Quotes of the Day:
“The sense of being at home in the world through social connection with others is a deep and pervasive Stoic theme. Stoicism, whether ancient or modern, sees social supports and not just inner strength as critical to how we surmount rather than succumb to adversity.”
- Nancy Sherman, Stoic Wisdom: Ancient Lessons for Modern Resilience
“There are no dangerous weapons; there are only dangerous men.”
- Robert A. Heinlein, Starship Troopers
“Democracy cannot succeed unless those who express their choice are prepared to choose wisely. The real safeguard of democracy, therefore, is education.”
- Franklin D. Roosevelt
1. Full text of President Moon Jae-in's speech at U.N. General Assembly
2. Moon proposes formal end to Korean War for irreversible progress in denuclearization efforts
3. Why Provide Nuclear Submarines to Australia, But Not South Korea or Japan?
4. Opposition party leader leaves for US for North Korea among other issues
5. Moon's proposal to end Korean War faces feasibility questions
6. 70 years after he died in a Korean POW camp, Medal of Honor recipient Fr. Emil Kapaun begins journey home
7. South Korea president to visit Hawaii to honor service members in repatriation ceremony
8. Republic of Korea calls for UN-led ‘era of global community’
9. Kim Jong Un shift from nuclear push to economy intensified internal debates in country, report says
10. Understanding Kim Jong Un’s Economic Policymaking: Defense Versus Civilian Spending
11. The Last Chance to Stop North Korea?
12. At UN, Moon pushes peace with NKorea after missile tests
13. Top diplomats of S. Korea, U.S., Japan to hold talks in New York
14. U.S. seeks diplomacy to completely denuclearize Korean Peninsula: Biden
15. S. Korea's first lady holds talk session with young Korean Americans
16. North Korean Food Shortages Hobble Autumn Holiday Rituals and Feasts
17. S. Korea planning 23 bln-won aid project for war-torn Afghanistan
1. Full text of President Moon Jae-in's speech at U.N. General Assembly
Full text of President Moon Jae-in's speech at U.N. General Assembly | Yonhap News Agency
NEW YORK, Sept. 21 (Yonhap) -- The following is a full text of South Korean President Moon Jae-in's speech at the 76th session of the U.N. General Assembly.
President Abdulla Shahid,
Secretary General António Guterres,
Distinguished delegates,
Standing before you again in two years at the United Nations General Assembly, I am keenly reminded of the precious normal daily lives that had been lost.
Guided by the leadership of President Shahid who assumed presidency of the 76th session of the UNGA, I hope the international community will gather its wisdom and work in collaboration to tackle global crises.
For the past 5 years, Secretary General Guterres has worked tirelessly to revitalize and reform the UN, and I offer my sincere congratulations and respect to you, Mr. Secretary-General, for your re-election victory.
I am most certain that you will make greater strides in the key agenda dearest to your heart such as peacekeeping operations, climate response and SDGs.
I hope that the UNGA session this year will impart to the people of the world a message of hope that we will emerge victorious from the pandemic and climate crisis and attain sustainable development.
Mr. President, Mr. Secretary-General and Distinguished Delegates,
Humans, by nature, build and live together in communities.
Resorting to collective intellect and mutual aid available in those communities, humanity has prevailed over a myriad of infectious diseases and lived in co-existence.
The COVID-19 pandemic will also be surmounted by the love of humanity and solidarity, and at its heart, the UN shall stand.
In our fight against coronavirus, borders were crossed to share genomic information; vaccines were successfully launched through close collaboration; and therapeutics are also being developed at a rapid pace.
A triumph over coronavirus demands us to break down barriers.
The horizons of our lives and thoughts have extended from villages to countries, and from countries to the entire planet.
This, I reckon, is the coming of an era of global community.
In this era of global community, we employ one another and work with one another. We gather our wisdom together and we act together.
To date, countries with advanced economy and more power have taken the lead in the world. Yet, from now, all nations are called upon to move in tandem with their best possible goals and best possible approaches in pursuing sustainable development.
As the pivot of such cooperation and action, the UN will be asked to take on a larger role than now.
Founders of the UN, having gone through the scourge of two world wars, aspired to establish an order for international peace.
Now, the UN is requested to recommend a new set of rules and goals as it ushers in this era of global community.
To facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation within the framework of multilateral order, the UN must become an institution that builds trust among nations.
An institution that brings together the commitment and capabilities of the community of nations to galvanize action.
The Republic of Korea will take an active part in the international order of solidarity and cooperation to be led by the UN.
Korea, a newly independent state after World War II, was able to build a democracy and a strong economy with the support of the UN and the international community.
Now a responsible member of the international community, Korea is determined to step up its efforts to help countries prosper together and embrace one another.
Korea will take the lead in putting forward a vision for partnership and co-existence that can be shared by both developed and developing countries.
A task most urgent for the global community is delivering an inclusive recovery from the coronavirus crisis.
Low-income families, the elderly and other vulnerable groups were left most widely exposed to the threat of coronavirus.
Socioeconomic problems built up over the years were brought to the fore by the pandemic.
Poverty and hunger have deepened.
From income, jobs to education, gaps widened across gender, class, and countries.
The UN has been calling for reducing such inequalities already for years by putting forth the Sustainable Development Goals for 2030.
Now, it is incumbent upon all members of the UN to work with greater vigor to realize the SDGs.
Korea will stand together to help all people in every country live without the fear of coronavirus.
We will deliver on our 200-million-dollar pledge to COVAX AMC. As one of the global vaccine production hubs, we will strive for an equitable and expeditious supply of COVID-19 vaccines.
Korea will also stand at the vanguard of the endeavors to achieve the SDGs.
In a bid to defeat the pandemic and make a new leap forward, we are pushing forward the Korean New Deal policy.
Notably, we are reinforcing employment and social safety nets and expanding investment in people under the Human New Deal to realize an inclusive recovery that puts people first.
Our policy experience from the Korean New Deal will be shared with the rest of the world.
To help developing countries advance closer towards SDGs together, Korea plans to scale up its ODA, particularly in green, digital, and healthcare - the areas that have seen a surge in demand during the pandemic.
Another pressing task for the global community to undertake is responding to the climate crisis.
Even as we speak, our planet is getting hotter faster than anticipated.
The community of nations must join forces in closer concert with one another to push forward carbon neutrality.
Last year, Korea committed itself to carbon neutrality by 2050 and legislated its vision and implementation framework by enacting the Framework Act on Carbon Neutrality.
By next month, we will finalize our 2050 carbon neutrality scenario and unveil our enhanced 2030 NDC at COP 26 in November.
We have shut down coal-fired power plants earlier than scheduled and ended public financing for new overseas coal-fired power generation, with efforts underway to ramp up the generation of new and renewable energy.
Carbon neutrality can be achieved only when each and every country is engaged in continued cooperation.
Action plans must be also sustainable.
Through Green New Deal, Korea is turning its carbon neutrality commitment into opportunities to cultivate new industries and create jobs.
Many Korean businesses are voluntarily joining the RE100 Campaign and expanding their investment in hydrogen and other new and renewable energy, while pushing forward ESG management and carbon neutrality with greater force.
The government, for its part, will firmly back up the private sector in technology development and investment.
Korea will scale up its climate ODA and set up a Green New Deal Trust Fund with a view to supporting the work of Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) and share its technologies and capacity for carbon neutrality.
We will stand ready to help developing countries build their capacity to tackle the climate crisis.
Moreover, building on our experience as the host of the P4G Seoul Summit in galvanizing the global commitment into climate action, Korea seeks to host COP28 in 2023.
We aspire to take on a more vigorous role for the faithful implementation of the Paris Agreement.
Mr. President, Mr. Secretary-General and Distinguished Delegates,
The most ardent dream of the global community is creating a life that is peaceful and secure.
The birth of the UN has transformed the paradigm of international relations based on competition and conflict into the one of coexistence and shared prosperity.
The UN has endeavored to replace the incomplete peace maintained by the balance of power with sustainable peace grounded in cooperation, thereby promoting freedom for entire humanity.
To ensure a complete, lasting peace will begin taking firm root on the Korean Peninsula, Korea remains fully committed to doing its part.
Envisioning a de-nuclearized, co-prosperous Korean Peninsula, the government of the Republic of Korea has steadily carried forward the Korean Peninsula peace process, and amid the support of the international community, achieved historic milestones – the Panmunjeom Declaration, Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018 and military agreement resulting from the inter-Korean Summit, as well as the Singapore Declaration from the US-North Korea Summit.
Peace on the Korean Peninsula begins always with dialogue and cooperation.
I call for speedy resumption of dialogue between the two Koreas and between the United States and North Korea.
I hope to see that the Korean Peninsula will prove the power of dialogue and cooperation in fostering peace.
Two years ago in this very place, I declared zero tolerance for war, mutual security guarantee and co-prosperity as the three principles in resolving issues related to the Korean Peninsula.
Last year, I proposed a declaration to ending the War on the Korean Peninsula.
More than anything, an end-of-war declaration will mark a pivotal point of departure in creating a new order of 'reconciliation and cooperation' on the Korean Peninsula.
Today, I once again urge the community of nations to mobilize its strengths for the end-of-war declaration on the Korean Peninsula and propose that three parties of the two Koreas and the US, or four parties of the two Koreas, the US and China come together and declare that the War on the Korean Peninsula is over.
When the parties involved in the Korean War stand together and proclaim an end to the War, I believe we can make irreversible progress in denuclearization and usher in an era of complete peace.
In fact, this year marks a meaningful 30th anniversary of the simultaneous admission of South and North Korea into the United Nations.
With the joint accession to the UN, the two Koreas both recognized that they were two separate nations different in systems and ideologies.
However, such was never meant to perpetuate the division.
For when we acknowledged and respected each other, only then could we set out on a path to exchange, reconciliation, and unification.
When the two Koreas and the surrounding nations work together, peace will be firmly established on the Korean Peninsula and prosperity fostered across entire Northeast Asia.
That will go down as a Korean Peninsula Model in which peace is attained through cooperation.
North Korea, for its part, must brace for changes that befit the era of global community.
I expect that the international community, together with Korea, remain always ready and willing to reach out to North Korea in a cooperative spirit.
Heeding the yearnings of the separated families, already advanced in age, we must lose no time in pressing ahead with their reunions.
When South and North Korea are engaged together in regional platforms such as the Northeast Asia Cooperation for Health Security, a more effective response to infectious diseases and natural disasters will become feasible.
As a community bound by common destiny on the Korean Peninsula, and as the members of the global community, the South and North, I hope, will come together to join forces.
Towards building a Korean Peninsula that promotes shared prosperity and cooperation, I will make ceaseless efforts until my very last day in office.
The recent situation in Afghanistan serves as a stark reminder of the crucial role that the UN plays in advancing peace and human rights.
Coming December, the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial will be hosted in Korea.
