Quotes of the Day:

"Certain things catch your eye, but pursue only those that capture the heart." 

- Ancient Indian Proverb

“To be yourself in a world that is constantly trying to make you something else is the greatest accomplishment.” 

- Ralph Waldo Emerson

For if you knew our hardships! – our rough, quarters, 

Ill, bedded on our galleys, crowded gangways…

Or, on the Trojan shore (more hateful still!),

To live encamped beneath a hostile rampart, 

Drenched with a constant curse of rain from Heaven,

And dews of the field, that swarmed our clothes with vermin!” 

- Aeschylus’s Agamemnon 

1. FDD's Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker June Trends

2. Ukrainian special operators are learning to fight Russia without the 'tethers' other militaries have gotten used to

3. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 2, 2023

4. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, June 2, 2023

5. United States-Japan-Australia Trilateral Defense Ministers' Meeting (TDMM) 2023 Joint Statement

6. 'We Have No Plan': United States and United Kingdom Struggle to Combat Chinese Influence, Officials Say

7. The Nobel Prize Takes Aim Against Disinformation, Lies And Fakes

8. Private Eyes: China’s Embrace of Open-Source Military Intelligence

9. How to Use Unconventional Warfare Against the Establishment

10. These may be the world's best warships. And they're not American

11. Shall We Play a Game? The Promise (and Pitfalls) of Wargames for Policy

12. How Hong Kong is snuffing out memories of Tiananmen Square

13. U.S. Will Try to Bring China Into Arms Control Talks

14. Guam Is Officially Becoming a U.S. Fortress for Repelling Missile and Drone Attacks

15. US says talks with China key to a prevent ‘crisis or conflict’

16. US Defense Secretary spoke 'briefly' with his Chinese counterpart in Singapore

17. CIA chief Burns visited China in May

18. Ukraine’s Zelensky: We Are Ready for Counteroffensive

19. What the Future Might Hold for Asia: "Every Time China Has Been United, It Has Dominated"

20. What Engagement With China Has Meant for Me

21. A BARRIER TO LONG-TERM SUCCESS: SHORT-TERMISM

22. Fleet Tactics & Special Warfare

1. FDD's Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker June Trends

Access the Foreign Policy Tracker here.  https://www.fdd.org/policy-tracker/2023/06/02/biden-administration-foreign-policy-tracker-june/

Assessments are below.

FDD's Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker

June Trends

Read Tracker

Trend Overview

Edited by John Hardie

Welcome back to the Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker. Once a month, we ask FDD’s experts and scholars to assess the administration’s foreign policy. They provide trendlines of very positive, positive, neutral, negative, or very negative for the areas they watch.

At the G7 summit in Hiroshima, President Joe Biden announced he would support a European initiative to train Ukrainian pilots on the F-16 — something he had previously opposed, wasting valuable time. The G7 allies also sought to display unity in their approach to China, although the Biden administration continues to be plagued by internal confusion over its China policy. The summit provided an opportunity, however, for Biden to discuss trilateral security cooperation with his Japanese and South Korean counterparts.

The administration, with backing from Congress, is encouraging Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel. However, the Saudis want security guarantees from the United States, and it remains unclear whether Washington is prepared to meet Riyadh’s conditions. Meanwhile, the Biden team is still holding out hope for a diplomatic agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, even as Tehran continues to stonewall an international inquiry into its undeclared nuclear activities. Yet the White House remains unwilling to deploy sufficient pressure to make a worthwhile deal possible.

China, Russia, and other authoritarian regimes continue to abuse key international organizations, while the Biden administration’s engagement-first approach has yielded scant progress on reform. Finally, Arab normalization with Syria’s murderous Assad regime continues to gain steam with the Biden administration’s quiet approval.

Check back next month to see how the administration looks to deal with these and other challenges.

China

By Craig Singleton

Previous Trend: Negative

The Biden administration’s mixed messaging on China continued in May. At the G7 summit in Hiroshima, G7 leaders issued a communique condemning Beijing’s “malign practices.” But President Biden predicted a “thaw” in U.S.-China relations, even suggesting he is contemplating easing sanctions on China’s defense chief, General Li Shangfu, to pave the way for a resumption in high-level military-to-military engagement. The State Department later clarified Biden’s comments, insisting that the administration is not considering lifting sanctions on Li and that sanctions do not prevent Li from holding official meetings with his American counterparts. This latest gaffe is emblematic of the White House’s fractured policymaking process on China.

Meanwhile, China made clear it has no intention of reducing tensions. Beijing labeled the G7 communique a smear attack and lambasted Washington’s “arbitrary” interference in China’s “internal affairs.” Beijing has also repeatedly rebuffed White House offers to schedule a phone call between Xi Jinping and Biden. In holding diplomacy hostage, Beijing is signaling that Washington can either maintain its existing containment strategy against China or stabilize bilateral relations, but it cannot do both.

Further complicating the administration’s balancing act, state-sponsored Chinese hackers waged a massive cyberattack against communications, manufacturing, transportation, and maritime networks in the United States and Guam, home to a major U.S. military installation. Microsoft said the hackers aimed to spy on and disrupt “communications infrastructure between the US and Asia during future crises.” Failing to respond to China’s latest hack could lead Beijing to ramp up its cyber-bullying.

Cyber

By RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery and Jiwon Ma

Previous Trend: Positive

The Biden administration demonstrated its increased cybercrime investigation capacity through efforts with international allies and partners. In early May, the Department of Justice (DoJ) and foreign partners announced the arrest of 288 criminals as a result of Operation SpecTor, the largest-ever operation against darknet trafficking of fentanyl and opioids. Similarly, DoJ and the Commerce Department’s Disruptive Technology Strike Force announced five coordinated enforcement actions against individuals supporting China, Russia, and Iran in stealing information on U.S. technologies.

In addition, the Internal Revenue Service’s criminal investigative division plans to equip Ukrainian investigators with tools from Chainalysis, a blockchain analytics firm, to pursue Russian oligarchs who may be using cryptocurrency assets to evade sanctions. Likewise, the Treasury Department sanctioned North Korean state actors for malicious cyber activities that support the Kim regime.

In other news, President Biden has nominated U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Timothy Haugh to lead both U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. He will replace Gen. Paul Nakasone, who is completing a highly successful five-year tour. Meanwhile, the national cyber director (NCD) position has remained vacant since NCD Chris Inglis’ departure in February. Nevertheless, Kemba Walden ably continues the work as acting NCD. Walden announced that the administration intends to produce a national cyber workforce strategy in the coming months.

Lastly, the Department of Defense submitted a classified defense cyber strategy to Congress. The strategy, informed by lessons learned in Ukraine, defines how the department operates in cyberspace. An unclassified version is set to be released over the summer.

Defense

By Bradley Bowman

Previous Trend: Negative

More than a year after Kyiv first requested F-16 fighter jets, President Biden relented and told allies at the G7 Summit in Hiroshima, Japan, on May 19 that he would support an international coalition to train Ukrainian pilots on F-16s, paving the way for their eventual transfer to Ukraine. The administration’s delay reportedly stemmed primarily from a desire to prioritize weapons Ukraine needed most for its counteroffensive and an eagerness to avoid escalation with Russia.

In a mistake that would make any self-respecting accountant blush, “the Pentagon overestimated the value of the ammunition, missiles and other equipment it sent to Ukraine by around $3 billion,” according to a May 19 Reuters report. Pentagon officials overvalued some items sent to Ukraine by using the cost to replace them rather than their current value. The Department of Defense apparently did not tell key congressional leaders for two months after the error was discovered.

In the latest effort to expedite the Pentagon’s dangerously slow weapons development and fielding process, the Navy on May 2 established the Maritime Accelerated Response Capability Cell (MARCC). “The MARCC will initially focus on Ukraine, Taiwan, and contingency support,” according to a memo cited by Defense News. The cell will respond to urgent Department of Defense taskings and then work with Navy and Marine Corps research labs, acquisition offices, fleet warfighters, and resource sponsors to “rapidly find and field a solution.” Such efforts could help more expeditiously arm U.S. forces and beleaguered democracies confronting ongoing or potential aggression.

Europe

By John Hardie

Previous Trend: Negative

At the G7 summit in Hiroshima, President Biden and his counterparts sought to display unity against common challenges. The joint communique declared a commitment to “de-risking” economic relations with China, including by reducing critical supply chain dependencies. The leaders also pledged to counter China’s “malign practices, such as illegitimate technology transfer or data disclosure,” and criticized Beijing’s human rights abuses and “militarization” in the South China Sea. However, while some G7 allies are clear-eyed about the China threat, others, such as Germany, continue to water down allied efforts.

In a joint statement on Ukraine, the G7 leaders pledged to support Kyiv “for as long as it takes.” Biden reinforced that message during a meeting with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the summit’s margins. The administration unveiled a new $375 million military aid package for Ukraine, adding to the $1.8 billion in other security assistance pledged in May. Biden also dropped his earlier objections to providing Kyiv with F-16 fighter jets (covered further in the Russia section).

In concert with its G7 allies, Washington unveiled new sanctions against Russia, focused chiefly on thwarting circumvention of Western restrictions targeting Moscow’s defense industrial base. The G7 leaders also welcomed Zelenskyy’s “Peace Formula,” declaring that “a just peace cannot be realized without the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops and military equipment, and this must be included in any call for peace.” They used the summit as an opportunity for outreach to Russia-friendly Global South countries, such as India and Brazil, which attended as observers.

Gulf

By Hussain Abdul-Hussain

Previous Trend: Negative

The Biden administration showed urgency in pursuing normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Signaling bipartisan support for that policy, 28 members of Congress sponsored legislation to create a special envoy position tasked with “expanding and strengthening the Abraham Accords.” Secretary of State Antony Blinken is reportedly considering former U.S. Ambassador to Israel Dan Shapiro for that position. Blinken had reportedly weighed whether to create such a position during the Biden administration’s first few months in office but ultimately decided against it.

During a May 8 trip to Riyadh, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan discussed normalization with Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS). The Saudi ruler reportedly told his guest that he does not want to take any more incremental steps toward normalization. Instead, MBS seeks a big package that will include deliverables from Washington, including stronger U.S.-Saudi military cooperation.

The Saudis have previously outlined several conditions for normalization with Israel. Riyadh wants a written agreement defining the U.S.-Saudi strategic partnership and American security guarantees for Riyadh. In addition, the Saudis seek a guarantee of reliable American arms sales to the kingdom. They also want a U.S.-Saudi agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation that does not require Riyadh to forgo enrichment of uranium.

Although MBS reportedly favors a grand bargain, news reports suggest Riyadh and Jerusalem are nearing a U.S.-brokered deal to allow Arab Israelis to board direct flights to Saudi Arabia for the annual Islamic pilgrimage in Mecca.

Indo-Pacific

By Craig Singleton

Previous Trend: Positive

With the debt ceiling crisis unfolding in Washington, President Biden was forced to cancel a much-anticipated trip to Papua New Guinea (PNG) this month. Secretary of State Antony Blinken traveled to Port Moresby in his place. The two sides formalized several bilateral agreements, including one aimed at increasing surveillance of PNG’s exclusive economic zone to deter illegal Chinese fishing. The administration has devoted significant attention towards improving America’s posture in the Pacific Islands region, opening several new embassies and ramping up aid to countries hard hit by the pandemic. Still, Biden’s absence risks reinforcing concerns that Washington is falling back into old habits of neglecting the region.

Meanwhile, Beijing wasted little time capitalizing on Biden’s scuttled trip. China’s state-owned Global Times argued Biden’s cancelation “erodes U.S. credibility,” underscoring that “when its domestic issues override its political agenda,” Washington “easily turns back on its commitments.” This specious framing is consistent with China’s broader efforts to alter global perceptions about democracy in a bid to portray Washington as unreliable. To repair the damage, Biden should consider scheduling a follow-on trip to the region or, at a minimum, hosting Pacific Island leaders at the White House for a high-level summit.

In positive news, the United States and Taiwan agreed to the first stage of a bilateral trade initiative. The proposal covers trade facilitation, regulatory practices, and anti-corruption, while deferring action on more contentious issues surrounding tariffs, agriculture, and digital trade. The proposal falls well short of a formal free trade deal. But if enacted, it would enhance Taiwan’s international standing and could lead other nations to enter into their own trade pacts with Taipei.

International Organizations

By Richard Goldberg

Previous Trend: Negative

For the third year in a row, the Biden administration failed to win observer status for Taiwan at the World Health Assembly, the annual gathering of the World Health Organization (WHO). Meanwhile, the administration took no action to suspend Russia’s voting rights or membership on the WHO’s executive board. The assembly did, however, follow past practice of castigating Israel in a dedicated agenda item.

All of this deals a major blow to the Biden administration’s core UN strategy, which posits that Washington can achieve reform of flawed international organizations through active engagement rather than by conditioning U.S. funding or participation on reforms. Indeed, on his first day in office, President Biden restored U.S. funding for and participation in the WHO without first winning any concessions from the agency. Biden later backed its director-general’s bid for re-election, again without demanding reforms.

The administration has suffered similar failures at the UN Human Rights Council, which Biden rejoined after taking office. In mid-May, the council’s president announced that Iran had been appointed to chair the council’s Social Forum. While the U.S. ambassador to the council blasted the appointment, her statement also exposed a U.S. inability to achieve systemic reform within the organization.

In better news, the Biden administration boycotted the UN’s antisemitic “Nakba Day,” which commemorates the supposed “catastrophe” of the Jewish State of Israel’s establishment in 1948. Moreover, the administration blocked the UN Security Council from issuing a China-proposed joint statement condemning Israel for conducting precision strikes against the leaders of the Iran-directed Islamic Jihad terrorist organization in Gaza.

Iran

By Behnam Ben Taleblu and Rich Goldberg

Previous Trend: Very Negative

In their communique from the G7 summit in Hiroshima, President Biden and his counterparts expressed concern over “Iran’s unabated nuclear” escalation, which earlier this year included enrichment of uranium to near weapons-grade purity. But the statement contained no references to economic, political, or military consequences for Iran’s nuclear conduct. The communique remained silent on whether to snap back UN sanctions on the Islamic Republic. Nor did it declare Tehran to be in non-compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or express readiness to take military action to deny Iran a nuclear weapon. Instead, the G7 leaders reiterated their preference for diplomacy, calling the fatally flawed 2015 nuclear deal “a useful reference.”

The Biden administration did, however, offer a show of force in response to Tehran’s continued threats to civilian maritime traffic, including its May 3 seizure of another oil tanker. The U.S. military stepped up naval and air patrols in and around the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman. Separately, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that current U.S. policy recognizes “Israel’s freedom of action” to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

In other news, U.S. officials danced around questions as to whether the administration has lobbied the United Kingdom against proscribing Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization. And while the European Union imposed its eighth round of human rights sanctions against Tehran over its ongoing repression of peaceful protests in Iran, the United States did not impose similar sanctions or take other steps in May in support of the protest movement.

Israel

By David May

Previous Trend: Neutral

After the Iran-backed Palestinian terror group Islamic Jihad launched more than 100 rockets at Israel in early May, Jerusalem responded with targeted strikes against the organization’s leadership and military infrastructure. The Biden administration reassured Israel of its continued support, worked to implement a ceasefire, and blocked a UN Security Council statement condemning Israel.

Meanwhile, the Biden administration has expressed support for a normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Top Israeli officials visited Washington this week to discuss this expansion of the Abraham Accords and the threat posed by Iran.

But the administration also rebuked Israel multiple times. On May 19, the State Department criticized anti-Palestinian slogans chanted by some Israelis during marches celebrating Jerusalem Day, which commemorates the reunification of Jerusalem. Days later, Foggy Bottom condemned an Israeli minister’s “provocative visit” to the Temple Mount, Judaism’s most revered location and a site of frequent Palestinian unrest. The administration also announced that it was “deeply troubled” by an Israeli decision to allow its citizens to return to an outpost in the northern West Bank.

On May 25, the Biden administration released its plan on combatting antisemitism. The plan embraced the widely accepted International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition of antisemitism, which outlines how criticism of Israel can venture into antisemitism. At the same time, the plan gave a nod to a competing definition that declares that holding Israel to a double standard is not inherently antisemitic. Despite the controversy, many mainstream Jewish organizations expressed support for the administration’s serious commitment to combatting antisemitism.

Korea

By David Maxwell

Previous Trend: Positive

North Korea did not conduct any missile tests or other provocations for six weeks, from April 13 to late May. But on May 31 (Korea time), it launched a space vehicle, purportedly to place a reconnaissance satellite in orbit. The launch violated UN Security Council resolutions. However, the launch failed.

The United States, South Korea, and Japan made progress on trilateral security cooperation at the G7 meeting in Hiroshima, which Seoul attended as an observer. President Biden held a joint meeting with ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, during which they discussed deepening trilateral cooperation. Yoon and Kishida also met separately on the summit’s sidelines. This followed Kishida’s positive visit to Seoul earlier in May.

Meanwhile, South Korea and the United States have begun work on implementing the Washington Declaration on extended deterrence. ROK and U.S. forces held their largest-ever live-fire combined military exercises on May 25 and will continue to do so four times per year to demonstrate strength and readiness.

On May 23, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned four entities and one individual connected to Pyongyang’s malicious cyber activities and illicit revenue from overseas IT workers. South Korea issued a similar set of sanctions designations. Washington and Seoul continued to coordinate on cyber defense.

Julie Turner, Biden’s nominee to be the U.S. special envoy for North Korean human rights, laid out her top five priorities during her Senate confirmation hearing on May 17. This position has been vacant since 2017. Turner’s confirmation will allow the United States to implement a human rights-upfront approach in coordination with South Korea.

Latin America

By Carrie Filipetti and Emanuele Ottolenghi

Previous Trend: Negative

The Biden administration’s Latin America policy pays ample attention to issues such as migration and human rights. But the administration is failing to aggressively confront the influence of America’s enemies in the region.

Under Secretary of State Uzra Zeya visited Colombia and Guatemala in late May to discuss migration, countering narcotics trafficking, and civilian security. Brian Nichols, assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs, visited Brazil to open a new U.S. embassy building and advance a joint bilateral agenda to fight ethnic and racial discrimination. Finally, U.S. Southern Command chief General Laura Richardson visited Colombia and Brazil to discuss bilateral defense cooperation and speak at a conference on the role of women in peace and security. However, China, Russia, Iran, and transnational crime remained on the backburner.

The administration’s shift away from confronting malign actors head-on is evident with Venezuela. The May 19 departure of Ambassador James Story as the State Department’s top Venezuela hand likely signals the end of Washington’s “maximum pressure” policy toward Venezuela. It remains to be seen whether Francisco “Paco” Palmieri, a longtime Latin America hand at the State Department, will fight to continue his predecessor’s policies or move toward appeasement.

Finally, the White House nominated Ambassador Dennis B. Hankins, a career diplomat who previously served in Sudan and Congo, among other places, to be the U.S. ambassador to Haiti. The ambassador position has been open since 2021. Hankins’ nomination signals the Biden administration is finally ready to start taking the escalating violence and humanitarian crisis in Haiti seriously.

Lebanon

By Tony Badran

Previous Trend: Very Negative

The Biden administration’s nominee to be the next ambassador to Lebanon, Lisa Johnson, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 16. Unsurprisingly, Johnson voiced her support for the administration’s failed policies in Lebanon, including aid for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF) as a supposed counterweight to Hezbollah. “If confirmed, I would continue to advocate for very strong, robust security assistance” for the LAF and ISF, Johnson told the Committee. “They’re doing a great job of bolstering stability and security in this part of the world.”

To accept Johnson’s definition of stability and security, one must ignore Hezbollah. Case in point: Days after Johnson’s testimony, Hezbollah conducted a large military exercise in southern Lebanon, inviting local and international media outlets to flaunt its dominance and its readiness to wage war. But despite the LAF’s fecklessness, the Biden administration has divorced its provision of taxpayer-funded aid from any expectation of concrete action against Hezbollah.

For its part, the ISF conducts counterintelligence for Hezbollah. Moreover, in her testimony, Johnson would not rule out dealing with Lebanese government ministries controlled by Hezbollah or its allies, answering only that it “complicates our diplomacy.” In reality, the Biden administration routinely engages with Hezbollah cutouts, both in the government and in the security sector.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Embassy in Beirut celebrated the construction of a new 43-acre compound that will cost American taxpayers $1 billion. Washington has seen fit to construct its second-largest diplomatic outpost in the world in a pseudo-state run by an Iranian-backed, U.S.-designated terrorist group.

Nonproliferation and Biodefense

By Anthony Ruggiero and Andrea Stricker

Previous Trend: Very Negative

Washington and its allies have not yet held Russia accountable for its use of chemical weapons by suspending Moscow’s voting rights and privileges at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), as they did with Syria in 2021. From May 15 to 19, the OPCW held a conference to review the Chemical Weapons Convention, which Russia continues to violate. Moscow and its bloc ultimately blocked consensus on adopting the review conference’s final report. Russia may have also joined Turkey, as well as China or Iran, to block FDD experts from attending.

Iran has made little to no progress in resolving an over four-year-old International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inquiry into Tehran’s undeclared nuclear activities. Nor has Iran made significant progress toward reinstalling surveillance cameras at nuclear sites. The regime also has yet to turn over to the agency key video recordings and monitoring information. Washington and its allies have a chance to hold Iran to account at the IAEA’s upcoming Board of Governors meeting, which starts on June 5.

Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant was disconnected from the national electricity grid for the seventh time since Russia invaded last year. When this occurs, the reactors must rely on emergency diesel generators for cooling and to maintain nuclear safety functions, risking a radiological disaster. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi has urged both sides to declare a demilitarized zone around the reactor complex.

