush, as head of acquisition in the Biden-era team has certainly helped.

However, it is McConville himself who as Chief of Staff has kept the Army’s modernization agenda on track, something that is often hard to do when political administrations change. McConville’s combat experience and communications skills have helped him to explain the rationale for critical investments, while beating back premature ideas like trying to field unmanned scout aircraft.

So as General McConville makes his final round of visits to Capitol Hill and think tanks as the Army’s top leader, he deserves a hearty round of applause for the role he has played in fostering a renaissance of the world’s premier land force.

McConville has seen his share of setbacks to Army plans over a 40-year career, from seemingly endless fights in Iraq and Afghanistan to the cancellation of previous modernization plans to budget sequestration year after year during the last decade. He knows that the institution is probably in better shape now than at any time since he was commissioned in 1981.

But Washington needs to know it too. James McConville has made a big difference in preparing his service and his nation to deter or defeat in future conflicts. If his successors are half as good as he has been, America’s soldiers will be the best the world has to offer for a long time to come.

Forbes · by Loren Thompson · June 6, 2023

15.  Marine Corps pushes ‘dramatic change’ for its reconnaissance forces

Marine Corps pushes ‘dramatic change’ for its reconnaissance forces

Defense News · by Megan Eckstein · June 5, 2023

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Marine Corps’ Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicle is undergoing testing throughout this year, cementing a previously debatable requirement that senior officials now believe will be critical in Europe, the Middle East and Africa — though too heavy for Pacific environs.

As the Corps continues on its Force Design 2030 modernization quest, it found a “requirement for littoral, multi-domain reconnaissance capabilities that our light armored reconnaissance (LAR) battalions do not currently provide,” reads a Force Design annual update document, released June 5.

The service has long struggled to find a replacement for the 1980s Light Armored Vehicles. In 2021 the Marine Corps awarded Textron and General Dynamics Land Systems contracts to build ARV prototypes, which were submitted in December for testing that began in January and will continue into the third quarter of the year.

The Corps is also testing a BAE Systems’ amphibious combat vehicle outfitted with similar mission equipment as the ARV prototypes: tethered and untethered unmanned aerial systems, electronic warfare systems, long-range weapons and a battle management system that allows vehicles to share information and control a wide battlespace.

Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl, the deputy commandant for combat development and integration, told Defense News in a May 31 interview that the light armored reconnaissance community has been a focus of Force Design experimentation over the past year. The 2022 Force Design update placed great importance on reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance battles.

The service’s analyses show that “we do still have a requirement for some type of LAV thing,” Heckl said. “And it’s going to be ARV. Initially, there were thoughts that perhaps that wasn’t required; it is. When you think of, from an [U.S. Africa Command], a [U.S. Central Command], a [U.S. European Command] perspective, that piece of equipment is necessary.”

While he said the legacy LAVs have a 25mm Bushmaster cannon and drive fast, the ARV “is going to be a node, another part of that sensing ecosystem at the tactical edge that is going to connect other pieces of kill webs and command and control.”

Because that need is clear, Heckl said there would be no delay in evaluating the three ARV prototypes this year and making a decision about down-selecting to a single vendor — though the Marine Corps has not released a timeline for when that decision might occur.

But the new vehicle may not work everywhere.

That is because the Marines’ vision of small units operating dispersed over large areas in the Pacific places a premium on light equipment, said Heckl. Any large vehicle with significant sustainment needs “is probably going to be borderline more of a liability than an asset” in that scenario, he told Defense News.

General Dynamics Land Systems' Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicle. (General Dynamics photo)

Other solutions could include light and ultra-light tactical vehicles and small boats, as forces move around their operating area and increasingly rely on unmanned vehicles to spread out in all directions and help sense the area and pass targeting data to other Marine Corps or joint force units.

“A light reconnaissance entity in the Indo-Pacific is probably going to look dramatically different from one that would be roaming around in Northern Africa or in CENTCOM’s AOR,” he said.

According to the 2023 Force Design update document, the current proposal for new mobile reconnaissance battalions (MRBs) would include maritime reconnaissance (waterborne) companies, light mobile companies and light armored companies, “all with greater reach and lethality.”

To help accelerate the transition from the current LAR battalions to these MRBs, each of the three active-duty LAR battalions will experiment with designing one of the new MRB companies: 1st LAR in California will experiment with the maritime reconnaissance company design; 2nd LAR in North Carolina will experiment with the light mobile company design; and 3rd LAR in California will experiment with the light armored company design.

Scott Lacy, the deputy director at the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, said in the interview that this setup of concurrent experimentation, with each unit responsible for a distinct portfolio, will allow the Marines to answer its remaining questions “at the fastest possible pace.”

1st LAR and I Marine Expeditionary Force will experiment with small boats in support of the maritime reconnaissance company, something that that organization has already done and something the Marine Corps is familiar with from its old riverine squadrons.

The Marines will also pull from lessons learned by the Navy and special operations communities, as well as allies and partners that routinely conduct small boat operations, according to Marine Corps Warfighting Lab commander Brig Gen. Kyle Ellison. This existing body of research will help point the Marines in the right direction for their light reconnaissance platforms, he said.

This research and experimentation with small boats will also include the minimally manned Long-Range Unmanned Surface Vessel that will help provide multidomain reconnaissance, electronic warfare and deception, Col. Daniel Wittnam, the director of the Marine Corps Integration Division, told Defense News.

Heckl acknowledged the magnitude of change the reconnaissance community would see in the coming years, not only absorbing a new vehicle type but also rethinking the mission overall.

In preparing the latest annual Force Design update, he said, “I thought one of the most difficult things we were going to tackle was going to be this very subject, was going to be the MRBs, because it is so broad and I believe at this point the change is going to be so dramatic.”

About Megan Eckstein

Megan Eckstein is the naval warfare reporter at Defense News. She has covered military news since 2009, with a focus on U.S. Navy and Marine Corps operations, acquisition programs and budgets. She has reported from four geographic fleets and is happiest when she’s filing stories from a ship. Megan is a University of Maryland alumna.

16. Opinion | Sunday’s sonic boom was the sound of a system that’s working

And of course it is the sound of freedom (though we do not often get to hear this sound). That is what our daughter said to us on Sunday after we heard the sound and then learned what it was. (we at first thought it was thunder far off in the distance from our home outside of Fort Belvoir)

As an aside, the first word our daughter learned in Korean was airplane. We lived at the end of the runway at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa and she spent the first two years of her life there.. While I was TDY so much they would sitout side and watch the aircraft take off and land

Opinion | Sunday’s sonic boom was the sound of a system that’s working

The Washington Post · by Editorial Board · June 5, 2023

Nearly 22 years after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, a usually invisible but always vigilant network protects the homeland from potential enemies. That system appears to have worked on Sunday afternoon as six F-16 jets scrambled from three locations, including Joint Base Andrews, where President Biden was golfing with his brother, to check on an unresponsive private plane. Two fighter jets intercepted the Cessna and saw its pilot slumped over before it crashed in a remote Virginia forest.

The fighter pilots received unusual permission to break the sound barrier in the race to catch the aircraft. That led to a sonic boom that startled and confused Washington-area residents around 3:10 p.m. This was a rare boom that counted as good news — evidence of the military’s 24/7 readiness to defend against the kind of attack from the sky that hit the Pentagon and World Trade Center two decades ago. This is especially welcome after the Chinese spy balloon debacle earlier this year highlighted vulnerabilities and gaps in the air defense system with regard to high-altitude surveillance.

White House spokesman John Kirby called it a textbook response for dealing with an unresponsive pilot. The plane was flying at 34,000 feet when it reached the Washington area and crossed into D.C.’s flight-restricted zone, created after Sept. 11. It crossed near prohibited airspace that includes the White House, National Mall and the vice president’s residence, where planes are forbidden from flying under 18,000 feet.

Also on the Editorial Board’s agenda

• D.C. Council reverses itself on school resource officers. Good.
• Virginia makes a mistake by pulling out of an election fraud detection group.
• Vietnam sentences another democracy activist.
• Biden has a new border plan.

The D.C. Council voted on Tuesday to stop pulling police officers out of schools, a big win for student safety. Parents and principals overwhelmingly support keeping school resource officers around because they help de-escalate violent situations. D.C. joins a growing number of jurisdictions, from Montgomery County, Md., to Denver, in reversing course after withdrawing officers from school grounds following George Floyd’s murder. Read our recent editorial on why D.C. needs SROs.

Gov. Glenn Youngkin (R) just withdrew Virginia from a data-sharing consortium, ERIC, that made the commonwealth’s elections more secure, following Republicans in seven other states in falling prey to disinformation peddled by election deniers. Former GOP governor Robert F. McDonnell made Virginia a founding member of ERIC in 2012, and until recently conservatives touted the group as a tool to combat voter fraud. D.C. and Maryland plan to remain. Read our recent editorial on ERIC.

In Vietnam, a one-party state, democracy activist Tran Van Bang was sentenced on Friday to eight years in prison and three years probation for writing 39 Facebook posts. The court claimed he had defamed the state in his writings, according to Radio Free Asia. In the past six years, at least 60 bloggers and activists have been sentenced to between 4 and 15 years in prison under the law, Human Rights Watch found. Read more of the Editorial Board’s coverage on autocracy and Vietnam.

The Department of Homeland Security has provided details of a plan to prevent a migrant surge along the southern border. The administration would presumptively deny asylum to migrants who failed to seek it in a third country en route — unless they face “an extreme and imminent threat” of rape, kidnapping, torture or murder. Critics allege that this is akin to an illegal Trump-era policy. In fact, President Biden is acting lawfully in response to what was fast becoming an unmanageable flow at the border. Read our most recent editorial on the U.S. asylum system.

1/5

End of carousel

While it’s a tragedy the plane crashed, killing all four aboard, it’s good news the F-16s did not need to shoot down the aircraft. These pilots were not trigger-happy. They were trained, following carefully crafted rules of engagement.

National Transportation Safety Board investigators, at the crash site Monday, expect to release a preliminary report in about three weeks. Early indicators are that the pilot fell unconscious shortly after taking off in Tennessee, likely because of a loss of cabin pressurization, and the plane ran on autopilot until running out of fuel. Regardless of what the NTSB finds, the military can always learn from episodes such as this one to identify gaps — should the plane have been allowed to stray as close to Washington as it did? — and to make sure they’re ready for a time when a pilot might actually be targeting the nation’s seat of government.

The Washington Post · by Editorial Board · June 5, 2023

17. The Pentagon is to blame for industrial base failures​

Only the Pentagon? What about Congress and the industrial base itself?

Excerpts:

The report’s finding should have instead been that America’s defense-industrial base is failing our warfighters and taxpayers, as the Pentagon has willfully and with foresight created today’s monopolistic, overregulated and costly defense marketplace. That marketplace has left the DoD without the ability to procure at scale the goods and services it needs to fight a major war, demonstrated by munitions shortfalls from the conflict in Ukraine. It’s also left the Pentagon in need of a change to its profit policy as CBS’ “60 Minutes” segment on price gouging in the defense-industrial base recently showed.

...

In short, forced consolidation, faulty Pentagon planning assumptions, a focus on R&D at the expense of procurement, and the cash flow structure of the major defense primes have led us to the situation that we find ourselves in today: We’re in need of warfighting capabilities — a lot of them — but cannot produce them at scale and at prices that a functioning capitalistic market would allow.

The Pentagon is to blame for industrial base failures​

By Maj. Gen. John Ferrari (ret.) and Charles Rahr​

Defense News · by Maj. Gen. John Ferrari (ret.) · June 5, 2023

In April, the Department of Defense released a report on the financial health of the defense-industrial base, spelling out three key findings: the defense industry is financially healthy, the DoD does not need to change its profit and incentive policy, and the Pentagon can procure the goods and services that the American warfighter needs to effectively defend our nation.

Talk about missing the forest for the trees.

The report’s finding should have instead been that America’s defense-industrial base is failing our warfighters and taxpayers, as the Pentagon has willfully and with foresight created today’s monopolistic, overregulated and costly defense marketplace. That marketplace has left the DoD without the ability to procure at scale the goods and services it needs to fight a major war, demonstrated by munitions shortfalls from the conflict in Ukraine. It’s also left the Pentagon in need of a change to its profit policy as CBS’ “60 Minutes” segment on price gouging in the defense-industrial base recently showed.

The origins of today’s defense marketplace are as follows: First, the leadership of major defense primes are mostly compensated with stock awards, which, while substantial, are expected within our capitalistic system. Wall Street then rewards these companies with higher share prices based upon their ability to provide profits for dividends and stock buybacks. But thanks to the Pentagon, these returns are less a result of competitive market forces and more a result of industry consolidation.

In the 1950s and in the 1980s, the Pentagon’s spending power created a healthy, competitive marketplace where defense firms competed on both price and innovative capabilities. This marketplace fostered free and open competition, equipping the United States with the best military in history. Despite this success, the Pentagon killed the proverbial golden goose by consolidating the defense-industrial base in the 1990s, leaving fewer suppliers and, therefore, little competition.

Industry consolidation is but one piece of the puzzle when it comes to how the Pentagon has elevated prices for taxpayers. Another is the Pentagon’s misguided divest-to-invest strategy, which devotes an ever-greater share of the department’s investment dollars to research and development rather than adequately funding procurement. R&D has thinner profit margins, meaning that for every dollar the government spends on R&D, few are able to become profit for contractors.

As the prices for weapons and components increase, the Pentagon orders less of each. With less purchased, the primes are poised to negotiate harder for higher prices so that they can maintain or increase their total profits, further raising the price of their products and leading to even fewer purchases. This means that, in effect, the divest-to-invest strategy is a pricing-to-procurement death spiral, threatening readiness and fair prices.

Elevated prices are also a consequence of the interactions between prime contractors and their array of subcontractors. Not subject to the same payment terms or timely cash flow from the government as the primes, the subcontractors receive less cash themselves. This squeezes the suppliers, already often sole- or single-source, leading to less redundancy and less capacity. The suppliers left standing then become economically powerful, as “60 Minutes” correctly noted.

But what’s most important here is that this results in a lack of surge production.

An inability to surge production is also a product of rosy planning assumptions where the Pentagon’s leaders essentially assume away the problem. The defense-industrial base is healthy if you assume only one very quick war. If this assumption isn’t correct, the Pentagon then believes that allies will pick up the slack, but their weapons’ cupboards are barer than ours.

In short, forced consolidation, faulty Pentagon planning assumptions, a focus on R&D at the expense of procurement, and the cash flow structure of the major defense primes have led us to the situation that we find ourselves in today: We’re in need of warfighting capabilities — a lot of them — but cannot produce them at scale and at prices that a functioning capitalistic market would allow.

Thankfully, the Pentagon can start to turn this around. First, when starting the acquisition of new weapons systems, it should err on the side of not developing them as joint programs, which are essentially a synonym for “contract-to-monopoly.” Consolidation of buying power into the purchase of one system kills off competitors and creates a monopoly; the market for fighter jets shows this to be true.