To ensure safer and more effective operation of UN peacekeeping missions, Korea will make use of this opportunity to encourage closer cooperation in the international community.
For the UN's initiatives in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, Korea too will increase its fair share of contribution.
Korea will make a bid for a seat as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the coming 2024-2025 term, and to build sustainable peace and thriving future generations, it stands ready to play an active part.
I look forward to your cooperation and support in this regard.
Mr. President, Mr. Secretary-General and Distinguished Delegates,
Humanity, even in the darkest hours of adversity, has never lost hope for the future.
Trusting one another, working side by side, we have changed that very hope into reality.
Even in the face of the COVID-19 crisis, we are yet again sowing the seeds of hope.
To build back better, we are gathering our greatest strengths.
If humanity is united as one and never loses sight of today, we will surely be able to build a better tomorrow.
As humanity embarks on a new journey for ushering in the era of global community, I count on the United Nations to lead the way with a spirit of solidarity and cooperation.
Thank you.
(END)
2. Moon proposes formal end to Korean War for irreversible progress in denuclearization efforts
Despite my support for peace on the Korean peninsula, I have to say this is problematic on many levels.
Let me state upfront that there should be no end of war declaration or a peace agreement without a reduction of the frontline forces in north Korea. We must understand that the ROK forces are postured for defense while 7-0% of the 1.2 million soldiers (4th largest army in the world) is posture offensively among the DMZ between South Korea and Pyongyang. We must ask how an end of war declaration or peace agreement will ensure the security of the ROK? Answer: It will not, given the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.
Some considerations:
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We should consider the history and who are/were the belligerents in the Korean Civil War - with emphasis on civil war between north and South. A review of the UN Security Council resolutions of 1950 (82-85) shows that the United Nations clearly identified the north as the hostile aggressor who attacked South Korea. The UN called on member nations to come to the defense of South Korea. It established the UN Command and designated the United States as executive agent for the UN Command which included designating the commander.
- The United States did not declare war on the north. It intervened under UN authority and fought under the UN command. President Rhee placed the remnants of the Korean forces under the command of the UNC. The Chinese did not officially intervene in the war. It sent "volunteers"- The Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) to defend the north. The 1953 Armistice was signed by military representatives the UN Command and the north Korean People's Army (nKPA)and then later by the Chinese People's Volunteers and the Commander in Chief of the nKPA.
- The logical end to the Korean Civil War and adoption of a peace treaty must be brokered between the two designated belligerents (the north and South). The US and PRC could provide security guarantees but they should not be parties to the peace treaty and the US should not try to have a separate peace treaty with the north (which is exactly what the north has demanded for years and what also worries Koreans in the South who fear a separate peace that would abandon the South).
- The other problem with a peace treaty between north and South is their current constitutions. Both countries do not recognize the existence of the other and in fact both claim sovereignty over the entire Korean peninsula and Korean population. A peace treaty would undermine both constitutions because signing a peace treaty would mean recognizing the existence of two Koreas
- Of course if the north and South sign a peace treaty ending their hostilities it is logical to argue that the UN command should be dissolved. But I do not think there is any international precedent for this. How would the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions be rescinded (UNSCRs 82-85)? Also, there is nothing in the Armistice that says the signatories of the Armistice must also sign a peace treaty. Again international lawyers are going to hash this out but now we have two member nations of the UN (north and South) and if they choose to end the war who can stop them? And of course once they do that all kinds of arguments will be made (like Moon Chung-in) that there is no more rationale for the UN command or US troops.
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However, USFK and CFC exist and are present as a result of a bi-lateral agreement, the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953 (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kor001.asp). Note that the MDT makes no mention of north Korea or the DPRK. A peace treaty should technically have no impact on the presence of US forces and bilateral ROK/US agreements and US troops are present by mutual agreement but if the South wants them to leave I expect we will immediately leave - we are not a nation that would occupy a sovereign country against its wishes - even if it were for its own good!! See the MDT below for details.
- So the jury is still out on all of this. These are uncharted waters in my opinion. I go to the basics. There are two belligerents north and South and they had a civil war. The UN and Chinese intervened to support the two sides. The military commanders agreed to an Armistice to halt the fighting and to buy time for the political parties to find a resolution. We have been in suspended animation for almost 70 years and now we may see some kind of political movement.
- One last thing. If on June 12th The US, nK and ROK say that the war is officially ended I do not think that officially changes anything until there is a peace agreement negotiated between north and South with mechanisms put in place to ensure the peace. I see the US and possibly the Chinese role as mere guarantors of security but I do not think they have to be signatories on a peace treaty since the US was acting for the UN and the Chinese only sent "volunteers." The treaty obligations of both the US with the ROK and China with nK are separate agreements and do not necessarily impact on the peace treaty. I also see no way for the US, China, or the UN to "veto" a peace treaty between the north and South. I also think it would be political suicide for any party to do so. I think a declaration of the end of the war would be symbolic only but would have tremendous political influence.
Lastly, we need to consider the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime and ask how will an end of war declaration lead to irreversible denuclearization? A major element of Kim's political warfare strategy is to demand the end of the US "hostile policy." While we would assess that an end of war declaration should be perceived as an end of the US hostile policy, Kim would not agree with that perception. For him an end of the hostile policy is an end of the ROK/US alliance, withdrawal of US troops, and an end of extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella over the ROK and Japan. This is so the regime can continue to execute its strategy based on subversion, coercion/extortion (blackmail diplomacy) and the use of force to dominate the peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State. An end of war declaration will be a means to achieving these ends.
We should always remember that north Korea is conducting a political warfare strategy: "Political warfare is the use of political means to compel an opponent to do one's will, based on hostile intent. The term political describes the calculated interaction between a government and a target audience to include another state's government, military, and/or general population. Governments use a variety of techniques to coerce certain actions, thereby gaining relative advantage over an opponent. The techniques include propaganda and psychological operations (PSYOP), which service national and military objectives respectively. Propaganda has many aspects and a hostile and coercive political purpose. Psychological operations are for strategic and tactical military objectives and may be intended for hostile military and civilian populations." Smith, Paul A., On Political War (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1989), p. 3. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a233501.pdf
(LEAD) Moon proposes formal end to Korean War for irreversible progress in denuclearization efforts | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with more remarks, details; CHANGES photo; ADDS another)
By Lee Chi-dong
NEW YORK, Sept. 21 (Yonhap) -- South Korean President Moon Jae-in suggested once again in his United Nations speech Tuesday that the two Koreas and the United States, probably joined by China, declare a formal end to the 1950-53 Korean War.
"I propose that three parties of the two Koreas and the U.S., or four parties of the two Koreas, the U.S. and China come together and declare that the War on the Korean Peninsula is over," he said, addressing the 76th session of the U.N. General Assembly here.
"When the parties involved in the Korean War stand together and proclaim an end to the War, I believe we can make irreversible progress in denuclearization and usher in an era of complete peace."
Declaring an end to the war will "mark a pivotal point of departure in creating a new order of 'reconciliation and cooperation' on the Korean Peninsula," he added.
It marked his last speech at the annual U.N. session, with his single five-year tenure slated to finish in early May 2022.
His proposal for such a declaration was not new. He made the offer during his U.N. General Assembly speech in 2018 and last year.
But this year's offer was delivered in a stronger tone and more specifically.
He asked the world to explore ways for cooperation.
"I expect that the international community, together with Korea, remain always ready and willing to reach out to North Korea in a cooperative spirit, he said.
He also called for "speedy resumption of dialogue" between the two Koreas and between the U.S. and North Korea.
"I hope to see that the Korean Peninsula will prove the power of dialogue and cooperation in fostering peace," Moon said, citing a set of inter-Korean agreements as well as the Pyongyang-Washington summit accord signed in Singapore in 2018.
This year, especially, marks the 30th anniversary of the U.N. approving the both Koreas as its members simultaneously, he noted.
Moon made no mention of North Korea's recent test-launches of ballistic and cruise missiles.
He instead proposed the resumption of an inter-Korean program to get separated families reunited.
"Heeding the yearnings of the separated families, already advanced in age, we must lose no time in pressing ahead with their reunions," he stated.
He added that the two Koreas can work together in regional platforms such as the Northeast Asia Cooperation for Health Security, which will make them respond more effectively to infectious diseases and natural disasters.
"As a community bound by common destiny on the Korean Peninsula, and as the members of the global community, the South and North, I hope, will come together to join forces," Moon said.
Meanwhile, Moon announced South Korea's bid to become a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council for the 2024-2025 term. South Korea had the seat for the 1996-1997 and 2013-2014 terms.
Moon described the recent situation in Afghanistan as a "stark reminder" of the U.N.'s crucial role in advancing peace and human rights and reaffirmed Seoul's commitment to more contributions to the international community. In December, it is scheduled to host the U.N. ministerial meeting on peacekeeping.
A task most urgent for the global community is delivering an inclusive recovery from the coronavirus crisis, he emphasized.
"Now a responsible member of the international community, (South) Korea is determined to step up its efforts to help countries prosper together and embrace one another," he said. "It will take the lead in putting forward a vision for partnership and co-existence that can be shared by both developed and developing countries."
lcd@yna.co.kr
(END)
3. Why Provide Nuclear Submarines to Australia, But Not South Korea or Japan?
Nuclear powered submarines are not needed for defense against north Korea. Both countries (with advanced defense industries as noted in the article) would be better served in investing other capabilities such as missile defense. Politically, neither country is likely to employ SSns in a way that would be of strategic value because of domestic politics and in the ROK's situation the effect on relations with China. As long as the existential threat from north Korea exists South Korea must invest the right capabilities to deter and defeat that threat. SSNs will not make a significant contribution to those missions..
Excerpts:
Beyond the significant discrepancy in military industries, Japan and South Korea’s locations make them far less well suited to deploying nuclear powered submarines, considering the security challenges that Washington is seeking to address by proliferating such weapons. Both Northeast Asian states are located near to the countries that challenge the perpetuation of Western-led order in the region, namely China, North Korea, and Russia. Diesel-electric submarines are thus considered more than sufficient, with the usefulness of nuclear-powered ships’ high endurances being ideal for power projection but far from necessary for short-range regional operations. Indeed, diesel-electric ships may be preferable when a high endurance is not needed as they are not only much more cost-effective both to build and to operate, but are also generally considered quieter and harder to detect.
This may change in the future for South Korea in particular, as it moves to build carrier strike groups capable of projecting power beyond Northeast Asia, for which high endurance submarines could provide a valuable escort as they do for U.S. carrier groups today. South Korea has also moved toward developing a possible second-stage strategic deterrent, as the only non-nuclear state to field submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and could seek nuclear-powered ships to accommodate these in the distant future.
Why Provide Nuclear Submarines to Australia, But Not South Korea or Japan?
Australia’s strategic location makes its deployment of SSNs a much greater asset to broader Western interests than if other U.S. allies did the same.
