Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"This was to be a new instrument of war and I should be responsible for shaping it. Its purpose was to coordinate all action by way of subversion against the enemy overseas. A new organization was being created which would absorb some small elements of existing organizations but would be on a much greater scale, with wider scope and largely manned by new personnel. It would be a secret or underground organization. . . . Subversion was a complex conception. It meant the weakening by whatever "covert" means of the Enemy's will to make war and the strengthening of the will and power of his opponents including in particular guerrilla and resistance movements. . . . I accepted the Prime Minister's suggestion with great eagerness and satisfaction. "And now," he exhorted, "set Europe ablaze."

- Hugh Dalton, quoted in "On Political Warfare" by Paul Smith

“The surest way to corrupt a youth is to instruct him to hold in higher esteem those who think alike than those who think differently.”

- Friedrich Nietzsche

"Love of power, operating through greed and through personal ambition, was the cause of all these evils."

- Thucydides

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 21, 2023

2. Ukrainians to Get U.S. Tanks by Fall

3. US to send Patriot missile systems and tanks to Ukraine faster than originally planned

4. The U.S. Has a Troublesome Asian Ally Against China

5. From Balloons To AUKUS: The War Drive Against China

6. Why allies unlikely to back US strategy to contain China

7. Richard Haass Says More…(On Taiwan, Ukraine, Russia, China, Japan Civics and his new book)

8. Tracking the Chinese Balloon From Space

9. After Iraq, Mullen wants to prevent future presidents from launching a war of choice

10. After Iraq, Mullen wants to prevent future presidents from launching a war of choice

11. What Do America’s Spies Really Think About China?

12. Putin and Xi must be taught the lessons Hitler and Mussolini learned the hard way

13. ‘Woke-ism’ Not an Issue, Top Military Leaders Say

14. Chinese ‘spy’ who claimed he undermined Hong Kong protest movement facing deportation from Australia over fraud claims

15. TikTok Reassures Advertisers Over Ban Threat as Some Set Backup Plans

16. Are We Headed for World War III?

17. Chinese Pressure Tactics Against Other Countries Largely Ineffective, Study Finds

18. Warsaw’s secret war against Moscow’s spies

19. US F-22s land in Philippines for first time, furthering defense ties

20. TikTok lands first major ally on Capitol Hill: Democratic Rep. Jamaal Bowman

21. China’s Pressure on Taiwan: Nothing to See Here, Says Former Biden State Department Official

22. The Case for a Restrained Republican Foreign Policy

23. Ukrainians a ‘Quick Study’ on Patriot System; U.S. Army Taking Notes

24. Inconvenient Facts for the Disarmament Community

25. Opinion | Here's the real lesson from the showy Xi-Putin meeting

26. Starlink satellites are boosting Air Force communication across the Indo-Pacific

27. Japan’s Kishida shames China by visiting Ukraine as Xi meets Putin: ‘Pure antagonism’

28. Back to the Future: Using History to Prepare for Future Warfare

29. US protectionism eroding its allure in Asia

1.Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 21, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2023

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be setting conditions to weaponize the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a method of Russian power projection in advance of Russia’s accession to the rotating UNSC presidency in April.
The readouts of the second day of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit with Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to suggest that Putin has not been able to secure the no-limits bilateral partnership with China that he likely hoped for.
Putin falsely portrayed the Western provision of depleted uranium ammunition (not suitable for use in nuclear or radiological weapons) to Ukraine as a significant escalation in order to bolster information operations aiming to deter Western security assistance to Ukraine and to place the onus for negotiations on the West.
Wagner Group may lose most of its convict force in the upcoming weeks as convicts finish their six-month military contracts.
The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) launched a criminal investigation into the Deputy Commander of the Rosgvardia’s Central District, Major General Vadim Dragomiretsky.
The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced that it authorized a presidential drawdown to provide around $350 million of security assistance to Ukraine.
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces did not make any confirmed gains in or around Bakhmut and continued offensive operations along the outskirts of Donetsk City.
The Kremlin continues crypto mobilization campaigns to recruit men across Russia for contract service to avoid declaring second mobilization wave.
Russian occupation officials continue to facilitate the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 21, 2023

Mar 21, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 21, 2023

Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

March 21, 7:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be setting conditions to weaponize the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a method of Russian power projection in advance of Russia’s accession to the rotating UNSC presidency in April. Russian UN Ambassador Vasily Nebenzya stated during a press conference on March 21 that Russia plans to hold an informal UNSC meeting in early April to discuss the “real situation” of “Ukrainian children taken to Russia.”[1] Nebenzya claimed that Russia planned to hold the meeting before the announcement of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrants for Putin and Russian Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova for the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.[2] Nebenzya’s announcement, as well as vitriolic denials of the ICC’s accusations by Russian officials, come as Kremlin-appointed occupation officials continue to facilitate the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia under a variety of schemes and guises.[3] Putin additionally made a number of notable comments proclaiming Russia’s commitment to the UN, UNSC, and the UN charter during his press conference with Chinese President Xi Jinping on March 21.[4] Taken in tandem, Nebenzya’s and Putin’s comments suggest that Russia continues to use its position on the UNSC as a base of power projection as the UNSC prepares for Russia to take the UNSC presidency in April.[5] By setting information conditions to posture about Russia’s supposed commitment to the UNSC, Putin is positioning himself to continue to weaponize and exploit Russia’s UNSC veto power in the coming months.

The second day of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit with Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to suggest that Putin has not been able to secure the no-limits bilateral partnership with China that he likely hoped for. Putin and Xi signed a “Joint Statement by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on Deepening Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Cooperation, Entering a New Era” on March 21, which stressed that Russian–Chinese relations are comprehensive, strategic, and at the highest level in history.[6] The Joint Statement outlines a variety of bilateral intentions and affirms the commitment of Russia and China to each other’s state sovereignty and territorial integrity, among other diplomatic promises.[7] The commitments made by Xi and Putin were notably lopsided, however, indicating that Xi is agreeing to a more reserved version of Russian–Chinese relations than Putin likely desires, as ISW observed on March 20.[8] Xi praised Putin, reaffirmed China’s commitment to Russia in the UNSC, and amplified China’s position on a political settlement of the war in Ukraine; but Xi did not go much further than offering those statements.[9] Putin, by contrast, announced a number of measures that signal Russia’s continued orientation towards and dependence on China in the energy and economic sectors, which appear very one-sided compared to Xi’s relatively tempered commitments.[10] Xi additionally did not signal an intent to provide support for Russia’s war in Ukraine beyond vague diplomatic assurances, which is likely a step down from what Putin hoped to secure in negotiations. Putin has likely failed to secure the exact sort of partnership that he needs and desires, and Xi will likely leave Moscow having secured assurances that are more one-sided than Putin intended them to be. Putin observed that Russia and China had “a very substantiative and candid exchange of views” on the prospects for the further development of the Russian-Chinese relations. Such rhetoric notably lacks the language normally used in diplomatic readouts to indicate that the two parties have come to definitive and substantive agreements.

Putin portrayed the Western provision of depleted uranium ammunition to Ukraine as a significant escalation in order to bolster information operations aiming to deter Western security assistance to Ukraine and to place the onus for negotiations on the West. Putin claimed on March 21, while discussing the Chinese peace plan, that the West is beginning to use weapons with a “nuclear” component in a response to the UK’s announcement that it would provide Ukraine with shells with depleted uranium.[11] Putin claimed that the UK’s provision of depleted uranium shells indicated that the West is not ready for a “peaceful settlement."[12] Anti-tank munitions in the West are commonly made of depleted uranium—that is, uranium that is less radioactive than natural uranium—due to its high density and the penetrative effect it generates. Such munitions cannot be used to produce either nuclear or radiological weapons. Putin seeks to portray the provision of depleted uranium shells as escalatory in order to deter Western security assistance despite the shells not containing any fissile or radiological material.

The Wagner Group may lose most of its convict force in the upcoming weeks as convicts finish their six-month military contracts. The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) assessed that thousands of Wagner convicts who were recruited during fall 2022 will be pardoned and released, given that Wagner appears to be sticking to its promise of releasing convicts after six months of service.[13] The UK MoD forecasted that the exodus of convict forces would worsen Wagner personnel shortages as the Kremlin has also blocked Wagner from recruiting additional prisoners. The Kremlin had previously confirmed on January 27 that Russian President Vladimir Putin is issuing preemptive pardon for convicts who serve in Russian combat operations in Ukraine.[14] The Kremlin’s announcement aligns with the ISW-established timeline of Putin’s decision to completely distance himself from Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin following the fall of Soledar, Donetsk Oblast, on January 12–13.[15] The Kremlin had likely deliberately authorized publicization of pre-emptive pardons to incentivize more Wagner convicts to leave following the expiration of their contracts to further erode the Wagner force. Prigozhin has developed a brand consistently mocking the Russian MoD for its disregard for the troops’ wellbeing and is unlikely to anger a convict force by retaining them on the frontlines past the expiration of their contracts.

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) launched a criminal investigation into the Deputy Commander of the Rosgvardia’s Central District, Major General Vadim Dragomiretsky on March 20.[16] Russian State Duma Parliamentarian Aleksandr Khinshtein stated that Dragomiretsky is suspected of receiving multimillion dollar bribes and abusing his power and will face subsequent dismissal from his position. Khinshtein said that officials forced Dragomiretsky to admit his guilt in a written confession. Dragomiretsky was suspected of having received bribes from a contractor who reconstructed a military unit in the Moscow Oblast.[17] The accusations follow Russian President Vladimir Putin’s bill on March 18 that increased fines and jailtime for the misappropriation of Russian military assets.[18] Khinshtein stated that the Rosgvardia leadership’s investigation proves its dedication to “purifying their ranks.“ The Kremlin may use the premise of misappropriation of military funds to oust officials who have fallen out of favor.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on March 20 that it authorized a presidential drawdown to provide an additional $350 million of security assistance to Ukraine.[19] The DoD stated that the package will include ammunition for HIMARS, 155mm artillery rounds, HARMs missiles, and other critical military equipment.[20]

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be setting conditions to weaponize the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a method of Russian power projection in advance of Russia’s accession to the rotating UNSC presidency in April.
The readouts of the second day of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit with Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to suggest that Putin has not been able to secure the no-limits bilateral partnership with China that he likely hoped for.
Putin falsely portrayed the Western provision of depleted uranium ammunition (not suitable for use in nuclear or radiological weapons) to Ukraine as a significant escalation in order to bolster information operations aiming to deter Western security assistance to Ukraine and to place the onus for negotiations on the West.
Wagner Group may lose most of its convict force in the upcoming weeks as convicts finish their six-month military contracts.
The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) launched a criminal investigation into the Deputy Commander of the Rosgvardia’s Central District, Major General Vadim Dragomiretsky.
The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced that it authorized a presidential drawdown to provide around $350 million of security assistance to Ukraine.
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces did not make any confirmed gains in or around Bakhmut and continued offensive operations along the outskirts of Donetsk City.
The Kremlin continues crypto mobilization campaigns to recruit men across Russia for contract service to avoid declaring second mobilization wave.
Russian occupation officials continue to facilitate the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1—Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1— Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Masyukivka (15km northeast of Kupyansk), Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove), Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna), and Verkhnokamyanske (20km south of Kreminna). [21] Geolocated footage published on March 20 indicates that Russian forces have advanced towards Terny, about 15km northwest of Kreminna.[22] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that the Kupyansk-Lyman direction is under the heaviest Russian artillery fire and that Russian forces use Soviet-era armored vehicles and older tanks more actively on this line.[23] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 21 that unspecified motorized rifle units disrupted two Ukrainian troop rotations near Dvorichna (17km northeast of Kupyansk) and Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk) and discovered two Ukrainian sabotage groups near Berestove (24km northwest of Svatove) and Novoselivske.[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that positional battles continue west of Ploshchanka and near the Zhuravka gully, within 18km northwest of Kreminna.[25] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces attempted to break through Ukrainian positions in Novoselivske and conducted offensive operations towards Yampolivka, Terny, Nevske, and Makiivka.[26] Another milblogger published footage on March 21 reportedly of the 4th Brigade of the 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Army Corps operating in the forests near Kreminna.[27]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces did not make any confirmed gains in or around Bakhmut on March 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut; within 11km northwest of Bakhmut near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Hryhorivka, and Bohdanivka; and within 22km southwest of Bakhmut near Ivanivske, Predtechyne, and Pivnichne.[28] Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that there were 13 combat clashes in Bakhmut, a notable decrease from the 24 combat clashes in the city that he reported on March 16.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff specified that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults in northern Bakhmut, likely suggesting that Russian forces are concentrating offensive operations on the northern part of the city.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group fighters continued assaults in the AZOM industrial complex in northern Bakhmut and that they control most of the complex, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced from southwestern areas of Bakhmut towards the city center on March 19 and 20, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation that Russian forces have done so.[32] The Lystyan volunteer battalion of the Cossack Don Brigade published footage on March 18 claiming to show the formation fighting in Bakhmut itself, possibly indicating that the Cossack Don Brigade has ties with the Wagner Group in the area.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner fighters conducted an assault towards Khromove (2km west of Bakhmut) and broke through Ukrainian defenses in the direction of Hryhorivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut).[34] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults west of Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut) and that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful counterattacks southwest of Bakhmut.[35]

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the outskirts of Donetsk City on March 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka; within 14km north of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka, Berdychi, and Krasnohorivka; and within 36km southwest of Avdiivka near Sieverne, Pervomaiske, Marinka, Pobieda, and Novomykhailivka.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attempting to advance towards Orlivka (8km northwest of Avdiivka) following the likely Russian capture of Stepove (9km northwest of Avdiivka).[37] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces still hold positions in Stepove.[38] ISW assesses that Russian forces likely captured Stepove based on a Ukrainian General Staff report of Russian assaults near Berdychi (10km northwest of Avdiivka, and 1km west of Stepove) on March 19.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Stepove and Kamianka as well as towards the southern outskirts of Avdiivka, where fierce fighting has reportedly been ongoing for the past five days.[40] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces are trying to advance north of Vodyane (8km southwest of Bakhmut).[41] A Russian milblogger purportedly in contact with personnel from the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 1st Slavic Brigade claimed that the formation has suffered heavy losses and conducts assaults without artillery support in the Avdiivka area.[42] ISW previously reported that the increased tempo of Russian operations in the Avdiivka area has led to major losses and is likely a misguided effort to pull Ukrainian forces away from other areas of the front.[43]

Russian sources offered diverging views on the Russian military’s ability to encircle Avdiivka and the significance of the settlement. Some Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are threatening to encircle Ukrainian forces in Avdiivka from the north, east, and south and that the capture of Stepove cut the railway line that Ukrainian forces used to supply its grouping in Avdiivka.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attempting to advance towards Orlivka to cut Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that lead from Orlivka, Lastochkyne (4km northwest of Avdiivka), and Tonenke (7km west of Avdiivka) into Avdiivka and will soon encircle Avdiivka.[45] Other prominent milbloggers argued that Russian forces are not close to encircling Avdiivka and called on other Russian sources to stop premature conversations about the topic.[46] One milblogger stated that the current difficulties of the Russian advance in the Avdiivka area confirms that Russian forces are not closer to victory.[47] Russian sources offered diverging views on the importance of capturing Avdiivka, with one Russian milblogger arguing that the settlement is a significant industrial area while another questioned how capturing Avdiivka would significantly change the operational situation along the outskirts of Donetsk City when Ukrainian positions in Karlivka (16km northwest of Avdiivka) and Kurakhove (25km west of Donetsk City) are just as fortified as those in Avdiivka.[48] ISW continues to assess that Russian advances could prompt Ukrainian command to decide to withdraw from Avdiivka although that does not appear likely at this time.

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on March 21.

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on March 20 that explosions in occupied Dzhankoy, Crimea destroyed Russian Kalibr NK cruise missiles during their transport via railroad.[49] Russian milbloggers published footage purportedly showing explosions and the aftermath of explosions in Dzhankoy and claimed that if a drone had struck a supply of missiles, a secondary explosion should have been visible.[50] The Russian Investigative Committee notably announced it is opening an investigation into drone activity following the reported drone strike in Dzhankoy.[51]

Russian forces conducted routine shelling in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts on March 21.[52]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin continues crypto mobilization campaigns to recruit men across Russia for contract service to avoid declaring a formal second mobilization wave. Representative of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Andriy Yusov stated that Russia recruits 20,000 servicemen per month via crypto mobilization schemes.[53] Yusov noted that Russia continues to lack trainers and is using Belarusian training grounds to train the mobilized servicemen. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian conscripts from Krasnodar Krai are signing contracts to deploy to Ukraine in August 2023.[54] Russian recruitment officials are likely coercing conscripts into signing contracts, and Russian independent media reported that the Moscow Aviation Institute withheld diplomas from graduates who refused to sign military contracts.[55] Russian local outlets reported that military enlistment offices are threatening private companies with fines if they do not provide personal information about their male employees up to 50 years of age.[56] Russian outlets also reported that Russian recruitment officials continued to distribute summonses to students and civilian men to clarify their personal information.[57] The Wagner Group also continues to expand its recruitment campaigns across Russia and opened another recruitment center in Rostov-on-Don.[58]

Russian milbloggers are increasingly assessing that the Kremlin is unlikely to declare another mobilization wave and is instead in favor of a contract service recruitment campaign. A milblogger noted that the Kremlin will only declare mobilization if regional authorities are unable to generate the desired quota of volunteers.[59] The milblogger noted that the Kremlin is advertising contract service to regenerate forces without mobilization. Another milblogger noted that the Kremlin’s recruitment campaign is set up for failure, stating that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) had not been effective in promoting recruitment drives.[60] The milblogger noted that the Kremlin is unlikely to generate the desired 400,000 troops because most of the volunteers that wanted to fight in the war already enlisted during previous recruitment drives. The milblogger noted that Wagner Group and Chechen “Akhmat” units are the only formations that have been able to effectively recruit volunteers and speculated that the Russian MoD only was able to mobilize 230,000 servicemen in September 2022. The milbloggers’ observations support previous ISW’s assessments that the renewed volunteer recruitment campaign is unlikely to fulfill Russia’s ongoing need for timely reinforcements.

Russian servicemen who joined regional volunteer battalions over summer 2022 revealed that the Russian military command treats Russian volunteers like cannon fodder. Russian independent outlet Important Stories (iStories) interviewed a Russian volunteer from Kazan’s “Alga” volunteer battalion who is currently accused of desertion.[61] The volunteer revealed that his battalion suffered tremendous losses on the west (right) bank Kherson Oblast during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in November 2022. The servicemen, alongside some other elements of the battalion, received permission from company and battalion commanders to quit after four months of contract service, but commanders of the 72nd Brigade refused to dismiss them. ISW could not locate any information about a Russian 72nd Brigade, which was named in the iStories report. The subordination of the volunteer battalion to a brigade may indicate that some Russian volunteer battalions were embedded in existing or new units. The volunteer also revealed that Ukrainian forces largely destroyed the “Alga” volunteer battalion near Vuhledar on February 6, 2023.

Russian involuntary recruitment campaigns, if declared again, would further worsen brain-drain problems in the country. Radio Liberty and Current Time uncovered that 250 of Russia’s most prominent doctors fled the country on September 27, 2022, six days after Russian President Vladimir Putin declared mobilization.[62]

The Russian Supreme Court developed and presented a draft resolution that explains which activities the court would rule as a crime against military service.[63] The court proposed on March 21 to introduce punishments for “attempted unauthorized abandonment of a military unit and desertion.” The draft would allow the court to punish servicemen who were absent from their units for less than two days, which is currently not an offense under existing law. The draft defined desertion as an offense in which a serviceman intends to evade his military duties, and the court will be able to prosecute anyone who evaded service within 15 years after reaching the age limit of being in reserve. The draft also noted that Russian servicemen should fully resist capture and fulfill military obligations even in a complete encirclement. A Russian human rights advocate noted that any Russian serviceman who is captured would be investigated under the Russian criminal code.

Chinese entities reportedly continue to supply drones and drone parts to Russia. The New York Times reported that official Russian customs data shows that nearly 70 Chinese exporters sold 26 brands of drones and drone parts worth more than $12 million to Russian entities since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[64] The Chinese drone maker Autel has reportedly sold two million dollars’ worth of drones to Russian entities alone.[65] Chinese firms appear to be increasing their sale of commercially available drones to Russia, which have dual use purposes that Russian forces can employ on the battlefield in Ukraine. These commercially available drones likely do not have payload capacities that would allow Russian forces to employ them in significant combat or high-precision strike roles. It still remains uncertain whether Chinese leadership will decide to allow Chinese defense industry to sell lethal equipment to Russia.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian forces continue to conduct law enforcement operations in occupied areas to target pro-Ukrainian sentiment and coerce compliance with passportization measures. Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov posted footage on March 21 of Chechen riot police of the “Akhmat-1” formation conducting a law enforcement sweep in an unnamed occupied village that shows them entering a small private residence and finding Ukrainian flags and Ukrainian “training manuals for sabotage and subversive work.”[66] While the video appears highly staged and choreographed, it demonstrates that law enforcement operations in occupied areas particularly target anything and anyone deemed to show pro-Ukrainian sentiments. The Ukrainian Resistance Center remarked on March 21 that Russian forces raided homes in the Azov village near Berdyansk, occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, to conduct “preventative searches” and threaten residents who do not hold Russian passports, arbitrarily detaining those who refuse to apply for Russian citizenship.[67]

Russian occupation officials continue to facilitate the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. Kherson Oblast occupation Head Vladimir Saldo reported on March 21 that he signed an agreement with All-Russian Children’s Center “Okean” Director Natalya Solovey that stipulates that children from occupied Kherson Oblast will go to “rest and study” at the “Okean” camp near Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai.[68] "Okean” is funded and directed by the Russian government and Ministry of Education, according to its website.[69] Vladivostok is closer to the American state of Alaska (approximately 5,000km) than it is to Kherson Oblast (over 7,000km).

Russian occupation officials continue efforts to consolidate bureaucratic and administrative control of occupied areas of Ukraine. The Kherson Oblast Occupation Administration stated on March 21 that people with disabilities will need to undergo re-examination under Russian legislation for the re-issuance of their disability status.[70] Occupation authorities are therefore weaponizing the issuance of disability status to require individuals to register and provide personal information to occupation organs. Russian occupation authorities also continue to push for the issuance of Russian passports in occupied territories. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation Head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed on March 21 that 30 percent of residents (164,577 people) of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast have received Russian passports and that there are 16 stationary and two mobile departments operating in the oblast for the receipt and issuance of passport documents.[71] The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) similarly claimed on March 21 that it opened a checkpoint for passport application and issuance in Bilolutsk and that the checkpoint received over 200 passport applications on the day of its opening.[72] The number of Russian passport applications and holders are likely purposefully overblown by occupation officials, and the actual process for application is likely becoming increasingly coercive. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration noted that Russian occupation officials have greatly accelerated the process for renouncing Ukrainian citizenship in Luhansk Oblast, likely to expedite the Russian passport application process.[73]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

The Ukrainian General Staff continued to note on March 21 that Belarus is providing its military infrastructure for the training of Russian troops and that Russia maintains a significant military presence in Belarus.[74]

Belarusian forces continued various military exercises on March 21. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the 103rd Vitebsk Separate Airborne Brigade started brigade-level tactical exercises to practice unit maneuver, combat fire, and UAV operation.[75] The Belarusian MoD also noted that the Belarusian Signal Corps is holding tactical and special training classes until March 25 under Head of the Belarusian Communications Department, Colonel Vadim Romaniv.[76] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko additionally held a meeting on external and internal security threats.[77]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-abducted-children-un-security-...