Russia

By John Hardie

Previous Trend: Negative

President Biden told his G7 counterparts that he would support a transatlantic effort to train Ukrainian pilots on fourth-generation fighter aircraft, including American-made F-16s. The Biden team had previously resisted Kyiv’s monthslong campaign for U.S.-made fighter jets, insisting it wanted to focus on Ukraine’s more pressing needs. The administration reportedly even blocked European allies from using their own F-16s to train Ukrainian pilots. Biden’s reversal came amid mounting congressional and international pressure, including from a growing number of European nations that supported the initiative. In the weeks before the G7 summit, the administration reportedly signaled it would not stop European allies from re-exporting F-16s to Ukraine.

U.S. personnel will participate in the training, which will take place in Europe. A senior administration official said the training “will require months to complete” and will hopefully begin “in the comings weeks.” It remains unclear which countries will provide the aircraft and how many Ukraine will receive. It is also unclear how the Western coalition plans to maintain the aircraft. Training Ukrainian maintenance personnel will likely take even longer than training the pilots.

Ukraine’s new aircraft are not likely to be a game-changer against Russia. Kyiv will likely receive older versions of the F-16 and AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile. Russian fighter aircraft will continue to enjoy an advantage in the air, and Ukrainian pilots will still face potent threats from Russia’s ground-based air defenses. But the new aircraft will help Kyiv offset attrition within its Soviet-made fighter fleet, provide some additional capability, and further Ukrainian integration with NATO.

Sunni Jihadism

By Bill Roggio

Previous Trend: Negative

The U.S. military continues to target Islamic State leaders and networks in Iraq and Syria. U.S. Central Command reported that, in April, American and local partner forces conducted 25 operations in Iraq, killing nine ISIS operatives and detaining seven more. U.S. and partner forces conducted another 11 operations in Syria that killed four ISIS operatives and detained 21 more. Three of the ISIS operatives killed in Syria were senior leaders, and two of them were involved in terror plots in Europe and the Middle East.

However, the U.S. military is retracting its earlier claim that it killed a senior al-Qaeda leader in a strike in Syria. The military believes it may have killed a low-level al-Qaeda operative, but local Syrians claim a civilian was killed in the strike.

In Somalia, al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s branch in East Africa, overran a Ugandan military base outside of the capital of Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab forces killed scores of Ugandan troops while seizing military hardware. The U.S. military continues to target the group. U.S. Africa Command launched two counterterrorism strikes, one of which targeted al-Shabaab fighters after they seized military equipment during the raid on the Ugandan base.

The Taliban yet again claimed it would not allow foreign terrorist groups to use Afghanistan as a base of operations. This time, the Taliban promised China that it would reign in the Turkistan Islamic Party, an affiliate of al-Qaeda. The Taliban has made this claim many times in the past, including before the 9/11 attacks.

Syria

By David Adesnik

Previous Trend: Negative

The Arab League welcomed Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad back with open arms at its May 19 summit in Riyadh, 12 years after suspending his regime for its atrocities. The Biden administration claimed to oppose Assad’s rehabilitation, consistent with its pose as a defender of the Syrian people, while quietly encouraging Arab governments to negotiate the terms of reengagement with Damascus. The White House told reporters it is committed to upholding the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019, which prescribes tough sanctions on those doing business with the Assad regime. In practice, the administration has barely enforced the Caesar Act, leading top lawmakers from both parties to warn of their disappointment. With such concerns likely in mind, the administration imposed Caesar Act sanctions at the end of May on two Syrian currency exchanges and three exchange proprietors.

On May 16, the House Foreign Affairs Committee pressed Biden for a much firmer line on Syria by approving the Assad Regime Anti-Normalization Act. The bill would expand the range of targets subject to Caesar sanctions and create a process to accelerate their designation. It also clarifies that all energy-related transactions with the Assad regime are subject to sanctions. That provision targets a pair of regional energy deals that the Biden administration has supported, claiming they are exempt from sanctions even though they would enrich the Assad regime. In addition, the act directs the president to sanction those in Syria responsible for the theft of humanitarian assistance, while requiring annual reports on the Assad regime’s manipulation of UN agencies.

Turkey

By Sinan Ciddi

Previous Trend: Positive

President Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken congratulated President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on his re-election as Turkey’s president on May 28. The administration is now eyeing when Ankara will push forward with ratifying Sweden’s NATO accession bid. Erdogan has been holding up Sweden’s membership since 2022, citing Stockholm’s alleged support for the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), a militant Kurdish separatist organization. In reality, Erdogan delayed Sweden’s accession so he could use it as a campaign issue, rousing his voter base by accusing Stockholm of supporting the PKK. Now that the election is over, Erdogan is expected to ratify Swedish accession.

In return, Ankara wants Washington to approve its request to buy F-16 fighter jets. But while the Biden administration supports the sale, key members of Congress have threatened to block it. Congressman Michael McCaul (R-TX), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, recently signaled that he may be in favor of approving the F-16 sale, provided that he “see[s] some action from Turkey” on Sweden’s NATO membership bid. But for the sale to go forward, Senator Bob Menendez (D-NJ), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, would also have to consent. Whether Menendez will do so remains unclear, as he has a longer list of grievances against Ankara, including Turkey’s belligerent stance towards another NATO ally, Greece.

The analyses above do not necessarily represent the institutional views of FDD.

2. Ukrainian special operators are learning to fight Russia without the 'tethers' other militaries have gotten used to

Ukrainian special operators are learning to fight Russia without the 'tethers' other militaries have gotten used to

Business Insider · by Stavros Atlamazoglou

A Ukrainian artillery unit fires toward Russian positions on the outskirts of Bakhmut in December.SAMEER AL-DOUMY/AFP via Getty Images

• Ukraine's military has grappled with logistical challenges throughout the war with Russia.
• Ukrainian special operators in particular have been learning to fight without those "tethers."
• The US military is also preparing for a future where opponents can challenge its logistics network.

Ukrainian special-operations units have played an important part in their country's defense against Russia over the past 15 months.

But operating against an adversary that is larger and, in many cases, better-equipped has required Ukrainian special operators to learn to fight without the logistical "tethers" that many militaries, including the US and its allies, have gotten used to over the past several decades of warfare.

Many Ukrainian leaders were skeptical that Russia's military would invade, even after months of buildup along Ukraine's borders. When Russia launched its attack early on February 24, 2022, Ukraine's government was caught off guard — but the Ukrainian military wasn't.

Ukraine's armed forces had been preparing for another war ever since Russia seized Crimea and stoked a separatist movement in the western Donbas region in 2014. Since then, Ukraine has waged a deadly low-intensity conflict against pro-Russia fighters and their Russian advisers in the Donbas.

Ukrainian troops carry rocket-propelled grenades and sniper rifles toward the city of Irpin in March 2022.Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP via Getty Images

Eight years of warfare taught the Ukrainians that a major Russian invasion would put extreme pressure on their logistics and that resupply of frontline units would be difficult, so the training provided by the US and other NATO countries has focused on the basics.

A well-trained force that excels in small-unit tactics and other basic military skills has an advantage over a larger but poorly trained adversary.

Ukrainian special operators knew from the beginning that they would be operating against a bigger adversary, and they tailored their tactics and training to meet that challenge.

What that means on the ground is that Ukrainian commandos have been ensuring that they have good intelligence and fire superiority — even if it is temporary — when conducting an operation. Even if the Russians have numerical superiority, a well-planned raid based on timely intelligence conducted by a well-trained force will likely succeed.

Fighting without tethers

Ukrainian soldiers unload ammunition near Bakhmut in April.Diego Herrera Carcedo/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images

Ensuring smooth logistics in a large conventional war isn't easy. Even the US military has acknowledged that in a fight with China, it would face logistical difficulties and have limited ability to resupply its forces.

Fortunately for Ukrainian special operators, their supply lines are short — they are fighting on their home turf, after all. As a result, the Ukrainians are able to resupply their units much easier than the Russians, whose resupply efforts have been made more difficult by Ukraine's deadly accurate long-range missile and artillery strikes.

Moreover, Russia lacks air superiority or consistent long-range precision fires, which are needed to attack Ukrainian logistical nodes reliably. A cruise missile or Shahed-136 drone might get through and hit a railway line or ammunition depot, but Ukrainian air-defense systems have been highly effective against Russian aerial wave attacks.

That doesn't mean the Ukrainians have it easy. "The main thing you hear on the front lines is the Ukrainian military, like any large force in a big war, has internal distribution problems," Michael Kofman, an expert on the Russian military at CNA, said on a podcast in early March, shortly after returning from a research trip to Ukraine.

A Ukrainian special-forces soldier during an exercise in the Donetsk region in April.GENYA SAVILOV/AFP via Getty Images

While considerable amounts of Western aid is going to Ukraine, getting that aid to the frontline is complicated and the distribution is often uneven.

"Things enter Ukraine, but then all Ukrainian units have to find their way to getting those things, and there's a lot of challenges in that," Kofman said. "Anyone's who ever seen a military operation — the best military operation, with US logistics — will see those issues where one unit has one thing, another one doesn't."

Insider understands that the Ukrainian special operators often resort to unconventional methods to overcome logistics challenges on the ground. For example, the use of non-military vehicles is standard procedure. Ukrainian commandos also use drones to resupply frontline units, though those drones can only carry limited amounts of ammunition and supplies and Russian defenses often mean those drones don't last long.

Russia's military also has potent electronic-warfare capabilities to intercept or jam communications. So Ukrainian special operators have been using a variety of methods to exchange information, including satellite phones and encrypted messaging apps like Signal, reflecting Ukrainian troops' ability to integrate new technology. (Less secure methods, like WhatsApp, are also in use, however.)

A Ukrainian special-forces soldier, right, fires a Malyuk rifle during an exercise in the Donetsk region in April 6GENYA SAVILOV/AFP via Getty Images

By the nature of their mission, special-operations forces are mobile and don't linger in one place. Commandos wouldn't be responsible for taking and holding a strategically important target, like a town. Rather, they would gather intelligence or possibly spearhead an attack but eventually turn it over to a conventional unit.

On the other hand, the fact that special-operations units usually operate more independently and sometimes take on larger forces means they need more firepower, which translates into greater resupply demands.

Insider also understands that Ukrainian special operators have nothing to envy about their Russian adversaries. Months of Western military assistance means that Ukrainian special operators are equipped with the latest gadgets, including top-tier night vision, thermal optics, and small arms.

As the war drags on and the Ukrainian forces advance, Ukrainian special operators will continue to face logistical difficulties. However, their training, familiarity with the battlefield, and adherence to basic special-operations "truths" will see them through.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate. He is working toward a master's degree in strategy and cybersecurity at Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies.

Business Insider · by Stavros Atlamazoglou

3. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 2, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-2-2023

Key Takeaways

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to respond disproportionately to limited raids into Russian territory, likely to project confidence and competence in the MoD’s ability to respond to perceived threats.
• Select Russian milbloggers continue to use the situation in Belgorod Oblast to criticize Russian leadership while others downplayed the recent raids.
• Russian forces conducted another series of strikes against Ukraine using cruise missiles and Iranian-made drones on the night of June 1-2.
• Head of the Russian Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff Colonel General Yevgeny Burdinsky announced that the Russian military will form two new military districts and other new formations by the end of 2023. Budinsky's statements likely aim to reintroduce and reamplify Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s standing proposals to significantly expand the Russian military.
• Russian sources appear to be reorienting the debate about the attribution of responsibility for small-scale tactical gains in the Bakhmut area to an ongoing offensive operation to capture Marinka, a small, almost leveled settlement where Russian sources have struggled to advance since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. These discussions about responsibility coincide with the reported arrival of Chechen forces to assume responsibility of the Donetsk front and complete the capture of Marinka and other settlements in the area.
• US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on June 2 that calls for a ceasefire are unacceptable because they will freeze the current lines in place and enable Putin to consolidate control of occupied areas and prepare for future attacks on Ukraine.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Kreminna directions.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks in Marinka.
• A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces made territorial gains during limited counterattacks in western Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukraine struck the port area in occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast, with Storm Shadow missiles.
• Ukrainian sources continue to report that Russian cadets from higher military academies are deploying to areas near the Ukrainian border within Russia.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to forcibly transport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of medical rehabilitation schemes.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 2, 2023

Jun 2, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 2, 2023

Layne Philipson, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, and Fredrick W. Kagan

June 2, 2023, 6pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1pm ET on June 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to respond disproportionately to limited raids into Russian territory, likely to project confidence and competence in the MoD’s ability to respond to perceived threats. The Russian MoD issued a second update about the June 1 Shebekino, Belgorod Oblast border raid, largely fixating on the timeliness and scope of the Russian response to the raid.[1] The MoD claimed that additional Russian Western Military District (WMD) elements reinforced the border area within an hour of the start of the raid and conducted heavy air, artillery, and flamethrower strikes against the raiding units and their reserves. The MoD claimed that over 135 people and 35 vehicles in total conducted the raids and that various Russian defensive efforts - including small arms fire and mines - repelled the raids. The MoD later celebrated the commander of an unspecified motorized rifle battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Nikitin, for leading the defensive effort, likely to preempt attempts to attribute the “victory” achieved by Belgorod border defense on Russian Colonel General Alexander Lapin as the information space did during the May 23 raid.[2] The Russian MoD’s fixation on portraying Russian forces and the Russian military command as capable defenders of Russia likely reflects internal and broader information space anxiety over the coming Ukrainian counteroffensive as well as any reverberating informational impacts from any failures to defend against Ukrainian counterattacks.

Select Russian milbloggers continue to use the situation in Belgorod Oblast to criticize Russian leadership while others downplayed the recent raids. A Wagner-affiliated milblogger stated that the Russian MoD is not treating Belgorod Oblast like Russian territory and claimed that it is only adding to the list of settlements affected by Ukrainian shelling.[3] A milblogger called on Russian forces to destroy increasingly well-equipped Ukrainian forces at their deployment points along the border and not to lie in their reports about the situation in the area.[4] Some milbloggers stated that Russian forces have responded well to the raids, which they claim are merely “terrorist attacks” aimed at creating a psychological impact as opposed to securing concrete territorial goals.[5] A prominent Russian milblogger absurdly claimed that Ukrainian forces have concluded that it is too risky to start the counteroffensive now after observing Russia’s responses to recent probing efforts.[6] The raids, any Ukrainian probing efforts, and Russian responses in the past few weeks have all been on an extremely small scale compared with the announced forces Ukraine is reportedly preparing for the counter-offensive. The Russian hyperfocus on minor tactical engagements highlights Russian nervousness and insecurity about the forthcoming counteroffensive.

Russian forces conducted another series of strikes against Ukraine using cruise missiles and Iranian-made drones on the night of June 1-2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 15 Kh-101/555 missiles at Kyiv City from Tu-95 aircraft over the Caspian Sea and that Ukrainian air defense destroyed all 15 missiles.[7] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces shot down all 21 Shahed 131/136 drones that Russian forces launched at Kyiv from southern Ukraine.[8] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russian forces are attempting to attack in atypical patterns and at unexpected times to deceive Ukrainian air defense, but that newly supplied air defense systems nonetheless allow Ukrainian forces to shoot down all Russian missiles flying along a ballistic trajectory.[9] Ukrainian Southern Forces Joint Press Center Head Nataliya Humenyuk stated on June 2 that Ukrainian air defenses shot down a Russian drone over Mykolaiv Oblast during the June 1 to 2 overnight strikes.[10]

Head of the Russian Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff Colonel General Yevgeny Burdinsky announced that the Russian military will form two new military districts and other new formations by the end of 2023. The Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD’s) “Military Commissariats of Russia” journal published an article by Burdinsky in its June 2023 edition in which he stated that it is necessary for Russian forces to create the Moscow and Leningrad military districts and organize and staff new combined arms and air armies, army corps, the Azov naval regional formation, five divisions, and 26 brigades in 2023.[11] Burdinsky emphasized that the main organizational task for the MoD remains contract service recruitment and the implementation of conscription, however.[12] Burdinsky did not expound upon how the Russian military plans to generate the necessary personnel and equipment required to form these new formations and it is unclear if Burdinsky’s statements were meant to represent a formal MoD deadline for the creation of the new formations.

Budinsky's statements likely aim to reintroduce and reamplify Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s standing proposals to significantly expand the Russian military. Shoigu delivered a series of public proposals at the MoD’s Collegium on December 21, 2022 aimed at significantly increasing the size of the Russian military which included the reestablishment of the Moscow and Leningrad military districts as well as the formation of a new army corps.[13] Shoigu proposed that the Russian Armed Forces increase its strength to 1.5 million servicemen, including 695,000 contract servicemen, but did not specify a timeline for any of his proposals.[14] Shoigu also proposed an increase in the age of conscription, a measure that Russian officials have decided to implement in a phased manner over the course of three years instead of by the end of the year.[15] The creation of two military districts and these formations is a significant undertaking, and the Russian MoD’s current force generation efforts do not signal that the MoD intends to generate the necessary number of personnel to fulfill these tasks by the end of 2023.

Both a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger and Igor Girkin, an ardent nationalist milblogger who is increasingly critical of the Kremlin, questioned where the MoD plans to acquire the personnel and equipment from to create these new formations. [16] Girkin stated that 26 brigades would require 80,000 personnel, a figure roughly correct if brigades were formed at full staff with 3,000 personnel per brigade.[17] Girkin added that five divisions would require another 40,000 personnel and argued that the MoD would have to conduct another mobilization wave to generate the roughly 120,000 required personnel.[18] ISW has previously assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin is likely hesitant to launch another mobilization wave and that the MoD’s current hybrid force generation effort of contract service recruitment and crypto mobilization is aimed at avoiding such a mobilization wave.[19] The Russian MoD is highly unlikely to institute any of Shoigu's long-term force restructuring and expansion proposals by the end of 2023 with the possible exception of re-establishing the Moscow and Leningrad military districts.

Russian sources appear to be reorienting the debate about the attribution of responsibility for small-scale tactical gains in the Bakhmut area to an ongoing offensive operation to capture Marinka, a small, almost leveled settlement where Russian forces have struggled to advance since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. A prominent Russian milblogger stated that there are disputes within the Russian information space over who took more control of Marinka even though Russian forces have not yet fully captured the settlement.[20] A Wagner-affiliated milblogger claimed the elements of the 150th and 20th  Motorized Rifle Divisions (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) and the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) are primarily responsible for the gains around Marinka.[21] The milblogger claimed that the DNR‘s 100th Brigade, Sparta Battalion, and the ”Kaskad” and ”Rusich” Operational Tactical Combat Formations deserve responsibility for gains around Marinka as well.[22]

These discussions about responsibility coincide with the reported arrival of Chechen forces to assume responsibility of the Donetsk front and complete the capture of Marinka and other settlements in the area.[23] These discussions are likely aimed at undermining Kadyrov’s ability to use any subsequent tactical gains to elevate his standing and reintroduce his paramilitary forces as a main irregular offensive force following the culmination of Wagner forces and their withdrawal from the frontlines.[24] Many irregular formations, primarily DNR forces, have served on the Donetsk front and may be resentful of Kadyrov’s attempt to assume responsibility for any success following months of attritional offensives.[25] This discussion around Marinka also coincides with a concerted attack from Chechen commanders against Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, which has generated debates between Chechen and Wagner commanders about which forces have been more successful fighting in Ukraine.[26] Prigozhin routinely emphasized Wagner’s responsibility for tactical gains around Bakhmut throughout the offensive to capture the city to advocate for more supplies for Wagner and increased influence.[27] Other irregular forces may be trying to replicate this informational campaign in Marinka and elsewhere in Ukraine and are likely competing amongst each other for envisioned favor from the Kremlin. The capture of Bakhmut, despite offering no operational advantages, did allow the Kremlin to present a Russian victory, if only temporarily, to the Russian public. The capture of Marinka, a settlement with a pre-war population of 10,000 people and with no tactical or operational significance, would likely present marginal informational benefit to the Kremlin at most. Russian forces have advanced less than 2km from 2014-controlled territory around Marinka since the start of the full-scale invasion, suggesting that this entire conversation is premature.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on June 2 that calls for a ceasefire are unacceptable because they will freeze the current lines in place and enable Putin to consolidate control of occupied areas and prepare for future attacks on Ukraine.[28] Blinken noted that the war is a strategic failure for Russia and Russia is worse off militarily, economically, and geopolitically than before the start of its full-scale invasion – all contrary to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s broader strategic aims. Blinken noted that the war undermined many of Putin’s broader goals, including to divide NATO, foster a partnership with China, and strengthen the Russian military. Blinken stated that Russian forces in Ukraine suffered 100,000 killed and wounded “in a meat grinder of its own making” just within the past six months. Blinken stated that Putin believes he can outlast Ukraine and its supporters but reiterated that NATO remains committed to supporting Ukraine, as “Ukraine will never be Russia.”