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The announcement on September 15 that the United States and United Kingdom would support a Royal Australian Navy (RAN) program to acquire nuclear-powered attack submarines, the first of which will reportedly be launched by the end of 2039, represents one of the most significant developments of the year for East Asian security. Australia will become the seventh country to field such assets and the very first non-nuclear weapons state to do so, with U.S. reactors using weapons-grade uranium expected to power the new vessels.
The unprecedented deal has sparked concerns of a proliferation risk either through Australia’s eventual acquisition of nuclear arms or, more likely, through a sharing arrangement similar to what the U.S. currently has with several European allies. The latter possibility would see U.S. nuclear weapons, in this case cruise missiles, transferred to Australian service in the event of a major war, with the RAN training to use them until then, much as European states train to use U.S. nuclear gravity bombs today. All this remains speculation, however, and the possibility remains that Australia currently intends to field its attack submarines purely as conventionally armed assets for long-distance power projection.
Nuclear-powered attack submarines have the advantage over their diesel-electric counterparts of being able to cover longer distances at much higher speeds, and of having far higher endurances, which allow them to remain at sea longer without the need to refuel. This has made them particularly highly prized by Western powers, which are accustomed to fighting wars offensively and far from their shores. By some estimates nuclear-powered submarines will allow the Royal Australian Navy to maintain deployments in the South China Sea for seven times as long as diesel electric ones – 77 days at a time rather than 11.
The provision of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia has raised the question of whether other U.S. allies could be next, and of why the RAN was the first and only client for such weapons. This can partly be explained by the fact that the U.S. and Britain’s offering of nuclear-powered ships was likely key to allowing them to gain contracts that had previously been promised to France by improving on the French offer of 12 diesel-electric ships. Australia’s strategic location, however, makes its deployment of such ships a much greater asset to broader U.S. and Western interests than if other American allies did the same.
Japan and South Korea in particular, which have far larger defense budgets, would be much better able to afford such acquisitions but, for a number of reasons, are not expected to be offered similar technologies. Both East Asian states are much more industrialized and have long had sizeable submarine industries of their own producing diesel-electric powered ships. Japan’s submarines in particular, such as the new Taigei class, are thought to be much stealthier than any Western counterpart.
Beyond the significant discrepancy in military industries, Japan and South Korea’s locations make them far less well suited to deploying nuclear powered submarines, considering the security challenges that Washington is seeking to address by proliferating such weapons. Both Northeast Asian states are located near to the countries that challenge the perpetuation of Western-led order in the region, namely China, North Korea, and Russia. Diesel-electric submarines are thus considered more than sufficient, with the usefulness of nuclear-powered ships’ high endurances being ideal for power projection but far from necessary for short-range regional operations. Indeed, diesel-electric ships may be preferable when a high endurance is not needed as they are not only much more cost-effective both to build and to operate, but are also generally considered quieter and harder to detect.
This may change in the future for South Korea in particular, as it moves to build carrier strike groups capable of projecting power beyond Northeast Asia, for which high endurance submarines could provide a valuable escort as they do for U.S. carrier groups today. South Korea has also moved toward developing a possible second-stage strategic deterrent, as the only non-nuclear state to field submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and could seek nuclear-powered ships to accommodate these in the distant future.
Australia’s move to acquire nuclear powered submarines was far from inconsistent with trends in Canberra’s security discourse, with multiple reports in 2018-19 indicating that the country was considering acquiring nuclear weapons and reports subsequently indicating that B-21 bomber acquisitions were also being considered. The country’s most influential think tank, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, was among those making the case for a B-21 acquisition. As an intercontinental-range bomber the B-21, like nuclear powered submarines, is the kind of asset that only nuclear weapons states have deployed in the past and is intended to hold targets an ocean away at risk.
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While an Australian acquisition remains uncertain, a B-21 sale would reflect part of the same trend of Canberra seeking to acquire assets capable of projecting power into Northeast Asia and holding Chinese cities and bases under threat, which is highly beneficial for Washington as it contributes to upholding Western-led order in the region. Whether Australia acquires them or not, B-21s will complement its nuclear-powered submarines and are expected to be deployed on Australian soil by the U.S. Air Force with missions in East Asia firmly in mind.
As U.S. bases on Guam and Wake Island, let alone South Korea and Japan, are increasingly considered highly vulnerable to a new generation of Chinese and North Korean armaments, Australia’s importance will only grow. Its distance provides relative safety as Guam once did in the Cold War years, but it is still close enough to be a valuable staging ground for offensive operations. The provision of nuclear-powered submarines thus represents part of a wider trend toward Australia emerging as a central part of Western power projection efforts aimed at East Asia, with the country hosting new infrastructure and combat assets to this end.
4. Opposition party leader leaves for US for North Korea among other issues
I will be part of a group that will meet this delegation on Friday. It will be interesting to meet Chairman Lee and hear what he has to say.
Opposition party leader leaves for US for North Korea among other issues
Lee Jun-seok, chairman of the main opposition People Power Party, speaks to reporters before leaving for the United States, at Incheon International Airport, Sept. 22. Yonhap
Lee Jun-seok, chairman of the main opposition People Power Party (PPP), and his fellow lawmakers left for the United States on Wednesday, a visit that comes months ahead of South Korea's next presidential election.
Lee and six other PPP lawmakers are on a weeklong trip that will also take them to New York and Los Angeles, where they plan to meet various U.S. officials and representatives of the overseas Korean community in America.
Before departing for Washington, Lee said he plans to discuss a slew of key issues, including South Korea's diplomacy with the U.S., when he meets with senior U.S. officials.
"The Moon Jae-in government's North Korea policy pushed for during the Trump administration is on course to be scrapped substantially," Lee told reporters at Incheon International Airport, west of Seoul.
"Since the launch of the Moon government, our U.S. diplomacy has experienced confusion and gone back and forth between cold and hot water," Lee said. "We plan to talk with senior U.S. officials about a new orientation as a mandated political party."
While in America, Lee's delegation will meet Kurt Campbell, White House National Security Council policy coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Gregory Meeks and other government and congressional figures and experts.
They also plan to meet with Korean residents to encourage their participation in the absentee vote for the presidential election, slated for March next year. (Yonhap)
5. Moon's proposal to end Korean War faces feasibility questions
Not just feasibility. It must pass the FAS test: feasibility, acceptability,and suitability.
Moon's proposal to end Korean War faces feasibility questions
The Korea Times · by 2021-09-22 16:18 | Health & Welfare · September 22, 2021
President Moon Jae-in addresses the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Tuesday (EST). Yonhap
Unresponsive Pyongyang, Washington-Beijing rivalry stymie talks
By Nam Hyun-woo
President Moon Jae-in once again renewed his call for a formal end to the 1950-53 Korean War in an effort to bring peace to the Korean Peninsula, but the feasibility of his proposal is questionable, given the state of relations between the two Koreas and the U.S.
During a speech at the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Tuesday (EST), Moon proposed a trilateral or quadrilateral declaration to proclaim a formal end to the Korean War.
The war ended in an armistice signed in 1953 by the U.S.-led United Nations Command, China and North Korea, leaving the two Koreas technically still at war.
"Today, I once again urge the community of nations to mobilize its strengths for the end-of-war declaration on the Korean Peninsula, and propose that the three parties of the two Koreas and the U.S., or the four parties of the two Koreas, the U.S. and China, come together and declare that the war on the Korean Peninsula is over," Moon said.
"When the parties involved in the Korean War stand together and proclaim an end to the war, I believe we can make irreversible progress in denuclearization and usher in an era of complete peace," he added.
Unlike a peace treaty, which requires parliamentary level approval, an end-of-war declaration would be a non-binding political statement, thus an easier step for both Washington and Pyongyang.
Due to the relative ease of signing such a declaration, President Moon has been championing the idea since 2018, when inter-Korean relations were at their best in recent years, saying that it would serve as a gateway to peace on the peninsula. He officially proposed the declaration to the international community during last year's U.N. General Assembly. At the time, he did not clarify who should make the declaration, but this time, he specified that the two Koreas, the U.S. and even China could be involved.
As the President has now specified which countries could be involved in signing the declaration, this proposal is being interpreted as an attempt to find a breakthrough in the inter-Korean stalemate during his presidency, which will end in May next year.
A missile being launched from a train in an undisclosed location in North Korea is seen in this photo released by North Korea's state-run Korean Central News Agency, Sept. 16. YonhapHowever, Moon's proposal seems unfeasible, considering that inter-Korean relations are deadlocked with the North seemingly continuing on with its nuclear program, while remaining silent toward repeated calls for talks from South Korea and the U.S.
Recent developments in the missile programs of both Koreas are also against the peace narrative that Moon is pitching. On Sept. 15, the South Korean Navy successfully test-fired a domestically developed, submarine-launched, ballistic missile, while on the same day, North Korea launched a ballistic missile from a train, signs that the two Koreas are trying to show each other their military strength.
The conservative main opposition People Power Party (PPP) criticized Moon's proposal, saying that peace cannot be achieved through a declaration, but must come through North Korea taking action to show its commitment to denuclearization.
"The North fired cruise and ballistic missiles from a train less than 10 days ago," PPP spokesman Kim Yeon-joo said in a written commentary. "This act reveals that the Korean Peninsula's situation has not changed, despite the three inter-Korean summits and two Pyongyang-Washington summits under the Moon government," Kim said, adding that Moon did not mention anything about the North's missile launches during his U.N. speech.
Rep. Tae Yong-ho of the PPP, who is a former North Korean diplomat, also said that an end-of-war declaration should be considered only after North Korea makes a meaningful move towards denuclearization.
"So far this year, North Korea has begun carrying out its nuclear program as planned by restarting its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and by test-firing ballistic missiles. With North Korea escalating its nuclear threat, an end-of-war declaration will only cause North Korea to misbelieve that it may see the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces Korea from the Korean Peninsula," Tae said.
U.S. President Joe Biden addresses the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Tuesday. Reuters-YonhapRising tensions between the U.S. and China are also lowering the feasibility of an end-of-war declaration within Moon's presidency, because the Joe Biden administration has been stating that it will not engage in a top-down approach of meeting directly with North Korea leader Kim Jong-un or signing any "grand bargains." Involving China in a quadrilateral, end-of-war declaration is also unlikely, given the intertwined rivalry between Washington and Beijing.
During the U.N. General Assembly, Biden said that the U.S. seeks "concrete progress toward an available plan with tangible commitments that would increase stability on the Korean Peninsula," but did not elaborate further on North Korea issues, showing that Washington's diplomatic interests are currently focused largely on China and Afghanistan.
