Quotes of the Day:
"I am not afraid, and am always ready to do my duty, but I would like someone to tell me what we are fighting for."
-Arthur H. Vickers, Sergeant, 1st Nebraska Volunteer Regiment. Philippine-American War.
"A soldier is the most-trusted profession in America. Americans have trust in you because you trust each other. No matter how difficult times are, those of us who love the Army must stick with it."
- Sergeant Major Richard A. Kidd
"Battles are sometimes won by generals; wars are nearly always won by sergeants and privates."
- F. E. Adcock
1. How to Use America’s New Peace Dividend
2. ‘Integrated Deterrence’ to Drive National Defense Strategy
3. Why the US should offer to buy France's submarines for Vietnam
4. Clarifying the Issue of Nuclear Weapons Release Authority
5. It's time for Congress to act on WHO reform
6. The Afghans that Fought
7 Time for U.S. to unfriend Pakistan
8. AUKUS sub deal splits ASEAN into pro and anti camps
9. FDD | Iran Joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
10. Analysis | Why the Pentagon can’t fully account for all its assets — in Afghanistan or anywhere else
11. Learn to Use Data or Risk Dying in Battle, New Army Project Teaches
12. Racial Division, Troops’ Role in Protests Has Hurt Minority Recruiting, Air Force Says
13. Special envoy to Haiti resigns citing 'inhumane' US decision to deport thousands of Haitians from US border
14. Biden Just Gave France Something More Valuable than a Submarine Contract
15. China Can’t Win an Arms Race With the U.S.
16. US botched the response to COVID-19, McChrystal says
17. A GI Bill for Afghan allies
18. Top Army spokesperson suspended after abysmal climate survey
19. Taiwan seeks entry into key trade pact before China
1. How to Use America’s New Peace Dividend
A peace dividend? Is there really one? How many times have we spent peace dividends in the past?
How to Use America’s New Peace Dividend - The American Conservative
How to Use America’s New Peace Dividend
Redirecting money from Afghanistan would be a clear message from Congress that it is time to rebalance and focus on strengthening America.
September 22, 2021
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12:01 am
Washington isn’t quite sure what to do after the chaotic end to America’s longest war. Some suggest we may need to reestablish a military foothold in the country. Others want to funnel money to the Taliban under the guise of diplomacy. And there are those who want to wash their hands to focus solely on funding refugee resettlement programs.
How Congress decides to commit our national resources following the withdrawal will be the clearest indicator of the state of our policy toward Afghanistan and our foreign policy priorities going forward.
I believe there is only one right answer: rescind any remaining funds appropriated for maintaining a military and diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, as well as funds to support the Afghan government or military, and put them to better use. Namely, put them toward great power competition with the People’s Republic of China.
Last year, Congress appropriated more than $3 billion toward the Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, in addition to funds for supporting the U.S. diplomatic presence in the country, training Afghan military and law enforcement units, and rooting out corruption in the government. Given Taliban control of the country, and the Taliban’s role in harboring terrorists, no taxpayer dollars should be released to the regime.
Rescinding these funds would be a clear message from Congress that it is time to rebalance and focus on strengthening America. With Democrats in control of Congress, however, it is unlikely that any rescinded funds this year will go unspent. How we use the unspent dollars is an important question.
Rescinded funds from Afghanistan should not be used for refugee resettlement efforts or social programs. Instead, they must go towards bolstering America’s position for the challenges of the future. My Prioritizing Readiness and Competitiveness (PRC) Act would do exactly that by directing these funds to critical supply chain issues, advanced research, and Navy shipbuilding.
Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, few in Washington considered the potentially catastrophic impacts of our overreliance on the Chinese economy, which is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. The pandemic, the shortages, and the deaths exposed the dangers of a U.S. economy built on short-term financial gains over long-term resilience. The PRC Act would pour funding into the Defense Production Act purchases account to support domestic manufacturing and supply chain resiliency in strategic industries critical to national security.
This is, essentially, how then-President Trump stood up and funded Operation Warp Speed, which was a tremendous success and should serve as a blueprint for future initiatives. There are numerous areas ripe for investment, as I noted in a 2019 report on China’s economic plans, including biotechnology, robotics, new materials, and more.
As China directs its strategic attention to development in technological areas that pose threats to our security, such as quantum computing, America must develop high-technology defenses. The PRC Act will direct unspent funds into the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) for research and development projects related to strengthening the United States’ global advantage in strategic technologies. DARPA has been at the forefront of some of America’s most important technological breakthroughs, as it takes on moonshot projects that the private sector will not, either because of cost or reputation. We cannot rely on nationless companies like Apple to out-innovate the Chinese, let alone put Americans, their families, and our national defense first.
Finally, we must also continue to invest in the United States Navy, which has fallen behind the People’s Liberation Army Navy in terms of assets. While the Chinese Communist Party has been on a shipbuilding spree, the United States is stagnant. We cannot successfully refocus on the Indo-Pacific region, protect our critical trade routes, and discourage Beijing’s aggression if our Navy cannot project power or maintain order in critical areas. As Elbridge Colby has argued in The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict, Beijing’s quest for hegemony must “be reflected across every aspect of the U.S. armed forces defense and U.S. defense planning.” And naval power is essential to that goal. Otherwise, the communist nation will be able to hold our economy hostage to advance its goals.
As I said last fall, we could not keep our military in Afghanistan forever. The questions were always how we execute the withdrawal and how we focus our resources afterwards. The Biden administration botched the first part, but it is not too late for the president to get the second part right. But we cannot compete with China based on lip service; we actually need to invest in American research, American industry, and American naval power.
We have the opportunity to do exactly that, and the question is whether the Biden administration and a Democrat-led Congress can rise to the challenge.
Marco Rubio serves as the senior United States Senator from Florida.
2. ‘Integrated Deterrence’ to Drive National Defense Strategy
There is not enough emphasis being placed on DOD's concept of integrated deterrence.
Excerpt:
"Integrated deterrence" means that the Pentagon will not rely on U.S. military strength alone to prevent adversaries from attacking, said Melissa Dalton, who is performing the duties of assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans and capabilities.
I would argue there are three pillars of deterrence: nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence, and unconventional deterrence, this being something not addressed in the concepts.
What is conventional deterrence (a term coined by Robert Jones at USSOCOM)? It is helping to harden populations and militaries of friends, partners, and allies to resist the malign influence of revisionist, rogue, and revolutionary powers and violent extremist organizations. This is exemplified by the Resistance Operating Concept pioneered by SOCEUR to counter Russian malign influence in Europe.
But this is a DOD concept that calls for more than the military contributes to deterrence. The question for me is who is responsible for driving the concept and process of integrated deterrence? Who develops the "campaign plan" for integrated deterrence? Who assesses it? If it is more than military deterrence then what agency or organization in the USFG is responsible for execution?
‘Integrated Deterrence’ to Drive National Defense Strategy
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
AFA NEWS: ‘Integrated Deterrence’ to Drive National Defense Strategy
9/22/2021
iStock photo
NATIONAL HARBOR, Md. — The team putting together the 2022 National Defense Strategy is focusing on a concept called “integrated deterrence,” according to a Defense Department official working on the document.
"Integrated deterrence" means that the Pentagon will not rely on U.S. military strength alone to prevent adversaries from attacking, said Melissa Dalton, who is performing the duties of assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans and capabilities.
“Adversaries are pressing for advantage in multiple domains, and our department requires a different approach — one that requires deeper integration with allies, partners and other instruments of national power,” she said Sept. 22 during a panel at the Air Force Association’s annual Air, Space and Cyber Conference.
Dalton confirmed that the document will be released in early 2022, as required by Congress.
Pentagon leaders have increasingly expressed concerns about Russia and China’s growing investment in military capabilities.
Nuclear and cyber deterrence are two areas that present threats to integrated deterrence but could also enable it, Dalton said. The defense strategy will address how “we can better use the capabilities we already have, including by integrating domains and determining the capabilities we need to deter and address potential future conflict” within those domains, she said.
As adversaries place more emphasis on nuclear capabilities, the risk for escalation increases, she noted. The defense strategy will place an emphasis on limiting chances for miscalculation, she said.
“We're looking at how to reduce the risks of miscalculation in crisis and reduce the risks of unintended escalation across domains,” she said.
She noted nuclear issues are being given special attention in the stand-alone nuclear posture review that will be fully “integrated” with the defense strategy.
Additionally, the officials crafting the defense strategy are planning how to utilize cyber capabilities without relying on them too heavily, Dalton said.
“There's a sense sometimes that there's a magical component to what cyber can do, but I take the pragmatic view that it is a very powerful tool, but perhaps best used as part of an integrated or nested approach,” she said.
The defense strategy will also address the military’s needs for cyber resilience, she noted.
Meanwhile, the defense strategy needs to take into account the capabilities available with a “whole-of-government” approach to deterrence, she said. Diplomacy, information tools, economic incentives and sanctions should be used alongside the military’s contributions.
“When you think about how to deter, it really is the most effective to be able to mobilize the full suite of capabilities that the U.S. government can bring to bear … to create that that deterrent effect combined with the U.S. military tool,” she said.
Defense officials will also examine the role of international partners and allied nations in deterring adversaries, she noted. Each nation has its own unique capabilities and familiarity with certain terrains and geography that the Pentagon should leverage.
She said the upcoming strategy will address the question “how do we fully integrate them not just as an afterthought, but as a deliberate part of our planning and operations?”
Another factor for the defense strategy to consider: how “dynamic” is the threat environment?
“You need to be precise about what it is that we're actually seeking to deter and what effects do we want to achieve,” she said.
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3. Why the US should offer to buy France's submarines for Vietnam
May as well provide them to Indonesia as well. I could imagine a taxpayer revolt over this.
Why the US should offer to buy France's submarines for Vietnam
The United States would achieve three objectives by purchasing a number of Shortfin Barracuda submarines from France and then giving them to Vietnam.
First, the Biden administration would repair relations with America's oldest ally. Second, it would supply a rising security partner with newly potent means of challenging China's imperialism. Third, it would test President Emmanuel Macron's commitment to international security in the South China Sea.
This option bears note as France rages over Australia's cancellation of a submarine contract worth tens of billions of dollars. France is mixing justifiable anger (it has lost a lucrative contract worth thousands of jobs) with a healthy degree of hypocrisy (France's government-owned Naval Group was playing games with its timetable, cost estimates, and production/sourcing commitments).
Still, these submarines would provide outsize value to the U.S. and broader international security interests were they built for Vietnam. The Shortfin Barracudas would be very quiet and a major threat to the People's Liberation Army Navy.
Vietnam remains in the control of a communist authoritarian government. That said, its people enjoy a degree of freedom and a heavily capitalist-influenced economy. In 2021, Vietnam is defined by a strong export market and a young, internationally connected population. This population is also hostile toward China — angered by Beijing's arrogant claim that the South China Sea is its own private swimming pool and angered more by Beijing's not-so-veiled expectation that Vietnam exists as its feudal state.
