Quotes of the Day:
“Be practical as well as generous in your ideals. Keep your eyes on the stars, but remember to keep your feet on the ground.”
- Theodore Roosevelt
“That’s why the philosophers warn us not to be satisfied with mere learning, but to add practice and then training. For as time passes we forget what we learned and end up doing the opposite, and hold opinions the opposite of what we should.”
- Epictetus
"In truth, knowledge is a great and very useful quality; those who despise it give evidence enough of their stupidity. Yet I do not set its value at that extreme measure that some attribute to it."
- Michel de Montaigne
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 20 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. 'The impossible': Ukraine's secret, deadly rescue missions
3. No nukes? Ukraine-Russian war will shape world's arsenals
4. Can Putin Survive? – The Lessons of the Soviet Collapse
5. Dr. Frank Hoffman on “Defining and Securing Success in Ukraine”
6. Chinese, Russian Warships Active Near Japan Ahead of RIMPAC 2022
7. Eritrea: North Koreans With Black Faces – OpEd
8. Nepal Rejects US Semi-Military Project – Analysis
9. Extremist Travel to Ukraine Is a Cause for Concern, Not Alarm
10. FDD | The Lexicon of Terror: Crystallization Of The Definition Of “Terrorism” Through The Lens Of Terrorist Financing & The Financial Action Task Force
11. HASC chairman's NDAA mark focuses on munitions, R&D
12. US can rely on what China decries as the 'Asian NATO' for deterrence, former officials say
13. What is the Utility of the Principles of War?
14. China claims successful anti-ballistic missile interceptor test
15. Why this tiny island in the Pacific may be ground zero in a war with China
16. 50 Cognitive Biases in the Modern World
17. How Grassroots Censorship Threatens the American Experiment
18. Greitens slammed for ‘RINO hunting’ campaign ad
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 20 (PUTIN'S WAR)
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 20
Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan
June 20, 5:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Ukrainian officials are emphasizing that the coming week will be decisive for Russian efforts to take control of Severodonetsk.[1] Deputy Ukrainian Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian leadership has set June 26 as the deadline for Russian forces to reach the Luhansk Oblast administrative border, which will likely result in intensified efforts to take full control of Severodonetsk and move westward towards the Oblast border.[2] Head of the Luhansk Regional State Administration Serhiy Haidai reported that Russian forces control all of Severodonetsk except for the industrial zone as of June 20, which is the first explicit Ukrainian confirmation that Russian forces control all of Severodonetsk with the exception of the Azot plant.[3] Russian forces will likely continue efforts to clear the Azot plant and complete encirclement operations south of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk by driving up the T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway.
Russian authorities likely seek to leverage the consequences of Russia’s blockade on Ukrainian grain exports in order to cajole the West into weakening its sanctions. Head of state-owned propaganda outlet RT Margarita Simonyan stated on June 20 that the famine caused by Russia’s blockade on grain exports will force the rest of the world to lift sanctions in order to curb further effects of global famine.[4] Simonyan’s statement is especially salient considering a report by the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office that Ukraine had generated 12% of global wheat and barley exports and that Russia’s blockade has trapped over 20 million tons of grain in storage.[5]
The UK Ministry of Defense claimed on June 20 that consistent failures of the Russian air force have significantly contributed to Russia’s limited success in Ukraine.[6] The UK MoD emphasized that the Russian air force has continually underperformed and been largely risk-averse, failing to establish air superiority or give Russian forces a decisive advantage in Ukraine. The report additionally claimed that training procedures for air force personnel are scripted and designed to impress senior officials but do not adequately prepare personnel for the challenges of active air combat.
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian sources stated that the coming week will be decisive for Russian forces to complete the capture of Severodonetsk and that Russian forces will focus troops and equipment on the area.
- Ukrainian sources confirmed that Russian forces control all of Severodonetsk with the exception of the Azot industrial zone, where fights are ongoing.
- Russian sources are likely setting information conditions to justify slow and unsuccessful advances towards Slovyansk from the southeast of Izyum and west of Lyman.
- Russian forces are likely intensifying operations to interdict Ukrainian lines of communication along the T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway in order to support escalating operations in Severodonetsk-Lysychansk.
- Russian forces continued to focus on resisting further Ukrainian advances north of Kharkiv City towards the international border.
- Russian forces are continuing defensive operations along the Southern Axis.
- Ukrainian partisan activity is continuing to complicate efforts by Russian occupation authorities to consolidate control of occupied areas.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
- Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts
- Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City;
- Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis;
- Activities in Russian-occupied Areas
Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Ukrainian sources confirmed that Russian forces control all of Severodonetsk except for the Azot chemical plant, where fights are ongoing on June 20. Head of the Luhansk Oblast Administration Serhiy Haidai stated that Ukrainian troops “only control the Azot plant” and that Russian troops are fighting within the industrial zone.[7] Haidai additionally confirmed that Russian forces took control of the southeastern suburb of Metolkine, but claimed that the remaining Ukrainian forces in Severodonetsk are still not completely encircled.[8] Deputy Ukrainian Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that the coming week will be decisive for Russian forces to complete the capture of Severodonetsk and that Russian leadership has set June 26 as the deadline for Russian forces to reach the Luhansk Oblast administrative borders.[9] Russian forces are accumulating equipment around Toshkivka, which is still highly-contested territory, and are drawing equipment into Starobilsk (approximately 40km northeast of Severodonetsk in Russian-occupied Luhansk Oblast) to support operations in Severodonetsk from the east.[10] Russian forces will likely continue to funnel troops and equipment into Severodonetsk to complete the capture of the industrial zone in the coming week.
Russian forces focused on maintaining positions to the southeast of Izyum and west of Lyman but did not make any confirmed advances towards Slovyansk on June 20.[11] Russian forces reportedly conducted an unsuccessful assault on Bohorodychne, about 20 kilometers northwest of Slovyansk.[12] Russian Telegram channel “Military chronicle” notably claimed that Ukrainian positions around Slovyansk are highly fortified and on “dominant heights,” which likely is an attempt to set information conditions to justify slow, grinding, and largely unsuccessful Russian advances towards Slovyansk.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops around Lyman are conducting continual airstrikes and attempting to prevent Ukrainian forces from regrouping in this area.[14] Russian forces remain unlikely to advance on Slovyansk as they concentrate resources on completing the capture of Severodonetsk and the rest of Luhansk Oblast.
Russian forces continued efforts to interdict Ukrainian lines of communication east of Bakhmut along the T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway but did not make any confirmed advances on June 20.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian sabotage groups near Bakhmut conducted an unsuccessful assault on Mykolaivka, which is a settlement directly along the T1302 highway.[16] Chechen troops additionally continued efforts to take control of Zolote to further support efforts to interdict Ukrainian lines of communication along the T1302.[17] Ukrainian officials have stated that the coming week will be decisive for the Russian offensive on Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, and Russian troops will likely further intensify artillery attacks east of Bakhmut along the T1302 in order to set conditions for an offensive northward to support the encirclement of Ukrainian troops in Severodonetsk-Lysychansk from the south.[18]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)
Russian forces north of Kharkiv City continued to focus on preventing further Ukrainian advances towards the international border on June 20.[19] Deputy Ukrainian Defense Minister Hanna Malyar claimed that Ukrainian troops have nearly reached the Russian border in Kharkiv Oblast and that Ukrainian forces still have some territory to liberate north of Kharkiv City.[20] While ISW cannot independently confirm the positions of Ukrainian troops near the Russian border, Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in this area will likely continue to pressure Russian troops to fight for control of occupied frontiers and intensify artillery attacks against Ukrainian positions around Kharkiv City.[21] Russian forces additionally conducted artillery attacks and unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force southeast of Kharkiv City, likely in response to Ukrainian counteroffensive actions southeast of Kharkiv City heading towards the Izyum area.[22]
Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces focused on defensive operations and fired on Ukrainian positions along the Southern Axis on June 20.[23] Russian forces intensified artillery strikes on the Mykolaiv-Kherson Oblast border, likely in response to recent Ukrainian counterattacks along the border south of Davydiv Brid and just north of Kherson City.[24] Ukraine’s Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration stated that Russian forces are continuing to move equipment northwards towards the Vasylivka district (approximately 40 kilometers south of Zaporizhia City) in order to fortify and defend occupied positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[25] Commander of the Azov Regiment Rodion Kudryshov notably claimed that Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia have moved from defensive to offensive positions, which is consistent with reporting that Russian troops are concentrating forces and equipment in Zaporizhia Oblast to prepare for potential Ukrainian counteroffensives.[26] Russian forces are reportedly engaging in continual counter-battery operations along the E105 (also known as the M18) highway that runs through Vasylivka south of Zaporizhia City.[27] Russian forces continued missile and artillery strikes against various areas of Kherson, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa Oblasts.[28]
Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)
Russian authorities continued to struggle with consolidating control of occupied territories in the face of persistent Ukrainian partisan pressure. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on June 20 that mass partisan activity in occupied territories is preventing Russian authorities from being able to present public support for the accession of these areas to Russia.[29] The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) similarly claimed that Russian authorities in Berdyansk are faking queues for Russian passports at local administrative centers in order to fabricate a false façade of public desire for Russian citizenship.[30] The GUR additionally reported that Russian occupation authorities in Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast, are coercing people into collective farming schemes and forcing those who work in these schemes into taking Russian citizenship.[31] Ukrainian partisan activity is likely having administrative consequences on Russian efforts to institute Russian citizenship processes en masse within occupied territories.
[1] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/06/20/vorog-namagatymetsya-vyjty-na-kordony-luganskoyi-oblasti-do-26-chervnya-ganna-malyar/
[2] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/06/20/vorog-namagatymetsya-vyjty-na-kordony-luganskoyi-oblasti-do-26-chervnya-ganna-malyar/
[9] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/06/20/vorog-namagatymetsya-vyjty-na-kordony-luganskoyi-oblasti-do-26-chervnya-ganna-malyar/
[18] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/06/20/vorog-namagatymetsya-vyjty-na-kordony-luganskoyi-oblasti-do-26-chervnya-ganna-malyar/
[29] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/06/20/cherez-sprotyv-rosiyany-ne-mozhut-zimituvaty-dobrovilne-vhodzhennya-okupovanyh-terytorij-v-sklad-rf/
2. 'The impossible': Ukraine's secret, deadly rescue missions
An incredible story (and more to come from the sounds of it). To all helicopter pilots from any nation: I salute you. You are among the bravest and boldest.
'The impossible': Ukraine's secret, deadly rescue missions
AP · by JOHN LEICESTER and HANNA ARHIROVA · June 21, 2022
KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — As was his habit before each flight, the veteran Ukrainian army pilot ran a hand along the fuselage of his Mi-8 helicopter, caressing the heavy transporter’s metal skin to bring luck to him and his crew.
Still, the mission was vital, even desperate. Ukrainian troops were pinned down, their supplies running low, their dead and injured stacking up. Their last-ditch stand at the Azovstal mill was a growing symbol of Ukraine’s defiance in the war against Russia. They could not be allowed to perish.
The 51-year-old pilot — identified only by his first name, Oleksandr — flew just the one mission to Mariupol, and he considered it the most difficult flight of his 30-year-career. He took the risk, he said, because he didn’t want the Azovstal fighters to feel forgotten.
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In the charred hell-scape of that plant, in an underground bunker-turned-medical station that provided shelter from death and destruction above, word started reaching the wounded that a miracle might be coming. Among those told that he was on the list for evacuation was a junior sergeant who’d been shredded by mortar rounds, butchering his left leg and forcing its amputation above the knee.
“Buffalo” was his nom de guerre. He had been through so much, but one more deadly challenge loomed: escape from Azovstal.
___
A series of clandestine, against-the-odds, terrain-hugging, high-speed helicopter missions to reach the Azovstal defenders in March, April and May are being celebrated in Ukraine as among the most heroic feats of military derring-do of the four-month war. Some ended in catastrophe; each grew progressively riskier as Russian air defense batteries caught on.
The full story of the seven resupply and rescue missions has yet to be told. But from exclusive interviews with two wounded survivors; a military intelligence officer who flew on the first mission; and pilot interviews provided by the Ukrainian army, The Associated Press has pieced together the account of one of the last flights, from the perspective of both the rescuers and the rescued.
The military intelligence officer said one helicopter was shot down and two others never came back, and are considered missing. He said he dressed in civilian clothes for his flight, thinking that he could melt into the population if he survived a crash: “We were aware it could be a one-way ticket.”
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Said Zelenskyy: “These are absolutely heroic people who knew what was difficult, who knew that it was almost impossible. ... We lost a lot of pilots.”
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If Buffalo had had his way, he would not have lived to be evacuated. His life would have ended quickly, to spare him the agony he suffered after 120mm mortar rounds tore apart his left leg, bloodied his right foot, and peppered his back with shrapnel during s treet fighting in Mariupol on March 23.
The 20-year-old spoke to The Associated Press on condition that he not be identified by name, saying he didn’t want it to seem that he is seeking publicity when thousands of Azovstal defenders are in captivity or dead. He had been on the trail of a Russian tank, aiming to destroy it with his shoulder-launched, armor-piercing NLAW missile on the last day of the invasion’s first month, when his war was cut short.
Tossed next to the wreckage of a burning car, he dragged himself to cover in a nearby building and “decided it would be better to crawl into the basement and quietly die there,” he said.
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When he came around, a nurse told him how sorry she was that he’d lost the limb.
He cut through the awkwardness with a joke: “Will they return the money for 10 tattoo sessions?”
“I had a lot of tattoos on my leg,” he said. One remains, a human figure, but its legs are gone now, too.
“There was constant shelling,” said Vladislav Zahorodnii, a 22-year-old corporal who had been shot through the pelvis, shredding a nerve, during street fighting in Mariupol.
Zahorodnii saw the missing leg. He asked Buffalo how he was doing.
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“Everything is fine, we will go clubbing soon,” Buffalo replied.
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Zahorodnii was evacuated from Azovstal by helicopter on March 31, after three failed attempts.
It was his first helicopter flight. The Mi-8 took fire on its way out, killing one of its engines. The other one kept them airborne for the remainder of the 80-minute early morning dash to Dnipro city on the Dnieper River in central Ukraine.
He would mark his deliverance with a mortar-round tattoo on his right forearm: “I did it not to forget,” he said.
Buffalo’s turn came the following week. He was ambivalent about leaving. On the one hand, he was relieved that his share of the dwindling food and water would now go to others still able to fight; on the other, “there was a painful feeling. They stayed there, and I left them.”
Still, he almost missed his flight.
Soldiers hauled him on a gurney out of his deep bunker and loaded him aboard a truck that rumbled to a pre-arranged landing zone. The soldiers wrapped him in a jacket.
The helicopter’s cargo of ammunition was unloaded first. Then, the wounded were lifted aboard.
But not Buffalo. Left in a back corner of the truck, he’d somehow been overlooked. He couldn’t raise the alarm because the mortar blasts had injured his throat, and he was still too hoarse to make himself heard over the whoop-whoop-whoop of the helicopter rotors.
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“I thought to myself, ‘Well, not today then,’” he recalled. “And suddenly someone shouted, ‘You forgot the soldier in the truck!’”
Because the cargo bay was full, Buffalo was placed crosswise from the others, who’d been loaded aboard side by side. A crew member took his hand and told him not to worry, they’d make it home.
“All my life,” he told the crew member, “I dreamed of flying a helicopter. It doesn’t matter if we arrive — my dream has come true.”
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In his cockpit, the wait seemed interminable to Oleksandr, the minutes feeling like hours.
“Very scary,” he said. “You see explosions around and the next shell could reach your location.”
In the fog of war and with the full picture of the secret missions still emerging, it’s not possible to be absolutely sure that Buffalo and the pilot who spoke to journalists in a video interview recorded and shared by the military were aboard the same flight. But details of their accounts match.
Both gave the same date: the night of April 4-5. Oleksandr recalled being fired upon by a ship as they swooped over waters out of Mariupol. A blast wave tossed the helicopter around “like a toy,” he said. But his escape maneuvers got them out of trouble.
Buffalo also recalls a blast. The evacuees were told later that the pilot had avoided a missile.
Oleksandr gunned the helicopter to 220 kilometers (135 miles) per hour and flew as low as 3 meters (9 feet) above the ground — except when hopping over power lines. A second helicopter on his mission never made it back; on the return flight, its pilot radioed him that he was running short of fuel. It was their last communication.
On his gurney, Buffalo had watched the terrain zip past through a porthole. “We flew over the fields, below the trees. Very low,” he said.
They made it to Dnipro, safely. Upon landing, Oleksandr heard the wounded calling out for the pilots. He expected them to yell at him for having tossed them around so violently during the flight.
“But when I opened the door, I heard guys saying, ‘Thank you,’” he said.
“Everyone clapped,” recalled Buffalo, now rehabbing with Zahorodnii at a Kyiv clinic. “We told the pilots that they had done the impossible.”
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AP journalists Sophiko Megrelidze in Tbilisi, Georgia, and Oleksandr Stashevskyi in Kyiv contributed.
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AP · by JOHN LEICESTER and HANNA ARHIROVA · June 21, 2022
3. No nukes? Ukraine-Russian war will shape world's arsenals
Excerpts:
That reconsideration by non-nuclear states is playing out in Asia. The region is home to an ever-more assertive North Korea, China, Russia and Iran — three nuclear powers and one near-nuclear power — but is unprotected by the kind of nuclear umbrella and broad defense alliance that for decades has shielded NATO countries.
...
“I don’t think either Japan or South Korea are eager to become nuclear weapon states. It will be immensely politically painful and internally divisive. But what are the alternatives?” ex-Singapore Foreign Minister Bilahari Kausikan told the audience at a March defense forum.
For those hoping North Korea would give up its nuclear weapons, the example provided by
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is “another nail in that coffin,” Terence Roehrig, a professor of national security at the U.S. Naval War College, said at another defense forum in April.
“Ukraine is going to be another example to North Korea of states like Iraq and like Libya, that gave up their nuclear capability — and look at what happened to them,” Roehrig said.
No nukes? Ukraine-Russian war will shape world's arsenals
AP · by ELLEN KNICKMEYER and YONG JUN CHANG · June 21, 2022
“Our country should also develop a nuclear program. And prepare for a possible nuclear war,” said Lee, voicing a desire that a February poll showed was shared by 3 out of 4 South Koreans.
It’s a point that people and politicians of non-nuclear powers globally are raising more often, at what has become a destabilizing moment in more than a half-century of global nuclear nonproliferation efforts, one aggravated by the daily example of nuclear Russia tearing apart non-nuclear Ukraine.
That reconsideration by non-nuclear states is playing out in Asia. The region is home to an ever-more assertive North Korea, China, Russia and Iran — three nuclear powers and one near-nuclear power — but is unprotected by the kind of nuclear umbrella and broad defense alliance that for decades has shielded NATO countries.
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Vulnerable countries will look to the lessons from Ukraine — especially whether Russia succeeds in swallowing big pieces of Ukraine while brandishing its nuclear arsenal to hold other nations at bay — as they consider keeping or pursuing nuclear weapons, security experts say.
As important, they say, is how well the U.S. and its allies are persuading other partners in Europe, the Persian Gulf and Asia to trust in the shield of U.S.-led nuclear and conventional arsenals and not pursue their own nuclear bombs.
For leaders worried about unfriendly, nuclear-armed neighbors, “they will say to their domestic audiences, ‘Please support our nuclear armament because look what happened to Ukraine,’ right?” said Mariana Budjeryn, a researcher with the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.
As a schoolgirl in 1980s Soviet-era Ukraine, Budjeryn drilled on how to dress radiation burns and other potential injuries of nuclear war, at a time that country housed some 5,000 of the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons. Her country renounced nuclear weapons development after the Soviet Union shattered, opting for economic assistance and integration with the West and security assurances.
“Ultimately, I think a lot is riding on the outcome of this war in terms of how we understand the value of nuclear weapons,” Budjeryn said.
