Quotes of the Day:

"The first principle is that you must not fool yourself, and your the easiest person to fool."

- Richard Feynman

"The world suffers a lot. Not because the violence of bad people. But the silence of good people.

- Napoleon Bonaparte

"People do not seem to realize that their opinion of the world is also a confession of character."

- Ralph Waldo Emerson

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 7, 2023

2. Analysis | Ukraine’s counteroffensive won’t be an easy retread of last year’s wins

3. To Confront China, the US Must Act Like the Superpower It Is

4. What the US should do with its A-10 Thunderbolt By Sen. Marco Rubio

5. Not-So-Great Powers: U.S.-China Rivalry in the Neomedieval Age

6. A Hidden Player: The Significance Of Mongolia In Geopolitics – Analysis

7. It Was All in Vain: Edward Snowden’s Sacrifice 10 Years On

8. Cuba to Host Secret Chinese Spy Base Focusing on U.S.

9. 448. Applying Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning to the Target Audience Analysis Model

10. Energy drinks – The unsung hero of the Global War on Terror

11. US-China: A Cold War lesson to apply “rules of the road” at sea

12. Countries Buy Defective Chinese Military Equipment. Why?

13. ASEAN to hold first joint military exercise off Indonesia

14. Ukraine Situation Report: 'Partisans' Threaten Crimean Incursion Next

15. Martha Gellhorn: The only woman present on D-Day

16. Propaganda film casts Chinese Army as saintly liberators

17. Gray Hulls and Gray Zones

18. War of the Words: Lessons in Psychological Operations from the Eastern Front in World War II

19. Would Europeans Back Washington in a U.S.-China War? A New Survey Might Surprise You

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 7, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2023

Key Takeaways

• The destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam is significantly changing the geography and topography of the Kherson frontline sector in southern Ukraine.
• Ukrainian officials continued to accuse Russian forces of destroying the KHPP dam out of fear that Ukrainian forces would land on the east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
• The New York Times (NYT) reported that engineering and munitions experts believe that a deliberate explosion was the likely cause of KHPP dam’s collapse on June 6.
• Russian forces and occupation authorities are responding to the flooding in Kherson Oblast with a great degree of disorganization and thereby exacerbating harm to the civilian population of occupied areas.
• Select Wagner Group-affiliated Russian senior military officers continue to posture as effective commanders to appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin by capitalizing on high-profile military events.
• The pro-Teplinsky interview is likely part of an information operation aimed at undermining the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
• Wagner-affiliated commanders’ reactive public relations campaigns may not be sufficient to deflect from battlefield realities.
• Russian and Ukrainian officials each accused the other state of damaging an ammonia pipeline that runs through Kharkiv Oblast and causing an ammonia leak.
• Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks around Kreminna.
• Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukrainian forces are conducting offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction as of June 7.
• Russian forces continued limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks on the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts on June 7.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly engaged in skirmishes in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian authorities continue to restrict international travel for those eligible for military service.
• Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to establish patronage programs between Russian regions and occupied territories in order to integrate occupied territories into Russia.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 7, 2023

Jun 7, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 7, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, George Barros, and Fredrick W. Kagan

June 7, 2023, 8:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 3pm ET on June 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam is significantly changing the geography and topography of the Kherson frontline sector in southern Ukraine. Near-infrared (NIR) imagery captured at 0400 am ET on June 7 indicates that the flooding is heavily disrupting Russian prepared defensive positions on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River – especially affecting Russian first-line positions in Hola Prystan and Oleshky. Various sources reported that Oleshky, Hola Prystan, Kozacha Laheri, and Dnipryany are almost entirely flooded with water levels rising to the height of a one-story buildings in some areas.[1] The Ukrainian headquarters established to remediate the consequences of the dam’s destruction reported that as of June 7 29 settlements are partially or fully flooded, 19 of which are located on the Ukrainian-controlled territory and 10 on Russian occupied territories.[2] Russian sources published footage indicating that water had begun receding in Nova Kakhovka and had dropped by 30cm.[3] Russian sources also claimed that water levels decreased by three to four meters in some areas from a high of 10 meters.[4] Water levels in nearby Mykolaiv City reportedly increased by 70cm as of June 7.[5] Flooding will likely worsen and further change the geography in Kherson Oblast over the next 72 hours.

The destruction of the KHPP dam is affecting Russian military positions on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River. The flooding has destroyed many Russian first line field fortifications that the Russian military intended to use to defend against Ukrainian attacks. Rapid flooding has likely forced Russian personnel and military equipment in Russian main concentration points in Oleshky and Hola Prystan to withdraw. Russian forces had previously used these positions to shell Kherson City and other settlements on the west (right bank) of Kherson. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces relocated their personnel and military equipment from five to 15 kilometers from the flood zone, which places Russian forces out of artillery range of some settlements on the west (right bank) of the Dnipro River they had been attacking.[6] The flood also destroyed Russian minefields along the coast, with footage showing mines exploding in the flood water.[7] Kherson Oblast Occupation Head Vladimir Saldo, however, claimed that the destruction of the KHPP is beneficial to the Russian defenses because it will complicate Ukrainian advances across the river.[8] Saldo’s assessment of the situation ignores the loss of Russia’s first line of prepared fortifications. The amount of Russian heavy equipment lost in the first 24 hours of flooding is also unclear.

Ukrainian officials continued to accuse Russian forces of destroying the KHPP dam out of fear that Ukrainian forces would land on the east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. Representative of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Andriy Yusov stated that only Russian forces could have detonated the dam given its structural and engineering features and noted that Russians are “very happy that the islands, on which [Ukrainian forces] were allegedly based, were flooded.”[9] Humenyuk states that Russian forces did not consider the consequences before destroying the dam and were too concerned over a Ukrainian counteroffensive.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff similarly claimed that Russian forces detonated internal structures of the KHPP to damage the dam and thereby prevent the advance of Ukrainian forces.[11] Russian milbloggers had expressed concern about claimed Ukrainian river crossings onto the east bank the day before the destruction of the KHPP dam and on numerous occasions in the past. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that there were active engagements between Ukrainian and Russian forces in the Dachi area on the east bank of the Dnipro River (11km southwest of Kherson City) and on the contested islands near Kherson City as of June 5.[12] The milblogger claimed that the number of Ukrainian speedboats also increased in the Dnipro Delta as of June 5. Another milblogger speculated that Ukrainian forces were attempting to establish a bridgehead by seizing the KHPP dam.[13] ISW offers no assessment of whether the Ukrainians were attempting to cross the river or for what purpose they might have sought to do so. The clear concern in the Russian military information space, however, shows that the fear of such a crossing and belief that it was either underway or imminent was present in the minds of Russians closely following the war shortly before the dam was destroyed.

The New York Times (NYT) reported that engineering and munitions experts believe that a deliberate explosion was the likely cause of KHPP dam’s collapse on June 6.[14] NYT reported that a blast within an enclosed space would cause the most damage, whereas external detonations – such as by targeted missile or artillery strikes – would only exert a fraction of the force necessary to breach the dam. The NYT quoted the experts as acknowledging that the KHPP sustained damage from military operations prior to the collapse but questioning whether this prior damage alone was sufficient to collapse the dam. NYT reported that the dam was first breached in its middle, close to the KHPP on the Russian-held east (left) riverbank, and that more of the dam collapsed throughout the day, a pattern that one expert characterized as inconsistent with the dam failing due to prior damage.

Russian forces and occupation authorities are responding to the flooding in Kherson Oblast with a great degree of disorganization and thereby exacerbating harm to the civilian population of occupied areas. Kherson Oblast Occupation Head Vladimir Saldo claimed that Russian authorities have evacuated about 1,500 people from flooded areas and established 48 temporary accommodations in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to house them.[15] Saldo also claimed that the Kherson Occupation Administration is “almost mandatorily” sending children living in flooded areas to “recreation camps” located deeper in Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast and in occupied Crimea.[16] Saldo‘s reports of proactive efforts on the part of occupation authorities do not cohere with reports by Ukrainian officials and anecdotal evidence from the occupied east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian military personnel near Kozachi Laheri (30km southwest of the KHPP on the Russian-occupied east bank of the Dnipro River) purposefully prevented civilian populations from fleeing the area despite flooding.[17] Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated that residents of east bank settlements are waiting on their roofs with no food or water for the occupation administration to provide aid and evacuate them, while Russian soldiers abandoned their positions and fled.[18] Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported that civilians in Russian-occupied Oleshky (53km southwest of KHPP) have waited for almost two days on roofs for volunteers and Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations employees to arrive after which they helped civilians evacuate to dry areas of Oleshky, but that Russian forces did not permit civilians to evacuate outside of Oleshky.[19] Russian forces’ and occupation authorities’ varied responses and slow reaction time indicate that they were unprepared to deal with civilian evacuations.

Civilian accounts about the lack of evacuations in Belgorod Oblast in response to the pro-Ukrainian all-Russian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and Freedom of Russian Legion‘s (LSR) raids suggest a similar pattern of Russian authorities struggling to coordinate evacuations even on their own territory.[20]

Select Wagner Group-affiliated Russian senior military officers continue to posture as effective commanders to appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin by capitalizing on high-profile military events. A Russian milblogger published a long interview with Russian Colonel “K. Zalessky” in which Zalessky claimed that Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky played a decisive role in Russian forces’ ability to defend against the ongoing Ukrainian localized counterattacks near Velyka Novosilka, Donetsk Oblast.[21] Zalessky confirmed prior claims that Teplinsky became an overall theater deputy commander responsible for southern Ukraine as of April 1 and praised Teplinsky for being intimately involved in Russian defensive preparations west of Vuhledar and throughout the south.[22] The interview notably portrays the Russian defense against these localized Ukrainian attacks as a significant undertaking, contrasting with some Russian milblogger claims that these Ukrainian operations constitute a reconnaissance-in-force and were not part of a main counteroffensive effort.[23]

The pro-Teplinsky interview is likely part of an information operation aimed at undermining the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Zalessky claimed that Teplinsky praised the commanders of the 5th Combined Arms Army and 36th Combined Arms Army (both of the Eastern Military District) for their defensive efforts in the Velyka Novosilka area but claimed that not all of the Russian military command displayed similar bravery.[24] Zalessky claimed that Teplinsky personally arrayed Russian formations across their defensive lines, inspected battalions, and trained personnel, echoing Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s June 6 criticisms that MoD officials need to visit the front lines.[25] The interview was published almost immediately after the MoD claimed that Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov took command of Russian operations in the south on June 5, and after Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu characterized the defense as an MoD success on June 6.[26] Shoigu notably also praised elements of the 5th and 36th Combined Arms armies but failed to visit them on the frontlines as Teplinsky reportedly did.[27] Teplinsky notably had to use a Russian milblogger to claim credit for repelling claimed Ukrainian attacks in eastern Zaporizhia and western Donetsk oblasts. The MoD has previously blocked Wagner-affiliated commanders from being featured on official platforms.[28] It is noteworthy that Russian commanders and senior military leaders appear to prioritize public posing in the midst of ongoing significant military operations and major catastrophes.

Wagner-affiliated commanders’ reactive public relations campaigns may not be sufficient to deflect from battlefield realities. Though some large milbloggers amplified the Teplinsky interview on June 7, the broader Russian information space remained saturated with tactical claims of Ukrainian counterattacks near Velyka Novosilka and with the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam disaster.[29]

Key Takeaways

• The destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam is significantly changing the geography and topography of the Kherson frontline sector in southern Ukraine.
• Ukrainian officials continued to accuse Russian forces of destroying the KHPP dam out of fear that Ukrainian forces would land on the east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
• The New York Times (NYT) reported that engineering and munitions experts believe that a deliberate explosion was the likely cause of KHPP dam’s collapse on June 6.
• Russian forces and occupation authorities are responding to the flooding in Kherson Oblast with a great degree of disorganization and thereby exacerbating harm to the civilian population of occupied areas.
• Select Wagner Group-affiliated Russian senior military officers continue to posture as effective commanders to appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin by capitalizing on high-profile military events.
• The pro-Teplinsky interview is likely part of an information operation aimed at undermining the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
• Wagner-affiliated commanders’ reactive public relations campaigns may not be sufficient to deflect from battlefield realities.
• Russian and Ukrainian officials each accused the other state of damaging an ammonia pipeline that runs through Kharkiv Oblast and causing an ammonia leak.
• Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks around Kreminna.
• Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukrainian forces are conducting offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction as of June 7.
• Russian forces continued limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks on the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts on June 7.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly engaged in skirmishes in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian authorities continue to restrict international travel for those eligible for military service.
• Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to establish patronage programs between Russian regions and occupied territories in order to integrate occupied territories into Russia.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian and Ukrainian officials each accused the other state of damaging an ammonia pipeline that runs through Kharkiv Oblast and of causing an ammonia leak. Geolocated footage shows a large cloud of ammonia leaking from a section of the Togliatti-Odesa ammonia pipeline just south of Masyutivka, Kharkiv Oblast (12km northeast of Kupyansk).[30] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov reported that Russian forces fired six shells at the pipeline and that Russian forces previously targeted the pipeline with artillery fire on June 5 and 6.[31] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces deliberately mined the area at night on June 5.[32] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that repairs to the pipeline will take one to three months.[33] Russian and Ukrainian forces have recently conducted engagements near Masyutivka.[34] ISW has previously reported that Russian officials have set informational conditions to accuse Ukraine of using chemical weapons or of conducting false flag attacks using chemical or radiological weapons.[35]

Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks around Kreminna on June 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Kreminna itself and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka (10km south), Berestove (30km south), and Vesele (32km south).[36] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces attacked Novoselivske (13km northeast of Svatove) and advanced near Bilohorivka on June 6.[37]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click here to read ISW’s retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.

Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukrainian forces are conducting offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction as of June 7. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on June 7 that Ukrainian forces near Bakhmut have transferred from defensive to offensive operations and have advanced from 200 to 1,000m in various unspecified areas over the past day.[38] Malyar also noted that Russian forces are deploying reserves to Bakhmut to prepare to conduct a defense-in-depth and that some Wagner elements are remaining in the Russian rear.[39] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces are advancing on the flanks of Bakhmut and that Russian forces are losing certain unspecified positions.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops are conducting counterattacks southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka (6km southwest), northwest of Bakhmut near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest) and in the Berkhivka area (6km northwest), and northeast of Bakhmut near Yakovlivka (15km northeast).[41] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian troops repelled Ukrainian attacks on several settlements on the outskirts of Bakhmut.[42] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations towards Klishchiivka, Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Ivanivske (5km southwest of Bakhmut), and Pivnichne (20km southwest of Bakhmut).[43]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on June 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations towards Avdiivka and that Ukrainian forces repelled 13 Russian ground attacks in Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[44] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Nevelske, Vodyane, and Opytne and that Ukrainian forces retreated from near Opytne with losses.[45] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck and destroyed two Ukrainian fuel depots in Avdiivka.[46]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks on the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts on June 7. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks southwest of Velyka Novosilka and reiterated that Russian forces control Novodonetske (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[47] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled renewed Ukrainian attacks on Novodonetske on June 6 and claimed that Ukrainian forces had “varying successes” southwest of Velyka Novosilka.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that a Ukrainian tactical group advanced by one kilometer and reached a tactical height southwest of Velyka Novosilka.[49] Russian Colonel “K. Zalessky” reported that Eastern Military (EMD) elements of the 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army) and the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army) – namely the 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, 114th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, and the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment – are operating in the Vremivka-Velyka Novosilka directions.[50] Zalessky added that the Russian 37th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army, EMD), elements of the Donetsk People’s Republic Militia (DNR) Operational-Combat Tactical Formation ”Kaskad,” and other unspecified DNR units repelled Ukrainian attacks on the Velyka Novosilka frontline.[51] Zalessky noted that elements of the 29th Combined Arms Army previously stopped Ukrainian advances in the Pavlivka area (45km southwest of Donetsk City).[52]

Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly engaged in skirmishes in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 7. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to advance into settlements south and southwest of Orikhiv.[53] Russian sources also claimed that fighting is ongoing southwest of Orikhiv.[54] A Wagner-affiliated milblogger claimed that elements of the Southern Military District’s 291st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment and 70th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (both part of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army) repelled Ukrainian attacks on the Orikhiv-Tokmak-Melitopol line.[55] Russian milbloggers claimed that unspecified Russian reconnaissance and special forces continue to defend Russian positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[56]

Russian and Ukrainian sources reported explosions in occupied territories in Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts on June 7. Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported a loud explosion in Myrne, Melitopol Raion and six explosions in Tokmak.[57] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a foundry shop in Molochansk southwest of Tokmak.[58] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushenko amplified local reports about explosions northeast and southwest of Mariupol.[59] Andryushenko also reported an increase of Russian aviation activity over Mariupol on June 7.[60] Russian forces reported shelling Ukrainian positions along the southern frontline.[61]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian authorities continue to restrict international travel for those eligible for military service. The Russian Federation Council approved a law on June 7 that clarifies rules on declaring Russian passports invalid and introduces travel restrictions on certain categories of citizens.[62] The law holds that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs can essentially take passports for “storage" (confiscate them) for citizens who are restricted from leaving Russia due to conscription for military service or alternative civilian service.[63] Such legislative manipulations are likely aimed at maintaining a force generation pool and preventing Russians from fleeing abroad to avoid military service.

Russian regional governments continue efforts to incentivize military service. Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News reported on June 7 that the Leningrad Oblast Legislative Assembly adopted a bill that will give all those who signed contracts to fight in Ukraine a 5-acre plot of land starting on June 1, 2023.[64]

The Russian MoD continues efforts to present the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) as an effective wartime organism. Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu visited the Almaz Antey arms industry enterprise on June 7 to inspect the enterprise’s fulfilment of the state defense order.[65] Shoigu visited anti-aircraft missile production workshops and called for increased synchronization between commissioning orders for new equipment and the production of those models.[66] Almaz Antey General Director Yan Nivkov in turn reported to Shoigu that the creation of new production facilities at the enterprise will double production output.[67]

Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian MoD for falsely claiming that Russian troops destroyed a Leopard tank in Ukraine. The Russian MoD posted footage June 6 that claims to show a Russian strike destroying a Leopard tank.[68] Russian milbloggers were quick to notice, however, that closer examination of the footage shows that the object resembles a piece of agricultural equipment and suggested that Russian forces actually destroyed a John Deere tractor.[69] Several Russian milbloggers criticized the MoD for posting the footage and urged Russian military authorities to vet their public posts more carefully.[70] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin sardonically congratulated the Russian MoD for a “job well done” in reference to the tractor.[71]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to establish patronage programs between Russian regions and occupied territories in order to integrate occupied territories into Russia. Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Head Yevgeny Balitsky met with North Ossetia-Alania Republic Head Sergey Melyailo on June 7 to discuss a patronage program with Chernihivskyi Raion in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[72] Balitsky claimed that the North Ossetia-Alania will first help to restore a secondary school and a temple. Balitsky also requested that North Ossetia-Alania send doctors and social workers to Chernihivkskyi Raion and that North Ossetia-Alania establish a recreation program in the Republic for children from Zaporizhia Oblast.