Secondly, the Pentagon should procure much more, and it should do so by making multiyear procurement contracts and block buys the rule rather than the exception.

Lastly, the federal government can break open the doors to competition by eliminating unnecessary regulations that make it difficult and costly for emerging startups to do business with the DoD.

Failing to take these actions will mean that we’ll be stuck with a defense-industrial base that’s unhealthy, not meeting the needs of the warfighters and, on the most basic level, not providing the American taxpayer with a fair deal. And that’s an industrial base that we shouldn’t accept.

Retired U.S. Army Maj. Gen. John Ferrari is a senior nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute think tank. Ferrari previously served as a director of program analysis and evaluation for the service. Charles Rahr is a research assistant at AEI.

Defense News · by Maj. Gen. John Ferrari (ret.) · June 5, 2023

 18. The Debt Deal’s Defense Threat

No more sequestration. That is a terrible word. We do not need a 2.0.

Excerpts:

As the U.S. dithers with defense spending that barely keeps pace with inflation, the PLA’s budget has nearly doubled in the past decade as China has undertaken an unparalleled modernization program. The prospect of Chinese military supremacy is real.

To avoid Sequestration 2.0, Congress needs to take two concrete steps before the start of the next fiscal year on Oct. 1. First, it should immediately pass a defense appropriation bill. That will demonstrate to adversaries that fiscal debates won’t hamper U.S. military strength. Second, lawmakers should pass a defense supplemental bill—a measure not prohibited under the debt-ceiling deal—that funds the urgent requirements to defend Taiwan and provides sorely needed defense-industrial base upgrades ranging from munitions to shipbuilding. Congress added nearly $70 billion to the Pentagon over the last two fiscal years to begin addressing these needs; it should do the same this year.

The Chinese Communist Party is pressing forward to replace the U.S. as the dominant military power in the Indo-Pacific. Now is not the time to retreat from the competition because Congress failed to agree on how much it ought to spend to keep its lights on.

The Debt Deal’s Defense Threat

The last sequester hurt military preparedness. Republicans can avoid repeating that mistake.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-debt-deals-defense-threat-military-sequester-dod-funding-continuing-resolution-37b51fa8?utm

By Roger Zakheim

June 4, 2023 5:55 pm ET

The U.S. Capitol in Washington, May 30. PHOTO: JONATHAN ERNST/REUTERS

President Biden and Speaker Kevin McCarthy might have pulled themselves out of the debt-ceiling quagmire, but now the real work begins to ensure our military will emerge from the standoff unscathed.

The Fiscal Responsibility Act includes a mechanism that holds defense spending hostage to the passage of all 11 other appropriations bills. Unless Congress enacts all of them or passes a full-year continuing resolution, the agreement subjects the military to a 1% cut below 2023 spending levels. After accounting for inflation, this snap-back sequestration mechanism would be about a 6% cut to the military.

Passing appropriations bills may not seem like a heavy lift, but the last time Congress passed all 12 appropriation bills was 1996. Congress has relied on the annual crutch of continuing resolutions to keep the government funded; over the past 13 years the Defense Department has operated under a continuing resolution 12 times. This inefficient use of taxpayer dollars inevitably results in weapons programs being delayed or denied while diverting the Pentagon’s attention from making our military more lethal. Under a continuing resolution the Pentagon is bound by the previous fiscal year spending levels and can’t start new programs or significantly adjust funding to meet changing needs.

So while Washington has avoided a fiscal crisis, it is on the cusp of inviting a geopolitical crisis: The debt deal’s two-year time frame overlaps with the window that Xi Jinping has set for China’s military to prepare for an annexation of Taiwan.

History is repeating itself. A little more than a decade ago, a Republican House majority tried to reduce federal spending by delivering a budget control act that capped spending for eight years and included a sequester mechanism that would punish the defense budget. We were told then that the sequester would never happen as it would impose draconian cuts on the military that no one would dare stomach.

But it did happen. The military lost a decade of modernization, giving up our margin of safety over China. Military readiness suffered, resulting in degraded deterrence and tragic loss of life owing to insufficient training and poorly maintained platforms. That national defense depends on funding the Environmental Protection Agency or congressional office supplies defies common sense.

Sequestration 2.0 would rapidly erode America’s position in the world. Today’s stakes are higher because the threats are greater.

Still suffering from the 2011 sequestration hangover, the U.S. military has struggled to reconstitute itself to deter or defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The Pentagon is woefully behind in generating the capital necessary to upgrade military platforms and integrate new technology into the force. The war in Ukraine has exposed the shallow capacity of the defense industrial base and the dramatic need to recapitalize defense manufacturing. Combined with ill-defined and underdeveloped operational concepts for how our military ought to fight the People’s Liberation Army, these realities have sowed doubt about whether the U.S. can win a fight in the Indo-Pacific.

As the U.S. dithers with defense spending that barely keeps pace with inflation, the PLA’s budget has nearly doubled in the past decade as China has undertaken an unparalleled modernization program. The prospect of Chinese military supremacy is real.

To avoid Sequestration 2.0, Congress needs to take two concrete steps before the start of the next fiscal year on Oct. 1. First, it should immediately pass a defense appropriation bill. That will demonstrate to adversaries that fiscal debates won’t hamper U.S. military strength. Second, lawmakers should pass a defense supplemental bill—a measure not prohibited under the debt-ceiling deal—that funds the urgent requirements to defend Taiwan and provides sorely needed defense-industrial base upgrades ranging from munitions to shipbuilding. Congress added nearly $70 billion to the Pentagon over the last two fiscal years to begin addressing these needs; it should do the same this year.

The Chinese Communist Party is pressing forward to replace the U.S. as the dominant military power in the Indo-Pacific. Now is not the time to retreat from the competition because Congress failed to agree on how much it ought to spend to keep its lights on.

Mr. Zakheim is director of the Ronald Reagan Institute, a former general counsel for the House Armed Services Committee and a member of the National Defense Strategy Commission.

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the June 5, 2023, print edition as 'The Debt Deal’s Defense Threat'.

19.  Defend ‘every inch’ of NATO territory? New strategy is a work in progress.

Excerpts:

The plan for rapid reinforcements is itself a work in progress.

Stoltenberg made headlines last June with an announcement that the alliance was putting 300,000 troops on high readiness — up from 40,000. Under this new force model, NATO said, troops would be pre-assigned to particular countries, with 100,000 troops deployable within 10 days and an additional 200,000 within 30 days.

The announcement appeared to catch some European defense officials by surprise, and left them wondering if or how their troops were being counted. Almost immediately, NATO officials offered caveats. The overall target number was still conceptual, they said, and national commitments needed to be negotiated. “The train left the station before the tracks were built,” Tomas Jermalavicius, head of studies and research fellow at Estonia’s International Center for Defence and Security, recently told The Post.

Discussion of the proposed new force structure — including which troops would be preassigned to protect which countries and what level of readiness they would need to maintain — is on the agenda for the NATO leaders’ summit in Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital, next month.

Defend ‘every inch’ of NATO territory? New strategy is a work in progress.

By Emily Rauhala and Ellen Nakashima

June 5, 2023 at 5:00 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Emily Rauhala · June 5, 2023

VIITNA, Estonia — They left France in the early hours, flying north and east over sleeping cities until they were less than 100 miles from the Russian border. Then, they jumped.

The French paratroopers who floated into the fields of Estonia in May were part of a stepped-up rehearsal of what it would take to reinforce a battle group if the country — and NATO — were attacked.

Before Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine last year, the multinational troops stationed in the Baltics and Poland were intended as a “tripwire” — a presence just large enough to signal that any aggression would be met with a collective response, and just capable enough to hope to slow down enemy forces until reinforcements arrived.

Now, as part of what NATO bills as its “biggest overhaul” since the Cold War, the alliance claims that it intends to defend “every inch” of its territory from Day One. That is meant as a message to Moscow, as well as reassurance for countries that feared being left to languish under Russian occupation. “How it works is to give a very clear signal to Russia that we are so ready, don’t even think about us,” Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas said in an interview with The Washington Post.

That’s the idea, at least. Roughly a year in, an energized and expanded NATO has more soldiers in allied countries closest to Russia. It is training standby troops to deploy to border states more rapidly. And it is starting to pre-position the kind of heavy weapons and equipment that can’t fit in a paratrooper’s pack.

Yet NATO hasn’t committed to the level of permanent on-the-ground troops that some nations wanted. And interviews with more than a dozen senior officials, as well as former officials and analysts, suggest that the overhaul still has a ways to go before the alliance could repel Russia without losing an inch of territory.

“Being faster than the Russians to get to a critical place is the only metric that matters for effective deterrence, and we still can’t do that,” said retired U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, a former commander of U.S. Army Europe.

“Military mobility is still a problem,” he said. “It is better than it was five years ago, but that’s not the metric that matters.”

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATO has bolstered its eastern flank in part by establishing battle groups in four additional countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. There are now about 10,000 troops spread across eight battle groups, compared with 5,000 in four groups in 2021, according NATO spokesperson Oana Lungescu.

Lungescu said allies have also sent dozens more ships and hundreds more planes to the eastern part of the alliance — especially important for the Baltic nations, which don’t have their own fighter jets.

Allies have additionally deployed an “unprecedented” number of ground-based air defenses, such as Patriot missiles, and air-defense-capable ships at sea, she added.

Other aspects of the strengthened posture are still under debate.

Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said ahead of last year’s NATO summit that the alliance would “enhance” battle groups in the eastern part of the alliance from battalion to brigade level — which generally means, Lungescu said, going from about 1,000 troops to 3,000 or more. The summit declaration, however, hedged that the scale-up would take place “where and when required,” leaving allies to argue over what “required” means in practice.

While past concerns about provoking Moscow with too large a presence have receded, some allies say that a bigger presence isn’t worth the expense and could limit NATO’s flexibility.

Germany, for instance, which leads the battle group in Lithuania, has opposed calls for a permanent brigade there, saying it makes more sense to keep standby forces on German bases. The German military sent another 20 soldiers to Lithuania as a “forward command element” of an additional brigade. Nearly 6,000 more could be there “if necessary,” a spokesperson said, “within the shortest possible time.”

Lithuanian officials counter that because of the country’s geography, Russia could cut it off quickly, with little time for reinforcements to arrive.

The plan for rapid reinforcements is itself a work in progress.

Stoltenberg made headlines last June with an announcement that the alliance was putting 300,000 troops on high readiness — up from 40,000. Under this new force model, NATO said, troops would be pre-assigned to particular countries, with 100,000 troops deployable within 10 days and an additional 200,000 within 30 days.

The announcement appeared to catch some European defense officials by surprise, and left them wondering if or how their troops were being counted. Almost immediately, NATO officials offered caveats. The overall target number was still conceptual, they said, and national commitments needed to be negotiated. “The train left the station before the tracks were built,” Tomas Jermalavicius, head of studies and research fellow at Estonia’s International Center for Defence and Security, recently told The Post.

Discussion of the proposed new force structure — including which troops would be preassigned to protect which countries and what level of readiness they would need to maintain — is on the agenda for the NATO leaders’ summit in Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital, next month.

Officials overseeing the recent exercises in Estonia said training together is important, but further readiness is contingent on knowing which troops would actually be deployed to protect them in a crisis.

“We need to know exactly … these units which are coming, to be interoperable, to exercise with them … how we receive them, how we move them, how we staged them,” said Gen. Martin Herem, military chief of the Estonian defense forces. “That makes everything very fast. If you haven’t done it right, that takes time. Not days, but weeks.”

Estonian military officials say they would like more detail on what might trigger deployments. “We need reinforcements not when Russian aggression starts, but from the moment we see the first indicators and warnings,” Herem said.

Estonian officials are also looking for specific guarantees that the multinational battle group based here will stick around.

“Right now we have bilateral agreements with those countries, and we want to have it in NATO’s plans so that if, you know, one country decides to withdraw their troops here, there’s somebody else coming in,” Kallas said.

The prime minister is pushing others to follow Estonia’s lead in upping military spending to 3 percent of gross domestic product next year. Many allies, though, still aren’t even meeting the NATO standard of 2 percent of GDP. Some countries, Kallas said, hold out hope “that this problem will go away and they don’t actually have to invest in defense.”

Estonia and other nations in Central and Eastern Europe see the threat from Russia as real and existential.

“I think Russia is on a trajectory to conflict or to war with NATO,” Gen. Karel Rehka, chief of the general staff of the Czech Republic, said in an interview in Tallinn, the Estonian capital. “That doesn’t mean they’re planning to do it. NATO doesn’t want to go to war with Russia, just as Russia doesn’t want to go to war with NATO. But that doesn’t mean it cannot happen. There’ve been many wars that no one really planned to have.”

Rehka said he was troubled by the swell of nationalist sentiment in Russia and President Vladimir Putin’s announced plans to expand his military. “Regardless of how the war ends” in Ukraine, Rehka said, “Russia will be more hostile towards us and less predictable.”

Being ready to defend against an enemy like Russia requires conventional military might, Herem said: “Bombs, not cyber.”

Analysts said that to provide credible deterrence and defense, Europe will need to invest in military logistics. Hodges, the former commander of U.S. Army Europe, said there are simply not enough train cars that can carry armored vehicles, or bridges and tunnels wide enough for the stuff of modern warfare.

There is diplomatic work to be done, too. Hodges sees a need for something like a “military Schengen zone” — like Europe’s borderless travel and trade zone — that would allow NATO military convoys to “cross borders with the same ease as truckloads of apples.”

Building trust is also key, said Camille Grand, a Frenchman who was until last year NATO’s assistant secretary general for defense investment and is now a distinguished policy fellow with the European Council on Foreign Relations.

The disagreement between Germany and Lithuania over troop levels “has to do with political and military trust,” he said. The Lithuanians worry that German reinforcements might be held up by political delays or might show up lacking the relevant capabilities, he said. “This is why the Lithuanians are pushing so hard to ask, ‘Are they worth their word?’”

Lungescu, the NATO spokesperson, said German troops this month will practice reinforcing Lithuania’s battle group to brigade level. The alliance’s efforts “strike the right balance between a greater military forward presence and the ability to quickly send reinforcements,” she said. “There should be no misunderstanding about NATO’s will and ability to protect every ally.”

Estonian officials say they trust that NATO would come to their aid and that the alliance would ultimately prevail in any conflict with Russia.

“I am quite sure that if Russia acts, then NATO will win,” Herem said. “However, if you look at a map, then how much of Estonia and for how long will we have to cede territory?”

He continued: “There will be books about how small, heroic Ukraine defended against Russia and was successful. If you go deeper, and look at what they have lost, it’s a tragedy.”

“To avoid this, we must be much more ready than we are today.”

Nakashima reported from Tallinn.