Key Takeaways

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to respond disproportionately to limited raids into Russian territory, likely to project confidence and competence in the MoD’s ability to respond to perceived threats.
• Select Russian milbloggers continue to use the situation in Belgorod Oblast to criticize Russian leadership while others downplayed the recent raids.
• Russian forces conducted another series of strikes against Ukraine using cruise missiles and Iranian-made drones on the night of June 1-2.
• Head of the Russian Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff Colonel General Yevgeny Burdinsky announced that the Russian military will form two new military districts and other new formations by the end of 2023. Budinsky's statements likely aim to reintroduce and reamplify Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s standing proposals to significantly expand the Russian military.
• Russian sources appear to be reorienting the debate about the attribution of responsibility for small-scale tactical gains in the Bakhmut area to an ongoing offensive operation to capture Marinka, a small, almost leveled settlement where Russian sources have struggled to advance since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. These discussions about responsibility coincide with the reported arrival of Chechen forces to assume responsibility of the Donetsk front and complete the capture of Marinka and other settlements in the area.
• US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on June 2 that calls for a ceasefire are unacceptable because they will freeze the current lines in place and enable Putin to consolidate control of occupied areas and prepare for future attacks on Ukraine.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Kreminna directions.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks in Marinka.
• A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces made territorial gains during limited counterattacks in western Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukraine struck the port area in occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast, with Storm Shadow missiles.
• Ukrainian sources continue to report that Russian cadets from higher military academies are deploying to areas near the Ukrainian border within Russia.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to forcibly transport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of medical rehabilitation schemes.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted ground attacks in the Kupyansk direction on June 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Novoselivkse (30km southeast of Kupyansk), west of Masyutivka (12km northeast of Kupyansk), and near Kuzemivka (30km southeast of Kupyansk).[29] Ukraine’s Eastern Group of Forces spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty noted that Russian forces intensified combat operations along the entire Kharkiv-Luhansk frontline, particularly in the Kupyansk direction.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that fierce fighting occurred near Masyutivka and Dvorichna (17km northeast of Kupyansk) and that Russian forces crossed the Oskil River near Dvorichna.[31] A Russian milblogger posted footage reportedly showing elements of the 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District) striking Ukrainian positions near Kyslivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk).[32] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces fired TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems at Ukrainian positions in the 1st Guard Tank Army’s area of operation near Kupyansk.[33]

Russian forces continued ground attacks around Kreminna on June 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Makiivka (22km northwest of Kremmina), Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna), and Spirne (24km south of Kreminna).[34] The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian Central Group of Forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack in the Serebrianske forest area (about 10km southwest of Kreminna), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian troops advanced in this area.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click here to read ISW’s retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.

There were no reported combat engagements in the Bakhmut direction on June 2. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that no combat engagements occurred in the Bakhmut direction in the past day.[36] Cherevaty reported that the Russian forces relieving Wagner forces in Bakhmut do not want to engage in the same attritional fighting as Wagner forces previously did. The Ukrainian General Staff did not report any ground attacks in or around Bakhmut.[37] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian forces only advanced 29km during the entire battle for Bakhmut, which works out, the UK MoD noted, to 48 centimeters of ground territory for each of the 60,000 personnel killed or wounded near Bakhmut since May 2022.[38]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks near Avdiivka and prioritized the Marinka direction (directly southwest of Donetsk City) on June 2. Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces made incremental advances in northwestern Marinka as of June 1.[39] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled eight Russian ground attacks near Marinka.[40] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed on June 1 that Akhmat special forces arrived in Marinka on May 30 and that Russian forces have captured 70 percent of the town.[41] The Russian MoD claimed on June 2 that Akhmat forces are conducting assault operations in Marinka.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that a meeting engagement (encounter battle) occurred near Opytne (3km southwest of Avdiivka).[43] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled a reconnaissance-in-force attempt in the Avdiivka direction.[44]

A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces made territorial gains during limited counterattacks in western Donetsk Oblast on June 2. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made territorial gains after attacking near Volodymyrivka (11km southeast of Vuhledar on the T0509 Pavlivka-Volnovakha-Mariupol highway).[45] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian positions near Pavlivka (3km southwest of Vuhledar) and Vodyane (6km northeast of Vuhledar).[46] Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed or claimed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast.[47] 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian sources claimed that Ukraine struck the port area in occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast, with Storm Shadow missiles on June 2. Geolocated footage posted on June 2 shows smoke plumes and explosions following a strike near the Berdyansk port area.[48] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukraine may have used British-provided Storm Shadows for the strike.[49] Ukrainian officials have not confirmed a strike on Berdyansk as of the time of this publication.

Russian forces continued routine artillery and air strikes throughout southern Ukraine on June 2.[50] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces shelled frontline territories on the southern axis 77 times with 365 shells and launched 5 KAB aerial bombs at Kozatske and Beryslav, Kherson Oblast.[51]

Ukrainian sources warned that Russian forces may be preparing a provocation at the Armyansk Chemical Plant in occupied Crimea. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on June 2 that Russian forces are bringing unspecified chemicals to the territory of the Crimean “Titan” Plant, risking setting off an explosion that will release various toxic substances into the air.[52]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Ukrainian sources continue to report that Russian cadets from higher military academies are deploying to areas near the Ukrainian border within Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 2 that the Russian military leadership decided to strengthen positions near the Ukrainian border in unspecified western Russian regions with 200 third-year cadets.[53] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the cadets deployed to the border area under the pretext of training and received small arms and grenade launchers.[54] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on May 24 that Russian cadets are undergoing training at the deployment points of elements of the 4th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District) and the 76th Air Assault Division in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts.[55] Russian cadets from higher military academies recently graduated several months ahead of schedule, and ISW assessed that Russian forces are likely expediting education paths for cadets to generate new lower-level commanders and fill gaps within the Russian command cadre.[56] ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of recent graduates from Russian higher military academies serving in Ukraine nor current cadets operating near the Ukrainian border.

Russian milbloggers claimed on June 2 that Russian aerospace forces received an unspecified number of newly produced Su-34 attack aircraft from the Russian United Aircraft Corporation.[57] One milblogger claimed that the Novosibirsk Aircraft Production Association Plant, one of the largest aerospace manufacturers in Russia and a subsidiary of the Sukhoi Company, produced the batch of Su-34 aircraft.[58]

Wagner Group Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on June 2 that Wagner has recruited 300 personnel from Kirov Oblast since opening a recruitment center there in March 2023.[59] Prigozhin also stated that Wagner recruited 800 to 900 convict recruits from Kirov Oblast during its prison recruitment campaign from fall 2022 to February 2023.[60]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue to forcibly transport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of medical rehabilitation schemes. Chair of the Kherson Oblast occupation government Andrey Alekseyenko claimed on June 2 that Russian doctors determined that 8,000 children require medical treatment in Russia after conducting full medical evacuations on children in occupied Kherson Oblast.[61] Alekseyenko claimed that 500 children are already undergoing operations in high-tech Russian hospitals free of charge.[62]

Russian occupation authorities continue to intensify measures to passportize residents of occupied territories. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 2 that Kherson Oblast occupation authorities announced September 1, 2023, as the deadline for residents to obtain Russian passports and submit mandatory written refusals of their Ukrainian passports.[63] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Kherson Oblast occupation authorities continue to pressure residents to accept Russian documents by threatening to terminate their electricity supply, deport them to Russia, evict them from their homes, and confiscate their personal property.[64]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine is extraordinarily unlikely).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

The Belarusian MoD reported that Belarusian forces are continuing the phased formation of electronic warfare (EW) units and that Special Forces Commander Major General Vadi Denisenko delivered special EW equipment to newly formed Belarusian units.[65]

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Belarusian territorial troops are completing the final stage of command and staff training in Minsk.[66]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

4. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, June 2, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-june-2-2023

Key Takeaways

1. 2024 Taiwanese presidential candidates are basing their cross-strait policy positions within the “peace vs war” framework, which may provide China greater influence over their election narratives through the PRC-supported framework.
2. Xi Jinping stressed the need to establish China’s national security risk monitoring and early warning system, which could serve as a tool to implement the CCP’s holistic security concept.

CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, JUNE 2, 2023

Jun 2, 2023 - Press ISW

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, June 2, 2023

Authors: Nils Peterson and Roy Eakin of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: May 31, 2023

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on Chinese Communist Party paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

1. 2024 Taiwanese presidential candidates are basing their cross-strait policy positions within the “peace vs war” framework, which may provide China greater influence over their election narratives through the PRC-supported framework.
2. Xi Jinping stressed the need to establish China’s national security risk monitoring and early warning system, which could serve as a tool to implement the CCP’s holistic security concept.

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

Terminology

1992 Consensus: a disputed cross-strait policy formulation supported in different formations by the CCP and KMT that acts as a precondition to cross-strait dialogue. The DPP does not support the 1992 Consensus.

One-China Principle: a formulation created by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) claiming that the PRC is the sole legal representative of China in the international arena and that Taiwan is a part of China.[1] The ROC (Taiwan) and United States do not recognize the one-China principle. The United States operates under its own one-China policy that acknowledges the PRC’s position towards Taiwan without accepting PRC territorial claims over the island.

2024 Taiwanese presidential candidates are basing their cross-strait policy positions within the “peace vs war” framework, which may provide China greater influence over their election narratives through the PRC-supported framework. ISW previously assessed that framing the election as a choice between war and peace provides the CCP with leverage points over each candidate.[2] The leverage points could enable the CCP to influence how the candidates form their cross-strait and US-Taiwan policies, as well as how they present those policies to domestic and international audiences in the post-election period. The PRC frequently frames the policies of Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as a major source of cross-strait tension that could lead to war.[3] KMT nominee Hou Yu-ih and TPP nominee Ko Wen-je are both promoting cross-strait dialogue and engagement, which may allow the CCP to promote economic and political dialogue under their leadership. DPP nominee Lai Ching-te (William Lai) countered the larger ”peace vs war” framing by promoting rhetoric that emphasizes the protection of Taiwan’s sovereignty. Each candidates’ statements respond to the prevalence of the ”peace vs war” framework in the Taiwanese election cycle.

KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih endorsed former President Ma Ying-jeou's cross-strait policy approach, which signals continuity in the KMT’s cross-strait policy. Hou praised Ma’s cross-strait policy as “peaceful and stable.”[4] He signaled his view that close cross-strait economic and political engagement, such as that which occurred under Ma’s leadership from 2008-2016, is necessary to the return of cross-strait stability.[5] Hou’s praise of Ma’s cross-strait policy signals his acceptance of the 1992 Consensus even as he refuses to clarify his views of the consensus, given its unpopularity among a majority of Taiwanese voters.[6]His acceptance of the 1992 Consensus shows that he will not stray from the KMT’s existing approach to cross-strait relations, which frames cross-strait engagement as beneficial to Taiwan’s economic interests and overall stability. This is in line with the views among the ”dark blue” bases of support within the KMT and the CCP

Hou’s statements signal the KMT’s internalization of the view that close engagement with China is needed to secure Taiwan’s stability and cross-strait peace. His association with Ma highlights the KMT’s view that Ma’s cross-strait policy remains an influence cross-strait policy influence within the KMT. Hou’s open support for Ma’s cross-strait policy complements existing leverage points by providing the CCP with ideological synergy and points of agreement regarding the general direction of cross-strait relations that could be leveraged during a hypothetical Hou presidency. This ideological synergy could operationalize shared desires for economic engagement and dialogue with specific engagement and initiatives during a Hou presidency.

DPP presidential nominee Lai Ching-te (William Lai) opposed framing the upcoming Taiwanese presidential election as a choice between war and peace. ISW previously assessed that the “peace vs war” narrative could frame Lai’s refusal to accept the 1992 Consensus as a major source of cross-strait tension.[7] Lai warned on May 28 that Taiwanese political parties “unintentionally or intentionally” repeat CCP-supported rhetoric in framing the 2024 Taiwanese election as a choice between war and peace.[8] Lai instead merged calls for peace with calls for the protection of Taiwan‘s sovereignty by promoting “peace and sovereignty.[9] He also stated that certain measures intended to promote cross-strait peace, such as accepting the 1992 Consensus, would ”sacrifice sovereignty” and lead to ”fake peace.”[10] This rhetoric aligns with Lai’s existing framing of the 2024 election as a choice between democracy and authoritarianism.[11]

Lai’s rhetoric challenges the “peace vs war” narrative by re-orienting the discussion around the well-being of Taiwan’s sovereignty. This may allow voters to re-think their view of the election by re-framing the DPP as a party that will defend Taiwan’s sovereignty and democracy from persistent CCP threats. By doing so, Lai can frame the CCP as the source of existing threats towards Taiwan. Lai provides this counter-argument at a time when a majority of Taiwanese say they agree with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen's cross-strait policy, which emphasizes the protection of Taiwanese sovereignty.[12]

TPP presidential nominee Ko Wen-je emphasized the need for cross-strait dialogue, which aligns with the need for immediate engagement with the CCP at the core of the “peace vs war” narrative. Ko contributed to the framing of the upcoming election as a choice between war and peace by blaming the DPP for the lack of cross-strait dialogue and saying that the chances of a cross-strait conflict will “reduce” under his leadership.[13] This type of rhetoric implies that immediate dialogue is needed to secure cross-strait peace and stability. Ko framed himself as a candidate that can both stabilize cross-strait relations through dialogue and preserve Taiwanese autonomy by calling for “cross-strait peace and Taiwanese autonomy” on May 28.[14] This rhetoric resembles that of DPP nominee Lai Ching-te (William Lai), who called for a Taiwanese policy approach emphasizing “peace and sovereignty.”[15] Ko differentiates himself from Lai by blaming the DPP for failing to engage in cross-strait dialogue and stressing the need for immediate cross-strait dialogue.[16] Ko has not mentioned existing barriers to cross-strait dialogue, such as the CCP’s emphasis on Taiwanese participants recognizing formulations like the 1992 Consensus.[17] Ko did not specify how his vision of cross-strait dialogue would emerge and even said that Taiwan could emphasize its “freedom and democracy” in talks where China emphasizes its “One Country, Two Systems” post-unification formula.[18] Rhetoric involving “democracy and freedom” aims to appeal to Taiwanese voters concerned about the future of Taiwan’s democracy amid the CCP’s military threats against Taiwan.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Xi Jinping stressed the need to establish China’s national security risk monitoring and early warning system, which could serve as a tool to implement the CCP’s holistic security concept. This is a low confidence assessment. Xi approved a document on accelerating the “Construction of a National Security Risk Monitoring and Early Warning System” at the meeting of the National Security Commission on May 30.[19] His comments fit the trend of the party viewing itself in a protracted struggle in a more hostile geopolitical environment coming out of the 20th Party Congress in October 2022. An early warning system that indicates when the party is losing ground in different areas broadly aligns with the CCP’s holistic security concept, which involves cultural influence, economic power, military strength, and party control of domestic society. This includes preventing mass protests, such as those that occurred from November to December 2022 in response to societal discontent stemming from the zero-Covid policy.

The CCP policy guidance to diversify China’s supply chain indicates the party views food supplies, particularly pork, as part of a long-term protracted struggle with hostile powers, including the United States. The party claims China is self-sufficient in grains but relies on imports for proteins, such as soybeans, meat, and milk.[20] The CCP policy guidance aims to increase self-reliance in these import dependent sectors.[21] Xi Jinping reiterated this position in a party journal article on May 30 by stating that the party faces a challenging strategic environment where it must be prepared to face “high winds” and “turbulent waves.”[22]

Xi included food security as a necessity in this strategic environment, which he aims to achieve via the “big food concept.”[23] The concept calls for cultivating food sources beyond limited arable land via means such as greenhouses and intensive livestock breeding.[24] The absence of rhetoric about future geopolitical tranquility in CCP state media and journals indicates that Xi views the party as in a protracted period of struggle against hostile powers for the foreseeable future.

Recent food shortages and associated popular discontent during China’s zero-Covid policy make food security a sensitive issue for the regime. The party derives legitimacy from addressing the livelihood concerns of its people rather than through democratic institutions.[25] Food-related discontent during the pandemic, in part, led the party to fire three Shanghai party officials in April 2022.[26] Pork is particularly important as China accounts for over half the world’s consumption annually and maintains a strategic pork reserve of several hundred thousand tons.[27] The ongoing construction of high-rise buildings housing hog farms to increase Chinese domestic pork production serves the larger goal of implementing the ”big food concept” and partly decreases the country’s reliance on foreign protein imports.[28]

5. United States-Japan-Australia Trilateral Defense Ministers' Meeting (TDMM) 2023 Joint Statement

United States-Japan-Australia Trilateral Defense Ministers' Meeting (TDMM) 2023 Joint Statement

June 3, 2023 |   

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3415881/united-states-japan-australia-trilateral-defense-ministers-meeting-tdmm-2023-jo/

Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence the Hon. Richard Marles MP, Japanese Minister of Defense Hamada Yasukazu, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III, convened a Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting in Singapore on June 3, 2023 during the 20th International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security Summit (2023 Shangri-La Dialogue) in Singapore. This was the twelfth meeting among the defense leaders of the three nations and highlighted the significant progress made in implementing activities and practical areas of cooperation set forth in the 2022 Joint Statement.

The Ministers welcomed and acknowledged the significance of each country’s strategic documents issued this past year, confirming the alignment of their strategies and the important role that the trilateral partnership plays in realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific. The Ministers highlighted that trilateral defense cooperation has never been stronger, and noted advances in the complexity of our trilateral cooperation and growing trilateral coordination at all levels.

The Ministers expressed serious concern about the increasingly severe security environment in the East China Sea. They strongly opposed any destabilizing and coercive unilateral actions that may escalate tensions in the East China Sea. 

The Ministers expressed concern about the situation in the South China Sea. They strongly opposed any unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force or coercion and actions that could increase tensions in the area, including the militarization of disputed features, the dangerous use of coast guard vessels and maritime militia, and efforts to disrupt other States’ offshore resource exploitation activities. They strongly object to China’s claims and actions that are inconsistent with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and which undermine international rules, standards, and norms. The Ministers emphasized the importance of the peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law, particularly UNCLOS, and reaffirmed the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal decision as final and legally binding on the parties. They resolved to work together to support states being able to exercise their rights and freedoms in the South China Sea, consistent with UNCLOS, including the freedoms of navigation and overflight.

The Ministers emphasized the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. 

The Ministers emphasized the importance of a secure and prosperous Southeast Asia, where sovereignty is respected and in furtherance of broader regional stability. They reiterated continued support for ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led regional architecture, including ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). They also emphasized their strong support for the practical implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. The Ministers committed to work closely with regional countries, bilaterally and through ASEAN mechanisms, to support regional security and stability including to promote maritime, cyber, border, and health security cooperation. The Ministers recognized the importance of strengthening cooperation with the Philippines and welcomed the meeting of Australia, Japan, Philippines, and United States’ defense ministers taking place while at the Shangri-La Dialogue. 

The Ministers committed to deepening cooperation with Pacific island countries, including by working with Pacific partners to support maritime security, respond to increased pressure from natural disasters, and address the impacts of climate change. The three countries will continue expanding regional engagement and strengthening cooperation with Pacific counterparts, particularly through the Pacific Islands Forum and other inclusive Pacific architecture.

The Ministers are deeply concerned about North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. They strongly condemn North Korea's repeated launches of missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles at an unprecedented frequency, and the most recent claimed space launch using ballistic missile technology, which is a serious violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions. The Ministers remain committed to working with the international community to address North Korea’s serious threat to the region. They reiterate their call on North Korea to immediately resolve the abduction issue and cease its human rights violations.

Recognizing the important role the trilateral partnership plays in boosting regional stability, the Ministers committed to continue to take concrete and practical measures to improve interoperability and deepen defense cooperation across the spectrum. They reinforced the importance of consulting with each other and developing coordinated responses to regional disasters and crises.

The Ministers noted the significance of the introduction of counterstrike capabilities by Japan and investment in long-range strike capabilities by Australia. They confirmed that Australia and Japan would work closely together, and with the United States, as these capabilities are introduced.  

The Ministers welcomed the progress being made toward the entry into force of the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA). They acknowledged the important role of the RAA in enabling deeper trilateral cooperation and enhancing interoperability. The Ministers agreed to leverage the RAA for this purpose as soon as it enters into force and committed to working on a roadmap for conducting trilateral cooperation activities in Australia over the coming year.  

The Ministers welcomed the recent announcement of Australia’s pathway to acquire conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines. Japan reiterated its consistent support for AUKUS. 

The Ministers welcomed the progress being made and highlighted achievements including the first coordinated Asset Protection Mission (APM) during a trilateral activity in November 2022, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) cooperation at Iwakuni Air Base in March 2023.

The Ministers exchanged views on the regional security environment and concurred to resist unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion in all parts of the world and to work closely to deter and counter actions that undermine international peace and stability and the international system based on the rule of law. They strongly condemned Russia's unprovoked, unjust, and unlawful aggression against Ukraine. They shared the view that Russia should immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders and cease hostilities in line with the Charter of the United Nations as called for in the resolution A/ES-11/L.7 adopted by the UN General Assembly on February 23.

The Ministers committed to continue enhancing defense cooperation among the three countries across the following areas:

Trilateral Activities and Exercises: 

• Conduct trilateral F-35 Joint Strike Fighter training in Australia.
• Increase complex and high-end trilateral exercises in northern Australia such as Exercise SOUTHERN JACKAROO to enhance readiness.
• Regularize Asset Protection Missions for the U.S. Forces and the Australian Defence Force by Japan Self-Defense Forces.
• Accelerate and deepen trilateral information-sharing cooperation.
• Continue trilateral policy and strategy dialogues on regional issues.

Expanded Cooperation:  

• Seek to conclude a trilateral Research Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) framework at the earliest possible opportunity.
• Boost strategic capabilities cooperation across multiple domains, including in integrated air and missile defense (IAMD), intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and undersea warfare.

Inclusive Partnerships:  

• Further deepen engagement with ASEAN Member States (including through the ADMM-Plus framework), Pacific island countries, European countries and like-minded partners and allies to uphold and reinforce free and open international norms in every region in the world.
• Coordinate capacity building engagements with regional partners.
• Work in complement with Pacific partners in addressing the challenge of unexploded ordnance.

The Ministers affirm that trilateral cooperation is essential to maintain democratic values, transparency and respect for international norms, and expressed their firm determination to keep the Indo-Pacific region as a free, open, secure, and prosperous region while continuing to expand the scope of defense cooperation.