The Korea Times · by 2021-09-22 16:18 | Health & Welfare · September 22, 2021
6. 70 years after he died in a Korean POW camp, Medal of Honor recipient Fr. Emil Kapaun begins journey home
We should always remember the heroism and humanity of Chaplain Father Emil Kapaun
70 years after he died in a Korean POW camp, Medal of Honor recipient Fr. Emil Kapaun begins journey home
U.S. Army chaplain Fr. Emil Kapaun died in a prisoner of war camp in Korean on May 23, 1951. On April 11, 2013, former President Barack Obama posthumously awarded Kapaun, credited with saving hundreds of soldiers during the Korean War, the Medal of Honor. (U.S. Army)
HONOLULU, Hawaii (Tribune News Service) — None of his family or his closest Korean War compatriots thought Tuesday’s events were possible, not in 70 years.
But the day has come. And Father Emil Kapaun can come home to Kansas now.
Farm boy. Catholic priest. U.S. Army chaplain. Defiant prisoner of war who stole food and medicine right under the noses of camp guards. Medal of Honor recipient, possible Roman Catholic saint — and now, finally, a long-lost son of Kansas returning to a family that can lay him to rest.
On Tuesday, 70 years after he died in a North Korean prisoner of war camp, U.S. Defense Department searchers for missing soldiers gave the hero’s remains to his family in a ceremony at Pearl Harbor.
The searchers, along with Bishop Carl Kemme and others from the Diocese of Wichita, made a human tunnel outside the Senator Daniel I. Inouye Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency laboratory building, where they had identified his remains in March.
An honor guard made up of men and women from all branches of the military escorted Kapaun’s flag-draped remains outside past more than 50 saluting soldiers on one side and white coated lab anthropologists and lab technicians on the other.
Ray and Lee Kapaun walked a few steps behind, with Johnie Webb beside them; Johnie is a deputy director of the Hawaii based search teams and a legend among former POWs and fellow MIA searchers.
Ray wept as the hearse took his uncle.
U.S. Army chaplain Fr. Emil Kapaun died in a prisoner of war camp in Korean on May 23, 1951. On April 11, 2013, former President Barack Obama posthumously awarded Kapaun, credited with saving hundreds of soldiers during the Korean War, the Medal of Honor. (U.S. Army)
“You guys really did this right.” Ray told Johnie.
“We’re glad to provide every honor he deserves,” Johnie said. “All of us are glad to be a small part of the effort to send him home.”
For Ray, this day was the latest tribute in a wild six months since his phone rang at his home on Whidbey Island in Washington State in March; a U.S. Army soldier told him the Defense Department had found his uncle, who starved to death in 1951 after saving many fellow starving prisoners of war in North Korea.
In the weeks after his uncle’s identification Ray traveled; he talked many times to the few surviving POWs who revered their chaplain friend.
In June he flew to Hawaii, where he touched the bones of the uncle he’d never met. On the lab table where Kapaun’s bones lay, Ray placed items from the priest’s long-dead parents: Bessie Kapaun’s rosary, Enos Kapaun’s scratched and worn pocket watch. A small container of Kansas prairie dirt scraped from the soil of the old Kapaun farm southwest of Pilsen, in central Kansas.
Ray made many calls after March. He talked with the POW William Funchess, who in 1951 hugged Father Kapaun night after night trying to warm the dying man’s body. Funches died only weeks after Ray called him.
Ray talked many times with the former POW Mike Dowe, who wrote Father Kapaun’s first Medal of Honor recommendation in 1954. He visited — and hugged — the POW Robert McGreevy in Maryland, who struggles now to stand. At the battle of Unsan, where they were both captured in 1950, McGreevy had been a 19-year-old soldier who saw Kapaun repeatedly ignore officers’ orders to evacuate; Kapaun instead gathered a knot of soldiers. “Some of you aren’t going to make it,” Kapaun said. “I’m going to give you the last rites.”
Dowe has said the POWs who revere Kapaun all thought his body would never be found, they thought the Chinese guards in North Korea had rolled his body into one of the many mass graves that were dug in Camp Five, where they were imprisoned. More than 1,400 of the 3,000 American and Allied prisoners in Camp Five starved or froze to death in the first winter of the war.
But the Chinese in 1954 had sent 4,200 sets of remains south after the war.
The odds were long that one set might be those of Father Kapaun. Not only was 4,200 only a fraction of those killed in North Korea, but the Army had found it impossible in the mid-1950s to identify more than 850 of those Korean War remains.
They buried them as “unknowns” in the Punchbowl, an ancient volcanic crater now called the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific, on the Hawaiian island of Oahu. In August 2019, as part of a concerted effort to finally identify the Korean War unknowns, soldiers dug up hundreds of sets of remains and sent them to the Pearl Harbor laboratories for analysis.
Ray Kapaun poses with President Barack Obama after receiving the Medal of Honor on behalf of his uncle, Father Emil Kapaun. (Stars and Stripes)
In March, to the surprise of his friends and family, scientists using DNA and other investigative methods identified Kapaun’s remains.
Finding him at last was a shock to Ray and Father Kapaun’s surviving POW friends. “It’s like somebody up above was making this happen,” former POW Dowe said.
Ray Kapaun has worked relentlessly since March to make this reunion of loved ones about more than him or his family. Dowe and the other POWs years ago all became like second fathers to him.
For Dowe it was a gathering of brothers. In May 1951, while Kapaun lay sick and starved, Dowe and other POWS got into a shoving match with camp guards when the guards came to take Kapaun away to what they called a hospital and what the POWS called “The Death House.” “They got aggressive with their bayonets,” Dowe said. The enfeebled and sick Americans relented only when Kapaun himself told them to stop fighting.
Those men can rest easy now.
He’s coming home.
___
(c)2021 The Wichita Eagle (Wichita, Kan.)
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7. South Korea president to visit Hawaii to honor service members in repatriation ceremony
One of the many shared values of the US and the ROK: we recover and honor our fallen and missing.
South Korea president to visit Hawaii to honor service members in repatriation ceremony
HONOLULU (HawaiiNewsNow) - South Korean President Moon Jae-In will be visiting the islands on Wednesday to honor America’s military.
He will be part of a repatriation ceremony at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam as the United States accepts remains of service members killed during the Korean War.
The Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency said 68 Republic of Korea and six U.S. service members will be repatriated back to their home countries. The DPAA works to investigate, search for and recover American soldiers missing and killed in action.
To further honor these soldiers’ service, Moon is also scheduled to lay a wreath at the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific to recognize independence fighters.
Copyright 2021 Hawaii News Now. All rights reserved.
8. Republic of Korea calls for UN-led ‘era of global community’
Republic of Korea calls for UN-led ‘era of global community’
“To facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation within the framework of the multilateral order, the UN must become an institution that builds trust among nations”, he said, pledging that his country would “take the lead in putting forward a vision for partnership, and co-existence that can be shared by both developed and developing countries.”
He called for an inclusive recovery out of the COVID-19 pandemic and pledged to deliver on his nation’s pledge to provide $200 million in funding for the international COVAX vaccine equity initiative.
Mr. Moon said another “pressing task” was action on the climate crisis, saying that by COP26 at the end of October, Republic of Korea would finalize its national plan for meeting the Paris Agreement, and carbon neutrality by 2050.
“We have shut down coal-fired power plants earlier than scheduled and ended public financing for new overseas coal-fired power generation, with efforts underway to ramp up the generation of new and renewable energy.”
Call for official end to Korean War
Confronting the issue of peace on the Korean Peninsula and its northern neighbour the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK), President Moon called for a “speedy resumption of dialogue between the two Koreas and between the United States and North Korea.”
He said that last year, he had proposed a formal declaration ending the War on the Korean Peninsula, in the hopes of creating a new order of “reconciliation and cooperation”.
“Today, I once again urge the community of nations to mobilize its strengths for the end-of-war declaration on the Korean Peninsula and propose that three parties, of the two Koreas and the US; or four parties of the two Koreas, the US and China; come together and declare that the War on the Korean Peninsula is over.
If that can be achieved, he said that “irreversible progress” could be made to denuclearize the Peninsula, and “usher in an era of complete peace.”
Mr. Moon called on DPRK to “brace for changes that befit the era of global community”, highlighting the example of Korean families separated for decades across the divide.
“We must lose no time in pressing ahead with their reunions” he said, pledging that he would make “ceaseless efforts until my very last day in office” to bring the two nations together in shared prosperity, and cooperation.
Full statement in English here.
9. Kim Jong Un shift from nuclear push to economy intensified internal debates in country, report says
Interesting report which I will forward in its entirety. But regarding the speculation of an internal debate between defense spending and the welfare of the Korean I would like to see evidence when the regime has ever actually prioritized the welfare of the Korean people over the support to the elite, and the military?
Excerpts:
The authors — Carlin, one of the foremost North Korean researchers in the United States, and Rachel Minyoung Lee, a former intelligence analyst based in South Korea — argue that understanding North Korea’s economic policy calculus and the historical tug-of-war over the allocation of the country’s limited resources are key to making progress on denuclearization or rapprochement.
“There is a generally accepted view that a large — perhaps the largest — portion of the DPRK economy in one way or another is devoted to the defense sector, thus starving the civilian economy,” the authors wrote, referring to North Korea’s official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. “This does not seem to be settled policy, however, and has not been for some time.”
...
One line of thinking advocated for a harder position on defense spending as a stimulant for the economy, and another suggested the need to shift the emphasis away from the military, according to the report. While authors did not disclose their affiliation, they likely had the backing of high-level regime officials to make such commentary on such a critical topic, Carlin and Lee wrote.
“You get to see North Korea’s thinking, their inner discussions on the different economic policies and positions that they may be thinking about, what they’re interested in,” Lee said in an interview. “It’s a more raw version of central media.”
These economic articles reflect the most relevant debates when there are major policies in discussion under leadership, the researchers said. They can provide context about official Pyongyang statements.
For example, even though Kim said in a January speech that he plans on developing new weapons and improving existing deterrence measures, the research articles throughout 2019 and 2020 showed “no signs yet of North Korea significantly backtracking on economic reforms to make room for more emphasis on defense industry,” the researchers wrote.
My assessment of Kim's speech at the 8th Party Congress last January. While the authors say they see no signs of backtracking on economic reforms, I see no evidence of ever having prioritized the welfare of the Korean people over military spending.
•Political Warfare
•Subversion, coercion, extortion
•“Blackmail diplomacy” – the use of tension, threats, and provocations to gain political and economic concessions
•Example: Kim Yo-jong threats in June – ROK anti-leaflet law in December
•Negotiate to set conditions - not to denuclearize
•Set Conditions for unification (domination to complete the revolution)
•Split ROK/US alliance
•Reduce/weaken defense of the South
•Exploit regional powers (e.g, China and Russia)
•Economics by Juche ideology – the paradox of “reform”
•Illicit activities to generate funds for regime
•Deny human rights to ensure regime survival
•Continue to exploit COVID threat to suppress dissent and crack down on 400+ markets and foreign currency use
•Priority to military and nuclear programs
•For deterrence or domination?
Kim Jong Un shift from nuclear push to economy intensified internal debates in country, report says
TOKYO — In a pivotal 2018 address, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un announced he would shift from emphasis on nuclear development toward "concentrating all efforts" on modernizing and expanding the economy.