The Washington Post · by Emily Rauhala · June 5, 2023

20. Destruction of Ukraine Dam Floods Front Line, Scrambling Battle Plans

Using a man-made disaster as a defensive operation? I always think about the dma on the north side of the DMZ and a north Korean induced flood of South Korea will do. We have so much to learn from Putin's War in Ukraine.

Destruction of Ukraine Dam Floods Front Line, Scrambling Battle Plans

Russia and Ukraine blame each other for blowing up the dam and power plant as thousands face imminent flooding

https://www.wsj.com/articles/major-dam-destroyed-in-russian-occupied-ukraine-8cd10725?mod=hp_lead_pos1

By Matthew LuxmooreFollow

 and Bojan PancevskiFollow

Updated June 6, 2023 7:26 am ET

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The destruction of the dam in southern Ukraine has put thousands of homes at risk. Photo: Ukrainian Presidential Office/Associated Press

KYIV, Ukraine—A major dam and power station in a Russian-occupied part of Ukraine were destroyed Tuesday, casting uncertainty over Ukraine’s planned counteroffensive in the south of the country.

Both sides accused each other of being responsible for an incident that caused serious flooding, put thousands of homes at risk and potentially threatened the safety of Europe’s largest nuclear power plant.

The destruction of the dam could win Russia time to reconfigure its defenses while at the same time depriving Ukraine of some options for its expected counteroffensive. Crossing the vast Dnipro river along that stretch of the front will now become impossible, said Nico Lange, a former German Defense Ministry official. 

Approximate area where the dam was destroyed

RUSSIA

UKRAINE

Zaporizhzhia

Dam destroyed near the town of

Nova Kakhovka

Zaporizhzhia

nuclear plant

Kherson

CRIMEA

100 miles

100 km

Black Sea

Note: Approximate locations shown.

Russia could now redeploy resources from the southwest to reinforce other sections of the front, said Lange, now a fellow with the Munich Security Conference, a global security forum.

Kyiv has kept a tight lid on where its counteroffensive would focus, but military experts have long said one of its main goals could be to sever the land bridge built between Russia and the Crimean Peninsula that Moscow annexed in 2014. The flooded region would have been one pathway to do so.

The destruction of the dam was likely a desperate act by Moscow to break the momentum of the unfolding Ukrainian offensive, Lange said, adding that Kyiv must have a contingency plan following earlier claims that Russian forces had mined the dam.

“Russia can now…reinforce the front line in the Zaporizhia region, and possibly to the east as well, because there is no longer a threat of Ukraine actually crossing the Dnieper,” he said.

In one upside for Ukraine, the flooding could also wash away fortifications and minefields put up by Russian forces in the area.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said he had convened his national security and defense council to discuss the incident. ”We’re doing everything to save people,” Zelensky said in a post to his Telegram channel. He previously said the dam’s destruction, which he blamed on Russia, “only confirms for the whole world that they must be expelled from every corner of Ukrainian land.”

Russia blamed the dam’s collapse on Ukrainian shelling overnight into Tuesday.

“We can definitely declare a deliberate sabotage on the part of the Ukrainian side,” said Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov. The sabotage was aimed to deprive Crimea of water and distract attention from the failure of the Ukrainian offensive, Peskov said.

A satellite image showing the dam last month. PHOTO: MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES/VIA REUTERS

Floodwaters in Nova Kakhovka, the Russian-occupied town that adjoins the dam. PHOTO: ALEXEI KONOVALOV/ZUMA PRESS

Footage posted online in the early hours of Tuesday showed vast quantities of water moving downstream from the power station—which separates Ukrainian and Russian-held parts of the Kherson region—and flowing through spaces where buildings comprising the power station have collapsed or been blown up.

The dam contains about 18 million cubic meters of water, according to Ukrainian officials, and flooding endangers more than 80 settlements, including the major regional capital of Kherson.

The destruction could affect the water supply to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which relies on the reservoir to cool its reactors, experts say. A spokesman for Ukraine’s state nuclear energy company said water levels in the Kakhovka reservoir that supplies water to the plant were rapidly decreasing, but levels inside the plant’s cooling pond were currently sufficient.

All of the plant’s six reactors have been in cold shutdown mode for months and the flooding is happening downstream from the facility. Reactors in shutdown mode still need small amounts of water for cooling, but the plant has sufficient reserves as part of its contingency plans, said Mark W. Nelson, managing director of Radiant Energy Group, an energy consulting firm. In case the water supply ceased entirely, the plant management could bring in cooling waters by trucks or other means, he added.

The Moscow-appointed mayor of Nova Kakhovka, the Russian-occupied town that adjoins the dam, said shelling at around 2 a.m. on Tuesday had caused it to collapse. He didn’t specify what side the shelling had come from.

“As a result water from the Kakhovka reservoir has begun to flow uncontrollably downstream,” the Russian-appointed official, Vladimir Leontyev, was quoted as saying. He said there was no need for an immediate evacuation of residents.

The governor of Ukraine’s Kherson region, which is partly controlled by Russia, said water levels were expected to reach a critical point within five hours, and said authorities had begun to evacuate Ukrainian-controlled settlements closest to the dam.

Mustafa Nayyem, the head of Ukraine’s State Agency for Restoration and Infrastructure Development, said the destruction of the power station could have catastrophic consequences for the Zaporizhzhia plant.

The Kakhovka power station supplies electricity to more than three million people in Ukraine and is a crucial part of the country’s energy infrastructure, Nayyem said. It also supplies water to the Russian-occupied Crimean Peninsula, which is part of Ukraine’s sovereign territory.

“Blowing up the Kakhovskaya Hydroelectric Power Plant will have devastating consequences, including a decadelong water shortage in Crimea, irreparable damage to hundreds of thousands of lives, and the risk of drowning for thousands,” Nayyem said in a post on Twitter.

Beyond posing a danger to the functioning of the nuclear power plant and threatening thousands of homes downstream, the destruction of the plant could also have consequences for an expected Ukrainian counteroffensive to retake occupied territory, including in the south.

The dam had already suffered damage in October when its sluices were destroyed as Russian forces sought to retreat from Kherson amid an ultimately successful Ukrainian offensive to retake the southern city. Ukraine and Russia at the time accused each other of plans to blow up the dam.

The flooding could endanger more than 80 settlements, including the major regional capital of Kherson. PHOTO: SERGIY DOLLAR/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

The flood will also hit Ukraine’s large agricultural industry, which is one of Kyiv’s main sources of revenue and a key supplier of grains for the developing world. Video footage on social media showed submerged grain storage while local farmers said that water above the dam was used to irrigate their crops. Farmers in occupied Crimea will also be hit because this water is key to their own harvests.

“My business is over because we will not have water at all,” said Petro Grigoriev, an asparagus farmer just north of Crimea in an occupied part of the Kherson region. Mr. Grigoriev said that while his fields weren’t flooded, his crop is watered from a canal that came out of the reservoir.

Grain futures rose on the back of the destruction. Chicago wheat futures were up 1.9% and corn gained 0.8% in morning European trade.

The dam has been destroyed before in its long history. The Soviets demolished it in 1941 to halt the advance of Nazi Germany’s troops in World War II. The Nazis then repaired it, only to blow it up again when they were retreating in 1943.

Alistair MacDonald contributed to this article.

Write to Matthew Luxmoore at matthew.luxmoore@wsj.com and Bojan Pancevski at bojan.pancevski@wsj.com

21. What are disinformation and extremism? And why should troops be aware?

Some of the basics.

Excerpts:

To start with, in the broadest definition, disinformation is any false information that is created deliberately to mislead people. It’s often spread covertly with the intention of influencing public opinion or obscuring the truth, according to Merriam-Webster’s dictionary

U.S. government leaders have taken a more nuanced approach. The Department of Homeland Security says disinformation can be targeted toward an individual, social group, organization or country. It’s typically spread with malice or greed and in pursuit of political, social or financial agendas, according to the Anti-Defamation League. At the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Department of Defense said the most harmful disinformation is that which sows global mistrust and confusion.

This kind of disinformation can come in various forms and includes hoaxes, propaganda and spear phishing, according to the United Nations.

...

Among the slightly varying descriptions of disinformation from dictionaries, government agencies, nonprofits and international organizations, one key word is consistent: “deliberate.” The deliberate nature of disinformation is what differentiates it from misinformation.

Misinformation, while also false, is not shared with the intention of causing harm, DHS says. Or as the American Psychological Association put it, misinformation is getting the facts wrong.

...

When officials talk about extremism in the military, they generally focus on extremism in terms of religious, political or social ideologies.

The Pentagon lists one broad definition of extremism in the Department of Defense Instruction 1325.06. The directive makes clear that the actions matter most, specifically, violent action: “Advocating or engaging in unlawful force, unlawful violence, or other illegal means to deprive individuals of their rights under the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States…” And also advocating, engaging in, supporting or encouraging things like subversion, sedition or unlawful discrimination.

Each branch develops its own policies to enforce the DoD’s top-down guidance.

However, anti-extremism watch groups and academia break down extremism into non-violent extremism and domestic violent extremism.

What are disinformation and extremism? And why should troops be aware?

By Nikki Wentling and Allison P. Erickson

militarytimes.com · by Nikki Wentling · June 5, 2023

On Jan. 6, 2021, myths about voter fraud in the 2020 presidential election drove supporters of former President Donald Trump to the U.S. Capitol, where they attempted to stop Congress from certifying the results. About one in six people charged for storming the Capitol that day had connections to the military.

That event and others like it have opened a flood of debate about veteran and military communities being targeted with disinformation and the rise of extremism among the ranks.

Consider how Jan. 6, 2021 is described: as the “Capitol riot” or “insurrection” by most Democrats and many independents and centrist Republicans, or a “peaceful protest” by GOP supporters of President Donald Trump, shows a deepening divide between the two main U.S. political parties – a gulf arguably widened and supercharged by political-party- and nation-state-sponsored disinformation, leaving disgruntled followers potentially vulnerable to extremist ideology.

As part of an 18-month project through a partnership between Military Times and Military Veterans in Journalism, we’ll be reporting about disinformation and extremism as the issues relate to veterans and military communities. To start, we’ve compiled a list of frequently asked questions about extremism and disinformation in the military we will update throughout the year.

If you have a tip or idea, please email us at MVJ-Tips@militarytimes.com.

What is disinformation?

To start with, in the broadest definition, disinformation is any false information that is created deliberately to mislead people. It’s often spread covertly with the intention of influencing public opinion or obscuring the truth, according to Merriam-Webster’s dictionary

U.S. government leaders have taken a more nuanced approach. The Department of Homeland Security says disinformation can be targeted toward an individual, social group, organization or country. It’s typically spread with malice or greed and in pursuit of political, social or financial agendas, according to the Anti-Defamation League. At the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Department of Defense said the most harmful disinformation is that which sows global mistrust and confusion.

This kind of disinformation can come in various forms and includes hoaxes, propaganda and spear phishing, according to the United Nations.

Another tool for spreading disinformation, known as synthetic media, is becoming more prolific following recent advances in artificial intelligence. Synthetic media refers to AI-created text, images and audio. One of the most notorious forms of synthetic media are deepfakes, images or videos in which the face of one person is overlaid onto another person, often in real time.

Images created by Eliot Higgins with the use of artificial intelligence show a fictitious skirmish with Donald Trump and New York City police officers posted on Higgins' Twitter account. The highly detailed, sensational images, which are not real, were produced using a sophisticated and widely accessible image generator. (AP Photo/J. David Ake)

What is misinformation?

Among the slightly varying descriptions of disinformation from dictionaries, government agencies, nonprofits and international organizations, one key word is consistent: “deliberate.” The deliberate nature of disinformation is what differentiates it from misinformation.

Misinformation, while also false, is not shared with the intention of causing harm, DHS says. Or as the American Psychological Association put it, misinformation is getting the facts wrong.

How about the lesser-known term, malinformation?

Unlike both disinformation and misinformation, malinformation is based on fact. It’s true information that is used for harmful or manipulative purposes, according to DHS.

In many cases, malinformation refers to situations in which facts are used out of context, such as editing a video to remove key information. It can also refer to information that stems from the truth but has been exaggerated to mislead, the Government of Canada said in a recent report. For example, some alternative media sites that rely on outrage to generate views will distort headlines, a tactic known as “click-bait.”

Doxxing – the practice of publicly revealing someone’s private information without consent – also falls under the umbrella of malinformation, the Anti-Defamation League said.

Who is deploying disinformation?

A variety of sources from homegrown extremists to foreign adversaries create disinformation targeted toward the American public.

Disinformation is spread by foreign states, including Russia, China and Iran, as well as transnational criminal groups and human smuggling organizations. Other governments have accused the U.S. of spreading disinformation in their countries, too. China said earlier this year that the U.S. spread rumors about data security issues with the Chinese company TikTok in an effort to suppress foreign businesses.

The State Department works to counter disinformation from Russia, which creates and spreads false narratives in order to confuse people and advance the Kremlin’s policy goals, the agency said. Russia and other actors spread disinformation to exploit the American public, and they often target the country during national emergencies, according to DHS.

Particularly after disasters, disinformation spreaders use social media to deny the event ever happened or claim it’s a “false flag,” meaning a covert operation by authorities that frames someone else. One of the most recent examples of this came after a train carrying hazardous items derailed in Ohio, when conspiracy theories spread that the wreck was a planned, deliberate attack by the U.S. government.

Disinformation can also come from U.S. citizens. Alex Stamos, Facebook’s former security chief, went so far as to say in 2020 that “the future of disinformation is going to be domestic.”

So-called domestic disinformation, which comes from message boards, websites and social media accounts, is created by both far-left and far-right individuals. However, two recent studies from the University of North Carolina and New York University found it’s more often a right-wing phenomenon. This homegrown disinformation bubbles up from message boards and finds its way onto ideological websites and social media. Its consequences are sometimes deadly. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, or CSIS, reported there were a historically high number of far-left and far-right terrorist attacks in 2021, and far-right attacks were more lethal.

Elected officials also have participated in the spread of disinformation. The University of Oxford found that politicians running for office in 45 democracies, including the U.S., have shared false information to gain voter support.

What is extremism?

When officials talk about extremism in the military, they generally focus on extremism in terms of religious, political or social ideologies.

The Pentagon lists one broad definition of extremism in the Department of Defense Instruction 1325.06. The directive makes clear that the actions matter most, specifically, violent action: “Advocating or engaging in unlawful force, unlawful violence, or other illegal means to deprive individuals of their rights under the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States…” And also advocating, engaging in, supporting or encouraging things like subversion, sedition or unlawful discrimination.

Each branch develops its own policies to enforce the DoD’s top-down guidance.

However, anti-extremism watch groups and academia break down extremism into non-violent extremism and domestic violent extremism.

DHS and Federal Bureau of Investigation use the term domestic violent extremism to refer to domestic terrorism threats, or U.S.-based, non-foreign influenced actions “through unlawful acts of force or violence dangerous to human life.” There’s an emphasis here on the “action,” since harboring extreme or hateful opinions or ideology may be considered protected under the First Amendment’s freedom of speech. You can have a hateful thought or opinion, you can voice that thought or opinion, but you can’t perform a hateful act without legal consequences.