Recognizing China's challenge, the U.S. and Vietnam are moving closer together. Though her trip was overshadowed by the chaos in Afghanistan, Vice President Kamala Harris recently visited Hanoi. Top line: The U.S. knows that Vietnamese sentiments, Vietnam's proximity to China, and its possession of a deep-water port at Da Nang (capable of forward basing for the U.S. Navy) make the former enemy an ideal security partner for the future.
China says that the South China Sea and all its fishing and resource deposits belong to Beijing. These waters see at least $3.5 trillion in annual trade flows. By militarizing control over the South China Sea, China can extort political fealty from regional states and, gradually, international powers relying on the waters for trade. This is a profound threat to the post-World War II U.S. international order. China cannot be allowed to succeed.
So even as the U.S. rightly consolidates Australia with the new AUKUS security agreement , so, too, should Washington pursue strong relations with France. While France's pursuit of economic ties with China has undermined Macron's credibility as a leader for democratic values, he has shown subsurface support for upholding the South China Sea's international status. From a U.S. perspective, Macron is certainly preferable to the isolationist-minded and pro-China Marine Le Pen, who seems set to be the president's major challenger in next year's elections.
Absent U.S. efforts to consolidate Macron, he risks being caught between an ever-present well of domestic anti-American populism (now being fueled by his foreign minister) and Chinese investment offers. Xi Jinping is no idiot. He will sense that now is the time to offer Macron vast new investments in return for his rejection of U.S. overtures targeting China. At the same time, Beijing is holding firm on its threats to Australia . China's message to U.S. allies: Choose between its easy economic boosts and its uncomfortable coercive pressure.
Biden should use the two leaders' upcoming phone call to offer to buy some of Naval Group's Shortfin Barracudas — but only on the condition that most of the submarines are transferred to Vietnam (others can be used for U.S. Navy training and special operations purposes).
China would be enraged by such a deal, seeing it as a means of dramatically strengthening Vietnam's navy and thus the strategic depth of the PLA's South Sea Fleet . Macron would face a choice: accept an economic boon and support the international values he so eloquently salutes, or show that his rhetoric is paper-thin.
Either way, Biden should make the offer, then let us know what Macron decides. The stakes in the South China Sea demand it .
4. Clarifying the Issue of Nuclear Weapons Release Authority
David J. Trachtenberg, Clarifying the Issue of Nuclear Weapons Release Authority
No. 503, September 22, 2021
Clarifying the Issue of Nuclear Weapons Release Authority
David J. Trachtenberg
David J. Trachtenberg is Vice President of the National Institute for Public Policy and former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
In the United States, the president—and only the president—has the authority to order the use of nuclear weapons. This exclusive authority is consistent with president’s Constitutional role as commander in chief of the armed forces and reflects the principle of civilian control of the military. It is also consistent with the intent of the nation’s Founders—expressed in the Federalist Papers—to ensure that the direction of war be executed by a sole commander. As Alexander Hamilton stated in Federalist 74, “Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.”[1]
Recently, controversy has arisen over the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in nuclear weapons launch authority. This controversy was fueled by passages in a new book by Bob Woodward and Robert Costa, entitled, Peril, in which they recount statements purportedly made by the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley regarding his potential involvement in the decision process of launching nuclear weapons. As The New York Times reported:
General Milley convened a meeting in a war room at the Pentagon with the military’s top commanders, telling them that he wanted to go over the longstanding procedures for launching a nuclear weapon. The general reminded the commanders that only the president could order such a strike and that General Milley needed to be directly involved.
‘If you get calls,’ General Milley said, ‘no matter who they’re from, there’s a process here, there’s a procedure. No matter what you’re told, you do the procedure. You do the process. And I’m part of that procedure. You’ve got to make sure that the right people are on the net.’
The general added: ‘The strict procedures are explicitly designed to avoid inadvertent mistakes or accident or nefarious, unintentional, illegal, immoral, unethical launching of the world’s most dangerous weapons.’
Then, he went around the room and asked each officer to confirm that they understood what he was saying.[2]
In contrast to this reported explanation of the procedure, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith explained the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff this way:
As a legal matter, the chain of command for military operations is straightforward: The President and the Secretary of Defense are the two civilians—the only two—who can issue an order to U.S. military forces. For operations (as opposed to training), the chain runs from the two of them directly to the four-star general or admiral at the top of each combatant command—for example, CENTCOM, Pacific Command, or Special Operations Command. These combatant commanders are responsible for planning and fighting wars—indeed, for planning and executing all military operations, including humanitarian relief and reconstruction….
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman, and the service chiefs (the top military officers of the army, navy, marine corps, and air force) are not in the chain of command for operations. The Chairman’s job is giving military advice to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council—not commanding forces in battle. Rather than run military operations, the service chiefs are responsible for recruiting, training, and equipping.[3]
As explained, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has an advisory role and is responsible for providing the president and the Secretary of Defense with his best military advice. The Chairman exercises no operational control over the launch of nuclear weapons and is not in the operational chain of command.
Despite this, the book passages cited by The New York Times have led to confusion over the appropriate role of the Chairman in launch decisions regarding nuclear weapons. Is the Chairman “directly involved” in such decisions? And what does being “directly involved” actually mean?
The language in the statements attributed to General Milley has sparked confusion and may suggest to some that the Chairman’s role in nuclear launch decisions is more than advisory; to wit, that no launch decision can be taken without the Chairman’s involvement, or perhaps even his approval. Yet, this view is not supported by official documents and U.S. law.
For example, Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5100.01, titled, “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components,” and updated in September 2020, identifies the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the “principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council (NSC), the Homeland Security Council (HSC), and the Secretary of Defense.”[4] In this capacity, DoDD 5100.01 states that the Chairman shall “[a]dvise and assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in performing their command function,” and shall “[a]dvise and assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces, including the direction of operations conducted by the Commanders of the Combatant Commands, and provide military guidance for use by the DoD Components in the preparation of their respective detailed plans.”[5]
The advisory role of the Chairman is also codified in statute. Title 10, Section 163, of the U.S. Code states:
The Secretary of Defense may assign to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibility for overseeing the activities of the combatant commands. Such assignment by the Secretary to the Chairman does not confer any command authority on the Chairman and does not alter the responsibility of the commanders of the combatant commands prescribed in section 164(b)(2) of this title.[6] [emphasis added]
Moreover, as the official website of the Joint Chiefs of Staff notes:
The chain of command to these combatant commands runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense directly to the commander of the combatant command. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may transmit communications to the commanders of the combatant commands from the President and Secretary of Defense but does not exercise military command over any combatant forces.[7] [emphasis added]
In his November 2017 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, General C. Robert Kehler, former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, stated that “US nuclear forces operate under strict civilian control. Only the President of the United States can authorize the use of US nuclear weapons….”[8] He emphasized that “the decision to employ nuclear weapons is a political decision requiring an explicit order from the President. The process includes ‘assessment, review, and consultation…(via) secure phone and video conferencing to enable the President to consult with his senior advisors, including the Secretary of Defense and other military commanders.’”[9]
Accordingly, the role of the Chairman appears clear: he advises the president and Secretary of Defense on military matters, but does not exercise control over whether, when, or under what conditions the United States might actually launch nuclear weapons. That authority remains—as it always has been—the exclusive purview of the president of the United States as the nation’s chief executive and top civilian official in charge of the nation’s armed forces. The president may ask for the Chairman’s advice, and the Chairman may offer it, but the ultimate decision on nuclear weapons employment lies with the president.
Some have suggested that the president alone should not be entrusted with such a monumental decision regarding the use of nuclear weapons. As a recent editorial asserted, “At a minimum, a presidential order for a preemptive nuclear strike should be certified as authentic by the secretary of defense and reviewed by the attorney general to determine its legality. The vice president, as well as leaders of both parties in Congress, should be notified of the order.”[10] Indeed, some in Congress have sought to involve the legislative branch in the decision-making process.[11] However, in the event a president is deemed unable to discharge the duties of the office, the 25th Amendment to the Constitution provides an appropriate solution by outlining the procedure for transferring power to the vice president. In this way, the Constitution both addresses the need for a single executive authority to act promptly in situations where the national interest demands it and provides a mechanism for removal should the president be unable to do so.
This is what the principle of civilian control of the military is all about. And it is a testament to the wisdom of the Founders and the enduring resilience of the governing charter they created
[3] Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008), p. 108.
[9] Ibid., p. 4, citing Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook, 2016, Washington, DC, 2016, p. 80.
The National Institute for Public Policy’s Information Series is a periodic publication focusing on contemporary strategic issues affecting U.S. foreign and defense policy. It is a forum for promoting critical thinking on the evolving international security environment and how the dynamic geostrategic landscape affects U.S. national security. Contributors are recognized experts in the field of national security. National Institute for Public Policy would like to thank the Sarah Scaife Foundation for its generous support that makes the Information Series possible.
The views in this Information Series are those of the author and should not be construed as official U.S. Government policy, the official policy of the National Institute for Public Policy or any of its sponsors. For additional information about this publication or other publications by the National Institute Press, contact: Editor, National Institute Press, 9302 Lee Highway, Suite 750 |Fairfax, VA 22031 | (703) 293- 9181 |www.nipp.org. For access to previous issues of the National Institute Press Information Series, please visit http://www.nipp.org/national-institutepress/informationseries/.
© National Institute Press, 2021
5. It's time for Congress to act on WHO reform
Excerpts:
Specifically, legislators should carefully consider the White House’s record-setting $6 trillion 2022 budget request, which increases voluntary contributions to the WHO beyond the $300 million donated in 2020. The budget also recommends using taxpayer dollars to subsidize the purchase of ineffective Chinese vaccines for use in the WHO’s troubled global vaccine initiative. Such mismanagement is consistent with a recent audit that revealed the WHO spent millions of donor dollars procuring defective Chinese personal protective equipment. Rather than reforming the WHO, Biden’s budget request simply subsidizes Tedros’ mismanagement — a clear opportunity for congressional oversight.
In attaching strings to donations which fund huge swathes of the WHO’s operations — from human resources and pandemic surveillance to PPE procurement and its inspector general — Washington could reshape those endeavors with or without Tedros’ buy-in. Funding could also be tied to restoring Taiwan’s observer status, a move certain to frustrate Beijing. And that’s just for starters.
Blindly increasing U.S. funding for the WHO is a recipe for disincentivizing reform and ensuring that China can continue shaping the organization to suit its ends. Congress can and should take over this process, starting with demanding a better return on our investment and leveraging earmarks to overhaul the WHO. Doing so is about more than just dollars. It’s also common sense.
It's time for Congress to act on WHO reform
The Hill · by Craig Singleton, opinion contributor · September 22, 2021
This week, the Biden administration missed the deadline to nominate a candidate to challenge embattled World Health Organization (WHO) Director General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus in his quest for a second five-year term. This unforced diplomatic error, one welcomed in Beijing, all but assures Tedros’ reelection. It also confirms the Biden administration lacks a serious strategy to overhaul the beleaguered global health body. At a time of skyrocketing COVID-19 infection rates and still unanswered questions about the virus’ origins, the U.S. has a responsibility to address the WHO’s failings. Enter Congress.