Around the world, the U.S. military is reassuring strategic partners who are facing nuclear-backed rivals.
Near the North Korea border this month, white-hot ballistic missiles arched through the night sky as the U.S. joined South Korea in their first joint ballistic test launches in five years. It was a pointed response to North Korea’s launch of at least 18 ballistic missiles this year.
In Europe and in the Persian Gulf, President Joe Biden and U.S. generals, diplomats and troops are shuttling to countries neighboring Russia and to oil-producing countries neighboring Iran. Biden and his top lieutenants pledge the U.S. is committed to blocking nuclear threats from Iran, North Korea and others. In China, President Xi Jinping is matching an aggressive foreign policy with one of his country’s biggest pushes on nuclear arms.
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Some top former Asian officials have cited Ukraine in saying it’s time for more non-nuclear countries to think about getting nuclear weapons, or hosting U.S. ones.
“I don’t think either Japan or South Korea are eager to become nuclear weapon states. It will be immensely politically painful and internally divisive. But what are the alternatives?” ex-Singapore Foreign Minister Bilahari Kausikan told the audience at a March defense forum.
For those hoping North Korea would give up its nuclear weapons, the example provided by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is “another nail in that coffin,” Terence Roehrig, a professor of national security at the U.S. Naval War College, said at another defense forum in April.
“Ukraine is going to be another example to North Korea of states like Iraq and like Libya, that gave up their nuclear capability — and look at what happened to them,” Roehrig said.
Ukraine never had detonation-ready nuclear bombs — at least, none it could fire on its own.
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The Soviet Union’s collapse left Ukraine with the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal. But Ukraine didn’t have operational control. That left it with a weak hand in the 1990s when it negotiated with the U.S., Russia and others on its place in the post-Soviet world, and the fate of the Soviet arsenal. Ukraine got assurances but no guarantees regarding its security, Budjeryn said.
“A piece of paper,” is how Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy referred to one such assurance, signed in 1994.
The U.S. itself has given nuclear and nuclear-curious countries plenty of reasons to worry about forgoing the world’s deadliest weapons.
The West compelled Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi to give up his country’s rudimentary nuclear weapons program in 2003. A couple of years later, Gadhafi’s son Saif al-Islam shared with researcher Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer his father’s biggest worry about that — that Western nations would support an uprising against him.
“And lo and behold, a few years later, get to 2011, you saw what happened,” said Braut-Hegghammer, now a University of Oslo nuclear and security strategy professor.
What happened was NATO, at U.S. urging, intervened in a 2011 internal uprising against Gadhafi. A NATO warplane bombed his convoy. Rebels captured the Libyan leader, tortured him and killed him.
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In Iraq, the U.S. played a central role in forcing Saddam Hussein to give up his nuclear development program. Then the U.S. overthrew Saddam in 2003 on a spurious claim he was reassembling a nuclear weapons effort. Three years later, with Iraq still under U.S. occupation, Saddam plunged through a gallows.
The Middle East leaders’ fall and brutal deaths have clouded denuclearization efforts with North Korea. Rare U.S.-North Korea talks in 2018 collapsed after the Trump administration repeatedly raised the “Libya model” and Vice President Mike Pence threatened Kim Jong-un with Gadhafi’s fate. “Ignorant and stupid,″ North Korea’s government responded.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine now “only highlights to some countries, at least, that if you have a nuclear weapons program, and you’re sort of far along with that, giving it up is a terrible idea,” Braut-Hegghammer said.
The world’s nine nuclear powers — the United States, Russia, France, China, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, India, Israel and North Korea — hold some 13,000 nuclear weapons. Israel does not acknowledge its nuclear program.
The biggest nuclear powers historically have sought to control which countries can licitly join the club. Countries that proceed regardless, including Iran and North Korea, are isolated and sanctioned.
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Nuclear experts mention South Korea and Saudi Arabia as among the countries mostly likely to consider nuclear weapons. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in 2018 pledged to immediately acquire nuclear bombs if Iran did.
It’s surprising that more countries haven’t acquired a bomb, Jessica Cox, head of NATO’s nuclear directorate, said at the April forum.
“If you look at it from a historical perspective, it is not at all clear in the 1950s and 1960s that there would be less than 10 nations armed with nuclear weapons in the world ... 70 years later.”
What made the difference in Europe was NATO’s nuclear deterrence — 30 nations sharing responsibility and decision-making for a nuclear arsenal that deters attacks on them all, Cox said.
Many feel Ukraine made the right decision when it avoided possible isolation by waiving a nuclear-armed future. That gave Ukraine three decades to integrate with the world’s economy and build alliances with powerful nations now aiding its defense against Russia.
As a young woman in Ukraine, Budjeryn realized at one point after the 1990s accords that her own job, then in business-development, was funded by the Clinton administration, as part of the West’s rewards to Ukraine for the nuclear deal.
“If Ukraine prevails,” she said, ” then it will communicate that nuclear weapons are useless.”
“But if Ukraine falls, the story will look very different,” she said.
___
Chang reported from Seoul.
AP · by ELLEN KNICKMEYER and YONG JUN CHANG · June 21, 2022
4. Can Putin Survive? – The Lessons of the Soviet Collapse
Excerpts:
In the long term, it is possible to imagine this seriously weakening the Russian state. Separatism could rise or return to some regions, such as Chechnya, if the Kremlin stops paying their residents’ bills. Tensions will generally grow between Moscow—where money is amassed—and the industrial cities and regions that depend on imports and exports. This is most likely to happen in Eastern Siberia and the mid-Volga, oil-producing regions that could find themselves forced to give ever-larger shares of shrinking profits to the Kremlin.
Still, even a much weaker Russia is not destined to suffer a Soviet Union–style breakup. National separatism is not nearly as much of a threat to present-day Russia, where roughly 80 percent of the country’s citizens consider themselves to be ethnic Russians, as it was to the Soviet Union. Moscow’s strong repressive institutions could also ensure that Russia does not experience regime change, or at least not the same kind of regime change that took place in 1991. And Russians, even if they turn against the war, would probably not go on another rampage to destroy their own state.
The West should nonetheless stay the course. The sanctions will gradually drain Russia’s war chest and, with it, the country’s capacity to fight. Facing mounting battlefield setbacks, the Kremlin may agree to an uneasy armistice. But the West must also stay realistic. Only a hardcore determinist can believe that in 1991, there were no alternatives to the Soviet collapse. In fact, a much more logical path for the Soviet state would have been continued authoritarianism combined with radical market liberalization and prosperity for select groups—not unlike the road China has taken. Similarly, it would be deterministic for the West to expect that a weakened Russia would fall. There will at least be a period in which Ukraine and the West have to coexist with a weakened and humiliated but still autocratic Russian state. Western policymakers must prepare for this eventuality rather than dreaming of collapse in Moscow.
Can Putin Survive?
The Lessons of the Soviet Collapse
On May 9, 2022, a column of tanks and artillery thundered down Moscow’s Red Square. Over 10,000 soldiers marched through the city’s streets. It was Russia’s 27th annual Victory Day parade, in which the country commemorates the Soviet Union’s triumph over Nazi Germany in World War II. Russian President Vladimir Putin, presiding over the ceremonies, gave a speech praising his country’s military and fortitude. “The defense of our motherland when its destiny was at stake has always been sacred,” he said. “We will never give up.” Putin was speaking about the past but also about the present, with a clear message to the rest of the world: Russia is determined to continue prosecuting its war against Ukraine.
The war looks very different in Putin’s telling than it does to the West. It is just and courageous. It is successful. “Our warriors of different ethnicities are fighting together, shielding each other from bullets and shrapnel like brothers,” Putin said. Russia’s enemies had tried to use “international terrorist gangs” against the country, but they had “failed completely.” In reality, of course, Russian troops have been met by fierce local resistance rather than outpourings of support, and they were unable to seize Kyiv and depose Ukraine’s government. But for Putin, victory may be the only publicly acceptable result. No alternate outcomes are openly discussed in Russia.
They are, however, discussed in the West, which has been near jubilant about Ukraine’s success. Russia’s military setbacks have reinvigorated the transatlantic alliance and, for a moment, made Moscow look like a kleptocratic third-rate power. Many policymakers and analysts are now dreaming that the conflict could ultimately end not just in a Ukrainian victory; they are hoping Putin’s regime will suffer the same fate as the Soviet Union: collapse. This hope is evident in the many articles and speeches drawing comparisons between the Soviet Union’s disastrous war in Afghanistan and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It appears to be a latent motivation for the harsh sanctions imposed on Russia, and it underlines all the recent talk of the democratic world’s new unity. The war, the logic goes, will sap public support for the Kremlin as losses mount and sanctions destroy the Russian economy. Cut off from access to Western goods, markets, and culture, both elites and ordinary Russians will grow increasingly fed up with Putin, perhaps taking to the streets to demand a better future. Eventually, Putin and his regime may be shunted aside in either a coup or a wave of mass protests.
This thinking is based on a faulty reading of history. The Soviet Union did not collapse for the reasons Westerners like to point to: a humiliating defeat in Afghanistan, military pressure from the United States and Europe, nationalistic tensions in its constituent republics, and the siren song of democracy. In reality, it was misguided Soviet economic policies and a series of political missteps by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that caused the country to self-destruct. And Putin has learned a great deal from the Soviet collapse, managing to avoid the financial chaos that doomed the Soviet state despite intense sanctions. Russia today features a very different combination of resilience and vulnerability than the one that characterized the late-era Soviet Union. This history matters because in thinking about the war in Ukraine and its aftermath, the West should avoid projecting its misconceptions about the Soviet collapse onto present-day Russia.
The Soviet Union did not collapse for the reasons Westerners like to point to.
But that doesn’t mean the West is helpless in shaping Russia’s future. Putin’s regime is more stable than Gorbachev’s was, but if the West can stay unified, it may still be able to slowly undermine the Russian president’s power. Putin grossly miscalculated by invading Ukraine, and in doing so he has exposed the regime’s vulnerabilities—an economy that is much more interdependent with Western economies than its Soviet predecessor ever was and a highly concentrated political system that lacks the tools for political and military mobilization possessed by the Communist Party. If the war grinds on, Russia will become a less powerful international actor. A prolonged invasion may even lead to the kind of chaos that brought down the Soviet Union. But Western leaders cannot hope for such a quick, decisive victory. They will have to deal with an authoritarian Russia, however weakened, for the foreseeable future.
CREATIVE DESTRUCTION
In the United States and Europe, many experts assume that the collapse of the Soviet Union was preordained. In this narrative, the Soviet Union had long been fossilized economically and ideologically, its military overextended. It took time for the economic flaws and internal contradictions to tear the state apart, but as the West increased pressure on the Kremlin through military buildups, the country began to buckle. And as national self-determination movements in the constituent republics gained steam, it began to break. Gorbachev’s attempts at liberalization, well intentioned as they were, could not save a dying system.
There is some truth to this story. The Soviet Union could never successfully compete militarily or technologically with the United States and its allies. Soviet leaders performed Sisyphean labor to catch up with the West, but their country always lagged behind. On the battlefield of ideas and images, Western freedom and prosperity did help accelerate the demise of communist ideology, as younger Soviet elites lost faith in communism and gained a keen interest in coveted foreign goods, travel, and Western popular culture. And the Soviet imperial project certainly faced discontent and disdain from internal ethnic minorities.
Yet these were not new problems, and by themselves, they were not enough to rapidly force the Communist Party out of power at the end of the 1980s. In China, communist leaders faced a similar set of crises at roughly the same time, but they responded to rising discontent by liberalizing the Chinese economy while using force to put down mass protests. This combination—capitalism without democracy—worked, and the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party now rule cynically and profit from state capitalism while posing under portraits of Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, and Mao Zedong. Other communist regimes, such as the one in Vietnam, made similar transitions.
In reality, the Soviet Union was destroyed not so much by its structural faults as by the Gorbachev-era reforms themselves. As the economists Michael Bernstam, Michael Ellman, and Vladimir Kontorovich have all argued, perestroika unleashed entrepreneurial energy but not in a way that created a new market economy and filled shelves for Soviet consumers. Instead, the energy turned out to be destructive. Soviet-style entrepreneurs hollowed out the state’s economic assets and exported valuable resources for dollars while paying taxes in rubles. They siphoned revenues to offshore sites, paving the way for oligarchic kleptocracy. Commercial banks quickly learned ingenious ways to milk the Soviet state, leading the central bank to print more and more rubles to cover the commercial banks’ financial obligations as the government deficit expanded. In 1986 and 1987, as vodka sales and oil prices fell and the country reeled in the wake of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the Ministry of Finance printed only 3.9 billion and 5.9 billion rubles, respectively. But in 1988 and 1989, when Gorbachev’s reforms were enacted, the injections of ruble liquidity increased to 11.7 billion and then to 18.3 billion.
It took decades for tens of millions of former Soviet citizens to develop postimperial identities.
Gorbachev and other reformers plowed ahead anyway. The Soviet leader delegated more political and economic authority to the 15 republics that constituted the union. He removed the Communist Party from governance and authorized elections in each of the republics for councils vested with legislative and constitutional authority. Gorbachev’s design was well meaning, yet it magnified economic chaos and financial destabilization. Russia and the other republics withheld two-thirds of the revenues that were supposed to go to the federal budget, forcing the Soviet finance ministry to print 28.4 billion rubles in 1990. The Soviet ruling class, meanwhile, decomposed into ethnic clans: the communist elites in the various republics—Kazakhs, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and others—began to identify more with their “nations” than with the imperial center. Nationalist separatism rose like a flood.
The change of heart was particularly striking in the case of the Russians. During World War II, the Russians had done most of the fighting on behalf of the Soviet Union, and many in the West saw the communist empire as a mere extension of Russia. But in 1990–91, it was primarily tens of millions of Russians, led by Boris Yeltsin, who tore down the Soviet state. They were an eclectic group, including liberal-minded intellectuals from Moscow, provincial Russian apparatchiks, and even KGB and military officers. What united them was their rejection of Gorbachev and his failing governance. The Soviet leader’s perceived weakness, in turn, prompted an attempted coup in August 1991. The organizers put Gorbachev under house arrest and sent tanks into Moscow in hopes of shocking people into submission, but they failed on both fronts. Instead, they hesitated to use brutal force and inspired mass protests against the Kremlin’s control. What followed was the self-destruction of the Soviet Union’s power structures. Yeltsin pushed Gorbachev aside, banned the Communist Party, and acted as a sovereign ruler. On December 8, 1991, Yeltsin and the leaders of Belarus and Ukraine declared that the Soviet Union had “ceased to exist as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality.”
But without Yeltsin’s declaration, the Soviet Union might have soldiered on. Even after it ceased to formally exist, the empire continued to live for years as a common ruble zone with no borders and customs. Post-Soviet states lacked financial independence. Even after national independence referendums, followed by celebrations of newfound freedom, it took decades for tens of millions of former Soviet citizens outside Russia to develop postimperial identities, to think and act like citizens of Belarus, Ukraine, and the other new states. In this sense, the Soviet Union proved to be more resilient than brittle. It was no different from other empires in that it took decades, not months, to disintegrate.
LEARNING FROM THE PAST
Putin is deeply familiar with this history. The Russian president once declared that “the demise of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the twentieth century, and he has structured his regime to avoid the same fate. He recognized that Marx and Lenin were wrong about economics, and he energetically worked to figure out how Russia could survive and thrive under global capitalism. He brought in capable economists and made macroeconomic stability and having a balanced budget among his top priorities. During the first decade of his rule, soaring oil prices filled Russia’s coffers, and Putin quickly finished paying back the $130 billion in debt Russia owed to Western banks. He kept future debts to a minimum, and his government began to accumulate reserves in foreign currency and gold. Those precautions paid off during the global financial crisis of 2008, when Russia was able to comfortably bail out corporations vital to its economy (all of which were run by Putin’s associates).
After Putin annexed Crimea in 2014, the United States imposed sanctions on Russian oil and other industries, and oil prices plummeted as much as they did under Gorbachev. But the Russian government reacted skillfully. Under the leadership of Central Bank Chair Elvira Nabiullina and Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, the government allowed the ruble to devalue, restoring macroeconomic stability. After a brief dip, the Russian economy rebounded. Even during the COVID-19 pandemic, the country maintained strict fiscal discipline. While Western states printed trillions of dollars to subsidize their economies, Russia increased its budget surplus. The government’s economists “are holier than the Pope in applying” the approach advocated by the International Monetary Fund, said Dmitry Nekrasov, a former Russian state economist. “During the last ten years there has been no country in the world that would have conducted such a consistent, conservative, and hard-principled policy drawn on [a] liberal model of macroeconomics.” By 2022, Putin’s state had accumulated more than $600 billion in financial reserves, one of the largest stashes in the world.
But for Putin, the primary purpose of this sound financial policymaking was not to earn international plaudits or even to help ordinary Russians keep their savings. The point was to bolster his power. Putin used the accumulated reserves to restore the sinews of the authoritarian state by building up the security services, expanding Russia’s military and armament industry, and paying off the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, and his paramilitary—another pillar of the Kremlin’s dictatorship.
Putin energetically worked to figure out how Russia could thrive under global capitalism.
When Putin decided to invade Ukraine earlier this year, he believed Russia’s large reserves would allow the country to ride out whatever sanctions resulted. But the West’s financial response was far harsher than he expected—even ardent anti-Russian hawks in the West were surprised. The West and its allies cut off a number of major Russian banks from SWIFT, the international payment clearing network, and froze $400 billion in Russian international reserves that were physically stored in G-7 countries. Washington and its allies also blocked a host of manufacturing companies from working with the Russian government or Russian businesses. Over 700 Western manufacturing and retail corporations walked out of Russia on their own, shamed by public opinion in their home countries. Large international transportation and financial firms and intermediaries stopped working with companies linked to Moscow. The decoupling is unlike anything the world has seen since the blockades of Germany and Japan during World War II.
In the West, these actions were met with euphoria. Pundits declared that Russia’s currency would collapse and that there would be broad protests. Some even speculated that Putin could be toppled. But none of those scenarios came to pass. The ruble did initially tank, but Nabiullina and Siluanov acted quickly to save it. The Russian state suspended the currency’s free convertibility and decreed that 80 percent of the oil revenue made by Russian companies and other exporters (including revenue made in dollars) had to be sold to the central bank. It banned Russian citizens from wiring more than $10,000 abroad per month, quashing the panicky rush to convert rubles to dollars, and the Russian currency eventually bounced all the way back to pre-invasion levels. Had Gorbachev been assisted by such expertise, the Soviet Union might have survived.
Russia’s entrepreneurs, meanwhile, are learning how to adapt to their new reality. Many of the front doors to the international economy have shut, but Russia’s businesspeople—including those who run its arms industry—know how to use backdoors to find what they need. Russian businesses also still enjoy legal access to multiple major economies, including those of China and India, both of which remain willing to do business with Russia. There is little economic reason for them not to: the strength of the ruble makes it profitable to buy Russian energy and other materials at a discount. The Russian government can then tax these profits and enforce their conversion to rubles, further maintaining the country’s solvency. In the short term, then, it is unlikely that the West’s harsh sanctions will kill the ruble and force the Kremlin to yield.
DIVIDE AND CONQUER
Western penalties may not be shifting Moscow’s thinking. But they are unmistakably hurting parts of Russia’s population: namely, the country’s elites and the urban middle class. Governments, universities, and other institutions around the world have canceled thousands of scientific and scholarly projects with Russian researchers. Services that were woven into the lives of many white-collar Russians—from Facebook to Netflix to Zoom—are suddenly unavailable. Russians cannot upgrade their MacBooks or iPhones. It has become extremely hard for them to get visas to enter the United Kingdom or the European Union, and even if they succeed, there are no direct flights or trains that can take them there. They can no longer use their credit cards abroad or pay for foreign goods and services. For the country’s cosmopolitans, Russia’s invasion has made life quite difficult.