One report by the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), an academic research center, collected data on instances of extremism since World War II and defines non-violent extremism as “individuals who engage in illegal extremist activity short of violence or who belong to a violent extremist group but do not participate in violent activities.” Again, the key here isn’t simply having an extreme belief, but acting violently from or on behalf of that belief.

White nationalist demonstrators walk into Lee park surrounded by counter demonstrators in Charlottesville, Va., on Aug. 12, 2017. (Steve Helber/AP)

How widespread is extremism and disinformation among military communities?

The extent to which extremism has seeped into military and veteran communities is a contentious debate on Capitol Hill and around the country. The argument about whether it’s a problem has heightened since the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol, when some Trump supporters believed the election was stolen and sought to overturn his loss.

There’s a lack of data about the infiltration of extremism in the active-duty military, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, a bipartisan, nonprofit think tank. Experts generally agree that only a small number of service members have been involved in extremist activities, but some argue that even a tiny proportion could damage the military’s reputation and harm U.S. security.

There’s more data available about veterans’ adoption of extremist views, and research in this arena has increased in the past two years.

Here’s a snapshot of what the data says:

• Of the rioters in the Jan. 6 attack on the Capitol, 17% were veterans, Harvard University found. The same study showed that nearly all participants in the siege that day had shared or received misinformation about the 2020 election on social media platforms.

• Veterans were responsible for 10% of all domestic terrorist attacks and plots between 2015 and 2021, according to the CSIS. Veterans make up about 5% of the overall adult population in the U.S., according to data from the Bureau of Labor and Statistics in May.

• Individuals with military backgrounds make up 15% of the cases in a database kept by the University of Maryland that tracks people who were driven by their extremist views to commit criminal offenses. Together, veterans and service members account for 6% of the U.S. population as of May.

• The University of Maryland’s data shows a “significant uptick” in the past five years of people with military backgrounds who have committed extremist offenses. From 1990 to 2010, an average of seven people with military histories were added to the database every year. That increased to 63 people per year from 2018 to 2022.

Protesters gather in front of the U.S. Capitol Building on January 6, 2021 in Washington, DC, to protest the ratification of President Joe Biden's Electoral College victory over former President Donald Trump in the 2020 election. A pro-Trump mob later stormed the Capitol, breaking windows and clashing with police officers. Five people died as a result. (Photo by Brent Stirton/Getty Images)

A brief history of violent military extremists

Acts of violent extremism aren’t new to the U.S. military. The DOD tried addressing tensions following the Civil Rights Movement in a policy in 1969, but incidents continued.

Then in the early 1980′s former Army Green Beret and retiree Frazier Glenn Miller started a white nationalist paramilitary group called the White Patriot Party in Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Miller’s recruits wore Battle Dress Uniforms with Confederate flag patches sewn onto the left shoulder. Miller had plans to start a race war and used active-duty soldiers to create a weapons cache. Federal agents infiltrated the group before a major catastrophic event.

On April 19th, 1995 a former Army sergeant and special forces selection washout named Timothy McVeigh bombed a federal building in Oklahoma City killing 168 and injuring 684. That event is known as the deadliest domestic extremist act in the U.S. to date. Federal investigators later found McVeigh harbored antigovernment extremist ideology and even visited the Branch Davidian compound in Waco before the federal standoff there. The bombing in Oklahoma City prompted the Department of Defense’s next revision of its extremism policies.

Nidal Hasan’s name went down in infamy on November 5th, 2009. The then Army major opened fire on soldiers and civilians preparing to deploy at a readiness processing center on Fort Hood (now Fort Cavazos) near Killeen, Texas. Hasan killed 13 and injured more than 30 others. Prosecutors later argued in his trial that he had planned his attack to align with his views on Islamic extremism. He acted alone, but under the umbrella of a hateful or extremist ideology.

In terms of disinformation, one example occurred in March 2015, when residents in small towns across Texas began hearing whispers among social media networks that an annual military exercise known as “Jade Helm” was actually an attempt to suppress the locals, seize guns, and enforce martial law. The uproar kicked up enough of a ruckus that the governor enacted the Texas State Guard to oversee the national military’s operations. Years later, a former Central Intelligence Agency director revealed that Russia had launched a disinformation attack against the U.S. government.

This undated photo shows the north side of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and the damage caused by a car bomb explosion on April 19, 1995. Former Army Sgt. Timothy McVeigh was convicted in the bombing. (AFP/Getty Images)

What is Congress’ role in helping solve these problems?

Republicans and Democrats disagree about whether it’s necessary to address extremism among military and veteran communities.

In the wake of the Jan. 6 attack, Democrats urged the Pentagon to do more to counter extremism in the ranks, and they pushed the Department of Veterans Affairs to intervene when veterans show signs of being susceptible to recruitment by extremist groups.

Many Republicans, however, have attempted to halt Defense Department training aimed at countering extremism, criticizing it as a distraction from military preparedness and an effort to politicize the armed forces. Some Republicans have taken issue in particular with a daylong extremism “stand-down” in 2021, a military-wide training on the dangers of extremist ideology.

Lawmakers opposed to such training were able to cut seven of eight measures aimed at combatting domestic extremism from the annual defense policy bill, a legislative fight that is sure to come up in defense budget wrangling again this year.

This story was produced in partnership with Military Veterans in Journalism.

Nikki Wentling covers disinformation and extremism for Military Times. She's reported on veterans and military communities for eight years and has also covered technology, politics, health care and crime. Her work has earned multiple honors from the National Coalition for Homeless Veterans, the Arkansas Associated Press Managing Editors and others.

Allison Erickson is a journalist and U.S. Army Veteran. She covered military and veterans' affairs as the 2022 Military Veterans in Journalism fellow with The Texas Tribune and continues to cover the military community. She has written and reported on topics such as migration, politics, and health.

22. A Sanctuary No Longer? Examining the Defense Department’s Prioritization of the Homeland

Those two oceans are no longer enough for our defense.

Conclusion:

In short, whether the United States has really lost its “sanctuary” status depends on the type of attack you’re talking about. While countries like Russia and China can attack the United States directly, they are no more likely to do so now than they have been for decades. Additionally, although some nations may boast about their long-range strike capabilities, the list of nations capable of invading or conducting a strike on the U.S. homeland is small and full of allies. Furthermore, while nonstate attacks are becoming easier and potentially more likely, there is not now, nor has there been for generations, a sanctuary from a terrorist/criminal organization or state-sponsored covert action.

Yet the risk of a state-sponsored but deniable nonkinetic attack on the homeland as part of a broader conflict is growing. The U.S. Army has acknowledged that this threat “extends beyond directly targeting unit personnel and equipment,” conceding that military operations rely “on various interdependent infrastructures, the majority of which it does not own or operate.” Consequently, such actions affect more than a military deployment timeline. While a nonkinetic attack may drastically slow a military response to a crisis and frustrate those allies and partners who rely on the United States, it also has the potential to wreak havoc on the American way of life. In this context, the homeland is no longer a sanctuary, and this scoped realization may have strategic implications. By disrupting force flow and changing what equipment is sent abroad or making the U.S. military “late to need” in an international crisis, an adversary may undermine America’s role in the international system. At the same time, this type of attack directed at U.S. infrastructure can erode the population’s trust in the government, something easily amplified through disinformation tactics and social media.

The homeland should remain a priority. However, there is no new armor or ammunition that can mitigate nonkinetic attacks. Nor will the military prevent a cyber attack by strategically staging its forces nationwide. Moving forward, any Defense Department restructuring or shift in focus should be couched in a threat assessment and address the challenges of the new operating environment. An article in these pages contended that the “United States can reasonably assume some additional risks to confront undesirable adversary cyber behavior.” To do so effectively, an Army cyber operations officer recently argued that the United States “should assert a cyberspace border.” Beyond this, establishing redundancies in key systems and infrastructure could also reduce vulnerabilities. Ultimately, though, a different approach is necessary, one that appreciates exactly what form of sanctuary has been lost. For the foreseeable future, power projection vulnerabilities and nonkinetic attacks are problems without easy solutions.

A Sanctuary No Longer? Examining the Defense Department’s Prioritization of the Homeland - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Brennan Deveraux · June 6, 2023

A decade ago, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey declared, “Our homeland is not the sanctuary it once was.” Five years later, in 2018, the National Defense Strategy codified this sentiment: “It is undeniable that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary.” This statement has subsequently become the rallying cry of those demanding a refocus on defending the U.S. homeland and an accepted premise for reimagining the Defense Department’s role inside the United States. But has the United States really lost its sanctuary status?

The claim that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary has morphed into a potentially misleading mantra with many possible meanings. As a result, it is more important than ever to distinguish between a range of different threats. The homeland is hardly more vulnerable to a missile strike or land invasion today than it was at the height of the Cold War. Instead, a recent technological shift has made U.S. infrastructure more vulnerable, directly impacting U.S. military power projection. Large movements across the country, from secured forts to ports of embarkation, present a tempting target for any adversarial nation interested in disrupting the U.S. military through difficult-to-attribute unconventional or nonkinetic means. At the same time, these disruptive technologies provide adversaries the tools to erode the American way of life, sowing chaos without openly “attacking” the homeland. It is in this specific context that the United States is no longer a sanctuary.

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This threat shift has strategic implications. The technological revolution of nonkinetic means provides adversarial nations new tools to weaken the United States by slowing military response times in support of crises, introducing chaos into a generally stable economy, and fanning the flames of controversial domestic debates. Stated another way, if nations like Russia or China aim to supplant the United States in the international system, the proliferation of nonkinetic options provides a path for them to win without fighting.

A Turn of Phrase

With the U.S. focus shifting away from Iraq and Afghanistan and back to near-peer threats like China and Russia, the emphasis on defending the homeland has intensified significantly. While the “Global War on Terror” may have been touted as a means to keep America safe (a controversial concept), its design was to address threats where they originate, to play the away game. Therefore, this shift is effectively a transition from the defend-forward mindset. While the United States will always maintain a forward presence with basing and alliances — working to keep the fight abroad — this new mindset acknowledges that America is vulnerable, a paradigm shift that forces the U.S. military to adapt to a new reality.

This was the essence of General Dempsey’s 2013 remarks. For a conventional threat, he contended that “middleweight militaries now have intercontinental ballistic missiles.” In the nonkinetic realm, he highlighted the rise of cyber in a military context. Though still an emerging capability at the time, Dempsey argued that “cyber has reached a point where bits and bytes can be as destructive as bullets and bombs.” With these thoughts in mind, he concluded that “our homeland is not the sanctuary it once was.”

Two pieces of context are crucial for understanding Dempsey’s remarks. First, he assessed vulnerability with reference to an active conflict. In examining a future war, he noted that if the United States is “engaged in a conflict virtually anywhere in the globe there is likely to be some effect in the homeland.” This coupling of conflict abroad and vulnerability at home is critical to understanding the role of any potential enemy attack — lethal or nonlethal. Second, these comments emerged amongst a budgetary battle that did not favor the Defense Department. As a result, this vulnerability rhetoric fits a historical narrative of exaggerating threats to secure funding or bolster support. A similar argument could well be made today concerning China, given the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the U.S. military’s limited role in the Middle East. However, the department’s continued and consistent prioritization of the homeland challenges that line of reasoning, highlighting the threat in times of both growing and shrinking budgets.

More recently, in 2018, the National Defense Strategy reinforced the linkage between an attack on the United States and an active conflict: “During conflict, attacks against our critical defense, government, and economic infrastructure must be anticipated.” In contrast to 2013, the Defense Department was not facing any budgetary constraints at this time — quite the opposite. Even while the Pentagon was confronting the Islamic State and preparing for the rise of China, the homeland remained a priority, culminating in the 2022 National Security Strategy and the 2022 National Defense Strategy.

Sanctuary!

In the context of homeland defense, sanctuary can be understood by examining the scope of a conflict. Established boundaries — informal and formal — are often present in warfare. Crossing these boundaries could lead to war escalation, loss of allies, reduced public support, or similar consequences.

Three examples of this type of sanctuary stand out for the United States. First, the U.S. military avoided conducting operations or strikes on mainland China during the Korean War for fear of escalation. Second, North Vietnamese fighters would retreat into Laos and Cambodia during the Vietnam War, believing the United States could not follow. While the United States conducted limited cross-border operations into Cambodia, these actions brought criticism from U.S. voters and Congress. Notably, these actions were eventually a factor in the passage of the War Powers Act, which was “designed to limit the U.S. president’s ability to initiate or escalate military actions abroad.”

The third example — less tangible but more applicable to homeland defense — is the great power sanctuary of the Cold War. While the United States and the Soviet Union regularly engaged in international actions often directed against the interests of the other (arming the Afghans in the 1980s, for example), the homelands of both states were “off limits” for fear of nuclear escalation. This did not mean the threat did not exist — think of the Cuban Missile Crisis — just that the deterrence model held. Although the Cold War is over, this concept of sanctuary largely remains. Even as the United States openly provides Ukraine with advanced weapons systems to fight Russia, President Joe Biden told reporters that the United States is “not going to send to Ukraine rocket systems that strike into Russia.”

What Changed?

So, what changed? The answer lies in the increasing threat of nonkinetic attacks, fueled by a technological revolution and the yet-to-be-seen implications of emerging technologies like cyber, artificial intelligence, and machine learning.

Kinetic attacks are overt acts like military invasions or missile strikes. While a land invasion in North America seems highly unlikely, a missile strike has been a credible threat for decades. Still, long-range missile proliferation is nowhere near as far along as some pundits may claim. Outside of allies like France and England, only Russia and China have a proven capability to strike the U.S. homeland with a missile launched from their territory. While North Korea appears to have recently joined this list, and nations like Iran aspire to do the same, the list remains incredibly small. Advancements in cruise missile technology, hypersonic flight, and varying delivery platforms do complicate this situation and increase the threat. But while this increased threat should be addressed, its nature is not new. The U.S. Navy has been posturing against adversary ships since the Cold War. The U.S. Air Force has a long history of interdicting any foreign aircraft approaching U.S. airspace, limiting how an enemy could use these missile technology advancements.

Moreover, as the Defense Department stated in the 2022 Missile Defense Review, the “United States will continue to rely on strategic deterrence — underwritten by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal” in order to meet new missile threats. This has been the foundation of U.S. missile policy since these weapons started proliferating globally. Theoretically, the United States has been vulnerable to a missile attack for decades, but at an extremely high cost to the attacker. Consequently, unless a future conflict was with one of these other powers and their “sanctuary” was already violated, it is unlikely an adversarial nation would escalate the conflict with a kinetic attack on the U.S. homeland. The Army reached a similar conclusion in its recent publication of Field Manual 3-0, Operations, writing that “while a conventional attack on U.S. forces conducting operations during competition is unlikely, the greater the perceived danger to their vital national interests, the greater the chance a peer threat will contest U.S. military force projection.” Therefore, the status quo that has generally established mutual deterrence between great and rising powers remains unchanged, regardless of recent technological advancements.