The need for action has been building since the pandemic’s first days, when many began to question Tedros’ perceived deference to the Chinese Communist Party. After meeting with Xi Jinping in January 2020, Tedros praised China’s pandemic mismanagement, claiming that Beijing’s response had set a “new standard.” In the intervening months, the WHO chief hewed closely to China’s preferred political narratives about the pandemic and its origins. Over Washington’s objections, Tedros also excluded Taiwan from the WHO’s 2021 annual agenda setting meeting. This particular incident highlighted Beijing’s outsized influence over Tedros, even though China’s contributions account for less than 1.5 percent of the WHO’s budget.
But, in a move designed to alleviate Western concerns, Tedros moderated his messaging in the lead up to this month’s nominating deadline. After a Dutch documentary exposed how the lead scientist investigating the WHO’s COVID-19 origins altered the team’s final report in response to Chinese pressure, Tedros admitted it had been “premature” to rule out the so-called lab leak theory. Weeks later, Tedros expressed support for a European-led initiative to negotiate a new global health treaty. The proposal, which Beijing and Moscow are actively undermining, includes plans for a new dispute-resolution mechanism to penalize countries which refuse to cooperate with future pandemic investigations.
Apart from these minor deviations, however, there is scant evidence that Tedros’ affinity for China has lessened. This is unsurprising given Tedros’ history of championing Beijing’s interests, first as Ethiopia’s health minister and later as foreign minister. A review of United Nations (UN) records reveals that Chinese aid contributions to Tedros’ native Ethiopia substantially increased when he was in top leadership positions. The same goes for China’s contributions to the WHO after Tedros’ election in 2017, one preceded by intense Chinese lobbying on Tedros’ behalf. Tedros’ Chinese ties also include links to Xi’s wife, Peng Liyuan, who serves as a WHO Goodwill Ambassador.
During their Senate confirmation hearings, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and U.S. Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield endorsed WHO reform as a means to combat Chinese malign influence and better prepare for the next pandemic. And yet, no such reform agenda has materialized. The administration has also not explained why it abdicated in nominating a qualified candidate to lead the WHO, even while it has put forward candidates to lead other UN bodies seen drifting into China’s orbit. Despite this inaction, Congress still has an opportunity to affect change.
WHO leaders have long bristled at demands that the organization align its operations with donors’ priorities and donors have been hesitant to earmark funds for specific projects, even though doing so would greatly increase accountability over the WHO’s scope of work. As the WHO’s top funder, Congress has both the power and the responsibility to use its appropriations and earmarking authorities to set a clear reform agenda for the international body.
Specifically, legislators should carefully consider the White House’s record-setting $6 trillion 2022 budget request, which increases voluntary contributions to the WHO beyond the $300 million donated in 2020. The budget also recommends using taxpayer dollars to subsidize the purchase of ineffective Chinese vaccines for use in the WHO’s troubled global vaccine initiative. Such mismanagement is consistent with a recent audit that revealed the WHO spent millions of donor dollars procuring defective Chinese personal protective equipment. Rather than reforming the WHO, Biden’s budget request simply subsidizes Tedros’ mismanagement — a clear opportunity for congressional oversight.
In attaching strings to donations which fund huge swathes of the WHO’s operations — from human resources and pandemic surveillance to PPE procurement and its inspector general — Washington could reshape those endeavors with or without Tedros’ buy-in. Funding could also be tied to restoring Taiwan’s observer status, a move certain to frustrate Beijing. And that’s just for starters.
Blindly increasing U.S. funding for the WHO is a recipe for disincentivizing reform and ensuring that China can continue shaping the organization to suit its ends. Congress can and should take over this process, starting with demanding a better return on our investment and leveraging earmarks to overhaul the WHO. Doing so is about more than just dollars. It’s also common sense.
Craig Singleton, a national security expert and former U.S. diplomat, is an adjunct China fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a non-partisan think tank focused on national security and foreign policy issues.
The Hill · by Craig Singleton, opinion contributor · September 22, 2021
6. The Afghans that Fought
The Afghans that Fought | Small Wars Journal
The Afghans that Fought
By Frank Sobchak
Since the disastrous fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban, there have been a continuous series of reports that announce far-reaching observations and conclusions from the conflict. Two popular narratives are that cowardly Afghan forces collapsed with barely a shot fired and that the U.S. military is incapable of building an effective foreign partner force. On its face, each judgement would seem to have some threads of truth given the considerable debacle that played out over August 2021. But the reality is much more complex and requires nuance, something that is challenging in the current American political environment.
While there is little way to describe the overall effort as anything other than an abject failure, the U.S. did build several capable Afghan partner forces. The Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment created the KKA, commonly known as the Kta Khas, and elements of the U.S. intelligence community trained elite units for the National Directorate of Security, sometimes known as NDS Units or simply Unit 01 or 02. Both of those organizations were small but had solid reputations as capable and determined fighters. Because of their size, each no more than several hundred soldiers, their applicability to the discussion of building foreign armies is limited. The Afghan Commandos, however, totaled in the range of twenty to thirty thousand personnel: a force larger than the active-duty militaries of roughly seventy countries including Denmark and New Zealand. A discussion of their capabilities, therefore, yields more applicable lessons due to the scale of that effort.
The Commandos were built by the U.S. Army Special Forces, commonly known as the Green Berets, and designed as an elite light infantry force similar to U.S. Army Rangers. While selection of Commando candidates did not differ significantly from that of the average Afghan National Army soldier, each had an additional twelve weeks of training and were regularly partnered with small elements of Special Forces advisors. In practice the Commandos were frequently used as shock troops, shuttled from key battle to key battle, rather than used as special operations forces. While they were partnered with American elements, especially Special Forces teams, the Commandos usually fought and performed capably. The presence of critical U.S. enablers, such as air support, medical evacuation, and intelligence that went along with being partnered with Americans often stiffened the resolve of the Commandos to the point that they were generally a dependable partner.
They could fight at night, conduct limited internal sustainment, and hold their own against the Taliban. Through airframes and ground vehicles within the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command, the Commandos could provide emergency resupply for their forces that enabled them to operate in combat for up to 72 hours. Some even could call in their own air support and conduct intelligence driven operations. Commandos suffered far more casualties than American forces, and their headquarters element even set up a wounded warrior program to allow injured fighters to be able to continue to serve in non-combat roles within the organization. A set of Special Forces officers and sergeants even attempted make the force capable of operating with minimal internal logistic support that was prepositioned at each of the Commando bases, such as “chuck wagon” style mobile feeding and mortars for fire support rather than aircraft. Unfortunately, senior leaders decided instead that the Commandos should operate inside a functional Afghan military logistics system for any operation that lasted more than 72 hours. That fatal flaw, building a force in our image logistically, proved to be the Commandos’ Achilles heel. American Army units are designed to function in a resource intensive logistics system which can provide just in time delivery of critical supply needs. Yet when faced with Afghanistan’s infrastructure challenges of few roads and vast distances, even our logistics system strained.
As the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated and province after province fell, many Commando units continued fighting. Around Kandahar City, Commandos and other security forces battled the Taliban for more than a month. When the U.S. contracted logistics withdrew and the Afghan supply system collapsed, the Commandos were not able to perform as they were designed: supported by a heavy logistics footprint that could resupply them on demand. Commando elements began to run out of ammunition, food, and water. Some surrendered after extended sieges or battles, putting themselves at the mercy of the Taliban. At least one Commando unit was summarily executed, likely a warning by the Taliban to those who would similarly resist. Even after the fall of Kabul, several Commando units refused to give in and began the slow march to the Panjshir, where a nascent resistance to the Taliban was building. Other units moved to Hamid Karzai International airport and helped secure the outer perimeter during the U.S. led evacuation.
The Commandos provide many lessons for future conflicts and the ability of the U.S. military to build effective partner forces. Under the right conditions and with properly selected and trained advisors such as Special Forces, which hold developing foreign forces as central to their organizational identity, America can build effective foreign military forces. Consistency in advisor pairing across multiple rotations (even more so than tour lengths), low advisor to advisee ratios, and general language skills and cultural awareness are important conditions to such a process. When those are in place, the notion that the U.S. is incapable of successfully conducting advisory missions misses critical nuances. In the Commandos we built a light infantry force that fought competently as long as the conditions and context were maintained for which we prepared them. But when those conditions changed, even though many Commandos had the will to fight, they could not continue to resist without logistics support. Building forces in our own image, especially when the domestic logistics infrastructure will never be as capable, is a recipe for failure. We should be proud of the elite Afghan forces that we built over our longest war. They fought respectably and some have refused to give up even though the country to which they swore allegiance no longer exists.
Frank Sobchak (Colonel, Retired) is a PhD candidate in international relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and has taught at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and Tufts University. He holds a BS in Military History from West Point and a MA in Arab Studies from Georgetown University. During his twenty-six-year career in the U.S. Army, he served in various Special Forces assignments including leading teams and companies in 5th Special Forces Group advising foreign militaries and representing U.S. Special Operations Command as a congressional liaison. His final assignments included garrison command (akin to being a mayor or city manager of an Army base) and leading the Army effort to publish an official history of the Iraq War. That effort spanned five years and included the declassification of over 30,000 pages of documents and several hundred interviews in addition to having access to a similar sized set of documents and interviews that had not yet been released. The project’s culmination resulted in the publication of the 1,500-page two volume set, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War. He has been a frequent contributor to television, radio, and print interviews for topics such as Middle East security matters, defense reform, civil military relations, and special operations forces. He is a contributor (Fellow) at the MirYam Institute and has been published in Newsweek, Time, The Wall Street Journal, The Jerusalem Post, Defense One, The Hill, Small Wars Journal, and The Jewish News Syndicate. His twitter handle is @abujeshua
7. Time for U.S. to unfriend Pakistan
Time for U.S. to unfriend Pakistan
ANALYSIS/OPINION:
Who’s to blame for America’s humiliating surrender in Afghanistan, the dishonorable abandonment of American citizens along with Afghans who sided with us against the Taliban and al Qaeda, the disgraceful treatment of NATO allies, and the lethal incompetence with which the retreat was carried out? The buck stops on the desk behind which Joe Biden sits. But we would be remiss to ignore the contributions of others to this historic fiasco. Prominent among them: Pakistan’s leaders.
I take no pleasure in saying this. I first visited Pakistan 38 years ago. Most of the people I encountered were gracious, hospitable, and tolerant. They were open to talking about anything – in English!
Of course, four years prior to my visit, angry mobs had stormed the American embassy in Islamabad, incensed over reports – entirely erroneous – that the U.S. had been involved in the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. But after that crisis passed, Muhamad Zia-ul-Haq – a four-star general who became the country’s president after deposing Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – was eager to improve relations with the U.S.
I attended a small dinner he hosted. His eyes were as dark and predatory as a shark’s. But he didn’t seem like a bad guy – as dictators go.
He was then providing a haven for a flood of refugees from Afghanistan where Soviet forces were supporting a communist government at war with Muslim guerrillas. Both Washington and Islamabad favored the guerrillas who, most Americans believed, were throwing off a foreign occupation, not launching a new global jihad against infidels and heretics.