At first glance, this might seem to bode ill for Putin. During the Soviet political crisis of 1990–91, members of the middle and upper classes played a huge role in bringing about the collapse of the state. Hundreds of thousands of educated Soviets rallied in the main squares of Moscow and St. Petersburg, demanding change. A new Russian elite, one that embraced nationalism and cast itself in opposition to the Soviet old guard, gained power after elections held in 1990. The country’s knowledge workers and intelligentsia teamed up with this new elite to help bring the empire down.
But Gorbachev tolerated, and arguably encouraged, such political activism. Putin does not. Unlike Gorbachev, who allowed opponents to contest elections, Putin has worked to prevent any Russians from emerging as credible threats—most recently, by poisoning and then arresting the opposition leader Alexei Navalny in August 2021. There have been no demonstrations against the war on the scale that Gorbachev allowed, thanks in no small part to the ruthless efficiency of Russia’s security services. The enforcers of Putin’s police state have the power and the skills needed to suppress any street protests, including through intimidation, arrests, and other assorted punishments, such as hefty fines. And the Russian state is aggressively pushing to control its people’s minds. In the first days after the invasion, Russia’s legislature passed laws criminalizing open discussion and the dissemination of information about the war. The government forced the country’s independent news outlets to shut down.
Navalny on a screen during a court hearing in Moscow, May 2022
Evgenia Novozhenina / Reuters
But these are just the most visible tools of Putin’s system of control. Like many other authoritarians, the Russian president has also learned to exploit economic inequality to establish a firm base of support, leaning into the differences between what the Russian scholar Natalya Zubarevich calls “the four Russias.” The first Russia consists of urbanites in large cities, many of whom work in the postindustrial economy and are culturally connected to the West. They are the source of most opposition to Putin, and they have staged protests against the president before. But they constitute just one-fifth of the population, by Zubarevich’s estimate. The other three Russias are the residents of poorer industrial cities, who are nostalgic for the Soviet past; people who live in declining rural towns; and multiethnic non-Russians in the North Caucasus (including Chechnya) and southern Siberia. The inhabitants of those three Russias overwhelmingly support Putin because they depend on subsidies from the state and because they adhere to traditional values when it comes to hierarchy, religion, and worldview—the kinds of cultural positions that Putin has championed in the Kremlin’s imperialist and nationalist propaganda, which has gone into overdrive since the invasion of Ukraine began.
Putin, then, doesn’t need to engage in mass repression to keep himself in command. Indeed, recognizing the seeming futility of opposing the state, many members of the first Russia who are truly fed up with Putin are simply fleeing the country—a development that Putin openly supports. He has declared their departure to be “a natural and necessary self-purification of [Russian] society” from a pro-Western “fifth column.” And so far, the invasion has done little to erode his support among the other three Russias. Most members of those groups do not feel connected to the global economy, and they are therefore relatively unbothered by Russia’s excommunication by the West via sanctions and bans. To maintain these groups’ support, Putin can continue to subsidize some regions and pour billions into infrastructure and construction projects in others.
He can also appeal to their conservative and nostalgic sentiments—something Gorbachev could never do. Russia’s turbulent history has led most of its people to want a strong leader and consolidation of the country—not democracy, civil rights, and national self-determination. Gorbachev, however, was no strongman. The Soviet leader was driven by an extraordinarily idealistic vision and refused to use force to maintain his empire. He mobilized the most progressive groups of Russian society, above all the intelligentsia and urban professionals, to help him yank the Soviet Union out of its isolation, stagnation, and conservative moorings. But in doing so, he lost the support of the rest of Russia and was forced out of office, leaving behind a legacy of economic crisis, statelessness, chaos, and secession. The life expectancy of Russians dropped from 69 years in 1990 to 64.5 years in 1994; for males, the plunge was from 64 years down to 58 years. Russia’s population declined, and the country faced food shortages. It is no wonder that so many Russians wanted a strongman like Putin, who promised to protect them from a hostile world and to restore the Russian empire. In the weeks after the invasion of Ukraine, the Russian people’s knee-jerk reaction was to rally around the tsar, not to accuse him of unprovoked aggression.
UNDER PRESSURE
None of this bodes well for Westerners who want Putin’s system to fall—or for the Ukrainians fighting to defeat the Russian military machine. But even though the Soviet Union’s collapse may not offer a preview of Russia’s trajectory, that doesn’t mean the West’s actions will have no impact on the country’s future. There is a consensus among both Western and savvy Russian economists that in the long term, the sanctions will cause Russia’s economy to shrink as supply chain disruptions mount. The country’s transportation and communications industries are especially vulnerable. Russia’s passenger aircraft, fastest trains, and most of its automobiles are made in the West, and they are now cut off from the companies that know how to service and maintain them. Even official government statistics indicate that the assembly of new cars in Russia has fallen precipitously—at least partly because Russian factories are cut off from foreign-made parts. The Russian military-industrial complex may continue to go on unimpeded for now, but it, too, will eventually face shortages. In the past, Western companies continued to supply Russian arms manufacturers, even after Russia annexed Crimea. Now, if for ethical reasons alone, they won’t.
The Russian energy sector has largely escaped the penalties, and as prices soar, it is making more money on exports than it did before the war. But eventually, energy output will also deteriorate, and the energy sector, too, will need spare parts and technological upgrades that only the West can properly offer. The Russian authorities have admitted that the country’s oil output declined by 7.5 percent in March and may go down to levels not seen since 2003. Selling energy is likely to become a problem as well, especially if the European Union can wean itself from Russian oil and gas.
Putin denies that this will happen. At a meeting with the heads of the energy corporations, he referred to Western sanctions as “chaotic” and asserted that they would hurt Western economies and consumers more than Russians because of inflation. He even spoke about Europe’s “economic suicide” and promised to stay ahead of the West’s anti-Russian actions. He has also convinced himself that the West no longer calls the shots in the global economy, given the world’s increasing multipolarity. He is not alone; even Russian economists who oppose Putin are convinced that as long as the country’s finances are in good shape, the rest of the world—including some Western companies, traders, and intermediaries—will risk violating the sanctions to do business with Russia. As the global economy sags under the weight of the war and as international shock over the invasion fades, they believe that Russia’s relationship with the world will return to normal, just as it did after 2014.
A fall in energy profits will not undermine the resilience of Putin’s regime.
But the West appears prepared to keep going. One day before Putin celebrated Victory Day, the G-7 leaders issued a declaration in support of Ukraine in which they recognized the country as an ally of the West and pledged financial support, a steady supply of arms, access to NATO intelligence, and, critically, continued economic pressure on Russia. The key of the declaration was, indeed, an announcement that they would work toward “Russia’s isolation across all sectors of its economy.” It echoes what Ursula von der Leyen, the head of the European Commission, described as the EU’s goals: to stop Russian banks “from operating worldwide,” to “effectively block Russian exports and imports,” and to “make it impossible for the [Russian] Central Bank to liquidate its assets.”
It won’t be easy to maintain this level of unity, nor will it be easy to expand the pressure to more of Russia’s sectors—such as by instituting an EU embargo on Russian oil and gas. Several countries, including Hungary (whose prime minister, Viktor Orban, remains one of Putin’s few friends in Europe) as well as Germany and Italy, are aware that an energy embargo would deal a huge blow to their economies. And even if Europe does institute an energy ban, it will not lead to an immediate crisis in Russia. The Soviet Union, after all, experienced a drastic drop in oil revenues in the late 1980s, but that is not what bankrupted the country. It was, instead, Gorbachev’s loss of control over the central bank, the ruble, and the country’s fiscal mechanisms. As long as Putin retains power over these assets and follows professional advice, a fall in energy profits will not undermine the resilience of his regime.
But if the West is serious about stopping Putin, it will have to try to keep up the pressure anyway. The longer the sanctions go on and the harsher they grow, the more the West’s anti-Russian economic regime will be implemented and internalized by other actors in the global economy. States and companies outside the West will grow more concerned about secondary sanctions. Some of the businesses may even worry about their reputations. The Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei has already suspended new contracts with Russia. Indian firms that indicated a readiness to buy Russian oil at a 30 percent discount are now under intense pressure to back off.
Only a hardcore determinist can believe that in 1991, there were no alternatives to the Soviet collapse.
If the sanctions regime does drag on and becomes institutionalized, the West may yet succeed in undermining Putin’s system. Moscow’s talented economists will eventually become unable to shield the country from devastating macroeconomic impacts. Even with trillions of dollars in investment in infrastructure projects or other stimulus measures, the Russian state will be unable to overcome the effects of exclusion as the costs of these projects, especially with the accompanying corruption, balloon. Without foreign know-how, the efficiency of producing Russian goods and their quality will return to where they were in the early 1990s. The three Russias dependent on the state for their livelihoods will then acutely feel their country’s growing weakness and isolation in a way that, for now, they do not. People may even struggle to put food on the table. This would all seriously undermine Putin’s story: that he is the essential leader of a “sovereign and great Russia,” which has “risen from its knees” under his tenure.
In the long term, it is possible to imagine this seriously weakening the Russian state. Separatism could rise or return to some regions, such as Chechnya, if the Kremlin stops paying their residents’ bills. Tensions will generally grow between Moscow—where money is amassed—and the industrial cities and regions that depend on imports and exports. This is most likely to happen in Eastern Siberia and the mid-Volga, oil-producing regions that could find themselves forced to give ever-larger shares of shrinking profits to the Kremlin.
Still, even a much weaker Russia is not destined to suffer a Soviet Union–style breakup. National separatism is not nearly as much of a threat to present-day Russia, where roughly 80 percent of the country’s citizens consider themselves to be ethnic Russians, as it was to the Soviet Union. Moscow’s strong repressive institutions could also ensure that Russia does not experience regime change, or at least not the same kind of regime change that took place in 1991. And Russians, even if they turn against the war, would probably not go on another rampage to destroy their own state.
The West should nonetheless stay the course. The sanctions will gradually drain Russia’s war chest and, with it, the country’s capacity to fight. Facing mounting battlefield setbacks, the Kremlin may agree to an uneasy armistice. But the West must also stay realistic. Only a hardcore determinist can believe that in 1991, there were no alternatives to the Soviet collapse. In fact, a much more logical path for the Soviet state would have been continued authoritarianism combined with radical market liberalization and prosperity for select groups—not unlike the road China has taken. Similarly, it would be deterministic for the West to expect that a weakened Russia would fall. There will at least be a period in which Ukraine and the West have to coexist with a weakened and humiliated but still autocratic Russian state. Western policymakers must prepare for this eventuality rather than dreaming of collapse in Moscow.
VLADISLAV ZUBOK is Professor of International History at the London School of Economics and the author of Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Union.
5. Dr. Frank Hoffman on “Defining and Securing Success in Ukraine”
This is arguably one of the most important yet most difficult tasks in strategy and especially in the context of Ukraine and Putin's War.
The last paragraph gets to one of the most important actions: attacking the enemy's strategy (It is of supreme importance according to Sun Tzu). We need to recognize Putin's strategy, understand it, expose it, and attack it (with information among other tools).
Conclusion:
Rather than simply manage the consequences of this conflict, the West should define our common goals and push for an end game to establish the better peace that should be the ultimate objective. The strategic discipline demonstrated to date by the U.S. government, employing all the tools of statecraft in close linkage with allies and parties, is the surest path to that end point.
Ukraine’s military success against Putin’s aggression is a necessary step in the larger contest with Moscow. The bigger picture requires us to implant in Putin’s mind an acute appreciation for the West’s capacity and willingness to defend the existing order. To advance that goal, the strategic pressure generated to date must be increased, until Moscow realizes it cannot obtain its larger goals by this malevolent campaign.
Putin has not been compelled to stop his rapacious quest against Ukraine, and not deterred from barbaric violations of international law. We have to make him aware that he has lost and will continue losing. That conclusion should be made compelling in the darkest recesses of the Kremlin and Putin’s psyche.
Dr. Frank Hoffman on “Defining and Securing Success in Ukraine”
What is the way forward in the Ukraine crisis? In today’s post Dr. Frank Hoffman joins us again to discuss that very question in his thoughtful but extremely candid way. As he puts it, “[n]ow is the time to reassess collective strategies for bringing this conflict to an end rather than accept the costs and consequences of its protracted character.”
In an extraordinarily realistic manner, Frank reviews the current situation, examines the larger dynamics, considers the strategic options, and concedes that a diplomatic and political solution “will require painful compromise on both sides.” He adds that “[t]hese are not ‘face-saving’ gestures or ‘off ramps’ but a pragmatic reality about ending this conflict.”
Seriously, Frank’s essay is a ‘must read’:
Defining and Securing Success in Ukraine
by Frank Hoffman
The war in Ukraine has passed its 100-day anniversary and a grinding war of attrition has arrived. The predicted stalemate scenario is being borne out with the Russians making slow and costly advances, which is all that they can hope to achieve. The question of the day, to borrow the title of a famous book, is Tell Me How This Ends. General David Petraeus’s famous question looms just as large today.
There is a lot of sentiment behind ensuring that Putin cannot win this war, and for declarations that “Ukraine must win” but not a lot of ideas on how to make that happen anytime soon. Some columnists passionately claim The War Won’t End Until Putin Loses and press for a clear military defeat. Yet, the persistent “Putin Must Lose” school does not offer a viable way to generate that end state and does not weigh the related costs or risks.
While there seems to be some clear and public aims in the United States, there is less agreement in NATO and precious few ideas on the ways and means to obtain them. As Ian Bremmer noted in a dispatch from Davos:
There’s a lot of consensus around Putin needing to be stopped and Ukrainians deserving all the help we can give them. But that’s where the unity ends. How does the conflict end? Can the Ukrainians actually win? Does that require humiliating the Russians? Or does Putin need to be offered an off-ramp? On those questions, there’s no agreement whatsoever.
It is time to ask, as Eliot Cohen did, what is our goal or What Victory Will Look Like. Is a battlefield victory by Ukraine the right goal and what would generate that result? What are the realistic chances of success? This paper examines the ongoing war and explores options that lead to ending the conflict in some way that would constitute success or “victory.”
Decisive victory in a purely military sense is an unlikely prospect. A frozen conflict, a larger and longer version of Donbas across the entire Ukrainian frontier, is increasingly likely despite the efforts from the West to induce Russia to back down.
The prospects of a grinding stalemate are evident and extending the fighting creates spill over consequences for other U.S. strategic priorities. A war of endurance may play to U.S./European economic advantages but could evolve in a way that harms longer-term interests.
Now is the time to reassess collective strategies for bringing this conflict to an end rather than accept the costs and consequences of its protracted character.
Is Victory Possible?
Thus, few political or military options seem available aside from continuing the current approach which is predicated upon massive security assistance to provide the arms the Ukrainian people need to defend themselves.
Is the Alliance strategy and contributions enough? Can Ukraine build off its initial success around Kyiv and thwart the Russian Army in the eastern and southern coastline? Some analysts believe that Kyiv could restore the status quo ante that existed before Russia launched its attack in February.
Assessing the relative chances of Ukraine’s ability to not just hold the line but regain the 20% of its territory from occupation raises a key question for the West. Can success be obtained with a strategy that relies so heavily on Ukraine to bear the entire human costs of the combat?
President Zelensky has vowed to retake all of the occupied territory. Is this feasible, and at what cost? The Ukrainians make it clear they are willing to bear that horrific cost, while also recognizing that they want to convert that battlefield success into a durable political solution.
Yet, Ukraine, even with massive military transfusions, may not be able to regain its lost territory by force of arms. It would require offensives that would require combined arms maneuver against dug in Russian forces for success, reversing the conditions of the prior battles and victories in the north.
More likely, another frozen conflict will ensue, with Putin simply digging in and annexing his current holdings. A stalemate, with Russian occupying a swath of Ukraine, and Kyiv’s economy reduced by 40 percent, could result.
Defining Success
U.S. strategic aims are reflected in the policy goals announcement made by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, “what we want to see is a free and independent Ukraine, a weakened and isolated Russia, and a stronger, more unified, more determined West.” Secretary of Defense Austin’s comments about that second policy aim were misunderstood as a unilateral escalation.
The implications of the policy and the consensus behind these goals is revealed by the accelerated security assistance the U.S. is providing, and by the type of weaponry being supplied. Congress substantially increased aid to Ukraine for the coming year to over $40 billion more in aid. More aid, much more aid, seems needed if Ukraine is to regain most of the territory Russia initially seized.
It is time to question aims, assumptions and risk. Most importantly, we need to ask if we have a Theory of Victory for this war. Kyiv has now made their own hypothesis for a theory of victory much clearer. It may not be realistic but it is clear.
Is the strategy and its inherent logic realistic about the complexities of the conflict? Does the military notion of victory and defeat capture the only options to resolve the conflict or at least stop the horrific violence? What trade space exists for negotiations, including territory or political constraints on both sides? Too many have deflected this issue, deferring to Kyiv.
But there are Western chips on the negotiating table; sanctions relief, security guarantees, reconstruction costs, freedom of navigation, etc. Kyiv has borne the butcher’s bill and thus should sit at the head of the settlement table, but it cannot write checks for U.S. taxpayers or unilaterally pass on bills for the West to pay. Moreover, the goals its sets for reclaiming territory from Russian occupation have to be balanced against how much security assistance is available and offered.
The answer for the larger questions involve generating a broader Theory of Success for the West. The U.S. representative to NATO called for a strategic defeat of the Russian Federation. Those comments should mean that Putin’s strategy in Ukraine is completely stopped. But that statement and Mr. Austin’s widely cited comment in Poland about “weakening” Russia came across as a call for regime change to allies in Europe. The Secretary’s statement simply outlined a longer term goal, consistent with Mr. Sullivan’s, to ensure that Russia cannot simply regroup and reattack Ukraine next year.
Yet, this has surfaced cracks in the West about desired political outcomes and what constitutes “victory.” Is that about defending Ukraine, or a military defeat of Russia’s armed forces, or a larger and more enduring end to tensions with Moscow? The two contests are inter-related but winning in Ukraine does not necessarily and automatically resolve the larger contest.
Opinions on U.S. objectives vary and emotive calls to embrace Ukrainian victory as the singular goal are increasingly voiced now, with little distinction between what actions best serve Washington’s or the West’s interests. We also need to align our strategy with Ukraine’s leadership. We need to gain an agreement on what constitutes success in Ukraine and with the larger challenge posed by Putin against Europe writ large.
To reassess objectives going forward, we need to be clear eyed about Putin’s agenda. This is far more than a fight between Moscow and Kyiv. As the Atlantic Council noted, Putin seeks to dismantle the entire post-Cold War European security architecture and reestablish a Russian sphere of influence over Eastern and Central Europe. He wants veto authority over how states in Europe exercise their sovereign rights of political, economic and security association. He has designs on a weaker if not dissolved NATO.
We also need to understand Putin’s theory of victory, which is not hard to capture. Putin’s logic is based on his willingness to pile more men and materiel, and accept higher losses, in order to simply grind down Kyiv’s defense through sheer brute force.
As Russian expert Kier Giles at the UK-based Conflict Studies Research Centre put it, Moscow seeks to “keep up the pressure on Ukraine longer than Ukraine can keep up Western interest in supporting it in its fight for freedom.” That is Moscow’s theory of victory in a war of endurance they started.
Strategic Options
Having explored the contours of the strategic interaction, what options does the West have given what we have observed and learned from 100 days of war? Can diplomacy resolve this crisis or should overt military from NATO be deployed inside Ukraine? This next section compares diplomatic and military options, and concludes with a discussion about merging them into a more comprehensive strategy focused on compelling an end to the war.
Prospects for Diplomacy. Key European leaders including the French President and the Italian foreign minister have advocated diplomatic solutions to the war. They hope that Putin will rationally assess his diminished chances of a battlefield success and seek to get out from under the massive sanctions package levied on Moscow.