6. 'We Have No Plan': United States and United Kingdom Struggle to Combat Chinese Influence, Officials Say

Excerpts:

The AUKUS treaty—a trilateral security pact between the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia—was raised in nearly every meeting, which included sit-downs with Britain’s deputy national security adviser, its defense minister, and eight members of Parliament.

Government leaders want to leverage the treaty to increase military and technological cooperation between the Western governments in a bid to isolate China, according to the source briefed on the meetings. By expanding the AUKUS treaty, the three countries can use it as a vehicle to beat back Chinese influence operations.

"AUKUS presents an opportunity to turbo charge military and technological cooperation with our two closest allies," Gallagher said.

The American delegation also held meetings with executives from Google’s DeepMind artificial intelligence project, which is headquartered in Cambridge. Gallagher said the project provides an opportunity to undercut China’s use of AI in its military projects.

"It puts us in a really good position to beat the Chinese Communist party in the AI race," Gallagher said. "We heard from our counterparts in the U.K. that allowing China to dominate this tech would be an incredibly, incredibly bad idea."

'We Have No Plan': United States and United Kingdom Struggle to Combat Chinese Influence, Officials Say

freebeacon.com · by Adam Kredo · May 30, 2023

The United States and United Kingdom are struggling to counter China’s increasingly hostile political warfare operations, according to sources briefed on recent high-level meetings between officials from both countries.

During this month's summit between British leaders and members of the House Select Committee on China, officials acknowledged that while both countries have strategies in place to handle a military confrontation with China, "we have no plan" to combat Chinese aggression off the battlefield, according to a source briefed on the contents of the private discussions.

The CCP’s political warfare operations were raised as a concern in several meetings during the transatlantic summit, a sign that both countries are struggling to beat back China’s growing global footprint. Officials from both countries expressed concerns about a burgeoning "international order with Chinese characteristics," according to the source briefed on the meetings.

China has expanded its global influence operation in recent years in a bid to exert dominance over the international community. Beijing has poured resources into a global campaign of economic coercion and worked to shape narratives and peddle propaganda through international institutions like the United Nations. These efforts were on full display during the coronavirus pandemic, when China successfully prevented the World Health Organization from disclosing that the virus likely emerged from a Wuhan lab, as several U.S. intelligence reports have determined in recent months.

Rep. Mike Gallagher (R., Wis.), the China committee’s chairman who led the delegation to Britain, said he came away from the meetings concerned the British and American governments are not doing enough to detach their economies from China and fend off the CCP’s global spy operations. Both countries continue to rely heavily on Chinese supply chains, particularly in the technology sector, that are vulnerable to Communist Party coercion and spying.

"There is a sustained push we’re seeing right now from the Biden administration on this kind of what I call a ‘zombie engagement’ or detente, this sort of revival of economic engagement as a core pillar of our policy, of which I’m kind of skeptical," Gallagher told the Free Beacon last week.

The United Kingdom is pursuing a similar policy, Gallagher said, and has recently walked back commitments to crackdown on CCP spy outposts like Confucius Institutes. The British government additionally watered down recent policy declarations regarding China’s malign economic behavior, and continues to foster economic ties to Beijing.

"I think that lack of clarity muddles our thinking and undermines our approach," Gallagher said.

If the United States and China went to war, the communist government would likely shut down global supply chains, crippling the Western world’s economy. A congressional war simulation held in April confirmed this outcome, determining that a military conflict would leave the global economy in "absolute tatters," the Free Beacon first reported.

Taiwan and the threat of a Chinese invasion also emerged as a top agenda item during the trip, with officials discussing strategies to deter a full-blown military siege of the contested island.

The AUKUS treaty—a trilateral security pact between the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia—was raised in nearly every meeting, which included sit-downs with Britain’s deputy national security adviser, its defense minister, and eight members of Parliament.

Government leaders want to leverage the treaty to increase military and technological cooperation between the Western governments in a bid to isolate China, according to the source briefed on the meetings. By expanding the AUKUS treaty, the three countries can use it as a vehicle to beat back Chinese influence operations.

"AUKUS presents an opportunity to turbo charge military and technological cooperation with our two closest allies," Gallagher said.

The American delegation also held meetings with executives from Google’s DeepMind artificial intelligence project, which is headquartered in Cambridge. Gallagher said the project provides an opportunity to undercut China’s use of AI in its military projects.

"It puts us in a really good position to beat the Chinese Communist party in the AI race," Gallagher said. "We heard from our counterparts in the U.K. that allowing China to dominate this tech would be an incredibly, incredibly bad idea."

Published under: AI , Belt and Road , CCP , China , Mike Gallagher , United Kingdom

freebeacon.com · by Adam Kredo · May 30, 2023

7. The Nobel Prize Takes Aim Against Disinformation, Lies And Fakes

Photos and video at the link: https://www.forbes.com/sites/daviatemin/2023/05/26/the-nobel-prize-takes-aim-against-disinformation-lies-and-fakes/?sh=39a3047822d4

Excerpt:

We can all be fooled, they cautioned. We can all become victim to disinformation or false memory campaigns. And all people — even the best of people — can be made to believe the lies. It’s called the “Misinformation Effect,” says Professor Elizabeth Loftus, and we are all subject to it. And yes, we can all be canceled and we can all be made to cancel through the malicious manipulation of the truth by bad actors.

Ten key points from Nobel Laureate Maria Ressa:

Closing speaker 2021 Nobel Peace Laureate, author of the book “How to Stand Up to a Dictator,” and “fearless defender of freedom of expression,” Maria Ressa, topped off the first day with a rafter-rousing speech calling for the most important solutions: courage and inspiration. In her own words:

• “Disinformation is when power and money use the existing information ecosystem to insidiously manipulate the cellular level of our democracy, which is each of us...”
• “The only weapon a journalist has to fight back is to shine the light.”
• But, “the tech has gone exponential, exponential, and we’re still moving at glacial speed.”
• “What will you sacrifice for the truth?”
• “How will we move you to act? It’s about your courage; this is what I stand for. because silence is complicity.”
• “Lies are spreading 6x faster than facts — Lies that are laced with anger and hate, fueling the worst of humanity.” “Make no mistake, this is warfare...behavior modification.... attacks make you disbelieve. Without facts, no truth; without truth, no trust...no shared reality, no democracy... We cannot know what we will become when we are being pumped through with toxic sludge. We cannot believe in the goodness of human nature.”
• “Last year 60% of the world was under authoritarian rule...this year 72%. Trade sanctions won’t work... our window is closing.”
• “On-line violence is real-world violence.” “In my own case, 60% of the attacks were meant to tear down my credibility; 40% were meant to tear down my spirit.”
• But, “inspiration is the antidote” to disinformation and anger.
• “2024 is a tipping point between fascism and democracy.”

And between courage and inspiration and...desolation. 

The Nobel Prize Takes Aim Against Disinformation, Lies And Fakes

Davia Temin

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May 26, 2023,07:16pm EDT

Truth, Trust and Hope — Vidar Helgesen of Nobel Foundation and Marcia McNutt of National Academy of ... [+]DAVIA TEMIN

In the most extraordinary instance of public thought leadership most of us have ever witnessed, this week the Nobel Prize (Nobel Foundation) joined forces with the US National Academy of Sciences to mount a 3-day Summit targeting the disinformation, lies, fakes, and deep fakes that are flooding the globe.

High Stakes

The stakes could not be higher. From one-on-one ad hominem attacks, to the state-sponsored reputation destruction of political enemies, to the wholesale targeting of scientific findings, research and inquiry, disinformation campaigns are challenging our principles, truths — and souls. And, of course, social media and AI-enabled mimicry exacerbate the problem, putting our cognition more and more at risk. At their worst, they challenge our very understanding of reality, as well as our ability to trust anyone or anything.

Cartoon from The Nation used at Nobel Prize Summit to announce IPEI—International Panel on the ... [+]DAVIA TEMIN

No Trust

Once there is no certainty to be found on the shifting sands of lies, trust dies a hard and ugly death.

So, who better to lead the charge than The Nobel Foundation and the National Academy of Sciences? In this three-day tour-de-force, titled “Truth, Trust and Hope,” they convened Nobel Prize laureates, notable experts, poets, artists, musicians, and even magicians to call out the problems caused by purposeful disinformation and truth destruction.

We can all be fooled, they cautioned. We can all become victim to disinformation or false memory campaigns. And all people — even the best of people — can be made to believe the lies. It’s called the “Misinformation Effect,” says Professor Elizabeth Loftus, and we are all subject to it. And yes, we can all be canceled and we can all be made to cancel through the malicious manipulation of the truth by bad actors.

Dr. Elizabeth Loftus speaking on false memory at Nobel Prize Summit 2023DAVIA TEMIN

Forbes Leadership

00:06

01:12

Four American Scholars Among Seven Winners Of

The Shaw Prize For 2023

But once the audience was cautioned, this multidisciplinary group began to explore solutions — macro and micro — to redraw the battle lines, and change the outcome.

The International Panel on the Information Environment (IPIE)

One solution, whose seeds were planted at the last Summit, is the establishment of the International Panel on the Information Environment (IPIE), by Sheldon Himelfarb, President & CEO of PeaceTech Lab, and Director of Oxford University’s Programme on Democracy and Technology, Phil Howard. An independent global organization, IPIE is the response of 200 research scientists (so far) from 55 countries around the world and across disciplines to ensure an information environment that promotes human progress and peace.

Phil Howard and Sheldon Himelfarb announce IPIE at the Nobel Summit 2023DAVIA TEMIN

Early insights include the 2 most effective ways to counter disinformation found so far: flagging incorrect content, and providing corrections to that misinformation, at the exact moment it is first seen. In fact, AI-fueled efforts will almost certainly be effective in countering the disinformation that other uses of AI create. Fascinating, a battle of titans, and truly not a battle for the faint of heart.

Courage

Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Maria Ressa, standing ovation at Truth, Trust and Hope Nobel Prize SummitDAVIA TEMIN

Courage — Maria Ressa's Slide DAVIA TEMIN

Closing speaker 2021 Nobel Peace Laureate, author of the book “How to Stand Up to a Dictator,” and “fearless defender of freedom of expression,” Maria Ressa, topped off the first day with a rafter-rousing speech calling for the most important solutions: courage and inspiration. In her own words:

• “Disinformation is when power and money use the existing information ecosystem to insidiously manipulate the cellular level of our democracy, which is each of us...”
• “The only weapon a journalist has to fight back is to shine the light.”
• But, “the tech has gone exponential, exponential, and we’re still moving at glacial speed.”
• “What will you sacrifice for the truth?”
• “How will we move you to act? It’s about your courage; this is what I stand for. because silence is complicity.”
• “Lies are spreading 6x faster than facts — Lies that are laced with anger and hate, fueling the worst of humanity.” “Make no mistake, this is warfare...behavior modification.... attacks make you disbelieve. Without facts, no truth; without truth, no trust...no shared reality, no democracy... We cannot know what we will become when we are being pumped through with toxic sludge. We cannot believe in the goodness of human nature.”
• “Last year 60% of the world was under authoritarian rule...this year 72%. Trade sanctions won’t work... our window is closing.”
• “On-line violence is real-world violence.” “In my own case, 60% of the attacks were meant to tear down my credibility; 40% were meant to tear down my spirit.”
• But, “inspiration is the antidote” to disinformation and anger.
• “2024 is a tipping point between fascism and democracy.”

And between courage and inspiration and...desolation.

Thank you, National Academy of Sciences, and Nobel Foundation for joining the fight. These institutions have just shone a tremendous light on disinformation, lies and fakes. Now, it is up to us to join them.

To hear the entire Day 1 Program, just click the link below. More to come in the near future on the fight against disinformation, against calculated reputation destruction, and against the attack on essential trust that disinformation breeds.

Follow me on Twitter or LinkedIn. Check out my website. 

Davia Temin

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Founder and CEO of Temin and Company, a boutique management consultancy focused on socially responsible global risk, reputation, media, and crisis management, and C-suite leadership coaching. I work at the highest levels to help create, enhance and save reputations for major corporations, organizations, boards, non-profits, products, services, colleges, governments, and individuals.

I also work with global leaders to help them define and implement their vision and voice. A frequent public speaker on governance, leadership, risk, crisis, reputation, and social media, we also conduct media, presentation skills, and crisis management training for boards, C-suites, corporations, CEO groups, and association meetings around the world.

A frequent guest on TV as well as a spokesperson in times of client crises, before starting my firm, I ran marketing for GE Capital, Schroders, Scudder, Citicorp Investment Bank and Columbia Business School.  Read Less

8. Private Eyes: China’s Embrace of Open-Source Military Intelligence

I am a great believer in using open source information to support intelligence analysis.

The full 35 page report can be downloaded here: https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/ta-2023-0601.pdf

Private Eyes: China’s Embrace of Open-Source Military Intelligence | Recorded Future

recordedfuture.com

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is using new collection, processing, and analysis technologies to exploit the massive amount of open-source information available from the internet and other sources for military intelligence purposes. A growing ecosystem of private companies, state-owned enterprises, state-run research organizations, and universities is supporting the PLA’s push to leverage open-source intelligence (OSINT) by providing research services, platforms, and data. The PLA almost certainly views OSINT as an increasingly valuable source of military intelligence that can support decision-making and necessitates the use of new collection, processing, and analysis technologies, which the PLA and China’s defense industry are actively developing.

The PLA and China’s defense industry almost certainly take advantage of other countries’ open information environments to extract OSINT from foreign governments, militaries, universities, defense industry companies, scientific research organizations, think tanks, news media outlets, social media platforms, forums, individuals, commercial data providers, print media, radio broadcasts, satellites, and other sources. This OSINT almost certainly provides the PLA insight into foreign military capabilities, facilities, doctrine, decision-making, weapons, equipment, science and technology, exercises, training, intelligence, and deployments, providing a clear intelligence advantage.

In addition to supporting decision-making, Chinese observers have suggested more specific uses for military OSINT as well, such as carrying out long-range maritime target tracking, enabling early warning of crises, supporting precision strikes, countering enemy propaganda, facilitating domestic science and technology innovation, and supporting training and talent development.

This report profiles 5 private Chinese OSINT providers that serve the PLA, including providers that mainly sell platform and database products, providers that primarily offer research and analysis services, and providers that specialize in remote sensing data. The PLA very likely uses this data to support decision-making and better understand potential foreign adversaries in preparation for future conflicts. Given that China is very unlikely to open up its information environment, and that Western countries are very unlikely to close off their information environments, the PLA will very likely maintain its advantage over Western militaries in OSINT.

To read the entire analysis with endnotes, as well as receive more information about the author, Zoe Haver, click here to download the report as a PDF.

recordedfuture.com

9. How to Use Unconventional Warfare Against the Establishment

Note this article audio is "sponsored" by The John Birch Society." I had to forward it because it is of course a misuse of unconventional warfare. Is this author advocating for the overthrow of the US government by Chinese means?

Excerpts:

It would be foolish for anyone involved in war, statecraft, and politics not to use these same principles. That includes those involved in activism on the American Right who want to bring down the Marxist-globalist establishment.

Accordingly, there is one very useful pearl of wisdom found in Unrestricted Warfare that is highly applicable to the realm of American politics.

In the first chapter, Qiao and Wang write that high-tech actors are often at a loss when it comes to dealing with forces using “outdated” and unconventional technologies and tactics. In such situations, the technological superiority of that side becomes a liability, because it no longer knows how to fight in the old ways.

How to Use Unconventional Warfare Against the Establishment

thenewamerican.com · by Luis Miguel · June 1, 2023

Luis Miguel

Article audio sponsored by The John Birch Society

Winning, in politics and war, isn’t always about which side has the most money or the best equipment. Sometimes it comes down to who fights more astutely with the limited resources at their disposal.

That’s certainly one of the lessons to be learned from America’s modern military incursions, particularly the botched occupation of Afghanistan. And it’s a principle to be found in the landmark book Unrestricted Warfare by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui.

Published in 1999, the book is a treatise on military strategy. The authors are two colonels in the People’s Liberation Army. Although the book has been marketed as China’s “master plan” for destroying America, its tone is, in fact, not so slanted and the principles it expounds can be applied by any actor (including by the U.S. against China, if it chose to).

The book is so titled because it advances the concept of unrestricted warfare — a kind of warfare that is not limited to traditional military action, but that can encompass any kind of action by governments or private individuals, such as economic and other private-sector activity. Hence the name — unrestricted warfare — for it is war that is not restricted to the typical field of combat.

Of course, the Chinese Communist Party has followed this philosophy to a T, as we can see in the way China has done everything from purchasing tracts of land and agriculture in mainland America to creating Confucius Institutes for the purpose of indoctrinating the nation’s students in pro-China propaganda.

By implementing unrestricted warfare, China is getting ever-closer to bringing down U.S. hegemony and establishing itself as the supreme world power without the need for a single shot to be fired.

It would be foolish for anyone involved in war, statecraft, and politics not to use these same principles. That includes those involved in activism on the American Right who want to bring down the Marxist-globalist establishment.

Accordingly, there is one very useful pearl of wisdom found in Unrestricted Warfare that is highly applicable to the realm of American politics.

In the first chapter, Qiao and Wang write that high-tech actors are often at a loss when it comes to dealing with forces using “outdated” and unconventional technologies and tactics. In such situations, the technological superiority of that side becomes a liability, because it no longer knows how to fight in the old ways.

As the authors write:

Viewed from the performance of the U.S. military in Somalia, where they were at a loss when they encountered Aidid’s forces, the most modern military force does not have the ability to control public clamor, and cannot deal with an opponent who does things in an unconventional manner. On the battlefields of the future, the digitized forces may very possibly be like a great cook who is good at cooking lobsters sprinkled with butter: when faced with guerillas who resolutely gnaw corncobs, they can only sigh in despair. The “generation gap” in weapons and military forces is perhaps an issue that requires exceptional attention. The closer the generation gap is, the more pronounced are the battle successes of the more senior generation, while the more the gap opens, the less each party is capable of dealing with the other, and it may reach the point where no one can wipe out the other. Looking at the specific examples of battles that we have, it is difficult for high-tech troops to deal with unconventional warfare and low-tech warfare, and perhaps there is a rule here, or at least it is an interesting phenomenon which is worth studying.

Let’s apply this to the world of American politics. In this case, the more “senior” generation is the establishment, as they have a bigger war chest, namely money and the political assets that money can buy — lobbyists; political-opposition research; journalists-for-hire; favorable entertainment and celebrities; advertising on television, radio, and social media.

Most of the tools the establishment is able to acquire with its money are ones that have been created within the last century, more or less.

It would be wise, then, for right-wing activists to apply the principles of Unrestricted Warfare, as described above, by using techniques of mass persuasion that were used successfully prior to the advent of modern technologies. That can include learning how to organize people in-person, applying the old door-to-door to circumvent the establishment’s access to mass-media advertising and direct mail.

Print publications are also an effective way to get around social-media censorship. Local activists should consider creating their own regular print newsletters, magazines, or newspapers (depending on what kind of budget they’re working with), which they can deliver door-to-door or via mail, or make available at highly frequented public locations such as libraries and stores.

Finally, right-wing activists should diligently learn the arts of personal magnetism and public speaking. This is something that has been highly lost today; most politicians get elected thanks to all the advertising dollars spent on their behalf; none can hold a candle to the oratorical abilities of public speakers of the past.

Think of it as guerrilla political warfare. In the face of the establishment’s enormous resources, we must play smart if we want to win.

thenewamerican.com · by Luis Miguel · June 1, 2023

10. These may be the world's best warships. And they're not American

Japan and the ROK.

These may be the world's best warships. And they're not American | CNN

CNN · by Brad Lendon · June 3, 2023

Seoul, South Korea CNN —

It’s a growing problem that has United States naval commanders scratching their heads: How to keep up with China’s ever-expanding fleet of warships.

Not only is China’s navy already the world’s largest, its numerical lead over the US is getting wider, with the head of the US Navy warning recently that American shipyards simply can’t keep up. Some experts estimate China can build three warships in the time it takes the US to build one.

It is just one of the concerns, alongside Beijing’s increasing aggression in the South China Sea and around Taiwan, that’s likely to be weighing on the mind of US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin as he joins top military figures from across the region at this weekend’s Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.

The chance of a breakthrough on any of those issues this weekend appears slim, not least because China has pointedly rejected a US proposal for Austin to meet his Chinese counterpart Li Shangfu at the forum.

But experts who spoke to CNN before the summit say a potential solution to one of them – the Chinese fleet’s numerical advantage – is within reach, if the US is prepared to think outside the box.

Washington, they say, has something Beijing doesn’t: Allies in South Korea and Japan who are building some of the highest spec – and affordable – naval hardware on the oceans.

Buying ships from these countries, or even building US-designed vessels in their shipyards, could be a cost-effective way of closing the gap with China, they say.

Their warships are “certainly a match for their (Chinese) counterparts,” says Blake Herzinger, a research fellow at the United States Studies Center in Australia, while Japan’s warship designers “are among the world’s best,” says Carl Schuster, a former director of operations at the US Pacific Command’s Joint Intelligence Center in Hawaii.

Both countries have mutual defense treaties with the US, so why doesn’t the US team up with them to outbuild China?

The problem is, US law currently prevents its Navy from buying foreign-built ships – even from allies – or from building its own ships in foreign countries due to both security concerns and a desire to protect America’s shipbuilding industry.

Schuster, Herzinger and others are among a growing body of experts who say it may be time to rethink that law to give the US an edge in the battle for the seas.

A challenger for China’s world-beating Type 055s

The Pentagon estimates China’s navy to have around 340 warships at present, while the US has fewer than 300. It thinks the Chinese fleet will grow to 400 in the next two years, while the US fleet will take until 2045 to hit 350.

But it’s not just the increasing vastness of the Chinese navy that has raised concerns. Some of the ships China is churning out arguably have greater firepower than some of their US counterparts.