Nevertheless, over the five years that followed, President Zia would establish Sharia laws and courts, appoint Islamists to senior government posts, restrict the rights of women and religious minorities, criminalize “blasphemy,” and add whipping, stoning, and amputation to the list of punishments meted out to those deemed miscreants.
My last visit to Pakistan was in 2009. During the less than two weeks I was there, four terrorist attacks were carried out inside the country. One, attributed to the Pakistani Taliban, targeted the equivalent of the Pentagon. Armed with automatic weapons, grenades, and rocket launchers, the terrorists fought for 22 hours. Hostages were taken, and a brigadier, a colonel, and three commandos were reportedly killed.
The reaction of many Pakistanis struck me as shockingly blasé. And even some of those who condemned attacks by the Pakistani Taliban against Pakistanis condoned attacks by the Afghan Taliban against Americans.
Suspicion was already growing that al Qaeda’s central leadership, possibly including Osama bin Laden, was hiding out in Pakistan. I had noted that in a column and, on a television program, was scolded by the host for having done so.
Those suspicions were borne out, of course. And we now know for sure that powerful elements within Pakistan’s military and intelligence establishment helped create the Afghan Taliban in the early 1990s and continued to fund and train its fighters even after the U.S. intervention in 2001. The Taliban’s close alliance with al Qaeda troubled them not at all.
Author Elliot Ackerman, who served as a Marine in Afghanistan, is hardly alone in believing that had Pakistani leaders ended that support and shut the border to the Taliban – whose leaders retreated to Pakistani bases every winter – the organization would have “collapsed” rather than soldiering on until American leaders grew tired and quit – the outcome the jihadis both expected and predicted.
Pakistani leaders continue to support Islamic supremacists and jihadis of various stripes. Former Pakistani Ambassador Husain Haqqani, now a scholar at the Hudson Institute, has written: “While Pakistan’s establishment has alternated between various Islamist factions, mainstreaming one while suppressing another, it has never thought about mainstreaming secularists who have been dubbed as traitors or unfaithful to the ideology of Pakistan.”
The “international community,” rhetorically committed to nuclear non-proliferation, failed to prevent Pakistan from detonating a nuclear weapon in 1998, the same year al Qaeda bombed two American embassies in Africa, and bin Laden issued his infamous fatwa: “The rule to kill Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is a sacred duty for any Muslim.” Pakistani physicist A. Q. Khan, the father of Islamabad’s illicit nuclear arsenal, illicitly transferred nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Many Pakistanis regard him as a hero.
Following President Biden’s “unconditional surrender to an amorphous armed rabble” – as Indian journalist Shekhar Gupta aptly phrased it – Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan declared “the shackles of slavery” broken. The head of Pakistan’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, Lt. Gen. Faiz Hameed, was welcomed by the Taliban in Kabul. Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmoud Qureshi paid a call on Ebrahim Raisi, the new president of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Though designated a “major non-NATO ally,” Pakistan maintains a close alliance with Beijing, and its military has links with the People’s Liberation Army. Nevertheless, between 2002 and 2018, the U.S. government gave Pakistan more than $33 billion in assistance.
The Trump administration cut aid to Pakistan, but a broader reconsideration of this disappointing relationship is long overdue. I know it’s tricky: We don’t want to push Islamabad closer to America’s sworn enemies. But if Pakistan’s leaders have decided that their interests are best served as clients of China (ignoring Beijing’s persecution of the Muslims of Xinjiang), allies of Tehran’s imperialist jihadis, and supporters of the Taliban, al Qaeda, and other Islamist terrorists, this marriage cannot be saved.
President Biden inherited a long list of mistakes, misjudgments, and unfinished business from his predecessors. But, as noted, he currently occupies an office that contains a desk from which bucks can be passed no further.
• Clifford D. May is founder and president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a columnist for the Washington Times.
8. AUKUS sub deal splits ASEAN into pro and anti camps
A description and list of the two "camps."
Excerpts:
While US allies in India, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have all been mainly mute on the announcement, the strategic tremors of the nuclear deal will be most acutely felt in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea.
Already, the region appears to be splitting into pro and anti camps. Indonesia and Malaysia have openly criticized the deal, portraying it as a potentially destabilizing development that rekindles age-old resentment of Australia acting as America’s “deputy sheriff” in the region.
Singapore and Vietnam, two countries with rising concerns about Chinese expansionism, quietly welcomed the deal without issuing any formal statements. The Philippines, a US treaty ally, stood out by openly backing the deal as a necessary “enhancement of a near-abroad ally’s ability to project power.”
The AUKUS deal, which is purportedly consistent with regional principles on nuclear non-proliferation, is expected to be discussed in the forthcoming high-level meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including a scheduled annual summit in November.
AUKUS sub deal splits ASEAN into pro and anti camps
Deal could break core ASEAN tenets barring nuclear weapons in region but some welcome the boats to deter China in South China Sea
MANILA – The Australia, United Kingdom and United States nuclear submarine deal and their announced new AUKUS trilateral alliance have sent shockwaves across the Indo-Pacific and beyond as fears rise the move could spark an armed conflict with China.
While US allies in India, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have all been mainly mute on the announcement, the strategic tremors of the nuclear deal will be most acutely felt in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea.
Already, the region appears to be splitting into pro and anti camps. Indonesia and Malaysia have openly criticized the deal, portraying it as a potentially destabilizing development that rekindles age-old resentment of Australia acting as America’s “deputy sheriff” in the region.
Singapore and Vietnam, two countries with rising concerns about Chinese expansionism, quietly welcomed the deal without issuing any formal statements. The Philippines, a US treaty ally, stood out by openly backing the deal as a necessary “enhancement of a near-abroad ally’s ability to project power.”
The AUKUS deal, which is purportedly consistent with regional principles on nuclear non-proliferation, is expected to be discussed in the forthcoming high-level meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including a scheduled annual summit in November.
There are serious regional concerns about the strategic implications of US-made Australian nuclear submarines patrolling the hotly contested South China Sea, where the US is pressing to maintain freedom of navigation. In recent years, Chinese and US naval forces have almost come to blows in multiple “close encounters” in the disputed sea.
Some ASEAN members worry the involvement of more naval forces, especially nuclear-powered submarines, would likely further complicate the situation and raise the risk of armed confrontation.
A US Navy Carrier Battle Group with USS Ronald Reagan in the lead in the South China Sea. Image: US Navy/Handout
Eager to preserve its “centrality” in shaping a stable regional order, the Southeast Asian bloc has actively pushed over the decades for a reduction of foreign military forces in the strategic region, now a chief theater of rivalry between the US and China.
Malaysia, a staunchly “neutral” country, has been a major advocate of the principle of ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in Southeast Asia).
As former Malaysian Prime Minister Abdul Razak Hussein argued in the 1970s, ASEAN should espouse “a policy of neutralization which will ensure that this region will no longer be a theater of conflict for the competing interests of the major powers.”
The ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), which has been signed by all major Indo-Pacific powers, similarly calls upon member states as well as dialogue partners to contribute to a peaceful management of disputes and, accordingly, refrain from militarizing the region.
Of particular concern is the ASEAN’s Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ Treaty) treaty, which expressly opposes the presence of nuclear weapons and other forms of weapons of mass destruction in the region.
Critics say the AUKUS deal could potentially violate some of these key ASEAN tenets, since any nuclear-powered submarine would rely on highly enriched uranium that could also be used for nuclear weapons production.
Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry thus immediately criticized the Australian submarine deal, making it clear that the de facto leader of ASEAN “is deeply concerned over the continuing arms race and power projection in the region.”
Sensing the potential for fallout, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison reached out to regional counterparts, including Indonesia and Malaysia, to assure the AUKUS deal is consistent with the country’s nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) obligations and that the subs would only act to enhance “strategic balance” in the region, in light of China’s rapidly expanding naval footprint in the area.
Chinese President Xi Jinping (L) and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison are locked in a multi-front dispute. Image: Facebook
Australia’s ambassador to ASEAN, Will Nankervis, also issued a statement clarifying that the AUKUS “is not a defense alliance or pact” and that the nuclear submarine deal “does not change Australia’s commitment to ASEAN nor our ongoing support for the ASEAN-led regional architecture.”
“Australia remains staunch in our support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Australia will work closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure full compliance with our NPT obligations as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State,” the Australian envoy said in a statement addressed to the ASEAN headquarters in Jakarta.
“We remain committed to reinforcing international confidence in the integrity of the international non-proliferation regime, and to upholding our global leadership in this domain,” he added.
Malaysia’s newly installed Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob, however, remained unconvinced, telling his Australian counterpart that that “AUKUS could potentially provoke other powers to act more aggressively, especially within the South China Sea region.”
Significantly, other key ASEAN states such as Vietnam and Singapore, which have welcomed greater strategic cooperation with the US, have not raised any objections. Experts and analysts believe that the two countries quietly welcome any external efforts to counter China’s muscle-flexing in the South China Sea.
Surprisingly, Beijing-friendly Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte bucked the reticent trend by openly backing the deal as an indispensable contribution to regional security.
Following phone conversations with his Australian counterpart Peter Dutton, Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana reiterated the country’s “neutrality” but didn’t openly criticize the AUKUS deal.
Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana delivers a speech during a closing ceremony of an annual joint US-Philippines military exercise, Manila, May 19, 2017. Photo: AFP / Ted Aljibe
A week earlier, the Philippine defense chief welcomed expanded maritime security cooperation with the US during a visit to Washington to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Philippine-US Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) amid a recent rapid revival of the century-old alliance.
Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr, who also recently visited Washington, reflected Manila’s quiet return to its traditional alliances after years of strategic flirtation with China by defending the deal as consistent with regional principles and the NPT because the nuclear submarines will use enriched uranium but not carry nuclear weapons.
“The enhancement of a near-abroad ally’s [Australia] ability to project power should restore and keep the balance rather than destabilize it,” said the Philippine chief diplomat in an official statement.
He welcomed the submarine deal as crucial to “enhancing Australia’s [deterrence] ability, added to that of its main military ally, to achieve that calibration [against regional threats].”
Though not directly mentioning China, Locsin warned of the Asian superpower’s “threatening” behavior in the disputed waters, including the use of “maritime militia” vessels to intrude into Philippine-claimed waters.
“Proximity breeds brevity in response time; thereby enhancing an ASEAN’s near friend and ally’s military capacity to respond to a threat to the region or challenge the status quo,” Locsin added in a thinly veiled jab at China.
9. FDD | Iran Joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
FDD | Iran Joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
Bradley Bowman CMPP Senior Director, Ryan Brobst Research Analyst, Zane Zovak Research Analyst
fdd.org · by Bradley Bowman CMPP Senior Director · September 22, 2021
September 22, 2021 | Policy Brief
Members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) unanimously agreed on Friday to elevate Iran to full membership. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s entry into the SCO strengthens Tehran’s relationships with China and Russia and demonstrates the need for more unity among Israel, the United States, and its Arab partners about the challenges coming from China.
The SCO was formed in 2001 as an intergovernmental organization dedicated to addressing political, economic, and security issues across Eurasia. China and Russia dominate the SCO, whose member states also include India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Diverse security priorities and tensions among members, exacerbated by the addition of India and Pakistan in 2017, mean that the SCO functions more like a diplomatic forum than a unified security bloc.