[2] https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-abducted-children-un-security-...

[3] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/573

[4] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70750

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin%27s%20Offset%...

[6] http://kremlin dot ru/supplement/5920

[7] http://kremlin dot ru/supplement/5920

[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[9] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70750; https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/zyxw/202303/t20230321_11045492.shtml; https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/202303/t20230321_11045969.html

[10] http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70750

[11] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70750; https://questions-statements.parliament dot uk/written-questions/detail/2023-03-06/hl6144

[12] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70750

[13] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1638068626761580544?s=20

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[16] https://t.me/readovkanews/55122

[17] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-national-guard-general-accu...

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[19] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3334472/dod-announ...

[20] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3334472/dod-announ...

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tpFmTQfD5KmivVrZAb4...

[22] https://twitter.com/chris__759/status/1637983779959578626; https://twit...

[23] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/03/21/najbilshyh-artylerijskyh-obstriliv-voroga-zaznaye-lymano-kupyanskyj-napryamok-sergij-cherevatyj/

[24] https://t.me/mod_russia/24988

[25] https://t.me/basurin_e/272; https://t.me/rybar/44860

[26] https://t.me/wargonzo/11518

[27] https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/20118; https://t.me/stepnoy_veter/732

[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wJX9Eg8EBP4gsVw3pp...

[29] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU; https://suspilne dot media/415431-pidsumki-ramstajnu-devat-krain-nadadut-ukraini-tanki-leopard-a-norvegia-sistemi-nasams-386-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1678970429&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://suspilne dot media/420147-ugorsina-zablokuvala-zaavu-es-sodo-ordera-na-arest-putina-ssa-nadali-cergovij-paket-dopomogi-391-den-vijni-onlajn/

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wJX9Eg8EBP4gsVw3pp...

[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/11518 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46233

[32] https://t.me/rybar/44855 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/272

[33] https://t.me/svolistan/374

[34] https://t.me/wargonzo/11518

[35] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46233

[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wJX9Eg8EBP4gsVw3pp...

[37] https://t.me/milchronicles/1688 ; https://t.me/milchronicles/1688; ht...

[38] https://t.me/strelkovii/4289

[39] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[40] https://t.me/strelkovii/4279 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/11518

[41] https://t.me/strelkovii/4279 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/11518

[42] https://t.me/akashevarova/6223 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46251

[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[44] https://t.me/readovkanews/55148 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/11518 ; http...

[45] https://t.me/milchronicles/1688

[46] https://t.me/strelkovii/4279 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46234

[47] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46234

[48] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46234 ; https://t.me/milchronicles/1686

[49] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/vybukh-u-misti-dzhankoi-znyshchyv-rosiiski-krylati-rakety-kalybr-nk.html

[50] https://t.me/rybar/44869; https://twitter.com/CrimeaUA1/status/16379027... ; https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1637902776754642952?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1637904142458044416?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/War_cube_/status/1637905635705593858?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/War_cube_/status/1637922105244241924?s=20 https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1637912185681723393 ; https://t.me/mash_na_volne/2948; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/80971; https://t.me/z_arhiv/19806 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/98297

[51] https://t.me/sledcom_press/5897

[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tpFmTQfD5KmivVrZAb4...

[53] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/rf-shchomisiatsia-vdaietsia-mobilizuvaty-blyzko-20-tysiach-osib.html

[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wJX9Eg8EBP4gsVw3pp...

[55] https://t.me/meduzalive/80609; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/1619

[56] https://mstrok dot ru/news/v-nizhnem-tagile-voenkomat-nachal-trebovat-u-chastnyh-kompaniy-predostavit-dannye-o-vseh

[57] https://t.me/ChuvashiaDream/6624; https://perevolockday dot ru/news/170323133954; https://progorod76 dot ru/news/63973; https://www.e1 dot ru/text/gorod/2023/03/20/72146204/; https://t.me/ChuvashiaDream/6624

[58] https://t.me/wargonzo/11524 ; https://t.me/rostov_glavniy/47879

[59] https://t.me/rybar/44852

[60] https://t.me/Leningrad_guide/15937

[61] https://istories dot media/stories/2023/03/21/pod-ugledarom-kazanskii-batalon-polozhili-prakticheski-polnostyu/

[62] https://www.currenttime dot tv/a/meditsinsky-samolet-systema/32327706.html

[63] https://meduzad dot io/feature/2023/03/21/verhovnyy-sud-rf-dal-raz-yasneniya-po-prestupleniyam-protiv-voennoy-sluzhby; https://tassd ot ru/obschestvo/17324143; https://www.rapsinews dot ru/judicial_analyst/20230321/308764470.html

[64] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/21/business/russia-china-drones-ukraine-...

[65] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/21/business/russia-china-drones-ukraine-...

[66] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3448

[67] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/03/21/okupanty-provely-obshuky-v-selah-poblyzu-berdyanska/

[68] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/573; https://okean dot org/; https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/7920

[69] https://okean dot org/ofitsialnaya-informatsiya#osnovnie-svedeniya

[70] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/7912

[71] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/883

[72] https://telegra dot ph/V-pgt-Beloluck-otkryty-punkt-policii-i-priema-zayavlenij-o-vydache-zamene-pasporta-grazhdanina-Rossijskoj-Federacii-03-21

[73] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/9375

[74] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wJX9Eg8EBP4gsVw3pp...

[75] https://t.me/modmilby/24686

[76] https://t.me/modmilby/24686

[77] https://t.me/modmilby/24684

Ukrainians to Get U.S. Tanks by Fall

defense.gov · by C. Todd Lopez

The Defense Department announced in January that 31 M1A2 Abrams tanks would be delivered to Ukraine, but officials had speculated it would take about a year to make that happen. Now, they say, the U.S. will instead send M1A1 Abrams tanks from refurbished hulls already in U.S. inventory, and the delivery will be in the fall — faster than what was initially expected.

Training Exercise

The Defense Department announced today it will send tanks similar to the M1A1s used in this 2015 training exercise to Ukraine by the fall.

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"Since we've made this announcement, we've been committed to exploring options to deliver the armored capability as quickly as possible," Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder said during a briefing today. "After further study and analysis on how best to do this, DOD, in close coordination with Ukraine, has made the decision to provide the M1A1 variant of the Abrams tank, which will enable us to significantly expedite delivery timelines, and deliver this important capability to Ukraine by the fall of this year."

Spotlight: Support for Ukraine

The M1A1 Abrams will have "a very similar capability" to the M1A2, Ryder said, including advanced armor and weapons systems, such as a 120 mm cannon and 50-caliber heavy machine gun.

"This is about getting this important combat capability into the hands of the Ukrainians sooner rather than later," the general said.

Press Briefing

Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder conducts a press briefing at the Pentagon, March 21, 2023.

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In January, the initial plan was that the United States would use funds from the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative to procure new tanks from the manufacturer. Now, Ryder said, excess hulls already in U.S. inventory will instead be refurbished and refitted to create M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks that can be sent to Ukraine more quickly in order to meet their needs.

"You've heard us talk in the past about trying to work with Ukraine to meet not only their near-term needs, but their medium-term needs," Ryder said. "Taking territory, retaking territory, you know, as part of any offensive will be important ... as will sustaining those gains at some point in the future, as well as being able to deter future Russian aggression. This is all part of ... our broader near-term and longer-term support to Ukraine and their defense requirements."

Ryder also told reporters that training Ukrainians on the tanks is also in the works.

Training Time

An M1A1 tank, with soldiers from the Army’s 11th Armored Calvary Regiment was part of an August 2015 exercise at the National Training Center on Fort Irwin, Calif. The Defense Department announced today it will send similar tanks to Ukraine by the fall.

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"We will ensure that the Ukrainians receive the necessary training on these tanks in time for them to be delivered," he said. "We'll have more details to provide on that training in the future. But, again, that would be our intent — and I'm confident that we will accomplish that."

Yesterday, the Pentagon also announced the most recent round of security assistance to Ukraine. The latest round of security assistance, worth about $350 million, includes, among other things, ammunition for the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System; high-speed, anti-radiation missiles; AT4 anti-armor weapon systems; grenade launchers, small arms and associated ammunition; and Riverine patrol boats.

Since the beginning of Russia's invasion on Feb. 24. 2022, the U.S. has committed more than $32.5 billion in security assistance to Ukraine. The United States also continues to work with allies and partners to provide Ukraine with additional capabilities to defend itself.

defense.gov · by C. Todd Lopez

3. US to send Patriot missile systems and tanks to Ukraine faster than originally planned

US to send Patriot missile systems and tanks to Ukraine faster than originally planned | CNN Politics

CNN · by Natasha Bertrand,Haley Britzky · March 21, 2023

Fort Sill, Oklahoma CNN —

US Patriot missile defense systems and Abram tanks are set to be deployed to Ukraine faster than originally planned, US defense officials said on Tuesday.

A group of 65 Ukrainian soldiers will complete their training on the systems at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in the coming days, the defense officials said.

The troops will then move on to Europe for additional training on the two Patriot systems – one American and one built by the Germans and Dutch – that will be deployed to Ukraine in the coming weeks, the officials told reporters at Fort Sill.

The announcement of the acceleration of Patriot deployments came shortly after it was reported that the US will accelerate the time it takes to ship Abrams tanks to Ukraine by sending older M1-A1 models of America’s main battle tank instead of the more modern version of the tank, according to two US officials.

The decision to speed up the delivery of tanks and Patriots comes as Ukraine is preparing to launch a spring offensive against Russian forces, built largely around the more powerful and more advanced systems Western countries have agreed to send, including tanks and other armored vehicles.

US trainers at Fort Sill, where the 65 Ukrainians have been training since January 15, were able to significantly speed up the timeline of the course because of the Ukrainians’ baseline knowledge of air defense systems, the officials said.

“Our assessment is that the Ukrainian soldiers are impressive, and absolutely a quick study,” said Brig. Gen. Shane Morgan, the Fort Sill commander. “Due to their extensive air defense knowledge and experience in a combat zone, it was easier – though never easy – for them to grasp the Patriot System Operations and Maintenance concepts.”

It typically takes around a year for US soldiers to complete training on the Patriot, though Pentagon spokesman Brig. Gen. Patrick Ryder said in January that the accelerated training timeline for Ukrainian troops would take “several months.”

Ryder declined to get into specifics about the new timeline during a press briefing on Tuesday, saying only that the US is confident “we’ll be able to get the Patriots there on an expedited timeline.”

Troops training range in age from 19 to 67

The Ukrainian troops training are men and women ranging in age from 19-67. They arrived in mid-January and are set to compete the training in the coming days. The schedule was “aggressive,” a Fort Sill official said, with the Ukrainians training daily from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m.

The announcement at the end of 2022 that the US would be providing a Patriot battery was a welcome one for Ukraine, who had repeatedly asked for the air defense capability. But experts warned that the system would not be a game changer overnight because of the significant training and logistical requirements that go along with it, as well as its limitations in scope.

“These systems don’t pick up and move around the battlefield,” retired Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling, former commander of US Army Europe, told CNN in December. “You put them in place somewhere that defends your most strategic target, like a city, like Kyiv. If anyone thinks this is going to be a system that is spread across a 500-mile border between Ukraine and Russia, they just don’t know how the system operates.”

The Ukrainians’ day-to-day training in Oklahoma was overseen by the Army’s 3rd Battalion, 6th Air Defense Regiment, Morgan said, adding that the Ukrainian troops were “hand-picked by their country” and the “best of the best in what they do.”

“I’m certain their actions these past months will save lives and alleviate suffering,” Col. Marty O’Donnell, the spokesman for US Army Europe and Africa, said of the Ukrainian troops on Tuesday. “What they did matters — it matters to Ukraine, and to the world.”

On Tuesday morning, John Kirby, the National Security Council’s strategic communications coordinator, said the US was working to speed up the delivery of tanks to Ukraine.

“We’re working on that. There’s some changes that you can make to the process, to sort of speed that up,” Kirby said on MSNBC. “The Pentagon is working as fast as they can, and they’ll have more to say on adjustments they’re making.”

Ryder confirmed that the US would be sending M1-A1 tanks to Ukraine during Tuesday’s briefing, saying the decision was made to help deliver the capability “as quickly as possible.” Sending the older variant will allow the US to deliver the tanks by the fall, Ryder said.

He added that Ukraine would also be receiving similar armor and weapon capabilities to the M1-A2, including a 120 mm cannon and .50-caliber heavy machine gun.

The US had previously announced it would send the more modern M1-A2 version of the Abrams battle tank, but that would have required either building new tanks or modernizing existing older tanks, then training Ukrainian crews on the more advanced system. The M1-A2 has a newer digital targeting system that makes it a more capable tank, but it also required more training for Ukrainian troops to operate the more complex tank and to maintain the system.

The US still intends to send 31 M1-A1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine, the same number as previously announced and the size of a complete Ukrainian tank battalion.

CNN’s Oren Liebermann and Kevin Liptak contributed reporting.

CNN · by Natasha Bertrand,Haley Britzky · March 21, 2023

4. The U.S. Has a Troublesome Asian Ally Against China

Quite an accusation in the subtitle.

No due process? Must have been some since he is out on bail.

I do not know the current status but in the years I was in the Philippines we could not provide any training, advice, or assistance to the Armed Forces of the Philippines for employment against the NPA. We could only support operations against AQ linked terrorist groups even though the communists were and remain an existential threat to the Philippines. They continue to seek the overthrow of the Philippine government (whether they can accomplish that is unlikely or questionable at best).

Excerpts:

“There was no due process,” Bolinget told me of his arrest after he posted bail. “I’m not armed. I am a legal activist. I am an Indigenous peoples’ human rights defender.”

Now, Bolinget and other human rights workers worry that Washington’s expanded support of the Philippine armed forces will put their lives at risk. For decades, the United States has directly trained Philippine soldiers and provided weapons and aircraft to the Manila government. These are used in domestic counterinsurgency operations that often target dissidents and land defenders. Top Philippine generals designed their counterinsurgency program after learning U.S. strategies from American counterparts visiting Philippine bases, or on their own visits to West Point military academy or other U.S. training centers.

...

Philippine Lt. Gen. Antonio Parlade Jr., the task force’s first spokesperson and one of its key architects, became notorious for his wild red-tagging sprees targeting activists. He worked in rural provinces, but also in major universities; targets included a former Miss Universe winner and the mayor of Manila. Parlade, like many Philippine generals, received training at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Experts worry the military expertise the United States shares with the Philippines will continue being used not to make the country more secure, but to hunt and kill political opposition.

“With military generals being trained in the U.S., that … transfer of knowledge and training translates into a very particular aspect of Philippine society, which is counterinsurgency and counterterrorism,” Macaspac said. “And there’s really no accountability there.”

The U.S. Has a Troublesome Asian Ally Against China

The Philippines is using U.S. military infrastructure to commit human rights violations.

By Nick Aspinwall, a journalist based in New York.

Foreign Policy · by Nick Aspinwall · March 21, 2023

On Feb. 2, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin shook hands with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and announced a new deal allowing U.S. forces access to four additional military camps, strengthening a decades-old defense bond and significantly increasing the U.S. military’s presence on China’s doorstep. “It’s a really big deal,” Austin said at a press conference. “[This is] just part of our efforts to modernize our alliance.”

As Austin spoke in Manila, the Philippine capital, Windel Bolinget and six other activists sat in jail cells near Baguio, a city 250 kilometers north. The group was part of the Cordillera Peoples Alliance, an environmental group organizing Indigenous opposition to hydropower and dam projects on the nearby Chico, Apayao, and Saltan rivers.

They now face charges of insurrection and rebellion under a deeply controversial anti-terrorism law; they are accused by Philippine courts of being members of the New People’s Army (NPA), a communist rebel group waging an armed rebellion in the countryside in increasingly small numbers.

“There was no due process,” Bolinget told me of his arrest after he posted bail. “I’m not armed. I am a legal activist. I am an Indigenous peoples’ human rights defender.”

Now, Bolinget and other human rights workers worry that Washington’s expanded support of the Philippine armed forces will put their lives at risk. For decades, the United States has directly trained Philippine soldiers and provided weapons and aircraft to the Manila government. These are used in domestic counterinsurgency operations that often target dissidents and land defenders. Top Philippine generals designed their counterinsurgency program after learning U.S. strategies from American counterparts visiting Philippine bases, or on their own visits to West Point military academy or other U.S. training centers.

“It’s not the interest of the U.S. in the Philippines to protect human rights,” Bolinget said. “The U.S. is practically supporting a human rights violator.”

For years, Bolinget and other Cordillera activists have found themselves in the crosshairs of the Philippine counterinsurgency campaign. On paper, the campaign is an effort to root out NPA rebels and other terrorist organizations in rural areas. However, under successive administrations, it has evolved to target nearly anyone who opposes the government: activists, land defenders, female Indigenous leaders, teachers, and even a United Nations special rapporteur.

“They see us as enemies of the state,” Bolinget said. “This is political persecution, with the intent of trying to kill us or silence us and instilling fear in the people.”

In 2020, Bolinget was charged with murder by a court in Tagum, a city in the southern island of Mindanao where he says he has never been. Shortly after Bolinget learned about that warrant, the Cordillera region police director offered a bounty for information on his whereabouts and issued a shoot-to-kill order should he resist arrest, in the style of the notorious “nanlaban” cases of the drug war. Days later, Bolinget negotiated his surrender; the charges were dropped months later.

The U.S. has strategic reasons to stick close to the Philippines, which has numerous land and air bases and deep sea ports close to the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. In the process, it tolerates, and has sometimes backed, Philippine police and military counterinsurgency operations that frequently target civilians and suppress dissent within the Asian democracy.

The Philippine military frequently reminds the United States that, along with territorial defense, it expects material assistance with its counterinsurgency program. And efforts in U.S. Congress to pass legislation tying Philippine security assistance to human rights reforms have faltered, signaling Washington’s reluctance to hold Manila accountable.

The United States has influenced the counterinsurgency strategy of its former colony since Philippine independence from Spain in 1898, said Nerve Macaspac, an assistant professor of geography at the College of Staten Island who co-authored a 2020 article on the Philippines’s “whole-of-nation” counterinsurgency approach. Its program, honed through regular joint training exercises with U.S. counterparts, is largely adapted from the U.S. war on terror. “It’s really an American ideology,” Macaspac said.

Just as the U.S. Patriot Act criminalized any associations with terrorists, the Philippines began pursuing non-governmental organizations and private citizens for alleged ties with communists, making the domestic counterinsurgency campaign an overpowered tool for the government to hunt its enemies. Any Philippine politician, military officer, or business magnate can claim without evidence that an inconvenient opponent has ties to the NPA. It’s an insidious, deadly practice called “red-tagging”: labeling progressive activists and celebrities as communist sympathizers and then hunting them as if they were rebels. Red-tagging has ensnared everyone from jeepney drivers to teachers to Catholic bishops in the first months of 2023 alone.

“What we see primarily as a consequence is that the civic space in the Philippines is increasingly shrinking,” Macaspac said.

And in rural areas like the Cordillera mountains, red-tagging effectively acts as a license to kill.

Brandon Lee, a Chinese American from San Francisco, began receiving threats after he moved to northern Ifugao province to volunteer with the Cordillera Peoples Alliance. Lee and his colleagues were red-tagged by government Facebook accounts—and threatened in anonymous private messages—as early as 2014. In 2018, Ricardo Mayumi, an activist who worked with Lee in another environmental group, was shot dead by unknown assassins.

After Mayumi’s death, Lee began receiving frequent visits from military officers offering to partner with him. When Lee demurred, the officers took pictures of him outside his office without his consent. Flyers and tarpaulins appeared around Lee’s home in Ifugao, branding him a communist; social media posts labeled him an enemy of the state.

In August 2019, Lee was shot four times outside his home. He was transferred to a hospital in Baguio, where he suffered eight cardiac arrests and remained in critical condition for months. Despite calls for a government investigation from former U.S. Speaker of the House and California Rep. Nancy Pelosi, there have been no serious efforts to find his attackers.

Lee was left quadriplegic from the attacks. He returned to San Francisco, where he and his wife care for their 12-year-old daughter. His experience, including the threats and social ostracism leading up to the attack, mirrored those of other activists ensnared in the counterinsurgency.

“They try to isolate you from the public, from the people that you serve,” Lee told Foreign Policy. “They’re hoping that you, yourself, will stop doing this work on your own because of all the threats.

“If you continue doing it, the threats are there. ‘We’re really going to showcase to the public what happens when you do this kind of work.’”

The United States, Lee said, is complicit in the attack on his life. “They’re giving the military training,” he said. “They’re giving the ammunition. They’re giving the small arms the Philippine army are using.”

The United States has provided more than $2 billion in arms sales and security assistance to the Philippines since 2021, and it has plans to more than double that number. It’s also increasing joint military exercises with Philippine troops under an expansion of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which Macaspac said would lead to more U.S. troops and contractors maintaining a presence in the Philippines.

And the United States has no mechanism to hold the Philippine military accountable, whether in the United States or abroad. In 2021, U.S. Rep. Susan Wild introduced the Philippine Human Rights Act, which would forbid Washington from arming or training the Philippine military until Manila commits to human rights reforms. But the act has failed to make it out of committee.

The U.S. Department of Defense is legally required to provide human rights training to all national security forces receiving agency-funded security cooperation, U.S. Army spokesperson Martin Meiners wrote in an email.

“U.S. counterterrorism cooperation with the Philippines has a decades-long history and is an enduring feature of our alliance,” he wrote.

In 2018, the Duterte administration created the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict, which requires local governments to conduct civic activities in conjunction with the military to root out communists, usually by conducting “peace rallies” and enticing alleged rebels to surrender for cash. In practice, activists are often the task force’s real target.

Philippine Lt. Gen. Antonio Parlade Jr., the task force’s first spokesperson and one of its key architects, became notorious for his wild red-tagging sprees targeting activists. He worked in rural provinces, but also in major universities; targets included a former Miss Universe winner and the mayor of Manila. Parlade, like many Philippine generals, received training at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Experts worry the military expertise the United States shares with the Philippines will continue being used not to make the country more secure, but to hunt and kill political opposition.

“With military generals being trained in the U.S., that … transfer of knowledge and training translates into a very particular aspect of Philippine society, which is counterinsurgency and counterterrorism,” Macaspac said. “And there’s really no accountability there.”

Foreign Policy · by Nick Aspinwall · March 21, 2023

5. From Balloons To AUKUS: The War Drive Against China

A view from Australia. A scathing view about the US and the rest versus China.

Excerpts:

For days, the Australian press demonstrated a zombie-like adherence to the war line that had been fed by deskbound generals no doubt suffering from piles and deranged civilian strategists desperate to justify their supper. It is a line that always assumes the virtue of war; that going into battle, much like US President Theodore Roosevelt thought, will always outdo the tedium of peace in a haze of phosphorescent glory. It is only in the morgues and the crowded cemeteries that we find a worthy patriotism. Go out and kill, you noble sons and daughters. Do your nation proud, however stupidly.

The desperation of such a measure is also a reflection of how public opinion rejects the war drive. In a 2022 poll by the Lowy Institute think tank, 51% of Australians said they preferred their country to remain “neutral” in a conflict between the US and China over Taiwan. This was not a bad return, given the repetitious insistence by various Australian government ministers that joining a war with the United States over Taiwan was simply assumed.