I am not sure we can count on rationality in the Kremlin. He is clearly not, as John Mearsheimer once claimed, “a first-class strategist who should be feared and respected.”
Putin’s judgment is shaped by imperial illusions as shown by Jeff Mankoff in his impressive book, Empires of Eurasia. The imperial histories of Europe cast a long shadow that influences events today. Russia seems schizophrenic, trapped between delusions of power and vulnerability.
As Nick Burns, the U.S. director of the CIA put it, President Putin is “stewing in a very combustible combination of grievance and ambition and insecurity.” The American intelligence community finds Putin more unpredictable than ever.
Would be some sort of negotiated settlement with a Russian withdrawal from selected areas be feasible? Perhaps, but does it matter or is a sustainable solution feasible at all? The real question may be “why do we think a negotiated settlement is a useful end state?”
Putin does not have a strong track record for honoring his commitments. His dismissal of the Helsinki and Budapest accords, and violation of the should suggest that attempting to secure a meaningful, lasting agreement is problematic. There are calls for negotiations to this conflict but little common ground on what the deal may look like. The Italian proposal, a cease fire and some concessions to promote a peace conference, is thin gruel. Both sides have flatly rejected it.
Given the dynamics on the battlefield, both sides will have problems compromising and dealing with their domestic politics. Putin obviously has less concerns about his domestic base, but his actions to tightly control the information space and dissent inside Russia suggests he knows that his authority and position can be challenged. He needs to deliver some benefit for the horrible costs his war has imposed on his economy and his devastated military.
President Zelensky is strong politically but also has constraints. In a recent survey, 82 percent of Ukrainians polled stated that territory should not be given to Russia in trade for peace and “under any circumstances, even if this prolongs the war.”
Just 10 percent of Ukrainians who participated in the poll indicated that they were willing to cede land now to gain peace. Given this, Zelensky cannot politically accept an agreement that locks in Russia’s current position inside Ukraine, or survive politically if he goes against the majority of his electorate.
At this point, neither side seems prepared to negotiate. Russia is making incremental progress in Donbas and holds a lot of terrain. The Ukrainians have mobilized and shifted to securing their eastern and southern region, and expect greater success they absorb advanced weaponry.
A settlement is not in sight and a premature deal would alleviate the horrible suffering inside Ukraine temporarily. Russia may only regroup and threaten Ukraine’s freedom and peace in Europe yet again.
At this point there seems to be no available mechanism or motivation to implement a political solution or even a cease fire. The latter may be palliative, stopping the massive violence, but it is certainly not conducive to long-term stability if it simply locks in the current battle lines and tensions, and with Putin holding three times more ground than before the war.
More Direct Military Force? If a political solution is not likely are there military options that require consideration? A few analysts have argued that NATO should call Russia’s bluff and use armed force for specific and narrowly defined humanitarian purposes, including No-Fly Zones or escorted naval convoys to enforce freedom of the sea. Some have called for more forceful options including some sort of a U.N. Peace Enforcement Operation.
More recently, advocates have called for a naval corridor to keep supplies and grain flowing to and from Odessa. Using a NATO force to sustain trade going into and out of Ukraine’s ports is possible but depends on Turkey and other allied nations supporting the maritime force that ensures that Ukraine is not blockaded. The Russian Navy was postured to secure its interests in the Black Sea, but the naval combat power those plans were built upon now rest literally on the bottom on the Black Sea.
Of course, invariably, using force comes with potential risks of escalation. The authority and appetite for intervention, whether no fly zones or humanitarian escorts, in Ukraine are limited. Direct intervention has little appeal inside the Alliance, especially from states that have underfunded defense for years.
Most observers feel that direct and overt intervention, with either planes in the air over Ukraine or troops on the ground is a step too far. There is a risk that Putin would simply escalate further and possibly attack a NATO ally.
Putin and his foreign minister never fail to condition Western policy makers with less than subtle commentary about their tactical nukes. Numerous Western leaders have cited fears of World War III and the specter of global war repeatedly since the start of the war.
While there are few credible advocates for more direct intervention, the risk calculus needs recalibration due to Russian losses and clear dysfunction. Putin has little military force left to deploy, his army is starting to field legacy and junkyard quality systems. He may attempt to escalate the conflict in response, inside of Ukraine or beyond in NATO countries, if the West was to inject any overt form of military force. But to do so would doom what’s left of his military and hirelings to obliteration.
As one former U.S. policy official commented, “If the Ukrainian military can fight the Russian military to a standstill, imagine what it would look like if the United States and its allies joined?”
There is now months of evidence to assess how a contest of arms between Russia and a professional combined arms force will play out. Ukraine’s chances of offensive maneuver and regaining all its lost ground may not be likely, but more confident than RAND expert David Johnson that the United States would prevail due to its qualitative advantages as well as evident and enduring Russian deficiencies. It’s not hubris to conclude that U.S. forces would be effective in Ukraine, while also recognizing that Russia’s armed forces have been learning too.
However, there are members in NATO not willing or able to provide combat forces for such an operation. An intervention could be a coalition of the willing, but activating that coalition may impose costs or risks to non-participating NATO members. Nor does the alliance want to accept the risk of an attack on an alliance member that would trigger a debate on Article V obligations.
A rupture in the alliance hands a win to Putin. Moreover, geographic access for large ground forces into Ukraine is not easily resolved without major diplomatic and logistical challenges. The same is true for keeping the Black Sea open and preserving freedom of navigation in those international waters with naval power.
At this point, defined NATO and U.S. goals are being gained and vital interests preserved without taking that risk. The President has made it clear that there are limits to U.S. goals and to our support, and he defined what his government will not do in Ukraine. That includes placing combat forces inside Ukraine.
Hence the current approach with diplomacy, unprecedented sanctions, intelligence sharing, and robust security assistance. Thus our theory of success is tied to Kyiv’s success and their theory of victory, which requires substantial fighting and far more additional military aid across a longer time horizon.
A Third Way: Comprehensive Compellence. We should increase our level of political and economic and military pressure with an approach that seeks an end to the fighting and the establishment of Ukrainian territorial integrity including the withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine.
This approach, Comprehensive Compellence, uses all elements of statecraft to pressure Putin to stop his aggression. Having failed to deter last February, we now seek to compel or induce Putin to stop his massive and brutal incursion.
The elements of this approach are integrated and include political, military and economic costs together to increase pressure and urgency. The new EU oil embargo and the recent U.S. decision to send the longer-range HIMARS advanced rocket systems to Ukraine indicate that we can still add more pressure.
Using Russia’s frozen hard currency reserves to pay for reconstruction could be added as a mechanism to create that pressure, albeit there are legal considerations to address. Even that funding will only address half of Ukraine’s damages and recovery. The recent announcement from European leaders to endorse Ukraine for candidate status in the EU is a productive element of a comprehensive effort targeting the long-term.
Comprehensive compellence need not be all stick and no carrot as one commentator accurately noted. Carrots or diplomatic inducements could be part of a concerted approach that academics call Coercive Diplomacy towards Putin. Some relief on various travel sanctions and property seizures from Russian oligarchs may be offered, as well as potential security guarantees for Russia and Ukraine, to initiate discussions.
Energy embargoes have not yet taken effect, and maritime tanker embargos may need to be added. Future energy options can be offered as an incentive later, as Putin may find that his subordination to China unappealing especially as evidence grows that Russia’s status as an energy superpower is declining appreciably. Restrictions on Russian cultural and sporting events could be rescinded, as we are not at war with Russia’s culture, just the regime.
Zelensky has openly discussed a neutral status for his nation, and at one time acknowledged that territorial concessions were possible. Those concessions may no longer be acceptable to Kyiv, given the dynamics of the war and Ukrainian losses.
But diplomacy and a political solution will require painful compromise on both sides. These are not ‘face-saving’ gestures or ‘off ramps’ but a pragmatic reality about ending this conflict. Judging from the President Biden’s New York Times piece, the need for a political solution is ultimately recognized. The measured strategy implementing that policy right now should be strengthened and made more urgent until Mr. Putin realizes he cannot outlast the West.
Being pragmatic does not mean support for appeasement or a “sell out” of Ukraine. Quite the contrary. So instead of worrying about Putin’s feelings and his self-inflicted humiliation, the allies need to worry about the stability of Europe and the people of Ukraine. That should help clarify NATO’s goals and frame an end-game for the Alliance.
There is a larger conflict involved about Russia’s relationship with the West. While the decline of Russia is quite evidently not a myth, it is a persistent problem. We should address that in formulating our goals and appreciate the “bigger picture” about the West and Putin’s Russia.
The Beginning of the End?
In Churchillian terms, it is probably only the end of the beginning. But it is still the right time to define and declare what the West requires for strategic stability, and what it collectively accepts as conflict resolution parameters. Putin should not be allowed to dictate Moscow’s control over its ‘near abroad,’ as that does not advance a stable order or sustain free and independent Europe with NATO as a crucial element of its security.
A free and neutral Ukraine is possible, but it should not be neutered economically. Thus its freedom to seek alignment with the EU should not be surrendered, and its access to the Black Sea regained and assured. Freedom of the seas in the Black Sea must be restored.
To gain these goals, the West will have to cohere politically, and sustain its endurance in terms of the collective pressure against Moscow. Persistence and prudence is a useful combination to gain the desired end state. Russia is but nor can it be allowed to operate against its neighbors the way it has for the last decade.
Lawrence Freedman is surely right that the systemic advantages of the West favor Ukraine, and that time favors Ukraine. It has asymmetric advantage in motivation and morale which counts for a lot. Clearly, given Ukraine’s existential challenge, it can mobilize more manpower despite the significant population differential (Russia’s 145 million to 44 million in Ukraine).
But Kyiv’s endurance is predicated upon an assumption of sizable external support. As long as it receives the support from the West, it can continue to thwart Russian advances. That assumption will be sorely tested by economic conditions including inflation, recession, energy prices, and empty food shelves in several regions.
This could test the West’s collective unity and its resolve to give Ukraine continued economic and billions of dollars of military aid. Even Zelensky understands the lagging support and growing ‘fatigue in the West. Given the Administration’s avowed aim of making its foreign policy deliver tangible results for working class Americans, it has an upward fight to sustain the popular support needed to maintain the aid it has accelerated.
Other considerations including NATO readiness and industrial base concerns are germane as well. Stocks of munitions in NATO countries are being drawn down appreciably. The temporal dimension in a contest of wills may favor the autocratic regime since Putin does not have to face opposition or answer to his electorate. As Brookings’ Constanze Stelzenmüller notes, “We have a democratic handicap that Putin is completely free from.”
The West’s approach so far has been comprehensive and deliberative, and not yet successful. Hence, emphatic calls for escalating support in terms of more advanced weaponry and embracing decisive victory. That support should have been offered long ago.
Yet, a zero-sum victory mentality seeking a clear cut, military defeat might be the surest way to lock in a drawn out contest with Russia. It’s also the riskiest option in terms of Russian reactions and undesirable consequences, and could be the fastest path to the collapse of the coalition and the consensus behind economic sanctions and energy embargoes. That consensus and the support are tenuously linked and must be preserved to ensure Kyiv’s future.
In war, as Churchill once noted, “the terrible ‘ifs’ accumulate.” Risk accrues over time, for both sides. More risks to global security, including famine, emanate from this conflict each week. The instability Putin threatens by weaponizing wheat poses significant consequences for countries struggling to import grain and dampen food insecurity.
Miscalculation and escalation are constant risks. Reducing those risks and their likely implications is in our interest ultimately. A comprehensive solution, mixing sticks and carrots, should be on the table at some point to reduce the possible risks and the real costs of this horrible crisis.
Conclusion
Rather than simply manage the consequences of this conflict, the West should define our common goals and push for an end game to establish the better peace that should be the ultimate objective. The strategic discipline demonstrated to date by the U.S. government, employing all the tools of statecraft in close linkage with allies and parties, is the surest path to that end point.
Ukraine’s military success against Putin’s aggression is a necessary step in the larger contest with Moscow. The bigger picture requires us to implant in Putin’s mind an acute appreciation for the West’s capacity and willingness to defend the existing order. To advance that goal, the strategic pressure generated to date must be increased, until Moscow realizes it cannot obtain its larger goals by this malevolent campaign.
Putin has not been compelled to stop his rapacious quest against Ukraine, and not deterred from barbaric violations of international law. We have to make him aware that he has lost and will continue losing. That conclusion should be made compelling in the darkest recesses of the Kremlin and Putin’s psyche.
About the author:
Dr. Frank Hoffman is a former senior Defense official and strategic advisor and retired Marine officer. He is a Distinguished Research Fellow at the National Defense University, has been long affiliated with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and currently an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London. He graduated from the University of Pennsylvania, earned a Master’s in National Security Studies from the U.S. Naval War College, and holds a Ph.D. in War Studies from King’s College, London. These comments reflect his own personal views and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
Disclaimers
The views expressed herein are those of the author. They do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense or any other governmental or non-governmental agency.
The views expressed by guest authors do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, or Duke University.
Remember what we like to say on Lawfire®: gather the facts, examine the law, evaluate the arguments – and then decide for yourself!
6. Chinese, Russian Warships Active Near Japan Ahead of RIMPAC 2022
I am sure this is not unexpected.
Chinese, Russian Warships Active Near Japan Ahead of RIMPAC 2022 - USNI News
Chinese ships on June 17, 2022. JMSDF Photos
Russian warships are now steaming in the East China and the Philippine seas near Japan, the Russian Navy and the Japan Defense Ministry announced on Monday.
Meanwhile, the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) Indo-Pacific Deployment 2022 (IPD22) drilled with the U.S. Navy while ships from five Indo-Pacific nations sailed together out of Guam en route to the Rim of the Pacific 2022 (RIMPAC2022) exercise in Hawaii.
The Russian Navy said destroyers RFS Marshal Shaposhnikov (543) and RFS Admiral Panteleyev (548) and the missile range instrumentation ship RFS Marshal Krylov were underway with accompanying corvettes had operated replenishment ship Pechenga in the Philippine Sea. The release added that the ships practiced joint maneuvering in the region with air defense, submarine search and cooperation with the aircraft of the Pacific Fleet. Earlier on Friday, the Russians said a detachment of the Russian Pacific Fleet had entered the Philippine Sea and was engaging in anti-aircraft training as well as searching for mock enemy submarines.
The movements of Russian, as well as Chinese warships around Japan, have been observed by the Japanese Ministry of Defense, with the Ministry’s Joint Staff Office issuing releases. On Friday, the JSO issued a release stating the sighting of five Russian ships comprising of a destroyer and four corvettes on Thursday in the vicinity of the Izu Islands, with the ships subsequently sailing southwest between Smith Island and Torishima. Subsequently, on Friday, a Russian Navy destroyer together with Marshal Krylov was seen at in the same area moving southwest.
Hull numbers and images provided in the release identified the ships as Marshal Shaposhnikov and Admiral Panteleyev, corvettes RFS Sovershennyy (333), RFS Gromkiy (335), RFS Gremyashchiy (337) and RFS Hero of the Russian Federation Aldar Tsydenzhapov (339) and Marshal Krylov. The release also stated that destroyers JS Kongo (DDG-173) and JS Teruzuki (DD-116) along with JMSDF P-1s Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) of Fleet Air Wing 4 based at Naval Air Facility Atsugi monitored the Russian ships.
On Sunday, the JSO issued a release stating that five Russian ships were observed around Okinawa and sailed northwest through the Miyako Strait into the East China Sea. Hull numbers and images provided corresponded to Admiral Panteleyev, Sovershennyy, Gromkiy, Hero of the Russian Federation Aldar Tsydenzhapov and Marshal Krylov. Teruzuki and replenishment ship JS Tokiwa (AOE-423) together with a JMSDF P-3C Orion MPA of Fleet Air Wing 5 based at Naha Air Base monitored the Russian ships.
A second group of nine Russian ships were spotted on Friday, 25 miles north of Cape Soya, Hokkaido stated a JSO release that day. Hull numbers and images provided in the released identified the ships as corvettes RFS Koryeyets (390), RFS R-29 (916), RFS R-20 (920), RFS R-24 (946), RFS R-298 (971), RFS R-19 (978) and RFS R-261 (991), an Altay class replenishment ship and the hospital ship Irtysh. The ships then sailed west through La Pérouse Strait into the Sea of Japan. Fast attack craft JS Wakataka (PG-825) and a JMSDF P-3C Orion of Fleet Air Wing 2 based at JMSDF Hachinohe Air Base monitored the Russian ships.
On Sunday, three People’s Liberation Army Navy ships were sighted sailing south in the sea area about 137 miles east of Mt. Jinhua, Miyagi Prefecture, hull numbers and images provided identified the ships as destroyers CNS Lhasa (102) and CNS Chengdu (120) and replenishment ship CNS Dongpinghu (902), according to Japanese officials. The PLAN ships were monitored by the destroyer JS Makinami (DD-112), the release also included details of the PLAN ships’ movement since their sighting on June 12 in the Tsushima Strait and the movement of a Dongdiao class surveillance ship with hull number 794 which has been on and off sailing in the vicinity of the group. Dongpinghu and Dongdiao 794 had sailed together through the Tsugaru Strait on An earlier JSO release on Friday stated that Lhasa and Chengdu were sighted on Thursday at noon sailing northeast in an area 230 km southwest of Rebun Island, Hokkaido and subsequently sailed east through La Pérouse Strait. The release stated that Wakataka and a JMSDF P-3C Orion of Fleet Air Wing 2 monitored the PLAN ships.
Meanwhile the JMSDF’s IPD22 deployment conducted its first engagement with JS Izumo (DDH-183) and destroyer JS Takanami (DD-110) having carried out an exercise with destroyer USS Sampson (DDG-102) and replenishment ship USNS Rappahannock (T-AO-204) in the Pacific Ocean from Friday to Sunday. IPD has been an annual deployment by the JMSDF since 2019 and IPD 2022 will involve two surface units, one comprising of Izumo and Takanami while a second surface unit comprises of the destroyer JS Kirisame (DD-104). An unnamed submarine will also be deployed.
In other developments, a multi-national sail exercise was held from Thursday to Saturday by ships of five Indo-Pacific navies who are sailing towards Hawaii for the Rim of the Pacific 2022 (RIMPAC 2022) exercise, set to be held in Hawaii from June 29 until August 4. The ships in the joint sail were the Indian Navy frigate INS Satpura (F48), Philippine Navy frigate BRP Antonio Luna (FF-151), Indonesian Navy frigate KRI I Gusti Ngurah Rai (332), Republic of Singapore Navy frigate RSS Intrepid (69) and Royal Malaysian Navy corvette KD Lekir (FSG26).
7. Eritrea: North Koreans With Black Faces – OpEd
That is quite a headline. I think the analogy is controversial.
Excerpts:
The communist regime’s repression in Eritrea is so severe that 10% of its 5.7m population is
composed of refugees. In 2018, Eritrea and Syria were tied for the number outflow of
refugees at the height of the Syrian Civil War. The only difference was that Eritrea, a nominally stable country, had not experienced civil war since its independence in 1991. So, what happened?
The answer is quite simple: Communist regimes, such as those in Cuba, Venezuela, North Korea, and Eritrea, are innately skilled at destroying a society’s norms and cultures, depriving the population of individual rights, and reducing the citizens to property of the state. Ethiopia is home to 140,000 Eritrean
refugees and has hosted Eritreans seeking respite from the communist regime for almost two decades.
...
Eritreans favour democracy, the rule of law, and capitalism. After three decades of Marxism, they are fed up with it. They are looking to Eritreans in the West as a force for change, and, with diligent Western backing, Bayto Yiakl U.S.A has the potential to become the catalyst. Unfortunately, Washington and Brussels have limited economic, military, and social capacity to topple the North Korean regime in Asia.