Take China’s Type 055, in many eyes the world’s premier destroyer.

Displacing 12,000 to 13,000 tons, the Type 055 is bigger than typical destroyers (it is nearer in size to the US Navy’s Ticonderoga class of cruisers) and packs a formidable punch.

It has 112 vertical launch system (VLS) cells that fire surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles, which is more than the 96 on the newest of the US Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. It also boasts sophisticated radio and anti-submarine weapons systems.

And China is pumping them out. It began building the Type 055s in 2014 and recently commissioned its eighth, the Xianyang. The US’s work on its Zumwalt-class destroyers has been much slower; construction began five years earlier, yet only two have entered service.

But some Western analysts say the Type 055 may have a peer in South Korea’s Sejong the Great-class destroyers.

At 10,000 to 12,000 tons displacement, the Sejongs are slightly smaller than China’s Type 055s, but they have more firepower, with 128 VLS cells and weapons that include surface-to-air, anti-submarine and cruise missiles.

The three Sejongs, which cost about $925 million each, are the pride of the South Korean fleet.

“With this one ship, (the South Korean Navy) can cope with multiple simultaneous situations – anti-aircraft, anti-ship, anti-submarine, anti-surface – and defend from ballistic missiles,” the country’s Defense Media Agency says.

Retired South Korean Adm. Duk-ki Kim, the first person to captain a Sejong, says it’s more than a match for China’s Type 055.

“China is focusing on quantity and price competitiveness rather than the quality of its vessels,” Kim, now vice president of the Korea Association of Military Studies, told CNN.

High-spec, low cost

Japan, too, has “world class” destroyers, said Alessio Patalano, professor of war and strategy at King’s College in London.

The country’s newest Maya-class destroyers are armed with 96 VLS cells that can fire both anti-ballistic and anti-submarine missiles, while the “quality of its sensors and systems stands at the very top end of the spectrum,” according to Patalano. Last November, the Mayas demonstrated their ability to destroy ballistic missiles traveling outside Earth’s atmosphere.

Those 96 VLS cells put the Mayas on par with the newest of the US Arleigh Burkes, but there’s a crucial difference between them: The Arleigh Burkes cost $2.2 billion; the Mayas cost a billion dollars less.

In other words, the Mayas represent both “quantity and quality”: They are high-spec, (relatively) low cost and can roll off production lines at speed.

“If Chinese shipbuilding is showing a remarkable capacity for mass production, Japan’s is leading the way in affordable quality on a scale larger than most naval powers, without sacrificing commissioning times. That balance, and the experience in the philosophy, are a genuine edge,” Patalano said.

And it’s not just the Mayas. Take Japan’s Mogami-class frigates; speedy, stealthy 5,500-ton warships with 16 VLS cells that fire surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles. All done with a crew of 90 and a price tag of about $372 million each.

By contrast, the first of the US Navy’s under development Constellation-class frigates are expected to cost three times as much and require twice as many crew. That’s less than ideal given the US Navy is having a hard time recruiting – the US vice chief of naval operations has said it is likely to miss its recruiting goal by 6,000 this year – though the Constellations are expected to have twice as many VLS cells as the Mogamis.

Cost comparisons with China’s Type 055s are harder due to the opacity of the Chinese system; estimates of their costs range anywhere from $925 million to $2.6 billion each.

An Asian secret weapon

So what’s making South Korean and Japanese shipyards so competitive?

Cost overruns, endemic in US defense contracting, are not common in Japan, Schuster says, because – unlike the US – the country holds manufacturers to their estimates.

“A Japanese shipbuilder’s bid is an absolute. If they finish it below expected cost, they make a larger profit. If they encounter delays and mistakes, the builder has to correct it at their own expense,” Schuster said.

That approach was “much wiser” than that of the US, he claims, pointing to the alleged problems with Zumwalt-class destroyers and littoral combat ships that have seen the Pentagon spend billions on platforms that critics say the US Navy doesn’t know what to do with.

The US Navy’s three Zumwalt destroyers have priced out at about $8 billion each, but it’s unclear how they fit into the rest of the fleet.

Meanwhile, some of the US’s littoral combat ships, which cost more than $350 million each, are expected to be decommissioned before they have even served a third of their life span.

Time for a rethink?

All these Japanese and South Korean vessels are designed to incorporate US technology, weapons, spy radars and the Aegis command and control system.

Partly this is so that the two navies can operate seamlessly alongside their US counterpart, as they did in joint exercises earlier this year.

But then if the US, Japanese and South Korean ships use similar technology and can operate together, why does the law prevent the US from building some of its ships in Japanese and South Korean shipyards?

The prohibition isn’t just about security concerns. It’s also aimed at keeping shipbuilding jobs and expertise within the US.

In 2019, total economic activity associated with the US shipbuilding industry accounted for nearly 400,000 jobs and contributed $42.4 billion in GDP, according to the Maritime Administration, with 154 shipyards spread across 29 states classified as active shipbuilders and more than 300 engaged in ship repairs or capable of building ships.

The US military is an important source of demand for these shipbuilders; while less than 3% of the vessels delivered in 2020 went to US government agencies, 14 of the 15 large deep-draft vessels went to a combination of the US Navy and the US Coast Guard.

Tough call to make

Any move that might be perceived as threatening such an important industry would therefore be politically fraught. Shipbuilding representatives argue more needs to be spent on the domestic industry, rather than less, recently telling Congress the single biggest issue facing shipyards was attracting and retaining a quality workforce, according to USNI News.

US Navy spokesperson Travis Callaghan said, “The Navy currently has a significant number of ships under construction and on contract across several shipyards. We have also made and continue to make significant investments in our shipyards to increase and maximize capacity. The Navy is committed to providing a ready, modernized, and capable naval force that continues to be the nation’s primary instrument of sea control both now and into the future.”

There are also those analysts who, while admiring the shipbuilding prowess of Japan and South Korea, say getting them to build ships for the US would be a step too far.

Speaking on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue, Nick Childs, senior fellow for naval studies at the IISS, said US cooperation with its allies is already shifting the trajectory of naval power in Asia away from China.

There’s “a new phase of maritime balance” in the region that has it slowly edging back in Washington’s favor, Childs said. However, he doesn’t think the answer is building US ships overseas.

“I think the answer is to learn from the way they do it rather than get them to do it for you,” he said.

Still, proponents of outsourcing say employing the help of allies offers a more immediate fix – and point out the US already outsources designs overseas; its Constellation-class frigates are based on an Italian design and Japan has been mooted as a possible source for future blueprints.

But Schuster thinks designs aren’t enough – the US needs more ships now, he says.

“Since shipyard availability is at a premium in the United States, having a portion of that work done in Japan would address that problem until America can refurbish and expand its shipyards – a 10-year process in most defense analysts’ eyes,” Schuster said.

Retired South Korean admiral Kim thinks partnering on shipbuilding offers everyone “a win-win.”

Herzinger, too, thinks it’s time to rethink the law.

Japan and South Korea “both build very high quality ships on time and on budget, both things (the US has) lost the ability to do,” Herzinger said.

CNN’s Haley Britzky, Gawon Bae, Jiwon Jeong and Moeri Karasawa contributed to this report.

CNN · by Brad Lendon · June 3, 2023

11. Shall We Play a Game? The Promise (and Pitfalls) of Wargames for Policy

Shall We Play a Game? The Promise (and Pitfalls) of Wargames for Policy

Featuring Jacquelyn Schneider via PolicyEd

policyed.org

Published May 31, 2023

Wargames—interactive events with human players immersed in scenarios and bound by rules—have a long history of influencing policy and are becoming increasingly prevalent. They are used not only for military purposes but also to simulate natural disasters, assess economic cooperation, and study political phenomena. The Hoover Institution aims to enhance wargaming as a policy-making tool by creating an open-source archive of wargames, conducting games on significant policy issues, and providing resources for educational purposes.

Discussion Questions:

1. What makes a good wargame, and how can it provide valuable insights for policy makers?
2. How should policy makers assess and use wargaming data to inform their decision-making process?

Additional resources:

• Read “Wargaming for International Relations Research,” by Erik Lin-Greenberg, Reid B.C. Pauly, and Jacquelyn G. Schneider via European Journal of International Relations. Available here.
• Watch “How Dangerous Are Cyberattacks?” with Jacquelyn Schneider on PolicyEd. Available here.
• Read “Does Technology Win Wars?” by Jacquelyn Schneider via Foreign Affairs. Available here.

View Transcript

Wargames are having a moment. Newspapers and nightly news warn that wargames “map a huge toll” in a war over Taiwan and that in order to win, the Air Force will have to buy new bombers and fighters. Congressmembers, like Congressmen Mike Gallagher, have even argued that wargames should be a standard part of Congressional budget and legislative processes.

So what are wargames? And should we believe what they say?

While often called “simulations” or “exercises,” wargames are distinct from computer simulations of combat, field exercises featuring actual military forces, or organized brainstorming sessions. Instead, wargames are interactive events that display four characteristics: human players, immersed in scenarios, bounded by rules, and motivated by consequence-based outcomes.

Wargames go back millennia, with evidence of games in ancient Rome, early Iraq, and China. They took on a central role in the modern conduct of war with the Prussian development of Kriegspiel, a boardgame that simulated combat to train officers. A century later, the United States’ embrace of wargames for military planning between World Wars I and II became a pivotal part of the Navy’s success in the Pacific. During the Cold War, the U.S. military turned again to wargames to understand the impact of the nuclear revolution. U.S. defense wargaming continued after the Berlin Wall fell, with games designed to test new ideas about warfare and aid acquisition decisions.

But while wargames have primarily looked at military or crisis situations, their use goes far beyond “war.” Governments use games to simulate natural disasters and to assess economic cooperation; consultants use wargaming to test new business strategies; and scholars use gaming to study how human behavior affects various social and political phenomenon like governance, revolutions, and insurgencies.

Games are closely tied to policy decisions. Because they have such a strong experiential quality, they can be compelling evidence for policymakers, faced with difficult decisions in rare or unexpected scenarios. Senior decisionmakers often rely on lessons learned from games in which they previously participated, and the evocative results from games—especially ones played with high realism—can be far more persuasive than lab-produced models or simulations. Indeed, games can be such powerful devices of influence that organizations have been known to change rules to influence outcomes and leak results when it benefits their cause.

Wargames are increasingly prevalent and have a long history of influencing policy, but what makes a good game? And how should we evaluate wargaming data when making policy?

In general, for games that are analytic, or designed to answer questions, a good game should have five qualities.

First, they need to be enjoyable and believable so that players act in the game as they would in real life (this is what we call external validity in social science).

Secondly, they need the right players with the correct expertise and demographics to mirror real world decision-makers (in social science, we call this having the right sample to represent our real-life population).

Third, there need to be enough players and game iterations to be able to make conclusions that go beyond the unique characteristics of any one instance. The social science term for this is generalizability.

Fourth, good wargames control for bias within their scenarios and rules—things like baking in certain outcomes or creating scenarios that unduly influence players’ behaviors. When we are able to control for bias that might invalidate results, we call this internal validity. The best games have both external and internal validity.

Finally, for analytical games, the best designs have good data collection—able to explain not only what happened in the game, but why.

The primary value of using and analyzing wargames is not in generating new or better data about outcomes, but is instead in understanding behaviors and choices leading to these outcomes. Wargames do not predict what will happen in conflict or crisis, but they can tell us why and how one outcome or another occurred.

This can be hard to do and so most games struggle on one of these dimensions (sometimes intentionally). That doesn’t mean that wargames aren’t important for policy, but that we need to do a better job of analyzing across games for patterns of outcomes and behaviors.

Here at the Hoover Institution, we are working to make wargaming an even better tool for policymakers—building the first ever open source archive of wargames and wargaming data, running games on some of the biggest policy questions of our time about cyber, nuclear weapons, AI, and space, and providing wargaming resources for the classroom to build the next generation of policy analysts.

policyed.org

12. How Hong Kong is snuffing out memories of Tiananmen Square

One recommendation for the GEC (Global Engagement Center): Establish a program that focuses on all the history the Chinese Communist Party is trying to eliminate and help keep that history alive.

How Hong Kong is snuffing out memories of Tiananmen Square

But there is still a bit more scope for commemoration in the territory than on the mainland

The Economist​ June 2d​

IN “1984”, GEORGE ORWELL’S dystopian novel, the ruling party controls the past by feeding reports of inconvenient historical events into a “memory hole”, replacing them with its preferred version. China’s Communist Party has long taken that approach—no more so than when it comes to the massacre of pro-democracy demonstrators that occurred around Tiananmen Square in the early morning of June 4th 1989. For three decades China’s rulers have stuffed their own memory hole with articles, social-media posts and even references to the number 64 (a cryptic nod to June 4th). Many Chinese now have little idea of what happened on that bloody night in Beijing.

Except, that is, for those in Hong Kong. For years the territory was one of the only places in China in which June 4th remembrance ceremonies and open discussion of the events were permitted. Tens of thousands, sometimes hundreds of thousands, attended an annual vigil; many more lit candles in their windows or dressed in black. But in 2020 Hong Kong’s government banned the gathering. First it blamed the pandemic. The following year it threatened to use a sweeping new national-security law imposed on the city by the mainland in July 2020, as well as pre-existing legislation. Since then the ban has remained in place and the Hong Kong government’s efforts to control remembrance of Tiananmen have grown.

Officials insist that the freedoms of expression and assembly enshrined in Hong Kong’s Basic Law, the mini-constitution enacted after Britain handed back the territory to China in 1997, remain unmolested. But the national-security law, which gives the authorities broad powers to clamp down on anything they deem seditious, renders such statements close to meaningless.

The legislation is so vague that no one knows where its lines are drawn. In March the organisers of the Tiananmen vigil were jailed, even though the last such event had been held before the national-security law was enacted. (They were charged with failing to hand over documents related to a suspicion that they were “foreign agents”.) Chris Tang, Hong Kong’s security chief, is evasive on whether wearing black or lighting candles on June 4th would be considered seditious. Authorities have hauled down statues commemorating Tiananmen and closed a museum dedicated to the massacre.

Earlier this year the government oversaw the removal from public libraries of books that mention the massacre. Accused of censorship, John Lee, Hong Kong’s chief executive, insisted that the works would still be available in private bookshops. But bookshops, too, have been purging their shelves of literature that might upset the authorities. With the legislation ill-defined, and the punishment for transgression so harsh, they have inevitably erred on the side of caution. Encouraging self-censorship is indeed the point of making the offence so vague.

For all that, Hong Kong is not yet quite the same as the mainland. Authorities have all but stamped out critical local media by closing down newsrooms and locking up journalists. But the international press is freely available to locals. Government officials, including Mr Lee, still appear before the media to answer (occasionally) difficult questions. Nor is there all-encompassing control of the internet equivalent to China’s Great Firewall (although some sites, such as that of Hong Kong Watch, a British NGO, have been blocked). For now the flame of Tiananmen will be more difficult to snuff out in Hong Kong than in Beijing—whether or not those who remember June 4th are allowed to light a candle to its victims. ■

The Economist

13. How will the Chinese interpret this? More desperation on the part of the US trying to do anything to engage with China?

U.S. Will Try to Bring China Into Arms Control Talks

By Julian E. Barnes and David E. Sanger

Julian E. Barnes reported from Washington, where the administration laid out its new plans. David Sanger, in Madrid, has covered nuclear strategy for The Times for four decades.

The New York Times · by David E. Sanger · June 2, 2023

The nuclear order established during the Cold War is under more stress than at any point since 1962, but efforts to negotiate with Beijing are unlikely to succeed anytime soon.

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Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser, described President Biden’s plans to deal with nuclear threats in a post-Cold War world.Credit...Oliver Contreras for The New York Times

By Julian E. Barnes and

Julian E. Barnes reported from Washington, where the administration laid out its new plans. David Sanger, in Madrid, has covered nuclear strategy for The Times for four decades.

June 2, 2023, 6:10 p.m. ET

The White House will renew its effort to draw China into discussions about entering arms control talks, President Biden’s national security adviser said on Friday, and will attempt to establish a global accord that specifies that artificial intelligence programs can never be used to authorize the use of nuclear weapons without a human in the decision loop.

The speech by Jake Sullivan, the adviser, was the first to describe with some specificity Mr. Biden’s plans to deal with a world in which, he said, “cracks in our post-Cold War nuclear foundation are substantial.” But the solutions he pointed to were largely aimed at maintaining nuclear deterrence by supplementing America’s deployed arsenal of 1,550 weapons with new technologies — from precision-strike conventional weapons to technological updates of the existing nuclear complex — rather than entering renewed arms races.

For the first time, Mr. Sullivan was explicit on the American response to China’s rapid military buildup, which the Pentagon says could lead it to deploy up to 1,500 nuclear weapons by 2035, a fivefold increase from the “minimum deterrent” it has possessed for nearly 60 years. If Beijing hits that number, America’s two biggest nuclear adversaries would have a combined force of over 3,000 strategic weapons, which can reach the United States.

But Mr. Sullivan argued that the U.S. arsenal does not need to “outnumber the combined total of our competitors” to remain an effective deterrent.

“It’s important to recognize that when it comes to the issue of the growing nuclear capacity of both Russia and China, that deterrence has to be comprehensive,” Mr. Sullivan said. “We believe in the current context, we have the number and type of capabilities today that we need.”

His efforts to draw China into arms control talks, however, are unlikely to achieve success anytime soon. So far, Chinese officials have refused to even discuss agreements limiting their work on nuclear weapons. And tensions between the United States and China have stayed high after months of rancor and frozen high-level contacts. Though Beijing has returned to the table on some issues, it has struck an even tougher posture on others, complicating the “thaw” in U.S.-China relations that Mr. Biden predicted in May. China has questioned Washington’s sincerity in saying it wants a warmer relationship.

Mr. Sullivan said the administration would attempt to revive arms control discussions among the nuclear-armed members of the United Nations Security Council, which includes China, and push them to embrace agreements on basic issues that can avoid accidental conflict, such as advance notification of missile tests. The United States established such agreements with the Soviet Union and renewed them with Russia, but there is no parallel accord with China.

Mr. Sullivan’s speech, at the annual meeting of the Arms Control Association, a nonpartisan group that advocates nuclear nonproliferation agreements, came at a moment when the nuclear order established during the Cold War has been under more stress than at any point since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

China’s buildup comes as North Korea has been boasting of major advances in shrinking its nuclear warheads, theoretically enabling it to put them on cruise missiles and other weapons. Mr. Sullivan noted that Iran has built up a large stockpile of near-weapons-grade fuel — a direct result, he charged, of former President Donald J. Trump’s decision to abandon a 2015 accord limiting its nuclear activities.

And Russian officials have been issuing more regular, if usually vague, threats to use tactical nuclear weapons.

“We’re under no illusions that reaching risk reduction and arms control measures will be easy,” Mr. Sullivan said. “But we do believe it is possible.”

Mr. Sullivan said Russia’s decision to suspend provisions of the New START treaty — which expires in early 2026 — and cancel other international pacts had eroded the foundations of arms control efforts.

Russia largely walked away from the New START treaty earlier this year and on Thursday, the United States announced it would take reciprocal action, halting inspections of nuclear sites, no longer providing information on the movement of weapons or launchers and no longer providing telemetry data for ballistic missile tests.

But Mr. Sullivan noted that Russia would continue to adhere to the core of the treaty, limiting its strategic warheads to 1,550. After the treaty expires, both sides will need to decide whether to renew the limits.

Mr. Sullivan said that a fresh arms control effort could begin by expanding notifications of ballistic missile test launches among major nuclear powers. Russia has agreements with the United States and China to notify them of ballistic missile test launches, but there is no such agreement between China and the U.S. Mr. Sullivan said an agreement that China would notify the United States and other permanent members of the Security Council could be possible.

While fairly basic, such a pact could lead to other agreements among the nuclear powers, including on crisis communication channels and restricting the use of artificial intelligence. Mr. Sullivan did not provide many details of the kinds of limits the administration would pursue but said one measure could manage nuclear risk by requiring “a human in the loop for command, control and deployment of nuclear weapons.”

Artificial intelligence is already at play in some missile defense systems, like the Patriot, which can be set to automatically intercept incoming missiles. Increasingly, American policymakers are worried about the temptation among many states to use artificial intelligence in determining whether and how fast to launch nuclear weapons. While that prospect has inspired movie plots for decades, in recent years the real-world challenge has grown more complex.

Artificial intelligence can aid in detecting incoming attacks. But in speeding decision-making, many experts have noted, it can also shorten decision times. The president might discover too late that a warning of incoming attack was based on bad data, faulty sensors or disinformation.

Nevertheless, some countries see some artificial intelligence as a potential deterrent. If a first strike decapitated a country’s leadership, that country’s computers could still carry out a counterattack. President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia often boasts of the Poseidon nuclear-armed torpedo, which can range across the Pacific Ocean even if the Russian leadership has already been wiped out.

“I can’t speak to every context and contingency we have into the future, but as things stand today, we believe that we have what we need,” Mr. Sullivan said.

Julian E. Barnes is a national security reporter based in Washington, covering the intelligence agencies. Before joining The Times in 2018, he wrote about security matters for The Wall Street Journal.

David E. Sanger is a White House and national security correspondent. In a 38-year reporting career for The Times, he has been on three teams that have won Pulitzer Prizes, most recently in 2017 for international reporting. His newest book is “The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage and Fear in the Cyber Age.”

The New York Times · by David E. Sanger · June 2, 2023

​14. Guam Is Officially Becoming a U.S. Fortress for Repelling Missile and Drone Attacks

What happens between now and 2029:

I think bases in Japan and Okinawa will be TRP 1 for the PLA. Guam will be TRP 2, South Korea TRP 3 and the Philippines TRP 4.