In the US, the Wall Street Journal was also doing much the same thing, plumping for great power competitions that can only end badly, rather than great power cooperation which, when it goes well, spares us the body bags, the funerals and the flag fluttering.

From Balloons To AUKUS: The War Drive Against China – OpEd

eurasiareview.com · by Binoy Kampmark · March 21, 2023

When will this hate-filled nonsense stop? Surveillance balloons treated like evocations of Satan and his card-carrying followers; other innumerable unidentified phenomena that, nonetheless, remain attributable in origin, despite their designation; and then the issue of spying cranes. In the meantime, there has been much finger pointing on the culprit of COVID-19 and the global pandemic. Behold the China Threat, the Sino Monster, the Yellow Terror.

In this atmosphere, the hawkish disposition of media outlets in a number of countries in shrieking for war is becoming palpable. The Fairfax press in Australia gave a less than admirable example of this in their absurd Red Alert series, crowned by crowing warmongers warning Australia to get ready for the imminent confrontation. The publications were timed to soften the public for the inevitable, scandalous and possibly even treasonous announcement that the Australian government would be spending A$368 billion in local currency on needless submarines against a garishly dressed-up threat backed by ill-motivated allies.

For days, the Australian press demonstrated a zombie-like adherence to the war line that had been fed by deskbound generals no doubt suffering from piles and deranged civilian strategists desperate to justify their supper. It is a line that always assumes the virtue of war; that going into battle, much like US President Theodore Roosevelt thought, will always outdo the tedium of peace in a haze of phosphorescent glory. It is only in the morgues and the crowded cemeteries that we find a worthy patriotism. Go out and kill, you noble sons and daughters. Do your nation proud, however stupidly.

The desperation of such a measure is also a reflection of how public opinion rejects the war drive. In a 2022 poll by the Lowy Institute think tank, 51% of Australians said they preferred their country to remain “neutral” in a conflict between the US and China over Taiwan. This was not a bad return, given the repetitious insistence by various Australian government ministers that joining a war with the United States over Taiwan was simply assumed.

In the US, the Wall Street Journal was also doing much the same thing, plumping for great power competitions that can only end badly, rather than great power cooperation which, when it goes well, spares us the body bags, the funerals and the flag fluttering.

The introductory note of one article in that Rupert Murdoch-owned organ was not encouraging. “Since 2018, the [US] military has shifted to focus on China and Russia after decades fighting insurgencies, but it still faces challenges to produce weapons and come up with new ways of waging war.”

The obsession with war scenarios rather than diplomatic ones is hardening. It elevates the game to level pegging with peace overtures. In fact, it goes further, suggesting that such measures are to be frowned upon, if not abandoned in their entirety. Rather than considering discussions with China, for instance, on whether some rules of accommodation and observance can be made, the attitude from Washington and its satellites is one of excoriation, taking issue with any restrictions on the growth of the US defence complex. Acid observations are reserved for the Budget Control Act of 2011, which supposedly “hampered initiatives to transform the military, including on artificial intelligence, robotics, autonomous systems and advanced manufacturing.”

As defence analyst William Hartung writes, the Pentagon has never been short of cash in its pursuits, though it has been more than wasteful, obsessed with maintaining a global military presence spanning 750 bases and 170,000 overseas troops, not to mention the madness of shovelling $2 billion into developing a new generation of nuclear weapons. Far from encouraging deterrence, this is bound to “accelerate a dangerous and costly arms race.”

The same must be said of AUKUS, the triumvirate alliance that is already terrifying several powers in the Indo-Pacific into joining the regional arms race. Here we see, yet again, the Anglosphere enthralled by protecting their possessions and routes of access, directly or indirectly held.

In the red mist of war, lucid voices can be found. Singaporean diplomat and foreign policy intellectual Kishore Mahbubani is one to offer a bracing analysis in observing that China is hardly going to undermine the very order that has benefitted it. The Chinese, far from wishing to upend the rules-based system with thuggish glee, saw it as a gift of Western legal engineering. “So the paradox about the world today is that even though the global rules based order is a gift of the west, China embraces it.”

He also has this to say about the US-China relationship. “China has been around for 5,000 years. The United States has been around for 250 years. And it’s not surprising that a juvenile like the United States would have difficulty dealing with a wiser, older civilisation”.

Mahbubani, ever wily but also penetratingly sharp, also offers a valuable point: that the notion of a remarkable weapon (the nuclear-propelled submarine is not so much remarkable as cumbersomely draining and costly) must surely come a distant second to the attainment of economic prosperity. “Submarines are stealthy, but trade is stealthier,” he writes with a touch of serene sagacity. Both provide security, in a fashion: the former in terms of raw deterrence; the latter in terms of interdependence – but the kind of security created by trade, he is adamant, “lasts longer”. To date, that realisation seems to have bypassed the AUKUS troika.

Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. Email: bkampmark@gmail.com

Website: http://bkampmark@gmail.com

eurasiareview.com · by Binoy Kampmark · March 21, 2023

6. Why allies unlikely to back US strategy to contain China

Excerpts:

Some observers perceive AUKUS as an attempt to protect the US-led world order and reinforce American hegemony in an increasingly important global power centre. Yet Washington and its regional partners have cited fears over China’s militarisation in the South and East China Seas, as well as a possible invasion of Taiwan.

In response, the US has focused on hard military power and defence partnerships with its regional partners.

Such partners, including India, Japan, and Australia – who fear China’s regional military projection – are stepping up their defence capabilities. Washington is also trying to outsource military development, with US companies setting up weapons manufacturing capabilities within partners like South Korea and Australia.

And there is deepening cooperation with Western allies like Canada, Australia and the UK over countering China through organisations like the Quad and AUKUS, which underpin the US-led security architecture.

Indeed, Washington has fiercely resisted China’s emergence as a manufacturing rival, and Joe Biden’s administration has continued many of Donald Trump’s protectionist policies from the 2018 trade war with Beijing. This has been pursued, in particular, by directly and indirectly blocking China’s access to important semiconductor items and technologies, thus attempting to slow Beijing's progress on advanced semiconductors.

...

Some Indo-Pacific countries may even feel anxiety over Washington’s defence focus and its risks to regional stability. After the latest announcements over AUKUS, Indonesia expressed worries over the pact triggering a possible regional arms race as well as submarines having to pass through its waters.

Ultimately, aside from risks over further polarisation in the Indo-Pacific and the neglect of pressing issues like climate change, the US may struggle to offer an appealing alternative to China’s economic hegemony, dampening its hopes of acquiring the full support of its partners.

And while Washington may be seen as a valuable security partner, regional countries may act multilaterally and play the two powers against one another – a further reflection of the increasingly multipolar world we live in.

Why allies unlikely to back US strategy to contain China

JONATHAN FENTON-HARVEY12 HOURS AGO

trtworld.com

Despite AUKUS boosting the US-led containment of China, Washington may still struggle to gain full support from its allies as economic woes bubble to the surface.

On March 13, US President Joe Biden met his British and Australian counterparts, Rishi Sunak and Anthony Albanese, to upgrade the AUKUS security pact designed to counteract China.

In effect, the advancement of the deal enables Australia to acquire nuclear submarines, embedding its navy with the US and UK navies while reinforcing the US-led alliance with the stated aim of ensuring a “free and open” Indo-Pacific.

Beijing warned the three countries were “going down a dangerous road” following the trilateral meeting, while President Xi Jinping recently warned the US-led containment strategy in the Indo-Pacific aimed to achieve “containment and suppression on our country” during China’s annual National People’s Congress.

Some observers perceive AUKUS as an attempt to protect the US-led world order and reinforce American hegemony in an increasingly important global power centre. Yet Washington and its regional partners have cited fears over China’s militarisation in the South and East China Seas, as well as a possible invasion of Taiwan.

In response, the US has focused on hard military power and defence partnerships with its regional partners.

Such partners, including India, Japan, and Australia – who fear China’s regional military projection – are stepping up their defence capabilities. Washington is also trying to outsource military development, with US companies setting up weapons manufacturing capabilities within partners like South Korea and Australia.

And there is deepening cooperation with Western allies like Canada, Australia and the UK over countering China through organisations like the Quad and AUKUS, which underpin the US-led security architecture.

Indeed, Washington has fiercely resisted China’s emergence as a manufacturing rival, and Joe Biden’s administration has continued many of Donald Trump’s protectionist policies from the 2018 trade war with Beijing. This has been pursued, in particular, by directly and indirectly blocking China’s access to important semiconductor items and technologies, thus attempting to slow Beijing's progress on advanced semiconductors.

In addition to tariffs, the White House has tried to establish a strategy that prioritises domestic investments in American industry and infrastructure to compete with Beijing.

Crucially, however, while the Biden administration prioritises defence partnerships to contain China, it could further lose out to China based on its economic strategy in the region and the desires of its partners to uphold trade ties with Beijing.

While there is recognition of the failures of US investment in the Indo-Pacific, Washington in early March announced Pacific states would get billions of dollars from its budget over the next 20 years, showing Washington is aware it should have a long-term economic approach to the region.

Despite the US trying to get Europe on board with countering China, the European Union (EU) has preferred a nuanced ‘competition and cooperation’ with Beijing. Germany has prioritised economic relations with China, which Berlin has seen as more necessary than ever amid the continent’s cost-of-living crisis, which has also hit German manufacturing.

Although US pressure has prompted some EU nations to decouple from Chinese technology, such as the Netherlands placing restrictions on Chinese semiconductors on March 9, it’s largely submerged by the EU’s desires to keep business with China open. Perhaps the only major contention between the EU and China, per Brussel’s Indo-Pacific foreign policy strategy, are those “where fundamental disagreements exist, such as on human rights”.

Even countries with a more active military presence in the Indo-Pacific, namely France and the UK, are somewhat cautious about fully following the US’ lead. French President Emmanuel Macron’s planned visit to China in the coming weeks is partly about getting China on board with ending the Ukraine war, highlighting Europe’s priorities of restoring security in the continent, and possibly seeing Beijing as an important partner in achieving this.

While the UK is currently a partner in Washington’s containment efforts, in recent years, it has drifted between a hawkish approach on China and stressing the importance of economic relations with Beijing, its largest source of imports.

Rishi Sunak recently called for “robust pragmatism” towards Beijing, seemingly a setback to the hawks who favoured London following Washington’s position on China.

Moreover, with various political shifts ongoing in the UK, including growing questions over its capabilities to commit to an Indo-Pacific naval presence given its substantial support for Ukraine, it would not be surprising to see London further alter its commitments to Washington’s vision.

Crucially, Washington must also face the reality of Beijing’s significant economic entrenchment in the Indo-Pacific region, even among US partners there.

On the one hand, Japan does have diplomatic grievances with China over some disputed regions. This is not only limited to Taiwan but also the Senkaku islands, which are managed by Japan but claimed by China, which calls them the Diaoyu.

Despite this, Tokyo is unlikely to ever explicitly oppose Beijing per Washington’s vision due to its own deep economic ties with China. It is, therefore, a mistake for political figures in Washington to approach Japan as though it wishes to pit itself directly against China.

And while Australia has expanded its commitment to US-led defence initiatives, it is important to note that China is by far Canberra’s largest trading partner, while both countries have recently attempted to patch up their tensions over trade.

And in a blow to Washington, Canberra has also stressed it would not step in if a conflict breaks out over Taiwan, despite its commitments to AUKUS, revealing the US may struggle to fully sway its allies over containing China.

Despite Washington’s current fixation on hard power as a deterrent, China has increasingly embedded its economic sway in the region. It has been the biggest trading partner of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since 2009. And by 2020, it had almost doubled the trade volume of that of the US with ASEAN.

And for all the talk of tensions with India, China’s bilateral trade with New Delhi also reached a record $136 billion in 2022.

China’s own trade with Asian countries, namely through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), has offered lower tariffs on cheaper electronics and other consumer goods that are popular across Asia. As it is not part of the agreement due to its trade war with China, this also inhibits the US’s economic influence.

In contrast, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IDEF), which the US announced in May 2022 to solidify its economic presence in the region, has flaws because it doesn’t provide such tariff reductions that China offers and instead focuses on issues like labour standards, clean energy, supply chains.

Some Indo-Pacific countries may even feel anxiety over Washington’s defence focus and its risks to regional stability. After the latest announcements over AUKUS, Indonesia expressed worries over the pact triggering a possible regional arms race as well as submarines having to pass through its waters.

Ultimately, aside from risks over further polarisation in the Indo-Pacific and the neglect of pressing issues like climate change, the US may struggle to offer an appealing alternative to China’s economic hegemony, dampening its hopes of acquiring the full support of its partners.

And while Washington may be seen as a valuable security partner, regional countries may act multilaterally and play the two powers against one another – a further reflection of the increasingly multipolar world we live in.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints and editorial policies of TRT World.

We welcome all pitches and submissions to TRT World Opinion – please send them via email, to opinion.editorial@trtworld.com

Source: TRT World

trtworld.com

7. Richard Haass Says More…(On Taiwan, Ukraine, Russia, China, Japan Civics and his new book)

Richard Haass

Says More…

https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/an-interview-with-richard-haass-ukraine-war-china-policy-taiwan-us-democracy-2023-03

Mar 21, 2023

This week in Say More, PS talks with Richard Haass, former Director of Policy Planning for the US State Department, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, and the author, most recently, of The Bill of Obligations: The Ten Habits of Good Citizens.

Project Syndicate: You recently predicted that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “unwarranted war of choice” will “not end anytime soon,” with the year ahead promising to be “more reminiscent of World War I than of World War II.” But, in considering how the war might end, it might be worth revisiting how the war started. The Kremlin and some in the West blame the United States and NATO for “provoking” Russia, and claim that Ukraine is being used – whether as a pawn or a battering ram – as a Western proxy. Could this narrative affect the war’s trajectory?

Richard Haass: This is not a war about NATO enlargement or a future expansion to include Ukraine (which was not about to happen). It is not about NATO at all, or the United States, for that matter. This is a war initiated by Russia to eradicate Ukraine as a sovereign entity. Ukraine represented an alternative path for a Slavic nation – one characterized by a democratic political system and deep ties to the West. This was and is unacceptable to Putin, lest it stoke demands at home to shift Russia onto a similar path.

That Putin’s goals are so existential makes it difficult to see the war ending any time soon with the two sides reaching some kind of territorial compromise. Putin’s belief that time will weaken Western resolve further reduces the likelihood that he will consider any kind of settlement to end the war. For Ukraine’s part, the desire to reclaim all of its lost territory, secure economic reparations from Russia, and ensure accountability for Russian war crimes similarly precludes compromise. Again, we need to gird ourselves for a protracted conflict.

PS: In 2021, you wrote that the goal of US policy toward Taiwan “should be to reduce uncertainty about America’s intentions and its ability to make good on them, while underscoring to Chinese leaders the economic and military costs of aggression.” With this in mind, has the West’s response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine made a Chinese attack on Taiwan less likely? More broadly, what changes to America’s China policy – one of the few domains where there is bipartisan agreement – are most urgently needed?

RH: The West’s response to Russian aggression in Ukraine may have affected China’s calculations on Taiwan. China has to assume any use of military force against Taiwan would lead to severe economic sanctions. Moreover, whereas the United States and others have helped Ukraine only indirectly, there is a real possibility that they would participate directly in the defense of Taiwan. Russia’s failure to achieve a swift victory, and its continued battlefield setbacks, have probably also given China pause, though it will learn from Russia’s mistakes and strengthen its capabilities.

At the same time, China may believe that the delivery of huge amounts of material and financial support to Ukraine will undermine the West’s ability to assist Taiwan militarily. Its leaders could also conclude that Western countries’ far deeper economic ties with China than with Russia would make them less willing to impose severe sanctions.

The US needs to work with Taiwan and Japan to demonstrate to China that any use of force against Taiwan would bring more costs than benefits, while counseling Taiwan not to take any potentially provocative actions. Meanwhile, the US must lead its allies in an effort to scrutinize their economic dependence on China, which must not be allowed to use this dependence to gain geopolitical leverage over the West. Finally, the US must try to find a way to reintroduce a private, diplomatic element into its sharply – and dangerously – deteriorating relationship with China.

PS: You argue in your new book, The Bill of Obligations, that if America is to confront either “Russian aggression” or a “more capable and assertive China” effectively, it will need to reverse the “deterioration of democracy” at home, which you view as possibly the “most serious threat to global security and stability.” Why does restoring US democracy require shifting from a purely “rights-based” conception of American citizenship to one that places obligations on an equal footing?

RH: Rights are central to any democracy. But they cannot, on their own, make a democracy secure or functional. The reason is simple: rights inevitably collide with one another. We see this every day in the US, on issues ranging from abortion to guns. When such clashes of rights occur, the result is often gridlock, which prevents the design and implementation of responses to challenges at home and abroad. Clashing rights could also easily lead to internal violence. Obligations, both among citizens and between citizens and their government, are essential to avoid these outcomes and enable democracy to function effectively and peacefully.

PS: From “Be Informed” to “Get Involved” to “Support the Teaching of Civics,” education plays a large role in meeting a number of the ten obligations you present. How must the US education system change to create the “culture of obligation” that you advocate?

RH: Education is central to building and sustaining a democracy, not least because it provides a ladder for the advancement of citizens. Civics education, in particular, is a critical means of imparting an understanding of why democracy is valuable, how it operates, and what it requires of its citizens. In an age of misinformation, it is also essential to teach information literacy – that is, how to scrutinize and assess information. To strengthen US democracy, civics education should be required in all middle and high schools, as well as in all colleges and universities.

PS: In Obligation VIII, you argue that we must “make government service far more common than it is.” Why does this matter, and what laws, programs, or other incentives do you believe would be most effective in making it happen?

RH: Public service offers a way to bring together citizens of varying backgrounds and help break down some of the barriers – like those arising from differences of religion, class, race or ethnicity, or ideology – that divide a nation. It can also help close the political distance between citizens and their governments, while providing useful skills for individuals.

I do not argue that public service should be made mandatory – an approach that would trigger considerable political resistance. Instead, we should create better incentives for citizens to opt for public service, including financial incentives – from higher salaries to student-loan forgiveness – and career-boosting opportunities, such as enhanced access to jobs or additional education.

PS: After 20 years as president of the Council on Foreign Relations, you are preparing to step down in June. What legacy do you hope to leave, and what changes do you hope to see at CFR after you depart?

RH: I am beyond fortunate to have served as the president of the Council on Foreign Relations for the last 20 years. During this time, we continued to provide serious, policy-relevant, non-partisan, and independent analysis to our members, corporations, journalists, and government officials. In addition, we took on a large education mission, providing background on the world and US foreign policy to middle- and high-school students and teachers, to college and university students and professors, and to citizens.

We accomplished all of this by publishing shorter, more accessible pieces – such as explainers and backgrounders – online, as well as longer reports and books, while also maintaining Foreign Affairs as the field’s premier magazine. We also convened thousands of events with scholars and political leaders from around the world. More than anything else, I feel a sense of satisfaction about all we did here at CFR over the past two decades to bring a much larger number of people in this country and around the world into discussions of foreign policy and why it matters.

RICHARD HAASS

Writing for PS since 2000

153 Commentaries

Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, previously served as Director of Policy Planning for the US State Department (2001-2003), and was President George W. Bush's special envoy to Northern Ireland and Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan. He is the author, most recently, of The Bill of Obligations: The Ten Habits of Good Citizens (Penguin Press, 2023).

8. Tracking the Chinese Balloon From Space

Please go to the web site to see the interactive visual display.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/03/20/science/chinese-space-balloon-incident.html?referringSource=articleShare&smid=nytcore-ios-share

Tracking the Chinese Balloon From Space

By Muyi Xiao, Ishaan Jhaveri, Eleanor Lutz, Christoph Koettl and Julian E. Barnes

March 20, 2023

In early February, a giant white balloon was seen floating over U.S. skies, prompting speculation about its provenance and purpose. An exclusive analysis of millions of square miles of satellite imagery traces the balloon hours after its launch in China, across the Philippine Sea and then to North America. It also reveals that the balloon was remotely maneuvered at points on its journey.

9. After Iraq, Mullen wants to prevent future presidents from launching a war of choice

We must do what is constitutionally correct.

After Iraq, Mullen wants to prevent future presidents from launching a war of choice

NPR · by March 20, 20235:10 AM ET Heard on Morning Edition

The U.S. invaded Iraq 20 years ago Monday. NPR's Steve Inskeep speaks with retired Admiral Mike Mullen, whose tenure as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff included the troop surge in Iraq.

STEVE INSKEEP, HOST:

The 20th anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq has many people remembering. This day, in 2003, U.S. bombs and missiles struck Baghdad. An army soon followed and deposed Iraq's leader, only to find he did not have weapons of mass destruction, as the U.S. had claimed, and then to find they faced an insurgency. Recently, American veterans recalled fighting house-to-house in Fallujah.

UNIDENTIFIED PERSON #1: If you needed to put a tank main gun round into a building, you put a tank main gun round into the building. You know, if we needed to blow down trees to clear our fields of fire, we blew down trees to clear our fields of fire.

UNIDENTIFIED PERSON #2: Every day, it was kicking in doors, house-to-house, clearing operations. Sometimes...

INSKEEP: These voices are from a new NPR podcast, Taking Cover, in which a team, including our colleague Tom Bowman, investigate Americans who killed their own comrades in an act of friendly fire.

TOM BOWMAN, BYLINE: It's a story about mistakes, faulty assumptions, miscalculations, lies.

INSKEEP: When Tom came by my office last week, he said that sentence you just heard could sum up the war. We hear next from a man whose job was to clean up the mess. In 2006, as the war grew worse, President George W. Bush's party lost control of Congress. But rather than end the war as public support dropped, the president sent more troops.

(SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED RECORDING)

GEORGE W BUSH: If we increase our support at this crucial moment and help the Iraqis break the current cycle of violence, we can hasten the day our troops begin coming home.

INSKEEP: Months later, a new officer took over as the president's top military adviser. Admiral Mike Mullen was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as fighting continued for several more years. And we began our talk at that moment of trying to recover from calamity.

Did anybody in the Pentagon think at that moment or argue at that moment the thing to do, actually, is to stop - this is not going well, stop digging the hole?

MIKE MULLEN: No. No, no. Not from my perspective. It was to try to turn it around because we were losing literally hundreds of our men and women a month, and we knew we had to turn that.

INSKEEP: What do you think you achieved, then?

MULLEN: Well, among other things, the killings slowed dramatically. The number of troops that we lost while the surge itself - and as we talk about this, the first thing that comes to my mind are the some, you know, 4,000 or so troops that we lost that were killed in Iraq over the course of that war, and lives changed forever. Families changed forever. And the brave young men and women who went off to serve nobly, I actually would say that given how poorly it had gone in the first several years, that surge set the stage for the transition, which actually is still going on, literally as we speak.

INSKEEP: I'm glad you mention the human cost. Of course, there was a human cost in Iraqis that was even...

MULLEN: Yeah.

INSKEEP: ...Far greater than Americans who were killed. When veterans have been asked in recent years, was this war worth it, majorities have said no, it was not. Majorities of Americans have said the war was not worth fighting for. What would you say to them?

MULLEN: I generally would agree with that, Steve. I think it was a mistake. The presidents - and I worked for two of them - and many more have said the most consequential decision they make in that office is to send young men and women off to war. And my worry is that we didn't have the debate and we didn't get the answer right.

INSKEEP: Some people who are in government with you, though, still argue, I suppose, that it is a kind of 60-40 result. They feel that despite all the problems, that there was some benefit. Let's hear one such perspective from former Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who served under both Bush and Obama. He spoke last week to NPR's All Things Considered.

(SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED NPR BROADCAST)

ROBERT GATES: From today's vantage point, you have an Iraq that has a democratically elected government, however flawed. It's really the only democratically elected government in the Arab world, for all of its flaws.

INSKEEP: Would you defend the Iraq war results even to that extent, to say that, well, there was some benefit?

MULLEN: Yeah, I would, Steve. I mean, I think there was some. And I think what Secretary Gates said is true. I think if one can back away from that and look at if we knew that today is where we'd be, whether the price that was paid would be worth it - and I'm not sure it would be.

INSKEEP: We told Admiral Mullen of a darker vision of the war. It comes from the city of Fallujah, that city where we heard about the house-to-house combat. Recently, our colleague Tom Bowman went there and spoke with Sheikh Nawwaf Jabbar Hussein Ali (ph).

NAWWAF JABBAR HUSSEIN ALI: (Through interpreter) The American, they ruined the whole country and specifically Fallujah. We've been displaced many, many times here. And then the Americans brought al-Qaida. Al-Qaida never exist in Iraq before.

INSKEEP: Doesn't that cast a different idea of the war - even the resolution of the war - that for Iraqis, it's not even resolved?

MULLEN: Steve, when you ask that question, I mean, one of the biggest lessons that I took away is to see the challenges from the people who are most affected. And certainly, I can't push back on how he sees that. My perspective is a little different. Certainly, that wasn't the intent, and obviously, that was the most intense fighting, I think, over the course of the many years that we fought there, you know, in Fallujah. So that perspective is something that we need to, I think, take into consideration. And it would have been much better to understand that ahead of time as opposed to ending up the way it did in terms of the damage that we - that the war generated with respect to that country and its future. And I think now we have to both hope and pray that they can see a future where they are unimpeded by ISIS and al-Qaida, et cetera. And to the degree that we can help them and support in that regard, I think we have an obligation to do that.

INSKEEP: What lessons did the military learn from this bitter experience?

MULLEN: Well, the biggest lesson for me, quite frankly, was to have the American people on side. I've argued in recent times that for the future, we need to reduce the size of our actually standing army. And so the next time we go to war or the president wants to go to war, he'll have to call up a half a million kids not to make the initial surge, if you will, or the initial deployment - these wars also have a way of lasting longer than we thought. That debate about a draft needs to take place at the dinner table of every family that's got a young son or daughter that's 18 or 19 years old that could get drafted to go fight the war. That's what's got to be fed up to our congressional leadership and voted on in terms of a decision to go or not.

INSKEEP: You're describing, Admiral, of course, the way that American wars - large wars - were fought up until modern times. There would be a relatively small army and navy and they would expand in times of war. And you're telling me you want that as a kind of deterrent against a needless war. You want the next president or a future president to be forced to take that step before going to war.

MULLEN: I want that debate to occur, Steve. I haven't been able to come up with a better mechanism to force that than to draft kids - you know, draft young men and women.

INSKEEP: Admiral Mike Mullen, it's a pleasure talking with you again. Thank you so much.

MULLEN: Thanks, Steve.

INSKEEP: He was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Presidents Bush and Obama during the later years of the war in Iraq.

(SOUNDBITE OF THE FLASHBULB'S "UNDISCOVERED COLORS")

NPR · by March 20, 20235:10 AM ET Heard on Morning Edition

10. After Iraq, Mullen wants to prevent future presidents from launching a war of choice

We must do what is constitutionally correct. Of course Congress had the power to prevent the last war of choice.

After Iraq, Mullen wants to prevent future presidents from launching a war of choice

NPR · by March 20, 20235:10 AM ET Heard on Morning Edition

The U.S. invaded Iraq 20 years ago Monday. NPR's Steve Inskeep speaks with retired Admiral Mike Mullen, whose tenure as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff included the troop surge in Iraq.

STEVE INSKEEP, HOST:

UNIDENTIFIED PERSON #2: Every day, it was kicking in doors, house-to-house, clearing operations. Sometimes...

INSKEEP: These voices are from a new NPR podcast, Taking Cover, in which a team, including our colleague Tom Bowman, investigate Americans who killed their own comrades in an act of friendly fire.

TOM BOWMAN, BYLINE: It's a story about mistakes, faulty assumptions, miscalculations, lies.

(SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED RECORDING)

GEORGE W BUSH: If we increase our support at this crucial moment and help the Iraqis break the current cycle of violence, we can hasten the day our troops begin coming home.

Did anybody in the Pentagon think at that moment or argue at that moment the thing to do, actually, is to stop - this is not going well, stop digging the hole?

MIKE MULLEN: No. No, no. Not from my perspective. It was to try to turn it around because we were losing literally hundreds of our men and women a month, and we knew we had to turn that.

INSKEEP: What do you think you achieved, then?

INSKEEP: I'm glad you mention the human cost. Of course, there was a human cost in Iraqis that was even...

MULLEN: Yeah.

(SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED NPR BROADCAST)

INSKEEP: Would you defend the Iraq war results even to that extent, to say that, well, there was some benefit?

INSKEEP: Doesn't that cast a different idea of the war - even the resolution of the war - that for Iraqis, it's not even resolved?

INSKEEP: What lessons did the military learn from this bitter experience?

MULLEN: I want that debate to occur, Steve. I haven't been able to come up with a better mechanism to force that than to draft kids - you know, draft young men and women.

INSKEEP: Admiral Mike Mullen, it's a pleasure talking with you again. Thank you so much.

MULLEN: Thanks, Steve.

INSKEEP: He was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Presidents Bush and Obama during the later years of the war in Iraq.

(SOUNDBITE OF THE FLASHBULB'S "UNDISCOVERED COLORS")

NPR · by March 20, 20235:10 AM ET Heard on Morning Edition

11. What Do America’s Spies Really Think About China?

Conclusion:

In short, the IC’s otherwise well-presented unclassified annual assessment should have dug deeper. Congress and the public deserve to hear its best insights into the problems facing Xi’s regime. As we all know by now, what happens in China does not stay in China.

What Do America’s Spies Really Think About China?

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-intelligence-china-domestic-issues-beyond-military-economic-technological-threats-by-kent-harrington-2023-03

Mar 20, 2023

KENT HARRINGTON

While the US intelligence community’s latest threat assessment is right to focus on advances in China’s military, economic, and technological capabilities, it omits too much when it comes to the country’s domestic political challenges. These matter, because what happens in China does not stay in China.

ATLANTA – The US intelligence community’s annual threat assessment for 2023 certainly cannot be faulted for having a narrow focus or Pollyanna perspective. From a rising China, Russian aggression, and Iran’s nuclear ambitions to climate change, future pandemics, and the growing reach of international organized crime, the IC’s analysis is as comprehensive as it is worrying.

Inaugurated two decades ago as a gesture of transparency and to inform Congress and the American public, the annual threat assessment offers the intelligence agencies’ top-line conclusions about the country’s leading national-security threats – though always in ways that will not compromise “sources and methods.” As in the past, America’s spies and intelligence analysts have stayed in their lane and avoided policy questions or any suggestion that some problems are more important than others.

Yet when testifying to the Senate Intelligence Committee on March 8, US National Intelligence Director Avril Haines was not as constrained. She made it abundantly clear that the Biden administration regards China as “our unparalleled challenge,” and as America’s leading national-security threat.

If the annual threat assessment was less categorical, that is because it represents a harmonized view. Differences of expert opinion and bureaucratic battles across 18 intelligence agencies come with the territory, requiring compromises on both wording and substance. Having chaired scores of meetings to coordinate IC assessments as a member of the National Intelligence Council, I can attest to the heated debates that are involved. Forging a consensus among such an animated crowd is a true art.

But as important as it is to argue over evidence and language, it all ultimately takes a backseat to the first step in any analysis: figuring out what questions the final product should address. Part of the answer, of course, depends on the president and other key policymakers. With a $67 billion budget, the IC owes its paymasters that much at least. But the task also calls for a sober examination of the facts and their implications, regardless of whether these align with the administration’s views. Here, this year’s threat assessment fell short.

Like the White House, the IC’s assessment emphasizes the threats represented by Chinese President Xi Jinping’s confrontational approach and advances in China’s military, economic, and technological capabilities. But there is less insight into China’s domestic problems and what those could mean for Xi’s regime. As threat assessments go, this omission may be justifiable. But when it comes to improving policymakers’ and ordinary Americans’ understanding of their country’s foremost global competitor, Xi’s domestic difficulties should not get such short shrift.

Consider Xi’s effort to restructure the Chinese property sector following decades of massive investment. According to Michael Pettis of the Carnegie Endowment, this sector accounts for as much as one-third of China’s GDP, but it is extraordinarily bloated and thus underperforming. Two years ago, Chinese authorities tried to crack down on borrowing by overleveraged developers, sparking multibillion-dollar defaults and leaving scores of cities littered with abandoned projects and faced with long construction delays. Many of the big developers are still struggling, as are local governments that have racked up massive debts financing their work.

Even China’s own dodgy official economic statistics reveal a massive festering problem. China’s 31 provinces have racked up $5.1 trillion in debt to fund development, and that figure does not even include all of the additional local government financing vehicles (LGFVs). These off-the-books entities serve as backdoors for municipal governments to tap banks for loans and sell bonds after they have borrowed heavily to finance property and infrastructure projects. According to the International Monetary Fund, the total debt associated with LGFVs has exploded to almost $10 trillion.

This red ink is as much a political problem as a financial one. Chinese LGFVs have $790 billion worth of bonds coming due this year, and another $70 billion of offshore debt will have matured by 2025. Land sales to developers have long been local governments’ principal revenue source. But with these tanking, officials are being forced to slash salaries, pensions, services, and health care in order to service debts.

These cuts have provoked demonstrations in several cities – and it isn’t only workers and pensioners who are upset. China’s burgeoning middle class bet big on real estate in recent years, giving the country a homeownership rate of nearly 90%. But now the property sector’s turmoil is hitting them hard. With 70% of Chinese household wealth tied up in property, owners have seen their nest eggs shrink.

In response, the Chinese government once again eased credit to stimulate the real-estate market last November, and by January, home prices had ended a 16-month decline. But potential buyers remain wary. There is still a massive backlog of unfinished projects, and everyone remembers the large protests last year by would-be homeowners who had taken out up-front mortgages on homes that may never be built. More stalled projects and flagging sales already bode ill for 2023.

To be sure, like other short- and long-term domestic challenges facing China – from growing youth unemployment to a shrinking labor force – property-sector woes are not an immediate threat to Xi’s rule or the Communist Party of China’s power. But they do obviously pose problems for his agenda, both foreign and domestic. Following the massive protests against the zero-COVID policy late last year, Chinese officials are well aware of the political risks. Under Xi, the CPC is expanding its presence in China’s government ministries as well as business boardrooms, and a raft of reforms has tightened access to officials and information.

In short, the IC’s otherwise well-presented unclassified annual assessment should have dug deeper. Congress and the public deserve to hear its best insights into the problems facing Xi’s regime. As we all know by now, what happens in China does not stay in China.

KENT HARRINGTON

Writing for PS since 2015

36 Commentaries

Kent Harrington, a former senior CIA analyst, served as national intelligence officer for East Asia, chief of station in Asia, and the CIA’s director of public affairs.

12. Putin and Xi must be taught the lessons Hitler and Mussolini learned the hard way

Excerpts:

Like Hitler and Mussolini, Putin and Xi are kindred spirits in brutality and the inhuman treatment of people under their control — their meeting in Moscow could well be called the Genocide Summit. But, aside from “sanitizing” Putin and ending his near-total international isolation, Xi could demonstrate more overt support for his war in Ukraine by supplying “lethal” weapons, some observers worry.

China already has significantly softened the impact of Western sanctions on Russia by increasing its purchase of Russian oil and gas by orders of magnitude, a circumvention that the West tolerates. Washington and other capitals also indulge China’s supply of small arms and dual-use technology that can be integrated into Russia’s military arsenal. Those willing oversights and the deliberate slow-walking of more potent weapons systems to Ukraine inexcusably prolong the war and Ukraine’s suffering.

It also extends the potential drain of Western weapons, resources and attention away from the Indo-Pacific arena, where China awaits the opportunity to pounce on Taiwan, Japan and other American allies and partners.

The answer to that challenge, however, is not to deprive Ukraine of all it needs, as fast as it needs it, to defeat Russia. Instead, the Biden administration should make explicit and official what the president has casually said four times — that the United States will directly come to Taiwan’s defense. Scrapping the longstanding policy of strategic ambiguity is the safest way to deter China’s aggression.

If Hitler and Mussolini — and Putin — had known the fate that awaited them, they might well have tamed their aggressive urges. Xi still has time to learn that lesson, if a resolute West is prepared to teach it.

Putin and Xi must be taught the lessons Hitler and Mussolini learned the hard way

BY JOSEPH BOSCO, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 03/21/23 10:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3909219-putin-and-xi-must-be-taught-the-lessons-hitler-and-mussolini-learned-the-hard-way/

In the 1930s, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini met several times in each other’s countries to pledge their unified opposition to the post-World War I liberal international order. The two dictators committed Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy to a “common destiny”: to create “a New Order” in Europe, an “axis” around which the fate of the continent would revolve.

Undeterred by the West, they then unleashed the horrors of World War II.

Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, today’s most threatening world leaders, have also engaged in a series of exchange visits, the latest of which is happening this week with Xi’s visit to Moscow. It is a fitting bookend to Putin’s meeting with Xi for the opening of the Beijing Olympics, where the two dictators announced their “no-limits strategic partnership” and effectively declared another cold war against the United States and its democratic allies and partners.

Like Hitler and Mussolini almost a century ago, Putin and Xi detest the rules-based international system that has brought stability, peace and economic progress to much of the world. But the system also espouses a regime of democracy and human rights that is anathema to totalitarian despots who lust for total power over repressed populations and seek to extend their control over the people of neighboring countries.

Within weeks of their statement of mutual support in February 2022, Putin unleashed the largest, most destructive war in Europe since Hitler’s rampages across the continent, repeating what the Nuremberg Tribunal labeled as Nazi Germany’s first war crime: a war of aggression.

In the course of Russia’s own latest aggression — after the invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 — Putin’s forces have perpetrated a daily terror of war crimes and crimes against humanity: indiscriminate killing of civilians; torture, rape and kidnapping of women and children; and targeted bombings of hospitals, schools, theaters, government buildings, crops, energy infrastructure, etc.

For those and other atrocities, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine reported to the United Nations General Assembly last October that a range of war crimes and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have been committed in areas of Ukraine occupied by Russian forces: “The impact of these violations on the civilian population in Ukraine is immense. The loss of lives is in the thousands. The destruction of infrastructure is devastating.” The situation has only grown worse in the six months since the report.

Last week, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Putin and Maria Levova-Belova, his Commissioner for Children’s Rights in Russia, for the crimes of kidnapping Ukrainian children and deporting them to Russia for adoption, where forced “Russification” can be carried out unseen by the outside world. It is Putin’s own version of cultural genocide. To show his disdain for these findings by impartial international observers, Putin immediately paid a visit to the site that endured the first of his crimes against civilian population and infrastructure: Mariupol in southern Ukraine.

Xi’s visit to Moscow this week is intended to lend political and “moral” support to Putin, the accused war criminal, who has become an international pariah for the extensive atrocities committed by his forces in Ukraine. But it should be no surprise that Xi does not recoil at smiling, supping and shaking hands with this mass murderer. After all, Xi heads a communist regime that systematically subjugates and imprisons Uyghurs in Xinjiang — seizing the men and impressing them into forced labor, dispatching Chinese soldiers to cohabit with the women and produce Sinicized babies, desecrating their families and their faith, attempting to erase every vestige of Uyghur or Muslim identity.

The United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights issued a report in August 2022, finding “allegations of patterns of torture, or ill-treatment, including forced medical treatment and adverse conditions of detention are credible, as are allegations of individual incidents of sexual and gender-based violence.” It concluded that “genocide and crimes against humanity” took place over the course of the past year.

Then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, speaking for the Trump administration in 2021, condemned the “decades-long campaign of repression against Uyghur Muslims and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups, including ethnic Kazakhs and ethnic Kyrgyz.”

The statement detailed the abuses and their sinister purpose: “Their morally repugnant, wholesale policies, practices and abuses are designed systematically to discriminate against and surveil ethnic Uyghurs as a unique demographic and ethnic group, restrict their freedom to travel, emigrate and attend schools, and deny other basic human rights of assembly, speech and worship. [People’s Republic of China] authorities have conducted forced sterilizations and abortions on Uyghur women, coerced them to marry non-Uyghurs, and separated Uyghur children from their families.”

Pompeo invoked the Nazi precedent against Xi’s regime: “The Nuremberg Tribunals at the end of World War II prosecuted perpetrators for crimes against humanity, the same crimes being perpetrated in Xinjiang.”

Secretary of State Antony Blinken of the Biden administration has criticized Beijing’s obstruction of a fair investigation by the Human Rights Commissioner and declared his own finding that “genocide and crimes against humanity are ongoing” in Xinjiang Province.

Like Hitler and Mussolini, Putin and Xi are kindred spirits in brutality and the inhuman treatment of people under their control — their meeting in Moscow could well be called the Genocide Summit. But, aside from “sanitizing” Putin and ending his near-total international isolation, Xi could demonstrate more overt support for his war in Ukraine by supplying “lethal” weapons, some observers worry.

China already has significantly softened the impact of Western sanctions on Russia by increasing its purchase of Russian oil and gas by orders of magnitude, a circumvention that the West tolerates. Washington and other capitals also indulge China’s supply of small arms and dual-use technology that can be integrated into Russia’s military arsenal. Those willing oversights and the deliberate slow-walking of more potent weapons systems to Ukraine inexcusably prolong the war and Ukraine’s suffering.

It also extends the potential drain of Western weapons, resources and attention away from the Indo-Pacific arena, where China awaits the opportunity to pounce on Taiwan, Japan and other American allies and partners.

The answer to that challenge, however, is not to deprive Ukraine of all it needs, as fast as it needs it, to defeat Russia. Instead, the Biden administration should make explicit and official what the president has casually said four times — that the United States will directly come to Taiwan’s defense. Scrapping the longstanding policy of strategic ambiguity is the safest way to deter China’s aggression.

If Hitler and Mussolini — and Putin — had known the fate that awaited them, they might well have tamed their aggressive urges. Xi still has time to learn that lesson, if a resolute West is prepared to teach it.

Joseph Bosco served as China country director for the secretary of Defense from 2005 to 2006 and as Asia-Pacific director of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from 2009 to 2010. He served in the Pentagon when Vladimir Putin invaded Georgia and was involved in Department of Defense discussions about the U.S. response. Follow him on Twitter @BoscoJosephA.

13. ‘Woke-ism’ Not an Issue, Top Military Leaders Say

For those unfamiliar with the term I have pasted the Merrium Webster definition (with descriptive quotes) of the word "woke" below the article.

At the risk of blowback I offer my thoughts on being "woke:"

Do you respect the dignity of all human beings?

Do you accept that all people have the right to be free, deserving of liberty and justice?

If so, then you are "woke"

‘Woke-ism’ Not an Issue, Top Military Leaders Say

Inclusion is actually a critical part of unit cohesion, Air Force chief and Marine commandant said.

defenseone.com · by Audrey Decker

Top military leaders say there is no evidence that diversity policies have harmed recruiting or readiness, and that troops and recruits actually value inclusion—despite repeated criticism of so-called “woke” policies by right-wing politicians.

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. C.Q. Brown and Marine Commandant Gen. David Berger both commented on the issue in exclusive interviews with Defense One as part of the annual State of Defense series.

Brown said the Air Force is building a team for every service member—“no matter their background.”

Conservative lawmakers have argued that “woke-ism” is causing the military’s recent recruiting woes. The House Armed Services Committee is holding a hearing Thursday to question military officials on the impact of diversity, equity, and inclusion policies on the “readiness, lethality, and cohesion of the military forces.”

But airmen need to feel comfortable that they’re part of an organization that cares about them, Brown told Defense One.

Woke-ism ‘Not a Factor’ in the Marine Corps, Commandant Says

“What I will tell you is when people join our military, they want to look around and see somebody who looks like them. They want to be part of a team [and] feel like they're included,” Brown said. “They don't want to join something that they feel like you're put as an outcast.”

To address the Air Force’s recruiting challenges, current service members need to build relationships with younger generations to share the “tremendous opportunities” that military service provides, Brown said.

Berger said he’s seen “zero evidence” that diversity policies have detracted from the Corps’ warfighting focus and in fact, a feeling of belonging is inextricably tied to readiness.

Echoing Brown’s comments, Berger said that building a “cohesive” team is a part of preparing a unit for combat.

If there was real concern over progressive policies in the military, Berger said that Marines would leave the Corps—but “that’s not the case at all.”

“Retention last year exceeded our goals this year, way in front of last year, so just the opposite has happened. People want to stay in the Marine Corps, so I don't see any evidence of that,” Berger said.

defenseone.com · by Audrey Decker

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/woke

woke

1 of 2

adjective

ˈwōk

woker; wokest

Synonyms of woke

chiefly US slang

: aware of and actively attentive to important societal facts and issues (especially issues of racial and social justice)

But we will only succeed if we reject the growing pressure to retreat into cynicism and hopelessness. … We have a moral obligation to "stay woke," take a stand and be active; challenging injustices and racism in our communities and fighting hatred and discrimination wherever it rises.

—Barbara Lee

… argued that … Brad Pitt is not only woke, but the wokest man in Hollywood … because he uses his status—and his production company Plan B—to create space for artists of color, with such films as 12 Years a Slave, Selma, and the upcoming film Moonlight.

—Giselle Defares

Being woke to gender discrimination is difficult; it ruins things you love. Entire canons of art are rotten to the core with it.

—Rachel Edelstein

—often used in contexts that suggest someone's expressed beliefs about such matters are not backed with genuine concern or action

There is never really a moment where a person of color doesn’t have to deal with discrimination, whether it be veiled and passive or as blunt as possible. So, woke white people, why can’t you step in?

—Lauren Sanchez

Enter the age of the performatively woke brand. Politics has become a kind of fashion accessory for corporate America these days, a way to profit from protest.

—Jon Gingerich

"Fake woke" behavior arises. We put the hashtags on our social media. #Sayhername, #icantbreathe, #blacklivesmatter. And repeat. The problem is that the level of concern we express online doesn’t match the everyday behavior we exhibit.

—Surayya Walters

also : reflecting the attitudes of woke people

woke values/language

In our newly woke times, there has been increased scrutiny of old films dealing with sensitive subjects.

—Hannah Jane Parkinson

He wants to make The Wombles more "woke" so the characters are gender-fluid or of different races.

—Liz Perkins

disapproving : politically liberal (as in matters of racial and social justice) especially in a way that is considered unreasonable or extreme

The national conservatives view today’s liberals as woke cultural warriors who pose an existential threat to the nation and its traditions.

—Shadi Hamid

He’s built a social media brand on the right railing against "woke liberals" and supporting former President Donald Trump.

—Marissa Martinez

The military is struggling to find new recruits to fill its ranks. … While the official reasons given by the military—including fewer face-to-face recruitments during the pandemic, and fewer young people who meet the physical standards required—likely play a role, some say it’s because the military is too "woke," turning off its normal constituency of young, conservative recruits.

—Suzanne Bates

If there is any hope, it’s that voters are rejecting woke green goals. Already this has occurred in Sweden and Italy, where voters threw out left-wing governments …

—Michael Shellenberger

'Woke capitalism' tends to be a term that critics use to refer to … portfolios that are built around environmental, social and governance issues like climate change or diversity.