Despite these limitations, Iran’s SCO membership underscores Tehran’s desire to build a deep and comprehensive partnership with the People’s Republic of China. Under Iran’s “Look to the East” foreign policy, Tehran sees China as its main long-term partner. Earlier this year, Iran and China signed a 25-year strategic partnership that will see China invest several hundred million dollars in Iranian projects, including nuclear power, energy development, and infrastructure. A leaked draft of the partnership agreement called for combined Chinese-Iranian military exercises, weapons development, and intelligence sharing. The final terms of the agreement remain secret.
The Islamic Republic has also been improving its relationship with the SCO’s other key power, Russia. Tehran has agreed to hold joint military exercises with Moscow and Beijing in late 2021 or early 2022, building on trilateral naval exercises in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Oman in late 2019.
Although it could take approximately two years to finalize the legal process of Iranian accession to the SCO, Iran’s acceptance by the body’s members reinforces the importance of enhanced cooperation between the United States and its allies and partners in the Middle East.
In particular, the growing political, military, and economic ties between Tehran and Beijing should ring multiple alarm bells in Washington, Jerusalem, and a number of Arab capitals.
Some Americans have wittingly or unwittingly consoled themselves with the vague notion that great power competition happens only in Europe and East Asia, allowing the United States to ignore the Middle East. As Iran’s SCO membership shows, China and Russia compete in the Middle East, too.
They have a better grasp of the region’s continuing importance.
That reality must inform Washington’s thinking when it comes to the U.S. military posture in the region. It may just be a matter of time until Iran builds or acquires (with Beijing’s or Moscow’s help) some of the same formidable anti-access and area-denial weapons that China and Russia are already fielding. The partnership could provide Tehran, for example, more advanced air defense, missile, cyber, anti-satellite, and electronic warfare capabilities.
The growing military and economic integration between Beijing and Tehran also forces Jerusalem, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and others to assume that technology shared with China may find its way to Tehran. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates should be more sympathetic to concerns regarding their own growing arms purchases from Beijing. The increasingly close economic and military links between China and Iran should also help solidify a growing consensus between Washington and Jerusalem regarding the potency of the Chinese military-civil fusion threat and the need to protect shared technology that may have military applications.
While Iran’s accession to the SCO is distressing, if Washington, Jerusalem, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and others draw the right lessons and increase their cooperation, it may turn out to be a blessing in disguise.
Bradley Bowman is senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Ryan Brobst and Zane Zovak are research analysts. They also contribute to FDD’s Iran Program and China Program. For more analysis from the authors, CMPP, and the Iran and China programs, please subscribe HERE. Follow Bradley on Twitter @Brad_L_Bowman. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_CMPP and @FDD_Iran. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Bradley Bowman CMPP Senior Director · September 22, 2021
10. Analysis | Why the Pentagon can’t fully account for all its assets — in Afghanistan or anywhere else
Inventories and accounting in the military are hard! :-)
Excerpts:
This bipartisan piece of legislation would require any Defense Department component that does not “achieve an unqualified opinion on its full financial statement” after fiscal year 2022 to forfeit 1 percent of its annual funding. The secretary of defense would then have to return those funds to the Treasury Department to be used to reduce the federal deficit.
This added pressure suggests that the earlier the Defense Department can successfully complete a full-scale financial audit, the better. And it means Congress may be keeping a closer eye on those spending requests to ensure that the Pentagon is spending according to law — and also putting the military’s vast resources to use.
Analysis | Why the Pentagon can’t fully account for all its assets — in Afghanistan or anywhere else
Incomplete audits make wasteful spending more likely
Following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, the media and other critics began asking questions about the volume of U.S.-made weapons and equipment left in the hands of the Taliban. One U.S. official estimated that the Taliban controls more than 2,000 armored vehicles and perhaps 40 aircraft, including UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters.
Of course, the U.S. government prioritized the evacuation of people over military equipment — much of which belonged to the now-defunct Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. Yet the inability to quickly and precisely track what resources have been lost highlights a systemic problem that has plagued the Pentagon for decades: the inability or unwillingness to fully account for assets.
What the audit process entails
In 1990, Congress began requiring federal departments and agencies to produce annual audit reports — with the goal of greater transparency on government spending, along with decreased waste. Despite three attempts, the Department of Defense has never successfully outlined its total assets and liabilities. In fact, the department only began conducting audits in 2018.
Auditing the Defense Department’s $3 trillion in assets is no small undertaking — the department’s assets are located on 4,500 sites, across 40 countries and all 50 states. For each of the Pentagon’s 24 components, including military services and various defense agencies, auditors perform two types of on-the-ground testing.
For “existence testing,” auditors verify that everything on paper exists in real life — that all the jets are in the hangar. “Completeness testing” takes the opposite approach — confirming that what exists on the ground is also recorded in the books. Last year, approximately 1,400 auditors were deployed across the department to examine assets and record keeping.
Audits help identify lost material
The audit is critical because the department receives nearly half of all federal discretionary spending each year — $740 billion in the current fiscal year. Lost or unutilized resources could be on the order of hundreds of millions of dollars. Additionally, if Congress doesn’t know specific resources are not being used, legislators might unwittingly allocate money on duplicative assets.
The Defense Department has not published an estimate of how much of its property was lost or destroyed in Afghanistan. But the past three audit attempts reveal the agency has a hard time keeping track of equipment, even when it’s within U.S. borders. During the first effort, auditors at Hill Air Force Base in Utah discovered 71 uninstalled missile motors, worth approximately $51 million. Once it identified the equipment and determined it was in working condition, the Air Force was able to use these motors.More recently, Thomas Harker, the acting Defense comptroller at the time, noted that as a result of the third audit, the Marine Corps “increased the accuracy of a lot of their property, plant and equipment balances, and their inventory and operating materials and supplies.”
As well as discovering mislaid material, the audit attempts have revealed informational gaps that have improved combat readiness. For example, the audit identified a database entry that listed buildings at an Army base as usable, but that were in fact broken down beyond repair.
The potential for illegal impoundment
In addition to creating inefficiencies by not having a complete inventory of its resources, the Defense Department’s inability to fully account for its assets raises a legal concern: the possibility of unauthorized impoundment.
In government lingo, this isn’t the same as what happens to your illegally parked car — “impoundment” refers to when the executive branch refuses to spend funds appropriated by Congress to be spent for specific purposes.
Since the Jefferson administration, presidents have occasionally withheld federal funding to agencies, typically to reduce wasteful spending. But in the early 1970s, President Richard Nixon slashed billions in domestic federal spending, claiming he had constitutional authority to do so. Congress reacted by passing the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which prohibits the president from rescinding or delaying appropriated funds without prior congressional approval.
A year later, the Nixon administration did not adhere to the new statute when it blocked funding to alleviate water pollution. The Supreme Court in Train v. City of New York ordered the president to disburse the funds.
Decades later, impoundment reentered the public discourse when the Trump administration temporarily withheld $391 million in military assistance to Ukraine. That move became part of the complicated backstory that led to President Donald Trump’s first article of impeachment.
In addition to traditional impoundment, another potential challenge to effective use of government funds is passive impoundment, which occurs when the administration purchases but does not use a resource. Otherwise, the executive branch could sidestep Congress’s power of the purse by complying with the appropriations law, but then refusing to employ the resource.
Simply put, passive impoundments — even when they result inadvertently from financial mismanagement — undermine the constitutional authority of Congress to determine whether and how public funds are spent. Though Nixon (and later Trump) asserted that the president has independent constitutional authority under the Constitution’s take care clause to cut or temporarily suspend appropriations, the Supreme Court in the Train case held otherwise.
Will Congress get tough?
This bipartisan piece of legislation would require any Defense Department component that does not “achieve an unqualified opinion on its full financial statement” after fiscal year 2022 to forfeit 1 percent of its annual funding. The secretary of defense would then have to return those funds to the Treasury Department to be used to reduce the federal deficit.
This added pressure suggests that the earlier the Defense Department can successfully complete a full-scale financial audit, the better. And it means Congress may be keeping a closer eye on those spending requests to ensure that the Pentagon is spending according to law — and also putting the military’s vast resources to use.
Christian I. Bale (@ChristianIBale) is a former program examiner in the national security division of the White House, Office of Management and Budget, and former country director for Japan in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of any agency of the U.S. government.
11. Learn to Use Data or Risk Dying in Battle, New Army Project Teaches
Excerpts:
The first line of effort seeks to “create a culture of innovation that respects data as a strategic asset,” Kearney said. That will happen through large-scale basic, voluntary training on the role that data plays in artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies. That part of the project will target both executive leadership and Army personnel who save and manage data—the people making those PowerPoint slides—to teach them a different way via basic courses, about two hours per week. It will launch on a large scale across the XVIII Airborne Corps next spring, but already some 250 people have finished a four-hour basic course.
The second line of effort will apply to those soldiers who want to develop more skills to manage data and even build apps. That starts with four months of training through the software coding bootcamp Galvanize, followed by six months of training through Joint Special Operations Command’s Gap program, learning to build apps that respond to real-world problems. There’s also training in applied data science through the education company Coursera.
Soldiers at Ft. Bragg who are part of the initial rollout already are building apps that serve their needs. Chief Warrant Officer Brian Masters developed a program to track vaccination rates on base in real-time. Spc. Morian Senador built a data-visualization tool for commanders to better understand objects in their inventory. Both are full-time soldiers with other duties, but were able to quickly build low-code apps as part of the JSOC fellowship and their involvement in Project Ridgway.
The final two lines of effort will build off the first two. One will focus on data governance: Why does one service branch, or even one part of a service, have different names and standards for structuring data, and what can be done to overcome that? The other will focus on cloud computing, data storage technologies, and other elements of data infrastructure.
Achieving a level of real data literacy across the force is a far-reaching goal, Kearney said.
Learn to Use Data or Risk Dying in Battle, New Army Project Teaches
Project Ridgway pushes soldiers to use—and even create—the artificial-intelligence tools that will confer military advantage.
FORT BRAGG, N.C. — Soldiers aren’t rushing to use the artificial-intelligence tools that Pentagon leaders are rushing to develop, so Army leaders at Fort Bragg are launching a training program meant to convince commanders that trusting data, algorithms, and AI will keep them alive in battle.
Called “Project Ridgway,” the nascent program aims to help soldiers and commanders better understand how the data they are holding and producing can yield important advantages on the battlefield. Lt. Col. Dan Kearney, the XVIII Airborne Corps plans officer who developed the program, told Defense One in an exclusive interview that contemporary military training just does not adequately address the importance of digital data in future combat. Soldiers and operators, Kearney said, are accustomed to putting data into PowerPoint slides, but not helping machine-learning tools to output insights. That could put the force at a big disadvantage in fights against high-tech competitors whose soldiers know how to put AI to work.
“We have to put the force in a position so that when artificial intelligence efforts are thrust upon us, we are in a position to go ahead and employ them immediately,” he said. “You want leaders to trust that the algorithm is going to go ahead and extrapolate from the right data sets to go ahead and come out with this recommendation. And if commanders don’t trust it, they won’t use it, and they’ll second-guess it, and it will slow down the kill chain.”