While an overt attack remains unlikely, a nonstate attack is a distinct possibility. This includes operations conducted by nonstate actors like terrorist organizations, criminal organizations, and even covert actions by a state seeking deniability. While U.S. geography makes the nation less vulnerable than its European counterparts, few would categorize the United States as a “sanctuary” from this type of attack. As shown on September 11, the United States probably lost this sanctuary status long ago. But even if technological advancements increase the number of these attacks, this does not equate to a fundamental shift that requires reimagining the nature of homeland defense.

Nonkinetic attacks, however, are different. While bits and bytes have not yet proved as damaging as bullets and bombs, nonkinetic weapons have shown their relevance. From the STUXNET cyber attack to Russia’s use of electronic warfare in its 2014 Ukraine invasion, they foreshadow a different kind of warfare. If, for example, the United States found itself in a conflict against China, Beijing could conduct a cyber attack to slow America’s flow of forces from its forts to a port. This would not only disrupt U.S. military operations, but it would also cost the nation money and credibility. Equally important, this nonkinetic approach can target the homeland nonmilitarily, impacting U.S. infrastructure. Suppose such an attack temporarily knocked out power in a major metropolitan city, shut down port operations at a critical time, disrupted flights at an international airport, or perpetuated false and dangerous messages across numerous social media platforms. This would damage the nation economically, create chaos within the population, and sow distrust in the government.

A further challenge is that these nonkinetic means offer deniability, as highlighted by the U.S. Army Operations Field Manual. At times, a cyber attack may go unnoticed or be incredibly difficult to attribute. Moreover, even when the culprit can be identified, retaliating may still require the United States to convince allies and the public. This in turn may mean revealing classified sources and methods that would be damaging to the United States if exposed. And even then, the perpetrator could pin the actions on an individual or criminal element, publicly denouncing what occurred and denying any state involvement. In the example above, China could deny any involvement and even potentially arrest individual perpetrators if identified to enhance its international narrative. As a result, these types of attacks, coupled with deniability at the international level, throw a wrench into the status quo deterrence model.

Washington can do a great deal by way of “attribution diplomacy” in order to more credibly threaten retaliation for nonkinetic attacks. But despite this, the current technological revolution will still allow hostile nations to act against the United States without inflicting casualties and with a reduced potential for attribution. With no “rally around the flag” from an overt attack and a politically fraught debate about attribution, the United States would struggle to follow through on threats of retaliation.

Conclusion

In short, whether the United States has really lost its “sanctuary” status depends on the type of attack you’re talking about. While countries like Russia and China can attack the United States directly, they are no more likely to do so now than they have been for decades. Additionally, although some nations may boast about their long-range strike capabilities, the list of nations capable of invading or conducting a strike on the U.S. homeland is small and full of allies. Furthermore, while nonstate attacks are becoming easier and potentially more likely, there is not now, nor has there been for generations, a sanctuary from a terrorist/criminal organization or state-sponsored covert action.

Yet the risk of a state-sponsored but deniable nonkinetic attack on the homeland as part of a broader conflict is growing. The U.S. Army has acknowledged that this threat “extends beyond directly targeting unit personnel and equipment,” conceding that military operations rely “on various interdependent infrastructures, the majority of which it does not own or operate.” Consequently, such actions affect more than a military deployment timeline. While a nonkinetic attack may drastically slow a military response to a crisis and frustrate those allies and partners who rely on the United States, it also has the potential to wreak havoc on the American way of life. In this context, the homeland is no longer a sanctuary, and this scoped realization may have strategic implications. By disrupting force flow and changing what equipment is sent abroad or making the U.S. military “late to need” in an international crisis, an adversary may undermine America’s role in the international system. At the same time, this type of attack directed at U.S. infrastructure can erode the population’s trust in the government, something easily amplified through disinformation tactics and social media.

The homeland should remain a priority. However, there is no new armor or ammunition that can mitigate nonkinetic attacks. Nor will the military prevent a cyber attack by strategically staging its forces nationwide. Moving forward, any Defense Department restructuring or shift in focus should be couched in a threat assessment and address the challenges of the new operating environment. An article in these pages contended that the “United States can reasonably assume some additional risks to confront undesirable adversary cyber behavior.” To do so effectively, an Army cyber operations officer recently argued that the United States “should assert a cyberspace border.” Beyond this, establishing redundancies in key systems and infrastructure could also reduce vulnerabilities. Ultimately, though, a different approach is necessary, one that appreciates exactly what form of sanctuary has been lost. For the foreseeable future, power projection vulnerabilities and nonkinetic attacks are problems without easy solutions.

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Brennan Deveraux is a major in the U.S. Army currently serving as an Army North planner. He is an Army strategist and an Art of War scholar specializing in rocket artillery and missile warfare. He has completed combat deployments to Iraq and the Horn of Africa and has three defense-related master’s degrees, focusing his research on military adaptation and emerging technology management.

The views in this article are the author’s own and not those of the U.S. Army or the Department of Defense.

Image: Department of Defense

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Brennan Deveraux · June 6, 2023

23. 6 Swing States Will Decide the Future of Geopolitics

Excerpts:

The most important policy implication is that Washington needs to up its game towards the six swing states in order to prevent a significant weakening in the U.S. position in the global power balance. With the swing states’ refusal to line up behind the United States on the Russia-Ukraine war or competition with China, many of these key countries are already drifting away. The threat of a Sino-Russian co-optation of an expanded BRICS—and through it, of the global south—is real, and it needs to be addressed.

Washington needs to have a well-crafted diplomatic strategy not only toward each of the six key countries, but toward the global south more broadly. Inviting most of the swing states to the recent meeting of the G-7 was a useful start, but much more is needed. A better strategy would begin with more high-level visits by key U.S. diplomats. Improved policy would also include a nimbler trade strategy that begins to crack the nut of access to the U.S. market. More broadly, the United States needs to be able to better predict the reactions of the six swing states and the global south to key U.S. policy decisions. For example, the degree to which Western policies on Russia’s war have created alienation in the global south caught Washington by surprise. Since the start of the invasion in February 2022, the United States has been playing catch-up––and not doing very well at even that. This kind of prediction capability would necessitate a better understanding of sentiment and elite beliefs in the many countries of the global south.

Second, the power and leverage of the swing states and indeed all middle powers would take a hit if U.S.-China tensions rise dramatically and turn into a Cold War-style confrontation. Decoupling would broaden, and the swing states would likely have to align more closely with one side or the other.

Finally, because of the rise of the swing states, there are now more countries in the world that have leverage over geopolitical outcomes. Among these states, there are no discernible patterns of behavior beyond intensive pursuit of their national interest. We now have more drivers on every geopolitical issue. That makes predictions of geopolitical outcomes, already a fraught endeavor, even harder.

6 Swing States Will Decide the Future of Geopolitics

These middle powers of the global south should be the focus of U.S. policy.

By Cliff Kupchan, the chairman of Eurasia Group.

Foreign Policy · by Cliff Kupchan · June 6, 2023

Last month, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky made a rare foray out of Ukraine, spending almost one week in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and Hiroshima, Japan. His goal: to win the support of Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia—four major fence-sitters on Russia’s war in Ukraine. These and other leading countries of the global south have more power today than ever before. The reasons for their newfound geopolitical heft: They have more agency, they benefit from regionalization, and they can leverage U.S.-China tensions.

Middle powers today have more agency than at any time since World War II. These are countries with significant leverage in geopolitics, but they are less powerful than the world’s two superpowers­­—the United States and China. In the global north, they include France, Germany, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and others. With the exception of Russia, these countries do not tell us much about the shifting dynamics of power and leverage, as they remain broadly aligned with the United States.

Much more interesting are the six leading middle powers of the global south: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey. These swing states of the global south are not fully aligned with either superpower and are therefore free to create new power dynamics. All are members of the G-20 and active in both geopolitics and geoeconomics. These six also serve as a good barometer for broader geopolitical trends in the global south.

There are many reasons for the growing importance of these six states, but they can be grouped into two buckets: long-term, historical developments and and more recent global trends. Regarding the first bucket, developments since the Cold War have given these powers more agency in international relations. The Cold War entailed a stricter separation into opposing blocs, which pulled in some of today’s swing states. The subsequent era of U.S. unipolarity necessitated some fealty to Washington by almost all states. Today’s Sino-U.S. bipolarity is weaker, and all middle powers have more freedom of movement.

Second in the history bucket: The world has been deglobalizing in important ways over the past two decades, and as a result new geopolitical and geoeconomic relationships are forming at the regional level. The swing states are all regional leaders, and they become more important as power devolves to their regions. The processes of near-shoring (moving supply chains closer to home) and friend-shoring (moving them from adversaries to like-minded countries) are slowly moving some firms and trading relationships away from China to other regions, mostly in the global south. Some of the swing states of the global south will become even busier hubs of regional trade. India is the best example, as some U.S. firms are setting up production and routing new supply chains there. Energy markets are becoming more regional, which benefits Saudi Arabia. Similarly, the Saudi capital, Riyadh, is emerging as a regional financial hub. Also, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) emphasizes that the world is fragmenting, and in a fragmenting world regional middle powers logically play an increasingly important role.

Third, during the Cold War, India and Indonesia had just emerged from colonial rule. That limited their global role during that bipolar era. Today, the six swing states are fully autonomous actors. But they are not just a new incarnation of the Non-Aligned Movement, or other groupings dominated by the global south, such as the G-77 and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), none of which have packed much punch. Those groups all involved or involve some ideological affinity, which today’s six swing states don’t have. The absence of ideological affinity helps free these states to take a hard-core transactional approach in foreign policy, which in turn elevates their aggregate impact on international affairs.

Other drivers of swing state power flow from more recent global trends. Swing states’ power is enhanced by the leverage they gain from the competition and confrontation that increasingly characterizes U.S.-China relations. Each superpower wants the swing states to align with it, creating opportunities for swing states to play one off the other. For example, India’s power and leverage has increased dramatically since joining the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, the most important U.S.-led effort to balance China. Brazil and Indonesia have benefited from China’s eagerness to lock down deals on critical minerals, especially lithium, nickel, and aluminum. A recent study shows that while each of the six states may swing toward the United States or China on a particular issue, most of them remain relatively balanced in their allegiances. For now, they will be free in many areas to play one great power off the other. Foundational technologies, including semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum technology, 5G telecommunications, and biotechnology, are the only exception; here, the middle powers probably have to make a choice between trading with the United States or China.

Similarly, the swing states of the global south, with their large and growing economies, derive leverage from international climate policies. There can be no solution to the challenges from pollution and climate impacts without the participation of these states. Carbon markets will increasingly bring resources to these middle powers, regardless of their actual impact on emissions, because Western companies need to purchase offsets as they pursue net-zero status. More broadly, policies on deforestation and decarbonization need constructive participation by the swing states—Brazil and Indonesia on deforestation and mainly India and Indonesia on decarbonization, especially relating to the use of coal. Finally, Just Energy Transition Partnerships focus on finding creative solutions to financing climate goals, with South Africa and Indonesia being the first funding recipients. Although the results of the program are mixed so far, this is an example of two middle powers taking on a leadership role on climate policy.

The six swing states have played an important role on sanctions and framing the optics of the war in Ukraine. From the very outset, they have refused to fall into line behind Western military aid to Ukraine and sanctions on Russia. They argue that the war affects only European and not global security, and that it does not advance their national interests in development, debt reduction, food security, energy security, and other areas.

But the most important impact of these states on the war has been their leadership role in opposing—and in some instances undermining—Western sanctions on Russia. Turkey is one of several countries involved in channeling large volumes of dual-use items to Russia, violating the spirit and possibly the letter of Western sanctions. For these activities, the United States has already sanctioned four Turkish companies. Most of the other middle powers have remained firmly neutral, although South Africa tilts toward Russia. All six have maintained or increased trade and other ties with Russia since the start of the war.

The IMF projects that the Russian economy will grow by 0.7 percent this year—hardly the paralyzing impact Western nations had hoped for. The swing states have helped Russia erode the impact of sanctions and will continue to do so. They are one reason why the Kremlin seems to believe it can make a living by turning its trade south and east.

The vastly increased leverage of the global south’s middle powers is also evident in their mediation initiatives. Turkey is the single most influential external power on the war in Ukraine. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been a key negotiator of the grain deals, was involved in the peace talks at the beginning of the war, and is well-positioned to facilitate future talks if the warring parties opt for them. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has come forward with his own initiative. India, meanwhile, has more quietly positioned itself to broker a peace in the future. These states are now well positioned to mediate other conflicts, too. India’s stature in this regard is particularly high, not least because it already contributes 8 percent of active U.N. peacekeepers, as of February. Indonesia and South Africa are also active as mediators and peacekeepers.

Finally, the scientific and engineering expertise found in these countries makes them future proliferation risks; the next instance of nuclear weapons proliferation, were it to occur, would most likely be in a country in the global south. While unlikely in the near term, especially after the rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, Iran remains the world’s most dangerous proliferation risk. It is only a few technological steps away from becoming a latent nuclear power—one with the ability to make a bomb in a short amount of time. In a scenario where relations with Riyadh plummet and Tehran dashes to a bomb, the Saudis and possibly Turks could seek one also. That’s why the Saudis reportedly demanded nuclear guarantees from the United States, among other concessions, in exchange for establishing diplomatic relations with Israel—Riyadh wants the protection afforded by a nuclear umbrella, if not nuclear weapons themselves.

The popular focus on the BRICS countries as the main counterweight to Western dominance obscures much of what’s interesting about the global south. That’s because the inclusion of China and Russia in BRICS masks the critical rise of the swing states.

China and Russia co-opting an expanded BRICS—and through it, the global south—is a real threat that needs to be addressed.

China is today one of the two great powers in a bipolar world. It’s a big stretch to consider China part of the global south, primarily because China’s economic power and extensive geopolitical ambitions make it a different type of state. Russia is a middle power, but one in decline. It is also hyper-revisionist in its approach to the world, a view which the global south’s swing states do not share. So the policies of the two most geopolitically active BRICS states need to be explained with a different logic than that driving the swing states.

That said, the question remains whether the BRICS states are going to become a more formal institution under China’s direction that claims to represent the global south. That prospect is a clear challenge to the West, especially given that 19 other countries have already expressed interest in joining the group. But the threat is unlikely to materialize. India is an influential BRICS state and will adamantly oppose Chinese efforts to co-opt the body. Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Turkey (a NATO member), India, and even South Africa still have significant relationships with the United States and other key Western countries, whether in security or trade. These countries may have tacked away from the United States—but that’s different from joining a Chinese-directed, Russian-assisted body actively opposing the United States. As of now, BRICS has not shown the ability to develop and implement a common agenda, so there is very little institutional strength for China to co-opt. Lastly, BRICS operates on a consensus basis; the likely addition of new members with their own interests will make reaching consensus even harder.