—Victor Reklaitis

14. Chinese ‘spy’ who claimed he undermined Hong Kong protest movement facing deportation from Australia over fraud claims

Chinese ‘spy’ who claimed he undermined Hong Kong protest movement facing deportation from Australia over fraud claims

By Cyril Ip South China Morning Post3 min

January 10, 2023

View Original

William Wang Liqiang made a series of explosive claims in an interview with Australian television. Photo: 60 Minutes Australia

A self-proclaimed Chinese spy who attracted global attention with a series of claims about China’s espionage activity is facing deportation from Australia after a panel ruled he was guilty of fraud.

William Wang Liqiang’s claims had led to the arrest of two Hong Kong executives in Taiwan before prosecutors found his claims to be baseless and dropped the charges.

The 32-year-old had requested political asylum in Australia, but the country’s Administrative Appeals Tribunal ruled that he had committed “serious fraud against an Australian citizen” Filip Shu Xin.

The tribunal questioned how it could “safely find that [Wang] was engaged in espionage activities” given his fraudulent activities. The home affairs department rejected his asylum application, meaning that he faces deportation back to mainland China, where he is also charged with fraud.

Wang’s former business associate Shu sued him for A$3 million (US$2 million) in 2020, leading to Wang’s assets being frozen by the New South Wales Supreme Court.

Shu claimed that Wang had persuaded him in 2018 to invest millions in a business which transports luxury cars from Germany to China, while offering a property in Shanghai, which he said he owned with his wife, as security.

The Shanghai police informed Shu in early 2019 that the couple “are not and never were the owners of the Shanghai property” and documents purporting to show their ownership were “fraudulent”. Shu said the couple had “failed, neglected and refused” to pay him the money he owed.

Wang left China months later and began claiming he had been a spy.

In an interview with the Australian television programme 60 Minutes, Wang claimed that he had been a secret Chinese operative for five years and had met China’s spy chief in Australia, who he said worked in the energy sector.

He has made various claims against Beijing to media outlets and provided a sworn statement outlining Beijing’s alleged covert operations to the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO).

Wang claimed that while in Hong Kong, he infiltrated universities, stole military intelligence and weapons, and undermined anti-government protests. He also said that he attempted to manipulate election results in Taiwan and embezzle public assets to undermine President Tsai Ing-wen’s administration.

He also claimed that he was involved in abducting Hong Kong bookseller Lam Wing-kee, who alleges that he was targeted by Chinese agents for selling politically sensitive books. However, Lam, who is now based in Taipei, said he does not recall meeting Wang and has reservations about his claims.

ABC also reported, citing government sources, that Wang claimed that Beijing had ordered overseas assassinations, including in Australia.

02:29

‘Chinese spy defector’ says he helped China’s interference in Hong Kong and Taiwan

China at the time called Wang’s allegations “absurd” and stated that he was a convicted fraudster who left mainland China using bogus travel documents. Chinese state media also published a video that appeared to show him admitting fraud during a 2016 trial.

All the individuals in Taiwan who Wang claimed were his associates or handlers were cleared after an investigation by the island’s authorities found no evidence to support his claims that a “spy network” existed.

Wong Yen-ching, former deputy director of Taiwan’s Military Intelligence Bureau, described his allegations as “falsified” and “an attempt to seek political asylum”.

Wang gave the Australian authorities the supposed identities of Beijing’s senior military intelligence officers in Hong Kong along with details of how they funded and conducted operations in the city, as well as in Taiwan and Australia.

“As I grew older and my worldview changed, I gradually realised the damage that the [Chinese Communist Party]’s authoritarianism was doing to democracy and human rights around the world,” Wang said at the time, adding that he “will be dead” if he returns home.

Wang, who has a tourist visa for Australia, is living in an undisclosed location in Sydney with his wife, who is currently studying, and their infant son.

Cyril Ip

Cyril Ip joined the Post in 2021 after graduating from the University of Bristol with a degree in Sociology, specialising in postcolonialism. He wrote opinions for Young Post between 2016 and 2020 and has interned at the Trade Development Council and the New People’s Party.

15. TikTok Reassures Advertisers Over Ban Threat as Some Set Backup Plans

I am a broken record. I have seen the same TokTok commercial a number of times today.

TikTok Reassures Advertisers Over Ban Threat as Some Set Backup Plans

Advertisers take wait-and-see approach after Biden administration demands that video app’s Chinese owners sell stakes

https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktok-reassures-advertisers-over-ban-threat-as-some-set-backup-plans-8c67e7db

By Patience HagginFollow

and Suzanne VranicaFollow

March 21, 2023 1:08 pm ET

TikTok has sought to reassure advertisers in recent days that the app is unlikely to be banned in the U.S., according to people familiar with the situation, as some companies begin to make contingency plans for their ad spending.

The Biden administration has raised national security concerns about TikTok and is demanding that its Chinese owners sell their stakes in the popular video-sharing app or face a possible ban, The Wall Street Journal reported. TikTok is owned by Beijing-based ByteDance Ltd.

The U.S., which is concerned about the app’s Chinese owners collecting data on American users and potentially influencing the app’s content, has been applying pressure on TikTok for some time. The latest move marked an escalation by the Biden administration.

In communications with ad executives in recent days, TikTok ad-sales staffers have played down the threat of an outright ban and sought to keep brands from cutting their spending, ad buyers said. The TikTok staffers have indicated they don’t think a ban will happen, the ad buyers said.

In a Friday email to an ad agency that had inquired about the uncertain situation, TikTok discussed the steps it has taken to secure user data, saying, “We are confident that we are on a path to fully satisfy all reasonable U.S. national security concerns.”

On Monday, TikTok sent an ad agency a link to an animated video that touts those data safeguards. The video, which includes images of American flags at various points, lays out how TikTok spent $1.5 billion on “security to prevent unauthorized foreign access to your data and the systems that deliver you content.”

The latest communications follow other moves by TikTok to reassure Madison Avenue in recent months as the U.S. has ratcheted up the pressure.

In a statement, a TikTok representative said the company has been working to engage marketers and agencies in “open, fact-based, and ongoing dialogue” about its efforts to build a trusted platform for users and brands.

TikTok is a big draw for advertisers because of the viral nature of its content and strong appeal with teens.

PHOTO: JANE HAHN FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

“If protecting national security is the objective, divestment doesn’t solve the problem: a change in ownership would not impose any new restrictions on data flows or access,” the statement said.

TikTok has become a big draw for advertisers, thanks to the viral nature of its content and strong appeal with teenagers. The app has been downloaded more than 4 billion times globally and was the most-downloaded app in 2022, according to research firm Sensor Tower Inc. More than 150 million Americans are now on TikTok, the company says.

The company is expected to have 2.5% of the U.S. digital ad market this year and its U.S. ad revenue is expected to surge 36% to $6.83 billion, according to market research firm Insider Intelligence.

Some of TikTok’s growth has come at the expense of Meta Platforms Inc. and Alphabet Inc.’s Google, which have ramped up their short-form video offerings. Google and Meta together are expected to capture almost 45% of U.S. digital-ad revenue this year, Insider Intelligence estimates.

Some brands have begun to prepare for a possible ban by coming up with contingency plans for their TikTok ad spending, several ad executives said.

Advertisers are looking to avoid any disruption to their business, said Diana DiGuido, chief client officer at marketing firm Tinuiti. Brands “can’t have any gaps in performance, so they are looking at where they can replicate the performance they are getting from TikTok,” if the app is banned, she said.

Watch: FBI Director Warns of TikTok Security Concerns During Senate Hearing

Are We Headed for World War III?

Students discuss the threat of China invading Taiwan, the war in Ukraine and polarizing domestic politics.

March 21, 2023 6:43 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/are-we-headed-for-world-war-iii-china-russia-iran-electrical-infrastructure-ukraine-foreign-policy-b1b42224?page=1

Editor’s note: In this Future View, students discuss World War III. Next week we’ll ask, “Are the liberal arts dead? The number of students majoring in the liberal arts has declined, and the question is why. Is it the takeover of liberal arts by politicized concerns? Is it a fading of belief in the importance of the classics of Western civilization? Or is it students more concerned with degrees that lead directly to jobs?” Students should click here to submit opinions of fewer than 250 words before March 28. The best responses will be published that night.

The War of Ideas

Whether it begins in the South China Sea or Eastern Europe, World War III feels more likely with each passing day. But what’s more concerning is the domestic war of ideas that would surely accompany it. During the Cold War, the stark contrast between the American way of life (individual liberty and free markets) and the Soviet system (political oppression and state control of the economy) made it easy for Americans to rally around our ideals and oppose our enemy. The same can be said about our national attitude toward Hitler’s Germany and Imperial Japan.

But that dynamic doesn’t apply to America today, as the public debates whether such ideas as free markets, limited government and individual liberty are even worth defending. Any chance we have of defeating Vladimir Putin’s Russia or Xi Jinping’s China in the next world war will depend on a national consensus that our ideas are better than theirs. It’s hard to imagine such unity happening anytime soon.

Still, most Americans are rallying for a free Ukraine and learning about China’s oppression of its own people through increased news coverage. The national attitude toward our potential enemies is shifting in the right direction. But without a stronger national understanding of what makes America good, we’ll lack the domestic unity necessary to put up a winning fight.

—Trevor Kiefer, Chapman University, law

We’ve Predicted Wars Before, and We Were Wrong

It doesn’t take much for Americans to deem a conflict the next World War. When U.S. forces assassinated Iran’s Gen. Qasem Soleimani in January 2020, people were quick to tweet “#WW3” and speculate about nuclear fallout. Months later, the question went viral again surrounding China-India border tensions.

Nowadays, most Americans have forgotten these events even happened. Which raises the question: Why are we so obsessed with identifying the next global conflict, and why are we consistently wrong? Since World War II, the military-entertainment complex has become embedded into our cultural narrative. From films such as “Top Gun” to videogames such as “Call of Duty,” Americans aren’t merely desensitized to warfare—we pay top dollar to be enamored of it.

Our fascination with war motivates us to speculate its emergence. In discussing a third World War, however, Americans perpetuate two misguided assumptions: that World War I and World War II are history’s only world wars, and that our next global war will mirror warfare from 80 years ago.

The next major global conflict won’t be fought with trench warfare, blitzkrieg or other familiar mechanisms from other world wars. It will be fought—or averted—with cyber tactics and economic sanctions.

—Meredith Perkins, Miami University, diplomacy and global politics

There Will Be No War

As America comes to terms with no longer being the world’s only superpower, Washington has taken steps to ensure it can maintain its hegemony and support of liberalism across the globe. But that recognition itself is crucial and ultimately suggests that a third world war won’t happen.

Why? With a rising China, who is to say the U.S. wants to engage in—much less win—a war with another superpower? Instead, the U.S. will likely seek proxy wars to maintain its power, while attempting to balance its other international commitments, such as the war in Ukraine. That there is no political will for the U.S. to get involved in war on a global scale counsels in favor of this thesis, never mind politicians’ claims to the contrary.

While World War III is unlikely, the alternative may not be much better, especially with the nation’s own domestic political situation intensifying over a range of cultural and social issues. Instead, America should focus inward and care for its own internal needs first.

—William Benson, the Catholic University of America, politics

The Chinese Computational War

I fear World War III will happen soon and believe its consequences could be far more disruptive than most Americans expect. Toughness on China has enduring and broad political appeal in the U.S., and Xi Jinping has grown increasingly aggressive toward Taiwan, South Korea and Japan. If China attacks the territory of our Pacific allies, the U.S. is sure to intervene.

But my biggest concern isn’t the possibility of conventional war; it’s that if China begins losing, it might escalate by wreaking global havoc on civilian space and electrical infrastructure. For decades, China has been perfecting antisatellite missiles, culminating in a 2007 test strike on a satellite that resulted in one of the largest creations of space debris ever. In conflict, such strikes could destroy most normal satellites, leading to the loss of GPS, telecommunications, instant online financial transactions and other critical infrastructure that could cripple the American economy and quality of life.

China has also developed electromagnetic weapons that could knock out power grids across America and allied countries, causing long-term blackouts. Without functioning power grids, stocking grocery-store shelves and keeping gasoline flowing to stations become monumental tasks. Even a scaled-down version of these attacks could disrupt the lives of citizens thousands of miles from the frontline. Given the U.S.’s military superiority, China can win only with these unconventional tactics, making the war about computational power.

—Lucas Moyon, College of Charleston, economics, physics and astronomy

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17. Chinese Pressure Tactics Against Other Countries Largely Ineffective, Study Finds

Seems like a good assessment.

We need to listen to Bonaparte: "Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake."

Maybe we should not try so hard at this competition thing (note slight attempt at sarcasm).

Excerpts:

“Chinese coercion is not just largely ineffective, but it creates long-term strategic costs for China,” said Matthew Reynolds, a fellow at the Washington think tank who co-wrote the report.

The study examined what it describes as China’s use of coercive tactics against eight countries since 2010, including Japan, Norway, the Philippines, Mongolia, South Korea, Australia, Canada and Lithuania, following moves taken by these governments that China viewed as having challenged its territorial claims, security or positions on other issues.

Chinese Pressure Tactics Against Other Countries Largely Ineffective, Study Finds

Trade restrictions sometimes produce the opposite of what Beijing wants, says Washington think tank

By Lingling WeiFollow

March 21, 2023 11:19 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-pressure-tactics-against-other-countries-largely-ineffective-study-finds-3f49561f?page=1

Chinese trade restrictions and other punitive measures against countries seen as offending its interests have a poor record of getting Beijing the outcome it wants, a new study finds.

In some cases, according to the study, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies on Tuesday, the strategy has produced the opposite of what China has sought by driving countries closer to the U.S., the biggest threat seen by the Chinese leadership to its national interests.

“Chinese coercion is not just largely ineffective, but it creates long-term strategic costs for China,” said Matthew Reynolds, a fellow at the Washington think tank who co-wrote the report.

The study examined what it describes as China’s use of coercive tactics against eight countries since 2010, including Japan, Norway, the Philippines, Mongolia, South Korea, Australia, Canada and Lithuania, following moves taken by these governments that China viewed as having challenged its territorial claims, security or positions on other issues.

For instance, Beijing took umbrage at Canberra’s call in 2020 for an investigation into the origin of Covid-19 and slammed tariffs on Australian wines. In 2021, in response to the strengthening of relations between Lithuania and Taiwan, which Beijing regards as its own territory, China stopped providing permits for Lithuanian food imports and made it difficult for Lithuanian firms to renew and close contracts in China.

While China’s actions have inflicted pain on certain companies or sectors in those countries, the study says, Beijing has proven unsuccessful in getting their governments to reverse course in their China policy and instead has given some of them political cover to be tougher on China.

In 2016, for example, soon after Seoul approved deployment of the U.S. missile-defense system known as Thaad to guard against the North Korean threat, China expressed concerns about the system’s potential impact on its national security. China then closed almost all stores owned by Korean conglomerate Lotte Group and suspended subsidies for electric vehicles powered by Korean-produced batteries.

China’s Global Peacemaker Ambitions Put It in Competition With U.S.

Warsaw’s secret war against Moscow’s spies: Poland’s intelligence services have gone into overdrive to combat Putin’s covert assault

thefirstnews.com

The arrest this week of a spy network in Poland is just the latest in the country’s secret war against Russian intelligence since Putin’s troops attacked Ukraine. ABW

Sitting on the border of war-torn Ukraine, in the shadowy world of espionage Poland is fighting a secret war against Russian aggression.

Openly supplying President Zelensky’s soldiers with weapons and firepower, in the cloak and dagger world, Warsaw is covertly battling Moscow’s increasingly aggressive subterfuge.

The arrest last week of a spy network in Poland is just the latest in the country’s secret war against Russian intelligence since Putin’s troops invaded Ukraine.

The nine people were seized after agents from Poland’s Internal Security Agency, the ABW, found hidden cameras recording important railway routes for transferring weapons and ammunition to Ukraine.

Captured while secretly monitoring the shipments, according to Polish authorities, the spies were preparing to ‘paralyse the deliveries’, destabilise Polish-Ukrainian relations, incite hostility towards Nato countries in Poland, and attack the policies of the Polish government towards Ukraine.

The hidden cameras were found near the small Rzeszow-Jasionka airport, less than 50 miles from Ukraine's border.Gov.pl

Poland’s interior minister Mariusz Kamiński said: “The suspects had been conducting intelligence operations against Poland and preparing acts of sabotage ordered by Russian intelligence.

“The suspects had been getting ready to carry out sabotage operations designed to paralyse deliveries of equipment and weapons, as well as humanitarian aid to Ukraine.’

He added that ABW agents had seized cameras, electronic equipment and GPS transmitters which were to be installed on aid transports going to Ukraine.

Kamiński said: “The ABW has at its disposal evidence confirming that the suspects had been receiving payments from the Russian secret services.”

The hidden cameras were found near the small Rzeszow-Jasionka airport, less than 50 miles from Ukraine's border.

Since the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the airport has become one of the most important places for transferring Western weapons and ammunition.Rzeszow-Jasionka/Facebook

Since the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the airport has become one of the most important places for transferring Western weapons and ammunition.

The arrests come as the decade’s-old spy conflict between Russia and Poland has intensified since Moscow’s attack on Ukraine.

A few weeks ago, Poland’s security service minister Stanislaw Żaryn warned of Russia’s increasingly aggressive intelligence activities.

Revealing that nine other people suspected of collaborating with Russian and Belarusian services had been ‘detained in recent months’ he said: “Russia is looking for new opportunities to act against Poland.

“We are dealing with attempts to obtain sensitive information, including photographing credit cards or browsing the private telephones of Poles.

“All this is used to collect data on what is happening in Poland and what movements our troops are making.”

In January, it was revealed that two men from Russia and Belarus had been seized by Poland’s Military Counterintelligence Service on charges of spying for Russia’s GRU between 2015 and 2022.

Arrested in April last year, the Belarusian sleeper agent is said to have studied at university in the Polish city of Białystok before becoming a parachute trainer.

The day before the announcement that 45 Russian diplomats were being expelled from Poland for being spies, smoke was seen rising from the Russian embassy in Warsaw leading to speculation that staff there were burning secret documents.Twitter

According to prosecutors, the contacts he made were then ‘used in his activities for the Russian military intelligence.’

The Russian, who was a member of historical reconstruction groups and lived in Poland for 18 years, is accused of using his contacts with Polish military personnel to help Russian intelligence.

Prosecutor spokeswoman Aleksandra Skrzyniarz said: “They carried out tasks consisting of identifying important elements of the Polish Armed Forces and obtaining information, in particular in the area of carrying out tasks by soldiers of the Polish Army in the area of the state border with Belarus.”

She added they had also been monitoring the number of “soldiers performing tasks in the region of the border and the structure of subunits, the use of specialist equipment by the Polish Armed Forces, the state of morale and operational capabilities, [and] the cooperation of military units stationed in north-eastern Poland with the troops of other NATO countries.”

The spying activity also involved obtaining information about the combat capability, morale and functioning of units, “including in times of danger, and then transferring the obtained information to the GRU intelligence service.”

Both men are still in custody.

A month after Russia’s invasion, Warsaw expelled 45 ‘Russian spies pretending to be diplomats’ and arrested another man suspected of espionage.

Security services minister, Stanisław Żaryn, said at the time that: “Forty-five individuals…Russian secret services officers and persons related to them enjoying diplomatic status in Poland were expelled.”

In January, it was revealed that two men from Russia and Belarus had been seized by Poland’s Military Counterintelligence Service (SKW), on charges of spying for Russia’s GRU between 2015 and 2022. (Illustration photo).PAP

Accused of actions ‘designed to undermine the stability of Poland and its allies in the international arena and pose a threat to the interests and security of our country,’ interior minister Mariusz Kamiński added: “With full consistency and determination, we are breaking up the intelligence operations of the Russian secret services in our country.”

He added: “They were spies posing as cultural attaches or consular employees who were in fact seeking to recruit agents and transmit information back to Moscow.

“They were spies pretending to be diplomats.”

The day before the announcement, smoke was seen rising from the Russian embassy in Warsaw leading to speculation that staff there were burning secret documents.

Posting a photo on Twitter, the OSINTdefender account said: “Smoke can be seen coming from the Russian Embassy in the Polish Capital City of Warsaw, there are claims that Russian Diplomats are burning documents, the same thing was done at the Russian Embassy in the Ukrainian Capital City of Kyiv right before the Invasion of February 24th.

“This does not mean that Russian is Preparing to Invade Poland but it may be a sign that Russian Diplomats may be Preparing to leave the Country for some reason.”

The next day Żaryn revealed that one of the alleged Russian spies was discovered after a Polish man was detained the week before on suspicion of ‘conducting espionage on behalf of Russia.’

The man worked as an archivist in Warsaw’s registry office which gave him access to documents that ‘posed a threat to both the internal and the external security of Poland.’

Following the most recent arrests, Poland’s security service is now said to be searching for more cameras and GPS transmitters. Pictured: ABW HQ in Warsaw.Jacek Turczyk/PAP

He is suspected of providing copies of documents to Russian intelligence and of performing checks on specific people, including foreigners living in Poland.

According to Polish Radio Zet, the man had worked at Warsaw’s registry office since 2005.

Following the most recent arrests, Poland’s security services are now said to be searching for more cameras and GPS transmitters.

According to Polish radio RMF FM, this includes viaducts and and bridges on key routes leading to border crossing points with Ukraine as well as the eastern section of the A4 motorway in Podkarpacie.

On Monday, Żaryn said the nine suspects had not been operating for long in Poland.

He told the Polish Press Agency that the ABW had "found their trail sufficiently early to neutralise the greatest threat.

"For sure we are not dealing with an operation lasting since the start of the war, it started recently.

"We do not rule out that further arrests will be necessary because we are aware that the evidence in this case is huge; we are still analysing it and we will see where it leads the (security) services investigating the case.

Former spy chief Grzegorz Małecki has called on people living in Poland to invoke ‘Britain’s WWII spirit’ and stay alert for spies and saboteurs working for Russia.CC BY-SA 4.0

”Certainly we are not treating this investigation as closed.”

Meanwhile, a former spy chief has called on people living in Poland to invoke ‘Britain’s WWII spirit’ and stay alert for spies and saboteurs working for Russia.

Grzegorz Małecki who was head of Poland’s Foreign Intelligence Agency, said that Poland was facing an increasing risk of ‘sleeper agents’ carrying out ‘acts of sabotage’.

The 55-year-old told Fast newspaper: ‘We can't put a policeman everywhere, because we don't have so many of them, but we have to count on the fact that every person concerned about the appearance of a stranger in their neighbourhood who behaves strangely, will react, pick up the phone and notify the services.

‘It's an old, proven way.

‘It was the basis of the British system that enabled the capture of German spies landing in the British Isles during World War II.

‘At the right moment, they were brought to the state authorities, and thanks to this, a very efficient system was created, which in turn allowed them to win the war.

‘All thanks to the participation of the public.’

thefirstnews.com

19. US F-22s land in Philippines for first time, furthering defense ties

Maybe we can turn the Philippines into an F-22 base. (attempt at humor - but it surely could be an advanced staging base in contingencies especially if we develop multiple airfields).

US F-22s land in Philippines for first time, furthering defense ties

militarytimes.com · by Zamone Perez · March 21, 2023

Two U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptors landed at Clark Air Base in the Philippines last week in a move signaling increased defense efforts between the two countries.