But new research suggests that before Kim’s speech, the policy shift was openly debated among high-level officials in the North Korea regime.
Those who supported greater defense spending on the military and nuclear programs — widely viewed by the North’s leadership as critical leverage with the world — made the case that investing in defense is actually good for the civilian economy.
Meanwhile, the gloves were practically off among those who wanted to see greater spending on civilians, who suggested the need to shift emphasis away from the military, according to the researchers.
A report released Wednesday by 38 North, a research program at the Washington-based think tank Stimson Center, provides a rare look into the range of leadership thinking on the tensions between the country’s nuclear ambitions and its dire economic struggles.
Through articles published in North Korea’s premier economic journals, researchers tracked internal struggles over spending on weapons development in the face of agricultural and consumer goods needs, particularly as Kim looked to make his pivot.
That debate was heating up when Kim took over in 2011, and intensified leading up to 2018 when Kim began engaging with South Korean and U.S. leaders — including two summits with President Donald Trump — carrying proposals to ease international sanctions in exchange for scaling back Pyongyang’s nuclear program.
“They can’t afford to be opening their arms to the outside and having a smiling face without having some real teeth,” Robert Carlin, former intelligence analyst and co-author of the report, said in an interview. “That’s why we see this back-and-forth. They’re never sure when they have enough to establish that external” connection.
The report comes amid stalled denuclearization talks with North Korea, dramatically less information about North Korea due to its pandemic lockdown, and mounting economic pressures from a food shortage, self-imposed trade restrictions and international sanctions.
The authors — Carlin, one of the foremost North Korean researchers in the United States, and Rachel Minyoung Lee, a former intelligence analyst based in South Korea — argue that understanding North Korea’s economic policy calculus and the historical tug-of-war over the allocation of the country’s limited resources are key to making progress on denuclearization or rapprochement.
“There is a generally accepted view that a large — perhaps the largest — portion of the DPRK economy in one way or another is devoted to the defense sector, thus starving the civilian economy,” the authors wrote, referring to North Korea’s official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. “This does not seem to be settled policy, however, and has not been for some time.”
To uncover some of that debate, Carlin and Lee turned to the journals that reflect the current policies and directions, and whose publication has been discontinued since January.
One of the main themes they found was that after Kim took power in late 2011 vowing to improve the economy, there were dueling arguments — though often in coded phrases — relating to that strategy.
As Kim made his public debut as the successor to his father, Kim Jong Il, the economic journals started carrying more articles about the need for improved economic management rather than defense, which may have been a part of an effort by the ailing elder Kim to lay down the groundwork for his son, Lee said.
One line of thinking advocated for a harder position on defense spending as a stimulant for the economy, and another suggested the need to shift the emphasis away from the military, according to the report. While authors did not disclose their affiliation, they likely had the backing of high-level regime officials to make such commentary on such a critical topic, Carlin and Lee wrote.
“You get to see North Korea’s thinking, their inner discussions on the different economic policies and positions that they may be thinking about, what they’re interested in,” Lee said in an interview. “It’s a more raw version of central media.”
These economic articles reflect the most relevant debates when there are major policies in discussion under leadership, the researchers said. They can provide context about official Pyongyang statements.
For example, even though Kim said in a January speech that he plans on developing new weapons and improving existing deterrence measures, the research articles throughout 2019 and 2020 showed “no signs yet of North Korea significantly backtracking on economic reforms to make room for more emphasis on defense industry,” the researchers wrote.
10. Understanding Kim Jong Un’s Economic Policymaking: Defense Versus Civilian Spending
Is there any evidence where the regime has ever prioritized the welfare of the Korean people over the development of nuclear weapons, missiles, and military modernization?
Understanding Kim Jong Un’s Economic Policymaking: Defense Versus Civilian Spending
There is a generally accepted view that a large—perhaps the largest—portion of the DPRK economy in one way or another is devoted to the defense sector, thus starving the civilian economy.[1] This does not seem to be settled policy, however, and has not been for some time. Internal North Korean discussions on defense spending have been and continue to be key indicators of the range of leadership thinking on this central question, not merely in terms of allocation of resources, but in a larger sense, in terms of thinking about economic reform.
The Landscape
There has long been a tug-of-war in the North Korean leadership over military versus civilian spending. National priorities have almost always ended up favoring defense spending, not just for military hardware but also for priority access to talent and technology. To some extent, the debate surrounding those decisions has been conducted in full view. Contrary to the commonly accepted notion that there can be no dissent or inconsistencies in North Korean publications, North Korea’s primary economic journal Kyo’ngje Yo’ngu (Kyongje Yongu)—and to a lesser degree, Journal of Kim Il Sung University (Philosophy, Economics)—has served as a platform for voicing differing views on defense spending. Notionally, the journal is simply a platform for academics, but it is inconceivable that this level of disagreement over such a sensitive topic could be conducted without the concurrence, and more likely the active backing, of various elements in the leadership. In effect, the authors, some of whom are apparently on the leading edge of the discussions, are used to voice the contending views when a policy is under discussion within the leadership, sometimes inserting new ideas or even carefully voicing shades of opposition to the current line, again, almost certainly with high-level backing.
In that vein, over the past two decades, there have been frequent episodes where arguments have broken out in the journal over the value of defense spending, forcing those who favor giving defense industries such a large portion of the pie to justify that position in ways that went beyond simple traditional arguments about the need for strong armed forces. Simply put, there is an underlying argument that the more funds the regime allocates to national defense, the fewer resources can be spent to prop up and revitalize the civilian economy, leaving little room for reform-oriented ideas and measures to take root. In recent years, proponents of defense spending were forced to demonstrate how money in the defense sector is actually good for the economy, supports other non-defense sectors, and stimulates growth overall. The opponents, occasionally with unbelievable boldness, argued that defense spending was money down a rat hole, and actually undermined economic growth.
That debate was very evident in the period of 2001 to 2005, for example, when contending arguments appeared in the economic journal and the pages of the party daily Rodong Sinmun as Kim Jong Il’s efforts to introduce new, reform-oriented economic policies ebbed and flowed.[2]
There was a resurgence of articles in Kyo’ngje Yo’ngu beginning in 2008 again advocating a more balanced approach, and thus implicitly less emphasis on the defense sector. This was despite the North’s hardening line against cabinet-led economic reforms, which culminated in Kim Jong Il’s “June 18 talk” in 2008 with senior party and state economic officials that appeared to be rolling back these reforms.[3] Even after Kim’s stroke in August 2008, when the North seemed to swing toward a harder external line, most notably on the nuclear issue, arguments for more balanced economic policies continued to appear in the journal. There are many possible interpretations for that, but at one level, it suggests that Kim’s efforts to prepare for the eventual political succession consisted of two parts: a shield of toughness against external pressure, and a new look at ways to improve the economy to increase the chances of a smooth transfer of power.
Each year from 2007 to 2010, there were several articles in Kyo’ngje Yo’ngu that dealt primarily with or were exclusively dedicated to the defense industry and its correlation with other industries. These decreased sharply starting with the first volume of 2011, giving way to more articles on economic management—a theme which, as it developed, became increasingly linked with reforms. In other words, just four months after Kim Jong Un’s public debut in 2010, and nearly a year before his father’s death in December 2011, the economic journal was already reflecting a new focus on economic policies associated with reform and less on defense priorities.
The Debate: Three Areas of Focus
First Front. The easiest theme to identify in this overall debate is the clear cry of pain from those whose back is seemingly against the wall trying to defend the priority once granted automatically to defense industry spending.
In an article published in early 2010, proponents of a massive diversion of economic resources to the defense sector had to shift their ground. They argued, not very convincingly apparently, that spending on defense did not retard but actually helped stimulate the economy, and that arguments raised to the contrary were “one dimensional.” They said:
Conventional wisdom has it that it was the development of munitions production that delayed overall economic development. The basis for this is that munitions products cannot be inducted into the reproduction process again. This, however, is based on a one-dimensional understanding. The national defense industry of the military-first era plays the role of leading and vigorously promoting overall people’s economic development.[4]
This sort of reference to another side of an argument—in this case pushing back against a “one dimensional” viewpoint—is usually a sign of an underlying debate. Writings later in 2010 appeared to advance the other side. In typical fashion, these tiptoed into the argument. On the surface, they acknowledged the importance of the defense industry, but then argued, for example, that the defense industry was dependent on a prior development of heavy industry, implicitly rejecting the idea that by giving priority to the former, it would strengthen the latter. An article in the final volume in 2010, after a lengthy lead-in that ostensibly discussed the importance of the defense industry, shifted gears to argue the opposite. In effect, it argued that the country had already reached the level of a “militarily powerful state”—a flag around which the reformers had long rallied, and that:
At the present time, the urgent issue in our people’s struggle to build a powerful socialist state is to build our country into an economically powerful state with powerful economic capabilities.
Our country has already confidently stepped up to the position of a politically and ideologically powerful state and a militarily powerful state under the wise leadership of the great party.
Hence, the issue that needs to be resolved in our people’s struggle to build a powerful state at the present time is to place the country’s productivity development level to a position of an economically powerful state.
In order to decisively raise the level of the country’s productivity development, [we] must first give a boost to the leading sectors and basic industrial sectors of the people’s economy, which are in charge of the leading processes of social production and are the basic sectors of all industrial development, such as the machine industry.[5]
An article published in the Journal of Kim Il Sung University (Philosophy, Economics) in 2015 seemed an effort to straddle the two positions. It largely swept away an appeal to the economic efficacy of the national defense industry and reverted to an old-fashioned argument that was unusually harsh, given that Kim Jong Un’s key economic reforms had been tested and launched by the time the article was published. The article argued that military spending was crucial, first and foremost, to protect the country against “the imperialists,” citing Afghanistan and Iraq as examples that must be avoided at all costs. Nevertheless, the times apparently did not allow that argument to stand alone, and so the author was obliged to address the efficacy of defense spending for overall economic progress, in terms similar to what had been advanced in Kyo’ngje Yo’ngu several years before:
Strengthening national defense capabilities guarantees rapid economic advancements by rejuvenating the entire socialist economy through the priority development of the national defense industry…The development of the national defense industry is premised on the priority development of heavy industry. Therefore, if [we] advance the national defense industry, [we] end up promoting the priority development of heavy industry, and based on the priority development of heavy industry, [we] can also rapidly advance light industry and agriculture.[6]
In short, through this period, those arguing for special status for the national defense industry were being forced to make their case that “munitions production” was actually a productive investment, something that paid dividends, perhaps over time, in terms of overall economic progress.