Some may disagree with the idea that these six swing states are the powers to watch. They are all still emerging markets, and recent years have not been kind to that part of the global economy. Except for India, growth rates in the swing states have not met expectations. The group lags in the development of institutions that support the rule of law. Technological revolutions, including AI, will hit the global south harder than the advanced industrialized democracies, since the former has fewer resources with which to combat the politically dangerous effects of generative AI. And even as climate goals give the swing states leverage, climate-related effects will also inflict significant damage and suffering on some of these states.

On balance, though, the argument that these powers have become and will continue to become more powerful geopolitically remains strong. They are able to derive leverage from some of the strongest global trends, and there are already clear manifestations of their new power.

The most important policy implication is that Washington needs to up its game towards the six swing states in order to prevent a significant weakening in the U.S. position in the global power balance. With the swing states’ refusal to line up behind the United States on the Russia-Ukraine war or competition with China, many of these key countries are already drifting away. The threat of a Sino-Russian co-optation of an expanded BRICS—and through it, of the global south—is real, and it needs to be addressed.

Washington needs to have a well-crafted diplomatic strategy not only toward each of the six key countries, but toward the global south more broadly. Inviting most of the swing states to the recent meeting of the G-7 was a useful start, but much more is needed. A better strategy would begin with more high-level visits by key U.S. diplomats. Improved policy would also include a nimbler trade strategy that begins to crack the nut of access to the U.S. market. More broadly, the United States needs to be able to better predict the reactions of the six swing states and the global south to key U.S. policy decisions. For example, the degree to which Western policies on Russia’s war have created alienation in the global south caught Washington by surprise. Since the start of the invasion in February 2022, the United States has been playing catch-up––and not doing very well at even that. This kind of prediction capability would necessitate a better understanding of sentiment and elite beliefs in the many countries of the global south.

Second, the power and leverage of the swing states and indeed all middle powers would take a hit if U.S.-China tensions rise dramatically and turn into a Cold War-style confrontation. Decoupling would broaden, and the swing states would likely have to align more closely with one side or the other.

Finally, because of the rise of the swing states, there are now more countries in the world that have leverage over geopolitical outcomes. Among these states, there are no discernible patterns of behavior beyond intensive pursuit of their national interest. We now have more drivers on every geopolitical issue. That makes predictions of geopolitical outcomes, already a fraught endeavor, even harder.

This essay is adapted from a letter to Eurasia Group clients.

Foreign Policy · by Cliff Kupchan · June 6, 2023

24. A Convocation of Spies

Conclusion:

Secret meetings of intelligence heads are dangerous. They can trigger distrust at home, particularly in the United States. But the fact that someone wanted the world to know that the meetings had been going on for a long time and who was involved in them indicates that the leakers came from countries that did well at the gathering. The other 20 or so retained their anonymity. This is a major event in the shifting balance of power.

A Convocation of Spies - Geopolitical Futures

geopoliticalfutures.com · by George Friedman · June 6, 2023

A Convocation of Spies

June 6, 2023

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Over the past weekend, major global media outlets revealed that the heads of intelligence of about two dozen countries held a (formerly) secret meeting in Singapore and had in fact been held annually for several years. The venue for the talks was the Shangri-La Hotel, also the meeting place for a large, widely known conference called the Shangri-La Dialogue, involving about 600 representatives from around the world. Such conferences, perhaps usually smaller, are common gatherings of government officials and others who want to be and are allowed to be there.

Among the roughly 24 intelligence chiefs at the informal meeting were the heads of U.S. and Chinese intelligence. India’s top intelligence chief was also present, as were chiefs from the Five Eyes network (the U.S., the U.K., Canada, Australia and New Zealand), but no other attendees were identified. It was noted that Russia was not represented – whether by its choice or by the organizers’ exclusion is unclear.

According to Reuters, the source of the information was five separate (and I assume unconnected) people. When one person leaks information, it is one of those things. When five leak the same information simultaneously, it is the equivalent of a press release. The existence of these meetings, and the revelation that the U.S. and China were both there and Russia was not, is important. What is fascinating is that there was an organized attempt by someone to blow the cover off the meeting. That the leakers seem not to have identified the others present is interesting, since it suggests the leak came from official sources who respected requests for anonymity – and indicates that those named didn’t mind it being revealed that they had attended secret meetings with major powers for some years.

Equally interesting is that the meeting of two dozen heads of intelligence could have been kept secret. A meeting of such people requires several weeks of logistical planning, security preparations, and exchange of proposed agendas and position papers. Heads of intelligence need to know what they will be dealing with, at least generally. Intelligence chiefs know secrets that their governments don’t want blurted out, and they aren’t casual about this. Their briefings on official positions and authorized threats that might be made require weeks of preparation for the chief and some staff. The American head of intelligence can’t be casually chatting with the Chinese. Obviously, preparations for the Shangri-La Dialogue mostly would have covered the smaller conference. But it is hard to believe that 24 national intelligence heads, plus other officials in each country who had to know of the preparations, could for years fail to leak a conference such as this.

The focus on security might seem less important than the reasons for the leak, but in this case, they are closely linked. The cover of the meeting was blown simultaneously by five sources. The loss of secrecy will raise public concern in at least some countries as to why the meetings were held, why they were kept secret, and what was discussed and agreed to. In democratic countries like the United States, intelligence agencies are already distrusted by many.

If any serious discussions were held, it is hard to believe they took place in the company of all the other nations present. I would guess that the meeting was accompanied by secret bilateral meetings, if not by others then by the Americans and Chinese. Russia’s absence from the smaller group is also important. I doubt that Russia was absent from prior meetings, but it was missing from this one. Obviously, China did not insist that Russia be included. The willingness of the Chinese to sit down with other powers without Moscow’s presence signifies that Russia is not seen as a great power. It was not missed. China and India had things to talk about concerning conflict on their border. And China and the U.S. had things to talk about as well.

I doubt the discussion was about potential war. I think that is a distant possibility, and any such discussion would be about the substance of war, rules of interception, warning systems and so on. At this fundamental level, the discussion more likely would be about geopolitics – more precisely, Russia. Recall the alliance between Russia and China that went nowhere.

There are two likelier subjects. There have been rumors that the U.S., which has an interest in ending the Ukraine war at or near the front, has asked China to try to work with its putative ally to end the conflict. Discussing China’s ability to do this and the price it would demand for its labor might well be at the level of intelligence directors. Another, even more probable possibility is that the two countries, sensing Russia’s decline, want to think of what the future might look like, hoping to prevent conflict between the two remaining superpowers.

After the meeting, it was revealed that India is shifting away from its relationship with Russia, long a major supplier of weapons for India, and toward the United States. Since India has been fighting China along their shared border, this agreement, like other agreements reached in the Pacific, places China in a difficult military position. It is locked out of the Pacific and facing an increasingly powerful India to its southwest.

It is, of course, not clear how long this U.S. relationship with India will last, but for the moment, added to the decline of Russia as an ally and the aggressive actions the U.S. has taken to form alliances in the Western Pacific, China is in a difficult position. I have long argued that China could not risk a war in the Pacific. Now, in my view, China must take steps to deescalate the tension. A meeting involving China’s head of intelligence and his counterparts from the U.S., India, Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand – and not Russia – suggests Beijing understands the position it is in and that it had to shift. The leaders seemed very careful to make the balance of power public.

There has been a spate of speeches and articles in China emphasizing the need to avoid conflict and increase cooperation. Given the geopolitical reality they face, and studying the Russian experience in Ukraine, the Chinese have a new sense of the way the world works, or a confirmation of a reality they saw months ago and hoped would evaporate. It is uncertain if the shift in tone is permanent. The test will be if they stop threatening war over Taiwan or at least confine their threats to ritual gestures. But China is on the whole signaling new relations, and the intelligence meeting and its publication was sobering.

Secret meetings of intelligence heads are dangerous. They can trigger distrust at home, particularly in the United States. But the fact that someone wanted the world to know that the meetings had been going on for a long time and who was involved in them indicates that the leakers came from countries that did well at the gathering. The other 20 or so retained their anonymity. This is a major event in the shifting balance of power.

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George Friedman

https://geopoliticalfutures.com/author/gfriedman/

George Friedman is an internationally recognized geopolitical forecaster and strategist on international affairs and the founder and chairman of Geopolitical Futures.

Dr. Friedman is also a New York Times bestselling author. His most recent book, THE STORM BEFORE THE CALM: America’s Discord, the Coming Crisis of the 2020s, and the Triumph Beyond, published February 25, 2020 describes how “the United States periodically reaches a point of crisis in which it appears to be at war with itself, yet after an extended period it reinvents itself, in a form both faithful to its founding and radically different from what it had been.” The decade 2020-2030 is such a period which will bring dramatic upheaval and reshaping of American government, foreign policy, economics, and culture.

His most popular book, The Next 100 Years, is kept alive by the prescience of its predictions. Other best-selling books include Flashpoints: The Emerging Crisis in Europe, The Next Decade, America’s Secret War, The Future of War and The Intelligence Edge. His books have been translated into more than 20 languages.

Dr. Friedman has briefed numerous military and government organizations in the United States and overseas and appears regularly as an expert on international affairs, foreign policy and intelligence in major media. For almost 20 years before resigning in May 2015, Dr. Friedman was CEO and then chairman of Stratfor, a company he founded in 1996. Friedman received his bachelor’s degree from the City College of the City University of New York and holds a doctorate in government from Cornell University.

geopoliticalfutures.com · by George Friedman · June 6, 2023

25. How to Read Xi Jinping​: ​Is China Really Preparing for War?

Culver:

Pomfret and Pottinger rightly note Xi’s aggressive closing comments in March at the National People’s Congress, directed at the United States: “Western countries headed by the United States have implemented containment from all directions, encirclement and suppression against us, which has brought unprecedented severe challenges to our country’s development.” But they don’t mention the most likely reason for Xi to “break the practice” of not naming the United States as an adversary: a month earlier, President Joe Biden’s State of the Union address had called out Xi by name twice, breaking an even stronger practice and warning that “Winning the competition [against China] should unite all of us!” Biden closed by asking: “Name me a world leader who’d change places with Xi Jinping? Name me one. Name me one”—a personal taunt that Xi chose not to return.

Pomfret: and Pottinger:

Given the collective failure by Europe and the United States to deter Putin’s war, Washington and its allies should hurry to shore up deterrence in the Western Pacific so that Xi thinks thrice, as the Chinese saying goes, before committing aggression against Taiwan or anyone else. It is here where we might differ sharply with Culver’s thinking. In his essay, Culver quotes a Biden administration official stating that the U.S. Department of Defense has made it a priority to maintain Washington’s capacity to resist a Chinese attack or other form of coercion against Taiwan. The statement, which struck our ears as responsible and in tune with decades of U.S. policy, seems to be regarded by Culver as highly provocative—"at least as pointed as anything cited by Pomfret and Pottinger emanating from Beijing in recent months.” That’s quite a statement, considering that we cited a proposal in Beijing by a delegate to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference recommending the assassination of Taiwan’s vice president and other elected officials for their “pro-independence” leanings.

Culver also criticizes Biden for mentioning Xi Jinping by name in his most recent State of the Union address. But Culver may be confusing Washington for the provocateur and Beijing for the guardian of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, even though Washington‘s longstanding commitment to defending the status quo, and Xi’s recent efforts to undermine it, should make plain that it is the other way around.

How to Read Xi Jinping

Is China Really Preparing for War?

By John Culver; John Pomfret and Matt Pottinger

June 6, 2023

Foreign Affairs · June 6, 2023

Root Causes

John Culver

John Pomfret and Matt Pottinger’s recent article (“Xi Jinping Says He Is Preparing China for War,” March 29) deserves attention for highlighting the rising risk of war between China and the United States. Relations between the two countries, which have the largest economies and most powerful militaries in the world, are so fraught that experts strain for a comparison short of actual conflict. Each is preparing itself for strategic rivalry, building up military forces, and aligning partners for future economic, diplomatic, and potential military contestation. But the drivers are now longstanding and increasingly structural, not the result of a handful of speeches that the Chinese leader Xi Jinping has delivered since February and that Pomfret and Pottinger focus on in their piece. Indeed, it would be strange if Xi’s authoritative guidance didn’t reflect this reality.

As the authors note, “It is too early to say for certain what these developments mean. Conflict is not certain or imminent.” But the article could leave many readers with the impression that Xi has already made a decision to go to war (he almost certainly hasn’t); that he is confident that his military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is ready to fight and win such a war (he’s likely not); and that his country’s population and economy are prepared for years of austerity, combat losses, and damage to infrastructure by missiles, cyberattacks, or crippling resource shortages (they aren’t).

FIGHT OR STRUGGLE?

Pomfret and Pottinger write that Xi told his generals to “‘dare to fight.’” The phrase was apparently part of an overall directive upon the opening of China’s legislature on March 6—not a directive just to the PLA. (Moreover, according to Chinese language experts I consulted, a more common translation of the phrase “敢于斗争” is “dare to struggle”; the character used to denote “fight” is not the one typically used to refer to military conflict, 战斗.) Xi has used martial language in speeches to military leadership gatherings since at least 2012. The key phrase is usually translated as “to be able to fight and win battles is the key to being a strong army”—with the unstated implication that “at present, the PLA is not and cannot.’’ Xi’s interactions with the army since he assumed leadership in 2012 is left out of Pomfret and Pottinger’s discussion. He jailed the two most senior officers, prosecuted thousands of officers for corruption, and drove the PLA into a wrenching, and ongoing, reorganization. One might surmise that Xi does not yet trust the military, which has not fought in a major conflict since 1979, and that he still doubts it can “fight and win’’ against a strong military opponent.

More telling than Xi’s guidance to the army is, as Dennis Blasko has written, that “the PLA’s general assessments of its own capabilities have become, if anything, more acute during Xi’s tenure as Central Military Commission chairman, especially concerning the state of leadership at the operational unit level. The totality of these criticisms implies a lack of confidence in PLA capabilities and a failure of the PLA’s educational and training systems to prepare commanders and staff officers for future war.”

Pomfret and Pottinger also note that Xi’s government “announced a 7.2 percent increase in China’s defense budget, which has doubled over the last decade.” The PLA has indeed built a formidable, modern military in terms of equipment, facilities, and defense industrial base, and by some measures it now has the largest or second largest navy in the world. But it did this over 20 years, and annual defense budget increases averaged almost 15 percent prior to the global financial crisis, doubling every five years. Since 2009, real growth in the PLA budget has been halved as China’s economic growth has slowed. The resources available to the military as a percentage of China’s GDP have been flat since the 1990s, and the PLA budget has declined as a percentage of total central government spending. China’s spending on police and other security services is larger than its military spending. This doesn’t negate the threat posed by the PLA, but the growth in its capabilities has been a long process, not crash preparation for war.