During the exercise, U.S. pilots from the Alaska-based 525th Fighter Squadron joined aviators from the Philippine Air Force’s 5th Fighter Wing for low-altitude flyovers, air combat maneuvering, formation training, and, with help from a KC-135 Stratotanker, air-to-air refueling over the heavily contested South China Sea.

“This was the first time that F-22s, or any fifth-generation aircraft, have landed on and operated out of the Philippines,” Capt. Karl Schroeder, one of the Raptor pilots, said in a release. “This milestone with a regional ally aids in providing stability and security to the Indo-Pacific.”

Regional stability has become an increasingly glaring focus of the two militaries as threats continue to emerge out of Beijing. While the Philippine Constitution prohibits permanent basing of foreign troops, the two nations’ Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement does allow for an increased footprint of American forces by way of rotations to a handful of predetermined locations.

“The EDCA is a key pillar of the U.S.-Philippines alliance, which supports combined training, exercises, and interoperability between our forces,” DoD officials said in February. “Expansion of the EDCA will make our alliance stronger and more resilient, and will accelerate modernization of our combined military capabilities.”

The EDCA includes granting U.S. forces access to a number of military camps, one of which, Basa Air Base in Pampanga on the island of Luzon, just launched a $25 million renovation of its runway in preparation to be used as a hub for joint task force exercises and humanitarian assistance, USNI news first reported.

Four other identified sites currently slated to host U.S. rotations are Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base (Cebu), Antonio Bautista Air Base (Palawan), Fort Magsaysay (Nueva Ecija), and Lumbia Air Base (Cagayan de Oro). Additional locations that have not yet been identified are expected to be unveiled in the near future.

In a separate step toward countering Chinese aggression and propaganda, the Philippine Coast Guard announced on March 8 that it would begin publicly disclosing aggressive actions taken by China in the South China Sea.

Recently released footage depicted one such incident on Feb. 6, during which a ship belonging to the China Coast Guard aimed a military laser at a Philippine vessel, briefly blinding some crew members.

The string of announcements in recent months follows a period of tension between the U.S. and the Philippines, when former Phillipine President Rodrigo Duterte threatened to sever military relations with Washington and cozy up to China and Russia. Duterte’s successor, Ferdinand Marcos, has worked to thaw relations, even hosting Vice President Kamala Harris in November.

About Zamone Perez and Jon Simkins

Zamone “Z” Perez is a rapid response reporter and podcast producer at Defense News and Military Times. He previously worked at Foreign Policy and Ufahamu Africa. He is a graduate of Northwestern University, where he researched international ethics and atrocity prevention in his thesis. He can be found on Twitter @zamoneperez.

Jon Simkins is a writer and editor for Military Times, and a USMC veteran.

20. TikTok lands first major ally on Capitol Hill: Democratic Rep. Jamaal Bowman

Perhaps he is going for the TikTok vote. With 150 million American users perhaps he could get enough votes to win a presidential election.

TikTok lands first major ally on Capitol Hill: Democratic Rep. Jamaal Bowman

Bowman, of New York, is defending the app, rejecting efforts to ban TikTok as "ill-advised" and part of a "fearmongering" campaign with undertones of "xenophobia" around China.

NBC News · by Sahil Kapur

WASHINGTON — For an app that boasts 150 million American users, TikTok has had virtually no allies on Capitol Hill to fight back against the growing movement to ban it. That appears to be changing.

The Chinese-owned platform has won over Rep. Jamaal Bowman, a New York Democrat, who is scheduled to host a press conference Wednesday at the Capitol alongside dozens of TikTok content creators to make the case for protecting the app in the U.S.

In an interview Tuesday, Bowman staunchly defended TikTok and denounced legislation to ban the app, rejecting arguments about its dangers as “fearmongering” and saying he hasn’t seen evidence that China is using it for espionage.

“This is a space where these creators have found a platform to share their ideas, their inspirations, their thoughts, their voices with the rest of the country and the rest of the world. And why do we want to take that away?” Bowman told NBC News. “Why do we need to ban a platform that 150 million Americans now use?”

“There are many apps on our phones right now that are Chinese apps. And so the idea that, ‘Oh, TikTok is the boogeyman’ — it’s just part of a political fearmongering that’s happening,” said Bowman, who posts frequently on the video-sharing app and has a substantial following himself. He compared criticism of TikTok to Republican “fearmongering” about an “open border” and the debt limit, as well as “xenophobia around China.”

TikTok CEO to appear before Congress amid growing security concerns

March 20, 202304:18

“I haven’t seen any hard evidence that TikTok is committing some form of espionage,” he said. “What I’ve heard is speculation. And what I’ve heard is innuendo.”

The remarks make Bowman the most prominent ally of TikTok on Capitol Hill. And they come just days before TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew is scheduled to testify before the House Energy and Commerce Committee in what is likely to be a contentious hearing on Thursday morning. Chew will make his first appearance on Capitol Hill as the company has fallen behind the eight-ball in Washington and scrambles to stave off a potential ban.

Critics in both political parties say the app presents risks to national security and data privacy as it is effectively controlled by the Chinese government, at a time of rising global tensions between the U.S. and China.

Bowman and the TikTok users will be joined at the press conference by Rep. Mark Pocan, D-Wis., whose office said he plans to attend.

“We appreciate the support of these members of Congress, and we will remain steadfast in our commitment to building a safe, secure, and innovative platform that our community of 1 billion strong have come to know us for,” TikTok spokesperson Jamal Brown said.

Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., the chair of the Intelligence Committee, rejected the argument that Americans' data on TikTok can be made safe from potential spying by China, saying it “doesn’t pass the smell test” due to a law in China that obligates companies first and foremost to the Chinese Communist Party.

Warner told reporters Monday at a breakfast hosted by the Christian Science Monitor that he worries the app can be used for propaganda and manipulation. If it’s banned, he said, the market can produce a new product that isn’t controlled by an “authoritarian regime.”

Asked about Warner’s argument that a new app could replace TikTok, Bowman shot back, “I guess so. That could totally happen. Let’s shut down Facebook and force Mark Zuckerberg to create a new platform.”

“When we look at American companies like Facebook looking the other way in 2016 when Russia colluded to impact our election — Facebook is a national security risk. We’re not talking about a ban on Facebook,” Bowman said, calling it “ill-advised” to target TikTok.

Instead, Bowman called for broader regulations on social media companies that would “end big tech monopolies” and “give people a choice” immediately on a pop-up screen when they log on about whether or not their data can be shared.

In December, President Joe Biden signed a bipartisan bill to ban the app on government devices. More recently, he has endorsed a bill that would enable the administration to regulate or ban foreign-produced platforms. As NBC News reported last week, his administration is threatening to ban the app in the U.S., if the company's Chinese owners won't sell their stakes.

Bowman said that banning TikTok would present political dangers for Biden as he gears up for a re-election bid, too, citing the app's popularity with young voters, a group Biden and Democrats “already struggle with,” he said.

“I think the more we learn, the more you’ll see people stand up and defend TikTok,” the New York congressman said. “Let me say this: If information comes out that clearly shows TikTok as a problem, I will say I was wrong. I have no problem saying that. I just haven’t seen that information as of yet.”

NBC News · by Sahil Kapur

21. China’s Pressure on Taiwan: Nothing to See Here, Says Former Biden State Department Official

Quite a takedown of Professor Jessica Chen Weiss' Foreign Affairs article this week.

China’s Pressure on Taiwan: Nothing to See Here, Says Former Biden State Department Official

There is a word for such counsel — appeasement.

by FRANCIS P. SEMPA

March 22, 2023, 12:49 AM

https://spectator.org/chinas-pressure-on-taiwan-nothing-to-see-here-says-former-biden-state-department-official/

essica Chen Weiss, who served on the Biden State Department’s Policy Planning Staff until last July, has once again taken to the pages of Foreign Affairs to assure us that “[f]ears that China will soon invade Taiwan are overblown,” and are driven not by China’s rhetoric and conduct but rather by “Washington’s assessments of its own military vulnerabilities.” China’s foreign policy, she claims, has “moderated” due to internal problems. This China “expert” warns that Western policymakers who “exaggerate the risk of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan” may produce the very thing they are trying to prevent.

Weiss, who is currently a professor at Cornell University and a senior fellow at the Asia Society’s Policy Institute’s Center for China analysis, calls upon the United States to reduce tensions, avoid needless confrontation with China, and to “thread the needle between deterrence and provocation.” And what she labels as provocative are “symbolic displays of resolve, unconditional commitments to defend Taiwan, and pledges of a surge in U.S. military power in the region.” Weiss even suggests that authoritarian leaders like President Xi Jinping are less likely than democratic leaders to initiate crises to divert the attention of their populations from domestic problems. She takes comfort in President Xi Jinping’s remarks to the CCP’s 20th Party Congress that “the wheels of history are rolling toward China’s reunification.”

The United States, she advises, should not mistake heated rhetoric from Chinese spokesmen or aggressive posturing in the South China Sea for CCP preparations for war because China’s leaders have told us that “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan is their “first choice.” And she cautions U.S. policymakers that denying the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Navy (PLAN) the ability to prevail in a war in the South China Sea is not “the only way to deter Beijing from … aggression.”

Weiss assures us that like in the United States, there are hawks and doves within China’s leadership, and the hawks, she writes, “appear to be less influential” than the doves — whom she acknowledges want to take Taiwan without fighting (as presumably Sun Tzu would have recommended). The fact that Chinese leaders are instructing the PLA to prepare for war over Taiwan, Weiss claims, is evidence that “they are uncertain about their ability to win.” There is “no evidence,” she writes, “that they are preparing for an imminent invasion.” That assessment differs somewhat from the U.S. Navy’s chief of naval operations, Michael Gilday, who warned in October that China could attack before 2024. And it also differs from Weiss’ former boss Secretary of State Antony Blinken who warned that “China was seeking unification with Taiwan on a ‘much faster timeline’ than previously thought.” To paraphrase Bill Clinton, it depends on what the meaning of the word “imminent” is. And perhaps China’s leaders are preparing for war because they intend on seizing Taiwan by force and don’t believe that the United States can or will stop them.

Beijing has told us in no uncertain terms that their goal is reunification with Taiwan, and that they are prepared to achieve it peacefully or by force. Weiss counsels her former employer — the Biden administration — to “assure” Beijing that we are not “bent on promoting Taiwan’s permanent separation or formal independence from China.” That we should not “refer to Taiwan as a country, ally, or strategic asset.” That we should not “attempt to sow discord or encourage regime change in China.” That we should not “provoke” China to attack Taiwan.

There is a word for such counsel — appeasement.

22. The Case for a Restrained Republican Foreign Policy

Conclusion:

Acknowledging that the United States faces real limits to its power does not mean accepting a broader narrative of American decline. To the contrary, adopting a more prudent foreign policy will ensure that U.S. power isn’t squandered and provide the means to guarantee the safety and prosperity of future generations of Americans. But if conservative policymakers deny reality and advocate the same failed policies that led the United States to where it is today, they will only guarantee American decline. Conservatives must demand better from their candidates and elected officials when it comes to foreign policy.

The Case for a Restrained Republican Foreign Policy

Conservatives Can’t Go Back to Ignoring the Limits of American Power

By Dan Caldwell

March 22, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Dan Caldwell · March 22, 2023

As the U.S. Republican presidential primary heats up, so too will the debate about the future of conservative American foreign policy. Although most of the declared and likely candidates will probably attempt to assume the mantle of “America first,” there are substantial differences among them on the question of what a conservative foreign policy should entail. Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley and former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo have indicated that they see continued military support for Ukraine as essential, for instance, whereas former U.S. President Donald Trump and Florida Governor Ron DeSantis have questioned the wisdom of becoming further entangled in a distant conflict that could ultimately land the United States in a shooting war with Russia.

A debate about Republican foreign policy could be healthy for the party and draw attention to important global issues that are often crowded out by pressing domestic concerns. But such a debate would be fruitless if conservative candidates used it as an excuse to pine for a return to caricatures of the foreign policies of former U.S. Presidents Ronald Reagan and Trump. It is no longer 1983, when Reagan correctly labeled the Soviet Union an “evil empire” and was able to oversee a relatively rapid military buildup to counter it. Nor is it 2016, when Trump won the presidency in part by righteously condemning the foreign policy failures of not just Democratic former presidents but also Republican ones.

Conservatives need to accept that the world has changed dramatically over the last seven years, to say nothing of the last 40. The United States faces much greater economic and military constraints today than it did at the end of the Cold War, and these constraints can’t be overcome through inauthentic optimism or sheer willpower. By its very nature, conservatism recognizes limits—whether of government, social progress, or human nature. A conservative foreign policy should accept that the United States exists in a world of limits and must behave accordingly.

THE WORLD AS IT IS

The United States is no longer an unrivaled power. It now has real competitors—China, in particular—and serious domestic economic challenges that necessitate difficult trade-offs in foreign policy. The U.S. national debt exceeds $31 trillion, and interest payments on that debt are on track to eclipse the overall defense budget. According to the Congressional Budget Office, high and rising federal debt obligations could seriously harm the U.S. economy, dampening private investment, accelerating inflation, and pushing interest rates higher. Conservatives should not forget that U.S. military strength is underwritten by U.S. economic strength and that neglecting the latter will weaken the former.

The U.S. military is also under strain. The United States has spent more than 20 years entangled in conflicts across the Middle East and Africa. The price of these wars has been steep. Thousands of American lives have been lost and more than $8 trillion has been squandered in the service of nation-building missions that did not make the United States safer or more prosperous. These conflicts have also worn down important military assets such as the B-1 bomber fleet, incentivized investments in systems such as the littoral combat ship (a surface vessel designed for missions near shore) that are not suited for combat with near-peer adversaries, and forced the United States to cut the size of the Air Force and the Navy in order to build a ground force to fight in strategic backwaters.

The war in Ukraine has exposed the weakness of the United States’ defense industrial base and called into question the military’s ability to sustain a protracted conventional conflict. By sending huge supplies of critical weapons systems to Ukraine, the United States has severely diminished its own inventories. And at current production levels, it will take years to replace the depleted stockpiles, much less fortify them for another major conflict. According to an analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, for instance, it will take at least five and a half years for the United States to replace the Javelin anti-tank missiles it has sent to Ukraine. It could take more than a decade to replace the Stinger missiles Washington has delivered—and the United States has already promised to send more to Taiwan.

By its very nature, conservatism recognizes limits—whether of government, social progress, or human nature.

In addition to economic and military constraints, conservative presidential hopefuls must consider political ones. Modern American conservatism has always included a strain that is wary of American interventionism, exemplified by figures such as Senator Robert Taft of Ohio and Patrick Buchannan. In recent years, and especially since the rise of Trump, this faction has grown much more influential. Polls show that conservative-leaning voters are significantly more skeptical of continuing aid to Ukraine than are liberal-leaning voters, for instance, and the only votes in the U.S. Congress against increasing aid to Ukraine or expanding NATO have come from conservative Republican lawmakers.

Even conservative institutions that have historically advocated a more muscular U.S. foreign policy have recently grown warier of intervention abroad. In May 2022, for instance, the traditionally hawkish Heritage Foundation came out in opposition to a $40 billion military and humanitarian aid bill for Ukraine. To be sure, many leaders of the Republican Party still want to maintain American global primacy, and for most voters, foreign policy remains an issue of only moderate importance. But for conservative politicians, it is clear that the political incentives—as small as they may be—have shifted when it comes to foreign policy.

In light of the economic, military, and political limitations their face, conservative candidates would do a disservice to their voters (and the country) if they reverted to the pre-2016 bipartisan foreign policy consensus or maintained the foreign policy of President Joe Biden. Instead, they should adopt a sober and realistic approach to foreign affairs that recognizes U.S. limits and prioritizes what is required to keep the United States safe and prosperous.

Trump’s “America first” foreign policy, which offered an alternative to the failed policies of the post–9/11 period, remains a useful starting point for any discussion about the future of conservative foreign policy. But conservatives should recognize that dramatic shifts—both in the United States and around the world—since 2016 necessitate far greater changes to U.S. foreign policy. Such changes will not be easy to implement. Trump’s foreign policy preferences were resisted not only by the career staff of the national security bureaucracy but also by many of his own appointees. For instance, Trump’s special representative for Syria, James Jeffrey, has admitted that he routinely misled the president about the number of U.S. troops in Syria in an effort to blunt his desire to withdraw from the country. Making even more substantial changes to American foreign policy than Trump did will require an abundance of qualified and ideologically aligned staff to fill key positions in the next conservative administration. It will also require personnel reforms that enable such appointees to fill more of the national security policymaking roles that are currently filled by career staff.

FREE RIDERS AND RECKLESS DRIVERS

The most important shift that is needed concerns U.S. policy toward Europe. By railing against European security free-riding and planning to withdraw thousands of U.S. troops from Germany, Trump created space on the right for a more fundamental rethinking of U.S. commitments to the continent. Conservatives should embrace policies that force Europeans to take primary responsibility for their own security. Russia’s military failures in Ukraine have revealed that its conventional armed forces are not a threat to well-funded and well-trained European armies—even without significant American support. A Russian army that cannot take Kyiv cannot take Warsaw, Berlin, or Paris.

The United States should therefore encourage and incentivize the strengthening of the non-NATO security architecture in Europe. At a minimum, Washington should bring home the additional troops Biden sent to Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But the United States should also pursue a more substantial withdrawal of military forces from the continent. Washington should maintain only enough ground combat units to enable the U.S. military to serve as a logistics provider of last resort for European armies and only enough of a naval and air presence to secure vital sea lanes. Finally, the United States should stop treating NATO as a holy sacrament and start rethinking Washington’s role in the alliance. In its current form, NATO should be viewed by conservatives with the same skepticism as the United Nations, not as the pillar of deterrence it was during the Cold War.

Europe is not the only region of the world in need of a U.S. policy reset. Conservatives should also embrace a military pivot away from the Middle East. Washington should maintain its long-standing naval presence in Bahrain as well as a regional counterterrorism force with long-range strike capabilities to target terrorist groups that have both the intent and the ability to harm American interests. But the United States should withdraw most other troops from the region, including from the conflicts in Iraq and Syria. To counter the threat from Iran, Washington should lean more heavily on its regional partners. Through the Abraham Accords, which normalized Israel’s relations with several previously hostile Arab states, Trump forged a coalition of regional powers with a common interest in countering Tehran’s nefarious activities. But the accords should not form the basis of a Middle Eastern NATO, as some analysts have suggested. They should instead be used as a ticket out of the region.

The United States should stop treating NATO as a holy sacrament.

At the same time that they deprioritize Europe and the Middle East, conservatives should focus Washington’s attention on securing U.S. interests in East Asia. China poses a much greater threat to the long-term safety and economic prosperity of the United States than do Russia, hostile regional powers in the Middle East, or the remnants of al Qaeda and other jihadist terrorist organizations. Only when more of the resources currently devoted to these challenges are freed up will the United States be able to effectively tackle the threat posed by China.

A conservative strategy for China needs to be more than a rhetorical exercise in Beijing-bashing or empty virtue-signaling around Taiwan. The United States must prioritize supplying its East Asian partners with defensive weapon systems such as antiair and antiship missiles that can effectively raise the costs of Chinese aggression. It must also prioritize funding for the U.S. Navy and Air Force, since air and naval power will likely be at the forefront of any future conflict in the Pacific. Additionally, U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies should work more aggressively to counter China’s malign activities within the key American institutions of government, business, and education.

But conservatives should not act as though a war with China is preordained, lest they wind up unintentionally sparking one. It is also important to remember that China, governed by a collectivist government that practices many of the top-down policies that conservatives have long warned against, has its own domestic and international constraints that may limit its power in the long run. Conservative policymakers should therefore avoid responding to the challenges posed by China with policies that would increase the likelihood of direct conflict or undermine incentives for U.S. partners in Asia to take more responsibility for their own defense. Specifically, conservatives should not replace the United States’ longstanding policy of “strategic ambiguity” toward Taiwan with an explicit security guarantee, and they should avoid extending military aid to wealthy countries in East Asia without requiring them to do more for their own defense. As they have in Europe and elsewhere, U.S. security guarantees and unconditional military support can encourage free-riding or reckless driving that puts the United States on a course to war.

DEMANDING BETTER

Acknowledging that the United States faces real limits to its power does not mean accepting a broader narrative of American decline. To the contrary, adopting a more prudent foreign policy will ensure that U.S. power isn’t squandered and provide the means to guarantee the safety and prosperity of future generations of Americans. But if conservative policymakers deny reality and advocate the same failed policies that led the United States to where it is today, they will only guarantee American decline. Conservatives must demand better from their candidates and elected officials when it comes to foreign policy.

DAN CALDWELL is Vice President at the Center for Renewing America and former Vice President of Foreign Policy at Stand Together. He served previously on the staff of Representative David Schweikert, Republican of Arizona, and in the U.S. Marine Corps.

Foreign Affairs · by Dan Caldwell · March 22, 2023

23. Ukrainians a ‘Quick Study’ on Patriot System; U.S. Army Taking Notes

As an aside and not addressed in this article, I wonder about contract support. I think US Patriots still require contractor support. Will the Ukrainian Patriot units also relieve contractor support?

Excerpts:

“They in effect took over part of their training,” the leader continued. “They began to design their scenarios based on the tactics, techniques and procedures that they know the Russians are employing.”

And the real-world experiences the Ukrainians are facing could inform how the U.S. Army trains on the Patriot and other systems, and could impact modernization requirements, the leader noted.

“Some of it is as simple as when we talked about how we operate versus how they operate, they've already modified some of the crew positions. They're like, ‘We don't need to do that, we'll do this,’” the leader said.

“We'll be very interested to see how they implement operations to protect this system, because you can see how big it is, it's hard to hide it,” the leader said, noting that so far, the Ukrainians have been very successful with the survivability of their other equipment. “How do they protect the system? And this is what will be … very interesting to observe as they progress with the system [going] forward.”

Ukrainians a ‘Quick Study’ on Patriot System; U.S. Army Taking Notes

nationaldefensemagazine.org · by Sean Carberry

3/21/2023

Army photo

FORT SILL, Oklahoma — A low rumble gradually replaces the howl of the wind battering the golden grass and brush of the Oklahoma plains. A convoy of nine hulking Army vehicles emerges from a dirt road and speeds by into an expanse. Five trailered missile launchers fan out as radar and command vehicles stop about 100 yards behind. Then, 65 Ukrainian soldiers set the legs to anchor the launchers and start running cables to the command vehicles.

This was one of the final exercises in the 10-week training course on the Patriot missile defense system the U.S. Army has been conducting at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. And as the Ukrainian soldiers — who will soon return to the battlefield — were learning how to use the system, the U.S. Army was learning from the Ukrainians about real-world missile defense applications that could shape Army training and system requirements going forward.

For the first time since the training began in January, the Army brought a group of reporters to Fort Sill to witness the Ukrainians undergoing training on a Patriot battery. Under the ground rules, the media could not film, shoot video or speak with the Ukrainians for the safety of the soldiers and their families.

Brig. Gen. Shane Morgan, commander of Fort Sill, said the training focused on operator and maintainer tasks, and differed from the typical training course because the Ukrainians came in with more experience than most of the 5,000 U.S. and international students who come to Fort Sill for Patriot training each year.

Under the instruction of the 30th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, the Ukrainians went through a conditions-based program of concurrent courses on Patriot operations — or air battle management — launching station operations and radar, engagement control system and launcher maintenance, Morgan said.

“Our assessment is that the Ukrainian soldiers are impressive and absolutely a quick study due to their extensive air defense knowledge and experience in a combat zone,” he added, saying that the Ukrainians had been hand-picked and were some of the most educated Ukrainian soldiers.