Guam Is Officially Becoming a U.S. Fortress for Repelling Missile and Drone Attacks

By 2029, the island will be capable of repelling extensive missile and drone attacks.

BY KYLE MIZOKAMIPUBLISHED: JUN 1, 2023

Popular Mechanics · June 1, 2023

• The Pentagon is proceeding with plans to build a powerful anti-missile defense system to defend Guam.
• The U.S. territory is home to critical air and naval bases and a node for projecting power into the Asia-Pacific region.
• As a result, the island will become a prime target in the event of a major war, as adversaries try to destroy airfields and harbors.

Over the last 200 years, the United States has relied on fortified bases to protect American territory. From Manila Bay to Baltimore, fortresses have long protected U.S. citizens, preventing enemy forces from gaining control of the surrounding area in wartime. The U.S. territory of Guam is the latest in this long line; by 2029, this 21st-century fortress will be capable of repelling extensive missile and drone attacks.

The Changing Nature of Fortresses

Fort Ticonderoga, overlooking Lake Champlain. Ticonderoga played an important role checking French expansionism in North America.

Getty Images

Fortresses have played an important role in the history of the United States. One of the earliest was Fort Ticonderoga, a British fort that blocked the French Army as it marched to expand French territory in the New World. During the War of 1812, Fort McHenry prevented advancing British forces from taking Baltimore, a battle that led to the penning of “The Star Spangled Banner.” In 1942, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the island fortress of Corregidor protected Manila Bay in the Philippines, then also a U.S. territory, from seaborne invasion.

Traditionally, fortresses have relied on walls of rock, and later reinforced concrete, to protect those sheltering inside from archers, catapults, and eventually heavy siege guns. Modern fortresses, like the Ukrainian capital city of Kyiv, rely on radar waves and supersonic missiles to shoot down incoming ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and even kamikaze drones. Kyiv’s invisible walls have proven highly effective at stopping Russia’s modern-day siege weapons, allowing the city’s inhabitants to live relatively peaceful lives.

More From Popular Mechanics

Western Outpost

The aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt is docked at Naval Base Guam in Apra Harbor amid the coronavirus pandemic on Monday, April 27, 2020.

TONY AZIOS//Getty Images

Guam is an island of 212 square miles located 5,975 miles off the coast of California. The island has a population of 152,600, and as a U.S. territory its people are American citizens. Guam became a U.S. territory in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War of 1898, when the protected cruiser USS Charleston seized the island without a shot from Spanish authorities who had been unaware the two countries were at war. Imperial Japan invaded and occupied the island shortly after Pearl Harbor, and U.S. forces liberated it in 1944.

Guam is America’s westernmost territory and America’s gateway to the western Pacific; it’s also the westernmost location for U.S. military bases still on American territory. Andersen Air Base, which launched raids of dozens of B-52 bombers against targets in North Vietnam, is still an important hub for American air power, while Naval Base Guam serves as home to a squadron of American nuclear-powered attack submarines and has the facilities to host warships as large as aircraft carriers. In January 2023, the U.S. Marines opened a new base, Camp Blaz, which will host up to 5,000 Marines previously based on the crowded Japanese island of Okinawa.

In the event of war, Guam would serve as an important way station for U.S. forces heading to Asia and the western Pacific. Aerial refueling tankers from Andersen would help ferry troops westward, while strategic bombers would attack heavily defended enemy targets. The island’s naval base would function as a repair depot for U.S. Navy ships damaged in battle, and reload the missile magazines of returning destroyers and frigates. Marines from Camp Blaz would embark amphibious transports for island defense or attack missions throughout the region.

21st-Century Fortress

The 108th Air Defense Artillery Brigade launches a Patriot missile at an airborne target during a joint live-fire exercise held October 1, 2014.

U.S. Army

A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on missile defenses makes it plain what the Pentagon has in store for the island: the Army and the Navy will man the island’s new defenses, which will include both sensors to detect and track enemy threats, and missiles to shoot them down.

Guam will be the first American real estate in the post-Cold War era to include 360-degree radar coverage and defense against all manner of aviation threats.

Homeland Defense Radar-Guam, also known as AN/TPY-6, will be a four-sided radar system designed to detect maneuvering ballistic missiles and high-altitude hypersonic weapons as they approach the island from very high altitudes, including low-Earth orbit, the midcourse phase of missile flight. The Army’s new Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) will monitor the “lower tier” of the atmosphere for threats such as hypersonic cruise missiles, fighters, cruise missiles, and drones. Sentinel A4 radars, designed to detect battlefield threats including aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, rockets, and artillery shells, will back up LTAMDS, and the new Army Low Cost Surveillance (ALPS) sensor will be optimized to detect terrain-hugging, subsonic drones and cruise missiles.

The Army will provide actual kinetic defense, including M903 missile launchers, which the Patriot missile uses. The M903 can launch both Patriot PAC-2 and Patriot PAC-3 missiles, which are variously useful against ballistic missiles, aircraft, cruise missiles, and drones. The service’s new Indirect Fires Protection Capability Multi-Mission Launcher (MML) will tackle incoming low-altitude threats. Each MML is capable of holding up to 15 Hellfire, Stinger, or AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles for downing cruise missiles or drones.

The Takeaway

A U.S. Army Multi-Mission Launcher salvo fires two missiles at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, 2017.

U.S. Army

In a future conflict, Guam will be America’s doorway to the Pacific, but any adversary capable of thinking strategically will go to extraordinary lengths to slam the door shut. The Pentagon believes Guam’s defenses will be complete by 2029 or 2030, and should be enough to keep the island open for business despite attacks from “any nation, including rogue states and near peer threats.”

As the siege of Kyiv is making clear, attacks on major targets with missiles and drones can drag on for months, and perhaps even until the war is over. If war breaks out with a country like China, Guam will likely be in danger for a long, long time.

Kyle Mizokami

Kyle Mizokami is a writer on defense and security issues and has been at Popular Mechanics since 2015. If it involves explosions or projectiles, he's generally in favor of it. Kyle’s articles have appeared at The Daily Beast, U.S. Naval Institute News, The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, Combat Aircraft Monthly, VICE News, and others. He lives in San Francisco.

Popular Mechanics · June 1, 2023

15. US says talks with China key to a prevent ‘crisis or conflict’

As I listen to China experts describe the Chinese interpretation of our desire for talks I am struck but how they view China's interpretation of our actions as grovelling and that we appear to make concessions so that China does not have to talk with us. Do we (can we ) really understand China? Or do we try to apply conventional international relations theory: e.g., talk to avoid crisis? Does China see things the same way? It appears that they do not.

US says talks with China key to a prevent ‘crisis or conflict’

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin tells Asian security summit that ‘conflict is neither imminent nor inevitable’ and lines of communication with China are crucial.

Al Jazeera English

United States Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said he was deeply concerned by China’s unwillingness to engage in military crisis management, warning that talks are key to avoiding conflict.

Speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on Saturday, Asia’s top security summit, Austin said that open lines of communication between US and Chinese defence and military leaders were essential to avoid conflict and bolster stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

“I am deeply concerned that the PRC [People’s Republic of China] has been unwilling to engage more seriously on better mechanisms for crisis management between our two militaries,” Austin told the meeting in Singapore.

“The more that we talk, the more that we can avoid the misunderstandings and miscalculations that could lead to crisis or conflict,” he said.

Austin made specific mention of Chinese planes making “risky intercepts of US and allied aircraft flying lawfully in international airspace”.

“We won’t be deterred by dangerous operational behaviour at sea or in international airspace,” he wrote in a series of tweets summarising his speech to the summit.

“Open lines of communication with the People’s Republic of China are essential – especially between our defence and military leaders,” he said in another tweet.

“For responsible defence leaders, the right time to talk is any time, the right time to talk is every time, and the right time to talk is now,” he said.

“Dialogue is not a reward. It is a necessity.”

Dialogue is not a reward. It is a necessity.

And the more that we talk, the more that we can avoid the misunderstandings and miscalculations that could lead to crisis or conflict. pic.twitter.com/yHvkeVrLi4

— Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III (@SecDef) June 3, 2023

Relations between Beijing and Washington are at their lowest point in decades with both China and the US deeply divided over everything from the sovereignty of Taiwan to maritime disputes in the South China Sea.

Austin pointed to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an example of “how dangerous our world would become if big countries could just invade their peaceful neighbours with impunity”.

He said the US was “deeply committed” to preserving the status quo in Taiwan and opposes unilateral changes from either side.

“Conflict is neither imminent nor inevitable. Deterrence is strong today and it’s our job to keep it that way,” Austin said.

“To be clear, we do not seek conflict or confrontation,” he said. “But we will not flinch in the face of bullying or coercion.”

US military officials have previously said that Chinese President Xi Jinping has called on his armed forces to develop the capabilities for a possible invasion of Taiwan by 2027.

“It doesn’t mean that he’s made a decision to do that,” Austin said in response to a question about Xi’s plans for Taiwan.

China’s Minister of National Defence Li Shangfu had this week declined an invitation to meet Austin at the summit. The two shook hands on the sidelines of the conference but did not hold detailed talks, the Pentagon said.

“A cordial handshake over dinner is no substitute for a substantive engagement,” Austin said. “The United States does not seek a new Cold War. Competition must never spill over into conflict,” he said.

‘Is there any sincerity?’

Al Jazeera’s Florence Looi, reporting from Singapore, said the broad theme of Austin’s speech was keeping the Asia-Pacific region “open – open to trade, open to freedom of movement”.

“He also warned that a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, should it happen, would have a devastating effect on the rest of the world,” Looi said.

Austin also said the US would continue to strengthen partnerships and alliances in the region by holding more military drills and ensuring partners had the capability to deter aggression, Looi said.

“What does China make of his speech?”

“We know that China views many of the US actions here as attempts to contain its influence and to encircle it, and this summit is taking place as US-China ties are becoming increasingly strained,” Looi said.

Liu Pengyu, spokesperson at the Chinese embassy in Washington, said on Friday in an emailed statement that communication between China and the US was conducive to a greater mutual understanding.

“However, now the US says it wants to speak to the Chinese side while seeking to suppress China through all possible means and continue imposing sanctions on Chinese officials, institutions and companies,” the statement said.

“Is there any sincerity in and significance of any communication like this?”

Another recent flashpoint has been high-end microchips, with Beijing saying last month that US semiconductor giant Micron had failed a national security review and would not be allowed to sell to operators of “critical information infrastructure”.

The announcement came after Washington and its allies took measures in recent months, which China claimed were designed to restrict its ability to purchase or manufacture cutting-edge chips and curb its rising global power.

Beijing has also criticised a deal announced by Australia in March to buy US nuclear-powered submarines.

Australia is set to spend 368 billion Australian dollars ($250bn) over three decades on the submarine programme, part of a broader security pact with the US and United Kingdom known as AUKUS.

“[AUKUS] promotes greater stability and security,” Austin said.

Beijing sees AUKUS as one more attempt by the West to hem in China as a growing global power.

Al Jazeera English

16. US Defense Secretary spoke 'briefly' with his Chinese counterpart in Singapore

US Defense Secretary spoke 'briefly' with his Chinese counterpart in Singapore | CNN Politics

CNN · by Haley Britzky · June 2, 2023

CNN —

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin “spoke briefly” with his Chinese counterpart in Singapore on Friday, a Pentagon spokesperson said Friday.

“Secretary Austin and PRC Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu spoke briefly at tonight’s opening dinner of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. The two leaders shook hands, but did not have a substantive exchange,” Pentagon Press Secretary Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder said in a statement.

“The Department believes in maintaining open lines of military-to-military communication with the PRC — and will continue to seek meaningful military-to-military discussions at multiple levels to responsibly manage the relationship,” the statement said.

The brief encounter follows China rejecting a US proposal for Austin to hold a formal meeting with his counterpart at the Shangri-La Dialogue Security Forum that is now underway in Singapore. Austin had not spoken with his counterpart in months despite other requests. Earlier this year, China refused to take a call after the US shot down a suspected Chinese surveillance balloon that had traversed across the country.

China’s Defense Ministry blamed the US in a statement this week about the deteriorating communication, saying that responsibilities “for the current difficulties faced by the two militaries in their exchanges lies entirely with the US side.”

“The US claims that it wants to strengthen communication, but in reality it disregards China’s concerns and creates artificial obstacles, seriously undermining mutual trust between the two militaries,” said ministry spokesperson Tan Kefei.

The break in communication has extended past the most senior levels of the two countries’ militaries. Adm. John Aquilino, commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, told lawmakers in April that Chinese officials have also declined to accept a standing invitation to meet with the eastern and southern theater commanders of the People’s Liberation Army.

Asked in Japan on Thursday about China’s turning down the meeting request, Austin warned that the ongoing lack of communication could result an “incident that could very, very quickly spiral out of control.”

“[Y]ou’ve heard me talk a number of times about the importance of countries, with large, with significant capabilities, being able to talk to each other so you can manage crises and prevent things from spiraling out of control unnecessarily,” Austin said during a news conference with Japanese Minister of Defense Yasukazu Hamada.

“And as we take a look at some of the things that China is doing in the international airspace in the region and international waterways, you know, the provocative intercepts of our aircraft and also our allies’ aircraft, that’s very concerning, and we would hope that they would alter their actions. But since they haven’t yet, I’m concerned about, at some point, having an incident that could very, very quickly spiral out of control.”

CNN · by Haley Britzky · June 2, 2023

17. CIA chief Burns visited China in May

CIA chief Burns visited China in May

By Michael Martina and Trevor Hunnicutt

June 2, 20233:08 PM EDTUpdated 18 hours ago

Reuters · by Michael Martina

WASHINGTON, June 2 (Reuters) - CIA director William Burns visited China last month for talks with Chinese counterparts, two U.S. officials said on Friday as Washington seeks to boost communications with Beijing.

"Last month, Director Burns traveled to Beijing where he met with Chinese counterparts and emphasized the importance of maintaining open lines of communication in intelligence channels," one of the officials told Reuters.

News of the visit by the head of the U.S. intelligence agency, first reported by the Financial Times, comes as President Joe Biden's administration has been pressing to maintain open lines and schedule meetings between various top officials in Washington and Beijing amid tense relations.

Burns, a veteran U.S. diplomat before leading the CIA, has made dozens of sensitive overseas trips as head of the agency, including to hold talks with Russian counterparts, as well as the Taliban in Afghanistan. U.S. officials are careful to stress that his intelligence-related missions are not directly linked to U.S. diplomacy.

The CIA, which does not regularly announce such visits, declined to comment on the China trip.

Ties between the world's two largest economies are strained over issues ranging from Taiwan and China's human rights record to military activity in the South China Sea.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken postponed a planned February trip to China after an alleged Chinese spy balloon flew through U.S. airspace over sensitive military sites, kicking off a diplomatic crisis.

But the White House has said efforts are continuing to facilitate visits by Blinken, as well as Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo.

Some Biden administration critics have questioned U.S. overtures to China, arguing that past decades of engagement have failed to change its line on a range of trade, security and human rights issues.

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin shook hands with China's Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu on the sidelines of a security summit in Singapore but the two did not have a "substantive exchange," the Pentagon said on Friday.

China earlier declined a formal meeting between Austin and Li, who is under U.S. sanctions, during the Shangri-La security summit taking place over the next few days.

Separately, White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan said on Friday that the U.S. wanted to engage with China "without preconditions" on nuclear arms control issues, but that Beijing continued to be unwilling.

"Simply put, we have not yet seen a willingness for the PRC (People's Republic of China) to compartmentalize strategic stability from broader issues in the relationship," Sullivan said in a speech at the Arms Control Association, noting that this had been the bedrock of nuclear and strategic security for decades.

"That's why we're also ready to engage China without preconditions, helping ensure that competition is managed, and that competition does not veer into conflict," Sullivan said.

Sullivan said he broached the issue in two days of talks in Vienna with China's top diplomat Wang Yi last month.

"We'll see what the PRC chooses to do," he said.

Reporting by Michael Martina, Jonathan Landay, David Brunnstrom and Susan Heavey in Washington Editing by Tim Ahmann, Alistair Bell, Matthew Lewis and Don Durfee

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Michael Martina

1​8. Ukraine’s Zelensky: We Are Ready for Counteroffensive

Video at the link: https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-zelensky-we-are-ready-for-counteroffensive-22f4f3f2

Ukraine’s Zelensky: We Are Ready for Counteroffensive

Ukrainian president also discusses U.S. elections, NATO and China in wide-ranging interview

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As the world waits for Ukraine’s counteroffensive against Russia, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky sat down with Wall Street Journal editor in chief Emma Tucker in Odesa to talk about the need to cement Ukraine’s long-term security as the country faces an uncertain future. Photo: Alex Stratienko

By James MarsonFollow

 and Emma TuckerFollow

June 3, 2023 12:01 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-zelensky-we-are-ready-for-counteroffensive-22f4f3f2

ODESA, Ukraine—Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said he was now ready to launch a long-awaited counteroffensive but tempered a forecast of success with a warning: It could take some time and come at a heavy cost.

“We strongly believe that we will succeed,” Zelensky said in an interview in this southern port city as his country’s military girded for what could be one of the war’s most consequential phases as it aims to retake territory occupied by Russia. 

“I don’t know how long it will take,” he told The Wall Street Journal. “To be honest, it can go a variety of ways, completely different. But we are going to do it, and we are ready.”

In a wide-ranging, hourlong discussion, Zelensky, 45 years old, said he feared U.S. elections next year could bring a less-supportive administration to power and called on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to offer a clear path to membership for Kyiv.

He also urged China to try to restrain Russia and said Ukraine urgently needed more U.S.-made Patriot missile-defense systems to protect citizens from aerial bombardments and to shield front-line troops.

Zelensky acknowledged Russian air superiority on the front lines and said a lack of protection from Russian air power means “a large number of soldiers will die” in the counteroffensive. 

Ukraine would have liked to have more Western-supplied weapons for the coming campaign, he said. Still, Ukraine is ready to move. “We would like to have certain things, but we can’t wait for months,” he said.

Soldiers operated from a trench in December in Bakhmut, Ukraine. PHOTO: MANU BRABO FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

An antiaircraft unit trained in March near Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine. PHOTO: MANU BRABO FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Zelensky said Ukraine’s ground forces were “stronger and more motivated” than the dug-in Russian troops trying to hold on to the roughly 20% of Ukraine they control in the country’s east and south. 

The counteroffensive is a pivotal moment for Zelensky, a former actor and comedian whose leadership during the war has propelled him to global prominence. The outcome will shape the contours of Western military backing and diplomatic jockeying over Ukraine’s future.

Ukraine’s backers have provided billions in military and financial support that has been essential to Kyiv’s war effort, and calls for Zelensky to seek a peace deal could grow if the counteroffensive fails to deliver a significant breakthrough.

Zelensky veered from expressions of gratitude to Western supporters for weapons deliveries to words of frustration over their reluctance to give Ukraine greater quantities of powerful arms to fend off the Russians. 

His statements reflected the balance he must find between pressing to get what he needs to retain Ukraine’s independence and domestic political support while not pushing allies too far and eroding their backing. 

Zelensky said he was aware that Western leaders sometimes take offense at his harsh tone, but couldn’t understand why, in his view, they were drip-feeding more-advanced arms that they know would protect lives and help Ukraine win.

If Ukraine isn’t able to withstand Russia, Zelensky said, “that animal, that beast will develop a taste” for conquest and go further.

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As Ukraine prepares to launch a counteroffensive, satellite images and videos show how Russia is strengthening its defense lines with antitank ditches, Dragon’s teeth and trenches. WSJ examines what Ukrainian troops could face. Photos: Planet Labs PBC; RIA-FAN

“Let’s not compare who should be grateful to whom,” he said.

Zelensky spoke at a government residence after a day visiting wounded soldiers, meeting military commanders and visiting the port to discuss how to increase exports. Wearing a black T-shirt emblazoned with his country’s name, he looked a touch weary, but perked up when asked how he keeps his spirits up. 

“There is no place for weakness,” he said.

The West has helped train and equip tens of thousands of soldiers to try to strengthen Kyiv’s hand for the counteroffensive.

Ukraine repelled a Russian assault on its capital in February last year and took back swaths of territory in the northeast and south in two earlier counteroffensives in 2022.

In recent weeks, Ukraine has stepped up long-range attacks with missiles and drones aimed at crippling Russian supply lines ahead of the campaign. Ukraine-backed Russian volunteers have staged cross-border raids aimed at forcing Russia to shift troops away from front lines inside Ukraine.

Western officials said they thought Ukraine’s counterattack was imminent, and that Kyiv was waiting for the ground to dry out.

Russian offensive efforts this year have yielded tiny gains, including the capture of the small eastern city of Bakhmut, but cost thousands of lives and strained Russia’s military.

Ukraine’s Western backers recognize that Kyiv’s own offensive won’t end the war, but want it to demonstrate to Russian President Vladimir Putin the futility of his strategy of digging in and waiting for support for Ukraine to erode, a Western official said.

The Biden administration has committed more than $37 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion and pledged further military aid. European allies have followed.

But former President Donald Trump, the leading Republican contender for the 2024 presidential election, declined last month to say he would back Ukraine, saying instead that he would seek to bring a swift end to the war, without saying how.

Zelensky said he was concerned that any change in administration could affect aid.

“In a situation like this, when there is support, you are afraid of changes,” he said. “And to be honest, when you mention a change of administration, I feel the same way as any other person—you want changes for the better, but it can also be the other way around.”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said President Biden had an affinity for Ukraine that underscored American support for the country. PHOTO: LUDOVIC MARIN/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Zelensky said he couldn’t understand Trump’s claim he could end the war in 24 hours, as Trump hadn’t done so while in office, when Russia was already occupying Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine. 