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine is extraordinarily unlikely).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

The Russian military likely redeployed a significant number of its forces that were training in Belarus to Ukraine or staging areas near Ukraine ahead of Ukraine’s counteroffensive. Ukraine’s State Border Service Spokesman Andriy Demchenko stated on June 7 that as of the beginning of June there are approximately 1,000 Russian military personnel in Belarus.[73] This is a sharp decrease from spring 2023, when Ukrainian officials reported that about 9,000-10,000 Russian troops were in Belarus as of March 30.[74]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Analysis | Ukraine’s counteroffensive won’t be an easy retread of last year’s wins

Analysis | Ukraine’s counteroffensive won’t be an easy retread of last year’s wins

Analysis by Adam Taylor

Reporter

June 8, 2023 at 12:00 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Adam Taylor · June 8, 2023

Has Ukraine’s long-awaited spring counteroffensive finally begun? Even now, as the calendar ticks firmly into summer, the answer still very much depends on whom you ask. Russian officials say yes, it has — a view shared by some U.S. officials, too. But the Ukrainians have directly rejected these claims. “When we start the counteroffensive, everyone will know about it, they will see it,” Oleksiy Danilov, secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, told Reuters on Wednesday.

Ultimately, the wins of last year’s counteroffensives were easy to spot. After Ukraine stealthily maneuvered its forces to the Kharkiv region in September, they were able to displace invading Russian forces who had been expecting the counteroffensive to begin hundreds of miles south in the Kherson region. The Russians were flummoxed. In the resulting strategic disarray, Moscow’s forces were soon also forced to retreat in the south, with Ukraine ultimately liberating the city of Kherson and the surrounding area in November.

However, the landscape of the war has fundamentally changed since last year. There are several reasons that this year’s efforts may not prove to be an easy repeat of 2022’s counteroffensives for Ukraine — for better or worse.

1. The battle map has been redrawn. Last year, Ukraine was able to retake significant areas of land in the Kherson region, but only on the west bank of the Dnieper. This mighty, sprawling river serves as a dividing line between Ukrainian forces and Russian occupiers, who have destroyed bridges that could be used to cross it. Crossing the Dnieper is possible — small groups of Ukrainian soldiers have already done just that — but it presents a significant tactical problem.

That problem may have been made more severe this week by the collapse of the Russian-controlled Kakhovka dam and hydroelectric power plant, which resulted in enormous flooding, with thousands of homes caught in rising waters. The flooding has already reshaped the battlefield, cutting off one of the few remaining routes across the river.

In the neighboring Zaporizhzhia region, meanwhile, the relatively flat expanses of mostly agricultural land make for a far riper target. Many expect the counteroffensive to take place in this direction as it could sever the “land bridge” to Crimea, the Ukrainian peninsula occupied by Russia since 2014. But Russia knows this too and has spent more than six months heavily fortifying the area with trenches, minefields and antitank obstacles. Getting through those lines will take time, effort and equipment — potentially allowing Russian reserves to regroup and counterstrike before Ukraine’s forces can break through.

2. New weapons are on the battlefield. The United States has provided significant amounts of new weapons to Ukrainian forces since last November, including the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, the M1A2 Abrams battle tank and Patriot air defense missile systems. Other allies have filled in the gap, with European allies providing Leopard 2 battle tanks and Britain supplying the Storm Shadow long-range missiles. (The United States also recently gave approval for the supply of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine, though like the Abrams tanks, it is likely to be many months before they are used).

Many of these weapons will mark a change for Ukraine, which at the start of the conflict was relying on older machines largely of Soviet-era design. The Bradleys, for example, are generally faster and have better armor than the vehicles they are supplanting, while the addition of long-range missiles like the Storm Shadow could force Russia to move its reserves further from Ukrainian-controlled territory, making them slower to respond.

Just as important, however, are the troops themselves. Units like the newly created 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade are not only armed with Western weapons but trained in Western military tactics, too. They have been trained in offensive maneuvers — remarkably, unusual in Ukraine’s military until the invasion — as well as combined-arms warfare, which calls on different types of weapons and units to work together to maximize their impact.

3. Morale could prove to be a big issue for both sides. Russia’s military has been beset with problems since the war began — one reason for the hasty retreats seen last year. Russia’s planned winter offensive earlier this year never took off, while whatever gains there have been are at best pyrrhic victories. Bakhmut, for example, was taken at the massive cost of both the strategically unimportant city itself and thousands of Russians — many convicts recruited as mercenaries — who died there. Yevgeniy Prigozhin, the Wagner mercenary chief who placed himself at the center of that battle, is now in a war of words with Russia’s military, further evidence of deep and potentially dangerous internal divisions.

By comparison, the fissures in Ukrainian morale are limited. In general, Ukrainian soldiers and officials keep a remarkably consistent patriotic tone, even after the setback in Bakhmut, with few reports of rifts over military strategy or other issues with President Volodymyr Zelensky’s leadership. But this means the weight of expectations bears down on Ukraine’s counteroffensive. Last month, Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov told reporters from The Washington Post that the counteroffensive may be “overestimated” given Ukraine’s strength during the last push and its remarkable resilience over 14 months of the war. He warned of “emotional disappointment” if something huge wasn’t achieved.

Reznikov may not just have been talking about domestic disappointment in Ukraine, where many are ready for some kind of return to normalcy even if they don’t want to give up the fight against Russia. If Ukrainian forces are not able to keep up the momentum seen in previous counteroffensives with all the new military equipment and training they’ve recently received, some Western allies may begin to push for negotiations as their own morale is sapped. It’s one more reason Ukraine has left many waiting for the counteroffensive: They need to get it right.

The Washington Post · by Adam Taylor · June 8, 2023

3. To Confront China, the US Must Act Like the Superpower It Is

As I have been told often by China experts, if there was not a Chinese Communist Party the leaders of China would likely be acting in the same way as the CCP is today. They are acting within Chinese culture and tradition and not communist ideology.

I too have long thought it was a good idea to focus on the CCP and not on China writ large - name the CCP as the enemy while respecting the Chinese people. But I learned from my mentors that while we think the distinction is a good thing, it is a distinction without a difference and only seems good to us.

That said, we must consistently demonstrate strength and resolve as we compete with the PRC and try to prevent conflict.

Excerpts:

The Biden administration will not state the powerful truth: China’s Communist Party is the enemy of the U.S. and threatens not only our national security but that of other countries in the Indo-Pacific and, indeed, around the world. At its root, this confrontation is zero-sum. As Frederick the Great is purported to have said regarding the origins of the First Silesian War against Austria’s Queen Maria Theresa, “There was no misunderstanding. We both wanted Silesia.” So, too, is it with the South China Sea or Taiwan or hegemony, or whether it will be China or the U.S. that defines the political values of the 21st century.

The U.S. must possess a strategy for victory. It must act like the superpower it is. Any dialogue with China should convey only this message: You will lose this fight.

To Confront China, the US Must Act Like the Superpower It Is

Published 06/07/23 09:30 AM ET

Bradley A. Thayer

themessenger.com

The Chinese spy balloon’s lengthy sojourn over the United States led to the postponement of Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s trip to Beijing, yet the Biden administration’s efforts to compel talks with Chinese officials have intensified. This desire is present in almost every speech delivered by a national security figure in the Biden administration.

During May, national security adviser Jake Sullivan met with Wang Yi, China’s highest foreign policy official, in Vienna, in part to sustain the dialogue. Also last month, CIA Director Bill Burns secretly visited China to meet with Chinese intelligence officials to maintain lines of communication. While these efforts are indefatigable, perhaps to the point of being Sisyphean, China continues to rebuff the U.S.

Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu refused to meet with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin at the Shangri-La Dialogue security conference. In his speech to the conference, Austin provided warnings for China and stressed the importance of dialogue: “For responsible defense leaders, the right time to talk is any time, the right time to talk is every time, and the right time to talk is now. Dialogue is not a reward; it is a necessity. … And the more we talk, the more we can avoid misunderstandings and miscalculations that could lead to crisis or conflict.”

Regarding the U.S.’s demand for dialogue, China’s Lt. Gen. Jing Jianfeng, deputy chief of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission, provided a tart observation at the Shangri-La conference: “The U.S. has been calling for communication and exchanges on the one hand, and undermining China’s interests and concerns on the other, and claiming to enhance the management and control of crisis on one hand and acting tough and showing provocation on the other.”

Austin’s remarks were made about the same time as Sullivan’s address to the Arms Control Association’s annual forum in Washington, which was an entreaty to China and Russia to enter into arms control talks — and to state that the U.S. need not deploy nuclear weapons to maintain deterrence. Sullivan said the Biden administration is “trying to adapt both our nuclear deterrence and our arms control strategies to meet this moment.”

Austin’s stated goal — that the point of a Sino-American dialogue is to avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation — is itself a misunderstanding and miscalculation. First, to request dialogue plays to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) considerable strengths in political warfare. The U.S. appears as a supplicant, pleading with China to speak to it, which places China in the position of making the decision. That puts China in charge and plays into broader narratives that Beijing advances: that the U.S. is in decline, and so, states should not ally with it but instead should look to China to shape the future; and second, that the U.S. does not belong in the region. Beijing is attempting to de-legitimize Washington’s presence as a step toward evicting the U.S. from the Indo-Pacific.

Austin’s goal assumes there is some value in dialogue for its own sake, or that it will result in the CCP having an epiphany, realizing it was wrong and altering its behavior. The thinking is that this Damascene conversion might occur through reasoned exchange, in which China would come around to the way the U.S. sees issues. This would be as a result of Washington’s brilliant logic, or it might happen through intense discussion. Those who think this way assume that the CCP will come to realize that the U.S. is right after all, or that China simply did not see before that its interests can be accommodated with those of the U.S.

Sadly, those outcomes will not come to pass.

The need to talk betrays the Biden administration’s lack of strategic thought. The value of strategy is to tell you how to win. Strategy assumes that you have interests to advance and protect, and that threats to those interests exist. The CCP, at least, understands this; it considers the U.S. as its foe and acts like it. Despite its defense strategy released last fall, the Biden administration evidently does not truly accept that the CCP is the enemy of the United States, so it acts like it can alter the CCP’s understanding of its interests — which are to defeat the U.S.

The Biden administration will not state the powerful truth: China’s Communist Party is the enemy of the U.S. and threatens not only our national security but that of other countries in the Indo-Pacific and, indeed, around the world. At its root, this confrontation is zero-sum. As Frederick the Great is purported to have said regarding the origins of the First Silesian War against Austria’s Queen Maria Theresa, “There was no misunderstanding. We both wanted Silesia.” So, too, is it with the South China Sea or Taiwan or hegemony, or whether it will be China or the U.S. that defines the political values of the 21st century.

The U.S. must possess a strategy for victory. It must act like the superpower it is. Any dialogue with China should convey only this message: You will lose this fight.

Bradley A. Thayer is director of China policy at the Center for Security Policy and the co-author with Lianchao Han of “Understanding the China Threat.”

themessenger.com

4. What the US should do with its A-10 Thunderbolt By Sen. Marco Rubio

Maintenance and sustainment. Will friends, partners, and allies be able to sustain the A-10s?

Conclusion:

Simply put, phasing out the A-10 by transferring it to allies and partners is the smart thing to do. Not only would it help America adapt to the challenges of the 21st century, it would also help our friends confront their own challenges without deep U.S. intervention. That’s killing two birds with one stone — the best kind of public policy.

What the US should do with its A-10 Thunderbolt

By Sen. Marco Rubio

Defense News · by Sen. Marco Rubio · June 7, 2023

After years of obstruction, Congress is finally approving the Air Force’s plan to retire the A-10 Thunderbolt. This is the right call, as the A-10 is no longer suited to America’s geostrategic needs. However, we should not simply dispose of this venerable plane; in the hands of our international partners, it can continue advancing the national interest.

The U.S. government created the A-10 in the 1970s to provide close-air support to American ground troops. At the time it was an effective counterweight to the threat of Soviet tanks, and in the decades since it has served the military faithfully.

The A-10 proved especially useful in the Gulf War, when it flew 8,100 sorties and destroyed thousands of Soviet-era combat vehicles and equipment. Later, it helped the U.S. destroy hardened enemy positions in the war on terrorism.

But major military operations in the Middle East have ceased. Today, our greatest adversary is communist China, whose tanks and emplacements are much more advanced than those used by the Soviets or Islamic terrorists.

To prepare to counter Beijing in a future conflict, we must make the best possible use of our limited hangar space and procurement dollars. To do that, we must retire the A-10, as senior military leaders have called for. This will make room for aircraft like the F-35 Lightning II, and free funds for the development and construction of next-generation missiles and missile defense systems, which will be invaluable in any future Indo-Pacific conflict, whether that’s in Taiwan, the South China Sea or the Korean Peninsula.

However, the A-10 can still do a lot of good if transferred to allies and partners in need of it. The most obvious example is Ukraine, which is preparing to mount a counteroffensive against Soviet-era tanks and entrenched Russian positions.

At the recent G7 summit, President Joe Biden stated he supports training Ukrainian forces to operate F-16 Fighting Falcons, a critical first step to allies providing the planes to Ukraine. But there is good reason to wonder if an air-to-air fighter makes the most sense. Ukraine’s defense intelligence chief, for one, believes Ukraine would fare better with A-10s. Moreover, F-16s require 6,000 feet of tarmac — increasingly rare in bombed-out Ukraine — to take off and land, while A-10s only require 4,000 feet of dirt runway.

Beyond Ukraine, potential beneficiaries of an A-10 transfer program include African countries in the Sahel fighting ISIS and Boko Haram, or even Latin American nations combating paramilitary rebels and drug cartels in the jungle.

Such a program would be neither unprecedented nor unusual. The U.S. manufactures and sells vehicles and platforms the U.S. military no longer uses on a semi-regular basis. For instance, production of the A-29 Super Tucano employs hundreds of Floridians in Jacksonville and supports counterterrorism operations in Africa and Colombia.

Simply put, phasing out the A-10 by transferring it to allies and partners is the smart thing to do. Not only would it help America adapt to the challenges of the 21st century, it would also help our friends confront their own challenges without deep U.S. intervention. That’s killing two birds with one stone — the best kind of public policy.

Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., is vice chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, and services on the Foreign Relations Committee.

5. Not-So-Great Powers: U.S.-China Rivalry in the Neomedieval Age

Excerpts:

The current U.S.-China rivalry contrasts sharply with these historical experiences. Unlike their predecessors, the two countries contend amid a complex and overlapping array of threats, labor under severe resource constraints, and manifest distressing signs of domestic weakness. With a diminishing ability to meet the needs of their citizens, the U.S. and Chinese governments have inspired little patriotic enthusiasm. Neither side has mobilized their citizenry against the other, nor do strategies of mass mobilization appear plausible for the foreseeable future. Instead, the principal mode of military recruitment consists of professional volunteers and contractors. China indeed continues to rely on conscription for perhaps a third of its military manpower, but that is because it cannot attract enough qualified volunteers. Far from a minor hindrance, transnational threats and episodes of domestic upheaval appear highly menacing and routinely vie with traditional threats for the attention of policymakers. For example, U.S. military forces have struggled to counter non-state actors in the Middle East and control outbursts of domestic turmoil. Meanwhile, the People’s Liberation Arm has scrambled to protect Chinese citizens abroad from serious harm, and the country’s security forces struggle to ensure domestic control in Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang.

...

Consequently, U.S. decisionmakers and planners should be wary of resorting to strategies and methods drawn from industrial age wars with which contemporary militaries bear a superficial resemblance. The U.S. military, in particular, will face the temptation to prescribe industrial nation-state solutions for neomedieval problems. Focusing on conventional military challenges both validates the importance of such forces and frames issues in terms that existing interests find comfortable. But policymakers should resist this temptation. The Russian military’s disastrous performance in Ukraine and America’s painful experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq provide examples of what can happen when outdated thinking dominates approaches to warfare. To avoid potentially disastrous misjudgments and miscalculations, U.S. decisionmakers and planners should consider several key points about the neomedieval era.

...

The great powers who most effectively grasp and adapt to the neomedieval reality may gain a crucial advantage over rivals who continue to exhaust increasingly scarce treasure in futile efforts to recreate the past. Which country is best positioned to do this? Paradoxically, China’s more limited experience with modernity may prove a valuable asset. Beijing might grasp neomedieval trends more intuitively than Western countries, whose principal point of reference rests in a recent past in which they predominated. Yet there are compelling reasons to believe America can adjust effectively. The most important one is the country’s innate dynamism and innovation. A key reason America has succeeded so well as a nation-state has been its willingness and ability to experiment and adapt. If the United States is to maintain its position, developing strategies to lead as a neomedieval great power will be a critical step in that direction.

Not-So-Great Powers: U.S.-China Rivalry in the Neomedieval Age

Counterintuitive as might sound, U.S. decisionmakers should avoid strategies and methods drawn from industrial-age great power competition.

The National Interest · by Timothy R. Heath · June 6, 2023

At the same time that the U.S. Congress deliberated on legislation to counter China, it remained gridlocked over national debt limits. The current political acrimony adds to persistent American problems of wavering economic growth, bitter partisan feuding, and record levels of gun violence, among other long-standing issues. Meanwhile, Beijing’s demands that the United States “correct” its policies regarding China occurred alongside news that its own economy is faltering amid slowing global demand. China also continues to grapple with a worsening debt problem, a bleak demographic outlook, and high levels of violent crime. Relative political and economic weakness stands out as a striking and disturbing feature of the current U.S.-China rivalry.

The weakened state of the rival powers ill-fits the pattern set not only by the Cold War but also by all great power rivalries over the past two centuries, including the two World Wars and even the conflicts of the Napoleonic era. The state of technologies differed dramatically, of course, but they shared key social, political, and economic features. Those epic contests involved centralized, unitary states with a high degree of internal cohesion and robust patriotic popular support. Governments enjoyed strong legitimacy partly due to expanding opportunities for political participation and economic advancement. Broad popular support for the governments also owed to industrialization, which took off in the late 1700s and yielded dramatic gains in the material standard of living for many people, especially after 1850. Industrial-age warfare typically centered on strategies of mass mobilization that permitted the fielding of vast armies consisting of citizen-soldiers equipped with standardized uniforms and equipment. When these nation-states fought, they demonstrated an impressive ability to mobilize resources, involve the population, and sustain a war footing for years on end. Their militaries frequently engaged in blood-soaked set-piece battles that generated staggering casualties. The wars often wrought immense destruction and typically ended with unconditional surrender by one side or the other.

The current U.S.-China rivalry contrasts sharply with these historical experiences. Unlike their predecessors, the two countries contend amid a complex and overlapping array of threats, labor under severe resource constraints, and manifest distressing signs of domestic weakness. With a diminishing ability to meet the needs of their citizens, the U.S. and Chinese governments have inspired little patriotic enthusiasm. Neither side has mobilized their citizenry against the other, nor do strategies of mass mobilization appear plausible for the foreseeable future. Instead, the principal mode of military recruitment consists of professional volunteers and contractors. China indeed continues to rely on conscription for perhaps a third of its military manpower, but that is because it cannot attract enough qualified volunteers. Far from a minor hindrance, transnational threats and episodes of domestic upheaval appear highly menacing and routinely vie with traditional threats for the attention of policymakers. For example, U.S. military forces have struggled to counter non-state actors in the Middle East and control outbursts of domestic turmoil. Meanwhile, the People’s Liberation Arm has scrambled to protect Chinese citizens abroad from serious harm, and the country’s security forces struggle to ensure domestic control in Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang.

Grasping that the current situation bears little resemblance to twentieth-century precedents, experts have fiercely debated its meaning. Some have insisted that past patterns will hold and that the two countries are bound for conflict. Others disagree, arguing that war is unlikely and the two countries will carry out a distinct type of competition. Still others question the wisdom of competition at all given the magnitude of domestic problems confronting each rival and urge greater cooperation on shared concerns instead.