According to Col. Martin O’Donnell, public affairs director for Army Europe and Africa, the Ukrainian soldiers would complete the training in the coming days and then travel to another location in Europe.

“There they will marry up with other Ukrainian air defenders” and the two donated Patriot batteries from the United States, Germany and the Netherlands “in order to validate their systems, ensure that they are interoperable before both the equipment and the men and women who will operate it go to Ukraine in the coming weeks,” he said.

Some 20 U.S. instructors and nearly as many interpreters — which the Army brought in from around the country — conducted the accelerated and highly tailored training for the cohort of 65 Ukrainian soldiers, a senior Fort Sill leader told reporters on background.

“We did include realistic threats and conditions that the Ukrainians will face, so we were able to have dialogue and we were able to implement some of those aspects into the training here at Fort Sill, which normally we don't do that,” the leader said.

Key to accelerating the training and focusing on advanced threats was the fact that the Ukrainians were not starting from scratch.

“So, they understand all the basics of overlapping coverage [and] layered defense based on the different threats that the Russians have — cruise missiles, [unmanned aircraft systems], ballistic missiles, fixed wing and rotary,” the leader said. And the Ukrainians have long operated systems like the Russian-made S-300 missile system, giving them a solid understanding of systems like the Patriot.

One advantage of the U.S. system over what the Ukrainians have been using is the level of automation, the leader said.

“Our systems provide a lot more assistance in determining when to engage and how to engage than what they were used to,” the leader said. “So, where they may have had to do a lot more manual computations or manual determinations, our systems are more automated and provide information to the operators to make faster decisions.”

The Ukrainians also appreciated having fewer cables to connect, the leader said.

“What they told us is many of their systems that they have there — obviously Russian systems — have 10 times the number of cables that they have to connect to make sure the system operates,” the leader said.

While the training program began with a standard script, it quickly changed as the Ukrainians provided input based on their experiences over the last year, the leader said.

“They in effect took over part of their training,” the leader continued. “They began to design their scenarios based on the tactics, techniques and procedures that they know the Russians are employing.”

And the real-world experiences the Ukrainians are facing could inform how the U.S. Army trains on the Patriot and other systems, and could impact modernization requirements, the leader noted.

“Some of it is as simple as when we talked about how we operate versus how they operate, they've already modified some of the crew positions. They're like, ‘We don't need to do that, we'll do this,’” the leader said.

“We'll be very interested to see how they implement operations to protect this system, because you can see how big it is, it's hard to hide it,” the leader said, noting that so far, the Ukrainians have been very successful with the survivability of their other equipment. “How do they protect the system? And this is what will be … very interesting to observe as they progress with the system [going] forward.”

The training at Fort Sill was out in the open with no threats. The Ukrainians will be operating their two donated Patriot batteries in urban and contested environments.

The system takes about 45 minutes to deploy once parked, and how and where the Ukrainians decide to operate the batteries will provide more feedback for Army personnel, many of whom have never operated an air defense system in combat.

One takeaway from training the Ukrainians was that when a soldier has a solid foundation in missile defense operations, it is not that difficult to transfer from one system to another, which means that as the Army modernizes its systems, “maybe we can train a little quicker going forward and save time and resources on the U.S. side,” the leader said.

The United States continues analyzing the various missiles being launched by Russia, and “when the analysis is done, and we'll be able to … run simulations to determine performance, and then, hey, maybe we need to make some advancements based on [what] we observed with the characteristics of that missile system,” the leader said.

All of which could inform Army programs like the Future Interceptor, which is slated to replace the Patriot system that first launched in the early 1980s.

Another area where the Ukrainians have shown the Army there is room for change is in maintenance. One of the soldiers training the Ukrainians recounted an anecdote from early in the training process when one of the Patriot vehicles was sidelined because of a coolant leak.

“And they go, ‘Oh, we'll go fix it.’ And I was like, ‘Well, it would take me three weeks to get this fixed, you guys probably won't fix it.’ 20 minutes later, they come back, and they go, ‘It's fixed,’” the trainer said.

“I wish it would get faster,” the trainer said of the Army’s maintenance system. “But for us, it just shows what can be done with dedication.”

Ukrainian soldiers have a sense of urgency and can’t wait weeks — they have minutes to address problems on the battlefield, the trainer said. “And so, their sense of urgency is what has driven this training.”

nationaldefensemagazine.org · by Sean Carberry

24. Inconvenient Facts for the Disarmament Community

Conclusion:

The rosy picture painted by nuclear disarmament advocates may sound appealing because Americans simply want to go to work, raise their children, and live in peace. However, the last of these desires, peace, only comes at the cost of ensuring that any adversary is unwilling to wage war.

The naivete of the nuclear disarmament community only leads to a world where wars are more likely, more frequent, and far more deadly. In reality, peace is achieved when the fear of the consequences outweighs any perceived benefits. History shows that nuclear weapons—and only nuclear weapons—create such fear.

Inconvenient Facts for the Disarmament Community

By James Petrosky & Curtis McGiffin , Adam Lowther

March 22, 2023

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/03/22/inconvenient_facts_for_the_disarmament_community_888727.html

Since its release in October of last year, President Joseph Biden’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) has garnered significant criticism from the arms control community because it did not include the desired nuclear arms reductions or changes to nuclear use policy. Disarmament advocates are suggesting that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine and nuclear threats against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are evidence that deterrence is not possible. They criticize the President for not doing enough to disarm the United States.

Perhaps nuclear disarmament advocates are blind to the deterrent effect of the nation’s nuclear arsenal because their ideology forbids nuclear weapons from making a positive contribution to peace and stability. They may also fundamentally misread America’s adversaries. The reality of the nuclear disarmament argument is that advocates cannot provide an evidence-based and historically sound explanation of the disarmament argument. Instead, the disarmament community offers an aspirational defense policy that has never worked.

While disarmament advocates are entitled to their own opinions, they are not entitled to their own facts. The following are eight inconvenient facts the nuclear disarmament community fails to address.

First, the United States is expected to face two nuclear peers in China and Russia by 2035. This will leave the United States in a position of nuclear inferiority. As Matthew Kroenig points out, nuclear superiority matters when it comes to a crisis between two nuclear-armed adversaries. In every case studied by Kroenig, the country with the weaker nuclear arsenal backed down. This does not bode well for the United States and, if disarmament advocates have their way, will only weaken the United States at a time when Russia and China are growing their nuclear arsenals.

In real terms, disarmament advocates were wrong about the peace nuclear arms reductions were said to bring. The world is more dangerous today than at any point in the past three decades and getting worse. If the United States reduces or eliminates any element of the nuclear arsenal, future administrations will grapple with the implications of the increased threat with a diminished timeline, especially as China and Russia continue to cooperate in their efforts to overturn the liberal international order created by the United States.

It is worth noting that Russia and China are not modernizing and growing their nuclear forces to match American nuclear capabilities. They are seeking to mitigate American conventional military superiority. Thus, when nuclear disarmament advocates suggest we can offset nuclear weapons with conventional weapons to deter adversaries, their advice drives further Russian and Chinese increases to their nuclear capabilities, not diminish them, as history has shown.

Second, the United States modernization program is not increasing the size of the nuclear force, contrary to the claims of nuclear disarmament advocate Tom Collina. The United States is merely recapitalizing its strategic triad, swapping one-for-one and replacing weapon systems that are between thirty and fifty years old and well beyond their planned service life. The 1960s- and 1970s-era technology upon which most of our nuclear delivery platforms are based are now well out of date.

The use of modern methods for engineering and design actually provides for a more reliable, sustainable, and safer nuclear arsenal, decreasing the inventory needed to ensure needed operational effects. Moreover, the current recapitalization plan contains two fewer Columbia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) than the current Ohio-class SSBN.

In short, criticism of the Biden administration’s nuclear policy is unwarranted. The United States is already becoming less capable against its adversaries. There is no need to weaken the nation further.

Third, cancelling the nuclear-armed submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) results in a capability gap between the US and its adversaries. It does not decrease tension between the superpowers who already possess sea-based theater nuclear weapons. It may actually increase tension since the United States must respond to a Russian or Chinese theater nuclear strike with a strategic weapon.

China, North Korea, and Russia are all expanding their arsenal of low-yield and shorter-ranged nuclear weapons. Canceling the SLCM-N allows Russia, in particular, to use the coercive threat of low-yield nuclear weapon employment in Europe without the fear of a proportional American response. NATO’s B61 nuclear gravity bombs are political, not operational, weapons, making them of limited deterrence value. Any American response to a low-yield theater nuclear weapon with an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), or low-yield SLBM will be regarded as escalation, not an in-kind response.

Fourth, China’s “No First Use” policy means something very different to them than it does to Americans. China’s “Active Defense” strategy allows for preemptive attack while describing it as defensive. “No First Use” is similarly applied. Thus, when nuclear disarmament advocates claim that China is not a nuclear threat, they are fundamentally wrong.

China has openly threatened Japan, a non-nuclear state, with a first strike should they aid Taiwan during a conflict. Russia renounced a No First Use policy in 1993, but as we now know, the Soviet military plan for war against NATO included opening nuclear strikes against major West German cities—in direct violation of the Soviet No First Use policy.

Fifth, America’s adversaries have no interest in following the West’s example because their goals and ambitions are hegemonic and revanchist. As such they are fundamentally seeking to topple the liberal international order. China and Russia want a world that allows them to bully their neighbors, seize territory, and create vassal states around them.

Any belief that Russia and China will follow the American example and move to a more peaceful and cooperative approach is naïve and the height of folly. It is also ahistorical. The current human rights records of China and Russia are well known. When considering the twentieth-century cost of Chinese and Russian communism, almost 60,000,000 lives, it is hard to comprehend how anyone would see any altruism in Putin or Xi.

Sixth, the world is not on an inevitable path to nuclear disarmament. In their ahistorical optimism following the Cold War, disarmament advocates viewed two decades of nuclear arms reduction treaties as the inevitable product of the “peace dividend.” They assumed the world would continue negotiating away the only weapons that can guarantee a state’s sovereignty.

America’s conventional wars for regime change led the nation’s adversaries to substantially increase their nuclear capabilities as a means of deterring American conventional superiority. With North Korea dramatically increasing its arsenal to forestall regime change and Iran on the verge of joining the “nuclear club,” the world may soon see a dramatic expansion of the number of nuclear weapons states as Saudi Arabia and other gulf states proliferate for their own security.

The ongoing events in Russia and China prove that shuttering American nuclear weapon production capabilities was a serious mistake. As expected, international affairs is returning to the norm, where great powers wage war against one another by varying means. The idealism of the disarmament community was flat wrong.

Seventh, assertions that American nuclear policy is similar to Russian nuclear policy is disingenuous and untrue. The difference is nowhere more relevant than in President Biden’s Nuclear Posture Review. The US posture is aimed at providing peace and the status quo in international affairs through a retaliatory threat that is withheld. Russia’s deterrence posture and language is focused on coercing adversaries from becoming obstacles to their revanchist goals.

Eighth, history shows that a world free of nuclear weapons is not a safer world, but one that is more dangerous. At least 100,000,000 people died in World War I and II. These wars also brought communism and misery to about half of the world’s population. The world has not suffered a war between great powers since 1945.

This means millions of lives were saved during the “long peace.” Since 1945, no human has been killed by a nuclear weapon. Eliminating nuclear weapons will, without question, make it safe to wage world war again. Americans should never create the conditions for that to happen. As Margaret Thatcher once said, “There are monuments to the failure of conventional deterrence in every village in Europe.”

Conclusion

The rosy picture painted by nuclear disarmament advocates may sound appealing because Americans simply want to go to work, raise their children, and live in peace. However, the last of these desires, peace, only comes at the cost of ensuring that any adversary is unwilling to wage war.

The naivete of the nuclear disarmament community only leads to a world where wars are more likely, more frequent, and far more deadly. In reality, peace is achieved when the fear of the consequences outweighs any perceived benefits. History shows that nuclear weapons—and only nuclear weapons—create such fear.

James Petrosky, Curtis McGiffin, and Adam Lowther are on the staff of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. They have a century of combined experience in nuclear deterrence.

25. Opinion | Here's the real lesson from the showy Xi-Putin meeting

Excerpt:

The bottom line: The International Criminal Court indicted Putin last week for war crimes. Xi is his only powerful friend. Dealing with them separately is bad enough. If they truly become partners in Eurasia, sharing dominion under a Chinese banner, that would be worse.

Opinion | Here's the real lesson from the showy Xi-Putin meeting

The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · March 21, 2023

Pentagon strategists have always divided the world into East and West, with U.S. regional forces under European Command or Indo-Pacific Command. But looking at the embrace of Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin this week, you wonder whether we may need a single “Eurasian Command” to handle an integrated threat.

A strong China is bolstering a weak Russia. That’s the real headline that describes the showy meetings in Moscow this week between the two countries’ leaders. The Chinese aren’t providing weapons (yet), but Xi certainly offered moral and psychological support in what might be described as a get-well visit to an ailing relative. White House spokesman John Kirby on Tuesday rightly called Putin a “junior partner.”

The paradox of the Ukraine war is that Putin’s bid for greater power in Europe has made him weaker. This diminished Russia will fall increasingly under China’s sway — unless there’s an unlikely turn post-Ukraine and a Western-leaning leader replaces Putin. Maybe that’s the biggest reason for Xi’s fraternal visit: He is bolstering a flank against America and the West.

China’s dominance over a weaker Russia will take many forms in the coming years. Russia has lost its energy markets in Europe because of its reckless invasion, so it will depend ever more on demand from China and other Asian customers. China’s economic sway grows every year in central Asia and in Russia’s own far east. Its hard power in space, cyber, robotics and artificial intelligence will increasingly dwarf Russia’s.

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Xi’s rescue strategy for Russia seems to center on a peace plan that would stanch the bleeding in Ukraine. From what we know, Xi proposes a cease-fire agreement that would freeze Russia’s gains from last year’s illegal invasion. That version won’t fly with Ukraine or the United States. We won’t know for a few days whether Xi will talk with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in a way that opens a real process of negotiation. That seems unlikely. But so did the Iran-Saudi deal that Xi brokered this month.

By playing the peacemaker, Xi can position himself better to take other, harsher rescue measures if Ukraine rejects a cease-fire. He could offer ammunition for Russia, arguing he’s only leveling the playing field. He could try to mobilize nations of the Global South, such as India, South Africa and Brazil, to pressure Ukraine to end the fighting. Xi wants to keep the high ground, invoking the sanctity of the United Nations charter even as he affirms his support for the Russian leader who shattered that charter’s norms. It’s a shameless approach, but smart diplomacy.

Xi’s emerging role as the leader of a Eurasian bloc presents dilemmas for U.S. strategists. For a generation, separating China from Russia was a central goal of U.S. foreign policy. Driving that wedge was a major reason for the historic visit to China in 1972 by President Richard M. Nixon and national security adviser Henry Kissinger. The Biden administration initially hoped it could try that strategy in reverse — warming relations with Moscow in the June 2021 summit in Geneva in part to concentrate on the Chinese challenge. That didn’t work out as the White House hoped, to put it mildly.

Now it’s Xi who is the triangulator. He is playing off the bitter split between the United States and Russia, helping Putin, but also keeping a bit of distance, too. Xi similarly used China’s close relations with Iran to make the diplomatic breakthrough between Riyadh and Tehran that the United States could never achieve.

Though Putin was beaming in Xi’s reflected glow this week, the visit was a reminder of just how isolated the Russian leader is. President Biden hosts a prominent foreign leader at the White House every other week. When was the last time you saw a major foreign leader visit the Kremlin? (The president of Belarus doesn’t count.) Xi’s get-well visit will give his “dear friend” Putin a psychological boost and help his domestic popularity. But other than China and a few outliers, Russian stands alone.

If you were looking for another reason why it’s important that Ukraine succeeds against Russia, consider the photos from Moscow. “The President of Eurasia” — I fear that’s the invisible caption of the pictures of Xi that we’re seeing amid the Kremlin’s golden doors and red carpets. The idea that a vast swath of the world is dominated by a China that stands so resolutely against freedom and democracy is chilling. If this alliance succeeds, we will live in a darker world.

The bottom line: The International Criminal Court indicted Putin last week for war crimes. Xi is his only powerful friend. Dealing with them separately is bad enough. If they truly become partners in Eurasia, sharing dominion under a Chinese banner, that would be worse.

The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · March 21, 2023

26. Starlink satellites are boosting Air Force communication across the Indo-Pacific

Can Musk turn off access?

Starlink satellites are boosting Air Force communication across the Indo-Pacific

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · March 21, 2023

The U.S. Air Force is using commercial Starlink satellites to communicate with airmen dispersed across the vast Indo-Pacific. (Seth Robson/Stars and Stripes)

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YOKOTA AIR BASE, Japan — The Air Force is using commercial Starlink satellites to communicate with airmen dispersed across the vast Indo-Pacific, officials said this week at the home of U.S. Forces Japan.

The 730th Air Mobility Squadron showed off one of three recently acquired Starlink terminals during a visit Monday by the Air Force Expeditionary Center’s commander, Maj. Gen. John Klein.

Tech billionaire Elon Musk’s SpaceX has launched nearly 4,000 Starlink satellites into low-Earth orbit since 2019. Starlink provides highspeed internet to more than a million locations around the world, the company said on its website Feb. 26.

Air Force Expeditionary Center commander Maj. Gen. John Klein, right, visits with air terminal manager Ernie Weber at Yokota Air Base, Japan, Monday, Feb. 20, 2023. (Seth Robson/Stars and Stripes)

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A Starlink terminal inside this C-130J Super Hercules at Yokota Air Base, Japan, allowed Air Force Expeditionary Center commander Maj. Gen. John Klein to video conference with an airman on the island of Diego Garcia, more than 5,000 miles away, Monday, March 20, 2023. (Seth Robson/Stars and Stripes)

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Starlink made its service available in Ukraine and shipped terminals to the country days after Russian forces invaded the nation last year, according to a March 16, 2022 report in The Mercury News.

A Starlink terminal set up inside a C-130J Super Hercules airlifter at Yokota allowed Klein to video conference with an airman who was using a Starlink terminal on Diego Garcia, an island more than 5,000 miles away in the Indian Ocean.

The system could be used by contingency response forces such as those who deployed to Afghanistan to evacuate U.S. troops and civilians in August 2021, Klein said after the demonstration.

“I was extremely impressed with the capability,” he told Stars and Stripes on Tuesday as he prepared to depart Yokota. “We are looking to give our units throughout the Pacific the ability to communicate with command-and-control entities. They are evolving to do that in support of agile combat employment.”

Agile combat employment is the ability to move aircraft rapidly to a network of smaller airfields. U.S. forces are honing agile combat employment skills in the Western Pacific to avoid being targeted by Chinese missiles in the event of war.

The Starlink systems cost $350 and deliver data at a rate of 120 megabytes per second under a subscription that costs $109 a month, Staff Sgt. Alejandro Flores, a client systems technician with the 730th, said after Monday’s demonstration.

Starlink works with the Air Force’s secure internet routers used for secret communication, he said.

The Air Force has its own satellite internet system called Hawkeye that’s a lot more expensive and slower, Flores added. A Hawkeye dish costs $250,000 and provides internet speeds of 4 megabytes per second, he said.

The downside of Starlink is that it is a commercial service and not controlled by the government, Flores said.

In September, Musk asked the Pentagon to fund Starlink services in Ukraine but later backtracked and said his company would continue providing the service for free, the BBC reported Oct. 15.

Starlink had become the connectivity backbone of Ukraine all the way up to the front lines, Musk tweeted on Feb. 1.

“This is the damned if you do part,” he wrote. “However, we are not allowing Starlink to be used for long-range drone strikes. This is the damned if you don't part."

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · March 21, 2023

27. Japan’s Kishida shames China by visiting Ukraine as Xi meets Putin: ‘Pure antagonism’

Excerpts:

India and other states across “the so-called Global South” have resisted Western appeals to condemn Putin, perhaps partly due to Russia’s invocation of Western imperialism to elicit sympathy in the developing world. Kishida’s efforts have raised Ukrainian hopes that Japan could be a more effective partner in persuading such states to take a harder line on Kremlin aggression.

“Japan — it’s well known in the Global South, and it’s respected by India,” Merezhko said. “Japan is more influential; it’s more known ... so Japan can be helpful for us in trying to draw more attention [among] Indians and by India to Ukraine.”

Japan’s Kishida shames China by visiting Ukraine as Xi meets Putin: ‘Pure antagonism’

by Joel Gehrke, Foreign Affairs Reporter | March 21, 2023 07:18 PM

Washington Examiner · March 21, 2023

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida expressed “great anger” over the murder of Ukrainian civilians by Russian forces during a surprise visit to Kyiv that coincided with Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping’s trip to Russia.

“I really feel great anger at the atrocity upon visiting that very place here," Kishida told reporters Tuesday after a visit to Bucha. “I would like to give condolence to all the victims and the wounded on behalf of the Japanese nationals. Japan will keep aiding Ukraine with the greatest effort to regain peace.”

BLINKEN: XI GIVING PUTIN 'DIPLOMATIC COVER FOR RUSSIA TO CONTINUE TO COMMIT' WAR CRIMES

Kishida swept into Kyiv off the back of a visit to New Delhi, where he gave a wide-ranging speech on his desire to coordinate with India to “foster the region into a place that values freedom, the rule of law, free from force or coercion.” And his trek to Ukraine immediately thereafter underscored Tokyo’s emergence as a counterweight, alongside the United States, as a counterweight to Russia’s cooperation with China.

“China has chosen [a] side,” a senior European official in Kyiv told the Washington Examiner. “And Japan balanced the picture by showing immediately which side they are. Pure antagonism."

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, right, greet each other after the signing of joint documents in Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, March 21, 2023.

Efrem Lukatsky/AP

Zelensky extended an invitation to Kishida in January. The fact that the visit coincided with Xi’s portentous trip to Moscow offered Ukrainian policymakers "a hugely symbolic" diplomatic counterpoint.

“It's hugely symbolic because it emphasizes that relations with Japan are much more important than relations with China,” Ukrainian lawmaker Oleksandr Merezhko, who chairs the Ukrainian parliament’s foreign affairs committee, told the Washington Examiner. “So if China is interested in bringing more chaos into the world system, into international relations — in contrast, Japan is interested in maintaining order, regional and global order.”

The visits continue an emerging pattern of U.S. allies and partners in Europe coordinating with allies in the Indo-Pacific — one that the U.S. hopes will continue, as President Joe Biden’s top envoy in Tokyo made clear on Tuesday. Xi and Kishida’s dueling itineraries reflect “two very different European-Pacific partnerships,” Rahm Emanuel, the U.S. ambassador to Japan, suggested.

“Prime Minister Kishida is making an historic visit to Ukraine to protect the Ukrainian people and promote the universal values enshrined in the U.N. Charter,” Emanuel, a former Chicago mayor and White House chief of staff during Biden’s first term as vice president, wrote on Twitter. “Approximately 900 kilometers away, a different and more nefarious partnership is taking shape in Moscow. ... Against these two Pacific leaders visiting Europe, Prime Minister Kishida stands with freedom and Xi stands with a war criminal. Which Pacific leader is the right partner for a brighter future?”

Japanese officials have exerted a more shaping influence on diplomatic and security arrangements in recent years. The late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pioneered the concept of the “free and open Indo-Pacific” as Chinese forces placed military assets on artificial islands in the South China Sea and increased their presence around the islands at the center of a territorial dispute between Beijing and Tokyo.