However, they have a window of opportunity to overthrow the North Korea of Africa—Eritrea. But will Washington and Brussels assist Bayto Yiakl U.S.A in seizing this opportunity? At present, we can see that communist states are thriving in Asia (North Korea and China) and Latin America (Cuba and Venezuela). Before it’s too late, Washington and Brussels should stamp out the last communist wildfire in Africa. Three decades of Marxist dictatorship is already more than any people should have to suffer.
Eritrea: North Koreans With Black Faces – OpEd
By Daniel Haile*
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Eritrea is a very small country in East Africa along the Red Sea. Second to North Korea, the Eritrean regime is the most isolated, secretive, and repressive authoritarian regime globally, and the last remaining Marxist state on the African continent. The Kim Jong-un of Africa, Isaias Afewerki, has been in power since Eritrea’s independence de jure in 1991 and de facto in 1993. Subsequently, Eritrea is infamously known in Africa as the North Korea of Africa for a good reason.
Africa’s lack of economic and political development can be attributed to the residue of colonialism, tribalism, state corruption, and lack of democratic norms. However, Eritrea’s case is much simpler than that: it’s due to the vile totalitarian Marxist regime that has been in power since 1991.
The Eritrean people have had to endure Italian fascist colonialism, Ethiopian occupation and dictatorship under Western-backed Haile Selassie, 30 years of war for independence against the said dictator, and a Soviet-backed communist regime under Mengistu Haile Mariam.
The collective misery, sheer hopelessness, and mass exodus of young Eritreans to Western shores cannot be solely attributed to these unwarranted occupations and wars, not when the Marxist regime of Isaias Afewerki so ignobly carries the torch of oppression against Eritreans today.
After all, the most arduous struggle for Eritreans was neither Italian nor Ethiopian occupation, nor the decades of war with its neighbouring countries, but the ideological fallout from their compatriots who have been brainwashed with a foreign doctrine as alien to as it is wholly incompatible with Eritrean society, norms, and values—Marxism. As a result, the last remaining communist country in Africa, Eritrea, is a pariah state in the Horn of Africa and a source of instability in one of the most unstable regions in the world.
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The Mediterranean Sea—The mass grave for Eritreans
The Mediterranean Sea has become a mass grave for Eritreans, whose youth are willing to sacrifice their lives to cross it. The tragedy at Lampedusa is unforgettable for Eritreans and Italians. It shocked Europeans because 370 people drowned in the Mediterranean trying to reach Europe, most of whom were Eritreans. Starved for freedom and peace, Eritreans are still trying to reach European shores. Eritrean refugees are similar to the scores of Cubans, North Koreans, and Venezuelans trying to escape their home country in search of a meaningful existence.
The communist regime’s repression in Eritrea is so severe that 10% of its 5.7m population is composed of refugees. In 2018, Eritrea and Syria were tied for the number outflow of refugees at the height of the Syrian Civil War. The only difference was that Eritrea, a nominally stable country, had not experienced civil war since its independence in 1991. So, what happened?
The answer is quite simple: Communist regimes, such as those in Cuba, Venezuela, North Korea, and Eritrea, are innately skilled at destroying a society’s norms and cultures, depriving the population of individual rights, and reducing the citizens to property of the state. Ethiopia is home to 140,000 Eritrean refugees and has hosted Eritreans seeking respite from the communist regime for almost two decades.
However, Eritrean refugees are apprehensive about their safety with the current rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Therefore, Eritreans embark on the dangerous journey to Uganda and Kenya as a last resort. For them, anything is better than remaining in the last communist bastion in Africa.
Eritrea—A case study for George Orwell’s 1984 novel
If there is one country synonymous with totalitarianism and a true-to-life reference to George Orwell’s 1984 novel, it is the Eritrean Marxist regime in the Horn of Africa. It only recognizes four religions: The Eritrean Tewahedo Orthodox Church, Sunni Islam, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Eritrea. The Eritrean people are not free to choose other religions. And if they do not prescribe to one of these listed by the state, they are tortured and imprisoned until they renounce their faith and collaborate with authorities to expose other members.
Even Eritreans who belong to the four state-sanctioned religions still live in fear of persecution every day. In 2006, the communist regime arrested and deposed the Patriarch of the Eritrean Tewahedo Church, Abune Antonios, who died in 2022 after serving 16 years in prison because he refused to submit to the government. He paid the ultimate price for freedom and self-dignity.
Abune Antonios is a symbol of resistance for the devout Eritrean Orthodox Christians who are finally, and inevitably, ready to realize the inalienable change in their country. No person of faith is safe in Eritrea. The regime is also brutal to people who outright oppose the totalitarian regime, as was the case of Haji Musa Mohammed Nur, Honorary President of al Diaa Islamic School. He was arrested in 2017 for opposing the regime’s interference in Islamic religious affairs and eventually died in prison in 2018, like his counterpart Abune Antonios.
The communist regime in Eritrea has turned the entire country into a Gulag state. The residents who have suffered and are currently suffering the most are non-denominational Christians. Without exception, these citizens are forced to renounce their faith and imprisoned because the state does not sanction their religion. Their fates are torture and imprisonment for years, if not decades, and their numbers overflow prisons to the extent that they have been reported to be secretly imprisoned and tortured in shipping containers.
The Catholic Church ran the best hospitals and clinics in the country to date. Still, unfortunately, in 2019, the regime closed the hospital system, depriving the population of 22 health centres because the Catholic Church spoke out against them. As a result, Eritrea’s healthcare system is non-existent, and even if there were one, it couldn’t be expected to function any better than the useless models in other Marxist states.
The totalitarian state in Eritrea, like any Communist regime, thrives on maintaining a close grip on media with the intent to brainwash the innocent, manipulate the vulnerable, confuse the sceptical, and safeguard the average citizen as a tool and property of the state. For the last three decades, Eritreans have had only access to one TV station and two newspapers, which are government-controlled and designed to bend the current and future generations toward its communist agenda.
This malign indoctrination by communist propaganda has gone on for the last three decades. Unfortunately, there are a lot of useful dimwits who support the Marxist regime in Eritrea and the West.
The Eritrean supporters of the regime are a means to an end for the regime, tools wielded to prolong the dictatorship in Asmara. To the regime, its supporters in the West are nothing but dimwits’ accomplices who ironically fight for the enslavement of their compatriots and deny them the fundamental individual freedoms they are at liberty to exercise in the West.
Thus, these hypocrites purposefully deny the same rights they enjoy abroad to Eritreans in Eritrea. Finally, who are these hypocritical drones, devoid of moral principles and incapable of distinguishing between fact and fiction? They are Eritreans who live in the West and still support and donate capital to the communist regime in Eritrea.
The pariah state in the Horn of Africa
Most people in the West and across the globe are unaware that there are two North Koreas, one in Asia and the other in Africa. If some can imagine North Koreans with black faces, they would see Eritreans as they truly live today. For the last three decades, Eritreans in Eritrea have been brainwashed by communist propaganda, and Eritrean society has been degraded by Marxist ideology.
Both Eritreans who have escaped Eritrea and Eritreans born in the West are eager to overthrow the Marxist regime and install a democratic form of government that restores dignity and peace to its people. Eritrean civil society is composed of 26 political parties that are working to remove the communist regime in Eritrea and advocate for democracy, a market economy, and justice in Eritrea. So far, the most reputable Eritrean political movement representing most of these civic organizations is Bayto Yiakl U.S.A.
So far, Bayto Yiakl U.S.A has not received much attention, capital injection, or political support from Washington. Still, suppose Washington is committed to toppling the last communist regime in Africa and promoting democracy and a market economy. What then? In this case, it should start collaborating with Bayto Yiakl U.S.A and pursue a mutually beneficial relationship. Additionally, suppose the European Union is serious about curbing the influx of Eritrean refugees to Europe. To achieve this goal, they should cooperate with Bayto Yiakl U.S.A to aid the political movement, in collaboration with Washington, to overthrow the communist regime in Eritrea.
Eritreans favour democracy, the rule of law, and capitalism. After three decades of Marxism, they are fed up with it. They are looking to Eritreans in the West as a force for change, and, with diligent Western backing, Bayto Yiakl U.S.A has the potential to become the catalyst. Unfortunately, Washington and Brussels have limited economic, military, and social capacity to topple the North Korean regime in Asia.
However, they have a window of opportunity to overthrow the North Korea of Africa—Eritrea. But will Washington and Brussels assist Bayto Yiakl U.S.A in seizing this opportunity? At present, we can see that communist states are thriving in Asia (North Korea and China) and Latin America (Cuba and Venezuela). Before it’s too late, Washington and Brussels should stamp out the last communist wildfire in Africa. Three decades of Marxist dictatorship is already more than any people should have to suffer.
8. Nepal Rejects US Semi-Military Project – Analysis
Strategic competition is everywhere.
Excerpts:
In view of the public furore about the possibility of Nepal’s being drawn into the vortex of geopolitical conflict between the US and China and possibly between China and India too, all Nepalese parties, including the ruling the pro-US and pro-India Nepali Congress, have said that they would not countenance entering the SPP.
Home Minister Bal Krishna Khand, said on behalf of the government, that the government strongly believes that Nepal’s territory should not be allowed to be used against any friendly nation. Airing his views in a meeting of the House of Representatives, the Home Minister said: “Nepal is not connected with the SPP. No decision has been made towards this end. It has not imagined proceeding towards that end either.”
Comparing SPP with the MCC, Khand said: “We consider and recognize the MCC as a pure development project and not a military project. It was endorsed by all.”
It is learnt that India too was not in support of the SPP as it feels that the pushy US will unsettle the traditional special relationship between the Indian and Nepalese armies.
Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba is to visit the US in mid-July. Observers say that if the SPP had not got the adverse reaction it has, he would sign the Agreement while in Washington. But now he cannot. The other consideration is that he has to face parliamentary elections in November this year. As it is, Deuba is very unpopular and is on a weak political wicket, seasoned Nepal watchers say.
Nepal Rejects US Semi-Military Project – Analysis
Fear of becoming a theatre of military conflict between the US-India lineup on the one hand and China on the other, lies at the root of the rejection.
Emboldened by its success in arm-twisting Nepal into ratifying the controversial Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact in February, the United States took on the equally hard task of getting Nepal to join its State Partnership Program (SPP).
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But the ambitious move to give a military dimension to US-Nepal relations has boomeranged. Faced with strident and widespread opposition, even the pro-US government of Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba has sworn not to sign up for the SPP.
Fear of becoming a theatre of military conflict between the US-India lineup on the one hand and China on the other, lies at the root of the rejection.
The SPP is a bilateral program which is outwardly peaceful in intent. But it is perceived to have deep-set military objectives with consequences not only for Nepal’s internal security, but also for relations with its two big neighbors, China and India. The impact on Sino-Nepal relations will be catastrophic if the SPP leads to stronger US-Nepal military ties. The Indian army’s exclusive and unique relationship with the Nepalese army will have got diluted, a prospect the conservative Indian top brass cannot reconcile with.
Be that as it may, a fact that cannot be brushed under the carpet is that from 2015 onwards, successive Nepalese governments, whether pro or anti-US, had sought admission to the SPP, apparently attracted by its potential to help Nepal tackle natural disasters. In October 2015, Nepal wanted US humanitarian assistance to meet the challenges posed by the earthquake and sought membership of SPP. Nepal’s request was repeated in 2017 and 2019.
The SPP got no public attention until very recently. According to veteran Nepalese journalist, Yubaraj Ghimire, this was because there was no requirement for the SPP to get parliament’s ratification unlike in the case of the MCC. But what eventually brought the SPP under suspicion or scrutiny was a flurry of high-level US diplomatic activity in Nepal in a short span of time after the ratification of the MCC. The frenetic US activity made observers wonder if the US had something up its sleeve.
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Uzra Zeya, US Under Secretary of State for civilian security, democracy, and human rights, and US Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues made a highly publicized visit to Nepal in May. She created waves by meeting Tibetan refugees, thereby touching a raw nerve in China and creating tremors in the corridors of power in Kathmandu. She took up the refugees’ undocumented status since 1995 and urged documentation. To encourage Nepal towards this end, Zeya offered a developmental sop of over US$ 600 million. But her prescription is unlikely to be accepted by Nepal because China wants Nepal to send the refugees back to Tibet. Like Zeya, the US Ambassador, Randy Berry, met Tibetan refugees and went to upper Mustang to visit Tibetan monasteries.
The Commanding General of the US Army Pacific, Gen. Charles A. Flynn, was the next to visit Kathmandu adding grist to the rumor mill. He had apparently urged Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba and General Prabhu Ram Sharma, Chief of Staff of the Nepal Army, to put Nepal in the State Partnership Program. Nepalese fear that all these moves will have a negative impact on Nepal’s balanced foreign relations, marked by equidistance from India, US and China
Worried about Nepal’s coming under more pressure from the US, the Chinese Ambassador, Hou Yanqi, called on Nepal’s Home Minister ostensibly to get confirmation of Nepal’s continued adherence to the “One China” policy. Nepal’s condemnation of Russia for its aggression in Ukraine had also made Beijing suspicious about the links between the Deuba and the Biden regimes.
Meanwhile, a document purporting to be an agreement between Nepal and the US on the SPP, emerged and went viral in the media. It spoke of a strong military content, including joint US-Nepal army training and also sops in the form of Fellowships for Nepalese officers in US academies. It said that the US National Guard and US contractors, related vehicles and light aircraft operated by or for the United States, may use agreed facilities and areas for training, transit, support and related activities, refuelling, temporary maintenance of vehicles and aircraft, accommodation of personnel, their dependents, communications, staging, deploying of forces and material.
The US embassy promptly said that the document was a fake. The government too said that there has never been an agreement. The government’s line is that while the SPP has indicated its readiness to admit Nepal, there has been no follow-up.
This is what is said in defense of the SPP: “The State Partnership Program (SPP) is an exchange program between an American State’s National Guard and a partner foreign country. The US National Guard domestically supports US first responders in dealing with natural disasters, such as earthquakes, floods, and wildfires.”
“In the event of natural and other disasters, ranging from hurricanes to earthquakes, floods, and fires, the United States seeks to share the best practices and capabilities of our National Guards — our first-line responders. SPP can be an effective means of facilitating this type of cooperation.”
The SPP has existed for over 25 years and includes partnerships with over 90 countries.
The Rub
But the rub lies elsewhere: The SPP is administered by the National Guard Bureau, guided by State Department foreign policy goals, and executed by the state Adjutants General in support of the Department of Defense policy goals.
“Through SPP, the National Guard conducts military-to-military engagements in support of defense security goals but also leverages whole-of-society relationships and capabilities to facilitate broader interagency and corollary engagements spanning military, government, economic and social spheres,” a US government website says.
In other words, the SPP is a multi-purpose vehicle to advance wide-ranging US political and strategic objectives under the overall cloak of humanitarian engagement.
In view of the public furore about the possibility of Nepal’s being drawn into the vortex of geopolitical conflict between the US and China and possibly between China and India too, all Nepalese parties, including the ruling the pro-US and pro-India Nepali Congress, have said that they would not countenance entering the SPP.
Home Minister Bal Krishna Khand, said on behalf of the government, that the government strongly believes that Nepal’s territory should not be allowed to be used against any friendly nation. Airing his views in a meeting of the House of Representatives, the Home Minister said: “Nepal is not connected with the SPP. No decision has been made towards this end. It has not imagined proceeding towards that end either.”
Comparing SPP with the MCC, Khand said: “We consider and recognize the MCC as a pure development project and not a military project. It was endorsed by all.”
It is learnt that India too was not in support of the SPP as it feels that the pushy US will unsettle the traditional special relationship between the Indian and Nepalese armies.
Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba is to visit the US in mid-July. Observers say that if the SPP had not got the adverse reaction it has, he would sign the Agreement while in Washington. But now he cannot. The other consideration is that he has to face parliamentary elections in November this year. As it is, Deuba is very unpopular and is on a weak political wicket, seasoned Nepal watchers say.
9. Extremist Travel to Ukraine Is a Cause for Concern, Not Alarm
Excerpts:
The key to assessing the impact of extremist travel to Ukraine on the United States is neither to consider every foreigner traveling to Ukraine a neo-Nazi in training nor trend in the opposite direction and assume that all reports of ideological extremists flowing into the conflict are a construct of Russian propaganda. Doing either plays into Russia’s hands: Russian propaganda has in the past deftly exploited issues that Western media outlets seem to unjustifiably downplay.
As we have shown, the conflict in Ukraine has thus far not been a boon to violent extremists as many predicted it would be, and as Russian propaganda has sought to advance. But this does not mean the presence of violent extremists in Ukraine should be ignored. The United States should adopt a targeted approach to monitor and assess how the connections and skills that this small number of individuals might gain by participating in the conflict could influence the violent extremist landscape at home.
Ironically, if there is a significant problem with neo-Nazi foreigners on the battlefield, it can likely be found on the Russian side. Russian units like the Wagner Group’s Task Force Rusich and the Russian Imperial Movement have clearly-established and self-declared links to neo-Nazi ideology. They too should be a part of this discussion.
Extremist Travel to Ukraine Is a Cause for Concern, Not Alarm
While some individuals with connections to violent extremism have indeed traveled to Ukraine, a mass influx of ideologically driven fighters has thus far not materialized.
As Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine in February, so too did foreigners from around the world seeking to answer Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s call for military volunteers. This influx of foreigners raised alarm among analysts that violent extremists, particularly neo-Nazis, could use the conflict as a new training ground. Complicating these concerns, Russian president Vladimir Putin painted Ukraine as a Nazi stronghold, arguing that his invasion is designed to “demilitarize and denazify” the Ukrainian government.
Putin’s claims complicate analysis of extremist travel to Ukraine in two ways. On the one hand, Russian propaganda channels could contribute to unfounded fears about extremists on the pro-Ukraine side of this conflict. Conversely, commentators could overreact in attempting to counter this cynical and opportunistic Russian messaging, ignoring a real problem in an effort to avoid feeding Russia’s war narrative. In this article, based on extensive open-source research, we seek to strike a balance between these two poles. We find that while some individuals with connections to violent extremism have indeed traveled to Ukraine, a mass influx of ideologically driven fighters has thus far not materialized. The problem bears watching lest violent extremists find haven on the battlefield, but the issue should be kept in proportion as extremely minor at present.
The Demographics of Western Combatants in Ukraine
As of March 2022, nearly 20,000 individuals had expressed interest in traveling to Ukraine to fight. This number might suggest parallels to previous flows of foreign fighters to Syria during its civil war and to Ukraine in 2014. But the reality on the ground is different, as the actual numbers do not match initial expressions of interest.
In evaluating current numbers, take Syria as an example. In the first six months of 2014, 12,000 foreign fighters from eighty-one countries joined the country’s civil war. And following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, 17,000 fighters from fifty countries poured into Ukraine. But, despite the large numbers expressing their intent to fight in Ukraine during the current conflict, the actual turnout of foreign volunteers has been far lower than expected. Researchers estimate that only several hundred people will go through with traveling to Ukraine to support its government, and even fewer will actually fight.
In addition to differences in numbers, differences in motives should also be acknowledged. Many of the foreign fighters who joined the Syrian Civil War and the 2014 Ukraine conflict were motivated by jihadism or violent white supremacism, respectively. But all available evidence suggests that the vast majority of foreigners now traveling to fight in Ukraine are not driven by ideology and that they are largely trying to enlist in official Ukrainian military units rather than sub-state militia groups.
Many who have joined the fight are military veterans who see supporting the Ukrainian government against Russia’s unprovoked invasion as a patriotic duty. A smaller subset includes thrill-seeking individuals. The number of ideological extremists is even less appreciable. To date, Western governments are aware of only an extremely small number of individuals with connections to violent extremism who traveled to Ukraine. German authorities, for example, say that the number of German nationals who fit into this category is in the single digits. Though U.S. authorities have not publicly commented, open-source evidence suggests the number is likely similar.