Neomedievalism

A starting point for making sense of the U.S.-China rivalry’s unusual features is recognizing that our world is experiencing an epochal transformation. In a recently published RAND Corporation report, I present evidence that the international community entered a new epoch, which I call “neomedievalism,” beginning around 2000. This new period is characterized by the attenuation or regression of the political, social, and economic dimensions of the modern era.

Politically, the centralized nation-state is in steep decline. Although what might succeed it remains intensely disputed. The decline of the nation-state has already spurred severe political crises in many countries, and the problems of a weakened state will persist even following the consolidation of new sources of legitimacy. The relatively high level of social solidarity that predominated in nation-states has atrophied, and competing sets of identities have grown more salient. Economically, neomedieval states are experiencing slowing and imbalanced growth, primarily benefiting a small minority. Neomedieval economies are also experiencing disparate growth rates, the return of entrenched inequalities, and expanding illicit economies. The nature of security threats has undergone significant change as well. Reversing trends that predominated in the past two centuries, non-military dangers such as natural disasters, pandemics, and violent non-state actors rival or outpace traditional state militaries as principal security concerns. While many of these risks are not new, they are especially menacing due to neomedieval states' weakened legitimacy and capacity. Warfare in the neomedieval age has experienced a revival of pre-industrial practices, including the privatization of militaries, the prevalence of siege warfare, the prominence of intrastate war, and the formation of informal coalitions consisting of diverse state and non-state actors.

These trends represent a “meta-history,” in the sense that they extend beyond the experiences of individual countries or leaders. As trends that define the general arc of human experience, they are unlikely to be reversed and can, at best, be delayed or mitigated. Their effects will also likely overshadow the impact of particular technologies and weapons. This is because technologies, no matter how advanced or sophisticated, cannot always solve problems that are fundamentally political, societal, and economic. The limits of advanced technology were well illustrated by the American withdrawal from Afghanistan. American forces possessed the most sophisticated equipment available to any military throughout history. However, this proved inadequate against the realities of a weak Kabul regime, an impoverished and fragmented Afghan society, a tenuous commitment from Washington, and a poorly-equipped yet resolute Taliban-led insurgency.

Why is the world experiencing such attenuation and regression? The most fundamental driver owes to the declining strength of the advanced industrial economies that created the modern industrial era in the first place. Before 1800, no industrial nation-state existed. As Western countries developed into industrial nation-states, their immense concentration of power and wealth excited admiration, resentment, and envy in states worldwide. The appeal and influence of Western nation-states reached their apogee in the 1950s and 1960s when their economies experienced a “golden age” of prosperity that fueled rising incomes across virtually all social classes. However, the situation began to change in the 1970s when the same economies deindustrialized as rising wages rendered manufacturing less competitive. Growth rates slowed, economies experienced stagnation, and inequality grew. Analysts noted a concomitant decay of key social and political institutions dating from this period.

Consequently, U.S. decisionmakers and planners should be wary of resorting to strategies and methods drawn from industrial age wars with which contemporary militaries bear a superficial resemblance. The U.S. military, in particular, will face the temptation to prescribe industrial nation-state solutions for neomedieval problems. Focusing on conventional military challenges both validates the importance of such forces and frames issues in terms that existing interests find comfortable. But policymakers should resist this temptation. The Russian military’s disastrous performance in Ukraine and America’s painful experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq provide examples of what can happen when outdated thinking dominates approaches to warfare. To avoid potentially disastrous misjudgments and miscalculations, U.S. decisionmakers and planners should consider several key points about the neomedieval era.

First, the reality of weakening states will likely be a defining feature of the U.S.-China rivalry. Nation-states are experiencing a decline in political legitimacy and governance capacity. This weakness afflicts both the United States and China, as well as virtually all countries around the world. As economic growth decelerates, the debilitation of modern states will likely worsen over time, and efforts to fully reverse the trends are unlikely to work. This does not mean strengthening state capacity is futile. Finding ways to improve state capacity and rebuild the state’s legitimacy will become central tasks in the contest. But even in the best case, the United States and China will be weaker and less cohesive than they were in the past century. All defense planning should begin with an awareness of this vulnerability and the constraints that it imposes. Weakening state capacity restricts options for building military power and waging conflict. It introduces new vulnerabilities that must be accounted for in defensive preparations as well as opportunities for offensive operations against rival powers.

Second, conventional war between the United States and China is improbable owing to their political, economic, and societal weaknesses. Despite the potential for heightened tensions, neomedieval trends render total war between the United States and China unlikely. The persistent fragility of public support, the inability to carry out a mass mobilization, and the exceeding risks and difficulties of sustaining intensive conflict have made “total war” in the mold of World War II almost impossible to wage. Moreover, war requires the rapid depletion of scarce military resources that will be difficult and costly to replace. This is an especially important consideration given the competing fiscal demands of the welfare state. That said, some sort of conflict cannot be ruled out. Should the U.S.-China rivalry escalate to hostilities, the two sides might instead fight through proxy conflicts or by provoking political unrest in the rival’s homeland. Amid such friction, the two may find their contest frequently interrupted by the imperative to reallocate scarce resources to address various domestic and transnational threats, resulting in a chronic low-intensity conflict. Under such conditions, conventional combat between U.S.-China forces, if it occurs at all, could consist of sporadic clashes between relatively modest-sized formations in different parts of the world. As ambitions of total victory over the adversary prove infeasible, political goals may instead focus on securing minor gains through temporary settlements while leaving broader issues unresolved.

Third, controlling domestic and transnational threats is becoming a higher priority than deterring conventional military attacks. Compared to the modern industrial period, states are more secure from external threats and more vulnerable to internal threats. They are more secure in the sense that weakened rivals generally lack the political will and resource base to subjugate other countries. Thus, most countries continue to face a lower threat of invasion and conquest. However, the perpetually fragile public legitimacy for governments will leave domestic politics volatile. The principal danger to states will come from internal rather than external sources. These include pandemics, terrorism, transnational crime, and political violence. Because failure to ensure domestic security directly implicates the state's legitimacy, controlling such dangers will become an urgent priority. States should allocate resources accordingly.

The great powers who most effectively grasp and adapt to the neomedieval reality may gain a crucial advantage over rivals who continue to exhaust increasingly scarce treasure in futile efforts to recreate the past. Which country is best positioned to do this? Paradoxically, China’s more limited experience with modernity may prove a valuable asset. Beijing might grasp neomedieval trends more intuitively than Western countries, whose principal point of reference rests in a recent past in which they predominated. Yet there are compelling reasons to believe America can adjust effectively. The most important one is the country’s innate dynamism and innovation. A key reason America has succeeded so well as a nation-state has been its willingness and ability to experiment and adapt. If the United States is to maintain its position, developing strategies to lead as a neomedieval great power will be a critical step in that direction.

Dr. Timothy R. Heath is a senior international defense researcher with the RAND Corporation.

Image: Shutterstock.

The National Interest · by Timothy R. Heath · June 6, 2023

6. A Hidden Player: The Significance Of Mongolia In Geopolitics – Analysis

I am excited to make my first trip to Mongolia for a conference 16-24 June. I attended a fascinating meeting with the US Ambassador to Mongolia and I learned more about Mongolia in that 90 minutes than I have learned in the last 65 years of being a student!

Excerpts:

Accordingly, the Mongols balance diplomatic ties with North and South Korea and seek to promote stability on the Korean Peninsula. Mongolia describes the United States as its “most important” third neighbor and uses this relationship with Washington to influence political processes globally. Mongolia constantly participates in global peacekeeping operations of the United Nations (about 10 percent of the Mongolian armed forces serve in UN peacekeeping missions). The interoperability and capacity of the Mongolian military have been strengthened through engagement in campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo. Khaan military exercises are held in the country almost every year in the summer, simulating UN peacekeeping operations in which contingents from numerous countries participate.

Since Mongolia’s location is strategically important in geopolitics, the United States has broader interests in that country. These interests include trade, investments, preservation of democracy and sovereignty, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, maintenance of peace in the region. What the United States wants most is the survival of Mongolia as a sovereign, independent and prosperous country that plays a constructive role in the region and beyond. This is not strange, since Ulaanbaatar is in the arms of two Americans, perhaps not “mortal enemies”, but certainly two of the biggest rivals in the world. In recent years, the desire to spread democracy in the foreign policy of the USA has fallen to low branches, which also applies to the Far East (the bitter experience of Myanmar). However, US defense and security strategies are closely linked to superpower competition and provide an opportunity to support small states.

American policymakers have interests in the Far East that favor Mongolia, and they are essentially the same under Trump and Biden. It is that the United States is trying to use every means to loosen the Russia-China alliance, is strategically positioning itself towards the Indo-Pacific region, and is trying to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea. Mongolia can be a point of contention between the Russians and the Chinese, and it is also very important because of its influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Ulaanbaatar has excellent relations with Pyongyang and can facilitate peace talks between North Korea and the US.

A Hidden Player: The Significance Of Mongolia In Geopolitics – Analysis

eurasiareview.com · by Matija Šerić · June 8, 2023

Mongolia is a country that has a unique geographical, demographic, economic and geopolitical position. And it is not favorable at all, at least at first glance. Mongolia has no access to the sea, it is located in the climatically cruelly cold East Asia. It has the lowest population density of any sovereign state in the world: two inhabitants per square kilometer.

Its three million inhabitants live in an area the size of Alaska (1.5 million square km), and it is surrounded by 133 million Russians in the north and 1.4 billion Chinese in the south. Although all the above factors greatly limit the economic development of Mongolia, it nevertheless has the best cashmere in the world, a huge potential for eco and cultural tourism, and possesses huge mineral resources: copper, gold, coal, molybdenum, fluorite, uranium, tin and tungsten.

Mongolia is actually an enclave between the superpowers of Russia and China. It is currently a democratic enclave surrounded by autocracies. It is this fact, apart from its harmful effects, that gives this country an important and potentially decisive importance in international relations. Hypothetically and in reality, Mongolia can be a crucial geopolitical player that can seriously damage the Russian-Chinese alliance and lead to a split between these two countries, and on the other hand, it can become a key American partner in the challenging Far East region.

Mongolia has a rich history dating back to the founding of the famous Mongol Empire (1206-1368) and Genghis Khan, who created the largest land empire in history. Historians believe that this is a ruler who was the creator of the Mongolian nation, respected the rule of law, protected religious freedom, promoted international trade and established new diplomatic relations between Asia and Europe. The Mongol Empire connected the previously disconnected world by creating “a unique intercontinental system of communication, trade, technology and politics”.

Genghis Khan shook the world and created a new world order. After his death, the empire was divided, but it survived in some form until the occupation by the Chinese Qing dynasty, which lasted from 1691 to 1911. Then Mongolia overthrew the local ruler and declared independence. The Kyakhta Treaty of 1915 briefly re-established Chinese control, but Russia helped Mongolia finally break free from Chinese rule after the October Revolution of 1917. Mongolia declared independence in 1921. The Soviet Red Army was stationed in the country, and the Soviet Union used Mongolia as a a satellite communist state and a buffer zone with China. Mongolia maintained good relations with both China and the Soviet Union until the Sino-Soviet split in the 1950s. The Soviets had six military divisions in Mongolia, which Russia kept there until December 1992.

The disappearance of the USSR led Mongolia to two major problems. The first problem was the severe economic crisis. Trade with the USSR accounted for 40% of Mongolia’s GDP. All gasoline was imported from Russia, 90% of machinery and 50% of consumer goods. As Russia retreated into itself, the Mongolian economy collapsed. The second problem was of an existential nature. Mongolia was truly independent for the first time in modern history. Although Beijing recognized Mongolian independence in 1945, it is no secret that certain Chinese circles still harbor territorial claims against their northern neighbor. Some see Mongolia as part of China’s historical sphere, and Mongolian elites are concerned that younger and more nationalistic Chinese might try to implement annexation. China’s behavior in relation to provinces such as Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Hong Kong and Taiwan is not encouraging.

The area of modern and internationally recognized Mongolia is also called Outer Mongolia, while the area where the Mongolian people live is much larger and includes: the Chinese autonomous province of Inner Mongolia, Dzungaria (the northern half of the Chinese province of Xinjiang), the Russian republics of Buryatia, Tuva and Altai, and Transbaikal region and the Irkutsk region. All the mentioned regions are part of the pan-Mongolian irredentism that aspires to create Greater Mongolia. Such groups are marginal, but they exist.

According to its political structure, Mongolia is a multi-party democratic republic. The president is directly elected, as are the members of parliament by the Grand State Khural. The president appoints the prime minister, and on the proposal of the prime minister, he appoints the cabinet. The Constitution of Mongolia guarantees all possible freedoms, including full freedom of expression and religion. Mongolia has a number of political parties, the largest being the Mongolian People’s Party and the Democratic Party. According to the opinions of professional organizations that study the degree of democratic freedom, such as Freedom House, it is a democratic and free state.

Currently, the president of the republic is Ukhnaagiin Khürelsükh who comes from the left-wing social-democratic Mongolian People’s Party. He won the 2021 presidential election with 72% of the vote and previously served as prime minister from 2017 to 2021. Khürelsükh is a “macho” type of president as he was photographed topless on a Putin-style horse and became known by the nickname “the fist”. after punching an MP in parliament in 2011. However, he has since improved his public image.

After the collapse of the USSR and the Eastern Bloc, the idea of the “end of history” by the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama became popular. In the world, there was great initial enthusiasm for liberal democracy and neoliberal capitalism with one superpower, the USA. Such a situation turned out to be short-lived. Around 2014 at the latest, it became clear that the competition between the superpowers of the USA, Russia and China was in full force. In the chess game of the world’s three most powerful powers, along with many regional powers, Mongolia has an important but largely hidden geopolitical role.

Due to its unique “buffer position” between Russia and China, the protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity is the main priority of contemporary Mongolia. Precisely because of these circumstances, Mongolia’s foreign policy can maneuver between two strategies: the “good neighbor” policy with Russia and China and the “third neighbor” policy in which it strives to build strong ties with other countries – the USA, Japan, North and South Korea , India, European Union countries, Australia and Canada.

In its south, along the Gobi desert, lies the Mongolian border with China. It is interesting that as many as six million Mongolians live in the Chinese province of Inner Mongolia, which is twice as many as in the mother country. China has the most influence on its northern neighbor with its powerful economy. About 80% of all Mongolian exports go to China, mostly coal, copper, unprocessed cashmere. At the same time, more than one third of imports to Mongolia come from China. China is also the largest single foreign investor in the country. Cooperation with China is vital for the Mongolian economy. China relies on the New Silk Road strategic project, that is, on transport infrastructure and commodity trade flows. One of the project’s six transnational corridors would connect China to Eastern Europe via Mongolia and Russian Siberia. The realization of this corridor created an opportunity for Mongolia to export its minerals and would become a regional logistics center. Although the Chinese are rapidly building expensive infrastructure around the world, the project is moving slowly.

The trade war between the US and China directly affects Mongolia. Given that China uses its 80 percent share of global production of rare minerals as a geopolitical tool, Chinese pressure on Mongolia, which is abundant in these resources, is possible. This geo-economic situation makes Mongolia very vulnerable to Chinese economic fluctuations, but it can also be a great advantage. For example In 2017, with the participation of China, Japan and South Korea, the IMF approved a financial package of 5.5 billion dollars for the Mongols, which is the fourth largest financial package in history. The program supports the economic recovery plan and focuses on creating foreign exchange reserves, putting debt within sustainable frameworks, strengthening the banking sector and ensuring stable and long-term growth.

Economic leverage is a powerful tool of Chinese foreign policy that affects other spheres as well. For example In 2016, Beijing closed its borders with Mongolia and imposed import tariffs on Mongolian goods as punishment for a visit by the Dalai Lama. Mongolia has historical ties to Tibetan Buddhism and the Dalai Lama, a title first created by the Mongolian leader Altan Khan in the 16th century. After extracting a promise from Ulaanbaatar not to invite the Dalai Lama in the future, the Chinese Foreign Ministry was overjoyed.

The strongest influence on Mongolia is the Sino-Russian political, economic and military alliance formed by these two superpowers to counter US hegemony. As the Sino-Russian alliance strengthens, it is possible that Mongolia’s value as a token in the geopolitical game will diminish. However, despite the public hype, the Russian-Chinese alliance is not ideal. Moscow still sees Beijing as a potential long-term threat as Chinese claims to Russian territories persist. Russia is concerned that if its 3,485-kilometer border with Mongolia falls under Chinese control, its Siberian bottom will be exposed to a potential Chinese attack.

To counter such ideas, the Russians prioritize balancing Chinese influence in Mongolia by trying to strengthen their economic ties. Undoubtedly, the Russians have a strong influence over the Mongolian economy. Russia supplies about 80% of Mongolia’s oil market, since 2017 trade has increased by almost 40%, Moscow owns a 51% stake in Mongolian railways. In 2019, the two countries announced a strategic partnership that includes a $1.5 billion infrastructure investment fund, an upgrade of the Trans-Mongolian railway, and the possible passage of a Russian-Chinese gas pipeline through Mongolian territory. Russian influence is also present in other areas. Remnants of the Soviet era are visible through the most casual stroll through Ulaanbaatar, which reveals the enduring cultural legacy of Soviet rule, from the Opera House to the Wedding Palace to the Zaisan Memorial. At the same time, Russian territorial ambitions elsewhere on the globe (Ukraine, Kuril Islands) worry Ulaanbaatar because of their potential to strengthen China’s arguments for a potential invasion of Mongolia.

In order to break their dependence on Russia and China and assert themselves as a nation, the Mongols began to increasingly accept the aforementioned “third neighbor” policy – to connect with countries in the region and the world with which they do not directly border. Through strong relations with democratic and non-democratic countries such as the USA, Japan, North and South Korea, India; Mongolia works to strengthen stability and cooperation in Asia. It is rich in uranium but supports nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful resolution of disputes in the region.

Accordingly, the Mongols balance diplomatic ties with North and South Korea and seek to promote stability on the Korean Peninsula. Mongolia describes the United States as its “most important” third neighbor and uses this relationship with Washington to influence political processes globally. Mongolia constantly participates in global peacekeeping operations of the United Nations (about 10 percent of the Mongolian armed forces serve in UN peacekeeping missions). The interoperability and capacity of the Mongolian military have been strengthened through engagement in campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo. Khaan military exercises are held in the country almost every year in the summer, simulating UN peacekeeping operations in which contingents from numerous countries participate.

Since Mongolia’s location is strategically important in geopolitics, the United States has broader interests in that country. These interests include trade, investments, preservation of democracy and sovereignty, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, maintenance of peace in the region. What the United States wants most is the survival of Mongolia as a sovereign, independent and prosperous country that plays a constructive role in the region and beyond. This is not strange, since Ulaanbaatar is in the arms of two Americans, perhaps not “mortal enemies”, but certainly two of the biggest rivals in the world. In recent years, the desire to spread democracy in the foreign policy of the USA has fallen to low branches, which also applies to the Far East (the bitter experience of Myanmar). However, US defense and security strategies are closely linked to superpower competition and provide an opportunity to support small states.

American policymakers have interests in the Far East that favor Mongolia, and they are essentially the same under Trump and Biden. It is that the United States is trying to use every means to loosen the Russia-China alliance, is strategically positioning itself towards the Indo-Pacific region, and is trying to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea. Mongolia can be a point of contention between the Russians and the Chinese, and it is also very important because of its influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Ulaanbaatar has excellent relations with Pyongyang and can facilitate peace talks between North Korea and the US.