Kishida has accelerated that project in the year since Putin launched the full-scale offensive to overthrow the Ukrainian government — an offensive launched from the protection of Russia’s nuclear weapons umbrella that Kishida fears will be taken as a precedent for Chinese or North Korean aggression. The prime minister’s national security team crafted a plan for a rapid upgrade of Japan’s ability to repel “invasions against its nation,” as the latest national security strategy put it, and Kishida emphasized his focus on deterring a clash in the Indo-Pacific.

“As we have seen with the aggression against Ukraine, major geopolitical shifts are taking place at the heart of the vast Eurasian Continent,” Kishida said Monday at the Indian Council of World Affairs. “One could say it is a tragedy. I want to free the oceans from such geopolitical risks. There is an imperative to protect and nurture the public ocean bounty that we all share.”

Kishida described India as “an indispensable partner” in those efforts. He adopted a tone calibrated to accommodate India’s “historical and cultural background.” A former British colony with a Cold War tradition of nonalignment and a democratic system of governance, India has avoided frank condemnations of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and continued to import Russian oil but also warned Moscow not to use nuclear weapons and continued to cooperate with the U.S. and the rest of the Quad in other areas.

“Even during the COVID-19 pandemic, there were no voices at all in either Japan or India that said that a totalitarian system of governance would be better,” Kishida said in an apparent effort to underscore the ideological divisions between India, China, and Russia. “At the same time, both Japan and India have unique historical backgrounds. ... It follows that Japan and India have a great responsibility for maintaining and strengthening 'a free and open international order based on the rule of law.'”

India and other states across “the so-called Global South” have resisted Western appeals to condemn Putin, perhaps partly due to Russia’s invocation of Western imperialism to elicit sympathy in the developing world. Kishida’s efforts have raised Ukrainian hopes that Japan could be a more effective partner in persuading such states to take a harder line on Kremlin aggression.

“Japan — it’s well known in the Global South, and it’s respected by India,” Merezhko said. “Japan is more influential; it’s more known ... so Japan can be helpful for us in trying to draw more attention [among] Indians and by India to Ukraine.”

Washington Examiner · March 21, 2023

28. Back to the Future: Using History to Prepare for Future Warfare

Excerpts:

The discourse on future warfare today revolves around issues such as the threat of hybrid warfare, cyber attacks, the use of autonomous weapon systems, the militarisation of space, among many other emerging trends. And just like Douhet did in the early days of airpower, military planners today must assess the potential impact of these developments and draw the appropriate lessons, using observations from both the near and distant past to validate their findings. There are already examples of actors who have made bold predictions. For example, despite cyber power being in its relative infancy, Singapore’s establishment of the Digital and Intelligence Service has made it one of the first militaries in the world to establish an independent cyber force to operate alongside its more traditional counterparts from the domains of air, land, and sea, suggesting that it has own inherent strategic potential.[19]

While there is no single approach to how we should draw historical lessons, the above pitfalls suggest two points of caution. First, history should not be treated as a mirror for the future. While there is much it can teach, there is a danger in assuming that historical events repeat themselves in a cyclical manner. For example, many comparisons have been made between the current U.S.-China rivalry and the Cold War, but viewing the former merely as a repeat of the latter ignores the many contextual differences that require a varying set of responses.[20] Discernment must be exercised when extrapolating historical lessons into the future, taking note of unique contextual factors.[21]

Second, history must be studied in depth.[22] Studying the latest conflict is often attractive because its recency might suggest greater future relevance and there is more familiarity with the means used. However, the recency of the event also means a scarcity of available data with official sources often becoming available only years, or even decades, after its conclusion. While open-source data may be consulted as an alternative, the pervasiveness of disinformation makes it a less than reliable source, with care needed to discern fact from fiction.[23] Furthermore, if the conflict is still ongoing, drawing conclusions may be premature as events continue to unfold, sometimes with unexpected twists and turns.

The Russia-Ukraine War is a good example of this, already bearing witness to drastic fluctuations in the fortunes of both combatants in just less than a year.[24] It is therefore likely that any meaningful lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War can only be drawn postbellum as a more nuanced picture emerges following careful analysis.[25] Even better would be to compare the observations taken from the conflict with those drawn from samples across a wider timeframe, allowing for a fuller appreciation of the relevant trends and their impact. Patience and humility are therefore requisite traits for those who seek to scry the secrets of the future from the past. Nothing to come is inevitable and while history can help illuminate future pathways, the wise consult it with prudence.

Back to the Future: Using History to Prepare for Future Warfare

Ian Li March 21, 2023

thestrategybridge.org · March 21, 2023

Predicting the future of warfare is at best a speculative affair. Any forecast can never be proposed with absolute certainty, no matter how robust the underlying analysis. The future is always somewhat uncertain. In fact, history is replete with examples of visionaries who have tried but failed to accurately divine the nature of change. Nonetheless, it is a necessary endeavour, because such is the cost of war today that the implications of failure can be far-reaching, even existential. From the Oracle of Delphi to the modern application of data analytics, military planners over the ages have sought greater clarity regarding the future conduct of war.[1] However, there is no crystal ball for future warfare. Instead, this essay argues that historical lessons provide the best means of determining its form, but only if they are used correctly. The context behind each case study must be carefully considered by military planners who seek to learn from the past so that the observations gathered can be accurately extrapolated onto the present situation, and the resulting lessons meaningfully applied.

“Lycurgus Consulting the Pythia” by Eugène Delacroix (Wikimedia)

Learning from the Past

The value of history as a means of informing the future conduct of war is not new. James Mattis holds that “a real understanding of history means that we face nothing new under the sun.”[2] The fundamental reason for this lies in the Clausewitzian adage that no matter the age, all wars conform to a set of universal principles that constitute its nature.[3] The great captains of the past would therefore not find the conflicts of today any more foreign conceptually than those they themselves experienced. The struggle they would have to overcome would rather be in adapting to the new means available with which to wage them.[4]

Another reason why learning from history is essential comes from the practical reality that many militaries do not engage in wars frequently. Whether due to resource constraints or an inward focus on security, such militaries go to war only as a matter of last resort. As a result, it is possible that most of their members, including the regular officer corps, would have no personal experience of war throughout their entire professional careers. History then, as argued by the influential military historian Sir Michael Howard, represents the best alternative to actual experience for the military institution to hone its craft, and by extension, to prepare for the next war.[5] The degree to which this is successful may in turn be the difference between victory and defeat

For example, while the tank was an entirely new invention that had been introduced during the First World War, the development of German armoured warfare in the interwar period saw it employed in a manner that reflected the army’s basic doctrine which had itself been refined through an objective study of Germany’s wartime experience, centering around the principles of initiative, exploitation, and manoeuvre.[6] In contrast, the French adopted a more limited study of their own experiences, influenced in part by the failure of their more offensive-minded doctrine in the war’s earlier years, and the subsequent success of a more controlled operational approach in 1918 that emphasised firepower over manoeuvre.[7] As a result, French armoured warfare developed under more narrow parameters, preventing it from being utilised to its full potential. This divergence in learning would ultimately culminate in Germany’s stunning successes against France in the early stages of the Second World War using its armour-enabled brand of manoeuvre warfare that has come to be popularly known as blitzkrieg.[8]

Yet, it should be noted that the Germans were not the pioneers on the subject of armoured warfare. That honour should go to the British, who had first employed the tank on the Somme. Unsurprisingly, they were for a time at the forefront of armoured warfare development, and their ideas would help to further refine German armoured warfare doctrine.[9] While the reasons why the British failed to hold on to their advantage go beyond the scope of this essay, it does highlight the point that learning from history is not as straightforward as it would seem. Indeed, two main pitfalls hamper the objective study of history in the conduct of war: the failure to understand context, and to extrapolate correctly.

The Importance of Context

One of the common mistakes made when drawing lessons about war from history is a failure to fully appreciate the context of the case being studied. As suggested by Clausewitz, every age has “its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.”[10] As a result, every period has its own corresponding theory of war, derived from the conditions specific to the day. This means that while it remains true the universal principles of war lend to history’s evergreen value as a tool of instruction, there is still a need to discern the unique factors that define each conflict.

For example, while France’s building of the Maginot Line has since come to be a byword for failure, one of the key factors behind its construction was France’s declining birth rate in the interwar period, a strategic weakness that had to be considered against the relative population strength of its most likely enemy, Germany.[11] This made the construction of a system of fortifications a practical necessity to offset Germany’s numerical advantage in the event of a future conflict—France simply could not afford to match Germany’s growth in military power quantitatively.

Thus, putting aside any assessment of the Maginot Line’s ultimate utility, the decision to build it can only be fully understood when both military and non-military factors are considered. Ignoring either would result in a problematically narrow appreciation of France’s strategic conundrum at the time. And while it does not excuse France’s other strategic failings, it is necessary to prevent overly simplistic and frequently erroneous conclusions from being drawn, such as being too dismissive of the use of static fortifications, which continue to feature heavily in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.[12]

Ukrainian Fixed Fortifications to Defend Kyiv (Ukrinform)

The need for a more holistic perspective is especially pertinent today given how deeply war and its causal factors have become intertwined with the social. A military cannot function outside of the structures and constraints imposed by the society in which it is embedded.[13] A study of past conflicts therefore cannot be divorced from the social forces that shaped them. Furthermore, the subjective way military success or failure is increasingly being defined requires deeper introspection into the context of victory itself to proximate how success can be achieved in future war.[14] Weapon platforms do not win wars on their own. They need to be employed in alignment with the prevailing social forces of the day.

A military cannot function outside of the structures and constraints imposed by the society in which it is embedded. A study of past conflicts therefore cannot be divorced from the social forces that shaped it.

The Risks of Extrapolation

Because no two events are identical, extrapolation is inherent when attempting to apply the lessons of past wars. The military planner must therefore discern what is useful from the case being studied, and project its relevance into the future. Paradoxically however, because the future is so filled with uncertainty, the extrapolated and actual results are prone to deviate from each other. The probability and degree of deviation is further increased when the time distance between the case study and the future point of reference is great.

Take, for example, the early airpower theorist Giulio Douhet. He drew from his experiences in the First World War and his observations of how airpower had been utilised to compose his treatise on airpower.[15] Yet, while many of his ideas remain relevant today, contemporary airpower has never fully lived up to the promise he saw in it. Unlike the more measured predictions of his intellectual peers such as William “Billy” Mitchell and Hugh Trenchard, Douhet saw airpower as the ultimate war-winning tool of the future, espousing its strategic potential. However, his conclusions were made at a time when airpower was in its infancy and assumed the inexorable progress of its supporting technologies. Advances in air defence systems which he had not foreseen ensured that the famous maxim ‘the bomber will always get through’ would not be realised in the Second World War, moderating the decisive impact he predicted airpower would have.[16] Time has also not been kind to Douhet’s ideas, with the targeting of civilian centres that he believed would bring a swift resolution to war increasingly being frowned upon by the international community.[17]

The true risk in extrapolation lies in taking expectations to the extremes. When the value of an object is overestimated, more emphasis may be accorded it than it deserves, resulting in a waste of valuable resources. The converse results in a slow adoption of what may be essential military reform. This has a flow down effect on a military’s ability to win in a future conflict as doctrine, training, and asset acquisition become locked to the extrapolated vision. Extrapolation is not made easier by the accelerated pace of technological change today. The present rate of technological advancement means that it is likely that a military professional will have to adapt to several weapon systems throughout his career.[18] Because of this, the military planner has a smaller range of historical examples to call upon, and his projection will only be valid for a decade at best, requiring constant review. There will also be a need to extrapolate across domains, as some emerging vectors of conflict, like cyber and space, have no precedent in history. For this, an appreciation of the connecting threads that hark back to war’s immutable nature is critical.

Looking into the Future

The discourse on future warfare today revolves around issues such as the threat of hybrid warfare, cyber attacks, the use of autonomous weapon systems, the militarisation of space, among many other emerging trends. And just like Douhet did in the early days of airpower, military planners today must assess the potential impact of these developments and draw the appropriate lessons, using observations from both the near and distant past to validate their findings. There are already examples of actors who have made bold predictions. For example, despite cyber power being in its relative infancy, Singapore’s establishment of the Digital and Intelligence Service has made it one of the first militaries in the world to establish an independent cyber force to operate alongside its more traditional counterparts from the domains of air, land, and sea, suggesting that it has own inherent strategic potential.[19]

While there is no single approach to how we should draw historical lessons, the above pitfalls suggest two points of caution. First, history should not be treated as a mirror for the future. While there is much it can teach, there is a danger in assuming that historical events repeat themselves in a cyclical manner. For example, many comparisons have been made between the current U.S.-China rivalry and the Cold War, but viewing the former merely as a repeat of the latter ignores the many contextual differences that require a varying set of responses.[20] Discernment must be exercised when extrapolating historical lessons into the future, taking note of unique contextual factors.[21]

Second, history must be studied in depth.[22] Studying the latest conflict is often attractive because its recency might suggest greater future relevance and there is more familiarity with the means used. However, the recency of the event also means a scarcity of available data with official sources often becoming available only years, or even decades, after its conclusion. While open-source data may be consulted as an alternative, the pervasiveness of disinformation makes it a less than reliable source, with care needed to discern fact from fiction.[23] Furthermore, if the conflict is still ongoing, drawing conclusions may be premature as events continue to unfold, sometimes with unexpected twists and turns.

The Russia-Ukraine War is a good example of this, already bearing witness to drastic fluctuations in the fortunes of both combatants in just less than a year.[24] It is therefore likely that any meaningful lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War can only be drawn postbellum as a more nuanced picture emerges following careful analysis.[25] Even better would be to compare the observations taken from the conflict with those drawn from samples across a wider timeframe, allowing for a fuller appreciation of the relevant trends and their impact. Patience and humility are therefore requisite traits for those who seek to scry the secrets of the future from the past. Nothing to come is inevitable and while history can help illuminate future pathways, the wise consult it with prudence.

Ian Li is an Associate Research Fellow with the Military Studies Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU, Singapore.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

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Header Image: Sunny Night, 2018 (Hasan Almasi).

Notes:

[1] Jane Butler, Ross Coffey, Kathryn Pegues, and John Salvador, “Data Analytics in the Combatant Command: Improving the Approach to Decision-Making,” Strategy Bridge, September 6, 2021, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/9/6/data-analytics-in-the-combatant-command-improving-the-approach-to-decision-making.

[2] Jill R. Russell, “With rifle and bibliography: General Mattis on professional reading,” Strife, May 7, 2013,

[3] Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 85-89.

[4] Alex Roland, “War and Technology,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 27, 2009, https://www.fpri.org/article/2009/02/war-and-technology/.

[5] Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College 11, No. 1 (1981): 14.

[6] Williamson Murray, “Armored warfare: The British, French, and German experiences,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, eds. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 37–39.

[7] Ibid., 29–32.

[8] “The German ‘Lightning War’ Strategy Of The Second World War,” Imperial War Museums, accessed December 15, 2022, https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/the-german-lightning-war-strategy-of-the-second-world-war.

[9] Azar Gat, “British Influence and the Evolution of the Panzer Arm: Myth or Reality? Part I,” War in History 4, No. 2 (April 1997); Azar Gat, “British Influence and the Evolution of the Panzer Arm: Myth or Reality? Part II,” War in History 4, No. 3 (July 1997).

[10] Von Clausewitz, On War, 593.

[11] Indeed, the Merriam-Webster dictionary defines it as “a defensive barrier or strategy that inspires a false sense of security”; Enno Kraehe, “The Motives behind the Maginot Line,” Military Affairs 8, No. 2 (Summer 1944): 112-113.

[12] Stephen Biddle, “Ukraine and the Future of Offensive Maneuver,” War on the Rocks, November 22, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/11/ukraine-and-the-future-of-offensive-maneuver/.

[13] Ian Li, “The Importance of Context for Military History and Education,” POINTER: Journal of the SAF 46, No. 2 (2020): 57-58.

[14] J. Boone Bartholomees, “Theory of Victory,” Parameters 38, No. 2 (Summer 2008): 31-33.

[15] Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998).

[16] David Berkland, “Douhet, Trenchard, Mitchell, and the Future of Airpower,” Defense & Security Analysis 27, No. 4 (December 2011): 389-390.

[17] Neta C. Crawford, “Targeting Civilians and U.S. Strategic Bombing Norms: Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose?,” in The American Way of Bombing: Changing Ethical and Legal Norms, from B-17s to Drones, eds. Matthew Evangelista and Henry Shue (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2014), 64–68.

[18] Roland, “War and Technology.”

[19] “Fact Sheet: The Digital and Intelligence Service,” MINDEF Singapore, last modified October 28, 2022,

[20] Ian Li, “The U.S.-China Rivalry as Seen in the Cold War’s Rear-View Mirror,” Strategy Bridge, October 1, 2019, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/10/1/the-us-china-rivalry-as-seen-in-the-cold-wars-rear-view-mirror.

[21] Frank Hoffman, “Learning Large Lessons from Small Wars,” War on the Rocks, February 5, 2014, https://warontherocks.com/2014/02/learning-large-lessons-from-small-wars/.

[22] Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” 14.

[23] Julie Jargon, “How to Tell News Fact from Fiction, Even During a War,” The Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-spot-fake-news-even-during-a-war-11646434626.

[24] Biddle, “Ukraine and the Future of Offensive Maneuver.”

[25] William Leben, “Let’s hold our horses on drawing lessons from war in Ukraine,” The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 19, 2022, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/lets-hold-our-horses-on-drawing-lessons-from-war-in-ukraine/.

thestrategybridge.org · March 21, 2023

29. US protectionism eroding its allure in Asia

Excerpts:

The implementation of these Chinese domestic policies will determine the future of East Asian economic architecture. If regional leaders expect the Chinese market to grow at a faster pace, the US position in the region would weaken immensely.

But the US could mitigate the loss of prestige — which stems from its perceived inattention to East Asian welfare — if it can convince the region that its markets will remain open for Asian exports and that its ambition to renegotiate the regional economic order is limited in scope and defensive in nature.

While domestic politics and national security considerations might prevent a return to CPTPP and limit the ambitions of IPEF, the US could also argue that limiting its exposure to China through ‘friend-shoring’ benefits the region.

OECD data on trade in value-added indicate that more than half of East Asian value-added in products consumed in the US is produced in China, while less than one-fifth of it comes from ASEAN. Tipping the scales in ASEAN’s favor could well allay fears of US economic disengagement from the region.

US protectionism eroding its allure in Asia

America’s retreat from free trade with Asia has undermined its political leverage and given China an upper hand

asiatimes.com · by Tamas Meszaros · March 22, 2023

Protectionist trade policies and the lack of an economic agenda for East and Southeast Asia have become central themes in critiques of US policy towards the region and its approach to managing US-China “strategic competition.”

According to these accounts, US protectionism undermines its economic draw in East Asia — and the political leverage stemming from it — at a time when it has already been eroded by rising reliance on Chinese trade, investment and regional institutions such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

Instead, the US should employ open economic diplomacy, return to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and allow for greater market access for exporters from the region.

From the US perspective, limiting economic openness towards China is necessary to protect its industrial base, lessen its import reliance in critical sectors and mitigate the potential for China to weaponize interdependence.

But export restrictions, punitive tariffs and industrial policies aimed at eroding the market share of Asian firms are perceived in East Asia as detrimental to the “rules-based international order” and East Asian prosperity.

Yet current US policies are no worse than those pursued in the past vis-a-vis emerging East Asian economies. Persistent US trade deficits with East Asia also ensure that it remains a highly important economic partner and security guarantor in the region.

The role of free trade agreements (FTAs) in fostering trade and investment flows in East Asia has been the subject of debate for decades. Critics of East Asian regionalism have long argued that “looser” integration pursued by ASEAN and its partners offers meager economic gains.

Recent empirical studies investigating the effects of regional FTAs present a mixed bag — FTAs tend to increase trade for less developed countries but have very marginal effects for middle- and high-income economies.

While the degree of liberalization under the CPTPP is much more significant, it is not a benevolent offer of “free” market access but a result of a hard bargain driven by the US. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) is similarly aimed at promoting regulations that favor the United States.

Joe Biden’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework aims to counterbalance China’s rising power and influence in Southeast Asia. Image: Facebook

But US-East Asia trade diplomacy has often focused on protecting narrowly defined US economic interests. Trade frictions with Japan in the 1980s, “voluntary restrictions” put on Taiwanese and South Korean semiconductor industries from the 1990s, the US approach to the regional solution of the Asian financial crisis and China’s contested WTO accession all attest to this.

Yet protectionism has also proven to be futile in the past. One reason for this is the robustness of China-centric regional production networks. US trade policy might weaken these, but it cannot significantly alter the economics supporting them and a US manufacturing renaissance remains highly unlikely. The potential for isolating China in manufacturing production networks is therefore limited.

Another reason has to do with consumption and savings patterns. The US will remain a key market for the region as long as it consumes more than it produces and saves very little, while East Asian economies do the opposite.

The Covid-19 pandemic reinforced this pattern as China reacted with supply-side measures promoting manufacturing, while the US raised consumption with demand-side policies. China ended up with a record trade surplus and the US with a record deficit. The image of a protectionist US and an open China does not match reality.

Still, the development strategies of many regional states hang on joining regional production networks. These largely operate to satisfy US and European demand using US, Japanese and European foreign direct investment inflows. RCEP and a China-centric regional system could only provide an alternative if it also provides more demand and capital.

But China presents contradictory signals. The long-standing aim to raise domestic consumption should provide market opportunities, but the notion of dual circulation suggests that the onus would be on satisfying it with domestic supply.

Participation in the value chains of Chinese technology companies would offer rewards for regional suppliers, yet China also professes technological self-reliance, clouding these prospects. Chinese funding is crucial for regional infrastructure development, yet projects often go awry and capital has recently dried up.

The implementation of these Chinese domestic policies will determine the future of East Asian economic architecture. If regional leaders expect the Chinese market to grow at a faster pace, the US position in the region would weaken immensely.

China’s trade with the US has boomed through the pandemic. Photo: DTN / Chris Clayton

But the US could mitigate the loss of prestige — which stems from its perceived inattention to East Asian welfare — if it can convince the region that its markets will remain open for Asian exports and that its ambition to renegotiate the regional economic order is limited in scope and defensive in nature.

While domestic politics and national security considerations might prevent a return to CPTPP and limit the ambitions of IPEF, the US could also argue that limiting its exposure to China through ‘friend-shoring’ benefits the region.

OECD data on trade in value-added indicate that more than half of East Asian value-added in products consumed in the US is produced in China, while less than one-fifth of it comes from ASEAN. Tipping the scales in ASEAN’s favor could well allay fears of US economic disengagement from the region.

Dr Tamás Mészáros is a postdoctoral researcher at the Graduate School of Media and Governance, Keio University.

This article , republished with permission, was first published by East Asia Forum, which is based out of the Crawford School of Public Policy within the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University.

asiatimes.com · by Tamas Meszaros · March 22, 2023

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Starlink satellites are boosting Air Force communication across the Indo-Pacific

Japan’s Kishida shames China by visiting Ukraine as Xi meets Putin: ‘Pure antagonism’

Back to the Future: Using History to Prepare for Future Warfare

Learning from the Past

The Importance of Context

A military cannot function outside of the structures and constraints imposed by the society in which it is embedded. A study of past conflicts therefore cannot be divorced from the social forces that shaped it.

The Risks of Extrapolation

Looking into the Future

Notes:

US protectionism eroding its allure in Asia

Why allies unlikely to back US strategy to contain China