Kearney came to Fort Bragg in May 2020 fresh from a fellowship at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, where he analyzed how nation states will use AI to secure strategic advantage. At Bragg, he reconnected with Lt. Gen. Michael Kurilla, the commanding general of XVIII Airborne Corps. Kurilla told him he wanted to “operationalize innovation and build this AI-enabled corps. How do we get there?” recalled Kearney. That’s what Project Ridgway aims to do.
If it’s successful, the project could provide a blueprint for how the rest of the Army—and possibly other services—prepares soldiers and operators to use and build AI tools. Kearney said this starts with removing the mystique around AI and breaking it down into its core components: data, computing power, and algorithms.
While popular culture tends to focus on writing algorithms, the first two items on that list are actually much more important.
For companies like Facebook, Google, and Amazon, the reasons even low-level artificial intelligence is suddenly much more useful today than it was just a few years ago have little to do with advances in creating new statistical methodologies. It stems from two concurrent phenomena: The relatively recent availability of enterprise cloud storage means that programs aren’t limited by hardware. Even more important, far more data is available. But that data must be collected, saved, and stored in a way that allows machine learning and AI programs to use it.
Big tech companies understand that as a core aspect of doing business in the 21st century. Every search, friend interaction, or “like,” is essentially an act of data structuring, one that users take on voluntarily in exchange for free access to digital services.
But military personnel are accustomed to thinking of the data under their purview as having one audience—their superior—and one form—a PowerPoint slide.
“They don’t really appreciate or understand data as a strategic asset,” Kearney said. “They save items on their desktop, save it on the portal; they save it on a shared drive. They save it and they store it based on the way that they grew up. Unfortunately, it’s incredibly difficult to aggregate all that data when it’s stove-piped in all those different silos.”
Changing that mindset is one of the first things the project will seek to change.
The first line of effort seeks to “create a culture of innovation that respects data as a strategic asset,” Kearney said. That will happen through large-scale basic, voluntary training on the role that data plays in artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies. That part of the project will target both executive leadership and Army personnel who save and manage data—the people making those PowerPoint slides—to teach them a different way via basic courses, about two hours per week. It will launch on a large scale across the XVIII Airborne Corps next spring, but already some 250 people have finished a four-hour basic course.
The second line of effort will apply to those soldiers who want to develop more skills to manage data and even build apps. That starts with four months of training through the software coding bootcamp Galvanize, followed by six months of training through Joint Special Operations Command’s Gap program, learning to build apps that respond to real-world problems. There’s also training in applied data science through the education company Coursera.
Soldiers at Ft. Bragg who are part of the initial rollout already are building apps that serve their needs. Chief Warrant Officer Brian Masters developed a program to track vaccination rates on base in real-time. Spc. Morian Senador built a data-visualization tool for commanders to better understand objects in their inventory. Both are full-time soldiers with other duties, but were able to quickly build low-code apps as part of the JSOC fellowship and their involvement in Project Ridgway.
The final two lines of effort will build off the first two. One will focus on data governance: Why does one service branch, or even one part of a service, have different names and standards for structuring data, and what can be done to overcome that? The other will focus on cloud computing, data storage technologies, and other elements of data infrastructure.
Achieving a level of real data literacy across the force is a far-reaching goal, Kearney said.
“You look at the definition, that’s probably something that’s out of reach for the workforce unless we start inculcating that into all of our professional military education across all of the [military occupational specialties] and branches, and that’s not something we can do in the XVIII Airborne Corps,” he said.
But, he said, these first steps could begin to put the Army on a path to better prepare soldiers for the sorts of challenges they’ll face in a world dominated by new technologies.
12. Racial Division, Troops’ Role in Protests Has Hurt Minority Recruiting, Air Force Says
We ignore this to the peril of our nation's security.
Excerpts:
In the nationwide focus on racial inequality that has followed Floyd’s death, the Air Force and Space Force, which still relies on the Air Force’s recruiting structure, have re-doubled their efforts to not only recruit minorities but also pay increased attention to the career field opportunities that those new service members are exposed to.
Within the Air Force, relatively few women or minorities have operational jobs of the sort that increase the chance of promotion. Of the more than 48,000 service members in pilot roles, only about 3,300 were women, and fewer than 100 were Black women, according to 2020 data.
To counter that, the Air Force has been working with groups such as Women in Aviation and Black Pilots of America to get in touch with interested youth, Thomas said. The still-new Space Force has increased its outreach to university JROTC programs to increase diversity, Space Force Brig. Gen. Shawn Bratton told reporters at the Air Force Association’s Air, Space, and Cyber conference.
The issue has the Pentagon’s attention as well. Last year, then-Defense Secretary Mark Esper directed all the services to make changes to their promotion boards, such as removing photographs to reduce unconscious bias as both enlisted and officers are considered for advancement.
Racial Division, Troops’ Role in Protests Has Hurt Minority Recruiting, Air Force Says
Black interest in military service plummeted after the George Floyd protests. Can the Pentagon undo the damage?
Years of racial tension, and the use of National Guard troops last June after the death of George Floyd, have hurt the military’s ability to recruit minorities, the head of Air Force recruiting said Wednesday.
That drop is part of a worrisome long-term trend that the military is fighting against: that fewer recruitment-age youth show an interest to serve.
According to the Defense Department’s latest twice-a-year Futures Survey, released in August, shows that the share of eligible youth who reported they have an interest in military service, had dropped about two percent overall in the last couple of years, said Maj. Gen. Ed Thomas, commander of the Air Force Recruiting Service.
Most concerning, Thomas said, was that “the biggest drop in propensity to serve is from Black males, Hispanic males, and females.”
For example, the percentage of Black respondents who reported an interest in military service dropped from 20 percent in summer 2019 to 11 percent in summer 2020, according to the data. By fall 2020, the percentage of Black respondents interested in military service had dropped to 8 percent.
The percentage of Hispanics reporting an interest in military service dropped from 18 percent to 14 percent over the same time. Interest from recruitment-eligible whites remained steady, from 8 percent in summer 2019 to 9 percent in summer 2020.
“The last couple of years has done damage, there’s no doubt,” Thomas said. “The data shows us that the racial division in our nation has done damage to our recruiting efforts.”
Last June, after Floyd was killed by a Minneapolis police officer, then-president Donald Trump pitted the military against those protesting his death. He urged governors across the nation to bring out the National Guard and “dominate the streets”; he warned if those governors didn’t deploy Guardsmen, he’d do it himself and “quickly solve the problem for them.”
Some Guardsmen, as well as police forces dressed in military fashion, subsequently used force to disperse peaceful protestors and subdue rioters and looters.
Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. CQ Brown said he wasn’t sure why the numbers had dropped, but that it showed the military needed to reach out not only to recruitment-age youth but also that “we do need to engage with their influencers, whether it’s their aunt or uncle, mom, dad, cousins, grandparents…to show there’s is great opportunity in our Air Force.”
“One of the things I’ve always believed is that young people only aspire to be what they can see,” Brown said.
In the nationwide focus on racial inequality that has followed Floyd’s death, the Air Force and Space Force, which still relies on the Air Force’s recruiting structure, have re-doubled their efforts to not only recruit minorities but also pay increased attention to the career field opportunities that those new service members are exposed to.
Within the Air Force, relatively few women or minorities have operational jobs of the sort that increase the chance of promotion. Of the more than 48,000 service members in pilot roles, only about 3,300 were women, and fewer than 100 were Black women, according to 2020 data.
To counter that, the Air Force has been working with groups such as Women in Aviation and Black Pilots of America to get in touch with interested youth, Thomas said. The still-new Space Force has increased its outreach to university JROTC programs to increase diversity, Space Force Brig. Gen. Shawn Bratton told reporters at the Air Force Association’s Air, Space, and Cyber conference.
The issue has the Pentagon’s attention as well. Last year, then-Defense Secretary Mark Esper directed all the services to make changes to their promotion boards, such as removing photographs to reduce unconscious bias as both enlisted and officers are considered for advancement.
“The tragedy of George Floyd has brought emphasis to our efforts to reach out and do a better job in diversity recruiting than probably ever before,” Thomas said. “So while it has done damage in the short term, I'm optimistic that in the long term, we will end up being better for it. But it's going to only be with a lot of hard work.”
13. Special envoy to Haiti resigns citing 'inhumane' US decision to deport thousands of Haitians from US border
Special envoy to Haiti resigns citing 'inhumane' US decision to deport thousands of Haitians from US border
CNN · by Etant Dupain, CNN
(CNN)Daniel Foote, the US special envoy to Haiti, has handed in his resignation to Secretary of State Antony Blinken, saying he will "not be associated with the United States inhumane, counterproductive decision to deport thousands of Haitian refugees" from the US-Mexico border.
He adds that the US policy approach to Haiti remains "deeply flawed."
Foote stated in his resignation letter to Blinken that Haiti is wracked with poverty, crime, government corruption and a lack of humanitarian resources. He said the "collapsed state is unable to provide security or basic services and more refugees will fuel further desperation and crime."
He added that more negative impacts to Haiti will have calamitous consequences, not only in Haiti but in the US and our neighbors in the hemisphere."
A House Foreign Affairs Committee aide said Chairman Gregory Meeks, a New York Democrat, received a copy of the letter and confirms its content.
Read More
This story is breaking and will be updated.
CNN's Jennifer Hansler contributed to this report.
CNN · by Etant Dupain, CNN
14. Biden Just Gave France Something More Valuable than a Submarine Contract
Excerpts:
So let’s take this for what it’s worth, no more or less. The Biden White House’s one-line acknowledgement that a European defense capability that is separate but complementary to NATO is “important” was buried in a diplomatic readout of a private conversation. That is hardly a ringing endorsement. But it’s new, and rest assured Paris will use those words to continue making their case. Macron can now say he moved Biden further toward Paris’s position. And Biden can say he’s open to European defense evolution. Both can say they still love NATO. But none of us yet knows how far Biden is really to go down this path with Marcon, if at all.
They won’t have too much time to lurk behind vagaries. Biden and Macron agreed to meet in late October. If we don’t know more by then whether these world leaders are serious about creating a new European defense and security autonomy, that’s the question I would ask first.
Biden Just Gave France Something More Valuable than a Submarine Contract
The White House endorsement of European defense apart from NATO is worth more than a $66 billion deal with Australia.
The $66 billion submarine deal with Australia is lost, but France’s President Emmanuel Macron may have won something far more valuable from President Joe Biden.
For several years now, Macron has pitched the idea that Europe needs to boost its military spending and capabilities to better defend itself and its interests. U.S. and NATO leaders have largely responded politely but dismissively to a concept they argue could subvert the 71-year old alliance. Europe? Defend itself? Says France? Okay. But did the United States just come around?
The break came on Wednesday, after a week of Franco-American diplomatic faux pas from both sides over the surprise (to Paris) revelation that Australia would purchase American- and British-made nuclear-powered submarines instead of French diesel boats. Macron recalled his U.S. ambassador over it, and Biden had spent days trying to get his French counterpart to talk about it. When Macron finally picked up the phone, it’s unclear whether he got an apology from Biden. But buried inside the joint U.S.-French readout of their call came news of a major policy concession.