Biden has an emotional attachment to Ukraine that has underpinned his administration’s support for the country, Zelensky said. Trump’s presidency came before the full-scale invasion, and “I’m not sure how Trump would have acted,” he said.

Still, Ukraine’s president said he was encouraged by bipartisan support in the U.S. and the backing of ordinary citizens, and hoped that both parties and Congress would continue to support Ukraine and pressure any new administration to keep up flows of assistance.

A more immediate concern for Zelensky is to secure a clear path to NATO membership at a summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, in July.

NATO said in 2008 that Ukraine would become a member, but gave no timeline. Ukraine applied for membership last year, but the U.S., the alliance’s unofficial leader, largely has sidestepped discussions of how or when Ukraine might join NATO, instead focusing on boosting Kyiv’s security and military strength.

The Russians captured the small eastern Ukraine city of Bakhmut this year but at a steep cost to its military. PHOTO: MANU BRABO FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Zelensky said some in NATO were unwilling to admit Ukraine owing to fear of Russia. But pressure is growing on the alliance to offer concrete security guarantees and a path to membership.

Zelensky said he didn’t expect Ukraine to join NATO while fighting continued, but wanted a pledge that it would be admitted after the war.

“If we are not given a signal in Vilnius, I believe there is no point for Ukraine to be at this summit,” he said. Asked whether he thought he would get such a signal, he replied: “I don’t know. I honestly don’t know.”

Zelensky said he was grateful to Western countries for supplying weapons systems, but that deliveries should be faster and in greater numbers as delays were costing lives.

In particular, he said, Ukraine needs more Patriot missile batteries—which consist of several launchers, a powerful radar, a control station and other support equipment—to protect its cities and front-line troops. 

Ukraine now has at least two Patriot batteries, but Zelensky said he would like as many as 50, as it is the only system capable of intercepting some of the advanced missiles fired from Russia. 

Zelensky’s administration has sought to isolate Russia by working to win support from countries including China, India and Brazil that maintain friendly relations with Russia.

He is trying to convene a summit around his 10-point peace plan, which calls for Russian troops to withdraw from Ukrainian territory.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said deliveries of Western weapons systems need to be faster—and in greater numbers. PHOTO: JUSTYNA MIELNIKIEWICZ/MAPS FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

“Putin has to know that people won’t shake his hand, that he no longer sits at the table with serious countries, that Russia is not part of international organizations,” he said. 

China, which hasn’t condemned Russia’s invasion and has blamed the U.S. and its allies for the war, has sought to insert itself in diplomacy aimed at peace. Ukraine has said it is prepared to listen to China’s views but won’t agree to any proposal that would involve ceding territory.

Zelensky has said he urged Chinese President Xi Jinping in an April phone call not to supply Russia with weapons or other technologies, and Xi reassured him that China wasn’t providing arms to Russia.

China is bigger and more powerful than Russia and could play an important role in bringing peace, Zelensky said.

“I would not want such a country to stand by and watch people die,” he said. “If you are big, this is what national greatness means. This is not a painting or a museum; it is a real, bloody war.”

Max Colchester contributed to this article.

Write to James Marson at james.marson@wsj.com

19. What the Future Might Hold for Asia: "Every Time China Has Been United, It Has Dominated"

Excerpts:

DER SPIEGEL: Do you think the U.S. and other powers will allow the emergence of such a world order?

Yeo: Right now, the U.S. is still resisting multipolarity, and therefore can’t play that role. But once America accepts that the world is multipolar, it should grow into that role. Europe wants America to be first among equals. Singapore wants that, too. And in the end, China will accept it, even if it won’t say so.

What the Future Might Hold for Asia: "Every Time China Has Been United, It Has Dominated"

China is upgrading its nuclear arsenal even as its relationship to the U.S. is deteriorating. George Yeo, the former foreign minister of Singapore, discusses the ongoing power struggle in the Pacific region.

Interview Conducted by Bernhard Zand in Singapore

02.06.2023, 17.30 Uhr

Spiegel · by Bernhard Zand, DER SPIEGEL

DER SPIEGEL: Mr. Yeo, which of the many crises in the Asia-Pacific region do you consider to be the most concerning at the moment?

Yeo: The evolution of U.S.-China relations. China is on its way to becoming the world's biggest economy. It will be a comprehensive power and the United States feels threatened by it. It sees a threat to its global dominance and is trying everything to slow down China, and even to bring it down if possible. And the Chinese know that.

About George Yeo

Foto: Ore Huiying / DER SPIEGEL

A former brigadier general, George Yeo, born in 1954, was the foreign minister of Singapore from 2004 to 2011. He received his education in Singapore, Britain and the U.S. On Friday, June 2, Singapore plays host to the Shangri-La Dialogue, the Asian counterpart to the Munich Security Conference.

DER SPIEGEL: Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, the Pacific Island nations – almost all countries in the region want to continue trading with China. Militarily, however, most of them are looking to cozy up to the United States.

Yeo: For almost all of us, the "China account" is growing. I don’t think anyone would want to reduce the China account, because that account is too important and too lucrative. But everyone wants to diversify, and we welcome other partners. To have the U.S. around is a good thing. But as I once said elsewhere, America's best position is to be over-the-horizon. When their ships come within visual range, then instead of benefiting from a U.S. presence, we become peripheral to a larger game. That is not to our advantage.

DER SPIEGEL: What about European ships? Would you like to see a greater European presence in the Indo-Pacific?

Yeo: I don’t think European ships matter much. If they come to this part of the world, it’s like an ornamental presence. They come, they go. We have parties. But no one seriously believes that the European powers are a significant military force in this region.

"The very idea of South Korea becoming nuclear-armed would frighten Japan."

DER SPIEGEL: Russia's invasion of Ukraine has raised concerns in some countries that they, too, could be threatened by a major nuclear power. Japan is arming and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol has even spoken of a potential need for his country to develop its own nuclear weapons. Is he perhaps not the only one thinking along those lines?

Yeo: These are very major decisions for Japan and Korea. Japan is the victim of two atomic bombs, something that is seared in their collective memory. So, they won’t embark on such a path lightly. The very idea of South Korea becoming nuclear-armed would frighten Japan, because the historical animosity between Japan and Korea runs deep. The U.S. must manage this relationship very carefully, because standing up to the nuclear threat ...

DER SPIEGEL: ... also coming from North Korea ...

Yeo: … is how the U.S. justifies its presence in the region. Tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers are stationed in South Korea and Japan. If such countries go nuclear, there is less of a reason for the U.S. to be here in the region. But America wants to stay. So that is a card best used by being flashed but not being played. Because if it is played – would that be in the interests of the United States? I don't think so. Would it be in Japan's interest? Certainly not. Would it help South Korea against North Korea? I don't think so either.

Chinese DF-41 ballistic missiles during a military parade on Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 2019.

Foto:

Mark Schiefelbein / AP

DER SPIEGEL: Meanwhile, China is upgrading its nuclear arsenal. It could soon have 1,000 or 1,500 warheads instead of around 400.

Yeo: China's push towards nuclear weapons has to do with its need for a second-strike capability, i.e. the possibility of responding to a nuclear attack with a counter-strike. The Chinese know that the U.S. wants to deny them this ability. The U.S., on the other hand, senses that without its nuclear deterrent capability, China is likely to prevail in a conventional war over Taiwan. So they want to be able to threaten China with a nuclear attack.

DER SPIEGEL: A constellation reminiscent of the Cold War.

Yeo: That's one of the reasons why there is so much interest in the South China Sea. Not so much because of the freedom of navigation, which has never been an issue, but because of submarine warfare. China’s view is: Let's assume our opponent can locate every one of our ballistic-armed nuclear submarines. Well, then I'll increase my warhead count from 500 to 1,000, maybe even to 1,500. Because even if the other side destroys 95 percent of them, I'll still have some to hit back with. Meanwhile, I will build tunnels under my cities – just as China did in the 1960s and 1970s, when Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev threatened China. That explains China's response.

"China has always ruled out the first use of nuclear weapons."

DER SPIEGEL: It is, perhaps, a surprising analogy, but Beijing and Moscow were actually enemies in the Cold War.

Yeo: China has always ruled out the first use of nuclear weapons. From Beijing's point of view, this makes sense because China is an extremely strong conventional military power. But when threatened, it must be able to threaten back.

DER SPIEGEL: How worried are you about this situation?

Yeo: These developments are concerning in terms of the titanic struggle between the U.S. and China. They don't affect us directly, because I don't think China has any intention of threatening any of us with nuclear weapons. China doesn't need to do so because its conventional military force is so much bigger than ours. It can also use trade as a powerful instrument in their statecraft.

DER SPIEGEL: Could it be that the strategic order in the Pacific will develop in a similar way to that in the Atlantic, with mutual security alliances like NATO and the former Warsaw Pact?

Yeo: I don't think so, because the historical conditions in East Asia are different. Never since the fall of Rome did Europe ever have a single power so dominant that it could overwhelm everybody else. In the case of East Asia, every time China has been united, it has dominated. We are seeing the repeat of an old pattern. China's dominance is primarily economic and, to a lesser extent, political. It was never military in the way that military means were used in Europe. There have been horrible civil wars within China, millions of Chinese have killed each other when fighting for power.

Taiwanese warships during a naval exercise in April 2023.

Foto: HANDOUT / AFP

DER SPIEGEL: But not beyond China's borders?

Yeo: Traditionally, the Chinese thinking was: Yes, you can win a war. You can kill people and occupy territories. But then what? This is a historical wisdom which is told and retold in the storybooks. In the "Romance of the Three Kingdoms,” one of the four classic novels, there is an episode in which the great strategist Zhuge Liang subdued a "southern barbarian." It turned out to be very difficult. He was arrested, he then promised to behave and was released – and went to war again. This was repeated several times. "Why don't you have him killed?" Zhuge Liang was asked. His answer: Then someone else will take over. "Why don't you occupy his territory?" Answer: Because that's when the problems really begin. Eventually, the recalcitrant barbarian was tamed and there was peace.

DER SPIEGEL: Europe felt secure for a long time. Most of its conflicts, it seemed, had been settled and the demons of the past had been banished. Then, Russia invaded Ukraine. In Asia, though, many of the historical conflicts have not been resolved to this day.

Yeo: Japan has found it difficult to fully acknowledge the history of the Pacific War. China says: You may want to forget, but we will not forget, and we will not allow the world to forget. The Chinese have opened war museums and made archives and historical documents accessible. Instead of merely complaining about problematic Japanese school textbooks and history books, it decided to open up the archives to the world, including to Japanese scholars. There will be no forgetting in Asia.

Museum visitors in Beijing in front of an exhibit showing war atrocities committed during the Japanese occupation of China from 1931 to 1945.

Foto: FREDERIC J. BROWN / AFP

DER SPIEGEL: Doesn't that confirm concerns that the security situation in Asia has long been underestimated? That the historical undercurrents have only receded into the background – but are in fact still very influential?

Yeo: These currents are there, but they may not be as consequential as in Europe because of China’s overwhelming size. Even though Japan is now rearming and will double its defense budget – can Japan become as threatening to China as it was 100 years ago? I don't think so. Can Korea become a threat to Japan because of all those historical memories? Not unless China allows it. And fortunately, it is not in China’s interest to allow the region to be destabilized. In all different scenarios, you have a dominant China, which would ultimately tip the scales.

"In the overall architecture of this new world, America must become the first among equals."

DER SPIEGEL: The Taiwan conflict is also a historical legacy. Beijing regards Taiwan as part of its territory. But former U.S. President Donald Trump's last secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, has openly called for recognizing Taiwan as an independent state. What would happen if Taiwan officially declared its independence?

Yeo: Taiwan could only do that if the U.S. supported it. But Washington cannot do that because that means war. Its relations with Beijing are based on the one-China policy. China can accept that America does not encourage unification between China and Taiwan. But preventing unification would mean war. So there is a red line in between the two positions. Both sides need to talk to avoid accidents. Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu won't be meeting his U.S. counterpart Lloyd Austin at the Shangri-La Dialogue here in Singapore, because the U.S. has declined to remove the sanctions it imposed upon him. To the Chinese, this is insulting. In China’s mind, direct talks are not an end in themselves. They are not a favor granted by the U.S. to China.

DER SPIEGEL: Europe is worried about a possible re-election of Trump. What would such a re-election mean for Asia?

Yeo: Trump can be outrageous and completely inconsistent. But a friend of mine who is not fond of Trump once told me that Trump’s core is very stable. He listed four elements: Trump is against uncontrolled immigration. He is against free trade. He is pro-business. And he is against war. I don't think Trump’s core has changed. After Joe Biden's election, many thought America's politics would be fundamentally realigned. In truth, Biden has deepened some of Trump's tendencies. And on the last of those four points about Trump, I think U.S. Democrats may be more prone to using military force than Republicans.

George Yeo with DER SPIEGEL correspondent Bernhard Zand during their interview at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore.

Foto: Ore Huiying / DER SPIEGEL

DER SPIEGEL: Just like German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, you say that we are now living in a "multipolar" world. Isn't the new world order actually much more chaotic and unpredictable than this term suggests?

Yeo: Not necessarily. The world clearly moved away from being bipolar, became temporarily unipolar and is now multipolar. In order to gain stability and positive energy, we also need structure in this multipolar world. Two poles will always be close to each other: Europe and America. Europe will remain a weak pole because it needs America to defend itself. There is also a deep civilizational relationship. So, these two will have to stay close together. And then there is a Chinese pole that will be strong and will have a strong peripheral influence. Russia will be close to China for as long as there is no peace agreement in Ukraine, which may be for decades. But in the overall architecture of this new world, America must become the first among equals. Only the U.S., because of its history and culture, has the connectivity, the "software” for this role.

DER SPIEGEL: Do you think the U.S. and other powers will allow the emergence of such a world order?

Yeo: Right now, the U.S. is still resisting multipolarity, and therefore can’t play that role. But once America accepts that the world is multipolar, it should grow into that role. Europe wants America to be first among equals. Singapore wants that, too. And in the end, China will accept it, even if it won’t say so.

Spiegel · by Bernhard Zand, DER SPIEGEL

​20. What Engagement With China Has Meant for Me

What Engagement With China Has Meant for Me

For a Wall Street Journal reporter born in China, the mutual openness that began in the 1990s made it possible to envision a better future.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-engagement-with-china-has-meant-for-me-3d620e6a?mod=hp_lista_pos2

By Lingling WeiFollow

June 3, 2023 12:01 am ET

Over the past decade, the relationship between the U.S. and China has gone from a symbiotic embrace—“Chimerica,” as some academics called it—to an ominous mutual rejection. There is now a bipartisan consensus in Washington that the longstanding strategy of deepening economic ties with Beijing has failed. China’s leadership, in turn, increasingly sees the U.S. as an existential threat. In both countries, anyone arguing in favor of a softer line is seen as politically naive or worse.

But there is another side to the story. Mutual engagement opened up vistas for millions of Chinese and exposed Americans to a culture that is thousands of years old and a government that, for better or worse, will shape the future of the planet.

I am a product of that engagement. Coming of age in China in the 1990s, an era of openness to the West ushered in by Deng Xiaoping, I learned English by reading Mark Twain, listening to the Carpenters and watching “Growing Pains” on TV. As a student at Shanghai’s Fudan University, a brand-new Center for American Studies gave me access to The Wall Street Journal, the New York Times and other American publications. Along with some of my classmates, I devoured those pages, which we received weeks after they were published, gaining a rough understanding of independent journalism.

As eager as I was to learn about the U.S., many Americans were just as curious about China.

My first job after graduation, at a state-owned newspaper, involved writing glowing reports on foreign businesses setting up in Shanghai’s new development zone or on the extraordinary height of new office buildings. It was strictly a political exercise, but it brought me into contact with American businesspeople for the first time. I realized that as eager as I was to learn about the U.S., many Americans were just as curious about China.

A growing desire to get beyond the limits of state-controlled reporting pulled me toward the U.S. My own version of the American dream looked close to realization when I got a scholarship to New York University’s business-journalism program. Then, in May 1999, the U.S. bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Serbia, an event that put engagement at risk. No one in China believed the bombing was a mistake resulting from a bad map, as Washington claimed. In Shanghai, enraged college students hurled rocks at the U.S. consulate building, chanting “blood for blood” and “down with the U.S.A.!”

I was angry, too, and confused: Was the U.S. an enemy now? Would I still be able to go to New York? In an email I dashed off to Stephen Solomon, the NYU professor who accepted me into the business-journalism program he founded, I questioned the intentions of the U.S. in a way that now reminds me of the nationalist zealots termed “Little Pinks” in China today.

“Chinese people are outraged by the bombing, and people are wondering why the embassy became a target,” I wrote. “Just because our embassy represents Yugoslavia’s interests by opposing NATO’s airstrikes?” I was repeating the Chinese government’s line at the time.

My American professor encouraged me not to feel let down. “By fulfilling your dream of becoming a journalist,” he wrote back, “you would have an opportunity to get beyond all the political posturing.”

The bombing didn’t end up derailing engagement. The bilateral relationship was too important, at a time when China’s leaders put the country’s economic development ahead of everything else. “China will not deviate from the policy of developing the economy and carrying out reform and opening because of this incident,” then-President Jiang Zemin said in a speech a week after the Belgrade bombing. That meant I could get on the plane to New York.

Later the same year, the Clinton administration cut a deal with China that paved the way for the world’s most populous country to eventually join the World Trade Organization. That helped propel China’s phenomenal economic rise, allowing hundreds of millions of people to lift themselves out of poverty in the following decades.

The author on the ferry to the Statue of Liberty soon after arriving in the U.S. to study at New York University, 1999. PHOTO: LINGLING WEI

In New York, an internship at The Wall Street Journal led to a permanent job. I reported on how once-obscure Chinese companies were buying stakes in marquee American firms such as Morgan Stanley and Blackstone Group. I wrote about how a real estate tycoon named Donald Trump warmly greeted the chairman of China’s largest state-owned bank, which had leased an entire floor of Trump Tower.

In 2010, after I became an American citizen, I returned to China to report for The Journal, writing about Beijing’s handling of the economy and how its secretive decision-making process affects everyday lives. Then came the Covid pandemic. In the spring of 2020, American reporters were ordered to leave China by Xi Jinping’s government. It was the biggest expulsion of Western journalists since early in the Mao Zedong era, as the pandemic deepened tensions between the two nations.

In May 2020 I was escorted to a gate at Shanghai’s Pudong Airport, thrown out of the country where I was born and spent half my life. Fifteen hours later, as I handed over my blue U.S. passport at JFK Airport in New York, a customs officer greeted me with the words, “Welcome home.”

The two simple words brought tears to my eyes. I had thought of myself as Chinese, but at that moment I realized the essence of being American: You’re always welcome, no matter where you were born. The U.S. is built on inclusiveness. It’s one of the biggest factors in American competitiveness and what drew me here two decades ago.

Over the past three years, relations between the U.S. and China have turned ever more tense, with competition and sometimes outright confrontation replacing engagement. Communication between Washington and Beijing all but halted when the U.S. shot down an alleged Chinese spy balloon in February.

Ordinary Americans’ attitudes toward China have grown increasingly antagonistic. Some influential voices in the security establishment have gone as far as criticizing U.S. businesses for “underwriting America’s demise” by doing business in China. Chinese scientists and students who used to flock to the U.S. for opportunities now complain about increasing hostility to anything Chinese.

There is similar rhetoric in China, with accusations that the U.S. is doing all it can to keep China down. Authorities have tightened restrictions on academic exchanges, and many Chinese now feel a palpable sense of hopelessness. A friend in Shanghai who went to study in the U.S. around the same time I did recently wrote to me, “It appears the door that opened to me 22 years ago to the world has now been shut.”

In the U.S., one argument for engagement was that it would help open up China politically. Instead, China has become more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad.

The fact that the West won the hearts and minds of so many of us is one reason why Xi is trying to isolate China from foreign influences.

Still, engagement with the U.S. made it possible for many Chinese to realize their dreams by coming to the West or working with Western companies, or just by seeing the economy around them take off due to trade. The fact that the West won the hearts and minds of so many of us is one reason why Xi, who is more focused than his predecessors on political control and ideological purity, is trying to isolate China from foreign influences.

For Chinese people like me, with a foot in both countries, the current lack of engagement means that we have to do our jobs—and stay in touch with our loved ones—from afar. My 9-year-old son and I have been videocalling my parents, both in their 70s, nearly every day for the past three years. “Every day at this time is my happiest moment,” my mom tells me whenever I call. It is an uncertain and painful new reality for me and my family.

Lingling Wei is chief China correspondent for The Wall Street Journal and the co-author of “Superpower Showdown: How the Battle Between Trump and Xi Threatens a New Cold War.”

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the June 3, 2023, print edition as 'What America’s Engagement With China Has Meant for Me'.

21. A BARRIER TO LONG-TERM SUCCESS: SHORT-TERMISM

Afghan Hands was a gimmick. Why don't we have a China Hands Program, or a Russia Hands Program, or an Iranian Hands Program or a north Korean Hands Program?

What causes "short-term-itis?" Our industrial strength personnel management system. Army SOF – e.g., SF, CA, and PSYOP should be able to sustain long term presence but instead we did 6 month rotations (parto the reason for that was because while everyone rotated to Afghanistan and Iraq the regionally forces still had to conduct operations (and rotations) in their areas of responsibility even while the GWOT was taking place in Iraq and Afghanistan. But it was because they were (and still are) subject to service personnel management policies.  We need new authorities to manage personnel using unconventional or routine methods and focus instead on mission accomplishment while ensuring those who serve for long periods overseas are not disadvantaged for career progression (e.g., promotions). We have to stop the cookie cutter one sized fits all approach to personnel management.