China hasn’t yet made the decision to go to war, and Taiwan remains for Xi a crisis to be avoided.

Pomfret and Pottinger describe recently approved or proposed laws governing military affairs and mobilization, including the regulation of reserve forces and criminal law administration by the military during wartime. They cite the opening of new mobilization and recruitment centers, including those in cities on China’s eastern coast opposite Taiwan. But they omit mention of at least eight laws enacted since 1997 to codify military rights and responsibilities, military service, and civil-military relations. Many appear designed to improve China’s ability to conduct a prolonged war or deal with other major challenges and to adapt to the restructured PLA and enhance the military’s adoption of civilian technological innovations. But they don’t appear to signal a decision to go to war in the near term (which would be evident in a variety of moves toward mobilization that I outlined in a recent paper for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).

Pomfret and Pottinger rightly note Xi’s aggressive closing comments in March at the National People’s Congress, directed at the United States: “Western countries headed by the United States have implemented containment from all directions, encirclement and suppression against us, which has brought unprecedented severe challenges to our country’s development.” But they don’t mention the most likely reason for Xi to “break the practice” of not naming the United States as an adversary: a month earlier, President Joe Biden’s State of the Union address had called out Xi by name twice, breaking an even stronger practice and warning that “Winning the competition [against China] should unite all of us!” Biden closed by asking: “Name me a world leader who’d change places with Xi Jinping? Name me one. Name me one”—a personal taunt that Xi chose not to return.

IT TAKES TWO

I agree with Pomfret and Pottinger’s warning that we should take Xi seriously when it comes to Taiwan and prospective war with the United States. But China hasn’t yet made the decision to go to war, and Taiwan remains for Xi a crisis to be avoided, not an opportunity he should seize

Xi and other Chinese officials certainly take Biden and even more extreme voices in the United States seriously. The Pentagon’s top Indo-Pacific official, Ely Ratner, testified to the Senate in December 2021:

“In addition to the provision of defensive arms and services to Taiwan, the Department [of Defense] remains committed to maintaining the capacity of the United States to resist the resort to force or other forms of coercion that may jeopardize the security of the people on Taiwan. Let me be clear that this is an absolute priority: The PRC [People’s Republic of China] is the Department’s pacing challenge and a Taiwan contingency is the pacing scenario. We are modernizing our capabilities, updating U.S. force posture, and developing new operational concepts accordingly.”

This seems at least as pointed as anything cited by Pomfret and Pottinger emanating from Beijing in recent months.

If Taiwan or the United States ignores Chinese red lines, Beijing will quickly move to conduct hostilities in order to compel a return to the status quo or, failing that, to compel unification between Taiwan and the mainland by force. U.S. policymakers should take that very risk seriously, but this has been true for decades and will remain true for the foreseeable future. Today, China, Taiwan, and the United States are much closer to conflict than at any time since at least the 1970s. The growing preparedness of the PLA may, whether by 2027 or later, make Beijing more likely to take risks. But going to war with the United States over Taiwan would remain fraught with danger for the Chinese Communist Party and for China—a step Xi would take only if other options are exhausted.

JOHN CULVER is a Nonresident Senior Fellow of the Atlantic Council's Global China Hub. He served for 35 years as a Central Intelligence Agency officer, including as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia from 2015 to 2018.

Pomfret and Pottinger Respond

John Pomfret and Matt Pottinger

We read with interest the former intelligence analyst John Culver’s essay responding to our piece “Xi Jinping Says He is Preparing China for War: The World Should Take Him Seriously.”

Culver points out that the Chinese Communist Party’s formidable warfighting capability is the result of a decades-long effort that started before Xi Jinping’s rise to paramount leader. This is true.

Culver writes that the drivers of U.S.-Chinese strategic rivalry “are now longstanding and increasingly structural.” We wholeheartedly agree. Culver quibbles with Beijing’s common official translation of the phrase 敢于斗争 as “dare to fight.” Here, too, we agree with Culver that an even better translation would be “dare to struggle”—though the meaning of douzheng often encompasses violence and war, including in the context in which we quoted it in our article.

Culver’s primary point is that even though Beijing has built—and continues to build—a fearsome war machine, and even though Xi has made recent speeches emphasizing the importance of preparing for war and has advanced laws that would facilitate wartime mobilization, none of this means that Xi has already made a decision to go to war in the near term. It’s hard to argue with that point, either. Indeed, we wrote (as Culver notes) that “it is too early to say for certain what these developments mean. Conflict is not certain or imminent.”

Putin has destroyed much of his own army and made Russia a virtual vassal of China.

From a policymaking perspective, however, we think it would be wise for Washington, Tokyo, Taipei, and other capitals to assume there is a serious possibility that Xi will decide to wage war during his reign as supreme leader. Dictators sometimes commit aggression exactly when outside observers think they couldn’t or wouldn’t. Witness the debacle unleashed against Ukraine by Vladimir Putin, the man Xi calls his “best, most intimate friend.” Putin has destroyed much of his own army and made Russia a virtual vassal of China, as some people predicted might happen if he launched a major war in Ukraine. Yet he did it anyway.

Given the collective failure by Europe and the United States to deter Putin’s war, Washington and its allies should hurry to shore up deterrence in the Western Pacific so that Xi thinks thrice, as the Chinese saying goes, before committing aggression against Taiwan or anyone else. It is here where we might differ sharply with Culver’s thinking. In his essay, Culver quotes a Biden administration official stating that the U.S. Department of Defense has made it a priority to maintain Washington’s capacity to resist a Chinese attack or other form of coercion against Taiwan. The statement, which struck our ears as responsible and in tune with decades of U.S. policy, seems to be regarded by Culver as highly provocative—"at least as pointed as anything cited by Pomfret and Pottinger emanating from Beijing in recent months.” That’s quite a statement, considering that we cited a proposal in Beijing by a delegate to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference recommending the assassination of Taiwan’s vice president and other elected officials for their “pro-independence” leanings.

Culver also criticizes Biden for mentioning Xi Jinping by name in his most recent State of the Union address. But Culver may be confusing Washington for the provocateur and Beijing for the guardian of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, even though Washington‘s longstanding commitment to defending the status quo, and Xi’s recent efforts to undermine it, should make plain that it is the other way around.

JOHN POMFRET, former Beijing Bureau Chief for The Washington Post, is the author of .

MATT POTTINGER is Chair of the China program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. From 2019 to 2021, he served as Deputy National Security Adviser.

Foreign Affairs · June 6, 2023

26. Ground Rules for the Age of AI Warfare

Like fight club, in AI the ground rules will be that there are no ground rules. (My uninformed pessimistic view). I think there is both great promise and great danger in AI. But given today's state of international relations I doubt very much we will be able to adopt common ground rules and even if we are able to do so we will be unable to enforce them and hold any violator accountable. But we have to try as the author notes.

Excellent:

Elements of such an agreement could be as simple as requiring that autonomous and AI-enabled aircraft yield the right of way to nonautonomous aircraft (as Federal Aviation Administration rules already require of uncrewed commercial and recreational drones). The agreement could also require AI-enabled systems to stay at a certain distance from other entities. It might set notification and alert provisions to ensure transparency about who is deploying what.

The private sector appears willing to at least somewhat self-regulate its AI development.

Such provisions may seem obvious, but they would not be redundant. Outlining them in advance would set a baseline for expected behavior. Any actions by an AI system outside those parameters would be a cut-and-dried violation. Moreover, these parameters would make it easier to point out cases in which an AI-enabled system deviated from its expected behavior, even if it might not be technically feasible to determine a precise cause after the fact.

The time for an Autonomous Incidents Agreement is ripe, given that AI is at an inflection point. On the one hand, the technology is maturing and increasingly suitable for military use, whether as part of wargaming exercises or in combat, such as in Ukraine. On the other hand, the exact outlines of future AI military systems—and the degree of disruption they will cause—remain uncertain and, by extension, somewhat malleable.

States willing to take the initiative could build on existing momentum for stricter rules. The private sector appears willing to at least somewhat self-regulate its AI development. And in response to member state requests, the International Civil Aviation Organization is working on a model regulatory framework for uncrewed aircraft systems and has encouraged states to share existing regulations and best practices.

An Autonomous Incidents Agreement would put these nascent efforts on solid footing. The need for clearer norms, for a baseline mechanism of responsibility and accountability, is as great as it is urgent. So is the need for a protocol for handling interstate skirmishes involving these cutting-edge systems. States should start preparing now, since the real question regarding such incidents is not whether they will occur, but when.

Ground Rules for the Age of AI Warfare

How to Keep Autonomous Weapons From Stumbling Into Conflict

By Lauren Kahn

June 6, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Lauren Kahn · June 6, 2023

On March 14, a U.S. surveillance drone was on a routine mission in international airspace over the Black Sea when it was intercepted by two Russian fighter jets. For nearly half an hour, the jets harassed the American system, an MQ-9 Reaper drone, buzzing past and dumping fuel over its wings and sensors. One of the jets clipped the Reaper’s propeller, rendering it inoperable and forcing its American handlers to crash the drone into the sea. Not long after, Moscow awarded medals to the two Russian pilots involved in the incident.

The Reaper’s every move—including its self-destruction after the collision—was overseen and directed by U.S. forces from a control room thousands of miles away. But what if the drone had not been piloted by humans at all, but by independent, artificially intelligent software? What if that software had perceived the Russian harassment as an attack? Given the breakneck speed of innovation in artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomous technologies, that scenario could soon become a reality.

Traditional military systems and technologies come from a world where humans make onsite, or at least real-time, decisions over life and death. AI-enabled systems are less dependent on this human element; future autonomous systems may lack it entirely. This prospect not only raises thorny questions of accountability but also means there are no established protocols for when things go wrong. What if an American autonomous drone bombarded a target it was meant only to surveil? How would Washington reassure the other party that the incident was unintentional and would not reoccur?

When the inevitable happens, and a partially or fully autonomous system is involved in an accident, states will need a mechanism they can turn to—a framework to guide the involved parties and provide them with potential off-ramps to avert unwanted conflict. The United States took a small step in this direction when it released a declaration in February that distilled its vision for responsible military use of AI and autonomous systems. The declaration included several sound proposals, including that AI should never be allowed to determine the use of nuclear weapons. But it did not offer precise guidelines for how states might regulate the behavior of AI systems, nor did it set up any channels through which states could quickly clear up any miscommunications. A more comprehensive framework, with more buy-in from other governments, is sorely needed.

For inspiration, states could look to an underappreciated episode of the Cold War. In the 1970s, U.S. and Soviet leaders calmed rising tensions between their navies by setting rules for unplanned encounters on the high seas. Governments today should take a similar route through the uncharted waters of AI-driven warfare. They should agree on basic guidelines now, along with protocols to maximize transparency and minimize the risk of fatal miscalculation and miscommunication. Without such a foundational agreement, future one-off incidents involving AI-enabled and autonomous systems could too easily spin out of control.

OFF PROTOCOL

The loss of an American surveillance drone over the Black Sea in March was unsettling. The U.S. military has well-defined procedures for how to act if one of its crewed aircraft is shot down. But recent experience shows that standardized protocols do not necessarily extend to uncrewed aircraft. In one 2019 incident, Iran shot down a U.S. Navy drone over the Strait of Hormuz, setting off a chain reaction inside the Pentagon and the White House that nearly resulted in U.S. retaliatory strikes against Iran. U.S. forces were purportedly ten minutes from engaging their target when the strike was called off, according to then U.S. President Donald Trump. At the last moment, leaders in Washington had decided that a strike was disproportionate and opted instead for a cyberattack against Iranian intelligence and missile systems.

The upside of remotely operated aircraft is that, when the circumstances are right, they can lower the risk of escalation rather than drive it up. This is partly because the loss of insentient machinery, no matter how expensive, is easier to stomach than the death of an aircrew. But that silver lining may dissipate as technologies evolve.

Fully autonomous military systems do not yet exist, and the deployment of AI-enabled systems on the battlefield remains limited. Yet militaries worldwide are investing heavily in AI research and development. The U.S. Department of Defense alone has nearly 700 active AI projects. Among them are the U.S. Army’s Scarlet Dragon program, which has used AI to identify targets in live-fire exercises, and the U.S. Navy’s Task Force 59, which seeks to develop cost-effective, fully autonomous surveillance systems. The U.S. Air Force hopes to one day create swarming smart weapons capable of autonomously communicating with one another and sharing information on potential targets.

The U.S. military is not the only innovator on this front. In April, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States conducted a joint trial in which a swarm of AI-enabled aerial and ground vehicles collaborated to detect and track targets. China is investing in an array of AI-powered underwater sensors, some of which are reportedly already in use in the South China Sea. The war in Ukraine has witnessed some of the first real uses of AI in direct conflict. Among other things, Ukrainian forces have used an AI software interface that consolidates commercial satellite data, thermal images of artillery fire, and other intelligence. The information is superimposed on digital maps that commanders on the ground can use to pick their targets.

FATAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS

Encouraged by the benefits they already derive from AI-enabled systems, militaries will likely stay their current course and design future systems with growing degrees of autonomy. This push toward AI-enabled autonomy will certainly unlock strategic and tactical advantages, but they will come at a cost.

Perhaps the greatest challenge is that humans who encounter an autonomous military system may be faced, in essence, with a black box. When confronted or targeted, they may have difficulty gauging the system’s intent and understanding its decision-making. This is partly a feature inherent in the technology because the algorithm at work often will not or cannot explain its “thought process” in terms humans can grasp. Adversaries, in turn, may have difficulty distinguishing intentional aggression from errant AI behavior, leaving them uncertain about how to react. Worse still, research suggests that the accidental use of force by an AI-enabled autonomous weapons system may elicit a more aggressive response than conventional human error: leaders in the targeted country may feel angered by the other side’s decision to delegate any lethal decision-making to a machine in the first place, and they may opt for a forceful reaction to indicate that displeasure.

Some of the novel scenarios and the security risks they entail may differ not just from human error but also from the usual fog of war. Take a recent thought experiment conducted by an official in charge of the U.S. Air Force’s AI testing, in which an AI-enabled drone is trained to identify targets and destroy them on approval from a human operator. Each eliminated target equals a point, and the AI seeks to maximize a point-based score. It may conclude that its dependence on human approval for strikes limits its ability to accumulate points and may therefore decide to eliminate the operator. If the AI’s programming is tweaked to deduct points for killing the operator, the AI may instead resort to destroying the communication tower that relays the operator’s orders. What distinguishes this scenario from traditional human error or from a soldier going rogue is that the AI’s actions are neither accidental nor in violation of its programming. The behavior, although undesirable, is a feature, not a bug. This is a classic case of the “alignment problem”: it is challenging to develop and program AI such that its actions coincide exactly with human goals and values, and getting it wrong can have grave consequences.