“The United States also recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defense, that contributes positively to transatlantic and global security and is complementary to NATO,” says the joint statement.
That’s big. The part that matters most is the phrase “and is complementary to NATO.”
Recall that nearly two years ago, Macron called NATO a “brain-dead” organization. He has since argued in many venues that while NATO’s nuclear umbrella remains essential, Europe cannot and should not rely on outsiders— meaning the U.S., UK, Canada—for safety and security. Just weeks after Biden took office, Macron told the Atlantic Council think tank, “My mandate has been to try to reinvent or restore an actual European sovereignty.” Of late, he has argued that a stronger and independent European defense would make NATO stronger by relieving some of the burden on the larger defensive nuclear pact and allowing Europeans to think, plan, and act more quickly and independently.
It’s quite a turn after two decades in which U.S. officials have gently and not-so-gently prodded NATO’s European members to shoulder more of the burden of collective defense. Of course, that was always meant to take place within the construct of an alliance in which America is the big dog. The NATO supreme allied commander is an American military four-star officer, not French, German, British, or North Macedonian.
Recall that in February, Biden’s first transatlantic coming-out speech as president was filled with niceties that slighted Macron’s ideas by not even acknowledging them. Read aloud today, those remarks to the Munich Security Conference should be embarrassing for this White House. “I know the past few years have strained and tested our transatlantic relationship, but the United States is determined — determined — to re-engage with Europe, to consult with you, to earn back our position of trusted leadership,” Biden said.
Ha, some trust. September’s submarine scandal torpedoed that sentiment. The French were given no notice, much less consultation, about the coming deal, according to the New York Times and other newsrooms. So French leaders are furious while American and British leaders are hardly apologetic. Biden hasn’t taken a single question about the deal; in his public opening remarks with the leaders of Australia and the UK at the United Nations this week he made no mention of submarines; only the other leaders did.
So let’s take this for what it’s worth, no more or less. The Biden White House’s one-line acknowledgement that a European defense capability that is separate but complementary to NATO is “important” was buried in a diplomatic readout of a private conversation. That is hardly a ringing endorsement. But it’s new, and rest assured Paris will use those words to continue making their case. Macron can now say he moved Biden further toward Paris’s position. And Biden can say he’s open to European defense evolution. Both can say they still love NATO. But none of us yet knows how far Biden is really to go down this path with Marcon, if at all.
They won’t have too much time to lurk behind vagaries. Biden and Macron agreed to meet in late October. If we don’t know more by then whether these world leaders are serious about creating a new European defense and security autonomy, that’s the question I would ask first.
15. China Can’t Win an Arms Race With the U.S.
Excerpts:
China would be wise to learn two additional lessons from the Soviet experience. First, Soviet leaders kept investing in a losing arms race because they worried the U.S. would strike first. In retrospect, such fears were totally unfounded — and economically ruinous. Today, it is unimaginable that the U.S. would initiate a preemptive attack on a nuclear-armed China.
Second, the Soviet Union managed to keep the Cold War from turning into a shooting one by working closely with the U.S. to set up protocols and rules to avoid accidental conflict. China would be smart to implement existing Sino-U.S. protocols more robustly and to propose new ones.
So many of Xi’s policies have been geared toward avoiding the mistakes of his Soviet counterparts. Unless China changes course soon, he risks repeating their biggest one.
China Can’t Win an Arms Race With the U.S.
Attempting to match the combined military might of America and its allies would require a radical increase in defense spending — the same trap that ensnared the Soviets.
September 22, 2021, 5:00 PM EDT
After the collapse of the Soviet Union three decades ago, Chinese leaders reportedly commissioned in-depth studies of its causes. One of the U.S.S.R.’s biggest mistakes, according to Chinese researchers, was to engage in a costly arms race with the U.S. that ultimately bankrupted the Soviet economy.
Today, as the U.S. concentrates its military capabilities on East Asia, China confronts a similar strategic dilemma. Attempting to match America’s military might would require China to increase defense spending radically — the same trap that ensnared the Soviets. Failing to counter a U.S. military buildup, however, could leave China even more insecure and vulnerable.
The U.S. decision to arm Australia with nuclear-powered attack submarines has starkly highlighted China’s predicament. With this dramatic strategic move, the U.S. is effectively challenging China to a new and likely astronomically expensive arms race. Each Virginia-class U.S. submarine carries a price tag of $3.45 billion.
China now finds itself in an unenviable strategic position. It must contest the combined military capabilities of the U.S. and its allies in the Pacific at the same time.
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If China only had to reach near-parity with the U.S. military, it would face a difficult but not completely impossible task. At its peak, the Soviet economy was less than half the size of its U.S. counterpart. China’s GDP is now about 70% the size of America’s in dollar terms and is likely to surpass it within 15 years. In the foreseeable future, China could conceivably match U.S. military spending.
But the math changes completely if the combined economic heft of the Quad nations — the U.S., Japan, India and Australia — is added to the equation. The Quad is fast emerging as a military alliance constructed specifically to contain China. With a total GDP of $30 trillion as of 2020, according to the World Bank, the Quad’s economic output is twice as large as China’s.
Maintaining defense spending at 3% of their combined GDP would generate $900 billion for the Quad’s militaries. China, which spent $250 billion on defense in 2020, would nearly have to quadruple its military budget to keep up.
If one factors in the technological edge held by the U.S., which also has a huge stockpile of weapons after decades of outsized military spending, it would be utterly unrealistic for China to think it can win the next arms race on the strength of its growing economy and technological capabilities.
So, what is to be done?
The advice of Sun Tzu — avoid confronting your opponent’s strengths — seems particularly relevant. Instead of getting drawn into an unwinnable arms race, China should focus on diplomacy to increase its security.
The root cause of America’s success in rallying Japan, India, and Australia is those nations’ fear of China’s growing military capabilities. Japan and India, which have ongoing territorial or maritime disputes with China, have particular incentive to band with the U.S.
China would better serve its interests if it made a serious effort to settle these disputes and defuse tensions with its neighbors. Suspending incursions into the waters of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and withdrawing troops from some of the contested areas on the Sino-Indian border would be welcome initial signs of goodwill.
With mutual distrust and animosity spiraling to dangerous levels, it’s equally important for China to start engaging the U.S. again. President Xi Jinping should shed his apparent reluctance to meet with President Joe Biden. Only diplomatic engagement at the highest-level can slow the vicious cycle that is increasingly militarizing U.S.-China competition.
China would be wise to learn two additional lessons from the Soviet experience. First, Soviet leaders kept investing in a losing arms race because they worried the U.S. would strike first. In retrospect, such fears were totally unfounded — and economically ruinous. Today, it is unimaginable that the U.S. would initiate a preemptive attack on a nuclear-armed China.
Second, the Soviet Union managed to keep the Cold War from turning into a shooting one by working closely with the U.S. to set up protocols and rules to avoid accidental conflict. China would be smart to implement existing Sino-U.S. protocols more robustly and to propose new ones.
So many of Xi’s policies have been geared toward avoiding the mistakes of his Soviet counterparts. Unless China changes course soon, he risks repeating their biggest one.
This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
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To contact the editor responsible for this story:
16. US botched the response to COVID-19, McChrystal says
US botched the response to COVID-19, McChrystal says
Retired Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal is about to have a new book out, and it has a big takeaway: We’re not doing a great job of protecting ourselves.
“Risk: A User’s Guide,” out Oct. 5, takes a look at how leaders approach and handle risk. McChrystal has found they focus more on the likelihood that something will or won’t happen, and less on what to do when even the unlikely happens.
“Like many people, I’ve lived a life that touched risk and dealt with risk, tried to mitigate risk or defeat risk,” he told Military Times during a Sept. 7 interview. “And over the years, I’ve come to the conclusion, we don’t do it very well.”
Nowhere is that more stark than 18 months into the COVID-19 pandemic, as parts of the U.S. are ravaged by deaths and hospitalizations, while others have tamped their community transmission down to manageable levels.
“We always knew another virus was going to come and threaten a pandemic,” he said. “We not only knew it was inevitable, but we know how to deal with a threat like that through public health. And we blew it; we absolutely have flubbed the response.”
Rather than uniting as a country, he said, the U.S. fought dozens of small wars against the pandemic. Some states came up with a uniform plan, while in others, cities and counties had to fend for themselves, playing whack-a-mole with outbreak after outbreak.
“Well, I think up front, we reached a conclusion through personal experience, that we’re not good with risk,” McChrystal said. “And as we studied it, we concluded, we’re the big reason. You know, the biggest risk to us is us.”
The former commander of troops in Afghanistan, ousted in 2010 after making denigrating comments about the Obama administration during a Rolling Stone interview, compared the Global War on Terror to the pandemic response.
Like terrorism, he said, viruses mutate, but there are public health measures that can be taken to combat them.
RELATED
Of 46 deaths so far, none have occurred in troops who are fully vaccinated against COVID-19.
“The way we fought it is countless municipalities, all trying to deal with this threat, none of which by itself was capable of effectively fighting it,” he said. “And if you extrapolate that to the world, the reality of any viral pandemic is, you don’t solve it anywhere until you solve it everywhere. It’s like a forest fire. If the embers are still there, the problem is still there.”
In their book, McChrystal and his co-author, Anna Butrico, outline 10 “dimensions of risk,” that can be monitored and adjusted to shore up capabilities when an emergency comes.
He put these to work during the pandemic, as the state of Missouri, for example, contracted with his McChrystal Group consulting firm for guidance on its pandemic strategy.
“What I’ll say is, what we’ve done is we’ve been able to help several states and cities pull together their ability to communicate, make decisions rapidly, get the different dots connected, so that they can get a better outcome,” McChrystal said, declining to offer specifics about his clients. “And we’ve had tremendous satisfaction and success with that.”
On the horizon, he said, might not only be another pandemic, but something that has been under discussion for decades: climate change.
“And so if there’s anything that should be unifying to society, global society, it ought to be climate change, as COVID-19 should have,” he said. “But instead, what we’ve done is we’ve allowed climate change to become a political issue. And in many cases, we’ve allowed people with different agendas, whether their economic agendas or political science ideologies, to argue broadly.”
Arguing about whether it exists only pushes off the opportunity to do something about it, he said.
Meghann Myers is the Pentagon bureau chief at Military Times. She covers operations, policy, personnel, leadership and other issues affecting service members. Follow on Twitter @Meghann_MT
17. A GI Bill for Afghan allies
A GI Bill for Afghan allies
It is time to consider what more we can do to help those Afghans who helped us through 20 years of war. As Congress debates legislation to support newly arrived refugees, why not create a “GI Bill for Afghan Allies” to give those men and women who bravely served alongside our military, humanitarian, and development organizations access to training and education at community colleges, state schools and universities? The opportunity would be similar to what we’ve provided our own vets since the end of World War II.