Violent Extremists Are Staying Away From Ukraine
We collected publicly available information on more than 200 foreign volunteers who traveled to fight in Ukraine between February and May 2022. Our research did not point to a significant ideologically motivated or extremist contingent. To help us assess the potential threat posed by the small number of individuals with connections to extremism, we analyzed the responses of domestic violent extremist networks to Russia’s invasion, as well as the military units and militias in Ukraine with a history of violent extremist agendas that have historically recruited foreigners.
Online violent extremist communities have demonstrated a powerful capability to mobilize members to violence. It is reasonable to believe this influence can also work the other way, possibly dissuading members from taking certain actions. It is true that some white supremacist networks have expressed solidarity with both the Ukrainian and Russian sides. Further, early on in the war, some of these networks encouraged support for Ukraine and discussed organizing travel to join the fighting. However, U.S.-based violent extremist networks and social media channels have largely encouraged members not to fight in Ukraine.
Rinaldo Nazzaro, the reported founder of the neo-Nazi accelerationist group The Base, vehemently discouraged his compatriots from traveling to Ukraine due to the risks of being identified and tracked by Western intelligence agencies or being killed in a “NATO proxy war.” Shortly after the Russian invasion, a prominent U.S. neo-Nazi accelerationist website stopped advocating for its audience to join the Azov Regiment (formerly known as the Azov Battalion before its integration into the Ukrainian National Guard). In some cases, transnational white supremacist extremist networks have followed suit. Other white supremacist networks have propagated their own slogans discouraging engagement in the conflict, including “No More Brother Wars,” which suggests that white people should not be fighting other white people.
The demand side of the equation is similarly not conducive to a flourishing Western extremist ecosystem in Ukraine. One individual who joined Azov Battalion in 2014 felt the unit perceived foreign volunteers as “backpacks”—burdens in need of constant attention in order to function. This attitude likely remains less than a decade later. Further, Western extremists in Ukraine are vastly outnumbered by international and Ukrainian volunteers, diminishing their impact and reducing their appeal to military units in Ukraine.
Even Ukrainian fighting units like Azov Regiment, whose leadership and members have prominently displayed an affinity for neo-Nazi ideology in the past, have tried to clean up their image. We are not arguing that this represents an actual shift in ideological orientation—such a determination is beyond the scope of this article—but public messaging has an impact on the recruitment of extremists. Azov has sought to steer its public narrative away from extremism, potentially to increase its appeal to Ukrainian recruits, many of whom say they joined the regiment because of its reputation as an elite force.
Don’t Exaggerate, Don’t Ignore
Overestimations of the extremist foreign fighter threat in Ukraine have drawn criticisms that examination of the phenomenon could advance Russian propaganda narratives. Moreover, Americans traveling to Ukraine to combat the Russian invasion are within their legal rights to do so. How do we balance countering Russian propaganda, respecting foreign volunteers’ legal rights, and detecting the small number of ideologically motivated extremists who seek to exploit the war in Ukraine? Though this latter category accounts for a fraction of a relatively minor whole, one lesson from the history of extremist foreign fighter engagement in conflict zones is that the significance and prevalence of such fighters can shift in short periods and that these individuals typically deserve nuanced attention.
The key to assessing the impact of extremist travel to Ukraine on the United States is neither to consider every foreigner traveling to Ukraine a neo-Nazi in training nor trend in the opposite direction and assume that all reports of ideological extremists flowing into the conflict are a construct of Russian propaganda. Doing either plays into Russia’s hands: Russian propaganda has in the past deftly exploited issues that Western media outlets seem to unjustifiably downplay.
As we have shown, the conflict in Ukraine has thus far not been a boon to violent extremists as many predicted it would be, and as Russian propaganda has sought to advance. But this does not mean the presence of violent extremists in Ukraine should be ignored. The United States should adopt a targeted approach to monitor and assess how the connections and skills that this small number of individuals might gain by participating in the conflict could influence the violent extremist landscape at home.
Ironically, if there is a significant problem with neo-Nazi foreigners on the battlefield, it can likely be found on the Russian side. Russian units like the Wagner Group’s Task Force Rusich and the Russian Imperial Movement have clearly-established and self-declared links to neo-Nazi ideology. They too should be a part of this discussion.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is the chief executive officer of the private firm Valens Global and leads a project on domestic extremism for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).
Emelie Chace-Donahue, Madison Urban, and Matt Chauvin are analysts at Valens Global and support the firm’s public sector clients and FDD’s project on domestic extremism.
Image: Reuters.
10. FDD | The Lexicon of Terror: Crystallization Of The Definition Of “Terrorism” Through The Lens Of Terrorist Financing & The Financial Action Task Force
FDD | The Lexicon of Terror: Crystallization Of The Definition Of “Terrorism” Through The Lens Of Terrorist Financing & The Financial Action Task Force
fdd.org · by Juan C. Zarate CEFP Chairman and Sarah Watson Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
· June 17, 2022
June 17, 2022 | Harvard National Security Journal
The Lexicon of Terror: Crystallization Of The Definition Of “Terrorism” Through The Lens Of Terrorist Financing & The Financial Action Task Force
Sarah Watson
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Excerpt
It is widely assumed that there is no accepted international definition of terrorism, in part because global views on what constitutes terrorism are so politically polarized as to prevent arriving at any meaningful common ground. This view is widespread both in popular culture and the academic community despite the decades of work on this issue at the United Nations (UN), the existence of several UN conventions addressing terrorism, and the increasing convergence of domestic laws on terrorism. In common discourse, any discussion about the definition of terrorism is often met with the relativist quip that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”
This Article argues that there is in fact a definition of terrorism that has been widely adopted within the community of nation states, and that this definition is meaningful, substantive, and offers a resolution to some of the most salient debates on the nature of terrorism. Not only are 189 nations party to the UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (“Terrorist Financing Convention”), which offers a basic definition of terrorism, but more than 200 jurisdictions have also committed, through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), to domestic adoption of a definition of the offense of “terrorist financing” that includes a clear definition of terrorism. Furthermore, a majority of these jurisdictions have actually transposed the FATF definition into their national laws. These include nations, such as the members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, that formerly have led opposition to an international legal definition of terrorism very similar to the definition used by the FATF. While the FATF definition does not resolve all questions, such widespread and consistent adoption implies that the fundamental debates about the definition of terrorism have in fact been quietly concluded.
The literature on the impossibility of defining terrorism has acquired its own collection of literary clichés. It is traditional to begin articles and books about the definition of terrorism with a quote from a thinker of a previous generation reflecting on the difficulties of defining terrorism or a review of definitional efforts stretching back to at least the 1930s.
This Article pays due homage to that tradition with a quote from a man who, in contrast to many thinkers and writers on the issue, was confident that he understood what terrorism involved. Nelson Mandela, speaking in his own defense at his 1964 trial for sabotage and treason, offered a clear taxonomy of violent action: “There is sabotage, there is guerrilla warfare, there is terrorism, and there is open revolution.” He described sabotage as “not involv[ing] loss of life” and as principally involving attacks on economic and infrastructure targets. Although Mandela did not define terrorism, the use of the term in context suggests that he believed terrorism to entail violence directed against human lives rather than (like sabotage) inanimate targets. But at no point did he suggest that South Africans fighting for the overthrow of the apartheid government could not carry out terrorism simply because they were engaged in a struggle against a racist regime.
Juan Zarate is Co-Founder and Chair of the Board, Consilient and Co-Founder and Chair of the Center on Economic & Financial Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). He previously served as Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser for combating terrorism and as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorist Financing and Financial crimes, and was a Visiting Lecturer on Law at Harvard Law School for eight years. Sarah Watson is a Bank Examiner with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. The views expressed in this Article are those of the authors alone and do not represent the views of Consilient, FDD, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, or the Department of the Treasury. Follow Juan on Twitter @JCZarate1. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, non-partisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
- See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, art. 2(1), Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197 [hereinafter Terrorist Financing Convention]; FIN.ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION: THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS 13, 41–42, (Oct. 2021), https://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%2020 12.pdf [https://perma.cc/FE64-S649] [hereinafter FATF RECOMMENDATIONS] (identifying and clarifying Recommendation 5 (“Terrorist financing offence”) and defining “terrorist act”).
- See, e.g., John F. Murphy, International Law in Crisis: Challenges Posed by the New Terrorism and the Changing Nature of War, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 59, 61 (2011) (quoting R.R. Baxter); Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur & Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism, 16 TERRORISM &POL.VIOLENCE 777, 777 (2004) (quoting Walter Laqueur).
- See, e.g., Ben Saul, Attempts to Define “Terrorism” in International Law, 52 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 57, 57–61 (2005); BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 1–21 (3d ed. 2017); Geoffrey Levitt, Is “Terrorism” Worth Defining?, 13 OHIO N.U. L.REV. 97, 97–108 (1986); William R. Farrell, Terrorism Is…?, 33 NAVAL WAR COLL.REV. 64, 64–66 (1980).
- Nelson Mandela, I Am Prepared to Die, Statement from the Dock at the Opening of the Defence Case in the Rivonia Trial (Apr. 20, 1964), https://www.un.org/en/events/mandeladay/court_statement_1964.shtml [https://perma.cc/2NGW-5VQM].
- Id.
- See id.
- See id.
fdd.org · by Juan C. Zarate CEFP Chairman · June 17, 2022
11. HASC chairman's NDAA mark focuses on munitions, R&D
Someone has to be concerned with munitions.
HASC chairman's NDAA mark focuses on munitions, R&D - Breaking Defense
Staffers briefing reporters ahead of the release emphasized a focus on the health of the munitions industrial base.
A Marine fires a FGM-148 Javelin Missile during a live fire exercise at range SR-6, Camp Lejeune, N.C., Feb. 4, 2015. (US Marines/Andrew Kuppers)
WASHIGNTON: The House Armed Services Committee’s chairman’s mark for the fiscal 2023 National Defense Authorization Act largely stays in line with the White House’s national security funding request, seeking $772.5 billion for Pentagon-specific funds while emphasizing the need to focus on replenishing key munitions that are being used in the Ukraine conflict.
Overall, the mark also requests $29.5 billion for Department of Energy national security requirements, for a total of $802.4 billion in national security funding that falls under the HASC jurisdiction. (Another $11 billion is outside of the committee’s purview.)
The mark is not the final word from HASC, which will have its infamous all-day-and-often-all-night marathon markup session on June 22. But the document outlines Chairman Adam Smith of Washington’s priorities, and sets the overall ground for the debate to come.
Staffers briefing reporters ahead of the release emphasized a focus on the health of the munitions industrial base. That’s an issue that has been cast into the spotlight thanks to the number of weapons being shipped to Ukraine for its fight against Russia’s nearly four-month-old invasion; there are concerns throughout the national security community that not only will the US not be able to meet Ukrainian demand, but that America’s own stocks may not be able to be replenished in a timely fashion.
Smith’s mark would require a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) to do an assessment of the department’s ability to replenish its munitions in four key areas: air superiority, interdiction, missile defense and buried target. The language would also create a pilot program to track the health and security of sub-tier suppliers who may be vulnerable. Finally, it directs DoD to “a new initiative to develop and invest in technologies to reduce the cost, increase reliability, enhance lethality and diversify the supply chain for key munitions,” per a staffer.
Quarterly reports to Congress specifically about the reserves as it relates to Europe and Ukraine would also be required. However, the mark contains no extra funding for Javelins or Stingers above what the Pentagon already requested.
Explore the full text of the bill and a summary of the Chairman's mark:
R&D funding gets roughly a $900 million boost to $131 billion, including $102 million marked out specifically for R&D efforts at historically black colleges and universities. There is also language that seeks to “strengthen talent exchanges with the private sector,” where members of the military could go and spend time in the commercial technology sector in order to bring best practices and new ideas back to the department. And while little detail was given, there are also efforts to create award programs to incentivize acquisition professionals to innovate and overcome bureaucratic barriers.
Other key highlights laid out by staffers include:
-
The mark does not block the Navy’s planned retirement of nine Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) despite bipartisan pushback from other HASC members. “That may be a discussion at the full committee markup, but at this point, [Smith] supports those divestments,” a staffer said.
- There are plans to launch a pilot program on “unique approaches” to data rights issues. Who owns data and IP rights, industry or the department, is a major issue to be worked through going forward.
- Smith wants to hear more information from the Air Force about the possibility of speeding up the purchase of the Boeing-made E-7 Wedgetail, in order to avoid a gap as the legacy E-3 Sentry fleet retires. A staffer said there are ongoing discussions with USAF about “acceleration” on the E-7, and said they expect “to see some options from them by the time we enter conference.”
- On the policy side, the focus appears heavily to be on reducing civilian casualties — or at least establishing better tracking and reduction efforts. The markup would establish a commission on civilian harm, studying the issue going back to 2001, and also create a center of excellence on civilian harm mitigation inside the department.
- The mark does not increase the amount of F-35 procurement. When asked why, a staffer noted concerns about increasing procurement before the Block 4 upgrades are ready and pointed to Smith’s comments from June 15 when he argued that enemy systems have caught up with the F-35 as it is currently designed.
It’s unclear what the House version of the NDAA will look like after it goes through full markup, but at some point it’ll have to be rectified with the Senate’s version, a preview of which was provided by the Senate Armed Services Committee last week. That bill features a large jump in the topline budget of $45 billion. Speaking to reporters on June 15, Smith indicated he expected the topline of the House’s version to increase during negotiations, but it was unclear how much.
“So for example, if you collect an image of a…ground radar…and you determine that there’s also an electromagnetic signal coming from it that you collect through another platform and then you integrate it together, then that’s really interesting and it’s quite useful,” Air Force Deputy CIO Winston Beauchamp said.
12. US can rely on what China decries as the 'Asian NATO' for deterrence, former officials say
I would not count on India. I would not base our national security on relations with India. That does not mean we should not try to improve our relationship and seek alignment of interests. But I do not think India will ever be anyone's ally.
US can rely on what China decries as the 'Asian NATO' for deterrence, former officials say
Australia and Japan have built stronger ties, but India remains an unknown factor
foxnews.com · by Peter Aitken , Laura Taglianetti | Fox News
'Special Report' All-Star panel reacts to the president vowing military action if China invades Taiwan.
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The U.S. can rely on regional partnerships with Japan and Australia to deter Chinese ambition in the region, as the two Indo-Pacific countries develop closer ties and more robust military capabilities, former officials tell Fox News Digital.
"Japan and Australia share a common position on the need to balance the power of China in the Indo-Pacific region, and we actually have for years," former Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer told Fox News Digital. "[China] under Xi Jinping has become incredibly aggressive and has tried to dominate the region, and that will completely destabilize the region if they do so. We have to make sure China understands we’re happy to work with China and sell to China, but we’re not going to be bullied by China."
The U.S. faces a difficult and complex effort to check China’s regional ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. Officials previously told Fox News Digital that the U.S. relies on overlapping bi-lateral treaties to create a similar cooperation that the majority of Europe utilizes via NATO.
Leaders of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) from left to right, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, U.S. President Joe Biden, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, pose for photo at the entrance hall of the Prime Minister's Office of Japan in Tokyo, Japan, Tuesday, May 24, 2022. (Sadayuki Goto/Kyodo News via AP) (Sadayuki Goto/Kyodo News via AP)
Downer argued that it is best to operate from the assumption that China’s political system "won’t change between now and when I die."
America’s most reliable form of deterrence remains the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or QUAD) between the U.S., Japan, Australia and India. The QUAD does not carry the same military commitments as NATO, but China decried it as an "Asian NATO" all the same.
"The QUAD came out of what we originally called the trilateral security dialog, which was with the United States, Australia and Japan, and India has been added into it by the Japanese, actually, and very sensibly," Downer explained. "Japan has been a very, very reliable ally in the Indo-Pacific region actually for Australia, and equally for the United States."
Ambassador Mikio Mori, Consul General of Japan in New York, explained to Fox News Digital that other than its treaty alliance with the U.S., Japan has no single "best" ally in the region, instead relying on a mosaic of partnerships with different partners fulfilling different roles.
U.S. President Joe Biden, front, left, and Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, front right, listen to the national anthem during a welcome ceremony for President Biden, at the Akasaka Palace state guest house in Tokyo, Japan, Monday, May 23, 2022. (AP Photo/Eugene Hoshiko, Pool) (AP Photo/Eugene Hoshiko, Pool)
This May, 2017, photo shows Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force’s helicopter carrier Izumo. Japan has adopted new defense guidelines, calling for converting a destroyer into Japan’s first aircraft carrier to deploy advanced U.S.-made stealth fighters, as Japan seeks to increase defense spending and bolster arms capability in coming years. (Kyodo News via AP)
This photo provided by Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force shows USS Abraham Lincoln, left, and JS Kongo, front, sail in formation during a U.S.-Japan bilateral exercise at the Sea of Japan on April 12, 2022. U.S. and Japanese warships, led by the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group, are conducting their joint naval exercise in waters between Japan and the Korean Peninsula for the first time in five yeas, in a show of their close military alliance amid growing speculation of North Korea's missile or nuclear testing later this week.(Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force via AP) (AP)
But the U.S. sees the relationship between Japan and Australia as a critical component of its China deterrence policy in the Indo-Pacific. Former Japan officer director at the State Department Kevin Maher told Fox News Digital that "putting aside the U.S.," Australia is "clearly" Japan’s most important relationship.
He touted Japan’s role as leading the region in regarding "awareness of China," but acknowledged that both Australia and Japan have taken on that duty together.
The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, through which Beijing invests in smaller developing nations, has helped China secure influence over "second-tier and third-tier" countries" important to the supply chain, particularly for "military areas, cyber hacking and acquiring companies." Beijing even famously cut Japan off from rare earth metal resources as alleged retaliation over a dispute regarding fishing boats and waters in 2010. Japan at the time had grown almost entirely dependent on China for these metals.
Japan has since then worked to expand its military capabilities, which the U.S. government "has welcomed very much." Japan currently boasts one of the largest expenditures on their military, spending around $49 billion per year – seventh-most, putting it ahead of Russia and South Korea but behind the U.K. and Germany.
U.S. President Joe Biden, right, meets with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during the Quad leaders summit at Kantei Palace, Tuesday, May 24, 2022, in Tokyo. (AP Photo/Evan Vucci) (AP Photo/Evan Vucci)
FILE - Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi greet each other before their meeting in New Delhi, India on Dec. 6, 2021. India on Thursday said it would ramp up its production of military equipment, including helicopters, tank engines, missiles and airborne early warning systems, to offset any potential shortfall from its main supplier Russia. Former Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda said that during a visit to India last year by Russian President Vladimir Putin the two sides decided to shift some manufacturing to India to meet its requirements. (AP Photo/Manish Swarup, File) (AP)
In this Oct. 16, 2016, file photo, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, front and Chinese President Xi Jinping shake hands with leaders at the BRICS summit in Goa, India. At least three Indian soldiers, including a senior army officer, have been killed in a confrontation with Chinese soldiers along their disputed frontier high in the Himalayas where thousands of troops on both sides have been facing off for over a month, the Indian army said. The army said in a statement Tuesday, June 16, 2020, that a "violent faceoff" took place in Galwan valley in the Ladakh region on Monday night "with casualties on both sides." (AP Photo/Manish Swarup, File)
"In 2015, the then-prime minister changed their fundamental policy to allow for what's called collective self-defense," Maher explained. "Up until then, the operational planning … was very restricted because they could only do what's called individual self-defense, which means they were limited purely to actions to defend Japan."
The "collective defense" measure qualifies in situations in which Japan faces an "existential crisis," defined in Article 2 of its constitution as "an armed attack against a foreign state that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, and, as a result, threatens Japan’s survival."
"That's a direct attack on Japan, for example, the Taiwan Strait scenario, or a Korean Peninsula scenario," Maher said. "So there's a lot more combined training going on and combined planning going on between the U.S. and Japan."
The largest regional unknown remains India’s stance and alignment in the region: Downer raised concerns over India’s position, saying that it is "still has quite a close relationship with Russia."