A BARRIER TO LONG-TERM SUCCESS: SHORT-TERMISM - War Room - U.S. Army War College

warroom-armywarcollege-edu.cdn.ampproject.org · by Assad Raza

Short-term-itis, also known as short-termism, is not a new concept and can be simply defined as “an excessive focus on short-term results at the expense of long-term interests.”

In July 2022, John F. Sopko, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), emphasized a critical problem called “short-term-itis.” According to Sopko, “Everyone in Washington is focused on showing success under unrealistic timelines that do not reflect the reality on the ground…We didn’t fight ‘one’ twenty-year war – we fought ‘twenty’ one-year wars.” His comments present a common issue that permeates organizations: the trap for government personnel to make short-term decisions without taking into account the effects on U.S. long-term interests. This issue mentioned by Sopko raises questions about what factors contribute to these decisions and how organizations can reduce them to better align with their long-term interests. This article examines the problems SIGAR exposes and provides suggestions to minimize short-term decision-making among government agencies, specifically military services.

Short-term-itis, also known as short-termism, is not a new concept and can be simply defined as “an excessive focus on short-term results at the expense of long-term interests.” This overemphasis on quick results is a complex problem influenced by several organizational factors pushing individuals to make such decisions to meet set quotas or financial compensations like bonuses and promotions. For over 30 years, scholars and practitioners across different sectors, from business to government, have debated the consequences of short-termism. For example, those in the financial sector argue that short-termism was a pivotal contributor to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis that led to a world-wide recession. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp (FDIC) chairman at the time, Sheila C. Bair, noted that the common theme throughout Wall Street and Washington is the overvaluing of short-term gains while discounting the long-term consequences. Bair also expressed that routine decision-making is usually influenced by greed and instant gratification, another reason for short-termism.

This perspective on decision-making driven by self-interest has implications that extend beyond individual decision-makers to encompass institutions such as government and military organizations. Various factors such as election cycles, constituents, and lobbyists exert pressure on government officials to prioritize short-term gains. For example, the United Nations has argued that this short-termism exhibited by governments and investors has impeded progress toward creating sustainable economies in developing countries impacted by climate change.

Political pressures, stemming from changes in government leadership, budget constraints, and lobbying efforts, have also formed barriers to long-term initiatives aimed at promoting sustainability and economic equity. Furthermore, within military organizations, the combination of organizational pressures and performance-based incentives, such as promotions, may encourage short-term gains at the expense of strategic long-term goals.

Although several factors contributing to short-termism can be applied from other sectors to the military, deployment lengths and results-based culture are two important factors for personnel who served in Afghanistan. According to Sopko, short tours of duty for both military and foreign service personnel created critical knowledge gaps during handovers, which he dubbed the “annual lobotomy.” This high turnover combined with the pressures to perform put individuals in a situation to make mistakes similar to those made by their predecessors. One SIGAR report provided an example of the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan’s (CSTC-A) missteps driven partly by the high turnover of personnel:

In one instance in 2013, incoming personnel at CSTC-A requested $195.2 million for specialized military cargo trucks on behalf of the Afghan National Army, unaware that the White House and the National Security Council had already approved an identical request placed by their predecessors. Under pressure to allocate funds quickly and without knowing they were duplicating an already-filled order, CSTC-A personnel went ahead and procured the trucks anyway, even though the Afghan government did not need them.

This particular instance, which is one of several identified by SIGAR, highlights how the difficulties associated with short deployment cycles may be compounded when operating within a military culture that is results-based. In his speech, Sopko noted how military units would arrive, conduct an assessment, highlight their progress mid-way, and claim their successes on their way out, with the next unit repeating the same cycle. Personnel often failed to recognize the previous unit’s contributions and typically adopted a new approach to address the issue without any meaningful impact on the situation on the ground.

Similar to the business sector pressures created by sales quotas to gauge performance, U.S. government personnel felt pressured to show quick results in Afghanistan. For example, unrealistic timelines placed U.S. government personnel under undue stress to deliver results through reconstruction projects. This pressure was seen more on military personnel as they continuously increased spending on these projects.

According to General David Petraeus, “What drove spending was the need to solidify gains as quickly as we could, knowing that we had a tight drawdown timeline. . . . And we wound up spending faster than we would have if we felt we had forces longer than we did.” Furthermore, the excessive focus on spending became the short-term pressure to gauge results at the expense of actual long-term conditions on the ground. In a SIGAR interview, an unnamed United States Agency for International Development (USAID) official said, “There was a real and pervasive belief that if you dumped money into an economy, you could save it. Those of us who said otherwise were ignored…The strategy was “money expended equals success.” Thus, the pressure to demonstrate tangible outcomes during the U.S. military’s drawdown of troops influenced short-term decision-making, undermining the effectiveness of these programs to just measuring money spent.

One recommendation is for leaders to create a conditions-based versus a performance-based evaluation system for commanders at all levels while deployed.

Considering that certain governmental pressures influencing short-termism such as budget cycles, limited time in positions, deployment cycles, and the need for cross-organizational coordination, are unlikely to dissipate, how should U.S. government personnel across the different departments and agencies ensure they do not feel pressured to make short-term decisions, as seen in Afghanistan?

One recommendation is for leaders to create a conditions-based versus a performance-based evaluation system for commanders at all levels while deployed. Similar to the financial sector, the military evaluation system incentivizes short-term results over long-term gains causing personnel to seek a short-term competitive advantage over their peers for promotion. Moreover, any long-term consequences from their decisions may not be seen until after they are promoted and moved on to another position not associated with their previous unit or deployment. Thus, a conditions-based evaluation system may impel commanders to focus on how their tactical tasks, subordinates, and performance unique to their operations on the ground contribute to the long-term strategic goals while deployed. Although an alternate evaluation system for deployments may not entirely prevent short-termism, it may give personnel a sense of security that their careers are not at risk due to the perception of not performing because of constraints or other conditions out of their control on the ground.

At the policy level, U.S. policymakers must ensure that timelines for producing results do not create conditions for short-termism for personnel on the ground. One significant finding by SIGAR was that unrealistic timelines and expectations created organizational pressure and reinforced short-termism among personnel on the ground, contributing to the failure of programs in Afghanistan. To the degree allowed by other external factors such as elections and other stakeholders, U.S. policymakers must ensure decisions and timelines are developed based on the ground conditions and have the flexibility to ensure long-term strategic goals are not at risk due to timelines influenced by budget or deployment cycles.

Interestingly, it remains unclear how the duration of deployment cycles affects short-termism. Although the conventional wisdom as expressed by Sopko in his speech suggests that longer deployments help, others argue that shorter but repeated deployments to the same region may encourage focus on longer-term objectives. Longer deployments might also create other problems, like reduced reenlistment rates. Business literature is similarly ambiguous about how length of tenure might affect short-termism. An article in the Harvard Business Review highlighted the contradictory results of studies conducted on this issue over the years. Some scholars suggest that brief CEO tenures promote short-term thinking, while others have found that CEOs who remain in their positions for extended periods are more inclined to take on short-term risks that may jeopardize long-term benefits.

Unfortunately, the pressure to spend money because of a budget cycle is also another contributor to short-termism, as seen with the CSTC-A personnel under pressure to allocate funds because of a budget cycle that didn’t align with their deployment cycle. This put unneeded stress on personnel and resulted in excess expenditure of almost $200 million. It is imperative that budget cycles become more pliable and adaptable to changing circumstances, which may not align with initial projections. Even domestically, government agencies, including military personnel, experience pressure to overspend towards the end of the fiscal year to guarantee their budget for the upcoming year. According to Liebman and Mahoney, allowing government budgets to roll over reduces end-of-year spending, as seen with the Department of Justice’s special rollover authority for their extensive information technology (IT) projects. Thus, governmental budget policies should offer more flexibility on expenditures to prevent personnel from feeling compelled to overspend due to the fear of losing funding, another crucial factor promoting short-termism.

Considering the operational constraints at the time, it would not be reasonable or justifiable to attribute blame for short-termism in Afghanistan to any particular entity. However, the challenges in Afghanistan mentioned by Sopko and his team suggest the importance of studying short-termism across all U.S. government departments and agencies that contributed to this complex problem. Further inquiry is merited to explore potential modifications to deployment rotations, personnel evaluations, and budget cycles, with the goal of mitigating the effects of short-termism.

The issue of short-termism is not new, and its resolution is not imminent. Nevertheless, officials in government and the military must acknowledge the potential repercussions that may arise when excessive emphasis is placed on short-term objectives at the expense of the overall success of a long-term strategy. As highlighted by Sopko’s concluding remarks, “The only real question is whether, next time, we want to learn from the mistakes that we experienced at such great cost in blood and treasure, or – as we’ve done all too often in the past – make it up as we go and see how things turn out.”

Assad Raza is a retired U.S. Army Civil Affairs officer. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in psychology from the University of Tampa, a Master of Arts in diplomacy with a concentration in international conflict management from Norwich University, and a Master of Military Art and Science from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.

Photo Description: John Sopko, Special Inspector General For Afghanistan Reconstruction

Photo Credit: SIGAR Office

warroom-armywarcollege-edu.cdn.ampproject.org · by Assad Raza

22. Fleet Tactics & Special Warfare

"Maritime special forces?"

Conclusion:

Maritime special forces should have a role in naval operations in confined, littoral waters around the globe. But the tactical integration of NSW into the functions and counterfunctions of scouting, command and control, and firepower is underdeveloped. It needs to be improved by integrating NSW and fleet tactics, training, and exercises to become viable in combat.22 NSW has proven its tactical capability in counterterrorism missions, but the nation’s premier maritime special operations force must be able to contribute to fleet-level operations against peer threats in the maritime environment. NSW and the Navy need to improve their understanding of each other before the fight begins.

Fleet Tactics & Special Warfare

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/june/fleet-tactics-special-warfare

Naval Postgraduate School Essay Contest—First Prize

Sponsored by NPS Foundation and the Naval Institute

Naval Special Warfare can contribute much to the fight at sea.

By Lieutenant Commander Kenneth Walls Jr., U.S. Navy

June 2023 Proceedings Vol. 149/6/1,444

Since its first publication in 1986, the three editions of Captain Wayne Hughes’ Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations have become the definitive works on modern naval tactics in cyber, littoral, and fleet engagements. Despite the notable absence of Naval Special Warfare (NSW) from the text, NSW’s capabilities can support Hughes’ and coauthor Rear Admiral Robert Girrier’s six fleet functions: scouting and antiscouting; command and control (C2) and command-and-control countermeasures (C2CM); and firepower and counterforce.1 Fleet Tactics describes best practices for winning individual battles; NSW can directly contribute to naval victory in combat, especially in the littorals.2 Indeed, special forces contributions are most applicable within these confined coastal spaces crowded by commercial and military traffic—or, as Fleet Tactics puts it, “where the clutter is.”3

Fleet Engagements and Special Operations

SEALs fast rope onto the deck of the expeditionary sea base USS Miguel Keith (ESB-5) in the Philippine Sea. ESBs are designed to facilitate aviation and special operations forces, including launch and recovery of small craft, and would be well suited for deploying Naval Special Warfare forces. U.S. Marine Corps (Christopher W. England)

The exclusion of special operations may result from the book’s heavy emphasis on missile warfare. Or perhaps it is because of the text’s assumptions that the purpose of naval operations, especially in littoral zones, is to support objectives on land.4 Special forces do not obviously fit into missile combat, and it is easy to assume any fleet effort that requires significant land forces would involve massed Marines or soldiers, eliminating the need for small units. It is an easy omission to make. Even retired Admiral William McRaven, perhaps the most notable contemporary scholar on special operations, sees special forces as small units capable of achieving victory over superior numbers through “relative superiority,” not as a component of a larger naval engagement.5

However, McRaven cites examples of special forces in littoral combat, such as the Italian manned torpedo attack at Alexandria in 1941 and the British attack on the battleship Tirpitz in 1943, which demonstrate a definite role for small units in naval tactics. These methods may simply need to be updated for 21st-century combat.6 NSW has proven itself capable of McRaven’s version of special operations, but it has much to contribute to national defense through support of the larger Navy.

SOF Supporting the Six Fleet Functions

NSW comprises theater-deployed forces that are manned, trained, and equipped by Naval Special Warfare Command. Most military members are familiar with the SEAL teams, but NSW is also home to special reconnaissance teams, special boat teams, and SEAL delivery vehicle teams. These NSW components all have niche capabilities and deploy together in various configurations based on the operating area. Most common is the “task unit,” which is an O-4-led formation containing boat detachments, special reconnaissance capabilities, and SEAL platoons, supported by a small headquarters and staff. This operational structure is adaptable and expeditionary and could support each of the six fleet tactical functions.

Hughes and Girrier note the potential of unmanned vehicles to address the challenges of scouting and antiscouting operations.7 Naval Special Warfare invested heavily in unmanned assets and associated tactics during the war on terror. As a result, NSW has a robust inventory of unmanned aerial systems and experts and has made significant progress in integrating unmanned underwater systems. These robotic platforms would make effective tools for littoral scouting and reconnaissance—as well as useful decoy and deception platforms—without risking human life or significant financial loss. The new expeditionary sea base (ESB) platform is designed to facilitate aviation and special operations forces, including launch and recovery of special operations craft, and to provide the most straightforward avenue to include NSW in naval operations. It would be well suited for deploying these expeditionary systems.8

The surface fleet is investing in developing unmanned systems, but it could be more expedient and cost-efficient in the near term to take advantage of NSW’s established capabilities rather than creating new programs from scratch. The flexible nature of special operations forces allows NSW to adjust quickly to new tactical requirements, test new ideas without disrupting existing fleet doctrine, and identify the resulting successful equipment and practices.9 Incorporating robotic platforms into scouting and antiscouting operations is a new construct for the fleet, but as Hughes and Girrier note, “The great constant of scouting seems to be that there is never enough of it.”10 It would be prudent to integrate NSW’s unmanned systems to add depth to the Navy’s scouting arsenal.

U.S. Navy SEALs alongside members of the Philippine Navy Special Operations Group and Australian commandos on board a U.S. combatant craft assault during exercise Balikatan 22. These small, short-range, low-signature craft could perform or help prevent asymmetric attacks on capital ships by exploiting the “clutter of islands and neutral shipping.” U.S. Marine Corps (Mario A. Ramirez)

Hughes and Girrier assert that on land and sea, many “battles have been lost by abrupt degradation of control, followed by confusion and then fatal chaos.”11 NSW has a variety of tools it can bring to bear on what they describe as command and control and command-and-control countermeasures.12 A properly equipped SEAL element could cause chaos among enemy defense networks by targeting communication infrastructure or disrupting transportation. Naval special operations have their roots in near-shore scouting, and the sustained special reconnaissance mission has kept SEAL platoon skills sharp in covert inland patrolling and over-the-beach insertions.13 As Hughes and Girrier point out, in the age of missile warfare, “a substantial part of a coastal fleet may be land-based,” and it is reasonable to view land-based defenses as part of the naval engagement.14 SEALs could identify and mark targets, man forward observation posts, and perform battle damage assessments from within hostile territory. The combination of accurate targeting information and sabotage of enemy C2 infrastructure would sow discord within the enemy ranks, offering fleet commanders another method to achieve a decisive, early advantage in battle.

Aircraft might likewise perform the C2 and C2CM roles, but launching and recovering jets requires commanders to bring more of their fleet, including aircraft carriers, within range of littoral threats such as antiship cruise missiles and mines. SEALs on the ground could provide longer duration and more flexibility than unmanned craft and would allow the fleet to stay safely out to sea.

During a naval battle, firepower and defense are the primary considerations for the tactician. In the age of missile warfare, victory usually goes to the side able to “attack effectively first,” which becomes the ultimate purpose of all other fleet functions.15 Taken as a whole, NSW has two main proficiencies in this domain. First, a flotilla of small, short-range, low-signature craft could perform or prevent asymmetric attacks on capital ships and exploit the “clutter of islands and neutral shipping” to attack enemy combatants in small seas and shallow waters.16 This tactic would be especially effective in areas with plentiful safe-haven or allied ports nearby—such as the Mediterranean, Baltic, and North Seas—to alleviate the demands of launching and recovering at sea in such places.17 NSW will need to make some technical adjustments to its combatant craft to take on this role, but the transition could be assisted by a clearly defined requirement from numbered fleet commanders.

Second, SEALs can be inserted over the beach to ambush port infrastructure, sabotage enemy airfields, attack missile launch sites, or enable cyberattacks against enemy defense networks. In this context, the SEALs would be employed like a vessel on land to neutralize enemy defenses that may be otherwise unreachable by the fleet—perhaps this could be the confined seas equivalent of a destroyer screen. There is significant potential in this capability if NSW is pushed to continue development of unmanned systems proficiency within the SEAL platoons, which would allow for a small team of humans to control many small robots. Employing small elements inside hostile territory comes with risk, and the typical points of failure in this approach are insertion and extraction.18 The fleet and special operations forces will need to relearn how to coordinate and conduct the in-and-out part of these operations before they can be used in combat again.

Gaps, Limitations, and Risks

The Special Warfare SEAL canine team adds bite to successful special operations missions. SEALs (and canine team members) operating ashore in the littoral could disrupt enemy command and control. U.S. Navy (Dylan Lavin)

The use of NSW over the past two decades was effective at the tactical level but has normalized bureaucratic processes that have created an ever-widening gap between NSW and the Navy. Specifically, NSW forces deploy under the operational command of theater special operations commands (TSOC) rather than numbered fleets. This drives NSW training toward TSOC requirements, which generally focus on counterterrorism operations and partner engagements with friendly special operations forces. As a result, the overwhelming majority of NSW training is designed to satisfy the needs of the TSOCs, with nominal effort put into the development of naval tactics.

While NSW’s reconnaissance capabilities do not add much additional risk to fleet operations—other than small material costs in the event of a system loss—insertion and extraction of NSW forces can be extremely risky. To maximize C2, C2CM, and counterforce functions, NSW forces need to get into the area of operations, but these efforts can go awry, as they did in the U.S. invasion of Grenada. If done properly, as during Operation Earnest Will in the late 1980s, special operations significantly enhance the tactical performance of conventional naval forces.19 Special forces, by their nature, conduct operations at a steep numerical disadvantage and rely on a combination of surprise, speed, and purpose to achieve success.20 Surprise depends in large part on successful insertion; a bungled extraction or rendezvous can jeopardize troops by slowing the pace of operations. And if the purpose is too broad or complex, a special forces element may not have the capability or the time to achieve it. All of this requires commanders in the fleet and NSW to understand the risks and be willing to commit resources to training and rehearsals to mitigate them.

Fleet commanders may be dismayed by the risks associated with NSW forces ashore and might seek lower-risk options—with manned aircraft, for example, or even the exclusive use of unmanned systems. After three decades of total air superiority in the Middle East, these options seem attractive. However, unmanned systems technology still depends heavily on human operators to manage the system and make real-time moral and legal decisions.21 Relying on manned aircraft to perform these functions not only increases risk to valuable aircraft carriers, aircraft, and aircrew, but also raises the possibility of a downed aircrew, which could require the insertion of a recovery team anyway. The benefit of special operations, whatever mission they perform, is an adaptable human warfighter capable of making quick decisions in keeping with commander’s intent. In the end, the answer may be a combination of humans and machines. A small group of special operators managing unmanned systems at close range to land-based targets would be a powerful asset for littoral operations.

Fleet Tactics

Maritime special forces should have a role in naval operations in confined, littoral waters around the globe. But the tactical integration of NSW into the functions and counterfunctions of scouting, command and control, and firepower is underdeveloped. It needs to be improved by integrating NSW and fleet tactics, training, and exercises to become viable in combat.22 NSW has proven its tactical capability in counterterrorism missions, but the nation’s premier maritime special operations force must be able to contribute to fleet-level operations against peer threats in the maritime environment. NSW and the Navy need to improve their understanding of each other before the fight begins.

1. CAPT Wayne P. Hughes and RADM Robert Girrier, USN (Ret.), Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, 3d ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018), 168–69.

2. Hughes and Girrier, Fleet Tactics, 3, 29, 125, 287.

3. Hughes and Girrier, 4; and Milan Vego, “On Littoral Warfare,” Naval War College Review 68, no. 2 (Spring 2015): 33.

4. Hughes and Girrier, Fleet Tactics, xxxi, 24.

5. ADM William H. McRaven, USN (Ret.), Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Ballantine Books, Random House Publishing Group, 1996), 7.

6. McRaven, Spec Ops, 4, 73, 201.

7. Hughes and Girrier, Fleet Tactics, 253.

8. CAPT Daryle Cardone, CDR Ben Coyle, and LCDR Daniel Murphy, USN, “Assessing the Expeditionary Sea Base,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 149, no. 1 (January 2023).

9. Eliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies, Harvard Studies in International Affairs 40 (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University Press, 1978), 31.

10. Hughes and Girrier, Fleet Tactics, 198.

11. Hughes and Girrier, 290.

12. Hughes and Girrier, 200.

13. Benjamin Milligan, By Water Beneath the Walls (New York, USA: Bantam Books, 2021), 154.

14. Hughes and Girrier, Fleet Tactics, 284.

15. Hughes and Girrier, 29.

16. Hughes and Girrier, 4.

17. Hughes and Girrier, 291.

18. Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces, The Rediscovering Government Series (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 97; and Milligan, By Water Beneath the Walls, 257.

19. David B. Crist, “Joint Special Operations in Support of Earnest Will,” Joint Force Quarterly no. 29 (Autumn/Winter 2001–2002): 19; and Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 96.

20. McRaven, Spec Ops, 11.

21. Daniel Eichler and Ronald Thompson, “59 Percent Likely Hostile,” War on the Rocks, 30 January 2020.

22. Hughes and Girrier, Fleet Tactics, 20, 168.

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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com