Ulaanbaatar and Washington also support common goals and values in partnerships on the international scene. For example, Mongolia chaired the US-backed Community of Democracies, an intergovernmental organization based in Warsaw that advocates shared democratic values. The two countries also cooperated in the ASEAN Regional Forum. At the United Nations, Mongolia has proven to be a reliable US ally, consistently voting with the US on General Assembly resolutions. In addition, Mongolia has won America’s favor by implementing UN Security Council sanctions targeting North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

The alliance with the US influences Mongolia to prioritize the policy of the third neighbor at the expense of the policy of the good neighbor. In particular, Mongolia has resisted becoming a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which is led by Moscow and Beijing, in part because of the signal it could send to Washington and other Western capitals. Similar considerations influence Ulaanbaatar’s participation in China’s New Silk Road initiative. By strengthening ties with the US, Mongolia can stand up to powerful neighbors and chart its own foreign policy direction.

In the end, although it may sound contradictory, it is true: the biggest guarantors of Mongolian sovereignty and influence in the region are Russia and the USA. Russia, due to its fear of China, has a permanent interest in an independent Mongolia. Russia’s current strategic control over Mongolia’s energy and transportation sectors makes Mongolia a powerful deterrent to potential Chinese threats. Along with good relations with Russia, the alliance with America and allies in the Indo-Pacific also represent a strategic tool that will repel potential Chinese aspirations.

After nearly seven decades as a satellite state of the USSR, Mongolia made a peaceful transition to democracy and free markets. It currently plays an important role in a new chapter of world history in the 21st century. Mongolia can once again become an influential state through the application of freedoms and the rule of law, participation in international trade, and active diplomatic engagement among feuding states. Not only can it help the reconciliation of the two Koreas, but also the relaxation of relations between the superpowers, especially after the deterioration of relations between Russia and the USA because of Ukrainian crisis.

eurasiareview.com · by Matija Šerić · June 8, 2023

7. It Was All in Vain: Edward Snowden’s Sacrifice 10 Years On

I do not think Snowden's life in Russia should be viewed as a sacrifice that resulted from his criminal and traitorous action.

That said, I do believe we need surveillance reform and we need to ensure we protect our liberties, but Snowden's action will not lead to that.

It Was All in Vain: Edward Snowden’s Sacrifice 10 Years On

Snowden’s error was in believing that meaningful, forceful, and effective democratic oversight of NSA, FBI and other federal law enforcement and intelligence components actually exists.

JUNE 7, 2023 • COMMENTARY

By Patrick G. Eddington

https://www.cato.org/commentary/it-was-all-vain-edward-snowdens-sacrifice-10-years?utm_campaign=Cato%20Today&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=261605568&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_ygNX8br8Qai_AQv9BokMozXNA8SV7qe5Its5n0M4myyiwVYKefSrlSZlg4CPjMIQPzXUVJ5dE34elqAwdsQKyX6CugunLC2TwaEoANmld-qEtwpI&utm_content=261605568&utm_source=hs_email

This week marks the 10th anniversary of the first story featuring National Security Agency (NSA) contractor‐turned‐whistleblower Edward Snowden’s initial revelation: the role of Verizon in aiding NSA’s telephone metadata mass surveillance program.

As the Guardian noted at the time, “The court order appears to explain the numerous cryptic public warnings by two US senators, Ron Wyden and Mark Udall… that the US government is relying on ‘secret legal interpretations’ to claim surveillance powers so broad that the American public would be ‘stunned’ to learn of the kind of domestic spying being conducted.”

The Verizon revelation and the many others that followed in the months after it underscored the most consequential effect of Snowden going public: NSA’s ostensible overseers – the House and Senate Intelligence Committees – had been witting of the mass surveillance and instead of stopping it had gone along with it.

Snowden’s error was in believing that meaningful, forceful, and effective democratic oversight of NSA, FBI and other federal law enforcement and intelligence components actually exists.

Worse, through the annual appropriations process, Congress had given NSA (and the FBI) the money to continue that mass surveillance. American taxpayers were paying for the “privilege” of being spied on at scale by their own government.

And as I’ve noted previously, Snowden’s efforts to inform his fellow Americans of the surveillance dragnet under which they now operated were met with scorn or outright attacks, some from the press but most from members of Congress whose oversight failures Snowden had effectively exposed.

Fifty years earlier, in an era that saw similar whistleblower‐driven revelations of widespread illegal federal government surveillance, Congress was far less amenable to such executive branch misconduct. In 1975, the work of the Senate investigative committee, led by the late Senator Frank Church (D‑ID), exposed massive, previously undisclosed unconstitutional surveillance and political repression operations aimed at literally hundreds of thousands of Americans.

Church and his colleagues subsequently passed legislation designed to prevent such abuses in the future: the creation of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), and the Inspector General Act. And even though one can argue persuasively that the FBI, NSA, and other federal intelligence and law enforcement entities have found ways around the Church Committee’s reforms, at least Church and his colleagues understood the magnitude of the threat to the constitutional order posed by executive branch surveillance overreach and tried to do something to end it.

In contrast, Snowden’s revelations produced a nearly opposite reaction, with no public hearings into the breadth and damage caused by the mass surveillance he exposed and only one weak and ineffectual legislative fix for the NSA telephone metadata program: the 2015 USA Freedom Act. It was the legislative and constitutional equivalent of putting a Band‐Aid on a sucking chest wound.

It was also a testament to the power and influence of the nation’s national security establishment in shutting down any kind of meaningful surveillance reform effort, in no small part by indicting the whistleblower under the Espionage Act (no proof has ever surfaced that Snowden acted as the agent of a foreign power or gave legitimate U.S. secrets to one), seizing the royalties from his memoir, and refusing to consider allowing him to mount a public interest defense for his actions.

In that memoir, Snowden mused on the disparity in the treatment meted out to him and other whistleblowers versus officially sanctioned leaks (pp. 238–239):

“What makes one disclosure permissible, and another not? The answer is power. The answer is control. A disclosure is deemed acceptable only if it doesn’t challenge the fundamental prerogatives of an institution… To blow the whistle on secret programs, I’d also have to blow the whistle on the larger system of secrecy, to expose it not as the absolute prerogative of state that the [Intelligence Community] claimed it was but rather as an occasional privilege that the IC abused to subvert democratic oversight.”

Snowden’s error was in believing that meaningful, forceful, and effective democratic oversight of NSA, FBI and other federal law enforcement and intelligence components actually exists. The historical record at the time Snowden went public said otherwise, and that remains the case today.

Despite a fresh set of revelations of FBI and NSA abuses of the FISA Section 702 electronic mass surveillance program, no FBI or NSA officials have been sanctioned by the FISA court, much less lost their jobs as a result of their misconduct. That program is set to expire at the end of 2023, but anyone who believes its demise is a sure bet is only fooling themselves – in the same way that Edward Snowden tragically fooled himself into believing that exposing NSA and FBI surveillance crimes would somehow trigger a new age of surveillance reform and accountability.

Americans will continue to be federal government surveillance targets unless the public ejects from Congress and the White House those federal officials who continue to act as if Americans are suspects first and citizens a very distant second.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Patrick G. Eddington

Senior Fellow, Cato Institute

8. Cuba to Host Secret Chinese Spy Base Focusing on U.S.

The bases of June versus the missiles of October?

Cuba to Host Secret Chinese Spy Base Focusing on U.S.

Beijing will pay Havana several billion dollars for eavesdropping facility

By Warren P. StrobelFollow and Gordon LuboldFollow

June 8, 2023 7:00 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/cuba-to-host-secret-chinese-spy-base-focusing-on-u-s-b2fed0e0?mod=hp_lead_pos1

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Steps to move closer to the government in Havana have been taken by the Biden administration. PHOTO: YANDER ZAMORA/EPA/SHUTTERSTOCK

WASHINGTON—China and Cuba have reached a secret agreement for China to establish an electronic eavesdropping facility on the island, in a brash new geopolitical challenge by Beijing to the U.S., according to U.S. officials familiar with highly classified intelligence.

An eavesdropping facility in Cuba, roughly 100 miles from Florida, would allow Chinese intelligence services to scoop up electronic communications throughout the southeastern U.S., where many military bases are located, and monitor U.S. ship traffic.

Officials familiar with the matter said that China has agreed to pay cash-strapped Cuba several billion dollars to allow it to build the eavesdropping station, and that the two countries had reached an agreement in principle. 

The revelation about the planned site has sparked alarm within the Biden administration because of Cuba’s proximity to the U.S. mainland. Washington regards Beijing as its most significant economic and military rival. A Chinese base with advanced military and intelligence capabilities in the U.S.’s backyard could be an unprecedented new threat. 

“While I cannot speak to this specific report, we are well aware of—and have spoken many times to—the People’s Republic of China’s efforts to invest in infrastructure around the world that may have military purposes, including in this hemisphere,” John Kirby, spokesman for the National Security Council, said. “We monitor it closely, take steps to counter it, and remain confident that we are able to meet all our security commitments at home, in the region, and around the world.”

U.S. officials described the intelligence on the planned Cuba site, apparently gathered in recent weeks, as convincing. They said the base would enable China to conduct signals intelligence, known in the espionage world as sigint, which could include the monitoring of a range of communications, including emails, phone calls and satellite transmissions.

Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu and U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin at a conference last week in Singapore. PHOTO: VINCENT THIAN/ASSOCIATED PRESS

The Chinese Embassy in Washington had no comment. Cuba’s Embassy didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Officials declined to provide more details about the proposed location of the listening station or whether construction had begun. It couldn’t be determined what, if anything, the Biden administration could do to stop completion of the facility.

The U.S. has intervened before to stop foreign powers from extending their influence in the Western Hemisphere, most notably during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The U.S. and the Soviet Union came to the brink of nuclear war after the Soviets deployed nuclear-capable missiles to Cuba, prompting a U.S. Navy quarantine of the island. 

The Soviets backed down and removed the missiles. A few months later, the U.S. quietly removed intermediate-range ballistic missiles from Turkey that the Soviets had complained about.

The intelligence on the new base comes in the midst of the Biden administration’s efforts to improve U.S.-China relations after months of acrimony that followed a Chinese spy balloon’s flight over the U.S. earlier this year.

China in 2017 marked the opening of a military base in Djibouti, in eastern Africa. PHOTO: STRINGER/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Last month President Biden sent Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns on a secret trip to Beijing, and national security adviser Jake Sullivan held talks with a top Chinese official in Vienna. It couldn’t be determined whether the planned Chinese eavesdropping station figured in those exchanges.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken is expected to travel to Beijing later this month and possibly meet with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Biden said in May that he believed there would be a thaw in U.S.-China relations despite recent public tensions. 

Beijing is likely to argue that the base in Cuba is justified because of U.S. military and intelligence activities close to China, analysts said. U.S. military aircraft fly over the South China Sea, engaging in electronic surveillance. The U.S. sells arms to Taiwan, which China considers a renegade province, deploys a small number of troops there to train its military, and sails Navy ships through the Taiwan Strait. 

An eavesdropping facility in Cuba would make clear “China is prepared to do the same in America’s backyard,” said Craig Singleton, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a national-security think tank in Washington.

“Establishing this facility signals a new, escalatory phase in China’s broader defense strategy. It’s a bit of a game changer,” Singleton said. “The selection of Cuba is also intentionally provocative.”

China’s only declared foreign military base is in Djibouti, in the Horn of Africa. It has embarked on a global port-development campaign in places including Cambodia and the United Arab Emirates. U.S. officials say that effort is aimed at creating a network of military ports and intelligence bases to project Chinese power around the globe.

An aerial view of the Lourdes signals intelligence facility near Havana about a year before Russia said in 2001 that the site was closing. PHOTO: MAXAR

Security relations between Washington and Beijing have grown tense in recent weeks after close encounters between U.S. and Chinese ships in the Taiwan Strait and between the two nations’ military aircraft over the South China Sea. 

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and China’s defense minister, Gen. Li Shangfu, traded barbs at a conference in Singapore last weekend, though the two shook hands in a widely publicized gesture. Austin complained about Beijing’s lack of communication on military matters and Li’s refusal to meet with him. China has said it won’t agree to such a meeting until Washington lifts sanctions it placed on Li in 2018.

The Biden administration has attempted to pull closer to Havana, reversing some Trump-era policies by loosening restrictions on travel to and from Cuba and re-establishing a family-reunification program. The administration has also expanded consular services to allow more Cubans to visit the U.S. and has restored some diplomatic personnel who were removed after a series of mysterious health incidents affecting U.S. personnel in Havana.

Moscow has traditionally been Cuba’s closest partner among major world powers, supporting Havana with economic and military aid. But Beijing has been building closer diplomatic and economic ties to the island. Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel met with Xi in Beijing in November.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union operated its largest overseas signals intelligence site at Lourdes, just outside Havana. The site, which closed down after 2001, reportedly hosted hundreds of Soviet, Cuban and other Eastern Bloc intelligence officers. 

There were reports in 2014 that Russia would reopen the Lourdes station, but that doesn’t appear to have happened, and its current status couldn’t be determined.

Write to Warren P. Strobel at Warren.Strobel@wsj.com and Gordon Lubold at gordon.lubold@wsj.com

9. 448. Applying Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning to the Target Audience Analysis Model

Alot to digest here but some good food for thought.

JUNE 8, 2023 BY USER

448. Applying Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning to the Target Audience Analysis Model

https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/448-applying-artificial-intelligence-machine-learning-to-the-target-audience-analysis-model/

[Editor’s Note:  Our regular readers know the Mad Scientist Laboratory continues to explore the potential benefits Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML) bring to the future of warfighting and the Operational Environment. As Dr. James Mancillas so eloquently stated, “The integration of future AI systems has the potential to permeate the entirety of military operations, from acquisition philosophies to human-AI team collaborations.” Warfighting is a process-rich endeavor, where speed is oftentimes the decisive factor. AI/ML can overcome limits in human cognitive abilities to provide our Warfighters with a battlefield “edge.”

Today’s post adds to our compendium of understanding with MSG Casey A. Kendall‘s submission exploring how AI/ML could complement (but not replace!) human instinct and intuition in Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) by applying its sheer information processing power and machine speed to analyze Target Audiences (TA) in our on-going endeavor to “Persuade, Change, Influence” our competitors and adversaries. MSG Kendall’s submission was the first runner up in our fourth annual Army Mad Scientist / U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy (SGM-A) Writing Contest — Enjoy!]

The topic of artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) increasingly headlines conversations throughout a variety of professions. From law firms to academia, experts attempt to identify how the use of AI/ML can benefit their field; conversely, these experts are also examining the potential for AI/ML to circumvent or corrupt processes within their field. Regardless of the viewpoint, all understand that AI/ML is a powerful tool and in one way or another it is the way of the future. Within the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) regiment, planners are continuously evaluating their own processes to ensure they incorporate new innovations and technologies to outpace our adversaries; however, far too often the speed of innovation and the bureaucracy of applying new techniques keeps the field two steps behind. AI/ML is a technology that PSYOP cannot live without and if it cannot incorporate this tool, its adversaries will quickly outpace. PSYOP must adapt its processes to include the use of AI/ML platforms to augment human instinct and intuition as practitioners conduct target audience analysis to develop effective influence and persuasion products and actions.

A Brief Primer on the Target Audience Analysis Model

TAAM has been in existence in its current form since the late 1990’s, albeit with revisions made to account for changes in methods of communication and reach since that time. The purpose of U.S. Army PSYOP is to influence the attitudes, values, beliefs, and ultimately the behavior of selected groups or individuals in support of U.S. national interests and military objectives (Department of the Army [DA], 2022). Through an eight-step process, the PSYOP analyst uses the Target Audience Analysis Model (TAAM) to identify certain key elements which are necessary to effectively influence the target audience and change the desired behavior.

Through this process, the analyst selects and then refines target audiences (TA) based on their assessed ability to achieve the behavioral change. Analysts examine conditions to understand how the TA view the world around them and how that affects their current behavior. These conditions can be external, such as significant events or the TA’s immediate environment, or internal, such as attitudes, values, and beliefs (DA, 2022). An understanding of the conditions that affect the TA will lead the analyst to identify vulnerabilities which are those characteristics, motives, or conditions that the PSYOP practitioner hopes to exploit in order to influence the TA’s behavior (DA, 2013). Once the analyst identifies the points of leverage by which they can most effectively influence the TA, they must then assess the level to which the TA is susceptible to influence. This step is crucial because it instructs the PSYOP practitioner about the balance between PSYOP messages and influence actions that planners must later develop. If the analyst assesses that the TA has low susceptibility, it means the TA is less susceptible to influence through traditional messaging. When this occurs, PSYOP planners will instead choose to influence the TA’s external environment by altering or manipulating existing conditions. Thus far, the analyst has focused on how the TA thinks or perceives the environment around them, but they must also consider how the TA receives and processes information from their environment.

Once the analyst identifies the best approach for developing their influence products (either messages or actions), they must engage in an eight-step process to describe the TA’s accessibility, or their availability for influence targeting through a variety of media types or engagements (DA, 2022). Accessibility not only assesses traditional media such as television, radio, newspapers, or even the internet, but also key communicators, influencers, or non-traditional channels that may be unique or relevant to that particular TA. This step ties directly to the next step in which the analyst develops arguments and recommended psychological actions.

Based on the TA’s assessed level of susceptibility to influence messages, the analyst may develop arguments (previously referred to as lines of persuasion), which serve as a narrative theme and overall approach to guide influence messaging. If the TA’s level of susceptibility indicates that actions will provide better results, the analyst will recommend potential vulnerabilities related to the assessed conditions that can be exploited. Affecting these vulnerabilities leads to the desired behavioral changes by manipulating the conditions that result in the current behavior (DA, 2022). While these recommendations are expected to meet the psychological objectives based on the prerequisite analysis, a thorough assessment of the effects of PSYOP efforts are necessary to show if they were successful or require modification. During the final step of the TAAM, the analyst refines the initial assessment criteria identified in step one and selects specific indicators they expect to observe following the execution of a series of messages, actions, or both (DA, 2022). Like an intelligence collection plan, this is a systematic collection of PSYOP-relevant information from all available sources. The indicators answer the questions posed within the assessment criteria, providing PSYOP practitioners with an understanding of the level to which their PSYOP efforts have been successful.

Assessing current effectiveness in order to improve future effectiveness is where incorporating AI/ML becomes most relevant. Over the years, new technologies have consistently affected the process of analyzing selected target audiences for the purpose of marketing and influence (Huang & Rust, 2021). PSYOP is similar to commercial marketing and derives much of its doctrine and techniques from modern marketing; experts in behavioral psychology such as Malcolm Gladwell and Dr. Robert Cialdini have influenced the field just as much as Sun-Tzu. This is because they share similar goals, and the means to reach those goals are fairly universal. PSYOP creates a potential TA list and then narrows it down to a refined TA list. Similarly, commercial marketing does the same, though with different terminology calling these activities market segmentation and market research. PSYOP analyzes the conditions on a TA to identify potential points of leverage called vulnerabilities; marketing seeks to influence the consumer decision-making process in much the same way, catering to known vulnerabilities in the consumers’ conditions. In the end, both PSYOP and marketing reach their end states via similar processes. Sergio Zyman, Coca Cola marketing guru from the 1980’s, stated it like this: “The sole purpose of marketing is to get more people to buy more of your product, more often, for more money” (1999, p. 11). In essence, their shared processes and goals require greater levels of effectiveness at each step forward. If the principles and techniques shared by PSYOP and marketing are so similar, PSYOP must also strive to incorporate the tools marketing uses to increase its effectiveness.

Artificial Intelligence: A Tool to Improve Effectiveness

Analyzing target audiences is fairly laborious and often constrained by time, access to information, or the varying levels of experience individual PSYOP practitioners possess related to identifying crucial information in the focus areas in the TAAM. These factors, combined with the ambiguity about where to find relevant information creates a situation in which the finished product may miss the intended mark. The analyst must know which parts of the information are relevant, and what to make of the information once it is screened, reviewed, and assessed. Quality training and operational experience create analysts who are competent and capable of providing thorough target audience analysis, but their efforts to address complex and ill-structured problems could still benefit from computer-assisted analytical support in the form of AI/ML.