Eight years later, in January 2018—almost certainly in anticipation of, and implicitly voicing some level of opposition to Kim Jong Un’s shift to the “new strategic line” of “concentrating all efforts” on the economy announced in April of that year—dueling articles appeared in the same issue of Kyo’ngje Yo’ngu. One, seemingly trying to head off the decision to shift to the new line, advocated the harder position that defense spending helped to stimulate the economy. The other suggested the need to shift emphasis away from the military. Although the former article noted that “considering the requirements of the times today, newly clarifying the position of the national defense industry arises as a particularly important issue,” it did not actually clarify anything new. Instead, it basically repeated the same argument from 2010:
According to existing notions, the effects of munitions production on civilian production have been regarded as being limited effects on the overall economic development and as delaying economic development. This was based on the grounds that munitions products cannot be inducted into the reproduction cycle again and that investment in munitions production is unproductive investment.[7]
This reference to “existing notions” is a window into how baldly the debate is being conducted beneath the surface, that however roundabout those who advocate easing off defense spending may sometimes make their arguments in the pages of Kyo’ngje Yo’ngu, the gloves are actually off. Someone is calling investment in munitions production “unproductive,” a devastating charge that no one would make without very high-level backing.
Second Front. In addition to the back-and-forth noted above, a second part of the debate revolves around the seemingly obscure issue of whether the defense industry is part of or separate from heavy industry. This is not simply academic angels dancing on the head of a pin. Within the context of the debate over the position of the defense industry’s place in the overall economic scheme, it deals with an important issue—whose share of the pie the defense industry is consuming, or by implication, it ought to consume. If the defense industry is viewed as part of heavy industry, then spending on the defense industry gets counted as contributing directly to the heavy industry sector performance. In that case, the defense industry cannot be accused of taking resources away from a vital sector since, by definition, it is actually part of that sector. In turn, that reinforces the argument that spending for the defense industry is a contribution to economic development. Those who argue to the contrary are, in effect, adopting the line referenced above—that investment in the munitions industry is unproductive; that is, it adds nothing and is actually a net loss for the economy.
The claim that “heavy industry is the national defense industry and the national defense industry is heavy industry” is sometimes justified by arguing that industries like machine, metal, and chemical fall in both the defense and heavy industry pots. One author left no doubt:
The national defense industry and heavy industry are closely intertwined so as to be inextricable. The national defense industry is founded on heavy industry, and the development of the national defense industry cannot be thought of apart from the development of heavy industry.[8]
This has apparently been a tough argument to oppose, and it is not unusual for writers to throw up a protective shield in the first part of their article by seeming to support the conservative (or safe) position, then to shift to something over the line by arguing the opposite. For example, in 2008, the first half of a Kyo’ngje Yo’ngu article emphasized in standard language the link between the defense industry and heavy industry, only to suddenly pivot to what appeared to be its real main point: heavy industry’s resources must support more than national defense and should extend to light industry and agriculture:
All of this shows that the development of heavy industry into heavy industry for the national defense industry serves as the basic direction of heavy industry construction in the military-first era.
Next, the basic direction of heavy industry construction in the military-first era is to build [heavy industry] into heavy industry that vigorously lends impetus to socialist economic construction…
From this point of view, building heavy industry into heavy industry that vigorously lends impetus to socialist economic construction means building heavy industry into heavy industry that actively lends impetus to the development of light industry and agriculture.[9]
Third front. Pyongyang’s discourse on accumulation (investment) and consumption is a third battleground inextricably, though not always explicitly, linked to the issue of defense spending.
Dueling narratives in North Korea on accumulation and consumption go back as far as the mid-1950s, when Kim Il Sung supported concentration in heavy industry and the defense industry, while those who opposed Kim’s policy accused him of neglecting the people’s livelihoods. The core of this debate has never gone away, though arguments on both sides have shifted over time.
Proponents of accumulation call for investing national resources in the people’s future happiness, namely by delaying consumption and strengthening, first of all, the defense shield, then the basic (heavy) industry necessary to produce machines and resources required for eventual use by light industry and consumer goods. They argue that consumption can grow only through a systematic increase in investment.
Supporters of consumption, on the other hand, place weight on satisfying the people’s more immediate material needs, in some cases arguing that if the people are expected to come to the defense of the nation, they need to have something to defend. They argue that excessive focus on either will adversely affect the other, as accumulation and consumption both use national income. They specifically warn against overspending on accumulation (and heavy industry goes into the accumulation basket), as it reduces the national resources available for satisfying the people’s immediate needs, such as workers’ salaries, thereby negatively impacting growth in production.
In the past, during periods of discussion or debate within the North Korean leadership over economic reform policies or when the North was looking to pivot away from reform, Kyo’ngje Yo’ngu published articles that emphasized accumulation to justify increased defense spending as investment in the people’s future happiness. For example, there was a resurgence of articles in the journal on the accumulation-consumption debate starting in 2004, in line with Kim Jong Il’s “economic construction line of the military-first era,” which called for advancing the defense industry first while rhetorically at least developing light industry and agriculture simultaneously.[10]
Kyo’ngje Yo’ngu articles on accumulation and consumption in Kim Jong Un’s time have generally emphasized equilibrium between accumulation and consumption, with some explicitly justifying such a course by painting in rosy terms the economic impact:
In a socialist society, the correlation between accumulation and consumption calls for consuming while accumulating, and accumulating while consuming without being partial to any specific one of these. In a socialist society, there can be no contradictions between accumulation and consumption—they both are geared toward promoting the well-being of the people…
When [we] firmly build socialist material and technical foundations by first directing more funds toward accumulation for strengthening the production foundations of the leading sectors of the people’s economy, the basic industrial sectors, light industry, and agriculture can [we] strengthen the country’s financial foundation, accelerate overall economic development with [our] own funds, and rapidly improve the people’s living standards.[11]
The Current Discourse
Despite Kim Jong Un’s avowal at the Eighth Party Congress in January to continue to develop new weapons and improve existing deterrence, there appear to be no signs yet of North Korea significantly backtracking on economic reforms to make room for more emphasis on defense industry. North Korean central media continue to espouse the socialist enterprise responsibility management system (SERMS) and the “plot responsibility system,” the country’s key reform measures in the industrial and agricultural sectors, respectively.
Even Kim Jong Un’s remark at a recent party Political Bureau meeting that “the mission of our economy is to meet the people’s material demand,” as he emphasized the importance of light industry, sounded like consumption over accumulation.[12]
Though Kyo’ngje Yo’ngu ceased publication as of the beginning of this year, we don’t expect an end to the long-running internal North Korean discussion or debate over whether defense spending is crucial to or a drag on the economy.
What’s Next?
The next installment will deal with North Korea’s banking policy based on articles published in academic journals on the role of banks and funds. “Bank,” much less “banking,” is almost never mentioned in North Korean central media in a policy context, apparently due to its sensitivities. North Korean academics, however, write on them regularly in journals, reflecting the regime’s awareness of the importance of banks for revitalizing the economy.
- [1]
This paper is the second installment of the “Understanding Kim Jong Un’s Economic Policymaking” series. This paper also uses a modified version of the McCune-Reischauer romanization system for North Korean text, with some proper nouns following internationally recognized spellings or North Korean transliterations instead. For an overview of the project and the project’s scope and methodology, see: https://www.38north.org/2021/05/understanding-kim-jong-uns-economic-policymaking-project-overview/.
- [2]
Robert L. Carlin and Joel S. Wit, “Preparation for Economic Reform,” The Adelphi Papers 46, no. 382 (2006): 27-52.
- [3]
For more on Kim Jong Il’s rolling back of economic reforms, his “June 18 talk,” and the anti-market measures that followed, see 한기범, 북한의 경제개혁과 관료정치 [Han Ki-beom, North Korea’s Economic Reform and Bureaucratic Politics] (Seoul: Daewon Publishing, 2020), 176-205.
- [4]
- [5]
- [6]
- [7]
- [8]
O’m Kyo’ng-ch’o’l, “Strengthening National Defense Capabilities Is the State Affair of State Affairs.”
- [9]
- [10]
Han Ki-beom, 128-130.
- [11]
- [12]
“Third Enlarged Meeting of Political Bureau of 8th C.C., WPK Held,” Rodong Sinmun, September 3, 2021.
11. The Last Chance to Stop North Korea?
I just do not see it. Kim Jong-un is not interested in receiving humanitarian aid and certainly receiving it with the standard practices of international humanitarian assistance, e.g., transparency.
I think the ROK, US, and international community canre more about the welfare of the Korean people in the north than does Kim Jong-un. But I just do not see how offers of aid will entice Kim to negotiate. He will use the suffering of the Korean people to support his political warfare strategy and blackmail diplomacy. He is not interested in treating the Korean people humanely as far as I can tell.
Excerpts:
North Korea’s food insecurity also provides an opening for diplomacy. A combination of the border lockdown to trade and serious seasonal flooding has impacted North Korean food stocks. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization estimates an 850,000-ton shortage this year, and there are media reports that the public food distribution system has broken down. The provision of food and fertilizer could come from South Korea, which wants desperately to improve inter-Korean relations as a legacy of the current government in its last seven months in office.
Vaccines and food might seem like small ball and a detour from denuclearization. But humanitarian assistance would address the urgent needs of the North Korean people, promote solidarity with South Korea, and make it less likely that Kim would carry out major weapons provocations. What is more, an agreement to provide U.S. aid would reduce Chinese influence in Pyongyang. And, finally, it just might create some momentum for further diplomacy.
If the United States is unwilling to pursue such assistance, then it can roll the dice, wait for the next nuclear test by North Korea, and hope that traditional diplomacy can save the day. But with everything else that Biden needs to deal with, he hardly needs another crisis.
The Last Chance to Stop North Korea?
U.S. Aid Could Help Revive Nuclear Diplomacy
Last week’s weapons tests broke what had been an unusually quiet period on the North Korea front, reminding the Biden administration that the country’s zeal for nuclear weapons will eventually demand the White House’s attention.
Usually by this time in a new U.S. administration, the president would have already seen North Korea carry out a handful of ballistic missile or nuclear tests. That’s because the Kim regime in Pyongyang loves to test newly elected American leaders. Indeed, North Korean provocations cluster close to U.S. presidential and congressional midterm elections, a trend that has been especially true during the last few election cycles. Remember when President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe sat huddled over reports of North Korean missile tests during dinner at Mar-a-Lago only three weeks after Trump’s inauguration? And when President Barack Obama was greeted with a rocket launch in April 2009, followed by a nuclear test during his first Memorial Day weekend as president? Until last week, President Joe Biden has had to deal with none of that, even though the United States has taken part in events that usually upset North Korea, such as holding a summit and carrying out joint military exercises with South Korea in recent months.