"I don't see India as an ally," Downer said. "I see it in the way that I would say that obviously, the United States is our ultimate ally, but I would see Japan as pretty much akin to an ally. India is a like-minded democracy - that's how I would see India," he added, but admitted that "on the China issue, India has been pretty solid politically."
"I think we probably feel their relationship with China and with Russia is a function of history, which isn’t going to change very quickly," Downer said, adding that it remains important to "keep India on our side in terms of dealing with the aggression of Xi Jinping’s regime."
Downer believes that Australia and Japan must continue to build coalitions in the region, such as with Singapore and with Indonesia, who he believes can one day "dominate the region."
Those alliances would add to an already "huge amount" of military force available in the region, with both Australia and Japan boasting considerable support for U.S. military bases. Should China try to make a more aggressive move in the region – such as trying to invade Taiwan – Downer believes the current alliances and military capabilities could rebuff the effort.
"If they tried to take Taiwan, well, it could be fantastically difficult and incredibly expensive in terms of lives lost and equipment destroyed and the impact that would have on it's on China already," he said.
Peter Aitken is a Fox News Digital reporter with a focus on national and global news.
foxnews.com · by Peter Aitken , Laura Taglianetti | Fox News
13. What is the Utility of the Principles of War?
Conclusion:
This essay started with a quote from Maurice de Saxe, implying that no principle of war can truly be defined. This is true from a logical point of view, since strategy, being always concerned with contexts, cannot stand any universal law. However, it does not mean principles of war are useless.
They are always shaped according to one’s perception of the nature of war, strategic culture and understanding of a certain context. When confronted with one another, these principles are great ways to generate critical and creative thinking about deep features of war, and allow strategists a better grasp of what strategy is all about: the combination of means and ideas to reach a certain goal.
Discussing, comparing, and contrasting these principles allows for their progressive internalization into intuition as a useful framework for actual decision-making. This process of internalization is essential in order to be able to readily draw inspiration from these principles, but also to leap away from them when they seem irrelevant to the current situation. In that sense, world chess champion Garry Kasparov was accurate in saying that ‘rules are not as important as their exceptions’ – but it takes a deep understanding and internalization of the rules in order to spot these exceptions.
This relative utility of principles of war, and the fact that conducting warfare is all about continuously breaking these rules when necessary, is perhaps the reason why Napoléon never made a formal list of the principles behind his understanding of the art of war. He encompassed, however, the importance of imagination. And it is also by imagining new principles for new contexts that, eventually, we develop a better awareness of the strategic issues of tomorrow and how we can work our way through them.
What is the Utility of the Principles of War? - Military Strategy Magazine
Baptiste Alloui-Cros - King's College London, Department of War Studies
In the preface of ‘Mes Rêveries’, Marshal Maurice de Saxe states the following: [i]
“War is a science so obscure and imperfect that custom and prejudice confirmed by ignorance are its sole foundation and support; all other sciences are established upon fixed principles… while this alone remains destitute.”
However, this belief is a stand-alone in the Age of Enlightenment, a time in which it was commonly believed that war, just like any other domain, must surely obey some laws and scientific principles. Besides, this quest for the principles of war did not spare other eras. From Sun Tzu and Xenophon to Fuller and Foch, an abundant literature in strategic thought offers various perspectives on what these principles might be and how many can we account for.
One can wonder, however, what utility these principles have for the strategist when there are so many. Indeed, no two wars are alike, and in the absence of fixed principles of war, the precepts provided by some famous strategic thinkers in an older era within a completely different context would hardly seem to have any relevance in a present-day conflict.
Then why are we still producing principles of war and what are they for? How can they be of any use to the strategist?
I argue that while there are no fixed principles of war but rather an infinite multiplicity of principles, depending on the era, author, strategic culture and context; it is neither their number nor even their content that matters most.
The utility of the principles of war lies in their confrontation with one another, fostering innovation. Their strength, indeed, is conditional, and “they are only useful once we understand how relative they are”.[ii]
Consequently, they are mostly ways for the strategist to feed his intuition. They allow him to internalize features, deepen his expertise and improve his judgement. But the strategist needs to be aware of the relativity of those concepts and understand what their practical assumptions are. Thus, it is all about how these principles are delivered and how they are understood.
In this essay, I first look at the principles of war themselves, where they come from and how they are reflective of different understandings of war. Then, I argue that only their confrontation with one another can lead to a useful reflection for the strategist. Finally, I show that this phase of internalization of knowledge into the strategist’s own intuition is what is really at stake regarding the principles of war, since strategy is, first and foremost, an art of synthesis.
The Principles of War
The search for principles governing the phenomenon of war is a long historical journey. We can dissociate, however, different approaches depending on one’s understanding of the nature of war. One of these approaches is to consider war as a science, obeying a clear set of laws and fixed principles. Principles, in this case, are axioms that act as general laws and rules, applicable to any conflict. This approach was especially fashionable during the 18th and 19th centuries, starting with the works of French marshals such as the marquis of Puységur, Folard, Joly de Maizeroy and Guibert.[iii] War was then sometimes merely considered as a branch of applied physics and mathematics. This perspective on war reached its pinnacle with the works of the Welsh general Henry Lloyd and Prussian theorist von Bülow[iv], aiming to completely erase the role of chance and hazard in the conduct of warfare. Jomini, although moderating their excesses, would greatly inspire himself from these theories by presenting war through a geometrical lens and believing in fixed principles.[v]
The legacy of these authors goes a long way, and the quest for a scientific understanding of war remained an attractive idea. Indeed, in 1926, British officer J.F.C Fuller categorized nine principles of war that highly influenced the current military doctrine of the United States[vi] and the United Kingdom[vii] : objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity.[viii] In France, Marshal Foch posited three principles that are still constitutive of the French military doctrine: concentration of force, economy of force and freedom of action.[ix]
But these principles are, in many aspects, arbitrary. Fuller’s own principles went from six, to eight, to nineteen, to nine over the years. Despite some consistency from one country to another, these disparate principles simply reflect a particular understanding of the world and most importantly in the case of doctrines, a specific strategic culture.
For instance, Chinese principles of war differ considerably from western ones. Relying on the works of two PLA colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui,[x] its doctrine puts considerable emphasis on alternative methods to conventional confrontation. It also relies on a Confucian strategic culture which puts typical emphasis on indirect approaches to a problem.
Consequently, principles of war are never fixed, and their refinement is continuous. They always depend on a certain understanding of war situated within a specific context. Principles of war devised by Brodie, Sokolovski or Morgenthau regarding nuclear warfare obviously differ from principles of war devised by Mao Tse Tsung for revolutionary warfare. The same goes for Liddell Hart’s principles for indirect warfare or Ludendorff’s principles for total warfare.
New phenomena such as conflicts in the cyber domain, outer space, the rise of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and hybrid warfare potentially call for new principles which do not make previous principles of war irrelevant, but simply account for a change in context.[xi]
In that way, Robert Leonhard fails to understand, while making a very interesting suggestion of new principles for the information age[xii], that principles of war are nothing else than a demonstration that, as Clausewitz stated, ‘war is a chameleon’.[xiii] The introduction of new principles is useful not because they are better than older ones – after all, they are subject to the same biases and arbitrariness – but because the contrast they bring with the older ones is thought-provoking. Most importantly, it is not stubborn adherence to the principles that makes them useful and helpful. Adhering to fixed principles would likely reduce the engagement of the strategist with other principles and partially blind his understanding of war. I shall now argue why the utility of these principles lies in their confrontation.
Confronting principles and the essence of strategy
If strategy shall be considered as a science, then it can only be “a science of accident” according to the Aristotelian sense of the term.[xiv] It means strategy is entirely dependent on the context and the project it serves. As a theory of action, strategy combines every available idea to arrive at concrete conclusions. Consequently, it is the creative confrontation of ideas that allows the strategist to devise innovative ways to reach his goals. This is why French general V. Desportes calls strategy “the art of synthesis”.[xv]
Principles of war are useful ways to frame general concepts, ideas and features regarding the nature and conduct of war. But because strategy is all about contexts, it does not stand any universal truth. This is why the strategist cannot make use of a single set of principles of war, since they will never accurately account for the particular context of the war he will have to lead. He must confront various sets of principles; understand the tensions between them and what kind of conclusions they lead to. There is no systemic way to do it, and these confrontations will yield different conclusions for every individual. Indeed, “our knowledge and understanding of warfare is a science, but the conduct of war itself is largely an art.”[xvi] Confronting principles leads to innovative thought. Principles are thus mostly pretexts for discussion and creative thinking. Since strategy is an art where one must constantly come up with new ideas and solutions to new problems, principles of war constitute a very efficient intellectual tool in times of peace to think about these problems.
But the strategist does also make use of theoretical principles whilst conducting war. Chess, as a strategy game whose nature as a science or an art was long debated, is a perfect example of this. Our knowledge and understanding of the game of chess can be considered as a science but playing a good game of chess is definitely an art. Chess principles are numerous, and they evolve over time as we understand the game better, for instance thanks to AIs such as AlphaZero.[xvii] Throughout the course of a game, these theoretical principles come in and out of use. But it is not the player who has picked the best set of principles before entering the game who wins, but rather the one who is able to confront them through the course of the game and follow the ones most adapted to the situation on the board. Indeed, there are times when two good general principles, such as keeping a healthy pawn structure or developing pieces on active squares, come into conflict and the player must choose between them. By confronting them according to the unique necessities of the situation, he can make the right choice. In the conduct of war, the same thing happens. For instance, Fuller’s principles are interesting, but because resources are always limited it is never possible to maximize all of them: you have to make trade-offs. It is only by confronting the principles according to the situation on the ground that the strategist might be able to make the best decisions. All the value of the principles of war comes from this confrontation.
The form to leave the form: Internalization & Intuition
This essay so far has focused on the necessity of confronting principles in order to make use of them in actual action. But it must also take into account that in the conduct of a war, the time available to make a decision is extremely limited, and this process of confronting principles has to be quick. Principles, for this reason, were quickly ruled out as an efficient tactical device for US military personnel, and the top brass moved instead toward processes and systems of system analysis in order to teach decision-making to its military commanders.
The example of the OODA loop, developed by US Air Force colonel John Boyd, is a good instance of these methods.[xviii] It aims to unify the contextual character of warfare and the need to act quickly with the theoretical tools the strategist is provided with and its own singularity. The OODA loop consists of a phase of observation (context), orientation (theory + singularity), decision and action.
In this loop, we can posit that principles of war are still part of the elements in the ‘orientation phase’ that will lead the strategist to a synthetic assessment of the situation so that he can make a decision. They are being internalized into a large number of components that together constitute the strategist’s intuition. It is this internalization process that ultimately matters in order to assess the utility of principles of war. Indeed, as long as those remain distant theoretical concepts, they will never be truly taken into account in the orientation process. In ‘The Art of Learning’, chess master and martial art champion Josh Waitzkin suggests that a central aspect of high-level performance success is to be able to internalize complex knowledge and principles deeply enough so that one can access it without thinking about it.[xix] It then becomes part of one’s intuition and can thus be used effectively and efficiently in any context. He calls this process of internalization into intuition ‘to learn the form to leave the form’.[xx] Principles of war are no different: we learn about them to leap away from them.
Principles of war can hardly be useful to the strategist if he cannot have a practical grasp of them first. The problem is that at times of peace, there is no way to really experience the true utility of these principles and get a natural understanding of them. This is why it matters all the more to actively place principles in confrontation with each other, instead of simply learning how they apply in theory one after the other. The fact of thinking about these principles, why one sounds more appealing than another, confronting them while analysing a historical or fictional situation, or even better, using them directly while playing wargames, allows for a more intimate understanding of them and of their potential uses. This is a very personal process, and it requires an active engagement before these principles can be internalized and be used in a practical situation. Thus, I assert that doctrines are not of any use if they remain abstract references and distant guides for action. They are only useful when put in comparison with each other, especially with a potential adversary. To quote German historian Hans Delbrück, “since everything is uncertain and relative in times of war, strategic actions cannot come from doctrines, they come from the depth of one’s character”.[xxi]
Ultimately, principles of war are what we make out of them. Some principles will have greater resonance in some minds than others. Blind adherence to any set of principles will lead to the worst results. What matters is not their content, but the thoughts and reactions these principles provoke. As such, they can be an excellent starting point for deeper intellectual investigation of some features of war, and eventually improve one’s natural understanding of the conduct of war. Once internalized, they can prove to provide a useful unconscious mental framework in order to find creative solutions to a specific problem. Their whole point, in the end, is to provide the strategist with a better-nuanced intuition when the time comes to make difficult decisions.
Conclusion
This essay started with a quote from Maurice de Saxe, implying that no principle of war can truly be defined. This is true from a logical point of view, since strategy, being always concerned with contexts, cannot stand any universal law. However, it does not mean principles of war are useless.
They are always shaped according to one’s perception of the nature of war, strategic culture and understanding of a certain context. When confronted with one another, these principles are great ways to generate critical and creative thinking about deep features of war, and allow strategists a better grasp of what strategy is all about: the combination of means and ideas to reach a certain goal.
Discussing, comparing, and contrasting these principles allows for their progressive internalization into intuition as a useful framework for actual decision-making. This process of internalization is essential in order to be able to readily draw inspiration from these principles, but also to leap away from them when they seem irrelevant to the current situation. In that sense, world chess champion Garry Kasparov was accurate in saying that ‘rules are not as important as their exceptions’ – but it takes a deep understanding and internalization of the rules in order to spot these exceptions.
This relative utility of principles of war, and the fact that conducting warfare is all about continuously breaking these rules when necessary, is perhaps the reason why Napoléon never made a formal list of the principles behind his understanding of the art of war. He encompassed, however, the importance of imagination. And it is also by imagining new principles for new contexts that, eventually, we develop a better awareness of the strategic issues of tomorrow and how we can work our way through them.
References
[i] Saxe de, Maurice. Reveries, or Memoirs Concerning the Art of War: To Which Is Annexed His Treatise Concerning Legions. Forgotten Books, 2018
[ii] Desportes, Vincent. “Quels Principes Pour La Guerre ?” DSI (Défense et Sécurité Internationale), no. 131 (2017): 80–83.
[iii] Chastenet de, J-F, marquis de Puységur. Art de la guerre, par principes et par règles. Paris, 1748.
[iv] Speelman, J. Patrick. Henry Lloyd & the Military Enlightment of 18th century Europe, Praeger, 2002
[v] Jomini, Antoine-Henri de. Précis de l'art de la guerre. Tempus Perrin, 2008
[vi] Doctrine for Joint Operations, US DoD, Washington D.C., 2001
[vii] Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 (4th Edition), British Defence Doctrine, UK MoD, London, 2011.
[viii] Fuller, J. F. C. The Foundations of the Science of War. Hutchinson, London, 1926
[ix] Foch, Ferdinand. The Principles Of War (1903). Kessinger Publishing, 2007
[x] Liang, Q., & Xiangsui, W. Unrestricted warfare. Beijing, CN: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House Arts, 1999
[xi] Hoffman, F. G, “Hybrid warfare and challenges”, Washington DC Institution for National Strategic Studies, 2009
[xii] Leonhard, Robert. The principles of war for the information age. Presidio Press, 2009.
[xiii] von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, New York: Knopf, 1993.
[xiv] Aristote. Ethique à Eudème, Paris, Vrin, coll. « Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques », 1997
[xv] Desportes; Vincent. La Guerre probable : Penser autrement, Paris, Economica, coll.« Stratégies et Doctrines », 2007
[xvi] Vego, Milan. “Science vs. the Art of War” Joint Force Quarterly , no 66, 3rd Quarter (2012)
[xvii] See on this topic : Sadler, Matthew and Regan, Natasha. Game Changer : AlphaZero’s Groundbreaking Chess Strategies and the Promise of AI. New in Chess, 2019
[xviii] Coram, Robert. Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War. Back Bay Books, 2004.
[xix] Waitzkin, Josh. The Art Of Learning: A Journey in the Pursuit of Excellence. S & S International, 2008
[xx] See also : https://theartoflearningproject.org/resources/advanced-learning/numbers-to-leave-numbers/
[xxi] Delbrück, Hans. History of the Art of War in the Framework of Political History, Vol.IV: The Modern Era, tr. Walter Renfroe, Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1991
14. China claims successful anti-ballistic missile interceptor test
China claims successful anti-ballistic missile interceptor test
Updated 0820 GMT (1620 HKT) June 20, 2022
CNN · by Jessie Yeung, CNN
Seoul, South Korea (CNN)China successfully conducted an anti-ballistic missile test on Sunday night, according to the country's Defense Ministry, part of ongoing military efforts to enhance the country's defensive capabilities.
It was a land-based mid-course missile tested within China's borders, the ministry said in a brief statement, adding the test was defensive in nature and not targeted against any country.
Anti-ballistic missile systems are meant to shield a country from potential attacks by using projectiles to intercept incoming missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Some analysts liken it to shooting down a bullet with another bullet.
This marks China's sixth known test of a land-based anti-ballistic missile, according to state-run tabloid Global Times. The country has been conducting such tests since 2010, typically holding them every few years.
Before Sunday, China last launched an anti-ballistic missile test in February 2021, according to state media.
"China is planning to build a multilayered missile defense system which consists of several components," said Tong Zhao, senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
These efforts aim to tackle short-range, medium-range and long-range missiles; so far, China has developed the HQ9 and HQ19 missile defense systems for the first two, and has not yet publicly announced the development of a system that can intercept longer-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles, Zhao said.
It's unclear which system was tested on Sunday, as Chinese officials didn't release any further information.
But gauging by the size of the closed airspace, it could have been the medium-range HQ19, similar to the US' Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, or a different new mid-course system, Zhao said.
It looks similar to the "hit-to-kill" missiles the US has been using, he added, referring to technology that allows the interceptor to hit and completely destroy incoming threats.
The test comes amid rising tensions in the region, with a recent spate of missile tests from North Korea including short-range ballistic missiles and a presumed ICBM. South Korean and US officials have also warned that renewed activity at North Korea's nuclear test site suggests the country could conduct a nuclear test any day -- its first since 2017.
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, who took office in May, has vowed to take a tougher stance on North Korea -- and suggested he would seek to install a second anti-ballistic missile system.
In 2016, when South Korea announced it would deploy the US-built THAAD system, it sparked a year-long diplomatic feud with China, which argued the missile defense system would jeopardize its own national security.
THAAD is designed to shoot down short, medium and intermediate ballistic missiles and is used by the US military to protect units in places like Guam and Hawaii.
Despite its criticism of South Korea's use of THAAD, China has good reason to develop its own missile shield program, said Zhao.
"China just cannot let itself lag behind in this important area of military technological competition," he said. "China is looking at other major powers. US is the primary concern, but Russia is also developing increasingly capable missile defense technologies."
And though North Korea's missile testing has alarmed South Korea and Western observers, Beijing's friendly relationship with the North means it is likely more concerned about other threats -- such as from India, with which it shares long-simmering border tensions, and the US, which has deployed military assets in the region close to China.
Earlier in May, China criticized the United States for deploying medium-range ballistic missiles in the Asia Pacific region, saying it made a "gravely negative impact" on international arms control.
CNN · by Jessie Yeung, CNN
15. Why this tiny island in the Pacific may be ground zero in a war with China
Why this tiny island in the Pacific may be ground zero in a war with China
If China’s leaders thought a war with the United States was inevitable, they would be tempted to strike first.
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Stacie Pettyjohn, a defense strategy and wargaming expert, said that most of the wargames involving a Chinese invasion of Taiwan that she has led have begun with the team playing China attacking American bases on Guam and elsewhere in the Pacific to prevent the U.S. military from bringing significant combat power to the early stages of the fight.
“The opening big blow is in line with Chinese military doctrine – its counter-intervention strategy – in terms of seizing the offensive and also just trying to launch a knockout blow in the opening phases of a fight,” said Pettyjohn, director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security think tank in Washington, D.C.