The Army Design Methodology describes complex problems that lack an immediately identifiable solution and present competing advantages and disadvantages as ill-structured (DA, 2015). These types of problems require planners to account for large amounts of information to gain an understanding of the problem and the environment in which it exists. The challenge with ill-structured problems and setting them apart from other problems is that planners do not possess the ability to solve them with an algorithm or a single technique, nor do they have a single best answer. In fact, they often have more than one solution, each with its own advantages and disadvantages (Meyer et al., 2014). Likewise, the PSYOP planner, regardless of skill, seeks to solve ill-structured problems that possess neither an easy answer nor a simple means to answer the solution manually. Companies in the private sector are finding themselves in very similar situations where there is simply too much information for even a team of people to reasonably manage (Liberatore & Luo, 2010).

Many professional fields have begun to apply specific applications of AI/ML support to their own activities — enabling them to complete large amounts of research, technical writing, or modeling and simulation with greater effects. In the legal field, one company reports that they employ AI/ML platforms to recognize and extract specific kinds of clauses within contracts. The analyst can upload hundreds of contracts and provide the platform with specific types of legal provisions — termination clauses for example — and the system will respond with a spreadsheet containing every termination provision within the uploaded contracts (C. Bell, personal communication, January 22, 2023). Additionally, the ML aspect allows the analyst to provide feedback when the AI/ML correctly or incorrectly identifies the desired information and learns for future improvement. The representative from this law firm estimates that by using AI/ML, the firm saves hundreds of hours in arduously screening every contract line by line. The AI/ML does not remove the human operator from the process, but instead augments and improves the human instinct and intuition that comes from practical experience (Gelder et al., 2021). For PSYOP, the TAAM process and its outputs are an opportunity-rich environment in which AI/ML can support data screening, research, and the overall analysis that goes into the process.

Data Screening

One of the most important steps in the military decision-making process is mission analysis, and yet it is often the part of the process that is most constrained by time. This creates a situation in which the planner attempts to glean the most amount of information possible from the vast body of knowledge, but risks missing key information that proves to be crucial to understanding the Operational Environment, the mission, or the enemy. PSYOP suffers from this same problem when conducting TA analysis. The individual planner only has a finite resource of time to screen and assess the near limitless amount of data and determine which of it is relevant and useful to the analysis process (Liberatore & Luo, 2010). Even when a team of planners performs TA analysis as a collective group, they only marginally improve the process of screening all sources for relevant data. The team needs a tool that can scan the seemingly endless body of knowledge and identify not only the correct resources, but also the necessary information required to accurately and completely analyze the TA.

Research Improvement

Locating the information and screening it for completeness and relevance is only the first step. Once the AI/ML platform has identified the appropriate and relevant information to support the TA analysis, it can organize this information in a way that is consumable for the analyst. If the PSYOP analyst needs to specifically analyze the internal conditions on a refined TA in country X, the AI/ML can collate and organize the information according to the preferences of the analyst and the specifics of the analysis, allowing the analyst to apply the information more quickly and efficiently than they would be able to do without the AI/ML support (Liberatore & Luo, 2010). The use of AI/ML in support of the TAAM process does not divest the analyst from the process but augments and improves the product by the inclusion of the AI/ML platform outputs. The analyst is still an integral part of the analysis as is the research that feeds the analysis (Gelder et al., 2021). By first packaging the information, with emphasis on the most relevant and critical information, the analyst can focus on the information expected to have the greatest impact on the analysis and the end product.

Overall Analysis

Once the AI/ML identifies and categorizes the information and the analyst has reviewed it, the real work takes place. As described previously, there are eight steps in the TAAM and each of these steps are necessary to fully understand and target certain groups or individuals to reach the desired behavioral change. One of the advantages to implementing AI/ML in support of the analysis process is its ability to take the information and internally wargame it. Calculating the expected outcomes, the system can provide the analyst with an estimate of effectiveness when applied to hypothetical PSYOP products and actions (Alt et al., 2018). For example, if human analysts were to analyze TA “A”, the aforementioned time constraints may only allow the analyst or the analytical team enough time to wargame the expected results for two or three possibilities. AI/ML, on the other hand, could exercise multiple possibilities quickly and offer mathematical estimates of the expected level of effectiveness. The AI/ML platform, using inputs from the analyst to refine the wargame and account for any desired changes to the intended outcomes, provides timely and accurate analysis that the analyst can package and provide to the planners during the next phase of the PSYOP process, series development.

This is not to suggest that the AI/ML platform would develop the actual PSYOP messages or craft the psychological actions within series development. The computations from the AI/ML support a greater depth of understanding regarding the conditions, vulnerabilities, and accessibility, as well as the most likely levels of susceptibility. These resources provide the analyst and planner a deeper understanding of the TA, compared to manual research and analysis alone. TA analysis is critical to the development of effective PSYOP messages and actions; therefore, it is paramount that the PSYOP practitioner fully understand the TA and why it behaves in a particular way (DA, 2007). While the AI/ML is the tool used to increase that depth and efficiency, it is still the PSYOP analyst who must apply due diligence and proper ethics when determining the final analysis of each TA.

Ethical Use of Artificial Intelligence in the TAAM Process

As with anything new and shiny, you can have too much of a good thing. Increasing research shows that ethical practice must govern the field of AI/ML and its use (Gelder et al., 2021). Though this is not a new topic, it is a subject that analysts must consider as AI/ML becomes more commonly used and accepted. It would be irresponsible for the PSYOP community to implement a practice that gives over the wholesale process of TA analysis to an AI/ML system without the referenced human interaction throughout the process and as the final reviewer of quality assurance and control. Retaining the PSYOP analyst throughout the entire process ensures better-informed Soldiers who can inject instinct, intuition, and experience into the process. Where the AI/ML will speak in outputs of relative statistical probability, the human component can more accurately incorporate nuance and exceptions to the statistical probability (Gelder et al. 2021). The human component must remain an integral part of the process, though as a matter of integrity, they must also account for the participation of the machine. Through this ethical interaction, the PSYOP analyst can enable further development of PSYOP products and actions with the highest level of confidence that the data is accurate and relevant.

Conclusion

PYSOP doctrine and processes must adapt to incorporate the understanding and use of AI/ML platforms to augment human instinct and intuition when conducting TA analysis. As PSYOP practitioners move forward into newer and more complex Operational Environments, the amount of relevant and applicable information continues to grow. The sheer volume of this information dictates that PSYOP analysts can no longer rely solely on manual techniques to review and screen the available information in a reasonable amount of time. The modern PSYOP professional cannot be successful without computer assistance when it comes to identifying, assessing, analyzing, and applying the full body of knowledge available. The nature of warfare now and in the future is such that AI/ML in varying forms will become more and more necessary, not only in the PSYOP field, but in other areas of military decision making and planning.

If you enjoyed this post, check out the SGM-A Class 73’s winning submission — Universal Soldier, by proclaimed Mad Scientist MSG Greg A. McGowan

… as well as the following related content:

Psychological Warfare in the Human Domain: Mixing AI-Powered Technology with Psychosocial Engagement and “I Know the Sound it Makes When It Lies” AI-Powered Tech to Improve Engagement in the Human Domain, by COL Arnel P. David, LTC (Ret) Patrick James Christian, PhD, and Dr. Aleksandra Nesic

Chatty Cathy, Open the Pod Bay Doors: An Interview with ChatGPT and associated podcast, with Chatty Cathy, an instance of ChatGPT by OpenAI

Hey, ChatGPT, Help Me Win this Contract! and associated podcast with LTC Robert Solano

Keeping the Razor’s Edge: 4th PSYOP Group’s Innovation and Evolution Council, by members of the 4th Psychological Operations Group (4th POG) Innovation and Evolution Council

Two Vignettes: How Might Combat Operations be Different under the Information Joint Function? by proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. Christopher Paul

Artificial Intelligence: An Emerging Game-changer

Takeaways Learned about the Future of the AI Battlefield and associated information paper

The Guy Behind the Guy: AI as the Indispensable Marshal, by Brady Moore and Chris Sauceda

Integrating Artificial Intelligence into Military Operations, by Dr. James Mancillas

“Own the Night” and the associated Modern War Institute podcast with proclaimed Mad Scientist Mr. Bob Work

AI Enhancing EI in War, by MAJ Vincent Dueñas

The Human Targeting Solution: An AI Story by CW3 Jesse R. Crifasi

Bias and Machine Learning

An Appropriate Level of Trust…

There Will Be Data and associated podcast, with Inderpal Bhandari

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

References

Alt, J., Morey, C., & Larimer, L. (2018). Perspectives on combat modeling. Phalanx, 51(4), 28-31. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26553372

Department of the Army. (2007). Psychological operations process tactics, techniques, and procedures (FM 3-05.301). https://info.publicintelligence.net/USArmy-PsyOpsTactics.pdf

Department of the Army. (2013). Military information support operations (FM 3-53). https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=102936

Department of the Army. (2015). Army design methodology (ATP 5-0.1). https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=105348

Department of the Army. (2022). The psychological operations force influence process task: analyze (TM 3-53.11). https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=1025079

Gelder, A, Lockwood, J., Roberts, C., Williams, A., & Conley, K. (2021). Ethical considerations for the use of machine learning in military personnel management (IDA Paper NS P- 22652). Institute for Defense Analyses. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep33498

Huang, M. & Rust, R. (2021). A strategic framework for artificial intelligence in marketing. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 49, 30-50. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11747-020-00749-9

Liberatore, M. & Luo, W. (2010). The analytics movement: Implications for operations research. Interfaces, 40(4), 313-324. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40793168

Meyer, G., Adomavicius, G., Johnson, P., Elidrisi, M., Rush, W., Sperl-Hillen, J., & O’Connor, P. (2014). A machine learning approach to improving dynamic decision making. Information Systems Research, 25(2), 239-263. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24700172

Zyman, S. (1999). The end of marketing as we know it. Harper Business.

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10. Energy drinks – The unsung hero of the Global War on Terror

I have a friend and mentor who swears by some types of energy drinks (that I have never heard of! )  :-) 

Energy drinks – The unsung hero of the Global War on Terror - Sandboxx

sandboxx.us · by Travis Pike · June 7, 2023

Reportedly, when asked how many energy drinks troops in Ukraine needed, they answered “a billion.”

It’s oddly humorous, a little morose war humor in choosing such a number, but they have a point. They need those drinks. That might seem odd, but sure, a little caffeine probably helps here and there, right? To one who has never deployed, you may not realize that energy drinks are the unsung heroes of modern war. When you hear the phrase “an army marches on its stomach,” you likely assume that it refers to food. But in 2023, it means caffeine.

The boring reality of war

Airmen from the 820th Base Defense Group wait in the rear of an HC-130J Combat King II prior to conducting static-line jumps, March 30, 2018, in the skies over Moody Air Force Base, Ga. The 820th BDG and the 71st RQS work together frequently so the defenders and the aircrew can maintain their qualifications. (U.S. Air Force photo by 2nd Lt. Ryan Callaghan)

In my experience, war is about 1% fighting and 99% waiting around and doing manual labor. A unit doesn’t just set up shop and chill until its tour is over. There is always work to be done, sandbags to be filled, posts to be improved, trucks to load, and trucks to unload. If you aren’t patrolling or on a post, you are working at something or hiding.

Mix in physical labor with those post and patrol duties, and sleep becomes nearly nonexistent. My unit had a policy we called Pursue and Punish. Our operations tempo seemingly never slowed down, and we hit the ground running and only finished running when we climbed on the C-130 to leave. It wasn’t uncommon to go 36 hours without sleep, and 48 hours wasn’t record-setting.

Energy drinks combined with water and carbs kept us fueled up. It also helps to be 19 years old; (who knew pulling all-nighters with the boys at the barracks prepped you for war). And to make it through, we shoveled down the American military’s favorite energy drink at the time, Rip-It.

Rip-It becoming a staple of the GWOT

A Marine holding a Rip-It energy drink after his V-22 Osprey crashed in Afghanistan. (Reddit)

Rip-Its were America’s official energy drink. The National Beverage Company reached an agreement with the DoD in 2004 to provide the U.S. military with energy drinks. Famed for the small eight-ounce cans, they became a staple of the GWOT. Troops everywhere embraced a variety of flavors, and they became seemingly as necessary as water. My personal rule was to drink one canteen of water for every Rip-It energy drink I ingested.

After you get back from a 10-mile patrol, you might have had 20 minutes to get chow, water, and a couple of Rip-Its before you start an eight- to 12-hour post shift. Post is basically guard duty and you were often by yourself in a reinforced box. This provided force protection to your Combat Outpost or Forward Operating Base and prevented attackers from sneaking in.

Being alert and awake is tough to do when your entire body is screaming for rest. You can say fear is a motivating factor, but you can get used to anything. But falling asleep on guard duty is essentially a sin in the infantry as it puts everyone at risk. You owe it to yourself and your fellow troops to remain alert and awake. But this is easier said than done. A Rip-It and lots of water helped. In fact, I’d argue that Rip-Its and energy drinks, in general, have likely saved lives.

At the same time, consuming a lot of energy drinks can lead to abnormal electrical activity in the heart and higher blood pressure, according to a 2019 study by the American Heart Association.

The drawbacks of coffee

A World War II poster calling on the American public to consume less coffee so that troops would have more. (Creative Commons)

What about coffee? Coffee is great but it’s not the best option as it requires some logistics. You need the coffee and water and a way to mix them together if it’s instant coffee. But let’s be honest: instant coffee is an instant turn-off. On the other hand, regular coffee requires hot water, a pot, and more and is even less logistically friendly than instant coffee. (Plus, the first sergeant said no coffee pots in tents since LCPL Schumaktelli burned one down.)

What’s more, a canned bottle of Rip-It can be tossed into a cargo pocket. If you do that with a cup of coffee, you’re gonna have a bad time. Rip-Its stay fresh for hours, and when the temps are cresting 100 degrees by 9 AM as they were in Afghanistan, who wants a cup of hot coffee?

If energy drinks and coffee were weapons, the classic coffee would be an M1 Garand — a great rifle, that has accomplished a lot. Energy drinks would be modern M4 rifles: sleekier, easier to use, more versatile, and a modern option for a modern war. But then, excessively consuming them comes with health risks.

Those guys in Ukraine are asking for a billion energy drinks because it’s likely what helps them make it to the end of the day. Caffeine certainly has its drawbacks, but in the short term, it’s a vital asset for forces fighting an exhaustive war.

Feature Image: U.S. Air Force Airman 1st Class Cameron Otte, 60th Air Mobility Wing Public Affairs photojournalist, drinks an energy drink Aug. 6, 2019, at Travis Air Force Base, California. In a study published by the American Heart Association, energy drinks may abnormally impact the heart rhythm and raise blood pressure in people as young as 18 years of age. (U.S. Air Force photo illustration by Staff Sgt. Christian Conrad)

sandboxx.us · by Travis Pike · June 7, 2023

11. US-China: A Cold War lesson to apply “rules of the road” at sea

Excerpts:

The US and the former USSR did have maritime guardrails in place during the Cold War and these were effective. They extended from bilateral INCSEA (Incidents at Sea) arrangements agreed during the 1970s, to the 1989 Jackson Hole Agreement on the “Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage”. These mutually agreed interpretations of the law of the sea and associated maritime rules of the road dampened down Cold War maritime tensions and ensured there were no significant naval clashes. These are the types of Cold War examples Albanese would have been referring to.

To date there are no equivalent maritime understandings between China and the United States. One regional initiative was promoted. The 2014 Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), was signed by 21 Pacific nations at the 14th Western Pacific Naval Symposium in Qingdao, China. CUES is a series of non-binding rules-of-the-road to prevent an escalation of tensions between different militaries at sea, and references the COLREGS. However, notwithstanding Chinese and US endorsement, CUES has had little real impact as highlighted by the recent incident.

Australia is right to promote bilateral dialogue between China and the United States over these maritime matters. There is a Cold War track record of mutually beneficial outcomes from such negotiations, which would also have value for the Indo-Pacific. Given their entrenched positions, however, getting over the hurdle of the Taiwan Strait may be the blockage that impairs the advancement of any such talks.

US-China: A Cold War lesson to apply “rules of the road” at sea | Lowy Institute

Soviet and American warships had a code to prevent dangerous encounters and the US and China should have the same.

lowyinstitute.org · by Donald R Rothwell

The most recent Taiwan Strait incident between the US Navy and the PLA Navy have not only highlighted how determined both sides are to advance their positions in the Strait, but also how such a close encounter could so quickly escalate into a very serious maritime, diplomatic and political episode.

A US military statement reports that on 3 June the USS Chung-Hoon and the accompanying Canadian warship HMCS Montreal were passing through the Taiwan Strait on “a routine south to north Taiwan Strait transit … through waters where high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight apply”. The US asserts that during the transit, Chinese navy warship LY 132 “executed manoeuvres in an unsafe manner in the vicinity of Chung-Hoon … overtook Chung-Hoon on their port side and crossed their bow at 150 yards.” The position of the United States is that the actions of the Chinese vessel “violated the maritime ‘Rules of the Road’ of safe passage in international waters.”

This version of events is confirmed by the video released of the incident by Canadian journalists travelling with the Montreal, and China’s response during the 2023 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue that was taking place at the same time. There has been no suggestion by China that the incident took place within the Chinese claimed 12 nautical mile territorial sea.

Video: A Chinese warship came within 150 yards of hitting American destroyer USS Chung-Hoon.

Embarked journalists captured the moment on video & witnessed the near collision.

"The fact this was announced over the radio prior to doing it clearly indicated it was intentional." pic.twitter.com/cuksOabO15

— Ian Ellis (@ianellisjones) June 3, 2023

Given these events, what are the rights and entitlements of foreign navies to transit the Taiwan Strait, and what can be done to avoid these high-risk maritime encounters occurring?

The Taiwan Strait is generally wide, narrowing to a distance of 64 nautical miles and extending 135 nautical miles. Even allowing for the 12 nautical mile territorial seas claimed off the Chinese mainland, Taiwan, and adjacent small islands, given the breadth of the Taiwan Strait legally it is one in which there exists either an exclusive economic zone or a high seas corridor.

The strait is therefore effectively a form of international maritime highway because of its breadth.

Unlike Bass Strait, Torres Strait, and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the Taiwan Strait is not governed by certain provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that recognise the right of transit passage through recognised “international straits”. The Taiwan Strait is so wide that there is no need for passing vessels to enter the territorial sea, and consistent with UNCLOS exclusive economic zone or high seas navigation can safely be undertaken through the middle of the strait.

The strait is therefore effectively a form of international maritime highway because of its breadth. The US position that high seas freedoms of navigation apply in the Taiwan Strait is a view shared by other foreign navies, including Australia. The so-called maritime “rules of the road” in this instance are imbedded in the COLREGS (Collision Regulations), which lay down accepted practices and standards for how all shipping is to conduct itself so as to avoid collisions at sea. These rules are ones that navies apply and respect during peacetime, and are generally considered to be the baseline standard of professional conduct for all mariners at sea.

VIDEO: Pentagon releases footage it says shows Chinese Navy ship maneuvering in an 'unsafe manner' near an American destroyer transiting Taiwan Strait.https://t.co/9Q4g7wdysQ pic.twitter.com/03bB5JmRmk

— AFP News Agency (@AFP) June 5, 2023

Are there frameworks and mechanisms to avoid a naval collision between China and the US, and the inevitable tensions that would erupt following such an incident?