But North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has not acted according to script for reasons that may have to do with COVID-19, whose impact on the country remains largely unknown to the outside world. Still, the Biden administration should not take comfort in the relative lack of provocations thus far. Although North Korea’s saber rattling remains subdued, a crisis is brewing as Pyongyang continues to quietly develop weapons systems that could threaten the United States. The weapons tested last week do not appear to have the capability to reach the United States, but they should still be taken seriously. North Korean state news described a low-altitude cruise missile it launched as a “strategic weapon,” suggesting Kim’s ambition to field a nuclear cruise missile, which only a handful of countries now possess. It also fired a short-range ballistic missile from a railcar platform on September 15. This suggests a road-mobile launch capability, which along with solid-fuel propellant (which the North Koreans have already produced) would make it more difficult for the United States to preemptively strike a missile before its launch. These are all capabilities that make North Korea’s nuclear deterrent more survivable and impervious to a U.S. first strike.
But these tests aren’t the only troubling signs. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is going “full steam ahead,” Rafael Grossi, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, confirmed this week. Early evidence of this included thermal satellite imagery captured in March and analyzed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Those images indicated heat signatures at the Yongbyon nuclear facility, suggesting the regime had resumed the reprocessing of plutonium and enriched uranium for an arsenal of bombs now estimated to number between 20 and 40. Experts are now waiting for two more shoes to drop: the demonstration of a missile armed with multiple warheads and an operational ballistic missile launched from a submarine. The direction is clear: North Korea wants to have a modern force that can engage in nuclear warfighting, that can threaten the United States with missiles that can carry multiple warheads and are impervious to ballistic missile defenses, and that can survive and retaliate credibly against a U.S. preemptive attack. If it achieves those goals, then North Korea’s nuclearization will never be reversed, even by force.
This is why the Biden administration will eventually have to decide how to stop North Korea before it crosses this threshold. There are two paths out of this predicament. It can wait for a crisis and risk another near-war situation like the one Trump faced in 2017. Or it can act now, getting diplomacy back on track through humanitarian assistance that includes American COVID-19 vaccines and food aid, both of which the country needs.
The Back Burner Suits Everyone . . . for Now
How the Biden administration will approach this predicament is unclear. Its policy has been deliberately low key, displaying neither urgency nor enthusiasm for picking up the pieces from previous agreements and finding a diplomatic path forward. In large part this is because Biden’s national security team, all of whom cut their teeth on the issue during Obama’s presidency, is deeply skeptical of North Korea’s intentions to denuclearize and have plenty else to deal with at the moment.
There has yet to be a speech by any administration official offering a full elucidation of the policy beyond White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki’s promise that Biden would not pursue Trump’s made-for-TV summitry or Obama’s strategic patience. Sung Kim, the U.S. special envoy for North Korea, has declared a willingness to meet with the North Koreans “anywhere, anytime,” but most observers in Washington sense caution rather than enthusiasm from the administration when it comes to relations with Pyongyang. Moreover, now that U.S. military operations in Afghanistan have ended, the State Department’s leadership has been focused entirely on the diplomatic mission in that country, meaning there is little time for high-level attention on North Korea. Unless they’re discussing Afghanistan, visiting foreign officials cannot get much time with top officials at the State Department or the National Security Council.
If North Korea achieves its nuclear goals, its nuclearization will never be reversed, even by force.
Kim has his own preoccupations. A desperate economic situation—precipitated by floods and a pandemic-induced, 21-month shutdown of the border between North Korea and China—has caused Pyongyang to focus inward. The regime also has no interest in answering calls for engagement from what it perceives to be a lame-duck government in South Korea. Moreover, China has done nothing to promote diplomacy. If anything, China’s tying of cooperation on North Korea to U.S. concessions in bilateral relations with Beijing means China won’t do anything on its own to break the stalemate. In the near term, these have all afforded Biden the room to put North Korea on the back burner.
But this period of relative quiet is likely to further dissipate before the end of this year, if not sooner, as Kim will likely return to his old ways. Coercion, after all, is North Korea’s natural way of interacting with the outside world. In the past, the United States has relied on diplomacy to ratchet down tensions. This time, however, may not be same. That’s because as North Korea inches toward the completion of its nuclear capabilities, the provocations could become more significant and dangerous. For example, North Korea might acquire and test a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle, which could evade U.S. defense systems; an intercontinental ballistic missile; or a submarine-launched ballistic missile. The Biden team is also loath to de-escalate without meaningful progress. It certainly won’t respond to provocative gestures with a head-of-state summit or personal overtures to Kim. To avoid the path of watered-down diplomacy, the Biden administration may feel the need to respond forcefully: for example, by enforcing nonproliferation with a blockade. But North Korea will not back down. That would mean more testing, more provocative military exercises, and a crisis similar to the one that broke out in Trump’s first year.
COVID-19 Opens a Door
The usual answer to this problem is to apply more sanctions to North Korea in order to compel it to stop its weapons programs, even if temporarily. That option might make for good politics in Washington, but it is ineffective, largely because North Korea has essentially put itself under the most stringent sanctions in its history by keeping its border with China closed since January 2020 to prevent the spread of COVID-19. With sanctions rendered meaningless, the only answer to stemming the nuclear threat is diplomacy. And the best way to get there is through humanitarian assistance that would help North Korea stop the spread of COVID-19 and also ease the pain of the chronic food shortages that plague the country. With the appropriate verification protocols, humanitarian aid would not violate any of the current sanctions against North Korea under current UN Security Council resolutions and U.S. law.
It remains unknown how many COVID-19 cases or deaths North Korea has suffered. To date, the country has reported zero, a number about which U.S. and South Korean officials are skeptical. But the mitigation measures the country has taken to keep the virus out have hit its population extremely hard. Trade with China is down by as much as 90 percent, and food prices are rising. But Kim has already rejected an offer of roughly three million Chinese-made vaccines from COVAX, the UN-backed effort to distribute vaccines to countries in need, claiming North Korea does not need them as much as harder-hit nations. North Korea is reportedly not interested in the Chinese vaccines because of questions about their effectiveness. When Kim rejected an offer this summer, also organized by COVAX, of around two million doses of the Oxford-AstraZeneca shot, it was due to concerns about possible side effects. This could create an opportunity for the United States, whose vaccines—made by Pfizer-BioNTech, Moderna, and Johnson & Johnson—are believed to be the safest and most effective.
Humanitarian assistance would make it less likely that Kim would carry out major weapons provocations.
North Korea’s food insecurity also provides an opening for diplomacy. A combination of the border lockdown to trade and serious seasonal flooding has impacted North Korean food stocks. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization estimates an 850,000-ton shortage this year, and there are media reports that the public food distribution system has broken down. The provision of food and fertilizer could come from South Korea, which wants desperately to improve inter-Korean relations as a legacy of the current government in its last seven months in office.
Vaccines and food might seem like small ball and a detour from denuclearization. But humanitarian assistance would address the urgent needs of the North Korean people, promote solidarity with South Korea, and make it less likely that Kim would carry out major weapons provocations. What is more, an agreement to provide U.S. aid would reduce Chinese influence in Pyongyang. And, finally, it just might create some momentum for further diplomacy.
If the United States is unwilling to pursue such assistance, then it can roll the dice, wait for the next nuclear test by North Korea, and hope that traditional diplomacy can save the day. But with everything else that Biden needs to deal with, he hardly needs another crisis.
12. At UN, Moon pushes peace with NKorea after missile tests
No matter what north Korea does, it appears the Moon administration will not waiver from its "peace agenda."
At UN, Moon pushes peace with NKorea after missile tests
AP · by SALLY HO · September 21, 2021
Never once mentioning missiles, South Korean President Moon Jae-in again pushed for peace and reconciliation with North Korea at the United Nations on Tuesday, a week after recent missile testing on both ends of the peninsula renewed tensions between the two rivals.
Addressing the U.N. General Assembly in person in New York on Tuesday, Moon reiterated his push for a denuclearized coexistence and “co-prosperity” for the two countries that ended the three-year Korean War in a 1953 armistice that halted the fighting but never led to a formal declaration of peace.
“North Korea, for its part, must brace for changes that benefit the era of global community,” Moon said in his address at the largest gathering of world leaders. “I expect that the international community ... remain always ready and willing to reach out to North Korea in a cooperative spirit.”
A week ago, both countries tested ballistic missiles hours apart, underscoring rising tensions. South Korea’s tests included its first of a submarine-launched ballistic missile, which came after the South Korean and Japanese militaries said North Korea had fired two ballistic missiles into the sea.
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As Moon claimed South Korea’s growing missile capabilities will serve as a “sure deterrence” against North Korean provocations, the powerful sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un warned of a “complete destruction” of bilateral relations if Moon continued with what she described as slander of North Korea.
The back and forth unfolded as North Korea made waves this month with nuclear-capable missiles hidden in trains that can be launched anywhere along a railway, a new cruise missile resembling the U.S. Tomahawk that can be potentially topped with atomic warheads and the apparent resumption of fuel production for potential nuclear bombs.
But on Tuesday, Moon made no note of missiles testing before the General Assembly, instead focusing on the fact that this year’s gathering marked the 30th anniversary of both countries being admitted to the United Nations.
“With the joint accession to the U.N., the two Koreas both recognized that they were two separate nations, different in systems and ideologies,” Moon said. “However, such was never meant to perpetuate the division. For when we acknowledged and respected each other, only then could we set out on a path to exchange, reconciliation and unification.”
Moon also repeated some of the same pleas from his speech last year, including pushing for a formal end-of-war declaration. He suggested the region would be better positioned to handle the COVID-19 pandemic if the North would join the Moon-proposed Northeast Asia Cooperation for Health Security.
North Korea is scheduled to speak Monday, the final day of the General Assembly leaders’ meeting.
____
AP · by SALLY HO · September 21, 2021
13. Top diplomats of S. Korea, U.S., Japan to hold talks in New York
Small steps can lead to small victories and more.
Top diplomats of S. Korea, U.S., Japan to hold talks in New York | Yonhap News Agency
WASHINGTON/SEOUL Sept. 22 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken will hold trilateral talks with his South Korean and Japanese counterparts on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in New York this week, the State Department said.
The three-way talks with Foreign Ministers Chung Eui-yong and Toshimitsu Motegi, respectively, will take place at Palace Hotel in New York City on Wednesday afternoon (New York time), according to the department's website.
A foreign ministry official in Seoul confirmed the talks are taking place.
"The secretary and ministers of the three countries will discuss the Korean Peninsula issue and other regional and global matters," the official said.
The upcoming talks among the three come about four months after they last held trilateral talks on the margins of the Group of Seven (G7) foreign and development ministers' meeting in Britain in early May, to which South Korea was invited as a guest.
The planned talks in New York are expected to include discussions to follow up on the U.N. speeches by Presidents Moon Jae-in and Joe Biden regarding North Korea's denuclearization and Seoul's peace efforts.
During his U.N. speech on Tuesday, Moon proposed that the two Koreas and the United States, probably joined by China, declare a formal end to the 1950-53 Korean War, saying it will mark a pivotal point of departure in creating a new order of reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula.
Biden said in his speech that the U.S. will seek "serious and sustained diplomacy" to pursue the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
The planned trilateral talks also come after the North test-fired two short-range ballistic missiles last week, days after it test-fired a new type of long-range cruise missile, amid signs of the reactivation of its nuclear reactor and uranium enrichment facility inside the Yongbyon nuclear complex.