The GI Bill has been instrumental in reintegrating American service members returning from war and helped usher in one of the most prosperous eras in our history. The cost to educate Afghans admitted to the U.S. under the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program, while not inconsiderable, would be minuscule compared to what we have been spending daily on war and nation building in Afghanistan. Moreover, such an initiative would be critical to accelerating their integration and maximizing their ultimate contribution to their new country.
The exact number of Afghans who worked with the US military, the embassy, and the country’s development efforts in the past 20 years is uncertain due to incomplete records kept by many of the companies who facilitated their employment. The SIV program, enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006 and expanded by the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009, was designed to provide an expedited pathway for visas for Afghans (known as the principal applicant), who were employed “by or on behalf of the US Government” or by the International Security Assistance Force or its successor missions. It was intended for Afghans who had “experienced or (were) experiencing ongoing threats as a consequence of their employment” and extended to their spouses, and any unmarried children under 21 years of age. Including family members, more than 70 thousand Afghans may be eligible for SIVs, and there are a reported 20,000 interpreters with SIV applications in process due to the chronic and deadly delays in the application process. Whatever the exact number, thousands of Afghans have begun to arrive in the United States, their past lives in backpacks and suitcases, their futures unknown, carrying the trauma of decades of war and a narrow escape through a panic packed airport and Taliban checkpoints.
What can we do to help? In towns across the country, resettlement programs are underway, charities and philanthropic organizations are reaching out and homes are opening up, but what happens after the initial settling in? What about the future? How to help thousands who were part of the 20-year American project in Afghanistan survive their trauma and begin their new and productive lives?
Repeatedly, with the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, known as the GI Bill, and its successors, the Post 9-11 GI Bill and the 2017 Forever GI Bill, we have turned to education as a way of helping service men and women recover from the traumas of war by imagining — and moving toward — a new future. Between 1944 and 1956 alone, more than 2.2 million used the Bill to go to college and university; 5.6 million more used it for training programs. Why not help our Afghan colleagues who served alongside our military in brutal combat do the same?
The GI Bill provides 36 months of tuition at community colleges and state colleges and universities or up $20,000 at a private college or university, a monthly stipend and money for books. A program for Afghans admitted as principal applicants under the SIV process might be Congressionally funded, but it could also be supported by private donations from individuals and philanthropies and supplemented by scholarships and stipends from educational organizations, colleges and universities. A modest expenditure in GI Bill-like benefits for principal applicants under the SIV program would also lessen the burden on resettlement agencies while providing new Afghan arrivals the means to integrate more quickly into their new American society while maximizing their capacity to become economically self-sufficient.
Estimating the cost of a training and education benefits program is conjectural at this stage since we don’t know what portion of the total SIVs arriving would be interested, whether they would select short-term training or longer-term college and graduate schools, the extent to which colleges or universities might support the effort with stipends or work/study programs, or what individuals and philanthropic organizations might contribute to the program. That said, we can make some guesses based on experience with the GI Bill and what we know now about arriving SIVs.
Since December of 2014, the U.S. Department of State has authorized 34,500 SIVs for Afghan principal applicants, including 8,000 recently authorized under the Emergency Security Supplemental Appropriations Act of July 2021. As of August 2021, only some 16,000 principal applicants have emigrated to the United States from Afghanistan with approved SIVs. In 2018, the Congressional Budget Office estimated an average yearly expenditure of $17,800 per year per beneficiary under the GI Bill, for a four-year college cost of approximately $71,200. Assuming that some 10,000 of the SIVs opt for GI Bill-like education benefits, the total cost of the program might run about $160 million annually over a five-year span. These figures could well be high since they assume that every Afghan principal applicant would apply and be academically qualified for a four-year program. By comparison, the GI Bill currently costs American taxpayers almost $11 billion per year with no end in sight, and US spent some $300 million a day during its 20 years in Afghanistan. .
The cost for an Afghan education program pales compared to the $6 billion originally earmarked by Congress for support to the now-defunct Afghan military and would be a worthy target of any potential reapportionment of those funds. The Afghans coming to the United States have served with Americans, with the military or non-government and civil society organizations, in journalism, schools, and public health. They may have been students or faculty at the American University Afghanistan in Kabul. They have talent and experience; they may need specialized training and education and degrees. They have much to contribute and represent a remarkable resource—both to the country they are coming to and, potentially, one day and under different circumstances, the one they left behind. Creating an Afghan GI Bill would enable them to explore their new possibilities and build the capacity to fulfill them.
Desaix Myers, former Professor of National Security Studies at the National Defense University and retired Foreign Service Officer with the US Agency for International Development, is the author of three books and a variety of articles and chapters, most recently, “The US Agency for International Development: More Operator Than Policy Maker,” in The National Security Enterprise (Georgetown University Press 2017).
Doug Livermore serves as a civilian in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy while continuing his military service as an officer in the Maryland Army National Guard. Previously, he served for a decade on active duty as an infantry and Special Forces officer. Doug has deployed repeatedly to support combat and contingency operations. He is on the board of directors of No One Left Behind, is the national director for external communications of the Special Forces Association and graduated from West Point (BS) and Georgetown University (MA). You can follow him on Twitter @dolivermore or connect on LinkedIn.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Government or any of its departments or agencies.
Editor’s note: This is an Op-Ed and as such, the opinions expressed are those of the author. If you would like to respond, or have an editorial of your own you would like to submit, please contact Military Times senior managing editor Howard Altman, haltman@militarytimes.com.
18. Top Army spokesperson suspended after abysmal climate survey
Top Army spokesperson suspended after abysmal climate survey
The Army’s highest-ranking public affairs officer and top spokesperson has been suspended from her duties after 97 percent of respondents to a command climate survey for her office reported “workplace hostility.”
Brig. Gen. Amy E. Johnston took over as the service’s chief of public affairs in April 2019, according to her official biography.
In that role, she is “responsible for all communications activities involving the United States Army” and she serves as the principal public affairs advisor to the Army secretary and chief of staff.
Army Times obtained slides detailing a recent command climate survey that revealed massive dissatisfaction within the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs. A source familiar with the suspension said it was related to the survey, which has sparked an Army investigation.
An Army spokesperson confirmed that Johnston was no longer in her position, but said she could not provide details about the pending investigation or comment on the survey.
“We can confirm that Brig. Gen. Amy Johnston has been suspended and placed on special duty pending the outcome of an Army investigation,” said Army spokesperson Cynthia Smith. “Given that the investigation is ongoing, we can provide no further comment at this time.”
Johnston did not immediately respond to a request for comment sent through her office.
Johnston’s suspension came in the wake of a command climate survey that revealed alarming conditions at OCPA.
Of the soldiers and Army civilians who responded to the survey, 97 percent reported “workplace hostility,” which is a key indicator of potential toxic leadership issues, according to the slides.
The data also revealed a morale crisis. Roughly two-thirds of soldiers and civilians at OCPA reported low morale in the survey, with only 8 percent saying they had high morale.
This slide deck obtained by Army Times depicts the results of a command climate survey that resulted in the suspension of Brig. Gen. Amy Johnston, the Army's top public affairs officer.
According to the briefing slides, spirits were low due to overwork, poor work-life balance and unclear expectations concerning work products.
The survey also revealed potential issues with sexual and racial harassment.
Twenty-one percent of respondents said there was sexual harassment present at OCPA, and 26 percent reported they’d seen racial harassment.
There have been other signs of dissatisfaction with Johnston’s leadership of OCPA, as well.
This slide deck obtained by Army Times depicts the results of a command climate survey that resulted in the suspension of Brig. Gen. Amy Johnston, the Army's top public affairs officer.
The report, which uses her previous last name of Hannah, says she provided communications advice to Maj. Gen. Scott Efflandt, who was the highest ranking officer relieved in conjunction with the investigation.
The Fort Hood report criticized the post’s press shop for being “ill-staffed, ill-trained and ill-prepared” to deal with the social media environment during the Guillen case. Fort Hood public affairs ultimately fell under Johnston’s purview as the service’s ranking public affairs officer.
The investigation said the Army “ceded the social media space, lost the opportunity to inform and educate the public in a timely fashion, and allowed the unhindered growth of damaging narratives about Fort Hood and the Army.”
Army public affairs regulations, which Johnston is responsible for, lacked sufficient guidance on the topic at the time. A new version of the regulation that went into effect Nov. 8, 2020, included a chapter on social media, but it was too late.
Her office was also criticized in a June Task & Purpose report on the Army’s “failure to communicate.” The article quoted Army public affairs officers who said the service lacked transparency in dealing with news events.
Multiple Army public affairs officials also savaged the service’s strict public affairs regulations in the article, despite a significant overhaul last year that was designed to improve transparency.
“Most of the time we get it right,” Johnston told Task & Purpose in response to the criticism. “But sometimes we fall short; regardless, we will strive to do our best, and continue to do so, no matter what the challenge.”
It was not immediately clear who would serve as acting chief of public affairs during Johnston’s absence.
Davis Winkie is a staff reporter covering the Army. He originally joined Military Times as a reporting intern in 2020. Before journalism, Davis worked as a military historian. He is also a human resources officer in the Army National Guard.
Meghann Myers is the Pentagon bureau chief at Military Times. She covers operations, policy, personnel, leadership and other issues affecting service members. Follow on Twitter @Meghann_MT
19. Taiwan seeks entry into key trade pact before China
Taiwan seeks entry into key trade pact before China
Published
8 hours ago
Taiwan has filed an application to join a key Asia-Pacific trade pact just days after China submitted an application.
But it warned that its bid to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) could be put at risk should China join first.
The two places have a complicated relationship.
Taiwan considers itself as an independent nation, but China regards it as a breakaway province.
On Thursday, Taiwan's chief trade negotiator John Deng told reporters that if China joined the CPTPP first, "Taiwan's case to become a member will be at risk, this is fairly obvious".
The unanimous approval of all 11 members is needed for new countries to join the pact.
On Thursday, Japan's Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi told reporters that he welcomed Taiwan's application to join the pact, said a Kyodo News report.
The CPTPP was initially created by the US to counter China's influence - but the US later pulled out under then US President Donald Trump.
It is one of the largest of its kind, linking a wide swathe of countries across the region.
China has not yet commented on Taiwan's application - though it has in the past often insisted that Taiwan be excluded from many international bodies or to be labelled as part of China.
This has sometimes resulted in Taiwan joining under different names. For instance, its team competes under the name of Chinese Taipei in the Olympics.
Taiwan has also applied to join the CPTPP under the name it uses in the World Trade Organization (WTO) - the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen
Both China and Taiwan's applications come after the US, UK and Australia recently announced a controversial security deal, in an effort seen to counter Chinese influence in Asia-Pacific.
The Aukus pact will allow Australia to build nuclear-powered submarines for the first time, using technology provided by the US and the UK.
China has criticised Aukus, with foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian saying the alliance risked "severely damaging regional peace... and intensifying the arms race".
media captionAustralia’s ‘risky bet’ to side with US over China
The original Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was promoted by then-President Barack Obama as an economic bloc to challenge China's increasingly powerful position in the Asia Pacific.
After Mr Trump pulled the US out of the deal, Japan led negotiations to create what became the CPTPP.
The CPTPP was signed in 2018 by 11 countries, including Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan and New Zealand.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