Guam, which is more than 1,700 miles from Taiwan, is home to Andersen Air Force Base, where B-52 bombers deploy on a rotational basis; as well as Naval Base Guam Navy Base in Apra Harbor, where several submarines are homeported. The island has been part of the United States since becoming a territory in 1898.
In 2020, China’s air force released a video showing one of its nuclear-capable H-6 bombers launching a simulated cruise missile strike against an airfield with the same layout as Andersen Air Force Base.
Recognizing the threat posed by China, the U.S. military has started to strengthen its defenses on Guam, where the Defense Department has committed more than $11 billion in military construction over the next five years. The Missile Defense Agency has also reportedly asked Congress for $539 million to protect the island from Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles as well as hypersonic weapons.
Pettyjohn has run Pentagon-sponsored wargames both at CNAS and the RAND Corporation since 2014. In Taiwan scenarios, the team playing China typically hits Guam with a massive barrage of ballistic and cruise missiles armed with submunitions to take out Andersen Air Force Base – and possibly the U.S. airfield on the island of Tinian that is being expanded – and then H-6 bombers fire their long-range cruise missiles to sink ships in Apra Harbor and attack fuel storage facilities, she said. Then they launch follow-up attacks on Guam to prevent the U.S. military engineers from repairing damage to airfields and other installations.
“There are concerns about escalation and hitting U.S. territory,” Pettyjohn told Task & Purpose. “Most of the red teams [enemy forces] recognize that, and many of them do typically assume that the United States will intervene on the side of Taiwan. The operational advantages of destroying key American bases and logistics nodes, in particular those on Guam, outweigh the risks.”
The Island of Guam, located in the North Pacific Ocean and an unincorporated United States territory on February 10, 2015 (Photo by USGS/NASA Landsat data/Orbital Horizon Gallo Images/Getty Images)
In these games, the teams playing China have typically been skeptical that the United States would respond to a conventional attack with nuclear weapons, Pettyjohn said. Many experts also believe that China is increasing its stockpile of nuclear weapons to deter a U.S. nuclear response to an attack on Guam, she said.
While a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is often cited as the likeliest scenario that would lead to war with the United States, it is worth noting that the law governing the U.S. government’s relationship with Taiwan does not obligate the United States to come to the island’s nation’s defense if such an invasion occurs. Instead, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act says that “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes is considered a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.”
The president would also have to work with Congress to determine the “appropriate action in response to any such danger,” the law says.
However, President Joe Biden briefly upended more than 40 years of strategic ambiguity when a reporter asked him in May if he was willing to intervene militarily to defend Taiwan and he replied, “Yes,” and, “That’s the commitment we made.” Biden’s aides quickly stepped in to say the U.S. government’s policy towards Taiwan had not changed.
It is possible that China could avoid striking U.S. military bases if it is convinced that the United States will not defend Taiwan, said Timothy Heath, a senior international defense researcher at the RAND Corporation.
But if Chinese leaders are convinced that the United States will not stay out of a war over Taiwan, they would give their military commanders a free hand to attack U.S. military bases on Guam to and elsewhere to achieve victory, Heath told Task & Purpose.
“I think that if they are convinced Americans are in the war; they’re going to fight, and they’re bringing a lot of equipment and weaponry to the fight; it would be difficult for the Chinese leaders to resist the idea of knocking out as much military capability as possible in the opening salvos before they can get into the fight,” Heath said. “And, of course, there is a concertation of U.S. assets Guam — they’re exposed and vulnerable — it could be very tempting and difficult for the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] to resist requesting authorization to strike those facilities.”
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Jeff Schogol is the senior Pentagon reporter for Task & Purpose. He has covered the military for 15 years. You can email him at schogol@taskandpurpose.com, direct message @JeffSchogol on Twitter, or reach him on WhatsApp and Signal at 703-909-6488. Contact the author here.
16. 50 Cognitive Biases in the Modern World
A potentially useful tool. Very interesting explanations.
Please go to the link to view the graphics and the proper formatting of the article.
50 Cognitive Biases in the Modern World
Cognitive biases are widely accepted as something that makes us human.
Every day, systematic errors in our thought process impact the way we live and work. But in a world where everything we do is changing rapidly—from the way we store information to the way we watch TV—what really classifies as rational thinking?
It’s a question with no right or wrong answer, but to help us decide for ourselves, today’s infographic from TitleMax lists 50 cognitive biases that we may want to become privy to.
In the name of self-awareness, here’s a closer look at three recently discovered biases that we are most prone to exhibiting in the modern world.
Automation Bias
AI-infused applications are becoming incredibly good at “personalizing” our content, but will there come a time when we let algorithms make all of our decisions?
Automation bias refers to the tendency to favor the suggestions of automated systems.
Take Netflix, for example. Everything we see on the platform is the result of algorithms—even the preview images that are generated. Then, to harness the power of data and machine learning, Netflix categorizes its content into tens of thousands of micro-genres. Pairing these genre tags with a viewer’s history allows them to assign several of over 2,000 “taste profiles” to each user.
And while there’s nothing wrong with allowing Netflix to guide what we watch, there’s an enormous sea of content standing by. Estimates from 2015 claimed it would take nearly four years to watch all of Netflix’s content. Thousands more hours of content have since been added.
If we want to counter this cognitive bias, finding a new favorite series on platforms like Netflix may require some good old-fashioned human curiosity.
The Google Effect
Also known as “digital amnesia”, the aptly named Google Effect describes our tendency to forget information that can be easily accessed online.
First described in 2011 by Betsy Sparrow (Columbia University) and her colleagues, their paper described the results of several memory experiments involving technology.
In one experiment, participants typed trivia statements into a computer and were later asked to recall them. Half believed the statements were saved, and half believed the statements were erased. The results were significant: participants who assumed they could look up their statements did not make much effort to remember them.
Because search engines are continually available to us, we may often be in a state of not feeling we need to encode the information internally. When we need it, we will look it up.
– Sparrow B, et al. Science 333, 777 (2011)
Our modern brains appear to be re-prioritizing the information we hold onto. Notably, the study doesn’t suggest we’re becoming less intelligent—our ability to learn offline remains the same.
The IKEA Effect
Identified in 2011 by Michael Norton (Harvard Business School) and his colleagues, this cognitive bias refers to our tendency to attach a higher value to things we help create.
Combining the Ikea Effect with other related traits, such as our willingness to pay a premium for customization, is a strategy employed by companies seeking to increase the intrinsic value that we attach to their products.
For instance, American retailer Build-A-Bear Workshop is anchored around creating a highly interactive customer experience. With the help of staff, children (or adults) can assemble their stuffed animals from scratch, then add clothing and accessories at extra cost.
Nike also incorporates this bias into its offering. The footwear company offers a Nike By You line of customizable products, where customers pay a premium to design bespoke shoes with an extensive online configurator.
While there’s nothing necessarily wrong with our susceptibility to the Ikea Effect, understanding its significance may help us make more appropriate decisions as consumers.
What Can We Do?
As we navigate an increasingly complex world, it’s natural for us to unconsciously adopt new patterns of behavior.
Becoming aware of our cognitive biases, and their implications, can help us stay on the right course.
17. How Grassroots Censorship Threatens the American Experiment
Our daughter just started graduate school for her master's in teaching. This has often been a subject of discussion for us.
Excerpts:
The Supreme Court has put the challenge well. In a 1982 case called Island Trees Union Free School District v. Pico, the Court noted that educators should preserve access to even controversial ideas to prepare students for “active and effective participation in the pluralistic, often contentious society in which they will soon be adult members.”
Note the phrase often contentious. Pluralism cannot exist without contention. To teach students otherwise—through words and deeds—is to teach against America’s founding ideals.
This does not mean that no standards or limits should apply. Some students are too young for real debate, and some ideas are too big for small children. But students who begin their educational lives struggling to stand in a straight line end the process as adults voting in the elections that decide the leadership of the most powerful nation in the history of the world.
If we use that years-long process to train children to believe that dissenting ideas and perspectives are a cause for concern rather than an opportunity for conversation, we’re training them to reject American liberty and instead seek American conformity. But conformity creates a false unity. It’s rooted in fear and breeds frustration. It’s inherently destabilizing.
Yet that’s exactly the goal of punitive parents. Their aspiration is power. Their weapons are fragility and fear. And if they control American education, then they can ultimately shake the cultural and political foundations of the American republic itself.
How Grassroots Censorship Threatens the American Experiment
With Teachers Under Fire, Parents Are Teaching Kids the Wrong Lessons
By David French
JUNE 20, 2022
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I remember the time a teacher called me a “patriotic monkey.” In class. She was progressive, I’m conservative, and we were fighting over the Cold War. I was in ninth or 10th grade (it was early high school). This was the middle of the Reagan era, when tensions with the Soviet Union were at the breaking point.
She blurted out her insult in the middle of a heated discussion over the possibility of a Third World War. I wasn’t advocating for conflict with the Soviets, but I argued that we shouldn’t shy away from greater confrontation. I’ve remembered the moment all these years not because I was hurt but because it was funny—and because it demonstrated how emotions can get the best of us in an argument.
It didn't occur to me to complain to my parents. Nor did it cross my mind to complain to the principal. And I definitely did not even consider trying to get her fired. While she shouldn’t have insulted me, we should have grace—even as kids—and retain a larger view of other people’s lives and careers.
Moments like that happen in life, especially when people disagree, and a fundamental aspect of American education should be learning how to handle difficult conversations—even when they’re not conducted particularly well. In reality, moments like that sharpened me. They made me learn (I didn’t want to lose the fight!), and they prepared me for exactly the life I lead, a life immersed in the battle over ideas.
I bring up this story because of two vitally important reports—one in The Washington Post and the other by ProPublica—that illustrates what happens when parents take the opposite approach, when they reject disagreement, discourage free expression, and lead campaigns to fire dissenting teachers. The Post’s report begins like this:
A Florida teacher lost her job for hanging a Black Lives Matter flag over her classroom door and rewarding student activism. A Massachusetts teacher was fired for posting a video denouncing critical race theory. A teacher in Missouri got the ax for assigning a worksheet about privilege — and still another, in California, was fired for criticizing mask mandates on her Facebook page.
They were among more than 160 educators who were either fired or resigned their jobs in the past two academic years due to the culture wars that are roiling many of the nation’s schools, according to a Washington Post analysis of news reports. On average, slightly more than two teachers lost their jobs for every week that school remained in session.
The tally—based on combing through news reports and social-media feeds—is certainly an undercount. We can’t presume that every firing or resignation resulted in a public discussion prominent enough to catch the Post’s eye. It also demonstrates the extent to which cancel culture is a bipartisan problem. Of the 74 terminations the Post found, schools fired 31 teachers for upholding traditionally conservative beliefs and 31 for upholding traditionally liberal beliefs (12 were unknown).
The ProPublica report is a deep dive into a grassroots campaign against an educator named Cecilia Lewis, who was forced to quit her job before she could even start after a hysterical school-board meeting at the height of the anti-CRT panic, a meeting where a man stood and screamed at the school board, “We’re going to hunt you down.”
While I believe that parents should be deeply engaged in the education of their children—regardless of where they’re educated—punitive parental uprisings teach their children exactly the wrong lessons and corrupt a core purpose of American education.
First, punitive parents are teaching children to appeal to authority when they’re upset by ideas, rather than engage with the ideas themselves. When we teach children from the earliest ages until they’re 18 that exposure to a contrary idea—even an upsetting idea—is a cause for complaint, then we’re preparing them to mimic that same behavior in college and beyond.
We’re training them that fragility is a path to power. That their hurt feelings can trigger immediate action and real-world change. And that, perversely, learning a degree of stoicism and toughness achieves nothing in the short term.
Second, punitive parents are teaching children to see their political opponents as inherently untrustworthy and problematic. Whenever I object to firing or disciplining teachers for expressing political opinions, I always get the same response: “Can we trust them to grade fairly?” But is there any evidence that they have graded unfairly, or is that a presumption based on a prejudice against people who disagree?
Actual evidence of ideologically biased grading should be grounds for discipline (I once filed a lawsuit after an activist professor refused to grade a Christian student’s paper and wrote, “Ask God what your grade is”), but evidence that a teacher possesses an ideology is not the same thing as evidence that they possess bias against dissenting students. Many of my best teachers (at all levels of schooling) disagreed with me vocally and profoundly.
Third, punitive parents are helping raise the temperature of American politics to the boiling point. If you teach generations of Americans to appeal to authority in the face of disagreement and that their political opponents are inherently suspect, then attaining and holding political power is of paramount importance. After all, what good is an appeal to authority for emotional redress if the authority is politically hostile? And if political disagreement is evidence of a character defect, then how can you possibly trust any politician of the opposing party?
Under this formulation, both your fundamental liberties and your sense of belonging are directly related to the extent of your cultural and political power. This spirit directly contradicts the principles of American pluralism, which preserves individual and associational liberty so that a variety of American factions and communities can flourish side by side in American life, even if they can’t win elections or dominate corporate boards.
Fourth, punitive parents are forsaking a core purpose of American education. There is a reason we often refer to this country as the “American experiment.” There simply isn’t much historical precedent for a continent-size, multiethnic, multifaith, pluralistic democratic republic. Achieving a combination of unity, liberty, and prosperity across so much difference is hard. It takes intentional effort, and that effort should be embedded within American education from top to bottom.
The Supreme Court has put the challenge well. In a 1982 case called Island Trees Union Free School District v. Pico, the Court noted that educators should preserve access to even controversial ideas to prepare students for “active and effective participation in the pluralistic, often contentious society in which they will soon be adult members.”
Note the phrase often contentious. Pluralism cannot exist without contention. To teach students otherwise—through words and deeds—is to teach against America’s founding ideals.
This does not mean that no standards or limits should apply. Some students are too young for real debate, and some ideas are too big for small children. But students who begin their educational lives struggling to stand in a straight line end the process as adults voting in the elections that decide the leadership of the most powerful nation in the history of the world.
If we use that years-long process to train children to believe that dissenting ideas and perspectives are a cause for concern rather than an opportunity for conversation, we’re training them to reject American liberty and instead seek American conformity. But conformity creates a false unity. It’s rooted in fear and breeds frustration. It’s inherently destabilizing.
Yet that’s exactly the goal of punitive parents. Their aspiration is power. Their weapons are fragility and fear. And if they control American education, then they can ultimately shake the cultural and political foundations of the American republic itself.
18. Greitens slammed for ‘RINO hunting’ campaign ad
So I had a twitter engagement with someone last evening about this. the person made the claim that this is an indication of how special operators believe they can act with impunity with no concern for accountability. He made these claims among others.
Nothing is monocausal, but it's not an accident that he invokes being a SEAL and makes a video drawing on that imagery.
I'm not saying everyone in SOF is bad or like this; I am saying that lack of oversight and hero worship culture has had negative ramifications for some.
Short version: lack of oversight creates an entitled culture where members increasingly feel they can act with impunity.
Here's the thing: it's not just a *lack* of oversight. It's officials being far too deferential and starstruck by SOF instead of exercising oversight. I've read or watched every post-9/11 SOF testimony to Congress and interviewed dozens on the Hill.
And I think as compared to conventional forces, yes, more in SOF think they can get away with things because they will be "dealt with internally" etc. I don't think that's even a controversial statement.
Again- I'm not saying this is true for 100% of SOF, but it is for too many
And others piled on.
But one person sent this video about Greitens which provides information about his military and government experience.
Greitens has also created an entirely false image of his military service in order to chase fame and power.
16 SEALs who served with him, commanded him, or are currently serving in the SEALs made this video to reveal his dishonesty to the public.
Greitens slammed for ‘RINO hunting’ campaign ad
Updated June 20, 2022 at 5:57 p.m. EDT|Published June 20, 2022 at 2:09 p.m. EDT
Former Missouri governor Eric Greitens, a Republican candidate for Senate, is being widely criticized after releasing a campaign ad Monday that shows him pretending to hunt down members of his own party.
“Today we’re goin’ RINO hunting,” Greitens announces in the video, using the acronym for the derisive phrase “Republicans in Name Only.”
In the ad, Greitens stands outside a home with a team of others dressed in tactical gear and whispers: “The RINO feeds on corruption and is marked by the stripes of cowardice.”
The tactical team then busts open the door, detonates smoke bombs inside and storms through with their guns drawn.
“Join the MAGA crew. Get a RINO hunting permit,” Greitens says, standing inside an apparently empty house surrounded by smoke. “There’s no bagging limit, no tagging limit and it doesn’t expire — until we save our country.”
The ad was posted Monday morning to various social media accounts belonging to Greitens and his Senate campaign.
The video was removed from Facebook “for violating our policies prohibiting violence and incitement,” according to Facebook spokesman Andy Stone, but the video remained on Twitter and YouTube as of early Monday afternoon.
“While this video does not violate our Community Guidelines, it is not monetizing nor running as an ad,” YouTube spokeswoman Ivy Choi said.
About four hours after Greitens posted the video, Twitter placed a warning label over the tweet, saying it “violated the Twitter Rules about abusive behavior.” However, Twitter has left the video up with a message that the company “determined that it may be in the public’s interest for the Tweet to remain accessible.”
The ad comes amid a spate of political violence and threats against public officials, as well as a general environment of vitriol within conservative circles between those who believe former president Donald Trump’s baseless claims that the 2020 election was rigged and those in the GOP who have spoken out against those claims.
The Washington Post last year tracked how election administrators in at least 17 states received threats of violence in the months after the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol, often sparked directly by comments from Trump.
On Sunday, Rep. Adam Kinzinger (R-Ill.) shared that his wife had received a letter in the mail threatening to execute his family, including their 5-month-old baby. Kinzinger is one of 10 Republicans who broke with their party last year and voted to impeach Trump, and has since been criticized by Trump and his allies as a “RINO.”
Kinzinger has also drawn vitriol from Republican voters and members of his own party for being one of two GOP lawmakers to serve on the House select committee investigating the Jan. 6 attack.
“There is violence in the future, I’m going to tell you,” Kinzinger said on ABC’s “This Week” on Sunday, speaking about the death threats he and others have received. “And until we get a grip on telling people the truth, we can’t expect any differently.”
Greitens’s campaign ad also comes after high-profile mass shootings, including at a Buffalo grocery store May 14, where 10 people were killed, and in Uvalde, Tex., where 19 children and two teachers were killed at Robb Elementary School on May 24. Those and other shootings prompted protests across the country against gun violence and have sparked some bipartisan conversations in Congress about gun safety legislation.
The ad was swiftly criticized by those who warned that Greitens’s video could lead to real-world violence.
“This is sociopathic,” tweeted Rep. Joaquin Castro (D-Tex.). “You’re going to get someone killed.”
The Democratic National Committee’s chairman, Jaime Harrison, called the video “radical.. extreme... unhinged.” Former congressman Joe Walsh, who left the Republican Party over his criticisms of Trump, said he was not surprised by the ad and called out those in the GOP who still supported Trump.
“To every Republican today who’s thinking about criticizing this ad: You cannot criticize this & still support Trump,” Walsh tweeted. “There’s ZERO difference between Eric Greitens & Donald Trump. In fact, your cowardly embrace of Trump directly led to Greitens, and [Marjorie Taylor] Greene, and [Lauren] Boebert, and…”
Others pointed out Greitens’s own history of violence. A former Navy SEAL, he has been accused by his ex-wife of domestic violence, including physical violence toward their children. He has denied those allegations.
Greitens resigned as governor of Missouri in 2018 in disgrace after an affair with a former hairdresser that included allegations of abuse and blackmail. He launched his campaign for Senate last year after Sen. Roy Blunt (R-Mo.) announced he would retire at the end of his term.
Representatives for the Republican Party, the National Republican Senatorial Committee and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) did not respond to requests for comment.
Cristiano Lima and Rosalind Helderman contributed to this report.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