On his return from the Singapore Shangri-la Dialogue, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has put forward a proposal that has its roots in Cold War practice. He told the ABC that “during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, there were systems set up so that a misadventure or miscalculation didn’t lead to disastrous consequences. The concern here is that the guardrails are not in place. So the consequences of a misinterpretation or an accident occurring, and it leading to a reaction and then a further action is something that is very dangerous.” Albanese urged China and the US to have open communications about these matters and to consider putting bilateral arrangements in place.

The US and the former USSR did have maritime guardrails in place during the Cold War and these were effective. They extended from bilateral INCSEA (Incidents at Sea) arrangements agreed during the 1970s, to the 1989 Jackson Hole Agreement on the “Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage”. These mutually agreed interpretations of the law of the sea and associated maritime rules of the road dampened down Cold War maritime tensions and ensured there were no significant naval clashes. These are the types of Cold War examples Albanese would have been referring to.

To date there are no equivalent maritime understandings between China and the United States. One regional initiative was promoted. The 2014 Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), was signed by 21 Pacific nations at the 14th Western Pacific Naval Symposium in Qingdao, China. CUES is a series of non-binding rules-of-the-road to prevent an escalation of tensions between different militaries at sea, and references the COLREGS. However, notwithstanding Chinese and US endorsement, CUES has had little real impact as highlighted by the recent incident.

Australia is right to promote bilateral dialogue between China and the United States over these maritime matters. There is a Cold War track record of mutually beneficial outcomes from such negotiations, which would also have value for the Indo-Pacific. Given their entrenched positions, however, getting over the hurdle of the Taiwan Strait may be the blockage that impairs the advancement of any such talks.

lowyinstitute.org · by Donald R Rothwell

12. Countries Buy Defective Chinese Military Equipment. Why?

Excerpts:

The question now is whether a subpar reputation for quality will harm Beijing’s position in the global arms market. Data that the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute released in March showed a 23% decrease in China’s arms exports between the four-year periods of 2013–17 and 2018-22.

Affordability will remain an issue for developing countries looking to bolster their hardware and supplies. They also may have few alternatives. But if recipient countries continue to view Chinese military equipment as unreliable long-term, or find training and maintenance contracts lacking, they may not want to become completely dependent on Chinese suppliers.

Countries Buy Defective Chinese Military Equipment. Why?

By Cindy Zheng

June 08, 2023

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/06/08/countries_buy_defective_chinese_military_equipment_why_939443.html?mc_cid=a7f193745e&mc_eid=70bf478f36

China’s defense industry has exported malfunctioning and defective military equipment in recent years — leaving countries short of what’s needed for their security while also draining military budgets.

Nigeria’s military reported several technical problems with the Chinese-made F-7 aircraft delivered starting in 2009. A handful were lost in crashes or accidents. By 2020, of the nine remaining, seven had to be sent back to China for deep maintenance and repair.

The military junta ruling Myanmar found that the Chinese-made radar on its JF-17 aircraft have poor accuracy, and the aircraft itself lacks beyond-visual-range missile and airborne interception radar. Bangladesh reported problems with firing the ammunition loaded into its Chinese-built K-8W aircraft just shortly after their delivery.

Pakistan, the largest importer of Chinese military equipment, expressed dissatisfaction with Chinese-produced F-22P frigates, including technical issues, engine degradation, and poor overall performance. Pakistan also found that the onboard imaging device of the FM90 (N) missile system had a defective infrared sensor (IR17) system and SR-60 radars. As a result, the missile system was unable to lock onto targets. The IR17 sensors had to be discarded completely.

China attracts customers for its military equipment with cut-rate pricing and financing, but there are hidden costs — especially when gear malfunctions. A lack of technological compatibility with the Chinese military equipment can prove particularly expensive. Countries often do not have the personnel with the expertise and training to resolve issues. They also can have difficulty acquiring replacement parts.

Chinese suppliers have demonstrated little accountability for maintenance or repair. That has pushed some countries to recruit help from third countries. For instance, the Myanmar military forged partnerships with Pakistani technicians to solve its technical problems with the JF-17. Delays in getting equipment working can significantly slow down recipient countries’ military modernization timeline.

So why do countries continue to order military equipment from China?

A RAND report tracking China’s military exports shows that its customers are primarily developing countries. Its largest customers are in South Asia and Africa, though it has also made a push into South America. China has also benefited as countries in the Middle East and North Africa have sought to reduce their dependency on Western military suppliers. Soft power and image-building are China’s major motivators in these regions, setting the foundation for ties in the same way that its Belt and Road infrastructure projects do.

China also isn’t particularly discerning in who it will or won’t sell to.

Its arms deals have few political contingencies involved. In Africa, sales appear driven by profit and trying to grab market share from Russia. If a country worries its human rights records, financial credibility, or regime stability might harm its eligibility to purchase military equipment from Western suppliers, China is always an option.

In addition, China is a major player in the “value arms” market such as light training and fighter aircraft, armored personnel carriers, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Such equipment meets the affordability and the minimum functionality criteria that developing countries look for to use in counterterrorism operations and fighting rebel groups.

The question now is whether a subpar reputation for quality will harm Beijing’s position in the global arms market. Data that the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute released in March showed a 23% decrease in China’s arms exports between the four-year periods of 2013–17 and 2018-22.

Affordability will remain an issue for developing countries looking to bolster their hardware and supplies. They also may have few alternatives. But if recipient countries continue to view Chinese military equipment as unreliable long-term, or find training and maintenance contracts lacking, they may not want to become completely dependent on Chinese suppliers.

Cindy Zheng is a research assistant at RAND Corporation, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization. She specializes in research on Chinese foreign policy and U.S.-China relations.

13. ASEAN to hold first joint military exercise off Indonesia

Seems like it could be a positive development.

ASEAN to hold first joint military exercise off Indonesia

Reuters · by Kate Lamb

• Summary
• Joint exercises on the increase in South China Sea
• China has competing claims with 4 ASEAN members
• Exercise won't involve combat training - Indonesia

JAKARTA, June 8 (Reuters) - The Southeast Asian bloc ASEAN will hold its first-ever joint military exercise in the South China Sea, its chair Indonesia said on Thursday, the latest multilateral security drills at a time of rising tension and uncertainty in the region.

The decision was taken at a meeting of military commanders of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Indonesia, which will host the exercise in the North Natuna Sea, the southernmost waters of the South China Sea.

Indonesia's military chief, Admiral Yudo Margono, told state-run news agency Antara the exercise would be in September and would not include any combat operations training. The purpose, Margono said, was strengthening "ASEAN centrality".

ASEAN's unity has for years been tested by a rivalry between the United States and China that is being played out in the South China Sea. ASEAN members Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia have competing claims with Beijing, which asserts sovereignty over vast stretches of ocean that include parts of Indonesia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

Indonesian military spokesperson Julius Widjojono said the exercise was related to the "high risk of disaster in Asia, especially Southeast Asia."

A conduit for about $3.5 trillion of annual ship-borne trade, the South China Sea has seen constant tension of late as China presses its claims with a huge deployment of coast guard and fishing boats as far as 1,500 km (932 miles) off its coastline.

China claims sovereignty via an expansive "nine-dash line" based on its historic maps, which an international arbitration court in 2016 ruled had no legal basis.

ASEAN has been pushing for a long-awaited maritime code of conduct with China to be completed and several of its members have had run-ins with Beijing in recent months.

Vietnam criticised China's deployment of a research vessel near several gas blocs in its EEZ, while Beijing was accused of sending suspected maritime militia into waters where navies of India and ASEAN countries held an exercise.

The Philippines chided China's coast guard for "dangerous manoeuvres" and "aggressive tactics" and plans to hold joint patrols with the United States, on top of an inaugural trilateral coast guard exercise they held with Japan this week.

China maintains its coast guard is performing regular operations in what is Chinese sovereign territory.

Editing by Martin Petty

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Kate Lamb

14. Ukraine Situation Report: 'Partisans' Threaten Crimean Incursion Next

Partisans in UW - "coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power," deception, intellection collection, psychological warfare, subversion, sabotage, economy of force and more. There is a lot of potential for properly organized, trained, equipped, advised and assisted partisans or resistance forces. But we should romanticize (e.g., "wolverines" of Red Dawn) because it is damn hard work and dangerous.

Ukraine Situation Report: 'Partisans' Threaten Crimean Incursion Next

As partisans threaten an attack on Crimea, there are indications Ukraine’s counteroffensive is heating up in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia.

BY

HOWARD ALTMAN

|

PUBLISHED JUN 7, 2023 9:50 PM EDT

thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · June 7, 2023

The self-proclaimed anti-Putin partisans who have launched incursions into Russia say their next target is the Crimean peninsula.

In an address apparently broadcast on radio stations in Crimea, The Freedom For Russia Legion said they, along with the Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK), were going to conduct a raid into the peninsula occupied by Russia since 2014.

"Dear residents of the Ukrainian Crimea! The Freedom of Russia Legion and the Russian Volunteer Corps will soon make a raid of volunteers on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which is temporarily occupied by the Putin regime,” the message stated, according to the Crimea Partisans Telegram channel, which is dedicated to the liberation of the peninsula. “We, volunteers of free Russia, consider it our duty to help the Crimeans clear the peninsula of the war criminal Putin Please remain calm and assist us as much as possible."

On its Telegram channel, the Freedom For Russia Legion said that Crimea needs to be returned to Ukraine.

“Residents of the temporarily occupied Ukrainian Crimea! We do not recognize the quasi-referendum of 2014 and the criminal intervention of the Russian troops on the peninsula,” the group said. “The Legion considers it a matter of duty to return to Ukraine what is rightfully hers, in order to be able to build a new Russia with a clear conscience.”

The group then reached out to sympathetic residents for support, asking for information about:

• The exact location of the points of deployment and the address of residence of the occupying troops (geo-referencing with coordinates)
• Places of residence of the leadership of the occupying forces (geo-referencing with coordinates)
• Locations and routes of movement of military equipment
• Accurate data of local collaborators who went over to the side of the enemy (address of residence and location, georeference with coordinates, full name, position and place of work)
• Persons who "sympathize" with the occupiers and other supporters of the occupying power, and their data

The Legion urged those who support Ukraine to avoid Russian sympathizers and to identify themselves to remain safe in case of an attack.

“If you live nearby and are loyal to Ukraine, please let us know. Every life is dear to us, and we will do everything to save it. We are already close!”

Russia, as we have mentioned before, has been building up fortifications in Crimea ahead of a potential invasion from Ukrainian Armed Forces. Ukraine has made no secret that it wants to liberate the peninsula and there are indications that probing efforts are underway in a counteroffensive aimed at closing off the land-bridge to the peninsula. Crimea has also come under frequent attack from Ukrainian aerial and sea drones and internal partisans as well. But this is the first indication that these supposedly Russian partisan groups may attack.

The Russians have built dragon's teeth and trenches along the beach west of Yevpatoria, Crimea. Satellite image ©2023 Maxar Technologies.

The threat to raid Crimea comes on the heels of the two groups staging several incursions into Russian territory, including one apparently still ongoing in Belgorod Oblast, where fierce battles with Russian troops and security forces have been reported.

“Let's just say that at the moment the Russian Volunteers are still on the territory of the Shebekinsky district there are battles of local significance the exact configuration of the front line, the position of the units I won’t name,” 'Caesar,' the Legion’s spokesman said in an interview with Mark Faygin, a YouTuber and lawyer who represented the likes of Pussy Riot and Greenpeace in Russia.

A spokesman for Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR) said that the groups are still engaged inside Belgorod.

“Active hostilities and internal mass unrest in the Belgorod region continue,” said Andrii Yusov, adding that the two groups and local residents “with weapons in their hands rose up against the criminal Putin government and the regime of internal occupation established by it.”

Russian authorities “left several settlements without control, trying only to establish fire control, which means the task of striking with artillery, rocket salvo fire systems on the objects of their own civilian infrastructure and local residents," Yusov said.

"Support for the rebels among the local population is growing. This applies both to those willing to engage in armed struggle against Putin, and to local residents who are asking for protection," Yusov said, adding that Ukraine will consider requests for the evacuation of civilians from the Belgorod region.

It is unclear just how deeply Ukraine is connected to these groups, but it has previously acknowledged a level of cooperation with the groups fighting inside Russia.

After the May 22 incursion into Russia, Andriy Chernyak, an official from Ukraine’s military intelligence directorate, GUR, “acknowledged for the first time some form of cooperation” with the two groups, the Financial Times reported last week.

“Of course, we communicate with them. Of course, we share some information,” Chernyak told the newspaper. “And, one might say, we even cooperate.”

However, he said that Ukraine’s military was not directly involved in the attack, suggesting that it was the Russians’ own initiative.

“They are rebelling,” he said.

While it is unknown just how deeply Ukraine is involved in these incursions, speculation goes far beyond just mere communications.

A few journalists who ventured into territory previously claimed occupied by the groups on Wednesday said they saw no signs of them.

Whether these groups actually try to stage an incursion into Crimea remains to be seen. The peninsula is likely more heavily defended than Belgorod, given its strategic importance as the home of Russia's Black Sea Fleet as well as several air bases.

But given the frequent drone attacks and Ukraine's publicly stated desire to kick Russia out of Crimea, occupation authorities there are clearly concerned about the future, hence the fortifications. If nothing else, this is at least another information operation to wear down the Russians.

Before we head into the latest news from Ukraine, The War Zone readers can catch up on our previous rolling coverage here.

The Latest

A day after U.S. officials indicated that Ukraine's counteroffensive was underway and doing better-than-expected, there are indications that operations are increasing in intensity in Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.

Pro-Russian Telegram channels are reporting an uptick in activity, with Ukrainian forces making probing attacks in those regions.

The Russian Wargonzo Telegram channel reported Ukrainian attacks along the Orekhov-Tokmak highway️ in Zaporizhia Oblast that were pushed back by Russian forces.

The Kremlin-connected Rybar Telegram channel said Ukraine carried out unsuccessful probing attacks, backed by armored vehicles, near Lobkove, southwest of Orekhovo in Zaporizhizhia Oblast.

Rybar also reported that Russian forces repulsed attacks in southern Donetsk Oblast as well.

The information is unverified and Ukrainian armed forces are denying the counteroffensive has begun.

In an interview with Reuters, Oleksiy Danilov, Secretary of Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council, dismissed statements by Russian officials who have said the counteroffensive has already begun.

"All of this is not true. When all this will begin, it will be decided by our military," Danilov told Reuters. "When we start the counteroffensive, everyone will know about it, they will see it."

All this comes after Russia's Defense Ministry earlier this week claimed it defeated the Ukrainian counteroffensive in south Donetsk, with Kyiv suffering huge losses of troops and equipment.

As we mentioned before, figuring out exactly what is going on here is going to take time. But we are watching this closely and will update as we learn more.

Elsewhere on the battlefield, Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar said her troops have gone on the offensive in Bakhmut.

“In the direction of Bakhmut, our troops switched from defense to offensive,” said Maliar. “Over the past day, we have advanced from 200 to 1,100 meters in various sections of the Bakhmut direction.”

The Russians, she said, “went on the defensive, trying to hold the occupied positions. At present, the enemy is withdrawing its reserves in this direction from the depth for protection.”

“The Wagnerites remain in some places in the rear units. As of now, the regular army of the Russian Federation is conducting hostilities, deploying assault troops.”

Maliar said it is “possible to hold the defense of the Bakhmut direction for so long and now to advance on it thanks to the fortifications prepared in advance. The entire surrounding area is actually a fortified district. Fortifications were prepared in advance by the forces of our troops and local military administrations. It was built capitally.”

The Russian Defense Ministry (MoD) disputes Maliar’s contention.

“An attack by the [Armed Forces of Ukraine] militants was successfully repelled by Russian units,” the Russian MoD said on its Telegram channel. “No incursion into the defense was allowed. The reports of some sources about the alleged abandonment of Berkhovka by Russian troops does not correspond to reality.”

Yevegeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner mercenary group which did the bulk of the fighting for Bakhmut, said that Russia was in danger of losing the city.

He said on his Telegram channel Wednesday, Prigozhin said that after his troops left, “the army units lost control over the gardens in the southwestern part of [Bakhmut]. This carries great risks, because if the enemy is not immediately knocked out of the gardens, then the next step of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be an attempt to enter Tetris (high-rise buildings at the end of Korsunsky Street). And then the domino effect until the loss of control over the entire city.”

Prigozhin also took another swipe at Russian military leaders.

"Now part of the settlement of Berkhovka has already been lost, the troops are slowly draping," he said. "A shame! [Russian Defense Minister Sergie] Shoigu, [Russian Army Chief of Staff Valery] Gerasimov, I urge you to come to the front, raise an army with pistols so that they go forward. Come on, you can! And if you can't, die a hero."

Russian forces are shooting at Ukrainian rescuers attempting to reach those trapped in flooded areas of occupied Kherson after the destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told Politico Wednesday in an exclusive interview.

“As soon as our helpers try to rescue them, they are shot at,” Zelensky said, referring to rescue efforts in towns on the Russian-occupied bank of the Dnipro River, which has been inundated with floodwater after blasts partially destroyed the dam on Tuesday. The floodwaters threaten 80 settlements on both the Ukrainian-held and Russian-occupied sides of the river, according to Kyiv.

The rescue efforts included an innovative twist on what has become a battlefield staple. In order to supply them with fresh water as they waited for rescue, Ukraine dropped water bottles, not bombs, from quadcopters.

In addition to the human suffering, many animals were left behind as well.

A former NATO Secretary General said a group of member nations may be willing to put boots on the ground in Ukraine if other NATO nations, including the U.S., do not provide tangible security guarantees to Kyiv at the alliance’s summit in Vilnius, The Guardian reported.

Anders Rasmussen, who has been acting as an official adviser to the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, also the issue of Ukraine’s future NATO membership will likely be on the agenda at Vilnius.

“Rasmussen made his remarks as the current NATO chief, Jens Stoltenberg, said the issue of security guarantees would be on the agenda at Vilnius, but added that NATO – under article 5 of the Washington treaty – only provided full-fledged security guarantees to full members,” The Guardian reported.

It appears that Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, whose troops are fighting in Ukraine for Russia, have received the first Chinese military vehicles in Russian service. Kadyrov received at least eight new Tiger armored personnel carriers. While unarmed, they do have gun mounts.

The Kremlin-connected Rybar Telegram channel reported that Russian troops captured a complete set of PD-100 Black Hornet Nano drones.

"In a forest area near Novaya Tavolzhanka, a group of special forces ambushed a detachment of Nazis from the Kraken battalion," Rybar reported. "During the battle, the enemy was destroyed. And ours got a complete set of PD-100 Black Hornet Nano UAVs."

This isn't the first time one of those drone was captured. We reported back in 2020 that pro-regime social accounts claimed Syrian troops recovered the Black Hornet near the town of Tal Tamr in the country's northeastern Al Hasakah Governorate, which borders Turkey to the north and Iraq to the south.

Russia claims that Ukrainian saboteurs attacked an ammonia pipeline in Kharkiv Oblast.

"On June 5, at about 9 p.m. Moscow time, one Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group carried out an explosion of the Tolyatti-Odessa ammonia pipeline close to Masyutovka in Kharkiv Oblast," the Russian Defense Ministry said Wednesday on its Telegram channel.

“As a result of this terrorist act, there were victims among the civilian population. People received the necessary medical assistance.”

Ammonia residues were drained from the Ukrainian territory through the damaged sections of the pipeline, the Russian MoD claimed, adding there were no casualties among Russian servicemen.