An added danger is the role that autonomous and AI-enabled systems could play in military standoffs and games of chicken. Human recklessness is mitigated by survival instinct, among other things, but that instinct might not come into play when autonomous systems are deployed without a human operator on board. Consider another scenario: a pair of fully autonomous aircraft from rival countries confront each other in the skies above contested territory. Both systems perceive the other as a threat and, since they are programmed for aggressiveness, engage in escalating maneuvers to assert dominance. Before long, one or both systems are damaged or downed unnecessarily, and the rival countries have a crisis on their hands.

AI could also alter the domain of nuclear warfare, for better or worse. The speed of AI could allow for an incoming nuclear missile to be detected sooner, buying decision-makers valuable time to weigh their options. But when both sides are using AI, that same speed could add pressure to act fast (and think later) to avoid being outmaneuvered. AI-enabled nuclear deterrence would be a double-edged sword, too: autonomous nuclear-armed systems may make it harder for an attacker to take out all of a state’s nuclear defenses in one fell swoop, thus lowering incentives for a preemptive first strike. On the flipside, the complexity of AI-driven systems brings with it the risk of cascading, and potentially catastrophic, failures.

UNPLANNED ENCOUNTERS

The confluence of these risk factors makes determining the correct response to incidents involving AI-enabled and autonomous systems uniquely complex and context dependent. Given how hard it will be to grapple with such complexity on the fly, states need to build off-ramps from potential conflict ahead of time. Fortunately, in doing so, they can rely on blueprints from the past.

In 2020, around 90 percent of U.S. reconnaissance flights over the Black Sea were intercepted by Russian jets, according to the U.S. military. NATO said it had intercepted Russian aircraft on over 300 occasions that same year. Such intercepts are not new; they are a modern version of the nineteenth-century practice of gunboat diplomacy. The term emerged to describe Western states’ tendency to use physical displays of naval assets to project power and intimidate other nations into complying with their demands. As technology advanced, the gunboats gave way to aircraft carriers, then to B-52 bombers, and later still to E-3 Sentry AWACS surveillance aircraft and other imposing innovations. The use—and the interception—of increasingly high-tech, AI-enabled systems is simply the latest iteration of such techno-tactics.

As the name suggests, gunboat diplomacy is used to pursue diplomatic aims, not military ones. But given the tools involved, miscalculation and miscommunication can have dire consequences. States have long understood this, and they have, in the past, found ways to limit the danger of unintended escalation. One of the most effective of these mechanisms emerged during the Cold War. At the time, the Soviet Union objected to U.S. naval operations in waters it considered its own, such as the Black Sea and the Sea of Japan. It made its position clear by repeatedly and aggressively intercepting U.S. vessels, leading to a series of dangerous close calls. By the early 1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union had come to recognize that, as the scholar Sean Lynn-Jones wrote a few years later, “the risks of naval harassment undermine any justification for its continued unconstrained practice.” That mutual insight led, in 1972, to the U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement.

It is challenging to develop AI with human values, and getting it wrong can have grave consequences.

The INCSEA agreement, as it became known, covered any interaction between U.S. and Soviet military vessels on the high seas, from deliberate confrontations to unplanned encounters. It created notification protocols and information-sharing procedures designed to lower the risk of accidents and unintended conflict. As early as 1983, the U.S. Navy declared the agreement a success for having reduced the number of aggressive high-seas interactions even as the U.S. and Soviet navies had both expanded in size.

Like other confidence-building measures, the agreement did not constrain military operations or force structures. It neither eradicated nor fundamentally transformed U.S.-Soviet competition in the naval domain. It did, however, make the rivalry more predictable and safer.

The success of the INCSEA agreement paved the way for similar mechanisms on the high seas and beyond. The Soviet Union and, later on, Russia replicated the agreement with 11 NATO members and several countries in the Indo-Pacific. Additional U.S.-Soviet Union agreements created similar protocols for encounters on land and in the air. More recently, China and the United States have developed a nonbinding Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea to which they and nearly 20 other states now adhere. There have even been discussions of extending similar mechanisms to outer space and cyberspace.

RULES OF THE ROAD

To be sure, an agreement such as INCSEA technically applies whether a crew is on board or not, but it ultimately assumes that human operators are in control. The unique challenges presented by AI-enabled and autonomous systems demand more tailored solutions. Think of it as an INCSEA agreement for the age of AI: an Autonomous Incidents Agreement.

The first hurdle for any such agreement is the difficulty parsing the meaning and intent behind an AI-enabled system’s behavior. Down the line, it may be possible to monitor and verify these systems’ internal workings and code, which could offer greater transparency about how they make their decisions. But as a stopgap measure, an Autonomous Incidents Agreement could start by regulating not AI code but AI behavior—setting rules and standards for expected conduct for both AI and autonomous systems and the militaries that use them.

Elements of such an agreement could be as simple as requiring that autonomous and AI-enabled aircraft yield the right of way to nonautonomous aircraft (as Federal Aviation Administration rules already require of uncrewed commercial and recreational drones). The agreement could also require AI-enabled systems to stay at a certain distance from other entities. It might set notification and alert provisions to ensure transparency about who is deploying what.

The private sector appears willing to at least somewhat self-regulate its AI development.

Such provisions may seem obvious, but they would not be redundant. Outlining them in advance would set a baseline for expected behavior. Any actions by an AI system outside those parameters would be a cut-and-dried violation. Moreover, these parameters would make it easier to point out cases in which an AI-enabled system deviated from its expected behavior, even if it might not be technically feasible to determine a precise cause after the fact.

The time for an Autonomous Incidents Agreement is ripe, given that AI is at an inflection point. On the one hand, the technology is maturing and increasingly suitable for military use, whether as part of wargaming exercises or in combat, such as in Ukraine. On the other hand, the exact outlines of future AI military systems—and the degree of disruption they will cause—remain uncertain and, by extension, somewhat malleable.

States willing to take the initiative could build on existing momentum for stricter rules. The private sector appears willing to at least somewhat self-regulate its AI development. And in response to member state requests, the International Civil Aviation Organization is working on a model regulatory framework for uncrewed aircraft systems and has encouraged states to share existing regulations and best practices.

An Autonomous Incidents Agreement would put these nascent efforts on solid footing. The need for clearer norms, for a baseline mechanism of responsibility and accountability, is as great as it is urgent. So is the need for a protocol for handling interstate skirmishes involving these cutting-edge systems. States should start preparing now, since the real question regarding such incidents is not whether they will occur, but when.

• LAUREN KAHN is a Research Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Foreign Affairs · by Lauren Kahn · June 6, 2023

27. Why Marcos Jr is poking and not appeasing China

Excerpts:

Beijing left Manila with little choice but to take the next best approach, which was to strengthen its alliance with the United States to balance the China threat. This is not to say that the China-Philippines relationship is hopeless.

China can take the time to review its foreign policy and learn from the unexpected consequences of its actions. The strong-arm policy that Beijing used on Manila only aggravates tensions and has proven to be unsustainable in the context of great power competition for influence in Asia.

But Manila can take advantage of warmer US-Philippines ties to address critical issues beyond the security realm. The Philippines can join like-minded countries to address its vulnerabilities – including Chinese trade dependence and other economic security and resilience issues.

Why Marcos Jr is poking and not appeasing China

Philippine leader had little choice but to ditch his predecessor’s failed engagement policy and reach back to treaty ally US

asiatimes.com · by Jenny Balboa · June 6, 2023

Despite careful words from Philippine officials, the latest US-Philippines Balikatan military exercise was a response to China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea.

China’s provocations had become indiscriminate — targeting both uniformed Filipino personnel and small-scale fisherfolk in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. China’s aggressive actions had become bolder, making it more difficult to turn a blind eye to the situation.

The 38th Balikatan exercise in April 2023 was the biggest in the three-decade history of their joint combat drills. The exercise did not sit well with Beijing, which immediately released a warning that such activities can aggravate tension in the area.

The Chinese ambassador to the Philippines issued an upfront reproach to the Philippine government about China’s displeasure of such “provocative” activities.

The United States and the Philippines promptly conducted the third 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue on April 11, 2023, in Washington. Top US-Philippines foreign affairs and defense officials issued clear-cut statements about the South China Sea conflict.

The joint statement condemned China’s illegal activities and called for compliance with the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration decision, which rejected Beijing’s claims on territory and maritime rights based on its “nine-dash line.” The statement also reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, the Philippines seems to have turned its back on the China appeasement strategy that characterized the foreign policy of his predecessor.

Former president Rodrigo Duterte moved the Philippines closer to China by downplaying the Arbitral Tribunal award favoring the Philippines. In retrospect, Duterte provided China with ample space to construct a closer and mutually beneficial relationship with the Philippines.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Then-Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte. Photo: AFP / Mark Cristino

Yet Beijing continued to conduct aggressive actions in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone targeting the Philippine military and fisherfolk who are more disadvantaged. There was a clear mismatch between Beijing’s words and actions.

It did not help that China reneged on many of its economic commitments to Manila. Beijing failed to fulfill its pledged investment in several big-ticket infrastructure projects.

As a dominant state that wields considerable influence in the economy and security of many countries, China seems to have assumed that vulnerable states, such as the Philippines, would tolerate its belligerent actions.

China had lost sight that the Philippines – like many ASEAN countries – is a post-colonial state, sensitive to the raw ambition of superpowers to dominate and bend them against their will. Beijing overlooked the determination of many domestic actors in these countries to defend their national interest.

The country’s territorial integrity is now under threat from a hegemonic China. Given the Philippine military’s inability to defend the country against a preponderant China, the Philippines moved closer to the United States, which provides the training and capacity to protect its territory.

The Philippines is also vital to US interests because it is a treaty ally that occupies a critical position in the US defense perimeter in Asia — the US alliance architecture which runs from East Asia to the South China Sea and the Western Pacific.

During their meeting on May 1, US President Joe Biden assured Marcos Jr that: “The United States remains ironclad in [its] commitment to the defense of the Philippines, including the South China Sea.”

A stronger Philippines–US alliance has complicated the cost for China to challenge the Philippines over territorial issues. Given the US military’s sophisticated weapons, equipment, and combat training, it is fully capable of deterring China’s advance in the South China Sea.

The enlarged presence of the US military in the northern Philippines can also reinforce more dynamic and collaborative operations in case China attempts to forcefully unify Taiwan with the mainland.

The way China treated the Philippines in the 2010s showed Beijing’s overconfidence as a new global power. During the term of former president Benigno Aquino Jr — when the Philippines filed a case against China in 2013 at the Hague — China refused to participate in the three-year trial.

Instead, Beijing continued to flex through military drills and issuing trade sanctions to the Philippines. Beijing lost a critical opportunity to prove that it respects the rule of law. During Duterte’s presidential term, Beijing wasted the chance to establish that it is a credible and benign great power to its neighbors.

Philippine and US Marines during a surface-to-air missile simulation as part of exercise Kamandag joint exercises on October 10, 2019. Photo: Lance Cpl. Brienna Tuck / US Marine Corps

Beijing left Manila with little choice but to take the next best approach, which was to strengthen its alliance with the United States to balance the China threat. This is not to say that the China-Philippines relationship is hopeless.

China can take the time to review its foreign policy and learn from the unexpected consequences of its actions. The strong-arm policy that Beijing used on Manila only aggravates tensions and has proven to be unsustainable in the context of great power competition for influence in Asia.

But Manila can take advantage of warmer US-Philippines ties to address critical issues beyond the security realm. The Philippines can join like-minded countries to address its vulnerabilities – including Chinese trade dependence and other economic security and resilience issues.

Jenny Balboa is a Lecturer at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies and at the Department of Global and Interdisciplinary Studies, Hosei University. Shinji Takenaka is a Senior Economist at the Japan Center for Economic Research.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

asiatimes.com · by Jenny Balboa · June 6, 2023

28. Remembering D-Day: Key facts and figures about epochal World War II invasion

Some facts to reflect on today.

Perhaps the most important "fact" we should remember is the leadership lesson from General Eisenhower and the speech he fortunately did not have to make.

"Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops," Eisenhower wrote. "My decision to attack at this time and place was based upon the best information available. The troops, the air and the Navy did all that bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone."

The above is a real leadership lesson that we should remember and learn:

It's telling to see today where Eisenhower made changes in his note. He crossed out "This particular operation" to write "My decision to attack," which is emphatic and personal.

And he drew a long, strong line under "mine alone." When you see those words and that thick line on the note today, in the Eisenhower Library, you might feel some of the steel of a man who would so unflinchingly accept responsibility. Ike didn't try to camouflage failure in phrases like, "Mistakes were made," "Our projections were not met" or "I will say nothing pending investigation." He wrote, "any blame or fault ... is mine alone."

(See a photo copy if his handwritten speech at this link: https://www.npr.org/2013/06/08/189535104/the-speech-eisenhower-never-gave-on-the-normandy-invasion)

Remembering D-Day: Key facts and figures about epochal World War II invasion

AP · June 5, 2023

OMAHA BEACH, France (AP) — The D-Day invasion that helped change the course of World War II was unprecedented in scale and audacity. As veterans and world dignitaries commemorate the 79th anniversary of the operation, here’s a look at some details about what happened:

WHO TOOK PART

Nearly 160,000 Allied troops landed in Normandy on June 6, 1944. Of those, 73,000 were from the United States, 83,000 from Britain and Canada. Forces from several other countries were also involved, including French troops fighting with Gen. Charles de Gaulle against the Nazi occupation.

They faced around 50,000 German forces.

More than 2 million Allied soldiers, sailors, pilots, medics and other people from a dozen countries were involved in the overall Operation Overlord, the battle to wrest western France from Nazi control that started on D-Day.

WHERE AND WHEN

The sea landings started at 6:30 a.m. local time, just after dawn, targeting five code-named beaches, one after the other: Omaha, Utah, Gold, Sword, Juno.

The operation also included actions inland, including overnight parachute landings on strategic German sites and U.S. Army Rangers scaling cliffs to take out German gun positions.

Around 11,000 Allied aircraft, 7,000 ships and boats, and thousands of other vehicles were involved in the invasion.

VICTIMS ON ALL SIDES

A total of 4,414 Allied troops were killed on D-Day itself, including 2,501 Americans. More than 5,000 were wounded.

In the ensuing Battle of Normandy, 73,000 Allied forces were killed and 153,000 wounded. The battle — and especially Allied bombings of French villages and cities — killed around 20,000 French civilians.

The exact German casualties aren’t known, but historians estimate between 4,000 and 9,000 men were killed, wounded or missing during the D-Day invasion alone. About 22,000 German soldiers are among the many buried around Normandy.

SURVIVORS

A few thousand D-Day veterans may be still alive; the youngest are in their late 90s. A few dozen are in Normandy for the 79th anniversary. Charity organizations and local French residents helped organize their trip back to the beaches of D-Day, including providing travel and housing to ensure they could make the journey.

Next year, world leaders are expected for major commemorations marking the 80th anniversary of the invasion.

AP · June 5, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com