The three are also likely to discuss other regional and global issues, including China's assertiveness and the situation in Afghanistan.
(END)
14. U.S. seeks diplomacy to completely denuclearize Korean Peninsula: Biden
And of course we cannot (should not and must not) waiver from the objective of denuclearization of the north.
(2nd LD) U.S. seeks diplomacy to completely denuclearize Korean Peninsula: Biden | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with additional information, minor edits in paras 2-3)
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Sept. 21 (Yonhap) -- U.S. President Joe Biden said Tuesday that his country seeks to completely denuclearize the Korean Peninsula through diplomacy.
The U.S. president made the remark shortly after he said the U.S. will return to full compliance of the nuclear deal with Iran should the Middle Eastern country chooses to do so.
"Similarly, we seek serious and sustained diplomacy to pursue the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," Biden said while delivering his first in-person remarks at the U.N. General Assembly in New York.
"We seek concrete progress toward an available plan with tangible commitments that would increase stability on the peninsula and in the region, as well as improve the lives of the people in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)," he added, referring to North Korea by its official name.
His remark comes amid U.S. outreaches to North Korea.
U.S. Special Representative for DPRK Sung Kim has repeatedly offered to meet with North Koreans "anytime, anywhere without preconditions," but North Korea remains unresponsive to U.S. overtures.
"We have said repeatedly that we're prepared to meet with the North Koreans without preconditions, and we would hope that they would respond positively on this, but sadly, to date, they have not," a senior State Department official on international organizations affairs, Erica Barks-Ruggles, said Monday.
North Korea has stayed away from denuclearization talks with the U.S. since early 2019.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
15. S. Korea's first lady holds talk session with young Korean Americans
Excerpts:
At the meeting, Kim highlighted that Korean pop culture has created "a universal bond" that transcends race and borders, with the elevation of its global stature thanks to the contributions of Koreans working in the cultural fields.
Calling their efforts and passion "the future of the 7.5 million ethnic Korean community," Kim asked them to take pride in promoting the value of their culture to the world and serve as the foundation for promoting cultural exchanges between South Korea and the United States.
S. Korea's first lady holds talk session with young Korean Americans | Yonhap News Agency
NEW YORK, Sept. 21 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's first lady Kim Jung-sook met with young Korean Americans working in art and culture fields in New York on Tuesday (local time) to discuss the future of Korean popular culture.
The meeting took place at Korean Culture Center New York while she was visiting the city this week with President Moon Jae-in, who attended the U.N. General Assembly.
Brian Jon, the founder of the Asian American Youth Council (AAYC) who is known for his campaign that led to the first designation of Hanbok Day, was among the people who attended the event. Hanbok is the Korean traditional outfit.
At the meeting, Kim highlighted that Korean pop culture has created "a universal bond" that transcends race and borders, with the elevation of its global stature thanks to the contributions of Koreans working in the cultural fields.
Calling their efforts and passion "the future of the 7.5 million ethnic Korean community," Kim asked them to take pride in promoting the value of their culture to the world and serve as the foundation for promoting cultural exchanges between South Korea and the United States.
(END)
16. North Korean Food Shortages Hobble Autumn Holiday Rituals and Feasts
The terrible suffering continues because of the deliberate policy decision of Kim Jong-un.
North Korean Food Shortages Hobble Autumn Holiday Rituals and Feasts
High food prices make it impossible to observe Chuseok, an important holiday in Korean culture.
Major food shortages in North Korea left many of the country’s citizens unable to properly celebrate one of its most important holidays, sources in the country told RFA.
Chuseok, Korea’s version of the fall harvest holiday also celebrated around the autumn equinox in China and often likened to Thanksgiving in the U.S., is an important Korean holiday for honoring ancestors.
The holiday, which falls on Tuesday this year, brings extended families together to prepare an elaborate “jesa” table of traditional food offerings to honor their ancestors with a small ceremony at home or at family graves.
But North Korea is chronically short on food and has seen starvation deaths this year in the wake of the closure of the Sino-Korean border and suspension of trade with China in Jan. 2020 to prevent the spread of COVID-19.
In the northwestern border town of Sinuiju, food prices are about twice as expensive as they were last Chuseok and citizens must find ways to honor their ancestors without the proper food offerings, and celebrate the autumn feast, without the feast.
“The price of pork started to rise from the beginning of this month because of Chuseok,” a resident of Sinuiju told RFA’s Korean Service Sunday.
“Rice, eggs and fake meat have all risen today, just one day before Chuseok,” said the source, who requested anonymity to speak freely.
Traditional observance of the festival requires families to prepare a table with many different kinds of foods, including fresh fruit, several kinds of meat and seafood, and large portions of vegetable dishes.
But the high prices in North Korea are forcing people to cut corners.
“I bought just a little bit of rice and meat so I can prepare a jesa table at my mother’s grave in the mountains. Every jesa needs seafood, but prices have skyrocketed, so I could not even afford to buy it,” said the source.
The rise in prices over the last year at the Sinuiju market was gradual for most food items, but luxuries like meat and seafood increased sharply as the holiday approached.
Soaring prices
Credit: RFA
In August, the price of a kilogram (2.2 pounds) of pork was 20,000 won (U.S. $3.70), but it rose to 25,000 won ($4.63) in September. A frozen pollack rose from 10,000 won ($1.85) to 20,000 won ($3.70).
“The price of pork is so high that it seems that there are many residents who cannot buy meat, even on Chuseok!” the source said.
“Instead, fake meat made from bean scraps is cheaper, so people are serving fake meat dishes at jesa and families are eating the fake meat in their feast,” said the source.
A resident of Musan county in the northeastern province of North Hamgyong said people there were critical of the government for not caring about their plight.
“The price of rice at the local marketplace did not rise significantly, but the price of flour rose because we have to make buchimgae and kkwabaegi,” said the second source, referring to Korean vegetable fritters and twisted donuts.
“They say the people are having a hard time just to make a living, but the country is wasting its money firing missiles,” the second source said, referring to North Korea’s test launches last week of long-range cruise missiles and train-fired ballistic missiles.
“The people blame [North Korean leader] Kim Jong Un, who is ignoring their livelihoods and bragging about firing missiles off a train on the 15th.” added the source.
North Korean escapee Han Hong-geun and his family prepare for a memorial service for their North Korean ancestors on the occasion of Chuseok, near the Demilitarised Zone separating the two Koreas in Paju, South Korea, October 1, 2020. Credit: Reuters
Other residents told RFA ahead of the holiday that they were depressed that they cannot afford to set a proper jesa table.
“Chuseok is only four days away, but it is so gloomy, and nobody is in the holiday spirit,” a resident of Chongjin in North Hamgyong told RFA Sept. 17.
The coronavirus pandemic has reduced large swathes of the North Korean population to poverty. The Sino-Korean border closure did not only cause food shortages, it also stopped people from making a living buying and selling Chinese goods, and cut off North Korean industry from raw materials and components.
Commerce in entire towns dried up as a result, and ships in harbors began to rust from disuse.
Money is tight for almost everyone in Chongjin, the Chongjin source said.
“A resident of Bugo village in Chongam district told me that no matter how difficult the circumstances were, he was always able to prepare songpyeon [handmade rice cakes], fruit, fish and vegetables for jesa,” the Chongjin source said.
“But this year he could only put a single bottle of alcohol on the table with no food, because he didn’t have enough money, he said with tearful eyes,” the Chongjin source said.
North Koreans stand in front of flower wreaths to take portraits of their family members at a cemetery as they observe Chuseok, in Pyongyang, North Korea, Thursday, Sept. 19, 2013. Credit: AP
Placing offerings on family graves is also a Chuseok custom that has been hit by the hardship.
“Until a few years ago, you could see impressive displays at graveyards on Chuseok as residents carried a large variety of food on their heads and backs,” the Chongjin source said.
“But the number of grave visitors has gradually decreased and this year, so many residents are only bringing a bottle of alcohol instead of a whole jesa table,” said the Chongjin source.
Filial duty
The Chongjin source acknowledged North Korea’s severe economic issues during the pandemic, but said it was unimaginable that things got so bad that people cannot afford to honor their ancestors.
Many residents of Hyesan have become depressed that the only thing they can do to honor their ancestors is to beautify their graves by removing weeds from the grassy mounds.
“The gloom and doom this year at Chuseok is a testament to the unprecedented ordeal that we are experiencing in North Korea.”
Further dampening the holiday mood, North Korean authorities have also begun a Chuseok crackdown on families who receive money from relatives who have escaped the country and live in South Korea.
Escapees in the South usually send large sums of money to their families in the North through intermediaries known as phone brokers.
But families with relatives in the South fear severe punishment if they are caught, so they are foregoing money that many of them badly need.
“The border guards, the State Security Department, the strike force from the Social Security Department, and the Veterans Patrol are working together to shore up monitoring and control of residents day and night,” a resident in the city of Hoeryong in North Hamgyong told RFA Sunday.
“Every move of the families with members who have escaped overseas is closely watched by security agents, police and the heads of neighborhood watch units,” said the Hoeryong source, who declined to be named.
A resident of Musan county said authorities were also restricting movement of people near the Sino-Korean border, even those with ancestors’ graves there.
“Families from other regions with graves near the border were looking forward to using the visit to get in touch with their families in the South for Chuseok, but the authorities are intensively monitoring land routes and trains entering the border area,” the Musan source said.
“If there is any suspicion, they will be punished mercilessly, so many residents are just giving up on the whole idea.”
Reported by Hyemin Son, Jeong Yon Park and Myung Chul Lee for RFA’s Korean Service. Translated by Leejin Jun and Jinha Shin. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
17. S. Korea planning 23 bln-won aid project for war-torn Afghanistan
The only country to go from a major aid recipient to a major donor nation.
S. Korea planning 23 bln-won aid project for war-torn Afghanistan | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Sept. 22 (Yonhap) -- South Korea is planning to spend about 23.2 billion won (US$19.5 million) in next year's official development assistance (ODA) projects for war-torn Afghanistan, a document showed Wednesday.
The Office for Government Policy Coordination under the Prime Minister's Office said in the document submitted to Rep. Tae Young-ho of the main opposition People Power Party that its committee handling the development aid has reached the decision on the 2022 ODA budget for Kabul, according to Tae's office.
Of the amount, the foreign ministry plans to provide Afghanistan with 18.4 billion won through international organizations.
The Korean International Cooperation Agency, the country's overseas aid agency, will spend 4.72 billion won for six projects designed to support Afghanistan, such as fresh water development, vocational training and other capacity-building projects.
"The Afghanistan ODA budget has yet to be finalized in detail. We will review the size and the areas of support as we watch the situation in Afghanistan and the discussions that will take place on the humanitarian assistance at the U.N. General Assembly," a foreign ministry official said.
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