Germany this week announced the latest tranche of aid for Ukraine, which includes eight Bundvagn 206 tracked all-terrain vehicles, 2,000 rounds of ammunition for Gepard anti-aircraft systems, 16 border protection vehicles, 14 Vector reconnaissance drones and several logistics vehicles. It's all part of Germany's $5.78 billion commitment to Ukraine's security. That includes funds to backfill equipment donated from its own stocks as well.

Images have emerged on social media of DM63A1 kinetic energy 120mm ammunition for the Leopard 2 tanks donated to Ukraine and now in service with its military.

Often in war, being in the right place at the right time helps. In the case of this Ukrainian soldier, that meant being behind a 50 caliber heavy machine gun shield atop an Australian-donated M113AS4 armored personnel carrier. As you can see from the video below, it apparently saved his life.

And sometimes, you are not so lucky, as is the case of these Russian troops struck by a Ukrainian First Person Video drone.

Speaking of FPV drones, Ukraine's Army of Drones released a video highlight of attacks by the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Directorate's (GUR) Warmate FPV drones against Russian air defense, electronic warfare and surveillance radar systems. As the post below notes, it is unclear what the results of the strikes were. Often, another drone is in the air observing the hit, but not in most of these cases.

And finally, sometimes you go fishing, and sometimes the fish come to you, like these Ukrainian troops experienced in an amphibious vehicle.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · June 7, 2023

15. Martha Gellhorn: The only woman present on D-Day

Well, perhaps except for some OSS women working with the French resistance.

But this is another fascinating story.

Martha Gellhorn: The only woman present on D-Day - Sandboxx

sandboxx.us · by Amy Dickey · June 6, 2023

War correspondents are an integral part of the way global conflicts are captured and conveyed. They report firsthand what’s happening on the front lines, and choose to accept the potential dangers that come along with the job. Journalists have been held hostage and killed trying to get their story. While, historically, the majority of journalists in these positions have been men, women like Martha Gellhorn prove that the only real prerequisite for the job (aside from the writing chops) is the willingness to risk everything you’ve got.

At 19, Martha Gellhorn had already dropped out of the all-women Bryn Mawr College in Pennsylvania to pursue a career in journalism. Her first published works would appear in the political commentary magazine The New Republic. By 1930, she had her sights set on being a foreign correspondent. She went to France, where she spent several years working at the United Press Bureau, traveling around Europe and covering fashion for Vogue. Her first novel What Mad Pursuit was published in 1934. It was met with general disinterest; criticism purportedly centered around her lack of experience in fiction writing.

Regardless, Gellhorn’s contributions to the non-fiction realm would be much more substantial. She is seen here with Chinese Gen. Yu Hanmou in Chunking, China, 1941. (Wikimedia Commons)

Upon her return to the U.S., she would find work with then-First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt. For some time she was a resident of the White House working as a field investigator for President Roosevelt’s Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) by day, and helping the first lady with her column in Women’s Home Companion by night. Her work with Roosevelt’s FERA — which saw her team up with photographer Dorothea Lange — was unprecedented at the time. Lange and Gellhorn were given permission to investigate and report on topics not typically assigned to women.

It was in 1936 that Gellhorn would first meet author Ernest Hemingway, and when she was hired to cover the Spanish Civil War by Collier’s Weekly, the two traveled to Spain together. They would live and travel together on and off for four years, before marrying in 1940. While Hemingway admired her drive, there was contention and competition between them, and he often expressed his distaste for her inclination to dangerous situations. It was this trait that would ultimately make her the only woman to be present at Normandy on D-Day.

While there was a small number of women serving as correspondents and photographers throughout Europe in 1944, they were prohibited from following troops on the front lines. Gellhorn resented the unnecessary prevention, even writing a letter to military authorities voicing her displeasure:

“It is necessary that I report on this war. I do not feel there is any need to beg as a favour for the right to serve as the eyes for millions of people in America who are desperately in need of seeing, but cannot see for themselves.”

The night before the Allied ships left for Normandy, Gellhorn’s credentials allowed her to board a hospital ship, in order to interview nurses. Once aboard, she weighed the risk of being caught with the possibility of seeing the invasion firsthand. If caught, she would likely be sent back to America, and lose whatever foreign press credentials she had. Accepting the potential outcome, she decided to hide in one of the ship’s bathrooms as the Allies departed for France.

Anyone who has spent time at sea knows that isn’t a pleasant hiding spot.

(U.S. Army)

After the troops had landed and the chaos and violence had subsided, Gellhorn snuck ashore alongside the medics as a stretcher-bearer. She was the only woman there that day. The next group of women, who were members of the U.S. Women’s Army Corps, did not arrive in Normandy for another 38 days. Bearing witness to the resulting death and destruction, and as the wounded were being collected, she began to process the surroundings. She would later write for Collier’s:

“Everyone was violently busy on that crowded, dangerous shore. The pebbles were the size of apples and feet deep, and we stumbled up a road that a huge road shovel was scooping out. We walked with the utmost care between the narrowly placed white tape lines that marked the mine-cleared path, and headed for a tent marked with a red cross … Everyone agreed that the beach was a stinker, and that it would be a great pleasure to get the hell out of here sometime.”

She would also go on to be one of the first correspondents at the Allied liberation of Dachau, capturing in words the sight of skeleton-filled mass graves.

“They have no age and no faces; they all look alike and like nothing you will ever see if you are lucky,” she wrote after visiting the concentration camp.

Gellhorn was among the first journalists to tell the rest of the world of the atrocities seen at liberated concentration camps. (Wikimedia Commons)

While many tend to link her and Hemingway together in a profoundly meaningful way that often overshadows her own story, their tumultuous relationship is probably one of the least interesting things about either one of them.

Gellhorn procured a legacy of groundbreaking journalism throughout her entire life, continuing to work into her 80s, covering the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989. During this time her health began to pose challenges, and her last reporting endeavor came in 1995, with a trip to Brazil to shine a light on the poverty the country faced. This final work was particularly taxing on her, with her vision so impaired due to cataract that she could not even read her own typewritten drafts.

Gellhorn and Hemingway at the Stork Club in New York City, 1941.

(John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum)

Just three years later, in February of 1998, with failed vision and ovarian cancer that had spread to her liver, Martha Gellhorn committed suicide by taking a cyanide capsule. The following year, the Martha Gellhorn Prize for Journalism was created, which is given annually to journalists whose writing has “penetrated the established version of events and told an unpalatable truth that exposes establishment propaganda, or ‘official drivel,’ as Martha Gellhorn called it.”

She lived her life as fully as she possibly could, and on her own terms as often as possible. To live a life dedicated to sharing experiences and events that may otherwise be left unknown is a noble cause.

”I’m overprivileged. I’ve had a wonderful life. I didn’t deserve it but I’ve had it.”

Feature image: Martha Gellhorn (JFK Presidential Library and Museum)

Editor’s Note: This article was originally published in September 2021. It has been edited for republication.

sandboxx.us · by Amy Dickey · June 6, 2023

16. Propaganda film casts Chinese Army as saintly liberators

And you will find these themes in online games that are produced by gaming companies that are controlled by companies in China. We need to compete in the gaming space as well.

Propaganda film casts Chinese Army as saintly liberators

militarytimes.com · by Sarah Sicard · June 7, 2023

Shiny happy people holding hands / Shiny happy people laughing / Everyone around, love them, love them.

The lyrics performed by Michael Stipe in the 1991 R.E.M. song “Shiny Happy People” may sound like upbeat pop, but they were actually inspired by Chinese propaganda designed to paint a rosy picture in the wake of Tiananmen Square massacre.

Well, the Chinese government is at it again, this time framing its People’s Liberation Army as a humanitarian force for global peace in a brief film called “Here I Am.”

The two-minute video, which switches back and forth from animation to live footage, is a cartoonish depiction of the country’s military as a saintly, selfless group of missionaries.

“We are always here awaiting orders,” the video’s narrator says. “Regardless of perils, undaunted by dangers, we deliver hope in hard times. We extend benevolence and love across the oceans and we uphold justice and peace.”

Alas, on Sunday the U.S. released footage of a Chinese warship crossing paths with a U.S. destroyer in a dangerous maneuver. And on May 26, a Chinese fighter jet flying over the South China Sea performed a maneuver near a U.S. aircraft in international airspace that was deemed “unnecessarily aggressive.”

Shiny happy soldiers indeed.

Observation Post is the Military Times one-stop shop for all things off-duty. Stories may reflect author observations.

About Sarah Sicard

Sarah Sicard is a Senior Editor with Military Times. She previously served as the Digitial Editor of Military Times and the Army Times Editor. Other work can be found at National Defense Magazine, Task & Purpose, and Defense News.

17. Gray Hulls and Gray Zones

Excerpt:

What are the Black Swans, Black Jellyfish, and Black Elephants in the modern maritime dimension? Our nine deep dive topics attempt to tackle today’s most pressing challenges—including those that may not receive much attention in mainstream news reporting or are poorly understood by the joint force.

Gray Hulls and Gray Zones - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Lisa McKinnon Munde · June 8, 2023

Introducing Project Maritime: Exploring Underlying Conflict Multipliers in the Modern Maritime Dimension

Lisa McKinnon Munde

Editor’s Note: The Irregular Warfare Initiative proudly announces Project Maritime. This special project explores modern challenges and opportunities in the maritime dimension at the intersection of irregular warfare and strategic competition. With a focus on current events and their underlying geographical and historical patterns, recent changes to policy & doctrine, and emerging technologies, we aim to contextualize drivers of conflict in the maritime dimension and inspire dialogue toward integrated statecraft approaches. We invite your participation and engagement as we embark on this project.

Please send submissions to submissions@irregularwarfare.org with the subject line “Project Maritime Submission” and follow us on Twitter @proj_maritime.

Maritime Centrality

“Historical experience tells us that countries that embrace the sea thrive, while states that spurn the sea decline.”

Xi Jinping, July 30, 2013

The maritime domain has long played a critical role in shaping global affairs and provides a uniquely telling lens for evaluating broader geopolitical, geostrategic, and geoeconomic trends.

Oceans, lakes, and rivers have always held profound significance as conduits for global connectivity. Most of today’s megacities, representing many of the world’s most prominent cultural and financial centers, are non-coincidentally located near an ocean, lake, or river. Hubs like Shanghai, New York, Mumbai, Istanbul, Lagos, and Rio de Janeiro emerged as global powerhouses in part due to their proximity to strategic waterways that facilitated trade and economic development. Today, 90 percent of trade, including consumer goods, agricultural products, energy, and raw materials, arrive by ship. While free seas underpin the established rules-based international order and global economy, the maritime commons have become increasingly complex and contested.

While navalists (like our friends at CIMSEC and Proceeding’s Maritime COIN Project) routinely explore strategic implications of maritime issues below armed conflict, the broader irregular warfare community seldom includes the maritime dimension or addresses related themes as a standard part of the discourse. Not since the Vietnam War have our services devoted significant resources and attention to the nexus between irregular warfare and the maritime domain—and even then, that was in support of a land-based campaign. Project Maritime aims to make modern maritime themes accessible and bridge the gap between practitioners, policymakers, and scholars. By focusing on current events and their underlying geographical and historical patterns, we aim to illuminate and contextualize modern challenges and potential opportunities.

Vast, Complex, and Dynamic

The Pacific Ocean alone is larger than the entire earth’s landmass. Roughly half of the world’s population lives within 100 miles of a coast, and 99 percent of international internet traffic travels beneath the surface via a vast network of undersea fiber-optic data cables. Likewise, many nations rely on undersea gas and oil pipelines for energy imports. The recent NordStream pipeline sabotage highlighted the vulnerabilities of these pipelines, and a recent IWI piece by Walker Mills called for increased focus on critical undersea infrastructure protection in response. In a 2017 Policy Exchange report, current UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak warned that a “successful attack on the UK’s undersea cable infrastructure would be an existential threat to our security. Yet the exact locations of these cables are both isolated and publicly available – jugulars of the world economy which are a singularly attractive target for our enemies.”

As a multidimensional space that spans from the seabed to the airspace above, ocean governance includes a complex patchwork of overlapping governance regimes and frameworks. In short, the environment is vast, complex, and dynamic. (Take this Council on Foreign Relations quiz to test your knowledge).

Challenges in the modern maritime dimension are further complicated by climate change, which will negatively affect human security and drive migration (particularly for developing coastal and island states like Haiti, Bangladesh, Cuba, and Indonesia). Climate events like melting sea ice also have geopolitical implications and serve as potential flashpoints in places like the Arctic, where states like Canada, Russia, and the United States have differing interpretations of the legal impacts of an increasingly navigable Arctic.

Common Understanding

Project Maritime seeks to foster a common understanding of the challenges at the intersection of strategic competition in what has been dubbed the “Pacific Century.” However, while the People’s Republic of China, its maritime militia, and excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea, including the question of Taiwan, often dominate the conversation as a primary security concern, modern drivers of escalation and conflict extend far beyond the Pacific.

A surge in illegal, dangerous, and destabilizing activity at sea globally merits further exploration. In the past year alone, a snapshot of international headlines demonstrates how complex and dynamic the maritime domain is and confirms that truth is stranger than fiction. Unfortunately, maritime headlines do not always make national news, which experts often attribute to a phenomenon known as “sea blindness:” the oceans are out of sight and thus out of mind.

Gray Hulls, Gray Zones, Gray Matter

To better understand these potential drivers of conflict and instability, Project Maritime prioritizes defining and describing the maritime dimension and making nuanced analysis on associated themes accessible to non-navalists. Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, Competition Continuum, describes a competition-conflict continuum (pictured below) identified by conceptual and capability challenges. This special series prioritizes exploring the former over the latter.

The focus, thus, is more on the what and where than on offering solutions for the who and the how. While it is prudent for policymakers to prioritize capability gaps—including big-budget items like hypersonic missiles, the naval surface fleet size, icebreakers, and submarines—it is equally important to consider a “high-low mix” and include irregular and asymmetric approaches in integrated deterrence. The recent reports of a Ukrainian drone attacking a Russian ship in the Black Sea provide a glimpse of this future. Retired U.S. Navy Adm. James Stavridis noted in a recent tweet, “Here is the future of war at sea. Small, swift, unmanned attackers going at multi-billion dollar big platforms trying to guard exposed resource platforms. Danger ahead.”

Black Swans, Black Jellyfish, and Black Elephants

A recent UK Ministry of Defense study highlights the urgency to “explore new ways of finding answers for future, unforeseeable threats, to be ready to harness fleeting opportunities and seek new ways to keep on finding answers and opportunities. It means changing the way we think, act, and acquire equipment, exercise command, lead.” Their study proposes three metaphors of “Black Swans,” “Black Jellyfish,” and “Black Elephants” to describe distinct blind spots or cognitive biases. “Black Swans” represent unexpected, high-impact events; “Black Jellyfish” are complex, uncertain issues we thought we understood; and “Black Elephants” are challenges that everyone sees, but avoids tackling.

Deep Dives

What are the Black Swans, Black Jellyfish, and Black Elephants in the modern maritime dimension? Our nine deep dive topics attempt to tackle today’s most pressing challenges—including those that may not receive much attention in mainstream news reporting or are poorly understood by the joint force.

“Maritime Dimension”

We subscribe to the sentiment that “words mean things,” especially in irregular warfare. After all, the difference between a “rock” and an “island” was the basis for a 2016 decision denying China’s South China Sea claims. However, for this special series, we will sacrifice some measure of doctrinal orthodoxy to maximize inclusivity and consider the broadest possible applications for the terms “irregular warfare,” “strategic competition,” and the “maritime dimension.” The project’s “irregular” focus encompasses terms like asymmetric, competition below armed conflict, and gray-zone trends. Relatedly, we avoid a singular term of reference, such as “maritime irregular warfare,” to encompass the subject matter presented here.

We also use the term “maritime dimension” in its broadest sense to include all aspects of maritime affairs, including but not limited to those spaces laid out in joint doctrine. Our imagining of the maritime dimension encompasses maritime transportation, naval operations, maritime trade and shipping, maritime security, naval diplomacy, maritime law and law enforcement, ocean governance, marine resource management, open registries, and environmental considerations, to name merely a few aspects. We also intend to include the various subdomains that characterize this multidimensional space, including surface, subsurface, subsea, seabed, littoral, coastal, riverine, air, arctic, polar, Antarctic, cyber, electromagnetic, information, and human domains. That is not to say we do not recognize and appreciate the tremendous nuance and potential for increasing precision around these terms. We welcome a submission that attempts to present a cohesive taxonomy for this field amid the resurgence of strategic competition or build on an existing one, like that presented in this groundbreaking RAND study.

Diving Deep

Project Maritime embarks on this journey with three key aspects in mind: (1) contextualizing modern drivers of conflict through the lens of current events and geography, (2) surveying today’s dynamic policy and doctrine landscape, and (3) exploring applications and implications for emerging technologies with a focus on those that impact “maritime domain awareness”—commonly referred to as Blue OSINT (open-source intelligence). We have mapped out our first ten “deep dives” that combine these thematic and geographic aspects, although we welcome submissions on other topics of interest.

Current Events: Illegal, dangerous, and destabilizing activities

China

Just this week amid the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore, a Chinese warship (LUYANG III DDG 132 [PRC LY 132]) performed a provocative, unsafe maritime interaction in cutting in front of USS Chung-Hoon as the US warship and a Canadian warship operated together in international waters. In a recent talk, Rear Adm. Mike Studeman, commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence, reiterated the dangers posed by China’s frontline forces thus:

“China’s militia and Coast Guard have rammed foreign ships, water cannoned other vessels, interfered with legitimate resource exploration activities sponsored by other nations, driven off Southeast Asia nations’ fishermen in their own waters, and engaged in many other harassment tactics as they try to enforce their unlawful claims and cow other nations into giving China de facto control of whatever Beijing unilaterally claims in contravention of the U.N. Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).”

China’s malign maritime activity is not limited to the South China Sea, of course. Its state-subsidized distant-water fishing fleets engaged in IUU fishing have been a contentious issue in Latin America as well as West and Central Africa. Stanford University and the Hoover Institution have led the field in bringing attention to these issues through efforts like China’s Global Sharp Power Project, Project Myoshu from the Gordian Knot Center for National Security, and Stanford Law School’s inter-disciplinary Policy Practicum: Outlaw Ocean, based on Ian Urbina’s best-selling book Outlaw Ocean.

Russia

Russian fleets are also significant perpetrators of state-sponsored IUU fishing and “dark shipping.” Russian military forces have also demonstrated a surge in illegal, dangerous, and destabilizing activities. In an unprovoked incident in April over the Black Sea, Russian fighter jets intercepted a U.S. drone most unusually. The MQ-9 Reaper drone was operating in international airspace over the Black Sea when a section of Russian Su-27 Flankers approached it. One of the Russian jets dumped fuel on the drone before eventually colliding with it, causing it to crash into the Black Sea. While such midair collisions in international airspace occur occasionally—the most well-known perhaps being the EP3 incident at Hainan, China—this malicious fuel dumping tactic is worthy of examination amid a renewed emphasis on gray zone and asymmetric approaches. The unprofessional interaction occurred amid the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, where maritime activities have played a critical role, including along the Dnipro River, in the recently extended—albeit fragile—Black Sea Grain Initiative, naval mining, destruction of the Kerch Bridge, sinking of the Moskva, and a recently reported Ukrainian drone attack on a Russian ship and the unique role of Turkey and its control of the approaches to the Black Sea.

Indeed, the Black Sea is worthy of special attention. As Jakub Grygiel wrote in a recent article for the Hoover Institution:

“Thirty years from now, a historian writing a book on the events of the last two decades happening in the area between Russia and the Middle East, including in Ukraine, might entitle it The Long War for the Black Sea. For, in fact, while the military clash between Russia and Ukraine is occurring predominantly on land and the outcome of the war will determine the political and economic survival of an independent Kyiv, the great strategic prize is the Black Sea. To control Ukraine means to dominate the Black Sea, and to control the Black Sea means to control the internal sea of Central Europe and the Caucasus…The heart of Europe flows into the Black Sea.”

Iran

Equally unsettling is the trend of problematic interactions between Iranian forces and merchant vessels in and around the Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. In recent weeks, commandos boarded and seized in international waters Advantage Sweet, a Marshall Islands-flagged oil tanker chartered by Chevron, on its way to Houston from Kuwait. Less than a week later, a swarm of Iranian fast-attack craft seized a second vessel, the Panama-flagged tanker Niovi. According to a U.S. Fifth Fleet statement: “Over the past two years, Iran has harassed, attacked or interfered with the navigational rights of 15 internationally flagged merchant vessels. Iran’s continued harassment of vessels and interference with navigational rights in regional waters are unwarranted, irresponsible and a present threat to maritime security and the global economy.”

Perhaps the most disturbing of these events occurred in July 2021, when an Iranian-built drone armed with explosives attacked a merchant vessel, Mercer Street, killing two crew members. This recent surge in Iranian aggression invokes memories of the Tanker War of the 1980s.

Geography

Mark Twain once wrote, “God created war so that Americans would learn geography.” Martin Lewis, a prominent geographer, and founder of the popular blog geocurrents, echoed that while he taught at Stanford University, “most students learn that the globe is divided into fundamental units called either countries or nation-states, few of which have much significance. Beyond that, geographical knowledge is considered worthwhile mostly for game shows or trivia nights at local pubs. The result is not merely widespread gaps in public knowledge but rather pervasive geographical illiteracy that has damaging real-world consequences.”

In recognition of this unfortunate reality, a forthcoming Project Maritime deep dive will include a thorough, if ambitious, graphical representation of recent current events to illuminate overarching trends, black swans, black jellyfish, and black elephants.

The “deep dive” will explore the geographic and historical patterns that underlie these trends and illuminate the significance of the global system of waterways. As Dr. Ike Wilson and Scott Stimson write, these nuances are increasingly important today “where adversaries generate and exploit compound security threats deliberately and strategically along the gaps and seams of traditional geographic combatant command boundaries. The geography of compound threats is an essential calculus in strategic planning, force planning, and risk management and mitigation.” They go on to point out that “the convergence of threats at key geographic locations presents the United States with additional challenges, but it also presents opportunities to sharpen our focus and apply our resources in more precise and economical ways, at decisive locations…”

The Ship That Launched a Thousand Memes

The six-day blockage of the Suez Canal by the container ship Ever Given in 2021 highlighted the global system’s dependence on vital maritime chokepoints and the potentially disastrous implications of disruption to global trade. As we launch Project Maritime, the tenth anniversary of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) looms large. Despite varying assessments as to the success of the individual projects, which have included investments in maritime infrastructure from the Panama Canal expansion to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port to Hambantota Port on the southern coast of Sri Lanka to the port of Djibouti in the Red Sea, this maritime Silk Road serves as a reminder of the centrality of the maritime dimension and the enduring geostrategic importance of the world’s ports, harbors, sea lanes of communication and the extent to which they’re predicated on physical geography.

Dynamic Policy and Doctrine

The project will also explore recent changes to policy and doctrine. What, for example, are the implications of a recent change to the Navy’s roles and mandate under Title X that now includes “the peacetime promotion of the national security interests and prosperity of the United States” in addition to its traditional focus on power projection? What are the significant changes to a forthcoming revision of Joint Publication 3-32, Joint Maritime Operations, and naval doctrine publications like a Naval Warfare Publication entitled Maritime Competition?

A small sample of recent policy changes of interest include:

• The emergence of the QUAD and Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA).
• Joint U.S.-Philippine patrols planned for later this year and recent visit by Vice President Harris to Palawan.
• Maritime Architecture and Response to International Terrorism In the Middle East Act of 2023 or MARITIME Act.
• Recent bilateral agreements with Papua New Guinea including a defense cooperation agreement and an agreement concerning counter illicit transnational maritime activity operations.

Emerging Technologies

In an era of rapid technological evolution, advancements across various fields demand careful examination and exploration. Project Maritime will include a particular focus on the implications of “open-source intelligence, or “Blue OSINT,” for maritime domain awareness. Per naval doctrine, “maritime domain awareness is the effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of a nation.” Stanford Professor Amy Zegart highlights the critical role of OSINT in her bestselling book, Spies, Lies, and Algorithms, and on a recent IWI podcast episode.

The 2023 Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment notes that “the convergence of capabilities in high-performance computing, big data, and machine learning—each a critical enabler across multiple domains—could have broad yet unidentified consequences across military, commercial, and basic research applications with relevance to national defense, economic security, and political stability.”

Blue OSINT has implications for addressing a range of illegal activities, including illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and transshipment, sanctions evasion, and illegal activity like smuggling. It offers benefits such as affordability, allowing coastal states to more efficiently monitor and enforce their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), and enabling information sharing with partners. By leveraging publicly available and commercially available data and integrating various datasets, Blue OSINT enhances insights to enable better governance, economic policy, and sustainable development decisions.

Global Fishing Watch has been a leader in this field—not only in their open-access technology products, datasets, and code but to the extent that they have partnered with other nations to bring transparency to the maritime space and as an example of a whole of nation approach to modern challenges.

Whole-of-Nation Approaches

Project Maritime aims to model the very whole-of-society approaches required to contend with malign activity from pacing threats. To that end, the project includes planned collaborations with thought leaders and organizations across sectors and internationally. We will also amplify the excellent work of our colleagues at the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), Hoover Institution and Stanford University, US Naval Institute and its Maritime COIN project, Joint Special Operations University, as well as industry and NGO partners making waves in the “Blue OSINT” and emerging technology space like Global Fishing Watch, Windward, Planet, and various Defense Innovation Unit-sponsored projects. We also aim to amplify media outlets like gcaptain and What’s Going On With Shipping, which produce top-notch content and analysis and are popular with navalists and those in the maritime industry but perhaps lesser known by the irregular warfare community of interest.

Embracing Opportunity, Partnerships, and Innovation

Amid all these challenges lie significant opportunities. A singular focus on challenges in a merely reactionary or “prevent defense” mindset is both unproductive and limiting. Instead, Project Maritime aims to inspire approaches informed by current events, geography, policy, and emerging technology that capitalize on our nation’s two primary advantages in the contemporary security landscape. Our extensive network of alliances and partnerships, predicated on shared values such as the preservation of free and open seas, and second and our nation’s leading edge in technology and innovation. Project Maritime hopes to add to the dialogue as our nation navigates not only these challenges—but also the opportunities. Please join us in this conversation—we want to hear from you!

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Lisa McKinnon Munde is a graduate of the United States Naval Academy and served as a naval intelligence officer. She holds an MA in Latin American studies from Stanford University and is a 2022-2023 Hoover Institution Veteran Fellow, where her work is focused on illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. Lisa also leads Project Maritime for the Irregular Warfare Initiative—a joint venture between West Point’s Modern War Institute and the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project at Princeton University.

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irregularwarfare.org · by Lisa McKinnon Munde · June 8, 2023

18. War of the Words: Lessons in Psychological Operations from the Eastern Front in World War II

There is still a lot we can learn from psychological warfare in the past.

War of the Words: Lessons in Psychological Operations from the Eastern Front in World War II - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu · by Kyle Nappi · June 7, 2023

“Every seven seconds a German soldier dies. Stalingrad . . . mass grave,” thundered from the crackling Soviet loudspeakers positioned throughout the rubble-strewn city. Interspersed with the monotonous sound of a ticking clock, an orchestral melody dubbed the “Tango of Death,” and the howl of the Red Army’s Katyusha rockets, these nightly torments exerted considerable psychological pressure against the demoralized, half-starving, and chronically fatigued German bastion entrapped at Stalingrad. Blared on repeat throughout the winter of 1942–43, these Soviet taunts precipitated the fate of the Wehrmacht’s besieged forces.

For many, the Battle of Stalingrad conjures images of a herculean struggle between the Soviet Union and the Third Reich with hand-to-hand combat in frigid, frostbiting cold. The Battle of Stalingrad, along with subsequent clashes on the Eastern Front, offers many timely parallels and lessons for the Russo-Ukrainian War, especially with regard to psychological operations. Notably, Soviet psychological operations directed against German forces are a useful case study, highlighting both successes and shortcomings of exploiting psychological stresses and underlying motivators—lessons the Ukrainians have shown prowess in adopting.

At their core, psychological operations are concerted messages and actions, including deception, designed to affect outcomes among adversarial audiences. This is achieved by targeting ideological, political, military, and economic vulnerabilities that alter attitudes and behaviors. Combat operations in Ukraine have revealed the continued importance of psychological operations and the use of propaganda to shape the battlefield. Kyiv’s efforts to discourage Russian combatants from fighting in Ukraine have proven successful but more can be learned and applied by Ukraine and its allies if they are willing to look to the Soviet experience in World War II.

Lesson One: Emotional Appeals Work

One of the prime goals for Soviet propagandists was to encourage German soldiers to surrender rather than continue fighting. At Stalingrad, the Soviets successfully used emotional appeals to influence individual German soldiers. For most Wehrmacht soldiers, a hatred or repudiation of Hitler and the Third Reich did not compel them to lay down their arms. Rather, many were motivated by a determination to survive for family, among other emotionally charged issues. Soviet debriefings of captured Wehrmacht soldiers at Stalingrad revealed that the most psychologically impactful propaganda writings referenced home, family, and children. The Soviets subsequently exploited such emotionally stirring sentiments to entice more German surrenders. “Soldiers eagerly read Russian leaflets,” admitted one German prisoner of war. “[Some] cried when they saw a leaflet representing the corpse of a German soldier and an infant crying over it.”

Additionally, the Soviets deliberately appealed to German concerns about personal safety by promising humane treatment upon surrender. Soviet mistreatment was a common and justifiably held suspicion within the Wehrmacht’s ranks. One Soviet leaflet featured a special declaration by Joseph Stalin: “If German soldiers and officers give themselves up, the Red Army must take them prisoner and spare their lives.”

Lesson Two: Know Your Audience

Propaganda needs to understand the target’s culture and perspective to be effective. After Stalingrad, a widening fissure emerged between Soviet propaganda and its intended audience. Beginning in the spring of 1943, the Soviets pivoted their messaging tactics to amplify political narratives, such as insurrection and reformation within the Third Reich, instead of the previously successful emotional appeals. The narratives, often put together by exiled German communists or turned prisoners of war, largely fell flat. The Soviets’ messaging pivot greatly undercut subsequent efforts to invoke widespread German surrenders and hasten the end of the war. The messaging might have appealed to Soviet political leaders and cadres in Moscow but failed to appeal to the German soldier or civilian.

By contrast, Berlin denounced messages from the Soviets’ cadre of German expatriates, namely authors and political activists, as the work of traitors and Jewish communists. German officials responded with counterpropaganda, encouraging their forces to fight harder by stoking fears of a vengeful Red Army. Most significantly, Joseph Goebbels, the German minister for propaganda, called for total war and progressively exploited fears of a metastasizing Soviet threat. The Wehrmacht—alongside children, grandfathers, women, prisoners, and incarcerated sadistic criminals—stubbornly resisted the Red Army from frozen steppe of Stalingrad to the smoldering ruins of Berlin.

The Ukrainian Battlefield

As revealed around Stalingrad, appeal to emotional issues such as family, home, and personal security were driving factors in the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda. Using political appeals is a trickier tactic. When designing propaganda, Ukraine and its allies would do well to tailor messaging tactics that exploit Russian psychological pressure points. Effective psychological operations can influence populations and affect legitimacy as a subset of irregular warfare. Today, the Russo-Ukrainian War is an active proving ground for the relevance, deployment, and sustainment of psychological operations on the ever-proliferating digital battlefield. Since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, Ukraine’s military and intelligence apparatus has made good use of Soviet lessons and achieved success in its overt psychological operations campaigns.

Drawing from the Soviet experience at Stalingrad, Ukrainian psychological operations tailored to discourage and remove combatants, by means of provoking and encouraging their lawful surrender, may exert additional pressure and further strain the viability of Russia’s fighting force for sustainable operations. “The fight for Ukraine will not just be won on the battlefield,” opined David R. Shedd, former acting director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Ivana Stradner, an advisor to the Barish Center for Media Integrity. “For all the high-tech weaponry the West has delivered, psychological war against Russia remains a key opportunity for Ukraine and the United States.”

Ukraine manages an astute command of the digital theater of operations. Videos and messages circulated on social media show captured Russian soldiers calling home or participating in news conferences before an array of media outlets. Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense invited Russian mothers to retrieve prisoners of war from Kyiv. In response to Moscow’s partial mobilization in September 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy publicly encouraged Russian combatants to surrender with guarantees of civilized treatment, a promise that Russia would not be told that any surrender was voluntary, and a pledge that those fearful of returning to Russia would not be exchanged. Collectively, such messaging tactics best exemplify emotional appeals and knowing one’s audience.

Most observable among Western audiences is Ukraine’s creative use of lightweight quadcopter drones to foster technologically enabled surrenders of Russian combatants on the frontlines. This is not the first time enemy combatants have surrendered to a drone but the use of psychological appeals and propaganda makes the Ukrainian example unique. Managed by Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence, the “I Want To Live” hotline connects Russian troops with Ukrainian handlers through messenger app, phone, or website to arrange their rendezvous with and surrender to Ukrainian drones. The hotline’s instructional YouTube video choreographs this guidance for its daring Russian viewership seeking to cross no-man’s-land. According to Ukraine’s Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, the hotline generated more than ten thousand reports in six months from Russian combatants seeking to lay down their arms to Ukrainian forces. Last month, Ukrainian officials noted that the number of Russian soldiers seeking to surrender grew by 10 percent between March and April 2023.

The Russo-Ukrainian War has unveiled Russian troops as an ill-prepared, misled, and demoralized fighting force, further compromised by desertions, draft dodging, and an exodus of military-aged men from Russia. “I feel sorry for people left in Russia,” one captured Russian colonel mused during a March 2022 news conference. “They are not guilty. Their guilt is that they are misinformed.” Ukraine has seized on Russia’s repeated shortcomings, with digital taunts reminiscent of the Soviet loudspeaker broadcasts directed toward Germany’s weary troops besieged at Stalingrad. “The closer the counteroffensive, the hotter the surrender season,” mused a May 2023 Twitter post by Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense. “Don’t wait for the heat! The most favorable conditions are now.”

Kyle Nappi is a national security specialist with experience advising the US Department of Defense and intelligence community. Additionally, he has interviewed nearly five thousand Allied and Axis combatants from World War II—including many German and Soviet veterans of Stalingrad and the Eastern Front—to further understand and document the human condition in war and conflict.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, via Twitter

mwi.usma.edu · by Kyle Nappi · June 7, 2023

19. Would Europeans Back Washington in a U.S.-China War? A New Survey Might Surprise You

Uh oh.

Conclusion:

Just as Europeans’ views of Russia hardened following its invasion of Ukraine, Zerka says the same could yet happen if Beijing were to do the same with Taiwan. But so long as it remains a distant hypothetical, the scope of that movement will be difficult to gauge. “Before the war in Ukraine, most Europeans were seeing Russia as partners, not as rivals or adversaries,” says Zerka. “But the war radically changed their perception. … It’s only when such events happen when we would really be able to see whether European perceptions and attitudes have changed or not.”

Would Europeans Back Washington in a U.S.-China War? A New Survey Might Surprise You

TIME · by Yasmeen Serhan · June 7, 2023

In recent months, the U.S. and the E.U. have sought to portray a mostly united front when it comes to China. Both Washington and Brussels have called out Beijing over its support for Russia amid its ongoing invasion of Ukraine, and both have firmly opposed any attempts to alter the status quo around Taiwan, the self-governed democracy to which Beijing lays claim.

But as much as American and European leaders may appear to be in lockstep on China, the same cannot be said for their respective populations. According to new findings published by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) on Wednesday, a majority of Europeans see China as a “necessary partner” rather than as a rival or adversary, unlike most Americans. What’s more, in the event of a potential conflict between the U.S. and China over Taiwan, most Europeans would prefer to stay out of it.

The findings, which stem from a poll of more than 16,000 people across 11 E.U. member states, offer a stark contrast to the conventional view that there is a certain symmetry between what is happening in Ukraine and what could yet happen in Taiwan. Both have had their sovereignty denied by more powerful, authoritarian neighbors in Russia and China, respectively. But this isn’t necessarily all that surprising. Whereas U.S. President Joe Biden has put forward a hawkish stance against China—dubbing Beijing the most serious competitor to America and pledging to defend Taiwan against Chinese incursion —European leaders have held more mixed views, ranging from E.U. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s calls to “de-risk” the bloc’s relationship with Beijing to French President Emmanuel Macron’s more conciliatory approach of treating China as a strategic partner.

This discrepancy bears out in public opinion. Whereas more Americans are likely to regard China as a competitor (52%) or enemy (38%), according to a recent study by the Pew Research Center, European attitudes toward China are more mixed. On average, 43% of Europeans view China as “a necessary partner” as opposed to 24% who see the country as a rival or 11% who see it as an adversary. This is despite the fact that a majority of Europeans recognize China as being a close partner to Russia, which a majority of Europeans regard as a rival or adversary to Europe.

It’s perhaps for this reason that, when asked how their country should respond to a potential conflict between the U.S. and China over Taiwan, a majority of Europeans (62%) said that they should remain neutral. Pawel Zerka, a Paris-based senior policy fellow at ECFR and a co-author of the report, tells TIME that this position isn’t a reflection of Europeans’ feelings toward the U.S. (which most Europeans recognize as a close ally and partner) or Taiwan’s territorial integrity.

“The Taiwan or China question is still very abstract to European citizens,” Zerka says. “For Europeans, these are incomparable things: the war in Ukraine, which is actually happening next to our borders and that we are closely following, versus a very distant Taiwan, where there is not yet any war and which is not very much discussed.”

This position has been most prominently articulated by Macron, who following a visit to China in April warned that Europeans should avoid becoming “America’s followers” when it comes to Taiwan, noting that Europe should avoid the “trap” of getting involved in crises “that are not ours.” It’s a position that earned Macron flak among his allies, including fellow E.U. member states such as Lithuania, which has deep ties with Taiwan and has even opened a de facto embassy for the island nation.

Europe’s position vis à vis China could yet change—particularly if Beijing wades into the war in Ukraine. While China remains an important trading partner for Russia, it has yet to support Russia militarily. If Beijing were to supply Moscow with weapons and ammunition, as the U.S. claims it is considering, as much as 41% of Europeans would support imposing sanctions, even if it resulted in damage to Western economies.

Just as Europeans’ views of Russia hardened following its invasion of Ukraine, Zerka says the same could yet happen if Beijing were to do the same with Taiwan. But so long as it remains a distant hypothetical, the scope of that movement will be difficult to gauge. “Before the war in Ukraine, most Europeans were seeing Russia as partners, not as rivals or adversaries,” says Zerka. “But the war radically changed their perception. … It’s only when such events happen when we would really be able to see whether European perceptions and attitudes have changed or not.”

More Must-Reads From TIME

Write to Yasmeen Serhan at yasmeen.serhan@time.com.

TIME · by Yasmeen Serhan · June 7, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com